



NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

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NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

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FOREWORD

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Cover: Anchor from the 36-gun frigate U.S.S. *Constellation*, launched on 7 September 1797. Displayed in the International Park, NWC, as a tribute to Esau Kempenaar's efforts to promote the cause of international friendship. Photo by Jim Deffet.



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PRESIDENT'S NOTES

In May of this year I visited the People's Republic of China as a member of the U.S. Military Education and Training delegation. Our group, 14 military officers from all services and a civilian interpreter, was in China for 16 days. We visited a number of Army, Navy and Air Force training installations as well as advanced schools and were able to gain a good exposure to the PRC military and their systems of training and education.

This visit reciprocated the U.S. visit of PRC Vice Minister of Defense Xiao Ke and his Military Academies delegation in October of 1980. Our delegation was led by LTG William R. Richardson, USA, then Commandant of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College and now the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, U.S. Army, and included the Commandants of the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, the U.S. Army Infantry School and the USAF Air Command and Staff College as well as specialists in education and training from all services. RADM Don Jones, Director of East Asia and Pacific Region, OASD/ISA, did a superb job in organizing and administering the trip. The U.S. Defense Attaché, BG Webb, accompanied us throughout most of the tour in China. The U.S. Naval Attaché, CAPT Sam Monk, was with us in Shanghai.

I should say from the outset that we were received most cordially at every stop. We traveled in-country on an aging but well-maintained IL-18 aircraft. Since most of the installations



visited were out in the country, we also spent many hours in cars and Japanese minibuses making our way through crowded village streets and along narrow country roads. We were told that photographs were permitted everywhere except at air training fields and below-decks on ships (we didn't go below-decks).

We spent our first 3 days in Beijing where we met with government and military officials, visited the People's Liberation Army (PLA) Military Academy and had discussions with the Secretary-General of the Beijing International Strategic Issues Association. We also had a meeting with Geng Biao, Vice Premier and Minister of Defense.

In Dalian, we visited the Surface Ship Academy, a 4-year midshipman school for surface line officers. Submariners and aviators receive their training at separate schools. There were 1,000 midshipmen in training under the guidance of 300 instructors. Entrants come from high school or from the fleet; all have to pass the national college entrance exam. The dropout rate is 20 percent, usually in the first year. It is truly a Spartan environment. About 30 percent of the curriculum is dedicated to political indoctrination. We also learned here (and this seemed to be a common practice) that instructors usually spend

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an entire career at one institution and that there is little rotation between sea duty and instructor duty.

In Dalian we also visited the Army School for basic officer training and toured an impressive air raid shelter that runs for 10 miles under the heart of the city and holds 40,000 people.

We then flew to Shenyang for a Sunday climb of Mt. Qianshan, a visit to a hot springs where we all soaked in very hot baths, and a tour of Machine Tool Factory #1.

Next came Shijiazhuang and a visit to the Armor School where 1,000 students were training for regimental and higher command. We visited classrooms and the firing range where tanks engaged in subcaliber live firing exercises. As we saw throughout the trip, the PRC military practices great economy in training, and some of their training devices and training aids are quite ingenious. At the 4th Flying School of the Air Force, in addition to classroom tours and briefings, a flight demonstration was given using propeller and jet trainers.

In Xian, the ancient capital of China, our tour took us to the Engineering College of the Air Force where 2,500 officers are trained at college level in aircraft maintenance, airfield construction and aeronautical engineering. We also made a visit to the 4th Military Medical College where medical officers for all services are trained. The college produces 450 graduates annually. The hospital that serves this college has done some pioneering work in the restoration of severed limbs and the treatment of burns.

Nanjing brought visits to the 179th Infantry Division where we witnessed basic and field training, including weapons firings and a tour of the 1st Ground Surface Artillery School. An interesting note is that the army division grows 50 percent of the food it consumes. We also cruised on the Yangtze, truly a mighty river.

At Nanjing, I was particularly interested in our visit to the Naval College of the P.L.A., which is the counterpart of our Naval War College. In 1952, a Naval Department was added to the P.L.A.'s Military College; this led to the establishment of this separate college in 1957. The regressive effect of the Cultural Revolution beginning in 1966 was felt here, as it was throughout institutions of higher learning throughout China, for the Naval College was closed from 1969 to 1977.

The Naval College is a "command college" for training middle and high-ranking commanding officers of the Navy. There are six classes: (1) Senior Commanding Officers Class (short-term professional research training); (2) Combined Arms Commanding Officers Class (2 years); (3) Naval Air Force Commanding Officers Class (1 year); (4) Rear Services Commanding Officers Class (1 year); (5) Staff Officers Class (1 year); and (6) Political Officers Class (1 year). There are 554 students enrolled with 212 teachers; students are not accompanied by dependents. Most of the faculty have been with the college since its inception with the exception of the shutdown period when most of them had to work in the fields.

There are also 100 students engaged solely in research; other students can also take an active part in the research in an elective capacity. Reportedly, the teachers in the Research Department participate regularly in the formulation and revision of directives on naval doctrine and training, in exercise maneuvers and analysis, in tactical and technical evaluation of weapons and equipment, and in scientific research.

We were able to join in very productive discussions with faculty members. We ran into expected communication problems, but overall we had very frank exchanges.

Our final stop was Shanghai, advertised as "the most populous and most polluted city in the world." Here we

toured five ships of the East China Sea Fleet. All of these ships were built in China and the Chinese are quite proud of their shipbuilding achievements. The ships were fully dressed with officers and men manning the rails.


No submarines were present. When asked, the delegation was told that the submarines were "elsewhere conducting training." We did make topside tours of a *Luda*-class destroyer, a frigate, a mine-sweeper, a submarine chaser and an escort boat. The destroyer and frigate are fitted with surface-to-surface missiles. All guns and armaments were well-maintained. Most of the equipment is quite old, and the naval leadership with whom we spoke stressed their need for modern defense technology.

Officers formerly were able to be commissioned from the ranks as well as upon graduation from an academy. Since 1980, a policy has been adopted that all officers must go to college or academies for their studies prior to commissioning.

Military service in the enlisted ranks is compulsory—5 years for sea duty, 4 years for shore duty. All of the petty officers come from those men who extend voluntarily on completion of their compulsory service.

There appears to be a great disparity in age between the top leadership of the Navy and the commanding officers of ships. In several instances, flag officers were former infantrymen who had made the Long March with Chairman Mao; they had never served a tour at sea. Great value is placed on combat experience and the need to retain such experience in the armed services. The PRC Navy has never known combat and a great deal of time is spent at their Naval College delving into the history of naval warfare.

This trip was extremely rewarding, both professionally and personally. We were able to walk through doors which have stood unopened for many years and to have surprisingly frank discussions with our military counterparts in many disciplines. Any future such exchanges will, of course, be subject to agreement between governments, but this was a good beginning.



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The policy of having no strategic ASW policy is defensible only if both the United States and the U.S.S.R. adhere fully to the Mutual Assured Destruction concept. The United States has begun to move away from the concept and there is no evidence that the U.S.S.R. ever considered it other than an American aberration. The tactical and technological problems of strategic ASW are non-self-solving. A national policy is required. Some reasons and suggestions are offered here.

THE EMPTY SILO—STRATEGIC ASW

by

Hamlin Caldwell

Like a silo that holds no missile, strategic ASW may be an important nuclear warfare policy area devoid of a U.S. policy. The absence of any recent official statement concerning strategic ASW (action to destroy or neutralize strategic missile submarines) indicates that there may, indeed, be a conscious policy not to have a policy.

Nineteen sixty-five was the last time a Secretary of Defense publicly advocated a strategic ASW mission for the U.S. Navy. Then Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara included strategic ASW as one of the key objectives of U.S. military policy with the statement:

Our principal active defense capability against submarine-launched missiles lies in our system for detecting, tracking and destroying the submarines before they can launch their missiles.¹

This was the last official proclamation of policy conducting strategic ASW in support of a strategy of damage limitation; i.e., limiting, to the extent prac-

ticable, damage to the United States and allies during a nuclear war.²

Although strategic ASW has become an official nonsubject, the damage-limiting policy it would help implement was still alive but pale in 1978 as affirmed by former Secretary of Defense Harold Brown in testimony that:

U.S. strategic forces are not procured for a damage-limiting mission. They are procured for their contribution to deterrence. However, should a nuclear war occur, our forces may be utilized to limit damage to the United States to the extent practicable in addition to being used to destroy resources which contribute to the postwar power, influence and recovery capability of the enemy.³

This dichotomous defense policy in which military force was procured on the basis of a deterrent strategy but would actually be employed in a quite different damage-limiting/warfighting strategy largely explains the past invisibility of strategic ASW policy.

Secretary of the Navy John Lehman has reversed this stale strategy of buying forces for one purpose when they would be used for another by proposing to expand the U.S. Navy from 456 to 600 ships to underwrite a warfighting naval strategy.⁴ A coherent statement of the role of the U.S. Navy in national strategy is being drafted and a clear position on strategic ASW should be part of it.

The United States needs immediately to reexamine strategic ASW policy in light of:

1. Our own more realistic post-MAD nuclear warfare strategy in general and the new aggressive counterforce orientation of the U.S. Navy in particular.
2. Our better understanding of Soviet nuclear warfare strategy and philosophy.
3. The Soviet Navy's apparent Ocean Bastion strategy of withholding and protecting their SSBN force in home waters.
4. Current naval tactics, technology and capabilities.

If deterrence fails the need will exist for a comprehensive strategic ASW plan and it will be too late to sketch one with a stick in the possibly radioactive dirt.

Soviet Policy. An understanding of the Soviet view of warfare and the use of strategic missile submarines must be basic to the formulation of a strategic ASW policy and plan. We have this understanding. The Soviets discuss their views on warfare in considerable detail. There is no reason not to believe them. They outline a practicable, logical, professionally sophisticated approach that represents a clear worst case for the West. Former Secretary Brown said:

Soviet leaders acknowledge that nuclear war would be destructive beyond even the Russian historical experience of the horrors of war. But at the same time some things Soviet spokesmen say—and, of

even more concern to us, some things they do in their military preparation—suggest they take more seriously than we have done, at least in our public discourse, the possibility that a nuclear war might actually be fought. In their discussion of that prospect, there are suggestions also if a nuclear war occurred, the time-honored military objectives of national survival and dominant military objectives of national survival and dominant military position at the end of the fighting would govern and so must shape military preparations beforehand.⁵

Perhaps Mr. Brown's concern is misplaced. The true cause for concern is not this realistic Soviet position but that the same solid principles have not always shaped U.S. military preparations.

The Soviet Navy SSBN force is a major component of Soviet nuclear warfare capability. The authoritative *Military Strategy* in its 1968 edition placed the SSBN force on par with the Strategic Rocket Force and since then even more resources have been allotted to sea-based strategic forces.⁶ The 950 missile tubes of the 62 first-line operational Soviet SSBNs represent 38 percent of their present 2504 launchers.⁷ This large and relatively new force has three overlapping roles⁸ as a participant in:

- Intercontinental strikes
- Intratheater strikes
- The national strategic reserve

As a powerful and survivable asset, the Soviet SSBN force is useful from deterrence through war to war termination and is a foundation of Soviet nuclear superpower status.

It is helpful to divide Soviet ballistic missile submarines into four operational groups in describing how they would carry out their overlapping war-time tasks:

1. *DELTA*-class SSBNs. The *Deltas* with their 4,500-mile SS-N-8 missiles

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can strike most U.S. and Chinese targets from protected areas in Russian home waters. Most probably the *Delta* SLBMs would be withheld under the direct control of the General Staff as a carefully hoarded national strategic reserve to be used as a heavy counter during the termination phase of a war. They underwrite Soviet credibility at the highest level of nuclear violence, an intercontinental countervalue exchange, and accordingly are a keystone in the Soviet nuclear war plan. The huge new *Typhoon*-class boats under construction will join this operational group.

2. Deployed *YANKEE*-class SSBNs. The visible, or at least somewhat detectable, tip of the Soviet SSBN force iceberg is the approximately five *Yankees* maintaining a standing patrol off the Atlantic and Pacific coasts of the United States. Their 1,500-mile range SS-N-6 missiles can effectively strike relatively soft targets such as SAC bomber bases and SSBNs in port and disrupt the C³ that controls U.S. strategic forces around the world. Although the *Yankee* SLBMs may have a limited hard-kill capability against hardened ICBM silos, pin-down barrages might disrupt retaliatory attacks and hold some *Minuteman* missiles in their holes until arrival on target of flights of accurate, high-yield Soviet counterforce ICBMs. Missiles from forward deployed *Yankees* would have a time of flight of only 5 to 6 minutes to reach U.S. missile fields.⁹ By moving into shallow, close inshore waters (where, incongruously, U.S. ASW may be least effective) Washington and other coastal target complexes can be struck with a warning time so brief that it amounts to no warning at all. The deployed *Yankees* would be a high-leverage asset in a disarming, counterforce bolt-from-the-blue attack. Additionally, they may be a symbolic Soviet counter on the nuclear superpower playing board in position for a countervalue retaliatory snapshot in case of a U.S. first strike.

3. *YANKEE*-class SSBNs in Soviet home waters. The bulk of the *Yankees* are and will be withheld in Soviet home waters. Although they will be unable to strike the continental United States they will be within easy missile range of most theater targets of interest in Europe and Asia. James McConnell of the Center for Naval Analysis postulates that they might be part of an independent Eurostrategic option decoupled from an intercontinental strike and exercised by systems at sea or moved from the U.S.S.R. into Eastern Europe.¹⁰ This interesting option could stress the chronically weak strategic nuclear link of the NATO alliance chain.

At this point the full meaning of the term *counterforce* should be nailed down. William R. Van Cleave and his colleague Roger W. Barnett have stated:

... counterforce is not synonymous with hard-target kill. Some counterforce targets have been hardened to nuclear and blast effects, some have not, and some cannot be. To use counterforce to describe only missile silo destruction is an impoverishment of the term; using it solely in that sense is a distortion.¹¹

They go on to list Soviet nuclear targeting priority based on the number of times each type of target is mentioned in the Soviet literature. Not surprisingly, the West's means of waging nuclear warfare lead the target list. The only countervalue target, political/administrative centers and war-supporting industry, is sixth and last on the list behind purely military counterforce targets. Unencumbered by a strategic bombing doctrine left over from World War II, and keen students of Clausewitz, the Soviets count on disarming and defeating their enemies by destroying their armed forces. Perhaps deceived by kinder history, the United States was long enamored with Mutual Assured Destruction based on cheap countervalue targeting. This illusion of

national security at a bargain price is now fading as the MAD doctrine with its single dimension of city-busting is being edged closer to total bankruptcy.

The *Yankees* and *Deltas* in protected Soviet home waters would share many operational advantages. Shorter distances, less ASW pressure permitting more secure operation at communication depths, easier use of surface and air relay platforms and other factors facilitate rapid, reliable, redundant communications for flexible and precise command and control. Precise navigation, an important factor in SLBM accuracy, can be more easily realized with a variety of local navigation aids including bottom-mounted markers. Split-launch of missile loads would be safer in this less hostile environment. In a sustained counterforce war it may even be possible to bring SSBNs (the classic cold launcher) into isolated anchorages and rearm them alongside the *Lama* and *Oskol*-class missile cargo ships. In addition to increased survivability under the ASW protection of Soviet general-purpose forces, SSBNs in home water ocean bastions could fight a nuclear war more efficiently.

Yankees in home waters could also serve as a survivable theater nuclear reserve. If the war goes well for the Soviets, a delayed escorted *Yankee* sortie through the GIUK Gap after U.S./NATO seapower has been reduced could directly threaten the continental United States and be a convincing war termination factor.

4. Older *Golf*-class SSBs and *Hotel*-class SSBNs. Both are armed with the short-ranged SS-N-5 first generation missile. The noisy nuclear *Hotels* are probably on the way out of commission. The diesel *Golfs* operating in the Baltic and Sea of Japan represent a bargain of sorts. Not counted under SALT they are quiet, cheap to operate and have some effectiveness against theater targets in the NATO Central Region and North-east Asia.

Addressing the Threat. The Soviet SSBN force whose probable wartime operations have just been described presents a clear threat to the United States. There are three general approaches to addressing this threat:

- Our apparent current policy of not having a policy.
- The arms control approach of ensuring the security of the Soviet SSBN force in the hope that the Soviets will mutually accept deterrence.
- A strategic ASW policy directed toward the wartime destruction of the Soviet SSBN force.

The rationale for each of these approaches will be examined.

The "no policy-policy" was perhaps the best position that the U.S. Navy could have defended during the MAD era. There was strong pressure from disarmament groups for introduction of ASW limitations discussion into SALT negotiations.¹² Limiting the numbers of SSNs (nuclear attack submarines), establishment of privileged SSBN sanctuaries and prohibition of SSBN trailing were measures that were discussed. Restricting the number of SSNs would have cut deeply into U.S. capabilities in every naval mission area and the other operational restrictions would have unduly reduced freedom of action. The 1970s were a difficult period for the U.S. Navy when it was hard pressed to cut its losses. There was strong motivation to "go along to get along" on the controversial strategic ASW issue. All ASW was described as tactical ASW (SLOC protection, carrier escort, etc.). This permitted procurement of ASW forces in accordance with MAD guidelines but left the option open to employ them in a damage-limiting/warfighting mode if deterrence failed.

Although no mention was made of seeking out and destroying Soviet SSBNs, VAdm. Daniel Murphy stated that in wartime the Navy, "... would not be in a position of differentiating their attack submarines from their

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SSBNs."¹³ In a similar vein VAdm. Robert Kaufman allowed that, "... in a conventional war all submarines are submarines. They are all fair game."¹⁴ The U.S. Navy was careful to avoid saying that it would either go after Soviet SSBNs or leave them alone. One hopes that the present national security situation is such that this strategic policy issue can be squarely and openly addressed and resolved in the best interests of the United States. This is absolutely necessary because the tactical and technological problems of strategic ASW are too different and complex to be solved by indirection.

Those opposing strategic ASW are sincere, organized and articulate.¹⁵ Their principal argument is that any U.S. capability that threatened the survivability of the Soviet SSBN force would be destabilizing and would encourage the Soviets to launch a first strike. Additionally, credible threat to their SSBN force would discourage the Soviets from shifting more of their strategic offensive power to sea-based systems. Some consider that this seaward shift is desirable because of the dubious assumption that SLBMs are basically countervalue systems with inherent limitations preventing their development as a counterforce weapon. In a stable MAD situation neither side would have enough counterforce capability to disarm the other and both would retain a devastating retaliatory countervalue capability. The Soviet capability to launch a countervalue strike from the sea against the United States under any circumstances would remain assured, not only through their own efforts but would be guaranteed by the United States.

Under the MAD policy, would-be limiters maintain that strategic ASW would also be prohibitively difficult because all Soviet SSBNs would have to be sunk almost simultaneously before they could launch their countervalue strikes. To allay Soviet apprehension

about the survivability of SSBN force, they have variously proposed that the number of SSNs on both sides be limited, safe sanctuaries be set aside for the war and peacetime operation of SSBNs, and that trailing of SSBNs be prohibited. Before the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan it would have been a reasonable assumption that some combination of these proposals might have found their way into SALT III discussions.

The antistrategic ASW stance is valid only if there is a common and total adherence to a MAD strategy by the U.S.S.R. and the United States. This is patently not the case. After 35 years we have not only failed to "educate" the Soviets to accept MAD but have begun to adopt aspects of their more logical (and incidentally, moral) warfighting/damage-limiting strategy. PD-59 in some respects is a codification of this trend and it is doubtful if the United States ever had a pure MAD strategy.

The MAD-based concept of encouraging the Soviets to shift their strategic nuclear weapons to sea because SLBMs are inherently "good" countervalue weapons rather than "bad" counterforce weapons is probably no longer valid on technical grounds. Although our current SLBMs were not designed to strike hardened military targets such as command bunkers and missile silos, *Trident II* will be effective against all targets.¹⁶ If Soviet SLBMs do not now have a full counterforce capability they would soon acquire one with stellar tracking and precision navigation techniques that can be reasonably assumed to be available in the U.S.S.R.

Although strategic ASW is an extremely difficult technical and tactical task, the requirement for the simultaneous destruction of all Soviet SSBNs is unduly stringent and ignores the fundamentals of SLBM employment. Survivability is the primary advantage of SLBMs. They are not a "use or lose" but "shoot anytime" weapon. To

unloose them all in a near-simultaneous first strike would waste this feature. In a warfighting/damage-limiting strategy, destruction of any SSBN is a plus. This, in fact, is the Soviet strategic ASW philosophy that supports any feasible costs to prevent a free shot against their homeland.¹⁷

The third major alternative, an active strategic ASW policy aimed at wartime destruction of Soviet SSBNs would have the following advantages:

1. Damage would be limited in a nuclear war. Protection of the state and its citizens is an armed forces reason for being. Any distortion of this objective obligation in deference to a highly subjective concept such as MAD is basically wrong.

2. Strategic ASW would improve the U.S./NATO war termination position *vis-à-vis* the U.S.S.R. In the running calculation of the factors that determine who would win a war, the number of residual *Poseidon/Trident vs. Yankee/Delta* SLBMs in launch position will be a key statistic. Naval forces of any kind with their autonomy, flexible use, and mobility have always been a hole card in war termination bargaining. This will be particularly true of SSBNs.

3. Strategic ASW would degrade Soviet capability at the highest level of nuclear violence and thus improve U.S./NATO control of escalation. The credibility of nuclear superpowers ultimately rests on the capability to launch a massive intercontinental second, third and subsequent strike. This is the foundation that in the last analysis must support any show of force.

4. Strategic ASW would fix Soviet general-purpose forces in the defense of their SSBNs in home waters. A credible U.S. wartime naval threat to SSBNs and the periphery of their homeland will tie up a sizable chunk of the Soviet gross national product in production of expensive general-purpose naval forces earmarked for defensive missions. Warships, particularly air-capable ones, are

prodigious sinks of engineering talent, steel, high technology production capability, and trained and trainable manpower. *Kiev* and *Kirov* are impressive ships but they may be expensive Soviet mistakes. As formidable as they appear, their ability to operate against a maritime power outside home waters beyond land-based air cover is suspect. More *Backfire* bombers, attack submarines (neither in lavish production) or even T-72 tanks might have been an equivalent investment more menacing to the West.

Arms races are not necessarily bad. A judicious investment tailored to put pressure on Soviet SSBNs in their home waters would force a relatively greater Soviet defensive expenditure at the expense of offensive systems. General-purpose naval forces are of much greater value to the maritime West than they are to the continental U.S.S.R. Although it may sound like heresy in a naval professional journal, the Soviets may have passed the point of diminishing returns in their investment in sea-power. Intensifying a Soviet perception of the wartime vulnerability of their SSBNs will tend to generate a Soviet Navy bought at high cost primarily to respond to U.S. initiatives. Strategic ASW capability can be a powerful lever to keep the Soviet Navy firmly pinned on the defensive side of the oceans.

All of the advantages cited for a positive strategic ASW policy would be directly reflected in the continuous Soviet calculation of what they interminably refer to as the "correlation of forces." This win/lose, "howgozit" calculation is the strongest ultimate determinant of how great a risk of general war they are willing to incur by aggressive action. Few, if any, states in history have initiated a war that they have believed they would lose. There is reason to believe that the U.S.S.R. has not and will not be an exception to this observation. A risk-averse Soviet leadership would perceive a credible threat to

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their SSBN force, with its considerable war and war termination potential, as a strong deterring factor in their calculation of the correlation of forces.

Strategic ASW. Because naval strategy, like politics, is the art of the possible, it is necessary to determine if strategic ASW is technically and tactically feasible and how it would be conducted. Most past discussion has focused on ASW technology in isolation from the tactical considerations of complexly interlinked sea, air and ground campaigns of a global war. Strategic ASW goes far beyond the detectability of submarines and must be examined as an integral part of overall national security strategy.

The hectic action-reaction cycle between submarines and countering forces sometimes seems to have a life of its own, unguided by any coherent scheme of human foresight and planning. In peacetime, navies (as would any other human organizations) tend to tailor the problems they address to organizational essences and their solution is a function of self-perpetuation and professional satisfaction. If any slack is available this perfectly natural practice may carry over into war. Most nations have cast submarine/antisubmarine warfare problems in the most convenient terms until their survival has been seriously threatened. Because of this tendency, submarines have been a major factor in the conduct of two World Wars and are now a key element in the nuclear strategic balance—all more or less by accident. We cannot afford the consequence of the major differences in the anticipated and actual nature of submarine/antisubmarine warfare that have occurred and probably exist now. We must address the real strategic ASW problem that may not march our set of ASW solutions based on the relatively happier world of tactical ASW.

The submarine became a serious

weapon when it was married to the diesel engine shortly before World War I. Earlier submarines powered by gasoline engines were operationally equivalent to risky, submersible coastal torpedo boats. The diesel engine made the submarine a reliable long-range weapon of sea denial and in many respects was as significant a breakthrough as nuclear propulsion. The submarine could be used where the surface of the sea and the air above it was controlled by an enemy and became the classic *guerre de course* weapon of inferior naval powers.

After World War I, the major naval powers—the United States, Britain and Japan—attempted with limited success to work submarines in close harness with their surface battle fleets. Having lost control of large areas of the ocean, Britain and the United States were forced to cut their fleet submarines loose for independent operations in World War II. The Japanese did not make this adjustment and their submarines were never a significant operational factor. In World War II the submarine continued to be used by both the superior and inferior naval powers as an essentially independent sea denial weapon in hostile waters controlled by the enemy. Submarines depended upon their own stealth for protection and fought their tormentors only as a desperate last resort.

The pattern for the U.S. Navy of unopposed ASW was reinforced by the Korean and Vietnamese wars in which our use of the sea was not contested. We have, with very few exceptions early in the Battle of the Atlantic, never conducted ASW in a multithreat environment.

While ASW is a means of achieving sea control, it is also greatly facilitated by control of the sea surface and airspace in the ASW area. Attack submarines and mining can perform an ASW function in hostile waters but even these operations are significantly limited by the absence of sea control in

the conventional sense of the term. The conduct of ASW in the face of coordinated air, surface, submarine, and mine opposition is a difficult problem that the U.S. Navy has not faced in the past.

This opposed ASW problem is at the core of strategic ASW. For nearly 10 years the most perceptive students of the Soviet Navy have maintained that the Soviets will withhold a large part of their SSBN force in home waters under the protection of general-purpose forces. Soviet naval construction, deployment and doctrinal statements tend to confirm this Ocean Bastion strategy. Admiral of the Fleet Sergei Gorshkov alludes to part of this strategy in his comment:

Diverse surface ships and aircraft are included in the inventory of our Navy in order to give combat stability to the submarines and comprehensively support them, to battle the enemy's surface and ASW forces and to prosecute other specific missions.¹⁸

Official U.S. Navy acceptance of a Soviet pro-SSBN mission is mirrored in the 1978 edition of *Understanding Soviet Naval Developments*:

Another aspect of maritime security is Soviet countering of the considerable ASW forces of the U.S. Navy and our Allies. The Soviets are thus concerned with the protection of their own SSBNs and have developed forces to attack Western ASW forces in a defense in depth concept.¹⁹

This Soviet Navy's preoccupation with the maritime security of its coastal seas both for the defense of the homeland and the protection of its SSBN force is a reflection of the pessimistically cautious Russian attitude toward security in general. Comdr. Kenneth R. McGruther comments:

... the Russian assumes that if he does not protect what he has (whether it is his life, his job, his homeland or his SSBNs) sooner or later somebody is going to take it away from him.²⁰

The strategy is in line with both the Russian psyche and traditional Czarist/Soviet continental naval policy based on geography, naval inferiority, caution and inshore orientation. The concept of home water "naval positions" that were the focus of active defense using mines, submarines, light forces and shore-based aviation was advanced in 1924 by Professor M. Petrov, an ex-Czarist naval officer on the faculty of the Frunze Higher Naval School.* Eventually Petrov was executed for his tactical theories but then, in an evenhanded way, so were the people who opposed them.²¹ Tactics for protection of the Soviet SSBN force in home waters are probably an updated variant of the "naval positions" concept that runs through Russian naval history.

Toward a Strategy. In spite of Secretary Lehman's recent, "firm commitment to go into the highest threat areas and defeat the Soviet naval threat," the U.S. Navy may not have the appropriate ASW force structure, tactics or technology to hold the Soviet SSBN force at risk in its home water bastions. Decades of mindset and preparation for unopposed ASW in deep midocean waters has poorly prepared the U.S. Navy for this daunting task. The problems of conducting forward strategic ASW are a subset of the linked overall problems that must be solved to ensure success of the aggressive new U.S. naval counterforce strategy. Strategic ASW should be part of an integrated campaign of sequential and cumulative operations to fix and destroy the Soviet Navy. We must realistically assess the problems and get on with a coherent solution now.

*Under several names the Frunze School is the oldest naval academy in continuous existence in the world and had many ex-Czarist officers on its faculty through WW II. Nick Shadrin has recalled the culture shock when his classes there were addressed as "Gentlemen" and not "Comrades." There is strong continuity through all Russian navies, Czarist and Soviet.

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The United States now has 74 nuclear attack submarines and is projecting a force level of 90. This slim SSN force will certainly bear the brunt of early strategic ASW operations in Soviet waters. It has been designed primarily for open ocean, deep water, one-on-one ASW and the \$600 million *Los Angeles*-class SSNs are an expensive solution to that particular problem. Technical emphasis has been on propulsion system safety and reliability and the characteristics to achieve long-range detection using passive sonar. Tactical emphasis has been on establishing and maintaining covert trail of noisier Soviet submarines. Our SSNs do all of this extremely well. Unfortunately, taking the war to the Soviet Navy in the Barents Sea may require other strengths.

Firepower is the primary deficiency of the U.S. Navy attack submarine force. All of our first-line SSNs have only four torpedo tubes (compared with ten for WW II fleet boats) and based on estimates of the volume of the torpedo room carry about the same total number of weapons as their WW II predecessors. Quick fixes are in the works to fit a limited number of SLCMs external to the pressure hull in the forward ballast tanks of some of our SSNs. The problem remains, however. Our attack submarines float like a butterfly and sting like a butterfly.

The discouraging part of this serious lack of firepower is that the Soviet Navy, including its facilities ashore, is potentially very vulnerable to SSN attack. The propulsion, detection and personnel excellence of our SSN force cannot now be appropriately translated into tons of warhead on target. It has been aptly said that propulsion systems can't be used to kill people.²² To make strategic ASW and a forward strategy work we need a true tactical missile attack submarine that can carry and quickly launch a lot of weapons at a wide range of targets afloat and ashore.

Our nuclear submarines are significantly quieter than Soviet nuclear submarines and our sonar systems are superior to theirs. This decided acoustic advantage unfortunately counts for less in shallow Soviet home waters (where SSBNs may be) where all sonar performance is degraded and our margin of relative superiority shrinks proportionately. In passing, shallow water ASW remains a U.S. weakness where until a few years ago it was the only type of ASW practiced by the Soviets.

Long-range detections cannot always be converted into covert attacks, even in deep water one-on-one situations. In penetrating the layered defenses of an SSBN haven, sophisticated long-range detection and localization tactics may not be appropriate to the ensuing series of short-range torpedo brawls. As the U.S. Air Force has discovered in their illuminating AIMVAL/ACEVAL exercises, there are tactical situations in which qualitative superiority can only buy limited advantage and exchange ratios are relatively low. This may be true of strategic ASW in Soviet home waters.

Additional factors complicating offensive SSN operations are the presence of a large, relatively modern Soviet diesel submarine force and a capability of mining the approaches to SSBN havens. As long as diesel boats do not have to make long transits, can count on air superiority, and have a relatively short patrol line they can tactically exploit their significant acoustic advantage over nuclear boats. All these tactical conditions favorable to defending diesel boats are inherent in the Soviet Ocean Bastion strategy.

Mine warfare is a traditional Russian area of strength.* Much of Soviet home waters are minable. Judiciously placed

*A cynic might wonder if this reputation is at least partially based on a history of lackluster performance in most other facets of naval warfare.

mine barriers could act as an efficient force-multiplier by augmenting Soviet submarine barriers and pose a significant real and psychological hazard to penetrating U.S. attack submarines.

Air ASW forces are an increasingly effective but very soft U.S. asset. They are unable to operate either inside the SAM envelope of hostile ships or without nearly perfect friendly control of the air. This problem neatly illustrates the interlocking nature of strategic ASW and complementary operations against Soviet general-purpose forces in home waters. The underlying theme is to start where we can (probably SSN operations) and expand our initiatives by putting pressure on any part of the Soviet Navy that is vulnerable. The initial objective is to start an unraveling process that will permit the use of more types of forces in shrinking and penetrating the Soviet defensive perimeter.

A calculated and carefully linked sequence of offensive naval operations to defeat the Soviet naval threat, reduce their SSBN force and put direct pressure on their homeland must be at the heart of our naval planning. To make any plan credible we must have the appropriate force structure, tactics and technology to fight the Soviet Navy in their home waters.

The deployed Soviet *Yankee*-class SSBNs present a different problem than the SSBNs withheld in home waters. Our ASW efforts against them will be essentially unopposed but time-critical. The crux of the situation is being able when the political situation dictates to be continuously able, with economy of force, to destroy each *Yankee* as soon as hostilities commence or as soon as they initiate any missile launch sequence. An ideal technical solution would be to have a platform in continual contact that could both destroy any missiles launched in their boost phase and destroy the *Yankee* before its remaining missiles can be launched. Any approach will be fraught with technical and

political difficulties but the disarming consequences of not having an approach are grave.

Conclusions. The United States must have a clearly stated and understood strategic ASW policy for the wartime destruction of the Soviet SSBN force. This positive strategic ASW policy will be useful in both deterrence and warfighting. By influencing the Soviet perception of the "correlation of forces" it will serve to deter them from aggressive adventurism that could lead to war and force them into a more defensive military posture at the expense of considerable offensive capability. If in spite of this, war does occur, a positive U.S. strategic ASW policy will be a guide to limiting damage to the United States and its allies and gaining a position of relative military strength that will underwrite war termination on terms favorable to the United States.

To be effective this strategic ASW policy must be credibly backed not only by national resolve but by appropriate force structure, technology and tactics for the wartime destruction of Soviet SSBNs wherever they may be. Strategic ASW will entail opposed operations against Soviet SSBNs defended by general-purpose naval forces in Soviet home waters. It must be an integral part

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY



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of the U.S. Navy's overall strategy to destroy the Soviet naval threat and exploit all of the opportunities available to a dominant maritime power.

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It is essential that American strategists understand major Soviet economic, political, and military trends and some of the effects those trends may have on Soviet policy in order that they may propose alternatives to achieve U.S. national interests and objectives. This paper examines those U.S. interests and objectives, discusses Soviet trends, and offers some suggestions for offsetting disadvantages in one area with advantages in another.

STRATEGY, THE SOVIET UNION AND THE 1980s

by
Keith A. Dunn

The new Administration faces a number of serious domestic and international problems. In foreign policy, the single most important issue confronting the Administration is Soviet-American relations. The Administration must consider how it wants U.S. relations with the Soviet Union to evolve; what American strategy vis-à-vis the Soviet Union should be; and, how the United States can manage growing Soviet power and the emergence of the Soviet Union as a global military rival. Currently, superpower relations are in a hiatus. What small amount of understanding that existed between Moscow and Washington began to unravel as a result of Angola and Ethiopia and was crushed by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. At present, it is commonplace for critics to accuse the United States of being weak and unwilling to face up to the global Soviet threat. They point out that the Carter administration

was vulnerable to such charges and at times it could not stick to a policy once it was enunciated, e.g., witness Carter's maneuverings and backsliding on the Soviet brigade in Cuba.

Nevertheless, too many of the current criticisms about a lack of a coherent design, or strategy, in American policy seem to be based upon nostalgia and a desire to return to a bygone era when the United States was the unchallenged political, economic, and military leader of the world. All too often there is a sense that military force is the best—possibly the only—method for dealing with the Soviet challenge. If somehow the United States could just build a larger military force and man that force with better trained personnel the United States would solve its major problems of strategy. However, strategy is more than building bigger and better forces. Strategists do not assume that they will always have as much as they

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want. Their main task is balancing shottages in certain areas with advantages in others to minimize risk and maximize the chances of achieving national interests.

Strategists' problems are compounded further because the attempt to balance risks and advantages, costs and benefits must consider existing threats to U.S. interests and how those threats can interact to preclude the achievement of U.S. interests. This requires some assessment of economic, political, and military trends of U.S. adversaries. While such sophisticated intelligence capabilities as satellites, radars, and listening devices can provide strategists with a wealth of data, a significant information gap still exists and strategists must infer and make the best guess possible about how events will ultimately unfold in other nations. Recognizing the uncertainty of their projections, strategists must propose options for the United States to pursue in order to achieve declared interests and objectives.

Current events provide insights to adversaries' capabilities, suggest possible trends, and help to shape the environment in which the strategist must work. However, in the final analysis to the strategists' world is that of the future, normally the midrange (3-10 years from the present) and the long range (10-20 years in the future). Although there is wide disagreement about what approach(es) should be pursued, there is essential agreement, no matter what one's political persuasion, about the most significant challenge facing strategists: how can the United States deal with the growing power of the Soviet Union?

Almost all major U.S. foreign policy initiatives since World War II have been predicated upon the intelligence community's assessment of Soviet capabilities and trends and policymakers' evaluation of Soviet intentions. There is no reason to believe that this situation will

change drastically in the foreseeable future. In fact, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, concerns about enhanced Soviet power projection capabilities, and fears that the Soviet achievement of nuclear parity has made the Kremlin more bold and adventuresome make it even more important that, during the 1980s, the United States does not deal with the Soviet Union on an *ad hoc* basis, moving from crisis to crisis, without some overall guiding concept of how it wants to deal with the emerging power of the Soviet Union. But before suggesting options and alternatives, it is necessary first to discuss U.S. interests and objectives. Then, some of the major Soviet trends and how those trends affect U.S. interests and objectives will be considered.

Interests and Objectives. The fundamental building blocks of strategy are the concepts of national interests and specific objectives to support the attainment of U.S. national interests. There are four fundamental national interests common to all nations: survival, protection of territorial integrity, maintenance or enhancement of economic well-being, and promotion of a favorable world order.

The most basic national interest is obviously survival, because without national survival no other interest is relevant. Since the advent of the nuclear era, the primary U.S. objective in pursuit of national survival has been nuclear deterrence. Negotiation of formal and detailed strategic nuclear arms control and prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons have been pursued as additional objectives in an attempt to limit the possibilities that nuclear war will occur. To insure that U.S. deterrent capabilities are believable, one of our military objectives is to build offensive strategic nuclear forces based upon a triad of ICBMs, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and bombers. These forces are intended to provide the

United States with an assured destruction capability making it not worth the risk for the Soviets to strike the United States first. Since the early 1970s when the Soviets obtained a level of parity in strategic nuclear weapons, essential equivalence also has been an objective. Essential equivalence does not mean that the United States has to maintain forces that reflect those of the Soviet Union. Rather, the objective is to offset advantages in one area or system with U.S. advantages in other areas. An integral part of this objective is to insure that the Soviets, U.S. allies, and most importantly, American citizens do not perceive that U.S. strategic forces are inferior to those of the Soviet Union.

Geography has provided the United States with certain advantages in its efforts to protect the territorial integrity of the United States. While there is no real defense against strategic nuclear attack, except deterrence, the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans and historically compliant neighbors to the immediate north and south have made it relatively easy for the United States to protect itself from foreign invasion. As long as the United States maintains relatively strong military forces and continues to secure the air and sea lines of communication between Hawaii and Alaska, the prospect of any conventional invasion of U.S. territory should be virtually nonexistent. This unique position provides strategists with advantages that are often overlooked. Rather than concentrating their efforts on ways to insure the defense of the home base, U.S. strategists can primarily concern themselves with the other three fundamental national interests. Strategists in other nations do not have such a luxury.

Insuring the economic well-being of the United States is based upon two primary requirements: access to trading partners and assured access to vital national resources. In the absence of a global war with the Soviet Union, achieving the first requirement is relatively

easy. Obtaining assured access to vital natural resources, however, is another matter. U.S. economic security and the economic survival of many U.S. allies are affected increasingly by dependence upon scarce natural resources, particularly oil. The United States can be cut off from those resources in a variety of ways: cartel denial actions as OPEC initiated during the 1973 Middle East War; disruption as a result of internal revolution, insurrection, or civil war as occurred in Iran and in Zaire during the Shaba invasions; or resource denial caused by the actions of some external nation. The latter has most affected U.S. strategic thinking in recent years. There is a growing belief that the Soviet Union is attempting to establish a Third World alliance system that would put the U.S.S.R. in a position to pressure or even to sever the industrialized world's vital trade and natural resource supply lines in times of crisis. While numerous arguments indicate that this portion of the Soviet threat has been somewhat overstated, a major objective of the United States is to insure that it can effectively respond to any Soviet attempt to cut off resources to the industrialized world. Increased U.S. worldwide military presence, additional forward basing of U.S. military units, formation of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF), and negotiations to improve U.S. access to air and naval facilities in the Third World and to enhance "surge" capabilities are just a few of the military initiatives currently underway in support of this objective.

The final fundamental national interest is maintenance of a world order that is favorable to the United States. Historically, U.S. interests have been served best by an international environment of stability. As a result, a primary U.S. objective has been the promotion of peaceful solutions to world problems. Since the end of World War II, an equally important objective has been containment. This objective has evolved

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from the containment of monolithic communism to the more recent approach of selective containment of the expansion of Soviet political-military influence. To achieve these objectives, U.S. military strategy for the last 30 years has been based upon the concepts of forward defense and collective security in an effort to deter the Soviet Union from attacking U.S. allies and to insure that growing Soviet military power would not cause weaker nations to have no recourse but to seek political and economic accommodation with the U.S.S.R.

For illustrative purposes, specific national interests and objectives have been isolated and categorized. In reality, many strategic issues transcend arbitrary classifications. For example, containment was placed under the national interest of world order. One school of thought is that containment is fundamental to the defense of U.S. territorial integrity. By fighting in Europe or Korea, the United States can protect its own territory from the devastation of war.

Finally, it is possible that the pursuit of one national interest or objective can conflict with the achievement of other interests and objectives. For instance, former Secretary of State Cyrus Vance has defined one U.S. objective as the ability to promote "peace in troubled areas of the world" that "reduced potential threats of wide war and removes opportunities for our rivals to extend their influence."¹ A recognized and proven ability of the United States to project and sustain its forces in areas distant from its borders is one method to deter the Soviet Union from taking advantage of crises in the Third World. However, as recent events in Iran and Afghanistan indicate, there are many areas in the world where U.S. force projection capabilities are lacking and the United States needs access to facilities to increase its surge capabilities. To the extent that improved access

to facilities in the Third World and the formation of the RDJTF enhance U.S. force projection and rapid response capabilities, these actions will be positive steps.

However, an American attempt to obtain access to facilities in the Third World will not be provided free. Depending upon the particular nation and region of the world, the "return" or *quid pro quo* for improved access will cover a wide range of potential options. In some cases, Washington may simply be able to buy the desired access. Or, at the other extreme, a nation may ask for weapons with the intention of using those weapons against domestic opposition factions or to begin a conflict with a neighboring nation. It is important to recognize that in many parts of the world, U.S. interests with a potential "client" may be coincidental (e.g., to deter the U.S.S.R.), but they may not be completely compatible (e.g., to promote peace in unstable regions of the world). If the payment for increased U.S. access builds a nation's military capabilities, it very well may use those capabilities to pursue its own national interests that are in conflict with those of the United States. The Soviet-Somalia relationship from 1969-77 is an instructive example of this type of situation and should be studied as the United States negotiates to improve its access to facilities at Berbera.²

Moreover, it is important to recognize that once the United States enters into agreements with other countries for access to facilities, it loses some degree of leverage over the client. By the very nature of the agreement, the client is providing the United States something that is important to U.S. national interests and objectives. In addition, once access is obtained, formal status of forces agreements are signed, and some level of U.S. presence is established, it is difficult to withdraw from those commitments. U.S. allies and potential adversaries may view such a reduction

as part of an overall decline in U.S. commitment or diminution of political will, and such a perception could adversely affect U.S. ability to achieve its other national interests. A primary job of strategists is to point out such inherent conflicts between U.S. interests and objectives and to attempt to minimize their influence upon U.S. policy.

Soviet Trends. While it is in U.S.—and Soviet—interests to avoid direct military confrontations with its superpower rival, conflict (whether political, economic, ideological, or military) is the norm among nations. This is particularly true of the Soviet-American relationship because each superpower holds radically different views for how the world order should evolve. Given the centrality of the Soviet Union to American foreign and defense planning, it is essential that strategists understand major Soviet economic, political, and military trends and some of the effects those trends may have on Soviet policy so strategists can propose alternatives to achieve U.S. national interests and objectives.

As the Soviet Union enters the 1980s, it faces increasing difficulties and strains. Significant problems already exist within the economy. Like most nations of the world, the U.S.S.R. has been experiencing a declining average annual economic growth rate. Whereas in the early rebuilding years after World War II, the Soviet Gross National Product (GNP) grew at an average annual rate of 6 percent, in the 1970s its growth rate fell to below 4 percent. The best intelligence estimates indicate that this trend will continue and by the mid-to-late 1980s a Soviet GNP growth may be as low as 1 or 2 percent.

For several reasons most analysts believe that without major changes, the Soviet economic future is bleak. First, the Soviet Union is not an integrated national economy. Three distinct

economic subregions exist within the U.S.S.R.: European Russia, Siberia, and the southern republics. Neither an adequate transportation nor a distribution network ties the three regions together. Adequate market, social, or cultural incentives to encourage permanent population migration among the three areas are also lacking. As a result, the Soviet leadership is faced with the problem that European Russia has the industrial facilities and capital for economic growth. However, it is seriously lacking in labor and most of European Russia's recoverable natural resources will probably soon be depleted. The southern republics have an overabundance of labor, but the region is lacking in capital and natural resources. On the other hand, Siberia has a wealth of natural resources and great quantities of available land, but the area has only a few industrial facilities. In some Siberian areas the climate is so harsh as to make it virtually uninhabitable, and the transportation system is quite limited. Some time in the early 1980s the new Siberian railroad (Baikal-Amur Mainline or BAM) should be completed. It will allow the Soviets to put some new goods and services into the region, provide some raw materials to European Russia, and even provide an avenue for some export and import trade with Japan. However, given the huge overland distances that separate the BAM area from Russia's economic heartland and the paucity of the overall intra-Siberian transportation system, the new railroad will have only a marginal influence upon the Soviet domestic economy. If Moscow continues its refusal to negotiate with Japan on the northern islands issue, there will be only limited foreign trade with Japan for BAM to support. The new rail line's most important contribution may be military in case a Sino-Soviet conflict ever occurs.

Second, despite optimistic claims to the contrary, the Soviet Union has not

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matched the industrial and technological revolution that has been ongoing in Western Europe, Japan, and the United States for the last 20 years. The U.S.S.R. prefers to follow a path of selective imitation rather than adopting significant changes in products and processes. Soviet industry continues to retain old plant and capital equipment in service for longer times than is Western practice. By necessity, many Soviet industries use antiquated technology. Even though most observers agree that major innovative and technological changes must occur if Soviet industrial output is to increase, the incentives for such innovation are lacking within the Soviet system.³

Innovations are risky and in the Soviet system the potential rewards resulting from the success of some innovative practice do not outweigh the potentially bad consequences of a failure. Moreover, as experience in other industrialized nations has shown, technological progress may temporarily contribute to unemployment as more efficient machines replace manual workers. Because it is a Soviet dictum that unemployment does not exist under socialism, there is reluctance to adopt changes that put people out of work. More importantly, because it is the state that owns the means of production, determines the industrial output quotas, and dispenses the rewards and punishments for meeting or not meeting the goals of the State plan, there is a natural tendency on the part of plant managers toward status quo and filling the plan. To suggest alternative methods or to overachieve implies that the State plan was somehow in error. Finally, Soviet economic decision-makers have a vested interest in seeing that their particular industrial, plant, enterprise, etc. is not made obsolete by some technological change. If an official's enterprise is displaced by technology or innovation, not only his economic but also his political and social

status is affected. There are instances in Soviet history in which enterprises have continued to function primarily to protect bureaucratic interests rather than because of efficiency or need. For example, in the 1950s, when the Mikoyan rather than the Yakovlev design bureau received Stalin's approval to produce a new combat aircraft (the MIG-15), Yakovlev personally appealed to Stalin to revise his decision because as Yakovlev recounts, "I was very worried about the situation developing in our design bureau. You see, behind me stood 100 people who might lose faith in me as a leader of the design collective." The net result was that Stalin also approved production of the Yak-25 in order to satisfy Yakovlev.⁴

Third, while overall Soviet agricultural progress in the last 20 years has been respectable, with an average growth of three and one-half percent, the future level of agricultural production is uncertain at best. Agriculture continues to be the least productive sector of the Soviet economy. Low labor productivity, high costs of production, and serious environmental constraints are the major Soviet agricultural problems.

The ability of the U.S.S.R. to fulfill midrange production goals for meat and grain will be a major test for Soviet agriculture. In 1978, Brezhnev called for meat production to reach 19.5 million tons and the grain target to be increased to 260 million tons by 1985. At the Twenty-Sixth Party Congress, Soviet meat and grain targets were lowered considerably. The new meat target is 18.2 million tons by 1985. To meet this goal, the Soviets will have to achieve an average annual meat production of 17-17.5 million tons for the entire period of the 11 Five Year Plan. The new grain target for 1985 is 238-243 million tons. However, because of unpredictable weather patterns and the lack of expected agricultural breakthroughs, it is unlikely that the Soviets can achieve

even these lower goals for grain production and this will have a direct effect on the Soviet Union's ability to fulfill its meat production goals.⁵ Shortages in grain production will continue to cause a recurring need to import grain. How much of the shortages can be offset will depend upon the U.S.S.R.'s ability to acquire grain on the world market. To the extent that the Soviet leadership intends to fulfill promises to improve consumer conditions and is willing to spend hard currency, grain will be imported. However, an impending oil shortage with its potentially adverse effect upon Soviet hard currency supplies may limit Soviet abilities to import to meet projected grain deficiencies. In the final analysis, the future does not promise any significant changes in Soviet agriculture. In some years, grain production and imports will be enough to feed both the population and livestock herds. In other years, it will not and the feast or famine practice of killing off livestock herds because of a bad grain harvest will probably continue throughout the 1980s.

Fourth, economic self-sufficiency is a basic Soviet tenet. Fortunately, for the U.S.S.R., it has been generally well endowed with natural resources. In the past, Moscow has been able to fulfill most of its and East European natural resource requirements while at the same time exporting significant quantities of raw materials to the world. However, as older, more reliable resource fields have been depleted and Moscow has been forced to turn to areas where resources are difficult and expensive to recover (i.e., Siberia), the U.S.S.R.'s ability to continue its traditional role as a resource supplier to Eastern Europe and the world may become limited during the 1980s.

In the energy area, CIA estimates about Soviet oil production have generated an enormous amount of controversy in recent years. In 1977, the CIA predicted that the Soviet Union would

need to import between 3.5-4.5 million barrels of oil a day by the mid-1980s. Subsequent reports lowered those original Soviet oil import estimates to less than 1 million barrels of oil a day by the mid-1980s. Now, the most recent CIA estimates suggest that during the 1980s the Soviet Union will not have to import any oil to meet its domestic consumption needs.⁶

Even if CIA estimates are now correct and the U.S.S.R. will be self-sufficient in oil, a decline in its ability to export oil will still create difficult problems for Soviet planners in the coming decade. Traditionally, the U.S.S.R. has received most of its hard currency from the export of raw materials. Exports of oil and natural gas have usually accounted for 40-50 percent of Soviet hard currency earnings. If major reductions in oil exports to hard currency nations occur, it will be difficult for Moscow to acquire the Western technology needed to modernize the Soviet industrial base. Moreover, without sufficient hard currency funds, Moscow could find it difficult to service its hard currency debt to the West. Again, this could have a significant influence upon Soviet efforts to modernize its industries and acquire needed technology to exploit natural resources in Siberia.

One way for the U.S.S.R. to maintain its hard currency balance would be to shift oil away from its East European allies to Western hard currency markets. There are, however, at least two good reasons why the Soviet Union would prefer not to adopt such an option, except as a last resort. First, Moscow has already encouraged its East European allies to look for other sources of oil, told its allies that oil allotments during the decade would be no higher than 1980 levels, and raised the price of Soviet oil nearer to world market prices. These actions have already begun to strain some East European economies. It is very likely that during the coming decade some East European nations will

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have to backtrack upon their pledges to improve domestic standards of living and provide more consumer goods. Events in Poland during 1970, 1976, and 1980 rather clearly demonstrate that failure to meet such pledges can spark political unrest and instability in at least one East European nation. Second, as Moscow has been able to achieve significant control over its East European partners by acting as the predominant supplier of relatively cheap raw materials, any reduction in this role undoubtedly would result in some loss of Soviet influence in the region. Therefore, even if the Soviet oil future is not as bleak as originally thought, the probability that the U.S.S.R. will not be able to provide its East European allies with sufficient levels of oil at favorable prices means that the overall Eastern bloc economic future is less than optimistic and this must trouble Kremlin planners.

Soviet dependence upon external suppliers of other critical resources is also increasing. Even though the U.S.S.R. is the second leading producer of tin in the world, it imports 30 percent of its requirements and East European nations must import 90 percent of their requirements, primarily from Southeast Asian nations. The Soviet Union is self-sufficient in scrap and flake mica. However, it imports all its sheet mica needed to make critical electronic appliances. The U.S.S.R. and East European allies import 100 percent of their natural rubber requirements from Southeast Asian nations. In recent years, Moscow has imported larger quantities of beryllium for toughening metal, tantalum for use in electronic components, and lithium needed in aluminum production. Projections indicate that this trend toward greater Soviet dependence upon foreign sources of selected natural resources should continue.⁷

The Soviet Union will also experience a growing dependence upon foreign

agricultural products. The principal imports of agricultural products that will be required for the 1980s are grain, animal feed, sugar, fruit, vegetables, coffee, tea, and cocoa. In addition, the U.S.S.R. needs an assured access to large amounts of fish. This is one reason why the Kremlin is quite interested in the Law of the Sea Conference. It is predicted that by the year 2000, Soviet fishermen will have to catch and return over 15 million tons of fish per year to satisfy Soviet and East European needs.⁸

Finally, demographic trends will complicate rather than facilitate Soviet attempts to deal with its basic domestic economic problems. Preliminary analysis of the 1979 census data indicates no major changes in demographic patterns noted in the last Soviet census.⁹ The average population growth rate continues to decline. In fact, the 1970-79 average increase of .9 percent is slightly lower than Western demographers originally predicted the census would show. The growth distribution of Soviet population also remains very uneven. The Slavic nationalities, which traditionally have held the most important government and military positions in Russia and Soviet history, continue to experience a growth rate significantly lower than that of the Soviet Union as a whole. On the other hand, the rate of increase within the Central Asian republics is three to four times greater than the national average. Russians and Ukrainians still far outnumber the number of Central Asians. However, the exceptionally high rate of increase among the Central Asian nationalities indicates that the Soviet ethnic balance is likely to continue its shift toward Central Asia and the traditionally Muslim peoples of the region.

The continuation of this trend will affect any Kremlin attempt to solve its basic economic problems. Central Asians are a very immobile people. The 1959 census showed that 96 percent of the five Central Asian nationalities lived

in Central Asia and by 1970 the percentage had increased to 97 percent. Will the Kremlin be able to induce or coerce sufficient Central Asians to move to offset an expected manpower labor shortage in other areas of the U.S.S.R.? This is a major issue confronting Soviet economic planners.

Any strategic assessment of the Soviet Union must take into consideration the virtual certainty that a major change in the Soviet leadership will occur in the coming decade. Exactly when the leadership change will occur, who or what group of individuals will assume the positions of authority, and what major changes, if any, in Soviet policy will occur is unclear at this date. However, it is possible to speculate about how the process will occur.

The impending leadership change will most likely occur in stages and will be a prolonged process. It took Stalin most of the 1920s before he undercut his rivals and consolidated his position of authority. Both Khrushchev and Brezhnev maneuvered with their rivals for at least 4 years before they emerged as first among equals. Every indication is that a similar situation will occur when Brezhnev, either voluntarily or by death, leaves office.

The common expectation is that a caretaker regime, probably led by Andrei Kirilenko, will oversee the first succession stage. Because Kirilenko is 3 months older than Brezhnev and the other immediate Brezhnev heirs are at least in their late 60s, actuarial tables would indicate that this caretaker regime would not remain in power for an extended period. During the first succession stage no major changes in Soviet politics should occur. Those who will probably be in charge of the caretaker regime are identified with Brezhnev policies; they rose to power with or because of Brezhnev's support; they share the same World War II and postwar experiences with Brezhnev; and they seem to be committed to the

goals that Brezhnev articulated. Because none of the potential heirs for the first succession stage has the prestige or political power to emerge as the uncontested head of the Party, a form of collective leadership should develop.

While the caretaker government oversees the immediate Brezhnev succession, a number of other rivals will probably vie for power. Only after this period of internal political maneuvering, which could last as long as 4 or 5 years, will a new Soviet General-Secretary emerge. During this second succession stage, a group of men with political backgrounds different from their predecessors will compete for power. Whoever emerges as the new Soviet leader will have no memories of prerevolutionary Russia or any personal knowledge of Lenin. He will have experienced World War II as a very young man. All of his secondary education will have occurred in the Stalin period. Most of his adult years will encompass the period when the U.S.S.R. became a global military power. The incumbent will probably have long experience in management of the economy or the territorial party apparatus and very little experience in foreign affairs. The emerging generation of Soviet leaders will be better educated than their predecessors but, this does not mean that they will be any more sophisticated. Although they will be politically experienced, the emerging leadership group will not have the long tenure in very top ranks of the Soviet elite that Brezhnev and his associates had (virtually the entire postwar period). As a result, their claims for authority may be more easily questioned by rivals.

Will the new Soviet leadership be more aggressive and adventuresome? One school of thought is that the Soviet "window of opportunity"—a period when Soviet military power is at its peak and before the above domestic problems begin to constrain Soviet

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options—is sometime during the 1980s.¹⁰ A Soviet recognition that the window is closing, it is argued, could cause the Kremlin to use its military forces to gain strategic advantages before it loses the opportunity. However, if a succession struggle occurs sometime during the decade and historical precedent holds true, the U.S.S.R. may actually enter a period of less active foreign policy as the new leaders attempt to consolidate their domestic positions. While one should not completely discount the possibility of a new orientation of Soviet policy, analysis of the backgrounds and known attitudes of the emerging leadership group suggests fundamental continuity in Soviet policy through the midrange. Their memories of the Great Patriotic War and considerable pride in the U.S.S.R.'s postwar rise to superpower status, as well as their 20-year tutelage by a political leadership that has emphasized stability of personnel and policy, businesslike caution, and consensus-seeking decisions, suggest that the new Soviet leaders will be primarily nationalistic and pragmatic rather than ideological in their approach to world politics. This does not mean that the Soviet threat to U.S. interests will diminish during the midrange. Rather, it means that another Khrushchev-style personality, who leads the U.S.S.R. off into erratic policy zigzags, will probably not emerge as the new Soviet leader for the 1990s.

Over the coming decade it is only natural to expect that the Soviet Union will attempt to improve its regional position and enhance its security position. To the extent possible, the Kremlin will continue its efforts to drive wedges between Europe and the United States, using the traditional carrot-and-stick approach. Continued modernization of Soviet military forces will be the primary stick as the Soviets attempt to convince the Europeans that it is not in their best interest to undertake military initiatives and moderniza-

tion programs that the United States wants to see occur. Recognizing that Europeans, particularly West Germans, believe that détente has resulted in practical political and economic benefits, the U.S.S.R. may attempt to hold out increased German migration and enhanced trade as rewards for improved Soviet-European relations. The Kremlin may even attempt to manipulate the FRG's dependence on Soviet natural gas to obtain political concessions from Bonn. If the current U.S. disinterest in détente continues, Moscow will probably use this as another lever to create friction between the United States and its allies.

Forecasts about future Sino-Soviet relations are uncertain at best. Improved Sino-Soviet relations are surely a desired Soviet objective. However, since at least the mid-1970s, the devious factors between the two communist giants have intensified while Sino-American relations have improved. Without a radical change in Chinese leadership and threat perception, it is unlikely that Sino-Soviet relations will greatly improve during the midrange. As a result, the Sino-Soviet conflict will continue to influence not only Sino-Soviet but also Soviet-American relations. For the United States, the continuation of the Sino-Soviet conflict has certain potential advantages. The dispute has caused the Soviet Union to direct between 25-30 percent of its land forces against China, leaving them virtually unavailable for other contingencies. Moreover, the dispute is a major factor in improved Chinese-American relations. On the other hand, intensification of the Sino-Soviet conflict could lead to full-scale conflict. If this should occur, the United States would be confronted by some major policy decisions given its growing relationship with the PRC. Should the United States attempt to terminate the conflict in order to preserve a Eurasian balance of power? Which side should the United States support? Could the

United States use its political influence to terminate the conflict or would U.S. or allied military troops be required? If intervention is required should the United States help defend China?

Military strength should continue as the main element of Soviet international behavior in the midrange. Soviet leaders believe that the growth of their military power has permitted them to pursue a more active policy in the Third World and to expand Soviet influence. They see military strength as a crucial element not only for expanding Soviet influence in the future, but also for consolidating and preserving past gains. They correctly perceive that military strength is the foundation of the Soviet Union's status as a global power. Because it is unlikely that any major domestic economic improvements will occur to enhance the perception of the Soviet Union as a global economic power, the Kremlin leaders will most likely provide the military with the necessary financial support to allow continued modernization and expansion of the armed forces.

This assessment is particularly disturbing to some observers because there is already a growing concern in the American defense community over significantly improved Soviet "power projection" and "global reach" capabilities. Extensive force modernization programs have been carried out during the Brezhnev era. They have provided the Soviets with improved equipment and new military capabilities. These capabilities have allowed the Kremlin to exploit opportunities that it was unable to do in the past. The Soviet Union is now involved in areas of the world where it traditionally never ventured. The Kremlin can now provide friends and allies, as well as its own forces, with equipment, supplies, and military assistance to a degree that previously was impossible. This capability is obvious when one compares the level of assistance that Moscow could

provide Angola, Ethiopia, Egypt, Vietnam, and Afghanistan in the 1970s with its lack of capability in the Congo in the 1960s.

In the past, the U.S.S.R. has been willing to resort to the use or threatened use of military force to advance its own interests when it believed that it could do so cheaply and with minimum risk to Soviet interests. With improved military capabilities, there is every reason to believe that the Kremlin will continue to pressure, probe, and test the will of the United States. The main risk of such an approach is that a new Soviet leadership, inexperienced in foreign affairs, may inadvertently provoke a crisis in the Third World before discovering the limits of translating superpower strength into usable political influence.

An important determinant of Soviet behavior will be Soviet perceptions of the United States. There is no reason to believe that Moscow wants to initiate a direct conflict with the United States. The fear that such a confrontation may escalate to nuclear war still restrains Soviet actions. If Moscow believes that the United States has the capability and will to react to Soviet military initiatives, it probably will be more cautious. On the other hand, if the perception is, as it apparently was accurately calculated prior to the Angola, Ethiopia, and Afghanistan adventures, that the United States will not react militarily or that U.S. interests are only marginal in a particular region, the Soviet Union will probably be more inclined to use its own or proxy forces to enhance Soviet influence and interests.

Despite major improvements in Soviet forces, it is also important to keep in mind that significant military constraints on Soviet force projection capabilities for the midrange do exist. Heavy ground force divisions with their primary mission to repel a NATO attack and then to initiate a blitzkrieg counter-attack are difficult to project to areas that are noncontiguous to the Soviet

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Union. Although the Soviets have just launched a nuclear cruiser and indications are that the construction of a large nuclear aircraft carrier may take place, naval ship construction rates indicate that the largest share of the Soviet Navy's growth in the 1980s will continue to be in two nonforce projection areas: strategic nuclear submarines and antisubmarine warfare. Also, logistic weaknesses will continue to limit Soviet abilities to sustain at-sea combat operations if they occur in areas distant from the Soviet Union. The current afloat replenishment force is structured primarily for peacetime operations. Although new larger and faster replenishment ships are being built, the pace of construction is too slow to overcome the navy's combat logistic shortcomings during the midrange. Finally, current Soviet military transportation aircraft (VTA) are not air refuelable. If Moscow cannot obtain landing and refueling rights, VTA reach capability is limited to no more than 2,000 miles from Soviet borders. Also, the Soviets stopped producing the AN-22 (the only Soviet airplane capable of carrying such outsize loads as tanks) in 1974 when they had only 50. Because no replacement for the AN-22 has entered the Soviet inventory, it seems safe to say that Soviet capabilities to airlift outsized loads will be somewhat limited throughout most of the 1980s.

Moscow does have the capability to support certain types of Third World insurrections and guerrilla activities when its clients are unopposed by a sophisticated military adversary. The Soviet Navy can serve as an interpositional force in many Third World conflicts and thus increase the risk calculations required by American policymakers. In areas close to the U.S.S.R.—the North Atlantic, Eastern Mediterranean, South Asia, and North Pacific regions—where the Soviet naval and ground forces are concentrated and they can obtain reliable air support, Soviet

forces could obtain a geopolitical advantage over the United States. Any U.S. military operation in such areas would be a risky undertaking. However, as one moves further from the U.S.S.R., Soviet war and force projection capabilities become less significant and in some cases insignificant.

The recent invasion of Afghanistan occurred within that arc of primary Soviet geopolitical advantage. Moscow was able to move ground divisions by way of long, methodical road marches from bases within Russia to major Afghan cities easily within range of VTA capabilities. Moreover, if it had been required, tactical fighters could have been deployed from Soviet bases and range and refueling limitations would have been insignificant. These conditions of Soviet advantage, which maximized Soviet military capabilities in Afghanistan, may not exist as one moves further from Soviet borders. This is an important factor to keep in mind as increasingly concerned U.S. policymakers inevitably begin to reassess the implications of Soviet "power projection" and "global reach" capabilities in the aftermath of the Afghanisan invasion.

Strategic Issues and Options.

Given U.S. interests and objectives and Soviet trends, what are the major strategic issues confronting the United States in the midrange and what options should be adopted to deal with those issues? In the coming decade, to pursue or not to pursue arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union will be of major concern to U.S. interests and objectives. Should the United States suspend arms negotiations because of repugnant Soviet behavior, particularly in the Third World, or should the United States pursue arms control negotiations almost without regard to linkage because they are in U.S. interests? If it is Soviet military might or the potential for unrelenting growth

of the Soviet military that the United States fears most, then it seems logical that arms control negotiations should be pursued. Refusing to talk to the Soviets about SALT, MBFR, nuclear proliferation, or other arms negotiations seems rather foolish. Arms control negotiations are not—and should not be—separate actions sought merely to limit the size of defense arsenals or reduce costs. Rather arms control negotiations should contribute to national defense by providing force programmers and strategists with some reasonable idea of what maximum forces the adversary will have at its disposal in the future. Without reasonable arms negotiations and limitations, there is no "expected ceiling or umbrella" for the Soviet Union to grow toward and not exceed. Without successful arms negotiations and limitations, Western strategists are left to guess what the Soviets will consider their optimum ceiling to be. But with successful arms control negotiations an opponent's future forces can be fixed and, as a result, strategic planning and procurement policies can be tailored for an expected future. Therefore, early considerations of a SALT II treaty is essential. Then, negotiations toward a treaty that considers technological limitations should begin almost immediately.

Another major issue of strategic importance for the coming decade is for the United States to decide for itself and then communicate with the Soviet Union over what is acceptable superpower behavior in the Third World. Too often one is left with the impression that there is no level of acceptable Soviet behavior in the Third World. However, the Soviet Union is extensively engaged in the Third World; it has interests and objectives in the Third World; and no amount of wishful thinking will cause the Kremlin to turn to a policy of benign neglect toward the Third World.

Clearly it is not in American interests

for the Soviet Union or its proxies to use military force to overthrow governments that it disapproves. Likewise, it is not in U.S. interests for Soviet proxies or clandestine agents to provoke anarchy, civil war, or domestic disturbances that lead to the overthrow of legitimate governments. The United States also does not want to see the Soviets use proxy forces to influence the outcome of civil wars or revolutions. However, is the use of military force never acceptable in the Third World? Does the United States condemn the use of all proxies, even the Iranians in the Dofar Rebellion or Moroccans, Belgians, and French in the Shaba Province? If that is what we are asking of the Soviet Union, then the United States should also be willing to forego the use or threatened use of force to influence events in the Third World. Is covert manipulation of Third World domestic politics acceptable for the United States but not for the Soviet Union? When some analysts deplore the web of Soviet treaties of friendship and cooperation, should this be interpreted to mean that the United States opposes all political-military pacts, even those that the United States has signed calling for mutual defense obligations?

These and other similar sorts of questions need to be answered in the coming decade as the United States attempts to sort out what it thinks are acceptable levels of superpower behavior in the Third World. The Soviets will probably never sign a formal "rules of behavior." Mutual trust between the two superpowers is lacking, and both countries would seriously question if the other would abide by any such formal agreement. Nevertheless, the Soviets have a stake in predictability. On one hand, predictability helps to insure against accidental superpower conflicts. On the other hand, predictable levels of unacceptable behavior could be used as tools to curb the designs of more aggressive Soviet domestic factions and

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to restrain some allies, e.g., Vietnam, from initiating actions that could draw the Soviets into conflicts that they may prefer to avoid.

To some degree the United States should welcome a shift in strategic interests and competition with the Soviet Union toward the Third World. The most critical problems confronting most Third World nations are problems of modernization and how to establish stable governments in newly independent states; provide adequate health and educational services; diversify economic and political systems while at the same time safeguarding and maintaining social values; develop managerial skills among political leaders that will equip them to govern a modern nation-state; and accommodate the rising expectations of a growing middle class that is an almost inevitable creation of successful modernization. The Soviet record in responding to such problems is not very good. While Moscow does provide technical assistance to help Third World nations overcome their lack of experience in managing and operating aid projects, Soviet economic aid is still targeted toward a few countries that receive large credits for high visibility, heavy industry projects. Very little assistance is provided to help nations manage the social, economic, and political ramifications of the modernization process. On the rhetorical level, the U.S.S.R. has given its qualified endorsement of the south's call for a New International Economic Order (NIEO). In practice, it has done very little to provide firm economic or political assistance.

The United States has considerable capability to assist in the development of public health, education, and civil works projects. It is in U.S. interests to initiate actions that not only highlight the inconsistency between Soviet actions and words on the NIEO issue but also demonstrate U.S. commitment to help Third World nations meet their

political and economic needs. Constructive efforts—particularly in the area of increased security assistance and foreign aid—and not just empty declaratory policies are necessary. The United States ranks 13th among the 17 major industrial nations in the percentage of Gross National Product dedicated to developmental assistance. U.S. foreign aid and assistance should be increased significantly, not because of some idea that money will buy friends and allies for the United States, but rather because such programs can go a long way toward eliminating the causes that invite Soviet meddling in the Third World and work against U.S. world order objective of stability.

A shift of military competition away from Central Europe, where the United States faces the Soviet Union at its strongest point, to other areas, where the United States can bring its superior experience in global military operations and maritime power to bear, is also in U.S. interests. However, a more flexible military strategy and force structure will be required in the midrange if the United States is to exploit its advantages. The U.S. military is predominantly planned, programmed, and budgeted for a European conflict. Most active Army divisions are now heavy and some of the remaining nonheavy divisions are being considered for conversion to increase their antiarmor capabilities. While they may be appropriate for a European conflict, heavy divisions are less suitable for numerous other non-NATO contingencies. Also, by their very nature, heavy divisions are not rapidly transportable and the United States has been driven toward forward positioning of equipment, supplies, and material in Europe to support those divisions in case of conflict. As a result, the divisions, their supporting units, and supplies and equipment cannot easily be deployed elsewhere. The 1973 Middle East War pointed out how prepositioning could

curtail U.S. flexibility, if the United States has to have the prior approval of the host nation before supplies and material can be redeployed.

But heavy divisions and repositioning are only part of the problem. U.S. strategy needs to become more flexible, less myopic, and not so Europe-oriented. While U.S. military strategists have begun to recognize this problem, force programmers continue to build forces on the European scenario and, as a result, limit strategists' options. The defense of Europe will continue to be a vital U.S. interest. However, the complexity of international trends and the wide range of potential conflicts facing the United States will ultimately require a more flexible strategy than heretofore has been within U.S. capabilities.

If the United States is serious in its desire to obtain strategic flexibility, some changes in the positioning of forward deployed forces may have to occur in the midrange. Rather than being an integral part of static line defenses in Europe and Korea, Army divisions may need to be pulled away from the immediate border areas. In the event of conflict, such repositioning would present policymakers with more alternatives than the current posture provides. U.S. forces would be in less of a tripwire position, providing the opportunity to seek termination before U.S. prestige and forces were decisively engaged. But more importantly, with allies providing the first line of defense, U.S. forces could be used as reserves to augment European and Korean forces at the most crucial defense points. In addition, U.S. forces could be in a better position to be used in other contingencies. It is probably not politically feasible or wise to bring major contingents of U.S. forces back to the United States or to undertake major reductions in size of U.S. overseas forces. Such actions would probably reduce U.S. flexibility, result in units being lost to the force structure, and

cause allies to question U.S. resolve and will.

As the United States pursues strategic flexibility, it is imperative to articulate for itself, allies, and adversaries that alliance strategy will remain the cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy. However, alliances are two-way streets and burden-sharing among allies will have to continue to exist as allies exploit their own individual advantages to fulfill the objectives of any alliance strategy. The United States cannot and should not be expected to police the world unilaterally. It is helpful—and necessary—for Europeans and Japanese to assume a greater responsibility for their own regional defense. This can reduce the U.S. burden and provide greater opportunities for the United States to use its forces elsewhere. The United States can support allies and use its military capabilities where it has advantages over its allies, particularly in the area of global military operations. However, the United States should not assume a disproportionate share of the risk associated with any such alliance burden-sharing strategy. For example, if the protection of oil supplies is vital to the national survival of U.S. allies, they need to participate in the defense of the oil SLOC. The United States should not be expected to take actions to defend Middle East/Persian Gulf oil supplies, which could end in nuclear confrontation, without allied participation. If the United States is defending allied interests, which in reality are more important to them than to the United States, U.S. allies should also bear some of the risks. Failure of U.S. allies to participate in the defense of their own interests could very well result in U.S. domestic political pressures to curb U.S. military initiatives to defend the flow of oil to Europe and Japan. Such an event would not be in the best interests of either the United States or its allies.

Because alliances are the cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy, they should not be

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entered into lightly. Allies are precious commodities and they need to be cultivated and nurtured. There should be a reasonable assurance that once an alliance is entered into, it will survive. Moreover, any alliance must have sufficient domestic support so that the United States can fulfill its commitments in time of stress. Just because a nation feels threatened, opposes the Soviet Union, or requests U.S. assistance are not sufficient reasons for the United States to associate itself with unstable regimes, even if for the short run U.S. interests are advanced. For a mutually beneficial relationship to occur, the United States and a potential ally must have some common perception of the threat, as well as some commonality in long-range goals and interests. These latter factors often do not exist with unstable, Third World regimes and that usually makes any association with them a temporary rather than long-term phenomenon.

These are just a few of the options for the 1980s that need to be considered. Strategists will have to reexamine traditional ways of doing things, e.g., positioning of U.S. forces. Improvements in U.S. military forces, particularly general-purpose conventional forces, will be an important task. But military initiatives should not be viewed as panaceas. Attention needs to be given to political and economic options where

U.S. advantages vis-à-vis the Soviet Union should be significant. Of primary importance, it is necessary to recognize that adverse domestic trends could limit Soviet options during the 1980s. As a result, it is not a given that the 1980s will be an era in which Moscow will have more political-military advantages than does Washington. How successful the United States is in achieving its national interests will depend in large measure on the strategist's ability to balance U.S. disadvantages in certain areas with advantages in others. The strategist's task is a difficult one but it is achievable.

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY



Keith A. Dunn, a member of the Strategic Studies Institute, Army War College, was educated at Southeast Missouri State University and the University of Missouri, earning the Ph.D. degree in American

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NOTES

1. "Statement by the Honorable Cyrus R. Vance, Secretary of State Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee," *Department of State Press Release*, 27 March 1980, p. 6.

2. See Steven David, "Realignment in the Horn: The Soviet Advantage," *International Security*, Fall 1979, pp. 69-90 for an excellent analysis of not only the Soviet-Somalia but also the U.S.-Ethiopia relationship and how the pattern of commitment between the superpowers and their clients shifted during the 1960s and 1970s.

3. Joseph Berliner, *The Innovation Decision in Soviet Industry* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1976)

4. Quoted in Arthur J. Alexander, *Decision-Making in Soviet Weapons Procurement*, Adelphi papers, no. 148 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, Winter 1978/79), p. 24.

5. David W. Carey and Joseph F. Havelka, "Soviet Agriculture: Progress and Problems," in U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, *Soviet Economy in a Time of Change* (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1979), v. 2, pp. 70-71; "Accountability Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 26th CPSU Congress and the Immediate Tasks of the CPSU in the Field of Domestic and Foreign Policy," Moscow Domestic Service, 23 February 1981, in *Foreign Broadcast Information Service: Soviet Union*,

Supplement, 24 February 1981, p. 30; and "The Basic Guidelines for the Economic and Social Development of the USSR for 1981-1985 and for the Period Through 1990," *Pravda*, 5 March 1981, in *FBI-SOV*, Supplement, 10 March 1981, p. 25.

6. Central Intelligence Agency, *Prospects for Soviet Oil Production* (Washington: April 1977); Richard Burt, "U.S. Aides Say Soviets May Look to the Persian Gulf for Oil in 1980's," *The New York Times*, 15 April 1980, pp. A1 and A14; Bernard Gwertaman, "C.I.A. Revises Estimate, Sees Soviet As Oil-Independent Through 80's," *The New York Times*, 19 May 1981, pp. A1 and D11.

7. Arthur D. Little, Inc., *Dependence of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe on Essential Imported Materials Year 2000*, Study for Navy Project 2000 (Cambridge, Mass.: September 1977), pp. 13-19; and Herbert E. Meyer, "Russia's Sudden Reach for Raw Materials," *Fortune*, 28 July 1980, pp. 43-44.

8. Little, Inc., p. 16.

9. See Ann Sheehy, *The National Composition of the Population of the USSR According to the Census of 1979* (New York: Radio Research Committee, 27 March 1980), Report RI. 123/80.

10. Edward N. Luttwak, "After Afghanistan, What?" *Commentary*, April 1980, pp. 40-49.



The beginnings of a dynamic process of American and European economic and cultural interaction with the Asian-Pacific states can be discerned. Such interaction promises to be of benefit to all parties. NATO will be obliged to demonstrate sufficient collective will to identify and pursue successful policies beyond its traditional geographic confines if it is to meet the many political and economic challenges ahead.

ASIAN-PACIFIC ALLIANCE SYSTEMS AND TRANSREGIONAL LINKAGES

by

William T. Tow

During the past few years the majority of Western and Asian-Pacific states* have become more concerned about the Soviet Union's extension of military power throughout the Far East. In February 1980 America's Secretary of Defense characterized the European and Asian theaters as now posing "an awkward set of circumstances" for U.S. security interests. He contended that only "moderate levels" of nonnuclear deterrence existed in both theaters and strongly implied that a linkage of pro-Western Pacific states might be required to rectify evident imbalances between Soviet and Western force capabilities.¹ All preliminary indications are that the present Administration concurs with these assessments.²

Soviet strategies may be related to satisfying a historical insecurity regarding potential Asian threats to the Russian homeland, or the U.S.S.R. could be pursuing geopolitical opportunities within the context of its "correlation of

forces" world view vis-à-vis a perceived Asian power vacuum created by a diminished Western strategic presence in the region. In the absence of significantly increased regional defense efforts with strong Western support, Moscow's long-standing proposal for an "Asian Collective Security System" may become a reality by default. Such an arrangement could become a warrant for the U.S.S.R. to enforce an imposed neutrality on noncommunist states of Northeast and Southeast Asia.³

Under such circumstances, Soviet Russia could finally achieve what Tsarist Russia never could when playing the

*For the purposes of this study, the term "Asian-Pacific" refers to that area including the Siberian, Transbaikal, and Far Eastern Military Districts of the U.S.S.R., the Korean Peninsula, China, Japan, the Indochinese peninsula including Burma, the ASEAN states of Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines, and Indonesia, and the Western Pacific area commonly referred to as "Oceania" stretching from Western Australia to Hawaii.

"Great Game" with the British Empire—a global strategic breakthrough by establishing Soviet outposts throughout the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean while successfully contesting the traditional American predominance in the Western Pacific. The resulting Soviet strategic reach would sharply challenge, if not compromise, Western security through increased deployments of offshore strategic power. As one Western analyst has recently observed, the traditional geopolitical notion that the interests of a state diminish steadily with distance was never totally true and "makes a particularly bad fit" for the current realities of world market interdependencies and today's military technology.⁴

Since the 1975 communist victories in Indochina, however, the ASEAN states and South Korea have not become "dominoes" as many Western observers had initially predicted. They have instead exercised reasonable management over their domestic economic and development programs and have displayed surprising acumen in building an image of regional cohesion. Therefore, the major security challenges now confronting the region are mostly external ones and, within that context, several emerging trends will be discussed. Initially, the nature of Soviet strategic penetration into the area will be reviewed under the assumption that it is now the most important determinant influencing the security perceptions of Asian-Pacific states and other key external actors. Two developing patterns of response to the Soviet challenge will then be examined: (1) current Japanese moves to relate its security concerns with those of NATO and America's Asian allies and (2) an emerging interest by other Asian-Pacific states to expand their existing security ties with NATO and ANZUS states into a widened forum for consultations and policy coordination. The potential inducement of such alliance consolidation by Soviet geopolitical

behavior makes for a compelling area of inquiry in Asian-Pacific affairs.

The Interplay of Soviet Political and Military Force. The rapid pace of the U.S.S.R.'s military deployments in the Asian-Pacific has been complemented by the Soviet use of intimidating political and strategic tactics to test the will of various states in the region. A striking example was the increase of Soviet air and naval movements around Japan immediately before and after Tokyo signed its Peace and Friendship Treaty with China.⁵ Soviet spokesmen pointed to the Sino-Japanese diplomatic negotiations and "the guise of '(Japanese) self-defense forces'" as "tendencies which run counter to the statements made by Japanese officials to the effect that Japan has no intention of becoming a major military power—[and which]—if not rebuffed are liable—to increase tension in the Far East."⁶ While a few individuals in Japanese political and academic circles argue that Japan and East Asia's security interests would be best served by adopting a more compliant posture toward Moscow, the majority of Japanese entertain a deep-rooted fear and distrust of Russia and support their government's present campaign to resist Soviet penetration into the Asian-Pacific.⁷

The U.S.S.R. continues to regard the Sino-Japanese Friendship Treaty, developing NATO-PRC ties, the warming of Antipodean-Chinese relations, and China's improved relations with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as steps in forming a "united front against Moscow."⁸ It can be argued, however, that the Soviet Union has contributed more to these developments than any other state by the pace and scope of its military buildup in the Asian-Pacific region. From 1965 through 1979, Soviet ground forces in the Far East—roughly from Lake Baikal eastward—increased from 15 divisions

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with 150,000 personnel to 34 divisions with approximately 350,000 troops. If Soviet ground forces deployed in the Siberian Military District and other areas adjacent to the Chinese border are counted, Soviet ground force presence in the Asian-Pacific region now totals 46 divisions with 450,000 personnel.⁹ By comparison, U.S. ground forces have declined from a peak of 530,000 in 1970 (up from 100,000 in 1965 owing to the American involvement in Vietnam) to approximately 51,000 currently stationed in South Korea, Hawaii, and Japan. When the ground forces of probable Soviet regional allies are compared with those of countries most likely to align with the West, the quantitative imbalance is somewhat reduced, but still significantly in favor of Moscow.

Qualitative assessments of the Soviet ground force composition yield additional concerns. While only a few Soviet divisions in the Far East are at a "Category I" state of combat readiness with manning and equipment levels at or over full strength, significant numbers of T-62 battle tanks, BM-21 mobile multiple rocket launchers, 152 mm howitzers capable of firing nuclear shells, SA-8 and SA-9 surface-to-air missiles, nuclear mines, and *Hind* helicopter gunships have been added to the newly established Far Eastern Command.¹⁰ A particularly intense Soviet buildup has been occurring in the "Northern Territories"—with up to 12,000 Soviet personnel now deployed on the Japanese-claimed but Soviet-held island chain off the northeastern tip of Hokkaido. The Soviets have maintained a ground presence on Shikotan island since the summer of 1979, on Kunashiri and Etorofu since May 1978, with a division headquarters now functioning on Etorofu. An additional 18 Soviet divisions from Kamchatka, Sakhalin, and other points in the Soviet Maritime Provinces are within easy striking distance of Japanese territory.

Most Japanese military planners now believe that any Soviet ground attack against Japan would be largely amphibious with at least three divisions (35,000 men), 1,000 tanks and supporting airpower initially launched against Japan's Northern Army. The Northern Army's 5th Division could resist any such invasion directed toward eastern Hokkaido with only about 5,000 men, 266 tanks, and inferior firepower.¹¹ According to Gen. Hiroomi Kurisu, the Chairman of the Japanese Self-Defense Force (JSDF) Joint Staff Council until forcibly retired in July 1978 for his outspoken views on Japanese defense shortcomings, the total of Japan's forces would be stretched so thin in such a defense that the Soviets could secure Hokkaido and all of northern Japan within a matter of days through one of four possible invasion routes: eastern Hokkaido, northern Hokkaido, the Soya or Tsugaru Straits, and along the northern coast of Honshu. He has concluded that the only question remaining in any current scenario of Japanese resistance against a Soviet attack without swift and decisive U.S. intervention would be "how could members of the Self Defense Force die most honorably?"¹²

While Soviet ground capabilities in the Asian-Pacific are formidable, the U.S.S.R.'s extension of its offshore presence in the form of naval and airpower could have the greatest long-term effect in altering the regional balance of power. Moscow has structured a multidimensional theater nuclear deterrent through its deployment of SS-20 IRBMs as well as long-range *Backfire* and *Bear* bombers. The U.S.S.R.'s conventional force presence in areas adjacent to Japan and in Vietnam will enhance any Soviet attempt to clear the Seas of Okhotsk and Japan for operating and launching of *Delta*-class SSBN launched strategic warheads with ranges sufficient to hit most U.S. and all Asian-Pacific targets. If

refueled in flight, Soviet long-range bombers can reach most Asian-Pacific targets north of Alice Springs, Australia using Vladivostok or Petropavlovsk as bases of origin.¹³

Soviet naval and air presence in the Vietnamese ports of Cam Ranh Bay and Danang has also improved the U.S.S.R.'s strategic reach by upgrading its "surge capability"—the ready availability of flexible and responsive offshore power in support of Soviet military operations in Asia, the Indian Ocean, and other Third World regions.¹⁴ The marked growth of the Russian's surge capability is demonstrated by the number of naval ship passings the Soviet Pacific Fleet now conducts through the Sea of Japan—about one a day. In the space of only 1 year—between 1979 and 1980—the U.S.S.R.'s Pacific Fleet has increased in size from 770 ships and 1.38 million tons to 785 ships and 1.52 million tons. During the Iran and Afghanistan crises, the U.S.S.R. was able to deploy simultaneously a minimum of 10 ships in the South China Sea, 30 in the Indian Ocean, and the *Minsk* carrier and the *Ivan Rogov* amphibious assault transport/dock ship to the Pacific Fleet. Limited open-water amphibious capability has also been enhanced over the past few years by the deployment of 4,500-4,800 Soviet marines into the Asian-Pacific region. Replenishment and resupply problems have been addressed by the expected introduction of the 40,000 ton *Berezina* fleet oiler. Many Western strategists contend, however, that Soviet offshore forces do not really need to maintain a forward presence far from anchorage points in order to fulfill their basic missions of protecting the Soviet submarine-based nuclear deterrent and interdicting Western naval and merchant shipping.¹⁵

The growth of Soviet airpower in the Asian-Pacific area has been commensurate with its increased naval development. Up to 20 *Backfires* are now thought to be assigned to the Far East—

many of them in a naval aviation role.¹⁶ While Soviet bombers and military transport aircraft still lack extensive support for refueling, their recently increased ranges will allow for attacks against Asian land and sea targets at significantly greater distances from their own home bases.

Soviet aircraft, however, have long since moved beyond surveillance and/or transport missions restricted to North-east Asia. By 1979, the Soviet air force was flying military supplies and hardware—including components for 60 *MiG-21* jets being constructed in Danang—from Tashkent and Bombay over Thailand to Hanoi in extensive support of Vietnam's war efforts in Indochina. The frequency of such flights has violated Thai airspace regulations and has become a matter of increasing concern to ASEAN defense planners.¹⁷ Similarly, Japanese Air Self-Defense Force "scrambles" against Soviet military aircraft have increased on the average from 360 to 600 per year since 1976.¹⁸ Moreover, the naval air arm of the Pacific Fleet has reportedly stepped up its regular surveillance of the entire ASEAN region including the U.S. Navy's Subic Bay installation in the Philippines with such flights originating from Danang.¹⁹

Surge capability also increases the U.S.S.R.'s options for potential interruption in the flow of oil and other critical resources to European or Asian states and for possible application of coercive diplomacy by Moscow. In noting Japan's reluctance to stand by NATO boycott policies at the outset of the Iranian embargo, it seems reasonable to assume that Tokyo would regard any serious threat to its 20 percent of the world's total trade volume as unacceptable to its economic well-being. The Japan Defense Agency has publicly admitted, however, that the Maritime Self-Defense Force cannot develop an adequate antisubmarine defense on its own against the modern Soviet attack

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submarines or naval components that could be used to interdict Japanese sea lines of communication (SLOC), even though Japan is being pressured by Washington to assume a *greater* burden in ASW.²⁰ While Australia, Indonesia, South Korea and other ASEAN nations possess effective local naval forces and are or will be acquiring at least some modern ASW weapons (such as the *Harpoon* and ASROC missiles) and more advanced jet fighter aircraft such as the F-5E or even the F-16 or F-18, they cannot begin to match the overall maritime strike components of the U.S.S.R. because of financial or technological limitations.²¹

While the question of quantity versus quality in defense will continue to enter into strategic calculations, the establishment of geostrategic momentum, recognized and respected by both potential allies and opponents, is a more critical factor in the achievement and maintenance of regional influence. Indeed, the unmatched Soviet force buildups in the Asian-Pacific region has been decisive in forming the strategic perceptions of leaders heading Asian-Pacific states that the United States is committed to defend. By late 1979, Toru Hara, Director of the Japan Defense Agency's Bureau of Defense Policy, refused to acknowledge the superiority of U.S. Fleet deployments in the Pacific but was perhaps only following the lead of the U.S. Commander-in-Chief Pacific (CINCPAC) who, in congressional testimony the year before, estimated that the United States had only a "50-50 chance" of keeping vital SLOCs open in an Asian conflict.²² Washington's announced "1½ war" strategy (emphasizing the American defense of Europe and the Middle East) also fueled ASEAN nations' tendencies during the mid-1970s to downplay the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) and other existing security ties with the West. This problem recurred in Japan during late 1979 and early 1980 with the announcement

of the so-called "swing strategy" allegedly prescribing the transfer of U.S. forces in the Pacific to the NATO theater during an emergency.²³

Similarly, the Soviet buildup in the Asian-Pacific region has produced a "spillover" effect into the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean regions that could affect future U.S. strategic access to those areas. The credibility factor of U.S. defense guarantees entered into the intricate negotiations leading to *limited* American use of Somalian, Omani, and Egyptian facilities. The same problem was evident in negotiations leading to the U.S.-Philippine base agreements of January 1979. In both the Middle East and the Pacific, U.S. allies entertained fears of being abandoned if U.S. defense "guarantees" were ever seriously tested.²⁴

Japanese Movement Toward Multi-lateral Defense Cooperation: A Qualified Approach. Article IX of Japan's constitution renounces that country's use of force as a sovereign right except in self defense. The overall depreciation of U.S. military strength relative to that of the Soviet Union during the past decade, however, has led to the concentration of remaining American power in Europe and the Middle East, leaving Japan's peripheries less secure than at any time since the Second World War. Any efforts by the United States to correct this imbalance will be time-consuming and subject to Soviet counteractions. Under such circumstances, the necessity for Japan to build and maintain credible military forces of its own with the world's eighth largest defense budget is now fully accepted by the government and a vast majority of the Japanese people.²⁵

In July 1980 a Comprehensive National Security Study Group (CNSSG), appointed by the late Prime Minister Masayoshi Ohira, issued its first report.²⁶ The CNSSG concluded that Japan would now have to become a more active participant in future

Western international security efforts by achieving true self-reliance in defense and by broadening its defense perspectives. The CNSSG's conclusions were reinforced by those reached in the 1980 Japan Defense Agency's "White Paper" and by leading Western foreign policy institutes. A recent joint study by American, British, French, and West German scholars concluded that Japan must be recognized as an important world power and encouraged to participate in the Western defense system although not in ways that risk antagonizing neighboring Asian states.²⁷ A highly publicized "Joint Working Group" of American and Japanese analysts was even more specific after completing its own 2-year study.²⁸ It recommended that Japan should provide airlift and sealift capability as well as financial support for increased Western military forces now deployed in the Middle East. Tokyo was also called upon to increase simultaneously its force levels in the Asian-Pacific region to compensate for any U.S. elements transferred from there to the Persian Gulf or Indian Ocean.²⁹

To what extent Japan will actually restructure its security policies to comply with such recommendations remains uncertain. Japan still justifies its growing defense role within the guidelines of the "Basic Policy for National Defense" adopted in 1957, which stipulates that any external aggression against the country will be dealt with on the basis of the U.S.-Japan Mutual Defense Treaty.³⁰ Prime Minister Suzuki's recent directives forbidding speculation by members of his cabinet on the revision of Article IX and Japan's refusal to increase its defense budget more than 7.6 percent for 1981 despite intense pressure by Washington for a 9.7 percent expansion indicate that any Japanese moves to extend its alliances will be gradual.³¹

Until now, Japan has been highly cautious in its attempts to forge closer

political and security consultations with West European states. In early 1980 Japan announced that it would send permanent representatives to meetings of the North Atlantic Assembly (NAA)—the parliamentary affiliate of NATO. A Japanese Defense Agency spokesman qualified this decision to an NAA visiting delegation to Tokyo by reminding it that constitutional restraints still prevent Japan from assisting another country with JSDF forces if Japan itself had not been attacked. Within this context, the prospects for Japanese-West European joint military action are still remote.³² This constraint was reiterated by Asao Mihara, Chairman of Japan's Liberal Democratic Party Security Affairs Research Council and the leader of the Japanese delegation to the North Atlantic Assembly's November 1980 session in Brussels. The Japanese parliamentarian said that there could be no direct Japanese participation in the type of joint international supervisory fleet envisioned by the Joint Working Group report—although Japanese *financial* support might be forthcoming if such a task force ever materialized.³³

It is also doubtful that most of NATO's decisionmakers are ready to incorporate Japan as a formal member of the alliance. In recent interviews and correspondence by the author with NATO officials in Brussels, the 1978 and 1979 visits of the Japan Defense Agency Directors to NATO Headquarters were regarded as "information activities" or "courtesy visits" that are commonly extended to all nationalities. A Japanese diplomatic communique released following Ganri Yamashita's 1979 visit emphasized that no arrangements for the actual exchange of defense information were discussed. NATO considered the development of *bilateral security ties* between its members and Japan as the best way to meet Japan's understandable desire for reassurances in light of the Soviet threat.³⁴

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Strategic developments in the Persian Gulf, the Indian Ocean, and Southeast Asia, however, have created a shared sense of urgency between Tokyo and NATO that may soon overcome both sides' reluctance to move towards higher levels of security cooperation. In October 1980 the Defense Agency disclosed that it no longer necessarily interprets the concept of "basic and balanced defense power" to mean "minimum defense power to be achieved in peacetime" as was the case when this criteria was adopted as Japan's defense planning principle in 1976. This could be an indicator of some movement toward greater Japanese willingness to enter into more advanced interregional security arrangements.³⁵

Some mechanisms already exist for this possibility such as Japan's membership in the Consultative Group- Coordinating Committee (COCOM), which regulates Western technology transfers to communist countries, and Tokyo's participation in the annual economic summits held by the industrial democracies in which political and security issues are also weighed.³⁶ While Japan continues to adhere to its three "non-nuclear principles" of no production, deployment, or presence of nuclear weapons on Japanese soil, its strong interest in nuclear energy and proliferation problems complements EURATOM's concerns in this area.³⁷

European-Japanese cooperation in defense-related technology or in eventual outright weapons production cannot be discounted. In March 1980 West German Defense Minister Hans Apel journeyed to Tokyo to express the FRG's willingness to arrange for limited sales of military-related equipment with Japan. The imminent emergence of the Japanese aerospace industry could lead to consortium or coproduction arrangements similar to those now in effect for the *Tornado* jet fighter between several European countries—perhaps, in part, relieving the current problems now

being experienced with European nations' growing budgets. After Apel briefed Japanese officials, Japan Defense Agency Director-General Hosada observed that his country was already "spiritually tied to NATO."³⁸

Japan is also demonstrating a greater willingness to participate in bilateral and even multilateral military exercises with the United States and its NATO and ANZUS allies. Joint U.S.-Japanese exercises have increased under the auspices of the "Guidelines for U.S.-Japanese Defense Cooperation" (approved in November 1978) and the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee.³⁹ Similarly, British warships recently drilled with units of the Maritime Self-Defense Force near Oshima Island and in Tokyo Bay.⁴⁰ But the most significant Japanese participation in Western alliance military exercises to date was in RIMPAC 80, a 3-week multilateral exercise by American, Canadian, Australian, and New Zealand naval units conducted from 26 February to 18 March 1980 off Hawaii. The Japanese contingent included two destroyers and eight antisubmarine patrol aircraft (P-2Js) with 690 naval personnel in attendance.⁴¹ The Japanese Government justified the presence of Japanese forces by interpreting it as an "educative" venture not specifically directed toward any potential opponent and in compliance with Japan's criteria of not possessing, producing, or deploying nuclear weapons on Japanese territory. The JSDF has already announced that the MSDF will take part in RIMPAC 82.⁴² As a result of the RIMPAC precedent and Japan's newly developed concept of "non-collective defense" rights, some future Japanese role in various European maneuvers occasionally conducted with various ASEAN states or in the Indian Ocean cannot now be ruled out.⁴³

There have been recent indications that the ASEAN states are becoming more willing to accept a greater

Japanese security role in their region. ASEAN's major concern in this regard is that any growth in Japanese capabilities should occur under strict U.S. surveillance. Even with this condition fulfilled, the prospect of Japanese rearmament could quickly generate apprehensions throughout noncommunist Southeast Asia if Japan does not constantly reassure the area of its purely defensive intentions.

Singapore is probably the strongest ASEAN proponent of Japan increasing its military power. During a January 1981 interview with the *Asahi Shimbun*, Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew observed that Japan has been "most reluctant" to increase its defense budget but that the Soviet buildup of power in the Indian and Pacific Oceans made it imperative that it do so as a complement to U.S. defense efforts in the area. Lee qualified his endorsement by contending that Japan should only strengthen its conventional defenses and never aspire to become a nuclear power.⁴⁴ Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos has also conveyed approval for increased Japanese defenses as a component of a tacit U.S.-PRC-Japan "united front" necessary to check Soviet military power in Asia.⁴⁵ While leaders of the other ASEAN countries have been more reticent to endorse Japan's defense efforts, they have all at different times expressed understanding of Japan's need to pursue increased self-defense efforts, at least within Japanese territory.⁴⁶

For its part, Japan has begun to explore avenues of potential security cooperation with its noncommunist Asian neighbors. In July 1979, Japanese Foreign Minister Sunao Sonoda commented that Japan could only deal with the United States, the Soviet Union, and Western Europe on a basis of equality by allying itself with ASEAN.⁴⁷ During the past 2 years, Tokyo has initiated regional tours by JSDF officials to ASEAN states as well as to Australia

and New Zealand for consultations on defense matters. These activities culminated in a Japanese-Australian agreement, announced in March 1980, to upgrade their two countries' military personnel exchange programs.⁴⁸ In July 1979 Ganri Yamashita visited South Korea to enter into defense consultations with Korean defense officials and in October 1980 Seoul requested permission for a ROK naval training squadron to visit defense ports.⁴⁹ Finally, Japan's participation in the annual economic summits of the industrial democracies makes it a natural representative of Asian-Pacific interests at those prestigious forums, where global security issues are inevitably discussed.⁵⁰

Japan will most likely increase its regional military capabilities and activities to levels that it considers appropriate to the pace and scope of Soviet strategic penetration in the Asian-Pacific but not necessarily commensurate with levels preferred by Washington and possibly by Western Europe. Any Japanese buildup will remain tempered by other Asian states' lingering sensitivity to the specter of a remilitarized Japan. Prime Minister Suzuki's efforts during his January 1981 tour of the ASEAN states to promote a "comprehensive security" approach—the building of peace and stability throughout the region by emphasizing development assistance, freer trade, and conference diplomacy—was generally well received but also clearly illustrated Japan's difficulties for maintaining political credibility while simultaneously breaking out of a long-term situation of strategic self-restraint.⁵¹ In fact, however, most ASEAN leaders along with their counterparts in South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand understand that a credible regional security outlook must include a Japan that is capable of implementing region-wide defense missions if the need should arise.

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Developing Security Linkages of Other Asian-Pacific States and Extra-regional Actors. The projection of Soviet power into the critical SLOCs that traverse the Asian-Pacific and the Indian Ocean regions has introduced a profound security challenge to the ASEAN states as well as to the entire Western alliance system. The potential ramifications of the Sino-Vietnamese border conflict, the ambiguous nature of India's naval buildup along the Andaman Islands, and the Vietnamese Navy's recent acquisition of Soviet frigates as well as guided-missile craft are all regarded with justifiable concern by the nations of peninsular Southeast Asia.⁵² Revised intelligence estimates showing that North Korea's military capabilities and strengths were significantly greater than previously believed, coupled with the political instability of South Korea following the assassination of Park Chung-hee in October 1979, produced apprehensions in Tokyo and throughout the region about the vulnerability of the American deterrent in Northeast Asia.⁵³ Incursions of Vietnamese forces into Thailand that accelerated during the summer of 1979 and the subsequent Soviet invasion of Afghanistan increased the willingness of most noncommunist states throughout the region to seek more extensive security arrangements from each other and from the West.

The United States and its NATO allies, as well as Australia and New Zealand, have responded with initiatives designed to increase their own strategic presence and military assistance to Asian-Pacific countries. While a revival of SEATO may still seem premature, the ASEAN states' receptiveness to the West's renewed strategic presence in Asia prompted the *Times* (London) to conclude that "... [the] repeated disclaimers that ASEAN would never become a military alliance are becoming less and less credible."⁵⁴

In retrospect, SEATO was not

completely irrelevant to Asian-Pacific security needs until the time of its demise in June 1977, but throughout its 23-year history, its Western and Asian signatories entertained different views of participation in the alliance (i.e., deterrence of external threats of preoccupation with counterinsurgency requirements) that prevented its evolution into a credible military arrangement.⁵⁵ While the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty (SEACDT), better known as the "Manila Pact," is still in force, it remains unclear how or to what extent that covenant applies to the Malay Peninsula or to Indonesia. Kuala Lumpur and Jakarta have been traditional regional critics of Western alliance ties in the ASEA region, but they have demonstrated inconsistencies in their own security postures and now search for *kejahanan*—"the ability to endure"—by implementing domestic anticommunist campaigns of questionable value and by military procurement programs that, until recently, lacked cohesion in their purpose and in planning.⁵⁶

Malaysia and Singapore enjoy some measure of extraregional security guarantees by hosting small contingents of Australian, British, and New Zealand forces under the Five Power Defense Arrangements (FPDA). Despite its planned expansion, the FPDA continues to be a consultative mechanism rather than a formal pact. In the event of Soviet, Vietnamese, or possibly Indian military actions directed only against the Malacca Straits, Thailand, as a member of SEACDT, would have to become directly involved before U.S. military intervention would be automatic through Washington's regional treaty commitments. These realities, as Justus van der Kroef has noted, "tend to reflect something of the very need and purpose of SEATO."⁵⁷

In January 1980 Thailand did initiate consultations with U.S. officials on SEACDT's applicability to Vietnamese

encroachments against its territory. These discussions were later extended to include the leaders of Singapore and the Philippines, with Lee Kuan Yew reportedly offering to extend basing rights to U.S. forces.⁵⁸ Britain, Australia, and New Zealand also reaffirmed their commitments to the Manila Pact. While Malaysia and Indonesia publicly opposed the implementation of region-wide collective defense arrangements with external powers, Kuala Lumpur's approval for the FPDA's expanded activities and Jakarta's initiatives to commence joint military exercises with the Thais and to step up such Indonesia-Australian exercises were strong signs that all ASEAN members are gradually moving toward acceptance of trans-regional security cooperation perhaps even through the eventual creation of a formal alliance structure.

Unlike NATO, such an Asian-Pacific Security Organization (APSO) would initially function as a communications base rather than as a joint political and military command center. It could commence by integrating discussions of the FPDA's Joint Consultative Council (JCC) and the ANZUS Council. The ANZUS members (the United States, Australia, and New Zealand) have met annually to evaluate and act upon issues of mutual concern. The FPDA announced in November 1980 that the JCC will also convene once a year.⁵⁹ As members of both groups, Australia and New Zealand are in a position to promote mutual consultations between the FPDA and ANZUS on selected issues pending the approval of the United States, Singapore, and Malaysia. Under such circumstances, Washington and London could better identify and communicate any mutual defense concerns of NATO and Asian-Pacific states, particularly if such talks were eventually expanded to include the other ASEAN members.

The Philippines and Thailand already have existing defense ties with both

NATO countries through SEACDT as well as their own bilateral security arrangements with the United States (the U.S.-Philippine Mutual Security Treaty and the Rusk-Thanas Com-muniqué respectively). These affiliations could be readily expanded to justify their inclusion in APSO deliberations if Bangkok and Manila are willing entrants. Other NATO and Asian-Pacific nations could also become participants should they consider APSO membership to be in their own interests. In some instances, even France and Indonesia might welcome the opportunity to exchange views within such a council, either as "observers" or in some other status that would not compromise traditionally independent foreign policies.⁶⁰

Within the past year, the need for more coordinated security deliberations between Washington, its NATO allies, and Asian-Pacific countries has become especially evident.

The developing *ad hoc* character of NATO and ANZUS naval deployments is one area that such discussions might address. Avoidance of overlap between the missions of allied fleet activities there needs to be pursued. Australia serves as a case-in-point. During the February 1980 ANZUS Council meeting in Washington, Canberra committed its navy, with its long-range FB-111 strike aircraft, to more frequent deployments to the Indian Ocean in acknowledgment that over 9,000 miles of its 12,000-mile coastline faces that body of water. New Zealand was accordingly vested with greater defense responsibilities toward the island states of the South Pacific.⁶¹

During the ensuing months, the Australian Government *did* deploy a sizable task force led by the aircraft carrier *Melbourne* to the Indian Ocean, ostensibly in support of U.S., British, and French units already deployed there to offset the increased Soviet force presence. Notwithstanding its navy's increased physical presence, however,

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Australia was reluctant to contribute to America's Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) or to involve itself publicly in naval drills with its American and British allies.⁶² Australia cited its fear of disrupting critical "commercial relations" that it maintains with Persian Gulf states as the basis of its reticence. In retrospect, more comprehensive discussions probably should have been pursued in the ANZUS Council or other appropriate channels about the purpose of Australian naval deployments before they were carried out.

A promising development for Western security efforts was the West German dispatch of two destroyers into the Mediterranean and Indian Oceans for the first time in April 1980. While American efforts to involve the German units in spontaneous joint maneuvers with U.S. naval units were unsuccessful, the German ships did exercise with French units in the Mediterranean. This demonstrated that in the event of more careful allied planning, the *Bundesmarine* could either provide some units for Asian-Pacific contingencies or, more preferably, deploy greater numbers of combatants to the Baltic and North Seas, thereby releasing more experienced American and British naval units for peripheral area defense tasks.⁶³

The naval forces of other NATO members are also potentially available to APSO if used in ways that reflect advanced planning and coordination. Both the British and the Dutch have long maritime traditions in the East and Southeast Asian environment. For the past few years, the British have dispatched a 10- to 12-ship task force each May to the Far East, visiting Singapore and other critical ports.⁶⁴ Holland sends a similar, if smaller, task force to the Asian-Pacific area biannually. Dutch military contacts with the Indonesians that are now increasing are also valuable in encouraging Jakarta to continue perceiving its own national interests as

coinciding with those of the NATO and SEACDT powers.⁶⁵

Additionally, the French naval presence that spans from the Indian Ocean through the South Pacific is substantial. The French occasionally conduct joint maneuvers with ANZUS and ASEAN navies. During specific intervals, they could join an APSO naval arm that, with sufficient preparation and coordination, could largely supplement or replace American forces that were suddenly required to be elsewhere.

Currently, the British Government is weighing possible defense cuts that may further affect Britain's ability to sustain its offshore strategic deployments. Japan or various Persian Gulf states that envision British strategic presence in the critical SLOCs as serving their own national interests might wish to incur at least some of the expenses for their maintenance. APSO would serve as an appropriate institutional forum for Tokyo or the Gulf States to investigate such arrangements. These efforts could also be instrumental in allowing the United States to support better its 3rd and 7th Fleets in the Pacific theater during times of crisis.⁶⁶

If it proved capable of facilitating better transregional defense planning by serving as an effective communications instrument, the Asian-Pacific Security Organization could eventually address more specific regional defense problems with a commensurate authority carefully defined by APSO's participants to carry out policies addressing such problems. Doctrinal attention could be directed to the establishment of unified operational controls over Asian-Pacific and NATO air and naval elements active in the region and to such specific areas as air transport and airlift capabilities, tactical air missions, ASW procedures, and long-range surveillance and attack modes.⁶⁷ Three critical areas for consideration are base employment and logistical support arrangements, the reconciliation of political differences

between Asian-Pacific and NATO countries as they affect the climate of defense cooperation, and the utility of military assistance and sales.

The missions of American and allied bases and military installations still operating in the Asian-Pacific region might be reviewed to ascertain their relevance, efficiency, and acceptability to the host nation. A key consideration is how well such bases are able to function as components in the West's global deterrence strategies against identifiable and realistic threats.

The Subic Bay Naval Base, Clark Air Base, and San Miguel Naval Communications Station in the Philippines have been looked upon as the most important American installations in the region serving as support centers for the 7th Fleet and for much of CINCPAC's overall air and naval components, telecommunications, and cryptologic functions.⁶⁸ Since 1976, however, the bases' actual value for facilitating U.S. and allied forward defense in the Asian-Pacific region has been subject to increased scrutiny. In that year, Philippine-Vietnamese diplomatic relations were established and as a condition of normalization, President Marcos pledged "not to allow any foreign country to use one's territory as a base for direct or indirect aggression and intervention against the other country or other countries in the region."⁶⁹ Other criticisms have been directed against the bases' possible vulnerability to surprise attack by means of SLCMs or SLBMs, the tendency of all foreign bases to attract rather than to deter hostile military action, the irrelevance of the bases' repair and training facilities owing to modern airlift capabilities, and toward the bases' political unpopularity with various Filipino political opposition parties.

Regardless of their symbolic role in advertising American defense commitments in Asia, more pragmatic arguments for Washington's continued investment in the bases need to be

presented to America's European and Asian allies. A recent U.S. congressional study has contended, for example, that Subic Bay plays an integral role in supporting the 7th Fleet's presence around Japan and Korea. It also argues that Clark Air Base is vital in defending South Korea's security. Moreover, according to the study, the bases have designated support roles for possible operations in the Western Indian Ocean and South China Sea and could allegedly support U.S. military operations during a Middle East crisis.⁷⁰ Such arguments could be more credibly introduced in a setting in which the United States' Asian-Pacific allies could evaluate the bases' contribution to their own security interests on a constant basis.

The status of U.S. basing needs and rights concerning deployments of B-52 bombers at Darwin, Australia and on Diego Garcia (if its runways are extended) also need further clarification.⁷¹ The precedents for allied use of Australian air and naval bases already exist as Malaysia and Singapore's air force training units are routinely granted landing rights and U.S. naval elements frequently berth at Cockburn Sound and at other Australian ports. The B-52 negotiations and the possible use of American tracking installations in Australia imply a direct allied involvement in operationalizing the American nuclear deterrent.⁷² The United States and Australia might set a useful precedent for other transregional security arrangements by renegotiating current Memorandums of Arrangement (MOAs) so as to provide Canberra with greater access and input into the communications stations' missions, as was the case with the U.S.-Philippines base renegotiations, thus giving greater deference to the sovereign rights of Australia.

President Reagan has opted to downplay what his predecessor viewed as a serious human rights problem in South Korea, an approach that placed U.S.

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forces stationed there in a compromised position. The use of South Korean combat units in their country's domestic power struggles after the Park assassination and the ROK's controversial trial of Kim Dae Jung put serious strain on U.S.-ROK relations. In February 1981, however, South Korean President Chun Doo Hwan became the first foreign head of state to be received by President Reagan. The meeting restored some normalcy to relations between the two Pacific allies and provided the occasion for Reagan to announce the resumption of full U.S. military assistance to Seoul and the restoration of regularly scheduled security consultations between American and Korean elements of the Joint Military Command in South Korea.⁷³

All of the ASEAN states as well as South Korea are now involved in sizable arms procurement programs, with the United States serving as their largest supplier followed by France, Holland, and Britain. While COCOM regulates Western arms sales to communist countries, there is a pressing need for NATO countries to coordinate better their sales to Asian-Pacific weapons markets so that their customers have the opportunity to move toward increased standardization of regional forces. The United States, Britain, and Australia might weigh expanding the role of the Commonwealth Fund for Technical Cooperation to regulating bilateral and multilateral military assistance and sales programs instituted throughout the Asian-Pacific region.⁷⁴

Conclusion. Throughout history, policy decisions have emerged and then quickly faded before being fully understood by those charged with pursuing what were, in hindsight, clear national interests. Over the next few decades, a

dynamic process of American and European economic and cultural interaction with the Asian-Pacific states promises to develop in a manner that can be constructive to all parties concerned. Under such conditions, the stability of the Asian-Pacific region will become a greater concern for NATO.

In order to meet the many political and economic challenges now facing them, Western nations must generate sufficient collective will to identify and pursue successful policies of mutual survival. A critical factor that NATO is now obliged to weigh in this connection is the extent to which it will venture beyond traditional geographic confines to protect its overall security.

The Soviet Union, with its competing vision of a world order, will constitute the most formidable strategic challenge to both NATO and the Asian-Pacific region during their efforts to define common destinies in the years ahead. A strong interest in improved alliance management, seasoned by confidence in the worth of accumulated and shared values, is the best guarantee the allies have to weather the impending storm.

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY



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California, earning the Ph.D. degree from the latter. Dr. Tow has published articles in several journals including *International Affairs*, *Asian Affairs*, and *Military Review* and is coeditor of the forthcoming *China, the Soviet Union and the West*.

TABLE I—SELECTED INTRAREGIONAL/INTERREGIONAL MILITARY EXERCISES AND SECURITY EXCHANGES

Country	Time Period	Activity
Australia, Britain, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore	1970-Ongoing	Five Power Defense Arrangements (FPDA) air defense tests, exercises—FPDA upgraded in Fall 1980
Australia, Canada, New Zealand, U.S. and in 1980 and 1982, Japan	1971-Ongoing	"Rim of the Pacific" (RIMPAC) naval exercise with Hawaii as headquarters, testing sea control, weapons firing, forward defense capabilities
Australia, Indonesia	1972-Ongoing	Australian Republic of Indonesia (RI) navies conduct joint exercises in Java Sea
Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore	April 1975-Ongoing	<i>Kris Mare</i> exercise with mechanized infantry training on New Zealand's South Island.
Malaysia, Indonesia	August 1975/July 1977	<i>Malindo Jaya</i> naval exercises to train for enforcement of joint archipelago boundary in Malacca Straits.
Malaysia, Indonesia	October 1975-Annual	<i>Elang Malindo</i> air defense exercises.
Australia, Singapore	October 1975-Intermittent	Singaporean army companies train in North Queensland, Australia for one month.
France, Singapore	January 1976	French helicopter carrier <i>Jeanne D'Arc</i> and the destroyer <i>Forbin</i> conduct tactical maneuvers with missile ships of Royal Singapore Navy (RSN).
Singapore, New Zealand	April 1976/March 1980	"Exercise Lionwalk" series at Bertram Military Camp, New Zealand—survival training.
Indonesia, Malaysia	1977-Intermittent	<i>Cahaya Bena</i> joint anti-insurgency patrols, sea patrols on Thai-Malay border—refugee control—Joint Border Commission regulates "right of hot pursuit" and other aspects of exercise.
Indonesia, Malaysia	December 1977-Ongoing (usually annual)	<i>Kakr Malindo</i> series alternating between Malaysian and Indonesia territory in the Salawak Kalimantan area; these anti-insurgency exercises upgraded in 1980 (<i>Aram Malindo</i>) and 1981 (<i>Tatar Malindo</i>).
Australia, Britain, Indonesia, Philippines, Thailand	February/March 1978	Series of intermittent naval exercises with some of listed countries at different intervals, general intent seems to have been joint training directed at defending E. Indian Ocean/W. Asian and Pacific SLOCs.
France, New Zealand	(a) February 1978	(a) New Zealand frigates stage exercise with French naval units in Hauraki Gulf.
	(b) November 1980	(b) French/New Zealand joint naval maneuvers in greater South Pacific region

Country	Time Period	Activity
S. Korea, U.S.	March 1978	U.S.-ROK Joint Military Command established to coordinate joint operations and exercises such as "Team Spirit" (annual) and the "Majex" naval task force exercise series.
Singapore, U.S.	(a) March 1978 (b) January/September 1980 (c) April 1980	(a) Public disclosure that U.S. using Tengah military airfield in Singapore for Indian Ocean ASW operations with tacit consent of Indonesia and Malaysia. (b) Lee Kuan Yew offers U.S. naval facility access. (c) The USS <i>Constellation</i> task force participates in two-day naval exercise with RSN off Singapore.
Australia, Britain	June 1978	Memorandum of Understanding negotiation for collaboration on defense-related sciences and technology . . .
Australia, Japan, New Zealand	(a) April 1979 (b) July 1979 (c) March 1980 (d) March/April 1980	JSDF Chief of Staff Takishima visits New Zealand. (b) Australia's HMAS <i>Torres</i> visits Sasebo and other Japanese ports. (c) HMAS <i>Swan</i> visits Sasebo and Kune. (d) Australia's Chief-of-Defense Force Staff visits Japan.
Japan, South Korea Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand	July 1979 November 1979	Japan Defense Agency Director (Yamashite) visits South Korea for first time. "SEA EX THERMAL I" joint naval exercise oriented toward straits and archipelago defense.
West Germany, Japan/ Australia/New Zealand	March/April 1980	FRG Defense Minister Apel tours the Pacific—encourages defense purchases with Japan—probably discusses the Middle East and Indian Ocean security outlook with Australia and New Zealand (no details of Australia/New Zealand discussion given in Australia DOD public communique).
Australia, U.S.	April 1980	U.S. Defense Department evaluation team surveys HMAS <i>Sterling</i> naval bases as Cockburn Sound to gauge suitability for U.S. naval operations.
U.S. Indonesia, Singapore	May 1980 June 1980	U.S. deploys 1,000 Marines at Diego Garcia. RI and Singapore hold 6-day joint air force exercise in East Java— <i>ELANG INDOPARA I</i> .
Malaysia, Thailand	August 1980	First <i>major</i> joint naval exercise ranging from the southern tip of Malaysia to Thai port of Sattahip near Kampuchea—20 warships deployed, ASW and surface maneuvers were conducted.
Indonesia, New Zealand	September 1978/November 1978/January 1979	Indonesian naval elements make a good will visit to New Zealand; the Royal New Zealand Air Force (RNZAF) reciprocates by sending fighter contingents to train in Indonesia. New Zealand naval units later train in <i>Selindo II</i> with RI Navy with subsequent joint naval exercises also taking place into early 1980 . . .

Country	Time Period	Activity
Australia, Thailand	(a) September 1978 (b) February 1980	(a) Visits by Australian Chief-of-Staff to Thailand and other ASEAN states resulting in upgraded visits between Australian and ASEAN defense officials. (b) Visit to Bangkok by Australian Foreign Minister Andrew Peacock results in an Australian commitment to "significantly upgrade" its weapons assistance and sales to Thailand.
Indonesia, Singapore Japan, ASEAN	September 1978 November 1978	Singapore and Indonesia deploy four warships each in South China Sea. Japan Ground-Self-Defense Force Chief Nagano visits Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia for consultations.
Australia, Indonesia, New Zealand Philippines, U.S.	1979-1980 January 1979	RI Strategic National Command officials observe ANZUS "Kangaroo" series exercises. Base renewal agreements (Clark AB, Subic Bay, etc.) reverts sovereign control of U.S. bases to Philippines.
Vietnam, U.S.S.R.	March 1979	Soviets step up construction of air control facilities at Danaang and flow of military advisors to SRV after Sino-Vietnamese War (February 1979).
Australia, Britain Britain, Japan	August 1980 September 1980	Ninety Australian personnel participate in British NATO exercise. Eight British warships drill with Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) in Tokyo Bay and off Oshima Island, respectively.
Indonesia, Singapore	September 1980	<i>Englek</i> naval exercise—four Singapore patrol vessels and two RI guided-missile equipped destroyer escorts.
Indonesia, U.S.	November 1980	RI announces plans to build three air bases with assistance of U.S. Air Force training personnel. Announcement immediately follows tour of ASEAN states by Gen. Law Allen, U.S. Air Force Chief of Staff.
Japan, U.S.	December 1980	U.S. Congress examines option of asking Japan to construct U.S. warships in lieu of Tokyo's failure to meet 9.7 percent annual defense budget increase.
Indonesia, France	January 1981	Contingent of Indonesian Marines trained in France for 5 weeks—familiarization with AMX tanks shipped to RI in February 1981.
Indonesia, Thailand	January 1981	First joint air exercise—computer simulation only—no combat units involved. Combined with Indonesian ASW exercises in South China Sea.
Indonesia, Holland	January 1981	Dutch Secretary of State for Defense meets President Suharto for talks on naval base/shipyard construction and on purchases of Fokker aircraft. RI indicates it wants expanded defense assistance relations with Holland.
Thailand, U.S.	January 1981	Thai Foreign Minister calls for more efficient preplanning of U.S. weapons transfers to Thailand during emergencies—calls intermittently throughout 1981 for SEATO-type collective security ties.

Country	Time Period	Activity
Australia, U.S.	March 1981	Prime Minister Fraser announces to Australia's Northern Territory government that U.S. B-52s will use Darwin to refuel on surveillance trips over Indian Ocean—prior B-52 surveillance could only fly over—not land in—Australian territory.
Australia, Britain, New Zealand	Ongoing	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> — BRITANZ meetings annually in London and Canberra/Wellington attended by Chiefs of Staffs and occasionally by Defense Ministers. — Annual "North Star/Southern Cross" army exercises in Australia (May-June). — Occasional British participation in ANZUS "Westwind" naval exercises.
All Participants	Ongoing	<p>Military representatives train in various defense institutions:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> — Australian Staff and Joint Services College — U.S. Pacific Army Management Services — Jalore Jungle Weapons Training School (Malaysia) — National Defense College—Thailand

Sources: Department of Defence, Australia Government Ministerial Document Service
 Ministry of Defense, Singapore (Public Affairs Division)
 Ministry of Defense, Malaysia (Public Affairs Division)
 Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Reports (Asia and the Pacific)*
 Radio Australia News Bulletin, Daily Reports
 British Broadcasting Company, *Summary of World Broadcasts, The Far East*
 Research Institute for Peace and Security, *Asian Security 1980*
Asian Defense Journal
Pacific Defense Reportar

NOTES

1. Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, *Department of Defense Annual Report FY 1981* (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 29 January 1980), pp. 108, 112-114.

2. See "Remarks Prepared for Delivery by The Honorable Frank C. Carlucci, Deputy Secretary of Defense to the 18th Annual Wehrkunde Conference (Munich, Germany)," *News Release* (Washington: Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense, 21 February 1981), pp. 5-6. On 9 March 1981, William Casey, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, in an unexpected visit to Japan, asked Premier Zenko Suzuki to increase Japan's economic assistance to Thailand and Pakistan and to assume a larger military commitment for joint defense efforts in Asia. *International Herald Tribune*, 10 March 1981, p. 2.

3. Recent statements by President Brezhnev at the 26th CPSU Congress have updated the Soviet collective security approach for the Far East. For a text of his remarks, see *Pravda*, 24 February 1981, pp. 2-9. At least one Western interpretation of his remarks contended that they were directed as an offer toward Japan to correct what Moscow perceives as a regional power imbalance created by the August 1978 Sino-Japanese peace treaty; Bruce Porter, "The 26th Party Congress: Brezhnev and Soviet Foreign Policy," in RFE-RL 80-81, 23 February 1981 and reprinted in *Radio Liberty Research Bulletin*, 25 February 1981, pp. 4-5. For a Soviet theoretical treatment of collective security as applied to Asia, consult Ivan Kovalenko, *Soviet Policy for Asian Peace and Security* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1980). The authoritative Western background work on Soviet collective security strategy is Avigdor Haselkorn, *The Evolution of Soviet Security Strategy* (New York: Crane-Russak, 1978).

4. Albert Wohlstetter, "Protecting Persian Gulf Oil: U.S. and Alliance Military Policy," Background Paper for the Security Conference on Asia and the Pacific Workshop, Tokyo, Japan, 23-25 January 1981, p. 18.

5. Hiroshi Kimura, "Japan-Soviet Relations: Framework, Developments, Prospects," *Asian Survey*, July 1980, p. 716.

6. N. Borodin, "Japan's Policy: Words and Deeds," *International Affairs* (Moscow), May 1978, p. 88.

7. For an example of the "soft-line" defense position, see Fukushima Shingo, "Japan's Wavering Defense Plan," *Japan Quarterly*, October-December 1978, pp. 399-406, and various discussions in *Bunji Sunjei* (U.S. Embassy translations) during 1979. See especially the debate between Michio Morishima of London University and Yoshihako Seki of Toritsu University in *Bunji Shunyu*, July 1979. Morishima advocates that if Japan is attacked by the Soviet Union, it should surrender immediately if it hopes to secure its political independence. A poll taken by the Prime Minister's office in late 1979 found that 86 percent of those questioned favored the existence of the Japanese Self-Defense Force and the *Yomiuri Shimbun's* November 1980 survey indicated that 70 percent of the 3,000 Japanese men and women chosen at random approved of discussion for debate on revision of Japan's war-renouncing constitution. *Asian Wall Street Journal*, 2 April 1980, p. 1 and *The Daily Yomiuri*, 26 November 1980. A similar survey by *Mainichi Shimbun* showed that 69 percent of those surveyed favored discussion and 55 percent of that total favored constitutional revision. An *Asahi Shimbun* poll showed 44 percent in favor of constitutional revision, 41 percent opposed. "Stepping Out at Last," *Asiaweek*, 20 February 1981, p. 27. The Japanese Socialist and Komeito ("Clean Government") parties are also taking a more pragmatic line against the Soviet threat. See *The Japan Times*, 11 January 1980, p. 1 and Ian Nish, "Japan's Security Occupations," *The World Today*, November 1980, pp. 421-427. In response to the prevailing Japanese sentiment, Soviet Defense Minister Dmitry Ustinov has warned that it would be "dangerous" for Japan not to enter into a peace and friendship treaty with the U.S.S.R. and to continue exacerbating "regional tensions"—an obvious reference to the Northern Islands dispute. *Pravda*, 2 September 1980, pp. 3-4. A Western account is in *The Financial Times* (London), 3 September 1980, p. 2.

8. For Soviet analysis of a perceived U.S.-PRC-Japanese "anti-Soviet front," see *Pravda*, 1 June 1980 and reprinted in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press (CDSP)*, 2 July 1980, pp. 16-17, and *Pravda*, 6 December 1980, reprinted in *CDSP*, 7 January 1981, p. 17. On Soviet views of Sino-Japanese relations, see *Pravda*, 13 December 1979, and *Izvestia*, 16 December 1979, both reprinted in Foreign Broadcast Information Service (hereafter cited as FBIS), *Soviet Union (Daily Report)*, 21 December 1979, pp. C-1 and C-2 where the late Prime Minister Ohira's diplomatic trip to Beijing was regarded as part of a "hegemonist" strategy against the U.S.S.R. Soviet accounts of visits by Chinese leaders to Australia/New Zealand and by Antipodean leaders to China have also been vitriolic. One of the more comprehensive Soviet statements on Chinese-ASEAN relations was by V. Skosyrev, "Pressure on ASEAN" in *Izvestia*, 13 July 1978 and reprinted in FBIS, *USSR (Daily Report)*, 18 July 1978 at K-1. Cogent Western analysis on growing Soviet fears of encirclement is offered by Dusko Doder in the *International Herald Tribune*, 12 September 1980, p. 1.

9. Much of the data for Soviet force presence in Asia is taken from Research Institute for Peace and Security, *Asian Security*, 1980 (Tokyo: 1980), pp. 29-46 and Japan Defense Agency, *Defense of Japan 1980* (English Version) (Tokyo: The Japan Times, 1980), pp. 15-23.

10. *Asian Security*, 1980, pp. 30-31.

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11. For a comprehensive breakdown of Soviet and Japanese force capabilities and options in the Hokkaido-Northern Islands area, see John Lewis, "Inadequate Bear Traps in the Japanese North," *Far Eastern Economic Review* (hereafter cited as *FEER*), 14 March 1980, pp. 22-24.

12. *Ibid.*, p. 24.

13. Brown, p. 104; *Asian Security*, 1980, p. 4.

14. The term "surge capability" was used in the context of Asian-Pacific security problems by Adm. Maurice F. Weisner in testimony at hearings before the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, *Department of Defense Authorization Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1980*, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (Part 2), 20 February 1979, pp. 706-773.

15. See analysis offered in The International Institute for Strategic Studies, *Strategic Survey 1979* (London: Spring 1980), p. 23.

16. IISS estimates that the Soviet Air Force now has 60 TU-22M *Backfire B* bombers while Soviet naval aviation units have an additional 70 units. The Japan Defense Agency estimates a lower total estimate of *Backfires*—about 80 with 2½ built per month. In early 1980, Denis Warner reported that 50 *Backfires* were stationed in Mongolia. "The World Around Us—A Strategic Overview," *Pacific Defense Reporter*, March 1980, p. 9.

17. Reports of Thailand's concerns on the Soviet overflight issue are in *FEER*, 5 October 1979, p. 16 and *FEER*, 29 February 1980, p. 10. Also see *International Herald Tribune*, 3 October 1979, p. 5.

18. *Asian Pacific Security*, 1980, p. 42.

19. *The Straits Times* (Singapore), 25 April 1980.

20. Senior U.S. officials reportedly have urged the Japanese to assume responsibility for SLOCs up to 1,000 miles from Japan's shores. *International Herald Tribune*, 15 January 1980, p. 2. See also Office of the Secretary of Defense, "Statement by Secretary of Defense Harold Brown," 30 December 1980, in which he states that "Japan is an economic power which could certainly afford much larger defense expenditures . . . [U]nder these circumstances, we have for some time been privately suggesting to the Japanese government that a steady and significant increase in defense spending is needed . . ." For a Japanese interpretation of the American position, see the *Asahi Evening News*, 30 January 1980. The Congressional Budget Office also released a study early last year calling for greater Japanese naval construction efforts for convoy-escort purposes according to *Asahi Evening News*, 2 January 1980. Adverse U.S. response to the Japanese decision to effect only a portion of the 9.7 percent increase in defense spending initially recommended by U.S. defense officials is comprehensively reviewed in reports by Henry Scott Stokes for *The New York Times*, 23 December 1980, p. A-9 and 28 December 1980, p. E-2.

21. Two notable assessments of Asian-Pacific states' naval capabilities are in Denis Warner and Peter Young, eds., *Pacific Defence Reporter Yearbook* (Victoria, Australia: Peter Isaacson Publications), pp. 57-64 and A.J. Wallis, "The Threat: Southeast Asia and Adjacent Waters," *Maritime Defence*, February 1980, pp. 43-51.

22. Weisner, p. 759. Also see his "The U.S. Posture in Asia and the Pacific: The View from CINCPAC," *Strategic Review*, Summer 1978, pp. 41-47. Weisner's successor, Adm. Robert Long, has concurred with the view that "U.S. Pacific forces are spread too thin to cover with confidence all existing trouble spots," *The Japan Times*, 2 February 1980.

23. A Japanese analysis of the implications of any such strategy on Tokyo's security is given by Takio Yamazaki, "How Will Japan's Security Be Maintained . . . What Will 'Swing Strategy' Bring About?" in *Jiyu*, May 1980 and reprinted in *Summaries of Selected Japanese Magazines*, July 1980 (Tokyo: American Embassy Political Section, Office of Translation Services). Also see report on U.S. Ambassador Mike Mansfield's reassurances to Japanese officials in the *Asahi Evening News*, 9 September 1980 and on a subsequent Japanese announcement that it would build up its defense power because increased U.S. Indian Ocean commitments had reduced U.S. military power in the Asian-Pacific, *Mainichi Daily News*, 25 October 1980. The United States dropped its adherence (but did not necessarily eschew the option permanently) to "swing strategy" in the spring of 1980. See Richard Burt's report in *The New York Times*, 25 May 1980, p. 3, and John Edwards, "Washington's Pacific Thrust," *FEER*, 13 June 1980, pp. 38-40. For various military ramifications of the strategy, consult Paul Nitze, Leonard Sullivan, Jr., and the Atlantic Council Working Group on Securing the Seas, *Securing the Seas: The Soviet Naval Challenge and Western Alliance Options* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1979), especially pp. 218-220.

24. On U.S. base negotiations with Somalia, see Michael Getler and Don Oberdorfer's reports for the *Washington Post* and reprinted in the *International Herald Tribune*, 13 August 1980, p. 1 and Colin Legum's analysis in *The Observer* (London), 17 August 1980, p. 8. Egyptian reluctance to sign a treaty for a permanent U.S. base presence at Ras Banas is reported by the *International Herald Tribune*, 20 January 1981, p. 5. For a report that increased Soviet activities in Cam Ranh Bay, Vietnam has concerned the Philippines because it would be involved in any superpower conflict with its American bases, see an Agence France-Presse dispatch reprinted in FBIS, *Asia and the Pacific, Daily Report*, 18 July 1980, p. P-1. Also see Franklin Weinstein, "The United States and the Security of Southeast Asia," *The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists*, December 1978, pp. 27-30 and Robert Pringle, *Indonesia and the Philippines* (New

York: Columbia University Press, 1980), pp. 71-72. Alvin J. Cottrell and Thomas Moorer take a dissenting position on the view that U.S. bases attract great power confrontation contending that host or potential host countries "... do not take their cues from anything resembling an objective reading of relative capabilities . . . but rather from the more visible evidence of action." Cottrell and Moorer, *U.S. Overseas Bases: Problems of Projecting American Military Power Abroad* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1977), p. 8.

25. See Note 7. A comprehensive breakdown of Japanese budget and procurement stipulations and of the Self-Defense Force's Acquisition program is Edward C. Ezell, et al., "The Japanese Self-Defense Forces, 1980," *International Defense Review*, 13, No. 2, 1980, pp. 187-197.

26. The Comprehensive National Security Study Group (*Sogo anzen hosho kenkyukai*), Report on Comprehensive National Security (English Translation), 2 July 1980. For evaluation of the report, see Tadae Takubo, "Defense Awareness of the Japanese," *Asian Pacific Community*, Fall 1980, pp. 25-34.

27. Karl Kaiser, et al., *Western Security: What Has Changed? What Should be Done?* (Bonn, New York, London, Paris: Forschungsinstitut der Deutschen Gesellschaft fur Aswartige Politik, Council on Foreign Relations, Institut Francais des Relations Internationales, and the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1981).

28. Joint Working Group of the Atlantic Council of the United States and the Research Institute for Peace and Security, Tokyo, *The Common Security Interests of Japan, the United States and NATO* (Washington, D.C. and Tokyo: December 1980). For a thorough evaluation and critique of this report, see *The Daily Telegraph* (London), 4 December 1980, p. 4.

29. Joint Working Group, pp. 36-37.

30. *Defense of Japan 1980*, p. 84.

31. On the Suzuki Cabinet subdual, see John Lewis, "Suzuki Applies the Gag," *FEER* 111, 27 February 1981, p. 15. The final budget decision on the Japanese defense budget for 1981 is ably covered by Derek Davies, "Suzuki Surrenders to Austerity," *FEER*, 16 January 1981, pp. 24-26. A Japanese editorial supporting Suzuki's position is in *Mainichi Daily News*, 5 January 1981. Also see *The Daily Yomiuri*, 11 January 1981, which supports Suzuki's defense posture while simultaneously calling for a clearer Japanese hard-line foreign policy against the U.S.S.R.—and implies that Japan should spend more on defense.

32. North Atlantic Assembly, *Common Concerns: Report on the Tokyo Meetings of a North Atlantic Assembly Delegation With Japanese Officials* (14-17 May 1980) (Brussels: 1980). Later in the year, Japan Defense Agency Director Joji Omura reiterated that the JDA had no intention of revising the Defense Forces Law to authorize the dispatch of Japanese troops abroad for rescue operations. *The Daily Yomiuri*, 11 October 1980.

33. The Japanese have been somewhat reticent in moving toward any commitment to foot part of the bill for the defense of Middle Eastern oil supplies. In late October, Chief Cabinet Secretary Kiichi Miyazawa said that Japan's right of self-defense, under constitutional limitations, would not allow the favoring of any belligerents in a Middle Eastern oil conflict and this limitation would include sharing the expenses of an international fleet. *The Japan Times*, 22 October 1980, p. 1. At the end of the year, Japanese Foreign Ministry officials rejected the constitutionality of Japan financially assisting in the building of U.S. warships to compensate for the "less than expected" increases in Japanese defense spending. FBIS, *Asia and the Pacific*, 13 December 1980, p. C-1. In late November, however, the JDA revealed to the Japanese Diet that it had constructed contingency plans for a joint U.S.-Japan sealane clearing operations "on a southwestern route." *Asabi Evening News*, 28 November 1981. For a particularly enlightening Western treatment on possible Japanese options for defense contributions to a Persian Gulf force, see Zalmay Khalizad, "The Pacific Alliance and The Persian Gulf," Tokyo: The Security Conference on Asia and the Pacific Workshop, 23-25 January 1981.

34. English translation provided by the Japanese Embassy, Brussels.

35. *Asabi Evening News*, 22 October 1980.

36. A comprehensive review of Japan's activities in COCOM and East-West trade regulation is Stephen Sternheimer, *East-West Technology Transfer: Japan and the Communist Bloc* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1980). For reports on the Japanese aerospace industry, see the *International Herald Tribune*, 15 September 1980, p. 1; and for a report on Tokyo's weapons production capabilities, see "Interest in Making New Weapons is Mounting in Defence Industry," *The Japan Economic Journal*, 2 September 1980, p. 4.

37. See especially Ryukichi Imai, "Non-proliferation: A Japanese Point of View," *Survival*, March-April 1979, pp. 50-56.

38. British Broadcasting Corporation, *Summary of World Broadcasts* (hereafter cited as *SWB*), 25 March 1980, pp. A1/2. Also see accounts in *The Japan Times*, 26 March 1980, pp. 1, 4; *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 25 March 1980; and *Frankfurt Allgemeine*, 26 March 1980.

39. *Defense of Japan 1980*, pp. 171-182.

40. FBIS, *Asia and the Pacific (Daily Report)* 15 September 1980, pp. C-3 and C-4.

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41. Japanese discussion of RIMPAC is in *Defense of Japan 1980*, pp. 176-179. See also Ryochi Nishijima, "Participation of Maritime Self-Defense Forces in RIMPAC," *Asian-Pacific Community*, Winter 1980, pp. 43-53.

42. *Strategy Week*, 9-15 February 1981, p. 5.

43. The "non-collective defense" principle is outlined by Nishijima, p. 45 and meticulously evaluated by *The Japan Times*, 8 February 1980, p. 1. The exercise was not considered to have been linked with any alliance system but was entered into for "educational" purposes. The MSDF commander of the Japanese participants in RIMPAC, Capt. Tsutomu Yoshioka, assured the readers of *The Japan Times*, 27 January 1980, p. 2, that the MSDF units would "never come under the command of another country."

44. Government of Singapore, "Text of an Interview with Prime Minister Mr. Lee Kuan Yew by Asahi Shimbun's Foreign Editor, Mr. Kensaku Shirai, and Chief Correspondent (Asian General Bureau) Mr. Teruo Kunugi, on 5 January 1981 at the Istana Annex," *Press Release* (02-1/81/01-07).

45. "Marcos Calls U.S. a Dependable Ally," *The Southeast Asia Record*, 15-21 February 1980, p. 5. In late September 1980, Marcos contended that Japan was entitled to build up its defenses if done within the auspices of U.S. defense umbrella. FBIS, *Asia and the Pacific (Daily Report)*, 19 September 1980, p. P-3.

46. A Kyodo news dispatch reported that Indonesian Foreign Minister Mochtar Kusumaatmaja, after meeting with Japan's Premier Suzuki during the latter's January 1981 ASEAN tour, approved of Japan's self-defense efforts and that triangular relations between Japan, Australia, and ASEAN should be strengthened to promote assistance at *security levels* (emphasis mine). FBIS, *Asia and the Pacific (Daily Report)*, 12 January 1981, p. N-3. Thai and Malay officials reportedly favor a Japanese defense effort in the hope that it might shift some of the U.S.S.R.'s military resources from Southeast Asia to the northeast. See Michael Malik's report for Reuters in *The Asia Record*, September 1980, p. 2.

47. I.P.S.G. Cosby, "Disquiet in the Far East," *RUSI (Royal United Services Institute Journal)*, September 1980, p. 47.

48. *Radio Australia News* (Embassy Dispatch), 18 January 1980.

49. For concise accounts of the visit, see Research Institute for Peace and Security, *Asian Security 1979* (Tokyo: 1979), p. 174; and the *International Herald Tribune*, 24 September 1979, p. 10-S.

50. The most sophisticated treatment of this idea to date is James Morley, *Common Mutual Security Interests of the Major Industrialized Democracies* (Washington, D.C. and Tokyo: The Atlantic Council/RIPS Working Group on the Common Security Interests of Japan, the U.S., and NATO: June 1980).

51. Suzuki gave the fullest outline of the comprehensive security concept to date in the Diet on 26 January 1981 as reported by *The Japan Times*, 27 February 1981. Five broad components of cooperation are suggested: expansion of official development assistance (ODA), private level cooperation and trade, gearing aid toward the specific needs of recipient countries, encouragement of energy development in the Third World, and assistance in the development of human resources and self-sufficiency of target states. See also *The Japan Times*, 11 January 1981, pp. 1, 4.

52. Onkar Marwah cites the main objective of the Indian Navy's "Ten Year Plan" as to provide India with two blue-water navies, one each for the East and West Indian Oceans, able to operate independently of each other and to this end, Port Blair has become one of the biggest bases in the Indian Ocean. Onkar Marwah, "India's Military Power and Policy," in Marwah and Jonathan Pollack, eds., *Military Power and Policy in Asian States: China, India, Japan* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1980), p. 135. For a summary of the implications of the SRV's recent naval acquisition, see A.W. Grazebrook, "Maritime Threats," *Pacific Defence Reporter*, August 1980, p. 61.

53. Even several months before Park's death, Gen. John H. Cushman, former Commander of I Corps Group (from 1976-1978) was warning of the pending imbalance of military power between North and South. Cushman, "The Military Balance in Korea," *Asian Affairs*, July/August 1979, pp. 359-369. For a post-Park analysis on the visibility of the American deterrent on the Peninsula, see Jeffrey Antevil, "Fear of Giving 'Wrong Signal' Handicaps U.S. Policy on Korea," *The Asia Record*, August 1980, pp. 1, 21.

54. David Watts, "Pressure Grows for Overall ASEAN Defence Agreement," *The Times* (London), 7 January 1981, p. 5.

55. The best historical evaluation of SEATO's formation is Evelyn Colbert, *Southeast Asia in International Politics: 1941-1956* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1977), pp. 291-310. Other worthwhile studies include Astri Suhrke-Goldstein, *SEATO: Rethinking Regionalism*, Working Paper No. 10 (Canberra: Australian National University, 1969); and Justus M. van der Kroef, *The Lives of SEATO*, Occasional Paper No. 45, (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, December 1976). Also see Robert D. Shuy and Larry A. Niksch, "The Role of SEATO in U.S. Foreign Policy," Library of Congress-Congressional Research Paper, in the appendix of Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, *U.S. Commitment to SEATO*, 93rd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1 March 1974.

56. These problems are well covered by Charles E. Morrison and Astri Suhrke in *Strategies of Survival: The Foreign Policy Dilemmas of Smaller Asian States* (St. Lucia, Queensland: University of Queensland Press, 1978), pp. 143-169, 193-231; and by Michael Leifer, *Conflict and Regional Order in Southeast Asia*,

Adelphi papers, no. 162 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, Winter 1980), especially pp. 31-33. Also Donald E. Weatherbee, "The United States and Indonesia: New Realities in Southeast Asia," *Strategic Review*, Fall 1980, pp. 56-63.

57. van der Kroef, p. 3.

58. *Asian Security* 1980, pp. 158-159. By July, Thailand had softened its appeals with Foreign Minister Air Chief Marshal Siddhi Savetsila indicating to U.S. Secretary of State Muskie that SEACDT should not be invoked at that time because the Vietnamese were not expected to launch imminently a large-scale invasion against Thailand. Francis Daniel, "ASEAN, Western Friends United in Response to Vietnamese Foray," *The Asia Record*, July 1980, pp. 1, 4.

59. Announced by the office of Mohammed Yusuf Bin Abdul Rahman, Defense Minister Secretary-General and cited in BBC, *SWB FE/6633*, 22 June 1981, pp. A3/6.

60. France retains interests in the South Pacific region including its nuclear testing activities at Mururoa and a usual contingent of 15 ships in the Indian Ocean. Consultations with regional powers could serve French interests by familiarizing Asian states traditionally tied to Washington or the Commonwealth with French security perceptions on a more frequent basis.

61. The ANZUS Communiqué of 27 February 1980 (Washington: Dept. of State reprint) noted that the "composition and level of forces in the Indian Ocean that would be appropriate to demonstrate allied support for security of the area and determination to deter further Soviet adventurism . . . [was discussed]." For details of the Australian Indian Ocean commitment, see John Edwards, "Where Australia Fits Into the Pacific Power Balance," *The Bulletin*, 12 August 1980, pp. 78-83; Edwards, "The U.S. Rethinks Its Pacific Strategy," *The Bulletin*, 1 July 1980, p. 87; Robert Darroch's interview with Gen. Sir John Hackett in *ibid.*, pp. 88-90; and *Radio Australia News*, 2 February 1980, 19 February 1980, 9 May 1980, 30 July 1980, 9 November 1980, and 14 November 1980. Ross Babbage, *Rethinking Australia's Defense* (St. Lucia, Queensland: University of Queensland Press, 1980), pp. 20-21, assesses refueling capabilities and problems for the F-111 and B-52 for Indian Ocean missions. The majority opinion among most of the alliance's observers is that New Zealand's primary area responsibilities within the alliance remain in the South Pacific in accordance with the stipulations of the New Zealand Ministry of Defence's 1978 *Defence Review*. For extended interpretations of New Zealand's role, see *Reports of the Ministry of Defence*, published each March, and Henry S. Albinski, "New Zealand and ANZUS: A United States Perspective," in John Henderson, et al., eds., *Beyond New Zealand: The Foreign Policy of a Small State* (Auckland, N.Z.: Methuen, 1980), pp. 46-51. For more skeptical views of New Zealand's military role, see John Henderson, "The Changing Objectives of New Zealand Defence Policy," in Stephen Levine, *An Alternative View of ANZUS*, and Peter Jones, "Defence: A Radical View," in *ibid.*, pp. 41-45, 52-61, and 61-66, respectively and also Henderson, "The Burdens of ANZUS," *New Zealand International Review*, May/June 1980, pp. 2-3.

62. *Radio Australia News*, 2 March 1980. Also see *Strategy Week*, 3-9 November 1980, p. 11 and Brian Toohey's report in *The Australian Financial Review*, 11 March 1980.

63. *Frankfurt Allgemeine*, 8 April and 29 April 1980.

64. For background see Dov S. Zakheim, "Of Allies and Access," *The Washington Quarterly*, Winter 1981, pp. 97-105; Zakheim, "Towards a Western Approach to the Indian Ocean," *Survival*, January-February 1980, pp. 7-14; and *Frankfurt Allgemeine*, 10 December 1980.

65. For a report on the visit of William F. van Eckelen, Dutch Secretary of State for Defense to Jakarta in January 1981, see BBC, *SWB FE/6627*, pp. A/1-A/2.

66. For development of the Japanese financial/physical contribution thesis, see Khalizad, pp. 13-15. For the Persian Gulf states' security perspectives, see Koichi Tsutsumi, "Efforts to Prevent Unrest in the Persian Gulf Area," Tokyo: The Security Conference in Asia and the Pacific Workshop, 23-25 January 1980.

67. Noel Gayler, "Security Implications of the Soviet Military Presence in Asia," in Richard H. Soloman, ed., *Asian Security in the 1980s*, RAND-2492 (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand, November 1979), pp. 65-67 expands on these points within an Asian alliance context.

68. Cottrell and Moorer, pp. 46-50.

69. President Marcos reiterated this commitment in July 1980, saying that the United States cannot use the Clark and Subic facilities for "offensive purposes" without first seeking approval of the Philippine Government and that this matter had been approved by both the Philippine and U.S. Governments. Agence France-Presse report reprinted in FBIS, *Asia and the Pacific (Daily Report)*, 9 July 1980, p. P-1.

70. The Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, *United States Foreign Policy Objectives and Overseas Military Installations* (prepared for the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate) (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1979), pp. 147-150.

71. In March 1981 Prime Minister Fraser related to Paul Evringham, Chief Minister of the Northern Territory, that U.S. B-52s could use Darwin as a refueling base for surveillance flights over the Indian Ocean. *International Herald Tribune*, 10 March 1981, p. 2. See *Radio Australia News*, 3 February, 7 July, 12 July, 19 September 1980, and 14 January 1981, as well as *The Age* (Melbourne), 15 January 1981, p. 1, and

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the *Sydney Morning Herald*, 15 January 1981, p. 2, for background on the B-52 issue. Fraser's guidelines were that the Australian Government would have to be consulted if the aircraft carries nuclear weapons. The American Government's position has always been not to confirm or deny the presence of nuclear weapons on its B-52 missions. As of this writing, it is not clear what specific compromises had been reached prior to Fraser's announcement of the agreement.

72. Two definitive sources exist for background on American tracking and surveillance installations in Australia; Desmond Ball, *A Suitable Piece of Real Estate* (Sydney: Hale & Iremonger, November 1980) and Defence Science and Technology Division, Department of Defense, *Summary of Official Statements on the Joint Defence Research Facility Pine Gap Near Alice Springs and the Joint Defence Space Communications Station Nurrungar, New Woolmera* (Canberra: Department of Defence, 1 May 1978). Also see *Hansard's*, Australia House of Representatives, 19 October 1978, pp. 1658-1663.

73. Shim Jae Hoon, "Strength to Strength," *FEER* 111, No. 9, 20 February 1981, p. 12.

74. Background on this fund is to be found in a Report submitted by a Special Study Mission to Asia and the Pacific, 2-22 January 1978 under the auspices of the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the Committee on International Relations, U.S. House of Representatives, *Prospects for Regional Stability: Asia and the Pacific* (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1978), pp. 74, 77. Bangladesh, India, and Sri Lanka are also affiliated with the Commonwealth and would probably not wish to participate in this form of military assistance regulation with the Asian-Pacific members.

While it is not certain that more philosophical and logical thinking will lead to solutions of modern system conception and development problems, it seems reasonably clear that technological and detailed analytical thinking alone will not lead to solutions. Early thinking in systems planning is necessary to ensure that technology doesn't drive requirements—or if it does, that we know what we're doing.

PERSPECTIVES ON SOME PROBLEMS OF CONCEPT SELECTION, MANAGEMENT AND COMPLEXITY IN MILITARY SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT

by

Theodore C. Taylor

In his carefully reasoned book, *Military Concepts and Philosophy*, published in 1965, Rear Adm. Henry E. Eccles gave us a remarkable conspectus of the span of thought that applies to modern human conflict. In discussing the concepts of logistics, Eccles briefly reviewed the large investments in military equipments and systems during the period following World War II and came to the sobering conclusion that, "... the interaction of technological change and strategic concepts is bound to be very complex and costly no matter how skillfully we manage our systems."¹ The 15 years elapsed since 1965 have given many examples to buttress the truth of Eccles' words, albeit not always with the comforting signs of skillful management. While there has been some trend toward modification of strategic concepts since Eccles wrote, the

basic structure of the subject is not dissimilar to that prevailing then, and a grand strategist of 15 years ago would have little difficulty with incorporating the changes into his earlier perceptions of the general nature of Soviet versus free-world conflict. But quite another situation stems from the compounding of technological progress over those same 15 years. We are now faced with an ever-growing and more bewildering assortment of complex technical realities and prospects to consider in the development of future military systems—the systems that would implement any future military strategy.

The fact that the prospective applications of new technology to military capabilities has burgeoned so broadly poses a problem on two levels. The first is that the application of new technology seems inevitably to introduce

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more complexity into the systems that use it, and hence to increase their cost. Taken only to this level, the problem is both understandable and solvable, even though its solution may have onerous effects on the taxpayer and on the national economy. But there is a more ominous level of portent to the spreading growth of technology, which is that the conjoint effects of the variety of possible system developments, plus the potential cost of each, confronts us with the absolute necessity of choice. We cannot possibly afford to develop more than a very few of the military capabilities that modern technology makes feasible, and so must carefully choose those that would have the greatest potential value in supporting the national strategy. Both we and the Soviets are playing a game in which the probability of achieving technological surprise—or of being the victim of technological surprise—is far greater than in the past, and carries with it the weight of greater possible consequence. It was very aptly put by John Kenneth Galbraith that, "No problem in our time is a fraction so important, no source of uncertainty a fraction so valid as the arms competition between the United States and the Soviet Union."²

The way in which the fundamental choices of which military capabilities to develop are made in our free society is very complex, and often frustrating to the professional military officer and the civilian military technologist alike. The problem was summarized in one of its aspects 60 years ago by Rear Adm. Bradley A. Fiske when he wrote that, "In designing our navy, for instance, the people who designed the navy as a whole have usually been members of Congress; though the people who have designed the individual ships, guns, etc., have been experts. For this reason, the individual ships and guns have been better than the navy as a whole."³ Although there are undoubted benefits to having our Military Establishment

subordinate to the political government, the arrangement does greatly confound the problems of selecting and of developing modern weapon systems. In particular, it poses the problems that the politician must grasp the essence of the technologies involved, and that the professionals, both military and civilian, must attempt to understand and cope with the political realities.

It is in the nature of our democratic power structure that the greatest burden in an exchange of professional and political viewpoints lies on the side of the professionals. It is incumbent on the professional specialists to offer up the technical issues in a form understandable to the politician without too much effort on his part. Even though the professional's goal is to provide our nation with the means for its survival, he is basically in a mendicant role when dealing with the politician, as he cannot attain his goal, however noble, without the politician's support. That support becomes all the more difficult to get as the issues grow in complexity, and the potential costs of any decisions become more burdensome on the taxpayer. Unfortunately, the professionals have not always done the best job of representing—or even of understanding—their own positions on complex military-technical issues. The result has been a lengthening of the process of securing political support for the development of new systems, often followed by widely publicized cost overruns in development, and performance deficiencies in the use of those systems. The whole situation has fostered a general mistrust of the professionals on the part of the politicians and the public. If we who would develop our country's military systems are to succeed in our objective, which is to help those who must choose our systems to choose the right ones, and then develop them efficiently, we must put our own house in better order. We must achieve a far better grasp than at present of the problems that lie

within our own competence. We cannot expect to convince a nonspecialist of the merits on any side of a complex technical or military issue when the structure of our own thought processes on the subject is flawed, or incomplete, and therefore very possibly in error.

It is pertinent to give some examination to the thought processes leading to advanced system development, to consider the implications of those thought processes to the management of development efforts, and to take a critical look at the nature of the complexity problem in modern military systems. Armed with a better understanding of the nature of our thinking processes and of what they lack, and of the nature of the management tasks derived from that thinking, and of the nature and magnitude of the problem of modern system complexity, we will be in a much better position to get the support needed for new developments, and to succeed in the pursuit of those developments.

Eccles had much to say about the importance of achieving a proper balance between the various kinds of thought that apply to military decisions. He emphasized the importance of intuitive and logical thought as well as analytical thought in contributing to the decision process. The problem is not that such ideas are not almost universally known to those who should know them, but simply that they are too often ignored in the reality of carrying out the processes of planning for and developing new systems. We might represent the several thought processes as in Figure 1, where there are four strata depicted from the most intuitive to the most analytical levels of cognition. Ideally, the process of conception of a new system using advanced technology would begin with an intuitive notion of the possibilities, proceed to the heuristic, or discovery phase of thought, and then advance to the rigorous, logical proposing and testing of hypotheses. Surviving all of these, the concept would

be a candidate for detailed analytical examination. The Figure shows this sequence by dashed arrows, to distinguish it from the sequence more usually followed, depicted by the solid arrows. From the viewpoint of the thoughtful professional, this latter sequence often seems to begin with a half-baked conflation of intuitive and heuristic thought that emerges as a body of ideological material. This latter is then used as an excuse to proceed immediately to detailed analysis, and the seemingly endless round of "system studies" begins, in the too-often futile attempt to justify the badly structured thinking that led to it.

The almost inevitable result of bypassing the logical testing of ideas is that much of the detailed analysis that is done on proposed systems is not well-directed, and serves merely to confuse fundamental issues with an overburden of detail. A fortuitous result is sometimes realized, which is that the detailed analysis inadvertently exposes the flaws and omissions of logic on which it is based. When this happens, the system concept usually joins the growing ranks of those that never progress to any firm decision to proceed with demonstration or development. The best that can be said of the whole process is that it sometimes produces useful results, and that it employs a great many people and provides them with much experience. The worst that can be said of it is that it is wasteful of our professional talent and the taxpayers' money, contributes to the erosion of confidence in the professional and to a deterioration of his morale, and ultimately risks placing our country in a state of unpreparedness derived from poor decisions and unsuccessful development efforts. We absolutely must break free of this appallingly wasteful way of doing things. We must devote more effort than at present to thinking *about* the problem of advanced military system development, as opposed to confining our thinking to




Fig. 1—The sequence of thought processes to project advanced technology into system applications should follow the dashed lines from intuitive thought to analytical thought. Too often a conflation of half-finished intuitive and heuristic thought is blended into an ideology, followed by attempts to justify it by analytical efforts. Coherent logical examination is omitted.

within the subject. One way to begin is with an attempt to better define and understand advanced, complex military system development, both its logical structure and the mechanics of its execution. Such an attempt, in very rudimentary form, is what follows.

As with many human endeavors, both military and civilian, the process of military system planning and development begins with what a logician might model as a complex of perception processes. The generation of a threat model is an example of a perception process, as it consists of trying to perceive the threat, or possible military circumstance that sets the context for our own planning of future military capabilities. Assuming the existence of a threat model, we further assume the

accomplishment of the first two cerebral steps in producing a military system concept, which are, one hopes, the intuitive and heuristic thinking activities indicated in Figure 1. This brings us to the logical examination process of immediate interest, which is to assess how the projection of advanced technology, also a perception process, might suggest a pattern for subsequent analytical and developmental work. We must expect to work with projections of technology, as the pace of its growth, coupled with the leadtimes required for system development, would otherwise lead to the risk of obsolescence in newly developed systems. Correspondingly, we must accept the risks inherent in the technological projection, so that it is vitally important that we understand

what the projection is, in a formal and logical sense. While this understanding may not eliminate the risks, it can give an insight to their possible kinds, and provide a basis for better and more decisive program management.

Figure 2 presents a group of Venn diagrams that collectively represents all of the logically possible situations that

could arise from projecting the technology needed to develop a new military system. The rectangle enclosing each example case denotes what the logician calls the "universe of choice," and can be thought of as depicting the total of all technology that *may* have application to some projected development, such as a particle-beam weapon system. The




Fig. 2—The five Venn diagrams represent all possible cases that can occur in the perception (denoted by the circle labeled P) of the truth (denoted by the circle labeled T). The areas labelled m, v, and f respectively denote missing, valid and false perceptions, as measured against the truth.

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circles within the rectangle are usually called "subclasses," and enclose special regions within the universe of choice. Thus, a circle labeled with a "T" is used to enclose the domain of technology that is *truly* required to support the projected development, whereas that labeled with a "P" is used to enclose the domain of technology that is *perceived* as being required. The interrelationship of the "T" and "P" subclasses—what might conveniently be called the primary, or circular subclasses—can give rise to some derivative subclasses. It is in the consideration of these subclasses that we can gain a better perspective of the potential for risk in the system development process.

The five possible cases presented in the Figure run the gamut from that of perception identical with the truth (Case I) to that of perception having no intersection with (area in common with) the truth (Case V). Between these extremes lie the more general cases, wherein some or all of the derivative subclasses exist (two of them also exist in Case V, but are identical with the primary subclasses). The centermost case (Case III) is the most general of all, and can be considered the "normative" case, in that it gives rise to all of the derivative subclasses that are logically possible. These are labeled "v" for valid, representing the domain over which the perceived technology requirement overlaps what is truly required; labeled "m" for missing, representing the domain wherein the perception fails to account for true requirements; and labeled "f" for false, representing the extent to which the perceived requirements are false ones. History provides many examples of these general perception cases. A recent example of Case II was the misperception of what would be needed to develop the C-5A transport airplane, for which technical and operating characteristics actually achieved fell far short of those expected at the beginning of its development

program. An egregious example of Case IV was the misperception of technical difficulties, given by Vannevar Bush in 1949, concluding that intercontinental ballistic missiles were many years removed from being technically feasible.⁴

The logical models given in Figure 2 are not merely a body of content-free logical truth, for they are suggestive of a process that ought to be followed in the managing and execution of system developments. Such a process is diagrammed in Figure 3, based on the case of normative perception, which allows for the existence of all derivative subclasses. The process simply consists of making a conscious attempt to recognize the uncertainties inherent in the perception logic. It provides for an off-line monitoring function that would maintain alertness to any indications that efforts are being expended on the wrong problems, or that the real problems are being ignored. The suggested process of program monitoring is one that would best be done by a devil's advocate, or "truthsquad," situated *within* a program planning and development effort, as an intimate knowledge of the effort and of its technical foundations is a prerequisite to doing an effective job. While the suggested functions are ones that are ostensibly done already within our bureaucratic systems, they are usually done at levels and by people whose real involvement, motivations and access to information are often all too questionable. The involvement and access to information for an internally placed individual or team are clearly beyond question; the motivation should be the early extermination of false efforts and the prompt recognition of missing ones. These latter, in particular, are the leading progenitors of most program schedule slips and cost overruns. Some very outstanding program managers can perform the monitoring function themselves. But most of us do not have clear enough perceptions and are more

likely to have some emotional allegiance to our past misconceptions, and a resulting tendency to perpetuate them. It is a rare system development that could not profit from its leaders having an extrasomatic conscience—an individual or group that is close at hand, but that is detached enough to afford the leisure necessary to think, and that does that thinking in a framework dictated by logic, with all of the grubby realities of the relevant technology in full view.

In summary, a principal deficiency of our conceptual system thinking is the tendency to omit considerations of logic entirely, in favor of leaping from the ideological to the intensively analytical stratum of thought. Once at that

stratum, it becomes all too tempting to delectate in the baubles that modern technology and computational facilities offer as the toys of thought. A principal deficiency of our planning and development thinking is that it is too seldom structured around the totality of outcomes that elementary logic shows to be in the very nature of the technology perception process. Without reference to that logic, it becomes all too easy to believe implicitly in schedules and other elaborations on the original technological projection. Both of these deficiencies are subject to moderation, requiring only that we adopt a more logically disciplined perspective in the selection of goals, and perhaps even make formal




Fig. 3—The logical structure of the perception process suggests a procedure that might be used to monitor the planning and execution phases of a system development effort. The normative case may be assumed, as it provides for all derivative subclasses.

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provision for the development of a logically structured auditing process in both conceptual and development efforts.

Another major difficulty that afflicts military system developments is the more tangible problem of modern system complexity and its growth tendency. A quite simple, analytical model can be used to illustrate the nature of this problem, as well as to suggest how it develops almost unnoticed, and then to show how formidable it could become. The essentials of the model are presented in Figure 4.

The model conceives of a system as being composed of a number, N , of subsystems, each denoted symbolically by an open circle. The characteristic that makes an entity a system, as opposed to a collection of unrelated subsystems, is that the subsystems are somehow linked together, as a result of effort on each of the subsystems to make it function with other subsystems of the system. The efforts required are denoted in the Figure by the small filled circles. For system sizes that are small (small values of N), the total number of efforts, I , is also small. In fact, if we take




Fig. 4—In systems composed of a small number of subsystems ($N \leq 3$), the number of interface efforts (I) is at most $2N$. For larger systems ($N \geq 4$), more complex systems become possible, where the upper-bound of complexity is that $I = N(N - 1)$.

the ring system (that wherein subsystems interact only with adjacent subsystems) as a noncomplex example, the number I is readily seen to be at most $2N$, whatever the size of the system. But when the system size reaches $N = 4$, something new occurs. For this system size and larger, it is possible to define a "most complex system," where every subsystem interacts with all of the other subsystems. While this was also true for the smaller systems, at values of $N = 4$ and greater the most complex system is distinct from the simple ring system. It requires only very modest prowess as a mathematician to generalize this model for any value of N , and to find that the most complex system has the property that $I = N(N-1)$, or that for large and complex systems ($N \gg 1$), $I \approx N^2$. The plot of Figure 5 suggests how rapidly the number of interactions could grow with system size, and with the trend for

developing modern systems wherein the operation of every subsystem interacts with the operation of nearly every other subsystem.

The first message of this system model is obvious, but important enough to warrant explicit statement. It is that in our capacities as military system advocates, planners and developers, we should avoid complexity unless it is really needed, because engineering, development and manufacturing efforts are just as costly when expended on interface-generated requirements as when expended on isolated components or subsystems. The second message is equally important. We must not fool ourselves about the potential magnitude of the complexity problem. A well-founded system is not a mere collection of subsystems or technologies that will somehow work together through the good agency of serendipity. The develop-




Fig. 5—The analytical model of Figure 4, extended for ring systems and most complex systems up to those consisting of ten subsystems. For large values of N , ($N \gg 1$), and for very complex systems, the number of efforts increases as the square of the number of subsystems involved.

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ment of a complex system of any size requires much more effort than its size alone would suggest.

The most widely used method of trying to cope with the complexity problem in military system development is to adopt some variant of the so-called systems engineering process. Since its inception some two decades ago, this process has taken on various forms, but has seldom produced more than jejune results. Most conspicuously, it too often fails to anticipate many of the interaction problems of large and complex systems, with the result that their developments become enmired in schedule slips and cost overruns. One of the reasons for this could be the distressing lack of any basic theory of systems engineering—the lack of any body of information having either cognitive, pedagogical, or utilitarian value to the planning of large and complex undertakings. Such a theory need not be very complex or profound. Indeed, it might even begin with something so crude as using the model represented in Figures 4 and 5 to list all of the potential interaction tasks of a complex development, and to gain some grasp of the total effort to be accomplished. The shortcomings of the systems engineering process in dealing effectively with modern system development problems were noted over a decade ago by the then Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Robert A. Frosch.⁵ His paper on the subject remains very pertinent to this day.

Most professionals, both military and civilian, have a pragmatic outlook on their work that does not draw them toward the more philosophical ways of thinking about it. While it is not certain that more philosophical and logical thinking *will* lead to solutions of modern system conception and development problems, it seems reasonably clear that technological and detailed analytical thinking alone *will not* lead to solutions. Indeed, the technological and analytical

thinking has been one reason for the genesis, and then a major nutrient, of the growing problems. We should encourage more reflective thought about these problems, and not confine our thinking to working piecemeal on the problems themselves. We need to encourage the more consistent and rigorous application of logical thought in much of our planning effort. We need to avoid the penchant for plunging into detailed, results-oriented analysis before a concept has been examined to see whether it has a coherently justified place in our military requirements, or whether it is merely a technological possibility, supported primarily by slogans and schedule projections. We must make provision for all that simple logic tells us can happen in the pursuit of new technology; that we have missed perceiving some of the problems, and that some of our perceptions are false ones. Finally, we must recognize the true magnitude of the problem of developing large, complex systems based on modern technology.

Having begun with a quotation from Eccles, it seems fitting to end with another, which concludes his exemplary book and which he thought important enough to repeat at the beginning of his most recent book:

The methods of planning and decision, the criteria of judgment, and the causal ethics that are adequate for the relatively

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY



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modest risks of most business and domestic political decisions are utterly inadequate for the critical political-military deci-

sions of today's harsh world of conflict. The risks are great. The stakes are high. The challenge is clear.^{6,7}

NOTES

1. Henry E. Eccles, *Military Concepts and Philosophy* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1965), p. 81.
2. John K. Galbraith, *The Age of Uncertainty* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1977), p. 227.
3. Bradley A. Fiske, *The Art of Fighting* (New York: Century, 1920), p. 330.
4. Vannevar Bush, *Modern Arms and Free Men* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1949), chap. VIII.
5. Robert A. Frosch, "A New Look at Systems Engineering," *IEEE Spectrum*, September 1969, pp. 24-28.
6. Eccles, p. 289.
7. Henry E. Eccles, *Military Power in a Free Society* (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press, 1979), p. 1.

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Since World War II, Iceland's foreign policy has been designed to maintain her freedom of action and to remain independent of external domination, not unusual goals for a NATO nation. Iceland's view of the threats to her independence, and the priorities she assigns to those threats, however, are not coincident with what most Americans would believe them to be. It is thus especially important that those views be understood.

ICELANDIC THREAT PERCEPTIONS

by

Major John R. Fairlamb, U.S. Army

Modern Iceland is a parliamentary democracy whose policymakers are guided by a clear, national political consensus that demands a social-welfare policy orientation. The standard of living is exceptionally high. The economic environment is one of high mass consumption of the latest consumer goods despite a narrow industrial base and a virtual absence of natural resources. Geography and international politics have converged to make Iceland a strategic objective for both super-powers as it is ". . . an excellent base for both offensive and defensive military operations in the event of war."¹ Clearly, there is both an external and an internal dimension to Icelandic threat perception requiring an investigation of the total culture and society in which these perceptions are molded.

A Concept of Threat Analysis.

Until recently, even those studying the NATO Alliance in detail devoted little effort to analysis of Icelandic defense

policy. The changing nature of the Soviet naval threat to NATO's defensive strategy, and realization of the crucial and periodically precarious dependence of NATO on Iceland's strategic location to counter that threat, have generated renewed interest in the northern theater as a whole.

There is a proclivity among those making threat assessments to conceive "threat" as a military-strategic variable. Asked to make an assessment of "the threat" facing a nation, particularly a nation belonging to the NATO Alliance, analysts routinely make two basic assumptions. First, it is assumed that the threat is largely military in nature. This assumption is so common that threat is now defined almost exclusively in military terms. Second, the Soviet Union is routinely assumed to be "the" source of threat. In the calculus of Icelandic threat perceptions, both assumptions are false.

Because the conventional wisdom does not apply to Iceland, a broader

concept of threat is necessary before an assessment of Icelandic threat perceptions is possible. A question that should always be asked is; Threat to what? There must be a clear understanding of "what" is to be protected before the nature and source of threat can be rationally determined.

National security is obtained by policies designed to create "... national and international political conditions favorable to the protection or extension of vital national values against existing and potential adversaries."² Self-preservation, territorial integrity, and the political and economic systems are examples they cite of *core national values*. A major problem for government is the translation of such general expressions of national value into specific programs and actions. The identification by policymakers of more tangible *national interests* relating to specific core values serves as the link between vague national values and the attainment of a state of national security. Threats to national security, therefore, can be defined as factors that jeopardize those vital national values that serve to distinguish a group of people as a nation, either by undermining the values directly or by attacking vital national interests linked to core values.

Although it is possible to list core values presumed to be characteristic of any state, i.e., territorial integrity, it is important to recognize two key points. First, national values are the product of collective national experiences and cultural settings. Therefore, specific core values will change from nation to nation. Secondly, because national values are the product of collective national experiences, the priorities attached to specific values will vary as well. A determination of core national values and national priorities can only be accomplished by examining the historical experience of a nation.

Historical Background. Outside Scandinavia, the average person knows very little about Iceland. The physical setting is dominated by the intemperate weather of the North Atlantic and an unusually harsh landscape. Today, roughly 82 percent of the land area is uninhabited wasteland: glaciers, lakes, lava fields, desert-like sands and marshes. A nation with a homogeneous population of 228,700 living on an island of only 103,000 square kilometers in the middle of the forbidding North Atlantic, Iceland's isolation has been psychological as well as physical.

First settled by a Norse Viking in A.D. 870, Iceland was originally claimed by Norway. In A.D. 930 a parliamentary body met for the first time at Thingvellir. The present parliament (The *Althing*), composed of 60 elected members, is a direct descendant of that first consultative body. As a result, modern Iceland boasts the longest-standing parliamentary system of government in history.

In 1397, Norway and Iceland joined the Kalmar Union that recognized the King of Denmark as the supreme head of all the Scandinavian countries. From this point, the history of Iceland is one of economic exploitation and brutal neglect by Denmark until the spirit of nationalism and liberalism that swept Europe in the 19th century spilled over to Iceland. The ensuing nationalist spirit led to restoration of the old *Althing* as a consultative parliament in 1845, abolition of the Danish monopoly in 1855, and a constitution in 1874 that secured *Althing* legislative powers. In 1904 Iceland won home rule and, in 1918, complete domestic sovereignty when the Union Act ended all official ties to Denmark except the king's continued control of foreign affairs. In the tumult of WW II, Iceland was able to sever the remaining ties with Denmark and proclaim complete sovereignty as an independent Republic of Iceland in 1944.

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In the 16th century the Danish king totally disarmed Iceland, rather than accept the costs of defending a marginally productive subject.³ As a result, strands of pacifism run long and deep in Icelandic culture. Yet, in a culture that has never known armed conflict, modern Icelanders proudly proclaim their having "gone to war with Britain" over fishing rights in the North Atlantic in 1958, 1972, and 1975. (Collectively known as the Cod Wars.) The Union Act of 1918, by which Iceland negotiated an arrangement of limited sovereignty with Denmark, proclaimed a policy of perpetual neutrality in international affairs. Yet, when Great Britain occupied Iceland in 1940 the British were treated more like unexpected guests than as invaders. In 1949 Iceland declared her intention neither to raise an army nor maintain military forces of any type. In the same year Iceland became a founding member of NATO, a collective security organization clearly dedicated to the military defense of Western Europe in the face of a perceived, growing Soviet threat.

As a result of these and other apparent contradictions, Iceland is frequently perceived as a "reluctant ally" by some NATO observers and as a "troubled ally" by others.⁴ The important fact is that these crosscurrents run deep and form a complex societal and governmental environment through which present threat perceptions are screened.

The Influence of History. An inescapable conclusion to be drawn from this brief review of Icelandic history is the extent to which Icelanders have been continuously absorbed in their struggle for national identity. Unlike that of its alliance partners, Icelandic national sovereignty has a short history. Most Icelanders trace their independence to the Act of Union in 1918, by which Denmark ceded significant political autonomy. Actually, only in

1944 was Iceland able to gain formal sovereignty as an independent state. Thus, the eleven centuries of Iceland's history have been characterized by economic, political and military domination by external powers. The result has been the slow maturation of a deep vein of nationalistic spirit that runs through the modern Icelandic polity. External domination has led also to the development of an Icelandic psyche that tends to equate national security with freedom from outside influence, regardless of the source. Undue Western influence is rejected as readily as is undue Eastern influence. Given Iceland's history of domination by Western cultures, the perception of such threat is oriented more toward cultures of the West than those of the East.

Of great significance is the fact that, with the exception of a very brief period in the late 1940s, since achieving complete sovereignty in 1944 Iceland has endured the presence of large concentrations of foreign troops on its territory—British followed by Americans. The current American presence, while at a historic low, is to the Icelandic population proportionally what a comparable foreign presence of 5 million people within 50 kilometers of Washington, D.C. would be to the United States. The Icelanders are extremely ambivalent about the presence of foreign troops. On the one hand, they understand the realities of their strategic but exposed geographical location. On the other hand, they are concerned by the inherent conflict between the continuous presence of foreign troops and true national sovereignty.

Iceland has never and does not now maintain armed forces. It is one of few existing societies without experience in domestic military forces. This inexperience extends even to raising a local militia, given grave threats to national security during the two World Wars. Iceland's physical security was provided for centuries by its geographical

isolation. As improved travel and other communications eroded this isolation, Iceland's security was maintained by the British and American navies. Today, despite heavy reliance on the fishing industry and foreign imports that make water rights and sea lines of communication vital interests for Icelandic security, the nation maintains only a small coast guard constabulary force of approximately five modern gunboats and 160 men whose primary mission is policing Iceland's fishing zones.⁵

Because Iceland has never had a national army, there is no native military tradition. Consequently, regular armed forces are regarded as alien—as "UnIcelandic." There is no appreciation among the population for the role of armed forces in society and no frame of reference from which to judge the value or functions of military forces. These are issues considered irrelevant to Icelandic life and therefore rarely thought about.

As this review of Icelandic history shows, until 1944 politics in Iceland concentrated on independence as the primary issue. Since then, with respect to foreign policy, issues have focused on two sets of questions: those of physical security and those of resources. Icelanders have tended to view national security more in terms of resource constraints than in the politicomilitary context. Consequently, Icelandic core values important for the analysis of threat perceptions are: territorial integrity, preservation of a unique cultural experience, maintenance of economic vitality, and the maintenance of political freedom of action (independence from both superpowers). From this it is obvious that the potential range of threat to Icelandic values is much greater than a simple military focus conveys.

Icelandic Perceptions of Threat. From the NATO perspective, much recent analysis has focused primarily on the growing Soviet naval capability as

the primary threat to security of U.S./NATO interests in the northern theater. However, nothing in public print has come to grips with the host of issues, perhaps central for the future, concerning *Icelandic* perception of threats to the security of their nation. One understands these perceptions best through examination of the environment in which defense issues are debated and policy decided.

If the question is posed about a Soviet threat, Icelanders demonstrate a general awareness of the fact that the Soviet Navy has expanded in recent years and that Iceland's geography makes it strategically important to NATO and to the Soviets as well. This awareness is not accompanied by any real sense of urgency concerning Icelandic national security. However, bearing in mind that political opinion on any issue in Iceland runs from the ideological left to the ideological right, it is possible to detect a consensus concerning the Soviet Union.

There is a marked tendency for Icelanders to take the Soviets less than seriously. Some analysts have made much of the fact that the Soviet diplomatic mission is by far the largest in Reykjavik. The most common response to this by the average Icelander is to refer to well-known stereotypes of Russian bureaucratic inefficiency and the Soviet need to insure political reliability by overlapping functions and redundancy of personnel. There are other contributing factors. Russians perform all functions in the Soviet mission, whereas in Western embassies the bulk of nonrepresentative functions is performed by Icelandic employees. Nevertheless, the former reason is the most frequently cited by Icelanders.

While informed Icelanders generally are aware that the Soviet Navy has been growing in size over recent years, there is little understanding that it has also changed in capability and now threatens vital sea lines of communications between North American and European

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ports. Icelanders tend to separate the concept of a land war in Central Europe from the idea of a simultaneous naval war in the Atlantic. Many believe it entirely possible for NATO and the Warsaw Pact to fight a Central European land war without necessarily involving Iceland.

Generally speaking, Icelandic perception of threat from the Soviet Union in peacetime has been very low level. The U.S.S.R. tends to be considered more than anything else as a valuable trading partner. Until mid-1980, Iceland imported all of its oil from the U.S.S.R. Iceland has recently diversified its sources of oil by signing a long-term contract with the British National Oil Company (BNOC). However, it was price rather than a sense of dangerous dependence that caused Iceland to make other arrangements.⁶ Overall trade between Iceland and the Soviet Union has been increasing in recent years, and it now appears that this trend will accelerate.⁷ The Soviets have always been an important buyer of Icelandic fish. Traditional markets for Icelandic fish products in Western Europe and the United States are declining and the Soviets seem willing to buy excess supplies.

However, it is true historically that specific aggressive acts imputed to the Soviet Union have generated increased interest and awareness of threat to Icelandic security. It has been at these points that key Icelandic defense decisions typically have been made. (See Table I)

A newspaper poll conducted in October 1980 provides strong evidence that Icelandic perception of military threat from the Soviet Union is increasing. *Dagbladið*, an Icelandic daily newspaper, has determined that 54 percent of Icelanders now support the presence of American forces in Iceland. This is an increase of 10 percent over those who expressed support for the American presence in a similar poll conducted by

Dagbladið in the spring of 1976. The editors have concluded that the overall increase in international tensions in the last several years, and specifically the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, have been translated into greatly increased support for Iceland's role in the NATO Alliance.⁸

Thus, although perception of threat from the Soviet Union routinely is low, there is strong evidence to indicate that specific acts of Soviet aggression or breach of the peace frequently are perceived as threats to Icelandic security.

The question should not be posed solely in terms of Soviet threats to security in order to gain a real appreciation of the much wider range of Icelandic threat perception. For a variety of reasons, most of them cultural, Icelanders are not skilled at or predisposed to engage in wide-ranging, sophisticated discussions of ambiguous national security concepts. They also are largely unaccustomed to drawing logical connections between core national values and concrete interests that must be defended to insure national security. But, if threat perception is approached from a more neutral direction, e.g., "What do you see as possible threats to the independence and well-being of Iceland?", some interesting responses result.

In the majority of responses to such an open-ended question, the Soviet Union is not mentioned. When the Soviets are mentioned, it is almost never as a first consideration. The consensus on perception of threat seems to include several widely held elements: cultural, economic, foreign investment, and a desire to maintain freedom of action and independence from both superpowers.

According to the political officer at the U.S. Embassy in Reykjavik,

... Probably the gravest long-term problem facing the U.S. presence in Iceland is our ability to deal with the Icelandic perception that the American presence, even as

TABLE I

Event involving overt Soviet action		Dates of key Icelandic policy decisions	
1948	Fall of Czechoslovakia & other E. European states subverted by U.S.S.R.	1949	Iceland joined NATO
1950	N. Korea invades S. Korea	1951	Iceland signed a bilateral defense agreement with United States
1955	Soviet "peace offensive" (U.S.S.R. withdraws from Austria & Finland)	1955	Government of Iceland (GOI) demands evacuation of Iceland defense force (IDF)
1956	Soviet invasion of Hungary	1956	GOI dropped call for evacuation of IDF
1968	Soviet Invasion of Czechoslovakia	1968-69	Increased threat perception measured in opinion poll
1973	Mideast war U.S./Soviet confrontation	1974	Public opinion petition—over 50 percent of voters favor retaining the IDF—A second GOI proposal for withdrawing the IDF dropped
1979	Soviet invasion of Afghanistan	1980	Public opinion poll recorded 54 percent of Icelanders support retaining the IDF

restricted as it is, is damaging to Icelandic culture.⁹

The majority of Icelanders are deeply concerned about the culture issue. In addition to the political parties that express concerns in this area, various intellectual groups outside the political process keep the issue constantly before the people. Even many of those who support NATO membership and the American presence are concerned about cultural erosion.¹⁰ National pride has centered around the homogeneous character of the population and the resistance to cultural change in customs and language. Icelanders perceive it a major threat to their national well-being that American values, some of

which are inconsistent with Icelandic values, may supplant their own.

Except for a very brief period after WW II, Iceland has had to deal with the presence of foreign troops from the first days of formal national sovereignty. Initially a very large and visible presence, over the years the size of the American force stationed in Iceland has decreased steadily so that the number of American nationals resident in Keflavik in 1981 is only approximately 5,000, including dependents. Yet, the litany of cultural threats from the foreign presence has been heard for so long that the average Icelander regards it as a clear and present danger.

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For most Icelanders, the clearest threat to individual and national security is the economy. Icelanders have become used to a very high standard of living based on the ready availability of imported consumer products and government dedication to social-welfare programs. In the 70s, this resulted in a relentlessly increasing inflation rate, officially at 65 percent in December 1980 and rising.¹¹ Virtually all consumer goods necessary to support the high standard of living to which Icelanders have grown accustomed must be imported owing to a dearth of native industry. Thus, Iceland imports a good portion of the inflation generated in the Western industrial nations based on increases in the costs of production.

It is still accurate to refer to Iceland as a single-industry economy.¹² In 1980, 74.7 percent of the dollar value of all Icelandic exports consisted of fish products. Approximately 14 percent of the total labor force is involved in the fishing industry.¹³ These figures alone explain why the dominant concern of Icelandic foreign policy since 1944 has been to secure the stock of fish in the North Atlantic and to insure Iceland's access to these stocks. Three times the fishing industry has faced external threats severe enough to warrant extreme responses from the Government of Iceland (GOI). The signal truth is that any threat to either Icelandic fish stocks or export markets is in fact as well as perception a direct threat to the Icelandic standard of living.

The obvious answer would appear to lie in diversification of the economy. There is some sympathy for this in the current coalition government, but no one wants to move too far too fast.¹⁴ Iceland is a land bereft of raw materials and most natural resources. Only in hydroelectric power and geothermal energy does there appear to be a potential solution. The approach of the government has been to go slow for fear of economic domination from abroad. Ice-

landers are suspicious of multinational companies that seem to honor no flag and offer little opportunity for influence on decisionmaking. Because of the relatively small size of the Icelandic economy (1979 GNP = \$2.1 billion), a very real potential exists for foreign domination of the economy if contracts are not carefully managed. As an example, in the 1960s the GOI entered a cooperative agreement with Alusuisse, a Swiss-based multinational corporation, to build an aluminum plant (completed in 1969) south of Reykjavik.¹⁵ By 1979, this single industry accounted for 13.5 percent of total Icelandic exports.¹⁶ Although a success story for the Icelandic economy, this illustrates how easily a foreign investment can achieve a commanding place in the Icelandic economy. Many Icelanders perceive the threat from direct foreign investment to be a major challenge to national freedom of action. Thus, diversification, if it includes direct foreign investment, has become a political issue.

Finally, a general goal of Icelandic foreign policy since WW II, supported by the average Icelander, has been to chart a course of independence and freedom of action designed to remain clear of external domination. In this context, Icelanders perceive both the United States and the U.S.S.R. as threats. The Soviets generally are perceived as a distant threat. Ironically, since 1945 some of Iceland's NATO allies have figured as more direct threats. As noted, Britain and Iceland have clashed seriously over fishing rights on three occasions. Norway is perceived by many Icelanders as attempting to expand its territory in the North Sea. Negotiations on fishing rights and control of Jan Mayen Island are ongoing. With its past history of economic exploitation of Iceland, Denmark is still viewed in a subtle way with suspicion by some in the business community. This suspicion surfaces when Icelandic businessmen object to dealing with

American companies through Danish subsidiaries.¹⁷


Threat Perception and Party Politics. The Icelandic polity is best described as fragmented and politically polarized. Figure 1 shows that the four organized political parties run ideologically from left to right. The political parties typically are divided into factions by internal differences on particular issues. Thus, party splinter groups are a common feature stemming from differences over specific issue orientations. The 1981 governing coalition is composed of parties of the right, center, and left. The coalition leadership is a splinter group of the Independence Party comprised of four Independence Party members who bolted their party to participate in the government. Consequently, the coalition has only a two-vote majority in parliament and cannot sustain a unified policy position.

All the major Icelandic political parties have long-established positions on the key issues of national defense that have been shaped in large measure by their perception of the Soviet mili-

tary threat.¹⁸ When an issue arises in the process of defense policy debate, the parties take predictably opposing stands derived from their historical party positions. In most pluralistic political systems, the United States for example, the political parties exhibit a range of positions on defense issues such that cross-party coalitions on specific issues become possible. In the Icelandic case, party positions on basic questions of defense policy, e.g., NATO membership and the American presence, have hardened, making cross-party coalitions unlikely. The extent to which this "politicization" of defense policy has developed in Iceland serves as a major constraint on the policy formulation process. Icelandic governments are always coalitions that include political parties with widely divergent views on defense matters and the nature of the Soviet threat. Consequently, on questions of broad-based threats to national security, political parties place different priorities on specific national security policy orientations based on their perception of degree of danger from each

Party	Seats	(Change)	%	
Independence Party	22	(+2)	35.4%	The Coalition* 32 seats/80% vote
Progressive Party	17	(+5)	24.9%	
People's Alliance Party (PA)	11	(-3)	19.7%	
Social Democratic Party (SD)	10	(-4)	17.4%	
TOTAL	60		97.4%	

ICELANDIC POLITICAL SPECTRUM



*The Independence Party is represented in the Governing Coalition by a 4 member splinter group.

**Politically the Progressives are a centrist group. On the issue of NATO and the defense agreement with the United States they are to the right of center.

Fig. 1—Icelandic Governing Coalition, February 1981
(Results of Icelandic Elections in December 1979)

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source of threat. Roughly 80 percent of the electorate supports the NATO connection.¹⁹ Only one of the parties is unequivocally opposed to NATO membership. On the other hand, none of the parties view the presence of foreign troops as a permanent or desirable condition. The average Icelander considers the presence of foreign troops to be a distasteful necessity resulting from a temporary condition of international instability and superpower conflict.²⁰

The Nordic Balance: Icelandic Perceptions in Perspective. When examining security factors in the North Atlantic it is relatively common to do so in terms of a "Nordic Balance," a concept not neatly defined. In large measure the concept of a Nordic Balance depends on one's perspective. From a NATO point of view, the term is naturally conceived as referring to the relative balance of military and political capabilities on NATO's northern flank that bear on the overall balance of power between NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

From the perspective of the Nordic states, the concept of a Nordic Balance is much less structured, and the elements contributing to the balance less well defined. There is agreement that Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden comprise a Nordic bloc. The ties that bind these five independent states stem largely from a common cultural experience. All five perceive themselves as belonging to a distinct Nordic grouping. The Nordic Council provides a formal structure for the coordination of policy in the common interest. A series of Norden Associations with branches in each of the five capitals provides an informal structure to exploit and further common cultural experiences. No one argues that integration along the lines of the European Community is a goal. Nevertheless, significant coordination of effort has taken place in cultural and economic

areas. Of great significance is the fact that questions dealing with foreign and defense policy have generally been considered outside this cooperative framework.²¹

A brief look at the security profile of each Nordic state highlights key differences. Denmark, Iceland and Norway are members of NATO. Consequently, their military-security problems are dealt with through the alliance. Denmark and Norway continue to prohibit the stationing of foreign troops on their soil. Iceland is the only Nordic state that allows, reluctantly, a U.S.-NATO presence. Sweden, a neutral in the true sense of the word, carefully maintains the credible military capability to defend its neutrality if necessary. Finland is a neutral but with clearly recognized constraints regarding its freedom of action vis-à-vis the Soviets. These significant differences in security profiles coupled with differences in geographical proximity to the Soviet Union explain why the term, Nordic Balance, cannot be seen as including a cooperative approach to solving common security problems. Security issues are in fact excluded from the routine pattern of Nordic cooperation.

Nevertheless, there does appear to be a relationship among the basic security approaches of Finland, Norway and Sweden.²² The security and the orientation to security policy of each is vitally important to the others. Norwegian defense depends on a strong, independent Sweden inasmuch as the best invasion routes to Norway are through Sweden. Finland can maintain its political balancing act only so long as Sweden acts as a neutral buffer between NATO and Finnish territory. Alone, Sweden can merely raise the costs of Soviet aggression. The only hope for actual Swedish defense hinges on a successful Norwegian defense strategy. These factors are well understood among the three primary actors. Thus, if a Nordic Balance exists in the perceptions of the

Nordic states, it is defined by their awareness of this possible synergistic relationship.

Iceland is outside this security relationship, but far from irrelevant to it. Of the five Nordic states, Iceland is the least committed. Iceland considers itself culturally linked to the others, and perceives economic advantages deriving from coordinated efforts. However, once one looks for specific acts of co-operation that might be seen as defining an Icelandic "Nordic View," the connection breaks down. Denmark, Norway and Sweden participated in the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) from the beginning. Finland joined as an associate member in 1961. Iceland did not join until 1970. Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden agreed to a common representation in the 1966/67 Kennedy Round tariff reduction negotiations. Iceland declined to join this common effort. Denmark, Norway and Sweden merged their national airlines to form Scandinavian Airlines System (SAS). Iceland retains its national airline in spite of severe financial problems. Of most importance, Icelanders do not think in terms of a Nordic Balance when formulating security policy.

The key factor is the difference in threat perceptions. The primary security threat to the four "continental" Nordic states is the Soviet Union. Secondary threats are found in the areas of cultural erosion and economic stability much along the Icelandic model. The key is the clarity and universal recognition of the primary source of threat. Consciously or otherwise, they complement their security policies to address this common threat.

In Iceland's case there is a direct reversal of the hierarchy of threat perceptions. The Soviet Union clearly is not perceived as the primary threat. Cultural erosion and economic stability are widely regarded as the primary threats. Thus, Iceland could very well decide at some future date to remain in

NATO but terminate the base agreement. If it did so, it would be to reduce a primary source of threat to important Icelandic values. Such a change in the northern theater might very well damage the synergistic relationship of Finnish-Norwegian-Swedish defense policy by casting doubt on the viability of NATO reinforcement to Norway in a crisis. Largely as a consequence of its perceptions of threat, Iceland would be unlikely to evaluate such a move in terms of potential danger to the Nordic Balance.

Conclusion. Early in this paper it was asserted that Iceland requires a definition of threat beyond the military-strategic focus. It is evident that there are many facets to Icelandic perception of threats to national security. Of these, the Soviet military threat is not central. In the absence of new instances of overt Soviet breach of the peace, the Soviet threat is not likely to be dominant in Icelandic defense policymaking in the 1980s.

Ironically, the absence of overt Soviet actions may very well have influence on Icelandic defense policy in the 1980s. Iceland's NATO allies have focused primarily on the Soviet military threat. A NATO presence in Iceland is seen as necessary to counter that threat. To many Icelanders who place a higher priority on other threats to Icelandic values, a NATO presence *is* "the threat." As a result, an asymmetry has developed between the primary threat perception of the U.S./NATO commands and the more diffused nature of Icelandic threat perception. Why this is important can be exemplified with a specific example.

NATO officials have observed an increase in the number of Soviet aircraft violating the NATO Northern Military Air Defense Zone in recent years. Through November 1980, 176 Russian violations of the Iceland Air Defense Zone were recorded. Soviet

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commanders may very well be testing overall detection capabilities as well as mapping response times and intercept capabilities. To a trained analyst this is *prima facie* evidence of the existence and refinement of a Soviet military threat to Icelandic security. However, given their concept of threat perception, the average Icelander might very well argue that if the NATO base were not present, there would be no need for Soviet aircraft to violate Icelandic airspace. In fact, many Icelanders argue that the NATO base is a grave threat to Icelandic security in the event of war because it makes Iceland a primary target, possibly for nuclear attack. Thus, largely because of basic differences in the perception of threat, what NATO perceives as cause, Icelanders are apt to consider effect.

Given the perception of threats to core national values and the priorities of

Icelanders summarized in this paper, it is conceivable that a prolonged period of quiescent or ambiguous Soviet global behavior could again lead to a call for evacuation of the NATO base by some future coalition government.

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY



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NOTES

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not purport to reflect the position of the U.S. Military Academy, Department of the Army, or the Department of Defense.

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13. See "Basic Statistics of Iceland 1980," compiled by the National Economic Institute (Reykjavik: Guttenberg, 1980).

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17. Interview in the economic/commercial section of the American Embassy in Reykjavik.
18. Arnason, p. 57.
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A turn-of-the-century "single issue" group in American politics was the Christian missionary societies. Their influence, the reported assassination of an American diplomat in Beirut, an impending presidential election, and a Turkish Pasha unwilling to receive the American Minister because of "important visits to the harem" gave Theodore Roosevelt an opportunity to demonstrate American seapower. If its lessons were lost on Turkey, they weren't in the capitals of Europe.

**THE BIG STICK IN TURKEY:
AMERICAN DIPLOMACY AND NAVAL
OPERATIONS AGAINST THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE,
1903-1904**

by
William J. Hourihan

"Spain and Turkey," Theodore Roosevelt wrote to a friend during the Spanish-American War, "are the two powers I would rather smash than any in the world."¹ A little over 5 years later Roosevelt, now President of the United States, would have the opportunity of realizing the second part of this wish. In his feelings against the Ottoman Empire Roosevelt was not alone. The reputation of Turkey in the United States at the turn of the century was that of a somewhat sinister nation locked in the throes of an internal disintegration, brutally attempting to stem the process by the suppression of its numerous Christian minorities. One factor that brought this situation even closer to home was the presence in Turkey of a substantial group of American missionaries engaged in the running of a number of schools and hospitals. Accord-

ing to Lloyd G. Griscom, the Chargé d' Affaires of the U.S. legation in Constantinople during this period, the words American and missionary in Turkey were practically synonymous. The influence of these missionaries and their parent organizations in the United States on public opinion and the formation of official government policy toward Turkey was a powerful one. The Secretaries of State in these years, Griscom maintained, "used to quake when the head of a Bible Society walked in."² Sultan Abdul Hamid II and his government viewed these American missionaries with deep suspicion, especially in their close relationship with the Empire's substantial Armenian population.

America's missionary presence in Turkey had begun in the 1820s and 1830s, and as its numbers and activities

grew violent incidents involving the missionaries and their charges became more frequent. In 1895 a revolt by the Armenian minority was ferociously put down by the Turkish Government causing extensive damage to missionary property, and for the next 5 years diplomatic relations between the United States and the Ottoman Empire revolved around the issue of an indemnity for this damage. After the Spanish-American War an agreement was reached that would allow this indemnity to be paid secretly by adding it to the final cost of a protected cruiser to be built in the United States for Turkey. Two years later the decision to build the cruiser had still not been made, and it took the diversion of the American battleship *Kentucky* to Constantinople in December 1900 to finally cause the cruiser contract to be signed.³

The settlement of the Armenian claims indemnity did not bring harmony to Turko-American relations. In early 1901, John G.A. Leishman, a wealthy steel executive and former Minister Plenipotentiary to Switzerland, was appointed Minister to Turkey. The problem that dominated Leishman's next four years was the question of the special rights and protections claimed for the schools and properties of the American missionaries. In November 1901, France pressed its claims for these special rights and protections for her schools by sending a naval squadron to seize the Turkish Aegean island of Mytilene, holding it as ransom for a satisfactory settlement. The government in Constantinople capitulated to this show of force, and by 1903 all of the European powers had come to similar agreements, but not the United States.⁴ It had become patently evident by this time to the new American President, Theodore Roosevelt, that a settlement of the school question would not be easily accomplished. Leishman's despatches to the State Department had for

over 2 years clearly testified to Turkish intransigence on the issue. It had taken more than 5 years of protests, threats, and finally a naval demonstration to settle the Armenian claims; and the matter of the school question promised to take even longer to resolve unless stronger measures were initiated. Adding to the pressure upon Roosevelt were the activities of missionary societies in the United States. In the summer of 1903, for example, a large delegation of prominent Americans representing missionary opinion, and led by the Reverend Stuart Dodge, came to Washington and presented Roosevelt with a memorial urging him to gain for American missionaries the same rights and protections already "secured by the ambassadors of the Great Powers of Europe [for] their subjects" in Turkey.⁵

An opportunity to resolve the problem by a vigorous display of naval diplomacy occurred in late August 1903, when a cable reached the State Department from Leishman informing it that the American Vice Consul in Beirut, William C. Magelssen, had been assassinated. Roosevelt promptly took advantage of the incident and on 28 August 1903 he ordered the European Squadron, then lying at Villefranche on the French Riviera, to steam at once for Beirut. The squadron, commanded by Rear Adm. Charles S. Corron, was composed at this time of the armored cruiser *Brooklyn* and the protected cruiser *San Francisco*. Corron had just recently finished taking his command on a series of diplomatically significant official visits to France, Germany, Great Britain, and Portugal; and the emergency orders to proceed immediately to Beirut found his ships low on supplies, especially coal. The squadron initially went to Genoa, Italy to fill its bunkers, and left there on 30 August, arriving at Beirut on 3 September after steaming as quickly as possible across the Mediterranean.⁶

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Even before the squadron departed Genoa the State Department had been informed that the report of the assassination was in error. The revised version of the incident had Magelssen merely being fired upon as he rode through the city at night in his carriage. The American Consul in Beirut, G.B. Ravndal, telegraphed an account of the incident to Constantinople which through an error in coding caused Leishman to understand an assassination had occurred, and it was thus reported to Washington. Leishman clarified the situation the next day but Roosevelt chose to ignore the change in circumstances, and Cotton was allowed to sail.⁷ The President was clearly hoping that Leishman could make use of Cotton's presence in Beirut as a pawn in his negotiations with the Turkish Government on the school question.

Leishman himself was confident that this could be done. On 31 August Secretary of State John Hay told Roosevelt that Leishman had informed him that word of a naval squadron being sent had made a profound impression on the Turkish Government, and would probably stimulate it into activity. Chekib Bey, the Turkish Minister to the United States, protested to Hay about the naval demonstration. Hay, who privately referred to Chekib Bey as that "poor writhing worm of a Turk," declared to the Minister that if his government wanted the warships removed the Sultan "has only to keep his word with us, and settle two or three matters which have dragged on too long." Chekib Bey was left plaintively explaining Turkey's position to the Washington correspondent of *The Times* (London). "Unhappily massacres sometimes occur," he said, "but do they not occur in Christian lands? Nobody would be so foolish as to hold the United States Government responsible for the lynchings of negroes."⁸ Hay told Roosevelt that he felt we should be able "to finish up our little business" with

Turkey in a few days, and then departed for a short vacation at his summer home in New Hampshire, leaving the President and Assistant Secretary of State Alvee A. Adee "to struggle with the Beirut proposition." But Hay had been unnecessarily optimistic in his judgment, for by the end of September Leishman was reporting to Washington, in a series of "wordy and not very helpful" dispatches, that the same old excuses and procrastinations were being employed. By October the European Squadron, since strengthened by the arrival of the large gunboat *Machias*, was left to sit impotently in the harbor of Beirut.⁹

The next move was up to Roosevelt. Despite his antipathy to the Ottoman Empire he was well aware of the hazards involved in initiating a confrontation that could lead to conflict. Roosevelt once cautioned Elihu Root about the dangers of "pushing matters to a conclusion with Turkey and taking Smyrna." While he felt the Ottoman Navy presented no problem, Roosevelt warned that the Army was a different matter. Turkish ground forces, he admonished, were "a most formidable body," and man for man there "are no better fighters in Europe." With the Turkish Government ignoring the presence of the squadron the President was put in the position of having to use stronger measures (which he was obviously loath to do without a good excuse for doing so), or withdrawing Cotton. Evidently the squadron was simply not large enough and Beirut just too far away from Constantinople for the warships' presence to be effective. So, as the year drew to a close, Roosevelt and Hay were left with the problem of removing the squadron without giving the appearance of having backed down. An additional spur to withdrawal came from the Navy Department that was exerting pressure to have the warships brought home as they were badly in need of a refit.¹⁰

The determination to disengage the squadron was made in mid-January 1904. Apprised of it Leishman pointed out that withdrawing the warships without having obtained a settlement would be unfortunate, but because the Administration was not prepared to adopt more drastic measures he had no objection to their removal. In response the State Department asked Leishman to intimate to the Turkish Government that the vessels were being withdrawn only for the time being, in order to facilitate discussions. The withdrawal was to be presented as an example of Roosevelt's good will toward Turkey. To this Leishman replied that Ottoman officials would not be deceived; all they had to do was to read American newspapers. The departure of Cotton in February had no positive effect; indeed the opposite occurred for Turkish policy became even more intransigent. Leishman's direct access to the Sultan was suddenly ended by a Turkish decision to allow only those foreign diplomats accredited with ambassador rank to have audiences with Abdul Hamid. This unusual tactic was especially designed to isolate the persistent Leishman who held only minister rank. Confronted by this as well as other difficulties he cabled Hay that everything in Turkey was "so different here from other countries that one is seldom in a position to give a good reason for thinking anything . . ." All of the obstructions, veiled insults, and procrastinations finally came to an end on 1 April 1904, when the Turkish Government officially informed Leishman that after long consideration it refused to take a favorable decision on the school question.¹¹ Faced with this rebuff, Roosevelt began unlimbering his "big stick" in the form of a squadron of American battleships.

The decision to send a large contingent of the American Navy to cruise in the Mediterranean during the summer of 1904 was not a direct result of Roosevelt's Turkish problem; rather, it

was the consequence of a sea change in American naval strategic thinking that had occurred in the years since the Spanish-American War, especially after the elevation of Theodore Roosevelt to the Presidency in 1901.¹² The cruise was undertaken primarily to impress upon Europe the new strength and geographical reach of the U.S. Navy. It was to be the largest demonstration of American seapower ever seen outside the Western Hemisphere. The heart of this naval force was to be made up of the six first-class capital ships of the Battleship Squadron of the North Atlantic Fleet. This powerful squadron was commanded by Rear Adm. Albert S. Barker, flying his flag in the battleship *Kearsarge*. Two smaller squadrons would accompany the battleships: the reconstituted European Squadron commanded by Rear Adm. Theodore F. Jewell, composed of the protected cruisers *Olympia* (flag), *Baltimore*, and *Cleveland*; and the South Atlantic Squadron commanded by Rear Adm. French E. Chadwick, with *Brooklyn* (flag), the protected cruiser *Atlanta*, and the large gunboats *Castine* and *Marietta*.¹³

When the final judgment to undertake the cruise was made in February 1904, the initial itinerary of the fleet would have it cruise and visit ports in the western Mediterranean. The farthest east it was scheduled to steam was into the Adriatic in order to make a stop at Trieste.¹⁴ The Turkish decision of 1 April to reject American diplomatic pressure on the school question caused the Roosevelt administration to alter the fleet's movements. The need to put greater pressure on the Sultan, and also the fact that Roosevelt would be running for election in the autumn, were reasons enough for this most bellicose of Presidents to practice a little gunboat diplomacy. Sometime in April Arhens was added to the fleet's itinerary. Arhens was selected as it would put American warships within a day's steaming of either Smyrna (then the second largest

city in Turkey), or the mouth of the Dardanelles. What use Leishman was to make of this naval presence was lucidly stated in a private letter to the Minister from Hay in late May. "Within the next six weeks," Hay wrote, "an imposing naval force will move in the direction of Turkey. You ought to be able to make some judicious use of this fleet in your negotiations without committing the Government to any action." Hay ordered Leishman to keep this matter "absolutely confidential," and not place this letter in the legation's files, but to "destroy it, and so report to me."¹⁵

Intimations of an impending clash with Turkey began appearing with increasing regularity in the nation's press during the month of June. The fleet had been held up at the Strait of Gibraltar while Roosevelt used its presence to overawe the Sultan of Morocco during the Perdicaris affair, and *The New York Times* openly speculated that the warships would steam on to Turkey after the Moroccan imbroglio had been settled. *The World* (N.Y.) was also reporting that the "strenuous Roosevelt hand will fall next upon Turkey," with the likely bombardment of Beirut or Smyrna. "Yankee guns," *The World* predicted, "are expected to inspire the Turk with a desire to settle." On the morning of 8 June Hay had a stormy meeting at the State Department with John W. Foster, a former diplomat and now a representative of American missionary groups. Foster told the Secretary of State he wanted the Government "to growl" at Turkey. Hay was able to acquaint Foster with what the Administration was intending to do with the fleet, and he left in a "more reasonable" frame of mind.¹⁶

Leishman, while fully endorsing the sending of the battleships, pressed the State Department to take even stronger measures. He suggested that the United States deliver an ultimatum to Turkey, or failing that, at least to send the

warships to visit a few Turkish ports. Hay did not act upon these proposals, but on 9 June, the day after his meeting with Foster, he instructed Leishman to demand an audience with the Sultan on the school question, "in the name of the President." Hay confided to his diary that this strong approach and the arrival of the fleet should be enough to influence Leishman's "negroes." That the impending naval presence was having the desired effect was demonstrated when Tewfik Pasha, the Turkish Foreign Minister, promptly promised Leishman to bring up the school question before the Council of Ministers for review, and he begged Leishman "to grant him sufficient time to have the matter reconsidered." Leishman gave the Foreign Minister until the end of the month to produce an acceptable response. Two days later the Grand Vizier informed him that the Council had referred the matter to the Minister of Public Instruction with a favorable recommendation. Leishman was assured by this quick response that the Turkish Government was highly disturbed by recent developments and was attempting "to find a way of backing down peacefully." The medicine was working, Leishman cabled, but Hay, remembering past experiences with the Sultan, still had his private reservations.¹⁷

On the afternoon of 30 June the Battleship Squadron steamed into the anchorage at Phaleron Bay near Piraeus, the port of Athens, watched by a lone Russian corvette. The European Squadron, which should have accompanied it, had gone instead to Trieste, much to the displeasure of the State and Navy Departments which wanted the fleet at Athens to be as impressive as possible. While Barker's battleships were being feted in Athens Leishman still waited for a satisfactory response. On 2 July he cabled that there had been no definite reply as yet, and that he would wait a few more days; then, if nothing was

forthcoming, demand a meeting with the Sultan. Three days later Tewfik Pasha told Leishman that he could not give him any news on a settlement, and Leishman countered by asking for a personal audience with Abdul Hamid. Tewfik Pasha tried to dissuade him but Leishman persisted and the meeting was scheduled for 8 July. The audience never took place, for on the 8th Leishman was informed that the meeting had to be postponed because the Sultan was very fatigued and would be indisposed. Later in the day it was a much chagrined Leishman who learned that Abdul Hamid had been well enough to meet with both the Austrian and Russian Ambassadors. The reason for this deliberate rebuff—the other two audiences could not have been concealed—was obvious. On 5 July there had been five American battleships anchored at Piraeus, while on the 8th there were none; Barker's squadron had steamed away on the 6th bound for the Adriatic.¹⁸ Turkish sensitivity to American diplomacy was quite clearly related to the degree of coercion Roosevelt was able or willing to apply.

When Leishman next saw Tewfik Pasha, "prudence and policy," he cabled Hay, forced him to make no mention of his knowledge of the Ambassadors' visits. "Compelled to swallow [his] indignation and express . . . sorrow at the ill health of the Sultan," Leishman told the Foreign Minister he would ask for an audience with Abdul Hamid when the Sultan was feeling better. On 15 July Leishman requested this audience but was appraised that the Sultan would not be able to see him because he was engaged in important visits to the harem. Adding to this affront Leishman soon learned that the Sultan continued to meet with other diplomats, including the Persian Ambassador, on the very day he had requested his audience. Leishman told Hay that he felt it would be "beneath the dignity of the American Government" to again

ask for an audience under these conditions, and he requested Washington send him further instructions. In response to this state of affairs Leishman was ordered again to ask for an Imperial audience in the President's name at a fixed date and time in the near future. He was also instructed to tell Tewfik Pasha that the Government of the United States failed to comprehend the delay in according its representative the treatment that should exist between two supposedly friendly powers. Implicit in this language was the intimation that if an audience was not granted it would be taken as an unfriendly act. In anticipation of a refusal the State Department asked Leishman to let it know which of the Turkish ports would be best suited to a visit from the fleet.¹⁹

Faced with this strong approach the Turkish Government granted the request for an audience. The meeting took place on 29 July, and in a long and outwardly cordial interview Abdul Hamid "spoke very favorably" on the school question, promising to take the matter "under immediate consideration" and give a definite reply by the second of August. There was considerable hope in Washington at this news that the problem might be nearing a solution. The State Department, however, was still cautious. Leishman was told that just in case problems arose Barker's battleships were going to be held at Gibraltar, "in readiness subject to orders." The precaution seemed to be justified when Tewfik Pasha sent his secretary to see Leishman on 1 August to say that the Sultan would not be able to see him the following day. The excuse given was that the Council of Ministers had not as yet concluded its report on the problem; an answer was promised on 4 August. Leishman was disturbed by this delay but still optimistic. "The active consideration which the matter is now receiving," he explained, "warrants the belief that a definite decision will

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be reached before the end of the present week." His confidence was misplaced, however, for the 4th passed without the promised reply, and no word was offered on when one could be expected.²⁰

Washington, D.C. sweltered in the humid, tropical heat of August. Most of official Washington, including the foreign diplomats, had left the capital for either the sea or the mountains. Even the dutiful Hay had managed to slip away to his summer residence in New Hampshire for a few days. The great diplomat was not well and indeed he had less than a year to live. A few months earlier Henry Adams had watched the sculptor St. Gaudens modeling Hay's head for a bust, as well as John Singer Sargent painting his portrait; "two steps essential to immortality which," Adams observed, Hay "bore with a certain degree of resignation." Roosevelt had remained in the capital keeping a close watch on the Turkish situation, and Leishman's cable of 4 August describing the latest attempt at delay spurred the President into action. That afternoon Roosevelt sent a telegram to Hay urging his immediate return, and the evening saw the Secretary of State hurrying back to Washington by fast train.

On the morning of the 5th, a Friday, Roosevelt gathered his Cabinet together in a special session given over entirely to dealing with Turkey. After examining all of the options open to the Administration, Roosevelt decided to send in the Navy. The Battleship Squadron was still standing by at Gibraltar, but because they were nearer to the scene it was resolved to order the three fast cruisers of Jewell's European Squadron, then at Villefranche, to steam for the Turkish port of Smyrna. In the evening Roosevelt and Hay dined at the White House and again discussed the crisis, but beyond the resolution to send Jewell no decision was reached then or over the weekend on what the squadron should

do once it reached Smyrna. Indeed, the European Squadron did not leave Villefranche until Sunday. The Navy Department's order of the 5th caught Jewell off guard. Most of the squadron's officers and men were scattered ashore on liberty, and the warships were low on provisions and coal. By the time the crews were gathered back aboard and stores taken on there had been a delay of almost 48 hours. Around noon on Sunday, the 7th, the cruisers led by the flagship *Olympia* cleared the harbor at Villefranche and headed out into the Ligurian Sea bound for the Strait of Messina. The news of Roosevelt's action was widely applauded in the United States, the front page of Sunday's *New York Tribune*, for example, carried pictures of the squadron's three cruisers as well as an insert of Rear Admiral Jewell. These cruisers should be enough, the *Tribune* argued, but if more warships are needed Barker's command, "the most powerful fleet in the American navy," would be standing by at Gibraltar. High Administration officials, the *Tribune* pointed out, were seen as feeling confident that Barker's battleships would not be needed, but their appearance in Turkish waters "may be necessary for its naval effect."²²

Early Monday morning Hay went to see Roosevelt to discuss the developing situation, and suggested to the President an ingenious compromise between the actual use of force and abject retreat in the event the Sultan remained obdurate. He advised that when the squadron reached Smyrna Leishman should be instructed to make one final demand on our claims, and if this was refused the Minister would come away on one of the warships. Hay argued against a hostile demonstration and held that the withdrawal would suffice for now; later the entire matter could be put before the Congress for appropriate action. The President readily accepted Hay's counsel.²³ The strategy was extremely adroit as the serious

consequences of a full-scale incident were avoided, at least for the time being, while the domestic benefits gained by withdrawing Leishman and placing the matter before the Congress would be as satisfactory as a landing at Smyrna. It would quiet the missionaries for a while, please the jingoes, as well as answering those critics who were attacking Roosevelt for indulging in an aggressive foreign policy. Putting the matter before the Congress would also keep the question alive as an election issue. In any event, because the Turkish Government was unaware of Roosevelt's limited aims, there remained an excellent chance the Administration could bluff an acceptable agreement without having to actually withdraw Leishman.

When Hay returned to the State Department after meeting with the President he found Chekib Bey waiting on him and full of "great perturbation about the fleet." Hay attempted to set him somewhat at ease but told him "things could not continue as they were," and the United States had been forced to act by his government's dilatory stance on the school question. Before Chekib Bey saw Hay he had told waiting reporters that there was nothing to recent reports that Jewell's warships were being sent to Smyrna to menace Turkey. After the meeting he refused to discuss what was said, but admitted he would be staying in the capital. To the reporters, he appeared nervous and anxious. Later the same day Hay cabled Leishman that the European Squadron would be at Smyrna in a few days, and he should make use of the time before its arrival in attempting to obtain a settlement. If none could be arranged he was ordered to leave in one of Jewell's warships, putting the legation in charge of the legation secretary.²⁴

European concern about the possibility of American involvement was vividly expressed by the hasty return to Washington of a number of diplomats from vacation. On 9 August Baron

Hengelmüller, the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, returned from his summer home in Bar Harbor, Maine; ostensibly, as he told waiting reporters, to present Roosevelt with "a compilation of Austrian statistics which Emperor Francis Joseph has sent to the President with his compliments." The Ambassador then hurried to the White House for a long luncheon with Roosevelt and Hay. The German Ambassador, Baron Speck von Sternberg, arrived back in the capital in the afternoon from his summer house in the Massachusetts Berkshires at Lennox, and had dinner that evening with the President and Hay. He informed reporters that he had returned simply "to attend some business of an unofficial character." The next morning Portes de la Fosse, Counsellor of the French Embassy, appeared and went immediately to the State Department for a meeting with Hay.²⁵ This sudden return to a humid capital of European diplomats all "imbued with a desire to see President Roosevelt" did not pass unnoticed, and although none of those involved would admit the cause for this precipitate burst of high-level diplomatic activity, it was obvious the reason was Turkey. Two days before, *The New York Times* reported, Washington had been "almost completely deserted by the diplomatic body"; but since then "representatives of the German, Austrian and French Embassies have appeared here, and all of them have communicated with the State Department or the White House."²⁶ What the diplomats plainly wanted was some knowledge of just what Roosevelt was up to in Turkey, and how far he was prepared to go. It is not known what the President and Hay said to them, but it seems reasonable to assume that they were given assurances that American intervention was to be limited and would not at this time include the use of force.

Meanwhile, on the morning of the 12th Jewell's cruisers appeared off the

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port of Smyrna. The previous day while steaming across the Aegean Sea all of the warships had held preparedness drills, including General Quarters. On the *Olympia* there had been ammunition drills with live rounds being placed in the hoists and rested. Not knowing what to expect, the squadron warily screamed into the bay of Smyrna, passing the dun-colored fortifications guarding its entrance, finding only a solitary Turkish warship, the small gunboat *Sureyya*, in evidence. Going ashore in the afternoon with his three captains Jewell was received by the Governor of Smyrna, "with much ceremony, a guard of honor being paraded and a band playing 'Hail Columbia'."²⁷

The Turkish Government initially reacted to the news that warships were being sent by promising Leishman immediate reconsideration of the school question, if the squadron was withdrawn or at least stopped at Piraeus. Leishman passed this offer on to the State Department but it was rejected.²⁸ Finding it could not stop the squadron, Abdul Hamid and his government capitulated. On the afternoon of 11 August the Sultan sent one of his private secretaries to the American legation with an informal memorandum, in which Abdul Hamid declared in writing "that there should be no distinction between American schools and those of other nationalities."²⁹ Although Leishman thought the memorandum ambiguous and misleading and recommended it be rejected, he was overruled by the President and Hay; the latter feeling that the Sultan had "virtually agreed to all our demands." Roosevelt had a suspicion that Leishman might be tempted to reject the Sultan's memorandum and leave Turkey on his own authority. At one point the President took a draft cable that Hay intended to send Leishman ordering him to accept the memorandum, and "wrote it all over again" in order to make the dispatch sufficiently clear. With the incident

satisfactorily concluded Barker's Battleship Squadron left Gibraltar on 13 August and headed back across the Atlantic to the United States. Jewell's squadron was withdrawn from Smyrna on the 15th.³⁰

In the United States the incident was generally regarded as a triumph for Roosevelt's brand of naval "big stick" diplomacy. However, some saw the guns of the European Squadron aimed more at Judge Parker, Roosevelt's Democratic opponent in the Presidential campaign, than at Abdul Hamid. *The New York Times* came closest to the mark when it prophesied that there would be no permanence in the solution gained by Roosevelt. The Ottoman Empire had been humiliated by the display of American naval power, and it warned that an "exhorted assent leaves him who yields it in no amiable frame of mind." The *Times'* judgment was to prove correct, for as soon as Jewell's cruisers had departed, the Turkish Government began haggling over the implementation of the agreement and Leishman soon found himself more or less back in the same position he had been before.³¹ There was to be no next step for Turkey. By the time the election was over Roosevelt had moved on to playing for larger stakes in the world, and the President was too perceptive to involve himself permanently in a minor backwater at the expense of other, more profitable, games. In truth, the Ottoman Empire was almost incapable of dealing with other nations on a rational diplomatic basis. Its internal order was rapidly breaking down, and the central authority in Constantinople remained unable to look beyond the narrow world of palace intrigue.

For Theodore Roosevelt, the Turkish affair must be judged an unqualified success in its effective employment of American seapower. This use of the "big stick" in the Mediterranean gave the President increased confidence in the strength and range of the fleet, and

it would be increasingly employed by him as the primary instrument of his foreign policy during his next 4 years in office. Europe had been given a first-hand look at the American Navy in action, and the great powers were not slow to draw the appropriate message. The semiofficial Vienna newspaper *Fremdenblatt* spoke for many when it editorialized in the wake of the Turkish incident that the recent use of the U.S. Navy in the Mediterranean contained a warning for Europe. Roosevelt, it declared, had come to view his fleet "as a bulwark of peace." The continent must be cautious in reacting, as "the laurels of

war are highly prized in this modern Carthage."³²

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY



William Hourihan, a lecturer in American history at Northeastern University, was educated in economics and history at Northeastern University and the University of Massachusetts, earning the Ph.D. degree from the latter.

He has written for several journals, including the *Naval War College Review*, on American naval operations in European waters from the 1880s until the First World War.

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
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SET AND DRIFT



SUCCESS AND THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE: ANOTHER VIEW

by

Lewis Sorley

Recently in these pages Francis J. West, Jr. presented thumbnail sketches of the service of 14 Secretaries of Defense, suggested that most had failed, and offered the view that those failures were owed to a confusion of priorities among the several roles each Secretary must play and a consequent expenditure of too much time and energy on the wrong issues. Forging on from those conclusions, Mr. West argued that most of the Secretaries who in his view had failed had devoted too much attention to administration of the Department of Defense.

It seems to me that there is room for another view, including discussion of what constitutes "failure" in the circumstances faced by each of the successive incumbents. Given the several constituencies served by a Secretary of Defense (subsidiary to his overriding obligation to serve the public interest) and the often incompatible interests and equities of those various constituencies, it would appear that only under the most felicitous circumstances could any given Secretary be viewed as having succeeded by all parties. Thus what most Secretaries are faced with doing is estab-

lishing priorities not only among their various roles, but among the multitudinous political and national security concerns facing the administration in office. These priorities are reflected, of course, in the emphasis given to one or another role and the effort expended in serving one or another constituency.

Success as viewed retrospectively might then be defined in two parts: how wisely the priorities were chosen and adhered to, and how ably they were manifested in the conduct of the office. This seems to me to constitute a markedly different set of criteria than those implied by West, who emphasized being removed from office as an indication of failure.

Key to those removals from office (being fired outright or being replaced by another appointee following a President's reelection) was, West suggested, loss of confidence in the incumbent on the part of the President. While that certainly constitutes failure of a kind, it is important to consider the context within which the loss of confidence occurred in each case in determining whether at the higher level of his stewardship of public trust a

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Secretary ousted from office can be considered to have failed. Recent history provides an excellent case in point. James Schlesinger, whose substantial achievements included (as West acknowledges) beneficial modification of strategic nuclear doctrine, improvement of general-purpose forces, and reversal of a long-term trend in declining resources devoted to defense, was then fired by President Ford, a firing attributed by West to "personalities and the impending Presidential elections." Given these contrasting grounds, I suggest that there are few who have been closely involved with defense issues over the years who would not rate Schlesinger as one of the most effective Secretaries of Defense.

A more recent Secretary, Harold Brown, is also an interesting study in terms of success or failure in the role. Having served the full 4 years of the Administration in which he was originally appointed, he is one of only three Secretaries who were neither fired nor replaced upon reelection of a serving President, according to West's tabulation. Yet, if it is not at all clear that his service can be considered a success in terms of achievement as opposed to extended tenure, there are contextual factors that may lead one to conclude that Dr. Brown did the very best that could be expected in a difficult circumstance. That circumstance, as described by West, was being "caught in an impossible dilemma: remaining steadfastly loyal to a President who did not believe force should be a major component of international relations, while trying to strengthen U.S. forces." Many fair-minded people might conclude that under such conditions Secretary Brown did all that was humanly possible, and served more successfully than most would have been able to do.

There is another aspect of the success or failure of any given Secretary of Defense, one that keys on the tenures in office reported by West, that deserves comment. Of the 14 Secretaries of

Defense who preceded the incumbent, only four served for longer than 2½ years (see Table 1). The median term of office was 1½ years; six Secretaries (nearly half of those who have held the position) served less than a year and a half. The average tenure (in this case less instructive in terms of describing reality because it is skewed by much longer tenures of four incumbents) was some 28.2 months.

TABLE 1—TENURES OF SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE

Incumbent	Months In Office	
McNamara	82	
Wilson	57	
Laird	47	
Brown	47	
Schlesinger	29	
McElroy	26	
Forrestal	18	
Johnson	18	Median
Lovett	15	
Gates	14	
Clifford	13	
Rumsfeld	13	
Marshall	12	
Richardson	4	
Mean	28.2	

It should be clear that stability and continuity are important in dealing with matters of the complexity and diversity that confront the Secretary of Defense, and that stability and continuity are things we have rarely had, either among the appointed civilian leadership of the Department of Defense or in assignments of uniformed leaders of the military services. In assessing success or failure, then, it seems reasonable to take into account whether a given Secretary has been afforded a tenure giving him reasonable opportunity to have any significant effect. On the evidence, most have not. This also seems to call into

question Mr. West's suggestion that Secretaries of Defense need not give top priority to managing their department, inasmuch as one of the deputies could take that on as a full-time task. Given the historical experience, such an approach would seem likely to result in even more transitory leadership than that provided by the Secretaries themselves.

Meanwhile there are persistent problems with the acquisition process, the roles and missions of the services, the training and readiness of the forces, and their essential manning that have persisted through a number of Administrations. Many of these seem to constitute problems primarily of internal management. What is fascinating to speculate on, and would be a useful topic for further research, is whether more rather than less attention to internal affairs of the Department of Defense by successive Secretaries, especially the more able among those who have held the position, might not have resulted in institutionalizing some sea-change alterations in strategic doctrine (a notable success of the Schlesinger era, as suggested

earlier); restructuring the approach to the research, development, testing and acquisitions process in ways having long-term influence on reductions in the costs and time involved in fielding major systems; and influencing the allocations of roles and missions among the services so as to obtain a greater return on the investment in the force as a whole when applied to the evolving tasks of national defense.

In reaching the conclusion that "history shows that no Secretary has failed for poor management, while many have failed because they neglected other roles," therefore, Mr. West may be applying too narrow a definition of success and failure. It is not, I have sought to demonstrate, unarguably an indication of failure to have been fired. Neither is it necessarily evidence of failure to have suffered the departmental effects of broader trends in the affairs of the nation. Meanwhile the prospective benefits of a well-managed Department of Defense would, I believe, be sufficient to vindicate any Secretary who made his personal first priority managing the affairs of his department.

GIBRALTAR: A STUMBLING BLOCK OR A STEPPING STONE

by

Commander N.H. Kerr, Royal Navy

After almost 30 years of faltering nonprogress, the 1980s provide NATO with the opportunity to cement their gains, as opposed to paper over the cracks; to achieve a real increase in defense expenditures and preparedness, and to exploit, if only in physiological terms, the trauma in the Warsaw Pact caused by the Polish problem and the Afghanisran situation.

One of the most fundamental expressions of NATO's superiority in solidarity

and strength of purpose over the Warsaw Pact would be the warm and universal acceptance of another willing member into the alliance; Spain. Spain with its important strategic geographical position, its raw materials, industry and its population, not to mention armed forces, has been isolated from Europe for over 40 years and rejected from NATO for political reasons that since the death of Franco are no longer valid. Spain now stands as a great prize

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to be won for the common defense of the North Atlantic or lost to a neopacification stance, similar to Sweden; a stance of little use to either side in the ideological struggle between democracy and communism.

There is a problem—Gibraltar; geographically a part of Spain, historically a bastion of British power abroad, one can readily understand Spain's demands to have Gibraltar returned to her. Great Britain, however, is unhappy to give up Gibraltar because of its strategic importance. If Spain was in NATO, would this matter? But, and the big but, is that the Gibraltarians don't want (and have said so many times) to give up their special status. Squabbles over Gibraltar could be the stumbling block of Spanish entry into NATO. British Foreign Office officials within the ex-colonial or liberal mold will not be prepared to hand over Gibraltar, without some grandiose, impartial reciprocal gesture from Spain; a similar deal to that of Zimbabwe, where decolonization was only allowed to proceed to the tune of the media's cry of great diplomacy and good behavior from the Zimbabweans who wanted independence anyway. No such accolade could accompany the handover of Gibraltar, particularly as the Gibraltarians are fervently against becoming part of Spain.

The answer lies in NATO. The handing over by Britain of Gibraltar to NATO as a strategic linchpin and Maritime Headquarters for NATO would satisfy all aspects of the problem. Spain would no longer have a disputed border with Britain, and could not dispute the possession of Gibraltar if it were in NATO of which she was a member. Great Britain would pull off a great diplomatic coup, particularly in NATO circles, and the Gibraltarians special status, duty-free concessions, etc., could be maintained under a NATO flag.

Could NATO use Gibraltar, apart from holding it as a strategic fortress

between the Mediterranean and the Atlantic? The present NATO Supreme Allied Command Atlantic Headquarters is in Norfolk, Virginia. As an American officer, SACLANT is not only double-hatted as USCINCLANT, but at 200 miles down the Chesapeake from Washington, D.C., is too conveniently at the beck and call of U.S. politicians, only too eager to interfere or influence U.S./NATO relationships through their resident NATO/U.S. Commander. The colocation of the USCINCLANT/SACLANT headquarters is a mythical advantage. An outsider, particularly in Europe, presumes a harmony that does not exist, and tends to regard SACLANT decisions as binding on USCINCLANT and vice versa, which they are not. Norfolk is also remote from the supposed battlegrounds of the Atlantic Fleet, i.e., the Norwegian Sea, Iceland, Faroes Gap, etc., and command exercise only too frequently has to be passed to the NATO secondary commander, CINCEASTLANT, in Northwood, U.K., much to the disgust of the U.S. officers in SACLANT. Norfolk is also 3,000+ miles from Brussels and in day-to-day affairs tends to be much less well represented than the geographically much closer Army/Air Force dominated headquarters of SACEUR (40 miles from Brussels). Could preoccupation with the Central Front at the expense of the far more complex Warsaw Pact threat at sea be a result of this geographical disparity?

The location of SACLANT's headquarters at Gibraltar would give the fortress the privileged position its inhabitants require. Four stars are pretty big medicine in anyone's language. Being at the Mediterranean/Atlantic crossroads, the whole of NATO's sea-power could be controlled from a central position, while its location at the foot of the Iberian peninsula give it a measure of invulnerability and protection in depth. Location at Gibraltar would remove SACLANT from the U.S.

environment and allow his staff to concentrate on NATO matters as opposed to keeping one eye on U.S.-only interests. Being only 1,000 miles from and on the same continent as Brussels would go a long way to counteract the prevalent idea that SACEUR is the only NATO supremo.

Legal minds seeing only the minutiae of law and status quo, and petty officials, including many uniformed equivalents, will see only the snags and transitory problems of this solution to the future of Gibraltar. Those who can see beyond petty boundaries of jurisdiction and who see the true worth of Spain in NATO, the advantages of a European-based maritime Supreme Headquarters for NATO, and who are prepared to make concessions to the Gibraltarians them-

selves will see the far-reaching advantages of making Gibraltar a NATO headquarters.

Gibraltar could be a stepping stone to NATO solidarity, and Spanish membership of the alliance, in the face of the relentless, but internally divided, Warsaw Pact would be assured.

The invitation must come from Great Britain and come soon before the problems of Gibraltar not only impede Spain's entry into NATO, but build an impenetrable barrier on her entry, such as the Northern Ireland and Eire situation (countries cannot become members of NATO if they dispute a border with another NATO country). Both situations create avenues for Warsaw Pact mischief-making and intervention.

AN OUTLINE OF WARGAMING

by

Captain Abe Greenberg, U.S. Navy

In recent years, wargaming has enjoyed a general regeneration, particularly at the Naval War College. It will be useful to review its basic nature, origin, strong points and limitations. Although the Naval War College deals primarily with naval wargaming, a broader view of this field is necessary. Thus, the following survey will be slanted towards, but not limited to naval wargaming.

Opinions vary on the origin of war games but most authorities agree that it was invented about 5,000 years ago in China by Sun Tzu. The game was called *Wei-Hai* and was probably very similar to a later Japanese game, *Go*. It was played on special map boards using colored stones to signify opposing forces. The winner was the player who first outflanked his opponent. *Chaturanga*, a Hindu game of that period, used a map and military pieces

to depict warring forces. That game was probably the forerunner of chess.

The next major development in wargaming didn't occur until 1664. Thereafter, further developments came rapidly. A brief chronology follows:

1644—The King's Game, a war chess game developed by Christopher Weikmann at Ulm. It had 14 fixed moves and there were 30 pieces on each side.

1780—Helwig Game, a modified chess-like board of many squares, tinted in various colors to represent terrain.

1798—*Neues Kriegspiel*, a Helwig-like game developed by George Vinturinus and played on a chess-board map of 3,600 squares representing the Franco-Belgium border. The game rules were much more detailed and complex than Helwig's game.

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1811—Von Reissivitz's Game. The war game was transferred from chessboards and chessboard maps to a sand box. The terrain was modeled in sand to scale. A notable advance was that troop movement was no longer restricted to chessboard squares.

1824—Von Reissivitz's Son's Game. Adapted to realistic maplike charts with a scale of about 8 inches to the mile. Considered the first of the land warfare games.

1876—Von Verdy's Game. Developed what is termed free-form or free-play games. It "required the umpire to judge the effects of fire and to administer the progress of the game entirely on the basis of his own experience."¹ This was a significant departure from the previous rigid fixed rules to the umpire's judgment. We shall later see, in World War II, where arbitrary umpire judgment was as dangerous an assumption as inflexible rules.

1878—Colomb's Game. Captain Colomb of the British Navy introduced the first naval war game.

1879—*American Kriegsspiel*. A book by Major Livermore, U.S. Army, that introduced the war game into America.

1880—*Strategos*. A book and a series of games produced by Lieutenant Totten of the U.S. Cavalry. A more flexible game and somewhat easier to play than Livermore's game.

1887—William McCarty Little Lecture. As a member of the U.S. Naval War College staff, Little delivered six lectures on war gaming. These lectures, according to McHugh,² aroused the interest of the staff and students and led to the almost unbroken history of naval wargaming at the Naval War College since that time.

F.J. McHugh, in his "Game at the

Naval War College,"³ identifies five major periods of wargaming at that institution. The first extended from 1887 to 1893 in which the staff conducted occasional games. In 1892 there was a limited student participation on a voluntary basis. The second period, according to McHugh, began in 1894, with war games first scheduled into the curriculum, and ran through 1921. The games were used as analytical tools, frequently oriented toward formulation of tactical plans and evaluation of the worth of superior speed.⁴ The strategic significance of the Cape Cod Canal and suggestion for ship fuel experiments were significant.⁵

During the third period, 1922 to 1951, the emphasis was on educational gaming conducted primarily to provide the player with decisionmaking experience. This period was also characterized by the use of detailed rules, especially in regard to damage assessment. The late Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, lecturing at the Naval War College on 10 October 1960, perhaps paid the greatest tribute to this era's gaming. In an oft-quoted statement, Nimitz declared that:

The war with Japan had been reenacted in the game rooms here by so many people and in so many different ways that nothing that happened during the war was a surprise—absolutely nothing except the kamikaze tactics towards the end of the war; we had not visualized those.⁶

We are fortunate that in this case the high praise bestowed on wargaming by Fleet Admiral Nimitz can be compared with what the Japanese were doing during the same period. This rare comparison in history sheds much light on the influences of wargaming on the major participants in the conflict.

In his *Fundamentals of War Gaming*, McHugh cites the opposite side:

[Japanese] Naval planners then turned their thoughts to the east

and prepared ambitious plans for the capture of Midway and the western Aleutians in early June, the seizure of strategic points in Caledonia and the Fiji Islands in July, air strikes on southeastern Australia, and operations against Johnston Island and Hawaii in August. These proposed operations were tested in a series of war games in the spring of 1942. During the play the Nagumo Force was attacked by land-based air while its own planes were attacking Midway. Following the rules of the game, an umpire determined that the carriers received nine hits and that two of them, the Akagi and Kage, were sunk. Rear Admiral Ugaki, the director of the game, arbitrarily reduced the number of hits to three, and the number of sinkings to one, and then permitted the sunken carrier to participate in the next part of the play dealing with New Caledonia and Fiji Island invasions. These and other arbitrary rules [were] always in favor of the Japanese.⁷

That the Japanese knew the role of wargaming is well documented. They had previously exploited its value by their extensive gaming of the Pearl Harbor attack. But, as pointed out by Fuchida and Okumija:

No more vivid example of thoughtless and stupid arrogance can be conceived than the attitude which pervaded the war games preparation for the Midway operation.⁸

The fourth period described by McHugh is 1952-1957. This period used faster and freer gaming techniques, emphasized games at task group and higher levels, and placed increased emphasis on political and economic factors. It was during this period that the first national level strategic game was initiated.⁹

McHugh's fifth period is the post-1957 era. This period is primarily

dominated by technology as the ever-increasing complexities of naval warfare drove wargaming development to seek assistance. In 1958, analog computers were introduced into Naval War College gaming, later to be augmented and eventually replaced by digital computers as the sophistication of modern naval warfare required a level of detail beyond that of any individual umpire.¹⁰

Martin Shubik gives this key criterion for wargaming:

Gaming, in contrast to simulation, necessarily employs human beings in some role, actual or simulated, in its operation. A gaming exercise employs human beings acting as themselves or playing simulated roles in the environment which is either actual or simulated. The players may participate as experimental subjects being observed for teaching, training, or operational purposes.¹¹

Although all games are simulations, not all simulations should be regarded as games. This applies in particular to many all-machine simulations of physical processes in which human decisionmaking is neither postulated nor relevant.¹²

Gaming can be used for testing, teaching or operational evaluation. Above all else, gaming is an excellent educational device. Unlike other educational processes, in gaming the player must actively participate. But like education in general, the value of gaming is difficult to quantify. By first gaming a naval exercise or operation plan, not only are shortcomings discovered, but the participants become intimately familiar with that exercise. Thus, when that operation is taken to sea, lost time normally encountered with new exercises is reduced. Gaming cannot be a substitute for at-sea performance of naval units. It can, however, make that performance far more effective with respect to time lost because of lack of

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familiarity or undiscovered errors in the plan. In this respect gaming is cost effective. Hausrath states of gaming that:

... it is asserted that war games can be used for (1) training, (2) assessing plans, (3) a basis for analysis of military problems, i.e., serving to establish common understanding between the military man and the analyst; (4) simulation of command and decision processes; (5) formulation of insights and intuition; (6) detection of flaws in assumptions; (7) an environment for innovation; and (8) as an aid in dispute settlement.¹³

Although all these aspects may be useful, any given application tends to stress only one or two. Specht feels that the principal value of a war game is the teaching of players to consider carefully all of their resources,¹⁴ while Shubik points out the value of using a specific situation repeatedly, emphasizing investigation of different factors each time.¹⁵

Gaming does have limitations, however. Hausrath summarizes seven salient points why war is an inexact science and therefore why gaming will have the same limitations. They are: (1) the inability of man to predict how he or anyone else will react in warfare, (2) the vast numbers of variables, interrelations, and combinations that exist in combat, (3) these variables do not recur in fixed amounts, degrees, or weights of relative importance, (4) man's understanding of the process of warfare is incomplete and inadequate, (5) a unit's or man's "break" point cannot be predicted, (6) the influence of major factors in warfare like stress, courage, fear, morale, and leadership remains intangible, (7) even measurable physical forces, such as firepower, rate and accuracy of fire, amounts of fire, and the effects of these factors on surviving troops in battle are largely unknown.¹⁶ Wilson sums it up by stating that "No amount of gaming, however well con-

ducted, can uncover the future."¹⁷

Gaming should not be construed as a substitute for experience. Gaming can, however, disclose or indicate trends. These trends should be investigated and analyzed for their value or pitfalls. A major fallacy or unrealism in gaming, which must be guarded against, is again well pointed out by Wilson when he notes that "To play Red with fidelity requires . . . knowing how the real Red sees Blue, which may be very different from the way Blue sees himself."¹⁸

Thus, not only must the players playing Red understand Red's tactics, his technology, his balance of political forces in his country, but he must also understand his system of values. It is, however, very difficult, if not impossible, for an American admiral to think as his Russian counterpart. The differences are far too great.

Who are the users of wargaming? Initially only the military, still the largest user. However, in 1956 a team of operations analysts sponsored by the American Management Association visited the Naval War College to confer with the wargaming staff. Their mission was to adopt wargaming techniques in the development of a business/management game. The game that developed, called the AMA Top Management Decision Simulation, was completed and first played in May of 1957. It marked the first major nonmilitary use of wargaming and this aspect of gaming has been growing ever since. An example of its early growth was revealed by Dale and Klasson. Their 1962 survey revealed that the number of American Collegiate Schools of Business that used business games in the regular curriculum increased from zero to at least 64 in only 5 years.¹⁹ Nor is gaming limited to only the business colleges. The Department of State, the White House, and many universities have adapted the techniques of wargaming and produced various versions of Political, Crisis, and Strategic games. Even political and social

scientists and economists have adapted gaming as a tool in their fields.

In its general rejuvenation, war-gaming and its techniques now range from the sophisticated games conducted by the military, government, and business to the local hobby shop where one can pick up a game on almost any subject for entertainment purposes.

There the amateur strategist, surrounded by fellow amateur admirals and generals, can purchase a variety of games on the major campaigns of World War II and play an Admiral Nimitz, Field Marshal Rommel, General MacArthur or their opposition and, while enjoying himself, ingest a fair amount of history as well.

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 7. Francis J. McHugh, *Fundamentals of War Gaming* 3rd ed. (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College, 1969), pp. 2-19.
 8. M. Fuchida and M. Okumiya, *Midway, The Battle that Doomed Japan* (Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute, 1955), p. 247.
 9. McHugh, "Gaming at the Naval War College," p. 52.
 10. For a comprehensive review of technological changes in wargaming at the Naval War College, see Abe Greenberg, "War Gaming: Third Generation," *Naval War College Review*, March-April 1975, pp. 71-75.
 11. Martin Shubik, *Games for Society, Business and War: Towards a Theory of Gaming* (New York: Elsevier, 1975), p. 13.
 12. Martin Shubik, *On Gaming and Game Theory*, P-4609 (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand, March 1971).
 13. Alfred K. Hausrath, *Venture Simulation in War, Business and Politics* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1971), p. 292.
 14. Robert H. Specht, *War Games*, P-1041 (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand, 18 March 1957), p. 12.
 15. Shubik, *Games for Society, Business and War: Towards a Theory of Gaming*, pp. 280-281.
 16. Hausrath, pp. 276-277.
 17. Andrew Wilson, *The Bomb and the Computer* (New York: Delacorte Press, 1968), p. 80.
 18. *Ibid.*, p. 75.
 19. Alfred G. Dale and Charles R. Klasson, "Business Gaming," *Survey of American Collegiate Schools of Business* (Austin: University of Texas, Bureau of Business Research, 1964), pp. 2, 4, 6.
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ATLANTIC PASSAGE—A VITAL GUARANTEE FOR DETERRENCE AND SURVIVAL

by

Colonel Wolfgang W.E. Samuel, U.S. Air Force*

The proposal put forth here is neither new nor does it put more "rubber-on-the-ramp" or "bottoms-in-the-sea." However, it is deemed timely and relevant to national security. It suggests using what we have more intelligently and, thereby, improving the "team's" chances for success and victory if the need to fight in Europe should ever arise.

Simply stated, the proposal advocates Air Force augmentation of naval forces for the specific purpose of guaranteeing the relative safety of the Atlantic water route to and from the European continent in case of major and prolonged conflict. Obviously, if we believe a short war to be almost certain, then the following discussion is probably irrelevant and the current solutions of prepositioning materials and relying on aerial resupply and reinforcement are appropriate. Unfortunately, history provides little support for the short-war argument; and our time may not be as different from the past as some would like to believe it is.

Prolonged Conflict. Too many largely simplistic scenarios insist on a short-war concept as if any other alternative were quite unthinkable. The reasons for such thinking are certainly manifold, but prime among them are such assumptions as:

- Any European military conflict involving the two superpowers will rapidly escalate to a nuclear confrontation—the conflict will be violent but short.
- Soviet conventional ground power is so massive that NATO would not be able to sustain a successful conventional defense much longer than 30 days.
- All relevant allied conventional combat power will be either in place or

must be rapidly transportable to the continent at the onset of war, negating the need for sustained support operations.

A subset of these assumptions puts the burden of resupply on airlift and assumes a high degree of security in the air and on the ground for our limited in number, high value transport aircraft. It seems less than prudent, however, to base the critical sustenance of our European combat power on questionable assumptions and on a clearly vulnerable supply and support link. Prepositioning of equipment and aerial augmentation are certainly meaningful during the early days of conflict, but offer little in terms of sustaining effective combat power thereafter.

For instance, aside from the vulnerability of large transport aircraft, much current Army equipment fits only into the C-5A (of which we have 74 operational)—giving rise to the current C-X cargo aircraft requirement.¹ Additionally, moving the 100,000 tons of unit equipment and supplies of just one mechanized division, not including ammunition and fuel for sustained combat operations, requires a lift capacity generally beyond the reasonable employment of air transport.

Equipment prepositioning has been one option to get a jump on the problem of rapid "mass" transport. But such supply and equipment dumps make excellent targets and detract from the potential flexibility of Army operations. As comfortable as a short war concept may be from the standpoint of planners, it downplays the nation's ability to

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generate sustaining combat capability and, therefore, the need to transport that capability across the perilous Atlantic Ocean. Few seem to remember the importance of the Atlantic umbilical during the dark days of World War II, and what it took to secure it against enemies less powerful than those we face today.

The short war concept, as a general assumption underlying force projection, is fundamentally flawed and not sustainable from a historical perspective. Short wars have been notably rare in history.² Although most wars started with the belligerents firmly intending to achieve their goals quickly, they seldom turned out that way. One of the most harrowing conflicts of recent times was to be, in the words of Von Bethmann-Holweg, the Imperial German Chancellor, "a violent but short storm."³ But fortune was disposed otherwise: World War I lasted 4 long and bloody years and assumed its own course, nowhere near that envisioned by its planners.

The major recent short war example is the 1967 "6-day war" that owed its brevity to preventive attack and some unfortunate force dispositions on the part of the defenders. Because preventive war is *not* a NATO option, but readiness is, one can surely make an argument for war lasting well in excess of 60 days, and for a period longer than now supportable by prepositioned inventories.

Therefore, the concept of joint sea-lane protection espoused in this paper is at least worth examining. Unless safe passage across the Atlantic can be guaranteed, we are risking having to abandon continental Europe, including our own committed forces, to superior and more sustainable Soviet capability. The question is not one of the relative merits of fighting a long war, but one of insuring that the conditions for defeat in such a conflict are not allowed to develop. Therein lies our strength, and the credibility deterrence.

Deterrence and Mobility. The ability to move forces, equipment and supplies over long distances is a fundamental aspect of U.S. defense posture and underlies the very concept of conventional deterrence. It also widely recognizes that in a conflict approaching general war, especially in the central European region, the U.S. capacity to move what is necessary for sustained combat is at best limited.⁴ Consequently, existing assets would require extraordinary protection while transiting the Atlantic when the threat is highest.

With respect to vulnerability, it is worth recalling that large air transports such as the C-5A are also vulnerable to enemy counterair action, both in the air and on the ground. Such vulnerability was amply demonstrated by the Luftwaffe in 1943 when it attempted to reinforce and resupply the trapped Afrika Corps with (for the time) rather large aircraft such as the six-engine ME-323, with its 10-ton carrying capacity. Even with fighter escort these large aircraft made easy targets for Allied fighters. Their burned out hulks dotted the Tunisian landscape or they fell without trace into the Mediterranean. The German effort was costly in men and materiel and clearly demonstrated the limits of aerial resupply under conditions of less than air superiority.

This obviously is not an argument against aerial resupply, but it is an appeal to view it in perspective, especially for that period when air superiority has not yet been achieved. An example of what air transport can do when superiority has been achieved is the 1943-44 Allied air operation to supply forces in Burma. Flying the "Hump" was a superb achievement, but did not really disprove the inherent vulnerability and limits of air transportation.

The ability to project prompt combat power by air is one thing—sustaining lengthy combat operations in this manner without air superiority is quite

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another. Security considerations and cost effectiveness, therefore, dictate another approach. The burden for the other approach falls unequivocally upon maritime assets. This certainly is not a new responsibility for the U.S. Navy. It has an impressive record to rest on, especially in World War II. In that conflict, however, the nation had sufficient time to get ready for the job at hand. Even then we came perilously close to seeing the Atlantic lifeline snap. For example, not until 1943 did Allied construction exceed shipping tonnage lost. In any future European conflict, the United States would likely be involved promptly and we should have at least well-considered plans and procedures, if not the hardware ready to cope with the emergency.

The Soviet Threat. In setting up and securing a transatlantic supply line with the limited assets at hand, it is critical that the threat to it be recognized and counters prepared. The threat posed by the Soviets today is indeed significant and composed of air and naval surface, and subsurface elements.

Soviet surface combatants currently receive a significant amount of public attention. The reasons are quite understandable because the surface navy represents a highly visible element of Soviet naval power entering operational areas new to it and challenging to us—such as carrier operations. However, in applying their surface capability to extended operations at sea the Soviets may have no better luck than Hitler did with his flashy surface fleet in 1939-40.⁵

The Soviet naval air component, designed to operate with surface components, is something Hitler's forces never managed to evolve and, therefore, is a new dimension in conflict. Although many of the naval bombers are of older vintage—*Bears*, *Badgers* and *Blinders*—the new *Backfire* bomber with its air-to-surface missiles could pose a significant

threat, especially against Allied surface task forces.⁶

The threat posed by Soviet naval air forces should not be downplayed, but they, like surface forces, suffer from long approach routes and a lack of fighter escort with adequate range. In addition, these forces lack adequate air refueling support and face an improving Allied counterair capability. For instance, the interceptor threat posed by U.S. ground and ship-based aircraft, the soon to be introduced British interceptor version of the *Tornado*, and the command and control capacity provided by the U.S. AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System) and the U.K. *Nimrod* aircraft, pose formidable obstacles to the sustained successful application of Soviet naval aviation over the Atlantic.

The greatest effect on the Atlantic lifeline, however, can be expected not from Soviet surface and air operations, but from the attack submarine. It may be worth recalling the devastating effect of German U-boats on Atlantic shipping. On 1 September 1939 Hitler commenced combat operations with a force of about 56 submarines, 39 of which were at sea. In 4 months of operations this small force sank 114 Allied merchantmen and a number of warships including the British battleship *Royal Oak* and the aircraft carrier *Courageous*.

The Soviet attack fleet, including nuclear and conventionally powered submarines, torpedo types as well as cruise missile firing boats, numbers about 270. Allowing for those in port for maintenance, those deployed in the Pacific region and other areas of the world, the Soviets could still put to sea a submarine force quantitatively superior to Hitler's 1939 fleet, and orders of magnitude better in capability.

It appears quite simply that the potential Soviet submarine threat exceeds current U.S. Navy capabilities to handle it alone. This is a fact of life forced by three-ocean commitments of a

navy of only 490 general-purpose ships of all types.⁷

Air Force Augmented Sealane Control. How were the sealanes protected in the past, as it certainly is not a new problem? In World War II it was done with massive Allied naval and air forces. At the height of the German U-boat deployment 1,500 shore-based aircraft, 30-plus aircraft carriers (primarily smaller "jeep" types) and 2,500 escorts of all types were deployed against 240 operational German submarines.⁸ In addition, ULTRA⁹ and the new radar technology helped in no small part to defeat the U-boat campaign which until 1943 appeared to be headed for success.

Obviously, we cannot take for granted intelligence coups such as ULTRA and revolutionary technology such as radar. Additionally, surface resources of the magnitude committed to ASW operations in World War II are neither available, readily producible nor affordable. But one resource that is available, though insufficiently considered in current planning is Air Force capability so widely used in World War II.

Although Air Force Manual 1-1, *Functions and Basic Doctrine of the United States Air Force*, identifies sea surveillance, antisubmarine warfare, mine delivery and neutralization and destruction of enemy naval forces as "collateral" Air Force missions, these really are paper missions rather than real capabilities. Collateral functions by definition intrude into primary mission areas of the other services and, therefore, cannot be used for justifying additional force requirements—thus no money is put against such functions. Additionally, they have the potential for some really "fun" roles-and-missions brouhahas relished by no one.¹⁰

But the fact remains that if defense of the Atlantic lifeline is fundamental to our conventional deterrent strategy, and if our naval forces may not be adequate

for the entire task, then a cooperative Air Force-Navy arrangement would be in the national interest. Such a proposal is not made to expand Air Force interests at the expense of a sister service, but solely for the purpose of optimizing the use of limited combat assets and manpower to give our European strategy the best chance for success if conflict should occur. The roles-and-missions argument is in this instance specious and irrelevant. The issue is *not* one of roles-and-missions but one of mutual support and how best to provide that support.

Air Force long-range over-water operations are "old hat" and have long been a staple of SAC (Strategic Air Command) operations. Obviously it is quite another matter to fly in direct support of naval operations but even this area has sufficient precedent, and not only World War II experience, to justify a go-ahead. For instance, during the October 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis RB-47 aircraft of the 55th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing flew substantial numbers of Atlantic search and surveillance missions. These resulted in locating the Soviet missile-carrying ship which, when turned back, prompted then-Secretary of State Rusk to make his famous comment about the other guy having just blinked his eye.

Since that time SAC has frequently demonstrated its ability to fly sea surveillance missions with B-52 aircraft and additionally extended its role to minelaying support operations. But good will and occasional demonstrations of capability are not enough. To translate tentative support arrangements into a substantial capability to support a primary Navy mission requires:

- detailed planning;
- integrated strategy, tactics and procedures;
- intensive joint training;
- adequate and appropriate weapons;
- aircraft modifications to accommodate naval weapons; and

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- the commitment of a minimum but effective number of aircraft by the Air Force.

Obviously, to build a supportive Air Force element requires money, money neither the Air Force nor the Navy feels it can take "out of its hide." If Air Force support is in fact worthwhile in this particular mission area, then it should be funded to a level that would make the Air Force contribution meaningful in the overall maritime strategy for the Atlantic region. Funding obviously is the crux of the matter and is the only true measure of serious intent by either service partner.

Should the proposal be pursued seriously then questions have to be asked where, when and how Air Force support could make the most significant contribution to maritime operations without negatively affecting its own strategic and general-purpose primary missions. Undoubtedly, such an Air Force commitment involves certain opportunity costs and must, therefore, reflect objective cost-benefit considerations.

What could Air Force aircraft do best in helping to secure the Atlantic? Mine-laying to keep Soviet surface and sub-surface combatants bottled up seems a natural choice. The internal and external carrying capacity of the B-52 would fill a real void in this area and would likely free some submarines, surface ships and smaller naval aircraft from similar duty. Surveillance combined with antisurface ship operations may be another area offering substantial dividends. Antisubmarine operations, in contrast, may be significantly more complex in terms of aircraft modifications (sensing, detecting and interpretation equipment) and crew training required, so much so that this area may be less amenable to joint operations. Nevertheless, whatever the logical support role is, once identified and agreed upon it should be pursued and implemented promptly.

From the standpoint of command the problems should be few. Joint command is fundamental to our operations concepts and the structure for joint operations need not be invented; it already exists. However, control aspects of forces committed by the Air Force to the maritime support mission must be spelled out clearly and unambiguously. Potentially thorny questions are buried in the simple word "control." Again, the solution is a matter of clearly identifying requirements and then taking appropriate steps.

Finally, there remain those subjective, "gut-feel" questions to be dealt with. These rarely or never surface in day-to-day discussions but are an important determinant in the disposition of a proposal such as this. Some of the questions deal with skill, professional competence, procedures, and tactics, and these can be dealt with. Joint operations have a way of building mutual respect. And while the Navy has never been defeated at sea, that rare distinction also holds true for the Air Force in its own element. The record speaks for itself and, therefore, the issues of skill and competence can surely be resolved with relative ease.

On the other hand, there is that rich and potent realm of sea lore and maritime tradition that extends to views about different types of traditional missions and who can properly perform them. Although the Navy has made room for the airplane—its own—it looks askance at Air Force operations in its own "back yard." But because both Navy and Air Force are interested in final results, there may just be a small niche for the Air Force in the vast lore of the sea and in support of the U.S. Navy; at least I hope so.

Conclusions. Certainly there are other solutions to the problem of guaranteeing relative freedom of movement across the Atlantic—the great logistical handicap confronting NATO

in major prolonged conflict. One solution would be to persist in the short war approach and by doing so to assume away the issue. This ostrich-like approach is potentially catastrophic.

Another, and possibly the ultimate, alternative is to increase U.S. and Allied naval capability to a level where the job can be done exclusively with naval resources. In fact, much is being done in this area but as appealing as the solution of naval self-sufficiency may be, hardware and manpower needs are of such a magnitude that this optimal state of affairs must at best remain a futuristic option.

Improving of aerial resupply and reinforcement assets is another option. As much as this particular option needs to be pursued, the capabilities it will provide are primarily in areas complementary to the bulk carriage capability of ships. Transportation of personnel and high-value, low-bulk combat equipment, for example, is best accomplished through aerial transport. Even outsize and bulk cargo may at times be more appropriately transported by air, and the distribution of what comes into the theater on ships is often best accomplished with transport aircraft. Nevertheless, the transport of such bulk items as fuel, ammunition, general-purpose combat and support vehicles, etc., across long distances and in great quantities most of necessity fall on ocean shipping. Air transport is not a convenient substitute for safe ocean passage but rather complementary, and therefore provides no simple solution to a complex problem.

Transportation of combat power is obviously a joint effort by land, air and sea and, therefore, single solutions are lacking to such a complex problem. All transportation components make a vital contribution at different stages of conflict and national commitment, and must be maintained in a deliberate balance. Only rarely can one element substitute for another and then frequently only at great economic and other costs.

If effective aerial supply depends on a high degree of air superiority, so does sea supply depend on an equivalent degree of maritime superiority. The preferred solution to the twin problems of timely transatlantic bulk carriage and sealane security may be the continued pursuit to upgrade Navy capabilities over the longer term; maritime augmentation by the Air Force over the shorter and medium term.

Air Force augmentation, specifically with B-52s and AWACS aircraft, has the major advantage of forces in-being suitable for the general type of mission here contemplated. Their contribution to securing our sea lines of communication against surface and subsurface threats could be truly significant. It may just be worth pouring some money against.

Finally, joint operations intrinsically have something going for them. They provide the best capabilities of different "worlds" and frequently produce results out of proportion to the individual assets committed. The simple but crucial matter of Atlantic passage may just be possible if we face it as a team.

NOTES

1. Lt. Gen. Kelly H. Burke, USAF, expressed the requirement for a follow-on transport aircraft and deficiencies of the current fleet before U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, *Hearings on Military Posture and H.R. 6495* (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1980), pp. 393-394.

The X-C is the centerpiece of our airlift proposal . . . the U.S. Army simply cannot fight against a sophisticated army without a large amount of outsized cargoes, tanks, APC's, artillery, et cetera. It is not possible to preposition that equipment in all the areas where trouble might break out because, first, we don't know where that trouble might break out and second, even in regard to Europe we cannot put as much there as we want. So the Army, to be successful, must envision that that force is

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going to be airlifted. We cannot assume that there will always be a giant international airport available in the areas we are talking about. Frequently there is only one such airport in the vicinity, and if it is closed the C-5 and the 747-type airplanes are not much good. Although our first priority, and what we view as the most urgent goal, is to be able to lift that outsized cargo from the United States to other continents, a second and more important priority is to deal with landing in those austere fields, of which there are many and one would expect much closer to the battle area than the international airfield.

2. Classic but rare examples of short wars are the wars of German unification against Denmark (1864), Austria (1866), and France (1870). They were conducted under the political genius of Chancellor Otto von Bismarck and the military genius of Von Moltke the elder. Although everything turned out as planned, the Franco-Prussian War owed its speedy conclusion more to luck than superior generalship.

3. Fritz Fischer, *Germany's Aims in the First World War* (London: Chatto and Windus, 1967), p. 92.

4. Vice Adm. Kent J. Carroll addressed our current deficiency to provide adequate transport support for sustained combat operations in a written statement to the Armed Services Committee, *Hearings on Military Posture and H.R. 6495*, p. 167.

Our strategic mobility forces consist of military and civilian air and sealift assets and hundreds of tons of military hardware pre-positioned in Europe and the western Pacific. I would emphasize civilian assets particularly in sealift. None of the strategic mobility triad of sealift, airlift, and pre-positioning can be considered in isolation. Balance between the three is essential. Our airlift capability is significant, but it will probably be 5 to 8 years before additional airlift—particularly the outsize-capability the outairlift to carry tanks and helicopters—is available. In any case, airlift by itself can provide only a small part of the lift capability needed In my view we have seriously neglected the development of strategic sealift in years gone by. NATO has been the most demanding scenario so we have focused largely on it. And we have done so with what I might call the "short war" approach, that is, defending successfully against a massive Warsaw Pact surge in a few weeks. We have found ourselves concentrating on the buildup of combat power in the early time frame of reinforcement Today, in nonmobilization situations, we have a very limited early sealift surge capability, and no real certainty that the first ships will be on-berth, ready to load, in less than 10 days.

5. Germany entered the war with 7 battleships and battle cruisers, 6 light cruisers, 2 heavy cruisers and 22 destroyers. At the conclusion of the Norwegian campaign, June 1940, she had lost 10 destroyers, 1 battleship (*Graf Spee*), 2 light and 1 heavy cruiser. The remaining heavy cruiser and four of the remaining six battleships and battle cruisers were damaged. The invasion of Norway had a crippling effect on the German surface navy. Additionally, its senior command suffered from a singular inability to employ what was left effectively.

6. According to *The Military Balance 1979-1980* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1980), p. 10, the Soviet Naval Air Force consists of approximately 870 combat aircraft the majority of which are (295) *Badger* C/D medium bombers with air-to-surface missiles. Thirty Tu-22M *Backfire* 3 strike bombers with air-to-surface missiles are credited to naval air.


7. The effect of simultaneous and geographically diverse demands upon the Navy is succinctly addressed in a written statement of Admiral Thomas B. Hayward, USN, submitted to the Armed Services Committee, House of Representatives at the 96th Congress, February-March 1980, part 3, p. 357. States Admiral Hayward,

As a consequence of these multiple and growing requirements, your Navy is stretched thinner today than at any time since the late 1940s. We are being asked to meet increasing demands with a fleet which, as you know, is roughly half the size it was a decade ago. Individual unit capabilities have increased, as well as they must; but geography demands numbers as well as capability, and the simple fact is that today we are trying to meet a three ocean requirement with a one-and-a-half ocean Navy.

8. "Foreword to Jane's" as reprinted in *Sea Power*, September 1980, p. 46.

9. ULTRA was the code name given to the British Intelligence operation that exploited traffic from the theoretically unbreakable German ENIGMA cryptographic code machine. States Marshal of the RAF, Sir John Slessor, in his preface to F.W. Winterbotham, *The Ultra Secret* (New York: Harper & Row, 1974), ". . . I have the best reason to know that in the Battle of the Atlantic ULTRA, in conjunction with HF/DF, was a real war winner."

10. The primary functions, powers, duties and missions of the Department of Defense are set forth in the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, and in DOD implementing directives.



THE BAROMETER

To the Editor of the Naval War College Review:

May I make some minor corrections and some short comments on the interesting thumbnail appraisals by F.J. West, Jr. of the nation's Secretaries of Defense?

I have had great respect for Mr. West, his knowledge and his judgments ever since the publication of his classic book on Vietnam.

But: James Forrestal—"Humorless" he was not; too "intense" at the last he was. I knew him well, both on and off duty. He was, to my mind, one of the greatest public servants of my time. But it is scarcely possible to compare his tenure, when the powers of the Secretary were extremely limited and the office itself was innovative, with the far more sweeping powers and the far larger staffs of later secretaries. I was a member of the Hoover Commission task force on the Pentagon (national security) in those days, and believe it or not, we were concerned—lest the nation in attempting to match the increasing Soviet expenditures on armaments—spend itself into bankruptcy—all because of projected Pentagon budgets of \$12 to \$18 billions! But Forrestal, unlike any succeeding secretaries, did manage to see the woods despite the trees; he understood, as virtually no one else in Washington did (Averell Harriman excepted), the increasing threat of great Russian power coupled with the international ideology of communism. He also saw the necessity of providing American power (the Sixth Fleet) to fill the vacuum left by the British in the Mediterranean. Partially because of his strong anti-communism, partially because he opposed the recognition of Israel as an independent state in the midst of a U.S. election campaign, partially because of other reasons he was sand-bagged by a White House cabal. Secretary of the Air Force Symington was perhaps a creature of the intense service rivalries of those days, but he was a much better politician than Forrestal and, as a poker-playing pal of Truman's he was in a position to—and did—harass, hamper and undercut Forrestal. Jim Forrestal, with his broken nose and Irish face, looked tough, but he was an extremely sensitive man and the constant intramural carping and undercutting plus a barrage of (inspired?) criticism in the press got to him at the last.

Louis Johnson: The less said, the better. He was entirely a political animal but the broad-axe approach to budget slashing of defense expenditures was Truman's policy; Johnson was merely the implement. But he will be remembered for his famous remark on the eve of the Korean War that—despite the cuts—the services were ready to fight within twenty-four hours.

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Charles E. Wilson: He was far more interested in production lines than in strategic concepts, but again the broad defense policies of those days were forged by Eisenhower and John Foster Dulles. The famous quote attributed to Mr. Wilson by Mr. West was, I think, actually the reverse of the attribution. I believe Mr. Wilson actually said (and certainly meant) was "what was good for the country was good for General Motors—and vice versa," a thoroughly defensible proposition.

Thomas Gates: The most underestimated of the Defense Secretaries, but perhaps the best of them all. Quiet, unassuming, and careful in his judgments he was slow to make decisions but firm when he made them. He was the first of the Secretaries to join and take part in—on a regular basis—the meetings of the Joint Chiefs and he not only listened; he asked questions and joined in the discussions. He was the ultimate author of the SIOP plan and organization, which—with modifications—is still valid today. He did not toot his own horn, but had he had more time in office his accomplishments would have been obvious.

Robert McNamara: Again, the less said the better. A brilliant man, but not a wise one, he had little feel for human beings—except in the abstract; he was over-bearing, egocentric and ruthless with individuals. A master of statistical analysis, a workaholic and a detail man, he never did see, in Vietnam, the woods for the trees and the policies he followed, for which Lyndon Johnson was primarily responsible, and the manner in which McNamara implemented them—plus his egregious mistakes in judgments led the country to disaster. He was a managerial man and he moved the services well away from the vital concept of *command* and command responsibility to managerial concepts, with all the negative results that have followed. He tried mightily but McNamara was a Greek tragedy.


My compliments to Mr. West on a provocative article.

Sincerely yours,

/s/Hanson W. Baldwin

HANSON W. BALDWIN

EDITOR'S NOTE: Readers interested in this letter and Mr. West's article will also wish to consider the short paper by Lewis Sorley in the Set and Drift section of this issue.



PROFESSIONAL READING

REVIEW ARTICLE

THE VIETNAM BOOKSHELF ENTERS THE 1980s

by

Joe P. Dunn*

The Vietnam War dominated America in the 1960s and early 1970s. The voluminous literature on the experience is far more than any individual can assimilate. After the tragic end in 1975, most Americans attempted to forget the affair as quickly as possible. Fortunately, scholars did not. After a brief moratorium, when publishers considered the subject anathema, a new generation of Vietnam books emerged late in the decade. Some of the most significant Vietnam literature was published in the late 1970s.¹ The 1980s also will be a crucial period for rethinking, reinterpreting, and rewriting the Vietnam War. Scholars will probe further into the past to better understand origins, and they will continue to update events in Southeast Asia. New discoveries will be made, new questions explored, new aspects and implications pursued, and new approaches to old issues found. Our knowledge will be increased and our horizons broadened. The nine books highlighted here, all published in 1980, provide some early indications of the dimensions of the Vietnam bookshelf for the present decade.

The most significant book of the year,

and one that may become a classic, is Paul M. Kattenburg's *The Vietnam Trauma in American Foreign Policy, 1945-75* (Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction, 1980). It is a scholarly, analytic, damning critique of the morass of American Vietnam policy. A foreign service officer for more than 20 years, Kattenburg served as State Department Indochina Research Analyst and Vietnam Desk Officer, 1952-1956, and as Director of Vietnam Affairs, 1963-1964. He approaches Vietnam as "an intrinsic and inseparable part" of the conduct of American cold war foreign policy. This is an interpretative text for a generation of students who do not know the war personally nor historically.²

Kattenburg demonstrates how Indochina gained an exaggerated importance in the containment psychosis that gripped the postwar decade. By the beginning of the 1960s, the United States at the height of its "superpowerdom" was "ultra-prone to perceive, seize, and uphold commitments," with minimal attention to short-run or

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long-run interests. Enamored with its capacity, responsibility, and obligations, the nation was prepared "to respond almost immediately to almost anything almost anywhere." This is an elaboration of the perspective portrayed in David Halberstam's *The Best and the Brightest* (New York: Random House, 1972), the book that first called attention to Kattenburg's Vietnam dissent within the decisionmaking structures.

Possibly Kattenburg's most valuable chapter in his "Ten Fateful Decisions on Vietnam, 1961-75," "Winning Without Winning, 1961-72" and "Losing Without Losing, 1961-72" are brilliant analyses on such topics as the role of toughness and force; the premium on action, determination, and persistence; the failure of analysis; the triumph of management; the heyday of the managerial approach; the domestic and foreign consensus of support; and closed system decisionmaking. "Disengagement from Indochina" is a perceptive critique, and "Vietnam as Lesson of History" is one of the best retrospects in print.

Simply put, this is a thoughtful, challenging perceptive analysis by a knowledgeable expert. It incorporates the most recent scholarship and it ranks with such recent major interpretative contributions as Earl Ravenal's *Never Again: Learning From America's Foreign Policy Failures* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1978), Guenter Lewy's *America in Vietnam* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), and Leslie Gelb and Richard Bett's *The Irony of Vietnam: The System Worked* (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1979).

Equally critical but more specialized is James Clay Thompson's *Rolling Thunder: Understanding Policy and Program Failure* (Chapel Hill: North Carolina University Press, 1980), a study of the bureaucratic process and policy failure of the American bombing of North Vietnam from 1965 through

1968. It joins a number of critical studies of the military conduct of the war that have appeared since 1975.³ Thompson begins with his premise that the bombing was a failure; he believes that it did not weaken the enemy's military capacity nor force him to the bargaining table. Thompson, a political scientist and former defense intelligence analyst, questions why it took so long for the Air Force and the national security bureaucracy to recognize this fact. He explains that the problem was the decision-making process and the inability of the intelligence sector to develop means for assessing the effectiveness of the bombing program. The first half of the book details the origins of the bombing policy and the gradual growth of an antibombing coalition within the decision-making structure; the second half turns to a more abstract discussion of organizational theory as the author strives to define principles applicable in the future.

Studies of this kind are needed if we are to find and address the mistakes of the war; however, this book has significant problems. The historical development of the bombing policy is enlightening, and the account of bureaucratic provinciality and in-fighting is useful. But Thompson's rather narrow focus on *Rolling Thunder*, 1965-1968, which ignores the more successful *Linebacker I* and *II* raids in 1972, calls into question his rather sweeping conclusion that Vietnam was the final straw that proved the marginality of strategic bombing. Air Force and Navy pilots might argue that the United States never truly engaged in traditional strategic bombing. Although Thompson may be correct, he tends to proclaim his thesis rather than prove it. Finally, his section on organizational theory is interesting, but again his conclusions are slightly overblown.

Broader, more scholarly, and far more valuable than Thompson, Wallace J. Thies' *When Governments Collide:*

Coercion and Diplomacy in the Vietnam Conflict, 1964-1968 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980) is a brilliant study of bureaucratic politics, decisionmaking process, and coercion theory. Political scientists such as Graham Allison (on the Cuban Missile Crisis) and William B. Quandt (on U.S. Middle East policy) have made major contributions in this realm in recent years. Thies builds upon and broadens their work as he applies this theoretical literature to Vietnam.

Exhibiting a thorough command of extant literature and the *Pentagon Papers*, Thies begins with an intensive review of the escalation of the war and concomitant negotiation efforts. He then evaluates the failures of the Johnson administration efforts to coerce Hanoi to cease its policy of support for insurgency in South Vietnam. Implicit in the administration's program were several assumptions. Basic was the belief that force could be "orchestrated" to send clear signals to the enemy, that military responses could be turned on, off, up, or down at will to transmit the precise message and accomplish the desired goal. However, it did not work out that way.

In a lengthy discussion of coercion theory, Thies explains the problems. For instance, the sender may wish to employ force to emphasize a certain message, but implementation of the actions by subordinates may distort or totally change the message in the signal. Even if the signal is accurately transmitted, the receiver may willingly or unwittingly misread the message. Governments are not monoliths and the various actors may interpret the signal differently. Based upon their own desires, political or policy objectives, or other proclivities, they may argue for their personal interpretation with little regard to the actual meaning of the sender. Internal political dynamics may have more to do with response than the message itself. U.S. relations with

Hanoi during the war abound with such difficulties. Thies argues persuasively that we must understand the dynamics and problems of employing military force to send messages or signals; it is a most imprecise mechanism fraught with potential calamities.

This is not a book for the casual reader; it is written for scholars. And it is one of the most significant pieces of Vietnam literature to appear recently.

Like the previous authors, Archimedes L.A. Patti finds the Vietnam experience enshrouded in misperception and mistake. *Why Vietnam? Prelude to America's Albatross* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980) is Patti's long-awaited memoirs of his Indochina involvement. In the waning days of World War II, Colonel Patti, head of the American OSS-Indochina Mission, led a small team of agents into Hanoi to demand Japanese surrender and to free several hundred Allied POWs. This adventure is the heart of a four-part narrative that includes: (1) a short introductory unit on activity and intelligence work in wartime China, (2) a major section on his experiences in south China and his first meeting with Ho Chi Minh, (3) the majority of the book devoted to Patti's crucial months in Hanoi, August-October 1945, and (4) a final chapter that summarizes the First Indochina War, the defeat of the French, and American inheritance of the war albatross.

In the discussion of his time in Hanoi, Patti describes the arrival of the mission in Vietnam; his intricate dealings with the Japanese, French, and Vietnamese; the French effort to regain power; the trial of the Chinese occupation; America's first Vietnam casualty, the assassination of an American OSS agent; the formal Japanese surrender; and the personalities of Hi Chi Minh and other Vietnamese leaders.

Patti had extensive contact with Ho and was most impressed with the

skillful revolutionary patriot. Patti considered Ho a true nationalist and a pragmatist who was secondarily a communist. The author argues that Ho was disenchanted with the Soviet Union and its model for development. Ho claimed that he had fulfilled all obligations to the Soviets during his many years as a Comintern agent; he had no more commitments to them, and he wished to extricate his country from their orbit. He desperately wanted to align his newborn nation with the West, and he made every possible overture to the United States. Patti is quite critical of the convoluted American policy that spurned Ho and capitulated to the restoration of French colonialism.

Patti asserts that the Army strongly discouraged publication of a manuscript on this period that he completed in the mid-1950s. Not until his retirement from intelligence service in 1971 and the withdrawal of American troops from Vietnam in 1973, did he undertake to update and expand the study into its present form. Augmenting his firsthand experience with extensive research in State Department and OSS/CIA files, Patti expands on the earlier work of Bernard Fall, Donald Lancaster, King C. Chen, Edward R. Drachman, George C. Herring, and Gary R. Hess, and he makes a major contribution to our understanding of this critical period.

Finally, the book's appendixes including a detailed chronology, selected biographic briefs on major Indochina participants, invaluable capsule descriptions of the myriad of political parties, and helpful diagram histories of Indochina communism are among the most valuable auxiliary sources that exist in print.

Martin J. Murray's *The Development of Capitalism in Colonial Indochina, 1870-1940* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980) also offers historical perspective on why Vietnam became a tragedy for the West. Sociologist Murray expands upon earlier

political economy studies by William Duiker, Alexander Woolside, David G. Marr, Samuel Popkin, and Robert Sansom as he addresses why capitalism developed in its particular form under French colonialism and why Indochina remained so poor after 70 years of capitalist "development." The massive study examines French penetration of plantation agriculture particularly rubber cultivation, metallurgical mining, and urban manufacturing. It explains the influence of French trade and investment on the local social structure and it analyzes the different effect upon northern and southern Vietnam. Murray's volume is different from the other books in this review both in time period and in subject. However, the insight that he provides into the basic causes of communist insurgency make it an important contribution to our better understanding of the war.

Like the book just noted, William S. Turley's (ed.) *Vietnamese Communism in Comparative Perspective* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1980), a collection of nine papers from a conference of the Vietnamese Studies Group held in October 1978, represents another genre. The title is indicative. Recognized scholars John K. Whitmore, William J. Duiker, Pierre Brocheux, Edwin E. Moise, Jayne Werner, Georges Boudarel, David W.P. Elliott, Gareth Porter, and Turley himself address the question of Vietnam's typicality or uniqueness as a communist society. The authors find evidence of both. Space does not allow discussion of the individual articles. Briefly put, the quality varies; most are worthwhile, but the sum total is not monumental. Although useful, this is not a highly important book.

The final three books are all on important areas of study that merit more scholarly attention; unfortunately, all three are disappointing. Despite the significant body of general literature that claims to assess the effect of the war on South Vietnam, few detailed

grassroots studies actually exist. Jeffrey Race's *War Comes to Long An: Revolutionary Conflict in a Vietnamese Province* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971) and William R. Andrew's *The Village War: Vietnamese Communist Revolutionary Activities in Dinh Tuong Province, 1960-1964* (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1973) are examples of the kind of work necessary. James Walker Trullinger, Jr.'s *Village at War: An Account of Revolution in Vietnam* (New York: Longman, 1980) is a less successful effort.

The former USAID refugee officer focused on My Thuy Phong, a village in northern South Vietnam, headquarters of the U.S. 101 Airborne during their tenure in the country, and an area with loyalties divided between the Saigon regime and the local insurgents. Trullinger's 30-year survey of the village, in a scant 235 pages, covers the period from French occupation in 1945 until March 1975, when he fled the area just ahead of the North Vietnamese takeover. Despite the author's claim to employ captured enemy documents, recently declassified reports, and interviews with local inhabitants, documentation appears thin. Impressionistic interviews and direct observation constitute the major source, and the account is highly anecdotal. The author's prorevolutionary bent is evident. The book is worthwhile simply because such studies are rare and the opportunity for this kind of grassroots level work no longer exists. However, the book promises much more than it delivers.

If one area of research is no longer possible, another area is proliferating. A body of literature already has emerged on one of the saddest chapters of the long war experience, the plight of the Indochina refugee.⁴ Scott C.S. Stone and John McGowan's *Wrapped in the Wind's Shawl—The Refugees of Southeast Asia and the Western World* (San Rafael, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1980) is

the latest addition. The authors have extensive experience in Southeast Asia. McGowan spent four years in Vietnam as a foreign service officer and traveled throughout the area; Stone served there as a naval officer and later toured Asia as a Reuters correspondent. The book's 50 black and white photographs and the series of poignant vignettes capture the tragedy of the refugee situation. The final two chapters briefly survey other refugee experiences. While the book is touching and can serve as an introduction for the novice, it is summarial and to a large degree superficial. Better accounts exist.

While not as grave as the plight of the refugee, the saga of many Vietnam veterans is also tragic. Ignored, spurned, and often ridiculed, veterans faced a homecoming unprecedented in the history of American wars. While most of the 8½ million veterans reassimilated into American society, a significant number did not make the transition. Physical handicaps, emotional and psychological scars, or lack of vocational skills hindered their ability to function as normal productive citizens.⁵ Michael Uhl and Tod Ensign's *GI Guinea Pigs: How the Pentagon Exposed Our Troops to Dangers More Deadly Than War: Agent Orange and Atomic Radiation* (New York: Playboy Press, 1980) adds a new dimension to the plight of the Vietnam vet. The authors earlier were among the editors of the volume, *The Dellums Committee Hearings on War Crimes in Vietnam* (Washington: Vintage, 1972).

The first half of *GI Guinea Pigs* deals with soldiers exposed to nuclear radiation during the post World War II decade; the second half focuses on veterans supposedly exposed to debilitating chemicals during their Vietnam tours. Both topics have been the subject of national television investigations.⁶ Real problems appear to exist in both cases. Serious research is necessary; however, this book is a tract rather than

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an investigation. While addressing vital questions, it indulges in sensationalized journalism, breathless exposé, and excessive overstatement to attract attention. One brief example must suffice. To demonstrate the brutalizing experience of Vietnam (in a typically overblown chapter entitled "So Shall Ye Reap . . . War-torn Vets are a Nonrenewable Resource"), the authors present a lengthy interview with an obviously psychotic veteran. However, it is apparent from the account that the individual was unbalanced long before his experience in the military and Vietnam. The war may have pushed him further over the brink; certainly, it gave him a forum to display his

brutality. But this was a social deviant headed for serious trouble had he never heard of Vietnam. This vignette is merely one example of why the book must be read with care, caution, and a generous amount of skepticism. It is fascinating, it is disturbing, it is captivating; but it is also unreliable.

These are not the only Vietnam books published in 1980; it could be argued that they are not even the best sample. However, I think that they are a representative lot that reflect some of the diversity, controversy, and important questions that will continue to inspire a growing and dynamic Vietnam bookshelf in the 1980s.

NOTES

1. For a survey of the vast Vietnam literature with emphasis upon some of the key books of the late 1970s, see two articles by this author, "In Search of Lessons: The Development of a Vietnam Historiography," *Parameters*, December 1979, pp. 28-40; and "Teaching Vietnam as History," *Teaching History*, Fall 1981.

2. Only a limited number of texts or survey histories exist. None of Joseph Buttinger's histories remain in print. His *Vietnam: A Political History* (New York: Praeger, 1968) was one of the fine early surveys. George H. Kahin and John W. Lewis, *The United States in Vietnam*, rev. ed. (New York: Dial Press, 1969), the best-selling antiwar text of the late 1960s and early 1970s, and Chester Cooper's excellent memoir and survey of the development of the war in the fifties and sixties, *The Lost Crusade* (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1970), are out of print. Alexander Kendrick's *The Wound Within: America in the Vietnam Years, 1945-1974* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1974) was not adequate even when in print. Neither is Weldon A. Brown's two-volume war history, *Prelude to Disaster: The American Role in Vietnam, 1940-1963* (Port Washington, N.Y.: Kennikat, 1975), and *The Last Chopper: The Dénouement of the American Role in Vietnam, 1963-1975* (Port Washington, N.Y.: Kennikat, 1976) which is presently available. Mortimer T. Cohen's *From Prologue to Epilogue* (New York: Retriever, 1979) is too bad to take seriously. Allan R. Millet's *A Short History of the Vietnam War* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1978), a collection of 12 articles from "end of the war supplements" in the *Washington Post* in 1973 and 1975, is not really a text, but it can serve the function. A host of interpretative studies or surveys of particular periods could be cited including the classics by David Halberstam, Francis FitzGerald, Leslie Gelb, Guenter Lewy, or military histories such as Dave Richard Palmer's *Summons of the Trumpet: U.S.-Vietnam in Perspective* (San Rafael, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1978). All the military services and at least one civilian publishing company are at work on multiple volume histories. The best available text at the moment is George C. Herring's *America's Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950-1975* (New York: Wiley, 1979). Peter A. Poole's *Eight Presidents and Indochina* (Huntington, N.Y.: Krieger, 1978) is useful albeit brief. Hugh Higgins' *Vietnam* (Exeter, N.H.: Heinemann, 1975) takes a New Leftist approach.

3. William C. Westmoreland, *A Soldier Reports* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1976), U.S. Grant Sharp, *Strategy for Defeat: Vietnam in Retrospect* (San Rafael, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1978), and the commanding general officers surveyed in Douglas Kinnard, *The War Managers* (Hanover, N.H.: University Press of New England, 1977) put much of the blame upon the politically motivated restraints and impediments that the civilian bureaucracy placed upon the military. Several of the commentators in W. Scott Thompson and Donald D. Frizzell, eds., *The Lessons of Vietnam* (New York: Crane, Russak, 1977) make the same point, but other spokesmen in the book (as do several of the generals in *The War Managers*) focus upon problems within the military itself. Stephen T. Hosmer, et al., eds., *The Fall of South Vietnam: Statements by Vietnamese Military and Civilian Leaders* (New York: Crane, Russak, 1980) is a damaging indictment of the U.S. military's role. The best critique is Robert L. Gallucci, *Neither Peace Nor Honor: The Politics of American Military Policy in Vietnam* (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins

University Press, 1975), an exceptional study of bureaucratic policy disaster. Also see Jaya K. Baral, *The Pentagon and the Making of U.S. Foreign Policy: A Case Study of Vietnam* (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1978) and Gregory Palmer, *The McNamara Strategy and the Vietnam War: Program Budgeting in the Pentagon, 1960-1968* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1978).

4. See Darell Montero and Marsha L. Weber, *Vietnamese Americans: Patterns of Resettlements and Socioeconomic Adaptation in the United States* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1978); Gail P. Kelly, *From Vietnam to America: A Chronicle of the Vietnamese Immigration to the United States* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1978); William T. Liu, et al., *Transition to Nowhere: Vietnamese Refugees in America* (New York: Charterhouse, 1979); and Bruce Grant, *The Boat People: An "Age" Investigation* (Middlesex, Eng.: Penguin, 1979).

5. The literature on the Vietnam veteran includes Robert J. Lifton, *Home From the War—Vietnam Veterans: Neither Victims Nor Executioners* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1973); John Helmer, *Bringing the War Home: The American Soldier in Vietnam and After* (New York: Free Press, 1974); Paul Starr, et al., *The Discarded Army: Veterans After Vietnam; the Nader Report on Vietnam and the Veterans Administration* (New York: Charterhouse, 1974); Jan Barry and W.D. Ehrhart, *Demilitarized Zones: Veterans After Vietnam* (Perkasie, Pa.: East River Anthology, 1976); and Charles R. Figley, ed., *Stress Disorders Among Vietnam Veterans: Theory, Research and Treatment* (New York: Brunner/Mazel, 1978).

6. See the most recent investigation, Howard L. Rosenberg, *Atomic Soldiers: American Victims of Nuclear Experiments* (Boston: Beacon, 1980), which is the basis of a television movie.

BOOK REVIEWS

Barratt, Glynn. *Russia in Pacific Waters 1715-1825: A Survey of the Origins of Russia's Naval Presence in the North and South Pacific*. Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1981. Pacific Maritime Studies No. 1 300pp.

Gough, Barry M. *Distant Dominion: Britain and the Northwest Coast of North America, 1579-1809*. Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1980. Pacific Maritime Studies, No. 2. 190pp.

The University of British Columbia Press has published several important works on naval and maritime history in the past. These two volumes initiate a continuing series devoted to the subject.

Barry Gough's *Distant Dominion* is a companion volume to his distinguished study *The Royal Navy and the Northwest Coast of North America, 1810-1914* published in 1971. Gough's new volume starts with the earliest contact that Tudor seamen had with the North-

west coast of America. Beginning with Sir Francis Drake's visit in 1579, he describes the work of James Cook and George Vancouver and then proceeds to discuss international rivalries and the development of the fur trade in the area.

This volume is the first to examine comprehensive British maritime development on this, the most distant shore from English ports. While Gough deals with the broad aspects of British maritime expansion, the reader obtains a new perspective by seeing the subject in the narrow and specific terms of the American Pacific coast. Overall, the book is a well-written and lucid narrative that makes excellent use of manuscript sources, printed materials and a range of theses and unpublished reports. The reader who has savored Gough's earlier work may be disappointed by the first few chapters of this book. They summarize much that is already well known and add few new perceptions to the large body of literature that exists on the topic. It would be a pity, however, if

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a reader were put off by a sense of *déjà vu*. These finely crafted chapters provide a handy survey and a sound introduction to greater riches beyond. The large wealth of source materials for the later chapters brings forth a valuable new dimension. In addition to new details about British activity in the area, Gough provides insight into an aspect that was largely ignored by earlier writers. He tells us about the reaction of the native peoples and shows how the culture of the Indian was directly and immeasurably altered.

In the narrow and specific sense, Gough's work is designed to be a contribution to the local history of British Columbia, explaining larger events in specific terms. This process brings new insight for the generalist as well. In being specific, the book casts back an illumination on the whole. Any student of Pacific maritime enterprise will find Barry Gough's study rewarding.

Glynn Barratt's study of *Russia in Pacific Waters, 1715-1809* directly complements Gough's work from a different national perspective. This is the first study to examine Russian naval activities in the Pacific from the reign of *Peter the Great* to Tsar Nicholas I. Russian naval interest in the Pacific began with Bering's expedition, and the author traces the topic up to the collapse of Russian territorial ambitions in North America in 1825. Through the century under study, the reader witnesses the tension between naval and mercantile interests in the area as well as the development of rivalry between Russia, Spain and Britain.

The focus of Barratt's work is directly on the activities in the Pacific. He narrates the development of the ports at Okhotsk and Petropavlovsk as well as the Bering expedition, the great voyages of Kruzenshtern and Lisianskii as well as the work of V.M. Golovnin. Barratt has produced an interesting and valuable study, but much more needs to be said about the basis and the origins of

Russian motives. The reader clearly understands that Russian leaders sought to promote science, exploration and trade, but the pressures that created these motives are not always clearly stated. One very interesting aspect, the sudden interest that Catherine II developed in Pacific naval ventures, is glossed over much too quickly. Her "Naval Renovation" appears to have been a turning point in the mid-18th century after a 50-year period of relative inactivity. One must look elsewhere for an understanding of this major point.

Overall, the book might have benefited from a more judicious balance between the narrative of naval operations and an analysis of the formulation of strategy and policy as developed in St. Petersburg. Barratt's seven-page chapter, "Conclusions and Reflections," is excellent, but one wishes for more of it; one cannot help but feel that the author has been too diffident in presenting his material in the body of the book. Barratt makes an important statement when he writes that the "Russian Navy was incapable of a 'great power' role in the Pacific in the absence of a base of economic, agricultural and military strength on the Pacific, or at least in Transbaikalia." This theme might have been dealt with much more straightforwardly in the text.

The volume is complemented by some very good illustrations, but the map on pages xii-xiii would have been much more useful if it had graphically illustrated the extent of Russian influence and activity by indicating the tracks of the major voyages and distinctively marking Russian settlements, discoveries and claims.

The volume concludes with a very valuable bibliography that contains a long note on the archives in Leningrad and Moscow that relate to naval history.

The University of British Columbia Press heralds its new series with two excellent contributions to the field of

naval history. We look forward to future studies that maintain the same high standards of scholarship.

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Coletta, Paolo E., comp. *A Bibliography of American Naval History*. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1981. 453pp.

The ancient Greek *bibliographos* was a copyist of manuscripts. In modern times, the anglicized form of the word has expanded to cover so many specific functions that a precise definition of a bibliography has become nearly impossible. Yet, a bibliographer must do something more than just list books randomly. He must build upon a concrete and thorough understanding of his field and develop from it a structure that will allow him appropriate criteria for the selection and description of books and articles.

Paolo Coletta has compiled a bibliography of American naval history, a subject area that can greatly benefit from such work. Coletta describes his effort as a "working bibliography" that "encompasses the published writings that teaching experience shows are relevant and should be among the holdings of the average university library." One boggles at the concept of the "average university" and its library collections. Evidently, the compiler intends the book to be used for undergraduate survey courses. However, the study of naval history has rarely been a major interest in any American university. A bibliography of some 4,800 items seems inappropriate for a basic, general collection.

Moreover, Professor Coletta states that "American naval history should not be studied in a vacuum." It should be seen in relation to "diplomatic, maritime, Marine Corps, military, aviation, geographical, political, economic, social, intellectual, scientific, technological,

organizational, administrative, and personal history." Coletta adds books to his list that he believes are relevant on this basis.

The bibliography is divided into 23 sections which, for the most part, follow the chronological periods of naval history from the 18th century to the present. The final sections deal with "The Challenge of the Soviet Navy" and "Sea Power for the 1980's." Each section is divided into subsections that list books, articles, documents, theses and dissertations as well as fiction. Each book entry includes the Library of Congress shelf number. The entries are rarely annotated so that it is difficult for a novice in the field to judge the value, or in some cases, even the subject of the item. The listing of journal articles and fiction makes a new contribution, but it is clear that the bibliography makes no attempt to be either complete in coverage or critical of the material listed. Naval history is a field that abounds with historical writing of poor quality; a bibliography that makes no discriminating judgment provides little in scholarly value. Students and scholars need more than just a booklist if they are to have the "invaluable aid to naval historical research" that the publisher claims on the paperback cover of this volume.

Many scholars will find that they would choose different books in some of these sections. Indeed, there seems no obvious criteria to indicate why certain books were omitted and others included. This is particularly true of the section entitled, "The European Heritage." In that section, for example, the work of Geoffrey Marcus and E.B. Powley is included, but the more important scholarship of John Ehrman is missing. The books by Richard Pares are listed, but not his articles. Nordhoff's fictional account of the mutiny on the *Bounty* is listed, but none of serious historical studies of the subject are included. Only Gerald Graham's *Empire of the North*

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Atlantic is included, none of his other books and articles. Michael Lewis' work is listed, but not Daniel Baugh's excellent work on naval administration. There is an article by Frederic Lane listed, but not his more important book on Venetian shipping. Moreover, no published documents are listed and few books and theses deal with continental naval history.

One could point to similar anomalies in every section of the bibliography. At the far end of the volume in the section on "Sea Power for the 1980's" one finds the most curious agglomeration. Evelyn Berckman's *Creators and Destroyers of the English Navy* is included without annotation, although it contains not a word that refers to any event after the year 1685. Gerald Graham's superb lectures on *The Politics of Naval Supremacy* are included, but they are an analysis of the 19th century.

In short, one must commend the publisher for sponsoring a good idea, but the quality of the scholarship in this bibliography is so deeply flawed that it cannot be recommended for use, except with the greatest caution. A university interested in building a collection in naval history would be better advised to use an updated version of the 800-item bibliography that the Naval History Division published nearly 10 years ago. The research scholar should continue to use his Neeser, Albion, Hardin Craig, Charles Schultz and Myron J. Smith.

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De Santis, Hugh *The Diplomacy of Silence: The American Foreign Service, the Soviet Union, and the Cold War, 1933-1947*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980. 270pp.

Hugh De Santis is a research analyst for regional political and security affairs of Western Europe in the State Department. This, his first book, is a recipient of the 1980 Stuart L. Bernath Award,

given annually by the Society of Historians of American Foreign Relations in recognition of distinguished new scholarship in the field.

The work describes the professional world of 30 American Foreign Service officers in the years 1933-1947. De Santis has relied extensively upon both private papers of these diplomats and personal interviews to reconstruct the psychological, intellectual, and social dimensions of the milieu in which American Foreign Service officers worked. Almost incidentally, from this perspective, he has written about the Soviet Union and the cold war, two factors that only in retrospect came to dominate the lives of American diplomats in the mid-1940s. The approach he has taken, De Santis argues persuasively, is more likely to produce a better understanding of the environment in which policy decisions evolve; thus it is more conducive to an explanation of why American-Soviet relations took the course they did in the crucial years 1944-1947.

Most of the 30 individuals who are the focus of this study served either in Moscow or in European capitals in which Soviet policy and the activities of the Red army became a major and immediate concern as World War Two drew to a close. Some, like Charles E. Bohlen and George F. Kennan, were trained Soviet experts; most were not. The one characteristic they share in common was training as professional Foreign Service officers prior to 1939. What De Santis' research has shown is that, as Americans, these men tended to evaluate international events in highly moral and legalistic terms, discounting the European model of *realpolitik* as an outmoded, discredited method of diplomacy. As members of the Foreign Service, they were socialized into what was then still an exclusive organization generally restricted to white Anglo-Saxon protestant gentlemen. Despite the Rogers Act, passed in 1924 to

democratize the Foreign Service, the State Department retained its club-like atmosphere. Foreign Service personnel all knew each other. Set physically apart from American society by their service abroad, professional diplomats developed their own value system. Individuals who failed to conform not only risked being ostracized socially, but also jeopardized their careers. Finally, as members of the foreign policy bureaucracy, Foreign Service officers generally accepted the role defined for them by statute and custom—they were the conduits of American policy to foreign capitals and reporters of events from abroad. Most decidedly their responsibilities did not include being movers and shapers of policy.

These characteristics of the Foreign Service are of great significance for the role in which American diplomats found themselves cast at the war's end. Throughout World War Two, the State Department remained on the periphery of Allied policymaking. While individual diplomats occasionally acquired personal influence with Roosevelt, by and large he and the Joint Chiefs of Staff ran the war without the State Department. Socially, psychologically, and bureaucratically conditioned to be diplomatic spear-carriers, most Foreign Service officers in the field embraced the image of the Soviets as partisans of the ideals expressed in the Atlantic Charter. Thus they suppressed, or conveniently forgot, their private reservations concerning the Soviet system and Russia's international conduct in the decades prior to the war. As long as the focus of policy remained on Allied military victory, Foreign Service officers had little difficulty in adjusting or rationalizing discrepancies between Washington's official attitude toward cooperation with the Soviets and actual Soviet behavior. When the focus shifted to structuring the postwar world, the dissonance between the policy of cooperation and Soviet military and political depre-

tions became impossible to ignore.

Because of who they were, American Foreign Service officers originally accepted the image of postwar cooperation with the Soviet Union along Atlantic Charter lines from a mixture of motives: from genuine hope and expectation; from a sense of duty; and because their careers depended on it. Thus throughout the war most Foreign Service officers were wholehearted practitioners of the "diplomacy of silence." Maynard Barnes, Ambassador to Bulgaria, coined the phrase in June 1945. With it he meant to shame the Department and his colleagues in the field into speaking out against Soviet behavior in Eastern Europe.

As De Santis shows in a series of telling vignettes, Barnes and his colleagues were ill-equipped to assume an authoritative voice in policy formulation. Nor were their superiors in Washington any more capable of the combination of insight and analysis that were the prerequisites of a policy to deal realistically with the incipient clash of American ideals and Soviet policies. Ultimately, De Santis concludes, the diplomacy of silence signified the intellectual vacuum created within the American Government when ideals and expectations, held too long without re-examination, were overtaken by events.

It was this vacuum that George F. Kennan, a brilliant but idiosyncratic Foreign Service officer, filled with his "Long Telegram" from Moscow in early 1946. Kennan had never shared his colleagues' views of foreign relations, nor had he accepted the official wartime image of the Soviet Union. This made him unique in being able to rethink past policy and formulate a new direction for American diplomacy, one which, given his expertise in Soviet policy and Russian history, fully accounted for the nature of Soviet behavior.

De Santis' treatment of Kennan is one of the best accounts in print of the influences that shaped the thinking of

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this key individual in American cold war diplomacy. As De Santis portrays him, Kennan is a kind of tragic hero—a prophet without honor prior to 1946, afterwards hailed as the intellectual savior of American foreign policy. Ironically, Kennan now says that even as he achieved personal recognition, he saw his concept of containment of Soviet power misappropriated and misapplied. As De Santis has told the story, such a fate was virtually inevitable.

MICHAEL K. DOYLE

- Ireland, Timothy P. *Creating the Entangling Alliance: The Origins of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization*. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1981. 245pp.

The foundation of post-World War II American foreign policy was constructed between the end of World War II and the start of the Korean War. During that short span, the United States adopted the containment policy and devised instruments to put it into effect: economic assistance in the form of the Truman Doctrine and the European Recovery Program (Marshall Plan) and a military alliance, the North Atlantic Treaty, with the countries of Western Europe. These policy initiatives both marked a radical change in the nature of American foreign policy and created a policy framework that has endured for over three decades.

The intensity and durability of the cold war have skewed our perspectives on the motives of American policy-makers in the years following World War II. This is particularly the case with NATO, conventionally viewed as an American and European response to the Soviet military threat to Western Europe. Timothy Ireland's thoughtful work, *Creating the Entangling Alliance*, reminds us that there were other reasons for forming NATO and for the direction that that organization has taken. Soviet-American tensions were,

of course, an important consideration in the American view. For our European partners, however, the French in particular, the problem was the threat posed by an economically strong and possibly unified Germany. The dilemma facing American officials, therefore, was "to restore the power of Western Germany in order to create a new balance of power in Europe without also creating an imbalance of power in Western Europe." Initially, American officials saw a European coalition as a means of balancing Soviet power and thereby limiting American involvement in European affairs. With the decision of the Truman administration in 1950 to form an integrated military headquarters and to station American troops in Western Europe, American policy had moved full circle. The United States had become permanently "entangled" in European politics.

In tracing developments leading to the formation of NATO, Ireland gives roughly equal attention to the two main dimensions of the policy process: (1) the discussions between the Department of State and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee over the general nature of American involvement in Europe; and (2) the negotiations between the United States and the major countries of Western Europe. The result is an excellent case study, which illustrates the complexity and potential of patient diplomacy, and a forceful reminder that issues other than the Soviet threat were—and still are—important in NATO organization and policy.

The book has two shortcomings. First, President Truman's role in the policy process is not examined. Truman is mentioned frequently, but only as a background figure. It is difficult to believe that the President played such an insignificant part in a policy issue of this importance. (Ireland did not examine Truman's papers or cite his *Memoirs*.) Second, the analysis would

have been easier to follow had a copy of the North Atlantic Treaty (or at least the controversial articles, #3, #5, and #9) been included as an appendix. These deficiencies notwithstanding, *Creating the Entangling Alliance* is a useful and constructive book on the formation of the key security organization of the post-World War II period.

WILLIAM P. SNYDER
Texas A&M University

Keeton, George W. and Schwarzenberger, Georg, eds. *The Year Book of World Affairs, 1981*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1981. 288pp.

The purpose of this series of year-books is *not* to comment on the important events of the past year as such. Its "specific object," noted on page 1, is to "make possible analyses in a wider perspective and on the basis of more mature reflection than may be possible in a quarterly or monthly journal." If this caveat is not kept in mind one will be very surprised at this volume's contents. There is, for example, no article directly on the Middle East—and 1980 was an event-packed year for that area. Some of the articles could easily have been printed 2 to 5 years ago (and perhaps 2 or 5 years from now). For example, Kenneth W. Thompson's "Functionalism and Foundations in the United States," is in this category.

But the articles on the whole meet the standard set. Some of the 19 are of better quality than others. They range over a great variety of topics whose center of gravity is obviously the taste and preference of the two editors. The whole collection tends to focus somewhat outside the general politicomilitary framework. They include very specific titles such as "New Zealand and the European Community" and "External Indebtness of Less Developed Countries," to very general essays such as "Catasrophe Theory and International Relations." Among the more

interesting to this reviewer were Colin Legum's "Foreign Intervention in Africa(II)," Miguel Wionczek's external indebtness essay already mentioned (which is filled with well-selected data), C.P. Fitzgerald's "China's View of the World" (which is an excellent "philosophical" look at China), and Alfred P. Rubin's "The Panama Canal Treaties: Locks on the Barn Doors" (which exposes neatly the structural and technical defects in the Canal treaties). Each one of these is first-rate and a reader of this book with limited time could begin there and go on as time permits.

FREDERICK H. HARTMANN
Naval War College

Murphy, Paul J. *Brezhnev: Soviet Politician*. Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland, 1981. 363pp.

More than just another biography of another Soviet political leader, *Brezhnev: Soviet Politician* is an extremely timely study that examines Brezhnev's rise to power in one of the world's most complex and still largely closed political systems. In particular, while Brezhnev's career is in itself interesting, the book is most valuable for the insight it provides into the question of leadership succession in the Kremlin. Murphy takes the position that "conflict" is the principal element of Soviet politics resulting in a continuous process of rivalry, struggle and intrigue. Brezhnev, he contends, is an exemplary example of this process who possesses "the right mixture of tenacious energy, drive, cunning, discipline, ruthlessness, concealment . . . [and] above all . . . ambition."

Acknowledging that political biography, and in particular Soviet political biography, must contain conclusions often based on fragmentary and imprecise evidence, the author does indeed frequently rely on personal opinion and judgment to develop his study. He clearly identifies his own speculation,

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however, and while other analysts might not agree with all of them, they do not detract from the overall value of the book.

Of special interest is the author's excellent treatment of Nikita Khrushchev's consolidation of power after the death of Stalin, Khrushchev's successful bid to forestall an intricate Kremlin plot to overthrow him in 1957, and, finally, his eventual demise as a result of still another episode of Kremlin intrigue. Naturally Brezhnev's role in all of these events is the focus here, and Murphy clearly shatters the view widely held in the West that Brezhnev was not regarded as a serious contender for Kremlin leadership. Then, of course, the relentless manner in which he marshaled his own political forces until all semblance of collective leadership gave way to the eventual emergence of still another *vozhd* or supreme, incontestable and infallible leader, is a veritable case study in the dynamics of Soviet politics.

Appearing at a time when Brezhnev's advanced age and poor health are catching up with him, Murphy's book sheds much needed light on the impending succession struggle certain to beset the Kremlin in the not too distant future. In fact, the struggle has in all probability already begun.

DALLACE L. MEEHAN
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Air Force

Overy, R.J. *The Air War 1939-1945*.
London: Europa Publications Ltd.,
1980. 263pp.

This is an outstanding book on a subject in which past controversy has often generated more heat than light. Dr. Overy's study of the relationship between air and sea warfare, and air and land warfare, leads him to conclude that, prior to the dropping of the A-bomb in August 1945, airpower was a necessary, but not sufficient, means to victory, and that air forces were complementary to

navies and armies, rather than autonomous of them. He offers an analysis not only of the strategic but also of the economic, scientific and technical aspects of the air war. Navy men may feel that more might have been said about the naval side, but they will find much to interest them. The conclusion that strategic bombing alone, using high explosives, was insufficient to secure victory is itself significant from the point of view of assessing the role of navies. The most effective target for strategic bombing was the enemy's economy, but here airpower was being used in combination with naval blockade.

As for naval use of airpower, the author, a Briton, points out that whereas the Royal Navy maintained even in 1939 that aircraft from carriers could only slow down large ships leaving them to be sunk by other ships rather than aircraft, the use of aircraft carriers to attack the enemy fleet had been fully accepted by the U.S. Navy. This victory for the advocates of airpower was timely, in view of Japanese enthusiasm for aircraft carriers and the nature of the Pacific War in 1941-45. No less fortunate for the Allies was the *Luftwaffe's* failure to give adequate support to the *Kriegsmarine* in the Battle of the Atlantic. Admiral Raeder pointed out that aircraft were needed not only to attack shipping but also to guide submarines to vulnerable targets, but, despite initial success by Focke-Wulf *Kondor* long-range aircraft, Goering refused to divert more aircraft to the war at sea, largely because he did not wish to relinquish operational control over *Luftwaffe* units.

Certainly, from mid-June 1941 the *Luftwaffe* was busy elsewhere with what for Germany was the major effort of the war—the invasion of Russia. Although Overy's main focus is on the Anglo-Saxon countries—inevitably perhaps in view of the availability of sources—he has some interesting things to say about

the Russian contribution to the air war. Russia, like Germany, concentrated on the use of aircraft in close support of its army, but this did not mean that air warfare on the eastern front was only of local importance. Of the world's aircraft economies in 1939, Russia's was the largest in terms of current production, with massive plant expansion taking place in Siberia in time, as it proved, for the German invasion. By concentrating upon quantity production of a few types, at some sacrifice of quality, the Russians were able to enjoy an overwhelming numerical superiority over the *Luftwaffe* by 1943. It was the hope of hitting long-distance targets in Russia, rather than in Western Europe, that revived interest in Germany in strategic bombing; but the technical shortcomings of the chosen instrument—the Heinkel He 177—undermined every attempt to fulfill this ambition. Even before 1943 Russian resistance had forced the *Luftwaffe* to concentrate on tactical air warfare in the east, giving the Western allies a long breathing-space in which to build up and deploy large air forces without interference, and from this Overy concludes that the Western Powers benefited more from the Russians' efforts than vice versa.

The Western Powers' strategic air offensive against Germany is also put in perspective by comparison of the effects of bombing with other reasons for Germany's failure to keep pace with Allied aircraft production. Overy, who is no stranger to the history of German aircraft production, points out that poor production planning at three major firms—Messerschmitt, Junkers and Heinkel—resulted in a greater loss of output than the loss caused by bombing down to the end of 1944. The strength of the book is, in fact, Overy's masterly discussion of the economic problems of sustaining air forces in war and of hitting the right balance between quantity production of current models and diversion of resources to research

and technical innovation. Overy's comparison of the various aircraft economies shows up facism in a poor light, in that Germany made less efficient use of her human and technical resources than the United States, Britain or Russia. One word of caution here, though: Overy has used official, confidential records for Germany, but only official, published histories for the Allied powers, and it may be that as a result he has a clearer idea of the shortcomings of the Germans than of the others. Even so, the production figures of the various powers show clearly enough Germany's (and Italy's and Japan's) failure to keep pace in 1941-43, and a great increase in German (and Japanese) production came too late in the war to alter the result. The country with the worst interservice disputes was Japan, where rival research programs resulted in the navy and army producing separate radar aids to the identification of friendly aircraft and thus being unable to distinguish each other's aircraft from those of the enemy!

Truly this is a book that deserves attention from all those who wish to study, and learn from, the history of warfare.

G.C. PEDEN
University of Bristol

Paskins, Barrie, and Dockrill, Michael.
The Ethics of War. Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 1979.
332pp.

Best, Geoffrey. *Humanity in Warfare*.
New York: Columbia University
Press, 1980. 400pp.

The two books offer alternative academic theories regarding man's conduct in warfare. Paskins and Dockrill have produced "an experiment in practical philosophy by a philosopher and historian," while Geoffrey Best, also a historian, has written a history of the law of war.

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The former is a self-professed restatement of some parts of the so-called Just War tradition. In responding to the abstract question, "What sense does it make to think of applying moral ideas to war?", the authors have chosen to examine three issues from recent history and contemporary politics in detail: the planting of bombs by terrorists; area bombing; and nuclear deterrence.

There is an unevenness in their effort. In the section on area bombing, for example, the authors quite validly put paid to the canard that Italian Gen. Giulio Douhet (1868-1930) influenced the bombing philosophy of the Royal Air Force's Bomber Command in World War II, but curiously conclude that because Douhet's *Command of the Air* was translated in the United States toward the end of 1942 it became available to the USAAF "in time to be used as one of the theoretical justifications for the bombing of Germany." In fact, the USAAF was a little past that basic type of theoretical thinking by that time. Maj. Gen. Haywood S. Hansell, Jr., in his excellent *The Air Plan That Defeated Hitler* (1972), makes it quite clear that the planning for the strategic bombing offensive against Germany preceded U.S. entry into World War II, while showing that AWPD-1—the air plan that defeated Hitler—far preceded the translation (much less the reading) of Douhet. Craven and Cate, in their official history of the USAAF in World War II, dismiss Douhet as of far less influence USAAF thinking than Billy Mitchell, while aviation historian Robin Higham is of the opinion that Douhet's writings, once translated, did little more than reinforce already-extant American thinking.

Similar discrepancies pervade the discussion. No distinction is made between strategic bombing, area bombing, and indiscriminate bombing, nor between target area bombing (area attacks of legitimate objectives) and attacks against enemy cities undertaken

solely for psychological purposes—something no nation did during World War II, but something that the authors suggest they did. Similarly, the authors decline to define their principal term—area bombing—"because definitions are impossible," simultaneously (and curiously) referring the reader to the very comprehensive discussion of the term in Webster and Franklin's *The Strategic Air Offensive Against Germany, 1939-1945*. Their declination is equally curious given that their book was written 2 years after the nations of the world had arrived at a draft law of war treaty containing rules that define both "area" and "indiscriminate" bombing.

Similar errors mar the sections on terrorism and nuclear deterrence. *The Ethics of War* uses an interesting approach for esoteric thinking on the subject of morality and war. Unfortunately, incomplete research by the authors and what appears to be a basic discomfort with their three issues lead them to a rather simplistic and frequently inaccurate discussion of these very complex issues, limiting the value of the book.

In marked (and very pleasant) contrast to Paskins and Dockrill, Professor Geoffrey Best has taken on the difficult task of writing a history of the law of war and has come just about as close as possible to pitching a perfect game. While there is an obvious thoroughness in his research, he has been careful to prevent detail from overwhelming the reader. Indeed, he has taken an extremely complex and frequently controversial subject and produced a highly readable discourse on its development in modern times.

The author prefaces his account with a very able chapter in which he distinguishes between discussions of the theory of "Just War" (which he largely eschews) and the law of war, as well as between the law relating to when one may go to war as opposed to the law

relating to the conduct of hostilities, the latter being his intended subject. He next offers some rationale for the efficacy of the law of war. He concludes the chapter with a few words to each of three groups, aware that each would approach the book from a different perspective: international lawyers, military professionals, and his fellow historians. That he felt it necessary to offer admonitions to each manifests his appreciation for the complexity of his subject.

Best writes in a controversial style that avoids the normally stilted tones associated with international law, guiding the reader along a path leading through the evolution of modern warfare, the legislative foundations of the law of war, the trials of total war, and the difficulties of the law of war in our modern world of "co-existence." He addresses all aspects of the subject, and is not reticent in identifying those parts that have worked better than others.

If *Humanity in Warfare* falls short at any point, it is in the chapter on the law of war as it relates to aerial bombardment. The subject is complex and has defied codification into agreed rules of law that will assure universal respect. The rules applied in World Wars I and II, Korea and Vietnam were based on interpretation and paraphrasing of two treaties written at the Hague in 1907, or before aerial warfare had left the cradle. New rules drafted in 1977 have not yet been adopted by any military power, small or large, and even without the "fog of war" reveal substantial weaknesses. Yet Best, in his eagerness to condemn Air Marshal Sir Arthur Harris, wartime leader of the RAF's Bomber Command, and fellow British historian H. Montgomery Hyde, in some measure loses his objectivity as a historian. This is particularly true in his criticism of Harris, whom he appears to wish to try by what he *believes* the law to be today and by standards of modern

bombing capabilities, rather than by the even less clear standards and equally less-accurate capabilities that existed during Harris' tenure 40 years ago. Moreover, he lays all blame at Harris' feet to the neglect of myriad factors beyond Harris' control. He would have done well to heed the admonition of another British historian, Martin Middlebrook (author of books on the aerial raids on Hamburg and Nuremberg), who wisely counseled that "The wartime actions of Bomber Command . . . should not be judged out of the context of the period."

This brief lapse should not detract from an otherwise excellent book, however. Indeed, the book's overall quality and the controversial nature of Professor Best's discussion of the strategic air offensive over Europe during World War II make *Humanity in Warfare* an excellent vehicle for academic discussion within our service schools. That is no easy accomplishment, and the author is to be commended for it.

W. HAYS PARKS

Paterson, Thomas G. *On Every Front: The Making of the Cold War*. New York: Norton, 1979. 173pp.

This is a coherent, condensed, scholarly essay that attempts to describe just how America became involved in that global effort to hold back Communist expansionism, the cold war. The author, a historian at the University of Connecticut who has specialized in the "origins" of the cold war during the years 1945-1950, provides a useful, sweeping historical portrait of the post-World War II American-Soviet bipolar power structure of international politics.

The book contains eight chapters describing the events that generated this new bipolar world, one that arose in response to the devastation of Europe and the resulting collapse of European colonial empires leaving a power

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vacuum in Asia, Africa, and Eastern Europe. Other chapters describe the tacit allocation of Soviet and American "Spheres of Interest," the development of strategies to rebuild the economies and governmental institutions of Europe, and the tactics of American leaders who consciously manipulated public opinion in order to marshal support for America's own "expansionist" actions in assuming the role of leader of the Western World.

The chief virtue of this book is that it successfully synthesizes, as the author intended, a voluminous body of research, including archival material as well as conflicting analyses by conventional and "revisionist" historians of the cold war. In his thoroughly documented book (the bibliography runs to 22 pages and is itself a highly useful reference guide). Paterson writes with clarity and lucidity about the rise of the new international system that has confronted members of the American military for the past 30 years.

The thesis of his study gives little comfort to either the radical left or right wing political hucksters. Instead, Paterson demonstrates that the policies pursued by American leaders in the cold war were motivated by both an altruistic concern to defend Western democracy and at the same time a desire to secure economic markets, natural resources, and strategic advantages for American business, government and other interests. Similarly, he concludes that Soviet behavior in the cold war was motivated by both ideological fervor and a legitimate rational concern for security growing out of traditional Russian fear of military invasion.

Though Paterson offers no prescriptions for the future, his final chapter warns that the history of the cold war period has demonstrated a steady erosion of the dominant position of both America and Russia in a rapidly changing world of nationalism, Communist polycentrism, and shifting eco-

nomie power. The implication of his study is clear: history does not remain static.

Karl Marx once wrote that history repeats itself: the first time as tragedy, the second time as farce. Like many of Marx's prophecies, this one has been proven false in our time. In an age of nuclear weaponry, a second cold war, unchecked by sophisticated policy, wise historical understanding, and disciplined restraint, could lead to a cold war whose momentum spins out of control. In such a situation the repetition of history would not be farcical. It would be catastrophically tragic for all mankind.

JAMES M. KEMPF
U.S. Air Force Academy

Rose, Lisle A. *Assault on Eternity: Richard E. Byrd and the Exploration of Antarctica, 1946-47*. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1980. 292pp.

Assault on Eternity is the story of the U.S. Navy Antarctic Developments Project, more popularly known as *Operation Highjump*. This still is the largest expedition ever sent to Antarctica. *Highjump* was essentially a cold environment training exercise, but it had additional purposes—extending potential U.S. sovereignty over areas discovered by Americans, investigating the problems of establishing air and support bases in Antarctica's harsh climate, testing ships and equipment, and conducting limited scientific observations.

The author, the State Department Polar Affairs Officer, has written an excellent operational history of ship and aircraft operations in Antarctica in the post-World War II period. He discusses the concerns of ship's officers as they take their thin-skinned ships through the pack ice and the concerns of aircraft commanders and crews in long flights over unknown and dangerous territory. His report on the crash of the PBM "George-1" and the ordeal of the

survivors is a classic survival story of man against nature.

The inclusion of Admiral Byrd's name in the subtitle and his continuous presence in the narrative is a disservice to the reader, however. Byrd's role in *Highjump* was not critical to the actual operation. Day-to-day responsibilities were vested in Rear Adm. Richard H. Cruzen and his Task Group commanders—Capts. George Dufek, Charles A. Bond, and Delbert S. Cornwall and Cdr. Clifford M. Campbell. Byrd was somewhat the senior citizen, concerned primarily with land-based flying late in the expedition. He was again flown over the South Pole, but even Rose admits that the flying program from Little America was a minor part of the entire operation and not really productive. Byrd, at this point in his career, was well-beyond his prime and might have grown old gracefully. Byrd is clearly Rose's hero and his treatment clouds the fine work done by Cruzen and others.

Additional problems of fact characterize this book. Rose says that Amundsen made his first trip to Antarctica in 1910-12 but Amundsen was first mate and a critical member of the *Belgica* expedition (1898). The American Lincoln Ellsworth did not establish a base in the "American Highland" in 1939; Ellsworth flew from his ship *Wyatt Earp* and the American Highland is in the interior of Antarctica, not along the coast. And the U.S. Antarctic Service Expedition of 1939-40 was not "quasi official"; it was a full-fledged government sponsored and conducted expedition.

These misunderstandings of polar history are minor, though, when compared with Rose's flawed view of Richard Byrd. Byrd was a complex person, as Rose points out, but he was not motivated by the grandeur of Antarctica. Byrd was motivated by a continuous need for fame and recognition as well as a strong need to continue

proving himself. Rose's treatment of Byrd's drinking is a sham. No pilot or navigator can perform to the best of his abilities if he has "a few drinks to calm his nerves" before a dangerous flight. Rose's analogy of a passenger on a commercial airliner makes the case for Byrd much worse.

Assault on Eternity, hindered by uneven chapters and poor integration of information at times, is nonetheless an important record of Antarctic operations by the U.S. Navy in 1946-47.

PETER J. ANDERSON
Institute of Polar Studies
The Ohio State University

Ryan, Paul B. *First Line of Defense: The U.S. Navy Since 1945*. Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1981, 224pp.

The typically glowing dust-jacket prose on this slim but meaty book states that "*First Line of Defense* analyzes the events and errors that, step-by-step, have threatened the status of the U.S. Navy as the world's undisputed maritime power." Most readers will detect in this opening statement at least three implicit assumptions that weaken the text's value as *analysis*. The second statement, "It is a history of . . . the political changes, the individuals, and the international events that contributed to American naval decline" is much better but the book is not really good *history* either, if one seeks balance. The acknowledgment pages thank 24 Navy admirals and a Marine general, plus assorted captains and colonels, for their oral and other contributions. The only civilians so cited, however, are those employed by the Navy at its various archival and educational centers or those who helped with manuscript preparation and review.

So much for what *First Line of Defense* claims to be. What it turns out to be is an absolutely first-rate account of the last 35 years from the institutional

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Navy's point of view. This is a perfectly respectable undertaking. It has not been done before, certainly not with the sweep, continuity, and style the author has packed into this modestly scaled book. Paul Ryan, a retired Navy captain and research fellow at the Hoover Institution, first came to public attention as a conservative spokesman in 1977 with the publication of his widely read *The Panama Canal Controversy*. It is fair to say that he has done it again in *First Line of Defense*.

Predictably, in covering more than three decades in a volume of this size, both depth and reach suffer. To author Ryan's credit, however, he has at least touched on nearly every major event and development to preserve a sense of flow. He addresses in greater and more reassuring detail the truly significant—and endlessly recurring—issues of the nature of seapower, proper roles and missions, centralized control, and civilian accountability. Heroes and villains are identified, not only as individuals but also as systems and processes.

There is little new in the treatment of the McNamara years, the Vietnam conflict, and the Carter administration—three large chunks of the book—but the material is both well-organized and crisply documented. After reviewing these segments, one has little doubt about the problems and people the uniformed Navy was fighting. Many readers will enjoy learning of Adm. Robert Dennison's furious advance opposition to the Bay of Pigs fiasco, seeing Adm. "Oley" Sharp's judgment vindicated by subsequent failures of Washington-guided Vietnam combat policies, and finding Graham Claytor recognized as a superbly able and most perceptive Secretary of the Navy. Much of what Paul Ryan says is far from conventional wisdom, in terms of public and media understanding, but he is very close to what the Navy regards, with a good deal of justification, as truth.

There may be no real continuum from national goals through strategic concepts and command organizations to military forces and operations but there are clearly relationships between objectives and means that cannot be ignored. *First Line of Defense* is a tight provocative recital, from a U.S. seapower perspective, of what happens if those relationships are not understood or deliberately subverted to other interests.

HUGH G. NOTT

Smith, P.C.F., ed. *Seafaring in Colonial Massachusetts*. Boston: Colonial Society of Massachusetts, 1980. 240pp.

This volume contains the proceedings of a conference held by the Colonial Society of Massachusetts in November 1975. Five years is a long time to wait for the publication of these papers, but despite the inordinate delay, they have retained some value. A book of this type does not present a coherent study, but rather it elucidates a number of fascinating aspects that have been touched upon in the standard work on the subject, S.E. Morison's *Maritime History of Massachusetts*. The contents of this volume will interest both naval and colonial historians.

The colonial historian will be interested in the well-illustrated article on "Vessel Types of Colonial Massachusetts" by W.A. Baker. In addition, there are two pieces on maritime aspects of colonial commerce. Donald Chard has written on "The Price and Profits of Accommodation: Massachusetts-Louisburg Trade, 1713-1744" and tells us much about the little known trade between the French and English in North America. Richard Kugler has written on the candlemaking industry that centered in Newport, Rhode Island, in his article, "The Whale Oil Trade, 1750-1775." In another brief piece,

Stephen T. Riley has edited a portion of a 17th-century manuscript that relates the captivity of seaman Abraham Browne by the Barbary pirates in 1655.

Three complementary papers detail aspects of the history of hydrography. Sinclair Hutchings has sketched the career of Capt. Cyprian Southack, who drew several important charts of the period and commanded a number of small warships on the American Station. This article is followed by an extremely interesting and important work by William P. Cumming on Colonial Charting of the Massachusetts Coast. Beginning with the 16th-century contributions of Verrazzano and Gomez, Cumming provides 21 illustrations of charts up through the work of Holland and Des Barres in the 1770s. In addition, he has included three appendixes on the bibliography of New England cartography, the nomenclature of the Gomez charts, and edited correspondence relating to John Green's mid-18th century mapping of the Kennebeck Purchase in Maine. Complementing Cumming's work, Augustus P. Loring has provided the first full listing of all the 145 coastal views that appeared in the *Atlantic Neptune*, the great maritime atlas of the Atlantic coast published between 1774 and 1803.

The final articles in the volume are the only two that deal directly with naval operations. One is a brief history of *King George*, an armed vessel maintained by the provincial government of Massachusetts during the French and Indian War, 1757-63. The other brief article is by Joseph R. Frese, S.J. on "Smuggling, the Navy and the Customs Service, 1763-72" and details the Royal Navy's role in enforcing the Navigation Acts.

All this is varied and disparate fare to be found within the covers of a single volume. None of it provides new or startling interpretations, but nearly all of the articles in the collection make useful additions to our knowledge about

specific aspects of maritime affairs in 17th and 18th-century Massachusetts.

JOHN B. HATTENDORF
National University of Singapore

Yager, Joseph A. and Marby, Ralph T., Jr. *International Cooperation in Nuclear Energy*. Washington: Brookings Institution, 1981. 226pp.

This book has a narrower scope than might be inferred from the title as it is exclusively concerned with cooperative measures directed towards reduction of nuclear weapons proliferation risks associated with the peaceful use of nuclear energy. The major discussions are presented in Chapters 3 to 6 that occupy approximately half of the text—the remainder is devoted to two brief tutorial, introductory chapters and three substantial appendixes (two by the author's associate Ralph T. Marby, Jr.) that discuss various aspects of the world nuclear industry and the Bellagio Conference.

Chapter 3 addresses the problem of guaranteeing fuel supplies while minimizing proliferation problems associated with uranium enrichment. A detailed discussion of possible reasons for uncertainty in fuel supplies is given including changes in political attitudes and collusion among suppliers for their financial benefit, and institutional measures for their solution are presented. Chapter 4 similarly is concerned with fuel processing and proliferation questions associated with plutonium in the processed fuel. Again the discussion of problems in the back end of the fuel cycle is detailed and the relevance of such measures as multinational storage, return of spent fuel to country of origin, controls on technology transfer, and international plutonium storage is considered. In both of these chapters institutional matters are discussed extensively and Chapter 5, "New Institutional Arrangements" carries these discussions forward in further detail.

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The final sixth chapter is brief (13 pages) and is equally divided between a discussion on the events resulting from President Carter's concerns about nuclear weapons proliferation and presentation of a phased approach to new forms of international cooperation. It is in the first of these sections that President Carter's decision to defer reprocessing and induce the world nuclear community to undertake the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE) is discussed.

Although the Introduction correctly notes that many (the reviewer believes most) countries outside the United States do not have the great concern with nuclear weapons that necessitates drastic actions and new institutional relationships, the text does not discuss this question but assumes that changes are necessary. Nevertheless, the author presents a highly informative and well-written discussion that includes the disagreements and difficulties even if they are not emphasized. The result is an authoritative and extensive document within the boundaries set by the premise of the linkage between weapons proliferation and the civilian fuel cycle. What is lacking, however, is any flavor of the antipathy felt by the majority of the INFCE participants to the U.S. policy and the consequent isolation of the United States. This might be acceptable except for the fact that the INFCE conclusions (published in 1980) are not discussed at all and the extraordinary statement is made (page

134) that "what INFCE said is not of great or lasting importance." This is surely not correct inasmuch as the conclusions of a 3-year study on the same subject as this book involving over 500 experts from 46 countries and four international organizations must be of relevance to the United States. This is particularly true as the United States insisted on the study being made. In addition, it is surely also necessary to recognize that the effect of these policies upon the rest of the world has not been to modify their programs in any significant way. The effect on the United States, however, has been quite significant as U.S. credibility and influence have been severely diminished.

In brief, the relevance of this work to the world nuclear scene is uncertain inasmuch as such changes as the author discusses are probably not seen to be necessary by the majority of the world. As a consequence, the reviewer can recommend this book only to those who have sufficient knowledge of international nuclear events over the past 4 years to be able to put it into context. At minimum it is essential to read the INFCE summary and it is probably necessary to consult other less formal documentation if a proper appreciation of world opinion is desired. Within its constraints this book is informative, articulate, and interesting.

WILLIAM G. DAVEY
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RECENT BOOKS

Selected Accessions of the Naval War College Library

Annotated by

Doris Baginski, Steven Maffeo
Jane Sanfilippo, and Mary Ann Varoutsos

Ambrose, Stephen E. *Ike's Spies: Eisenhower and the Espionage Establishment*. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1981. 368pp. \$14.95

Eisenhower strongly believed in the intelligence community and used it to its fullest potential during his Presidency. He encouraged the growth of the CIA and considered it one of America's chief weapons during the cold war. It was Winston Churchill who introduced General Eisenhower to the world of espionage in 1942. At that time, the British Secret Service was the best in the world. Ambrose traces Ike's involvement in secret intelligence from the time he was briefed on Ultra through his involvement with Fortitude (the operation that misled Hitler on the 1944 invasion of Normandy). In addition, he treats the case of Francis Gary Powers and the U-2, and the CIA assassination plots.

Burks, Ardath. *Japan: Profile of a Postindustrial Power*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1981. 260pp. \$22.00; paper \$9.50

By the mid-1970s, Japan demonstrated all of the characteristics of a true postindustrial power—a majority of the labor force was engaged in service activities; the service sector produced a larger proportion of the gross national product than the agricultural and industrial sectors combined; and the economy exhibited high levels of production, income per capita, savings, and investment. An expert on Japanese politics shows how Japan achieved this extraordinary economic success in light of its history, culture, and geography. He contrasts the views of both revisionists and neo-Marxists as they interpret Japan's economic development, and he considers the transferability of the Japanese model to superpower countries such as the United States.

Campbell, Robert W. *Soviet Energy Technologies: Planning, Policy, Research, and Development*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1980. 268pp. \$22.50

This is an excellent detailed analysis of Soviet energy technology and policy. The utilization of thermal, coal, and nuclear power are discussed in depth. The philosophy and management of Soviet research and development techniques are also examined, and their effect upon policy is measured. Understanding Soviet values and technological capabilities provides a good basis for interpreting and forecasting Soviet choices regarding energy options in the future. However, Campbell sees no dramatic breakthroughs in any given technological area, since Soviet planners tend to follow development paths already well established by other countries.

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Dismukes, Bradford. *Expected Demand for the U.S. Navy to Serve as an Instrument of U.S. Foreign Policy: Thinking About Political and Military Environmental Factors*. Alexandria, Va.: Center for Naval Analyses, 1980. 30pp. (AD AO85 099/0) paper \$6.50; microfiche \$3.50*

Most analysts agree that, in principle, the power to threaten violence or act violently from the sea retains contemporary utility. However, there exists considerable disagreement regarding the range of practical contingencies in which U.S. seapower can be usefully employed at acceptable cost and risk. This paper initially reviews a few necessary terms of reference and then specifically discusses how requirements for naval support of policy are likely to arise. It also assesses the factors affecting the Navy's utility in a political role, particularly as compared to other instruments potentially available. The conclusion briefly summarizes implications for the future.

*For sale by the National Technical Information Service, U.S. Dept. of Commerce, 5285 Port Royal Road, Springfield, VA 22161.

Fairhall, David and Jordan, Philip. *The Wreck of the "Amoco Cadiz."* New York: Stein and Day, 1980. 248pp. \$12.95

The greatest oil-pollution disaster in history occurred on 16 March 1978, when the 230,000 ton crude-oil carrier *Amoco Cadiz* grounded on underwater reefs just off the French Brittany coast. Drawing on many diverse sources, this book presents a detailed account of how the wreck happened and how the French combated the immense flow of oil that subsequently inundated the shore. In addition, the authors evaluate world oil dependence, the use of the supertanker, international maritime law, the lasting effects of pollution, how future "black tide" crises must be prepared for, and how such disasters might be prevented.

Golan, Galia. *The Soviet Union and the Palestine Liberation Organization: an Uneasy Alliance*. New York: Praeger, 1980. 289pp. \$25.95

The author, who formerly directed the Soviet and East European Research Center of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, addresses several questions regarding the Soviet Union and the Arab-Israeli conflict. She specifically believes that the Soviet/PLO connection is highly complex, involving no simple patron-client rapport and no clearly established superpower control. The study focuses on issues critical to the Soviet/PLO relationship. In addition, it evaluates the issues best indicative of the Soviet Union's entire attitude toward the Palestinian question. All factors and criteria are examined from a pragmatic, as well as theoretical, point of view.

Gouré, Leon, Hyland, William G., and Gray, Colin S. *The Emerging Strategic Environment: Implications for Ballistic Missile Defense*. Cambridge, Mass.: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 1979. 75pp. \$6.50*

Comprised of three separate papers, this report questions the stability of superpower strategic-nuclear relationships for the 1980s. It assesses Soviet programs for missiles, air defense/ABM systems, technology research and development, and antisatellite systems. Gouré maintains that the United States evaluates its strategic forces as adequate for deterrence while the Soviets perceive political gains through a continuing massive buildup. Gray examines U.S. strategic options for the future, including the MX, the B-1

bomber, the Trident II SLBM, cruise missiles, revised targeting doctrine, and ballistic missile defense. Hyland concentrates on the ABM treaty, post-treaty developments, and prospects for the treaty.

*For sale from the Circulation Manager, Special Reports, Institute Foreign Policy Analysis, Central Plaza Building, Tenth Floor, 675 Massachusetts Avenue, Cambridge, MA 02139.

Herken, Gregg. *The Winning Weapon: the Atomic Bomb in the Cold War, 1945-1950*. New York: Knopf, 1980. 425pp. \$15.00

During the years when the United States held a virtual monopoly on the atomic bomb, the Administration's military strategies and policies were based upon two erroneous assumptions: that possession of the bomb would guarantee American dominance in world affairs for years to come, and that Washington could keep Moscow from developing atomic weapons of its own. This detailed historical study focuses on the consequences of treating the bomb as a "winning weapon" upon U.S. conduct of the cold war, the interaction between domestic politics and foreign policy with regard to the bomb, and American strategic thinking and planning from 1945 to 1950.

Hoerber, Francis P. *Slow to Take Offense: Bombers, Cruise Missiles, and Prudent Deterrence*. 2d ed. Washington: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1980. 136pp. \$9.50

This study stresses that the need for a new and revitalized U.S. manned-bomber force is urgent. It is not suggested that a new manned bomber alone will solve all our strategic problems; however, a modern, efficient bomber force is an essential component of U.S. security. The author believes that it is useful, and may prove crucial, to have a "slow" nuclear-response weapon such as the manned aircraft. Such a weapon can be recalled if, in a crisis, the world can be brought back from the nuclear brink, or if a nuclear war can be terminated before it becomes "all-out."

Hutcheon, Wallace S., Jr. *Robert Fulton: Pioneer of Undersea Warfare*. Annapolis, Md.: United States Naval Institute, 1981. 191pp. \$17.95

Originally written as a doctoral dissertation for George Washington University, this biography draws upon a number of newly discovered sources to illuminate the highly significant accomplishments of Robert Fulton in the field of naval warfare. Unlike the steamboat popularized in 1807, his contributions to the development of the submarine, the technology of sea warfare, and the design and construction of the steam-powered warship were not to achieve fruition until the 20th century. Therefore, this text provides a timely addition to the scholarship of a once obscure period in the life of this famous artist-inventor.

Mahoney, Robert B., Jr. and Clayberg, Richard P. *Analysis of the Chinese Crisis Management Experience: Summary Report*. Arlington, Va.: CACI, Inc.-Federal, 1979. 203pp. (AD AO71 483/2GA) paper \$9.25; microfiche \$3.00*

This report, based on Chinese sources, analyzes the Chinese crisis-management experience for the period 1949 to 1978. It outlines the methodology used to identify 386 crises of concern to the People's Republic of China. In

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addition, it provides short descriptions of these crises, while evaluating those characteristics that were of central interest to the Chinese. One chapter located P.R.C. concerns within the broader context of postwar international relations. Another section illustrates some capabilities of the CACI, Inc.-Federal component which makes these data available to policy planners and decisionmakers. An appendix evaluates the reliability and validity of the study.

*For sale by the National Technical Information Service, U.S. Dept. of Commerce, 5285 Port Royal Road, Springfield, VA 22161.

Mahoney, Robert B., Jr., et al. *Analysis of the U.S. and Soviet Crisis Management Experiences: Technical Report*. Arlington, Va.: CACI, Inc.-Federal, 1979. 366pp. (AD A076 624/6) paper \$19.00; microfiche \$3.50* Sponsored by the Cybernetics Technology Office of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, this report was monitored by the Office of Naval Research. It presents a major systematic performance assessment covering the crisis management behaviors of the United States and the Soviet Union. The authors analyze crisis outcomes with respect to the period 1966 to 1978. These are defined in terms of the achievement or nonachievement of established goals during the crises. Goals were identified through the evaluation of both U.S. and Soviet unclassified primary source materials.

*For sale by the National Technical Information Service, U.S. Dept. of Commerce, 5285 Port Royal Road, Springfield, VA 22161

Overshiner, Elwyn E. *Course 095 to Eternity: the Saga of Destroyer Squadron Eleven*. Santa Rosa, Calif.: Elwyn E. Overshiner, 1980. 224pp. paper \$4.95 Point Pedernales, located on the southern California coast, was the scene of one of the U.S. Navy's greatest peacetime disasters in September 1923. During a five-minute interval, seven battle-ready ships of Destroyer Squadron Eleven, Pacific Battle Fleet, ran aground in what the author calls "the most incredible navigational blunder of naval history." Elwyn Overshiner is the brother of one of the 23 men who lost their lives that night. Extensive hours of research have resulted in an exciting, well-documented account of the unfortunate sequence of events surrounding this disastrous accident.

Payne, Samuel B., Jr. *The Soviet Union and SALT*. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1980. 155pp. \$19.95

This is a lucid exposition of Soviet policy on strategic arms limitation based on numerous Soviet sources. Two major Soviet schools of thought regarding the nature of disarmament and nuclear strategy are delineated; both the differences of opinion within the Soviet elite and the views held in common by all members of that elite are examined. The concluding chapter outlines lessons learned from previous SALT agreements and offers some useful comments on the role of arms limitation in restraining the strategic weapons race and in Soviet foreign policy as a whole.

Perry, John C. *Beneath the Eagle's Wings: Americans in Occupied Japan*.

New York: Dodd, Mead, 1980. 253pp. \$12.95

Despite numerous reasons for failure, the American occupation of Japan succeeded in preserving the peace, promoting prosperity, and establishing a working democratic system with a high degree of social stability. This narrative, which is extensively illustrated with contemporary photographs, is based on many primary and secondary sources, as well as interviews with a number of the participants. Essentially a popular treatment of the years 1945 to 1947, the focus is on the significance of the experience to the individual Americans who were active in the occupation force.

Pfaltzgraff, Robert L., Jr. *Energy Issues and Alliance Relationships: the United States, Western Europe, and Japan*. Cambridge, Mass.: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 1980. 71pp. \$6.50*

This report analyzes problems of energy supply-demand relationships among industrialized nations, with special emphasis on the United States, Great Britain, France, West Germany, Japan, and the European Community. The author examines the impact of the 1973 Middle East crisis on these states, assesses the prospects for stability in energy-producing regions, and outlines some policy options available to the United States and its allies for the early 1980s. Soviet policies in the Indian Ocean littoral are examined, as are prospects and problems arising from the development of nuclear power. Finally, the issues of reprocessing, plutonium enrichment, and the transfer of reactor technology are considered.

*For sale from the Circulation Manager, Special Reports, Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Central Plaza Building, Tenth Floor, 675 Massachusetts Avenue, Cambridge, MA 02139

Pollen, Anthony. *The Great Gunnery Scandal: the Mystery of Jutland*.

London: William Collins, 1980. 280pp. \$24.00

There exists both speculation and controversy on the disappointing outcome of the Battle of Jutland (31 May 1916), in which the German High Seas Fleet evaded destruction after inflicting significant losses on the British Grand Fleet. At a time when the Royal Navy was at the height of power, its fire-control system may have been less than satisfactory. Arthur Pollen, a brilliant inventor and businessman, had earlier designed a possibly superior system. The author, son of the inventor, contends that it had been rejected by powerful forces in the Admiralty for political reasons and that the outcome of the battle would have been different if his father's invention had been in operation at the time.

Pricolo, Dennis M. *Naval Presence and Cold War Foreign Policy: a Study of the Decision to Station the 6th Fleet in the Mediterranean, 1945-1958*.

Annapolis, Md.: United States Naval Academy, 1978. 128pp. (AD A058 702) paper \$12.50; microfiche \$3.50*

Prepared for the Naval Academy's Trident Scholar Project, this report deals with the origins of the U.S. 6th Fleet and its role in the Mediterranean region in the aftermath of World War II. Considerable space is devoted to the

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development of American postwar naval activity in the eastern Mediterranean, the withdrawal of British aid to Greece and Turkey, and the subsequent decision to project a peacetime naval presence in the region.

*For sale by the National Technical Information Service, U.S. Dept. of Commerce, 5285 Port Royal Road, Springfield, VA 22161.

Quester, George H. *New Alternatives for Targeting the Soviet Union*. DNA 5047T. Marina del Rey, Calif.: Analytical Assessments Corporation, 1979. 58pp.*

This report, prepared for the Director of the Defense Nuclear Agency, addresses the options for target selection within the Soviet Union. New targeting evaluations are made necessary by the dynamic threat of Soviet strategic forces and are demanded by the rise in accuracy and in number of U.S. warheads. The increase in American capabilities would allow destruction of some targets previously deemed invulnerable; in addition, it would permit the sparing of certain Soviet facilities while "surgically" eliminating others. As a result, what to hit, versus what to spare, has emerged as an important issue now requiring specific decisions.

*Distributed by the Defense Nuclear Agency, Attention: STT1, Washington, DC 20305

Shackley, Theodore. *The Third Option; an American View of Counterinsurgency Operations*. New York: Reader's Digest Press/McGraw-Hill, 1981. 185pp. \$12.00

Shackley, a retired intelligence officer with 30 years of service, maintains that "year by year, nation by nation, we have relinquished our ability to shape events throughout the world." In this readable exposition of covert action and paramilitary operations, he argues that we cannot limit our national security options to military and diplomatic alternatives, but must actively employ counterinsurgency to protect American interests abroad. He presents a succinct analysis of the development of covert operations from the cadre phase to conventional war and offers a prescription for countering each stage, using examples from El Salvador, the Western Sahara, Angola, and the Spanish Basques.

Snyder, Edwin K. et al. *The Taiwan Relations Act and the Defense of the Republic of China*. Berkeley: University of California. Institute of International Studies, 1980. 132pp. paper \$3.95

The granting of formal diplomatic recognition to the People's Republic of China necessitated the "derecognition" of the Republic of China (Taiwan). The authors of this study concern themselves with the impact of this policy upon Taiwan's ability to maintain a credible defense capability. The Taiwan Relations Act provides for arms sales to Taiwan to secure its integrity, while at the same time the U.S. Government is seeking to develop friendlier relations with the People's Republic of China. If the United States does not uphold its promise, Taiwan's security will be jeopardized and America's credibility will be impaired.

PROFESSIONAL READING 135

Stein, Janice G. and Tanter, Raymond. *Rational Decision-Making; Israel's Security Choices, 1967*. Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1980. 399pp. \$25.00

Published by the Mershon Center for Education in National Security, this work is the outgrowth of a visit to the Department of International Relations at Hebrew University following the October War of 1973. The authors, who challenge the orthodox interpretation of Israel's decisions in 1967, contend that the decisionmaking process and the choices made during that crisis were based on questionable logic. Since those decisions are significant to today's decisionmakers, close scrutiny is given to the argument, process, and choices made in 1967; a detailed synthesis and explanation of available decision-making theories is presented; and the implications of the research results for both theory and policy are considered.

Steward, Dick. *Money, Marines, and Mission: Recent U.S.-Latin American Policy*. Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1980. 280pp. paper \$11.75

Inter-American relations from 1933 to the present are the subject of this study. U.S. political and economic power has strongly influenced Latin America for an extended period of time. It is Steward's opinion that American policy toward Latin America has been "a paradoxical combination of naked imperialism and misguided idealism; of philanthropy and profit; of altruism plus a healthy corporate profit." Latin America's subordinate position has bound the region securely to United States economics, objectives, and military power.

Ulam, Adam B. *Russia's Failed Revolutions: from the Decembrists to the Dissidents*. New York: Basic Books, 1981. 453pp. \$18.95

Ulam, Director of the Russian Research Center at Harvard University, addresses one of the central questions in Russian political history: why have attempts at revolution and reform failed consistently during the last century and a half? His book is an examination of the specific historical and social circumstances which have hampered the struggle for freedom. It takes us from the aristocrats' revolt that led to the Decembrists' abortive coup of 1825 to a look at political dissension in the Soviet Union today.

Wheeler, Keith, *War under the Pacific*. Chicago: Time-Life Books, 1980. 208pp. \$14.95

This work, the 23rd volume of the Time-Life World War II series, describes the submarine operations involved in the Pacific theater. While the American/Allied point of view receives the central focus, the book additionally develops the Japanese antisubmarine efforts. It also presents insights into the operations of the Imperial Japanese Navy's own submarine force. The volume is extraordinarily well-illustrated with over 170 photographs, maps, drawings, and diagrams, several of which are in color. Of particular note is a picture essay on the evolution of the submersible vessel as a weapon.

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