

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

VOL. XVII, NO. 8

APRIL 1965

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FOREWORD

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
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C. L. Melson
Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy
President, Naval War College



NAVAL
WAR
COLLEGE
REVIEW

**ISSUED MONTHLY
U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
NEWPORT, R. I.**

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

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PRESIDENT

THE ROLE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL MATERIAL IN LOGISTICS ADMINISTRATION

Remarks of

Rear Admiral R.L. Shifley, USN
Deputy Chief of Naval Material
(Programs and Financial Management)

at the
Naval War College
Newport, Rhode Island
on 9 February 1965

I appreciate the opportunity to offer to this particular audience some views on the Role of the Chief of Naval Material. Wherever your luck and the decisions of the Bureau of Naval Personnel may take you hereafter, I know you will encounter, and recognize, and grapple with, some of the Navy's many logistical problems.

Historical perspective a few decades from now will show, I think, that we are now in an era in which operationally oriented officers of the Navy came to realize more than ever before how closely operational success is tied to success in solving logistical problems. These problems are growing larger every day, and the Navy's capacity to solve them has to grow at the same rate.

I hope that none of you has to learn the importance of logistics the hard way I did some years ago. When I was operations officer of the Sixth Fleet, it was my custom to trust to others the task of computing the Fleet's requirements for black oil. One fine day in the eastern part of the Mediterranean, while over one thousand miles from our source of fuel oil, it came to my attention that all ships were getting low on fuel and both oilers were in our company and practically empty. Before the first oiler reached Pozzuoli, picked up a load of oil and returned to us, most ships were below twenty per cent of capacity. We were practically dead in the water to conserve what little fuel we had left. Needless to say, after that—with the encouragement of the Fleet Commander—I always personally checked the black oil computations and have had a very healthy respect for logistics to this very day. In my present position I feel right at home, because the main role of the Chief of Naval Material consists of solving logistical problems.

* * * * *

Before discussing the role of the Chief of Naval Material in Logistics Administration, I'd like to point out the position of the Chief of Naval Material within the Navy Department.

The Navy has long recognized a need for some sort of central focus and direction in its material organization. In 1941 a Materials Division under the Chief of Naval Operations was organized, to carry on liaison with wartime production agencies and to coordinate material programs within the Department.

In 1942, at the urging of Under Secretary Forrestal, the Materials Division was replaced by the Office of Procurement and Material (OP&M), reporting to the Under Secretary. This office reached a size of 1150 personnel by the end of the war. It performed liaison with other government agencies, coordinated procurement and material support activities, and established uniform procurement practices among the bureaus.

In 1948, the Office of Naval Material was formed by P.L. 432, with responsibility for policy formulation and enforcement in the fields of production, supply, procurement, and contract administration. The Chief of Naval Material had no actual responsibility for material programs. He was responsible for the specific functions of 'procurement policy formulation and enforcement.' He was not, in other words, responsible for the end product or the overall performance of the bureaus. The Chief of Naval Operations, by this same law, was charged with the coordination of bureau efforts in meeting the material needs of the Operating Forces, as provided by the Secretary of the Navy.

But the Chief of Naval Operations' authority was limited to 'coordination under the direction of the Secretary.' The Secretary himself retained most of the authority and responsibility for direction of the bureaus. The authority of the Chief of Naval Operations was limited, and perhaps a little bit nebulous. And while the Secretary had the necessary authority he did not have a staff of sufficient size to take charge of the material and support activities of the Navy. As a result, bureau efforts were neither as centrally directed nor as authoritatively and responsibly coordinated as was often desirable.

This was changed on 2 December 1963, when the Chief of Naval Material was given greatly expanded responsibility within the Department of the Navy. Under the provisions of General Order No. 5 the responsibility of the Chief of Naval Material now

includes the command of most of the material, development, and procurement capacity of the Navy, specifically, the four material bureaus (the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts, the Bureau of Naval Weapons, the Bureau of Yards and Docks, and the Bureau of Ships).

So we see that the Chief of Naval Material, Vice Admiral W.A. Schoech, is in command of, and responsible for, a vast logistics support complex. Admiral Schoech early established a concept or philosophy of operating which is 'to Control but not to Operate.' What does this mean? Basically, it means that the Chief of Naval Material authoritatively coordinates and controls the actions of the material bureaus. At the same time, this philosophy recognizes that it is essential that the Office of Naval Material does not destroy the internal integrity of the material bureaus.

As some of you know, the old Office of Naval Material had a population of about 300. Changing over to our new organization was obviously a complex job. The staffing philosophy was that 'numbers follow function.' In other words, each function was carefully analyzed to insure that it was needed in our new command relationship and to insure that there was no duplication of work being performed in the bureaus. We now have 400 personnel on board, and are authorized to build up to 680. About one out of five of our people are military.

I might remind you of how large and important the functions of the Office of the Chief of Naval Material are, by pointing out just how large a business operation this Naval Material Support Establishment actually is. During the past fiscal year, activities that are a part of the Naval Material Support Establishment spent or obligated 9.7 billion dollars—about 66 per cent of the Navy's budget at that time. Activities supported by the Naval Material Support Establishment had a population of over 360,000 personnel, or roughly 36 per cent of the Navy's total military and civilian roster. The facilities supported by the Naval Material Support Establishment comprised 77 per cent of all those owned by the Navy.

The role of the Chief of Naval Material is essentially similar to that of the head of a large business operation. In accomplishing his responsibilities, he is assisted by a Vice Chief of Naval Material and four Deputy Chiefs. In addition, seven Project Managers report directly to him. These are the managers of the

Fleet Ballistic Missile Program, Surface Missile Systems Project, F-111B or TFX Project, Anti-Submarine Warfare Systems Project, Instrumentation Ships Project, All-Weather Carrier Landing System; and newest of all, Reconnaissance, Electronic Warfare, Special Operations and Naval Intelligence Processing Systems (REWSON). I will have more to say later about project management.

The Chief of Naval Material exercises control of the Naval Material Support Establishment in four functional areas: Planning and Financial Management, Procurement and Logistics Support, Development, and Organization and Management.

In addition to my duties as Vice Chief, I also wear a second hat as Deputy Chief for Programs and Financial Management. (You see how this austere staffing works—I'm not only the executive officer, but also the operations officer. I haven't had so many duties since I was an Ensign.)

The Deputy for Programs and Financial Management combines program and resource control at the staff level. In addition, he has budgeting responsibility, and serves as the prime point of contact for OPNAV's Planning and Programming Office. His office includes a management information organization that collects and presents data upon which appraisals and management decisions can be based.

The Deputy for Development is responsible for supervising the planning, execution and appraisal of the development, test and evaluation programs, and for supervising the research, development, test and evaluation facilities within the Naval Material Support Establishment. He also holds the additional title of Chief of Naval Development. In this capacity, he provides direct staff support to the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research and Development.

The Deputy for Material and Facilities has two basic functions. They are quite different from each other. On the one hand, he has cognizance of the planning, carrying out, and appraising of production, construction and logistic support programs within the Naval Material Support Establishment. On the other hand, he has staff responsibility for carrying out certain 'business policies' of the Department. These include most of the functions of the old office of Naval Material. His policy responsibilities cover such areas as procurement, production, maintenance and supply, and the disposition of material. In addition, he oversees the acquisition, construction, maintenance and disposition of facilities.

Fourth, there is a Deputy Chief for Management and Organization who is responsible for organization, management policies, utilization of man power, administrative facilities, and supporting services within the Naval Material Support Establishment.

There is one other organizational fact which I believe should be emphasized. Creation of the 'new' Chief of Naval Material left the four material bureaus practically unchanged. I think of the Naval Material Support Establishment as a structure built of four strong pillars. The pillars are the four material bureaus. This structure is capped by the Office of the Chief of Naval Material.

No matter how any organization is structured, the final judgment of its worth must be made on the basis of how successful it has been in meeting its commitments. I think that evaluation of the success of the Naval Material Support Establishment, and the Office of the Chief of Naval Material, will have to await the passage of several more years. Time has not yet given us enough perspective to permit a firm or final evaluation. But I am satisfied that we are on the right track and it is a good thing to have one single military authority on the producer side of the house who can take a comprehensive position on material matters. I think that there is no doubt that the support organization is more responsive to the needs of the operating forces than ever before, if only for the reason that there is now one single individual who is accountable for material support to the fleet.

* * * *

Let's look at some of the programs presently underway which illustrate the role of the Chief of Naval Material in carrying out comprehensive actions involving the entire Naval Material Support Establishment.

The Chief of Naval Material, within his responsibility for central direction of the four bureaus, is able to initiate large-scale projects which may be necessary for the overall good of the logistics system. He can authoritatively coordinate the activities of the four bureaus and the Project Managers in carrying out improvements as may become necessary.

Let me cite five cases to illustrate this point: Supplies and Equipment Funding; Allowance List Development; Military Essentiality Coding; Programming and Budgeting; and Aviation Spares. Right now the entire logistics system is receiving the most

thorough scrutiny it has ever received. A number of problems are under study. The problems are related to the functioning of the logistics system, in the face of the demands of increasingly complex weapons systems. These problems are intensified by increasing pressures to provide this better support of the fleet without a proportionate increase in cost.

Although I am going to discuss some of the problems of our logistic system, I don't want you to conclude that the system is basically faulty. It isn't. The Navy has a living, effective logistics system, which operates at a high level of efficiency. Further, the system is getting better all the time. Now let's discuss how it's getting better.

Admiral Ensey reviewed for you last month some of the difficulties which have been encountered in justifying the cost of supplies and equipage. I assure you that every problem which he outlined from the point of view of the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Logistics) applies equally on the producer side of the river. We are grappling not only with the problem of the cost of supplies and equipage, but also with a host of cousins of this problem. For example, allowance lists are being reviewed and techniques are being developed to produce an allowance list which not only insures a high fleet material readiness posture, but one which also can be fully justified at the budget table. By the application of more realistic data factors for determining range and depth of material included in shipboard allowance lists, the overall costs of allowances can be reduced. At the same time supply responsiveness can be increased.

Allowance list revision is one area in which the fleet will soon see the result of actions by the Chief of Naval Material. The Chief of Naval Material's role consisted, in this case, of drawing together interested parties—the several bureaus, and the fleets—to work on a common logistics and funding problem.

Included in the program for revising allowance lists is the determination of whether shipboard systems and components are vital or nonvital to the missions of the ship. The parts must be identified according to their military essentiality. 'Military essentiality' and 'vital/nonvital' are phrases the Navy is going to hear with increasing frequency from now on. If we can't buy all the parts we want, what do we buy first? The essential ones, of course. But only recently has military essentiality been considered fully in establishing shipboard allowances. Needless to

say, every ship has several secondary missions, and eventually the relative importance of all systems and components will have to be determined on a graduated scale reflecting all missions a ship may have to perform.

Today the Military Essentiality Coding project, combined with improved accuracy in selection of allowed parts, looks as though it will help produce a solution to the problem of providing more effective allowance list support, and at less cost.

What can be done with the combination of carefully revised allowance lists and military essentiality coding? Look at the case of the two ships in which the new lists are being evaluated. The ships are *Mullinix* (DD 944) and *Becuna* (SS 319). In the case of *Mullinix*, hand-tailoring the mechanical, electrical and electronic allowance lists resulted in a reduction of about \$57,000 from a total inventory worth about \$300,000, or a cost savings of about one sixth. Aboard *Becuna* (SS 319) the savings were over \$30,000 from a total of \$117,000, and a reduction of 2,391 items from a total of 7,441. Further savings appear possible. This was accomplished without reduction in the ability of the ships to support themselves.

Typically, ships are able to satisfy, from their own store-rooms, between 60% and 80% of their requirements. Also typically, some 92% of allowed items are never used. The expectation is that by careful refinement of allowance lists, ships will be able to fill 90% of their own parts requirements for a period of 90 days. Experience with these ships has indicated that during the next three years the Navy may be able to reduce the total allowance inventory by about 30 million dollars without sacrificing supply readiness. The potential of realizing 30 million dollars is significant when you consider that we began FY 1965 with a supplies and equipage deficiency (based on then existing allowance lists) of 48 million dollars.

You can visualize what this means. If, through better inventory management, we can reduce the 'buy' requirements, and precisely identify what is actually needed, perhaps we can overcome our chronic supplies and equipage funding problem. We can buy more of exactly what we need with the money we save by not buying what we don't need.

Allowance list revision and military essentiality coding are not limited to individual ship allowances. Similar actions are being

taken with Fleet Issue Load Lists for ships of the Mobile Logistics Force, and for overseas and domestic supply points.

In addition to the revision of allowance lists and military essentiality coding a third area, in which you can see the fingerprints of the Chief of Naval Material, is in the programming and budgeting processes of the Navy. In these processes, the Office of Naval Material works closely with the Chief of Naval Operations, the Comptroller of the Navy, and the bureaus, to clarify guidance, eliminate interfaces, isolate problems, and participate in the development of workable solutions.

Perhaps the greatest contribution of the Chief of Naval Material this past year in the programming and budgeting area has been assisting in the refining and improving of programming systems. In conjunction with the bureaus, the Chief of Naval Material has taken an active part in assisting the Chief of Naval Operations in devising improvements to the programming system. Adoption of more workable procedures has enabled the Navy to respond better to the Department of Defense Programming System. The programming system is dynamic, with new changes being introduced continuously. Much more work has to be done to stay on top of this problem.

A fourth area in which the Chief of Naval Material initiated actions which were beyond the capability of any one bureau, relates to the requirements determination and control of aeronautical material. Beginning last March, a study group carried out a thorough review of aeronautical spares and repair parts support for the operating forces of the Navy and Marine Corps. This study group drew together some of the best talent from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Bureau of the Budget, the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, the Headquarters of the Marine Corps, the Office of the Comptroller of the Navy, the Office of Program Appraisal, and the Material Bureaus.

The study indicated that three categories of material were not recognized in procurement actions. These were:

1. Repairables in the 'back side' of the repair cycle (which are valued at \$100,000,000);
2. Material in allowances held by operating units and shore facilities (valued at \$400,000,000), and
3. In-transit items from one stock control point to another (valued at \$100,000,000).

This means that more than a half billion dollars worth of material had ceased to exist as far as the procurement system was concerned. Six hundred million dollars worth of critical spares are lost in our own logistics system!

The matter of reparable is interesting from the point of view of magnitude. Over 1 million reparable components are removed annually from aircraft for maintenance purposes. These components have an acquisition value of more than \$1 billion. Thus you can readily understand the need for attention to the repair cycle and turn-around time. At the outset of the study this turn-around time (TAT) was measured. It took an average of 6-½ months for items being returned for depot maintenance to be repaired and issued.

Two attacks are underway to reduce this turn-around time. First, to shorten the geographical trip; i.e., establish and improve the local repair capability aboard ship and ashore. This is being accomplished through the intermediate level of maintenance where about 55% of components are being repaired in an average time of 11 days. You can see what would happen if we raised the percentage to, say, 75%. Second, an objective has been set to reduce the turn-around time for depot repairs to 3 months. This can be achieved, and is being achieved, by firmly emphasizing prompt movement to the depot and by scheduling induction at the depot within two weeks of arrival. Our faith in achieving this goal is backed up by a reduction of \$10 million in procurement of reparable which otherwise would have been necessary in FY 1966.

Of course, the matter of good inventory management and material procurement is directly related to the quality of available management data. There is an urgent and increasing need to know where our material is, what is its condition, where is it needed, what are the proper substitutes, if any, and other factors as well. The computers and communications systems available open up all kinds of possibilities for management information, and misinformation.

Any computer will take whatever data is provided to it and process it according to instructions. This same study revealed a pressing need to put our data inputs and data banks through a quality control process. You have heard Admiral Eccles' phrase 'the logistics snowball.' A first-rate logistics snowball occurs when computers calculate our needs on the basis of faulty data. (This is also known as the GINGO system. Garbage in—garbage out.) A sampling technique is now being used to identify

and eliminate error sources, and to make these high-speed, high-volume, highly valuable information systems less subject to error.

The point in the discussions of aeronautical spares that I want understood is that the Chief of Naval Material has the capability to marshal talents and organizational efforts beyond the capability of individual bureaus. When the problems are larger than the bureaus or the project managers—and many are—only a strong, responsible, central authority can successfully attack them.

I think that this is a good place to point out also that accurate usage data depends on accurate input from the fleet. This will occur only if commanding officers recognize what happens to the data they supply in the routine reports from the ships. This is also a good place to acknowledge that the Chief of Naval Material recognizes a reciprocal responsibility to reduce the paperwork burden. This reduction in paperwork is a feature in all forthcoming improvements in the supply system.

* * * *

I've tried to show you how the Chief of Naval Material exercises his role as commander of the Naval Material Support Establishment in the areas of Supplies and Equipage Funding, Allowance List Development, Military Essentiality Coding, Budgeting, and Aviation Spares. Now let's have a look at a second set of areas in which the Chief of Naval Material has played an important role. These are: The 3-M System; Cost Reduction; Management Information Systems; Project Management; and Weapons System Standards.

Admiral Ensey has commented on the Standard Navy Maintenance and Material Management System, known for short as the '3-M System.' This is a comprehensive effort to bring Navy-wide efficient management to equipment upkeep. The 3-Ms will relate justifiable maintenance with the man power and parts necessary to carry out that maintenance.

The 3-M System owes a great deal to the Air Force 66-1 maintenance system. The Air Force started managing maintenance on a centralized basis 15 years ago. With proper emphasis it won't take us that long to catch up. The ships of the fleet are scheduled to be incorporated into the 3-M System by mid-1967. If the people

who work about 50 yards down the passageway from my office have anything to say about it, every aircraft squadron in the fleet will operate under the 3-M System by this time next year. The 3-M System brings together talent from all bureaus, from the Marine Corps, from the fleet, and from the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. This is another case where the role of the Chief of Naval Material is to help draw together diverse talents in a common undertaking.

Let's consider the Cost Reduction Program. Last year's cost reduction goal for the Navy was \$900 million. This goal was exceeded by \$400 million in a highly successful cost reduction effort for which the Office of Naval Material provided the leadership and guidance. This year's goal is 1.8 billion. Indications are that this goal will be exceeded.

The role of the Chief of Naval Material is also illustrated by his part in developing an Advanced Management Information System. The Chief of Naval Material is pioneering in the development of a management information system to serve top management. Those of you who are familiar with management data systems recognize that most of such systems operate at what might be thought of as the hardware store level. The classic cases include the inventory problem, the billing and accounting problem, payroll and personnel record keeping, and the like. But the Advanced Management Information System, which is being studied now, will utilize the latest management sciences techniques at a much higher level of decision-making than has heretofore been observed. This system will emphasize simulation of alternative courses of action (e.g. which weapons system to choose); mathematical modeling; decision logic; statistical decision theory and other advanced methods.

On 4 January, the Chief of Naval Material began a six-month Problem Definition Study which hopefully will show exactly what can and should be expected from this forward-looking effort. We hope that the Advanced Management Information System will be a Navy landmark in the history of management information systems.

One major feature of the new role for the Chief of Naval Material in command of the Naval Material Support Establishment is a result of increasing reliance on project management. This is not a new technique, certainly, but the very strong emphasis being placed on its use by the Department of Defense will considerably expand the number of formally designated projects.

This is especially true in the Navy, which has not in the past employed this technique to the same extent as the Army and Air Force. The Air Force and Army use project management more extensively at present than does the Navy, even though one of the first—and one of the most successful—applications of Project Management was the 'Polaris' Program. Although 'Polaris' was spectacularly successful, the Navy—for several reasons—did not follow this technique for managing other weapons systems as extensively as it might have.

One of the reasons the Navy could not widely apply project management was that, before there was a Chief of Naval Material, there was no place in the logistics organization, really, for Project Managers to fit. Without a common commander over all the material bureaus, project management could not be widely applied. Most projects are fragmented within several bureaus. Only a common commander has the power to delegate the authority necessary to pull together all elements of a project; and at the same time to responsibly satisfy himself that the best balance is being struck between the needs of the project and the needs of the bureau.

The project management technique involves formal recognition of the entire work effort involved in developing, producing and supporting high-priced, high-priority weapons systems. The scope of the work effort and of the Project Manager's authority and responsibility is set out in a charter which formally establishes the project. Each Project Manager is given full responsibility for the success of his project, and full control of his money and people resources. He is then held accountable for turning out a satisfactory end item in a timely manner and within the limits of the funds and other resources imposed on his project.

Depending on their importance to the Navy, projects can be chartered by Bureau Chiefs, by the Chief of Naval Material, or by the Secretary of the Navy. Those chartered by the Chief of Naval Material or the Secretary of the Navy may report either at the bureau level or the Chief of Naval Material level. Advantages of project management are substantial for those projects which really deserve priority attention.

Among the most notable recent efforts of the Chief of Naval Material in the area of project management are: First, assisting the Secretary in developing SECNAVINST 5000.21, the statement of broad Navy Department project management policy. The Chief of Naval Material also issued a comprehensive implementing

instruction which is a handbook for Navy Project Managers. A lot of thought, effort and distilled experience went into these documents. Second, the Chief of Naval Material has prepared new charters for three SECNAV-designated projects (Fleet Ballistic Missile Systems, Surface Missile Systems, and Anti-Submarine Warfare Systems). Further, four CNM-designated projects have been established (F-111B; Instrumentation Ships; All-Weather Carrier Landing System; and Reconnaissance, Electronic Warfare, Special Operations, and Naval Intelligence Processing Systems (REWSON)). \Currently, bureau 'programs' are being studied for more standardized application of project management. About 50 projects are under serious study, and fifteen or twenty appear to be suitable for eventual designation as CNM projects. Finally, the Chief of Naval Material has actively assisted in the establishment of the OSD-sponsored Project Management School (DWSMC) at Wright Field.

The most important thing to remember about the role of the Chief of Naval Material in project management is that the Chief of Naval Material has the role of 'boss' over all the major projects. Therefore he is able to allocate resources between projects and the bureaus, and to transfer between all projects management knowledge gained in working with each project. He also has the responsibility of overcoming interface problems between projects and bureaus, as well as between projects.

* * * *

If I had to nominate one single function of the Chief of Naval Material which, during the last year has made the greatest contribution to the logistics readiness of the Navy, I would point to his role in setting Navy-wide standards for development of weapons systems.

Not long ago, the term *weapons system* meant *hardware*. A new airplane, with its support equipment, was thought of as a complete 'weapons system.' Those days are gone. The concept of the weapons, or warfare system today, includes not only hardware, but also the supply support and the personnel support of that hardware in the hands of the operating forces. More important, a new level of maturity in dealing with warfare systems has evolved. The present approach to the development of a warfare system is to identify, at an early stage of the developmental cycle, the most effective of several competing systems; the most effective means of achieving the overall aims of the

Navy. This means that the concept of effectiveness is the resultant not only of the ability of a proposed system to carry out its mission, but of the cost of that system—the overall, real cost, including the cost of the parts and the people; the reliability of that system; its maintainability, operability, and its supportability. Before the Chief of Naval Material assumed command of the Naval Material Support Establishment, there was no single authority in the producer area to set standards for systems effectiveness, to evaluate critically the reliability, operability, and supportability of proposed weapons systems. Now there is.

All of these qualitative factors can be expressed in positive, measurable, verifiable numbers. Our difficulties in so expressing these numbers is part of the 'quantification problem' about which you have heard. Quantification expresses in numbers the facts upon which our military judgment is based. When we go to the Office of the Secretary of Defense to justify our actions and to ask for dollar support for our plans, our position must be supported by auditable dollar figures, reliability figures, and effectiveness figures. Without such figures, no proposal can weigh very heavily on the scale of cost effectiveness. The main function of the Chief of Naval Material in this area is to assure that the figures which report on reliability, supportability, and operability, are available, auditable, and are suitably high, and that the dollar figures make good sense.

I have outlined the role of the Chief of Naval Material in Logistics Administration. He has functional control of the Naval Material Support Establishment. This control pays off most handsomely for the logistics benefit of the Navy when the Chief of Naval Material authoritatively draws together talent and directs it in attacking problems which were comparatively unassailable before there was a Chief of Naval Material. By the nature of the subject, I've tended to highlight the importance of the Chief of Naval Material. I don't want you to think that this emphasis on the role of the Chief of Naval Material is intended to diminish in any way the importance of the bureaus. The bureaus are vital, as they have been since 1842. When I said they represented four strong pillars in the logistical structure, I meant it. The Chief of Naval Material is first to acknowledge that none of the programs I've outlined can be successful without the bureaus.

* * * *

In closing, I want to leave one single thought in your minds. I know that most of you are 'operationally oriented.' This is good, because there is no substitute for adroit tactics or for superbly planned and executed strategy. The thought I want to emphasize is this: An officer must be not only a competent mariner; must be not only a master of tactics and strategy, but now as never before, he must be able and ready to do his part in controlling the logistical destinies of the Navy.

Naval logistics needs the attention of operationally oriented officers. We have all developed the habit of looking over our shoulder to see how far away the oilers are, and we are all accustomed to keeping a sharp eye on the ship's allotment toward the end of the fiscal year. As naval officers each of you must develop a thorough understanding of the larger logistics problems of the Navy. Only when you understand the problems can you help the Navy master them. The term 'professional competence' is growing more and more to include a logistical element.

BIOGRAPHIC SKETCH

Rear Admiral Ralph L. Shifley, U.S. Navy

PRESENT POSITION: Deputy Chief of Naval Material (Programs and Financial Management)

CAREER HIGHLIGHTS:

- 1933 - Graduate U.S. Naval Academy
- 1933-34 - USS *Memphis*
- 1934-36 - USS *Astoria*
- 1937 - Naval Air Station, Pensacola, Fla. (flight training)
- 1938-40 - USS *Savannah* (Aviation Unit and Senior Aviator)
- 1940-42 - Naval Air Station, Jacksonville, Fla. (Instructor);
Naval Air Gunners School, Hollywood, Fla. (XO)
- 1942-43 - Staff, Chief of Naval Air Operational Training
(Air Gunnery Training Officer)
- 1943-44 - Bombing Squadron 8 (Commanding Officer)
- 1944 - Air Group 8 (Commander)
- 1945-47 - Naval Air Station, Jacksonville, Fla. (Superintendent
of Aviation Training)
- 1947-48 - USS *Randolph* (Air Officer, Executive Officer)
- 1948-49 - USS *Leyte* (Operations Officer)
- 1949-51 - Staff, Commander Air Force, Atlantic Fleet (Ops Officer)
- 1951-52 - Naval War College (student)
- 1952-54 - Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Dept.
(Aircraft Programs)
- 1954-56 - Staff, Commander SIXTH Fleet
- 1956-57 - USS *Badoeng Strait* (CVE-116) (Commanding Officer)
- 1957 - Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
- 1957-58 - Executive Asst and Senior Aide to CNO
- 1958-59 - USS *Franklin D. Roosevelt* (CVA-42) (CO)
- 1959-60 - Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (Asst Director,
Aviation Plans Division)
- 1960-62 - Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (Director,
Aviation Plans Division)
- 1962-63 - Commander Carrier Division SEVEN
- 1963 - Office of the Chief of Naval Operations: Deputy Chief
of Naval Material for Programs, Navy Department, and
Vice Chief of Naval Material and Deputy Chief of
Naval Material (Programs and Financial Management)

MEDALS AND DECORATIONS:

Navy Cross; Distinguished Flying Cross, with three Gold Stars; Air Medal, with two Gold Stars; Presidential Unit Citation (USS *Bunker Hill*); Asiatic-Pacific Campaign Medal, five operation stars; World War II Victory Medal; National Defense Service Medal; Philippine Liberation Ribbon.

NEW DIMENSIONS IN EXTENSION

Did you know that . . . on 19 January 1965, the Chief of Naval Personnel promulgated a Professional Study Plan for Officers and Warrant Officers on Active Duty in BUPERS INSTRUCTION 1500.49A? This Instruction provides detailed study plans whereby officers may broaden their background and increase their professional qualifications by completion of recommended reading or courses of instruction. In satisfying these study plans, particularly in the broad 'Executive' and 'Operations' areas, Naval War College Extension Courses have a prominent role.

Did you know that . . . the January 1965 issue of *The Officer Personnel Newsletter* contained an article on Naval War College Extension Courses? This article by the President of the Naval War College, Vice Admiral MELSON, was introduced as follows: 'The Chief of Naval Personnel heartily concurs in Vice Admiral MELSON's remarks and recommends that all officers give them careful consideration.' Admiral MELSON's article provided in pertinent part as follows:

The professional education of naval officers remains one of the most important and essential tasks faced by today's Navy. Not only is technical training playing an ever-increasing role, but the success of naval operations in support of national objectives requires that the planning for those operations be done and carried out by officers who have a firm grasp and understanding of the many varied considerations involved. These include, among others, the strategic, logistic, and international affairs factors.

The service colleges, particularly the Naval War College, continue to provide a high level of professional education for naval officers, both in the junior and senior courses. Ideally, of course, we would like to send all officers to both resident courses. Not only is this impossible, but currently, and in the foreseeable future, many naval officers will not have the opportunity to attend any of the service colleges.

To assist in bridging this unfortunate gap in professional education, the Naval War College offers a series of revised and updated extension courses.



These courses parallel, insofar as practicable, the resident courses offered at the War College. They cover the spectrum from military planning, command logistics, naval operations, and national and international security organizations, through the broader fields of strategic planning, counterinsurgency, international relations, and international law. . . .

. . . completion of any of these courses prior to attending one of the service colleges would make actual attendance a much more meaningful and rewarding experience as they provide an excellent preparatory background for such attendance. This is particularly true for those officers who may be ordered to a senior resident course, without having had the opportunity to attend a course of the command and staff level.

* * * *

Did you know that . . . in the month following the promulgation of BUPERSINST 1500.49A and the *Newsletter* article, new enrollments in Naval War College Extension Courses increased 338%?

NORTH AND SOUTH VIETNAM



THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF INSURGENCY AND COUNTERINSURGENCY

A lecture delivered
at the Naval War College
on 10 December 1964

by

Professor Bernard B. Fall

1. *The Century of 'Small Wars'*

If we look at the 20th century alone we are now in Viet-Nam faced with the forty-eighth 'small war.' Let me just cite a few: Algeria, Angola, Arabia, Burma, Camerouns, China, Colombia, Cuoa, East Germany, France, Haiti, Huugary, Indochina, Indonesia, Kashmir, Laos, Morocco, Mongolia, Nagaland, Palestine, Yemen, Poland, South Africa, South Tyrol, Tibet, Yugoslavia, Venezuela, West Irian, etc. This, in itself, is quite fantastic. In fact, if a survey were made of the number of people involved, or killed, in those 48 small wars it would be found that these wars, *in toto*, involved as many people as either one of the two world wars, and caused as many casualties. Who speaks of 'insurgency' in Colombia? It is mere banditry, apparently. Yet it has killed 200,000 people so far and there is no end to it. The new Viet-Nam war, the 'Second Indochina War' that began in 1956-57 and is still going on, is now going to reach in 1965, according to my calculations, somewhere around the 200,000-dead mark. Officially, 79,000 dead are acknowledged, but this is far too low. These may be small wars as far as expended ordnance is concerned. But they certainly are not 'small wars' in terms of territory or population, since such countries as China or Algeria were involved. These wars are certainly not small for the people who fight in them, or who have to suffer from them. Nor are they small, in many cases, for the counterinsurgency operator.

One of the problems one immediately faces is that of terminology. Obviously 'sublimated warfare' is meaningless, and 'insurgency' or 'counterinsurgency' hardly define the problem. But the definition that I think will fit the subject is 'revolutionary warfare' (RW).

Let me state this definition: $RW = G + P$, or, 'revolutionary warfare equals guerrilla warfare plus political action.' This formula for revolutionary warfare is the result of the application of guerrilla methods to the furtherance of an ideology or a political system. This is the *real* difference between partisan warfare, guerrilla warfare, and everything else. Guerrilla simply means 'small war' to which the correct Army answer is (and that applies to *all* Western armies) that everybody knows how to fight small wars; no second lieutenant of the infantry ever learns anything else but how to fight small wars. Political action, however, is the difference. The communists, or shall we say, any sound revolutionary warfare operator (the French underground, the Norwegian underground, or any other European anti-Nazi underground) most of the time used small-war tactics, not to destroy the German Army, of which they were thoroughly incapable; but to establish a competitive system of control over the population. Of course, in order to do this, here and there they had to kill some of the occupying forces and attack some of the military targets. But above all they had to kill their own people who collaborated with the enemy.

But the 'kill' aspect, the military aspect, definitely always remained the minor aspect. The political, administrative, ideological aspect is the primary aspect. Everybody, of course, by definition, will seek a military solution to the insurgency problem, whereas by its very nature, the insurgency problem is militarily only in a secondary sense, and politically, ideologically, and administratively in a primary sense. Once we understand this, we will understand more of what is actually going on in Viet-Nam or in some of the other places affected by RW.

2. *Recent and Not-so-recent Cases*

The next point is that this concept of revolutionary war can be applied by anyone anywhere. One doesn't have to be white to be defeated. One doesn't have to be European or American. Colonel Nasser's recent experience in Yemen is instructive. He fought with 40,000 troops, Russian tanks, and Russian jets, in Yemen against a few thousand barefoot Yemenite guerrillas. The tanks lost. After three years of inconclusive fighting the Egyptian-backed Yemen regime barely holds the major cities, and Nasser is reported to be on the lookout for a face-saving withdrawal.

Look at the great Indian Army's stalemate by the Nagas. And who are the Nagas? They are a backward people of 500,000 on

the northeastern frontier of India. After ten years of fighting, the Indian Army and government are now negotiating with the Nagas. They have, for all practical purposes, lost their counter-insurgency operations. In other words, (this is perhaps reassuring), losing an insurgency can happen to almost anybody. This is very important because one more or less comes to accept as 'fact' that to lose counterinsurgency operations happens only to the West.

Very briefly, then, let me run through the real differences between, let us say, a revolutionary war and any other kind of uprising. A revolutionary war is usually fought in support of a doctrine, but a doctrine may be of a most variegated kind. It could be a peasant rebellion or it could be religion. For example, in Europe between the 1300s and the 1600s, as the feudal system evolved and then disappeared and was replaced by the early stages of the capitalist system, there were many peasant rebellions. Those peasant rebellions were fought, even though the people did not know it, for economic and social doctrines. The peasants were sick and tired of being serfs and slaves working for a feudal lord. Those peasant rebellions were in line with later socioeconomic movements. This is why the communists, of course, retroactively lay claim to the European peasant rebellions.

There were, of course, the religious wars in Europe—Protestant versus Catholic. Their doctrinal (ideological) character was self-explanatory. As soon as we run into that kind of war, not all the rich and not all the poor will stick together with their own kind. Doctrine somehow will cut across all social lines. This is often misunderstood. We look, for example, at the Viet Cong insurgency in Viet-Nam, and expect that all the Viet Cong are 'communists' of low class. Then we find out that there are intellectuals in the Viet Cong. There are Buddhist priests, Catholic priests, and minority people. Hence, this very oversimplified view of the enemy falls by the wayside; we are now faced with something which is much more complicated and multifaceted, and the enemy, of course, thanks to doctrine, cuts across all classes. Pham Van Dong, the Prime Minister of Communist North Viet-Nam, is a high-ranking Vietnamese nobleman whose father was Chief of Cabinet to one of the late Vietnamese emperors. One of his colleagues at school was Ngo Dinh Diem, a high-ranking nobleman whose father also had been Chief of Cabinet to one of the Vietnamese emperors. Ho-Chi-Minh was not exactly born on the wrong side of the tracks. His father had a master's degree in the mandarin administration. This is very important.

In a doctrinal conflict there are people on both sides who probably embrace the whole social spectrum. Although communists will always claim that all the peasants and workers are on their side, they find out to their surprise that not all the peasants or workers are on their side. On the other hand, neither are all the elites on our side.

Finally, we have the French Revolutionary War and the American Revolutionary War. There is a difference between the two. The American Revolutionary War was literally a 'national liberation war.' It did not advocate the upsetting of the existing socio-economic structure in this new country called the United States. But the American Revolutionary War brought something into this whole field which nobody really studied, and that is the difference in certain types of foreign aid that the United States received during its liberation war. What basically made the difference between, say, Lafayette and Rochambeau? Lafayette was an integrated military adviser, but Rochambeau commanded a separate military force. He commanded French forces fighting alongside the United States forces, whereas Kosciuszko, Von Steuben, and Lafayette were actually the allied parts of the army that were sandwiched in (the new word for this in Washington is 'interlarded') with the United States forces.

What would happen if American officers actually were put into the Vietnamese command channels—not as advisers, but as operators; or if a Vietnamese officer were to serve in the American Army like the Korean troops in the U.S. Army in Korea? Perhaps this is one approach to the problem of 'advisermanship.' There was a whole group of foreign officers in the American Revolutionary War army. Were they 'mercenaries,' and if so, who paid them? I don't know. Were they Rochambeau's men or not? Or, what was the difference between Lafayette and the mercenaries of the Congo? I don't quite know. It would be interesting to find out.

The American Revolutionary War was a national liberation war in present-day terms. The French Revolution was, again, a social, economic, doctrinal war—a doctrinal revolution. In fact, it is amazing how well the doctrine worked. The French had developed three simple words: '*Liberté! Égalité! Fraternité!*' And that piece of propaganda held an enormous sway. For ten years after the French Revolution was dead and gone, French imperialism in the form of Napoleon marched through Europe taking over pieces of territories in the name of liberty, equality, and fraternity. Millions of people throughout Europe turned on their own natural or

home-grown leaders believing that this French concept of liberty, equality, and fraternity was carried around at the point of French bayonets.

To be sure, in many cases, Napoleon left behind a legacy of orderly administration, of such things as the Napoleonic Code, but certainly Napoleon did not bring independence any more than the communists bring independence. He did bring a kind of Western order which was highly acceptable. To this day there are slight remnants of Napoleon's administration in the Polish Code. The streets are lined with poplar trees in Austria because Napoleon lined such streets 167 years ago.

One thing that Napoleon also brought with him was French occupation and the first true, modern guerrilla wars against his troops. For example, the word 'guerrilla,' as we know it, comes from the Spanish uprising against the French. There were similar wars, for example, in Tyrol. The Tyrolians rose up under Andreas Hofer against the French. There were such uprisings in Russia also, although they were in support of an organized military force, the Russian army. In that case we speak of partisan warfare. We also had such things in Germany, the *Tugend-Bund*, the 'Virtue-League.' This was sort of a Pan-Germanic underground which got its people into the various German states to work for the liberation of the country from French occupation.

Very interestingly we see the difference between Napoleon and some of the other leaders in the field of counterinsurgency. Napoleon tended to make his family members and his cronies kings of those newly created French satellite states. One of his brothers, Joseph, got Spain, and Jerome got Westphalia, a French puppet state cut out in the Rhine area. The population of Westphalia rose up against Jerome. He sent a message to his brother saying, 'I'm in trouble.' The answer returned was typically Napoleonic. It said, 'By God, brother, use your bayonets. (Signed) Bonaparte.' A historic message came back from Jerome to his brother saying: 'Brother, you can do anything with bayonets—except sit on them.' In other words: One can do almost anything with brute force except salvage an unpopular government. Jerome Bonaparte had the right idea, for *both* the right or wrong ideas about insurgency are just about as old as the ages. We have always found somebody who understood them.

What then, did communism add to all this? Really very little. Communism has not added a thing that participants in other

doctrinal wars (the French Revolution or the religious wars) did not know just as well. But communism did develop a more adaptable doctrine. The merit of communism has been to recognize precisely the usefulness of the social, economic, and political doctrines in this field for the purpose of diminishing as much as possible the element of risk inherent in the military effort. But if one prepares his terrain politically and organizes such things as a Fifth Column, one may reduce such risks by a great deal.

3. *Insurgency Indicators*

The important thing is to know how to discover the symptoms of insurgency. This is where I feel that we are woefully lagging in Viet-Nam. I will show you how badly mistaken one can be in this particular field. For example, I have a Vietnamese briefing sheet in English which the Vietnamese Government used to hand out. It is dated 1957 and is called *The Fight Against Communist Subversive Activities*. At the end of the last page it says: 'From this we can see that the Vietminh authorities have disintegrated and been rendered powerless.' Famous last words!

Here is a communication by Professor Wesley Fishal, who was the American public police adviser in Viet-Nam in the late 1950s. He said in August 1958, 'Indeed, Viet-Nam can be classed as about the most stable and peaceful country in all of Asia today.' I would underline the fact that in 1958 the Vietnamese were losing something like three village chiefs a day. But village chiefs were not considered a military target. They were not considered part of our calculations with regard to what makes a war. For example, the *Infantry Journal* of August 1960 stated:

The Communist objectives, for the most part, have been thwarted by South Vietnamese military strength. Threats and actual attacks have been made on American advisers through their armed forces. The fact that these attacks have been made is a good indication that the American aid is effective.

What this seems to mean is that if American advisers get killed in Viet-Nam we are doing fine. *The Air Force and Space Digest* of June 1962 stated:

There are a few things about the insurgent warfare that favor the use of air power and one of them is that the jungle rebels are not equipped with anti-aircraft, so that air superiority is practically assured.

That would be good news to the helicopter pilots who represent the bulk of our casualties. In another *Air Force and Space Digest* article of August 1964 the following statement is made:

The figures of 1963 in the Vietnamese theater indicate that the cost/effectiveness of the air effort is high. It is estimated that the Viet-Nam Air Force uses less than 3% of the total military personnel. . . . These planes account for more than a third of the total Viet Cong killed in action; that is 7400 out of 20,600.

The joke, of course, if you can see the point, is that if 3% of the Vietnamese personnel effects 33% of the casualties, a simple tripling of that 3% of Air Force personnel would effect 100% of the casualties. Therefore, we need not send anybody else. But no one has considered that in all likelihood, of the 23,500 killed, a large part are noncombatant civilians. It is pretty hard to tell a Viet Cong flying at 250 knots and from 500 feet up, or more. This leads to the completely incongruous reasoning that if there are 100,000 Viet Cong in South Viet-Nam and the ARVN¹ kill 23,500 a year and maim perhaps another 25,000, and if we divide 100,000 Viet Cong by 50,000 a year the war should be over in two years. This meaningless equation probably accounted for 1963 estimates of victory by 1965. This is precisely where 'cost/effectiveness' has its limitations.

Such reports point to a phenomenon which seems to conform to a pattern. Allow me to cite a report on the subject:

There was little or no realism in the sense of appreciating facts and conditions as they really were or were going to be, instead of what was imagined or wanted to be. The cause was fundamental, consisting of an academic beaureaucratic outlook, based on little realistic practice and formed in an environment utterly different to what we experienced in the war.

In the case of the staff this environment was in the cool of an office or the comfort of the road, scarcely ever the rubber jungle with its storms and claustrophobic oppressiveness. All seemed good in a good world. There was no

¹Army of the Republic of Viet-Nam.

inducement to look below the surface or to change our appreciations.

The document is declassified now. It is a report of a British colonel whose regiment was destroyed in Malaya by the Japanese in 1941. This document is 23 years old. Yet it sounds like a U.S. adviser from yesterday. Then as now everybody likes to fight the war that he knows best; this is very obvious. But in Viet-Nam we fight a war that we don't 'know best.' The sooner this is realized the better it is going to be.



When I first arrived in Indochina in 1953, the French were mainly fighting in the Red River Delta (figure 1). This was the key French area in North Viet-Nam. The solid line marked the fortified French battle line. The French headquarters city was Hanoi. When I arrived I checked in with the French briefing officer and asked what the situation was in the Delta. He said:

Well, we hold pretty much of it; there is the French fortified line around the Delta which we call the 'Marshal de Lattre Line'—about 2200 bunkers forming 900 forts. We are going to deny the communists access to the 8 million people in this Delta and the 3 million tons of rice it produces. We will eventually starve them out and deny them access to the population.

In other words, this was the strategic hamlet complex seen five thousand times bigger. There were about 8,000 villages inside that line. This fortified line also protected the rice fields then, whereas now the individual strategic hamlets do not protect the same fields. 'Well,' I said, 'do the communists hold anything inside the delta?' The answer was, 'Yes, they hold those five black blotches.' But at the University of Hanoi, which was under national Vietnamese control, my fellow Vietnamese students just laughed. They said that their home villages inside the Delta were communist-controlled and had communist village chiefs, and just about everybody else said the same thing; that both the French and the Vietnamese Army simply did not know what was going on.

Most of these villages were, in fact, controlled by the communists and I decided to attempt to document that control. It was actually very simple: To the last breath a government will try to collect taxes. So I used a working hypothesis; I went to the Vietnamese tax collection office in Hanoi to look at the village tax rolls. They immediately indicated that the bulk of the Delta was

VIETMINH GUERRILLA INFILTRATION BEHIND FRENCH LINES SITUATION MAY 1953



no longer paying taxes. As a cross-check on my theory I used the village teachers.

The school teachers in Viet-Nam were centrally assigned by the Government. Hence, where there were school teachers the Government could be assumed to have control. Where there were none, there was no Government control. The result is seen in figure 2 which shows the difference between military 'control' and what the communists controlled *administratively*, which was 70% of the delta inside the French battle lines! This was *one year before the Battle of Dien Bien Phu*, in May 1954. In fact, the military situation shown on figure 1 was complete fiction and had absolutely no bearing on the *real* situation inside the Delta. Of course, when regular communist divisions became available to attack the Delta in June 1954, the whole illusion collapsed. The dotted line on figure 2 was the last French battleline before the ceasefire. The area in black was solidly communist-infiltrated and, of course, collapsed overnight. That is revolutionary warfare. You now have seen the difference between the two.

4. 'RW' in South Viet-Nam

When I returned to Viet-Nam in 1957, after the Indochina War had been over for two years, everybody was telling me that the situation was fine. However, I noticed in the South Vietnamese press, obituaries of village chiefs, and I was bothered. I thought there were just too many obituaries—about one a day—allegedly killed not by communists, but by 'unknown elements,' and by 'bandits.' I decided to plot out a year's worth of dead village officials, (figure 3). The result was that I counted about 452 dead village chiefs to my knowledge at that time. Then I also saw in the press, and here and there in Viet-Nam heard discussions about 'bandit attacks.' These attacks were not made at random, but in certain areas. That too worried me, so I decided to plot the attacks. I immediately noted in both cases a very strange pattern. The attacks and the village chiefs were 'clustered' in certain areas.

I went to see the Vietnamese Minister of the Interior, Nguyen Hũu Chẩu, who then was, incidentally, the brother-in-law of Madame Nhu, and I said to him: 'Your Excellency, there is something I'm worried about. You know that I was in the North when the French were losing and I noticed the village chiefs disappearing and I think you now have the same problem here.' He said, 'What do you mean?' So I just showed him the map. He







Figure 4


SOUTH VIETNAM

VC FUND-RAISING SITUATION LEGEND

 PROVINCES WHERE THERE ARE VC FUNDS COLLECTED FORMALLY BY TAX, BONDS OR OTHER NON-VOLUNTARY METHODS TOTAL 27

 PROVINCES WHERE VC FUNDS ARE IMPORTED (4), DONATED LOCALLY (2) OR SOURCES ARE NOT REPORTED (4) TOTAL 10

 PROVINCES WHERE THERE IS NO VC TAX TOTAL 3



said, 'Well, since you found that out all by yourself, let me show you *my* map.' And he pulled out a map which showed not only the village chiefs but also the communist cells operating in South Viet-Nam in 1957-58 (figure 4) when Viet-Nam was at peace and there was supposedly nothing going on. It was wonderful. We all congratulated each other. Yet, very obviously, to use a somewhat unscientific term, the whole Mekong Delta was going 'to hell in a basket,' and much of South Viet-Nam with it.²

The insurgency cross-check was unexpectedly provided to me by the International Control Commission. They get reports from the communists as well as from our side, but in this case what interested me was the alleged incidents inside South Viet-Nam. The communists would report from Hanoi, through the ICC, that Americans or Vietnamese were doing certain things out in the villages which Hanoi alleged were 'violations' of the cease-fire agreement. I said to myself, 'If I plot out all the communist reports about alleged violations on a map, and if they match high-incident areas, there may be a logical connection between the guerrilla operators and the intelligence operators who provide the basis for the ICC reports.' Sure enough the same areas with the high incidents also had high reports, (figure 4). As of early 1958, I knew we were in deep trouble in Viet-Nam and I kept saying so.

In 1959 the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization gave me a research grant to do a study on communist infiltration in the area. Figure 4 also contains one of the results of the study: Saigon was deliberately *encircled* and *cut off* from the hinterland with a 'wall' of dead village chiefs. President Kennedy, in his second State of the Union message on May 25, 1961, stated that during the past year (meaning April 1960-61) the communists killed *4,000 small officials* in Viet-Nam! This was one year before the Taylor Report which got the whole American major effort going. In other words, in 1960 and 1961 the communists killed *11 village officials a day*. By the time we woke up and learned that we had a problem, the communists had killed about 10,000 village chiefs in a country that has about 16,000 villages. This, gentlemen, is 'control'—not the military illusion of it.

From then on, it was open and shut. One year later, in 1963, somebody discovered that my system of judging insurgent control from tax returns was applicable to South Viet-Nam also. Figure 5,

²Cf. Fall, 'South Viet-Nam's Internal Problems,' *Pacific Affairs*, September 1958.

produced by AID (the U.S. Agency for International Development) shows tax collection in South Viet-Nam. This reflects the situation for March-May 1963, six months before Diem was overthrown, and four months before the Buddhist outbreaks!

To make a long story short, the communists (in all the dark areas) were formally collecting taxes with bonds, receipts, and tax declarations. In the shaded area they were collecting taxes on an informal basis. There were only three provinces out of forty-five which reported no communist tax collections.

5. *The Erroneous Criteria of 'Success'*

I have emphasized that the straight military aspects, or the conventional military aspects of insurgency, are not the most important. Tax collections have nothing to do with helicopters. Village chiefs have nothing to do with M-113s except in the most remote sense, nor with the aerial bombardment of North Viet-Nam. What we are faced with precisely is a communist, military-backed operation to take over a country under our feet. I would like to put it in even a simpler way: *When a country is being subverted it is not being outfought; it is being out-administered.* Subversion is literally administration with a minus sign in front. This is what I feel has to be clearly understood. Whether it is the Congo, Viet-Nam or Venezuela, is totally irrelevant. Whether we have the 'body count,' the 'kill count,' the 'structure count,' or the 'weapons count'—these are almost meaningless considerations in an insurgency situation. We can lose weapons and still win the insurgency. On the other hand, we can win the war and lose the country.

We always hang on for dear life to the Malayan example, which, of course, is totally unworkable. The only thing that Viet-Nam has which resembles Malaya, is the climate. We don't give the communists credit for making mistakes, yet Malaya was one of their big mistakes. They actually decided to take on the British in a straight-forward military operation and, predictably, failed.

If revolutionary war simply were jungle war, every regular force could win it. Americans know how to fight jungle wars. One can fight a revolutionary war in Norway, or fight a revolutionary war in France. It doesn't take a jungle to fight a revolutionary war. One can take over villages not only in the highlands of Viet-Nam, but in the lowlands of Belgium the same way. This is, of course, the key point. Remember that the British fought in Cyprus, and Cyprus

seemingly had everything in her favor. It is an island half the size of New Jersey. The Royal Navy, which can be trusted to do its job, sealed off the island from the outside. There were 40,000 British troops on Cyprus under Field Marshal Sir John Harding and his opponent, Colonel Grivas, had 300 Greeks in the EOKA. The ratio between regular troops and guerrillas was 110-to-1 in favor of the British! After five years the British preferred to come to terms with the rebels.

The French in Algeria learned every lesson from the French in Viet-Nam. The troop ratio there was a comfortable 11-to-1; the French had 760,000 men; the Algerians had 65,000. The French very effectively sealed off the Algerian-Tunisian border, and by 1962 had whittled down the guerrillas from 65,000 to 7,000. But the French were winning at the expense of being the second-most-hated country in the world, after South Africa, in the United Nations. They were giving the whole Western alliance a black name.³ At what price were the French winning? Well, 760,000 men out of about 1 million men of the French armed forces were tied down in Algeria. It cost 3 million dollars a day for *eight years*, or \$12 billion in French money. No American aid was involved. The 'price' also included two mutinies of the French Army and one overthrow of the civilian government. At that price the French were winning the war in Algeria, *militarily*. The fact was that the military victory was totally meaningless. This is where the word 'grandeur' applies to President de Gaulle: He was capable of seeing through the trees of military victory to a forest of political defeat and he chose to settle the Algerian insurgency by other means.

Some of these wars, of course, *can* be won, as in the Philippines, for example. The war was won there *not* through military action (there wasn't a single special rifle invented for the Philippines, let alone more sophisticated ordnance) but through an extremely well-conceived Civic Action program and, of course, a good leader—Magsaysay.

Civic action is not the construction of privies or the distribution of antimalaria sprays. One can't fight an ideology; one can't fight a militant doctrine with better privies. Yet this is done constantly.

³For example, when the French effected a reprisal raid on rebel bases in Tunisia on February 8, 1958, several senior U.S. leaders expressed shock and demanded the return to U.S. control of American-made aircraft used by the French.

One side says, 'Land reform,' and the other side says, 'Better culverts.' One side says, 'We are going to kill all those nasty village chiefs and landlords.' The other side says, 'Yes, but look, we want to give you prize pigs to improve your strain.' These arguments just do not match. Simple but adequate appeals will have to be found sooner or later.

6. Conclusion

What, then, can be done in a warlike Viet-Nam? Does the West have to lose such wars automatically? I said at the beginning that even the non-Westerners can lose those wars. But, either way, one must attempt to preserve the essentials. The question in my mind is this: Can we in Viet-Nam, or anywhere else, save (or improve) the administrative or governmental structure? The answer is obvious, and there is no other effort really worth doing. We have tried this with the 'strategic hamlets' and that literally failed. Out of 8,500 strategic hamlets, about 1,400 survived the effort. Some people have spoken of what is called the 'oil-slick principle' which has been described as the holding of one particular area, one central area, and working one's way out of the center. That was fine when the French developed the concept for the Sahara, because in the Sahara there are obligatory watering points. If they have all the oases, those outside have to come in and get water. But Viet-Nam doesn't happen to be the Sahara or an oasis. Thus, the oil-slick method succeeds mostly in pushing the Viet Cong units into the next province. Of course, it looks good, at least, because for one week there will be a 'cleared' province. For the time being this is considered adequate until something more imaginative is discovered.

The actual thing that can be done, and is also being done, is what the French call 'gridding.'⁴ One doesn't start from the center of something and work one's way out, but he starts from the periphery and works one's way *in*. The chances are that if it is done right, and if it is done in enough places at once, some communist units will finally get fixed (as the army says) and caught. This may yet work, but this requires a high degree of man-power saturation not available in Viet-Nam.

There are no easy shortcuts to solving the problems of revolutionary war. In fact, I would like to close with one last thought

⁴*Quadrillage.*

which applies, of course, to everything that is done in the Armed Forces, but particularly to revolutionary war: *If it works, it is obsolete.* In Viet-Nam and in many other similar situations we have worked too often with well-working but routine procedures and ideas. It is about time that new approaches and—above all—ideas be tried; since, obviously, the other ones have been unequal to the task.

BIOGRAPHIC SKETCH

Professor Bernard B. Fall

PRESENT POSITION: Professor of International Relations,
Howard University

SCHOOLS:

University of Paris, 1948-49
Ludwig-Max University (Munich), 1949-50
University of Maryland (Overseas), 1950-51
Syracuse University, 1951-52, M.A., June 1952
School of Adv. Int'l Studies, Johns Hopkins, Summer 1952
Syracuse University, 1952-53, Ph.D., January 1955

CAREER HIGHLIGHTS:

1942-44 - French Underground (FFI)
1944-46 - 4th Moroccan Mountain Division, 69th Pack Howitzer
Regt
1946-48 - War Crimes Investigator, Nürnberg Trials
1949-50 - International Tracing Service (UN)
1953 - Field research in Indochina
1954 - Res. Assistant to Director, S.E. Asia Program, Cornell
1956 - Howard University, promoted to full professor, 1962

MEDALS, HONORS AND PUBLICATIONS

Medal of Liberated France (for underground activities)
The Vietminh Regime, Cornell, 1954
Ibid., I.P.R., New York, 1956
Le Vietminh, Armand Colin, Paris, 1960
Street Without Joy: Indochina at War, Harrisburg; Stackpole, 1961
(1st ed.)
Ibid.: Insurgency in Indochina, 1946-1963, (3d ed.) (published also
in British, French and German editions)
The Two Viet-Nams, New York: Praeger, 1963
and more than 120 articles in *Foreign Affairs*, *Pacific Affairs*,
Saturday Evening Post, *Military Review*, *The New Republic*,
The Reporter, etc.

Recipient of two Fulbright Fellowships, Rockefeller Fellow-
ship, SEATO Fellowship.

PROFESSIONAL READING

The evaluations of recent books listed in this section have been prepared for the use of resident students. Officers in the fleet and elsewhere may find these books of interest in their professional reading.

The inclusion of a book in this section does not necessarily constitute an endorsement by the Naval War College of the facts, opinions or concepts contained therein.

Many of these publications may be found in ship and station libraries. Certain of the books on the list which are not available from these sources may be available from one of the Navy's Auxiliary Library Service Collections. These collections of books are obtainable on loan. Requests from individual officers to borrow books from an Auxiliary Library Service Collection should be addressed to the nearest of the following special loan collections.

Chief of Naval Personnel (G14)
Department of the Navy
Washington, D.C. 20370

Commanding Officer
U.S. Naval Station
Library (ALSC), Bldg. C-9
Norfolk, Virginia 23511

Commanding Officer
U.S. Naval Station
Library (ALSC)
San Diego, California 92136

Commanding Officer
U.S. Naval Station (Pearl Harbor)
Library (ALSC) Box 20
San Francisco, California 96610

Commanding Officer
U.S. Naval Station (Guam)
Library (ALSC) Box 174
San Francisco, California 96630

BOOKS

Fulbright, J. William. *Old Myths and New Realities*. New York: Random House, 1964. 147 p.

Senator Fulbright opens his title chapter with a well-phrased hypothesis, but he somehow fails to be fully convincing in his supporting discussion. Most of his examples of divergencies from reality are of a contemporary nature, when it would seem that the bases of the American ideology or 'Puritan Ethic' go much deeper into the historical, psychological, and sociological traditions of the United States. One of the most significant myths which the Senator attacks is the bugbear of Soviet ideology which looms larger to the Americans than the real threat that it obscures—communist imperialism. The second chapter, 'The Foundations of National Security,' deals with the 'paradox of growing military power and decreasing national security' in a most perceptive manner. The American people and Congress still tend to equate national security with military power despite witness to the contrary: the present art of nuclear weaponry and Sino-Soviet-Cuban penetration and subversion of the less developed areas of the world. The essential point that Senator Fulbright is trying to make is that there must be a fundamental *alteration of attitudes* on the part of both the American people and the Russian people before there can be meaningful reduction in the East-West conflict and lessening of nuclear destruction. In the third chapter, 'Atlantic Partnership and the Gaullist Challenge,' the author calls for the establishment of an Atlantic Assembly which would act as a broad parliamentary body of interdependence to serve both NATO and the OECD. In Chapter IV, 'The Cold War in American Life,' Senator Fulbright states his feeling that there has been an 'inversion of priorities' from hope to fear. He questions the rapidity with which a \$50 billion defense budget is passed and the difficulty with which an educational support bill, a poverty bill, a civil rights bill, and a foreign aid bill pass or fail to pass Congress. He also takes issue with the wisdom of landing a man on the moon by 1970 at a cost of \$20 to \$30 billion, when we are faced with enormous social, economic, and educational inequities here on earth. In his conclusion, Senator Fulbright expresses his concern over the myth of nationalism, which he terms 'a state of mind rather than a state of nature.' He sees nationalism in the twentieth century as the most powerful, the most dangerous, and the most universal 'force at precisely the time in history when technology has made the world a single unit in the physical sense—interdependent for economic, political, and cultural purposes and profoundly interdependent for survival in the nuclear age.'

Although most of the ideas articulated by Senator Fulbright are not new, they obtain greater meaning and significance because they are said by the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The Senator makes a valiant attack on cherished American myths about international relations, but it is questionable if he has moved the American people closer to reality. On balance, however, this treatise ought to be rated as one of the most important statements on the role of the United States in world affairs during the postwar period.

D. L. LARSON
Consultant, International Relations

Hanna, Willard A. *Eight Nation Makers*. New York: St Martin's, 1964. 307 p.

Drawing upon extensive research and personal acquaintance, the author has produced a fascinating and valuable work built around the charismatic leaders of eight Southeast Asian countries. He concludes his introduction by stating that he is 'impelled by the notion that politics is people, the politics of underdeveloped areas is people of overdeveloped politics, and Southeast Asian politicians, as people, are extraspecial specimens.' He then proceeds to prove this by producing a gallery of portraits which includes Sukarno of Indonesia, Tengku Abdul Rahman of Malaysia, Macapagal of the Philippines, Ngo Dinh Diem of RVN, Prince Sihanouk of Cambodia, 'Captain' Kong Le and the Laotian princes, General Ne Win of Burma, and King Bhumibol of Thailand. In company, this grouping serves to emphasize the regional diversities in the leadership, the development of the countries, and the external and internal problems and conflicts. Further, under the shadow of Red China, there is the implicit message that the tactical use of chaos and contradiction may be tools of modern revolution which are not exclusively for communist use. Whether the resulting conditions favor the international political nuisance value of these emerging countries, or merely prepare the way for a restoration of order Marxist-style is a legitimate concern for the military reader. Reading this book is an entertaining but disquieting experience. It is not a sure means of understanding Southeast Asian politics in eight easy lessons. It does provide a point for departure or opportunity to review the personalities and incidents which have made post-World War II Southeast Asia whatever it is. Since the United States has become increasingly enmeshed in this area, it seems wise to attempt to understand something of the political jungle which Mr. Hanna alludes to and which his work helps to depict.

W. F. LONG, JR.
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army

Paret, Peter. *French Revolutionary Warfare from Indochina to Algeria*. New York: Praeger, 1964. 163p.

Published for the Center of International Studies, Princeton University, this book traces the development of the French theory—or doctrine—of *guerre révolutionnaire*, which was initially formulated by French officers whose experiences in Indochina led them to seek new ways of countering anticolonial insurrections. Recognizing the interdependence of the guerrilla, the civil population, and social administration, the French theorists submit as a major tenet that the Army must therefore control the total administration of an area subjected to insurrection. One of the most illuminating chapters is devoted to a French experiment along these lines in a small coastal area in Algeria in 1957 and 1958. Basically, it was an application of the 'Oil Slick' tactic, which was evaluated by the French as only encouraging. In fact, large-scale fighting in the area was ended, the area was secured from outside attacks, and the slow work of administrative organization could proceed. The potential results of applying such tactics on a larger scale can be only speculative. The author concludes his analysis by noting that the role of civilians in revolutionary warfare remained largely unexplored in Indochina and Algeria, as the French experience was almost wholly military in character. He further notes that such an approach did not lead to satisfactory settlements there, but did push the country to the edge of revolution. One French officer argued that although the armed forces could and should fight against the effects of subversion, they were neither organized nor equipped to combat the causes, and concluded: 'To recognize that war has become total is implicitly to recognize that the Army can no longer handle more than a part of war.' This conclusion was reached on the American scene somewhat earlier, without benefit of near civil war, and expressed somewhat cavalierly as, 'War is too important for Generals to conduct.' Professor Paret's book is a thorough analysis of the French experience and interest in this important field of revolutionary warfare, worthy of serious consideration by the student of small wars, which appear more likely to develop than the confrontation of major powers.

I.N. FRANKLIN
Commander, U.S. Navy

Rees, David. *Korea, the Limited War*. New York: St Martin's, 1964. 511 p.

This book is a remarkably good and comprehensive study of that most peculiar war in Korea. The author is a young and astute Britisher who skillfully weaves the political warp and the military woof of the intricate fabric into a very clear pattern. His facts are full and complete, his views objective, and his style and organization exceptionally lucid. The book begins with a good essay on the nature of limited war and American hostility to such conflicts. The author believes that all of the introspection and disillusion in America created by the war can be boiled down to one cause—'the Korean War was the first important war in American history that was not a crusade.' With this introduction, he proceeds to write of the military campaign, the American political forces affected by, and affecting, the war, and the international aspects of the conflict. Mr. Rees writes well of the military action and he sets forth the political scene most understandingly. The real value of this book, it seems to the reviewer, is the objective manner in which the author treats the war as a politico-military action and not as two separate forces working either at cross-purposes or for a common goal. This is really the thesis of the volume. War is not divorced from politics at the commencement of hostilities; war is rightfully a tool for implementing a political policy. For Mr. Rees, the Korean War signaled 'America's emergence from the cocoon of a foreign policy based on total solutions to the reality of the limited ends and means of the cold war.' There are excellent chapters on the recall of General MacArthur, 'that most Republican of Generals,' and the subsequent hearings, and on the international implications of the war as they affected United States-Formosan policy, commitment to NATO, and adherence to the UN. The included maps are adequate, but the photographs indifferent and numerous misspelled words mar the text. Yet, overall, the book is an outstanding account of a unique war and very worth the reading.

C. V. JUDGE
Lieutenant Colonel,
U.S. Marine Corps

Tschebotarioff, Gregory P. *Russia, My Native Land*. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964. 384 p.

Professor Tschebotarioff has written *Russia, My Native Land* with the same completeness and analytical attention to detail that

he has used so often in his professional engineering papers. The reader will not find the flowery, emotional, enthralling imaginings of a novel, but rather a personal history that is made even more fascinating by its dispassionate, dramatic, step-by-step recounting of facts and events. A serious student of prerevolutionary Russia and the counterrevolutionary period during which the Soviets solidified their control, will find not only corroborative evidence of major occurrences, but also firsthand accounts of happenings that have been clouded by disagreement in the literature about this epoch. With the approach of an engineer and a teacher, the author provides both sides of each problem with honesty and clarity, admitting his own mistakes and poor judgment during those hectic years. Professor Tschebotarioff was born into a military family, and was a Cossack (translatable as armed frontiersman) of the Don River area. Trained as an army artillery officer, he saw service on the western front against the Germans/Austrians in World War I, and finally fought on the side of the White Russians in the Don region. The value of this study to the history of this era stems from the Professor's position as interpreter and aide-de-camp to the Ataman of the Don Cossack Army and to other senior officers, and from the 'inside' information to which he thereby became privy. This book is highly recommended to the student of Russia who is attempting to understand the background and motivation of its peoples.

L.E. STIFFLER
Commander, U.S. Navy

Tyler, A. Edward. *The Space around Us*. New York: Harper & Row, 1964. 239 p.

As suggested by the title, so evocative of the title of the late Rachel Carson's widely read book, an analogy is drawn between the sea and the sky in Mr. Tyler's *The Space around Us*. 'The space around us is like a sea,' the author states in his opening sentence, and then presses his aqueous analogy by describing the ocean of electromagnetic particles in outer space and the effect of the solar *wind* on this ocean. His observations on the Van Allen belts, the 'travelers in Space'—sun, planets, meteors, and comets—and the space race, include such orbital data as a consideration of the high altitude megaton blast of 9 July 1962 and a useful log of space projects. The sea-space relation is continued in a very interesting chapter on navigation in space, or 'astrogation,' offering a salty comparison to the sailor's problems in the middle of the Pacific. Mr. Tyler devotes

attention also to the specialized fields of communicating with and tracking satellites, the role of modern electronic computers in space age calculations, chemical propulsion systems, and new developments in engines. In his chapter on life in space, or exobiology, there is an entertaining account of an annual convention of UFO fans and their reports on their space 'experiences.' Almost equally amazing are the scientific advances in tools for 'seeing' in space, and the prospects of the laser for use in communications and lunar exploration. After a discussion of the men who have been important in modern space research, including von Karman, Van Allen, the American astronauts, and von Braun, the book ends with some speculation about where we are going in this dynamic new environment.

H. GLAZER
Chair of Physical Sciences