

BOOK REVIEWS

THE CHANGING SECURITY POLICY CHALLENGES IN CENTRAL ASIA

Allison, Roy, and Lena Jonson, eds. *Central Asian Security: The New International Context*. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2001. 279pp. \$18.95

To date, relatively few studies have appeared concerning the domestic and external security environments of the five new independent states of Central Asia or on relations with their neighbors to the north, south, east, and west. This volume, with contributions by some of the leading scholars in the field, seeks to fill in the lacunae in both areas. It does an admirable job.

The book begins by putting into context the impact of the collapse of the Soviet Union on these new independent states. Initially, the assumption within Russia, the West, and among the elites of the new republics was that the new Central Asian republics would maintain a close alignment with the Russian-led Commonwealth of Independent States. Russia had vast economic, security, and military interests in the region and clearly aspired to maintain a leading position in that area. Western observers were generally convinced that Russia would be able to maintain its position in the “stans.” As for the elites, their natural inclination was to maintain strong and tight links with the former ruler, a tendency reinforced by the “Soviet-era socialization”

and the looming presence of Russia in Central Asia, often in the form of military forces and bases. However, Russia failed to maintain its position there, because of its chronic domestic weaknesses, its inability to formulate a coherent national security policy, and its lack of resources.

By the mid-1990s it was recognized by all parties concerned that no tight strategic nexus would exist between Russia and the Central Asian republics. The elites also realized that their post-Soviet security environment was a complex one, with many issues that could not be addressed by simply maintaining a strong strategic relationship with the former Soviet Union. Indeed, there was a growing desire on the part of the elites to focus on their internal security problems, diversify their security policy relations away from Russia, and form new partnerships with other nations, both near and far. In light of this emerging strategic reconfiguration, the purpose of this work is to “analyse the changing security policy challenges in Central Asia since Russia became more disengaged from the region in the mid to late 1990s” and to “discuss

the security policy relevance of the expanding network of relationships between Central Asia and regional and international powers.”

Some of the contributors to this work address the cooperative and conflictual processes that are relevant for the security orientation of the region. There are numerous cooperative processes in Central Asia. The states have a common legacy and cultural and historical commonalities. The Soviet era provided them with a common interlocking transportation system, energy grids, and irrigation systems. On the face of it, such factors should enhance cooperative endeavors that could be formalized by institutional mechanisms. But processes born of ethnic rivalries and deteriorating social and economic conditions are also deep at work in the region, a topic analyzed extensively in Martha Brill Olcott’s essay. Also, the piece by Alexei Malashenko on the potential of Islam in Central Asia is particularly apposite in light of the impact of 11 September 2001 on the region. The Central Asian states are united by the common heritage of Islam, but the elites are fearful that Islam could become a source of conflict because of the use of religion by opposition parties and the hijacking of Islam by extremist movements that have a proclivity to terrorism. Not surprisingly, these states have worked with Russia to combat the growth of terrorist organizations using religion. In light of the increased American presence in Central Asia, one wonders whether the United States will supplant Russia in the republics’ struggle against terrorism. Another source of conflict within the region is the struggle over scarce water resources. The essay by Stuart Horsman

deals with this issue. Horsman concludes, however, that frictions over water are unlikely to lead to violent conflict.

The remaining essays address the important issue of how the involvement of external powers—both regional, such as Iran and Turkey, and great powers, such as Russia, China, and the United States—affect the security dynamics of the region. Some of these powers are involved in Central Asia because of historical and cultural affinities. This framework helps to explain Turkish and Iranian interests in the fate of peoples with shared religion and ethnic identities, and the Russian interest in the fate of the largest republic, Kazakhstan, with its sizable Russian population. Economic interests, in the shape of potentially lucrative trade, investments, and exploitation of vast oil and natural gas reserves, partly account for the involvement in Central Asia of all the powers addressed in this book. Security interests have much to do with the direct involvement in the region of Russia, China, and Iran. All three are concerned about the potential spillover of unrest from Central Asia across their borders. Finally, strategic interests explain the involvement of all the nations discussed here, in terms of their visions of their respective roles in Central Asia. Stephen Blank’s essay is especially pertinent.

This work is a welcome addition to the study of Central Asia. It is a critical addition to the understanding of security issues in the region, and it is required reading to understand better the war on terror and future U.S. relations with the Central Asia republics.

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Natsios, Andrew S. *The Great North Korean Famine: Famine, Politics, and Foreign Policy*. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute for Peace, 2001. 295pp. \$19.95

Though not linked to the tragedy of 11 September 2001, North Korea rose once again to near the top of the list of likely U.S. adversaries with President George W. Bush's association of Pyongyang with a so-called axis of evil. This fine book by Andrew Natsios should be required reading for those contemplating the various policy dilemmas that confront the U.S. on the Korean Peninsula. Natsios provides an eloquent and informed narrative of evil as it exists today in North Korea—the slow and tortured death of millions of North Korean citizens by starvation as a direct result of the regime's totalitarian nature and its failure to reform disastrous economic policies. But the author also demonstrates that the North Korean quandary defies simple solution.

The book compellingly captures the human side of this international tragedy. Indeed, this aspect of the “rogue state” phenomenon is too often brushed aside in favor of high-politics approaches that degenerate into sterile discussions of containment, sanctions, and arms control possibilities. By contrast, Natsios's descriptions of the prevailing conditions in North Korea and the behavior of its leaders and national security apparatus are graphic enough to turn the reader's stomach. Thus he recounts the testimony of refugees who escaped to China: “In most cases the [group] suicides were committed by younger couples with smaller children; the couples had been denying themselves food for so long they feared they would die before their children did and that their children would be

left to fend for themselves.” Natsios describes observing, from the Chinese side of the Tyumen River, North Koreans on the opposite bank “dumping wrapped bodies into a large pit,” one of a number of suspected mass graves in the region.

Few are as qualified to tell this story as Natsios. Though not a specialist on Korea, he is an expert on disaster relief operations, with wide experience both in the U.S. government and civilian organizations. This breadth of experience allows him to put the Korean situation into a wider social and historical context. He offers many insightful comparisons to earlier famines in Ethiopia, China, and the Soviet Union. As vice president of World Vision from 1993 to 1998, Natsios made numerous trips to North Korea and the bordering areas of China during the mid-1990s. President Bush appointed him director of the U.S. Agency for International Development, which is certain to play a leading role in the reconstruction of Afghanistan, among other missions integral to the war on terror. In addition, as a U.S. Army veteran of the Persian Gulf War, the author brings to the analysis a fluency on strategic issues that military readers are certain to appreciate. Thus his conclusions about the situation in contemporary North Korea go far beyond the speculation that is the norm for this closed state.

As a witness to the unfolding food emergency in North Korea, Natsios developed strong opinions about responsibility for the tragedy. He argues that culpability goes beyond the pathetic and cruel leadership in Pyongyang to the international community, and to the Clinton administration in particular—which took action only after the worst of the famine had passed, in the autumn of 1996. Natsios sharply criticizes Clinton for using food

aid as a diplomatic tool to coax concessions from Pyongyang. He maintains that such a position is ethically indefensible, since it punishes innocent populations, people who are unable to affect their government's policies.

The book does have a few weaknesses. First, its organization may prove frustrating. Different chapters focus on various perspectives of the famine, but this approach leads to some confusion about the overall chronology of events, which, given the complexity of the subject, is quite difficult to grasp. A second flaw is the lack of photographs. This in itself would not be a problem if no such photos existed, but Natsios makes a point of emphasizing the importance of photographs in conveying the reality of a famine. He also discusses the works of specific photographers but then fails to explain their absence. Finally, the overall analysis of the United States and North Korean interaction might have been stronger if greater attention had been paid to the nuclear proliferation issue. Certainly this was the most important concern in conditioning relations between the two countries, but Natsios hardly broaches the subject.

Overall, this study is an essential addition to recent scholarship on North Korea, which has not paid adequate attention to the human tragedy as it unfolded during the last decade. While Natsios makes a strong case for breaking the link between food aid and U.S. strategic interests, one wonders if relief efforts are aiding the North Korean regime and thus prolonging the catastrophe that Natsios has so eloquently described.

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Wirtz, James J., and Jeffrey A. Larsen, eds. *Rockets' Red Glare: Missile Defenses and the Future of World Politics*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 2001. 352pp. \$28.50

When President George W. Bush made his remark about the “axis of evil” in his 2002 State of the Union address, he publicly exposed the ballistic missile threat Iran, Iraq, and North Korea pose to the United States and its allies. So far, media concern has concentrated only on his name-calling. *Rockets' Red Glare* explores the missile defenses designed to counteract the threat from these countries.

James J. Wirtz, a national security affairs professor at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, and Jeffrey A. Larsen, a senior policy analyst of the Science Applications International Corporation, edited this book, which is an anthology of papers written to explore the implications of national missile defense (NMD). Contributors had a common assumption—that NMD will be deployed in a national security environment with either a modified antiballistic missile (ABM) treaty or no antiballistic missile treaty at all. This assumption allowed them to focus on the strategic level consequences of an NMD deployment; the editors then asked them to examine three levels of NMD deployment. These are “Limited Defense in a Cooperative Setting,” “Enhanced Defenses and the Limits of Cooperation,” and “Unlimited Defenses Unconstrained by Treaty.”

Wirtz and Larsen organized their anthology in these three major parts. The “ABM Regime” provides historical background. Kerry Kartchner, the State Department's senior representative to the Standing Consultative Commission in Geneva, Switzerland, researched the

origins of the ABM Treaty. Robert Joseph (special assistant to the president and senior director for proliferation strategy, counterproliferation, and homeland defense) reviewed the changes in the political-military landscape. Dennis Ward, a professional staff member of the Senate Governmental Affairs Subcommittee on International Security, Proliferation, and Federal Services, examined changes in technology since the inception of the ABM Treaty and their impact on both offensive and defensive systems.

Part 2 is entitled “Defense, Arms Control, and Crisis Stability.” Michael O’Hanlon, a senior fellow in foreign policy at the Brookings Institution, takes the lead by looking at the ramifications of NMD deployment on U.S. politics. Richard Harknett, associate professor of political science at the University of Cincinnati, focuses on how the strategic landscape will change with NMD deployment. Julian Schofield, an assistant professor at Concordia University, Montreal, analyzes NMD deployment in a multilateral arms control environment.

Part 3, “Regional Responses to National Missile Defense,” divides the world outside the United States into regions, and in some instances specific countries, examining the effect NMD deployment may have. Bradley Roberts, a member of the research staff at the Institute for Defense Analyses, reviews the impact NMD deployment may have on China and what its responses will likely be. Ivo H. Daalder, a senior fellow in foreign policy studies at the Brookings Institution, and James Goldgeier, acting director of the Institute for European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies at George Washington University, look at NMD deployment from a Russian perspective. Timothy D. Hoyt, director of special programs and adjunct

professor in the national security studies program at Georgetown University, analyzes the effects of NMD deployment on the states of South Asia, an area prominent in the current environment. Charles Ball, a senior scientist at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, studies the wide variety of views held by U.S. global allies.

The book’s appendices provide source documents, including the ABM Treaty itself and related documents that further refine the initial treaty. Presidential speeches on NMD include the appendices: President Bill Clinton’s speech of 1 September 2000 deferring a decision on NMD; George W. Bush’s speech as a presidential candidate delivered on 23 May 2000; and his presidential speech at the National Defense University on 1 May 2001.

As one who has a limited role in the operational aspects of NMD, I found in this book the historical context and strategic implications of its deployment, at least prior to the events of 11 September 2001. Obviously, those events could not have been foreseen, but we may suspect that the September tragedy would significantly reinforce the conclusions reached by the editors and contributors.

President Bush’s 2002 State of the Union address showed a new willingness on the part of the United States to confront aggressively and directly the threats posed by Iran, Iraq, and North Korea. NMD provides defense against these specific ballistic missile threats. But if U.S. political determination removes the ballistic missile threat from these states, what then for NMD? If NMD deployment continues, absent a threat from Iran, Iraq, and North Korea, what effect will that have on the global landscape? Will a capabilities-based argument against an

undefined and unknown emerging threat be acceptable to the rest of the world?

Rockets' Red Glare has my wholehearted recommendation. However, it must now be read with an active consideration of, and sober reflection on, the impact of the attacks of 11 September 2001 and their aftermath, the war on terrorism.

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Miller, Judith, Stephen Engelberg, and William Broad. *Germ: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001. 382pp. \$27

In 1988, only two years before the Soviet empire fell, secret scientific efforts were still turning germs into weapons and creating entirely new germs. In Koltsovo, a hidden Siberian city, scientist Nikolai Ustinov died from an accident while working with the Marburg virus, designed to bleed victims to death. With clinical detachment, he documented his own decline in a journal with blood-spotted pages. His colleagues found that the virus had mutated while killing him. Their response was consistent with their careers—they buried the scientist in a zinc-lined coffin and turned the “new” virus into a weapon, naming it “Variant U,” in tribute to Ustinov.

That story, with its multiple layers of horror, shows why reality is often more remarkable than the best novel. It also has important parallels to current concerns over states that manufacture and prepare living weapons for deployment. Iraq again made the news when in March 2002 Iraqi civil engineer Adnan Sayeed, along with another defector, smuggled

out evidence of Iraq’s ongoing germ weapons program. Then there is Iran. This book reprises the authors’ earlier reporting on wide-ranging, well-funded Iranian efforts to buy up talent from destitute Soviet weapons labs.

This is an important book on current affairs, crafted in an accessible style by three professionals of the *New York Times* who have excellent contacts in the federal government. William Broad is a science writer who has shared two Pulitzer Prizes. Stephen Engelberg has long reported on national security issues. Judith Miller has done groundbreaking investigations on anti-American terrorists. Although their report is not what might have been done by a blue-ribbon scientific panel, it is reaching a much larger audience. Moreover, it deserves favorable notice as an original work created well before the 2001 anthrax attacks.

Germ is not specifically about biological threats posed by small terrorist groups; it focuses on state producers of “super germs”—disease-generating organisms to be used in military weapons systems. It discusses the tension between developing biological weapons and devising programs to counter them. Any argument as to whether a weapons program is for offense or defense (as Winston Churchill showed in a humorous “disarmament fable” in October 1928) is more about intentions and regimes and fears than about actual weapons. That leaves challenging ambiguities. Parts of this book appear to be directed against any U.S. government germ work that goes beyond research and into development. Its wider appeal is that all countries be kept within bounds by treaty law.

Several small flaws are apparent. One paragraph flatly dismisses the value of all U.S. Senate hearings as mere stage

productions. This idea is silly and elitist, and is disproved by the authors themselves. In several other passages they discuss significant congressional work, including a hearing by former senator John Glenn, who chaired the Intergovernmental Affairs Committee.

There is no criticism of President Bill Clinton in this book. The authors repeatedly show him in a good light as prodding the lethargic toward caring about this new and very dangerous problem. The authors do admit to lapses in his administration, but they attribute them to others—for example, Secretary of Defense William Cohen, who in a press conference hoisted a five-pound bag of sugar to make a point about how anthrax could kill half the District of Columbia. Some think he exaggerated (and the authors agree), yet when reporting the argument Miller, Engelberg, and Broad treat Cohen unfairly by mixing references to Washington, D.C., and its far larger metro area. Also, just how much should one care if Cohen's five-pound bag of sugar was light by two pounds, or ten, when the next chapter states that the Soviets were making 4,500 metric tons of anthrax every year?

The efforts by many U.S. officials and scientists were important responses to a reality well stated in this work: the U.S. public health system must be better integrated into its national defenses—a need recognized early on in Cold War civil defense. Although civil defense later declined, by 1989 the need, if not apparent, was nonetheless great. Iraq was busy brewing veritable swimming pools full of anthrax, tularemia, glanders, bubonic plague, as well as smaller amounts of other agents. The Soviets' formidable *biopreparat* program would remain dangerous, even in decline, and even now

Russia cannot be fully trusted on biowar issues, say the authors.

Information on biological agent production came to light throughout the 1990s. Weapons of mass destruction are now a prime reason why the hottest topic in Washington is “unfinished business” with Baghdad. But with that challenge comes another. Whatever the world community may do to stop Iraq's weapon development program, Iran will still remain, wealthier than its neighbor and equally ready to kill people, as proven by three decades of transnational terrorism and ongoing development of a range of weapons of mass destruction. North Korea is still an odd blend of militarism, weapons of mass destruction, and occasional fatuity. There must be a strategy that deals with more than Saddam Hussein alone.

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Duncan, Francis. *Rickover: The Struggle for Excellence*. Annapolis, Md.: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 2001. 416pp. \$37.50

Dr. Francis Duncan served as the official historian to the Atomic Energy Commission and Department of Energy and worked in Admiral Hyman G. Rickover's office from 1969 until Rickover's retirement in 1982. Duncan also has had access to much of Rickover's personal correspondence, as well as that of his immediate family. Indeed, Rickover's widow wrote the foreword to this book. This is Duncan's third book on Rickover, for whom he candidly admits great admiration. Although the author's familiarity with and admiration for his subject

defines the book and gives it credibility, it also constitutes the book's greatest weakness.

Duncan thoroughly chronicles Rickover's methods of achieving his goals. This makes compelling reading for anyone familiar with the U.S. Navy's nuclear propulsion program. Past and present nuclear-trained officers and sailors will likely be fascinated by how Rickover manipulated naval and congressional bureaucratic processes to achieve his goals. Many may find themselves nodding familiarly at Duncan's incantations of Rickover's proven formula for success—hard work, sacrifice, self-discipline, conservative engineering, and technical mastery. Others, however, may shake their heads when they read how Rickover plotted and pulled strings to achieve flag rank, and how he fought retirement, serving as an admiral for more than twenty-seven years until he finally retired at the age of eighty-one, in 1982. Still, although these stories are interesting and tell us much about Rickover's character, a biography should offer more.

As Duncan aptly shows, Rickover is justly remembered as the father of the nuclear navy. However, Rickover is almost equally remembered for his abrasive and disdainful behavior, his vindictiveness, and his arrogance. Unfortunately, Duncan pays little attention to these characteristics, mentioning them only briefly. True, Duncan does acknowledge that Rickover could be unpleasant. He tells how in 1951 an admiral advised Rickover that "he could not get along with people" and pointed out how in a lecture Rickover had angered his audience of submarine officers "by talking down to them and calling them stupid." This anecdote is notable, however, for its inclusion rather than its honesty. Instead

of acknowledging and criticizing, or at least lamenting, Rickover's difficult personality, Duncan asks readers to empathize with the man. For example, in 1958 Rickover was not invited to the White House reception honoring USS *Nautilus's* passage under the North Pole. This slight, says Duncan, "hurt him deeply." Years later, in 1982, Rickover unleashed a tirade during a meeting with President Ronald Reagan, venting "the fury of a goaded man who felt manipulated, patronized, and humiliated." But it is difficult to feel much sorrow for the old admiral, who, at least by reputation, was so often guilty of even worse behavior. One can imagine that Rickover's long-standing adversaries and enemies would be acutely aware of Duncan's apparently inadvertent irony.

Another weakness is Duncan's short shrift to Rickover's private life. In the early chapters, Duncan makes significant use of letters between Rickover and his first wife during their courtship and early marriage, but that's it. His first wife receives little further mention, and his son receives even less. Rickover's second marriage gets only slightly more attention. The near absence of discussion between Rickover and family or friends leaves a critical void. No reason is offered for these omissions. Perhaps Duncan believed that Rickover, private citizen, did not warrant as much attention as Rickover, public servant. Perhaps Rickover's family authorized the biography on the condition that his personal life remain off limits. The absence of this material is striking and yet possibly revealing. It could be that once Rickover lost himself in his work, his family life suffered, which would not be surprising. Rickover demanded that level of commitment and sacrifice from those who

worked for him, and all indications are that he demanded the same of himself.

One comes away from this biography with an appreciation for Rickover's accomplishments in the Navy but with no understanding of the man. Rickover certainly left an enduring and immensely valuable legacy, but Duncan should have been fully open and fair, reporting all the pertinent aspects of his life. A biography should neither unduly venerate nor unjustly condemn. Duncan comes perilously close to writing a hagiography. Most readers would have much preferred honesty and a more complete depiction of the complex human being Hyman Rickover was.

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Ring, Jim. *We Come Unseen*. London: John Murray, 2001. 270pp. £20

Books about submarines are generally disapproved of, unless they are technical volumes describing the characteristics and performance of potentially hostile fleets. A couple of recent accounts of American operations have run into shallow water. For example, Roger Dunham was obliged to censor much of his *Spy Sub* (Naval Institute Press, 1996) and conceal the fact that he had served on the USS *Halibut* on classified projects, one of which was the discovery of the wreck of a Soviet submarine in the Pacific. Exercising discretion, Dunham called his boat *Viperfish* and never identified the *K-219*, the Soviet Golf II that went down in 1968 with ballistic missiles aboard and became the target of a celebrated CIA salvage operation, code-named JENNIFER.

Two years later, Dunham's efforts to comply with the demands of the U.S. Navy to protect *Halibut* proved counterproductive when Sherry Sontag, Christopher Drew, and Annette Lawrence Drew published their best-selling *Blind Man's Bluff: The Untold Story of American Submarine Espionage* (PublicAffairs, 1998). Their detailed description of the eavesdropping and other secret operations conducted by *Halibut* over many years had clearly been informed by inside sources. Finally, John Pina Craven, formerly the chief scientist with the U.S. Navy's Special Projects program, released *The Silent War: The Cold War Battle beneath the Sea* (Simon & Schuster, 2001), giving more details of *Halibut's* activities and providing his own astonishing explanation of the loss of the *K-219*. According to Craven, the Soviet submarine's commander had been preparing for a rogue missile launch aimed at Hawaii when his vessel sustained a sudden, catastrophic accident that sent it plunging to the sea floor. Until recently, such disclosures have been uniquely American, with almost nothing released in England about the Royal Navy's nuclear partnership with its U.S. cousins or about its contributions to the clandestine combat fought in the Arctic against the "boomers" (ballistic-missile submarines) of the Red Banner Northern Fleet. That silence has now been broken by Jim Ring, who marks the British submarine service's centenary with remarkable revelations about the cat-and-mouse games played off Murmansk, the extraordinary phenomenon of "ice damage" (a euphemism for underwater collision), as well as the deployment of hunter-killer submarines to the South Atlantic in 1982 during the Falklands War.

Possessing a relatively small fleet of submarines, at least in comparison to the United States, Britain requires its boats to fulfill several different roles. The smaller diesel-electrics are equipped to support teams of the Special Boat Squadron (SBS), who train continuously to perfect their covert infiltration skills and develop new techniques to counter terrorists and drug smugglers. The Poseidon-armed deterrent force undertakes long patrols and generally avoids surfacing so as to maintain a credible threat to a potential aggressor. For the hunter-killers, the task has been to shadow potential targets, raise antennas in dangerous waters to collect signals intelligence, and occasionally make goodwill visits to carefully selected ports to reinforce diplomatic messages.

Thus a courtesy invitation in Rio de Janeiro to the Argentine naval attaché to come aboard and enjoy a drink had a very specific objective; it certainly made clear the wisdom of not attempting to mount any amphibious landings on disputed territories in the region. This useful exercise was executed with total success in 1977, when HMS *Dreadnought* participated in Operation JOURNEYMAN, now regarded as a classic of deterrence. Unfortunately there was no time to repeat it in 1982 before General Leopoldo Galtieri seized the opportunity to launch a surprise invasion of the Falklands.

While much has been published concerning the Falklands War, two aspects have remained under wraps. First, there is the vexed question of what nuclear munitions were temporarily lost when the destroyer *Coventry* and the frigates *Antelope* and *Ardent* were sunk by Argentine aircraft in San Carlos Water. Such issues are never debated in public

in Britain, although reports have circulated of specialist divers engaged in the recovery of atomic depth charges. The second aspect, usually touched upon only when HMS *Conqueror* is referred to as the submarine responsible for sinking the cruiser *General Belgrano*, concerns the mission of that submarine and the other four attack boats that played unseen roles in the conflict. Where were *Valiant*, *Spartan*, and *Splendid*? They too were making a vital contribution, monitoring enemy aircraft from the Argentine mainland and giving valuable two-hour warnings of air raids. As for the diesel-powered *Onyx*, which took a month to reach the Total Exclusion Zone, its plan was to drop a team of SBS saboteurs near Rio Grande, the base from which the Exocet-equipped Super Etendards had flown to sink HMS *Sheffield*, the first major British casualty of the war. In the end, however, Operation MIKADO was handed over to the Special Air Service, which planned to crash-land two C-130s on the runway and then have the raiders escape to Chile. The idea was abandoned as suicidal.

The Falklands conflict provided plenty of firsts. *General Belgrano* was the first enemy ship sunk by a British submarine since the end of the Second World War; the sinking (with old Mark 8 torpedoes, in preference to the wire-guided Tigerfish) was a turning point in the war, effectively bottling up the entire Argentine navy in port. *Valiant* was at sea a record 101 days, and the jettisoning of unexpended ordnance upon it by Argentine aircraft returning to their base amounted to the first (unintentional) air attack on any nuclear submarine. The submarines' warnings of Argentine sorties, sent from dangerously shallow water to the task force, took just two minutes to reach

their destination with the aid of a satellite link. The early warning provided by the submarines saved many lives and was critical in giving air superiority to the British liberators of the islands. The Argentine air raids were countered by short-legged but deadly Sea Harriers armed with the latest Sidewinders, which proved to be impressive weapons.

Doubtless there is more to be revealed about the adventures of a handful of British submarine officers who survived the notoriously demanding “Perisher” command course to play tag with their Soviet opponents and fight the Argentine junta. Who could have foreseen a submarine service playing such a role?

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Harris, Brayton. *The Navy Times Book of Submarines: A Political, Social and Military History*. New York: Berkley Books, 1997. 398pp. \$15

This historical book is a compilation of thousands of facts surrounding the evolutionary development of today's modern submarine. In an effort to separate fiction from fact, Captain Harris (U.S. Navy, Ret.) debunks many commonly held myths that have been perpetuated in submarine lore.

With twenty-four years of active duty service, Harris is well suited to speak on these matters. The huge number of facts interlaced throughout this work is evidence in itself of the thoroughness of his research. Harris has also written *The Age of the Battleship, 1890–1922*, and a study of the role of the newspaper during the American Civil War that appeared in the

magazine of the Civil War Society, *Civil War*. He has written for the *Saturday Review* and the U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings*.

This book begins with the late sixteenth century. Little-known names like William Bourne, Frederico Gianibelli, and Cornelius Drebbel are joined by that of Robert Boyle (formulator of Boyle's Law) in the development of submarine craft. While Gianibelli carried out the first successful wartime assault using submerged explosives, Drebbel is credited with the first craft capable of transporting men and equipment underwater. Here begins Harris's correction of folklore. Drebbel's craft, rowed by twelve strong men, did not actually operate submerged, but awash. The boat's submerged operations became such a fish story that a hundred years after the event, it was claimed that King James I himself had ventured underwater in Drebbel's craft. Harris puts the matter right.

Harris points out two issues that plague military inventors. First, wars create necessity; without the threat of war, there is no drive to create new technology. Second, bureaucratic inertia is extremely difficult to overcome. Interest in these “infernal machines” would wax and wane depending upon the state of political and military unrest. Inventors and capitalists had to become politicians to find support within their governments; it required the patience of Job to wait for a bureaucrat to provide the necessary financial backing.

This work is more than a history of the mechanical evolution of submarines; it also discusses the legal matters surrounding naval warfare. Harris tells how Confederate president Jefferson Davis invited ordinary citizens to become privateers, including (and especially)

submarine privateers. This was by the 1860s considered illegal by most countries in the West: the Treaty of Paris, signed in 1856, had outlawed privateering. However, since neither the United States, nor, by extension, the Confederate States of America were signatories to the treaty, the treaty was nonbinding. But that did not stop President Abraham Lincoln from issuing an edict declaring all privateers “pirates,” subject to death if caught.

Harris is not without fault. While his facts are presented in a logical and well-thought-out sequence, he does not provide notes to document his sources. In addition, his attempts at sarcasm do not always hit the mark; some come off as confusing and inappropriate. For example, he writes, “Johnstone [an Englishman allegedly hired to build a submarine to rescue Napoleon Bonaparte] may—or may not—have had some involvement with Fulton’s expeditions against the French at Brest; he may—or may not—have built a submarine in 1815 with tepid support from the government. He may—or may not—have been offered £40,000 for the effort on behalf of the Bonapartists.”

Those who wish to learn more about the political, social, and military history behind submarine development should read this book. It is probably the greatest compilation of submarine facts ever published in one volume.

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McCann, David R., and Barry S. Strauss, eds. *War and Democracy: A Comparative Study of the Korean War and the Peloponnesian War*. London: M. E. Sharpe, 2001. 385pp. \$77.95

“At first glance,” the editors of this volume observe, “it seems odd to compare the Peloponnesian War and the Korean War.” One conflict was ancient, the other modern; one was long, the other short; one featured multiple battles at sea, the other was essentially a ground war, albeit with imaginative and potentially decisive amphibious dimensions.

So why compare these two wars? The reason is that they were (and were perceived to be) largely struggles between different kinds of societies—democratic Athens versus authoritarian Sparta in Greece; and the liberal-democratic United States versus international communism in Korea, led by the Soviet Union with assistance from China. These were tests of democracy during great struggles for hegemony, with Athens ultimately failing that test after twenty-seven years of war, and the United States surviving the challenge after forty-odd years of the Cold War. Why did one democracy succumb and the other prevail?

Foundations of an answer lie in this book’s five sections, which respectively address the character of democracy at war, the nature of these different wars, the dilemmas of small states during struggles between major powers, the dynamics of populism and civil-military relations in these conflicts, and the culture of democracy at war.

For readers of this journal, the essay by the noted Thucydides scholar Victor Davis Hanson is perhaps most important. The institutions of American

representative democracy and Athenian direct democracy are radically different, but their shared political culture, devoted to equality and liberty, has encouraged a degree of dynamic innovation no authoritarian government has been able to match. Nonetheless, it can be dangerously misleading to impose a Cold War framework on the early struggle between Athens, a democracy at home but a tyrant over its allies, and Sparta, tyrannical at home but relatively mild in its treatment of allies. As one contributor, Robert Kagan, suggests, the American-led anticommunist alliance in Europe and Asia was not a Delian League, exacting tribute at sword point and crushing all who resisted it. Athens turned the Delian League into something like the Warsaw Pact, which explains why both Athens and the Soviet Union were hated and could not count on voluntary support from their allies. The willing assistance of allies for the more benevolent hegemony of the United States goes far to explain why the latter succeeded where Athens failed.

Noteworthy too are essays exploring the problem of maintaining civil liberties and civilian control of the military. Ellen Schrecker shows how the Korean War strengthened McCarthyism in 1950, and Stephen J. Whitfield considers how the American populist tradition rendered the United States vulnerable to the worst excesses of the senator from Wisconsin. Jennifer T. Roberts's insightful discussion of the cults of personality attached to Alcibiades and Douglas MacArthur helps us understand why "loose cannons" are less likely to rise to the top in the United States but also less likely to be punished as severely as they might deserve. Oddly, the only discussion of the most infamous demagogue in wartime Athens, Cleon, occurs not in this section

but in another essay, on a fundamentally different topic—an attempt by Josiah Ober to reconcile Thucydides the realist strategic theorist with Thucydides the consummate historian of the Peloponnesian War.

Perhaps the most striking essay is Gregory Crane's, on the problems that small states, like Plataea and Korea, face in preserving their independence and security when caught up in struggles between would-be hegemons. Dae-Sook Suh and Kongdan Oh invite the American reader to explore the internal dynamics of North and South Korean policy and strategy, while Kurt A. Raaflaub and Dong-Wook Shin offer intriguing perspectives on the bellicose character of Athenian political culture and the efforts of Koreans to resurrect a national identity from the ashes of war.

This eclectic mix of essays reminds us that democracy can be both an asset and a liability to its votaries in time of war.

KARL WALLING
Naval War College



Worth, Richard. *Fleets of World War II*. Cambridge, Mass.: Da Capo, 2001. 375pp. \$35

In this handy-sized, reasonably priced book, Richard Worth and his publisher have provided an excellent instrument of discovery for readers whose range of interest in World War II includes the many fleets that fought, and even the few that only looked on nervously.

Worth describes adequately all the combatants, nation by nation (from Albania to Yugoslavia), type by type (aircraft carriers to motor torpedo boats), class by class (oldest to newest), and, for the

larger types down through destroyers and submarines, ship by ship (the Americans in hull-number order, though Worth does not give the individual numbers). Worth omits amphibious ships and auxiliaries, “ships whose primary function was not naval combat,” though he does include the U.S. Navy’s several dozen seaplane tenders, large and small. There are a few other omissions too, some obviously unintended.

Each country’s section begins with a general discussion, “an assessment” of its fleet, geostrategic situation, tasks, relevant history, and resources, including weapons (guns and torpedoes). Then Worth gets to the ships and their aircraft. He covers Albania in just over six lines; the United States requires seventy pages.

One should not expect to find portraits of any particular ship; Worth includes very few. However, other excellent but more expensive books provide satisfactory views, as well as individual ship data, of almost every class of fighting ship of that war.

Altogether, the index includes about 4,600 ships’ names. However, a host of unnamed ships and craft (such as the thousand or so U-boats, the eight hundred American torpedo boats, and the 502 American yard minesweepers, YMS) must content themselves with one general index entry for each class. Nearly all classes are to be found in the book—only nine lines for the 136-foot YMS, with a fine photo. The U-boats, in all their variations, properly get seven pages.

In a book of this sort one will find errors, but this reader found few indeed, compared to the great opportunity to commit errors, and those were small. For example, the German 280 mm gun was much closer to the eleven inches credited to it

in other books than to the 11.1 inches Worth allows. Also, not all American *Clemson*-class destroyers built for World War I “suffered from inferior workmanship.” Only those built by Bethlehem did, and the U.S. Navy discarded most of those before World War II began.

The great pleasure of this book lies in Worth’s clear and succinct commentary. Regarding a pair of British battleships, for example, he writes: “The *Nelsons* were innovative in many ways, but successful in few. The nine 16-inch guns seemed a potent battery, but by the time they worked out all their bugs, they proved no more effective than the old 15-inchers.” The fifteen-inch-gun *Queen Elizabeths* “sometimes achieved brilliant gunnery; as early as Jutland the Germans noted *Valiant’s* consistent fire.” In 1940 “at Calabria, *Warspite* planted a shot on the Italian flagship at a range of 26,400 yards, the longest ship-to-ship hit in history.”

Of the numerous American *Fletcher*-class destroyers, Worth observes that they “had a strong armament, long range, reliability, and irrepressible toughness. Some of their success came by inheritance; most units joined the fleet after the early, unpleasant lessons of night combat against the Japanese. However, the *Fletchers* presented the perfect vehicle for exploiting those lessons, achieving utter triumph at Cape St. George and Surigao Strait.” Also, “most of the losses among the *Fletcher* and *Sumner* classes resulted from kamikaze attacks. In many cases the ships survived, but the navy in that stage in the war didn’t bother to repair them. *Hoel* succumbed to a more traditional fate beneath an avalanche of Japanese gunfire: 40 shells, ranging from 5-inch to 16.1 inch, stopped her dead in the water, and subsequent hits finished her

off. *Johnston* received 4,700 pounds of incoming ordnance within the space of one minute. It wrecked half of her machinery, yet she continued at 17 knots. . . . After accumulating damage for two and a half hours, she wallowed so helplessly that her crew couldn't even properly scuttle her; they simply opened her watertight doors and let her flood."

Worth says of the American diesel-driven *Cannon*-class destroyer escorts that they "rolled as badly as the *Evarts* type," an earlier class of destroyer escort that he reports was prone to "lurid" rolls. The Navy, according to Worth, considered the *Cannons* the least successful of its several destroyer escort classes. I did not know the Navy's official opinion on those ships, but having a little experience in one of them, I found it an easy opinion to share.

Discussing briefly another class in which I sailed, the 173-foot American submarine chasers, Worth reports accurately that they were "wet forward and generally uncomfortable in heavy seas." Indeed, in a head sea of any magnitude, solid water often swept over the pilot-house. With the sea on the beam the ship proved a deep roller. Still, these little ships "proved seaworthy enough," and, Worth adds, "the navy viewed them as a success." This also is an easy opinion to share.

With a substantial library of good books on the fighting ships of the last century and a half, I am glad to add Richard Worth's *Fleets of World War II* to my collection.

FRANK UHLIG, JR.
Naval War College



Robinson, C. Snelling, *200,000 Miles aboard the Destroyer Cotten*. Kent, Ohio: Kent State Univ. Press, 2000. 320pp. \$35

As a midshipman in the 1960s, I discovered J. Bryan's *Aircraft Carrier*, the classic World War II nonfiction "diary" of life aboard the USS *Yorktown* (CV 10) in 1945. It remains a great source of insight into the everyday lives of the men of Task Force 58 at the height of the Pacific War. As a junior officer in destroyers, I sought out similar nonfiction work describing life aboard "tin cans" during the war, but I found only two books, both novels. Not until Robinson's *200,000 Miles aboard the Destroyer Cotten* have I read anything as good as J. Bryan's book.

This book comprises Robinson's recollections, bolstered by deck logs and his archive of letters to his parents, of his experience as a junior officer in *Cotten* (DD 669). As such, it is an amalgam of specific details, his immediate appreciations, and his present-day reflections on the men he served with, the events of those years, and the ship itself.

Ensign Robinson was commissioned via the Naval Reserve Officers Training Corps at Harvard University in late spring 1943. He was assigned to the precommissioning crew of *Cotten*, which was then under construction at the Federal Shipyard in Kearny, New Jersey. *Cotten* was a "war emergency" *Fletcher*-class unit, with built-in modifications based on the wartime experience of earlier sister ships. Laid down on 8 February 1943, the ship was launched and commissioned in just 165 days. Ensign Robinson began his service on *Cotten* as the typical junior officer, with a bewildering series of assignments while the ship was

fitting out in Kearny. Ultimately, he was assigned as assistant first lieutenant with a battle station at “Sky 2,” directing 40 mm anti-aircraft guns.

Cotten was quickly dispatched to the Pacific Fleet and began its combat career as part of Operation GALVANIC, the November 1943 invasion of Tarawa and Makin. The ship screened the escort carriers and performed antisubmarine warfare patrols.

While Robinson provides some historical framework to the ship’s operations, the strength of the book is the insight it provides into the daily life of a destroyer wardroom during this extraordinary time. As the war progressed, *Cotten* was assigned to Destroyer Squadron 50 and participated in the great Central Pacific campaign, continuing from Tarawa all the way to Okinawa. The ship performed all the classic destroyer duties, such as screening the fast carriers and steaming with the battle line, at the same time coping with weather, overdue maintenance, and, of course, an implacable and terrifying enemy. Robinson’s descriptions of depth-charging sonar contacts and engaging low-level torpedo bombers reaffirm the adage about war being “hours of boredom and seconds of terror.”

Robinson learned about the insularity of destroyer life, and he describes it well. He depicts how the world seemed to collapse into the restricted horizons of the wardroom and watch teams, and recalls vividly his quest to qualify as a fleet officer of the deck. He evokes some of the exhilaration of high-speed destroyer shiphandling in fleet operations, at a time when destroyer divisions maneuvered at a standard distance of five hundred yards and were constrained by

nothing except gross tonnage and the occasional floating mine.

Robinson ends the book with an epilogue that tells of *Cotten*’s Cold War service. He also includes appendices that discuss the characteristics of the *Fletcher*-class destroyers and the *Cotten*’s awards, as well as a glossary.

There is a minor error in one photo caption, and the maps could have been better, but these are minor quibbles. The book’s greatest strength is Robinson’s recollections of his experiences in *Cotten*, providing an evocative and accurate depiction of a valuable part of a great naval campaign. While the book is not quite the “DD version” of Bryan’s classic, it is well worth reading, particularly by destroyer veterans.

WILLIAM COOPER
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Moretz, Joseph. *The Royal Navy and the Capital Ship in the Interwar Period: An Operational Perspective*. London: Frank Cass, 2002. 292pp. \$57.50

The Royal Navy is often held up as an example of a military organization that failed to innovate in peacetime. Its critics maintain that naval officers spent the interwar years preparing to refight the Battle of Jutland when they should have been thinking about the new operational challenges presented by aircraft carriers and U-boats. At the root of the problem, these critics argue, was an increasingly irrational devotion to the capital ship (a term that encompasses both the battleship and the battle cruiser). In recent years, however, historians have challenged the image of an intellectually stilted and hopelessly reactionary officer corps. *The Royal Navy and the Capital*

Ship in the Interwar Period builds on such work to present a more sympathetic picture of a service struggling with inadequate budgets, global responsibilities, and rapid technological change.

The Royal Navy emerged from the First World War with its faith in the supremacy of the capital ship largely undiminished. Battleships were clearly vulnerable to attack by aircraft and submarines, but as Joseph Moretz demonstrates, the naval profession believed that the risks to these ships would be manageable, a view that was confirmed by the experiences of the Spanish Civil War. With naval aviation still in a formative stage of development, there was as yet no reliable and tested alternative to the capital ship. Nevertheless, aircraft carriers were regarded as an essential and integral part of any British battle fleet, valuable not just for spotting and reconnaissance but also as a striking force. The main impediment to the development of naval aviation in the interwar era was less a lack of imagination than a constant shortage of funds, as well as the control by the Royal Air Force (until 1937) of the Fleet Air Arm. By the beginning of the Second World War, the Royal Navy's initial commanding lead in naval aviation had vanished.

Challenging the traditional view, Moretz argues that in this period the Royal Navy strove to overcome known deficiencies and meet future challenges through a sustained process of fleet exercises and experimentation. Its accomplishments in this area were mixed. As the author notes, the gunnery proficiency of British capital ships actually decreased through much of the interwar period, due in large part to budgetary restrictions and the problems of assimilating new technology. The service was willing, however, to consider such measures as night fighting and

new divisional tactics in its effort to retain a qualitative edge over its increasingly numerous prospective enemies.

Capital ships were also employed in such peacetime tasks as "showing the flag," providing aid to civil authorities, and deterrence. Moretz maintains that the capital ship's utility across the entire spectrum of operational activity bolstered the Royal Navy's case for their retention. The evidence produced to support this claim is unconvincing, however. Peacetime tasks were usually undertaken by smaller warships that were better suited to them. It was only in demonstrations of British power to deter aggressors in crisis situations that heavy ships were essential, but even here, Moretz suggests, their record was notably weak, given their failure to deter Japan in 1941.

Other chapters attempt to provide context for the Navy's capital ship policies, but the results are uneven. Moretz often seems out of his depth when he strays into broad questions of naval policy. For example, he attributes Britain's willingness to enter into a series of arms control agreements almost entirely to financial considerations, though other factors were often of equal or greater importance. This propensity to oversimplify complex issues is also obvious in the chapter on interwar naval strategy, which ascribes Britain's difficulties to the maintenance of the "one power standard" (which was *not* replaced by a two-power standard in 1938, as the author claims) and the Navy's unwillingness to divide its fleet between two distant theaters (which is precisely what it *did* plan to do for most of this period). Moreover, while Moretz correctly notes that the Navy developed different strategies for Europe and the Far East, he is not clear on what those strategies were. This problem stems from

insufficient research and a tendency to conflate fleet exercises with strategic planning.

Nonetheless, and while the background material that makes up a significant portion of this study is not always reliable, the book is of value to the specialist for the fresh perspective it offers on the Royal Navy's response to the operational challenges of the interwar period.

CHRISTOPHER BELL
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Chisholm, Donald. *Waiting for Dead Men's Shoes: Origins and Development of the U.S. Navy's Officer Personnel System, 1793–1941*. Palo Alto, Calif.: Stanford Univ. Press, 2001. 883pp. \$125

Donald Chisholm has provided us with an important book. It is the first comprehensive history of the development of the U.S. Navy's officer personnel system. Others have provided portions of the picture; Christopher McKee's *A Gentlemanly and Honorable Profession: The Creation of the U.S. Naval Officer Corps, 1794–1815* is an excellent treatment of the early years. But the Royal Navy, from which many American practices derive, is more thoroughly covered. Extensive coverage of the Royal Navy is to be found in Michael Lewis's *British Ships and British Seamen* (1940); *The Navy of Britain: A Historical Portrait* (1948); *A Social History of the Navy, 1793–1815* (1960); and *The Navy in Transition, 1814–1864: A Social History* (1965). William Laird Clowe's magisterial seven-volume *The Royal Navy: A History from the Earliest Times to the Present* (1897), although dated, remains impressive. Yet no one has provided for the U.S. Navy books of such depth and coverage

until now, with Chisholm's impressive work.

Chisholm's intent goes well beyond a historical recounting of events. His stated aim is "to explore how institutions are created and elaborated, to assess the usefulness of the problem-solving conception of decision for so doing, and to relate the previously untold story of the origins and development of the U.S. Navy's officer personnel system." Chisholm believes that the problems faced by the Navy's officer personnel system parallel in many ways those faced by other large-scale organizations. He is at least as interested in process as he is in outcome, and he draws with impressive scholarship upon multiple disciplines, including not only history but political science, sociology, strategic management, foreign policy, and public administration. Although Chisholm's vehicle is the detailed study of naval officer personnel management, he uses that as a means of studying organizational management in a broader context. In this he is successful. Extensively researched in primary sources and thoroughly documented, his book is a major contribution to organizational theory.

The author's intended audience is the community of naval officers—past, present, and future—congressional scholars, and students of American political development. However, an even wider audience will appreciate this study for its insights into institutional problem solving, modification, and growth. However, even a comprehensive study such as this must set its limits. To make things manageable, Chisholm chose to omit the staff corps and Marine Corps, the development of the reserves, the creation and modifications of the Naval Academy curriculum, and the enlisted personnel system.

It took almost 150 years to construct the naval personnel system that existed at the beginning of World War II. Chisholm makes clear that this system did not come about because of any grand design but as the result of an infinite series of incremental decisions made to solve problems as they arose. The three main motivations behind these decisions were, Chisholm argues, efficiency, equity, and economy. “Efficiency” in this sense refers to the most economical use of resources, more closely resembling what might be called “effectiveness.” “Equity” is concerned with protecting the rights of officers. “Economy” ensures the least possible cost at all times. First one, then another of these goals prevailed as the Navy interacted with the administration and Congress during its periodic expansions and contractions. The interaction between the Navy and Congress in addressing naval personnel problems represents a major portion of the historical action recounted here. Of particular value is the report on congressional naval debates, offering not only the bills that passed but the full flavor of the debates, including the attempts (both successful and not) to amend them and the arguments presented. This gives us an idea of not only what happened but also of what might have been.

The title of the book is taken from the memoirs of Rear Admiral Yates Stirling, Jr.: “With all its faults, and there are many, the Navy has accepted selection because it brings officers to high ranks young enough to be at their best. Promotion by seniority, waiting for dead men’s shoes, is a sad blow to efficiency, for it stifles initiative and offers no incentive.” Yet for well over a century, promotion by seniority prevailed. It took until what later came to be called the Line Personnel

Act of 1916 for the Navy to adopt “selection up” as the means for determining who was to be promoted. Chisholm characterizes this decision as “*the* pivotal point in the navy’s history.” The commanders and captains selected in the twenty years following the passage of the act were to become the flag officers who led the Navy in its greatest test, and finest hours, during World War II.

The main features of naval personnel organization emerged slowly and incrementally. Initially the Navy had only two ranks, lieutenant and captain; flag ranks were not established until the Civil War. For many years naval officers’ pay lagged well behind that of Army officers. Advancement by seniority resulted in painfully slow promotion, which resulted in officers overage in grade. For half the period covered in this book the Navy had no means to retire officers. The principle of selection up was adopted only after trying a series of other ways to select for promotion. These included the use of professional examinations as a screening device and the establishment of “plucking boards” to accomplish “selection out.” None, however, proved satisfactory. Even after accepting selection up, the Navy still had to figure out how the selection board would work, what criteria would be used, and the details of fitness reports. So simple a matter as determining the number of officers needed in the various grades took years to organize.

One of the great virtues of Chisholm’s study is his detailed presentation of how every problem was addressed, describing the invariable false starts and unintended consequences that led serendipitously to a stronger institution. Chisholm argues that organizations cannot rely upon a succession of brilliant leaders: “It is that their rules and procedures—not least

those that govern the procurement, education and training, advancement, and placement of their personnel—permit them to operate effectively with normal human beings, and to withstand the occasional individual who proves less than completely competent.”

Gratitude is due to Stanford University Press for publishing this valuable work, which even at its steep price is unlikely to return its costs. For a book that will probably be consulted a great deal, however, it is too bad that a sturdier binding was not used. My copy is already beginning to fall apart.

Chisholm has achieved what he set out to do in fine style. He has provided a comprehensive history of naval officer personnel management and at the same time has shed light on the creation, structure, and problem solving that resulted in the organization we see today. From now on it will be impossible to write usefully about the history of personnel management without reference to this book. It promises to be a standard authority.

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Lehman, John. *On Seas of Glory: Heroic Men, Great Ships, and Epic Battles of the American Navy*. New York: Free Press, 2001. 436pp. \$35

John Lehman, former secretary of the Navy and author of *Command of the Seas* (1988), has with this book produced a masterful outline of “the grandeur of the American naval tradition.” The truest examples of this “grandeur” are “best found in its people, fighting sailors, technical innovators and inspiring leaders.” From John Paul Jones and the Revolu-

tionary War to the six-hundred-ship fleet of the Cold War, John Lehman brings us a wonderful episodic view of the U.S. Navy’s people and ships, and their collective contribution to the strength and character of the nation they have served.

Using both primary and secondary sources in the United States and England, Lehman offers an exciting and message-laden portrait of the American naval tradition, a portrait that is “deliberately selective and subjective.” In short, this book is not a typical chronological narrative history of the U.S. Navy but a stimulating history of a highly adaptive institution.

One of the most intriguing sections is the story of Joshua Humphreys, the “premier ship-builder” and “the most innovative and revolutionary designer of the age of sail.” Humphreys would design several warships for the young republic, all of them larger, faster, and more heavily armed than similar vessels in England or France. Collectively known today as the “super frigates,” this group included such storied vessels as *Constitution*, *United States*, and *President*. Even Admiral Horatio Nelson, the preeminent naval leader of his day, is quoted by Lehman as foreseeing “trouble for Britain in those big frigates across the sea”; the trouble of which Nelson warned came during the War of 1812. Throughout, Lehman contends that, contrary to the views of many historians, privateering had a significant impact on the outcome of both the American Revolution and the War of 1812. He argues that “the battles of the American Revolution were fought on land, and independence was won at sea.” This work does much to reinforce such a view.

From the end of the Civil War to the beginning of the Spanish-American War, a great deal of technological and strategic

change was absorbed by the “new Navy” of American Manifest Destiny. Lehman reminds the reader that the “new Navy” was made possible by the nation’s ever-increasing industrialization. The epitome of these changes, according to Lehman, was the fast cruiser USS *Olympia*, “the product of the first American military-industrial complex.” The end result of this rapid naval evolution was a recognized role for the United States on the global high seas. Lehman believes that it was President Theodore Roosevelt who dragged the United States to its true destiny: “TR was the midwife who delivered from the old isolated America the new international United States. And his instrument was the Navy.” It is clear that Lehman holds that, today as well, the Navy is the instrument of the international United States.

Outlining the role of the Navy in the Second World War, Lehman begins with War Plan ORANGE. Rejecting Napoleon’s dictum that planned strategies cannot last beyond the opening salvos of battle, Lehman asserts that War Plan ORANGE was “the most successful strategic document in the history of warfare.” He then discusses key campaigns of the naval war, including Midway, Guadalcanal, Normandy, Leyte, and Okinawa.

Among the book’s many unique features are vignettes of naval personalities. From the chapter on the American revolution to that covering the Cold War at sea, Lehman has laced into his narrative many enlightening and analytical biographies of the people behind the wood and steel walls of the fleet—“daring warriors,” “more prudent—less dramatic leaders,” and the “reluctant warriors.” These figures include the likes of John Barry, John Paul Jones, Stephen Girard, Uriah Philips Levy, William B. Cushing, Raphael Semmes, Chester W.

Nimitz, and Hyman G. Rickover, to name only a few.

John Lehman has given us a first-rate addition to the historiography of the U.S. Navy. With its brief bibliography, notes, and index, this work will benefit the naval enthusiast and the professional seafarer alike. However, this reviewer particularly commends *On Seas of Glory* to professional personnel of the sea services. It will remind them why they decided to commit their time, and possibly their lives, to such institutions.

ANDREW G. WILSON
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Feaver, Peter D., and Richard H. Kohn, eds. *Soldiers and Civilians: The Civil-Military Gap and American National Security*. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2001. 545pp. \$28.95

If you intend to own only a single volume on the crucial question of civil-military relations in the United States, choose this book. It is a comprehensive (indeed, exhaustive) review of the literature and commentary surrounding this timely debate. (A synthesis appears as the lead article in this issue.) It addresses what former secretary of defense William Cohen described as a “chasm” in American society. The editors have assembled a wide variety of commentators who examine two fundamental questions: Are the American armed forces and the civilian sector drifting apart as the result of a lack of shared values and near-total ignorance by the civilians of the military role? If so, what are the potential consequences for U.S. society?

The answer to the first question seems relatively easy. Clearly there is a growing divergence between civil and military sectors of society. This conclusion is based on

fundamental facts: the end of the draft in the early 1970s, and the resultant lack of firsthand exposure to military life; the dearth of elected representatives who have military experience or exposure, especially now that the World War II generation is passing into history; surveys conducted by a wide variety of credible institutions; and general sociological and demographic changes.

The more interesting question is, does it matter? After all, one could argue that there have always been “gaps” between the sectors in American society and that there is sufficient fundamental respect for civilian authority in the military ethos and culture to ease any concern. The contributors to this volume apply skill and insight to answer both of these questions.

Much of the work is based on a wide-ranging survey of civilians—both leaders and academics—as well as of military officers and the public at large. The baseline work was conducted by the well-regarded Triangle Institute for Security Studies, buttressed here by the analyses of a superb group of commentators. Their broad assessment is that the gap is real and has undermined cooperation between the military and civilian sectors. They see indications that it may reduce overall military effectiveness and produce wider consequences, although specifics are hard to define. This finding is clearly in the mainstream of thought, including the expressed view of military people found in various surveys that there is reason for “serious pessimism about the moral health of civilian society and that the military could help society become more moral, and that civilian society would be better off if it adopted more of the military’s values and behaviors.”

In addition to the survey work are significant historical sections that put the debate

in perspective. The fine essay by a leading American military scholar, Russell Weigley, “The American Civil Military Cultural Gap: A Historical Perspective, Colonial Times to the Present,” is worth the price of the book in itself. Additionally, Eliot Cohen, distinguished professor at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies and a frequent commentator on this topic, provides an exceptional discussion on the question of the use of force as it plays in this debate.

In their conclusion the editors outline the path ahead. While they make clear up front that “no problem identified is so acute or urgent as to require a drastic response,” they offer a series of relevant ideas meant to ensure that these sectors of our society maintain a healthy alignment. This book will provide an excellent springboard for future assessment.

Overall, this is an excellent survey of a vital topic in national security studies. It deserves to be read by anyone serious about civil-military relations in the United States today.

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Harvey, Miles. *The Island of Lost Maps: A True Story of Cartographic Crime*. New York: Random House, 2000. 405pp. \$24

In 1995 a middle-aged, well dressed, inconspicuous man attracted the attention of an alert librarian at the George Peabody Library in Baltimore, Maryland. This man was Gilbert Bland, Jr. Notwithstanding his appearance and name, however, the crime he was committing was hardly unassuming. Gilbert Bland (alias James Perry), using the razor-and-fold technique, had stolen from

library manuscripts nearly 250 antique maps valued at half a million dollars. A few of the maps were more than four centuries old. He had cut a swath through libraries from the University of North Carolina, the University of Chicago, the University of Washington, and Duke University to the University of Virginia. Many other institutions had also been victimized. In the end only a little over two-thirds of the maps were returned to their owners.

Miles Harvey, a journalist, began reporting on the thefts in 1996 for *Outside* magazine. However, the reader's fascination with this book would quickly fade if it were only a simple crime story. Harvey's investigation of Bland steps beyond the bounds of a contemporary event to touch every aspect of cartography.

Charts and maps become the central characters of this story as it delves into "cartomania"—the history of cartography, going back to cultures and times when maps were closely held state secrets, stolen by agents for the benefit and profit of other countries. One Carthaginian sea captain sank his ship rather than let his charts fall into Roman hands. Christopher Columbus is suspected of having absconded with a copy of Florentine Paolo del Pozza Toscanelli's world map, which may have shown a westerly sea route to the Indies. Spanish ships kept their official charts in lockboxes secured by two keys, one held by the pilot-major and the other by the cosmographer-major. A map by Martin Waldseemuller depicting the New World in 1513 named it after the first Spanish pilot-major, Amerigo Vespucci, under the mistaken impression that he had been the discoverer.

The economics of maps is revealed to us in Harvey's book. In the latter half of the twentieth century, W. Graham Arader III transformed an erudite hobby into an expensive business when he sold a single 1482

Ptolemy, printed on vellum, for nearly two million dollars. The dark side of this world is also revealed. Elegantly framed maps might be the results of book "breaking," taking advantage of the fact that individual pages of an atlas can be worth more money than the bound volume. Harvey chronicles the history of cartographic crimes; Bland is not unique. Apparently respectable members of society—such as Robert M. "Skeet" Willingham, Jr., librarian, Sunday school teacher, and city council member; Fitzhugh Lee Opie, direct descendant of General Robert E. Lee; and William Charles McCallum, graduate of Yale University and Boston College Law School—have all been involved in stealing maps.

Bland's crime reveals that the guardians of bibliographic treasures are easily penetrated security systems. The conflict between a library's goals of open access and security is not an easy one to solve. Beyond budgets, the dissemination of knowledge requires accessibility; preservation and security require the opposite. The attitudes of librarians and their institutions have created a climate where theft is relatively easy. Some do not have inventory controls adequate to let them know when something is missing. Some do not wish to be told that they have been robbed, while others deny it, for fear of losing patrons and financial backing.

This work is an introduction to a fascinating subculture. The writing style may irritate readers who want a linear revelation of a nonfiction topic, but in the end, the meandering exposition connects the many activities and bits of knowledge. Harvey imbues the book, and consequently the reader, with his exuberance about and interest in all aspects of maps.

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