BOOK REVIEWS

EURO-BASHING AS GOOD SPORT

Gordon, Philip H., and Jeremy Shapiro. *Allies at War: America, Europe, and the Crisis over Iraq*. New York: McGraw-Hill, 2004, 266pp. \$19.95

Is the alliance between the United States and the European community of nations broken beyond repair? Brookings Institution scholars Philip H. Gordon and Jeremy Shapiro definitively address the most fundamental and perplexing question continuing to face transatlantic relations. The authors, both products of the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies and presently in residence at Brookings in the Foreign Policy Studies Program, undertake a disciplined, critical analysis of whether the special relationship between nations is worth preserving. The book, in essence, represents a magnum opus regarding the ongoing question of shared values and solidarity in the U.S.-European alliance. Gordon and Shapiro effectively present valuable counterpoints to prominent neoconservative viewpoints marginalizing the influence and utility of Europe—particularly "Old Europe." This volume argues that the differences between the European and American viewpoints on security, particularly handling the rise of radical Islam, are more complex than Robert Kagan's "Americans are from Mars,

Europeans are from Venus" analogy. Gordon and Shapiro's ultimate conclusion is that strategic partners who share so much cultural identity with the United States, and who have had the courage to invoke for the first time in the alliance's fifty-two-year history their mutual defense clause in the wake of the 11 September attacks, should not be cast aside in the interest of short-term political expediency and of pandering to demographic elements who regard Euro-bashing as good sport. Despite the posturing, tough talk, and emotionalism swirling around the continued debate on the viability of the most successful and functional international alliance in history, America needs its European allies and NATO as much as they need America.

Although Gordon and Shapiro scrutinize the historic alliance of NATO and its relevance in light of the diminished threat from the East, they are also talking about something larger than NATO and its internal imperfections and inefficiencies and the synergy of its membership. They explore the real, substantial fissures in the transatlantic

alliance generally and the ascendancy of a new paradigm of political equality between the world's only remaining superpower and the interstate economic and political entity of Europe. Disagreement between the United States and the European powers is nothing new. As examples, the authors cite the 1956 Suez crisis, disharmony over U.S. policy in Vietnam (as the United States arguably attempted to finish what the French started in Indochina), substantive debates over the placement of Minuteman nuclear missiles in Germany during the height of the Cold War, and internal rifts over policy in the Balkans. They also observe that French leadership of the international intransigence toward U.S. policy on Iraq led some in the U.S. government and American society in general to exaggerate (and oversimplify) perceived French ingratitude for American contributions to their own preservation of sovereignty---twice in the same century—and German ungratefulness for the substantial postwar reconstruction that brought West Germany quickly back into the community of nations. The authors rightly observe that the U.S.-European rift demonstrates less about European courage and willingness to take a hard line against Iraq than about the European community's demand to at long last be truly equal partners in the alliance.

Gordon and Shapiro note that the familiar refrain, "the mission should determine the coalition," is far more controversial than it sounds: while a nation such as the United States should, of course, put its own national security interests first, is there a long view on cooperative strategy that trumps short-term coalition building? *Allies at War* represents a road map for "how to get

there from here." The authors hypothesize that given more time for diplomacy and a meaningful chance for Iraq to avoid war, France would have eventually voted for war. Germany, emboldened by the French example of standing down the Americans, would have probably followed suit, lessening Russian and Chinese resolve to block the war in the UN Security Council. The American diplomatic strategy, born perhaps of arrogance, intemperance, or a lack of understanding of the value of international approval or acquiescence to the principle of regime change in Iraq, placed the rest of the world on the American time line, which reflected eagerness to gain approval before the onset of summer temperatures in Iraq, which in turn diminish combat effectiveness. The diplomatic effort was driven by a single factor—because the United States had moved a hundred thousand troops and tens of thousands of tons of gear and materiel halfway around the world, war had to happen in March and could not wait until October. For many Europeans, America's "enough is enough" policy represented a fait accompli. The U.S. challenge was to legitimize a decision that had been made long before—to invade Iraq and topple the Baathist government.

The detailed authoritative account of the diplomatic effort is alone worth the investment in this book. The effort was a crusade that ultimately failed to achieve its prewar goal to unite Europe and add support, if not membership, to the ad hoc coalition. Concerning the run-up to war, and in its aftermath, the question lingers—did the war irreparably harm the relationship between NATO, the United States and Europe? Is the alienation permanent? If not,

what can and should be done to repair the damage? Should we care?

Allies at War highlights convincingly that the egotistical, black-and-white, good vs. "axis of evil" juxtaposition of parties in the conflict seemingly made it easy, even necessary, for Americans to demand that the Europeans choose sides: "You're either with us or against us." The Europeans, by contrast, found room for a third position. They would be willing to hold Iraq accountable, through military action if necessary, but only after diplomacy had been exhausted, not merely attempted. Perhaps, in light of the conflict that followed, the French and German position was not unreasonable—that the fact that Iraq had been in technical noncompliance with a litany of UN Security Council resolutions for a decade or more paled in comparison to their interest in demanding equal partnership and real, meaningful consultation between the United States and European powers.

The authors identify three key factors underlying French leadership of the European revolution: that removing Saddam Hussein from power could prove to be a strategic mistake; the desire to deny the United States a "blank check" for the use of force in pursuit of narrow national interests; and the establishment of French and German leadership of the European Union (EU). Yet at least one other factor does not obtain sufficient treatment in this book—the effect that French, German, and other European national economic considerations had upon the decision to oppose U.S. military intervention in Iraq. Indeed, eighteen months after the initiation of hostilities, Germany, France, and Russia were finally convinced by U.S. diplomats to forgive up to 80

percent of Iraq's multibillion dollar debt to the nineteen-nation "Paris club" to promote Iraqi reconstruction efforts. Moreover, a recent report by CIA investigator Charles Duelfer revealed substantial economic interests personally held by influential French businessmen and politicians—interests tied to the UN oil-for-food program.

Whether economic considerations materially affected the Franco-German position remains to be seen; ultimately, however, the underlying nature of French and German prewar obstinacy would not change Gordon and Shapiro's ultimate conclusions that the U.S.-European alliance should be here to stay and that U.S. investment in repairing continental relations would be beneficial to both sides of the ocean. Current "damn the torpedoes" groupthink is not sustainable in the interest of long-term security, and the benefit of gaining European and international legitimacy and resources is worth the cost in efficiency and selfdetermination. The security of liberal democracies from the common threat of radical Islamic terrorism demands solidarity, consultation, and compromise, not more brinksmanship and alienation. The war on terror could last forty-eight years, not forty-eight months, and even the military behemoth United States cannot go it alone in a fight this long, extensive, and wide-ranging.

Overall, Gordon and Shapiro's argument that the alliance is worth protecting and preserving is sound. This is a book for security professionals serious about examining the future of U.S. relations with the group of well resourced and well respected nations that have been longest our steadfast friends,

rather than indulging in oversimplified truisms regarding French and German national courage and gratitude for American participation in the world wars, the Marshall Plan, and the Cold War.

ROB BRACKNELL
Major, U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Europe
Staff Judge Advocate, USA,
Al Anbar Province, Iraq



Klare, Michael T. Blood and Oil: The Dangers and Consequences of America's Growing Dependency on Imported Petroleum. New York: Henry Holt, 2004. 265 pp. \$25

In *Blood and Oil*, Professor Michael Klare of Hampshire College offers an important critique of U.S. national security policy, one that should be read by American security professionals. In brief, he argues that U.S. foreign and military policy has been increasingly driven by the need to ensure reliable access to foreign oil, especially in the Middle East, and that as American foreign oil dependence continues to grow, U.S. forces will increasingly find themselves fighting to defend oil-producing regions and supply routes.

An engaging writer, Klare develops his thesis as follows. After documenting the substantial and growing U.S. dependence on foreign oil and the problems it has created, Klare describes the increasing involvement of the United States in the Middle East since World War II, particularly its close ties with Saudi Arabia, and the negative consequences of this involvement for American security. The next two chapters detail the latest phase of this unfolding story; they analyze the energy strategy adopted by the Bush administration in 2001,

pointing out how it has only reinforced U.S. dependence on foreign oil, especially from the Persian Gulf, and they describe the administration's policies toward the region. A fifth chapter discusses the prospects for diversifying foreign oil supplies, concluding that this approach offers little hope of reducing U.S. reliance on the Gulf even though it would increase the chances of American entanglement in conflicts elsewhere, while a sixth describes how U.S. oil dependence may increasingly bring this country into conflict with Russia and China. The final chapter summarizes the costs of oil dependence. It all too briefly sets forth an alternative national energy strategy of "autonomy and integrity," which emphasizes detaching our pursuit of energy from security commitments to foreign governments, reducing oil consumption, and hastening the development of alternative energy sources.

Overall, Klare performs a valuable public service by shining a spotlight on the national security consequences of U.S. foreign oil dependence, consequences that have often gone underappreciated. A central theme is how American leaders have chosen to "securitize" oil—that is, "to cast its continued availability as a matter of 'national security,' and thus something that can be safeguarded through the use of military force." The book is very well documented, with forty-five pages of notes, including references to a number of primary sources.

Some of Klare's claims may seem shrill or speculative, in part because they are so rarely voiced, but they nevertheless bear careful consideration. Perhaps most controversial will be his description of the current U.S. policy toward the Gulf. "In the months before and after 9/11," he argues, "the Bush administration fashioned a comprehensive strategy for American domination of the Persian Gulf and the procurement of ever-increasing quantities of petroleum." This "strategy of maximum extraction" involved three goals—the stabilization of Saudi Arabia, the removal of Saddam Hussein and his replacement with a stable government capable of substantially boosting oil output, and the escalation of pressure on Iran in the hopes of producing a favorable leadership change there as well.

As important and overlooked as oil has been as a determinant of U.S. strategy toward the region, this characterization of the Bush administration's policies may appear simplistic given the various other motives offered, such as nonproliferation, antiterrorism, and Israel's security. In particular, given the title of the book, the connection between energy concerns and the invasion of Iraq would have benefited from more thorough analysis. As it is, Klare devotes just one page to an explicit discussion of the administration's oil-related motives for ousting Saddam. As indirect evidence, he points to U.S. efforts to seize Iraq's oil facilities at the outset of the war, but this overlooks the equally plausible goal of ensuring that postwar Iraq could finance its own reconstruction.

Ultimately, Klare's argument is largely structural in nature, but it is also a powerful one that cannot be easily dismissed. As he notes in the preface, "Since cheap oil is essential to the nation's economic vigor, American leaders, of whatever party affiliation, have felt compelled to do whatever was necessary to ensure that enough was available to satisfy our ever-expanding

requirements." As the competition for oil intensifies, what is deemed necessary could well be increasingly a military response.

JOHN DUFFIELD

Department of Political Science

Georgia State University



Cronin, Audrey Kurth, and James M. Ludes, eds. *Attacking Terrorism: Elements of a Grand Strategy.* Washington, D.C.: Georgetown Univ. Press, 2004. 320pp. \$26.95

This volume is a much-needed tonic. Attacking Terrorism—a somewhat bellicose title, since most of the articles included recognize the need for a carefully calibrated response to terrorism—is a diverse collection of focused and evenhanded assessments of the military, diplomatic, economic, and legal tools available to confront the problem. Cronin, a terrorism specialist with the Congressional Research Service and an adjunct professor at Georgetown University, and Ludes, a former editor in chief of National Security Studies Quarterly, selected their contributors well. The diversity of expertise this volume offers affords it a broad perspective on counterterrorism strategies.

Lindsay Clutterbuck offers an exploration of a legal approach to combating terrorism (including illuminating discussions of British and European Union practices); she concludes that it is best to combine the legal and military elements of the struggle rather than approach counterterrorism solely as a war. Striking a similar note, Timothy Hoyt argues that the "use of military force may prove spectacularly unsuccessful if it is not carefully correlated

with political objectives." Yet he argues that it is "indisputable" that we have entered into a war with al-Qa'ida. Hoyt makes the point that the terrorists' campaign meets Clausewitz's definition of a "continuation of policy by other means," and that the American response will likely involve the use of military force over "many years." He also observes, however, that the elusive nature of terrorist organizations raises serious obstacles to employing military force to counteract them.

In a well-timed essay, Paul Pillar offers an excellent overview of the intelligence challenges peculiar to terrorist organizations. He notes there is grave danger in a rush to reform following an event such as 9/11. "A couple of wellpublicized mistakes . . . become the basis for a widely expressed beliefrepeated unquestioningly by scores of commentators—that 'the FBI and the CIA don't communicate with each other.'" (Ironically, Cronin echoes exactly this criticism of interagency communication in her conclusion.)

Carnes Lord offers a penetrating chapter on the opportunities and, more tellingly, the difficulties involved in what he terms "psychological-political instruments." While Lord is certainly correct that we must not "write off the West's assets in this contest," one finds oneself grimly concurring with Fouad Ajami's assessment of public diplomacy's prospects: "It's hopeless. We will not get a hearing." Lord claims the key task is not to sell democracy but to undermine radical Islam. Patrick Cronin also argues that "foreign aid triage" will certainly be of use in this regard. This aid will be urgently needed to "strengthen general order, moderate

institutions, and influential community and national leaders" in order to combat terrorism over the long term.

Martha Crenshaw reviews both counterterrorism strategy and the interaction between terrorism and security scholars over the past two decades. She observes that "al-Qaeda evolved under specific and perhaps unique historical circumstances; the assumption that al-Qaeda will be a model for future terrorism may be incorrect." Daniel Gouré remarks that the American homeland security strategy is "a pell-mell rush" that lacks an obvious attempt to "provide a risk assessment that would rank order threats."

Audrey Kurth Cronin herself supplies two excellent pieces. The volume opens with her survey of the four "levels of analysis" of terrorism—the individual, the group or organization, the state, and the international system. Her structured exploration of the problem is much needed. She rounds out the volume with a chapter on what might be called "grand counterterrorism strategy." Cronin calls for an assessment of each potential target's relative involvement in terrorism, and not a strategy that reflexively attacks "states that do not control the current wave of terrorism." Our integration of counterterrorism tools is in "an extremely primitive state." She concludes with the observation that "positive power" (aid, reconstruction efforts, and image enhancement) is an essential element of a balanced counterterrorism strategy. "This position is not naiveté or liberalism but pragmatism."

ANDREW L. STIGLER Naval War College



Ullman, Harlan. Finishing Business: Ten Steps to Defeat Global Terror. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2004, 241pp. \$29.95

Harlan Ullman's new book, Finishing Business: Ten Steps to Defeat Global Terror, is a worthy read for Americans concerned with the long-term security of our country. It focuses on two areas: understanding what Ullman considers to be the most important near- and long-term threats to the United States, and a strategy to defeat the challenge.

Ullman uses the term "jihadist extremism" to identify the threat. In the foreword, Newt Gingrich says of Ullman, "He begins by correctly noting that the global war on terror is a misnomer. The real threat to America comes from an irreconcilable Islamist faction that has a coherent worldview and a very clear strategy."

In the introductory chapter Ullman is more specific: "In blunt terms, the bulk of the danger-modern variants of the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany-that threatens this nation and much of the world emanates from radical Islam and the potential realities and excesses that fuel it. Jihadist extremists have hijacked Islam. Osama bin Laden and others like him, reminiscent of the extremists and anarchists of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, are using this perversion of Islam as a revolutionary ideology. Their purpose, like Lenin's and Trotsky's, is to seize power. Terror is the tactic. Its purpose is to terrorize. Furthermore, these extremists share a common geography—the crescent of crisis that runs from the eastern Mediterranean to the Bay of Bengal and then to the eastern tip of Indonesia.

"The end state for bin Laden is some form of fundamentalist regime banked by Saudi oil money and armed with Pakistani nuclear weapons. Whether this regime will require a host state as Bolshevism did or if it can be borderless is unclear. The appeal of this theocratic formula stretches across much of the Islamic world. However, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan are potential dominoes in this battle, as well as key targets of Islamic extremists."

To further accentuate the threat, in chapter 3 Ullman quotes a portion of Osama Bin Laden's "letter to the American people" published in the London Observer on 24 November 2002. The quote includes Bin Laden's rationale for targeting Americans anywhere in the world as originally decreed in his, and his associates', 23 February 1998 fatwa, "Jihad against Jews and Crusaders." Although not cited or quoted by Ullman, the fatwa says in part, "On that basis, and in compliance with Allah's order, we issue the following fatwa to all Muslims: The ruling to kill the Americans and their allies—civilians and military—is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it." Although the book does an admirable job of helping readers understand the characteristics of the current threat, other sources, such as chapter 2 of The 9/11 Commission Report, will be useful for gaining a fuller understanding of the historical roots of the theology and thinking that drive "jihadist extremism."

In the introduction to chapter 1, "From Destruction to Disruption," Ullman raises the question of why our powerful country is less secure today than perhaps at any time since the Civil War. His answer is that extremist groups can

be expected to strike frequently to disrupt society, the strikes will be difficult to identify and stop, and a progressively more integrated world will continue to foster easier access and more effective networks.

In chapters 4 through 7, Ullman deals with a wide range of strategy options for dealing with the threat. His focus is on the causes of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict; autocratic rule in Saudi Arabia, Iran, Syria, and Egypt; the Indian-Pakistani conflict over Kashmir; and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

In the final chapter (chapter 8), Ullman does an excellent job of pulling his thoughts together and summarizing elements of a countervailing strategy that are addressed individually in the earlier parts of the book. They include international considerations such as a revised alliance system as well as domestic recommendations involving Congress, the Department of Defense, the intelligence community, and national security education. Overall the chapter presents a comprehensive and well thought out approach for tackling the threat of Islamic extremism. As such, it overcomes a minor distraction of earlier chapters, where the author occasionally digresses from his central focus to provide possibly unnecessary background information.

Overall, I recommend the book to any reader concerned with Islamic extremism. Much has been written about the subject, but Ullman is to be commended for his contribution to our understanding of the challenge and for his wide-ranging and insightful suggestions for a countervailing strategy.

HENRY C. BARTLETT, JR. Naval War College



Ferguson, Charles D., William C. Potter, et al. *The Four Faces of Nuclear Terrorism*. Monterey, Calif.: Center for Nonproliferation Studies, 2004. 378pp. \$19.95

Only readers well prepared for a sobering analysis of the likelihood of the use of nuclear materials by terrorists and its consequences should read this book. The Four Faces of Nuclear Terrorism stands alone as a realistic and scientific treatment of a dire threat. It is well researched, credible, and easily understood despite delving into nuclear physics. The authors, all with impeccable credentials, have effectively framed their discussions around four situations that chillingly illustrate how nuclear materials may find their way into a devastating weapon of mass destruction.

Each of the "four faces" is a distinct scenario of nuclear terrorism and a frightening apparition of what our nation confronts. The first example is theft and detonation of an intact nuclear weapon, without question the most worrisome, followed secondly by theft or purchase of fissile material leading to the fabrication and detonation of a crude nuclear weapon or, as the authors say, an "improvised nuclear device." The third example is an attack on, or sabotage of, nuclear installations, causing the release of large amounts of radioactivity. The final manifestation is terrorist dispersal of highly radioactive material by conventional explosives, commonly referred to as a "dirty bomb" or, in the authors' words, a "radiological dispersion device." For each of these calamitous circumstances, the authors provide a cacophony of story lines, any one of which would make a riveting movie.

The writers cleverly create an analytic framework to examine the four "faces" of nuclear terrorism. This probing methodology includes looking at a causative chain of events leading to the acquisition and detonation of a mass-casualty weapon incorporating nuclear material; terrorist motivations and capabilities to achieve nuclear potential; transfer of radiological materials by force, intimidation, collusion, insider assistance, or as a gift by rogue states; defeating safeguards on the physical protection of fissile material or safeguards against unauthorized detonation of a nuclear device; undetected transportation of a device to the target; and lastly, consequence management of an undeterred terrorist nuclear attack.

Although the authors distinguish between the four scenarios, their analysis of underlying factors is often unnecessarily repetitive. Indeed, conclusions are lifted verbatim from previous chapters—understandably, since patterns of illegal activity often mirror each other, regardless of criminal goal. This frequent redundancy undermines the argument that there are four distinct paradigms relating to nuclear terrorism. Nevertheless, skillful incorporation of case studies helps to discriminate the authors' definitions.

The book does a less effective job of assessing the security environment. Chapter 1 states, "Risk can be defined as the probability of an event multiplied by its consequences... the greater the *probability* [emphasis added] or the greater the consequences, the higher the overall risk." A more complete analysis of risk, however, should consider factors of vulnerability and threat with more specificity. *Probability*, as the authors use the word, may implicitly consider

threat, foreseeability, and vulnerability, but alone is inadequate to capture the challenge of assessing risk. The book asserts that all four scenarios "pose potentially grave and imminent dangers" and America "must work to address all of them." Risk analysis is designed to prioritize resources and energy. Unfortunately, however, the book's conclusions do not offer much in the way of clear focus when all four faces are equally serious. In case the reader is not convinced of a nuclear terrorist threat, the authors declare, "Given the significant quantities of radioactive material currently outside regulatory control around the world, the unambiguous evidence of terrorist interest in using these materials to cause harm, and the ease of carrying out a radiological attack, we believe that such an attack is all but inevitable." So much for risk assessment.

In contrast, a particularly superb treatment of the most frightening development—that of a terrorist group acquiring an intact nuclear weapon—is found in chapter 3. This authoritative discussion of deteriorating nuclear security in Russia is at the same time candid and grave. The authors offer an intriguing juxtaposition between the ominous threat of huge Cold War intercontinental ballistic missiles and today's menace of small, portable nuclear weapons. Thoughtful readers will not miss the implications that "the good old days" of the Soviet menace made risk assessment less risky.

Despite some drawbacks, this book effectively leads confused scientific neophytes toward clarity in dealing with the threat of nuclear terrorism. It describes solutions in ways that allow homeland security professionals to

begin crafting prescriptive implementation plans. However, as with many of the challenges to defeat terrorism, convincing the public to expend limited resources is the first hurdle. *The Four Faces of Nuclear Terrorism* is a terrific attempt to do just that.

JEFFREY H. NORWITZ Naval War College



Cook, Martin L. *The Moral Warrior: Ethics and Service in the U.S. Military*. Albany: State Univ. of New York Press, 2004. 172pp. \$54.40

Martin L. Cook's most recent offering covers a wide variety of subjects, including a framework for just wars, military officers' professional qualities, humanitarian interventions, and a historical analysis of strategic bombing.

Cook previously taught for sixteen years in the Department of Religious Studies, Santa Clara University, and then as professor of ethics for five years at the U.S. Army War College. Since July 2003, he has served as the deputy department head of the Philosophy Department at the U.S. Air Force Academy. Cook has written numerous scholarly articles and two books: Saving the Earth: A History of a Middle-Class Millenarian Movement with Steven Gelber, and The Open Circle: Confessional Method in Theology.

The first chapter describes eight criteria that civilian policy makers can use to determine whether it is morally justified to go to war. The main tenets of just war doctrine represent a culmination of accepted constraints going back to the time of St. Augustine (AD 354–430). Cook labels them as "just cause, legitimate authority, public declaration, just intent, proportionality, last resort,

reasonable hope of success, and end of peace." A war can earn the title of just war only when it meets these constraints when it is initiated (jus ad bellum) and when it is justly conducted (jus in bello). The responsibility for jus in bello falls primarily upon the military leadership. The military recommends "the rules of engagement, choice of weapons and targets, treatment of civilian populations and prisoners of war, and so forth." The just-war framework will not produce "moral certainty," but it will provide civilian and military leadership a framework to evaluate the decision to go to war, as well as a guide for conducting the war.

Cook also describes some professional qualities required of military officers. They must be subordinate to civilian leadership, have integrity, and provide professional military advice based on professional knowledge. He writes, "The military has a significant resistance to embracing operation-otherthan-war missions in general." Cook maintains that the military must be able to see clearly the changing environment and develop the intellectual agility to adapt to it. Some of the chapters, written just after Kosovo and before 9/11, argue that humanitarian operations are the new strategic environment. (Assuming the next war will be similar to the last one is a common trap.) Much of the book focuses on the challenges of humanitarian intervention. Cook writes that "the decision to initiate hostilities over Kosovo was unjustified and unwise." He further states: "Humanitarian causes and human rights were cited to 'trump' Serbian sovereignty. The action itself was not authorized by any resolution of the UN Security Council." He seems to believe there is not an effective international authority. Without a recognized legitimate international authority, he declares, future humanitarian wars will be conducted unilaterally or by a coalition.

Another chapter describes the intent of area bombing campaigns as either to target the "enemy's capability to conduct military operations" or to "terrorize civilian populations and demoralize enemy citizens." While today it is not politically correct to target civilians deliberately, the author believes any targeting of the enemy's infrastructure could have a disproportionately negative effect on innocent civilians. The consequences of bombing now—the loss of clean water, heat, medical care, and food-would surely be death later. In addition, Cook states, that new precision targeting may tempt political leaders to use force early, instead of as a last resort.

The short, seven-page chapter on "Resisting Global Terrorism" briefly describes the challenges of applying the just-war framework to terrorism. Since al-Qa'ida is not a sovereign state and war is waged only against states, does the United States have the legitimate authority to curb terrorist organizations throughout the world? Is there a reasonable hope of success? Cook suggests that the former model of state sovereignty for the just-war framework must be adapted when dealing with terrorism, because terrorism is not necessarily a threat to a single state but to our civilization's world order. I would have liked Cook to expand his thoughts on modifications to the just-war framework for terrorism.

What moral direction should the United States take now that it is the sole remaining superpower? What is the proper role of professional military advice from an ethical and practical viewpoint? Why is force protection so imperative in humanitarian operations? Is the desire for human rights and democratic governments universally shared? Can we assume that the trend towards globalization will make it "irrational for large-scale interstate warfare"? These are a few of the thought-provoking questions that are discussed in this book.

Of the nine chapters, eight have been previously published. This may account for the lack of smooth flow among the numerous themes. Those interested in just-war theory will find this book an interesting read, but in our post-9/11 environment, this extensive treatment of "humanitarian war" has lost some of its post-Kosovo luster.

CYNTHIA PERROTTI Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Air Force, Retired



Moore, John Norton. Solving the War Puzzle: Beyond the Democratic Peace. Durham, N.C.: Carolina Academic, 2003. 212pp. \$40

Solving the War Puzzle may be the most insightful and important examination of the causes of war since Clausewitz published On War in 1832. This slim volume, precisely written, superbly researched, and elegantly presented, carefully evaluates, integrates, and synthesizes the multiple elements the confluence of which results in armed conflict. This presentation is then used as a basis for choosing reasonable indices for the deterrence of interstate violence.

The broader international system is reviewed in terms of the government structures involved, the incentives presented to decision makers, and an examination of whether these structures

coupled with the totality of external incentives enable or constrain high-risk behavior that can lead to conflict.

The construct of war avoidance is further addressed by examining the nature of specific governments involved—intercourse between well established democratic nations, between democracies and nondemocracies, and between nondemocratic states. By reference to historical examples and by examining the factors that influence the conduct of states, Moore concludes that the nature of the government alone may not be nearly as important in creating effective deterrence as the aggregate of external incentives, "which may be high or low, adequate or inadequate."

In concluding that the best theory of war avoidance will use the "full human arsenal of insights against war," Moore carefully identifies the entire quiver of measures available to decision makers to achieve security. These include but are not limited to: diplomacy, the existence of unequal power between adversaries, the willingness to precommit forces to a troubled area, the existence of arms control agreements, and mutual participation in international organizations. Similarly, Moore carefully analyzes those factors that influence the leadership elite to employ the military instrument—the absence of democracy, the absence of effective deterrence, and most importantly, the synergy of an absence of both.

The "incentive theory" is further tested in its application to instances of terrorist violence, specifically to the U.S. response to the 9/11 attack by al-Qa'ida, and finally, to the 2003 war with Iraq. Arguing that assessing and influencing the incentives of the decision elite who run terror networks may be even more

effective than terror, Moore suggests that extremists will no longer choose to pursue it. Arguing that the incentive theory fits the Afghan War "like a glove," Moore also posits that had Saddam Hussein focused more clearly on the incentives affecting President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Tony Blair, he would have understood that his only opportunity to avoid war was a highly visible effort to achieve full compliance with Security Council resolutions.

In assessing the way forward, the author urges the positive consequences for foreign policy of a paradigm rooted in the importance of internal and external incentives. As long as incentives within certain nations do not properly operate to control these scourges, incentives must be supplied externally. Moore argues that by considering the operation of collective security in deterrence terms, created through effective incentives, an essential element of foreign policy can be both preserved and enhanced.

JAMES P. TERRY
Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps, Retired



Flanagan, Stephen J., and Michael E. Marti, eds. *The People's Liberation Army and China in Transition*. Washington, D.C.: National Defense Univ., 2003. 364pp. \$34.50

Based on an October 2001 conference at the National Defense University, but published with revised papers two years later, this collection of seemingly miscellaneous essays all too often either misses the mark completely or treats only very lightly a long list of potential U.S.-Chinese problems.

After an introduction, the book is divided into six sections examining

respectively, China's fourth-generation leadership, growing nationalism, military trends, key policy challenges, U.S.-China military relations, and, finally, future options for U.S.-China relations.

Part 1 includes essays by Bates Gill and David Shambaugh. Although these chapters are well written, many of the political leaders and structural issues they describe in such detail have changed since they were submitted. For example, Jiang Zemin did resign, and many indicators suggest that he did so unwillingly. Jiang's remaining power base, or guanxi network, may therefore be severely limited. Meanwhile, the membership of important structural bodies such as the Central Military Commission, rather than going down from eleven to eight and staying there, was later increased from eight to thirteen, thereby giving Hu Jintao crucial support to retire Jiang Zemin.

The dangers inherent in Chinese nationalism are discussed in chapters by Nan Li and Edward Friedman. Li's essay, in particular, gives real insight in his discussion of the continuing importance of "face" in China. This cultural characteristic, he argues, can have an enormous impact on how Chinese assess their enemies: "To save face, or not to lose it, for instance, the incentive is not only to show self-righteousness or all the good, positive, and strong points of the self but also to show the evil, negative, and weak points of the other," which can result in "an exaggeration of the strength of the self and the weakness of the enemy." When joined with the Maoist idea of "voluntarism, which stresses the power of the mind and consciousness that can overcome obstacles of material conditions," the two can

create a deadly combination in which the "PLA strategic analyses may reflect not the balance of forces in the real world but rather an overestimation of PLA strength and an underestimation of the adversary's abilities." Friedman adds to this dire warning by stressing: "The political atmosphere in this China precludes accurate descriptions of Japan, America, or Taiwan and makes self-interested, common-sense compromises by the Chinese government seem, to many Chinese, to be virtual treason."

James Mulvenon, Bernard Cole, Richard Fisher, and Richard Bitzinger contribute worthy essays describing Chinese military reforms, naval and air units, and the level of military expenditure. Although technically sound and informative, these essays reflect the extreme fluidity in China's military modernization. It is potentially dangerous to predict China's strategic behavior solely by observing her military. Cole, for example, even while concluding that China's navy is focused mainly against any "East Asian force that stands in the way of achieving China's objectives in the region," appropriately hedges his bets in an endnote (no. 21) by admitting that China might also consider it a "justified risk" to fight the United States if it feels "backed into a corner." Fischer, meanwhile, takes the bull by the horns when he warns that the air force "could gain a measure of superiority on the Taiwan Strait after 2005."

Key policy challenges are examined by David Finkelstein, Cynthia Watson, John Tkacik, Eugene Rummer, Kevin Neader, and Howard Krawitz. Taken together, the contradictions and potential flash points discussed in these essays present a scary picture, with Watson admitting that if ordered to do so the People's Liberation Army would "likely choose the historical responsibility of keeping Taiwan part of China"; Thacik counters that the Taiwanese "will not permit an accommodation of China's demands that Taiwan become subordinate to Beijing." This standoff is a recipe for disaster, but one that is all too often obscured and glossed over rather than highlighted.

Finally, U.S.-China military relations are addressed by Paul Godwin and Alfred Wilhelm, Jr., while U.S.-China relations in general are outlined by Richard Thornton and David Lai. These authors again present a mixed bag, with Godwin warning of a U.S.-Chinese "escalation dynamic expanding the scope of the war beyond the intent of either adversary"; Wilhelm calling for removing "all remaining military-related sanctions on the PRC" and promoting increased military-to-military talks; Thornton advocating measures to "curb" Chinese ambitions "now before China becomes too strong to control and we find ourselves on the path to war"; and Lai arguing that the China threat has been "overblown." Since the book does not include a much-needed conclusion to sort through this morass, or an index to assist in locating particular topics of interest, the reader is left with the unfortunate impression that the experts could not agree with each other, much less with the editors, on what final message they should present to their audience.

While many essays in this book are quite good, they do not work well as a whole. One is left with the feeling that the editors published whatever they were given, with one essay on the air force numbering almost forty pages, while a scant four pages are devoted to

China's all-important relations with Russia, where the bulk of the PLA's most deadly weapons are purchased. Furthermore, there is no chapter devoted specifically to Sino-Japanese relations, though various authors admit that Japan is China's nearest great power and maritime rival. Equally relevant topics not raised by this book include rising tensions over North Korea; China's space program and the rapid growth of its missile forces; territorial disputes in the South China Sea; and the U.S.-led efforts with Japan, and perhaps even Taiwan, to build theater and national missile defense. For these reasons, this book falls short as an examination of the true nature of U.S.-Chinese relations.

BRUCE ELLEMAN
Naval War College



Merom, Gil. How Democracies Lose Small Wars: State, Society, and the Failures of France in Algeria, Israel in Lebanon, and the United States in Vietnam. New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2003, 295pp. \$22.99

In this work, Gil Merom, an assistant professor of political science at Tel Aviv University, sets forth an intriguing proposition based on case studies of conflicts occurring in the second half of the twentieth century. Democracies, he argues, fail to win small wars because, as democracies, they are unable to bear either the casualties, particularly from among the "educated middle class," that such wars produce or the brutality winning such wars requires. If valid, the implications of proving such a hypothesis are significant. For starters, a hard blow would be dealt to the international relations school of realism and its offshoots. These models tend to view relative national power, especially military power, as the primary determinant of military success—a tenet that Merom's conclusions seem to refute. To the contrary, his findings would seem to offer substantial vindication to analysts and scholars who believe constituencies in a democratic society's domestic political system are the true drivers of such a state's international behavior.

While important to political scientists and international relations scholars, Merom's question could not be more timely for national leaders struggling to advance their interests in the real world, for his work suggests that an entire family of conflict is not likely to be won by democracies. It would therefore follow that democracies should either avoid small wars altogether, strike and win before public opinion can react, or handle these conflicts with nonmilitary instruments. Put more bluntly, it would imply that the United States may be unable to secure victory in either the Middle East or Central Asia, because the American people will not condone the type of action required to win these wars and keep casualties low. Merom includes the intentional targeting of noncombatants, the use of concentration camps, intentional deprivation of food and water to a civilian population, forced exile, torture, and indiscriminate bombing as some of the brutal means traditionally used to win small wars.

It is impossible not to see similarities between Merom's case studies and current U.S. operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. However, a closer reading reveals not only significant questions but weaknesses concerning Merom's work. First, it rapidly becomes apparent that his case studies involve counterinsurgencies, not the much broader spectrum of conflict to which the term "small wars" refers. Thus the successful invasions of Grenada, Panama, and Haiti are not examined. Neither are such successful limited interventions as the French operations ARTEMIS and TOURQUOISE in Africa, the British in Sierra Leone, or the United States in Liberia. In fact, Merom focuses on guerrilla warfare, a type of small war identified by C. E. Callwell, who wrote the book on small wars in the eighteenth century, as "the most unfavorable shape which a campaign [can] take for the regular troops."

The need for brutal measures to ensure victory is also an assumption that deserves to be challenged. Merom does not make the case that the only way to win against a counterinsurgency is through such methods. While he identifies several historical examples of great powers embracing brutal methods to defeat insurgencies in the past, he does not prove that they made the difference between victory and defeat. Nor does he prove that such measures must be part of a future winning arsenal.

There are also problems with his selection of cases. Merom chose three failed counterinsurgencies to make his point; however, Malaya in the 1950s, Greece in the 1940s, and Central America in the 1980s and 1990s would seem to offer obvious historical counterexamples to Merom's thesis. Interestingly, Merom, on one page and in one footnote, acknowledges the existence of the British involvement in Malaya, but he does not identify this conflict as a successful postwar counterinsurgency. Thus it would seem unwarranted at this point to claim that Merom's conclusions

apply to all small wars, or even to all counterinsurgencies.

A related if less telling criticism is that the three selected conflicts are clearly grouped at the more robust end of the small-wars spectrum. The size of a war may be measured by intensity (number of deaths over a given time), duration (amount of time over which killing occurs), or scale (number of total deaths). Other units of measure could be fiscal cost, percentage of armed forces engaged, or the extent to which a state's vital national interests are at risk. None of the wars Merom looks at were quick, low-cost affairs. Perhaps they should not be included in the "small war" category at all.

That said, this book is not without merit. It certainly suggests several areas for future research. Of these, one of the more intriguing would be the use of locally recruited military forces as a means to achieve victory in counterinsurgencies and other forms of small wars without generating adverse domestic public opinion. Such forces have traditionally had key roles in small wars throughout history. Merom's findings suggest that the need for such units may be bigger than ever.

When it comes to the specific cases of Vietnam, Algeria, and Lebanon, Merom's scholarship and argument are convincing. Public opinion and war fatigue, aversion to casualties, and refusal to endorse certain methods of warfare clearly impacted national decision making in these cases. Merom demonstrates that forces unleashed in the various domestic political systems examined in this study had a profound impact on war prosecution and termination. Any scholar wishing to understand these conflicts in deeper detail should read

the appropriate chapters of this book. Again, it should be noted that it is impossible not to see similarities between these cases and current U.S. operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.

The potential for such domestically driven forces to impact national security policy is clearly something that should be of interest to any modern political-military leader or scholar. For, as this review is being published, U.S. and coalition forces in Iraq and Afghanistan are determinedly attempting to defeat counterinsurgencies while trying to avoid initiating the forces Merom examines. So while Merom's work does not provide the key to the problem of counterinsurgency, it does seem to provide at least a significant piece of the puzzle.

RICHARD NORTON

Naval War College



Ambrose, Stephen E. *To America: Personal Reflections of an Historian.* New York: Simon & Schuster, 2003. 288pp. \$24

The United States is the richest and most powerful country in the world. Yet over two hundred years ago it began as thirteen colonies at the edge of a continental wilderness. Stephen Ambrose, an eminent historian and skilled writer, has used this short, readable book to explain how the United States made this amazing transformation. He attributes its success as a nation to the American spirit.

The American spirit originated with the founding fathers and was further developed by presidents Andrew Jackson, Ulysses S. Grant, Franklin and Theodore Roosevelt, and Dwight D. Eisenhower.

It is based on the notions of justice, equality, and the rule of law and fundamental fairness, and embraces the ability to recognize and correct the ills of society.

At home the American spirit has been the driving force behind the U.S. Constitution, civil rights, women's rights, the rights of Native Americans, the denouncing of imperialism, the end of racial segregation, and concern for the environment. Abroad, it has brought democracy to former enemies.

This slim, modest volume is an autobiography as well as an interesting summary of Ambrose's thesis. He displays an admirable open-mindedness and willingness to change his position in light of changing circumstances, although he frequently disagrees with the academic orthodoxy, and with refreshing candor.

Ambrose's life as a historian was truly remarkable. He was the author of a

sterling biography of Eisenhower and the editor of his papers, as well as the biographer of Richard M. Nixon. From 1969 to 1970 he held the Ernest J. King Chair of Maritime History at the Naval War College, and in his later years Ambrose was the founder of the National D-Day Museum.

Ambrose was a first-class writer. His list of published works is truly remarkable. Primarily an expert on World War II, he had a tremendous respect for junior officers and enlisted personnel, for whom he had developed great admiration.

Shortly before his untimely death in 2002, Ambrose ended this compelling volume with these words: "That [American] Spirit got us through September 11, 2001 and it will see us through the future."

B. MITCHELL SIMPSON III *Editor*, Naval War College Review, 1975–77

"World War II: Pacific," one of a series of high reliefs at the Naval War College by the late Felix de Weldon, sculptor of the Marine Corps Memorial in Arlington, Virginia