# BOOK REVIEWS

## PROSPECTS AND CHALLENGES

*Maritime Security Cooperation in the Gulf of Guinea: Prospects and Challenges,* by Kamal-Deen Ali. Leiden, Neth.: Brill, 2015. 372 pages.

In *Maritime Security Cooperation in the Gulf of Guinea,* the legal adviser to the Ghana Navy, Commander Dr. Kamal-Deen Ali, argues that the world should pay attention to the maritime domain of West and Central Africa. The same argument can be made about his book, as Ali not only provides the most in-depth analysis of maritime security prospects and challenges in the Gulf of Guinea to date but offers conceptual frameworks for maritime security that are applicable around the world. Furthermore, the lessons that can be extracted from the Gulf of Guinea experience—both the problems of insecurity and the efforts to address them—can serve as helpful guidance for approaching similar challenges elsewhere. Notwithstanding the relative absence of credible literature on maritime security in West and Central Africa, this book exhibits the rigor of first-rate legal scholarship combined with the intimate knowledge gleaned from an insider's perspective, making it undoubtedly a seminal work on both the Gulf of Guinea specifically and maritime security in general.

Ali begins, rather helpfully, by exploring the meaning of several terms. First and foremost, he seeks to provide a working definition of the "Gulf of Guinea," as the phrase has been used for years without any real consistency to describe the maritime region of West and Central Africa. Ultimately, the author expands the range of states included in this important region. At a minimum, Ali includes the twenty-five member states of the Maritime Organization of West and Central Africa, all of which are members of either the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) or the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS). But he notes that Rwanda, which recently rejoined ECCAS, should not be included, as its strategic interests do not align with the maritime domain of West and Central Africa. On the other hand, he argues that Mauritania, which left ECOWAS in 2000 and is a member of the Arab Maghreb Union, should be included, as it is an important partner for maritime security cooperation in the Gulf of Guinea. This argument constitutes the first of many

novel contributions the book makes to the context-specific dynamics of maritime security in West and Central Africa.

Beyond defining the Gulf of Guinea, Ali makes a convincing case for the region's global strategic significance. The economic contribution of the region to the global energy, mineral, and agriculture markets makes the national security concerns of states in West and Central Africa concerns for the entire world. Even after the decline in the price of oil, Ali's case remains unimpeachable, as his arguments for the region's geostrategic relevance go far beyond oft-repeated statements about Nigerian oil in particular. With details about the region's contribution to the global supply of cotton, cacao, and fish, one need never mention oil to recognize the economic significance of the Gulf of Guinea. These arguments lend further weight to the examples and analyses of the main portions of the book, but the conceptual features of the book are perhaps its most significant academic feature.

In reviewing the literature on maritime security, Ali exposes some significant gaps, in both coverage of issues and existing conceptual frameworks. He begins his analysis by asking a few important questions: What is security? What is maritime security? And for whom is maritime security? In dissecting some of the existing works on maritime security, he comes to advocate a "human security" approach, but compiles elements from a number of different sources. He thus settles on maritime security as being a composite of societal security, environmental security, food security, and economic security. One could argue, therefore, that this approach aligns maritime security more closely with development than defense.

Conceptually, Ali charts new territory on several fronts. First, his analysis of the theoretical underpinnings of security lead him to the conclusion that, although the literature is largely silent in doing so, the theoretical approaches to "security" in general can be applied to the maritime realm as well. He writes, "It is argued that since the ocean environment serves the political, economic, and strategic objectives of States, the dynamics that surround the pursuit of all interstate interests will similarly be reflected in the maritime realm." This notion of the activities, interests, and challenges of the maritime domain being interrelated with the broader national interests suggests that a state's maritime territory is a microcosm of the state itself. Thus maritime security cannot be severed from national interests—security, development, governance, etc.—and is, indeed, a fundamental component of them.

Ali's second departure from the literature involves taking an evolutionary approach to maritime security. By examining how maritime security has developed from being a matter merely of transportation security into a field posing integrated, multisectoral challenges today, he shows how the concept of maritime security has changed and broadened over time. Furthermore, he contends that states' maritime concerns are context specific rather than universal. Partly for this reason, he also asserts that there is no real consensus on the elements of maritime security, allowing for a wide conception of what is included. He seems to suggest that the best approach in the literature is in the 2008 UN secretary-general's Oceans

and the Law of the Sea report, which lists (section V[B]) the main maritime security threats as "piracy and armed robbery against ships"; "terrorist acts involving shipping, offshore installations and other maritime interests"; "[i]llicit trafficking in arms and weapons of mass destruction"; "illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances"; "[s]muggling and trafficking of persons by sea"; "[i]llegal, unreported and unregulated fishing"; and "intentional and unlawful damage to the marine environment." He later assesses this set of threats, along with others, in the specific context of the Gulf of Guinea.

The third main departure is Ali's novel framework for conceiving of maritime security. His framework, elaborated throughout the book, has three elements: (1) identifying the maritime security threat path; (2) applying the threat path to geopolitical and geostrategic features; and (3) implementing a three-layer, three-indicator approach. The maritime security threat path is a bit more than merely a list of generic or even specific maritime security threats. It examines both the activity and the effects of any given threat. This approach allows for the contextualization of the threats versus geopolitical or strategic priorities. The third element of the framework then concerns the approach to those threats, involving three layers—national capacity, regional cooperation, and global support—paired with three progress indicators—improved maritime governance, adequate legal frameworks, and an inclusive maritime security concept. While the book elaborates this conceptual approach in the Gulf of Guinea context, it is applicable globally. Further academic work is therefore warranted, applying Ali's conceptual framework to other contexts besides the Gulf of Guinea.

As significant as this book's theoretical contribution may be to the academic literature on maritime security in general, the book's contribution to the discourse on maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea is impossible to express adequately. As a Ghanaian naval officer and legal adviser, Ali is able to delve into the subject matter in a way that few could. The majority of the book is dedicated to the region-specific analysis, and this is truly the heart of the work.

Given the resource constraints of West and Central Africa as well as the transnational nature of many of the threats, it is not surprising that cooperation is seen as the overarching answer to addressing maritime insecurity in the region. But the architecture of maritime security cooperation is still very much under construction. Ali meticulously dissects the challenges, internal and external, that plague the progress of effectively using cooperation as a means of countering threats. His personal familiarity with the processes afoot takes the chapters on both regional approaches and international partnerships beyond the capacity of normal academic scholarship. Indeed, one could not look up most of the information contained in these portions, further adding to the tremendous value of this volume.

Similarly, the legal analysis in this book would be difficult for any scholar outside the region to replicate. Ali's access to national laws and regional legal frameworks as well as his detailed understanding of international maritime law affords him the opportunity to provide insight into both the legal developments and

challenges in the Gulf of Guinea. Indeed, the book may be viewed as a compendium of the existing legal regimes in the Gulf of Guinea. This legal landscape is important to understand as efforts proceed to combat maritime insecurity and enhance maritime governance through cooperation. The section on emerging jurisdictional issues and legal complexities is particularly significant, as it provides a helpful warning of problems that are likely to arise as the cooperative architecture continues to develop.

Naturally, one of the challenges of writing an analysis of real-world issues is that they do not remain constant. If one were to attempt to identify a criticism of the book, it is that it is already out of date on a few specific issues, although one hardly can blame that on the author. For example, the section on private security companies or private maritime security companies, if written today, likely would include a number of new issues as well as new accountability mechanisms. But the analysis and lessons that can be gleaned remain sound and important, even if additional facts exist that could enhance the discussion.

The book expressly arrives at five main conclusions: (1) Current processes for maritime security cooperation in the Gulf of Guinea do not address adequately the multiple security threats in the region. (2) Poor governance contributes significantly to maritime security threats in the Gulf of Guinea, but the current cooperative framework does not address the land-sea nexus of maritime security concerns. (3) The relevant legal framework for maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea is poorly developed, and this undermines the effectiveness of maritime security enforcement and regional and international cooperation. (4) Prevailing regional cooperative processes lack coordination and have suffered several setbacks. (5) International support for maritime security cooperation in the Gulf of Guinea is inadequate, uncoordinated, and in some cases driven by national interests that affect its overall effectiveness.

These conclusions, as well as the analysis that led to them, serve as an invaluable aid in the ongoing effort to secure the maritime domain of West and Central Africa. This book is a must-read for maritime security scholars and anyone —from policy makers to industry leaders to students—working on maritime matters in the Gulf of Guinea.

IAN M. RALBY

*Marie von Clausewitz: The Woman behind the Making of* On War, by Vanya Eftimova Bellinger. Oxford Univ. Press, 2015. 312 pages. $29.95.

One is tempted to ask why naval officers should be interested in reading a biography of the wife of the famous Prussian philosopher of war Carl von Clausewitz. In answer we might go to the words of Marie von Clausewitz herself, from her letter of dedication to Carl's unfinished masterpiece *On War:* "Readers will be rightly surprised that a woman should dare to write a preface for such a work as this. My friends will need no explanation. . . . Those who knew of our happy marriage and knew that we shared *everything,* not only joy and pain but also every occupation, every concern of daily life, will realize that a task of this kind could not occupy my beloved husband without at the same time becoming

thoroughly familiar to me" (preface to Carl von Clausewitz, *On War,* ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret [Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 1986], p. 65 [emphasis in original]). In other words, to understand better *On War*'s hidden treasures, it helps to understand the formidable woman behind *On War*. We historians have this quaint notion that understanding the context for things helps one better understand the things themselves. For naval professionals, especially at the Naval War College, which owes so much to the Prusso-German intellectual tradition, to understand better the genesis of the greatest philosophy of war is no small thing. (Readers interested in evidence for this idea should consult Ronald H. Spector, *Professors of War: The Naval War College and the Development of the Naval Profession* [Honolulu, HI: Univ. Press of the Pacific, 2005; originally published by the Naval War College Press, 1977], pp. 14–17).

Additionally, Bellinger's biography is the result of a fruitful collaboration with Donald Stoker, who has published a companion biography of Marie's more-famous husband. Together they mined a treasure trove of recently uncovered correspondence between Carl and Marie held in Germany by the (now) famous couple's descendants.

*Marie von Clausewitz* is more than just a biography of a woman married to an officer and military theorist; it covers the spectrum of relevant social, intellectual, military, political, and feminist history. It is truly a synthesis of all these forms, much like Peter Paret's *Clausewitz and the State* (1976), which has held the field on the details of Clausewitz's life and times until now. As advertised, though, the book is centered on the life of his companion and lifelong love, Countess Marie von Brühl. With her formidable language skills, Bellinger does exceptional work in bringing the history, and even the prehistory, of the Brühl family to life.

Many surprises await the reader regarding Marie's background and influence. For example, she was no "ordinary" Prussian countess, but rather a daughter of an imperial count of the Holy Roman Empire. As an imperial aristocrat, she frequented only the very highest social circles in Europe. Her friends and acquaintances were queens, princesses, and various types of grand duchesses—all themselves politically influential women, in an age when few women wielded such influence.

Marie's elevated background raises the book's first major question, which Bellinger poses in this way (p. 47): "How and why did a countess raised in the highest social circles ever allow herself to consider marrying a man with conspicuously less social standing?" Carl's family had only a dubious claim to the "von"—which denoted nobility—in front of his name, he being a son of (at best) a very minor provincial official. Bellinger answers the question in this way (p. 8), and it tells one much about both Carl and Marie: "Indeed, from the very beginning of their romance, the couple determinedly defied the parochial attitudes of the time and strived to build a relationship if not equal in status, then at least equal in nature. . . . [I]t was Carl's promise to treat her as an independent and free individual that made this formidable countess decide upon marriage with a man of lesser social standing."

In other words, Carl and Marie managed to rise above the social norms of their times. Until now we have had only Carl's perspective, as it were—the one we read in *On War*. By telling the story of the collaboration between the two, Bellinger's book makes clear that the real political animal in the family was Marie, not Carl. Her influence can be judged by the fact that after Carl resigned his commission in the Prussian army and left for Russia to join its army—without the Prussian king's written permission—the king still acknowledged Marie, and even nodded to her at court functions. As for Carl, the king never forgave him completely; he did allow him to rejoin the Prussian army later, but never gave him a position of real influence. Again, this misfortune is our good fortune, since it probably allowed Carl the extra time, beyond that required for his minimal duties at the *Kriegsakademie* in Berlin, to write and rewrite his masterpiece.

One also learns that Marie was very active in supporting her husband's career, and developed friendships and corresponded independently of Carl with the great figures of the day, especially General August Neithardt von Gneisenau. Marie's mother, interestingly, was from the British middle class (a story in itself), and she taught Marie to speak English exceptionally well for a German aristocrat. This probably further cemented her relationship with Gneisenau, who also spoke English fluently. The two were so close that Marie, an accomplished painter, later executed one of the more famous existing portraits of Gneisenau.

Bellinger herself is married to a military service member. Because of that experience, as she writes about this military marriage she has an exceptional eye for the sorts of details that some academics might miss. Her text is full of interesting insights and observations on the extraordinary couple, but also includes details that even sailors will recognize, such as the fact that Marie and Carl numbered all their letters when he was in the field so they could tell if some were missing. (The reviewer used this very technique with his spouse during his many cruises in the U.S. Navy.)

Readers looking for new insights on the Prussian perspective from inside the Prussian court during the Napoleonic Wars will be well rewarded, as will those interested in how little or how much Marie played a role in the genesis and writing of *On War,* the subject that occupies roughly the last quarter of the book. Addressing Marie's pivotal role in getting Carl's work published, Bellinger leaves little doubt that without Marie there might have been no *On War* for us to read today, nor any of Carl's other works. Ms. Bellinger's work reminds us that a human life is rarely a solo accomplishment, lived apart and distinct from other human beings. Rather, a relationship such as that of Marie and Carl von Clausewitz is an enterprise lived in collaboration with others of our kind—or in Marie's case, not her kind—especially those we love and who love us. Highly recommended for all audiences.

JOHN T. KUEHN

*A Higher Standard: Leadership Strategies from America's First Female Four-Star General,* by Ann Dunwoody. Boston: Da Capo, 2015. 288 pages. $25.99 (Kindle $14.99).

In this book, General Ann Dunwoody, USA (Ret.), traces her illustrious career from initial entry into the Women's

Army Corps in 1975 as a second lieutenant through her promotion to four-star general to her retirement in 2012 as the commander of the Army Materiel Command (AMC). Dunwoody came from an army family: her father was a veteran of both Korea and Vietnam and retired as a brigadier general; her brother was a West Point graduate; and a sister was one of the Army's first female helicopter pilots. Throughout her remarkable career, Ann Dunwoody blazed a trail with a lengthy list of "firsts":

- First female field-grade officer in the 82nd Airborne Division
- First female to command a battalion in the 82nd Airborne Division
- First female to command the Combined Arms Support Command
- First female in the U.S. military to achieve the rank of four-star general

Dunwoody's promotion to four-star general made front-page news across the country and brought instant recognition outside military circles. Yet Dunwoody remained well-grounded, with strong support from her family. She relates stories about her mother and father and the influence each played in her career. She also tells about her husband, Craig, and how important he was to her success. These stories really enable the reader to relate to her on a personal level. Dunwoody writes (p. 72): "Throughout my life I've met plenty of superheroes, but the strongest and most effective among them were the ones who were simply human and knew they weren't perfect."

The title of the book, *A Higher Standard,* is important to Dunwoody. "Those words became the foundation of my leadership philosophy and a central part of how I tried to live my life." Dunwoody explains that she consistently worked hard to maintain a higher standard for both herself and whatever organization she led. After speaking to executives at Coca-Cola, Dunwoody related, "After managing nearly sixty-nine thousand employees, one thing is clear to me: there is a higher standard that provides the foundation upon which every effective leadership journey is built." We all could learn from her mantra.

This is truly a book about leadership, with each chapter showcasing important lessons and strategies applicable to leaders in any organization. Dunwoody highlights that "[t]his is not a manual about how to become a general, nor will I reveal a secret recipe for becoming a great leader." Her sincerity and passion for the Army team are evident. Chapter 2, "Wendell Would Be Proud—'Never Walk by a Mistake'"—chronicles her relationship, as a new second lieutenant platoon leader, with her platoon sergeant, Sergeant First Class Wendell Bowen. Dunwoody writes (p. 38): "Sergeant Bowen shared wisdom on many levels that guided me through every step of my military career." In this chapter, she discusses the important leadership lessons that young officers and new leaders in any company must learn. Dunwoody is a good storyteller, and the lessons she shares are easy for the reader to relate to. The leadership lessons are summarized in the postscript: "Leadership Strategies from an Army Life."

Another chapter, "Leader of Leaders—'Build Your Bench,'" enables Dunwoody to chronicle her work to promote and build the succession plan at AMC prior to her retirement. She relates (p. 223): "One of the most important jobs a senior leader has is to develop leaders or to 'build the bench.'" This is a critical lesson that many leaders never learn—to the detriment of the

organizations they lead. Countless leaders are often too involved in promoting themselves, and see developing subordinates as a sign of weakness.

The final chapter, "Afterthoughts—'My Way to Continue the Conversation . . . ,'" was initially confusing. It did not flow with the rest of the book; it seemed disjointed; it seemed to be made up of random thoughts about a variety of topics. I eventually realized that it was Dunwoody's way of discussing and underscoring contemporary issues she believes are important.

During my almost thirty-year career in the U.S. Army, I was privileged to serve in the 10th Mountain Division with Ann Dunwoody. Her technical and tactical skills, along with her keen insight and caring attitude, made her a positive role model. It is fitting that she ends every talk with the phrase "In the end, we're all just soldiers, but that's the highest thing you could claim to be." Dunwoody's legacy in the Army and the larger U.S. military will impact generations of young Americans for years to come. This book showcases her exceptional talents as an army officer and leader. It is a must-read for leaders at all levels, in both the military and other organizations.

THOMAS J. GIBBONS

*Lawfare: Law as a Weapon of War,* by Orde F. Kittrie. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2016. 504 pages. $29.95 (Kindle $14.41).

In *Lawfare: Law as a Weapon of War,* legal scholar Orde F. Kittrie analyzes the increasing effectiveness of the use of law to achieve objectives that not long ago might have been achievable only using force. In one of the first major works in English on the practice of lawfare, Kittrie has written an important book for lawyers, policy makers, and military strategists. Successful strategic performance requires an appreciation of the role of politics in war, and because law is an intensely political matter it is an integral part of the strategic operating environment. Kittrie's highly readable *Lawfare* enhances our understanding of the growing strategic potential of law.

This book is at once a history of lawfare, a collection of representative case studies, and a resource for other researchers. The foreword by former CIA director R. James Woolsey Jr. is itself an interesting read, setting up Kittrie's analysis with a description of the international legal arena as a sheriff-less "Wild West" exploited by various governments and nonstate actors. The author also describes his own foray into lawfare as a professor at Arizona State University, where his analysis of Iran's dependence on external gasoline suppliers eventually led to the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions Accountability and Divestment Act of 2010. Kittrie's practical bent is evident throughout *Lawfare,* and he offers numerous suggestions for incorporating lawfare into U.S. national security strategy.

Among the strengths of *Lawfare* are the concepts provided in the first chapter that prepare the reader for the case studies that follow. Kittrie begins with a historical overview, tracing lawfare back to the seventeenth century, when Hugo Grotius used legal arguments to bolster Dutch maritime power. Kittrie's section on the literature of lawfare provides a unique summary of the leading works in the field. Kittrie breaks down the practice of lawfare into two

categories: instrumental lawfare—the use of legal methods to achieve results typically sought from kinetic weapons; and compliance leverage disparity—the seeking of advantages over an opponent more disposed to comply with the law. Kittrie attributes the rise of lawfare to three factors: the increased number and reach of international laws and tribunals, the rise of nongovernmental organizations focused on the law of armed conflict, and the advance of globalization and economic interdependence.

Kittrie follows up his macro-level conceptual analysis with detailed case studies at the micro level that exemplify the prevalent trends in lawfare. His examples move from the battlefields of the Middle East through the courtrooms of New York to the doctrinal manuals of the Chinese military. The range of examples, all linked by the common theme of lawfare's increasing effectiveness, underscores how widespread and multifaceted the phenomenon has become.

Kittrie devotes four of his eight chapters to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which he describes (p. 197) as "the closest thing the world has to a lawfare laboratory." For example, Israel's experience with maritime law in 2011 demonstrates how "offensive" lawfare can achieve a military objective without using force. In May 2010, Israeli forces intercepted a flotilla of ships from Turkey attempting to violate a blockade of the Hamas-controlled Gaza Strip, killing nine people. A UN fact-finding mission subsequently criticized Israel for its handling of the incident. Faced with a similar flotilla preparing to leave Greece in June 2011, Israeli lawyers used legal measures to stop the ships from leaving port. Those measures included threatening legal action against companies providing the ships with essential services such as maritime insurance. In letters to these companies, Israeli lawyers referenced the U.S. Supreme Court case of *Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project* (561 U.S. 1 [2010], 130 S.Ct. 2705) to argue that providing services to the flotilla was illegal because it supported terrorism. The letters proved persuasive. By rendering the ships unable to secure the necessary services to gain permission to leave their Greek ports, Israel succeeded in stopping the 2011 flotilla without firing a shot.

Kittrie devotes a chapter to China's innovative approach to lawfare. He explains how China systematically wages lawfare across the strategic operating environment, including maritime, aviation, and space lawfare, as well as lawfare in cyberspace. For example, Kittrie analyzes how China is using maritime law to justify denying access to the South China Sea for international navigation. China has developed a concept of lawfare it calls *falu zhan,* or "legal warfare," as part of its military doctrine. Kittrie's case studies show how China incorporates lawfare into its strategy through a comprehensive approach coordinated across the Chinese government.

Unlike China, the United States has no similar comprehensive lawfare strategy. Kittrie describes how parts of the U.S. government nevertheless have employed legal techniques successfully to achieve strategic results, such as the U.S. Treasury's use of international financial laws against Iran. Some of the most effective U.S. lawfare has been the work of private-sector attorneys rather than U.S. government actions. Kittrie provides several examples of litigation that used the Antiterrorism Act

of 1990. A significant case was *Boim v. Holy Land Foundation,* in which attorneys working on behalf of the family of a U.S. victim of terrorism secured a judgment against Islamic fund-raising organizations, drying up a significant source of material support to Hamas.

Kittrie concludes with a compelling argument for a more creative and innovative integration of lawfare into U.S. strategy. As he observes (p. 96), the 2015 National Security Strategy identifies security challenges that are decentralized, transcend state borders, involve nonstate actors, and "cannot be neutralized using only deterrence or the United States' traditional kinetic toolbox." *Lawfare* underscores why strategists must have a practical understanding of the entire spectrum of factors affecting the strategic operating environment—informational, cultural, political, economic, social, and legal.

Kittrie understands that it is unrealistic to expect strategists and policy makers to be legal experts as well, so his conclusions include an analysis of the sources of "lawfare power" and recommendations for leveraging the skills of the U.S. legal community. To show how private-sector expertise can inform potential military uses of lawfare, Kittrie describes how Special Operations Command Pacific reached out to the University of Pennsylvania's law school for research on foreign criminal laws that could be used to detain and prosecute foreign fighters supporting the Islamic State. In Kittrie's assessment (p. 32), if the United States properly leverages its extensive legal expertise to support a national lawfare strategy, the "U.S. advantage in sophisticated legal weapons has the potential to be even greater than its advantage in sophisticated lethal weapons."

*Lawfare* reminds us that lethal force is only one of many factors affecting outcomes in war. Kittrie points the way toward how legal factors can be used to achieve practical effects. Military officers and policy makers who read this book will be rewarded with a better understanding of the legal dynamics that are exerting an increasingly powerful influence on the legitimate use of violence.

KEVIN ROUSSEAU

*Playing War: Wargaming and U.S. Navy Preparations for World War II,* by John M. Lillard. Lincoln: Potomac Books, Univ. of Nebraska Press, 2016. 224 pages. $39.95 (Kindle $26.37).

With the Navy's recent efforts to reinvigorate war gaming, there has been renewed interest in the interwar gaming conducted at the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island. In the *Naval War College Review, Proceedings,* and other maritime journals, war-gaming experts and enthusiasts alike have tried to characterize the nature and value of the Navy's war games played between 1919 and 1941. John Lillard's *Playing War: Wargaming and U.S. Navy Preparations for World War II* is the latest contribution to this resurgence. Seeking to provide a comprehensive study of the interwar games conducted at the College, Lillard intends to inform our understanding of the "navy's transition" during this period. *Playing War* asserts (p. 8) that the Newport games were "transformational" and played a "central role . . . in preparing the navy for war." For the most part, the author contributes to the history of that era, but does so with a work that would have benefited

from additional editing and more attention to detail in its historiography.

This book succeeds with its analysis of how the Newport war games evolved to reflect the emergence of new technologies and operational thinking for the Navy. Lillard organizes his analysis into three phases: early (1919–27); middle (1928–34); and late (1935–41). He focuses on one or two College classes within each of the phases, concentrating on those of significant figures such as Chester Nimitz, Thomas Hart, Harold Stark, Kelly Turner, Bull Halsey, and Robert Ghormley. The author is at his best when he analyzes the actual games played and describes the relevant insights recorded by the student-players or the gaming faculty, or both. For example, his section on Tactical Game 94 of 1923 describes how that game demonstrated the importance of reconnaissance and detection of the enemy's forces first. In his chapter on the middle phase, Lillard explains how the games explored the innovations of air and undersea warfare, pointing out that the players learned more about aviation than they did submarines. Lillard concedes that the College games were not innovative in themselves; instead he reinforces the idea that "they were a common playing field, a shared experience" for the men who would fight the next war at sea.

*Playing War* is a useful complement to Edward Miller's *War Plan Orange: The U.S. Strategy to Defeat Japan, 1897–1945* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1991) and Albert Nofi's *To Train the Fleet for War: The U.S. Navy Fleet Problems, 1923–1940* (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2010). Lillard's examination of the 1933 Van Auken report is particularly effective at showing the College's contributions to the evolution of War Plan ORANGE and the fleet problems. Requested by College President Admiral Harris Laning and written by Captain Wilbur R. Van Auken, head of the newly created Research Department, the report summarized lessons learned from all the Blue-Orange games played between 1927 and 1933. The author notes that Van Auken's analysis of the Trans Pacific problem presaged the logistic challenges of the war and the advent of the four hundred destroyer escorts that emerged during the war. As War Plan ORANGE matured in the 1930s, so too did the war gaming, marked by the construction of Pringle Hall and its famously square-tiled gaming floor. Lillard succinctly chronicles Newport's war-gaming transformation throughout the book's narrative.

Readers familiar with the scholarship that examines the U.S. Navy between the two world wars will be distracted by Lillard's efforts to set his thesis apart from the other literature. *Playing War* looks and feels most similar to Michael Vlahos's *The Blue Sword: The Naval War College and the American Mission, 1919–1941* (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 1980). Both of these works are short in length, and have appendices and tables that lay out the war games played by each class. Lillard's book focuses more directly on the games and the chronology of the College than Vlahos's monograph does. However, in attempting to separate his research from *The Blue Sword,* Lillard states (p. 10) that Vlahos "did not use wargame records from the Naval War College archives," which is not true. Making matters more confusing, Lillard continues to refer to Vlahos's text throughout the book. Later, Lillard asserts (p. 12) that John Hattendorf, coauthor of *Sailors and*

*Scholars: The Centennial History of the U.S. Naval War College* (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 1984), is "a former professor of naval history" whose history of the College lacks "critical analysis." At the time of publication, Hattendorf was and remains the Ernest J. King Professor of Maritime History at the Naval War College, and is still recognized as the preeminent scholar on the history of the U.S. Navy at Newport.

In addition to these two notable errors, *Playing War* still reads like a dissertation in need of another round of editing. Chapter introductions and descriptions of the students are repeated several times and add little to the analysis presented. With the main body of the book ending at 137 pages, this work leaves the reader with the impression that there is still more to explore about the relationship between the interwar war games and how the U.S. Navy fought during the Second World War. While this imperfect volume has some merit, the definitive history of the Naval War College's interwar war games remains to be written.

JON SCOTT LOGEL

*Social Science Goes to War: The Human Terrain System in Iraq and Afghanistan,* ed. Montgomery McFate and Janice H. Laurence. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2015. 320 pages. $39.95 (Kindle $22.99).

The twenty-first-century security environment has been characterized by numerous cross-cultural battle spaces, such as those in Iraq and Afghanistan. The U.S. Army initiated the human terrain team (HTT) because it needed to address the impact of the human cultural dimension in the combat operational environment. The HTT's mission was to conduct research (in the social sciences and anthropology) and to advise military commanders about the unique cultural aspects of the local/regional population. In eleven chapters, McFate and Laurence have compiled an invaluable collection of experiences from the scientists involved. They afford us the opportunity to accompany these scientists on their journeys, as they share their perspectives with the military. We learn the value of embedding social scientists with military units and how important their knowledge and expertise are for military leaders to achieve an understanding of today's complex, culturally diverse operational environments. In this way, social scientists can help military leaders make more-informed, and therefore better, decisions.

General David Petraeus (Ret.) states in the foreword that the "key terrain in irregular warfare is the human terrain." He highlights the role social scientists played in shaping the cultural framework of the battle space and how they contributed to military leaders' knowledge to ensure mission success. General Petraeus posits the notion that the military indeed may require even greater sociocultural knowledge to conduct future military operations.

Today's military leaders are well trained in tactics, techniques, and procedures; however, the twenty-first-century battle space presents inherent difficulties for military leaders. One of their principal deficiencies is a lack of cross-cultural competence ($C^3$). $C^3$ is the ability to communicate effectively and appropriately with people of other cultures. As the number of multinational coalition military operations

continues to increase, military leaders will need to achieve $C^3$ to be effective.

Military leaders must be prepared to adapt to a wide range of cultural, social, and political challenges in the operational environment. Education in cultural competency, cultural intelligence, and social intelligence plays a pivotal role in a military leader's ability to lead, build relationships based on trust, and develop unity of effort and command within complex, culturally diverse environments. A leader's ability to engage and communicate effectively requires that he or she understand the unique social and behavioral qualities of the local population. This capability is a requirement for successful negotiation and conflict management. Lack of it can mean the difference between success and failure.

This volume is a tribute to the knowledge and expertise of social scientists who served as members of HTTs. Their stories serve as evidence of their unique experiences, insights, and contributions toward achieving cultural understanding in combat zones in places such as Iraq and Afghanistan. It is worth noting that HTTs offered more than just cultural expertise. Rather, they made a considerable investment in developing relationships with local people and provided their military units with critical assessments about operating in and among members' host nations. This information was critical for military decision makers and those involved in counterinsurgency campaigns, so it was critical for the social scientists as soon as possible to build rapport and credibility with the local population, as well as with the military units to which they were assigned. Laurence and McFate invite us to share their experiences as we join each scientist on that journey.

For example, James Dorough-Lewis's chapter, "Investing in Uncertainty," provides a clear illustration of some of the challenges the social scientists faced in the HTTs. We learn about the need to delineate between social scientists and members of the Intelligence Community. This distinction is critical for social scientists as they attempt to establish relationships based on trust and credibility. Their research task is to assess and understand the cultural nuances and the cultural environment that may impact the overall military operation; in contrast, the intelligence analyst probes the environment for meaningful information that will be used to understand the operational environment. The social scientist seeks to understand each individual's cultural perspective and relationships among people living in the environment. Social scientists and anthropologists in the HTTs work with the local people to build relationships based on trust and to find ways to help local people continue with their daily lives. In one such example (p. 196), the Army had built a hospital to meet all the security requirements. However, Sunni women needing medical care preferred to travel to a hospital an hour away—rather than travel the path on which their husbands, sons, and brothers had lost their lives. Social scientists were able to communicate with these women and understand their cultural perspective, which they shared with the military team. This incident highlights the need to understand the culture, beliefs, and values of the local people when operating in a culturally diverse region. Social scientists provide a cultural lens toward the local people, examining and explaining how they perceive what is happening in their unique cultural point of view.

This book provides the perspectives and experiences of social scientists who, embedded with military teams, shared their knowledge and cultural expertise to help military leaders make informed decisions within culturally diverse environments. This volume will prove to be an invaluable resource for military leaders, as it highlights the importance and impact of understanding the role of cultural diversity in military operations. McFate and Laurence have performed a service to the military by providing a valuable resource for all military leaders to guide them in future military operations. In addition, this book applauds those scientists who were daring enough to join in the human terrain effort and share their experiences with us. The ability to achieve cultural competence must be viewed as a warfighting imperative and as a prerequisite for all future military leaders. This volume is informative and inspiring—a must-read for all those interested in the cultural and human dimensions of multinational warfare. The detailed bibliography provides recommendations for further reading to enhance the reader's knowledge of this topic.

YVONNE R. MASAKOWSKI

*Relentless Strike: The Secret History of Joint Special Operations Command,* by Sean Naylor. New York: St. Martin's, 2015. 560 pages. $29.99 (paperback $17.99, Kindle $14.99).

Once again, Sean Naylor has produced an authoritative and well-written book. *Relentless Strike* chronicles the history of the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC), America's top-tier special operations military unit. To the benefit of history and the reader, and most likely to the consternation of the Pentagon, Naylor's knowledge of special operations and his extensive contacts reveal the temperaments and competencies of key individuals and the details of numerous clandestine missions and organizational capabilities. Many will condemn Naylor for revealing these secrets, but the fault is not with Naylor; it is with those who talked. The book also, perhaps unintentionally, exposes flaws in how the United States wages war, as well as the limitations of special operations.

The book begins by recounting the creation of JSOC after the failed Iranian hostage rescue operation in 1980. New threats to national security required a new military organization that had the resources and capabilities to respond quickly to crises and apply specialized military capabilities to rescue hostages, kill terrorists, and neutralize weapons of mass destruction. Naylor reminds us that senior military leaders opposed the new command, but the failure in Iran trumped parochial thinking. The second and more interesting part of the book addresses the expansion of JSOC as one result of the momentous impact of the 9/11 attacks.

From the beginning, JSOC had significant advantages over both conventional military organizations and nonaffiliated special operations units. The units placed under JSOC's direct control were the best-trained and best-resourced units in the military. Each of these units had its own sophisticated—and grueling—selection process. Remarkably, JSOC headquarters had nothing that mirrored such careful processes for selecting its staff. Also oddly, the Pentagon had no process for selecting a JSOC commander whose experience

and temperament matched the requirements of a national force. To be sure, some of JSOC's early commanders were excellent—but that was the exception. This deficiency became clear in the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks.

The 1980s and '90s were a period of steady growth in terms of structure, budget, and formalized relationships throughout the interagency world. JSOC was required to be ready to launch a task force within four hours for a variety of missions of national importance. Although specific mission requirements ultimately would dictate the task force's composition, significant mission "enablers" from inside the Defense Department and external to it always had to be on standby. It required dedication of a dozen Air Force transport aircraft to deploy the JSOC staff, operators, helicopters, ground-assault vehicles, and other necessary equipment for initial operations. This initial package often would encompass five hundred people, and more people and equipment frequently would follow. Additionally, being ready for every contingency required JSOC to have a comprehensive liaison network throughout many government agencies, especially the Intelligence Community. This formulaic approach to every mission resulted in a large task force being deployed for almost every problem. As a result, JSOC unintentionally undermined its ability to deploy clandestinely and remain agile.

During this time frame, JSOC deployed to war alongside conventional forces in Panama and during Operation DESERT STORM. It also deployed in response to the hijacking of the Italian cruise ship *Achille Lauro,* which had eighteen Americans aboard, and to Somalia in 1993 in what would become the "Black Hawk Down" debacle. Other, less-known operations took place as well. The results of JSOC's work before 9/11 were mixed, at best. While the quality of operators in JSOC's subordinate units was superb, the JSOC command and staff—and "Washington"—often underperformed. Some of these deficiencies would be addressed after 9/11.

The 9/11 attacks produced a sense of vulnerability for Americans. They also created a need to respond quickly with force against those directly and indirectly responsible. No one was more frustrated by the military's inability to strike back quickly than Donald Rumsfeld, the Secretary of Defense. Rumsfeld looked to General Charles Holland, commander of the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), for a plan. He was bitterly disappointed: Holland was unprepared, and therefore was reluctant to seize the opportunity to take the war to America's enemies. However, JSOC's reputation, built in part by its extensive liaison network in Washington and its sophisticated exercise program, now grabbed Rumsfeld's attention. JSOC easily was able to sell its unique capabilities to an anxious buyer. JSOC's boundless self-confidence would lead to an expanded role, because the administration in Washington desperately needed to go after Al Qaeda and its supporters.

Although JSOC was a subordinate command of USSOCOM, General Holland was happy to stay on the sidelines. JSOC would become "almost an independent military force for Rumsfeld," under the command of Major General Dell Dailey. Everything seemed to be in place for JSOC to destroy those responsible for the 9/11 attacks. The leadership in Washington empowered JSOC to do whatever was necessary. The superbly

trained operators were anxious to make Bin Laden and his lieutenants pay with their lives for their actions. But, for the second time, a leadership deficiency on the part of a senior commander hampered JSOC. General Holland, and now Major General Dailey, both aviators, did not have what was necessary to unleash JSOC's special operations capabilities. Both were conservative, conventional thinkers unable to adapt to a new type of warfare. The triad necessary for successful action had two elements in hand—Washington sponsorship and competent operators—but still lacked a key element: a proper JSOC commander. Major General Stanley McChrystal would fix this shortcoming, and with gusto.

McChrystal commanded JSOC for almost five years, transforming it into a killing machine in Iraq, Afghanistan, and beyond. To McChrystal and many in Washington, JSOC was the "nation's main effort in the war on terror." He was in charge of a global enterprise, but the enterprise needed better intelligence and a better scheme to respond rapidly to that intelligence. JSOC would expand its liaison network within the Intelligence Community and to other organizations operating in the region. Capturing and interrogating enemy operatives now would be preferred to killing them. JSOC began running agent networks as well as putting its own operators on the ground, even in places such as Benghazi, to develop situational awareness. JSOC also demanded extensive aerial reconnaissance assets. Likewise, war in the information age pushed JSOC to develop a cyber capability to hack into social media and cell phone communications. Then JSOC's subordinate units needed to retool to respond to the growing clarity about the disposition of the enemy networks that the intelligence process was producing.

General McChrystal's force of personality fused all these disparate parts of the enormous intelligence apparatus together. Retooling Delta Force, the Rangers, and SEAL Team 6 was relatively easy; the troops instinctively knew they needed to operate in small teams and in unorthodox ways to defeat enemy networks. They welcomed McChrystal's aggressiveness and willingness to take risks. The war was an obsession for the JSOC commander. It became McChrystal's life, and he wanted his men to understand that the war, and nothing else, should be their life too. His single-minded determination was infectious to some and repellent to others. The JSOC commander had perfected a process that became known as F3EAD ("Find, Fix, Finish, Exploit, Analyze, Disseminate"), and the JSOC operations center was called the "Death Star." "Strike to develop" intelligence became the task force catchphrase. McChrystal had perfected the F3EAD machine, and the process had become self-sustaining.

Naylor claims that in the U.S. military's darkest days in Iraq, JSOC was the only American force achieving success. This depends on how you measure success, especially in light of the contemporary situation in both Iraq and Afghanistan. Under McChrystal's leadership, JSOC's operators efficiently and effectively found, fixed, and captured or killed high- and midvalue targets and anyone else they deemed appropriate. Often they fought their war disconnected from other U.S. and coalition forces that were fighting the same war. JSOC's size, an issue in the 1980s and 1990s, grew from about eight hundred to more than 2,300 in 2008, not including

a six-hundred-man JSOC intelligence brigade added in late 2008. JSOC demanded and received a disproportionate share of assets, including taking control of other military units not only when necessary but when convenient—to the dismay of commanders also charged with fighting the war. But JSOC did kill Zarqawi and Bin Laden and many, many other very bad people. Leaders in Washington declared, "JSOC is awesome." Our enemies needed killing, and no military unit did it better than JSOC.

Naylor tells us that before 9/11 several key figures described JSOC as "a Ferrari in the garage." General McChrystal, with the full support of leaders in Washington, took the Ferrari out of the garage and created a killing machine whose performance was unparalleled. Unfortunately, a discerning reader easily could conclude that the Ferrari actually was still on the same road as the rest of the U.S. military—and that road would lead to nowhere.

HY S. ROTHSTEIN

*Ghost Fleet: A Novel of the Next World War,* by P. W. Singer and August Cole. New York: Houghton Mifflin, 2015. 416 pages. $28 (paperback $14.95, Kindle $9.99).

No author today will argue with Samuel Taylor Coleridge's perspective that any work of fiction requires the reader to engage in a willing suspension of disbelief. The wording of the concept is important because it goes beyond the idea of a reader just pushing the "I believe" button. The concept requires the reader to be an active participant: he or she must willingly enter a world known to be false. It is the job of the author to maintain that world, to hold the reader suspended throughout the entire book, and to prevent him or her from falling out of the fictional world with an ungraceful "whump."

For the author of a techno-thriller, holding the reader suspended in this alternate reality requires even more finesse than for other types of fiction. The world of a techno-thriller is relatively close to the world in which the reader lives. Both the technology and the environment of the story are set in a future near enough that all the governmental and organizational structures, global and domestic relationships, and technical capabilities showcased in the story must be close enough to what the reader knows today to be believable.

This is the challenge P. W. Singer and August Cole set for themselves in *Ghost Fleet*. It is a herculean task. The international backdrop today is far different from that of the techno-thriller heyday of the 1980s and early 1990s. The U.S. cultural setting of *Red Storm Rising,* published in 1986, was influenced by forty years of the Cold War. Dominated by baby boomers and gen Xers, the general population of the United States during that time had limited access to international news and perspectives, had grown up with the threat of nuclear war, and had been indoctrinated with the ideological vilification of Communism. Today the cultural backdrop for the U.S. population is as mixed and varied as the people themselves. International news and perspectives are available to anyone, quite literally at the touch of a finger; the threat of nuclear war has been replaced with a threat of terrorism; and ideological vilification

revolves around extremist religious groups rather than nation-states.

This techno-thriller, then, with its hegemonic China overtaking the United States, feels slightly unbalanced, as if it is not settled on a firm foundation. It was only during the last decade that a majority of Americans came to consider China a player on the international stage, and those Americans who view China as a threat (with the exception of the U.S. Navy, perhaps) represent both a smaller percentage and an even newer phenomenon. In fact, the American perspective of our relationship with China over the past ten years probably can be described best as bipolar, or maybe schizophrenic; but historically China has not been considered existentially threatening, and still is not commonly considered so today. Whump.

That means the story Pete Singer and August Cole create has to be strong enough to overcome each cultural inconsistency that unceremoniously dumps us out of our suspended disbelief. Unfortunately, the one-dimensional and stereotyped portrayal of the military family in the story is representative of the rest of the characters in the book. Whump. China's "Directorate" is a calculating, unfeeling behemoth. The Russian character is a vodka-swilling spy. The insurgent is a femme fatale. Whump, whump, whump. It may be an editor's dream to have characters do exactly what we presume they would do, but as a story line it does not carry enough of a thrill to make the reader want to stay engaged. Rather than incorporating strong, motivating factors (including irrational ones) that would make erratic actions plausible and add interest and depth to the story, the characters act exactly as their stereotypes suggest they should—and the results of their actions are predictable.

The strongest element of the book is the technologies the authors choose to include. While the overuse of nomenclature feels clunky for all but those who collect technical classifications like Boy Scout badges, the authors do not reach too far into the realm of science fiction to build their arsenal of weapons, chemicals, and drugs. There is enough linkage to existing technologies and medical trends to make the future employment of these more-advanced programs feel realistic. Even so, they all fit into a too-predictable, no-surprise-here mold. There are even a few moments when the story feels like a propaganda piece for the Navy's existing *Zumwalt*-class destroyer or railgun programs. Whump, and whump again.

All of which raises the question, who is the audience P. W. Singer and August Cole are trying to reach? If it is the military, we do not need to read four hundred pages to tell us what we already know. China's versions of the concepts of antiaccess/area-denial and air-sea battle have brought plenty of visibility to the future risk China represents, even for those who have not been watching the Pacific for years. If the book is intended for a civilian population that no longer shares the common cultural backdrop that existed during the Cold War, it feels like just another fearmongering piece written by another advocate for a bigger defense budget. If it is a plea for the administration to sit up and take notice of China as a threat, it does not do a good enough job of explaining why all the elements of U.S. national power supposedly are completely defunct.

Perhaps all of this is what makes the book unique, though. While the plot follows the typical path of a techno-thriller, where an aggressive move by a "bad guy" forces a "good guy" to join in a fight of epic proportions, the discomfort the reader feels at the end is real, despite all the fully anticipated and stereotyped characters, plots, and technologies.

But that is not so much thrilling as it is troubling. The disturbing question that lurks in the background and permeates the plot like an insidious, deadly gas is, how effective is the United States when it comes to using the diplomatic and informational elements of national power in the international arena? This might have been the true heart of the story. Surrounded by layers of protective muscle in military might and economic strength, have the diplomatic and informational elements of U.S. national power aged and atrophied beyond the size of the body they inhabit? Without the diplomatic and informational elements, can the government still operate on just the military and economic elements? The idea is unexplored, but *Ghost Fleet,* with a plot that takes Lady Liberty's sword and purse away right from the start, leaves readers suspended in a disbelief completely different from the one they thought they were entering.

CONNIE FRIZZELL

*In All Respects Ready: Australia's Navy in World War One,* by David Stevens. Melbourne, Austral.: Oxford Univ. Press, 2014. 320 pages. $59.95.

Writing a definitive history of any major conflict from a single nation's perspective can be an exacting task—and, in the case of the First World War at sea, a thankless one too, when compared with the far better known and better reported situation on land. This notwithstanding, it is hard to imagine a more timely and well-balanced book. David Stevens, as the Royal Australian Navy's historian, was perhaps in a perfect position to take on this project, but this should in no way diminish what he has achieved. His extensive and far-reaching research has produced a work that, while entertaining and readable, has sufficient gravitas to ensure it will become the definitive work on the subject. This title will appeal to all audiences; historians will revel in the wealth of archival material and private diaries, but this book is far more appealing than a mere record of historical fact. Anyone who has been to sea and experienced life on board ship, in particular a warship, will appreciate the insights from someone so obviously well versed in this area. Drawing heavily on his own seagoing background, Stevens presents an engaging narrative that gets to the very heart of the unique human experience that is life at sea.

In many ways, then, this book represents the best of both possible approaches to a history of this type: the broad and analytical, which sweeps over the major maritime events of the time, giving the work its much-needed context; and the intensely personal, employing many passages from diaries, letters, and reports that together illustrate the rich variety of naval life from the deck plates to the wardroom. To this end, each chapter ends with a short biography of an important or interesting figure from the preceding pages, which both enriches and helps to consolidate this comprehensive coverage. The book also triumphs in another aspect: by not

overlooking the very real administrative challenges the young navy faced in trying to establish itself simultaneously with the moment of its supreme test: a world war at sea. Thus, interspersed with coverage of all the important actions at sea is a discussion of the myriad supporting activities necessary to develop a navy with global reach: the establishment of bases and supply lines; the use of native labor; the issues of pay and benefits; the challenges of recruiting and training; right down to health concerns and the treatment of offenders and deserters—it is all there. Even the boredom of the long and often fruitless patrols in search of contraband and intelligence, so much a feature of the war at sea and yet rarely reported on, is reproduced faithfully in an engaging manner.

In the end, one is left to marvel at the foresight of those who, all those years ago, came up with the "fleet unit" idea, as a way for the British dominions to contribute to the naval defense of the global economic system—something that should still resonate today, in this new era of naval cooperation. Australia alone among them persevered with it, and as a result was propelled within a few short years into the companionship of those nations with true global reach at sea. This is an important book because, above all else, it is a lasting testament to the character of the Australian sailor. The hurdles were enormous, but the Australians, it seems, always rose to the challenges, overcoming them with ease under the most trying of circumstances —and with an alacrity and charm that has endeared them to all.

ANGUS ROSS

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