

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

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Cover: The U.S.S. *America* (CV 66) in Norway's Vestfjord, September 1985. Photo courtesy of Commander Striking Fleet Atlantic Fleet Public Affairs Office. See article by Commander Striking Fleet Atlantic on page 2.

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The Role of the Navy and Marines in the Norwegian Sea

Vice Admiral H. C. Mustin, U.S. Navy

NATO's maritime strategy is a cohesive statement, incorporating collective inputs from all of the nations, for the employment of naval forces in support of the overall NATO strategy. The maritime strategy is based first on deterrence. Should deterrence fail, the NATO maritime strategy is designed to mount a defense far forward in order to protect the territory of its member nations. The U.S. Navy's Maritime Strategy is drawn both from the NATO and the U.S. national military strategy; it provides that the Navy and Marines will wage global, coalition warfare in conjunction with the U.S. Army, the U.S. Air Force and the military forces of our allies.

There are those who take issue with this forward strategy. This criticism ignores the real world: NATO is short of maritime forces to the extent that we cannot perform simultaneously all required maritime tasks to implement a basically defensive strategy in the high north. Therefore, if NATO is to keep the initiative at sea we must defend forward through offensive operations. This means that U.S. Marines and U.S. naval forces, operating in conjunction with NATO forces, must be in position for early and vigorous offensive action if the need arises. Maritime forces have a decisive role in defending and, in the event of invasion, restoring the integrity of the NATO islands in the high north and of Norway, all of which are separated from the rest of Europe either by water or non-NATO countries.

The U.S. Navy and U.S. Marines are part of NATO's Striking Fleet Atlantic. Support of the land battle by the Striking Fleet will be critical on the flanks; the loss of northern Norway would be a determining factor in the battle of the Atlantic as would the loss of Iceland; the loss of Greenland would be severe; losing control of the Baltic Straits would allow the Soviet Baltic Fleet access to the Norwegian Sea. Therefore, NATO has adopted at sea an offensive posture which seems superficially to contradict the premise of a defensive alliance, and some say that indeed it does. This is nonsense. NATO is a defensive alliance *politically*, but there is no logical, historical or legal reason to insist on a *military* strategy that is purely defensive. In fact, history has demonstrated that no purely defensive strategy has ever won a war. In

reality, the geographical spread of the high north is such that we would be self-imposing a very serious limitation on our forces if we were only going to react to events. The combination of large area and thinly spread forces has led NATO to the conclusion that reaction is not a prudent posture. The immediate defense of territory may require early augmentation of Norwegian forces by external NATO forces in the form of U.S. Marines, the U.K./N.L. Amphibious Force and/or Canadian forces.

The concern over our forward strategy is frequently couched in terms of questioning whether U.S. aircraft carriers, as the centerpiece of the Striking Fleet, can survive in the Norwegian Sea in a conflict with the Soviet Union. No one has ever said that war with the Soviet Union would be easy. In war, ships get sunk, aircraft get shot down and people get killed. The Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact would be very formidable foes, and we who would have to fight them are very much aware of their capabilities. But they would not be invincible. The Striking Fleet can get early warning and assistance in beating down Soviet air attack through joint operations with NATO AWACS and Norwegian air defenses—including the U.S. Air Force—and we have demonstrated this capability in exercises.

The Striking Fleet can deal with Soviet surface forces with relative ease. Since our forward aircraft carriers provide defense for Iceland and the U.K., we anticipate a full court NATO press on Soviet submarines with antisubmarine forces from those nations, with forces organic to the Striking Fleet, and with U.S. and NATO submarines. The Soviets recognize the threat from our carriers to a much greater degree than do many in the free world; they also acknowledge that a moving target ranging over thousands of square miles of blue water is much more survivable than a fixed airfield ashore. No one suggests that we should abandon all airfields in Norway at the start of hostilities, and yet some quake at the notion of less vulnerable aircraft carriers operating hundreds of miles at sea.

Our strategy is not a hell-bent-for-leather dash northward to the Kola Peninsula; as John Lehman has said, "We're not going to lob A-6s into the men's room of the Kremlin." Admiral James D. Watkins, the U.S. Navy Chief of Naval Operations, has testified to the Congress and stated on numerous other occasions that we do not propose to race blindly into the jaws of waiting Soviet forces. We are going to choose the time and the place of naval engagements, because our forces have the balance and the strategic mobility to afford us the option of making such a choice. Our forward strategy contains elements of risk, of course, but the naval forces that NATO is building, manned by the outstanding professionals who drive the ships and fly the aircraft of the alliance, are eminently capable of carrying out our strategy successfully. It goes without saying that NATO's Military Committee and Defense Planning Committee would never have

approved a strategy which they perceived to be a loser, nor would the U.S. Navy have concurred in the highly unlikely event that they had done so.

Another question concerns whether the successful execution of our strategy would exert a decisive influence on Soviet decisionmakers in a war between the NATO Alliance and the Warsaw Pact. In other words, what difference would successful naval operations make? There are those who believe that the ultimate outcome of a war in Europe will be decided in a matter of days or weeks on the ground in Central Europe. Without doubt, wars are decided on the land, but it is overly simplistic to construct a false dichotomy in which the alliance must choose between a war at sea or a war on land. All NATO commanders agree that naval power is indispensable for the defense of Europe; land forces are organic to success at sea. Maritime operations and continental operations complement each other. The real question that my senior NATO colleagues and I wrestle with is how to best employ maritime forces to achieve overall NATO strategic objectives.

It has become almost a cliché among serious strategic thinkers to observe that while one cannot win the land war in Europe at sea, one can just as surely lose it at sea. Senior NATO leaders openly acknowledge that NATO does not, in fact, have a strategy without the employment of maritime forces because NATO depends on the sea for direct support of the land battle, for military reinforcement and resupply, and for defense against seaborne attack and for sustenance.

Some also argue that we should reject a forward strategy and instead establish a maritime Maginot Line near the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom "gap" behind which we could protect the sea lines of communications to Europe. These arguments fail to acknowledge that the defense of NATO is much more than just the defense of West Germany. We cannot afford to forfeit the tactical initiative to the Soviets and concentrate on escorting convoys across the Atlantic. Such a posture would raise issues regarding the fate of Norway, Iceland, the Baltic approaches, and, indeed, the United Kingdom. These allies are of no less strategic importance than the allies on the Central Front; a strategy that amounted to a *de facto* writeoff of our northern allies would be unconscionable.

Nonetheless, there are those who apparently are willing to abandon the Norwegian Sea to the Soviets. I believe that if we allow the Warsaw Pact to turn the NATO flanks, the pact will eventually succeed in cutting off our allies in the center from resupply and reinforcement. The best means of protecting the sea lines of communications and bolstering the full alliance is by the conduct of offensive sea control operations far forward. The key to winning the battle of the Atlantic is winning the battle of the Norwegian Sea; it is no accident that the Soviets have constructed their navy to fight the critical battle in the high north. NATO's maritime objectives in the Norwegian Sea are to repel a Warsaw Pact amphibious assault on north

Norway, to support the defense of Norway against land threats, to prevent Soviet use of facilities in Norway, and to contain the Soviet Northern Fleet or destroy it at sea. In turn, these objectives provide for defense of Greenland and Iceland: if we control the Norwegian Sea, the Soviets would have severe problems in mounting sustained threat to the nations in the region. Should we concede this area in advance to the Soviets, we would be unilaterally granting them one of their dominant strategic objectives without requiring them to fire one shot to earn it.

The final issue involves the question of whether our forward strategy, which could include strikes against Soviet naval bases, would be unduly escalatory. War is not an idle exercise in intellectual polemics. There will always be risks and uncertainties, including the uncertainty of the actions of an adversary. We have learned the hard way that restraint on our part in military matters is by no means a guarantee of restraint on the part of the Soviets. The Striking Fleet is charged formally by NATO mission to conduct offensive operations to contain and neutralize the Soviet maritime threat, and these operations include destroying the threat at its source. Such operations will be a decisive feature of our campaign to defeat aggression from the Warsaw Pact.

One must consider the vital importance of conventional forces to deter below the nuclear threshold—and then acknowledge that a key element of that deterrence is a credible capability to strike the Soviet Union with *both* conventional and nuclear weapons. Put another way, deterrence with conventional forces must contain a credible threat of retaliation with nonnuclear means against targets that the Soviets value enough to give them pause. Without such a retaliatory capability—against both the Soviet homeland and the Soviet Fleet—NATO's maritime posture does not contribute to overall deterrence. If the Striking Fleet is to be an element of conventional deterrence, it must be in position to deliver convincing retaliation to Soviet adventurism. This retaliation by definition must include strikes into the Kola—the maritime equivalent of the "Deep Strike" concept for the land battle.

In summary, the alliance's basic strategic objective is the protection of the territory of its member nations. Our ability to meet this objective in the high north has been brought into question by the steady growth of Soviet maritime forces. Over the past 31 years we have continually reevaluated and evolved our strategy to account for the significant changes in the maritime balance of forces. In countering Warsaw Pact activities, our NATO forces are guided by three major principles: *containment*, including tying down Pact forces in defensive tasks by creating allied threats from the sea against the enemy's coastal areas; *defense in depth*, including striking enemy bases and facilities which support his forces at sea as well as amphibious landings as required in the high north; and, most importantly, *keeping the initiative*, because distances

are too great in the region for maritime forces to be deployed in time to prevent critical damage being done by the Soviets were NATO solely to chase after events. (From such a posture, the alliance would be able to do little more than note each incident in turn and then decide shrewdly that each was a hopeless cause where no NATO reaction would likely be effective.)

NATO maritime commanders can no more decide to fight only in some areas than land commanders can propose defending only some parts of Europe. The forward commitment of maritime forces is essential to the success of NATO's overall strategy because of NATO's vital dependence upon the sea. All senior commanders agree—as demonstrated repeatedly throughout military history and as true today as it was in the campaigns of Alexander the Great—offense is the best form of defense.



“The technological judgment of military men, like any technological judgment, works well only within the framework of a general strategic theory that everybody understands and relies upon.”

Max Ways, *Beyond Survival* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1959), p. 162.

Wargaming, an Enforcer of Strategic Realism: 1919-1942

Michael Vlahos

Wargaming in peace prepares for war. This is a simple and straightforward assumption in both civilian and service world views. Whether board games, computer models, or fleet exercises, there is a notion that such mental simulation encourages operational readiness—it is the recipe for victory. This is true especially of the wargaming that has been done at Newport. The Naval War College (NWC) introduced serious service wargaming to America, and made the act of *kriegspiel* the center of its course in the period “between the wars.”¹

It has become something like scripture to think of Newport interwargaming as *the* mental tool readying the Navy for the Pacific War. According to popular myth, the unfolding of that war followed faithfully the itinerary preordained in those sleepy, peaceful years. A letter of Chester Nimitz, written in 1965 to Vice Adm. Charles Melson, then president of the Naval War College, lent interwargaming an oracular and mystical element: “The enemy of our games was always—Japan—and the courses were so thorough that after the start of WWII—nothing that happened in the Pacific was strange or unexpected. . . . I credit the Naval War College for such success I achieved in strategy and tactics both in peace and war.”²

There is more, however, to what the War College did for the U.S. Navy after “the war to end all wars.” The games not only encouraged an evolution in war plans during the interwar period, they came to drive development of the 1930s’ version of a U.S. “Maritime Strategy.”

In 1919, the U.S. Navy had a generalized mission only: to protect American “interests.” These interests included the sea defense of the Philippine Islands from the only possible threat to them, the Empire of Japan. The rescue of this archipelago by the U.S. Fleet was, in 1919, the only possible wartime navy mission recognized by Congress, President, and people. The Navy, in other

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words, was bound by the strategic world view of the American Government and its electorate, and its parameters of action were circumscribed to a single narrow operational scenario.

From the years 1919-1941, the Navy developed its own strategic world view, one in which the missions of the fleet were integrated into a broad context of American national strategy. If the Navy wanted to define its utility beyond the relief of Manila Bay, then the mission framework had to be dismantled, and exchanged for a broader canvas. The major agency in evolving strategic as well as narrow operational plans was the process of wargaming.³ The period 1919-1941 was a coherent "era," distinct and well-bounded both historically and structurally. The problem of assimilating the experiences and codifying the "lessons" of the last war, and preparing for some yet-undefined future war on the basis of such acquired "truth" was the basic issue of a peacetime era bounded by two wars.

At the Naval War College, the challenge of straightforward war preparation was contrasted daily with a more generalized "spirit of the age." A unique American antimilitarism allied to a determined antiwar climate throughout the Western World created a special burden on American naval officers attempting to discharge both their higher calling and their institutional ethos.⁴ As such, the recognitions emerging from this distinct interwar

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"generation" has special relevance to the problems of war preparation—and more specifically, strategic world view preparation—in an era publicly pacific yet by service definition always potentially prewar. As important as wargaming is as a means of keeping experienced officers "sharp" as potential battle commanders, or training those who will someday ascend to service leadership, the games have an abiding higher service importance.

They are as well the stuff of strategic plans, and strategic plans before the fact have the potential to draw the horizon line of service mission. Indeed, in a world where such mission is politically elastic—still unformed or in flux—the process of gaming can help to test and refine, if not revise, a national mission which must be realized in war by the military services.

Game Evolution

Between the wars there were three distinct phases to wargaming at Newport, and they corresponded to explicit approaches, outcomes, and reactions to the gaming process.

Early Phase, 1919-1927. Postwar gaming was dominated by short-war, “campaign” parameters. The early phase was most resonant to the recent Great War and its “putative” lessons. I say putative, because the real lessons of the sea war were as yet unappreciated. In the aftermath of war, the romantic expectations of classical sea strategy, as codified by Mahan and exemplified by Nelson, still held sway. The U.S. Navy still lived by Mahanist doctrine. This dovetailed nicely into a postwar canvas where the only possible enemy of the United States was Japan, and then only in the context of a strictly limited scenario, almost a rerun of an 18th century “sugar war.”

If Japan and America had gone to war in the 1920s, the Navy’s main mission would have been to succor the Philippines, the main U.S. national interest in the Far East. Since the Washington Treaties of 1922 legitimized a U.S. battle fleet superior to that of Japan, an unquestioning American strategic initiative was clearly implied. The great and unrecognized burden of the Washington Treaty system was that it permitted the U.S. Navy no strategic option other than to undertake an immediate Pacific crossing in war. To nations with the larger force, the offensive was an urgent obligation. One committed to the Mahanian historical vision, where the entire body of his historical vision dwells on the impact of navies on national destiny, could not yield to an admission that Japan possessed real strategic superiority in the Pacific. We had the bigger battle fleet. It would have seemed foolish and weak of us to have avoided immediate decisive battle according to heroic tradition. In political terms, it would have been an unthinkable public abdication by the Navy.⁵

It was a politico-cultural necessity to take an instant offensive lead to straightforward, transpacific fleet movement. The imagined war with Japan in the 1920s took on a superficial, mock-aggressive, mock-confident pose, that a 5:3 fleet had no choice but to adopt. All that seemed necessary was a passage across the broad Pacific to an expected confrontation with a battle fleet that treaty had codified as inferior. Unfortunately, such movement entailed enormous logistical concentration and planning. The fleet that would have made such a transit would have resembled a 20th-century version of the Spanish Armada—the fleet formation would have included 170 ships in the fleet train alone, all moving at 10 knots—and a picking equally ripe for the Imperial Japanese Navy.⁶

The gaming dynamics tended to build up to a “decisive” fleet action. It was expected, in spite of all recent evidence from the recent North Sea naval war, that the numerically inferior Japanese Fleet would meet the oncoming U.S. Fleet under a twin handicap. First, it would accept battle in a classic battleline engagement that would heavily favor the American battle fleet. Second, it would refrain from forcing decisive engagement until the U.S. armada had completed its Pacific crossing and was fully relaxed and ready to do battle.

This was a period of complacency. What hubris! Here the United States faced a fleet that had defeated the Third World naval power, that of imperial Russia, a mere generation ago and had since gone from strength to strength. It was building some of the most advanced combatants in the world and possessed the advantage of strategic geography. In spite of all these dangling warning signs, the U.S. Navy of the 1920s still tended to view the Imperial Japanese Navy with a trace of disdain.⁷

Gaming scenarios were developed in response to a simple strategic mission—relief of a beleaguered Philippines. As the U.S. Navy moved the battle fleet from the Atlantic to the Pacific in 1919, it placed its strategic glass on an enemy who seemed distant and unrealistic. During the time of “Taisho democracy,” the possibility of a Japanese assault on the Philippines was remote. Japan appeared to be a parliamentary system integrating into the common tradition of the Western democracies. If a conflict evolved, it was reasoned, it would surely erupt over marginal, not vital national interests on either side. A hypothetical war with Japan in the 1920s was imagined publicly as limited and restrained.⁸

The then war game mission-charter was forced to focus on residual American commitments that were out of step with the international climate of the 1920s. To make matters worse, the Navy was trying to keep itself honed for war in a domestic climate that was not merely determinedly antiwar, but anti-internationalist. The Navy was attempting to keep alive in the schema of national policy. In the 1920s this was reduced to the rescue of the Philippines. Unfortunately, such an event had distinct atavistic overtones, and American society was shedding not only internationalist but former imperialist notions. The Philippines were becoming a national embarrassment. The Tydings-McDuffie Act of 1934 eventually defined the islands as something to divest progressively as a progressive nation should.

According to traditions and political norms, the Navy was merely attempting to carry out traditional charter—to defend national interests as its gaming showed. But the Navy had a problem. It was trying to deal with a world where its national interest seemed either unthreatened or unworthy: what was its future?

Middle Phase, 1928-1934. Then there began a slow shift to protracted war operations. Wargaming at Newport mutated after 1928 and, as might be expected, so did the Navy’s expectations about future war. The notion of conflict with Japan became studded with serious obstacles, and the attainment even of limited national objectives was in doubt. In short, the vision of a single, transpacific campaign climaxing in an American Trafalgar was replaced by an incipient sensation that future naval operations in that area were foreboding.

Game problems began to emphasize mobilization assets, as during this period the War College initiated several major economic and logistically oriented exercises. As war with Japan became a greater gaming challenge to the Navy, it

became clear that the resources necessary to conduct such a war transcended the sum of peacetime forces in the U.S. Fleet, and indeed, the capability of purely “naval” forces. If the United States were to fight a major Pacific war with Japan, army units and the military resources of potential regional allies in the Western Pacific would be necessary to defeat the Japanese Empire. Several specialized games after 1928 focused on joint operations with the U.S. Army and many games after 1930 included as strategic “givens,” alliance with non-U.S. forces.⁹

Instant and imperative transpacific offensive operations gave way to an initial defensive posture. As the notion of a cartoon-like armada—a Dreadnought juggernaut—majestically rolling across the Pacific to inevitable victory evaporated in rigorous gaming, the strategic mission—charter of the “defense of national interests” was revised. In effect, the original objectives and purposes underlying a hypothetical war with Japan now required reexamination.¹⁰

War might begin with the actual loss of the Philippines and the prostration of American arms. What would be the actual objectives of a war with Japan framed by humiliation and initial defeat? If, as in 1920s’ expectation, victory would be a simple rescue of a beleaguered garrison heroically resisting, then the narrow mission of the Navy decreed by government and electorate would be enough. Honor would be salvaged, and national purposes as well. The principle of proportionality would be served by inflicting a sharp and salutary slap in 18th-century manner according to limited belligerent provocation.

But what if the Philippines fell? What if the last bastions of American power and influence in the Western Pacific were eliminated, leaving American naval power the task of retaking them before any opportunity would finally present itself to destroy the Japanese Fleet? What if, in attempting to reestablish American power at one breadth, the Navy was so depleted that Japan could avoid a fleet action completely?

This possibility spurred a thorough gaming examination of combined operations with the Army, including joint Army and Navy War College scenarios focusing on large-scale amphibious operations. The Navy in the late 1920s began to realize that the loss of American possessions in the Western Pacific prior to an advance of the U.S. Fleet would require a recasting of the entire campaign. The gaming of the late 1920s and early 1930s forced the Navy to confront the truth behind the Washington Treaty system—that Japan traded a superficial concession in capital ship tonnage for a real advantage in strategic geography. In that treaty, Japan under protest accepted a battleship ratio only 60 percent that of the United States. In return, however, the United States agreed not to further fortify any of its outposts in the Western Pacific. Superficial superiority in battleship numbers would not compensate for true strategic inferiority. Games began to make it clear that any transpacific advance would have to wait for the development of superior

offensive resources, and this meant amphibious capability and oceanic logistics. Mahan's battle fleet was no longer the simple equation of national power.

These were years of the demise of the classic "fleet problem" in gaming. In the period before America's entry into the Great War in 1917, the Navy worried about defending the Americas against attack, and every threat was capable of reduction to a "fleet problem" codification. If Black (Wilhelmine Germany) descended on Puerto Rico with its coal-burning *schlachtschiffe*, then the U.S. battle fleet would sortie and the outcome, even if it required several months of delicate positioning, would finish with a final clash of dreadnoughts. The legacy of Mahanian readings of 17th and 18th-century naval warfare lingered on for the U.S. Navy into the 1920s, in spite of German reluctance to play at Jutland. Japan, like Germany, also would operate with inferior battleship numbers. Germany demonstrated the importance of a numerically inferior battle fleet utilizing other advantages to negate simple ship superiority. Against a determined opponent, able to use its naval assets from established strategic positions across the Western Pacific, a "fleet problem" approach to naval strategy was impossible.¹¹

It was a time of strategic awareness. The gaming at Newport in the late 1920s suddenly experienced a kind of reality collapse. That is, the assumptions, or if you wish the normative vanities that attempted to describe the reality of naval operations were torn down in a process of brutal simulation. There was in an era of complacency no complacent gaming. For a while it was possible to play at the kind of war that seemed promising for the Navy and acceptable to the American people. Then the reality of gaming set in. Perhaps as a function of the American ethos, it has been difficult to make devices of testing and truth—such as wargaming—perform as ritual mechanisms of cultural self-fulfillment. In interwar Japan, it was acceptable and even necessary to wear the Emperor's clothes. There was no such ritual at Newport.¹²

There emerged an awareness of the need for an all-out naval campaign effort in order to defeat Japan, and so counter its threat to the Philippines and U.S. interests in the Western Pacific. What kind of naval effort would be needed to defeat Japan, if a simple battle fleet procession could lead only to politically disastrous stalemate, if not outright defeat? How could the Navy respond to a Japan capable of controlling the Western Pacific after an initial period of war, seizing all defended U.S. possessions? Clearly, in order to regain American possessions, a path would have to be cleared and the Japanese Fleet effectively destroyed. To achieve these limited aims the U.S. Fleet could not hope to undertake a transpacific offensive without preponderant naval power. This would entail an initial period of defensive holding, of going on the strategic defensive, while America mobilized. The offensive, against a prepared enemy defensive position, would have to be

deliberate, destroying Japanese resistance through attrition. By the time that U.S. naval forces reached the Philippines, several years of war might have passed. For strictly limited objectives, a relatively unlimited war would be necessary.

This final point in the process of strategic recognition forced the Navy to face the new truth—that a successful strategy to relieve the Philippines required the defeat of the Japanese Fleet and of Japan itself, as a power in the Pacific. A war objective confined merely to transoceanic passage after several years of combat would be disproportionate to the effort and sacrifice. The war itself would not necessarily, let alone satisfactorily, be terminated by a simple geographic return to prewar frontiers. Both the Imperial Japanese Navy and the sources of its effective strength—the industrial might of the Japanese homeland itself—would have to be destroyed or neutralized permanently in order to secure a war objective commensurate with war effort.

Late Phase, 1935-1941. By the mid-1930s, war scenarios of three to five years duration were becoming common. The bruising experiences of the recognition phase led to several concrete revisions in the gamers' approach to future war. The first was an acceptance of wars geared to three to five years—long wars, gritty wars and expensive wars.

Coalition war scenarios with multiple actors and strategic-geographic planning—involving the Dutch East Indies and the Soviet Union for example—were tested. The wars began to exploit the theater geography and leverage of regional allies. Even the Soviet Union was considered as an ally of the United States, tying down Japan in Manchuria. The cooperation of the Netherlands through its possessions in the Dutch East Indies was particularly favored, since it gave the Navy a forward springboard for an assault on the Philippines.

Scenarios encouraged a phased, consolidative transpacific advance through island amphibious assault. This had become the foundation of expected war with Japan. At first, this strategic bridging was limited to the quick seizure of Truk as a way-station. Later, it was admitted that the advance would require a serial amphibious process, the image naturally later giving rise to the metaphor of "island-hopping." From an early assumption that island seizure would be straightforward, the later period anticipated rough scrimmaging on atoll beach after beach.

The destruction of the Orange (Japanese) battle fleet became subordinate to an elimination of enemy capacity to wage war. In the gaming process the U.S. Fleet was typically ground down in offensive attrition battles, and climactic fleet actions became less critical to campaign or war goals' achievement. There were still big battle games, of course, but the late period relentlessly explored naval combat across a theater spectrum—naval attrition

war, small unit war, war over sealanes and amphibious landings. It was war on a big scale writ small, where the accumulative welter of lesser battles produced a strategic effect not dissimilar to a single battleship big bang. Increasingly, gaming and doctrine came to describe the battleline as supportive, necessary for the operation of more active forward task groups, but not in itself the direct agency of enemy combatant attrition.

War termination became a dominating concept. As these hard-headed games were played, grappling and seizing island after island, climactically landing on the Philippines themselves, it became clear that the war could not end with strategic repossession. There was a metamorphosis in the objective of the war. The Navy, which began its gaming of theoretical war with Japan as a kind of lark, ended in recasting not only the nature of the war enactment but the purposes of the war itself.

War termination came to be linked in scenarios to a notion of Japanese national surrender, and of national military strategy aimed at bringing such surrender about through elimination of enemy capacity to resist. Game outcomes began to insist on the carrying of the war to the Japanese home islands. War termination in these games was achieved through bringing war to the Japanese and reducing the Japanese people either by blockade or strategic aerial bombardment. This was a period of conceptual emplacement, where a working naval strategy was shaped within the broad context of a complete theater-level war.

Game Outcomes

If the process of gaming promoted this strategic recognition, what did the gaming show? How did actual game outcomes and the process of gaming itself, in this distinct era, demonstrate the role of the War College in encouraging strategic evolution?

How did gaming play unfold to wrench the Navy from preconceptions and customary assumptions about transpacific war? How did gaming results encourage Navy improvisation in the face of strategic adversity, and how did such concepts lead to actual doctrinal and technological innovation in naval warfare?

Early Phase, 1919-1927. Tac.96, 1923. This is a typical exercise from the complacent postwar period. The entire Blue fleet was assembled in Hawaii, complete with 170 auxiliary ships of the fleet train. The armada, in symmetrical formation then, as the game history put it, “dashed” across the Pacific to Manila.¹³ By game end, Manila was successfully relieved. All attempts by the Imperial Japanese Navy to arrest the victorious progress of the American task force were of no avail.¹⁴

In the course of several sharp transit engagements, 3 Blue capital ships were lost out of a total of 18. Orange had lost a battleship and battle cruiser, and its 8

remaining capital ships were all damaged. Its light forces had been decimated.¹⁵ Fleet movement had been initiated and the entire campaign completed by D+90. The war was over and the Orange fleet retired after prolonged suffering and the Philippines were secured.

Middle Phase, 1928-1934. OP.IV, 1928 characterizes the shifting transition period in interwargaming. In this exercise, when the U.S. Navy had 18 battleships, only 10 reached Tawi-Tawi combat-capable. (Sixteen years later, this would be the chosen site for Japanese counterattack, to stop American assault on Leyte.) This was mere numerical parity with the Japanese battle fleet. By crossing the Pacific, the Navy succeeded in presenting itself for battle in Japan's chosen arena on Japanese terms.¹⁶

OP.VI, 1929 was a continuation of OP.IV, from the situation existing at the end of play the previous year: "This situation, which was about as bad for the Blue fleet as could be expected, short of actual defeat, also offered the possibility of framing additional problems, to be solved and played at the Naval War College, with the object of . . . defending the line of supply across the Pacific with naval forces which would not be superior to Orange forces."¹⁷

In spite of an adverse balance of capital ships, and absence of floating docks to repair damaged battleships, the game continued. At Tawi-Tawi, 56,000 Army and Marine troops were concentrated for the assault to retake Luzon. One Marine division was in the Marshalls, and the 2nd Army Division was in Hawaii, as well as four more Army divisions being readied in CONUS for commitment to the recapture of the Philippines.¹⁸ To a great extent, Blue weakness in battleships was to be compensated by air superiority: "The Blue Fleet may be in a position of temporary inferiority, but ultimately should possess a great superiority in aircraft."¹⁹ This was to be achieved at sea with rapid introduction of eight XOCV aircraft carriers converted from the premier liners in the American merchant marine, including the *Leviathan*. Here we see the introduction of the concept for the future CVE.²⁰

"It is not possible to regain Luzon with the Fleet alone," so read the Estimate of the Situation. Even though transpacific fleet movement was still thought possible in 60 days, the war was now protracted to at least a year, culminating in a series of multidivision landings in the central Philippines. Against an estimated 100,000 Japanese troops in Luzon, the United States planned to throw 350,000 Americans in coordinated landings. In the intricate and detailed planning for these operations, the old armored cruisers and XOCVs in the Blue fleet were used much as Oldendorf's old BBs and the "jeep carriers" at Leyte Gulf fifteen years later.²¹

OP.IV, 1933 was a decisive game. As usual the Blue offensive sortied from Honolulu in armada-formation—a main body of 239 ships, although the size of the fleet train was now pared down to 69 for 170 combatants.²² From a

standard start, however, things turned sour. Though in 1933 the Navy had 15 battleships, only 7 reached Manila Bay, all heavily damaged, and 18 out of 24 cruisers and all 4 CVs were either sunk or damaged beyond repair. Two night torpedo attacks pressed home by “practically the whole Orange Fleet,” make the 1942 night battles at Guadalcanal seem tame.²³ The postgame critique, yesterday’s form of “hot wash-up,” was unsparring of Blue. The simple, short transit to Manila was finally declared infeasible. This game was the last of the simple transit, short war scenarios of future war with Japan.²⁴

Adversity spurred innovation. In OP.IV, routine underway replenishment of task groups was introduced into game play six years before operational testing in the fleet. The problem of achieving working war termination became an issue in postgame discussion in early December 1933. For the first time, strategic bombardment of Japanese home islands was suggested as an alternative to simple blockade: “It was said that in a war with Orange we were holding on to the old idea of economic strangulation of Orange . . . and urged thought on ways of conducting a more successful war with Orange It was brought out that Orange is very much worried about air attacks on her cities.”²⁵

A nagging question remains, why did the U.S. Fleet begin to fail in gaming in the late 1920s? To a relatively ignorant public, the visible naval balance did not begin to shift until the mid-1930s, when it became obvious to all that Japan had taken advantage of, while the United States neglected, the opportunity to build to treaty limits. How did a triumphant Blue fleet of the early 1920s become the bedraggled, bruised and beaten task force of the early 1930s?

First, gaming evolved during the 1920s. The gaming process improved as the campaign problem of a strategic campaign against Orange was explored. As the transoceanic movement was repeated again and again, Japanese as well as American gambits and approaches were explored. It was discovered that a mature Orange strategic defensive posture could figuratively cut the heart out of Blue.

Second, professionals at the War College were much more sensitive to potential trends in the interwar Japanese shipbuilding program than a public lulled by treaty security. The very early Japanese 8” cruiser program was creating problems for U.S. naval perceptions as early as 1925. The big new cruisers and destroyers of the IJN had no equals in the U.S. Navy. In OP.IV, for example, the Orange fleet, newly reinforced by cruisers and destroyers superior to U.S. counterparts, was considered capable of launching debilitating night torpedo attacks. The instructors and students at the Naval War College correctly framed an area of Japanese tactical superiority—which would be so devastatingly asserted in 1942—without specific knowledge of large-diameter, oxygen-propelled torpedoes. The perceived strategic balance had shifted against the United States by 1930.²⁶

Late Phase, 1935-1941. By 1935, in OP.III, gaming plans of operations were detailing a careful central Pacific advance by prepared stages through the Mandates, with the development of a forward base at Truk. For OP.V., 1938, the itinerary had been established—Eniwetok to Ponape to Truk. OP.VII, 1938, continued the advance to Yap and Peleliu, and then on to Mindanao.²⁷ Scenarios in the late phase actively included regional allies for Blue. Both OP.VII, 1938 and 1939 assumed Brown (the Netherlands and Dutch East Indies) to be committed to the American cause.²⁸

The 1939 scenario starts, not at D+30 or 90 or 180, but in the *third year* of war with Orange. Blue's advance across the central Pacific has taken all that time, and the game begins with three million Americans under arms, and 400,000 of them concentrated on the northern New Guinea coast at Biak (not far from where MacArthur would end the Southwest Pacific drive, at Hollandia), preparing for an amphibious assault on the Philippines. Two games, Tac. VI, 1934 Sr., and OP.III, 1937 Sr., both suggested an American-Soviet coalition against Japan, with the Soviet Union (Purple), attacking Orange in Manchuria.²⁹

One final document deserves comment. The Advanced Class of 1935-36 presented a consensus report on a plan of operations for a transpacific offensive. As a result of the cumulative lessons of gaming, the following conclusions were drawn:

- Successful execution of this operation (depends) on first being able to reduce Japan's Air Force.
- Increase the carrier-based Air Force to at least double that of Japan.
- The preparation of the Bonins as a launching point for continuous air attacks against the vital centers of Japan.
- To exploit the relative inability of Japan to sustain a prolonged war³⁰

War Game Record

These are some salient examples of games that shifted the boundary posts of Navy strategic world view, but there were many games played each year. The common assumption in modern historiography is that the games simply tended to repeat standard scenarios and unfold in standard patterns for the instruction of officers at the War College. It is contended here that gaming at Newport not only changed in form and outcome over the 22 interwar years, but that these changes themselves had a powerful impact on Navy strategic world view.

How can these results be interpolated in the overall context of all wargaming conducted at Newport over 20 years? In general, what was the record?

There were 318 war games recorded and preserved in the War College Archives played between 1919 and 1941.³¹ Of these, 136 were clearly campaign, or strategic games, encompassing the problem of fighting a naval theater-level

war. Of these, 127 were conducted against Orange. The remaining nine were focused on Red or, in the late prewar, from 1939–41, on Black-Silver (Germany and Italy) combination threats.³² There were 106 purely tactical games. Seventy-one of which were full fleet actions, the formal clash of battle fleets. Forty-eight of these Jutlands or Trafalgars were against the Red fleet.³³

The Naval War College has been criticized at academic length for repeating, year after year, the kind of battle that the next war could prove anachronistic. However, the Jutland cliché reruns tend to be Blue-Red, and there were important reasons for this. The first of these may have been unconscious, yet they touched on the utility of wargaming in an unquantifiable and yet critical realm, that of reinforcing service ethos.

Meeting in hypothetical and unrealistic combat the world's largest fleet, with the most glorious traditions and the highest reputation, would tend to develop benchmark moral equality that would elevate U.S. Navy morale. It could instill an operational confidence that would be needed to face an adversary as tough, as determined, and as well-entrenched as Japan. It is true that pro forma war plans were maintained against Red into the 1930s. Their purpose in perusal is obvious: to challenge the planning parameters of a theater war in the Atlantic, to keep alive some mental readiness to respond to an Atlantic, as well as Pacific strategic threat. With the emergence of a true Axis threat in the late 1930s, Atlantic wargaming took on a more urgent mien.³⁴

The second purpose in fighting a matched but improbable foe was equally subtle. Creating tactical scenarios where the U.S. Navy did not have superior numbers helped to cement an aggressive, antidefeatist, anticomplacent combat ethos among naval officers by placing them consistently in adverse battle environments. This device was made all the more critical by a natural tendency to place all thoughts about war with Japan in the context of mental campaign architectures and an inclination, given peacetime treaty ratios, to assume that the U.S. Fleet would enjoy a comfortable numerical superiority. Fighting an equal or superior fleet, again and again, cancelled this impulse. Endless, frustrating Jutland reruns with Red helped to prepare the U.S. Navy for the equal frustration awaiting it in 1942 and 1943, and instilled the tactical grit needed to survive and win.³⁵

As a Campaign Problem, the repeated strategic gaming of Orange war forced the Navy to divest itself of several former "reality-assumptions":

- The notion that war at sea was defined according to a formal, climactic clash of battle fleets, and that naval strategy consisted of maneuvering one's fleet to bring the adversary to decisive engagement.
- The belief that superior peacetime naval order of battle was equivalent to *available* force in war, that a peacetime treaty status quo would persist indefinitely, and that only traditional naval weapons according to traditional hierarchies of importance would be necessary to defeat the enemy.

- The assumption that naval war across an oceanic theater could be conducted quickly, and that enemy advantage in strategic geography was marginal both to strategic planning and to the conduct of naval operations in war.

- The hypothesis that war with Japan would be limited in forces engaged, in objective, in belligerent participants, and in time.

Once these traditional building blocks of U.S. Navy world view were swept away, in large part due to balanced and realistic wargaming, the Navy began to shape its own, mature approach to naval war and national strategy in that war:

- It developed in gaming the doctrine and practice of progressive transoceanic offensive operations, where there had been before mere transit itinerary.

- It recognized, again through the process of cumulative lessons in yearly gaming, that the demands of such an operation on such a scale, and against such an adversary, required a critical examination of overall national war planning and Navy missions in a protracted theater war, including extensive combined operations and the prospect of serious coalition warfare.

Gaming as well forced a conceptual linkage between the demands of total war planning and a more expansive strategic world view. It underscored the need for the Navy to develop a coherent maritime strategy that would support more than traditional norms of the defense of national interests. Gaming reality forced the Navy to seize a set of strategic concepts about the conduct of future war which had the capacity to redefine the very nature of America's role in the world. When world dynamics shifted in the later 1930s to threaten visibly even the narrowest construction of American national security, the operational concepts developed by the Navy provided the national command authority a ready instrument of global war.

From Interwar to Postwar to . . . ?

Today the spirit of interwar Navy wargaming is being revived in a series of "Global Games" played annually at the Center for War Gaming at the Naval War College. These exercises are much broader both in participation and in scope than the purely naval matches fought by War College students 50 years ago. Today's Global Games bring together players and observers from all agencies and military services in the U.S. Government, and even include academics, scientists, and engineers. The intent, however, is the same: to put to the test in hypothetical war not only America's military and political leadership, but the very sense of reality underlying our assumptions about war and strategy.

Like the interwar era, the spirit of this age opposes the exercises called war games as either childish exercises (as depicted by the recent movie), or evilly

conjurative, as by “wizards of Armageddon” bidding demons into the light—by the very act of consideration somehow making war more possible. As in the interwar era, the Navy after 1945 received the new norms of a changed postwar national security policy, and attempted to fit them to its own traditional, operational ethos.

Those norms—well known to us as deterrence, escalation, and the acceptance of a kind of nuclear utility—are today in the process of perceptual transformation. The freeze movement, the Strategic Defense Initiative, the desire to substitute classical conventional warfighting capability for nuclear-theater deterrence in Europe, all point toward a common American yearning to escape the iron maiden of Mutual Assured Destruction.

In such nonnuclear imaginings, where the deterrent mechanism of controlled nuclear escalation is replaced by the threat of classical battle, the vision of the unthinkable not only becomes acceptable, but the horrific short war leading to nuclear holocaust is transformed into a potential “protracted” conventional war. It is in this latter-day mutation of future war expectation that the problem of defining the Navy mission begins to resemble that of the Navy in 1928.³⁶ As it was some 60 years ago, the more the uses of naval power in such a context are examined, the more the norms themselves are redefined.

What has been the bedrock assumption of deterrence theory for almost 40 years—a short conventional phase of major war, eventually escalating to inevitable nuclear use—is changing. A conventional deterrent, however, risks a long war, in the manner of the last two world wars. Given the lack of political resolve among most NATO members to foot the bill for conventional parity with the Warsaw Pact, the ability of the Alliance to stalemate, and so deter, Soviet conventional provocation is marginal. In a protracted conventional war, Soviet victory without resort to nuclear use appears possible.

The Navy has become central to the debate over a substitute strategy of conventional deterrence in ways undreamed of in an earlier era of nuclear utility. Whether Soviet provocation risks limited or general war, the survival of the West is dependent not simply on the balance of ground and air forces in Central Europe. The flexible offensive strength of the Navy may offer the West its strategic reserve, its only conventional credibility to deter Soviet thoughts of force majeure on the Central Front.³⁷ By redefining its potential contribution in such a hypothetical scenario, the Navy is doing what it did in the 1920s and 1930s.

Above all, it is developing not simply a doctrine for naval utility in a protracted, conventional general war, it is searching for ways in which Allied naval power—the one advantage of NATO in the power balance—can be used to terminate a Soviet conventional offensive. How is this being explored? Why, through wargaming, of course.³⁸

Notes

1. On this, see William McCarty Little, "The Strategic Naval War Game, Or Chart Maneuver," Lecture delivered June 1912, Record Group II, p. 10, Naval War College Naval Historical Collection (hereafter NHC); also, Bradley A. Fiske, *The Navy as a Fighting Machine* (New York: Scribner, 1916).

2. Nimitz to Adm. Charles L. Melson, 24 September 1965, NHC. The myth is preserved today. See Adm. James Watkins' reference to the Nimitz' statement in Hearings Before the Senate Subcommittee on Seapower and Force Projection, 14 March 1984, p. 3882.

3. This linkage was established well before the creation of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. In the first decade of the 20th century, nearly all naval war planning was developed through gaming and conferences held at Newport. After the "Great War," planning was the responsibility of the War Plans Division, OP-12 with "interagency" planning coordinated through the Joint Board. Gaming at the Naval War College, however, was the testing agency of the assumptions and expectations that underlay official war planning doctrines. For more on this, see Capt. W.S. Pye, "War Plans," Lecture delivered 7 January 1926, Record Group 15, NHC, and Cdr. R.B. Coffey, "The Naval War Plans Division, Naval Plans and Planning," Lecture delivered at the Army War College, 11 March 1924, Record Group 8, NHC. Many of those trained in the War College course, or who returned as instructors, later applied their personal gaming experience to revisions and amendments to the main war plan WPL-9. This is attested by J.O. Richardson, *On the Treadmill to Pearl Harbor* (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1973), p. 261.

4. As late as 1938, Senate Hearings Before the Committee on Naval Affairs, "Naval Expansion Program" (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1938), included 65 pages of testimony and statements from 42 peace groups. They called not for naval expansion, but for unilateral U.S. naval disarmament; and this, in times of accelerating international strife and military buildup. As J.O. Richardson lamented in 1934, at Newport: "... the American people are unalterably opposed to entanglement in European affairs, [and] they will not support entanglement in Asiatic affairs. . . . An American Naval Strategy that would be in keeping with present public opinion would be a purely defensive strategy. . . . The Hawaiian Islands would be a defensive outpost rather than a stepping off place for our westward movement across the Pacific." Capt. J.O. Richardson, "The Relationship in War of National Strategy, Tactics, and Command," Thesis, 1934 Senior Class, Record Group 13, NHC, p. 2.

5. This theme of an American offensive as judgment on American character was hammered on the interwar Navy by several vocal younger officers, especially Cdr. Holloway Frost. As he wrote to Adm. W.S. Sims: "I hope that I was able to emphasize the necessity of our officers being infused with the offensive spirit; it is necessary that we develop what might be called 'Offensive Minds' in the service; and to instill in all the idea of thinking about what we can do to the enemy rather than what the enemy can do to us." Frost to Sims, 14 October, 1923, Sims Papers, Naval Historical Foundation, Library of Congress. His voluble public writing framed Navy world view, especially his *Battle of Jutland* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1936), which scathingly condemned British irresolution in 1916 for failing to finish the German battle fleet.

6. This was from the game history of "The Battle of the Marianas," Tac.96, Record Group II, NHC.

7. For an illustration of this attitude see Navy Department, Office of Naval Intelligence, "Memorandum Regarding Japanese Psychology and Morale," 1 March 1927 File JNP, Record Group 8, NHC. This general perspective began to change in the late 1920s, as the IJN began to introduce new classes of combatant visibly superior to U.S.N. counterparts. It also became clear by 1930 that Japanese political commitment to building up to treaty limits, in contrast to Hoover's budget-cutting, would lead to a "real" Japanese Fleet strength 80 percent of the United States'. See comparative assessment in Capt. R.A. Koch, "Blue-Orange Study," 31 March 1933, File UNOP, Record Group 8, NHC, Appendix 1.

8. This impression is highlighted by Navy clippings of responses to popular fiction of future war with Orange, especially Hector Bywater's *The Great Pacific War* (Boston and New York: Houghton, Mifflin, 1925). Various critiques of the Bywater scenario were collected from a range of sources, including British and Japanese. Nowhere is there any sense that the Bywater teaser was anything but reasonable. Wrong in details, a bit too civilian. But acceptable. See Navy Department, Office of Naval Intelligence, "THE NEXT GREAT NAVAL WAR, Criticism of Hector Bywater's Book, *The Great Pacific War*," File XSTP, Record Group 8, NHC.

9. See 1929 Senior Class, Op. 6, 1934 Senior Class, Op. V, 1934 Senior Class, Tac. VI, 1937 Senior Class, Op. III, 1938 Senior Class, Op. VII, 1939 Senior and Junior Classes, Op. VII, Record Group II, NHC.

10. This image was preserved for public consumption up to the year of war, 1941, in Capt. W.D. Puleston's (former director ONI), *The Armed Forces of the Pacific* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1941), p. 242: "The American fleet would cross the Pacific at about the speed of translation of a cyclone. . . . It would resemble the cyclone in a more important phase, levelling everything in its path. . . ."

11. See John H. Maurer, "American Naval Concentration and the German Battle Fleet 1900-1918," *The Journal of Strategic Studies*, June 1983, pp. 147-181.

12. See Michael A. Barnhart, "Japanese Intelligence before the Second World War," from Ernest R. May, ed., *Knowing One's Enemies: Intelligence Assessment Before the Two World Wars* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984).

13. Class of 1923, "The Battle of the Marianas," Tac.96, Record Group II, NHC.

14. *Ibid.*, p. 94.

15. *Ibid.*, pp. 92-96.

16. 1928 Senior Class, Operations Problem IV, Record Group II, NHC.

17. U.S. Army War College and U.S. Navy War College, Operation Problem VI, 1929, "Joint Army and Navy Operations with Forced Landing," Part I, The Preliminary Situation, p. 1, Record Group II, NHC.

18. *Ibid.*, "Annex (c), Logistic Solution," p. 1.

19. *Ibid.*, Part II, Commander-in-Chief, Blue Fleet, "Estimate of Situation and Decision," p. 16.

20. *Ibid.*, "Operation Order of Commander, Air Group, Support Force."

21. *Ibid.*, Part XII, "Support Force Operation Orders and Accompanying Annexes of Commanders Naval Landing Groups and Air Group."

22. Cdr. J.W. Rankin, 1933 Senior Class, Operations Problem IV-1933, "Statistics and Leading Features."

23. *Ibid.*, pp. 3-4.

24. 1933 Senior Class, Operations Problem IV, "Stenographic Notes Taken at Critique," May, 1933, p. 11, Record Group 2, NHC.

25. *Ibid.*, p. 16.

26. See for example, Rear Adm. Harris Laning, "Building Program, 1932 (War College Suggestion)," 19 September 1930, File UNC, Record Group 8, NHC; Captain R.A. Koch, "Blue-Orange Study," 31 March 1933, File UNOpP, Record Group 8, NHC. Some of Koch's statements highlight a general contemporary Navy attitude: "Our Fleet has never been built up to the treaty limit, is actually weaker than Japan's in light forces" [p. 7] "Under present conditions to send the Fleet across the Pacific might well result in its complete loss" [p. 8] "ORANGE destroyers are each superior in gun power, ship for ship, to each of ours by at least 35%" [Appendix 1., p. 6].

27. 1935 Senior Class, OP.III, 1938 Senior Class, OP.V, 1938 Senior Class, OP.VII, Record Group 2, NHC.

28. 1938 Senior Class, OP.VII, 1939 Senior and Junior Classes, OP.VII, Record Group 2, NHC.

29. 1939 Senior and Junior Classes, OP.VII, 1934 Senior Class, Tac. VI, 1937 Senior Class, OP.III, Record Group 2, NHC.

30. Cdr. R.R.M. Emmet, "Comment on Plan of Operations submitted by Advanced Class of 1935-1936," Record Group 8, NHC.

31. These are collected in Record Group 2, Naval Historical Collection, Naval War College Archives. They are listed and abstracted in Vlahos, *The Blue Sword: The Naval War College and the American Mission, 1919-1941* (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press, 1981), pp. 166-179.

32. *Ibid.*

33. *Ibid.*

34. This is discussed at some length in *ibid.*, pp. 99-112. There was some discussion in the wake of world war of the possibility of a war with Great Britain. Indeed, this was something of an obsession for Cdr. Holloway Frost. He delivered several stinging lectures at the Naval War College between 1920 and 1932 on an American strategy to defeat the British Empire. They were useful planning problems for an Atlantic Ocean theater naval war, but they were not serious pieces of strategic intent. See H.H. Frost, "The Naval Operations of a Red-Orange Campaign," 25 October 1920, Record Group 8, UNOpP, NHC; H.H. Frost, "BLUE Naval Strategy in the Atlantic," 16 February 1932, Record Group 8, XSTA, NHC.

35. A good example of this process can be seen in 1930 Senior Class, Quick Decision Problem B [Record Group 2, NHC] which pitted 3 Blue BBs against 5 Red BBs. This inclination to create tactical encounters with Blue numerical inferiority as a baseline is also reflected in a number of Orange tactical sessions. In the 1935 Senior Class Quick Decision Problems A through F [Record Group 2, NHC], for example Blue task groups were allotted a range of 3-6 BBs, while Orange TGs were always equal or superior at from 5-9 BBs. This was typical of tactical drill sessions. Red confrontations were all the more bracing, however, because of the ability of Red to confront Blue with a mobilized naval order of battle equal or superior to the American.

36. See, for example, comments of Secretary of the Navy John Lehman, in Hearings Before the Senate Subcommittee on Sea Power and Force Projection, 14 March 1984 (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1984), pp. 3854, 3857; or Norman Friedman, "The Maritime Strategy and the Central Front," a paper delivered at a Naval War College Conference on "Maritime Strategy: Issues and Perspectives," May 1985.

37. This notion has been suggested by F.J. West, "U.S. Naval Forces and NATO Planning," a paper delivered at a Naval War College Conference on "Maritime Strategy: Issues and Perspectives," May 1985.

38. A point underscored four times by CNO Adm. James Watkins, in Hearings Before the Senate Subcommittee on Sea Power and Force Projection, 14 March 1984, pp. 3860, 3865, 3869, 3882.

Naval Protection of Shipping: A Lost Art?

Captain S.D. Landersman, U.S. Navy (Ret.)

When the Navy Department was founded in 1798 its primary mission was to protect American merchant ships. A century and a half later, the National Security Act of 1947 was the authority for the roles of the U.S. Navy. They are:

- provide the naval component of strategic deterrent forces,
- provide the naval component of overseas deployed U.S. forces, and
- ensure the security of sea lines of communications.

Under “Functions of the Department of the Navy,” Secretary of Defense and Secretary of the Navy directives contain a list of primary functions which include, “Organize, train and equip Navy . . . forces for the conduct of prompt and sustained combat operations at sea . . . specifically, . . . to protect vital sea lines of communication . . .” *NWP-1 Strategic Concepts of the U.S. Navy*, reiterates the above functions and provides a statement of the U.S. Navy’s Mission, which is, “to be prepared to conduct prompt and sustained combat operations at sea in support of U.S. national interest.” The national interest refers to the U.S. national military strategy, which is a “forward strategy” dependent on the Navy’s role of ensuring security of sea lines of communication.

Protection of the sea lines of communication (SLOC) is not a peripheral function, collateral duty, or secondary role of the Navy. It is one of the very basic Navy roles, one of the Navy’s principal functions, and an integral part of the primary mission of the Navy. SLOC protection, then, is one of the basic reasons we have a Navy.

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Sea Lines of Communication

The term "communication," as applicable to the use of the term SLOC in the Navy roles and functions, refers to a system of sea routes for moving the logistics of war—the troops, supplies, ammunition, weapons, fuel, and vehicles. This was the meaning intended by Alfred Thayer Mahan when he used the term "lines of communication" to describe the routes of logistic flow over the oceans to support land campaigns. Mahan offers numerous historic examples that demonstrate the importance of maintaining the SLOC. They illustrate that the strategic concept of striking at an enemy's SLOC was valid in the past, is valid today, and will continue to be valid in the future.

SLOC protection applies to both the Mahanian concept of logistics in support of a land campaign and to the logistics necessary to maintain the naval component of U.S. forces deployed overseas. U.S. Navy deployed ships and aircraft require support to remain at sea in an effective combat status. The logistical flow of fuel, food, repair, personnel and weapons for the Navy would rely upon the SLOC just as would the logistical support for overseas troops. Navy logistics would move primarily in ships of the U.S. Navy and of the Military Sealift Command (MSC). The majority of sealift for support of a major land campaign would be carried in merchant ships, and security of the SLOC must extend to these merchant ships.

Bernard Brodie, Professor of Political Science and noted author of several works on modern war, tells us that in a NATO-Warsaw Pact war the total seapower of NATO would be used to protect merchant ships at sea, and that all naval enterprises would be used for the single purpose of protecting the freighters and tankers which would carry nearly all the vital resources.

Merchant Shipping

The Western merchant ship inventory is listed in the *Particulars of Merchant Ships (SACLANT NCS-1)*, a NATO publication which provides data on more than 28,000 merchant and fishing ships of 105 non-Warsaw Pact countries. These ships are at least 1,000 gross registered tons or over 76 meters in length. While not all of these ships would be used by NATO in a major war, many would be called upon. A more realistic listing of "available" merchant ships that would impact on NATO logistic support would be:

MSC Nucleus Fleet	58
MSC Charter Ships	61
U.S. Flag Merchant Ships	545
Effective U.S. Control Ships	639
Ready Reserve Fleet	32
National Defense Reserve Fleet	245
Allies' Merchant Ships (designated for NATO contingencies)	400

- MSC Nucleus and Charter Ships are available on short notice.
- U.S. Flag Merchant Ships include about 400 dry cargo ships. Many of these are containerships. Less than half of U.S. military equipment fits into these containers.
- Effective U.S. Control Ships are known as “Flag of Convenience” vessels. While their status in wartime is questionable, most would be available. The majority are tankers.
- Ready Reserve Fleet are modern ships not in use but available in 5 to 10 days.
- National Defense Reserve Fleet are mostly older ships which would take 2 to 3 months to make usable.

Control and Protection

Two separate but closely related functions must be understood—Naval Control of Shipping and Naval Protection of Shipping. (As the name implies, naval control of shipping involves the control of cargo-carrying merchant ships, not their protection.) The Navy’s responsibilities in both control and protection of shipping are delegated by the Chief of Naval Operations to cognizant fleet commanders in chief. The U.S. Naval Control of Shipping Organization (NCSORG) exists to provide for the safe movement of merchant ships in wartime. NCSORG would perform the functions of routing, reporting, diversion of shipping, and organizing convoys. Except for a few active-duty Navy billets, Naval Control of Shipping would be accomplished by 3,600 Reserve personnel who continually train for their wartime mobilization roles. In peacetime MSC performs these functions for the MSC nucleus fleet and charter ships.

The objective of Naval Protection of Shipping is the safe and timely arrival of shipping at scheduled destinations. To accomplish this, a combination of offensive and defensive operations is required. This could include operations remote from the SLOC—such as barriers, strike operations, surveillance—as well as close-in defense. As protection of shipping is a part of the overall sea control operations in an area, the responsibility for naval protection of shipping rests with the naval commanders in chief. This responsibility is delegated to Operational Control Authorities (OCAs), who are responsible for the actual implementation of shipping protection measures. In the Atlantic, OCA functions are performed by CINCLANTFLT and COMNAVFORCARIB. In the Pacific, CINCPACFLT, COMTHIRDFLT, and COMIDEASTFOR are OCAs. The European theater OCAs are CINCUSNAVEUR and COMFAIRMED. OCA responsibilities generally include both control and protection of merchant shipping, but in some cases, COMSEVENTHFLT for instance, the responsibility is limited to protection only.

Convoying Method of Protection

While cost effective in the use of naval assets, convoying's disadvantage is reduced cargo productivity because of delays in convoy formation, slower transit speeds and port congestion at destinations. Under the convoy control system, NCSORG would form groups of merchant ships in ports and provide them with organization, routing, and reporting means. Naval auxiliaries may also be included. The OCA would establish the assembly points, give details of sailing intervals, and promulgate other special instructions as required. Military convoys and military independent ships would not be controlled by NCSORG. Details of the convoy formation, sailing folder, convey conference, departure, routing, reporting, communications, and port entrance are contained in *ATP-2, Allied Naval Control of Shipping Manual*. Procedures for protection which are not functions of the NCSORG are contained in *NWP-31, U.S. Naval Protection of Shipping* and *ATP-1: Vol. I, Allied Maritime Tactical Instructions and Procedures*.

History of Convoying. In April 1917 German submarines sank 444 merchant ships and the allies faced defeat because of the effectiveness of the German blockade. The convoy system was initiated and six months later, a total of 10 ships were lost out of 1,500 convoyed merchant ships.

In early 1942 the Germans had 30 submarines on station and the allies were convoying about 40 percent of their shipping. One and a half percent of the convoyed ships were sunk while seven and a half percent of the independent sailing ships were sunk. Later that year the allies were convoying 80 percent of their shipping and the loss rates were about the same although the Germans then had 50 submarines on station. Convoying in World Wars I and II clearly resulted in safer transits for merchant shipping than was provided by independent sailing. There were a few exceptions, particularly the large high-speed passenger ships which sailed independently and were not sunk.

While the results of convoying in World Wars I and II are impressive, they could be misleading. The primary threat then was the diesel electric submarine. Today, and in the future, it is the high-speed nuclear attack submarine with unlimited submerged endurance, antiship missiles, long-range homing torpedoes, supported by a complex ocean surveillance system. Also, an increased threat from land-based aircraft must be considered. But merchant ships now are generally larger and faster and antisubmarine capabilities have improved with underwater surveillance systems, communications intercept, multiplatform coordination procedures, sensor improvements, and homing weapons. Factors which produced effective convoying in the past have been altered and there is a need for analysis, simulation, and fleet exercises to determine the most effective procedures for the future. Yet until proven otherwise, convoying remains the basic system of merchant ship protection.

Destroyer Escort Background. The class of ships that were used for merchant ship protection, called “frigate” today, can trace their origin to World War II. In 1941 a new class of ship called the DE or destroyer escort joined the fleet. The DEs were intended to protect merchant ships against the submarine. As antisubmarine ships for screening convoys, they were slower, smaller, had less armament, and were lighter in construction than destroyers, but they had some of the best ASW capabilities of their day. As an ASW weapons system, the DE was at least as capable as the WWII destroyer.

Although the maximum speed of the World War II-built classes of DEs remained about the same (21 to 24 knots), some were diesel powered, some turbo electric, and some had geared steam turbine propulsion. All DEs built during World War II had two shafts, while those DEs and FFs built since World War II have a single shaft for main propulsion. The need for plant redundancy and increased survivability was dominant during the war. In peacetime cost considerations prevailed and a single engineering plant was standard in the newer ships. The post-World War II DEs and FFs with their single engineering plants have maximum speeds of 24-28 knots.

In the 1950s the DE classification name was changed from destroyer escort to escort vessel, then to escort ship, and finally to ocean escort. But DE designation remained, as did the hull numbers, and missions of the ships. In 1975, the DE ocean escort classification was changed to FF frigate to conform with most of the world navies' designations of such ships. In its brief history, the destroyer escort of World War II passed through four classification changes and a designation change from DE to FF. But change of purpose was not a part of the change in classification or designation, so the frigate (FF) of today exists for the same purpose as its World War II predecessor—the destroyer escort (DE). That purpose was, and still is, protection of merchant shipping.

As the primary threat to merchant shipping has expanded from enemy submarines to include enemy aircraft and missiles launched from submarines as well as aircraft, the DEG was introduced. Later, the DEG became the guided missile frigate (FFG). The frigate is still basically a single purpose ship, and that purpose is protection of merchant shipping. Some frigates are optimized for ASW work, others for AAW, but each one is intended to perform the merchant ship protection role. These capabilities can be used for other similar roles, such as escorting underway replenishment ships or amphibious groups. Frigates can also be seen in carrier battle groups, but they were not intended for such employment.

Fleet and Reserve Unit Training. *NWP-31, U.S. Naval Protection of Shipping* provides the U.S. commander with doctrine and procedures for the use of naval forces in the protection of shipping and SLOC control. It provides for a time-phased implementation including actions to be taken prior to hostilities,

during the early days of a war, and over a long term. *NWP-31* offers various methods of ship movements and a number of means of providing protection to merchant ships at sea. However, at present there are no active operational activities of the Navy dedicated to the development, training, or exercise of naval protection of shipping. Not so in the recent past. For example, prior to 1961, Commander Destroyer Flotilla TWO of the Destroyer Force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet was tasked primarily for protection of shipping matters. The flotilla contained most of the Atlantic Fleet DEs. Commander Destroyer Flotilla TWO also served as Commander Task Group Charlie and was tasked with training for and developing tactics related to naval protection of shipping. Convoy escort procedures, including coordination with maritime patrol aircraft, were also developed.

In 1961, the destroyer force and the cruiser force of the Atlantic Fleet combined into CRUDESANT and the three destroyer flotillas and three cruiser divisions became six cruiser destroyer flotillas. Some of the protection of shipping specialization “melted” away. In 1971 the amphibious force, service force and CRUDESANT were combined into COMNAVSURFLANT. A similar process of reorganization went on in the Pacific. With these reorganizations, the DEs—which had been in their own escort squadrons—were integrated into destroyer squadrons, and convoy escort development and training disappeared. Since the DE became designated a frigate (FF), it has been treated as a general purpose destroyer with little to no involvement in the protection of shipping.

Fleet exercises are routinely scheduled today to provide opportunities for the reserve forces to evaluate procedures and to train in control of shipping protection. Four RAINBOW REEF exercises per year provide NCSORG personnel, convoy commodores, and associated staffs training in convoy procedures using the Near Term Prepositioned Ships, now called Maritime Prepositioned Ships (MPS), in the Indian Ocean. Both the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets conduct one or two convoy exercises (CONVEXs) each year using amphibious and MSC shipping. The Atlantic Fleet also conducts one OCEAN SAFARI convoy exercise every two years. A few command post exercises are held each year for NCSORG personnel. In the RAINBOW REEF exercises, MSC chartered ships form a convoy in the vicinity of Diego Garcia and practice convoy procedures. These ships practice every month and are the most experienced merchant ships in the world in convoy procedures. Rarely is protection provided in the monthly exercises of the MPS or to the quarterly RAINBOW REEF exercises. Protection is seldom included in the CONVEX and very few merchant ships participate. In the CONVEX, the convoy is often formed with amphibious ships, and without protection, these ships provide a training opportunity for a convoy commodore and convoy commodore staff.

Although the training opportunities exist for naval protection of shipping in fleet exercises, little to no use is made of them. Officers who have had frigate commands typically have not had experience in providing escort services to merchant ships, receive no formal instruction in protection of merchant shipping, and are not aware that the senior officer of the escort force would be the Officer in Tactical Command (OTC) of such a group.

Using amphibious ships and underway replenishment ships formed in a convoy has some value for training but falls considerably short of the considerations regarding convoying merchant ships. Most naval officers know very little about merchant ships. Amphibious and underway replenishment ships have capabilities in ship control, command, and communications (C³) far in excess of merchant ships. Combat Information Center, radio communications, visual signals, and bridge manning are absent or considerably different in merchant ships, and false impressions are easily developed when convoy procedures, derived from Navy ship convoys, are translated to merchant ships.

In addition to the lack of training in naval protection of shipping in fleet exercises and the absence of formal instruction, there is a lack of cognizant staff positions on major staffs. It is rare to find someone on a major staff with the responsibility for naval protection of shipping. Although it is included in many war games at the Naval War College, shipping protection is not played in detail and seldom is there any interest in this basic function of the Navy. Shipping protection is not considered glamorous. Protection of carrier battle groups gets a great deal of attention. The battleship and the amphibious group get their share of attention, but not the merchant ship.

It is well established national and allied policy that the escort force commander is the Officer in Tactical Command (OTC) of the merchant ship convoy. This means that if three frigates are escorting a fifteen-ship merchant convoy, the senior frigate commander will be the OTC of the convoy and escort force—no matter what the rank of the convoy commodore. Although other arrangements for designation of OTC exists, the clear intent of existing doctrine is that the escort force commander will be the OTC.

The function of OTC of a 10 to 30 ship group including convoy and escort requires command, control and communications considerations beyond that of a coordinated unit. These OTC considerations should not be overlooked in the training of a frigate commander or the configuration of future combatant ships for protection of shipping.

Convoy Commodore Training. The convoy commodore serves as OTC only when no escort is provided. Retired Navy captains and above are selected for convoy commodore training from among those who have had significant tactical command at sea, are under 60 years of age, and are physically qualified. The officers selected and who accept this opportunity attend a

two-week course which provides instruction, lectures, demonstrations, and practical exercises in: U.S. Civil Direction and Naval Control of Shipping Organizations; U.S. Merchant Marine and merchant ship characteristics; control of shipping communications systems; convoy planning including routing, organization, sailing and forming; the threat to convoys; and convoy at sea operations including communications, maneuvering, emergency procedures and protection.

In the event of national mobilization these retired officers would be called to active naval service at their retired rank for duty as convoy commodores in command of merchant ships convoys. The authority and responsibility of the convoy commodore would be limited to the control and safe transit of the merchant ships in the convoy. The convoy commodore would have no authority over any Navy ships or any component of the escort force. There are about 125 designated convoy commodores with a turnover rate of about 15 per year. The RAINBOW REEF and CONVEX normally provide at-sea training opportunities for eight convoy commodores per year. The remaining have little or nothing to do with the program after completion of their two-week training course. Preparation and experience of the convoy commodore focuses on conveying as the primary means of protecting shipping, but "conveying" and "naval protection of shipping" are not synonymous.

Alternative Protection Methods

Conveying is but one means of protecting shipping. Other primary methods are independent sailing and protected lanes. Each system has advantages and disadvantages, and an operational commander must consider all three for a given tactical situation, including mixes. While considerable detail, data, and doctrine exist on conveying, very little documentation is available on independent sailing or protected lanes. Consequently, the operational commander may not have a freedom of choice in his selection of a protection method. Because of a lack of background information on independent sailing or protected lanes, a decision to employ convoy protection could be *pro forma*.

Independent Sailing. A better name for this method of shipping control and protection would be "merchant ships sailing individually," because the ship is not independent. It is selected, routed and controlled during transit by the NCSORG. Certain ships—because of their speed, cargo, port of departure and destination—are permitted to sail independently by the OCA. These ships are routed and sailed under conditions similar to those used for convoys. The routing is based on intelligence and tactical information by the OCA. Factors considered include avoidance of certain areas because of knowledge

or suspicion of enemy submarines and deliberate routing through other areas of ongoing antisubmarine operations for protection. Ships permitted to sail independently can commence their transit as soon as they are loaded. They can proceed at their own best speed rather than the speed of the slowest ship in a convoy. Upon reaching their destination, independently sailed ships can usually be unloaded immediately rather than queuing for unloading with other ships of the convoy.

Protected Lane. The protected lane involves sanitizing a geographical area against the submarine threat followed by the installation of a barrier or protected perimeter that provides for penetration warning. It can also involve the positioning of own forces at the perimeters for attack, destruction, and/or neutralization. Protective forces are positioned along a transit route. Each unit of the protective force is assigned an area of responsibility, the size of which depends upon the speed and sensors of the protective platform, perceived threat, environmental conditions, and weapons involved. Ships, aircraft, submarines, and fixed arrays could be employed along the protected lane. Merchant ships proceeding along the protected lane are passed from one area of responsibility to the next, but it may be necessary to have gaps or unprotected spaces between the protected areas.

Tactical publications provide very little detail on the protected lane. *AXP-5*, a NATO publication on experimental tactics, offers some perspective on a protection lane, but it is unclear and virtually unmanageable. A more comprehensive publication detailing the employment of the protected lane is needed.

Protection Method Comparisons and Strategic Considerations

Convoying has the advantage of making economical use of the forces available for protection—resources available for protection are employed directly in protecting the convoy, whatever its size. Four frigates could be assigned to escort a ten-ship convoy, or they could escort as many as forty ships.

Once an enemy locates the convoy and attacks a ship, the immediate presence of the escort force gives a greater probability of damaging or destroying the enemy. Hence there is a tendency to reduce the losses to the convoy and increase the kill probability of the attacker. The presence of escorts for the convoy also ensures accurate and secure communications between shore and ship.

An enemy may find it nonproductive to send out large numbers of aircraft to search for, localize, and attack individual merchant ships sailing independently on the open ocean. On the other hand, a large convoy of 50

merchant ships would provide such a lucrative target that an enemy commitment of regimental-sized aircraft raids, massed submarines, or surface combatants would be difficult to resist. With the cargo carrying capacity of modern merchant ships, a 50-ship convoy would represent an important portion of military logistic resources, the destruction of which could have considerable impact on the U.S. or NATO warfighting ability in a major conflict.

An independent merchant ship at sea, intercepted by an enemy, provides one target. If the individual merchant ship is destroyed, the enemy must then search for another target. Proper routing of these individual merchant ships can take advantage of both the protection afforded by U.S. and allied at-sea operations as well as weather, and threat avoidance. Existing procedures mandate that NCSORG give presail routing to the ship. This should be expanded to provide continuous positive control during the full transit so that diversions or changes can be directed as necessary. For this an OCA would require a command center staffed to deal with merchant ship traffic of his area, provided with communications, displays, and inputs from intelligence, operations, and oceanographic sources.

As the number of convoys increases, the need for direct support protective forces increases. In the protected lane method, a fixed level of protective forces is used to defend whatever level of shipping is used. The protected lane is a special variation of independent sailings—the merchant ships proceed at their best speeds as soon as loaded over a prescribed route. The major difference is that instead of taking advantage of opportune defensive forces for independent sailing, the protected lane uses forces deliberately positioned and dedicated to shipping protection. Each ship can commence the transit as soon as it is loaded, and congestion at the unloading port is reduced by normal spreading out of arrival times. Similar to independent sailing, an intercept by the enemy results in but one target. Economical employment of protective forces is realized in the protected lane, as once the lane is established a large number of merchant ships can use it, receiving protection from the same number of protective forces. In general, the protected lane combines the advantages of both independent sailing and convoying, without the disadvantages of those systems.

A disadvantage of the protected lane results from the static nature of the barrier-like structure. Once an enemy detects the establishment of the lane, targets on the predictable path can be attacked. To overcome this deficiency the lane should gradually shift laterally and the protective unit position coordinated with the movement of the other units in the lane. The merchant ships using the lane would be directed to proceed from one protected area to the next, making a transit over the continually shifting route. The shifting defended lane (SDL) and the merchant ships using it must be orchestrated by a sophisticated command center from which detailed instructions emanate.

The SDL incorporates the advantages of independent sailing and convoying without some of the disadvantages of the protected lane. The SDL requires a complex command, control, and communications system and would include: determining the size of each area, assigning of protective forces to areas, coordinating the movement of the areas with the routing of the merchant ships, receiving threat intelligence information from all sources, and directing immediate shifts of the lane in response to intelligence as well as the gradual shifting for deception.

In convoying, the escorts can return to the port of origin either steaming unaccompanied or by escorting returning merchant ships. Generally, an escort will be less productive on its return voyage than it was in protecting a loaded merchant ship. In the protected lane, the protective unit remains in an operating area providing defense to loaded merchant ships proceeding in one direction through the lane, as well as empty ships going in the other direction. Over a long period of time the convoy escort would be less productive as it must make a return transit for every convoy escorted, while the unit providing defense in a protected lane remains on station for a longer time offering protection to any merchant ships using the lane.

There would be times when owing to the strategic or tactical situation, threat, available forces and environmental conditions, an operational commander is forced to use a particular system of shipping protection. Also, the commander may find it necessary to use combinations of the systems in sequence or concurrently. For instance, escorting convoys through a shifting defended lane might provide the required added degree of protection for special cargoes.

Conclusions and Recommendations

The U.S. Navy has not given adequate attention to the protection of shipping during national emergencies. Procedures should be developed for coordinated protection of shipping involving surface ships, aircraft, and submarines controlled from command centers with access to the national intelligence community. These procedures should cover the various methods of shipping control and protection, such as independent sailing, convoys, and protected lanes, as well as mixes of the various methods. These methods should be utilized in war games, where subsequent analysis could develop probabilities of success and expected loss rates. Protection of shipping procedures should be included in formal Navy tactical training courses of instruction. This instruction should include characteristics and capabilities of merchant ships. Fleet exercises should be conducted using merchant ships, employing actual command, control, and communications arrangements which could be available ashore and in these merchant ships in wartime.

A flag officer level command should be established ashore colocated with each major area operational control authority with the responsibility for naval control of shipping and naval protection of shipping. This new command should have a command center with communications, display, computer supported decision aids, intelligence and environmental inputs. The new command should be delegated the tasks of training, developing, and carrying out the control and protection functions for the OCA. To accomplish this, the command should be given operational control of all frigates and a portion of VP aircraft, as well as periodic operational control of some submarines, destroyers, battle groups, airships, and Coast Guard resources. Liaison with Air Force, allies, SOSUS, tactical development, and research facilities should be granted.

As frigates were not intended to operate with battle groups, they should not be so employed. Frigates (FF and FFG) should form the basis of shipping protection and, under the new command, should train and develop procedures for the protection of shipping as part of a coordinated system. Money should not be spent by the Navy to make existing frigates more compatible with battle groups. Rather, those scarce funds should be applied to improving the capability of frigates to perform the shipping protection role.

Staffs from the Chief of Naval Operations through the numbered fleet commanders should have a "Naval Protection of Shipping" section with similar status as that given to battle groups.

Innovative procedures and systems should be explored and developed for protection of shipping. Building a replacement for an aging class of ship or a new sensor is not enough. Protection of shipping should be approached as a system involving all those platforms, sensors, and procedures which can provide the highest degree of protection against the projected threat for the least cost.

World War I and II procedures, with a few modifications, might offer the best opportunity for the present. Until new procedures are developed and analyzed against the projected threat, an operational commander will not know how best to protect shipping. Training in future protection of shipping procedures cannot commence until these procedures are developed, analyzed, and have been put into practice.



An Amphibious Landing? With Civilian Ships?

Colonel John F. Brosnan, Jr., U.S. Marine Corps

If we were directed to make a large amphibious landing anywhere in the world now or in the next few years, the one thing that the Navy and Marines can be sure of is that civilian-manned and civilian-owned ships will be a part of the force. It does not matter whether the troops to be landed constitute a Marine Amphibious Force (MAF) or a smaller Marine Amphibious Brigade (MAB) or whether maritime prepositioning ships will be included; civilian ships *will be* there. However, and this should be neither a secret nor a surprise to any of us, we are unprepared to put those ships to efficient use. The reason for this situation is that adequate planning procedures simply do not exist for the Commander Amphibious Task Force (CATF) to incorporate civilian ships as elements of his task force.

Some of the ships involved in amphibious operations will probably be manned and operated by the Navy's Military Sealift Command (MSC). Their crews will be more or less familiar with naval requirements and Navy ways. Moreover, they will have some of the equipment, such as radios, necessary to work within a naval force. While the other ships, those taken up from trade, will likely have few people or none familiar with the ways and needs of a naval force, and no compatible equipment to help them out. To keep our minds focused on the facts that these will be civilian mariners sailing in commercial or commercial-type ships, we will refer to them as civilian ships. To the extent any of them will be MSC mariners in MSC ships, that will be all to the good.

In the years since it became plain to us that we would have to depend, at least in part on civilian ships, the terms "assault echelon" (AE) and "assault follow-on echelon" (AFOE) have crept into our lexicon. For forward deployments in peacetime the situation has not been critical because we generally have had enough amphibious ships of the right types to satisfy our needs. And, because it was done slowly, even the introduction of Marine forces into Vietnam 20 years ago could be carried out totally in amphibious

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ships. Our discussion will focus on this available shipping and how the CATF must manage it in order to deal with five distinct activities in carrying out an amphibious operation—planning, embarking the force, rehearsing the men, moving the force to the objective, and making the assault.

But, let us look at the circumstances of today's amphibious commander, in which we will assume that both commercial and reserve ships will be made available to the CATF when he needs them.

Planning

The initiating directive will direct the CATF to conduct an amphibious operation—i.e., it will assign him a mission and provide him forces to accomplish that mission. It also will establish command relationships for the operation. Let us assume the landing force is a notional MAF of the following size:

Element	Assault Echelon (AE)	Assault Follow-on Echelon (AFOE)
Troops (includes Naval Support Element)	39,400	19,000
Cargo—Square (ft ²)	770,000	763,000
Cargo—Cube (ft ³)	1,750,000	5,507,000
Bulk POI. (bbl)	packaged	1,179,000*

One can see that the AFOE contains roughly one-third of the personnel, one-half of the square and three-quarters of the cube of the landing force. The notional amphibious lift for the assault echelon of a force of this size would consist of 23 helicopter-capable ships, 13 well deck ships, 15 LSTs, and 4 cargo ships. Depending upon the mix of LHAs, and LPHs and LPDs, one can assume the presence of some dual-configuration ships, but these figures assume a best case availability. Correspondingly, it would take about 30 MSC ships including (for the best case example) 7 troopships, 1 aviation support ship (TAVB), 1 crane ship (TAC), 4 LASH, 9 container, and 4 each of roll-on/roll-off (RO/RO) ships and tankers to complete the lift of the landing force. In a crisis requiring a MAF-size landing, it is fair to assume that other theaters would be active and competing for resources so there probably would be no guarantee that a local amphibious commander could get the optimum force. Furthermore, the requirement for 9 containerships assumes the containerization of landing force supplies at 70 to 75 percent. Realistically, one can assume a ship mix that will include a combination of container and old-style breakbulk cargo ships.

*U.S. Navy Dept., *Marine Air-Ground Task Forces (MAGTF)*, NAVMC 2710 (Washington: 1982), p. 11. See also same document, 1983 ed., p. 11. See also G.D. Hendrickson, "Commercial Ships in the Amphibious Assault," *Marine Corps Gazette*, March 1984, p. 47.

A more pressing consideration for the CATF than the breakbulk/containership mix is the available small troop lift in the U.S. commercial fleet. Aside from state maritime academy training ships, the United States has only 8 passenger and combination cargo/passenger ships, totaling 5,195 berths, in inventory. There are also 14 World War II vintage AP-class and 10 Victory-class troopships in the National Defense Reserve Fleet (NDRF), but the material condition of these vessels and their ability to sustain their designed speeds (19 and 16.5 knots) at their ages is questionable.* Each of these ships would also require from 30 to 90 days for reactivation.

The British experience in the Falkland Islands leads one to assume that, given the time, some or all of the operating passenger ships and passenger-cargo ships could be modified to increase their troop capacity by a factor of four. But such an improvement of berthing capacity alone, without corresponding improvements in tactical debarkation capability via helicopter or landing craft, would be of little value. The imposition of these restrictions would necessitate that the CATF expedite the establishment of an airhead in the amphibious objective area. Such an airhead should be capable of landing C-130 aircraft carrying AFOE personnel previously flown into the theater on strategic airlift. Correspondingly, until the Navy and Marine Corps have developed and fielded enough container offload and discharge systems, the urgent need for the CATF to secure a port for unloading containerships assumes an importance which is directly proportional to the number of containerships in the AFOE lift.

Mustering the Ships. Given the commitment of forces to more than one unified command operation plan, a large amphibious operation will involve swinging assets between Atlantic and Pacific Fleets. Who gives and who gets will depend upon the strategists in Washington. Just as the CATF must know the composition of the Assault Echelon to determine the optimum and limiting mixes of amphibious ships he needs to support the assault, he must know the composition of the AFOE so that he can acquire the best ships to do that job. Both the amphibious and civilian ships will be embarking personnel, equipment and supplies at numerous locations. The civilian ships will probably be loading at established ports, but such a limitation will not affect the amphibious ships. To ensure that the CATF does acquire the best combination of ships from MSC, he needs to know the landing force's vehicle square and cargo cube. He must also consider the capabilities of the various types of commercial shipping. Similarly, he must be familiar with some important differences between naval and commercial vessels and the philosophies for operating them.

*U.S. Navy Dept., Military Sealift Command, *Ship Register* (MSC P504) (Washington: 1985), pp. 18-37.

Merchant Ship Suitability. There are five broad types of commercial ships which can be employed in support of an amphibious operation: passenger; combination cargo/passenger; general purpose (breakbulk); intermodal (container, RO/RO, LASH); and tanker. Each type has its own qualities, and these influence its value to amphibious operations. The positive qualities to all, except for some tankers, are speed and endurance, while negative qualities common to all are poor communications, inadequate damage control, little or no ability to replenish underway, and in the case of LASH and Seabee ships, the need for barge tug support.

Merchant ships are designed to optimize their cargo-moving efficiency in point-to-point transits. Efficiency for such operations mandates design tradeoffs between speed and cost to optimize profit. A commercial operator's priorities recognize the ship's safety first, followed by the cargo's integrity, and finally the timeliness of its delivery. For these reasons it would be acceptable to the owner for one of his ships to go dead in the water to repair a casualty rather than to risk greater financial hazards by pressing on with a damaged ship. In contrast naval ships are designed to go in harm's way to survive damage up to a point, and carry on with the mission. A *Charleston*-class LKA, for example, might survive the flooding of two or three compartments. In contrast, a subsidized cargo ship need survive the flooding of only one compartment. Damage which penetrated a watertight bulkhead would probably result in the loss of such a ship.

Moreover, unlike amphibious ships, commercial vessels can transfer little cargo while at sea. Some can transfer none at all. This means that a ship damaged so she had to turn back might take away with her items essential to success of the operation. (An obvious solution to this problem, of course, is to spread key items among several ships.) Late changes to the mission could also affect the scheme of maneuver ashore if the essential cargo could not be shifted and reconstituted.

Because merchant ships have no cargo handling or hatch crew personnel, such people must come from the Naval Cargo Handling and Port Group (NAVCHAPGRU). But cargo ships have no berthing for such people either. So, NAVCHAPGRU personnel must be carried in other ships, live in other ships, or be flown to meet the merchant ships wherever their cargo must be worked. Merchant ships do not have medical facilities either, much less doctors, nurses, or corpsmen. Finally merchant ships cannot defend themselves.

Special Considerations. There are some critical issues that the CATF must address if he is to integrate civilian shipping effectively into his amphibious operations. I believe there are five that are of primary concern: mine countermeasures, convoy operations, troop embarkation and habitability, medical matters, and the termination of operations. While this list may not be

inclusive, it includes in my judgment all those that, if ignored, could cause significant problems in the assault and subsequent operations afloat and ashore.

Until the Navy developed airborne mine countermeasures systems, the landing forces faced virtually no competition for helicopter-capable amphibious shipping. Now, given the number of CH-53-capable amphibious ships, the possible threat assessments, and the projected mine countermeasures (MCM) assets required under certain scenarios, the CATF may have to designate an MCM ship at the expense of embarking elements of the landing force. Since sweeping operations involve not only a helicopter deck but also a wet well deck, the addition of MCM forces can force the CATF to shift some equipment best carried in amphibious ships to civilian ships. For example, Naval Beach Group equipment normally requires embarkation in amphibious shipping to assist in offload of both the AE and AFOE. The CATF should consider, if necessary, shifting some of this equipment to a LASH ship since that is one of the two types which can preboat barges for subsequent tactical unloading ashore. He could also consider loading air mine countermeasure sweep equipment in literage which, upon approaching the amphibious operation area (AOA), could be tethered alongside MCM shipping not equipped with a well deck. The LASH also can lift up to 28 supplemental landing craft.

Early in his planning the CATF should make the decision whether to sail the civilian ships to the amphibious operating area in convoy with the amphibious shipping. When faced with the large number of civilian ships needed to lift the AFOE and knowing that ships in the assault echelon carry a substantial amount of supplies, the obvious, logical, and yet *incorrect* decision is to allow the AFOE shipping to proceed independently—providing that it arrives before the ships in the assault echelon run out of the necessary stores. Some elements of the AFOE may be required as early as D+1, but the CATF should not gamble on simultaneous arrival of both groups. Moreover, if en route cargo reconstitution is required, it will have to be a last minute evolution if the AFOE is not steaming with the ATF. Further, it may develop that subordinate landing force headquarters elements requiring early landing may have to be embarked in these ships.

The major advantages and disadvantages of convoy operations are well known. But not so well known is the implicitly higher total cargo value of any of today's large commercial ships compared to those of World War II convoys. The CATF must weigh carefully the potential impact upon the operation ashore should he lose even a single ship such as a large RO/RO vessel carrying a major portion of the landing force's equipment. It will be shown later that moving the civilian ships in the AFOE to the objective with the ships of his amphibious task force will provide the CATF a valuable opportunity to assess the capability of his civilian ships to operate tactically with the task force before the assault.

In making the convoy decision the planner must remember that the basic objective of a convoy is to maintain the combat effectiveness of naval forces and ensure the safe transit of the maximum tonnage. In considering the availability of escorts for this force the CATF must also weigh the available opportunities for merchant ships to defend themselves. The most obvious choices are either to embark elements of the landing force's forward anti-air defense battery or to augment units embarked with Stinger missiles. During the Falkland Islands conflict, British troops embarked in transports mounted and fired machine guns from the decks. Their substantial volume of tracer fire reportedly had some deterrent effect on pilots attacking at low altitudes.

A major tactical disadvantage to the use of civilian shipping in amphibious operations is their lack of troop berthing. This separates sailors and marines from their equipment and drivers from their vehicles; it forces pre-H-hour transfers. Undesirable as this evolution is under any circumstances, it is further aggravated because merchant ships lack helicopter decks. Hence, the transfers must be made by landing craft. If it is at all possible, "quick fix" helo decks should be installed on civilian ships. Again, the British showed how rapidly this can be done.

Transfers by landing craft are naturally very sensitive to sea state conditions. Most cargo ships and vehicle transports presently in service have accommodations for 12 passengers. Though this small number could quickly be multiplied by four, that would still leave each ship grossly short of driver berthing capacity compared to the number of vehicles that she could lift. When coupled with the number of hatch crew and boom operators required from the NAVCHAPGRU, the berthing shortage becomes critical. While some actions can be taken to provide men with crude shelter, and might be lightly regarded as the work of resourceful marines making the best of a bad situation, the fact remains that it is a bad situation. Yet, there is no budget priority to equip even a few ships with troop berthing spaces. Containerized berthing systems have been investigated but there has been no major testing of such systems.

The CATF must also pay attention to medical matters, specifically three items. These are medical support for the civilian crews, hospital ship support for his amphibious operation, and combat fleet hospital support for his entire force. The first should be of significant concern during the movement to the objective area. It may be solved by marines of the landing force who will have organic medical support embarked with them. In the event that the very old mothballed transports in the NDRF are activated, at least notionally, each would be staffed by a doctor and nine hospital or Nurse Corps personnel. In any event, the CATF's staff should become familiar with the appropriate naval medical instructions concerning treatment of civilian ship crewmen.

A hospital ship supporting the amphibious task force must conduct its operations in accordance with the Law of Armed Conflict. The CATF must

make arrangements for his hospital ship's operations in relation to his overall scheme of maneuver, not only for legality under the Geneva Conventions but also to ensure that the ship's protected status is not endangered. In the Falklands the British and Argentines faced some interesting problems with their hospital ships and came up with some novel solutions.

Finally, fleet hospitals are bulky. For ease of loading, unit integrity and where there is no threat, each should be loaded in a single ship. In his planning the CATF should consider the en route threat and weigh the risk of losing an entire hospital against the efficiency of unit integrity.

It is as the end of his operation nears that the CATF must decide what to do with his civilian ships. It is possible, for example, that the operation could be ended and the amphibious shipping be directed to sail on to another one before the civilian ships are unloaded. In such a case he must decide which, if any, landing craft he will leave behind to continue the unloading. He will also have to decide on a boat haven for such craft. His Naval Beach Group and NAVCHAPGRU must remain until either the Marines' Force Service Support Group is fully operational ashore or the Army has taken over the beach and port operations. Lastly, the CATF may have to protect civilian ships as they depart or he may be directed to pass such responsibility to another commander.

Communications. The communication systems of commercial ships are primitive by Navy standards. In contrast, MSC nucleus fleet ships have good communications capability. Unfortunately, they are there chiefly to help provide underway replenishment. Be that as it may, the appropriate doctrinal and technical publications provide instructions on the specific radio nets and equipment to be operated by MSC ships in support of amphibious operations.

Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Defense. While the Military Sealift Command provides for delivery of NBC defense equipment and medical supplies to ships in the Sealift Readiness Program (SRP), information on the subject is scarce. Since those ships would not be activated until others had been put to use, perhaps it is reasonable to assume that, if the threat assessment warranted it, the Sealift Command could provide NBC defense equipment for those ships supporting an amphibious operation. By itself, the equipment is useless, the CATF must be certain that the ship's crew are adequately trained in its use prior to sailing. If this is not possible, he must see that the training is conducted en route, either as part of rehearsals or during tactical operations while steaming.

Embarkation, Rehearsal, Movement, and Assault

Embarkation. While "gator sailors" and Marines have become very proficient at rapid embarkation in amphibious shipping, no CATF should expect his

civilian ships to do it equally well. For example, individual MSC and chartered ships have no loading characteristics handbooks. Notional handbooks are being introduced, but embarkation officers will not know the size of their task until their particular ship arrives at the pier. While appropriate publications address such individual tasks as welding padeyes, one should also be ready for the time- and labor-intensive task of making up lashing and cribbing from scratch. Further, while certain loading procedures and operations may be permissible on Navy ships, they could be prohibited on merchant vessels unless waived by the Coast Guard. In a practical sense, the degree of urgency would dictate the latitude taken in conducting what normally would be considered prohibited loading operations.

Rehearsals. Rehearsals serve four purposes: they test adequacy of the CATF's planning, the timing of his operations, the combat readiness of his force, and whether he and his units can communicate amongst themselves. Given the difference in communication capabilities of Navy and civilian ships, the CATF who fails to include the latter in his rehearsals does it at his own peril.

Movement to the Objective. For the landing force the movement to the objective is a period of final preparation of men and equipment—weapon test firing and final issuance of orders to subordinates. The amphibious task force may steam in a formation similar to that to be used in the assault or in one from which it can easily deploy into final formation for the assault. Since the task-organized force has been drawn from various sea service components, the individual ships may not previously have operated together. Therefore, it is useful for ships of the task force to perform tactical rehearsals that can be incorporated into their transit. Civilian ships steaming in convoy with the ATF can exercise and improve their abilities to operate during the assault.

Assault. The critical element in the amphibious assault is the rapid buildup of combat power ashore. Two operations in which civilian ships will participate are general unloading from the transport area or selective unloading from the sea echelon area. These ships must be ever alert to use what defensive measures are open to them, such as keeping their screws turning over slowly and veering and heaving around on anchor chains. If it is planned and executed properly, the unloading should be a fast paced but yet anticlimactic evolution for the CATF and his staff.

Implicit in this paper is the simple fact that the scale of amphibious operations has changed for the U.S. Navy. It would be naive for any sailor or marine to believe the days of a total haze gray ATF will ever be seen again except on the smallest scale. It therefore behooves all who participate in amphibious warfare to learn all they can and train as often as possible with civilian shipping in amphibious operations. It's the only game in town.

American Strategic Culture and Civil-Military Relations: The Case of JCS Reform

Mackubin Thomas Owens

Reformers have a broad menu of candidates to blame for deficiencies in American defense policy. For some it is the very constitutional framework of the American government itself, which leads to competition and even conflict between the legislative and executive branches. For others it is the increasing bureaucratization of the Defense Establishment, the decline of military professionalism, interservice rivalry, or the organization of the Defense Department all of which result in an inability to develop an effective military strategy. But the target highest on the reformers' list is the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) which serves as the focus of civil-military relations in the United States. "Reform" is in the air and the 99th Congress has promised to do something about the Defense Establishment if it cannot put its own house in order.¹

For the most part the reformers are military "purists" who, rightly, seek to address the issues of military effectiveness. Their error is to ignore what has been called the American "strategic culture" and act as if reform can be accomplished in a vacuum.² Contemporary reformers seem to ignore the broad context of American history, tradition, and institutions. As Allan Millett and Peter Maslowski have observed, "national military considerations alone have rarely shaped [American] military policies and programs. The political system, the availability of finite . . . resources and manpower, and societal values have all imposed constraints on defense matters." In addition, "the nation's firm commitment to civilian control of military policy requires careful attention to civil-military relations. The commitment to civilian control makes military policy a paramount function of the federal government where the executive branch and Congress vie to shape policy."³

Throughout American history, would-be reformers have ignored these principles at their peril. A case in point was Emory Upton. From a strictly military point of view, Upton's proposals to reform the U.S. Army after the

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Civil War had a great deal of merit. But like many of today's reformers, he paid insufficient attention to the character of his countrymen or to their political traditions and institutions. In the words of Millett and Maslowski: ". . . Upton [did not] understand that policy cannot be judged by any absolute standard. It reflects a nation's characteristics, habits of thoughts, geographic location, and historical development. Built upon the genius, traditions, and location of Germany, the system, he admired could not be grafted onto America. In essence, Upton wrote in a vacuum. He began with a fixed view of the policy he thought the U.S. needed, and he wanted the rest of society to change to meet his demands, which it sensibly declined to do."⁴

The purpose of this paper is to address the relationship between American strategic culture and civil-military relations, as manifested in the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In doing so it will deal with the following issues: the nature of strategic culture and its relationship with military policy; the components of American strategic culture and how the pattern of U.S. civil-military relations has arisen from American strategic culture; and JCS as a reflection of American strategic culture.

Strategic Culture and Military Policy

A nation's strategic culture, in the words of Carnes Lord, is comprised of the "fundamental assumptions governing the constitution of military power and the ends they are intended to serve." These assumptions "establish the basic framework for, if they do not determine in detail the nature of, military forces and military operations." In other words, strategic culture is the framework within which military policy is debated and decided.

According to another writer it is "a set of general beliefs, attitudes and behavioral patterns," regarding strategy which have "achieved a state of semipermanence that places them on the level of *culture* rather than mere *policy*. Of course attitudes may change as a result of changes in technology and the international environment. However, new problems are not assessed objectively. Rather, they are seen through the perceptual lens provided by the strategic culture." Strategic culture, says Colin Gray, refers "to modes of thought and action with respect to force, derives from perception of the national historical experience, aspiration for self-characterization, . . . and from all the many distinctively [national] experiences . . . that characterize [that nation's] citizen."⁵

Influences on strategic culture include geography, political philosophy, civic culture, and socio-economic conditions. These interact with traditions and institutions to create what may be called the "character of a people" from which strategic culture is finally derived.

Military policy is inextricably linked to strategic culture. It is the aggregate of the plans, programs, and actions taken by the citizens of a nation

through their government to achieve security against external military threats and domestic insurrection. Military policy manifests itself in two primary ways, both of which are connected to civil-military relations: through the instrumentalities by which military forces are organized and controlled; and through the development and implementation of military strategy. Military policy must be consistent with national policy, and with the underlying purpose and fundamental perspective of the nation. It thus transcends purely military tasks and ultimately encompasses the nation's *civilian* goals.

American Strategic Culture and Military Policy. I would suggest that there are four primary factors that influence strategic culture:

- the geopolitical situation,
- political culture and ideology,
- international relationships, and
- weaponry and military technology.⁶

The interaction of these factors creates the strategic culture from which military policy arises. Since the influence of the different factors may vary with differing conditions, strategic culture in general is dynamic. But in the American case, certain of these factors have seen very little change since the founding of the Republic, resulting in a fairly constant strategic culture. Those more stable factors are the geopolitical setting, and political culture and ideology.

From a geopolitical standpoint, the United States has always been an island, as opposed to a continental power. Like the earlier island powers of England and Athens, American national security requirements have been intermittent rather than continuous—the nation has relied primarily on naval forces and citizen soldiers or militia to meet its requirements, and the national attitude toward war has been greatly influenced by commercial attitudes.

Throughout its history the United States has had essentially friendly and/or benign neighbors. The resulting isolation from most direct threats to national security has enabled the nation to enjoy the advantages of insularity, the most important of which is the freedom to choose involvement in international affairs as it suits the national purpose. This advantage is clearly articulated in Washington's Farewell Address: "Our detached and distant situation invites us to a different course and enables us to pursue it. If we remain a united people under an efficient Government the period is not distant when we may defy material injury from external annoyance—when we may take such an attitude as will cause the neutrality we shall at any time resolve to observe to be violated with caution—when it will be the interest of belligerent nations under the impossibility of making acquisitions upon us to be very careful how either forced us to throw our weight into the opposite scale—when we may choose peace or war as our interest guided by justice shall dictate."⁷

With the development of the intercontinental and submarine launched ballistic missile much of that advantage has been lost, but unlike continental states in Europe or Asia, the United States does not face the threat of a land invasion.

As important as the geopolitical factor has been in the development of the American strategic culture, it is less significant than the political-ideological one. The United States is a liberal democracy, and the political institutions and traditions of the nation have, more than any other influence, formed the American strategic culture.

The American political tradition is the result of the confluence of Lockean liberalism, radical Whig republicanism, and Puritan political philosophy, as modified by modern theories of progress. As such, it has always been strongly antimilitarist, primarily with regard to standing armies. The founders—steeped in the history of classical Greece and Rome, well aware that a military dictatorship had arisen out of the English civil war, and having just won their independence from a British monarch who had, in their view, violated his powers—were very concerned to diffuse power sufficiently widely to prevent its abuse. As a result of these concerns the founders paid particular attention to the standing army—“that engine of arbitrary power,” in the words of Luther Martin, “which has so often and so successfully been used for the subversion of freedom.”⁸ At the same time, the classical liberal political theory that served as the basis of the American Republic treated war as being fundamentally unnatural, and hence illegitimate, since it constituted a threat to the principles that the American Republic was designed to protect: life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.

Yet, the founders realized that a military establishment was necessary. As Madison wrote in *Federalist* 41: “How could a readiness for war in time of peace be safely prohibited, unless we would prohibit in like manner the preparations and establishments of every hostile nation? This means of security can only be regulated by the means and danger of attack. They will, in fact, be ever determined by these rules and by no others.”⁹

But they saw such an establishment as at best a necessary evil, and did all in their power to ensure that it could never become an instrument of despotism in the executive branch. In the words of John Taylor of Carolina: “An army is the strongest of all factions, and completely the instrument of a leader, skillful enough to enlist its sympathies, and inflame its passions. It is given to a president, and election is the only surety that he will not use it . . . the precept ‘that money should not be appropriated for the use of an army, for a longer term than two years,’ is like that which forbid Caesar to open the treasury.”¹⁰ The President was to be constrained by legislative prerogatives. What we call *civilian* control of the military meant for the founders *legislative* control.

Harry Summers has pointed out that it was not the French revolution but the American that laid the basis for the transformation of the army from an

instrument of executive power to one reflecting the national will—the will of the people at large as expressed through the deliberations of their representatives in the congress.¹¹ As Clausewitz wrote: “In the eighteenth century . . . war was still an affair for governments alone, and the people’s role was simply that of the instrument . . . the executive . . . represented the state in its foreign relations . . . the people’s part had become extinguished . . . war thus became solely the concern of the government to the extent that governments parted company with their peoples and behaved as if they were themselves the state.”¹²

The founders consciously rejected an army based on the eighteenth-century model, one answerable only to the executive. The purpose of the constitutional safeguards that they created was to ensure that the American *people* would ultimately control the military instrument.

Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution makes explicit the bond between the American people and the army: “The Congress shall have power . . . to declare War . . . to raise and support Armies . . . to make Rules for the Government and Regulations of the land and naval forces”

In *Federalist* Numbers 24 and 69, Alexander Hamilton made very clear the complete American break with the eighteenth-century model: “The whole power of raising armies [is] lodged in the *Legislative*, not in the *Executive*, this Legislature [is] to be a popular body, consisting of the representatives of the people, periodically elected . . . a great and real security against the keeping of troops without evident necessity.”¹³

“ . . . The power of the President would be inferior to that of the Monarch . . . that of the British King extends to the *Declaring* of war and to the *Raising* and *Regulating* of fleets and armies, all which by the Constitution . . . would appertain to the Legislature.”¹⁴

Such limitations on the executive branch address the founders’ fear of concentrated power and are clearly in consonance with the “Whig pessimism” about human nature. But, likewise, they were responsible for setting up obstacles to the efficient use of military power. Thus, the most important legacy of the political-ideological factor in American strategic culture was the division of control over the military between the legislative and executive branches. The complex nature of American civil-military relations arising from this division has made military reform, particularly of the sort desired by military “purists,” unusually difficult in the United States and should provide a warning signal for the current crop of reformers.

Samuel Huntington went to the heart of the problem of U.S. military reform arising from dual control over national forces when he wrote in *The Soldier and the State* that: “The principal beneficiaries of this spreading of power have been organized interest groups, bureaucratic agencies, and the military services. The separation of powers is a perpetual invitation, if not an irresistible force, drawing military leaders into political conflicts.”¹⁵ He

further observed that by defining the President's power as "Cominander in Chief" in terms of an *office* rather than a *function*, the founders broadened the area of conflict between the President and the Congress, since presidents have used the clause to "justify an extraordinarily broad range of nonmilitary presidential actions largely legislative in nature"¹⁶ and, by definition, at the expense of the Congress.

This conflict is exacerbated further by the fact that the constitutional separation of *powers* undermines the constitutional separation of *functions*, inviting the Congress and President to each "invade the constitutional realm of the other in any inajor substantive area of governmental activity."¹⁷ One may easily understand why military purists, who wish to see military considerations alone shape military policies and programs, would lament such a system resulting in duplication of functions and inefficiency in government. But the fact of the matter is that the central goal of American republican government is the widespread distribution of power and not functional efficiency. It is such an arrangement that best allows the United States to protect its citizens in their rights to "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness"—given the choice between liberty and efficiency, the founders chose liberty.

Despite the criticism of the military purists, the constitutional system created by the founders was designed to defend the Republic against threats to its security while remaining true to the principles and character of the American regime of liberal democracy. Though always weighted toward the latter, throughout history this system has been amazingly adaptable and responsive to changing conditions, allowing the nation for the most part to correctly evaluate the degree of danger and risk to the nation and to allocate resources accordingly. According to Millett and Maslowski: "When gauging America's strength against potential enemies, policymakers realized that the nation could devote its energies and financial resources to internal development rather than to maintaining a large and expensive peacetime military establishment. However, mobilizing simultaneously with a war's outbreak has extracted high costs in terms of speed and ease with each new mobilization."¹⁸

Since the end of World War II, changed geopolitical realities, as manifested in the growth of a militarily powerful and ideologically hostile Soviet Union and the increasing importance of nuclear weapons, have dictated that U.S. military policy be substantially changed. The peacetime Military Establishment has grown, and the United States has become a major player in international affairs. Yet, even in these dangerous times, military policy must be developed and implemented within certain constraints. These constraints may not please the purists among the military reformers, but even here they must acknowledge that the political system of the United States has created the conditions necessary for great economic growth, and it is the

economic potential of the nation that has in the past, and at present, undergirded its military might. At the same time, the American political system has produced generally courageous, clever and adaptable soldiers. The American soldier, backed by the economic power of the nation and employed to achieve clear war aims and political objectives, has generally performed well.

All of the factors enumerated and discussed above have created a unique strategic culture that has important implications for the future of national security and defense reform. In short, there exists an American strategic culture in which:

- the strategic defensive is fundamentally favored over the offensive (although tactically and operationally, preference for the offense prevails);
- reliance is placed on economic power and superior technology, rather than on "military art";
- seapower (and airpower) are favored over the employment of land forces (with the exception of the Marine Corps, which according to doctrine only represents the projection of seapower ashore);
- there is a predisposition against the use of force, but a tendency to emancipate the conduct of war from political goals, once force is employed; and
- fundamental decisions regarding war and peace and military policy in general are the result of a competition between civilian and military imperatives and competition and conflict between the executive and legislative branches, as well as among the agencies of the former and committees of the latter.

In light of American strategic culture, let us now return to the opening question of this paper: there are many who suggest that changed circumstances have rendered the existing system of civil-military relations in the United States obsolete. Samuel Huntington suggested that this might be the case as long as three decades ago, "Previously the primary question was: what pattern of civil-military relations is most compatible with American liberal democratic values? Now this has been supplanted by the more important issue: what pattern of civil-military relations will best maintain the security of the American nation?"¹⁹ Echoing what they take to be Huntington's point, the current reformers suggest that a wholesale and radical revision of American civil-military relations is necessary if we are to confront the military power of the Soviet Union.

As mentioned at the outset, the most prominent target for reformers is the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Yet, if what I have suggested up to this point is true, if the JCS, like other manifestations of American military power, is merely a reflection of prevailing and evolving attitudes about military affairs, themselves reflecting the American strategic culture, then to attempt to change the JCS without recognizing the pervasiveness of the underlying strategic culture is to risk making things worse.

The Case of the Joint Chiefs of Staff*

The charges against the JCS are fairly straightforward: the JCS provides military advice of a questionable quality; the members of the JCS, who are also the Chiefs of their respective services, are unable to set aside their parochial biases in order to provide objective military advice; since unanimity is required before the JCS can take a position, log-rolling is inevitable; the JCS will not address contentious issues for fear of bringing interservice rivalry into the open; the JCS decisionmaking process is cumbersome and unwieldy; JCS staff work is poor, because of Service parochialism and because the Services do not assign their best officers to the Joint Staff.²⁰

Among other things, say the critics, the JCS cannot agree on a coherent military policy or on the material requirements to support it. According to former Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, the JCS "would list as equally essential virtually all the programs each individual service wanted for itself When everything has 'top' priority, nothing does."²¹

The cure for the shortcomings of the JCS, say the reformers, involves curbing the independent powers of the Services. This is to be done either by replacing the JCS with a central defense staff or at least strengthening the Chairman so that he can make decisions in his own right and overcome the log-rolling that characterizes the decisions of the corporate JCS. Some proposals also place the Chairman in the chain of command.

The first, and more radical approach was recently proposed by Edward Luttwak, in his inside-the-Beltway-best-seller, *The Pentagon and the Art of War*. Another took the form of legislation initiated by Rep. Ike Skelton, which seeks to abolish the JCS and create a "single Chief of Staff for the National Command Authorities," still another was in the form of a staff report of the Senate Armed Services Committee, *Defense Organization: The Need for Change*. The general purpose or goal, in the words of Representative Skelton, is to remove "the built-in conflict between service interests and joint interests," which currently forces the JCS to "serve two masters."²²

A second approach is recommended by two recent think tank studies: the report of the "Defense Organization Project" of Georgetown University's Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS); and the "Defense Assessment Project" of the Heritage Foundation. It has taken legislative form in a bill offered last year by Rep. Bill Nichols. This approach seeks to address the problem succinctly identified by Rep. Les Aspin, Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee: "The Chairman of the JCS is a eunuch." In Aspin's view, the JCS is "a bureaucracy that can't make decisions" and are forever ". . . bogged down in the need for unanimity." As a result, says former Defense Secretary James Schlesinger, the advice

*This section of the article is based substantially on Mackubin Thomas Owens, "The Hollow Promise of JCS Reform," *International Security*, Winter 1985-86, pp. 98-111.

proffered by the JCS "is generally irrelevant, normally unread, and almost always disregarded."²³

The current structure of the Department of Defense and the JCS has arisen from the interaction among: political institutions based on the constitutional separation of powers; Service institutions and traditions; the exigencies of the international environment; assumptions about the role of the United States in that environment; the quality of leadership at different times within the executive and legislative branches and within the military; and the imperatives of organizational theory. The complaints of Representative Skelton about the present system are typical of those who assess the JCS with no regard for the political institutions of the nation. At the close of World War II, he says, President Truman and General Marshall wanted a truly unified Department of Defense. "But resistance, particularly by the Navy, led to compromises. Many of the structural flaws in today's Joint Chiefs of Staff system stem from these compromises, which had the effect of preserving autonomy for the individual services."²⁴

Of course Representative Skelton is correct, but he seems to miss the point. His complaints amount to an attempt to wish away the American political system which, after all, frequently results in compromise. Representative Skelton seems also to ignore the substantial role of his own body, the U.S. Congress, in insuring that the Truman-Marshall defense organization plan was soundly defeated. The point that the good Congressman misses is that any reform proposal must take account of the factors mentioned above. Representative Skelton's attitude, to ignore them, is indicative of the tendency among so many reformers. As Upton discovered, policy cannot be made without regard to the American political environment.

JCS Reform in the Light of American Strategic Culture. Although it has not been comprehensively presented, there is a persuasive case against the proposal to reorganize the JCS. This case takes account of political and strategic realities in a way that the reformers do not. To begin with, the proposed reforms are simply at odds with the character of American political institutions and traditions. There is a strong antimilitarist strain in the American experience, and whether correctly or not, a central military staff is perceived as an instrument of militarism. Secondly, proposals for JCS reform are based upon the questionable assumption that the major obstacle to sound military planning and execution is interservice rivalry and not the lack of civilian-military interagency coordination within the executive branch. Finally, reform proposals depend upon a further questionable assumption: that a Chairman with enhanced powers, or a "purple suit" national general staff, or central military staff will provide higher quality advice than is presently available. That the advice would be different, there can be little doubt. But would it be better? As Adm. James Holloway, former Chief of Naval

Operations and a critic of JCS reform, has remarked, bad advice is frequently a euphemism for not providing the desired answer.²⁵

In many respects the JCS face a double jeopardy: on the one hand, too much is expected of the JCS; on the other, the organization is blamed for decisions it had no part in making. The advocates of JCS reform simply need to make a more persuasive case than they have to date, i.e., would their reforms produce a more effective system, and would the costs, seen and unseen, outweigh the advertised benefits.

The first objection to JCS reorganization is a political-ideological one. The proposed reforms that place the JCS in the chain of command (as all except the CSIS study do) affect civilian control of the military. Advocates of JCS reform usually ridicule this concern, but the issue of civilian control of the military has been of constant concern throughout the history of the Republic.

By strengthening the Chairman (or creating a Chief of a national general staff) and placing him in the chain of command, reformers would give more power to a single U.S. military officer than has ever been given before. In addition, the attempt to place the CJCS in the chain of command confuses the necessary distinction between staff and line officers, and gives the Chairman and his supporting staff command authority without the commensurate *responsibility*. This is not a trivial matter, as John Kester, an advocate of JCS reform who nonetheless strenuously objects to the proposal to place the CJCS in the chain of command, understands very well. As he recently observed: "The premise of our free government, going right back to the 1787 Constitutional Convention, has been that our government institutions should be set up, not for the ideal people we may be blessed with at the moment, but for the distant and dimly foreseeable future—and for officials who are less than perfect, or careless, or even at times overly ambitious, or even unscrupulous."²⁶ (Anyone who wants to know why thoughtful individuals are loathe to provide an instrument that might be abused by a military man less than committed to a civilian government would do well to reread *Federalist* #51.)

The second political-ideological objection to JCS reorganization is that it creates incentives for bureaucratic warfare within the military that make the shortcomings of the present system look minor indeed. Bill Lind claims that the existing "bureaucratic model" establishes incentives for an individual in an organization to focus his attention and resources on his own "career success" at the expense of the organization's "external goals and purposes."²⁷ There is nothing in any of the proposed reforms that would, in and of themselves, modify existing bureaucratic incentives. However, things could be made worse.

Consider the sort of qualities an individually powerful Chairman would be likely to have. Would he not tend to derive more from conspiracy and intrigue than from leadership and command? And what of politicization? Would not an independently powerful Chairman have great incentive to be a

lapdog for a President or Secretary of Defense and to voice support for egregious policies in order to enhance his position? To give the Chairman power independent of the corporate JCS seems to invite the extremes in a way the present system does not—to increase the threat to civilian control of the military on the one hand; or to render the highest ranking American military officer a political toady. The two possibilities are not so much contradictory as complementary.

The advocates of reform must be aware that the political-ideological objections to JCS reorganization are serious and represent a real threat to the subordination of the military to civilian control. But they are not the most important reasons for resisting reform. More significant in the long run are the strategic-military objections to JCS reform.

As suggested earlier, JCS reorganization is predicated upon the claim that interservice rivalry is the root cause of most defense problems. It is the pervasive influence of the separate Services, claim the reformers, that renders the corporate JCS powerless. Since the members of the JCS are also spokesmen for their Services, no Service chief will allow any plan to go forward at the expense of his own Service. As a result, the advice provided by the corporate JCS is of little use to those who need it most. Thus, claim the reformers, a more powerful Chairman is needed in order to improve military advice.

But advocates of a strengthened CJCS have not made the case that the advice of a single officer will be superior to that of the corporate JCS. Given the geopolitical conditions faced by the United States, the variety of strategic opinions produced by the corporated JCS is a strength, not a weakness. To strengthen the Chairman in the interest of curbing interservice rivalry is to merely ensure that a *single* strategic view will be imposed upon policymakers. This would be at the expense of the corporate JCS' diverse and broad perspective on strategic and operational matters, and on service conditions and capabilities.

Interservice rivalry has the beneficial effect of spurring innovation in defense policy and in the development of doctrine and equipment in support of a strategic or tactical approach that may seem irrelevant at the time. When a single strategic view is forced upon a nation's policymakers, flexibility and adaptability to changing circumstances may suffer. A case in point is the recent Falklands crisis. According to Michael Hobkirk, a retired U.K. Ministry of Defense official and author of *The Politics of Defense Budgeting*, "the 1982 Defense Review planned to dispense with much of the specialized ships and equipment which proved so vital for landing on the islands. British Forces would probably have been unable to recapture them if the Argentine attack had been delayed for some five years or so, until these items had disappeared from the inventory."²⁸

Likewise, the major geopolitical challenge faced by the United States is to be able to respond to a variety of potential threats. The indeterminate nature

of the threat requires that the United States maintain a wide variety of forces (general-purpose forces) able to respond to a variety of contingencies, and is the reason that a single strategic view imposed by a general staff is inapplicable to the United States.

A military staff headed by an independently powerful Chairman has worked primarily in the case of landpowers facing the threat of invasion by other landpowers. In such cases there has been a dominant service within the affected nation's military establishment—the Army. The examples favored by the advocates of JCS reform—Germany/Prussia, the Soviet Union, and Israel—clearly fall into this category.

And even when it is recognized that powerful military staffs have historically been most effective in those cases involving landpowers with dominant armies, the question of strategic competence remains an open one, often placing the reformers in a contradictory position. When their opponents charge that, e.g., the German General Staff provided disastrous strategic advice during the two world wars, or that the Israeli defense staff was not able to avoid the recent debacle in Lebanon, the reformers reply that it was not the function of these staffs to provide strategic advice. They were instead to plan and execute at the operational and tactical levels of war. Yet in the same breath, the reformers criticize the JCS for its inability to formulate strategy and claim that a more powerful chairman or strengthened staff will rectify this deficiency.

The most important point to be made is that the United States must plan to respond to crises around the globe. The United States is a seapower, but its primary adversary is an ambitious landpower which has been able to combine totalitarian ideology and military power in a way only dreamed of by ancient tyrants. At the same time, the great landpower has turned its attention to the sea and has made progress against the periphery of the Western defense area, attempting to outflank the West which has concentrated most of its landpower on the Central Front of Europe. How should the United States respond? By emphasizing or deemphasizing its contribution to the Central Front?

Although seldom mentioned, *this* is the centerpiece of the debate over the JCS. It is the reason that, from the beginning of the debate in 1942 until the present, the Army and the Air Force have generally favored a national defense staff approach, or at least a strengthened chief, and the Naval Services have opposed it. Supporters of the JCS reorganization have generally been advocates of what Samuel Huntington has called "strategic monism," with the opponents being defenders of "strategic pluralism." The former places primary reliance on a single strategic concept, weapon or service, or region. In the words of Gordon W. Keiser, strategic monism "presupposes an ability to predict and control the actions of possible enemies." Strategic pluralism on the other hand "calls for a wide variety of military forces (or services) and weapons to meet a diversity of potential threats."²⁹

In practice, strategic monism has lately manifested itself as an emphasis on NATO's Central Front at the expense of regional defense or U.S. interests in the Third World. Since the Army is the service primarily concerned with the defense of the Central Front, the budgetary consequence of adhering to a policy of strategic monism would be to reallocate resources away from the naval services and to the Army. It is no accident that most of the individuals who favor a concentration of military resources on the Central Front and who criticize the direction of the Navy's recent buildup, writers such as Robert Komer and Edward Luttwak, are also the most outspoken supporters of JCS reform, critics who complain of the inability of the JCS to provide good advice.³⁰

In fact, what many of the reformers object to is the fact that there is presently no one officer on the JCS empowered to tell the President what these reformers think he should hear: that resources should be shifted away from the Navy and allocated to the conventional defense of Western Europe. They support a strengthened Chief in the apparent belief that he would share their view that the heart of American military interest abroad lies in the Central Front of Europe. Perhaps this explains why, in the words of James Woolsey, "the Navy has historically been the most skeptical service of unifying moves in the U.S. defense structure."³¹

There should be no argument that the defense of Europe is critical to the survival of the West and that it is a strategic imperative for the United States to prevent the domination of Europe by the most powerful nation of Eurasia. But the advantage of strategic pluralism as manifest in the advice of the corporate JCS is that it suggests ways that the United States can defend Europe other than concentrating resources on the Central Front. An emphasis on using U.S. resources to deal with areas of interest to Europe, but which lie outside of Europe suggests itself. Jeffrey Record, who has offered the most coherent defense of this approach calls for "a transatlantic division of labor" in which the United States would tap its comparative advantage in providing naval and expeditionary "balanced" forces to deal with contingencies outside of Europe, while the Europeans would exploit their geographical and logistical advantages by providing heavy formations to defend the Central Front.³² It is a variation of this approach (maritime superiority and balanced forces in pursuit of strategic pluralism) that has prevailed during the current Administration over the strategic monism (emphasis on NATO, deemphasis of U.S. regional objectives) of the Carter administration.

Thus the debate over the reform of the JCS reflects a deeper debate over strategic doctrine. The pro-reform group has as its hidden agenda an emphasis on Europe and on the land forces to defend the Central Front. Reformers want a powerful military advocate for their own position, and hence criticize the advice of the corporate JCS because it does not. Antireform opinion generally supports the maintenance of a variety of balanced forces which can be called upon to deal with a diverse range of contingencies.

A Better Approach. To oppose JCS reorganization is not necessarily to oppose other reforms. There is much of value in both the CSIS and Heritage studies, particularly in the area of Defense Acquisition, both in the areas of policies and organizational structure. Unfortunately, the legislative focus remains on the influence of the individual Services on military decisionmaking and advice; thus the tendency to see the JCS as the problem.³³

But the premise upon which JCS reform is based is flawed—interservice rivalry is *not* the root cause of all U.S. defense problems as the reformers assert. A more reasonable explanation for U.S. military failures since the end of World War II is that they are the result of: 1) the confused statutory relationship and unclear functional responsibilities of different parts of the national defense structure; 2) the resulting lack of interagency coordination within the executive branch; and 3) the growth of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) which has usurped more and more traditional military tasks at the expense of the JCS, while civilian expectations about what JCS should do have increased. Indeed, the JCS have been criticized for *not* giving advice that goes beyond military operational expertise and Service interests, and for *not* challenging the right of the President and Congress to make final policy decisions.

The first two problems could be addressed legislatively by amending Titles 50 and 10 of the U.S. Code in order to:

- clarify congressional purpose regarding organizational objectives and fundamental relationships;
- clarify the functions of the NSC regarding its role in developing and implementing U.S. security policy (Title 50);
- clarify the command authority of the President and the Secretary of Defense, and the status of the Secretary as executive agent of the President;
- clarify the functions of Military Departments and the corporate advisory functions of JCS; and
- replace the Armed Forces Policy Board with a Defense Policy Board, with expanded functions in the areas of policy planning integration and resource allocation (Title 10).

Clarifying statutory relationships and functional responsibilities and improving executive branch interagency coordination would solve only part of the problem. Changes in how OSD operates must also be effected. The OSD problem has been addressed very persuasively by Gen. Victor Krulak and Col. Harry Summers, among others. In his 1983 study, *Organization for National Security*, General Krulak charges that: “there has grown up, in the complex called the Office of the Secretary of Defense, a self-nourishing, self-perpetuating bureaucracy which impedes and diffuses the essential war-making functions—strategic planning, decision-making, weapons selection, preparation and execution—to a degree that gravely diminishes the ability of the United States to provide for its security.”³⁴

Col. Harry Summers, author of *On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War*, focuses the problem further: DOD (particularly OSD) has concentrated too much on “preparation for war” rather than the “conduct of war,” to use the Clausewitzian distinction. According to Summers, from Lincoln to Truman, Presidents who prosecuted successful wars divided these functions between an operational military commander, e.g., Ulysses Grant, Tasker Bliss, and George Marshall; and a civilian Secretary of War to oversee administration and logistics, e.g., Edwin Stanton, Newton Baker, and Henry Stimson. Preparation for war was kept separate from and subordinated to the conduct of war. For both Summers and Krulak, the interposition of a civilian Secretary of Defense between the President and the military laid the structural framework for the Vietnam disaster, because of the tendency of a civilian Secretary to concentrate on the quantifiable aspects of war, which in practice means preparation for war, at the expense of actually fighting a war.³⁵

Krulak recommends getting OSD “out of the professional area of war-making, which is the proper province of the JCS” and guaranteeing to the President and Congress “the unfiltered counsel of the nation’s military leaders, as represented in the corporate body of the JCS.” Echoing Summers, General Krulak suggests that the “principal and regularized statutory task” of the Secretary of Defense should be “to make the logistic, fiscal budgetary and administrative side” of national security work and “to carry out his day-in day-out directive and supervisory functions related to the three Military Departments.”³⁶

The issues raised in the JCS reform debate are extremely complex. Anyone who suggests that restructuring the JCS will cure the security problems of the nation is simply irresponsible. As suggested before, the current structure is the result of the interaction of political-ideological, economic, and strategic-military forces that make up American strategic culture. At the heart of the issue is the Constitution of the United States as a reflection of the character of the American people. The Constitution dictates that Congress and the President share responsibility for the defense of the nation. It may very well be the case that in the contemporary international environment, the roles of the Congress and the executive branch, which the founders intended to be complementary, have in many cases become competitive and even conflicting. But to attempt to restructure an agency such as the JCS, which arose out of the strategic culture of the United States, threatens to create new problems without really solving the old ones.

Notes

1. See e.g., U.S. Congress, Senate Armed Services Committee, 1st Session, 99th Congress, *Defense Organization: The Need for Change* (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1985). Hereafter S. Prt. 99-86. For a summary of this report, as well as the text of floor statements by Senators Nunn and Goldwater, see the

Armed Forces Journal "Extra" of October 1985. The most comprehensive hearings to date are found in U.S. Congress, Armed Services Committee of the House of Representatives, 2nd Session, 97th Congress, *Reorganization Proposals for the Joint Chiefs of Staff* (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1982). Hereafter HASC No. 97-47; U.S. Congress, Armed Services Committee of the House of Representatives, 1st Session, 98th Congress, *Reorganization Proposals for the Joint Chiefs of Staff* (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1983). Hereafter HASC No. 98-8; and U.S. Congress, Armed Services Committee of the United States Senate, 1st Session, 98th Congress, *Organization, Structure and Decisionmaking Procedures of the Department of Defense* (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1983-84). Hereafter S. Hrg. 98-375.

2. On "strategic culture" see Colin S. Gray, "National Style in Strategy: The American Example," *International Security*, Fall 1981, pp. 21-47; Gray, "Comparative Strategic Culture," *Parameters*, Winter 1984, pp. 26-33; Ken Booth, *Strategy and Ethnocentrism* (London: Crooms, Helm, 1973); Carnes Lord, "American Strategic Culture," *Comparative Strategy*, forthcoming 1985.

3. Allan R. Millett and Peter Maslowski, *For the Common Defense: A Military History of the United States of America* (New York: The Free Press, 1984), pp. xi-xii.

4. *Ibid.*, p. 258.

5. Lord; Jack Snyder, *The Soviet Strategic Culture* (Santa Monica: RAND, 1977), p. v.; Gray, "National Style in Strategy," p. 22.

6. Lord identifies six factors, but two of his "military culture and history" and "civil-military relationships" seem derivative from "political culture and ideology."

7. Washington's Farewell Address of 1796, in Henry Steele Commager, ed., *Documents of American History*, 7th ed. (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1963), p. 174.

8. Cited in Stuart C. Gilman, "Philosophical Challenges and Historical Ironies," *The Bureaucrat*, Spring 1985, p. 8.

9. James E. Cooke, ed., *The Federalist* (Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press, 1961), No. 41, p. 270.

10. John Taylor, *An Inquiry into the Principles and Policy of the Government of the United States* (1814) (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950), p. 175.

11. Harry Summers, *On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War* (Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1982).

12. Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. and trans. by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), Book VIII, Ch. 8, pp. 583, 589-591.

13. *The Federalist*, No. 24, p. 153.

14. *The Federalist*, No. 69, p. 465.

15. Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957), p. 177.

16. *Ibid.*, p. 179.

17. *Ibid.*, p. 402.

18. Millett and Maslowski, p. xii.

19. Huntington, p. 3.

20. A representative critique is that of John Kester, "The Future of the Joint Chiefs of Staff," *AEI Foreign Policy and Defense Review*, February 1980, pp. 2-23. Also see Samuel Huntington, *The Common Defense* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961), pp. 162-166.

21. Harold Brown, "U.S. Military Leadership Needs Reform," *Long Island Newsday*, 14 April 1985, p. 1.

22. Edward Luttwak, *The Pentagon and the Art of War* (New York: Simon and Schuster/Institute for Contemporary Studies, 1984). Representative Skelton's first bill was HR 2560, introduced during the first session of the 98th Congress. It was reintroduced on 22 April 1985 during the first session of the 99th Congress as HR 2314. His comments are found in his testimony before the Investigations Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee, 14 June 1983. HASC No. 98-8, p. 51. For the Senate Armed Services Committee version see S. Prt. 99-86, pp. 139-274.

23. CSIS *Final Report*; "Defense Assessment" in Butler et al., *Mandate for Leadership II* (Washington, D.C.: The Heritage Foundation, 1984), pp. 431-448; James Schlesinger, "Reorganizing the Joint Chiefs," *The Wall Street Journal*, 8 February 1984, p. 32; Michael Ganley, "Hill Again Promises JCS, DoD Reform, But Timing for Legislation is Unclear," *Armed Forces Journal*, May 1985, p. 12.

24. HASC No. 98-8, pp. 49-50.

25. James Holloway, "The Quality of Military Advice," *AEI Foreign Policy and Defense Review*, February 1980, p. 26.

26. John Kester, "Thoughtless JCS Change is Worse than None," *Armed Forces Journal*, November 1984, p. 115.

27. Bill Lind, "De Fidelitate," *Marine Corps Gazette*, December 1984, pp. 11-12.

28. Michael Hobkirk, "The Hesletine Reorganization of Defense: Kill or Cure," *RUSI Journal*, March 1985, p. 46.

29. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, pp. 400, 418-427; Gordon W. Keiser, *The U.S. Marine Corps and Defense Unification, 1944-47: The Politics of Survival* (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1982), pp. 121-122.

30. See in particular, Luttwak, pp. 258-265; and Robert W. Komer, *Maritime Strategy or Coalition Defense?* (Cambridge, Mass.: ABT Books, 1984).

31. S. Hrg. 98-375, Part 6, p. 257.

32. Jeffrey Record, *Revising U.S. Military Strategy: Tailoring Means to Ends* (Washington, D.C.: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1984).

33. For a critique of Congress in the defense debate, see Mackubin Thomas Owens, "Congress' Role in Defense Mismanagement," *Armed Forces Journal*, April 1985, pp. 92-96.

34. Victor Krulak, *Organization for National Security* (Washington, D.C.: United States Strategic Institute, 1983), p. 131.

35. Harry Summers, "How We Lost," *The New Republic*, 29 April 1985, p. 21.

36. Krulak, pp. 114, 117.



Twelfth Military History Symposium United States Air Force Academy 1-3 October 1986

The Soviet Union's rise as a military superpower ranks among the leading events in recent global history. The seeds for Soviet military capabilities existed before the twentieth century in continental resources, in the experience of a centuries old imperial state, and in well established military traditions and institutions. Understanding the changes which led to the transformation of the Russian Empire into a military superpower will lead to a deeper, more accurate view of the Soviet Union and to a fuller appreciation of Soviet military power today.

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Realistic Self-Deterrence: An Alternative View of Nuclear Dynamics

Donald M. Snow

Since the dawn of the nuclear age, and especially since nuclear weaponry was wedded to ballistic means of delivery across intercontinental ranges, a major (some would agree *the* major) goal has been the avoidance of strategic nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union. The effort to attain this goal has spawned the quasi-academic study of nuclear deterrence and the more practical policy debate over how best to guard against the nuclear threat to national existence.

In the United States, the result has been a multilevel strategic debate over declaratory, developmental and deployment, and employment strategies¹ to maintain the deterrent condition. This debate has centered on the questions of what threats dissuade our opponents from initiating nuclear hostilities, what weapons and arsenal characteristics are necessary to make those threats lively and credible, and how we should be prepared to fight and terminate hostilities to our maximum advantage or minimum disadvantage (which, if convincing, should contribute to the desired deterrence).

The most basic underlying assumption of this entire debate, especially but not exclusively at the level of declaratory strategy, is the need for threats to the adversary in the absence of which he would or at least might start nuclear war, the condition to be deterred. In other words, the major object of deterrence is the presumed hostile *intention* of the adversary, and the dynamic is to dissuade the opponent from activating that hostile intention.

One can see this in the entire debate over deterrence strategies. In the American debate, the basic question has been what kinds of threats are most dissuasive to the Soviets: retaliatory threats to wreak maximum death, destruction, and havoc (assured destruction) or threats to cancel out any projected Soviet gains through measured and proportional responses across

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the spectrum of possible provocation (limited nuclear options or countervailance). From the Soviet side, they maintain that "imperialism will unleash a world nuclear war against the Soviet Union unless prevented by the might of the Soviet Armed Forces"² and that it is Western knowledge of certain defeat at the hands of these forces that provides the motor of deterrence.

What if these formulations are simply wrong or, more precisely, irrelevant? The Soviets, after all, have been consistently derisive of both assured destruction and limited options, describing MAD as second-rate doctrine and expressing the opinion that nuclear war once started was highly unlikely to remain limited.³ If these representations reflect real Soviet thinking on American strategy, can one convincingly argue that the threats flowing from those strategies convincingly will deter the Soviets? Similarly, Americans dismiss the Soviet strategy as little more than an excuse to continue procurement processes, since the United States harbors no aggressive intentions that require deterring.

If American threats do not deter the Soviets and Soviet threats do not alter American intentions, then who is deterring whom? The question must be raised, because important decisions about policies, weapons decisions and even the fate of mankind rest on the answer. Beclouded by the frenzy and occasional hysteria of the debate in which it occurs, the answer may be simpler and more straightforward than is generally advertised: Rather than the United States deterring the Soviet Union from crossing the nuclear threshold or vice versa, *it may be instead that the United States and the U.S.S.R. are deterring themselves.* The principal dynamic of nuclear war avoidance may be calculated and realistic self-deterrence (hereafter realistic self-deterrence or RSD) by the superpowers.

This formulation should not be surprising. Particularly as nuclear arsenals have grown, it has become increasingly evident that, as one observer puts it, "One of the few common goals the West and the Soviets share is the avoidance of a nuclear war."⁴ The glue that bonds is the possession of nuclear capability, because "nuclear weapons create an uncommon interest between the two adversaries. Their fates are linked together—or the fate of each is in the hands of the other—in a way that was never true in the past."⁵ Caught in the nuclear embrace, the two sides have developed such a strong mutual interest in nuclear war avoidance that they both seek to avoid and defuse situations that could lead to nuclear war. The result, especially evident in the past decade or so—remarkably given the occupancy both of the White House and the Kremlin by four different men and cool relations between the two capitals during most of the period—has been a gradual stabilization of relations to lessen the prospects of "a sociopolitical disaster of immense proportions."⁶ This perceived need to avoid nuclear war has in turn made the likelihood of that war "extremely low."⁷

Realization of the need for realistic self-deterrence is recognized publicly by leaders in both countries. President Reagan, in a 16 January 1984 address, said "we should always remember that we do have common interests. And the foremost among them is to avoid war and reduce the level of arms."⁸ Reflecting the same sentiments and using some of the same words, Secretary of State George Shultz has stated that "we have a fundamental common interest in the avoidance of war. This common interest impels us to work toward a relationship between our nations that can lead to a safer world for all mankind."⁹

Although originating in Nikita S. Khrushchev's famous 1956 "peaceful coexistence" speech to the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU, official Soviet emphasis on the need to avoid nuclear war gained special momentum during the rule of Leonid Brezhnev. He argued the cataclysmic affects of nuclear war repeatedly, in statements such as, "only he who has decided to commit suicide can start a nuclear war in the hope of emerging victorious from it"¹⁰ and ascribing to nuclear arsenals the ability to "destroy every living thing on earth several times."¹¹ Another group of Soviet commentators intone the official public position in Clausewitzian language: "As regards the socialist community countries they unconditionally reject all variants of a nuclear war as a means of attaining socialism's political aims. *Nuclear war is not a continuation of socialist policy . . . Nuclear war cannot be permitted.*"¹² Before his banishment (and subsequent reinstatement to favor), no less a hard-line military figure than Marshall Ogarkov stated the official line that the Soviets have no intention of initiating nuclear war: "Soviet military strategy views a future world war, *if the imperialists manage to unleash it*, as a decisive clash . . ." (Emphasis added.)¹³

One may initially be tempted to dismiss the statements of Soviet (or for that matter American) leaders as propagandistic and politically motivated. The notion of nuclear war avoidance as a central tenet of Soviet policy does not comport neatly with the vaunted Soviet nuclear "war-winning" strategy.¹⁴ The main argument being made here is that the major reason realistic self-deterrence operates to create a stable nuclear relationship is that the first foreign policy priority of *both* the United States and the Soviet Union is the avoidance of nuclear war with the other. Whether one calls the policy Leninist peaceful coexistence, détente or whatever, it is the premier policy goal to which all other aims are subservient.

With regard to the Soviet Union, this assertion flies in the face of conventional deterrence wisdom because it denies a Soviet intention to commit nuclear aggression that needs deterring. At first blush, the suggestion may indeed seem radical and even disingenuous if taken out of context. Yet, there are at least three sorts of evidence that can be used to support the contention.

The first is that this interpretation has substantial support within the expert community that analyzes Soviet policy. The consensus of that opinion is that:

“The Soviets assign the highest priority to the deterrence of nuclear war.”¹⁵ This assertion arises not from any naive sense of Soviet benevolence, but rather their assessment of the consequences of “that very devastating exchange which both they and the United States seek to avoid.”¹⁶ Moreover, adoption of RSD does not represent any particular moderation of Soviet goals, which remain constant: “The Kremlin leaders do not want war; they want the world. They believe it unlikely, however, that the West will let them have the world without a fight.”¹⁷ Moreover, the abandonment of nuclear war as a policy alternative neither argues that the Soviets “reject the notion of nuclear superiority, or at least the appearance of superiority . . . [as yielding] tangible political benefits”¹⁸ nor that they “regard nuclear war as impossible.”¹⁹ Nuclear war, not nuclear weapons possession per se, may have lost its utility, but the Soviet-American relationship remains competitive and conflictual within those bounds.

The second basis for the assertion is a reading of Soviet-American relations and particularly the pattern of conflict and confrontations between them. Viewing the broad sweep of the postwar period, it is possible to discern two fairly distinct phases. The first spanned roughly the quarter century after 1945 and was marked by fairly frequent confrontations with escalatory potential over such problems and places as Berlin, Cuba and the Middle East. In the last 15 years or so, and especially since the Yom Kippur War of 1973, these confrontations have essentially ceased occurring, even though the opportunities to confront one another have certainly not disappeared (e.g. Afghanistan, the Persian Gulf). It is not coincidental that this period has coincided with the Soviet achievement of nuclear equality with the United States and also apparently reflects a reevaluation of that balance as well: “In the fifth phases (1971-1984), the Soviets recognized that assured destruction of Soviet society would result from fighting an all-out nuclear war.”²⁰ That these changes have occurred is all the more remarkable in a period when Soviet-American relations generally deteriorated (under Carter, culminating with the various sanctions imposed after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan) to the point that exchange between top leaders underwent a four-year suspension (the first Reagan term).

The third and final basis is Soviet profession. Recognizing the rejoinder stated above that leadership statements may have many purposes, including deception and manipulation, the Soviets have been quite consistent in stating their position on nuclear war. “Soviet political and military commentators have repeatedly acknowledged the catastrophic consequences of general nuclear war and are certain to support its avoidance.”²¹ Consistency and honesty are not the same thing, of course, so that one can place varying amounts of weight on Soviet pronouncement. Nonetheless, the Soviets’ very consistency cannot be dismissed entirely out of hand.

If the absence of intention to initiate nuclear war lies at the heart of U.S. and Soviet foreign policies and acts to create RSD as a principal consequence, the question is why is this the case? This situation and the consequent stability that it has produced in U.S.-Soviet relations, after all, flies in the face of early (and even contemporary) warnings about the inherent instability and delicacy of the balance of terror. As one observer puts it, "The superpower leaders and their allies in Europe have been more cautious than early theories of nuclear behavior predicted."²²

There is remarkable agreement within the recent literature about the absence of American or (particularly) Soviet intent to start nuclear war and why this is the case, even though the analysis is not carried through to its realistic self-deterrence conclusion. The basic dynamic that creates the situation is the recognition of "the objective reality of assured destruction in an all-out nuclear war," which has "led to important modifications in Soviet military and diplomatic strategy."²³ As a result of this realization, "the Soviets are likely to be self-deterred," because they realize fighting a nuclear war will bring "the destruction of both societies," meaning that "the chances of war between the United States and the U.S.S.R. are very slight."²⁴

Different analysts label this cause of RSD differently. McGeorge Bundy, for instance, has called it "existential deterrence."²⁵ Allison, Carnesale, and Nye, in a recent book, refer to the crystal ball effect, by which they mean that "the unprecedented damage nuclear weapons can do has produced an unprecedented prudence."²⁶

Analysts who make this point are very quick to make a distinction between assured destruction as the likely outcome of nuclear war and as a consciously followed strategy. As Jervis puts it, "MAD as a fact is more important than MAD as a policy. The latter is in the realm of choice, the former is not."²⁷ Stating this a slightly different way, Knorr maintains, "Even though the superpowers do not follow deterrent strategies of Mutual Assured Destruction, mutual destruction is very likely to describe the consequences of substantial nuclear hostilities between them."²⁸

In the case of most observers, there is a conscious desire to point out that, although assured destruction may be the factual outcome of an exchange, it is not a desirable strategic policy alternative. One group of analysts says that MAD "represents a condition, not an objective This condition exists today and is likely to persist for the foreseeable future. But MAD is not an objective of American policy. Its 'mutuality' is unattractive to most American policymakers (and presumably to Soviets as well)."²⁹ The assured destruction outcome is not only a likelihood, it is a regrettable if determined likely outcome of nuclear exchange that should not be confused as policy advocacy. Rather, the danger is in equating the condition and the policy advocacy, which has the effect of creating a "mountain of confusion The

mountain is the conclusion that this is the way we *should* design and plan the use of nuclear weapons."³⁰

What this suggests is that the motive force underlying Soviet and American determination to avoid nuclear war is a fear of its probable consequences. These consequences include the very real likelihood that any nuclear conflict, once initiated, would escalate to a general level with results as unacceptable as those associated with assured destruction, or worse yet, the nuclear winter. Moreover, this possibility is the result of a technologically, and not politically or strategically, driven condition of mutual societal vulnerability to attack against which there is no effective defensive means of mitigating the disaster once it begins to unfold. The only way to avoid the disaster is to avoid letting the process begin, in other words, deterrence.

This admittedly sounds a great deal like assured destruction (AD) thought, but here the distinction between AD as condition and as policy becomes critical. The basic contention here is that it is the assessment of AD as the likely outcome of any nuclear engagement, *regardless of the deterrence strategies either side articulates in advance of that engagement*, that dissuades both sides from nuclear fantasies and which forces them to adopt nuclear war avoidance as their first foreign policy priority. Neither the MAD threat nor the countervailing strategy deter Soviet aggression against the United States any more than Soviet threats to prevail in nuclear war deter a U.S. aggression. What deters nuclear war is the mutual (or for that matter independently arrived at) conclusion by the superpowers that the result of such a conflict would be devastating beyond any sensible conceivable purpose or gain. Because of that realistic assessment, each superpower deters itself from initiating nuclear war. The result is a system of mutual deterrence which has evolved.

This matter may be put a slightly different way. One of the earlier observations was that the stability of the system, at least as measured in terms of dangerous (i.e., likely to escalate) confrontations, has become tranquil since the early 1970s, when arsenals reached something resembling their deadly equivalence. Mutual vulnerability exists within a rough symmetry of deadly consequences, but the realization has redoubled the determination that war's consequences are unacceptable and that war's deadliness means it must be avoided. As the nuclear balance has become more deadly, both sides have worked to make it less dangerous. Realistic self-deterrence has been the tool to reduce that danger.

If this assessment of the dynamics of deterrence is accepted, it has some strong implications for the nuclear debate. The entire debate over what kinds of threats best deter—that long debate over assured destruction and limited options, countervalue and counterforce targeting begun nearly 40 years ago in Brodie's famous³¹ and Borden's obscure³² treatises published in 1946—takes on a different and more academic quality. The questions about Soviet and

American motivations and things such as weapons procurements, employment strategies and the like are altered as well.

What is remarkable about the system of war avoidance created by realistic self-deterrence is how well it is working and has worked. Some gloomy prognostications and fears from the political left notwithstanding, the current system exhibits considerable stability. The important question thus becomes how does one work to reinforce the set of perceptions on which realistic self-deterrence rests and to avoid its failure. Put negatively, what could cause the resulting system of stable deterrence to fail, and what can be done to avoid that happening?

The Conditions for RSD. The entire postwar U.S.-U.S.S.R. relationship has, in geopolitical terms, always had at least a slightly surreal image about it. Certainly, what have emerged as the dominant military powers on the globe differ in terms of political ideology and their views of a favorable world order, neither of which are inconsequential. At the same time, the two are not historic enemies with long traditions of animosity. The two clashed briefly during the Russian Civil War immediately after World War I, but otherwise relations have been cordial, or at worst neutral. The result is the absence of deep cultural animosities between the American and Russian people that could fuel the righteous fires of genocide. The passions that could inspire mutual annihilation are simply not there as might be the case in Soviet relations with some of her neighbors with whom there is a shared hatred. Rather, "it is perhaps fortunate that the U.S. and the Soviet Union are the ones to lay down precedents for dealing with the nuclear dilemma. It would be difficult to think of two great powers with less to fight about."³³

This observation, if accepted, means one can include the absence of atavistic passion to the list of disincentives for initiating superpower nuclear hostilities (a qualification one might not make so readily if, say, Germany and the Soviet Union were the principal nuclear antagonists). Rather, the keys to maintaining nuclear war avoidance under the current regime of RSD appear to be more mechanical, dispassionate and geopolitical.

If fear of the consequences of nuclear war triggers inhibitions and removes calculated intention from the realm of factors that could cause deterrence to fail, then one is left with two categories of factors that could lead to nuclear war. The first of these is nuclear war through inadvertence, where hostilities began without or even despite either side intending them to commence. The second category would be through the determination by one or both sides that the consequences of nuclear exchange were no longer unacceptable, such that there was not continuing need to feel self-deterred.

The first category, war by inadvertence, would most likely occur as the result of political causes. RSD posits that nuclear war would not occur unexpectedly as the result of either side planning or executing something such

as a surprise attack. Instead, such an outbreak would likely be the result of events getting out of hand, a crisis degenerating because of either third party (e.g., Middle Eastern-inspired) or direct superpower confrontation (e.g., a renewed Berlin crisis).

The solution, or at least a way of dealing with this sort of problem, is the creation of a political climate minimizing the prospects that a political crisis could inadvertently degenerate out of control, "a structure of political understanding and formalized restraint."³⁴ The purpose of this structure is dual: *crisis prevention* in the sense of defusing international differences and conflicts short of the level of confrontation and crisis; and *crisis management*³⁵ through a "structure [of] greater crisis stability with the goal of preventing war in crisis situations."³⁶ Crisis prevention, in other words, seeks to keep crises from occurring in the first place; crisis management seeks to defuse those crises that cannot be avoided altogether at the lowest and least dangerous levels of confrontation and escalatory potential.

The second category, *perceptual changes*, is more weapons balance and technological in character. The reasons for the inhibitions against nuclear usage are inbedded, at worst, in hard-headed assessments and comparisons of arsenal characteristics. The conclusions of such calculations are that the outcome of initiating nuclear attack under any circumstances would be unacceptable for the initiator in the final outcome, or at least that there is sufficiently great uncertainty about avoiding an unsuccessful outcome as to make the risk too great.

The problem here is to avoid either side from changing its perceptions. The key element is to maintain the perception either of the certainty of ultimate failure or dissuading uncertainty of probable success, because the "Soviet Union . . . ought to be deterred from attack given the massive penalties for even a slight failure."³⁷ Maintenance of such perceptions requires avoiding a change in either the quantitative or qualitative weapons balance such that one or both sides could conclude it possessed such advantages that it could avoid the unacceptable consequences of nuclear exchange.

These requirements for maintaining RSD are hardly radical. Crisis avoidance and management are similar in concept to the AD requirement for crisis stability (although the latter, since it assumes hostility that needs deterring, is more weapons oriented), and perceptual change avoidance shares conceptual purpose with the AD goal of arms race stability.

Where RSD diverges from more orthodox thought is in the assessment of what brings it about and hence how one maintains it. RSD divorces AD as policy from AD as fact and thus allows freer consideration of system maintenance in two senses. First, it removes the framework of AD vs. LNOs from the discussion, thereby broadening and unstructuring the parameters of discussion. Second, accepting AD simply as a current description of the consequence of nuclear exchange allows discussion of

alternative futures divorced from doctrinal restrictions about the desirability of change.

In this latter sense, the requirements for maintaining RSD can be viewed as an alternative and broader way to think about the future of deterrence less encumbered by orthodox canons. To this end, the discussion moves to a preliminary analysis of each of those requirements.

Crisis Management. If somber calculations during periods of "normal" relations (periods when there are no overt, dangerous sources of confrontation) produce the self-detering condition, then one must ask under what circumstances that judgment might be negated. One possible set of circumstances would be in the evolution of a crisis somewhere in the world where superpower vital interests came into direct conflict and where the evolution of the crisis rendered RSD as less vital than a favorable outcome or, in a more extreme fashion, if the crisis altered preceptions of the unacceptability of nuclear weapons usage. More simply put, the danger is in a crisis that escalates out of hand.

Former Secretary of Defense Schlesinger has looked at the problem of where geographically the escalatory potential is greatest. He suggests, "In the 'grey areas' the risks are low; incursions, subversions, and other pressures may occur without any major impact on the overall balance of power By contrast, a threat to Europe, Japan, or (for different reasons) the Arabian Gulf could start a process without limit."³⁸ This assessment, of course, is unexceptional; Western Europe and Japan have been considered vital to American security interests since the 1940s and former President Carter conferred the same status on the oil-rich littoral areas of the Persian Gulf in that part of his 1980 State of the Union Address that became known as the Carter Doctrine.

If nuclear weapons have produced RSD and general restraint in U.S.-Soviet relations, then the crisis-escalatory prospects are not equally likely in the three regions. Both sides have long understood the escalatory potential in Europe and Japan; and East-West relations have been structured virtually to preclude interbloc actions not authorized by one superpower or the other. West Germany is hardly likely to attack Czechoslovakia or vice versa without superpower agreement, including an assessment that the escalatory risks are somehow acceptable. In the absence of major changes in perceptions about the acceptability of nuclear war, such as assessment is very unlikely.

The real danger lies in situations where the superpowers do not entirely control events. In those circumstances, crises can arise and expand without the superpowers, who normally are supporting contending factions, being able to act decisively to defuse the crisis. The volatile Persian Gulf is such an area, leading Schlesinger to conclude, "only the Middle East region provides this potential for an uncontrolled clash between the Soviet Union and the

United States."³⁹ Some observers would add the Korean peninsula to regions with this potential, and the resurgence of nuclear proliferation adds to the horror of the scenario. "Any use of nuclear weapons by small nations is likely to involve the superpowers and any use of nuclear weapons by the superpowers almost certainly would escalate to all-out exchange."⁴⁰

The danger in a spiraling crisis is that the dynamics of the ongoing situation would alter perceptions of the acceptability of nuclear weapons and reverse judgments fashioned in a less hectic, more analytical environment. The problem is that crises can occur rapidly, condensing decision time and both restricting and distorting information, so that perceptions about what is and is not sensible behavior changes. As Allison, Carnesale and Nye describe this process, "What starts out as rational is likely to become less so over time. And accidents that would not matter much in normal times or early in a crisis may create 'crazy' situations in which choice is so constrained that 'rational' decisions about the least bad alternatives lead to outcomes that would appear insane under normal circumstances."⁴¹ Speaking directly to the distortion of perspective that can occur, Robert S. McNamara suggests "What may look like a reckless gamble in more tranquil times might then be seen merely as a reasonable risk."⁴² The psychological dynamic activating this distortion creation is stress, leading to the most demanding requirement for the system: "deterrence must work under terrible stress as well as in ordinary circumstances . . . [D]eterrence is harder in a crisis."⁴³

The problem with crises is that they contain the potential to loosen the inhibitions and distort the perceptions on which RSD rests. If maintaining RSD is the principal goal that eventuates in the absence of nuclear war, then dealing with superpower crisis situations is priority business. As one looks at the problem more closely, it appears to have two basic imperatives: crisis avoidance where possible, and crisis termination at the earliest and lowest level possible where avoidance proves unattainable. The evidence suggests that superpower relations, implicitly if not always explicitly and often obscured in a fog of hostile and confrontational rhetoric, have been moving in the direction of both these goals.

Crisis avoidance is the process of one or both parties staying out of situations that could lead to crises. The best evidence of this is the movement of negative interactions away from such potentially explosive places as Europe (and especially flashpoints such as Berlin) where mutually vital interests and deep historical animosities are involved to the Third and Fourth Worlds, where interests are more peripheral and where consequently either or both can withdraw before differences can become crises. Bracken concurs, arguing "it may be best to concentrate our energy on *preventing* confrontations, by diplomacy, wise foreign policy, and fostering of a cooperative relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union."⁴⁴ The other problem is crisis termination at the lowest possible level, before a crisis can

develop the intensity to trigger the dynamics by which crises get out of hand. Mechanisms such as the Hot Line are attempts to promote the communications that facilitate crisis termination. The vitality of the entire crisis management mission is underscored by Jervis, who says that "we must pay more attention to convincing the Soviets that, even in an extreme crisis, war is not inevitable."⁴⁵

Changed Perceptions. RSD posits that the perception of unacceptable outcomes after a nuclear exchange is the major reason that neither side contemplates the intentional initiation of nuclear war. Since the result is the desired state of the absence of nuclear war, this is a condition and set of perceptions to be maintained and nurtured. The questions to be asked are: what is there about the current balance that creates the perception? And what could make that perception change to a belief that a nuclear war's consequences would be tolerable?

The key factor is the deadly balance, defined loosely as some form of equilibrium, and there is agreement on this factor on both sides of the Iron Curtain. A quasi-official Soviet pronouncement, for instance, intones, "Where there is a military strategic equilibrium, nuclear weapons will give neither side an advantage: their utilization only threatens to bring about a global catastrophe."⁴⁶ Secretary of State George Shultz agrees with this assessment, stating succinctly, "The nuclear equilibrium has successfully deterred World War III."⁴⁷

The size and lethal characteristics of the two arsenals create this equilibrium of deadly effects such that, for instance, "The most obvious requirement for American nuclear forces is that they provide the unquestioned ability to destroy the Soviet Union even if the Soviets stage a skillful first strike."⁴⁸ Traditionally, the high level of mutually possessed force creates the inhibition. On the one hand, "U.S. and Soviet strategic forces are not in delicate balance over a sharp fulcrum. Instead, they are counterpoised on a broad base of uncertainties that will permit a number of force alternatives on either side without cataclysmic results."⁴⁹ Peripheral changes in the equilibrium, in other words, will not alter perceptions about gain. On the other hand, "an *attacker* will want high confidence of achieving decisive results before deciding on so dangerous a course as the use of nuclear weapons,"⁵⁰ and huge arsenal sizes make such calculations difficult if not impossible.

Large, complex arsenals also enter considerable operational uncertainties into any contemplations of initiating nuclear attack, because such calculations can only be answered positively if one is reasonably certain the consequences will be tolerable. As John Weinstein puts this effect, "the vulnerabilities and uncertainties confronting Soviet leaders and military planners will continue to provide powerful incentives to avoid war with the West."⁵¹ The

philosopher Leon Wieseltier turns this factor around, arguing that it is the absence of certainty that one can succeed that deters: "In fact, deterrence does not require your enemy to believe that you will strike back; it requires only that he not believe you will not. Deterrence, in other words, does not require certainty. Doubt is quite enough."⁵²

The large size of nuclear arsenals, the consequences of their use even after a victim has absorbed an initial attack, and operational uncertainties that frustrate plans to use nuclear weapons profitably have created the basis for RSD. Were the balance of forces between the superpowers stagnant, one could consequently reduce the vigil with which that balance is eyed. The strategic balance, however, is anything but stagnant, and its dynamism requires careful attention to ensure that the balance is not upset intolerably. This creates a particular imperative which Hoffman states specifically in the context of the SDI: "The point of departure ought to be reflection on the motives that might induce Soviet leaders and military planners to contemplate actually using nuclear weapons."⁵³ Guaranteeing that changes in the balance do not encourage altered perceptions about the utility of nuclear weapons employment is a major concern for maintaining RSD.

Conclusion. The central assertion of this paper has been that the avoidance of nuclear war does not derive from the power of declaratory threats that the Soviet Union and the United States make against one another. Rather, it has been asserted that any nuclear aggressive intentions either or both harbor against the other are deactivated by their individual and collective unwillingness to endure their projected estimates of the effects of nuclear war. These somber calculations, which have the effect of inhibiting nuclear war, have been called realistic self-deterrence (RSD).

RSD is simultaneously an orthodox and radical notion. Its orthodoxy derives from a growing consensus among students of superpower relations that each share the avoidance of nuclear war as their first foreign policy priority. Policymaker and analyst alike agree that nuclear war would be unacceptable to both, something akin (at least implicitly) to accepting assured destruction as factual consequence if not as policy preference.

The radicalism of RSD is to extend, possibly beyond the breaking point, that consensus to the conclusion—it is self-deterrence that powers nuclear war avoidance. If one accepts RSD, moreover, unsettling consequences flow, two of which have been discussed. First, acceptance of RSD transforms the debate over limited options (by whatever name) and assured destruction, rendering much of that debate and the subsidiary questions it spawns of questionable relevance. Second, RSD creates an alternative agenda for deterrence maintenance, notably focusing on conflict management and perceptual maintenance as key concepts.

The RSD hypothesis and its implementing criteria have implications in other aspects of the nuclear debate as well. How, for instance, does RSD meld with the growing concern over strategic uncertainty as part of nuclear strategy? Does RSD complement or undercut the conceptual attractiveness of missile defenses, and especially the SDI? The answers to these and other questions await a more detailed and critical analysis of the RSD idea.

Notes

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3. For some greater description, see Donald M. Snow, *Nuclear Strategy in a Dynamic World: American Policy in the 1980s* (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1981), pp. 135-136, and 141-142.
4. John G. Kelliher, "Discussion," in Richard F. Staar, ed., *Arms Control: Myth Versus Reality* (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1984), p. 41.
5. Robert Jervis, *The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy* (Ithaca N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1984), p. 30.
6. Fritz Ermath, "Contrasts in American and Soviet Strategic Thought," reprinted in John F. Reichart and Steven R. Sturm, *American Defense Policy*, 5th ed. (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982), p. 64.
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9. George Shultz, "U.S.-Soviet Relations in the Context of U.S. Foreign Policy," *The Atlantic Community Quarterly*, Fall 1983, p. 202.
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11. Laird and Herspring, p. 20.
12. Gancho Ganev et al., "The Nuclear Threat and Politics," *World Marxist Review*, April 1984, p. 46.
13. Nikolay V. Ogarkov, "Military," in Scott and Scott, p. 246.
14. The classic statement of this position remains Richard Pipes, "Why the Soviet Union Thinks It Can Fight and Win a Nuclear War," *Commentary*, July 1977, pp. 21-34. Jervis rejoins this position, stating "It is not clear that the Soviet doctrine has any relevance to deterrence at all. Instead, it may only be a discussion of what should be done if deterrence fails." See Jervis, p. 108.
15. Edward L. Warner III, "The Defense Policy of the Soviet Union," in Reichart and Sturm, p. 53.
16. Robert Kennedy, "The Changing Strategic Balance and U.S. Defense Planning," in Robert Kennedy and John M. Weinstein, eds., *The Defense of the West: Strategic and European Issues Reappraised* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1984), p. 11.
17. Paul Nitze, "Strategy in the Decade of the 1980s," *Foreign Affairs*, Fall 1980, p. 90.
18. Kennedy, "Changing Strategic Balance," in Kennedy and Weinstein, p. 12.
19. David Holloway, "The Strategic Defense Initiative and the Soviet Union," *Daedalus*, Summer 1985, p. 261.
20. Laird and Herspring, p. 9.
21. Warner, p. 55.
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34. John Steinbruner, "Arms Control: Crisis or Compromise," *Foreign Affairs*, Summer 1985, p. 1049.
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41. "Analytical Conclusions," in Allison, Carnesale, and Nye, p. 214.
42. Robert S. McNamara, "The Military Role of Nuclear Weapons: Perceptions and Misperceptions," *Foreign Affairs*, Fall 1983, p. 73.
43. Jervis, *Illogic*, p. 160.
44. Bracken, p. 49. He also argues crisis management as a major concern, p. 52.
45. Jervis, *Illogic*, p. 15.
46. Ganev et al., p. 42.
47. George Shultz, "A Forward Look at Foreign Policy," *Department of State Bulletin*, December 1984, p. 7.
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50. Hoffman, p. 19.
51. John M. Weinstein, "All Features Grate and Stall: Soviet Strategic Vulnerabilities and the Future of Deterrence," in Kennedy and Weinstein, pp. 42-43.
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Security Assistance Guidelines

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Since the end of World War II, foreign assistance has been a cornerstone in the foundation of U.S. foreign policy. As an element of foreign assistance, security assistance has been used to strengthen the ability of friendly foreign countries to resist aggression. Today, security assistance remains a critical element in a national strategy that seeks to secure important political, economic and military objectives.

Despite those noble goals, security assistance has been one of the most controversial elements of U.S. national security strategy. Arms transfers, as they are popularly called, seem to evoke polarized responses. Partisan rhetoric clouds the air and obscures the issues. Are security assistance programs valid instruments of policy? Which objectives do they support? Under what circumstances should they be used? The following analyzes the elements of security assistance, and offers suggestions that create a framework for application of the program.

The Advocates

Security assistance programs are cited by supporters as essential to the survival and continued security of allies and friendly nations. Advocates can adeptly define the global nature of U.S. national interests, citing chapter and verse of the nature of the threat to those interests. In short, they perceive security assistance as an indispensable element of U.S. foreign policy. To support their assessment, security assistance advocates typically include the following as some of the more compelling rationale in support of their position:

- avoid direct involvement of U.S. forces by providing a credible military capability for a recipient nation;
- strengthen regional and internal stability;

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- promote bilateral relations;
- encourage self-reliance;
- foster cooperative relationships in areas of geostrategic concern, i.e., allow access, basing rights, overflight rights, etc.;
- promote standardization of equipment and foster interoperability;
- preclude influence or coercion by unfriendly nations;
- publicly demonstrate U.S. interest and support;
- ensure access to energy and strategic minerals; and
- strengthen the U.S. industrial and mobilization base.¹

The Critics

Critics of arms transfers are unimpressed by these arguments. In fact, they have a long list of counterarguments. They point to events of the 1970s as a stimulus that removed the lid on global restraint of arms trade. In particular, the oil crisis, with the attempt of nations providing weapons to recapture petro dollars, and the end of the Vietnam war, with the U.S. entry into the arms export market, are singled out as the most significant events. The emerging nations of the Third World were targeted as the terminus of the increased arms exports. Critics blame easy availability of arms for encouraging nations to opt for the military solution to political conflict. Massive instability in the Third World is offered as evidence in support of this thesis. The following is a typical scenario used to illustrate the adverse impact of arms transfers.

In an attempt to maintain an advantage over real or perceived enemies, emerging nations seek increasingly sophisticated weaponry; systems out of proportion to the threat. Modern infrastructure requirements of those systems tend to separate the population from the military, exacerbating what is often an unstable domestic situation. In lieu of agricultural development, capital expenditures on defense "industry" becomes the rule. The critics believe that the military rapidly develops a vested interest in continuing expansion of the defense sector. This phenomenon contributes to continued underdevelopment by draining scarce resources from producers of primary commodities. As social unrest breeds domestic opposition, military governments suppress attempted insurrections. This environment creates an arena for East-West competition. It has been estimated by some sources that 65-75 percent of major arms transfers are from industrialized countries to the Third World.²

Opponents of arms transfers contend that the trend toward global militarization creates obstacles to disarmament and stability. According to the Center for Defense Information, over 40 armed conflicts took place in 1983, involving hostilities on five continents. In their view the "Major military states stretch tentacles of power and tension into distant areas of the

world. Lightning advances in technology make the weapons of today more dangerous to civilians than to the armed forces involved. In developing countries, political processes are increasingly under military control and civil rights are widely violated. Even in industrialized democracies, decisions on military matters appear unresponsive to the public will."³

These divergent views on the effect of arms transfers in general, and security assistance in particular, do little to lift the fog of rhetoric that obscures the basic issue: is security assistance a viable policy tool? Dealing with this issue requires an examination of the evolution of the program together with its contemporary applications.

Background

Contemporary security assistance had its genesis in the early WWII support of Europe through the Lend-Lease Act. As enacted by Congress, the legislation empowered the President to provide arms to those countries whose survival was deemed vital to the defense of the United States. This established a precedent for the transfer of arms as an instrument of national security strategy. Previous sales were uncoordinated and motivated by profit incentives. Peacetime use of security assistance as a legitimate policy instrument is often linked to President Nixon's 1969 declaration at Guam, commonly known as the Nixon Doctrine. The doctrine acknowledged the declining will of the nation to confront ill-defined threats to U.S. security with military force. It did however pledge support of friendly foreign nations to resist aggression through provision of military equipment and training. That intent has been tested repeatedly in the post-Vietnam era.

During the late 1970s, the policies of the Carter administration proved to be an anomaly in the evolution of security assistance. The Carter policy treated arms transfers as an exceptional instrument whose use should be restrained. It placed the burden of proof for need on the recipient. Human rights performance was used as a primary criterion in making the determination on whether to start or continue arms transfers. President Carter viewed the unilateral restraint of the United States as the first step in promoting multilateral cooperation in controlling arms. The Carter approach was severely criticized for being naive and counterproductive. Opponents claimed that Carter's emphasis on human rights compromised vital security interests for peripheral ideological interests.

The Reagan administration's arms transfer policy, announced on 9 July 1981, was a significant departure from that of the Carter administration. The Reagan administration's national security strategy, as articulated in NSDD-32, conceptually embodies the Nixon Doctrine, in that the strategy relies on allies and friendly nations to provide the first line of defense in contingencies not directly involving the Soviet Union. The implications of that strategy are

clear: the United States must ensure that friendly nations have the means to defend themselves. The Reagan policy views conventional arms transfers as an essential element of both foreign policy and U.S. global defense posture. Accordingly, requests for arms will be evaluated “. . . primarily in terms of their net contribution to enhanced deterrence and defense.”⁴ Though arms control is considered important, the Administration points out that it will not jeopardize interests through unilateral initiatives. This approach recognizes that mutual restraint in arms sales is required for effective arms control.

Security Assistance Programs

JCS Pub. 1 defines security assistance as a “group of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 [as amended]. . . , by which the U.S. provides defense articles, military training and other defense related services by grant, credit or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives.” Security assistance is differentiated from the general “arms transfers” by the fact that as an element of the foreign assistance program, security assistance involves fiscal obligations that must be accommodated through the budget process. Budgetary constraints require establishing a priority of requirements to efficiently allocate security assistance dollars. Current program priorities focus on countries:

- of critical strategic and political importance to the United States;
- that are alliance partners or with which we have commitments;
- that are vital because of proximity to the United States or other geostrategic locations;
- the support of which is critical for key foreign policy and security initiatives; and
- that supply essential raw materials.⁵

Security assistance consists of the following major programs.⁶

Economic Support Fund (ESF). ESF is intended to ensure political and economic stability in countries whose well-being contributes to U.S. security. These funds are used for a variety of purposes that include balance of payments support, capital projects, and programs directed at satisfying basic human needs. Allocation of ESFs is based on political criteria. In contrast to development assistance, which supports long-term economic development, ESF is intended to provide immediate economic aid. The program seeks to promote economic reform and development to remove the cause of instability that threatens the security and independence of the recipient. Military items are not authorized by this program. Figure 1 displays recent trends in ESF.

Military Assistance Program (MAP). MAP consists of grants of military equipment, facilities and technical assistance to friendly countries. Initially




Figure 1

the program was devised to strengthen mutual defense and collective security of the non-Communist world. MAP complements Foreign Military Sales by moderating the financial impact of those sales on recipients. Figure 2 shows trends in MAP program funding.




Figure 2

International Military Education and Training (IMET). Professional education and training under this program is normally provided in the United States to selected foreign military and civilians on a grant basis. Examples include attendance at service and war colleges, or U.S. training teams in the host country.

Peacekeeping Operations (PKO). These funds support the U.S. share of expenses incurred in international peacekeeping operations such as those in the multilateral force and observers in the Sinai and U.N. Forces in Cyprus.

Foreign Military Sales (FMS) Financing. This program of credit and loan guarantees enables friendly foreign governments to purchase military equipment, training and services. The financing program is available to governments whose economic situation or near-term security requirements make cash sales inappropriate or impossible. Terms typically include repayment at market interest at some time in the future when it is hoped that the economic and/or security problem will have stabilized. Provisions in the Arms Export Control Act require an evaluation of the impact of these sales on economic and social development of the recipient.⁷ Prior to FY85, the loan guarantee portion of the program was "off budget." Commencing with the FY85 security assistance request, FMS financing will be subject to the same authorization and appropriation processes that ensure congressional oversight of similar programs. Figure 3 illustrates recent program trends.




Figure 3

Two recent initiatives are changing the nature and cost of the security assistance program. The FY85 FMS appropriation included an expansion of "forgiven loans" and the creation of a concessional loan program element. Prior to FY85, forgiven loans were limited to Israel and Egypt. Concessional loans at approximately 5 percent interest, rather than the 10-12 percent market rate, have been extended to sixteen countries. In FY83, 28.6 percent of military assistance was concessional. In the FY85 program, 66.5 percent was concessional, including the forgiving of 100 percent of FMS financing for Israel and Egypt; \$1.4 and \$1.175 billion respectively.

MAP, IMET, PKO, and FMS financing programs comprise what is referred to as the "Military Assistance" element of foreign aid. MAP, IMET, and FMS forgiven loans are collectively referred to as "grant aid" since the government is not monetarily reimbursed for those goods or services. Table 1 summarizes trends in security assistance programs.

Security Assistance Programs (\$ Millions)

	80	81	82	83	84	85	86*
MAP	279	170	195	446	769	805	949
IMET	25	28	42	46	51	56	66
PKO	59	34	151	31	46	44	37
ESF	2151	2199	2700	2971	3150	4210	4020
FMS	1950	3046	3833	5106	5716	4940	5655

*Estimated

Table 1

Other Programs

In addition to the above five programs, two additional programs are the source of significant levels of arms transfers. However, they are not considered to be security assistance.

Foreign Military Sales, Cash. Under FMS cash sales, receiving governments buy military equipment, training and services from the U.S. Government under terms negotiated contractually. All expenses incident to the sale are paid by the purchaser. FMS sales to allies such as NATO are motivated by security interests and domestic economic concerns. Cash sales to other friendly or nonaligned countries are usually a political decision based on pursuit of foreign policy objectives.

Commercial Arms Sales. Direct sales of military equipment by industry to foreign governments is controlled through a licensing requirement of the Arms Export Control Act. Applications for commercial export of defense equipment and services are reviewed by State and other departments. Congressional approval may be required if certain dollar thresholds are

reached. U.S. concerns over the transfer of militarily significant technology to the Eastern bloc has resulted in the application of export controls on many articles of indirect military application.

Since these two programs pay their own way, they are not considered to be part of the foreign aid program. However, FMS and commercial cash sales provide assistance to the recipient in the form of the technological advantage associated with advanced U.S. weapons systems. Programs that provide weapons to foreign governments are popularly referred to as "arms transfers." Table 2 depicts recent trends in FMS cash and commercial arms sales.

Other Arms Transfer Programs (\$ Millions)

	80	81	82	83	84	85	86*
FMS \$	15300	8550	21500	15000	14554	16000	13000
COMM'L	1900	2060	2300	2080	1675	3020	3565

*Estimated

Table 2

Security Assistance Guidelines

How then shall we evaluate the worth of these programs? A good starting point might be to examine security interests to see if there is a logical linkage between those interests and security assistance as an element of national security strategy. An evaluation of the international environment confirms that the influence of the United States has receded from the high water mark of recent decades. In the wake of Vietnam the United States has not yet regained the will to directly confront Soviet-instigated or supported contingencies. Nevertheless, our interests have not changed. As a maritime nation, the United States remains dependent on seaborne access to far-flung markets to conduct the trade that ensures the nation's economic well-being. Those same sealanes also carry the energy and minerals on which the national security is both dependent and vulnerable. Further, the U.S. defense posture requires a mix of forward deployed forces, prepositioned equipment, and en route support and forward basing to enable direct defense of vital interests. Areas of geostrategic importance cannot be forfeited. Global U.S. interests in an increasingly interdependent world will become difficult to defend with only national military forces. Allied cooperation and global stability will increase in importance as U.S. interests proliferate. The United States must pursue a strategy that creates an economic environment conducive to stability. The Soviets have shown little inclination to initiate military adventures far from their shores. At the same time, they have shown no hesitancy to exploit opportunities attendant to social unrest and economic

instability. However, economic stability and growth are elusive objectives that require persistence. To allow those programs the time to bear fruit, nations must survive as sovereign entities. They must have the means to defend themselves. Thus, it would appear appropriate to increase security assistance as an element of national strategy.

Like other programs, security assistance must compete for scarce resources. Available funds must be applied effectively and used efficiently. This requires a careful examination of the circumstances under which security assistance should be extended. The following guidelines comprise a framework with which to evaluate proposed security assistance initiatives.

First. The United States must ensure that a decision to extend security assistance is guided by a clear definition of its relation to the national interest. Overly expansive definition of interests has produced what has been described as an ends/means mismatch. Such a situation compromises those interests that merit priority allocation of resources.

Second. Security assistance should be relevant to accomplishment of discrete objectives. Some program supporters claim that favorable economic influence should not be discounted. For example, it is claimed that \$21 billion in FY1982 arms orders (\$5 billion of which was in the form of Security Assistance) had approximately a \$60-billion GNP impact due to the multiplier effect on the economy. Those sales resulted in over \$1 billion savings to DoD and were credited with creating 750,000 jobs. Further, each \$1 million in FMS loans generates approximately \$675 thousand in revenues as well as easing balance-of-payments deficits.⁸ Nevertheless, that arms transfers may favorably impact the GNP or enhance domestic employment is interesting, but not relevant to the desired end. There are more efficient means to stimulate the economy. Relevant national security objectives might include:

- To maintain access to regions of resource dependency.
- To maintain favorable order in regions of geostrategic importance.
- To support friends and allies threatened with external aggression or externally supported internal insurrection.

Third. Any assistance should be proportional to the threat. In assessing arms requirements of potential recipients, the regional balance must be considered. Introduction of unnecessarily sophisticated or excessive quantities of weapons can create insecurity among neighboring states. In some situations, the arms may be used to settle old disputes that are unrelated to the object of the transfer. Arms in the hands of a sovereign nation are not amenable to external control. Even economic assistance, the Economic Support Fund for example, can be used to military ends since money is a fungible commodity. At the same time, it should be recognized that unilateral restraint is ineffective and contributes to deterioration of stability. The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) has a legislatively mandated

oversight role in the arms transfer process. That agency's thorough analysis of the potential impact of proposed sales can contribute to reduced likelihood of conflict and enhance arms control and crisis stability.

Fourth. The United States should be careful in applying its own American standards to evaluations of human rights violations. This is particularly true of countries that have no history of Western style civil liberties. Many nations have long societal traditions that emphasize order and respect for authority at the expense of American style individual rights and freedoms. The threat of withholding security assistance that supports national objectives under these circumstances, seems more a self-inflicted wound than a viable means of promoting human rights.

Fifth. The United States should avoid intervention in internal political problems of friendly nations if at all possible. This is especially true where an incumbent regime is guilty of conspicuous human rights abuses and corrupt administration. U.S. support of repressive or corrupt officials may sustain the conditions that invite Marxist exploitation. This caution may have to be modified in cases where insurrection is clearly externally initiated and supported by forces inimical to the interests of the United States. Under those circumstances, it is more appropriate to ensure the continued survival of the regime while continuing to work for reform.

Sixth. The nation must avoid program decisions based on zero-sum assumptions. Soviet aid to a particular nation does not necessarily mean that the United States has sustained a loss; nor does it mean that the Soviets have achieved a gain. A nation's decision to accept foreign assistance is based on its relevance to achievement of their own security interests not those of the donor. Acceptance of military assistance does not irrevocably commit nations to a strategic consensus in the East/West conflict. The Soviets discovered that in Egypt and Somalia, while the United States learned the same lesson in Iran and Ethiopia.

Seventh. The U.S. Government should be selective in its application of security assistance programs. Each of the previously described programs serves a distinct purpose. It is not necessary to throw the "whole tamale" at each situation. For example, in cases of social unrest, the Economic Support Fund may be most appropriate in establishing an economic infrastructure that promotes political, economic, and social stability. However, it should be remembered that the ESF is not a replacement for development assistance programs, rather it is intended to ensure stability and growth in areas where the United States has clear security concerns. Similarly, in the case of depressed economies, FMS, even at concessional rates, may divert much needed funds from development projects. Grant aid, such as MAP, is more appropriate under those circumstances.

Eighth. The United States and its allies must come to grips with the requirement to establish guidelines for an integrated security assistance

strategy. Unilateral efforts are often undermined when the rest of the "team" plays by a different set of rules. French sales of Exocet missiles to combatants who use them against Western shipping in the Persian Gulf is the most prominent operative example today. The Western alliance must recognize the multilateral impact of bilateral relations in an interdependent world. Failure to do so will sustain an "If we don't sell them someone else will" approach to arms sales. Because of the conflicting nature of national objectives, this will be a difficult task. Success will require consultation, negotiation, and compromise.

Ninth. There are finite limits to what the United States can accomplish alone. The NATO allies and Japan can and should contribute more to bolster the security of strategically important nations. Japan claims political and sociological constraints on rearmament as they spend less than one percent of GNP on defense. Simultaneously, they exploited a security environment paid for by the U.S. taxpayers to accumulate a merchandise trade surplus of \$36 billion in 1984. There are no constraints, other than self-imposed, on Japanese contributions to regional security. The major impediment is one that afflicts politicians on a global scale—lack of political courage. The United States may find attempts to promote equitable burden-sharing among its allies bearing more fruit if the security assistance track is pursued.

Tenth. The structure of the security assistance program should be reevaluated. In recent years, allocation of program funds has been increasingly focused on the Middle East in general and Egypt and Israel in particular. For example, Egypt and Israel will receive approximately 50 percent of funds appropriated to the Economic Support Fund in FY86. Further, they will also receive 55 percent of FMS financing.⁹ The Congress is also considering a supplemental appropriation that would provide emergency economic aid in the form of an additional \$1.5 billion to Israel and \$500 million to Egypt. All of these funds are in the form of grants and forgiven loans. This does not mean that those amounts are not warranted. Certainly, Israel is a special case for the United States, and aid to Egypt was part of the implied U.S. obligation for the Camp David accord. The real point is that, given the previously developed strategic rationale for security assistance as an instrument of policy, the remainder of the international security assistance program is underfunded and unbalanced.

This paper has been both descriptive and prescriptive. It describes the range of security assistance programs available to the policymaker/force planner and proposes guidelines for evaluation of program requirements. Armed with this kit bag of instruments, it is possible to analyze a particular situation and decide which tool is appropriate to the desired result. Security assistance is a viable element of a U.S. foreign assistance package. Some of these programs are suited to economic strategies while others apply

to security problems. Some are appropriate elements of a long-range program, while others support near-term strategies. Some may complement existing initiatives, while others may be viable substitutes. By focusing on the individual program elements, the means appropriate to the desired end is more likely to be selected.

The challenges to U.S. security interests are greater today than at any time since WWII. The United States must be prepared to respond to the valid requirements of its many regional partners. Their stability and survival may hang in the balance. Properly applied, security assistance supports basic security objectives by providing resources to:

- Promote peaceful solutions to regional rivalries.
- Ensure access to critical military facilities and basic resources.
- Confront the growing Soviet military threat.
- Reduce economic and social degradation that breeds domestic violence and invites external intervention.

The ten guidelines are not intended to be carved in stone like the Ten Commandments. They are intended to provide a basis for evaluation while recognizing that the international environment is fraught with uncertainty. Nevertheless, if the guidelines are followed, the security assistance program would become a more efficient and effective tool of U.S. foreign policy. That accomplishment would silence much of the criticism leveled at "arms transfers."

The realities of today's world require that the United States take pragmatic, measured responses to security assistance requests. If the request meets the established criteria, the United States cannot fail to help. While the Administration should not fail to heed valid criticism, neither should it be intimidated or paralyzed with doubt about the validity of its objectives. Given the nature of democracy and the divergent values that form the basis of rational analysis, it is unlikely that a universal consensus will be created in support of any national security initiative. Idealism will continue to place obstacles in the path of any initiative that hints of military solution. Nevertheless, security programs must be formulated on the basis of a world as it exists today, not on visions of a world that might be tomorrow.

In November 1984, Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger addressed the National Press Club. His remarks became one portion of a widely publicized public debate over the use of military power as an instrument of diplomacy. The debate featured Weinberger as the voice of moderation urging that the use of military power be limited to strictly defined conditions. His remarks also contained what might be the definitive justification for security assistance. "Recent history has proven that we cannot assume unilaterally the role of the world's defender. We have learned that there are limits to how much of our spirit and blood and treasure we can afford to forfeit in meeting our responsibility to keep peace and freedom. So while we may and should offer substantial amounts of economic and military assistance to our allies in

their time of need, and help them maintain forces to deter attacks against them—usually we cannot substitute our troops or our will for theirs.”¹⁰

Notes

1. U.S. Dept. of Defense, *Congressional Presentation: Security Assistance Programs, FY1986* (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off.), pp. 1-2.
2. Ruth Leger Sivard, *World Military and Social Expenditures 1982* (Washington, D.C.: World Priorities, October 1982), p. 5.
3. White House Announcement, “Conventional Arms Transfers Policy,” 9 July 1981.
4. U.S. Dept. of Defense, *Congressional Presentation: Security Assistance Programs, FY1983*, (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off.), p. 1.
5. Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management, *The Management of Security Assistance Programs*, 3rd ed. (Wright Patterson AFB: August 1982), pp. 2-4 to 2-14.
6. U.S. General Accounting Office, *Unrealistic Use of Loans to Support Foreign Military Sales*, GAO/ID-83-5 (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 19 January 1983), p. 19.
7. Francis J. West, “Security Assistance,” Lecture, Naval War College, Newport, R.I.: 22 October 1982.
8. Signe Landegren-Backstrom, “Global Arms Trade,” *Bulletin of Peace Proposals*, September 1982, p. 201.
9. *Congressional Presentation: Security Assistance Programs, FY1986*, pp. 19, 23.
10. Caspar Weinberger, “The Use of Military Power,” Address, National Press Club, Washington, D.C., 28 November 1984.



IN MY VIEW . . .



Jon Oliver

General Staff, Yes—OKW, No!

Sir,

In "JCS Reform: A German Example?" Williamson Murray makes a good case against German military organization at the highest levels in both Wilhelmine and National Socialist Germany. However, when he attempts to turn this into an attack on the military reform movement, he misses the mark. In fact, the military reformers are fully aware of Germany's failure at the strategic and grand strategic levels in both wars, and also of the serious deficiencies in the policy-making process and structure at those levels. No military reformer has urged that we follow those German models.

What has interested the reformers is Germany's consistent superiority in land warfare at the tactical and operational levels. A substantial portion of this superiority seems to have derived from the German General Staff. Many, although not all, military reformers are therefore supportive of a general staff system in the United States. But even here, most qualify the German example: they note that an American general staff, unlike the German, would have to be all-service, and that if it were to replace the present Joint Staff, its officers would have to receive the education in strategy and grand strategy their German counterparts were not given.

Interest in the German general staff, as distinguished from the larger German defense decision-making apparatus Murray rightly criticizes, is legitimate. A general staff system that reflected German virtues without copying the Germans' mistakes would be a good substitute for the current Joint Staff. But advocating this is very different from saying we should copy OKW.

William S. Lind
Alexandria, Virginia

Whose Objectivity in JCS Reform?

Sir,

In your last two issues you have included four articles on the JCS debate, all of them critical of reform proposals, in which my views are criticized explicitly or implicitly. Am I too bold in thinking myself entitled to some brief reply?

Robert J. Murray's "JCS Reform: A Defense of the Current System" (September-October 1985) is a thoughtful and qualified defense of the present system, on which I am pondering still. Murray, moreover, was admirably candid in describing his own article as an *ex parte* view.

By contrast, the merits of Admiral Holloway's personal endorsement, "Inside the JCS: Decisions in Crisis," entirely depend on whether one agrees or not with his crucial claim that the "JCS system has served us well" in the Vietnam War as well as in lesser crises. (He lists the Korean War as well but, symptomatically, that was one war that was not coordinated by the JCS and its theater-level committee-style replicas, but rather actually commanded, first by MacArthur and then by Ridgway.) If Admiral Holloway is satisfied with the strategic direction that the armed forces of the United States received from the JCS for waging the Vietnam War, then there is obviously no point in arguing with his views any further: by redefining "success" at will, any system whatsoever can be described as successful (Cf. Harold Brown's definition of the Iran rescue attempt as a "partial success.")

In the same issue also, David K. Hall's "Assessment" amounts to a lawyer's brief against reform, unworthy of sustained comment as far as I am concerned, because Hall's attack on my views depends entirely on misrepresentation: "The most extreme advocates of structural change, such as Edward Luttwak, would abolish the JCS altogether and replace it with a single Chief of Staff for military advice and operational execution." As any reader of my *The Pentagon and the Art of War* knows, my own recommendations are almost exactly the opposite: far from advocating reliance on any one individual officer, I call for a new corps of "national defense officers" selected from the services in mid-career, some of whom would serve on a "national defense staff" whose director would not be in the chain of command, any more than the Chairman of the JCS is at present. It pleased Professor Hall, incidentally, to describe me as a "publicist," an amusingly old-fashioned term to be sure, but scarcely accurate to describe one who has spent his entire adult life practicing and studying just one subject: warfare.

But oddly enough the most serious departure from the standards of scholarship that I have come to expect from the *NWCR* over the years is Williamson Murray's "JCS Reform: A German Example?" (November-December 1985) which comes with all the trappings of scholarship, abundant citations and all. The Secretary of the Navy in his lusty, demagogic way has accused the advocates of JCS reform of trying to foist a "Prussian general staff" on the United States; but an academic is not entitled to such verbal license. It is simply untrue that the General Staff of Prussia or Imperial Germany is offered as a model in any of the serious reform proposals. What is true, is that there is an analogy between the 19th century formation of general staffs, as supervising bodies of army officers over the separate artillery, cavalry and infantry hierarchies, and the present need for some form of national military staff to stand above the separate services, to impose national priorities in lieu of inner-

regarding and literally self-serving service priorities. Actually, ironically enough as Professor Murray must know, it is the present U.S. structure that closely resembles the disastrous German OKW of the Second World War, which Hitler created precisely to deny the German Army, Navy and Air Force of any strong coordinating body which would inevitably have become a rival power center.

I recognize that its present, gloriously anarchial independence suits the Navy's bureaucratic interests very well. In the absence of any military body fit to allocate resources between the services, past priorities are simply perpetuated and that happens to favor the Navy because of the large maritime element of our last large, priority-setting war, which ended some forty years ago. Those priorities, obviously, are not congruent with the nature of our present adversary, a continental landpower, which depends on the oceans very little, and which is scarcely vulnerable to non-nuclear naval action in any form. But the *Naval War College Review* is an important forum for American and not just Navy thinking, and I know that most Navy officers are fully capable of rising above narrow corporate self-interest in confronting our national military problems. The *NWCR* should reflect their capacity for objectivity.

Edward N. Luttwak
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Washington, D.C.

Historical vs. Policy Analysis

Sir,

The November-December 1985 issue of the *Review* contains two articles on strategic defense, "Strategy and the First Strategic Defense Initiative" by Benson D. Adams, and "SDI: A Policy Analysis" by Lt. Col. Stephen O. Fought, U.S. Air Force. These two articles present a distinct contrast in ways of looking at the issues of strategic offense and strategic defense, and illustrate some of the difficulties which the American people and government leaders have in considering these questions. Adams' article, like most arguments by historical analogy, is interesting and entertaining, but in my opinion, Fought's article, which presents a carefully thought out framework for analyzing the issues, is more useful.

It is clear that Adams is a proponent of the Administration's Strategic Defense Initiative, and he uses the example of the success of British air defenses in the Battle of Britain during World War Two to support his views. Historical analogies are often useful, but can be misleading; it is easy to misconstrue events, and by too facile an examination develop arguments that are superficially impressive although fundamentally fallacious.

Some might try to dismiss Adams' thesis on the basis that nuclear weapons are far more powerful than the weapons available to the Germans in 1940-41, but this would be inadequate. Instead, consider the reasons why Germany discontinued the air

attack against Britain, and consider also the numerous other air offensives conducted during and after World War Two.

I submit that Germany broke off the air offensive against Britain in 1940-41 for several reasons, including the following:

- The Luftwaffe (as Adams points out) was not designed for strategic bombardment, and did not have the capability to damage Britain enough to force surrender.
- Invasion of Britain was impractical because the Royal Navy effectively blocked the English Channel.
- Hitler wanted to get on with the invasion of Russia; his immediate purpose regarding Britain was to prevent British interference.
- British air defenses exacted a toll of the Luftwaffe, which contributed to the Germans' eventual conclusion that the cost of the offensive was too great in relation to its effectiveness.

In this combination of reasons, British air defenses were certainly a factor, but not the sole reason for German cessation of the attack. Indeed, British air defenses, while at least comparable in technology to the German attacking force, were unable to prevent the Germans from inflicting substantial damage on any target they chose to attack.

Later in World War Two, as in Korea and Vietnam, American air attacks were able to heavily damage any chosen targets, in spite of vigorous and sophisticated air defenses. These successful attacks were insufficient of themselves to force the surrender of the adversary. Germany finally surrendered after prolonged bombardment, defeat of her armies, and invasion; Japan surrendered after defeat of her navy, isolation from resources, and prolonged, devastating bombardment capped by the (low yield) nuclear attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. North Vietnam, as we well know, did not capitulate.

I believe that the lesson to be drawn from this is not that strategic air defenses make a big difference, but that conventional strategic bombardment is insufficient by itself to force the surrender of a determined adversary. When the cost and difficulty of an offensive campaign are high in relation to the value of the strategic objective, as is the case with conventional air warfare, then defenses, by complicating and increasing the cost of an already difficult and costly offensive, can contribute to an ultimate failure of that offensive.

The difference in today's case is that nuclear bombardment forces are several orders of magnitude more devastating than any conventional forces. An adversary can be very heavily damaged rather easily by nuclear attack, and the incremental cost of additional destructive capability is quite small. Under these circumstances, it is difficult to see how direct defense of other than selected hardened targets can be of much value.

Active defense against nuclear attack, like strategic air defenses, may be useful as a factor in the strategic equation, and historical examples can illuminate this. To suppose that defenses will be able to stop a nuclear attack once launched, in the sense of providing an impenetrable shield, seems at least presumptuous, especially in light of the historical ineffectiveness of air defenses in dealing with the much easier problem of stopping conventional strategic air attack.

Confusing and complicating an attack are valid goals, and it is for this reason that defense of selected hardened targets, to preserve retaliatory and warfighting capabilities, may make sense.

Lieutenant Colonel Fought's article takes the nuclear strategic situation as it is, and provides a well thought out framework for analyzing the role which strategic defense might play. The problem is complex and the uncertainties are large; as with most such careful analyses of complex and difficult problems, it requires substantial care and attention to follow the train of thought and to apply the methods suggested. The average citizen probably shies away from this sort of analysis because of the perceived difficulty, abstractness and tedium, yet it is just this sort of analysis that is required to make sense of the case.

The questions of national security in the nuclear age are of great importance, and it is the duty of national leaders to consider them carefully in all their complexity. The nation and the world are well served by thoughtful analyses which consider all pertinent factors. Emotional appeals, simplified summaries and historical analogies seem more concrete and appealing, but must be applied only with great care after thorough analysis of the issues; otherwise, our countrymen, allies, adversaries and other fellow human beings, all of whom tremble at the prospect of nuclear war, will be seriously confused and misled. False hopes and false fears do none of us any good; public officials who cause such confusion do us all great disservice.

W.G. Collins, Jr.
Commander, U.S. Navy (Ret.)

New NE Asian Geography?

Sir,

In his article, "Soviet Maritime Strategy and Transportation" (November-December 1985), James T. Westwood makes the unsupported judgment that the "*real* purpose [of the Baikal-Amur Mainline] cannot have been simply one of distance in military terms."

Several years ago at a meeting of the U.S. Association for Asian Studies I had the opportunity to discuss that subject with a distinguished member of the Soviet's senior institute for Far Eastern studies. To my comment that the new railroad would assist greatly in economic development the Soviet scholar replied, "Oh yes, economic development will be nice, but the real purpose is military." He then went on to great length educating me about the Soviet nightmare of a developing China pressing in on the virtually empty Soviet eastern domain.

That developing China is now no longer a dream, or nightmare, depending on one's point of view. The resources necessary to meet the rising aspirations of China's billion plus people lie temptingly close in those very "thousands of square miles of territory" that Mr. Westwood acknowledges to have been "disputed between Russia and China for over 150 years."

The long and torturous Soviet Southern Sea Route is indeed, as Mr. Westwood says, an acknowledgment that the "disparate" west and east halves of the Soviet

Union cannot be mutually supported by the overland connections. But that is just one more symptom of the fact that politically, economically and ultimately militarily Russian power east of the Urals cannot be sustained—something recognized by Gen. Charles de Gaulle when he spoke of an eventual “Europe des Patries” from the Atlantic to the Urals.

What that means for the United States, it seems to me, is that our best hope for deterrence of nuclear war lies in a North Pacific maritime strategy aimed at this greatest of all Soviet vulnerabilities. In the long term we should begin to think about how well the United States and Japan would adjust to a China in control of Asia from Vietnam (or beyond) northward to the pole and west to the Urals.

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PROFESSIONAL READING

The heart of the work is an account of the campaigns of the divided Spanish Navy during the Civil War. It is a textbook example of what can go wrong if there is not a close and insightful relationship among policy, strategy, logistics, and available forces, with a clear contrast of what can go right if there is.

Willard C. Frank, Jr.

Cerezo Martinez, Ricardo. *Armada española, siglo XX*. 4 vols. Madrid: Ediciones Poniente, 1983. 415, 330, 392, 419pp. 7,000 pesetas

The fiftieth anniversary of the Spanish Civil War of 1936-39 is upon us, yet the activity of the Spanish and allied navies that fought that war at sea and provided Franco the logistic conditions of victory remains little known in Spain, let alone abroad. Apart from the World Wars, here was displayed the most extensive exercise of seapower of the first half of the twentieth century. It was also the most significant maritime dimension of a civil conflict since the American Civil War but with a great deal more foreign intervention at sea and ashore. Captain Cerezo, long a professor at the Spanish Naval War College, has combed his navy's operational archives to provide us with the first detailed and comprehensive story of the creation of the modern Spanish Fleet and the campaigns it fought.

As a weakened Spanish nation entered the twentieth century, Iberian minerals attracted the increasing attention of the competing industrial powers while the surrounding seas contained their vital trade routes. Memories of the long-vanished days of imperial power haunted as much as inspired Spanish military and naval leaders, for Spain no longer had sufficient

Dr. Frank, an Associate Professor of History at Old Dominion University, is currently engaged in writing on seapower in the Spanish Civil War, 1936-1939.

means to defend Spanish integrity and interests in the face of the great power rivalries that swirled through the era of the World Wars. The old Spanish Navy was destroyed in 1898, just as the international climate was heating up. It became the goal of a new generation of naval leaders to create a credible fighting fleet that would tip the balance among the naval rivals and thus give clout to Spanish diplomacy.

Cerezo's painstaking exposition of the difficult search for a coherent and effective naval policy forms what is perhaps the best developed section of the work. The search was burdened by chronic political instability, a tight budget, and a tendency for factions in government to use the navy as a political football. The Spanish Republic of the 1930s, in tune with prevailing ideals, constitutionally renounced force as an instrument of national policy and clung to the fading hope of the League of Nations. Apprehensive about Spanish debility in a world of hungry dictators and fearful democracies, naval officers would have accepted almost any government that would provide direction. Force levels always remained far below what naval leaders deemed the minimum necessary to hold the balance at least between the fleets of France and Italy.

Cerezo pounds home the theme of the weakness of the navy and the incoherence of building programs. Yet the Spanish Fleet by 1936 was the most powerful in the world aside from those of the major powers that fought the Second World War. Largely the result of a cooperative effort by certain ministers and admirals, the new navy before 1914 centered around battleships to balance foreign fleets and torpedo boats for close defense, the emphasis shifting in the 1920s to a mobile squadron of large cruisers and destroyers and a growing submarine force to control sealanes. This navy gained experience in colonial campaigns, but was clearly insufficient to stand alone against a major maritime opponent. With a vision of prodding Spain back into the ranks of the first-class powers, Spanish naval officers then, as Cerezo now, pointedly contrasted Spanish naval weakness with the might of the major navies. It was a forlorn dream. The navy cannot be separated from the internal conditions of the nation that creates and supports it, as Cerezo recognizes in his preface, and the political and economic conditions of the time precluded Spain from again ranking among the great naval powers. An outsider might be surprised that Spanish officers should set their sights so high, yet take for granted the stature that naval powers of the second rank that clung to great-power status, such as Italy and France, claimed for themselves. These were just the states that appeared to be the most likely to extend or defend their interests at Spain's expense. Spanish naval apprehensions were justified, but the means to provide for a powerful naval establishment that would guarantee Spanish security simply were not there.

Less satisfactory is Cerezo's account of the bitter social conflicts that exploded into revolution in the navy and the nation. Despite his sincere

efforts to be objective, the emotional imperatives of the era have not let him go. He ignores the shared responsibility of the officer corps in snapping the bonds between the bridge and the lower deck. He cites no evidence for either a masonic or a communist plot, yet trots out both. He fills fifteen pages detailing the Republican executions of naval officers during the early weeks of the Civil War, but passes off in one thin undocumented paragraph the equally horrendous execution of multitudes of leftist sailors by Nationalist tribunals. Cerezo does put to rest much of the folklore perpetuated by the victors about the revolution in the fleet, yet the angry partisan has won this round over the dispassionate scholar.

The heart of the work is an account of the campaigns of the divided Spanish Navy during the Civil War. It is a textbook example of what can go wrong if there is not a close and insightful relationship among policy, strategy, logistics, and available forces, with a clear contrast of what can go right if there is. The armed struggle ashore was a close match, and both sides quickly became dependent on the continuous flow of seaborne support from abroad, the control of sealanes gaining decisive importance. The Republic retained the bulk of the surface fleet and the entire submarine force, but revolutionary imperatives purged this potentially formidable armada of most of its officers, dissolved the naval staff, and relied on incompetent Soviet naval advice for operational direction. Republican leaders were ignorant of the disastrous strategic consequences of abandoning the key island of Mallorca to the enemy or of removing an effective blockade in the Strait of Gibraltar in order to provide a temporary naval presence in northern ports. The latent power of the Republican navy was not focused, and this impressive fleet soon became an inert and demoralized mass bypassed by the hard contest being waged around it.

By contrast, the Nationalist navy started out with a quite inferior assortment of ships. Yet capable officers and an effective staff system at Franco's headquarters coordinated ends and means and developed a clear mission focused on the control of traffic. Successful concentration allowed the area of control to expand from the Straits to encompass in time the entire vast network of maritime communications. The disparity in effectiveness between the two Spanish Fleets encouraged Italy and Germany to risk sending their navies to intervene on the Nationalists' behalf, and they did so with near impunity. Aid to the Nationalist war machine flowed without interference, while supplies destined for the Republic became progressively choked off. By not diverting their sights from the objective when prospects seemed bleak, the Nationalist navy by 1938 produced decisive effects on the land war. The long and weary business of blockade had paid off.

These volumes, despite their bulk, fall short of a definitive treatment. The reader has to dig out meaning from heaps of data mostly served up as chronology and laden with excessive repetition. Cerezo has produced a

valuable and incisive strategic analysis, but we find it tucked away as an article in *Revista de Historia Naval* (No. 6, 1984), where it might have served to provide structure for the larger work. He allows himself to make sweeping assertions based on inadequate evidence, or conversely is satisfied simply to report conflicting data and interpretations and then to remain aloof from making a judgment. Having only mastered Spanish language sources, he is unable to probe very far into the interventions of those foreign nations that gave the conflict characteristics of a coalition war. He misses, for example, the active role of German U-boats or the self-blinding assumptions of Soviet naval advisers. The texts of documents appended to each volume are too often inaccurately copied. Much more care should be expected with editing and production.

This overwhelming assemblage of semidigested data may put off some readers. Yet a close reading will demonstrate once again that when one is constructing and employing a navy, the qualities of mind that one cannot easily tally on a ledger sheet are those of decisive significance. The ships and weapons, though necessary, are merely the tools.



Luttwak, Edward N. *The Pentagon and the Art of War. The Question of Military Reform*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984. 332pp. \$17.95

Ed Luttwak is both a provocative thinker and a clear and forceful writer. This book is no exception and the subject he focuses on (what the dust jacket calls "our outmoded military establishment") lends itself to his talents. Luttwak tends to make rather pungent, broad judgments and recommends more change than is likely to be forthcoming. Also, curiously for someone who has been immersed in defense detail, Luttwak's book is an outsider's evaluation which lacks the perceptions most of those with extensive military service share.

The subtitle of the book is: *The Question of Military Reform* and that is in fact the book's thrust. In eleven

chapters, Luttwak proceeds from an initial discussion of "the anatomy of military failure" and the "lessons of defeat . . . unlearned" to the "enormity of the [U.S.] defense establishment," a chapter on the Soviets, one on why the "materialist bias," then two chapters on "the officer surplus," three chapters on "the great budget game" and its consequences and effects, with a final chapter called "toward reform." Putting it another way, he has an assessment of Vietnam and recent military operations off Lebanon and on Grenada, followed by something of a broad net assessment (including intellectual attitudes toward military problems), branching over to a figure-laden discussion of a senior officer-heavy officer structure, on to the interplay between budget and strategy, and ending with a specific recommenda-

tion for a really "purple suit" joint staff.

Luttwak's criticism of the Vietnam War is very pointed. "By 1968 there were 110 generals and admirals actually in Vietnam, 64 of them for the Army alone; a small number were actually in command of forces in the field, but most were in Saigon, along with hundreds and hundreds of colonels." In discussing Desert One he renews his continuing criticism of what he calls "the 'unified' model" which patches forces together—some for you and some for you, meaning some for everybody. He has scant praise for the Grenada operation either, saying that "ever since Korea, each test of combat has revealed gross deformations in the making of strategy, in the absence of operational art, and in tactics made willfully clumsy." Luttwak is arguing that the very structure of our national defense is defective and its very size makes that difficult to grasp. The problem becomes even more acute when we have to take the enormity of the Soviet defense effort also into account.

He argues that the immense size of the defense effort spurs us to pick on small, understandable items to criticize, like the cost of toilet seats or hammers. Perhaps his most telling (or at least interesting) criticisms, buttressed by figures, have to do with what Luttwak calls "the officer surplus."

In 1945, with more than 12 million under arms, the ratio of enlisted to junior officers stood at about 10:1 and has more or less remained so since. But the middle and senior rank (colonel-

captain) picture has been very different: 1945, 100 enlisted, 1.3 such officers; 1950, 100:4.0; 1952, 100:2.9; 1958, 100:4.3; 1960, 100:4.7; 1969, 100:4.5; 1973, 100:5.8; 1983, 100:5.3. Luttwak says this inflation represents a redundancy to allow mobilization expansion to the large numbers à la 1942 but thinks this not very likely to happen. In the meantime, he says, these officers inflate staffs and create new staff layers whose main effect is to stifle the efficient development of new weapons systems. He especially focuses in on the Air Force Systems Command. He says: "During the twenty-year period 1965-1984 . . . the Air Force has developed a grand total of only two bombers, one of them merely a converted fighter . . . ; only three fighter-class aircraft . . . ; only one transport aircraft and a single trainer." He has harsh words, too, for the now defunct Navy Material Command and the Army's Materiel Development and Readiness Command, calling the M-1 tank "very advanced and very desirable in every way—except in combat" and criticizing the Navy for having too few convoy escorts.

When he turns to the budget process he condemns the vast energy expended which could be better applied to making strategy and reorganizing defense, and says that our expenditures on our forces reveals "a fundamental imbalance in American strategy"—by which he means that "instead of seeking to establish land-power parity, which is the required counterpart to strategic-nuclear parity, the declared goal is to build a '600-ship Navy' . . ." He

considers "naval operations . . . largely irrelevant . . . for Soviet military action in the major continental theaters of war . . ." He especially condemns the large carrier.

In chapter 11, he comes to his reforms. "Absolutely the first priority is to provide a central military staff" of "national defense officers" who would opt for joint careers, and place that staff under a Director. The operational chain would be through SecDef direct to the unified and specified commands. Only "national defense officers" could hold such commands. Luttwak thinks this change would provide better "joint" advice.

Luttwak does not really tangle with some thorny questions, like the apparent operational disconnect between the joint staff and the unified and specified commands. I find no real attention to what the new joint staff would really do that would be so much better than we do now. Luttwak apparently thinks that having career "national defense officers" both in Washington and at the unified and specified commands will create like thinking both at the center and in the field. Since he believes a thoroughgoing world war III is "imaginary" but that minor regional contingencies are likely, the author is not concerned with how a worldwide contingency or war would be coordinated or prepared for.

His book is readable and provocative. On his reform "solution" and related questions, however, the Senate 1983 hearings are more useful.

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Rearden, Steven L. *History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense: Vol. I, The Formative Years, 1947-1950*. Washington: Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1984. 667pp. \$25

The creation of a unified national security establishment turned out to be a much tougher proposition than anyone supposed it would be. But a start was made in 1947 and the story of the first two secretaries was one of somewhat more success than failure—though the shortfalls were serious and frustrating. But this history of those first two Administrations is a clear success.

The author of *The Formative Years* has good experience, appropriate credentials and a sound attitude on what official history can and should be. He is a graduate of the University of Nebraska and holds a Ph.D. from Harvard. He is experienced as a teacher at Harvard and Boston College, as a consultant in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and as a researcher at Johns Hopkins University. His research seems to be painstaking and his writing style clear, economical and readable.

Formative Years is organized along topical lines. Its first part covers the initial structuring of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and next comes the treatment of the external national security problems it faced in its first four years. Finally, it handles the domestic problems—largely ones of trying to get the services to live together in harmony and of helping divide the scarce dollars of the immediate postwar years.

Rearden shows that the problems facing James Forrestal and Louis Johnson during those early years were immense, more so than is typical for a large and new organization. It was a time of political upheaval all over the world and of revolutionary technological change. It fell to those two men to try to build an effective new national security structure in the face of those uncertainties. The author concludes that they did about as well as could be expected. They took the first steps towards centralized control of the larger armed forces that emerged from World War II, and laid the foundations that led to further rationalization and centralization in the subsequent years. But neither Forrestal's gradualist consensus-building leadership, nor the forceful and direct methods of Johnson ever really overcame the insecurities within the armed forces to the point where unification became any more than a hope for the future.

Steven Rearden has done a capital job on *Formative Years*. His documentation is impressive and heavily weighted with primary sources. He seems to understand that his function was to describe and interpret, not to glorify and he gives us something on the warts. His organization is sound and his prose is a pleasure to read.

The first volume of *History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense* establishes a standard for those to follow. It shows that official history *can* be good history and it should be read by the serving armed forces officer. The book is an essential acquisition for all

scholarly libraries and one worthy of the personal collections of the students of military history or national security studies.

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Buss, Claude A., ed. *National Security Interests in the Pacific Basin*. Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1985. 350pp. \$27.95

A collection of papers given at a 1983 Hoover Institution conference on Security in the Pacific Basin, this book is a first-rate *tour de horizon*. The participants include many well-known names in Asian matters—Roger Swearingen, Paul Wolfowitz, James Gregor, Douglas Pike, to name a few—as well as some that, at first glance, seem a bit out of place in a book on Pacific Basin security matters: retired Admiral Inman and Dr. Edward Teller. To Dr. Buss' credit he has fashioned a most interesting compendium from this diverse group.

Part I of the book deals with "Great Power Confrontation" and sets an overall theme: "The reality of global confrontation is a dominant factor in the decision making processes of the United States, its allies and friends as they seek solutions for their bilateral and regional problems." Part II examines U.S.-Soviet relations and their effect on the Pacific Basin nations. Some of the more interesting observations:

- "Hostilities are not likely to occur in the vast Pacific except as a

consequence of wars started outside the region." (Buss)

- "The United States can no longer go it alone in Asia, or in other portions of the globe—nor should it." (Admiral Long)

- "... the most important single element for stability and growth in . . . this decade . . . will be how the United States manages the economic competition." (Inman)

- "The favorable security picture in the Pacific is . . . not a product of the region's inherent peacefulness, or an absence of force, but rather what seems to be an effective balance of forces." (Wolfowitz)

Part III discusses Northeast Asia, characterized by Dr. Buss as the Pacific Basin area where national security issues are most sensitive. Roger Swearingen leads off with "Security Implications of Siberia and the Soviet Far East" which focuses on Siberia as (1) an economic/strategic "treasure house," (2) a commercial center and (3) a strategic-military complex.

This is followed by a discussion of Japan's defense posture, in which Yoichi Masuzoe presents reasons for the reluctance of the Japanese Government to take a larger responsibility for defending Japan and then examines whether more will be done in the future. Masuzoe's conclusions will disappoint those hoping for significant changes in Japan's defense posture. Lastly are two excellent contributions by Korean authors covering Korean national interests (Koo Youngnok) and the Republic of Korea and the

major powers (Han Sung-Joo). The discussant section features a comment from Edward Olsen.

In parts III and IV, discussion of Southwest Pacific and Southeast Asian security remind the reader of the vast ranges of problems not only between regions, but also between countries within a region. Although written before the recent differences between New Zealand and the United States papers, by Henry Albinski, T.B. Millar, Richard Kennaway and Desmond Ball provide thorough and reasoned analyses of our ANZUS partners. Ball's paper—"U.S. Installations in Australian Agenda for the Future"—provides a detailed description of the principal U.S. installations in Australia and discusses major domestic issues raised by them as well as offering controversial proposals for future Australian policy decisions.

In Southeast Asia, Dr. Buss feels that our most skillful diplomatic management will be required to formulate effective security policy because, unlike other regions of the Pacific community, "[i]n Southeast Asia, because of the diversity and complexity of the area, it is difficult to generate anything approaching consensus on priorities of national interest or common measures for their protection."

Against this backdrop, Douglas Pike discusses Indo-Chinese security in terms of ASEAN while Lie Tek Tjeng writes on Jakarta's view of the regional power balance. Malaysian issues are discussed by University of Malaysia Professor Chandran Jeshu-

run. Short papers present the views of Singapore and Thailand. These are followed by "The Politics of Philippine Security" by Salvador Lopez. Reflecting Dr. Buss' opening remarks, these papers and the discussants' comments reflect unhappiness with U.S. policy and concern with the future, particularly ASEAN's course.

Discussions on Salvador Lopez' paper by James Gregor and Stephen Jurika elicited the following rebuttal by the former Philippine Ambassador to the United States: "You know the trouble with colonialism? It is so much better to talk about it with the colonist than with the colonized. It is nicer, so much more pleasant. You can stand at the top of the stairs and talk to us below. But the fellow down below is something else. And we Filipinos have been there for 400 years! I hope that gives you an idea of why I feel as I do. And why many Filipinos feel as I do. We want you to get the hell out of there!" While not all of part IV is this heated, there is certainly a wider range of opinions here than elsewhere.

Part V deals with China, particularly within the context of the Taiwan issue. In Dr. Buss' words: "If the total security of friendly nations in the Pacific Basin is to be strengthened, due consideration must be given to the interests and policies of U.S. allies and, above all, to the security and welfare of Taiwan." Jonathan Pollack analyzes China's role in Pacific Basin security, giving an excellent assessment of China's strategic role and discussion of China vis-à-vis the superpowers,

other Asian communist states and the Pacific community. Next are three papers on Taiwan, discussing that country's policies, economic development and perspective on the Pacific Basin. Ralph Clough closes out with a discussion of recent trends on Chinese foreign policy, reinforcing the conventional wisdom that "[d]ifferences over Taiwan will be the most untractable problems in U.S.-PRC relations" while observing that "Chinese leaders find it difficult to admit, even to themselves, that the main obstacle to reunification is not U.S. policy . . . but the conviction of [the Taiwanese] that the status quo is preferable to submitting to Beijing's control."

National Security Interest in the Pacific Basin is a wide-ranging book. The variety of topics and styles is well balanced by Dr. Buss' comments and introductions. This, and the attention to detail always evident in Hoover Institution Press books, makes this volume a welcome addition to the literature on the Pacific Basin. Dr. Buss' book is recommended equally to the general reader and the serious scholar; there is sufficient material for both.

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Hoyt, Edwin P. *The Militarists: The Rise of Japanese Militarism Since WW II*. New York: Donald I. Fine, 1985. 256pp. \$18.95

As history has shown it is difficult to predict what may rise from the

war-torn ruins of a defeated and devastated nation. Oftentimes such nations have surprised even the most optimistic predictions and achieved far more than ever was conceived possible within a short period of time. If one lesson may be learned from such drastic progress it is that it is far easier to destroy a person than it is to destroy a people. In his book, *The Militarists: The Rise of Japanese Militarism Since WW II*, Edwin Hoyt closely and articulately examines the spirit of such a people—the Japanese. Through an examination of Japanese culture and postwar political and economic progress, Hoyt proposes that despite the devastation of World War II the Japanese spirit has endured and, more importantly, perpetuated its traditional tendency towards militarism.

In *The Militarists*, Hoyt specifically cites the creation and evolution of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces to imply that there indeed exists a possibility that Japan is on the road to creating a formidable military force which could conceivably lead to regional and global instability. The very existence of Self-Defense Forces, Hoyt explains, is a direct contradiction to its U.S.-imposed “peace constitution” which outlaws Japan’s right to develop a warfighting capability. It is more than just the development of a military force, however, that leads Hoyt to his alarming conclusions. Rather, it is his interpretation of the self-image of the Japanese nation itself. It is the parallels between current political rhetoric and pre-World War propa-

ganda that create the perception of a Japan which is struggling to reattain a position of power in the world.

Clearly, the concept of the “rising sun” has already manifested itself in Japan economically since 1945. The question Edwin Hoyt attempts to answer is whether the same vigor and resilience of spirit will be redirected toward a revitalized and potentially aggressive military. His conclusions are as fascinating as they are distressing.

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Blair, Bruce G. *Strategic Command and Control: Redefining the Nuclear Threat*. Washington: Brookings Institution, 1985. 341pp. \$32.95 paper \$12.95

Ford, Daniel. *The Button: The Pentagon’s Strategic Command and Control System—Does It Work?* New York: Simon and Schuster, 1985. 270pp. \$16.95

Shortly after the end of the Second World War there was a great flurry of interest in something called “push-button warfare.” Such great strides had been made in weapons and in electronics during that war that it seemed inevitable that a combination of such developments would lead to a global chessboard where two players could fight each other by remote control. Yet, at least one speaker of that era would attempt to dramatize the ridiculous aspect of such an idea by confiding to amazed audiences that yes, half of the equipment necessary to implement the concept

of pushbutton warfare had been designed, built, tested, and was even then in operation. He would then gleefully hold up a pushbutton—*attached to nothing*.

The image of that unattached pushbutton kept recurring during the reading of these two books on the subject of nuclear command and control. Both of them tell us in effect that if a President under attack were to “push the button,” nothing much might happen. They lay before us in great detail the vulnerabilities of the systems, that the great chess players have been assuming all along would function effectively. The authors remind us again and again that systems for the command and control of nuclear warfare are so complex that it is a wonder that they function in the first place, that they probably will not work well under the stress of sudden, heavy loading, and that under attack they might not work at all.

The two books cover much of the same material, but differ in their approach and in their ultimate conclusions. Daniel Ford, *The Button*, has taken a journalistic approach (portions of the book first appeared in *The New Yorker*) by visiting defense sites, interviewing officials, and describing what he saw and heard. Bruce Blair, *Strategic Command and Control*, who was then with the Brookings Institution and is now with the Defense Communications Agency, has written more of an “insider’s” book, relying heavily on congressional testimony and on his analysis of defense budgets. Both describe the

vulnerabilities of our existing command and control system in enough detail to convince any Soviet nuclear strategist that it ought to be a high priority target system.

However, the authors draw somewhat different conclusions from their analyses. Ford sees the vulnerabilities of our nuclear command and control system as both the cause and the reflection of a U.S. first strike strategy, which he claims is the strategy preferred by U.S. military planners. Blair attempts to avoid the dead end of such a strategy by recommending that we adopt the alternative strategy of riding out an enemy attack, and that we use our command and control system not to launch an immediate second strike under attack, but to enhance the survival of the nuclear forces. His proposal of “no immediate second use” is an attempt to relieve the intense pressure on the President that would be created by the perception of an imminent enemy attack. He describes the great difficulties that will arise at that critical moment when the national command authorities consider shifting from negative control of nuclear weapons to positive control. The difficulties include both organizational inertia and military overeagerness. Ford describes these same difficulties more colorfully by using such terms as safety catches, hairtriggers, and loaded dice.

When the history of the nuclear era is written, the 1980s will be remembered as the decade that command and control became recog-

nized as a central player. This recognition probably results from an appreciation of the likely effects of electromagnetic pulse and the deployment of Soviet SSBNs off our coasts. Our attention has been drawn to current vulnerabilities by the short time now estimated to be available for decision makers to assess the nature of an attack, to select a course of action, and to deliver the necessary orders, before our command and control system begins to be picked apart. But according to Blair, our nuclear command and control systems have throughout the nuclear age been more vulnerable and less capable than our nuclear strategists assumed them to be. He doubts that we have ever been capable of carrying out any of our nuclear strategies. And as for the present Administration's goal of fighting a protracted nuclear war, both authors consider such a strategy to be hopelessly beyond the capabilities of present and perhaps even of planned command and control systems.

Both authors paint a bleak picture, so bleak that Secretary of Defense Weinberger has found it necessary to assert that the two books contain "a great number of inaccuracies and poorly founded judgments." But whatever the facts, there is a difference between having a system that is vulnerable and having one that is totally incapable. The reader may find that in learning that his remarkably sophisticated command and control system may be seriously degraded by an

attack, he has also learned that the system that is now in place is remarkably sophisticated. And since rational decision makers on the other side cannot be assured that it will be totally incapable, the strategy of deterrence may continue to succeed. In the response quoted above to an inquiring senator, Secretary Weinberger encapsulates in a single sentence the "official" view of system vulnerabilities and of these two books: "I can state unequivocally that the present system, despite its current limitations, supports our national policy of deterrence and does not force us first to absorb a nuclear attack as suggested in Blair's conclusions or resort to the preemptive strike, implied as necessary by Ford."

These books describe how command and control vulnerabilities would undermine escalation control strategies by reducing the ability of either side in a conflict to perceive what level of conflict is being pursued by the other, how the same vulnerabilities tend to increase the pressure for the militarization of outer space, and how difficult it is for the individual services to procure command and control systems in a way that insures their overall coherence. But the most important issue raised by these books concerns the pressures placed on policy decision makers on both sides during a crisis between superpowers. As Ford points out, the military wisdom of striking first is reinforced by the recognition that one's own command and control system is so vulnerable that it is

reasonable to assume that it has been made a major target system by an opponent as a means of reducing damage to himself. The implications for rational decisionmaking by political leaders during a crisis are immense. Both authors argue that the vulnerabilities of some of our weapons systems pale to insignificance when compared to the impact of vulnerabilities of our nuclear command and control system. Ford is content to describe and deplore this state of affairs, while Blair at least advances an alternative strategy.

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Stares, Paul B. *The Militarization of Space U.S. Policy, 1945-1984*. New York: Cornell University Press, 1985. 352pp. \$25

Even the most casual observer of defense decisionmaking is aware that outer space is an integral part of Soviet and American military activity. According to Stares: "For those familiar with the history of the US military space programme, there must be a strong sense of *deja vu*. The very same weapon systems that are currently being developed were all proposed in a remarkably similar way during the 1950s and 1960s." The impetus for the development of space weapons being a direct result of fears caused by the launch of the Soviet satellite Sputnik in 1957. The anticipation that the United States would respond militarily to this threat led to proposals for a variety of space systems and weapons, including anti-

satellite (ASAT) weapons and space-based ballistic missile defenses.

Yet, Stares finds that while space developed as an important component of the U.S. military posture, the level of U.S. ASAT effort remained rather restrained, even after the U.S.S.R. began testing a satellite interceptor in 1968. Soviet interest in ASAT was similarly restrained and the tests that began in 1968 ceased in 1972 and were not to resume until 1976. Stares suggests that during this time ASAT was not a high-priority development project in either country. The fact that an arms race did not develop in space leads Stares to the first of the three questions around which he centers his study: "*Why were space weapons never extensively deployed by the United States and the Soviet Union when all the conditions were apparently ripe?*" On the basis of the findings presented in his study, Stares challenges the widely accepted theory that the absence of an arms race in space was the result of a tacit agreement reached between the United States and the U.S.S.R. not to interfere with the other's space systems because of the mutual benefits gained from reconnaissance satellites in strengthening the system of stable mutual deterrence. Instead, he hypothesizes that the absence of an arms race in space was not the result of the recognition of the benefits of satellite reconnaissance but rather: "the result of a convergence of national interests, military disincentives and technical constraints, which were buttressed at important times by formal agreements."

However, new perceptions of national interests, military incentives, and technical possibilities cause Stares to conclude that the chances of space remaining demilitarized are remote. He bases his prognosis on two recent developments: First, the active pursuit of ASAT systems by the Soviet Union and the United States. Second, the development of technology to create laser and particle beam weapons, whose most commonly noted missions are for ASAT and BMD. Stares concludes that the introduction of weapons for use in or from space does represent a qualitative departure from the dominant pattern of the past 25 years. This change leads to the second question around which his study is based: "What changed in the late 1970s to now make an arms race in space appear inevitable?" Stares hypothesizes that by the late 1970s, the factors that had served to restrain the development of an arms race in space began to change. According to Stares, the incentives for both sides to develop ASAT weapons increased: "as the services began to appreciate the 'force multiplier' effect of space systems for their traditional missions . . . satellites began to facilitate battlefield surveillance, tactical targeting and communication. They offered the chance of improving the lethality of weapons systems and the effectiveness of military forces generally. The net effect was twofold: the dependence on space systems increased, as did the threat they posed to terrestrial forces. Because satellites were both important to an

adversary and threatening to one's own forces, they became doubly attractive as military targets."

By the late 1970s, because of a combination of changes in national interests, military incentives and technical opportunities, ASAT restraint and arms control appeared to be of less and less military benefit whereas an active ASAT policy promised greater military benefit. According to Stares, the Reagan administration's policy represents a qualitative departure from the more restrained policy of previous Administrations and the beginning of a new era in U.S.-Soviet space activities.

This leads to the third question around which Stares focuses his study: "What are the likely implications of the development and use of antisatellite weapons?" In his conclusion, Stares outlines the possible results of an unrestrained ASAT competition. First, he notes that the drain on funding for space projects caused by higher military space expenditures may impose opportunity costs on the civil/commercial exploitation of space; furthermore, civil/commercial satellites are likely to be considered "fair game" for ASAT attacks in wartime. Second, Stares finds that as the West's level of dependence on space assets for war-fighting continues to increase, Soviet ASAT capabilities will increasingly threaten our ability to perform military support functions, such as global C³, navigation, and surveillance. Finally, Stares concludes that an unrestrained ASAT competition may undermine the strategic defense

initiative. If a shift to strategic defense is deemed mutually desirable, dedicated ASAT weapons may be used to attack the vulnerable space-based components of a BMD system. Any of the above actions would have a potentially destabilizing effect on the military balance. If one side perceived that its satellites were vulnerable to attack, in times of heightened tension there would be increasing pressure to conduct military missions dependent upon satellites before these satellites were destroyed.

Stares is not sanguine over the role that traditional arms control, with its emphasis upon qualitative and quantitative restrictions, might play in curbing the ASAT threat. Instead, he suggests that the United States and the U.S.S.R. might agree to certain cooperative measures in space, commonly referred to as "rules of the road." An analogue suggested by Stares is the U.S.-Soviet Incidents at Sea Agreement, which provides for rules of behavior for naval activities and also for consultative channels for resolving disputes.

This is a well-written, well-researched work and should serve as a needed corrective to the conventional wisdom on the military use of outer space. We are now engaged in debate over the role of the military in outer space and the extension of the arms race into space. Stares' book should be read and his recommendations carefully considered as a basis for informed participation in this debate.

LOUISE HODGDEN
Newport, Rhode Island

Rust, William J. *Kennedy in Vietnam: American Vietnam Policy, 1960-1963*. New York: Scribner, 1985. 241pp. \$15.95

Boettcher, Thomas D. *Vietnam: The Valor and the Sorrow*. Boston: Little, Brown, 1985. 472pp. \$27.50 paper \$14.95

Both of these works are contributions to the growing volume of Vietnam literature which attempts to reevaluate the roles played by senior advisors throughout the course of U.S. involvement and which consequently rejects the popular notion that the military establishment led the body-politique down the war-path.

William J. Rust has given us a tightly written review of a crucial period during the Vietnam era which is often overlooked by many who prefer to dwell on the more turbulent years which followed Kennedy's "1000 days." Relying heavily on interviews with major and minor players throughout the government, Mr. Rust provides an interesting glimpse at "the best and brightest" without the glitter. He focuses on the events which culminated in the November 1963 Generals' coup and subsequent assassination of Diem and Nhu, clearly indicting the Kennedy inner circle for its explicit role in them. In so doing, he offers fascinating insight into the means by which President Kennedy often arrived at decisions, bypassing established and systematic lines of authority to accept the advice of ad hoc study groups or minor officials. The

fragmentation of centralized control which naturally ensued is best exemplified by an incident which was to have vital repercussions. On 24 August 1963, the State Department released a message to the embassy in Saigon acknowledging Diem's expendability if his volatile brother Nhu could not be edged out of the political picture. The message, of obvious import in the Administration's overall position in Vietnam, was released without the knowledge of the Secretary of Defense or the Director of Central Intelligence.

Thomas D. Boettcher's book is nominally a first-rate textbook-style history of Vietnam from the beginning of French colonialism until April 1975, but it is at its best in examining the often tumultuous relationship which existed between the soldiers and the statesmen as early as the 1954 Dien Bien Phu crisis, when "General Ridgway's frank appraisal of the problems . . . in Viet Nam turned Eisenhower away from a troop commitment" against the advice of Secretary Dulles, who was preparing to signal France "that the U.S. was willing to move on the matter." In an even more telling passage, Mr. Boettcher describes Robert McNamara as one "who . . . looked upon the generals as men who had stayed in uniform after the Second World War because they couldn't make it in the civilian world."

This book goes far beyond personalities, though. It is first and foremost an exhaustive historical work which stands among the very best available. Mr. Boettcher has gone one step

further than standard pieces by giving us essentially a second book, printed in the margins of the main text, in which he provides the reader with what is best described as Vietnam trivia— anecdotes, quotations, photographs (over 500, superbly captioned), even an excerpt from the Soldier's Field Manual explaining the construction of Vietcong booby traps. This "book within a book" allows for a far broader understanding of the subject than that which is possible from a conventional history.

Mr. Boettcher's work should serve as the heart of any personal library of Vietnam literature. It is exceptionally well-documented and he uses personal interviews as effectively as Mr. Rust. While Mr. Rust's study is sometimes a little trite for serious history, "Max Taylor was Kennedy's kind of general," it is nevertheless an excellent account of a subject long overdue for dedicated independent analysis. Together with Mr. Boettcher's book, it is an attempt to interpret a crucial period in history which serves its purpose quite well.

LAWRENCE T. DIRITA
Lieutenant, U.S. Navy

Dallin, Alexander. *Black Box: KAL 007 and the Superpowers*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985. 180pp. \$14.95

Armed with a fellowship from the W. Averell Harriman Institute, Columbia University, the author examined the various theories about what happened and what caused the Korean Airlines Flight #007 to end up

in Soviet Air Space. Interviews were conducted in Moscow, Washington and in Montreal, home of the International Civil Aviation Organization. The author talked with knowledgeable people and has answered many of the theories that have been posed about the incident.

While a variety of explanations have emerged from the events surrounding the flight and its path to destruction, there are basically four that are examined. The first is the notion that it was caused by some equipment failure or an in-flight hijacking. The next is it all came about because there was human error, an undetected mistake, incapacitation or undetected cause during the flight. The third surmise is that the aircraft's crew (Captain, Co-Pilot and Flight Engineer) wanted to save time/fuel and therefore were taking a shortcut through Soviet airspace. Lastly, the author examines the idea that the crew was on some surreptitious mission for some foreign intelligence agency. Dallin examines all of them and compares the facts against the theories or hypotheses offered. None of these theories hold up well when fitted to the known facts. The reader is left with either believing that the necessary documents are locked in some security safe somewhere or there were some vital verbal exchanges on the flight deck that only the in-flight recorder will ever reveal, and that rests somewhere on the chilly bottom of the waters off Sakhalin Island. In any event, the facts do not fit any of the theories put forward so far.

Dallin devotes the remaining half of *Black Box* to examining the behavior of the two superpowers. He examines their actions and reduces them down to a handful of goals. The United States appears to have been concerned with labeling the Soviets as being totally devoid of morals and with any constraints of law. Dallin believes that data pictures an Administration that used the incident to generate support for itself and also for its defense programs. Lastly, the United States used the incident to initiate steps to reduce the likelihood of possible future recurrences. The Soviets, on the other hand, appear more concerned about what the controlling elite of the regime would think about the incident, pursuing a program of what Dallin labels "damage limitation." The attempt to limit the damage extends to the international community as well. They also attempted to undermine any U.S. allegation and also began to take those steps that would assure that a similar event, the penetration of their airspace, would not occur again.

The actual question of who destroyed the aircraft is clear. Also, the data shows that the Soviets knew what they were doing. An aircraft had entered their airspace and whether it was civilian or not was irrelevant. The reaction would be the same if it were military—bring it down one way or another. As Dallin states: "it is better to be safe (shoot it down), than to be sorry (let it leave the air space)."

The style is easy to read. The technical matters are reduced down

for the layman without being insulting. Anyone interested in how the powers handle incidents will find Dallin's work of great use. *Black Box* is excellent reading about a very tragic event.

PETER C. UNSINGER
San Jose State University

Fisher, David. *Morality and the Bomb: An Ethical Assessment of Nuclear Deterrence*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985. 136pp. \$25

The author of this short work is described on the book's jacket as a "civil servant with the Ministry of Defense." From the evidence of the book itself, it is clear that he is also a person trained in the techniques of contemporary British philosophy and that he is a Christian with a strong concern both for ethical values and for clarity of thought on a difficult subject. His book, because of its sober style and undramatic conclusions, will not generate great excitement, and it may be neglected because the author is not prominent in the American debate on these matters. But that would be unfortunate because this is probably the best work on the most important moral dilemma of our time.

Fisher's book is particularly valuable for the way in which it addressed a major lacuna in the U.S. Catholic bishops' letter on war and peace, namely, the letter's failure to give a satisfactory account of how the Western reliance on nuclear deterrence is to be justified. He begins by laying out the basic structure of

mutual deterrence and explaining why it is unlikely to fail. Like the American bishops and the ultimately rejected report of the Church of England working party, *The Church and the Bomb*, (1982), Fisher works within the just war tradition of thinking about justification for the use of force. With regard to the two fundamental norms of *jus in bello*, he affirms the principle of proportion and applies it to policy issues in a standard way without exploring its deeper difficulties. He also upholds the principle of noncombatant immunity, but he does allow exceptions to it on the basis of what he calls "principled consequentialism." On the basis of these principles he holds that there is "a strong moral presumption . . . against any use of nuclear weapons." On the other hand, he scrutinizes the alternatives to deterrence and finds them less satisfactory and more risky. Then, in an important and subtle chapter in which he pays careful attention to the ethical dilemmas confronting both political leaders and military commanders, he argues that the moral justification of deterrence is impossible "if one believes that any use of nuclear weapons would be morally impermissible." But, in Fisher's view, "it is not possible to establish in advance that there are no conceivable circumstances in which use, in some form, might be morally licit." Since deterrence does not depend for its effectiveness on the risk of unlimited escalation, which would violate the principle of proportionality, it can be justified as a means of preventing

war in general and nuclear war in particular. In two final chapters, he goes on to consider the bearing of his moral argument on declaratory policy and on disarmament policy.

Morality and the Bomb is heavy going in some places since it is written for a philosophically sophisticated audience, but it will repay careful study by any person interested in our developing a morally sound approach to deterrence. It is one book which explains both why deterrence makes a vital moral contribution to our society and why arms control is a morally urgent task. Its one major limitation is that the author's understandable preoccupation with the British debate, in which deterrence came under a stronger theoretical challenge, leads him to treat the American religious debate less fully than it deserves. But he has made a distinguished contribution to our common understanding of the deeper moral issues.

THE REVEREND JOHN LANGAN, S.J.
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Dougherty, James E. *The Bishops and Nuclear Weapons: The Catholic Pastoral Letter on War and Peace*. Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books, 1984. 245pp. \$22.50

This study provides the most thorough and balanced assessment to date of the American bishops' pastoral letter on war and peace issued in 1983. The study, published under the auspices of the Institute for Policy Analysis of Cambridge, describes the dominant theological and political forces influencing the drafting of the

letter, assesses the growing impact of pacifism on the American Catholic Church hierarchy, and reviews the teachings of the Catholic Church on the morality of nuclear weapons. A major strength of the book is that it provides a sympathetic, balanced yet critical assessment of the bishops' work. Dougherty probes beneath the simplistic slogans which have dominated the religious debate on nuclear arms by seeking to uncover the strengths and weaknesses of the bishops' argument. "The bishops are to be admired," he writes, "for adopting a courageous prophetic stance, for raising some tough questions about their own government's policy and for introducing a strong moral tone into the national debate about nuclear strategies." At the same time, Dougherty questions many of the letter's emphases and policy recommendations which he believes ultimately tend to undermine U.S. strategic policy.

Dougherty observes that the problem of nuclear weapons cannot be easily encompassed within the traditions of pacifism and just war. Indeed, deterrence requires a wholly new type of moral analysis if it is to adequately come to terms with the problems posed by nuclear technology. The author suggests that many of the letter's limitations can be attributed to the absence of any well-developed body of moral theory or church teachings on deterrence. The bishops' effort to base a qualified endorsement of deterrence on a pacifist-just war dichotomy is, in Dougherty's view, wholly unsatisfactory.

According to the author, one of the major shortcomings in the letter is that it gives too much attention to the preservation of the world and insufficient attention to the problem of Soviet expansionism. As Dougherty rightly notes, nuclear weapons have served not only to prevent nuclear war, but to inhibit Soviet imperialism. A morally satisfactory approach to nuclear weapons must be inspired not only by the fear of annihilation, but also by the call for world justice. Indeed, as George Weigel has observed, the posing of survival as the highest moral good runs directly contrary to the church's teachings for two thousand years. Justice, not survival, must be the clarion call of the church. A moral nuclear strategy must not only seek to reduce the probability of nuclear war, but it must also promote the common good by inhibiting the expansion of totalitarian tyranny. A significant failure of the pastoral letter is its failure to adequately relate the nuclear dilemma to Soviet imperialism.

There are no easy answers to the moral paradox of deterrence. Deterrence provides a crude and morally troubling strategy of peacekeeping. To renounce deterrence would be irresponsible; to endorse it without qualification would result, in all probability, in grave injustices. James Finn has stated the problem well: "one must currently choose between the unsatisfactory and the still more unsatisfactory. Anyone who thinks otherwise has not grasped the strange and desperate quality of our situa-

tion." The bishops do of course give conditional endorsement to deterrence, but what troubles Dougherty is that the bishops call into question the instruments by which the United States has historically operationalized nuclear deterrence. As Dougherty notes, "there is no such thing as an effective nuclear deterrent force without an operational doctrine to govern its use. Yet what the bishops seem to be calling for is a morally acceptable deterrent without a militarily credible doctrine to support it." Dougherty thinks—and the reviewer agrees—that the pastoral letter would have been much stronger had the bishops explored in greater depth the meaning of traditional moral principles to the problems of nuclear strategy and devoted less attention to specific policy recommendations. By focusing on issues of operational character, the bishops venture into a highly complex arena in which they have limited technical competence.

Those who have followed the moral debate on nuclear strategy will find this book a stimulating and insightful study. While the book is written for those who are generally familiar with the bishops' letter and who have some background in the moral dilemma of nuclear weapons, it would have been helpful had the author presented a summary of the essential elements of the bishops' argument before examining key moral issues in the debate. Overall, however, this is a thoughtful, informed study which illuminates the

contribution of the pastoral letter to the nuclear moral debate.

MARK R. AMSTUTZ
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Koch, H.W., ed. *Aspects of the Third Reich*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985. 611pp. \$29.95

No questions, no history. Huge chunks of the past are exempt from historical inquiry because no one wants to know about them. It is only when people ask questions, only where there is a problem, that a period, or an issue, will be addressed. In our time, for instance, formerly unexplored areas of our past have become relevant, and so there is now women's history, black history, world history, comparative history, the history of sexuality, the history of death. Investigation arises when people want the facts, and help in interpreting them.

The Third Reich never lacked for questions. This book of essays by German and British authors addresses the question: Are our customary views about Hitler's Germany still valid, or do we need to revise our conclusions in light of new evidence, new times, new problems? Was the Third Reich a modern, or an anti-modern phenomenon? Did it radically break with history, or can it be seen in terms of continuity? Did Hitler follow a master plan, or did he improvise? How much of the Third Reich is biography, and how much reflected broadly based contemporary wishes?

Ernest Nolte, dean of scholars of generic fascism, gives the overall answer: "the innermost core of the negative picture of the Third Reich needs no revision." What the essays in this book do mainly is to amplify, not alter, our knowledge of the period. Here are some points. *Mein Kampf* was a product of a particular time in Hitler's development. It is a fair indicator of the future, but Hitler was an improviser and new circumstances influenced him. Hitler's rise to power was helped by the absence in the Weimar constitution of any prohibition of parties whose explicit purpose was to overthrow the republic. Hitler could be, and was, entirely candid about his intention to take power legally in order legally to overthrow the democracy.

The organization of government was a management nightmare, with a confused, overlapping, and turf-obsessed hierarchy. Hitler alone stood as the integrating figure. His enormous popularity was decisive, and flowed from the skill and passion with which he expressed the deep longing for a classless, organic community that was, probably the most common characteristic of the Germans. It turns out that it was the leader of the army, dominated by this longing for Volksgemeinschaft, who took the initiative to establish the Fuehrer oath, hoping to establish a mystic relationship between the head of state and the armed forces as in the days of the emperors.

The genesis of the "final solution" is explained in terms of this unique authority of Hitler. A Fuehrer order,

the message that "the Fuehrer wished it," overrode law, humanity, and restraint, and carried through the genocide. There did not need to be, and there was not, a simple written order. Hitler's wish was enough. This is true, but narrow concentration on whether Hitler explicitly gave an order for the extermination of the Jews fails to take into account what scholars like R. Hilberg have shown: that the extermination came at the end of a process. Anti-Semitism became industrialized murder through the bureaucratic machinery of the modern state. First Jews were identified, then concentrated, then removed, and then, finally, killed—systematically, by the apparatus of the state. It was this process, well advanced by the time of the invasion of Russia, that enabled people to accept the final Fuehrer order.

The most original article here is by Nolte. He argues we must see the Third Reich anew, always in a broad historical context and never just as an isolated phenomenon, but no longer so dependent on the old totalitarian model which has, for the 1980s, lost much of its factual authority and interpretative vigor. Nolte proposes another historical connection in terms of the history of what he calls the "annihilation strategy" in Western politics. He shows that the idea of the annihilation of whole groups, one way or the other, goes back to the days of the French Revolution and Napoleon, to the industrial revolution, and, most importantly, was carried on in the Sovietization of Russia which Hitler

watched so carefully. In those times annihilation applied to classes or political groups (aristocrats, counter-revolutionists, opposing armies, capitalists, kulaks, etc.). The Third Reich applied it to "radical" groups, and the result was genocide. And, Nolte somberly adds, we still see annihilation strategies practiced in our day. Thus, the Nazi regime may be investigated "historico-genetically" within this trend of world history.

But whatever our perspective, this book shows there is no need to change our enduring negative judgments, our final moral denouncement, of the Third Reich. Nolte concludes: ". . . from the history of the Third Reich there must result the fundamental insight that the absence of *annihilating* measures towards political, economic, social or biological groups is the great distinction of that society which, with all its weaknesses, we call the liberal one."

GEORGE W. BAER
Naval War College

Terraine, John. *A Time for Courage: The Royal Air Force in the European War, 1939-1945*. New York: Macmillan, 1985. 816pp. \$29.95

A unique one-volume history of RAF European Operations during World War II by one of Britain's leading military historians whose works have earned him the Chesney Gold Medal—the highest award of the Royal United Services Institute for Defense Studies.

While the central focus of the book is on the RAF during the war in

Europe, the book begins with the origins of the RAF toward the end of World War I, its struggle for survival against the disarmers, the other Services, and the budget cutters in Whitehall; and, its appearance at the beginning of World War II as a modern air force which, in the opinion of its author, was to hold "... for much of the time the place of honor on the right of the line, as the Black Prince and his men did at Crecy." This volume is hard to put down despite its weight and length as Terraine assesses and analyzes the role of the RAF, its missions, organization, equipment, aircraft, its leaders and their personalities and its enemies. It is a critical analysis of the RAF's leadership, policies, plans and organization for war, and its conduct of the war in relation to its prewar preparations and the harsh realities of battle. Meticulously researched, brilliantly written with lucid detail, the author discusses the period of preparation for war; the development of new systems, weapons and organizations; strategic, tactical and doctrinal development and change; the predominant role of the bomber and Bomber Command in RAF thinking; an analysis of the "knock-out blow" thesis; the strengths and weaknesses of its leaders; and how the test of battle showed so much was wanting.

The main themes examined in detail in *A Time of Courage* include the expansion of the RAF for war; the decisive victory of Fighter Command in the Battle of Britain, including a sharp rebuke of Leigh Mallory and a

strong criticism of his own countrymen for not recognizing even posthumously the great deed of Air Marshal Dowding, the leader of the Few, who saved England in the summer of 1940; the RAF's role in the Battle of the Atlantic; the victories in the Desert and Mediterranean where the methods of Army cooperation and air support were forged and prepared the way for Overlord; and, the pyrrhic victory and glory of Bomber Command though the author admits to being displeased with the morality of the methods adopted by Bomber Command. But indicative of both the objectivity of the author and his willingness to draw conclusions, he points out that possibly the greater immorality was to lose the war to Nazi Germany.

This is must reading not just for students of airpower and World War II, but strategists, historians and even our present-day military reformers. This is military history the way it should be written.

BENSON D. ADAMS
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Hough, Richard. *The Great War at Sea, 1914-1918*. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 1983. 353pp. £14.50

Richard Hough has provided a highly readable and powerful appreciation of the global dimensions and revolutionary character of the Great War at sea, which proved in many respects the decisive strategic arena. Moreover, it was a conflict which, at least in prefatory competition,

mirrors all too sharply the conventional confrontation between the United States and Soviet Union; i.e., a beleaguered global maritime power challenged by the naval expansion of the predominant continental power.

The undiminished controversy engulfing both the strategic and tactical conduct of the war has accorded great significance to unprecedented scale and scope, as well as the impact of revolutionary weapons evident in naval warfare—the maneuvering and fighting of turbine-driven dreadnoughts of unimagined size, speed, and firepower; the impact of the mine, torpedo, and submarine; and the unfulfilled promise of combined operations. These all served in varying degrees to cast the strategic potentialities of balanced naval power beyond the grasp of most statesmen, and its tactical implications outside the corporate experience of captains and senior commanders.

In assessing the evolution of these developments, Hough deftly juxtaposes two navies of sharply contrasting traditions and purposes.

With particular facility for tactical and technical considerations, Hough effectively develops the frustrations and failures typifying emergence of the “new” naval warfare: the quixotic attempt to relieve Antwerp; the suspense and ineptitude of the chase of the *Goeben* and *Breslau*; the tragedy of Coronel and the undisputed victory at the Falklands; the lack of a “second Trafalgar”; and a host of colorful, if occasionally obscure, developments;

e.g., Room 40 and the captured German ciphers, German raids on the English coast, and the legendary exploits of British submarine commanders in the Baltic and Mediterranean, as well as of the fabled Q-ships.

Materiel, leadership, and the frictions of war comprised the essential elements of this great conflagration, and it is here that Hough’s narrative power soars: the outgunned but better protected Germans’ intent upon attrition of elements of the Grand Fleet; the faster and more powerful British desirous of the decisive victory but constrained by the plodding caution of Jellicoe; the prudent but able German leadership of Scheer and Hipper; and a plethora of operational and technical failures. While judgments of operational decisions will remain contentious, Hough generally defends Jellicoe’s cautious approach as successful in thwarting Scheer’s objective of piecemeal attrition, instead confronting the German commander with the full weight of the Grand Fleet. For as Churchill noted, Jellicoe was the only man who could have lost the war in an afternoon.

Jutland was, and has remained, the greatest naval battle in history, replete with the inextricable question of who “won.” Strategically the British were clearly triumphant. Despite extraordinary violence, the Grand Fleet was ready for renewed action the next day; the Germans, with many units barely afloat, could not muster an effective force for months. But more importantly, there was little inclination to mount

another serious challenge. With the Germans thus confined to port, the British tightened their control of the world's oceans, moved rapidly to correct the technical deficiencies evident at Jutland, eventually contained the U-boat menace, and, with the surrender of the German Fleet, experienced the greatest naval triumph in history.

Hough's insights and expository powers in the tactical sphere should not obscure serious limitations with regard to strategic and policy considerations. For example, insufficient interest is evident in the organizational developments and policy battles of the prewar years in which, even after the 1911 decision in favor of a Continental strategy toward Germany, a policy for the optimum employment of naval power might have been salvaged. Concomitantly, efforts at naval staff development and actual war planning are inadequately appreciated. This skewed perspective is particularly evident in the author's treatment of the Dardanelles campaign, which has served as a foil for various strategic perspectives since. He attributes little merit to the effort, but not through appreciation of the strategic dilemmas confronting policymakers by early 1915. Rather, the enterprise is dismissed as a "sideshow," a misunderstanding of seapower (the "true" nature of which is obscure), and as a *naval* expedition promoted by the impulsive and erratic Churchill. Hough's lengthy enumeration of technical difficulties and tactical malfeasance is valid; but the critical

strategic question of widening the war militarily to accommodate the political dimension of war aims and termination is cursorily dismissed, yet ultimately comprises the strategic imperative of maritime power in global war.

These deficiencies notwithstanding *The Great War at Sea* is well worth the read. Its treatment of men in action is a model of the art, and its exposition of the radical alteration of naval war from the romantic ideal of Trafalgar to the exigencies of a modern global maritime campaign superb. There is much to learn here about the Elephant and the Whale.

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Ulanoff, Stanley M., ed. *American Wars and Heroes: Revolutionary War through Vietnam*. New York: Arco, 1985. 378pp. \$19.95

This book is an adaptation—or perhaps more accurately, an abridgement—of *American Military History*, which is an ongoing project of the Office of the Chief of Military History, United States Army.

As is true with many official histories, this is long on description and short on analysis, especially when social and economic considerations might be involved. But in fairness, a lot of military history is compressed into a single volume. Also to be expected is the focus on land operations, although sea and air come into their own from time to time. One interesting example can be drawn from the discussion of Gen. Ulysses

S. Grant's operations in 1862 to take Fort Henry, on the Tennessee River. Grant proposed a joint Army-Navy expedition, with him commanding 15,000 men ". . . supported by armored gunboats and river craft of the U.S. Navy under Flag Officer Andrew H. Foote." This success was quickly followed by the surrender of Fort Donelson, the significance of which was described as follows: "The loss of the two forts dealt the Confederacy a blow from which it never fully recovered . . . Foreign governments took special notice of the defeats. For the North the victories were its first good news of the war. They set the strategic pattern for further advance into the Confederacy. In Grant the people had a new hero and he was quickly dubbed 'Unconditional Surrender' Grant."

In reading the circumstances surrounding the origins of the Spanish-American War, one is struck by the possible similarities to ambiguous crises involving naval forces in foreign ports and waters. Are these forces there to protect American lives and property, or are they hostages to the designs and aspirations of conspirators or politicians who are uninterested in mediation or the peaceful settlement of disputes? Nonetheless, the Naval War College comes in for some complimentary words, being singled out as having ". . . provided the Navy with a strong corps of professional officers trained in the higher levels of warfare and strategy, including the far-ranging doctrines of Mahan."

The book ends with the war in Vietnam, and takes no sides in the current and sometimes heated debate over "who lost Vietnam," which is a blessing. The conclusion does sum up neatly the book as a whole, and concludes on a modest note. "In Vietnam, the United States Army fought a war of contrasts . . . In a way it was two wars, a military campaign involving a compendium of all the Army had learned from the Revolution through Korea and at the same time a vast civic action project, using the men and tools of war in the task of winning the confidence and support of a people. For the United States, Vietnam was a limited war in the classic sense of the American Revolution, the War of 1812, the Indian wars, the wars with Mexico and Spain, and Korea. In the same way that history cannot prophesy, only illuminate, this war of contrasts produced no clear pattern for the warfare of the future."

The writing style is understated, but very clear; the maps and charts are helpful; the detail does not get in the way of the larger strategic picture. In sum, the book makes for a "good read."

ROBERT S. JORDAN
Naval War College and
the University of New Orleans

Lavery, Brian. *The Ship of the Line*.

Volume I: *The Development of the Battlefleet 1650-1850*.
Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1983. 224 pp. \$29.95

Volume II: *Design, Construction and Fittings*. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1984. 191pp. \$29.95

At last there is a study of British warship design and development in the sailing era which can match the work of Howard Chapelle on the U.S. Navy and Jean Boudriot on the French Navy. Without question, Lavery's two-volume, richly illustrated study is the definitive work on the British ship of the line. Unlike Chapelle or Boudriot, Lavery has illustrated his work with original manuscript drawings, original builder's models, prints, paintings, and documents, making it even more attractive and interesting to the historian. For the first time, Lavery has described each ship and class, showing precisely how and why changes were made. This carefully documented study makes it impossible for any responsible historian in the future to repeat the old commonplace that there were no significant technological changes in warship design between the eras of Drake and Nelson.

Of the two volumes, volume I, covering the general historical background contains the more interesting and useful information for readers of this journal. It includes a succinct 150-page summary of British naval history between 1588 and 1845. Volume II is devoted to technical developments in hull design, construction, sails, rigging, armament, decoration, and fitting.

As Drake and Hawkins revolutionized the English Navy by converting

it to gunnery by 1588, so Cromwell and the leaders of his navy revolutionized it with the use of the broadside by the time of the first Dutch war. These innovations seem to have been the cumulative effect of several gradual developments over more than a half century, involving changes in ship-based practices, methods of securing guns, and the allocation of gun crews as well as hull-design changes to achieve greater speed. Then, the flag officers in tactical command began to use their fleets or squadrons as a unit, instead of in a *melée*, ship on ship. Once these complex trends came together and became part of the many compromises which must be made between armament, speed, cost, and other factors, then the ship of the line became a recognizable and established concept.

Before the next phase in development could proceed in the years after 1653, some basic questions needed to be answered: What is the best size for a ship of the line? Are three decks better than two? How much fire-power should ships of various sizes have? The answers to these questions were first formulated in the shipbuilding program of 1677. But the design initiative begun here was lost quickly largely because of political interference from Parliament, poor naval administration, and rash experimentation. By 1697, an era of stagnation had set in which perpetuated attitudes and practices that were not changed until the War of 1739-48 demonstratively proved the inadequacy of British ship design.

In the first 30 years of the 18th century, British warships tended toward greater breadth, depth and height above water. From the 1740s onward, these trends were reversed, so that by the Seven Years' War, British warships were more weathery, more stable, and more heavily armed than their predecessors. What changed most, however, was size. Compared with those built only a little earlier, by 1763 British warships were longer, heavier, and more suitable for global naval warfare. With Britain's victory over France that year, a new period of conservatism set in. Between 1763 and Britain's defeat in the American War in 1783, the Royal Navy emphasized standardization rather than progress. Size and layout changed little during this period. Though carronades were introduced along with copper sheathing, the Royal Navy was not saved from total defeat by these small innovations, but rather by the strategic failure of her numerically superior enemies. The Franco-Spanish-Dutch coalition failed to take advantage of its members' joint strength; collectively they employed their preferred strategy from the past when they were each weaker powers. It was a mistake to think, as they once had, that they could cause more damage by avoiding action than by fighting. At the moment of Britain's greatest weakness, she avoided disaster by luck.

The French Navy was the decisive force in the allied victory of 1781 which led to American independence. Although 13 American colonies were lost, the rest of the British Empire was saved to grow into an even more formidable power. The defeat jarred the Royal Navy from its rut. The British built more and larger ships of the line.

The great change in tactics brought to a head by Nelson also carried with it a change in design. For the old line of battle, ships were built to be strong at the sides only, their weak bows and sterns protected by the next ship in the line. The new tactics changed this, exposing the weakest parts to the full force of a broadside. Ships now exposed their sterns, the weakest part of all. In order to remedy this, the open galleries, festooned with carvings, were removed and replaced with a closed stern that allowed more protection and permitted the effective employment of stern armament. By 1816, rounded sterns with diagonal bracing were used. This last innovation allowed British ships to retain their strength despite their increasing size. In the 1820s and 1830s further improvements were made to increase speed, to employ iron in construction, to modify underwater lines, and to arrange the decks in a new manner. By 1840, the ship of the line had reached the peak of its technology, on the very eve of its obsolescence.

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RECENT BOOKS

Selected Accessions of the Naval War College Library

Annotated by

Christine Babcock, Lynda Bronaugh, and George Scheck

Ademuni-Odeke, Dr. *Protectionism and the Future of International Shipping*. Dordrecht; Boston: M. Nijhoff; Hingham, Mass.: Distributors for the United States and Canada, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1984. 446pp. \$89.50

In this work Dr. Ademuni-Odeke has provided a thorough analysis of recent developments in international shipping and prospects for the future. The author focuses on protectionism and how it has affected the establishment and development of national fleets. Traditional methods of flag preference, flag discrimination, cargo reservations, cabotage restrictions, state intervention, and maritime subsidies are all discussed in detail. Since World War II the number of national fleets has increased dramatically, while the maritime shipping industry has suffered a decline. The author concludes with a call for cooperation instead of competition as a solution to this dilemma.

Alexiev, Alexander R. *The Soviet Campaign Against INF: Strategy, Tactics, Means*. Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand, 1985. 44pp. no price

This Rand note deals with Soviet efforts to undermine the NATO deployment of intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF). Despite the failure of the Soviet initiative Alexiev maintains that an understanding of the logic and strategy behind the campaign is worthy of consideration. He explains that the Soviets engaged in a bilevel effort to thwart the NATO INF decision. The "campaign from above" was aimed at creating a split in the alliance itself while the "campaign from below" involved the exploitation of European popular movements. Alexiev warns that the remarkable organizational and political capabilities exhibited by this Soviet effort could present long-term problems for West Germany and NATO.

Beckett, Ian and Pimlott, John, eds. *Armed Forces & Modern Counter-Insurgency*. New York: St. Martin's, 1985. 232pp. \$27.50

Based on recent counterinsurgency operations, this book presents an international overview of modern strategies and techniques. Each chapter considers a different army's experience and examines aspects of their counterinsurgency strategy. While the resources and techniques vary from army to army, certain general principles emerge, such as the importance of the ideological struggle. The editors contend that there is no clear blueprint for success in this most-difficult-to-counter form of conflict.

Consensus and Confrontation: the United States and the Law of the Sea Convention: a Workshop of the Law of the Sea Institute, January 9-13, 1984, Honolulu, Hawaii. Honolulu: Law of the Sea Institute, University of Hawaii, 1985. 576pp. \$29.50

The Third Law of the Sea Conference began in 1974 to negotiate a comprehensive treaty that would clarify global ocean issues. Although the United States was a primary participant from the start, by the time the convention was completed in 1982, the United States refused to sign. In 1984 a workshop was held to determine what had happened and why. This book is a collection of edited papers and discussions from the workshop organized by subject. The topics include customary international law, deep seabed mining, freedom of navigation, fishing issues, environmental protection, and enforcement.

Currie, Kenneth M. and Varhill, Gregory, eds. *The Soviet Union: What Lies Ahead?* Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1985. 804pp. \$18.00

This compendium was selected from papers presented at a 1980 conference in Reston, Virginia on the topic of Soviet military and political affairs in the 1980s. While the papers are arranged under seven general headings, the scope of many of the papers renders them applicable to more than one subject category. The first section of the book looks at Soviet military decisionmaking, traditions and leadership, followed by a section on the U.S.S.R. as a global power. Subsequent sections discuss Soviet military capabilities, military economy, armed forces organization and strategy.

Garthoff, Raymond L. *Détente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations From Nixon to Reagan.* Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1985. 1147pp. \$39.95

Raymond Garthoff provides a detailed study of American-Soviet relations from 1969 to 1984. The approach is a chronological analysis of world events within the context of détente—its development, decline, and revitalization. Garthoff's research is well-documented and embellished with personal recollections and interviews from his experience in government service. Despite its problems, Garthoff believes in détente and concludes with the hope that a more realistic approach by both the United States and the Soviet Union will lead to its future success.

Jagota, S.P. *Maritime Boundary.* Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 1985. 388pp. \$57.50

This study of maritime boundary deals with the outer limits of maritime zones, as well as with the delimitation of maritime zones between states with opposite or adjacent coasts. Based on a series of lectures delivered by the author at The Hague Academy of International Law in 1981, the book has been updated through 1983, with an addendum through 1984. Jagota's approach is chronological within four main parts to demonstrate the evolution of international law: scope and limits of maritime zones, treaties and agreements, judicial, arbitral and other decisions, and maritime boundary at the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, 1973-1982. A list of agreements on maritime boundary and sample texts from UNCLOS are included in the annexes.

McConnell, James M. *A Possible Change in Soviet Views on the Prospects for Antisubmarine Warfare*. Alexandria, Va.: Center for Naval Analyses, Naval Planning, Manpower, and Logistics Division, 1985. 16pp. no price

Recent Soviet developments in the area of antisubmarine warfare are analyzed in this CNA professional paper. The major premise is a shift in the Soviet view from the 1970s to the 1980s in terms of the success of ASW methods. The sources used by the author are from the unclassified literature and are interpreted with a keen eye for Soviet implications. The paper is concisely written and well-documented. According to McConnell, the Soviets have changed from projecting a strong confidence in submarine ASW to indicating that a new technological breakthrough in ASW is imminent and likely to be nonacoustic and space-based in nature. The author further speculates that the Soviet method of attack after long-range detection would be sea-based ballistic strikes against mobile naval targets.

McNaughter, Thomas L. *Arms and Oil: U.S. Military Strategy and the Persian Gulf*. Washington: Brookings Institution, 1985. 226pp. \$26.95

McNaughter offers a strategy designed to safeguard U.S. interests in the Gulf region by integrating American forces into the existing security framework there. He would leave responsibility for internal security to the individual states and encourage the cooperation of allies historically involved in regional security. U.S. forces could be used to protect the oil-rich states from external attack and deter Soviet encroachment in the area. McNaughter believes that the United States should combine its military strategy with its diplomacy, cultivating regional security mechanisms and supporting rather than jeopardizing the legitimacy of local rulers.

Michie, Donald and Johnson, Rory. *The Knowledge Machine; Artificial Intelligence and the Future of Man*. New York: Morrow, 1985. 300pp. \$16.95

Artificial intelligence is a topic that has generated much interest as computers become more complex and approach "true thinking machines." This book is a well-organized, interesting introduction to the field for both the "computer literate" and the intelligent layman. There is an appendix of basic computer concepts that the author recommends for reading by the novice before beginning the text. The text itself discusses "expert systems," computer interaction with human affairs, intellectual skills and the human brain, machine learning, information theory, and computer applications in art, language, philosophy, industry, and the military. A glossary and suggestions for further reading are also included.

Nixon, Richard M. *No More Vietnams*. New York: Arbor House, 1985. 240pp. \$14.95

In his third book on American foreign policy since his resignation from the Presidency, Mr. Nixon provides a personalized history of the Vietnam War as well as a plan of action for current and future U.S. involvement in the Third World. The approach is informal, more in line with a political speech than documented research, but the author has a unique foundation of experience from which to draw his conclusions. The title, *No More Vietnams*, is paradoxical in nature. Contrary to a call for U.S. isolationism, Mr. Nixon attempts to dispel what he considers the myths of the Vietnam War in hopes of generating a new sense of American nationalism and international realism.

Oseth, John M. *Regulating U.S. Intelligence Operations; a Study in Definition of the National Interest*. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1985. 236pp. \$24.00

In the wake of public and congressional scrutiny of U.S. intelligence operations in the 1970s, three Presidents have sought to resolve the questions that surfaced at that time. This book, written by a career Army intelligence officer who is currently an Army Fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies at Georgetown University, examines the need for regulation. He focuses on the controls, constraints, and accountability procedures for intelligence operations as traced through succeeding Administrations, and how they reflect the values of society and our national purposes. A selected bibliography as well as an index are included.

Rocco, Raymond G. and Dziak, John J. *Bibliography on Soviet Intelligence and Security Services*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1985. 203pp. \$16.00

This annotated bibliography is intended as a guide to literature on Soviet security and intelligence services published in both Russian and English language sources. It is intended as an aid to researching the role of Soviet intelligence in both domestic politics and world affairs. The entries cover approximately 500 books, periodical articles, and government documents and includes both first-person and secondary source accounts. A chronology of KGB/GRU leadership is included, as well as an author/source index. Annotations vary from several lines to nearly half a page and are numbered for easy reference.

The Sandinista Military Build-up. Rev. ed. Washington: U.S. Dept. of State. Bureau of Public Affairs, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1985. 40pp. \$1.75

This is the third State Department report issued in the last two years dealing with the rapidly accelerating military buildup of Nicaragua and its political implications in Central America. The study focuses in detail on each aspect of the military organization, particularly ground and air forces where the buildup has been most pronounced. Specific types, sources, and quantities of equipment are presented in a concise narrative format supplemented by photographs and maps. Issues such as Cuban and Soviet assistance, terrorist connections, and mandatory conscription are highlighted.

Segal, Gerald. *Defending China*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1985. 264pp. \$29.95

Mr. Segal's purpose in writing *Defending China* is "to provide answers to the basic questions of why and how China uses force in its foreign policy." He has divided his book into two sections to answer these questions. The first section is an analysis of the influence of four key factors (geography, history, ideology and institutions) on the determination of Chinese strategy. The second section is composed of eight comparative case studies of recent incidents (1950-1979) involving the use of armed force in areas adjacent to China. The book is well organized and clearly written with a final chapter that summarizes the author's conclusions.