

# Developing Strategists

## Translating National Strategy into Theater Strategy

By DEREK S. REVERON and JAMES L. COOK

*Tactics without strategy are a variety of roads that are going nowhere and will lead to a very short-term focus on a mission.<sup>1</sup>*

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To update an old saying, “Russians play chess, Chinese play ‘go,’ and Americans play poker.” While this saying is meant to evoke the astrategic nature of the United States and convey the image of the naive American policymaker going from crisis to crisis, it fails to capture the strategic continuity in U.S. grand strategy or its importance in contemporary foreign policy. Since 1945, the United States has consistently followed a strategic logic of global leadership through international economic and political institutions. The United Nations, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, International Monetary Fund, and the predecessor of the World Trade Organization were born and raised in America.

These international institutions speak with an American accent. Through these institutions and others like them, the United States has been attempting to ameliorate historic rivalries, promote economic development through international trade, and collectively address threats to international peace and security.

While there are limits (even for superpowers) that underscore policy inconsistencies, exemplified by economic engagement with China versus the economic isolation of Cuba, such exceptions should not be mistaken for a lack of a grand strategy. Rather, they should be interpreted as outcomes of a democratic political process that enables organized minorities to have significant influence on policy. To be sure, the United States in the



Soldiers train for joint air assault operation with Afghan National Army and Border Police

U.S. Army (Derek L. Kuhn)

pursuit of its national interests sometimes behaves outside of the international norms it seeks to promote. Employing force against Belgrade in 1999 and imposing tariffs on Canadian soft lumber are but two examples. Yet the United States behaves more like a platinum card member exacting special privileges from organizations that it helped create than it does a hegemon on the offensive.<sup>2</sup>

With a strong notion that strategy helps either prevent train wrecks or prepare for them, Washington follows a grand strategy that shapes the security environment. To avoid going from crisis to crisis, the United States, and in particular its national security actors, attempts to defuse situations before they become crises through a strategy of prevention.

The challenge for the strategist is to coordinate the various levers of national power in a coherent or smart way. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton emphasized this during her January 2009 confirmation testimony when she argued, “We must use what has been called ‘smart power’: the full range of tools at our disposal—diplomatic, economic, military, political, legal, and cultural—picking the right tool, or combination of tools, for each situation.”<sup>3</sup> Calls for smart power are a reaction to George W. Bush’s foreign policy, but more importantly they underscore that power relations are stratified. In the context of military power, unipolarity dominates thinking about the U.S. position in the world, but recent foreign policy frustrations illustrate that power relations are stratified.<sup>4</sup> At the military level, U.S. power is unparalleled and unprec-

edented. At the economic level, the United States is checked by other great economic powers such as Japan, the European Union, and the People’s Republic of China, and through institutions such as the World Trade Organization. And, at the transnational level, the United States is but one of many state and nonstate actors that influence global events.

To be effective in a stratified world, strategists must answer three basic questions: Where do we want to go, or what are the desired *ends*? How do we get there, or what are the *ways*? And what resources are available, or

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what are the *means*? While the first question is largely the domain of civilian policymakers, military officers are expected to advise on and ultimately implement strategy. As the *Joint Operating Environment* notes, “Future joint force commanders will not make grand strategy, but they must fully understand the ends it seeks to achieve. They will have a role in suggesting how the Joint Force might be used and the means necessary for the effective use of joint forces to protect the interests of the United States.”<sup>5</sup>

## Defining Strategy

At a minimum, strategy links ends, ways, and means. For the Department of Defense (DOD), *strategy* is “the art and science of developing and employing instruments of national power in a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve theater, national, and/or multinational objectives.”<sup>6</sup> Put differently, strategy is about *how* leadership can use the *power* available to the state to exercise control over people, places, things, and events to achieve *objectives* in accordance with national interests and policies.

Henry C. Barnett visualizes strategy as an interaction among key variables such as the security environment, ends, ways, means, resource constraints, and risk.<sup>7</sup> As represented in figure 1, strategy is shaped by the security environment, which it in turn attempts to shape. Allies, partners, and adversaries impact successful strategy implementation. At the same time, resource constraints impact strategy too.

Successful implementation is determined by the interaction of all variables, but achieving objectives or attaining ends is the overall goal of strategy. The strategist can look to national interests as a starting point to determine ends because they help identify the reasons countries commit military forces. National interests can be universal, such as ensuring the security of the state and its people. And national interests can be the product of national policymakers, such



DOD (Jerry Morrison)



U.S. Navy (Tiffini M. Jones)

**Left: Secretary of State Clinton believes national power must be coordinated in coherent, smart way**  
**Above: Chief of Naval Operations meets with senior South African defense leaders in Pretoria, South Africa**

as advancing democratic institutions. The attempt to differentiate intensity of national interests is important. Hans Morgenthau differentiated between *vital* national interests and *secondary* interests, which are more difficult to define.<sup>8</sup> One relatively simple approach to this rather complex and somewhat ambiguous concept is to stratify national interests:

- Vital interests: What are we willing to die for (destroy al Qaeda)?<sup>9</sup>
- Important interests: What are we willing to fight for (prevent genocide in Kosovo)?
- Peripheral interests: What are we willing to fund (deploy African Union peacekeepers to Darfur)?

Given the U.S. ability to achieve air supremacy or launch standoff weapons, it can kill with limited risk to its Airmen or Sailors, giving it a coercive advantage. In the 1990s, for example, missile attacks against Iraq and the air war for Kosovo exemplified that the United States was willing to fight to achieve objectives, but was not willing to suffer fatalities (during the 38,000 sorties in Yugoslavia, not a single pilot was killed). In both cases, the United States deliberately withheld ground force options, which would have considerably raised the stakes. It seemed that airpower alone could achieve strategic interests.<sup>10</sup>

In addition to using military force, the United States also pursues its national interests through friendly surrogates. In such cases, the Nation is willing to fund others to provide humanitarian assistance, conduct peacekeeping operations, or provide regional stability. The clearest example is through the Global Peacekeeping Operations Initiative (GPOI), which was designed to train and equip 75,000 foreign peacekeepers for global deployment.<sup>11</sup> A program such as GPOI is consistent with the preventative war strategy of the United States, which seeks to limit the impact of regional crises. And it gives the international community a ready response to crimes against humanity. Along these lines, the United States was willing to fund African militaries to take part in African Union/United Nations missions to stop and prevent genocide in Darfur. Deploying American ground troops or establishing a no-fly zone has yet to emerge as a viable option.

As Presidents and their administrations evaluate national interests, the above

approach suggests certain criteria for the employment of military forces. Not all crises around the world warrant the commitment of U.S. forces, especially considering the availability and utility of other elements of national power. The military, in particular, favors a conservative approach to force employment that can be traced to the Weinberger Doctrine, which emphasized six criteria for the commitment of forces. One of these criteria was a clear description of U.S. or its allies' vital national interests.<sup>12</sup> Donald Rumsfeld proposed a similar framework in 2002 by asking, "Is the proposed action truly necessary? If people could be killed, ours or others, the U.S. must have a darn good reason." Ultimately, the President determines what constitutes a vital interest, but the three questions act as a way to understand the intensity of national interests and defining ends. Not all foreign policy crises result in deploying ground forces, and we argue that the type of force deployed (air, ground, or allies) is a good empirical way to understand the intensity of national interests.

cive. Diplomacy is coercive when the threat of military force underlies a demand, or it can be noncoercive when it offers diplomatic recognition to a new government or country. Likewise, the military is coercive when it engages in combat, while it is noncoercive when it provides humanitarian assistance.

Ways can be reworked to be seen as concepts, which are end-to-end activities that define how elements, systems, organizations, and tactics combine to accomplish national objectives or tasks.<sup>13</sup> By specifying ways or concepts, the military departments can then develop required capabilities and attempt to limit redundancies. For example, there are many ways for the military to conduct global strike operations: submarine-launched missiles, precision weapons delivered by bombers, sabotage missions conducted by Special Forces, and others.

In 2009, there are about 20 concepts that range from preparing for major combat operations to conducting engagement activities. Each concept is designed to fully appreciate the various missions the military may

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After ends are defined, policymakers and national security professionals develop the ways to achieve national interests. Ways are often equated to the tools of national power (diplomatic, information, military, and economic). Yet power is more nuanced, and all tools can be coercive and noncoer-

undertake and is used to identify excesses and gaps in military force structure. The choice is ultimately the President's, but DOD sees its role as developing options with various levels of risk involved. When evaluating ways, strategists should analyze for feasibility, suitability, and acceptability. First, given the

Figure 1. The Shaping of Strategy



ends, is the action *feasible* with the means available? Second, is the action *suitable* to achieve the desired ends? Finally, is the action *acceptable* given public, political, and ethical considerations?

If ways operationalize elements of national power, then means are the tools that operationalize the ways. Resources are not means until they are considered and prioritized within the context of strategy. Overall strategic success is based on how well ends, ways, and means are balanced. Julian Corbett observed that one has to keep in view

as a way to achieve this objective, but does not possess any power projection capability (means), then the resulting mismatch places the strategy at risk. Likewise, neighboring countries can respond by matching defense acquisitions, which would be an example of the security environment impacting the strategy. In considering military strategy, DOD considers four dimensions of risk.<sup>16</sup> *Operational risk* is associated with the current force's ability to execute the strategy within acceptable costs. *Future challenges risk* considers the military's capacity to

know yourself; in a hundred battles you will never be in peril."<sup>18</sup> Ideally, perfect knowledge ensures success, but history is replete with evidence to the contrary. Since war "is . . . an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will," the enemy has a vote too.<sup>19</sup> War is characterized by fog and friction; strategy attempts to reduce (not eliminate) uncertainty.


### Levels of Strategy

Grand strategy is the highest level strategy and encompasses all elements of national power. While the country has always followed a grand strategy (for example, containment during the Cold War), Congress required the President to clearly state the overall vision of the United States in a national security strategy under the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986.

Since this statutory requirement, there have been eight national security strategies released by U.S. Presidents. While each President responded to particular security challenges during his tenure, there have been continuous policies related to trade, America's leadership in global affairs, and the promotion of international organizations to unify action. The United States roughly follows President Kennedy's Cuba policy, President Nixon's China policy, and President Clinton's trade policy.

Deriving strategic guidance from the country's grand strategy, DOD has regularly produced a National Military Strategy (NMS) since the 1990s. In 2003, Congress formally required the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to submit a biennial review of the strategy in even-numbered years. The NMS outlines the strategic direction for the Armed Forces of the United States, which should be consistent with the current National Security Strategy. Unfortunately, the Chairman has not released one since 2004, but one should follow the Quadrennial Defense Review when it is released in early 2010.

Though there is no statutory requirement, the Secretary of Defense released a National Defense Strategy (NDS) in 2005 and 2008. Since the strategy is written (or at least directed and signed) by the civilian head of the military, the strategy should be read as directions to the uniformed military. Though strategic documents are subtle, they are one form of civilian control. The NDS provides a more direct link between the National Security Strategy and the National



**Stiletto high-speed experimental boat manned by joint Army/Navy crew with Coast Guard law enforcement detachment under tactical control of Joint Interagency Task Force-South**

U.S. Navy (Alan Gregg)

constantly the politico-diplomatic position of the country (on which depends the effective action of the instrument) and its commercial and financial position (by which the energy for working the instrument is maintained).<sup>14</sup> General Anthony Zinni, USMC (Ret.), emphasized the importance of resources: "Even if the [commanders in chief] produced good strategies at their level (and I believe we did), with good ends and reasonable ways to achieve them, we still had no idea whether or not the administration and the Congress would come through with the means."<sup>15</sup>

A strategy is not considered complete until a risk analysis is conducted to determine the ability of the organization to carry out the tasks and missions implied by the strategy. Risk results from a "mismatch" among ends, ways, and means.

One example of a mismatch is country X's objective to become a regional power (ends). If country X relies on its military

execute future missions against an array of prospective challengers. *Force management risk* considers recruiting, training, equipping, and retaining personnel. And *institutional risk* focuses on organizational efficiency and financial management.<sup>17</sup> The "right" way is ultimately determined by policy, but the decision is informed through experimentation, war games, and exercises.

As the preceding discussion suggests, strategy is developed in the context of the international security environment. An analysis of the security environment is essential to the strategist; it identifies threats to national interests and challenges that impede the advancement of national interests. Furthermore, the security assessment can identify new opportunities, too. The analysis also forces the strategy to interact with the real world. Strategy shapes and is shaped by external actors, which differs from Sun Tzu's famous exaltation, "Know the enemy and

Military Strategy. It lays out strategic objectives for the defense of the Nation and its interests, articulates the ways the United States will achieve those objectives, and discusses implementation of the strategy. The various strategic documents are intended to “nest” together; that is, each document is intended to support the tasks, missions, and intent of the next higher strategy. Yet delays in releasing the strategies do not always enable the strategic documents to nest as neatly as we might like.

**Theater Strategy**

Using national strategy as a guide, combatant commanders develop theater strategies, which are:

*strategic concepts and courses of actions directed toward securing the objectives of national and multinational policies and strategies through the synchronized and integrated employment of military forces and other instruments of national power. Theater strategy is determined by [combatant commanders] based on analysis of changing events in the operational environment and the development of options to set conditions for success.*<sup>20</sup>

Theater strategy links national strategy to operational level plans and activities, tailored to the commander’s area of responsibility in a joint, multinational, and interagency environment.<sup>21</sup>

A major challenge in the development of theater strategy is the requirement to coordinate and synchronize theater security cooperation activities with other U.S. Government activities. These activities can cover the entire spectrum of conflict and often occur simultaneously, providing an additional level of complexity for commanders and their staffs to consider during planning and execution of the theater strategy. Theater strategy must therefore be broad and flexible enough to encompass a wide variety of political-military activities across a combatant command’s area of responsibility at the same time.<sup>22</sup> It must also take into account other countries’ activities.

Unity of effort is the key to a successful theater strategy. For example, a prominent way the United States pursues its strategy of global engagement is through military-to-military cooperation. Admiral James Stavridis, USN, views promoting security as an important mission. His approach—working with interagency partners and partner nations—implies

the criticality of developing partner capacity to address the challenges in today’s security environment. This notion is reinforced in the 2008 National Defense Strategy, which states, “Arguably the most important military component of the struggle against violent extremists is not the fighting we do ourselves, but how well we help prepare our partners to defend and govern themselves.”<sup>23</sup> However, simply building partner capacity is insufficient without a strategy to provide direction and ensure activities are unified with other government activities and the partner country’s goals.

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
Despite the complexity and criticality of theater strategy, there is relatively little doctrine or other guidance on developing it. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has issued direction that requires professional military education institutions to teach senior officers how to “synthesize how national military and joint theater strategies meet national strategic goals across the range of military operations.”<sup>24</sup> To bring rigor to theater strategy development,

Mackubin Owens offers a logic model designed to translate grand strategy and associated strategic direction into theater strategy and associated plans, including theater security cooperation (see figure 2).<sup>25</sup>

The model begins with national (grand) strategy, which defines U.S. security interests, objectives, and priorities and provides guidance to all who are charged with its execution, including regional combatant commanders. Given the National Security Strategy, DOD and the Joint Staff produce strategic guidance that focuses on the military instrument of national power and provides direction for the combatant commanders through several critical documents. For example, the Unified Command Plan (UCP) “sets forth basic guidance to all unified combatant commanders; establishes their missions, responsibilities, and force structure; and delineates the general geographical [area of responsibility] for geographic combatant commanders.”<sup>26</sup> The 2008 UCP sets general roles and missions, but it also includes explicit guidance.

According to the 2008 Strategic Management Plan, the DOD Guidance for the Employment of the Force (GEF) “covers how to use the current military to generate military effects within the battlespace, along with resource and capability needs.”<sup>27</sup> The GEF provides strategic direction for the

**Figure 2. Strategy and Theater Security Logic Model**



combatant commander in the development of near-term (2-year) operational activities and priorities, as well as global posture and force management guidance, and is designed to link strategy to military operations. The GEF also provides strategic end-states and priorities to the combatant commands in the development of campaign and contingency plans, as well as security cooperation activities.<sup>28</sup>

Finally, the Chairman's Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan implements the guidance contained in the GEF and "provides [focused] military strategic and operational guidance and direction to combatant commanders and Service chiefs for preparation of operations plans and security cooperation plans based on current military capabilities. It is the primary vehicle through which the Chairman exercises responsibility to provide for the preparation of joint operation plans."<sup>29</sup> This plan also provides guidance concerning operational requirements and the apportionment of resources.

Armed with grand strategy and strategic direction described above, as well as any guidance provided by the combatant commander, the staff is prepared to begin formulating theater strategy. One of the most critical steps in developing strategy is to conduct a thorough theater estimate, which is "the process by which a theater commander assesses the broad strategic factors that influence the theater strategic environment, thus further determining the missions, objectives, and courses of action throughout their theaters."<sup>30</sup> The estimate includes a mission analysis that derives specified, implied, and essential tasks, as well as theater-strategic objectives (ends) and desired effects.<sup>31</sup> Given the complex nature of the security environment as well as changes in strategic direction, the theater estimate requires continuous refinement. In addition to a detailed analysis of the combatant command's mission, capabilities, and limitations, the estimate should address the following:

- any states, groups, or organizations in the security environment that may challenge the combatant command's ability to advance and defend U.S. interests in the region. This analysis should include an appreciation for relevant geopolitical, geoeconomic, and cultural considerations within the area of operations.
- major strategic and operational challenges facing the combatant command
- known or anticipated opportunities the combatant command can leverage including those states, groups, or organizations

that could potentially assist the command in advancing and defending U.S. interests in the region

- risks inherent in the depiction of the security environment.

The theater estimate is crucial for setting the context for the combatant commander mission analysis. The commander articulates his intent through the theater strategic vision that describes how the theater strategy supports the goals and objectives of the United States as derived from grand strategy and strategic direction. The vision should discuss the general methods to achieve those objectives

or ends. First, the strategist must consider strategic alternatives that can be expressed either as broad statements of what is to be accomplished or lines of operations. As a useful reference in this process, the strategist can turn to the U.S. Joint Forces Command Joint Operating Concepts (JOCs), such as irregular warfare and the military contribution to cooperative security, that describe "how a Joint Force Commander will accomplish a strategic mission through the conduct of operational-level military operations within a campaign." JOCs identify "key ideas for solving those challenges, effects to be generated to achieve objectives, essential capabilities

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to include strategic communication, pertinent economic tools, and diplomacy. Additionally, the vision may describe where the commander is willing to accept risk. Finally, the vision should introduce and describe the appropriate strategic and operational concepts for the military instrument of power.

When crafting a vision, the commander should succinctly capture the strategic desired outcome.<sup>32</sup> The vision is a snapshot of what the commander wants the theater to look like in the future. Effective visions are usually short, focused, imaginable, positive, and motivating.<sup>33</sup> Constructing an effective vision statement is difficult: one or two sentences must reflect the consolidated theater strategy's goal so it is easily understood and engaging.

A good vision must also be compelling to a broad audience. For instance, if the commander is embraced by coalition partners, regional leaders, and Congress, there is a good chance that the strategy has enough critical mass necessary for success. A coherent and credible vision serves as a practical reference point for subsequent strategic communication initiatives in a complex and cluttered environment. The vision is primarily an essential communication tool that provides strategic continuity and integrity to the everyday challenges and decisions within the combatant command's theater.

Once the theater estimate and strategic vision are complete, the strategist must develop a strategic concept that articulates the ways to achieve the theater strategy objectives

likely needed to achieve objectives and the relevant conditions in which the capabilities must be applied.<sup>34</sup> In the 2009 *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations* (CCJO), the Chairman recognized that these concepts are not intended as "one size fits all" approaches for the combatant commanders. The CCJO requires the joint force to "[a]ddress each situation on its own terms, in its unique political and strategic context, rather than attempting to fit the situation to a preferred template."<sup>35</sup>

The strategic concept also forms the basis for subsequent planning efforts that include combat operations, security cooperation, and other support operations.<sup>36</sup> Given the size of the geographic combatant command areas, it is possible (if not likely) for these commanders to simultaneously conduct operations across the spectrum of conflict ranging from major combat to humanitarian assistance. The development of a sound strategic concept within the framework of theater strategy allows the command to better articulate to senior leadership what adjustments to doctrine, organization, training, material, leadership, personnel, facilities, and policy or to current capabilities the commander needs during the next 8 years to achieve his theater strategy objectives.

Having determined the ways, the strategic planner must now address the required capabilities (means) to prosecute the strategy. DOD uses Joint Capability Areas (JCAs) as its capabilities management language and framework.<sup>37</sup> The Joint Staff (J7) defines JCAs as "collections of like DOD capabilities function-

ally grouped to support capability analysis, strategy development, investment decision making, capability portfolio management, capabilities-based force development and operational planning.”<sup>38</sup> There are currently nine top-level (Tier 1) JCAs developed along functional lines to meet combatant command and DOD requirements: force support, battlespace awareness, force application, logistics, command and control, network-centricity, protection, building partnerships, and corporate management and support.

The strategic planner carefully analyzes these capability areas and determines the necessary means that may also include other governmental and nongovernmental capabilities within an interagency context. Upon completion of this analysis and an assessment of current capabilities, the combatant command must determine what capabilities to request from the Secretary of Defense. One mechanism for this request is the combatant command’s annual Joint Integrated Priority List, “a succinct statement of key capability gaps that could hinder the performance of assigned missions”<sup>39</sup> and “identifies those areas that require priority attention during” the DOD resource allocation process.<sup>40</sup>

### Implementation

Once the theater strategy is complete and approved by the combatant commander,

the next step is *implementation*, or executing the strategy. Without the means, competencies, and informed thinking to carry out the commander’s intent, the strategy is just an idea.<sup>41</sup> Theater strategy should outline the critical pathways and components necessary to carry out that strategy, as well as the required means, potential obstacles, risk assessment, timeframes, and functional accountability. Implementation requires the cooperation of multiple governmental and nongovernmental organizations, as well as multinational allies and partners. One of the most challenging tasks for the combatant command staff is ensuring that there is a

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*if the commander is embraced by coalition partners, regional leaders, and Congress, there is a good chance the strategy has enough critical mass necessary for success*

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credible commitment among all participants to accomplish the common goals.

With strategy playing a guiding role in U.S. foreign policy, it is important to know how to evaluate the strategy. At a minimum, a strategy is designed to change the security environment by preventing the emergence of a peer

competitor, increasing the number of democracies in the world, or eliminating biological weapons. In a broader sense, strategy develops and employs all tools of national power to advance and defend the national interest. Consequently, when evaluating strategy, one must examine the strategy’s concept of national interests, view of the security environment, strategic priorities, role of power, impact on resources, required means, risk, and acceptability.

During traditional combat operations, it is relatively easy to measure whether the military disrupts, degrades, or destroys enemy forces. However, in permissive environments, the objectives are generally broader and can be less clear. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Michael Mullen noted that the effects may never be clearly measurable and cultural sensitivities might preclude measurement.<sup>42</sup> However, in a resource-constrained environment, it is important to understand which activities are more effective.

A theater strategy should contain measurements to calibrate its progress toward achieving goals and objectives. There are three broad categories of measures: input, output, and outcome. Resources are typical examples of *input*. Interagency or coalition support might be other resource inputs. Performance measures that directly track progress toward goals and objectives are considered *outputs*, which are dependent on adequate resources, such as

Bataan Amphibious Ready Group serves as theater reserve force for U.S. European Command



U.S. Marine Corps (Theodore W. Ritchie)

securing an area or building infrastructure, and are accomplishments over which the combatant command has considerable direct control. These measures usually are quantifiable and have associated timeframes. In contrast, *outcomes* are more difficult to measure (often qualitative) and are usually only influenced, not directly controlled, by the combatant command. Examples may include the strength of regional security agreements or the relative receptivity of U.S. forces within the partner country. Outcomes are often referred to as strategic *effects*, the ultimate goals of theater strategy and the commander's intent.<sup>43</sup> If the desired strategic outcome is political or economic stability, examples of outcome measures or *effects* might be representative participation in government or the absence of political violence, or gross national product and revenue from oil production.

The practical value of performance measures is that they let the combatant commander evaluate the theater strategy's progress in achieving goals and objectives. Most theater strategies have a hierarchy of performance measures; high-level measures are supported by more detailed and granular measures. The essential point here is that all performance measures need to be consistent and aligned with the strategic goals.

In practice, strategic decisions must always compete with the demands of domestic politics, or what Samuel Huntington has called "structural decisions." These are choices "made in the currency of domestic politics." The most important structural decision concerns the "size and distribution of funds made available to the armed forces." The strategic planner can never ignore fiscal constraints. Indeed, political reality sometimes dictates that budgetary limits will constitute the primary influence on the development of strategy and force structure. Additionally, bureaucratic and organizational imperatives play a major role in force structure choices. Potential mismatches create risks. If the risks resulting from an ends-ways-means mismatch cannot be managed, ends must be reevaluated and scaled back, means must be increased, or the strategy must be adjusted.

That said, when done correctly, theater strategy enables the combatant commander to effectively secure U.S. national interests by obtaining and synchronizing available resources from within the interagency to achieve theater objectives within a multinational environment. **JFQ**

## NOTES

<sup>1</sup> General (Ret.) Rick Hillier, former Chief of the Canadian Defence Staff.

<sup>2</sup> Yong Deng, "Hegemon on the Offensive: Chinese Perspectives on U.S. Global Strategy," *Political Science Quarterly* 116, no. 3 (Fall 2001), 343–365.

<sup>3</sup> Senate Foreign Relations Committee, "Statement of Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton, Nominee for Secretary of State," January 13, 2009, available at <<http://foreign.senate.gov/testimony/2009/ClintonTestimony090113a.pdf>>.

<sup>4</sup> Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *The Paradox of American Power: Why the World's Only Superpower Can't Do It Alone* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002).

<sup>5</sup> U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM), *The Joint Operating Environment 2008* (Norfolk, VA: USJFCOM, November 25, 2008), 9.

<sup>6</sup> Joint Publication (JP) 1–02, *DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, August 31, 2005).

<sup>7</sup> Henry C. Bartlett, G. Paul Homan, Jr., and Timothy E. Somes, "The Art of Strategy and Force Planning," in *Strategy and Force Planning*, 4<sup>th</sup> ed. (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2004).

<sup>8</sup> Hans J. Morgenthau, *The Impasse of American Foreign Policy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962), 191.

<sup>9</sup> P.H. Liotta, "To Die For: National Interests and the Nature of Strategy," in Bartlett et al., 114.

<sup>10</sup> Andrew L. Stigler, "A Clear Victory for Air Power: NATO's Empty Threat to Invade Kosovo," *International Security* 27, no. 3 (2002–2003), 124–157.

<sup>11</sup> Nina M. Serafino, *Global Peacekeeping Operations Initiative: Background for Congress* (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2006).

<sup>12</sup> Edwin J. Arnold, "The Use of Military Power in Pursuit of National Interests," *Parameters* (Spring 1994), 4–12.

<sup>13</sup> Paul D. Wolfowitz, "Prepared Statement for the Senate Armed Services Committee Hearing on Military Transformation," April 9, 2002.

<sup>14</sup> Julian Corbett, *Some Principles of Maritime Strategy* (Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 1988), 308.

<sup>15</sup> Anthony C. Zinni and Tony Koltz, *The Battle for Peace: A Frontline Vision of America's Power and Purpose* (New York: Routledge, 2006), 136.

<sup>16</sup> Sean Sullivan, "Defense Resource Allocation: The Formal Processes in U.S. Defense Planning," faculty paper, Naval War College, National Security Decision Making Department, May 15, 2008, 23.

<sup>17</sup> Department of Defense, *The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2008).

<sup>18</sup> Samuel B. Griffith, *Sun Tzu: The Art of War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963), 84.

<sup>19</sup> Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 75.

<sup>20</sup> JP 3–0, *Joint Operations* (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, September 17, 2006, Incorporating Change 1, February 13, 2008), I–3.

<sup>21</sup> JP 5–0, *Joint Operation Planning* (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, December 26, 2006), I–9.

<sup>22</sup> Clarence J. Bouchat, *An Introduction to Theater Strategy and Regional Security* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, August 2007), 3.

<sup>23</sup> *National Defense Strategy*, 8.

<sup>24</sup> Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 1800.01C: "Officer Military Professional Education Policy," Washington, DC, December 22, 2005, E–E–2.

<sup>25</sup> Mackubin Owens, "Strategy and the Strategic Way of Thinking," *Naval War College Review* 60, no. 4 (Autumn 2007), 116.

<sup>26</sup> JP 1–02, 575.

<sup>27</sup> Department of Defense, "2008 Strategic Management Plan," Washington, DC, July 25, 2008, 8.

<sup>28</sup> Sullivan, 35.

<sup>29</sup> JP 5–0, II–5.

<sup>30</sup> Joint Forces Staff College (JFSC) Publication 1, *The Joint Staff Officer's Guide 2000* (Norfolk, VA: JFSC, 2000), 3–26.

<sup>31</sup> Bouchat, 12.

<sup>32</sup> The authors thank Ron Ratcliff and Hank Kniskern for their insights on vision.

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<sup>34</sup> The Joint Staff, "JOpsC Family of Joint Concepts—Status Update," October 20, 2008, available at <[www.dtic.mil/futurejointwarfare/joc.htm](http://www.dtic.mil/futurejointwarfare/joc.htm)>.

<sup>35</sup> Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (Version 3.0)," Washington, DC, January 15, 2009, 13.

<sup>36</sup> Bouchat, 13.

<sup>37</sup> Office of the Secretary of Defense, "Joint Capability Areas," Washington, DC, January 12, 2009, available at <[www.dtic.mil/futurejointwarfare/strategic/jca\\_approvalmemo.pdf](http://www.dtic.mil/futurejointwarfare/strategic/jca_approvalmemo.pdf)>.

<sup>38</sup> The Joint Staff, "Joint Capability Areas," available at <[www.dtic.mil/futurejointwarfare/cap\\_areas.htm](http://www.dtic.mil/futurejointwarfare/cap_areas.htm)>.

<sup>39</sup> CJCSI 8501.01A, "Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Combatant Commanders, and Joint Staff Participation in the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System," Washington, DC, December 3, 2004, available at <[www.dtic.mil/cjcs\\_directives/cdata/unlimit/8501\\_01.pdf](http://www.dtic.mil/cjcs_directives/cdata/unlimit/8501_01.pdf)>.

<sup>40</sup> Sullivan, 23.

<sup>41</sup> Larry Bossidy and Ram Charan, *Execution: The Discipline of Getting Things Done* (New York: Crown Publishing Group, 2002).

<sup>42</sup> Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (Version 3.0)," 17.

<sup>43</sup> William S. Murray, "A Will to Measure: Measures of Effectiveness in Military Decision-Making," *Parameters* (Autumn 2001), 134–147.