



# NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

MARCH - APRIL 1975





# NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

## FOREWORD

The *Naval War College Review* was established in 1948 by the Chief of Naval Personnel in order that officers of the service might receive some of the educational benefits available to the resident students at the Naval War College. The forthright and candid views of the lecturers and authors are presented for the professional education of its readers. Lectures are selected on the basis of favorable reception by Naval War College audiences, usefulness to servicewide readership, and timeliness. Research papers are selected on the basis of professional interest to readers. Reproduction of articles or lectures in the *Review* requires the specific approval of the Editor, *Naval War College Review* and the respective author or lecturer. *Review* content is open to citation and other reference, in accordance with accepted academic research methods. The thoughts and opinions expressed in this publication are those of the lecturers and authors and are not necessarily those of the Navy Department nor of the Naval War College.

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## PRESIDENT'S NOTES

The Naval War College, since the days of Capt. A.T. Mahan, has borne a special responsibility for encouraging creative thought with regard to the strategic and tactical application of maritime power. Today, the requirement for creativity and innovation is especially demanding in view of the new ships, aircraft, weapon systems, and sensors now in the fleet or entering production—all this at a time when the political, economic, and military context in which the U.S. Navy must function is changing with astonishing rapidity.

To emphasize the role of the Naval War College in preparing our Navy for the future, the Secretary of the Navy, on 27 February 1975, approved an addition to the mission statement of the Naval War College, "... to conduct research leading to the development of advanced strategic and tactical concepts for the future employment of naval forces." The scope of what needs to be done is so vast that we at the College can only hope to make a partial contribution. Further, we are well aware of the vital roles played by the Chief of Naval Operations, Fleet Commands, and others in the development of strategic and tactical concepts. Our work will be undertaken in the closest coordination with all concerned. At the same time, I



believe that the Naval War College should play a vital role in this development process—while acting as a focal point of forward looking maritime research. Besides holding a core of human and material resources, the College possesses an appropriate setting for objective research in which those concerned will be able to pursue their work relatively free of the distractions of the daily crisis. I, for one, look forward to the creative work involved with a thorough appreciation of its difficult nature and with an enthusiasm summoned forth by the challenge. I expect to call upon the *Naval War College Review* to report the progress made in our research activity. Whereas it may not be feasible to go into precise detail for obvious reasons, I would hope to interest those with a flair for innovation to contribute to or participate in research undertaken by the College.


In this issue of the *Review* there are several provocative articles which should challenge the minds, and hopefully the pens, of our readers. Philip Geyelin's discourse, given at the Naval War College Military-Media Conference in November, provides his view of the role of a free press in a free society. Mr. Geyelin refers to the discussions which took place during a similar conference at the Marine Corps School as having

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been "like Bangladesh." Such was also the case during the Naval War College conference—neither the students nor the media representatives believed that the points they were making were fully understood. Certainly, there is no doubt of the need for a free press in a free society—the debate concerned very simply how the press should go about meeting its responsibilities. It is in this spirit that we highlight Geyelin's remarks in this issue and solicit the comments of our readers on what he had to say.

In other articles, this issue of the *Review* turns to the lessons and examples of the past, both recent and not so recent. Professor Crowl of our

faculty gives an interesting new perspective on the approach of John Foster Dulles toward relations with the Soviet Union—a topic of special interest today. Professor Schroeder, in discussing the balance of power, turns our attention to the policies of the last century; but in reading his article we should also bear in mind that the same theories of balance have had a strong influence on contemporary international relations.



JULIEN J. LEBOURGEOIS  
Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy  
President, Naval War College

*The segment of American society collectively known as the press has come under increasingly heavy criticism in recent years and has been charged with such crimes as contributing to the American defeat in Vietnam, causing the downfall of one of "the finest American Presidents in history," and reporting only the bad news. The fact is that events caused these things to happen; the press, or the media as it is sometimes called, did nothing more than publicize the events. Such accusations inevitably lead to questions about the proper relation between the press and the Government and to the necessity of a well-informed public in a democratic society.*

## THE ROLE OF THE PRESS IN AN OPEN SOCIETY

A lecture given at the Naval War College

by

Mr. Philip Geyelin

I am especially happy to be here this evening and to be given the opportunity to talk to so distinguished a gathering about matters concerning our respective trades—the media and the military.

A similar adventure before a comparable audience at the Marine Corps Schools in Quantico makes me fully aware that there exists in military circles a certain lack of affinity with the press. You might even call it a hostility. They were polite down at Quantico and militarily proper, standing up when we came in and again when we walked out. But in between it was Bangladesh. Nothing was thrown and no blows were struck, but there existed a firm conviction that coverage of the Vietnam war by newspapers and television had contributed in a major way to prolonging it, to greatly increasing the cost in lives, and, in the end, to making a victory impossible in any conventional sense of the word. The message was abundantly

clear to the panel consisting of a CBS reporter, an Associated Press correspondent, a gentleman from the *Times*, and myself, all of whom had worked for varying lengths of time in Vietnam and thought we knew something about it.

But that was fair enough because having myself spent several months out there—with the Marines up around the Rock Pile and with the Army in War Zone C and down in the delta with the pacifiers—I think I can understand the frustrations of the military, the civilians as well, and their resentment of the way the story of the war was being told by the press and received by the public back home.

I also think that a lot of this anger and frustration was the result of some serious misconceptions about the role of the press in our system of government, about the obligations and responsibilities of our civilian leadership, and about the role of the military in the infinitely

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complex and delicate process by which a free and open society governs itself.

I would like to take this as a starting point because I think it will lead us into some of the questions that may be on your minds and may be central to the theme of this military-media conference.

In your letter, Admiral LeBourgeois, you posed some very pointed and provocative questions which generally had to do with:

- Differing standards and styles of journalism practiced around the world;
- How well journalists of other countries cover Washington or understand our own press coverage of Washington; and
- How much this matters with respect to our conduct of foreign policy.

You asked about the strengths and weaknesses of the adversary role of the press and why there is so much suspicion and hostility directed at the media in their coverage of military and international news. Finally, you asked what advice might be given professional military men who become involved in events of news interest.

Let us deal quickly with that last question as a separate issue. I have no hesitation in answering it because we have just had an opportunity to do so editorially with respect to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Our answer in that case was that there are some things so clearly presidential in nature and subject to ultimate civilian determination that professional military people ought not to express strong views about them publicly. I am referring now to the specific policy questions and sensitive political issues to which General Brown addressed himself. There were clearly elements in his remarks that ought not to be a part of the public discourse of any responsible, high-ranking officials of the U.S. Government, whether civilian or military.

Nevertheless, I would quickly add before setting this difficult question

aside that this is *not* to say that professional military people should be seen but not heard on the issues that bear on their principal concerns. They have a duty to speak out candidly about the Nation's defense needs or about the course of a war or about threats to this country's security, a responsibility to report to Congress and to the people in a forthright way. That is as far as I think we ought to wander off into this particular thicket, except to make the observation that we might all have been better off if top military leaders had been more inclined to share with the public some of their private reservations about the strictly military aspect of what was happening at various stages in our involvement in Vietnam. I would add, by way of returning to some of the admiral's questions, that we might also have been better off if the civilian leadership had been more candid in its dealings with the press and the public during the Vietnam war.

This brings us very close to the heart of my central argument, that with respect to most of the important national and international issues with which we are concerned, the press in this (or any other) country can generally perform no better in relation to the Government than the Government is prepared to perform in relation to the press. The amount of truth that you can expect the press to bring to you—and I am using the word "truth" rather grandly—is dependent to a large degree on the amount of truth which the Government wishes to make available.

That is the case, at least for the short haul. Happily—and this is something that a succession of national administrations have been slow to learn—it is not so in our country over any long period of time. In my view that is one of the major lessons of Vietnam, just as it is the lesson of Watergate. In both cases the highest officials of Government set out on a course of action which depended for its success on

concealing its true nature from the press and from people who the Government is supposed to serve. In both cases gradual, grudging disclosure of the true nature of events raised grave public doubts about our institutions—including that institution which is called the free press—and not without some reason. It is undeniable in the case of the press that in both instances our performance was uneven, that we were, first of all, slow to react and in some cases derelict in our duty, and later, sometimes overzealous and from time to time unfair. While being slow to get going, we may well have been too hot in our pursuit. Yet, this hardly sustains the charge that critical reporting of the war in Vietnam was the root cause of our troubles there. Our troubles began with the fact that the Government never made an honest effort to rally public support for its policy on the basis of a candid declaration of what the policy actually was. Still less does it sustain the even more excessive charge that some collective bias on the part of the press was responsible for the crisis in our affairs—the collection of crimes and improprieties and deceptions and conspiracies—which has come to be lumped together under the catchall label Watergate.

The point is that these things happened—as you can hear for yourself by reviewing almost any session of the Watergate cover-up trial. Things adverse to American interests also took place in Vietnam. Over time, the North Vietnamese proved to be a lot more resourceful than they were ever thought capable of being; whether it was the TET offensive, the later sweep through the DMZ, or simply the steady, relentless pressure in the highlands or in III Corps. The American mission proved to be a good deal more difficult to accomplish, under the ground rules which civilian leaders fixed from the very start, than most people supposed it would be. In other words, events were the deter-

mining factors, and the press, with varying degrees of skill, doggedness, and accuracy, reported these events.

Therefore, one must ask the question, "What is the source of the hostility and antipathy toward the press in the year 1974?" I would say that in large measure this situation developed from the fact that for more than a decade of racial conflict, campus disorders, economic distress, war, and unprecedented misconduct at the highest levels of Government, the press has been telling the people things that the people do not really want to hear and that the Government does not want the people to know or at least to think much about. There are other reasons, of course, but a large part of our problem, I would argue, is that we have been bringing you bad news, not for the sheer joy of it, but because the news has been bad. Now the question is whether you would really want it any other way, and if so, how.

Let us take a quick look at some alternatives. In the Soviet Union the so-called press is completely controlled by the government—worth reading only if you want to know what the government wants you to know. The same may be said for other Communist governments and a good many right-wing, totalitarian governments as well. I remember meeting a delegation of visiting Chinese "newspapermen" whose leader announced at the outset of the conversation that they could not discuss Watergate because of the sensitivity of relations between our two countries. They did not, in other words, wish to inquire into the single most important political event on the American scene. Would anybody in this country want to be served by a corps of American foreign correspondents under similar wraps? On assorted travels around the world, I have had some experience with what happens to the bad news. Sometimes it is removed with scissors or a blue pencil, as in Jordan or Lebanon, and sometimes more subtly, as in

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Nasser's Egypt. The trick was merely to hold up objectionable copy for 24 hours or so while the competition's copy moved out unimpeded. Under such circumstances and in the face of impatient cables from the home office, the pressure is strong to give the local government's monitors the least possible offense. Even in some Western democracies, government subsidies—and the concomitant power to withhold them—serve to restrain genuinely free expression by the press. In France it was not uncommon for the entire edition of a newspaper to be confiscated by the Government to block reports on atrocities by French forces in the Algerian war. How many people in this country would have wanted American newspapers similarly treated during the Vietnam war? Britain's press perhaps most closely resembles our own in its long tradition of free expression, and yet if the American press had been subject to British concepts of pretrial publicity and libel, it is doubtful that the story of Watergate could have been brought to the point of the Ervin committee hearings or to the initiation of the impeachment process in the House. We therefore have the venerable *Times* of London describing the *Washington Post's* Watergate reporting as a lynching party.

While participating on a recent French television panel, I heard the proposition seriously advanced that "two little journalists" had brought down one of the finest American Presidents in history." That proposition is wrong on two counts; what the press did was to report events. It was the events that brought down Mr. Nixon: the tapes and Judge Sirica, an alert watchman at the Democratic Party headquarters, the enemies list, the plumbers, the burglary of Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist, a unanimous decision by the United States Supreme Court, and all the rest. In the last analysis, Mr. Nixon brought Mr. Nixon down. And on a second count this

proposition is wrong because contrary to what a great many French and other Europeans feel, Mr. Nixon was not, by the judgment of his own people and of the Congress nearly as fine and upright a figure as the European press had led their readers to believe. He was, on the contrary, quite possibly the most dangerous President in our history. And yet the reason for his removal remains a mystery to many people around the world. The fact that the great bulk of newspaper readers even in some of the world's most open societies were totally unprepared for the denouement of Watergate and the President's ultimate disgrace is an important commentary on the standards of journalism which prevail elsewhere in the world—a commentary, you might say, on the alternatives that are available to us.

That is why it is disturbing to hear from sensible and responsible people in Government, industry, and in the military the litany: "Why do you only publish the bad news; why don't you tell us the good news?" The fact is we do tell you the good news if only because we dutifully report the things that Presidents and Senators and Cabinet members and generals and admirals are saying—the progress reports, the success stories, the rose-tinted view of economic conditions, our international achievements, or the effectiveness of weapons systems are published faithfully, often in full text, in newspapers every day. And there is something you should know about much of the bad news we also print: it usually comes, often anonymously but no less reliably on that account, from Government officials, politicians, and military officers who do not believe the good news stories, who do not share the official, rosy view of things, or who disagree with prevailing policy. Just the other day, a sub-Cabinet official from the Ford administration came before our editorial board to argue for a program of economic relief for areas of hard-core

unemployment which he thought his own administration was not doing enough about. He urged us to send a reporter and a photographer out to a ghetto or a West Virginia mining town to publicize the story of poverty. This request came from an administration which, at the same time and out of the other corner of its mouth, regularly accuses the press of accentuating the bad news. It comes from an administration which only recently could bring itself to say the word "recession" while the clear evidence of recession was before our very eyes, in unimpeachable unemployment figures and production statistics made public by the Government. As with the economic bad news, so it was with Vietnam and Watergate. The bad news behind the confident body counts and the hard evidence of criminal conduct behind the Presidential protestations of innocence came from honorable, responsible officials of Government who deeply believed that the public was not being told the truth.

Of course there is room in this process for inaccuracy or poor judgment on the part of the press. There is the possibility of bias as well, for bias is a frailty common to us all: to reporters, to editors, and to the reader who brings his own particular prejudices and predilections to bear in judging the fairness of the press. But in asking you to consider the alternatives, I suggest that there is a direct connection between the kind of press we have and the kind of Government we have, between a free press and a free society. You cannot have one without the other. It therefore says something troubling about the depth of our reverence for an open society when so many prominent and presumably thoughtful people express such a deep distaste for the free and

open functioning of the press by demanding a quiet conspiracy in restraint of bad news. The press is not in the business of building confidence or images; it is in the business of holding Government accountable to the governed—to a certain extent, it is in the early warning business, if you will. I would not argue that we could not do this business better than we do. But I would leave you with the thought that when the Founding Fathers predicated our system on a press free of governmental control—when they wrote the clause beginning: "Congress shall make no law..."—they were not deluding themselves into thinking that they were protecting or making provision for a perfect press; they expected it to be human; but they intended it, above all, to be free.

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#### BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY



Philip L. Geyelin has been Editorial Page Editor of the *Washington Post* since 1967. Following his military service with the U.S. Marine Corps in the 1940's, his career as a newspaperman has taken him to

the political and diplomatic fronts. From 1947 to 1967, Mr. Geyelin covered the Dewey campaign, the Eisenhower and Stevenson campaigns, and the White House for *The Wall Street Journal*. During the period of 1956-1960, he served as that paper's chief European correspondent. He has traveled to Vietnam, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, and Europe as a diplomatic correspondent in Washington. In 1966 Mr. Geyelin received an Overseas Press Club citation, and in 1970 he was awarded a Pulitzer Prize for editorial writing. He is author of the book *Lyndon B. Johnson and the World* published in 1966.

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*John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State during the Eisenhower years, remains in the memory of most political scientists as the hard-line cold warrior, the visceral enemy of appeasement and author of massive retaliation. However, as is the case with many a popular stereotype—even one created by the subject himself—the facts tend to contradict the tenets of the myth.*

## **JOHN FOSTER DULLES: THE POLICY BEHIND THE MYTH**

An article prepared

by

Professor Philip A. Crowl

Secretary of State John Foster Dulles was known as the notorious, fire-breathing warmonger, the self-styled brinksman ever pushing to the verge of Armageddon, the reckless brandisher of the hydrogen bomb, the truculent, intransigent, hard-line cold warrior *par excellence*. In reminiscing about the Geneva Summit Conference of 1955, Nikita Khrushchev referred to him as "that vicious cur Dulles . . . always prowling around Eisenhower, snapping at him if he got out of line."<sup>1</sup> Strong indeed, but only slightly more disparaging than many epithets commonly directed at the Secretary by his own countrymen.

Whence came this reputation? Did his deeds as Secretary of State, in fact, match the provocative words he so often launched in the direction of Moscow and Peking? And what about President Eisenhower? Was he badgered into line by Dulles, as Khrushchev observed? A dozen years ago these questions

would have almost certainly been answered in the affirmative, but today, as historians probe more deeply into the record of the Eisenhower administration, different answers emerge.

Indeed, such harsh phrases seem more in the nature of caricature than portrait, and the first strokes of the brush were first laid on by Mr. Dulles himself. The work began in earnest during the presidential campaign of 1952 when he, as one English critic put it, set for himself the task of "proving how much he differed from Acheson," whose shoes he was most anxious to fill.<sup>2</sup> Although it is unusual for a would-be Secretary of State to run for office, Dulles was an unusual man. Robbed once of his chance to serve in that capacity by the defeat of Governor Dewey in 1948, he was not disposed to permit history to repeat itself.

The opening shot of his campaign was an article in the 19 May 1952 issue of *Life* magazine called "A Policy of

Boldness." "Courage," Dulles wrote, "will not be maintained in the [Soviet European] satellites unless the United States makes it publicly known that it wants and expects liberation to occur." Furthermore, though disclaiming any wish for "a series of bloody uprisings and reprisals," he outlined a seven-point program by which the United States could promote the restoration of independence to the "captive nations" behind the Iron Curtain.

"Peaceful separation from Moscow" by making enslavement so "unprofitable that the master will let go his grip" was the program Dulles offered the Republican Party as an alternative to Dean Acheson's policy of containment. The party, in turn, offered it to the Nation's voters. Dulles himself wrote the foreign policy plank in the 1952 Republican platform that denounced "the negative, futile and immoral policy of 'containment'" and promised to "repudiate all commitment . . . such as those of Yalta which aid Communist enslavements." In the campaign that followed, Dulles pushed the idea of liberation with such vigor that even Eisenhower became alarmed lest the reservation "by peaceful means" be submerged in the flood of campaign oratory. The President-to-be had no interest in committing his administration to a revolutionary blood-bath throughout central Europe.

Once in office, of course, the Republican administration quickly shelved the doctrine of liberation except as a pious and long-range hope. However, Dulles' reputation as an implacable foe of Communist imperialism was firmly established and was to be enhanced by his frequent reference to the governments of Moscow and Peking as "godless," "brutal," and "monstrous."

In the same *Life* article of May 1952, Dulles also announced his views on what he called "peace by deterrence." "Obviously," he wrote, "we cannot build a 20,000 mile Maginot Line or match the Red armies, man for man, gun for gun,

or tank for tank at any particular time or place their general staff selects." The solution was obviously "for the free world to develop the will, and organize the means, to retaliate instantly against open aggression by Red armies, so that, if it occurred anywhere, we could and would strike back where it hurts, by means of our own choosing."

Here was a concept far more disturbing to nervous peace-lovers at home and abroad than liberation, especially after successful tests the following November revealed that one of the "means of our own choosing" could be the hydrogen bomb. Their fears were confirmed in January 1954 when Dulles, now Secretary of State, incorporated the threat of thermonuclear destruction into his developing doctrine of deterrence. The United States, said the Secretary, would henceforth depend primarily upon its "great capacity to retaliate, instantly, by means and at places of our choosing."<sup>3</sup> Not surprisingly, news editors the next day foreshortened the original to "massive retaliation" and thus, bold headlines all over the world confirmed Dulles' reputation as a relentless cold warrior.

Nonetheless, what the headlines omitted was another Dulles phrase more expressive of the central theme of the Eisenhower foreign and defense policies than "massive retaliation." What the administration sought, he said, was an international security system that provided "maximum protection at bearable cost." And he added: "It is now possible to get, and share, more basic security at less cost." This was the solution, it was hoped, for the major problem of foreign policy as it was perceived by the President and all his principal advisers: How to reconcile national security with national solvency.

The problem had been a major consideration of Eisenhower's for a long time. At Abilene, Kans., in June 1952, in his first public address as a declared candidate for the Presidency, the

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general announced: "Today, America must be spiritually, economically, and militarily strong, for her own sake and for humanity. She must guard her solvency as she does her physical frontiers. This means elimination of waste, luxury, and every needless expenditure from the national budget."<sup>4</sup>

The next month, in Denver, he called for the avoidance of further deterioration in the value of the currency and warned that "a bankrupt America is a defenseless America."<sup>5</sup> Again and again, both as candidate and as President, Eisenhower reverted to the same theme—Federal spending must be checked; fiscal irresponsibility would ruin the Nation; spiraling inflation spells social chaos; the budget must be balanced! Soviet leaders, he continued, were prepared to exploit America's weakness by imposing "an unbearable security burden leading to economic disaster." "Communist guns, in this sense," said Eisenhower, "have been aiming at an economic target no less than a military target."<sup>6</sup>

After the election, the President-elect went to Korea, as promised, and on the return trip aboard the cruiser *Helena* conferred with the men who would be his chief advisers. Again he stressed the grave dangers of inflation and the need for government economy, especially economy in defense spending. Among those present were George M. Humphrey, Secretary of the Treasury designate, who was later held responsible in some quarters for the ensuing cutbacks in the Federal Budget. Indeed, Dean Acheson went so far as to assert that "Eisenhower left foreign affairs to the decisions of . . . Humphrey . . . [whose] policy of retrenchment for fiscal and economic reasons . . . led to the Dulles rationalization of necessity—the policy of massive nuclear retaliation."<sup>7</sup>

Acheson exaggerated. Humphrey was no more the mastermind of Eisenhower's fiscal policy than was Dulles the *eminence grise* in the field of interna-

tional relations. Aboard the *Helena* it was Eisenhower who took the lead. If Humphrey pushed his own brand of economic conservatism on the President, he was only preaching to the converted; but Eisenhower knew his man. On 23 March 1953 he announced that thenceforth the Secretary of the Treasury would attend the meetings of the National Security Council. Thus, he later explained, "the responsibilities of the NSC as an advisory body were broadened to recognize the relationship between military and economic strength."<sup>8</sup> A few days later he directed that every NSC policy paper include the estimated cost of the program it proposed.

Upon assuming office, the President consulted with another of his most trusted advisers, Budget Director Joseph M. Dodge, to discuss the downward revision of the budget sent to the Congress by the outgoing Truman administration. He was "determined," in his own words, "to put the federal government on a stronger financial position as quickly as possible."<sup>9</sup> President Truman's Fiscal Year 1954 budget estimated total military expenditures of \$46.3 billion and requested new obligatory authority for military items of \$41.5 billion. Under pressure from the White House, the Pentagon agreed to cut the expenditures estimate by about \$2.3 billion and the appropriations request by about \$5.2 billion.<sup>10</sup> Then, having squeezed what it could out of the last of the Truman budgets, the new administration set to work on the budget for Fiscal Year 1955.

But before spending could be reduced, it was obvious that a new look would have to be taken at the Nation's strategic plans and military requirements. What emerged from this review, conducted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the National Security Council, was NSC policy paper 162/2 which received the President's approval on 30 October 1953. Assuming the continuation of the

containment policy, this document set aside plans for conventional general war or large-scale limited war. Reliance was instead to be placed on tactical nuclear weapons, strategic airpower, and the hydrogen bomb as deterrents to aggression.

This became the basis of Secretary Dulles' massive retaliation speech of a few months later, a speech which was, in essence, nothing more than the articulation of the New Look of NSC 162/2. Foreign policy bowed to military policy which, in turn, bowed to fiscal policy.<sup>11</sup>

The new defense budget dropped to \$40.6 billion in expenditures and \$31 billion in new obligational authority. Most of the savings were to be borne by cuts in manpower. While the FY 1955 budget did provide funds for expanding the Air Force from 114 wings to 120 wings, it called for a reduction of Army, Navy, and Marine Corps manpower by about 13 percent, with further cuts planned over the next 2 years. The Army was the chief target and dropped from a level of 1,480,000 on 1 January 1954 to about 1 million in the autumn of 1956.

Drastic reductions in manpower, however, were insufficient alone to bring about the much desired economies. One of the central features of the New Look was the redeployment of U.S. forces from outlying positions abroad to a central strategic reserve in the United States. It was argued that the indigenous troops of allied nations, with U.S. financial assistance, should have primary responsibility for local defense and that the cost of such an arrangement would be much less than to maintain American troops on foreign territory.

It was this rationale that underlay much of Secretary Dulles' own attitudes toward the Nation's allies. NATO is an example. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization was, of course, the linchpin of the policy of containment, but

without Germany, NATO was incomplete. Since its founding in 1949, the cardinal aim of American foreign policy in western Europe had been to incorporate a German army into what was called the European Defense Community, and the Eisenhower administration inherited the problem of pushing it through to completion despite French resistance. The New Look made the issue all the more urgent since there was little prospect of redeploying American Army units home without the addition of German troops to Western European defense. So when in 1953 it appeared that the French might reject EDC (as they eventually did), small wonder that Dulles threatened the oldest of America's allies with "an agonizing reappraisal of basic United States policy."

Outside of Europe, when Dulles engaged in alliance building ("pactomania," said his critics), the precepts of the New Look were equally present in his thinking. Pakistan and Iraq were urged to join the Baghdad Pact with the reward of U.S. mutual security funds, and the countries of Southeast Asia who joined the United States in SEATO were assured the same treatment. To those other nations of the Third World who declined the honor and chose to remain uncommitted, Dulles admonished that neutrality was "an immoral and short sighted conception."

Although the nonaligned nations were to frustrate Dulles' ultimate goal of "completing containment," at least the goals of the New Look were being achieved by the autumn of 1955. Total Government expenditures had been reduced by \$10 billion and taxes by about \$7.5 billion, thereby fulfilling Republican promises. By June of 1956 the budget was in balance.

Yet all was far from well, for in August 1953 the Soviets had carried out their own thermonuclear explosion. By 1955 they were stockpiling hydrogen bombs, were well along in the production of long-range bombers, and had

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begun testing large numbers of 800-mile-range ballistic missiles. A "balance of terror" was emerging, but rather than engage in an armaments race, Eisenhower chose to accept the balance as a fact of life. In late 1955 the administration embarked upon a "new new look," concluding that the United States need only maintain a nuclear retaliatory capacity *sufficient* to deter a direct Soviet attack on American territory or its vital interests. The now obsolete doctrine of massive retaliation with its dependence on the first-strike capacity of the Strategic Air Command was officially abandoned in favor of "sufficiency" and a second-strike capability.

On the basis of this doctrine, Eisenhower could still hold the line on military spending. Fiscal Year 1957 defense expenditures were down to \$36.7 billion, their lowest point in the Eisenhower administration. When they later began slowly to climb, it was only because of creeping inflation. Reckoned in constant dollars, the Eisenhower budgets went down every year from 1954 through 1960.<sup>12</sup> Nor did the launching of the Soviet Sputnik in October 1957 make much immediate difference except to cause some shifting of funds to research and development. When, in November of 1958, Khrushchev issued his 6 months ultimatum on Berlin, Eisenhower concluded that one of the Soviet leader's purposes was to frighten the United States and its allies "into unnecessary and debilitating spending sprees."<sup>13</sup> To a delegation of Congressmen representing both political parties, he "insisted that if we were to respond with frantic haste to every annoying threat of the Soviets, we would merely be dancing to the tune they called, with the result that they could destroy effective planning on our part and push us toward bankruptcy."<sup>14</sup>

Indeed, the economy-minded President had cause for alarm. Starting in the summer of 1958, aerospace enthusiasts,

backed by powerful Democrats in Congress, mounted an all-out attack on the Eisenhower budget. It was in this context only that the President issued his now famous warning about the "military-industrial complex"—hinting at sinister forces threatening to undermine the foundations of democratic society but really aiming at the more immediate danger of a spending spree. With the Democratic Party about to take over both the executive and legislative branches of the Federal Government, the outgoing Republican President could only view the future of the Federal Budget with grave alarm.

How did Secretary Dulles respond to the relative diminution of American military strength resulting from Eisenhower's fiscal policy? He was, of course, a Republican himself, an economic conservative, and a loyal member of the Eisenhower team constantly "touching base" with the boss. Abroad, he cabled the President daily; in Washington he as often phoned him, and two or three times a week stopped off at the White House on his way home from work. According to Eisenhower: "During our six years together, there were only a handful of days when, either abroad or at home, he did not communicate to me the essentials of his activities and the results of his work."<sup>15</sup> Dulles, himself, explained their working relationship as follows:

I try to present clear recommendations to the President rather than alternatives. If there are two or more choices as to what action to take, I don't want merely to outline these to him and leave it up to him to make the decision unaided by my advice. Rather, after stating the alternatives, I select the approach I think best and recommend this to him for his approval, giving my reasons for the selection. As the President's chief of staff in foreign affairs, I believe good staff work

requires me to recommend what I consider the best solution.<sup>16</sup>

The term "chief of staff" was well chosen. The fact is that the bureaucratic style and structure of the Eisenhower administration was closely patterned after that of SHAEF headquarters in World War II where Bedell Smith had "staffed out" the position papers, ironing out contrary opinions and alternative possibilities before presenting them to the Supreme Commander.<sup>17</sup> Now it was Dulles who performed much the same function in the field of foreign relations. The final judge, however, was Eisenhower, whose word was law and whose own grasp of foreign affairs was far from negligible.

Even so, there is evidence that Dulles chafed under the fiscal straitjacket that the President forced him to wear. According to Andrew Berding, Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs and Dulles' official *confidante* during his later years in office, the Secretary suffered considerable anxiety as "successive cutbacks in American military strength rendered more difficult... [his] task of conducting relations with the Soviet Union." Dulles "went along," but confided to Berding that "since we had to deal with the Soviet Union from a position of strength, any diminution of our power made it harder to sustain our position."<sup>18</sup>

No doubt the Secretary drew consolation from the fact that Red China, at least, had neither hydrogen bombs nor ballistic missiles and that he could therefore be a little truculent toward Peking. He could even boast about it. Hence the well-known January 1956 article in *Life* magazine which attached permanently to Dulles' name the label of "brinksmen"—meaning either "dauntless foe of appeasement" or "reckless adventurer," depending on the reader. "If you are scared to go to the brink," said Dulles to James Shepley, the author of the article, "you are lost.

We've had to look it square in the face—on the question of enlarging the Korean war, on the question of getting into the Indo-China war, and on the question of Formosa. We walked to the brink and we looked it in the face. We took strong action."<sup>19</sup> To clinch the point, *Life's* editors inscribed in bold print on the cover page: "Three Times to the Brink of War: How Dulles Gambled and Won."

Clearly, restraint was *not* the hallmark of Dulles' posture toward Communist China.<sup>20</sup> For the 6 years of his tenure as Secretary of State, the dialog between Washington and Peking consisted mostly of thunderous charges, countercharges, threats, and recriminations—all publicly pronounced. Had there been normal channels of diplomatic exchange between the two capitals, the tone of the discourse would probably have been less strident; also, Dulles would have been more mannerly toward Mao and Chou had there been any serious risk of military retaliation.

There was, in fact, only slight risk of war with Communist China unless the United States decided to start it. Though there were powerful elements within the Republican Party anxious to force a showdown with Red China, neither Dulles nor Eisenhower shared their views. In negotiating the Korean truce, they resisted pressures from the China Lobby and rejected the MacArthur doctrine of escalation. Even more significantly, they applied the brakes to Syngman Rhee. In the Mutual Defense Treaty negotiated by Dulles, Rhee agreed to take no unilateral military action to unite Korea, and the United States obliged itself to come to the aid of the Republic of Korea only in case of an armed attack south of the 38th parallel.

Outside of Korea, where both sides now settled into a fairly comfortable truce, the only possible areas of conflict between the United States and Communist China were Indochina and

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Formosa with its outlying islands. Armed intervention in the former was ruled out by Eisenhower at the time of the Dienbien Phu siege in the spring of 1954. That summer, although the United States refused to sign the armistice agreements negotiated at Geneva and Dulles proclaimed his country's unwillingness "to be a party to any treaty that makes anybody a slave," the Undersecretary of State, Walter Bedell Smith, announced that the United States would refrain from the threat or the use of force to disturb the Geneva agreements. The President, furthermore, assumed a quiet wait-and-see attitude.

As to Formosa, the attention of Eisenhower and Dulles was about evenly divided between warning Peking against an attack on the Republic of China and restraining Chiang Kai-shek from doing likewise against the mainland. At the time of the crisis precipitated by the Communist Chinese bombardment of Quemoy and Matsu in 1954, Dulles was perhaps ready to fight for the defense of the offshore islands. But Eisenhower, in the words of Sherman Adams, "rejected a hotheaded plunge into atomic war as a solution to the Chinese problem."<sup>21</sup> Congress, for its part, passed the Formosa Resolution, authorizing the President to take appropriate military action to defend Formosa and the Pescadores, but left U.S. intentions in respect to Quemoy and Matsu purposely in doubt. As Adams later said, the Formosa Resolution "was not quite the belligerent challenge" to Peking that Dulles claimed in his interview with Shepley.<sup>22</sup> Meanwhile, a mutual defense pact was concluded between the United States and the Republic of China, that did not include Quemoy and Matsu in the treaty area. Furthermore, in an exchange of notes between Dulles and Foreign Minister Yeh, it was agreed that Nationalist China would not attack the mainland without the prior consent of the United States.

When Communist Chinese artillery

again opened up on Quemoy and Matsu in the autumn of 1958, Eisenhower increased the carrier strength of the 7th Fleet and sent it into Formosa Strait with orders to protect Nationalist Chinese convoys to the beleaguered offshore islands. He was careful, however, to instruct the fleet to conduct their escort duties short of the 3-mile limit off Quemoy and Matsu. Dulles was then sent to Taipei to subdue the independent thinking Generalissimo. As the price of continued U.S. aid, Chiang was persuaded to renounce his long-cherished dream of returning to the mainland. He even agreed in principle to withdraw most of his troops from the offshore islands. Meanwhile, the United States had responded favorably to Chou En-lai's offer to resume conversations at the ambassadorial level in Warsaw, and by November the crisis had petered out. Not only had Eisenhower and Dulles thwarted Chiang's efforts to embroil the United States in a war with Communist China, but in the end had compelled the Generalissimo to promise publicly not to use force as "the principal means" to win the mainland. He would rely instead on winning "the minds and hearts of the Chinese people" by implementing Dr. Sun Yat-sen's Three Principles. This was a far cry from brinkmanship.

*Liberation, massive retaliation, brinkmanship* are the chief ingredients that form the popular stereotype of John Foster Dulles. Yet, in retrospect the foreign policy which he and the President pursued was marked by remarkable constraint. Indeed, the Eisenhower years witnessed a lull in the cold war, a sort of valley of quiescence between two peaks of activism—the Korean war on the one hand and, on the other, the Cuban missile crisis and Vietnam. Given the Republican administration's parsimonious defense budget, it could hardly have been otherwise.

In dealing with the Soviet Union, Dulles, in spite of his rhetoric, always moved with circumspection. In each of

the five crises out of which a serious Soviet-American confrontation might have developed, the American response was restrained and low-risk. In June 1953 he wisely shunned whatever opportunities for liberation were opened up by the East German uprising, and the rebels had to be satisfied with the offer of food-care packages from the United States. Three years later, when Soviet tanks and heavy guns moved into Budapest to crush a more serious revolution, Eisenhower issued a statement deploring the intervention; Dulles declared that "the weakness of Soviet imperialism is being made manifest," and the U.S. United Nations delegation introduced in the General Assembly a resolution calling on the Soviet Union to withdraw its troops. That was the extent of it. Later, when considering the question of whether the U.S. reaction would have been more intense had the Russian move into Hungary not overlapped the Suez crisis, Eisenhower observed: "My own answer . . . has always been negative."<sup>23</sup>

The 1956 Suez crisis, occasioned by the invasion of Egypt by Israel, France, and Britain, outraged Dulles and Eisenhower alike. America's chief partners in NATO had blatantly disregarded the wise counsel of the U.S. Government and, in Dulles' view, were guilty of insubordination. Of a far more serious nature was the potential Soviet missile threat against London and Paris and the fact that a protracted hot war in Egypt could only have raised the temperature of the cold war between East and West. Rather than allow that, Eisenhower sent Dulles to the United Nations, and there, "with a very heavy heart," the Secretary introduced a cease-fire resolution strongly censuring America's two closest allies. Thus the world was presented with the interesting spectacle of the United States and the Soviet Union marching hand-in-hand, voices joined in anticolonial harmony.

For a moment it looked as if the cold

war had ended, notwithstanding Hungary, but this was transitory. Two years later it was American troops that were dispatched to the Middle East—this time to Lebanon at the invitation of President Chamoun. There was no bloodshed, however, and the U.S. Marines were quickly withdrawn as were the British troops that had simultaneously entered Iraq. No real risk was run of confrontation with the Soviet Union, which, naturally enough, exploited the occasion to refurbish its own image before the world. Khrushchev later had this to say about the event:

Dulles stepped back from the brink of war. The reactionary forces of the United States and England pulled back their troops, partly under the pressure of world opinion but also partly as a result of Dulles's prudence . . . The prestige of the Soviet Union was enhanced in all the progressive countries of the world.<sup>24</sup>

The fifth and last crisis situation that developed between the two great powers during Dulles' tenure occurred in the wake of Khrushchev's announcement on 10 November 1958 that within 6 months he would sign a "peace treaty" with East Germany terminating Allied rights in West Berlin. He called upon the three Western Powers to begin negotiations with the East German Government toward a complete withdrawal of Allied forces from the city.

Certainly Calais was no dearer to the heart of Queen Mary Tudor than was Berlin to that of John Foster Dulles. Yet, when Khrushchev announced his intention of turning over the access routes to the East Germans, it was Dulles himself who suggested the possibility of dealing with them as "agents" of the Soviet Union and thus avoiding a showdown. It was an ingenious legalistic device and a credit to the man who claimed to have been the best paid lawyer on Wall Street. But Chancellor Adenauer was aghast, and Eisenhower

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himself would agree only to U.S. Army convoys on the Autobahn showing their passes to East German officials for identification purposes. Then, while Dulles cooled off the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the President proposed a four-power foreign ministers meeting scheduled for mid-April 1959.

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What then, in conclusion, can be said of Dulles' reputation as the number one cold warrior of the Western World? It is certainly not the purpose of this essay to unmask the Secretary as a brinksman *manqué*. Nor is it to expose the American press for fabricating another stereotype. The fact remains that it was Dulles who created the popular image of himself, and it is clear that he did so deliberately.

In his book, *War, Peace, and Change*, published in 1939, he had written as follows:

In order to bring a nation to support the burdens incident to maintaining great military establishments, it is necessary to create an emotional state akin to war psychology. There must be the portrayal of an external menace . . . This involves the development to a high degree of the nation-hero nation-villain ideology and the arousing of the population to a sense of the duty of sacrifice . . . Mass emotion on a substantial scale is prerequisite . . . A sense of peril from abroad must be cultivated . . .<sup>25</sup>

In 1939, on the brink of an earlier war, Dulles was arguing that preparedness alone is no guarantee of peace; so the quotation is lifted out of context. Ironically, however, it precisely forecasts his own chosen policy in the 1950's. As one scholar, O.R. Holsti, has put it: "One of the most enduring themes in his political theory was the proposition that unity and sacrifice are more easily built upon fear, especially

that engendered by external enemies, than upon hope."<sup>26</sup> As Dulles himself told Andrew Berding in explaining his opposition to the Geneva Summit: In the "false euphoria" created by such a meeting, "we and our allies might not take the necessary steps to keep the free world together. If there is no evident menace from the Soviet bloc our will to maintain unity and strength may weaken."<sup>27</sup>

No doubt the Secretary, by strong words and clarion warnings, hoped to dissuade the leaders in Moscow and Peking from launching adventurous probes westward and eastward and southward of the Iron and Bamboo Curtains. Perhaps he succeeded. But the words were meant equally for the ears of the American public, the U.S. Congress, and especially the Western Allies. It was the backbone of all three, he felt, that needed constant stiffening.

Yet, as Khrushchev himself admitted, "Dulles knew how far he could push us, and he never pushed us too far."<sup>28</sup> Sincere in his hatred of "atheistic com-

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### BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY



Professor Philip A. Crowl did his undergraduate work at Swarthmore College, earned his M.A. at the University of Iowa and his Ph.D. from Johns Hopkins University. He served as a Naval Reserve officer

in World War II and later as a historian in the Office of the Chief of Military History, U.S. Army, as intelligence officer in the U.S. Department of State, and as Director of the Dulles Oral History Project, Princeton University. Professor Crowl has published several books in the field of military history and has had a wide and varied experience in the academic community. Prior to assuming the chairmanship of the Department of Strategy at the Naval War College, he was professor and chairman of the Department of History, University of Nebraska. He is currently Acting Dean of Academics at the Naval War College.

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munism" and determined to block its spread, he was above all a prudent man, and prudence was the guiding principle of American foreign policy during the Eisenhower-Dulles years. In view of the

President's budgetary restrictions on the Armed Forces coupled with the Soviet Union's growing nuclear and missile strength, no other principle could possibly have been admissible.

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## THE "BALANCE OF POWER" SYSTEM IN EUROPE, 1815-1871

*Diplomacy in keeping with the balance of power system can be dangerous if the historical model of the 19th century is pressed too hard for analogies or lessons. Furthermore, it is important to impress upon contemporary statesmen the utility of alliances for mutual restraint, rather than security, and the value to the world of great powers having rivals upon whom they depend—powers they dare never fully trust, but whom they cannot finally do without.*

An article

by

Professor Paul Schroeder

Despite the significant role it played in the history of 19th century Europe, the balance of power is theoretically simple: Whenever a multistate system arises in a given area, that is, whenever you have a number of independent states in close proximity and frequent contact, the best way both to prevent violent conflict and to protect states' individual independence and security is to work for an equilibrium of power. How such a balance is initially achieved depends on historical circumstances—by postwar settlements, by peaceful territorial arrangements, by using a principle of compensation so that whenever any one state gains territory, others are similarly compensated, and so on. Once established, the balance of power must be actively maintained by member states; they must refrain from dangerous, unbalancing, unilateral gains

themselves and present a common front against states which do threaten the balance. The deterrent power of the system lies in this threat of a coalition against a would-be aggressor or dominating power.

The theory is inherently plausible and attractive, almost self-evident. It is virtually impossible for statesmen and theorists to consider conflicts of power in international relations without coming to terms with some sort of balancing procedure—checking power with countervailing power. Indeed, the historical precedent for balance of power reaches back at least to the works of Thucydides where the Peloponnesian Wars are explained as being fought to establish the proper balance of power in

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ancient Greece. Moreover, 19th century statesmen and publicists plainly thought and acted in terms of balance of power. Edmund Burke, Friedrich von Gentz, and other influential thinkers were balance of power theorists; almost every statesman used balance of power slogans and evidently believed them.

There is still another reason why balance of power doctrine and practice seem particularly appropriate to the 19th century. It was, in a certain sense, a British idea in the British century. Balance of power ideas for establishing peace and stability in international relations clearly resemble and fit in with other major 19th century ideas for achieving peace, progress, and prosperity in domestic affairs. These were the doctrines of free trade in economics and liberal constitutionalism in government. Each of these doctrines assumes that competition per se is a good, freedom-bearing, healthy thing, whether it is competition among states, among businessmen and entrepreneurs, or among political parties and ideas—so long as the competition is kept in balance, without domination, monopoly, or undue restrictions on freedom. Balance is the key to security and progress everywhere—a balance of state power in Europe; a balance of political power between monarch, parliament, and people in civil government; and a balance of economic power and wealth between manufacturers, workers, and traders through free trade, the natural balancer. Britain was the chief exponent of all these doctrines, and since she was the richest, most progressive, and most stable great power in Europe—the model and inspiration for most liberal reformers—her ideas, including those of balance of power, enjoyed special weight and prestige. In addition, Britain conceived herself as playing a special role in the European balance of power, free from those special interests and ambitions for which other powers might sacrifice the balance. Her only interest

was the preservation of the balance, and this disinterested objectivity plus her maritime supremacy and insular security, made Britain especially suited to be the holder and guardian of the concept.

Both balance of power doctrine and practice have value. Obviously, equilibrium is desirable, clearly preferable to empire or hegemony. Moreover, but for certain exceptions and qualifications which I will not take up here, balance of power practices do help to maintain the independence of the various states within the system. Since the strongest impulse in statecraft seems to be toward maintaining state independence, this makes balance of power doctrine and practice very attractive.

Unfortunately, the balance of power is less easily defined as an effective *peacekeeping* mechanism. First, the conditions of the system are very vague, subject to conflicting definitions and understandings. M.S. Anderson, an eminent British historian, remarks that the term "balance of power" often served no other purpose in 18th century British usage than to conceal an absence of thought.<sup>1</sup> One could say the same for the 19th and 20th centuries and for other countries besides Britain. The very fact that statesmen constantly talked about the European balance, using it to justify everything they did, makes the historian question whether it was anything more than a handy catch phrase. Martin Wight, another British scholar, concludes from a study of the actual uses of the term by statesmen and scholars that it had nine distinct meanings including the exact opposite of its normal meaning.<sup>2</sup> This would lead one to conclude that it is quite difficult to pin down the nature of balance of power policies and practices. Morton Kaplan, a political scientist, has drawn up six rules, or requirements, of the balance of power system, but as other scholars such as Raymond Aron have pointed out, they all amount to little

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more than saying that one ought to preserve a balance, which is not very helpful.<sup>3</sup> Thus the term "balance of power" does not seem useful either as a tool for analysis or a guide for policy.

More serious still, balance of power practice may be inherently self-contradictory. That is, in practice pure balance of power politics may tend to destabilize rather than stabilize an existing equilibrium. Several factors may contribute to this. First, any balance of power system requires that member states be able and willing to form a blocking coalition against an aggressor. Further, if the system is to be stable, the blocking coalition must remain a strict blocking coalition and not proceed to become aggressive or dominant itself. Yet, as W.H. Riker has shown, the natural, almost irresistible goal of politics—domestic and international alike—is to form winning coalitions. Hence any successful blocking coalition will be very strongly tempted to go beyond frustrating the alleged aggressor to win political or military victories, thereby itself threatening the balance.<sup>4</sup> Historical evidence suggests that coalitions quite often succumb to this temptation.

A related problem is the tendency of pure balance of power politics to promote dangerous confrontations rather than *détente* or *entente*. A successful balance of power system requires the early detection of a threat and prompt preparation to meet it, a sort of diplomatic early warning system. What this means, in theory at least, is that its members must be ready to act before a threat becomes obvious or is in the process of being carried out. This requirement does two things. It encourages an aggressor to prepare a surprise lightning move to upset the balance of power before a blocking coalition can be formed (historical examples from Louis XIV to Hitler demonstrate precisely this calculation), and it encourages other powers to confront and challenge supposed aggressors or

hegemonic aspirants when their dangerous purposes are only suspected, and are sure to be hotly denied—leading to a dangerous and perhaps unnecessary confrontation.

Furthermore, pure balance of power politics tends to promote, even to require, preventive and preemptive wars. One of the balance of power rules Kaplan cites is that actors must fight rather than allow the system to be overthrown or turned into empire or hegemony. But this clearly implies that if a statesman can recognize in the normal, expected course of events the growth of certain states and the decline of others, he must also see that the existing balance will be destroyed. Therefore, he must be willing to avert this outcome by preventive war, if necessary. To illustrate, prior to World War I, Germany complained that she was being encircled and threatened by the Triple Entente. The entente powers denied it and accused Germany of plotting to break up their purely defensive alignment. Which side was more correct makes no difference here. The point is that if the entente powers had good reason to believe that Germany aspired to dominate the Continent, they would have to form a blocking coalition encircling her, and if Germany had reason to believe that the entente powers were encircling and menacing her, she would have to try to break up the coalition or break through it. Thus this confrontation, so obviously dangerous, can be seen as a necessary, legitimate outcome of balance of power politics. One can go further. A.J.P. Taylor claims that the inherent dynamism of Germany was such before 1914 that had she merely remained calm, waited, and continued her peaceful economic development, she soon would have become dominant on the Continent without war.<sup>5</sup> I consider this prognosis incorrect. But suppose it were correct or the entente powers believed it correct; the obvious conclusion, on

balance of power principles, would be that they would have to launch a preventive war against Germany before she reached that commanding position. Or suppose, instead, that the position of Germany and her ally Austria-Hungary before 1914 was growing steadily weaker relative to that of their opponents and that in a few years the entente powers would be in a dominant position (which was what both entente statesmen and those of Germany and Austria tended to believe in 1914). Then Germany and Austria, on balance of power principles, would have to launch a preventive war to restore and secure the balance. Thus the preventive war gamble of these powers in July 1914, their attempt to regain a lost position of strength by violence, which set off World War I, becomes a necessary and justified move in balance politics.

Clear evidence of the destabilizing trend in pure balance of power politics, its tendency to promote and escalate conflict, is found even more in the 18th century, one dominated by the balance of power. Some scholars have viewed the 18th century balance of power as a moderating influence which helped to limit war, to moderate state goals, to make alliances restricted, temporary, and flexible, and in general to promote rational conduct in international relations. The fact is that 18th century wars of the European powers were frequent, long in duration, great in extent, and very exhausting. Indeed, most great powers in Europe were at war more years than they were at peace, fought as hard as the reigning military technology and their resources allowed, and strove just as desperately for survival or just as ardently for smashing victory as powers have in any other age. Neither were the aims of international politics limited or moderate. It was common practice to create alliances and carry on wars for the partition and destruction of major states. Poland, the Ottoman Empire,

Sweden, Prussia, the Austrian Empire, Spain, the French overseas empire, and other states and territories were all the victims of such intended or actual partitions. The system, moreover, did not tend to settle down into an increasingly stable balance but was clearly imbalanced, unstable, and headed for a crash even before the French Revolution in 1789.<sup>6</sup>

One therefore must find something besides the balance of power to account for the relative peace and stability of the 19th century, especially 1815-1848. This age was unusual not merely for the absence of major conflicts, but also for its positive accomplishments in international relations. Dangerous questions were settled and conflict avoided over issues that in almost any decade of previous centuries would have brought on war. We must remember that peace is caused, just as wars are caused. Often it seems to be tacitly assumed that peace is the normal condition in international relations and that only wars or other overt conflicts need to be accounted for as deviations from the norm. One can just as easily make an opposite case. In the European arena, conflict of interests and purposes is the norm and violent conflict the expected means of resolving them. No one should be puzzled by the fact that various European states fought more or less continuously from the 15th through the 18th centuries over the Low Countries, Switzerland, Germany, Italy, Poland, and the Near East. This is normal. What needs explaining is the phenomena of the 19th century: the fact that the great powers, despite grave crises and serious differences of opinion, cooperated to solve the Belgian and Swiss questions without even approaching war; the fact that revolutions in Italy and Poland failed to cause war between the powers, even though rivalries still existed there; the fact that all five great powers joined to save the Ottoman Empire from collapse, none of them seizing any of its territory for

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themselves. These facts need explaining, and balance of power alone does not provide the answer.

The actual peacekeeping system, though based on a balance of power, had elements built onto it which tended to modify potential conflict. The first of these elements was the prevailing spirit of pacific conservatism. All the states of Europe in 1815 save Switzerland were monarchies, mostly absolute monarchies. All were territorially satisfied, even defeated France. All were afraid of war and revolution, taught by bitter experience that these could overthrow not only individual thrones and kingdoms but the whole social order. Virtually all the statesmen belonged to a single international aristocratic elite, sharing the same conservative ideology and interests. Even the peoples of Europe were in a conservative mood—tired of war, taxes, conscription, and forceful change, mostly not yet politicized, nationally conscious, or socially alienated; by and large, content to be ruled by throne and altar. Hence there prevailed for a time an almost unexampled atmosphere of restraint, cooperation, desire to avoid war, and determination not to upset the status quo. Metternich used to say that Emperor Francis of Austria was so devoted to the existing treaties that if any power tried to get Austria to accept one village beyond them, Austria would declare war on that power. Hyperbole, no doubt, but the underlying sentiment was genuine enough.

The trouble is that such a spirit of peaceful conservatism cannot last. Peoples and rulers soon become restless and bored, lose their fear of revolt, regain the lust for adventure, revive the old issues and raise new ones. By itself this conservative spirit would hardly have lasted or preserved the peace more than a decade, which was all that Gentz and others expected. But something was created to institutionalize and perpetuate this conservative spirit, something

called the Concert of Powers, the Concert of Europe, or simply the Concert system—the second element added to the basic balance of power model. The Concert was not a supranational organization like the U.N. or even an organized system of international conferences, but rather a set of rules, understandings, and practices designed to enable the great powers to cooperate to control European politics, settle major problems, and, above all, avoid great-power conflicts. The Concert system proved far more durable than the general spirit of conservative solidarity, and although overthrown in mid-century, it was revived in a new form after 1871 and continued to function, though increasingly ineffectively, right down to 1914.

Essentially the Concert system established the great powers (the distinction between great and lesser powers was laid down at the Congress of Vienna) as a Directory of Europe. They alone decided great European questions; the other states could be heard but not vote. All significant European questions had to be decided in great-power concert, by agreed-upon means, generally through diplomatic conferences or congresses. The great virtues of this system were that it provided effective machinery and rules for settling dangerous questions and, even more important, enabled compromises to be secretly worked out between rival great-power interests behind a facade of great-power harmony and unity. Though the powers might line up against each other inside the Concert, the outcome would always be presented to the outside world as a unanimous solution, thus saving the face and prestige even of the powers who might actually have lost. Thus the Concert system served to avoid the confrontations, challenges, and humiliations which pure balance of power politics promoted. This was vital for whatever the deep-rooted causes of war may be, the most common immediate causes or

occasions for war are such challenges to a state's national honor or prestige. A prime diplomatic watchword has always been: "You must not play small tricks on great powers," and the first and great commandment of Concert politics was, "Do not seek to challenge or humiliate another great power."

The Concert system undoubtedly did much to keep Europe peaceful. Some scholars, including myself, have credited it with the chief role in European peacekeeping in the 19th century.<sup>7</sup> Yet there is a problem with emphasizing the Concert as the heart of the system: though it was useful and durable, it had no coercive power of itself. A state, if sufficiently determined and powerful, could defy the other participants and get away with it. Once successfully defied, either by great powers or, even worse, by smaller ones, the Concert would tend to lose its moral authority and effectiveness, and states would revert to power-political methods to preserve their interests. The state which most directly destroyed the Concert both in 1859 and in 1914 was Austria-Hungary, even though she had usually been the power most loyal to the Concert and most in need of the Concert system to uphold her great power status. Why then did she wreck it? Because in both instances she became convinced that the Concert system was only being used to isolate her, wreck her position, and force intolerable sacrifices upon her; therefore, it was better to overthrow it.

Thus, even the Concert system does not suffice to explain peace. A third element was an "independent center" for Europe. For centuries, Germany and Italy had represented power vacuums, the continual arena of great-power struggles. In 1815 Germany and Italy were organized into an independent center for Europe. Exactly how this was done—by means of a loose confederation of German states with Austria as president and by Austrian leadership in

Italy—is not so important as that it was done. This crucial cockpit of Europe was now made strong enough to escape the domination of the flank powers without the cohesion or power to menace its neighbors. To be sure, this system worked only until Italian nationalism created the Italian question, and the German great powers, Prussia and Austria, themselves fell out over Germany. Indeed, the eruption of wars in the 1850's and 1860's over Central Europe reinforces the thesis that an independent center was invaluable for European peace. When that center fell apart, war became inevitable, and before order and stability could return to Europe, an independent center in some shape had to be restored.

These three elements I have mentioned are all widely recognized. A fourth, perhaps the most important of all in making the 19th century system stable, is at the same time the one most easily overlooked and misunderstood: the "Holy Alliance." This alliance does not refer to the treaty of September 1815, sponsored by Tsar Alexander I of Russia in which he hoped to inaugurate a new era of peace and brotherhood among men (a treaty which most of the other states of Europe publicly signed and privately laughed at), but rather the actual alliance between the three so-called Eastern Powers—Austria, Prussia, and Russia. This relationship was based on combined rivalry and jealousy on the one hand and friendship and support on the other. This combination of mutual dependence and mutual suspicion made the Holy Alliance an outstanding example of what diplomats call a *pactum de contrahendo*—an alliance calling for restraint. All alliances are in some measure *pacta de contrahendo*. Every power which enters into an alliance with another wants not only to gain that power's help in case of need, but also seeks to exercise a greater influence over his partner's policy and to restrain him from using the alliance for illegitimate

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or dangerous ends. But the Holy Alliance was the very model of a *pactum de contrahendo*, tying these three powers so closely to each other, so entangling them in simultaneous rivalry and dependence that none, so long as this relationship lasted, was able to break loose either into open aggression or into a clear bid for mastery in Europe.

It is easy to identify the bases for this relationship. All these powers wanted to present a solid monarchical front against revolution, liberalism, and nationalism. The latter was obviously the most critical danger for Austria with her 11 major nationalities, but Russia was also a multinational state only 50 percent Great Russian, and Prussia had a large, troublesome Polish minority. This points to the most concrete shared interest of the three powers—hold down the Poles and prevent the resurrection of a Polish national state. They also feared social unrest; all of them had a peasant problem of sorts, by far the worst was in Russia. All had religious tensions, which we tend to underrate but which were as serious as nationality problems in the early 19th century. Prussia was split between Catholics and Lutherans; Russia had substantial Muslim, Roman Catholic, Lutheran, Old Believer, and Uniate minorities. Austria contained sizable Protestant and Orthodox groups; all had Jewish minorities.

Had shared conservative or reactionary social-political aims been the sole basis for the Holy Alliance, it might have constituted the great menace to European peace that many in the West thought it was; these aims might have led the three powers into dangerous antirevolutionary crusades and into a war with France or Britain. However, at the same time the power-political, balance of power aspects of their relationship cut in other directions. Each of these three powers saw the other two as potential or actual rivals, even at times as enemies. At the same time, each of

them had other potential or actual rivals and enemies against whom he needed the help of the other two. Thus each of these Eastern powers, from a power-political standpoint, was compelled constantly to be on guard against the other two as its opponents while retaining them as friends. For Austria one great challenge came from France, mainly in Italy; to meet this she needed Russian and Prussian support. But, at the same time, Austria was potentially menaced by Russia in southeast Europe and by Prussia in Germany, and most of all by a possible Russo-Prussian alliance against her. Russia, though more secure than her partners, felt a threat from the Western Powers, Britain and France, a threat of ideological penetration and subversion as much as direct attack. For this reason she wanted Austria and Prussia on her side as a barrier. The great danger was that Prussia and Austria themselves might become liberal or revolutionary and join the West in an anti-Russian coalition. But Austria was also Russia's rival in southeast Europe, and if either Prussia or Austria or both of them together ever united Germany into one great power, Russia would be directly and gravely threatened. As for Prussia, she was the weakest of the great powers and saw dangers and enemies in every direction.

Not only can historians in retrospect understand the Holy Alliance relationship as an ideal *pactum de contrahendo*, the statesmen of the time did also and often deliberately use it as such. The Austro-Prussian relationship in Germany offers a fine illustration. Metternich treated the Prussians as junior partners in Germany, let them in on all decisions, but, at the same time, watched them carefully and warned the other German states against possible Prussian ambitions. Even after the revolutions of 1848-1849, when Prussia made a bid to unite Germany and lead it without Austria, thus bringing the Austro-Prussian rivalry out into the open and

taking them to the brink of war in 1850, the Holy Alliance relationship continued to act as a deterrent. It is often claimed that after Metternich's fall in 1848, Austria abandoned her partnership with Prussia and under Prince Schwarzenberg's leadership set out to create a great Central European empire of 70 millions under Austrian rule. This is not true. Schwarzenberg, though more of a fighter than Metternich, still looked on Prussia as simultaneously a dangerous rival and a necessary ally against revolution. The 70-millions Reich was supposed to be an Austro-Prussian partnership. As for Prussia, once she was forced temporarily to abandon her plans to become the leader of Germany, or at least north Germany, she too came back to the Holy Alliance, sticking close to Austria, her worst enemy, in order to control Austrian policy. Prussia's Crimean War policy gives ample proof of this. A decade later, even Bismarck, with all his skill and unscrupulousness, found it very difficult to achieve a war with Austria which he considered necessary, in great part because of the web of restraints the Holy Alliance cast over Prussia, Austria, and the rest of Germany.

Many more examples could be cited of how the Holy Alliance worked and was consciously used as a *pactum de contrahendo*—in Austrian and Russian policy in the Near East, for example, where the two powers were rivals constantly watching each other for dangerous moves and at the same time allies cooperating to prevent revolution, save the Ottoman Empire, and preserve the status quo. Russia's policy of keeping Austria and Prussia from fighting over supremacy in Germany—but also trying to keep them from becoming too friendly, so that each would continue to need Russia—is again typical. One could point to the policy of all three powers in regard to intervention against revolutions between 1820 and 1850, where

again the rival-ally relationship becomes very apparent. The spirit of Holy Alliance politics is best summed up in a maxim of a veteran Austrian diplomat, Count Ficquelmont: "Always resist Russia, without breaking with her."<sup>8</sup> In other words, always resist your ally while keeping him as your ally.

Why is this particular *pactum de contrahendo* so important? After all, it was not the only such relationship in the 19th century. The British consciously entered into their ententes with France in the 1830's and 1850's with the aim of controlling French policy; to some extent the French did likewise with Britain. George Canning supposed that he could control Russia through an alliance over the Greek question in 1825 (he turned out to be wrong); and Palmerston succeeded in guiding Russian policy by cooperation with her in the Near East in 1839-1841.

What makes the Holy Alliance so special, of paramount importance to peace is first, geography. The Holy Alliance covered the most crucial area of Europe. Wars outside Europe—colonial conflicts like the Afghan, Chinese, or Persian Wars or even a Near Eastern war—would not necessarily lead to a general European conflict or shake the European system. Even a war between England and France on one side and Russia on the other could be contained so long as the German powers did not enter in—witness the Crimean War. But a war between the three Eastern Powers, or any two of them, was bound to shake up or destroy the European system, even if such a war could be localized as was the Austro-Prussian War of 1866.

Furthermore, the Holy Alliance covered the area from which the major threats of continental hegemony might arise. Already by 1850, if not before, it was clear that only two powers could possibly dominate Europe, either singly or in combination: a united Germany and/or Russia. True, this is easier to see

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now than it was then. At the time, France still seemed a major hegemonic threat. But, in fact, the balance already had been moving to the East in the 18th century. The wars of the French Revolution and Napoleon had represented, in a sense, France's last great effort to regain the dominant position she had enjoyed under Louis XIV, and with their failure France had lost her last chance to dominate the Continent. In Central and Eastern Europe lay the numbers, the broad territorial expanses, and the potential economic resources that would make possible a serious bid for European supremacy. By 1850 the population of France was about 35 million; of Germany and Austria combined, almost 70; of Russia, almost 60. Both Russia and Germany were growing rapidly in population while France was stagnating. In tying the great powers of Central and Eastern Europe into knots, the Holy Alliance was making the most important contribution to preventing such bids for continental hegemony as have wreaked havoc in the 20th century.

Finally, in Central and Eastern Europe lay the most dangerous explosive material for great national and racial conflicts. Here was an area containing the two largest ethnic groups in Europe, Germans and Russians, both historically inclined to expansion and conquest, both without clear frontiers, either natural or national ones. Here also was an area filled with other smaller peoples, already aware or becoming aware of their national identities, clamoring for their rights or independence, and led increasingly by men ready to turn to any power or exploit any conflict that would help their cause. In short, Central Europe was an area simply primed for trouble, apparently destined for a great struggle between Teuton and Slav for supremacy. If one seeks the basic cause of the two World Wars, it lies here. Everything else is hardly more than an elaboration on the

main factor, the national, racial, and social composition of Central and Eastern Europe. If one asks the more important and interesting question, What caused the peace? What kept the struggle between Teuton and Slav from breaking out until 1914? The answer is, surely, the Holy Alliance. For if one sees that the three great powers in this area were each monarchical-conservative states, mixed in nationality, not wanting or daring to base their rule on nationalist appeals or slogans; if all three were forced to live together in combined rivalry and dependence in order to survive as they were; if, above all, between the main German power and the main Slav power there was a third power both German and Slav, but also neither mainly German nor mainly Slav, whose very existence depended on not letting the national and racial question arise either within its own boundaries or in Central and Eastern Europe as a whole; one has the ideal system for holding back Armageddon, preventing the great Teuton-Slav struggle from taking place.

Lest you think that I picture the Holy Alliance as something brought down from Mt. Sinai graven on tablets of stone, let me add that it carried a very heavy price tag. In terms of international peace and stability, it was doubtless good for Europe as a whole; but in terms of progress, justice, personal and national freedom, it was very bad for the peoples who had to live under it. One cannot therefore simply endorse the Holy Alliance and all its effects. Even peace is not the only good or an immutable good; peace can be tyrannical and war liberating. But there were other real beneficiaries of the Holy Alliance besides the rulers and privileged elites in Central and Eastern Europe who profited directly from it—the governments and peoples of Western Europe, especially Britain and France.

The Holy Alliance, by keeping the three Eastern Powers primarily

preoccupied with each other, kept Western Europe free from Eastern military and political pressure. The Holy Alliance, absurd though this sounds, made its absolutist, antirevolutionary members tolerate successful revolutions in France, Belgium, and Switzerland. Holy Alliance restraints on the Eastern Powers helped France very quickly to return to great power rank and influence (and even to make a bid for renewed hegemony in the 1850's and 1860's) and helped afford Britain her remarkable autonomy and influence in continental affairs. Britain's world position, of course, she owed to her empire, navy, and commerce; but also in continental questions she often could intervene and speak with a deciding voice, even though she had practically no land army to back up her wishes. (When Bismarck was asked during the Schleswig-Holstein crisis what he would do if a British army was landed on Prussia's Baltic Sea coast, he replied that he would order the police to arrest it.) The Holy Alliance even benefited British empire building. Russia, Britain's main world rival in the 19th century, could not turn her attention and energy mainly to the Near East, the Middle East, Central Asia, and the Far East, where her interests clashed with Britain's, so long as her eyes were primarily fixed on Prussia, Austria, the unsolved German question, and the dangers of European revolution. The fact that the Western Powers were unaware of these points and failed to recognize that the Holy Alliance represented for them a great unplanned and largely unalloyed boon is, I think, one of the most important and neglected facts in European international history.

To be sure, the Holy Alliance and the system which it helped sustain did break up in the 1850's and 1860's, and though reconstituted after a fashion in the 1870's and 1880's, it was never again quite the same. What accounts for this breakup? A part of the cause, perhaps

the main underlying one, lay in long-range organic changes within the societies, economies, and political structures of these states, especially Prussia and Austria. The beginnings of industrialization, commercial progress, the rise of an educated prosperous middle class, the beginnings of worker class consciousness, the awakening of nationalism, the advance of liberal ideas—all these trends, culminating in and accelerated by the 1848 revolutions, tended to promote interallied rivalry while weakening the ties of mutual support and restraint.

More directly responsible for the midcentury breakdown of the European system was the Crimean War. Briefly, it put both the Concert of Europe and the Holy Alliance out of commission. The Western Powers, especially Britain, did the most to ruin the Concert by preventing Concert diplomacy from heading off the war. Instead, Britain promoted a confrontation with Russia, insisting upon either a decisive political victory or a military showdown. Moreover, the British pursued drastic war aims, attempting to destroy Russia's power and influence in the East for a generation and thereby frustrated Austria's efforts to promote an early, moderate peace settlement. Without such a settlement, restoration of the Concert was impossible. The breakup of the Holy Alliance, however, has always been blamed on Austria. She broke with Russia, supported the war aims of the Western powers, mobilized against Russia, allied with England and France, and finally forced Russia to accept defeat and to submit to what Russia considered humiliating peace terms. At the same time, Austria bludgeoned Prussia and the German states into going along with her dangerous policy, thereby alienating both her allies and initiating the isolation which led her to the disasters of 1859 and 1866. This accurately summarizes the impact and results of Austria's policy. The only

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qualification is that the aims of Austria's Foreign Minister, Count Buol, were quite different. His goals were to control the war, ending it before it became revolutionary in its impact; to curb Russia, whose expansion he considered dangerous; and, by means of a friendly relationship between Austria and the Western Powers, to restore good relations between Austria and Russia on a basis of equality rather than the previous Russian domination. No doubt he made grave miscalculations in his strategic and tactical assessments, and Austria paid dearly for them; but the aims Buol pursued were not intrinsically incompatible with the essential Holy Alliance relationship.

At any rate, the Crimean War broke up both the Concert and the Holy Alliance. The succeeding wars of Italian unification in 1859 and 1860 completed their ruin and brought much of the Vienna treaty system of 1815 down with it. It was not Bismarck who destroyed the restraints of European diplomacy by his *Realpolitik*. When Louis Napoleon and Cavour finished their work in Italy, before Bismarck came to power in 1862, no restraints were left. The question was not one of preserving the European system, but of clearing away the wreckage and establishing something in its place. That Bismarck accomplished both these ends constitutes his great achievement and his failure. Austria was no longer able to lead Germany or manage Central Europe; from being a pillar of European peace, she had become its main problem. Austria and Prussia could no longer function as senior and junior partners running a German Confederation. Prussia had already surpassed Austria in power and far outstripped her in prosperity and efficiency; German needs could no longer be satisfied by the old unreformed Confederation, and it could not be reformed so long as the two great powers had not settled who was master in Germany. Besides, the breakdown of

the Concert and the Vienna System had created real dangers for Prussia and Germany which called for a stronger Prussia and a more united Germany. What all this means is that despite the bad aspects of Bismarck's first two wars—the dangers of wider war and the damage done to Denmark, Austria, and other states—the outcome of 1866 can be viewed as a more or less inevitable one and about the best available solution.

It was not 1866, but 1870-71, that made Bismarck's solution to the German and European problems unstable. This is often said, and what is usually meant is that it was not harmful for Europe that Bismarck expelled Austria from Germany and unified Germany under Prussian leadership, but very harmful that he picked a quarrel with France, defeated her, annexed Alsace-Lorraine, and thereby created a permanent Franco-German enmity that eventually led to World War I. This is not the point at all. France can be faulted for starting a quarrel in 1870 as much as Germany. Moreover, the Franco-Prussian War and the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine are greatly overrated as the basic causes of Franco-German enmity up to 1914. No doubt the annexation had serious consequences, but it was not the basic cause of French hostility toward Germany, any more than the Treaty of Versailles was the basic cause of German revanchism after 1919.

Instead, the main factor destabilizing the European system in 1871 was simply the further unification of Germany or, to describe the process more accurately, the destruction of South Germany's independence and the final expulsion of Austria from the German sphere. These results, which most observers at that time and since regarded as natural, inevitable, and even desirable, were in reality highly detrimental to European stability, virtually destroying the chances of restoring the European Concert and the Holy

Alliance on a solid basis. The settlement of 1866 had left the door open (in its provisions, if not in Bismarck's intentions) to a restoration of the essential Holy Alliance relationship. The Austro-Prussian Peace of Prague had made Prussia master of North Germany, but it left the South German states independent and did not exclude the possibility that Austria could once again play a role in Germany—the role of encouraging South German independence, preserving the status quo, and thus checking Prussia. This provided a chance for the old dualism and federalism in Germany to survive in a new form. Such an outcome would have preserved Russia's interest in keeping Germany and Central Europe from being dominated by one power and would have revived Russia's stake in the existence of Austria as a check on a too powerful Prussian-led Germany. Austria would still have looked to Prussia and the South German states for backup help against Russian encroachments in the East, and at the same time to Russia and France for support against Prussian expansion within Germany. The South German states, who clearly wanted to remain independent, would at least have hoped that Austria could help them stay that way. In short, the restraints that had operated on Austria when she was the leading German power could now be turned against Prussia; the essential relationship of mutual rivalry and dependence in Central and Eastern Europe, the old *pactum de contrahendo* of the Holy Alliance, could still have been revived.

The years 1870-1871 ruined this possibility. It made Prussia-Germany master of all of Germany and Central Europe. Austria-Hungary was pushed decisively toward southeast Europe, where she would be only a rival to Russia and no longer an asset to her. Austria, moreover, became dependent on Germany for her very survival and therefore could no longer effectively

check German power or German policy, though she still tried. Germany was still obliged to live with Russia and Austria-Hungary as her neighbors, but was afflicted with a far greater burden of keeping them from fighting each other, now that Russia was Austria's major, almost sole, enemy and Austria was merely a rival and an obstacle to Russia. Bismarck saw the problem clearly and tried in every way he knew to meet it. It is fascinating to follow his efforts to manage the Austrian-Russian problem in the next 20 years—how he took up and discarded one expedient after another, each one more ingenious, artificial, and fragile than the last. For all his effort, however, a satisfactory solution escaped him, and his successors either gave up even trying to solve the problem or thought it no problem at all. As a result, Germany and the rest of Europe were ultimately entangled in all-out war.

Bismarck was a profoundly realistic, basically conservative statesman. He was fully conscious of the value of the Holy Alliance relationship for peace and after 1871 tried to restore it. Yet his own creation, the German Reich, in the last analysis made its restoration and functioning impossible. How does one explain this contradiction in Bismarck's policy? Many factors play a role, no doubt, but two are the most basic and revealing. One involved Bismarck's personality, the other his calculations. He was a combative, authoritarian leader with an intense drive to dominate. In politics he was completely unwilling to brook rivals within his sphere of authority. In domestic affairs he managed with difficulty to tolerate some opposition in Parliament; but no one, not even the King of Prussia and Emperor of Germany, dared cross him within the executive government he ran. In his conceptualization of Europe, Germany belonged in Prussia's sphere, and hence in his own. He could brook rivals and opposition in foreign policy outside Germany, but he could not stand having

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rivals within it. Hence he hated Austria as he hated no other power, until he had defeated, displaced, and eventually excluded her completely from Germany. After that, Austria was a foreign power, and with foreign powers Bismarck could get along reasonably well. Thus Bismarck's personality and basic outlook forbade him to accept a fundamental requirement of the Holy Alliance, that no one power dominate Central Europe, that each power be restrained within its own sphere by another power at once friend and rival in that sphere.

In addition, Bismarck made a fundamental, though very plausible, miscalculation. He thought he could get Prussian control of all of "Little Germany" and Prussian domination of Central Europe. He believed he could get Europe to both accept and endorse his basic purpose in unifying Germany. Besides strengthening Prussia, this was, as he put it, a way to "unburden" Central Europe. The goal was to disentangle Germany from other states' quarrels; to prevent Germany from being used, as she often had been in recent decades, to help other states solve the Eastern question or to check Russia or to help Britain hold back France or to promote Austrian purposes on the lower Danube. He calculated that if he made Germany strong and independent enough that other powers would have to respect her and leave her alone, and if Germany at the same time proved by her conduct that she was satiated and peaceful, that the rest of Europe would accept the new Germany and settle down with her. The European powers might still quarrel elsewhere—Britain and France over Egypt or Africa, Britain and Russia over Central Asia, Austria and Russia over the Balkans—but Germany would refuse to be dragged in. By staying out she would keep war from becoming general and would be able to restore the European equilibrium.

This seems a natural, plausible, attractive scheme which should have

worked. But it did not, and one can see why it could not. Germany could not stay out of other states' quarrels. Her geographical location and power position were too central for that, and the effects of other peoples' quarrels affected Germany too closely to be ignored, the Austro-Russian quarrel most of all. Worse still, a Germany so strong that she could not be dragged into questions she did not want to be involved in, a Germany strong enough to resist all possible pressures from both flanks was, *ipso facto*, a Germany too strong for her neighbors to be comfortable with, a Germany that could easily use the same strength which made her independent to make her dominant. Hence the other European powers in the long run could not simply be satisfied with Germany's assurances that she was satiated and peace loving; in international relations, capacities count for more than intentions. The paradoxical fact is that, in the long run, Europe could feel safe with Germany, and Germany would be really safe within Europe only if Germany were not independent, not disentangled, not unburdened as Bismarck wanted to make her; only if Germany were restrained and protected within Central Europe by something like the old Holy Alliance, only if she shared power in Central and Eastern Europe with other powers who at once mutually supported and checked each other.

I do not contend that this story has a

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#### BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY

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clear lesson for international relations today. History is still an indispensable teacher, but a dangerous one if misused or pressed too far for analogies and lessons. At the same time, I cannot help feeling that the 19th century European experience might well serve to impress upon contemporary statesmen the great usefulness of alliances not so much as instruments of power and security, but as devices of mutual restraint. It might illustrate the importance of seeing the

international scene less in terms of mechanics and power than in terms of symbiosis and organic system—in terms, if you will, of ecology. Finally, it might help convince statesmen and peoples that it is immensely valuable to the world, perhaps even vital, for great powers to have rivals upon whom they are dependent; for them to be tied to other powers whom they dare never fully trust, but also whom they cannot finally do without.

## NOTES

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4. *The Logic of Political Coalitions* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962), especially pp. 168-87.

5. Alan J.P. Taylor, *The Struggle for Mastery in Europe 1848-1918* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1954), chap. XXII.

6. The War of American Independence had not righted the balance in the West between Britain and France, as the French had hoped, but further weakened France. In the East the partition of Poland was underway; the Eastern question had flared up into a war that had spread to the Baltic as well; Prussia was forming alliances to intervene for grandiose expansionist goals; and, in general, the situation was out of control.

7. Richard A. Rosecrance, *Action and Reaction in World Politics* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1962); P.W. Schroeder, *Austria, Great Britain and the Crimean War* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1972), chap. 16.

8. Quoted in Waltraud Heindl, *Graff Buol-Schauenstein in St. Petersburg and London 1848-1852* (Vienna: Bohlau, 1970), p. 78.

*In the decisionmaking process, the Department of Defense has neglected at least one major constraint in assessing the total practicality of weapons systems: manpower. Ranging from an omission to consider the number of trained individuals available to operate the system to a lack of understanding of the true dollar costs, this oversight tends to generate a policy in which weapons systems may be undercosted, overprocured, and undermanned.*

## **MANPOWER PLANNING AND RESOURCE ALLOCATION IN DEFENSE:**

### **SOME ISSUES**

An article prepared

by

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and

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**Introduction.** The Department of Defense, in seeking the best level of national security, has tried to efficiently invest its annually budgeted resources in weapon systems that provide maximum security over time. Unfortunately, while past investment policy has properly included dollar constraints, it has apparently ignored manpower limitations. This paper seeks to examine this oversight by investigating four related aspects presented as four hypotheses. They are analyzed by describing the impact of each upon an objective of efficient resource allocation; included is some discussion of available quantitative techniques whose implementation could prevent misallocations. The four hypotheses are as follows:

- Properly accounting for manpower pipeline costs and fringe benefits could

help eliminate undercosted, overprocured, and consequently undermanned systems;

- Proper consideration of manpower supply dynamics would help provide a stable supply of trained personnel;

- Realization of the fact that budget dollars and manpower are not perfect substitutes would result in properly constraining weapon procurement by manpower limitations;

- Proper discounting procedures would discourage the accumulation of overly manpower intensive systems and thus reduce retirement costs.

**Manpower Pipelines, Fringe Benefits, and Opportunity Costs.** To understand the concept and potential impact of the "manpower pipeline," consider the following example: A certain hardware

system (called S) is manned and supported by 10 men of the same specialty and grade. If each is paid  $x$  dollars in wages per year, current Defense doctrine<sup>1</sup> would price annual manpower in this hypothetical system at  $10x$ . However, to ensure there are 10 men of the required rate and grade next year, 5 apprentices are in the personnel "pipeline" now. If, additionally, three of the men who manned system S in the past are now retired, then the actual cost of system S should include at least part of the costs of both the junior personnel waiting to man the system and the retired personnel who manned it previously. The fact that the junior and senior personnel are not currently assigned to the system does not negate the rationale for costing these future and past personnel in manning system S.

The point being made is that when personnel costs are predicated only on the current manning complement, the system tends to be undercosted. Similar undercosting does not occur in production, logistics, and other nonpersonnel related factors.<sup>2</sup> Manpower undercosting—and its resulting system undercosting—has important economic consequences. First, undercosted systems will be overprocured (since low prices generate a greater demand). Second, the systems which are most "overprocured" have tended to be those which are most manpower intensive (if manpower seems cheap, systems using more of it will be favored). In short, there exists a bias toward systems with high manning requirements when economic efficiency may call for more automated systems.

A pernicious side effect is that once these systems become operational, they quite likely will be undermanned, qualitatively and/or quantitatively. Whenever quantitative shortages develop, recruiting and advancement standards may be lowered to the point where those manning the systems are underqualified.

Manpower undercosting may also

result from the practice of omitting fringe costs, such as those for medical and housing, from estimates of system cost. For example, a completely automated system would be liable for the maintenance and storage of its hardware components. However, a replacement manpower-intensive system would not always be charged for the analogous medical and housing costs associated with maintaining its human components.

At this point a digression to qualify some of the above remarks is necessary. To a degree, the military does account for both pipeline and fringe costs in its budgeting processes. The Navy, for example, utilizes the model NARM (Navy Resources Model)<sup>3</sup> which includes manpower pipeline costs and fringe benefits in system costs.<sup>4</sup> However, the impact of these adjustments is not sufficient for the case being argued, as the data used to determine the specified pipeline and fringe costs is incomplete and adjustments occur in the budgeting phase of the weapon acquisition process rather than in the earlier cost-benefit phase when alternative systems are compared. Costly systems that make a bad showing in preliminary economic trade-offs but which are low in manpower intensity may never be programed. Finally, even when pipeline and fringe costs are considered, they are included as accounting rather than real (opportunity) costs.<sup>5</sup>

It would seem impossible for any single manager to consider all such complexities—the interdependencies between systems, the time variance of wages, and the involved rate structures of personnel over time. However, it is specifically in these matters of complexity, as opposed to policy, that the entire field of systems analysis comes into its own. In fact, techniques for dealing with such problems are state-of-the-art. One such technique is linear programing, which warrants a short digression here. To describe the rationale behind this approach for the present

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problem, the concepts of efficiency, opportunity cost, and accounting cost must be defined. *Efficiency* means resource use to the point where marginal return equals marginal cost.<sup>6</sup> *Opportunity cost* is an input factor's "real" cost, i.e., it is the increase in "profit" that would result if one more unit of the factor were available. *Accounting cost* is what is paid for the additional unit. As an example, if too many personnel of type Z are already on hand, then yet an additional one would have zero opportunity cost (since he adds nothing to output), but his accounting cost is positive (since he will still draw wages).

In the current application, a person's real cost is the appropriate unit for calculating a system's manpower usage. This is opposed to the accounting costs (wages and direct payments) traditionally used. Linear programming provides real costs as solution byproducts.<sup>7</sup> Given the objective of maximizing military effectiveness within appropriate budget and manpower constraints, the weapon system problem can be solved by indexing each system with its own budget and manpower requirements. Granted, the above description obscures the complexity of the application, but, compared with the magnitude of potential Defense budget reductions, the complexity is insignificant.

Mathematical techniques such as linear programming can, then, transform a variety of manpower requirements into real manpower costs over time—real costs which may be considerably higher than the wages paid to those actually manning the system. These costs will depend on the *availability* of manpower relative to the *requirement* for manpower by the systems under consideration (that is on manpower supply vs. demand). In this way linear programming places manpower into the decision process.

It is appropriate to point out that wages for persons manning systems

would provide correct costs if the military labor market were perfect. That is, if each person were paid his worth on the job and if new labor could be hired and fired without delays. But imperfections in the military labor market, even in the no-draft situation, are significant for two reasons. First, most skills are developed from recruit status. In contrast to the private sector, an experienced mechanic cannot be hired and placed immediately on the job. Second, and also unlike the private sector, the military pays equally all persons in the same grade regardless of the relative scarcity of skills.<sup>8</sup>

In today's atmosphere of fiscal constraint, it is easy to overlook the related costs of manpower even though this neglect is ultimately more expensive. If the Navy is really interested in the best system for the price and wishes to avoid the specter of a technically demanding fleet hampered by the shortage of qualified manpower, the service must change the system by which it accounts for the cost of manpower.

In summary, because the military labor market is imperfect, evaluation of prospective weapon systems on the basis of accounting rather than real costs of manpower results in undercosted and therefore overprocured systems. By maximizing a military effectiveness objective subject to appropriate manpower and budget constraints, the weapon acquisition process can be improved.

**Manpower Demand-Supply Dynamics.** It would seem apparent that if one knows the weapon systems to be operationalized, then its manpower demand can be estimated by grade and specialty. Further, manpower supply can be estimated to ensure having a proper inventory of qualified people.<sup>9</sup> What is most important, at least in this context, is not the absolute level of either supply or demand but rather the difference between them and its useful-

ness over time. Such a difference is closely related to the opportunity costs which evolve from the more formal analysis, i.e., significant shortage is associated with a high opportunity cost.

The 5-Year Defense program specifies the systems to be developed and the force levels to be attained. As such, it can be used to estimate manpower needs for 10 years plus.<sup>10</sup> Yet personnel planners often react only after manpower shortages become critical. A simple manipulation of the budget for recruitment, training, retention, et cetera, would not only deal with the magnitude of the manpower demand-supply gap but would also react to perceived changes in the personnel manning level at a given point in time. These controls can actively be used to minimize imbalances in manpower supply and demand over time.

In this discussion the law of supply and demand postulates that resources be shifted to those categories of manpower which are in shortest supply. The magnitude, timing, and duration of such reallocations, however, still present weighty problems for the decision-maker.<sup>11</sup> Recognizing some relatively sacrosanct political restraints, it seems less than realistic to insist that Defense planners carry the process to an actual optimum, but the process should be fully investigated for possible gains over current practice.

To illustrate the problem, consider figure 1. The two curves represent the

time-phased estimates of skilled manpower demand and supply. Skilled manpower represents all manpower above an established proficiency level. It is here assumed that planners may only shift funds between training budgets (which yield increased skilled manpower) and recruiting budgets (which yield unskilled manpower), in that the annual sum of recruiting and training budgets will remain constant. Also, a 1-year time lag is assumed between budget shifts and actual manpower changes. If planners react when supply and demand are not equal, then they will shift funds from recruiting to training budgets between points O and B in figure 1 since such an action would increase the level of skilled manpower. Similarly, they would shift funds out of training for the period between B and D since such action would reduce the excess supply. Unfortunately, this simple procedure does not always produce the best results. To illustrate, if one focuses on point X, a rational policy would appear to be to shift funds into training because demand exceeds supply. But, looking ahead, it is apparent that after point B, supply will exceed demand. Acknowledging a 1-year lag between budget and corresponding manpower changes, it becomes obvious that the supply/demand gap at X is already closing. In fact, at point X a shift of funds away from rather than into training may be warranted to stabilize the process.<sup>12</sup>




Fig. 1—Skilled manpower supply and demand corresponding to appropriate budget allocations represented continuously.

The mathematical discipline of "Control Theory" can deal with the proper timing of dollar shifts in this type of problem. It is perhaps apparent that somewhere near points A and E in the diagram, funds should stop flowing into training and begin flowing the opposite way. The timing of reversals and their magnitudes will determine their effectiveness in generating the manpower supply changes, lags, and functions that define the curves themselves.

Inasmuch as the budget cycle makes funds available at the beginning of the fiscal year, it may be more appropriate to associate manpower supply and demand with each annual budget rather than with a continuum as discussed above. With proper assumptions, this case is entirely tractable. Dynamic programming, a special form of control theory, can be used to determine the optimal resource allocation policy in the discrete case.

In summary, the timing of manpower resource allocations is a critical aspect of manpower management. The ultimate goal of stabilizing demand-supply gaps would be well served if timing could follow a program using techniques similar to those discussed.

**Constraints and Flexibility in the Resource Allocation Process.** A simple economic rule of efficiency requires combining input factors such as capital and manpower to the point where their marginal cost equals their marginal return. However, this rule is founded on free substitution of factors and other assumptions inherent in the economic term "perfect competition." In actuality, the Defense Department is constrained in its allocative process in many ways—manpower ceilings, budget constraints, and lack of access to capital markets are some congressionally imposed constraints. Imperfect labor supply, technological limitations, and production time lags are examples of equally binding, though nonimposed,

constraints. In this section we explore the flexibility which remains to the decisionmakers despite such constraints and how they can ensure such flexibility is utilized properly.

There are two basic forms of this flexibility. The first, well known and often applied, is to alter the supply of resources by sacrificing those in abundance to obtain more of those in shortage. Thus, if unskilled manpower is relatively free while skilled manpower is restrictive, funds can be shifted from recruiting budgets to training budgets. If manpower is more abundant than ships and aircraft, then the Defense Department can ask Congress to decrease personnel budgets and increase procurement budgets. Of course, words like "increasing," "decreasing," and "more" are only trends, and the question remains "By how much?" This is a question which may always require a judgmental answer, but judgment can be greatly aided by utilizing quantitative methods which account for all the problem constraints. We will return to this matter after mentioning the second form of flexibility available to the decisionmaker.

Still considering capital and labor as the principal input factors, assume there is no possibility of shifting budgets to affect the supply of manpower. The type of trade-offs used as examples in the last paragraph are then no longer available. In such an apparently rigid structure, the decisionmaking flexibility lies in changing the *demand* for factors rather than in changing the *supply* of factors as discussed. This is accomplished by deliberately accumulating weapon systems which require relatively more of the abundant resources and relatively less of the scarce ones. If skilled labor is in short supply and there is no real possibility of increasing the supply, then systems should be accumulated which rely more on unskilled personnel to man them. Examples of utilizing this form of flexibility in the

resource allocation process exist (modularizing equipment is one), but it is felt that such choosing of systems to account for factor supplies is not so common as is attempting to adjust supplies to meet a predetermined demand.

Under either form of flexibility, rational decisions can only be made if all the major constraints in effect are included in the decision process. Here we shall dwell only on the possible consequences of specifically ignoring manpower constraints. While defense planners do consider budget constraints in their system selection process, they apparently do not consider manpower constraints. That statement requires some elaboration. Manpower is certainly included in budget deliberations, for manpower levels are typically converted to dollar figures, and these manpower dollars are included in the planning, programming, and budgeting cycle. However "manpower" and "manpower dollars" are not at all the same thing, as a simple example can show. If technicians for the AN/SPS-40 radar cost \$10,000 per year and 400 technicians are required to man 100 units, then a \$4 million budget item reflects the manpower dollar needs of the 100 units. But suppose it is not possible to obtain (at any cost) more than 200 such technicians. If the manpower constraint indicating the availability of no more than 200 technicians is ignored, the results will be far from satisfactory. First, while budget availability may allow accumulating all 100 systems, there will not be enough men to man them, and the systems will therefore not deliver the effectiveness promised. Second, a hurried, expensive effort to supply more of the required technicians will result in unplanned cost increases. Third, resources may be drawn from other programs, causing disruptions elsewhere. The systems will have been overprocured, undermanned, and costs will have grown.

Whatever the ripple effects, it should be clear that failing to account for manpower constraints in an imperfect labor market (i.e., when dollars cannot be converted into manpower at existing wages) leads to serious inefficiencies. But how are known constraints converted into information useful to the decisionmaker? This again is the function of analysis.

Mathematical programming and simulation techniques are available to handle such problems. The theory is not difficult, though the mass of data and variables for the total Defense problem may prove more than even modern computers can handle within the time allowed to reach a conclusion. However, this problem should only be temporary. For the purposes at hand, the existence of techniques such as mathematical programming and optimal control theory and some of the less analytical techniques such as the emerging "system dynamics" provide adequate tools to assist the planner who does want to account for manpower or other constraints. The important thing is to acknowledge that such constraints exist; given this understanding, methods accounting for them will follow.<sup>13</sup>

**Accumulation of Manpower Intensive Systems Through Improper Discounting Procedures.** Before we discuss the added efficiency which can accrue if proper discounting techniques are used, particularly those in regard to manpower costs, it might be valuable to ask whether discounting (diminishing future returns relative to present returns by means of an interest rate) is worth considering at all. In a report prepared for the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Systems Analysis, Gene Fisher talked to the proper discount rate, "As a practical matter, perhaps too much effort has been expended in attempting to obtain a precise answer to this problem."<sup>14</sup> On the other hand, in speaking of Government investments in

general, Senator William Proxmire, then Chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Economy in Government, stated, "The rate of interest used in evaluating projects is of tremendous importance in determining whether or not such projects are economically feasible."<sup>15</sup>

In the late 1960's the Joint Economic Committee held intensive investigations into the various classifications of interest rates and the intent behind them.<sup>16</sup> At issue was whether the various interest rates used by different Government agencies led to inefficiency because agencies using low discount rates, to adjust future benefits, could justify receiving more funds than agencies using high discount rates. Further discussion, flavored with expert testimony, explained the merits of having Government agencies use discount rates comparable to the private opportunity cost of capital.

The authors of this paper believe that the decisions regarding appropriations and allocations to Government and different agencies within Government are largely political and judgmental in nature.<sup>17</sup> Therefore, neither the fact that discount rates differ between agencies nor that Government uses a different rate than industry is relevant—the competition for funds does not yet seem to be an economically rational process.

The comparisons of alternative investments *within* Defense prompts the type of quantitative economic analysis discussed here. Once alternatives are so similar that benefits can be measured in similar units (e.g., when comparing different weapon systems suited to perform the same missions), then the discount rate and how it is applied become important. The crucial nature of the discount rate in regard to manpower factors may be stated simply: A higher than justified discount rate will not give proper weight to the cost of retired personnel. The discounted present value of a \$10,000 retirement annuity

beginning in 10 years<sup>18</sup> is about \$26,700 if discounted at 12 percent and \$145,000 if discounted at 4 percent. (Interestingly, the range of 4-12 percent arose in recommendations for Government investment discount rates in the Joint Economic Committee hearings in 1968-69. Evidence was presented that rates actually used by the agencies of the Government in 1969 ranged from 0 percent to 12 percent.)<sup>19</sup> If a horizon cutoff is used, that is, if the costs which occur beyond a certain point, say 10 years in the future, are ignored, then retirement costs will be a relatively minor consideration when compared to operating costs. If retirement costs, which are manpower related, are discounted at these high rates, then real manpower costs overall will be understated. The tendency will be to buy weapons which are more manpower intensive than is optimal, resulting in disproportionately high retirement costs. This trend is already evident in the military. In 1964 the pay to retirees was 2.4 percent of the military Defense budget, while in 1974 it was estimated to be 6 percent.<sup>20</sup>

Therefore, one can easily understand that the *magnitude* of the discount rate is important. A more subtle, but equally important, consideration is how the rate should be applied. Given some acceptable level of interest rate appropriate to risk-free<sup>21</sup> investments, the rate should be adjusted for future risk and/or uncertainty. Such adjustments should differ for costs and benefits. Further, consideration should be given to the relative predictability of different costs. Regarding this last matter, one could argue that if manpower costs are more predictable than, say, research and development or production costs, a different discount rate should be applied. In this treatment, an extension of the two-rate concept proposed by Haveman will be used.<sup>22</sup>

The implicit assumptions in this line of reasoning are:

- Future costs and benefits are measured in real terms, that is, in constant dollars.

- Risk-aversion prevails, so that in the case of two alternatives with the same expected returns, the one with less variance in the returns is preferred.

- The risk considered is purely variance in the results and not a bias-type risk which is associated with consistent under or overestimation of future costs or benefits.

Earlier it was implied that current discounting practice may dictate accumulation of systems which are overly manpower intensive. To further develop that theme, assume that future benefits and costs can both be converted to dollar equivalents. The 10 percent discount rate then required for all Defense investment analyses is presumably applied to net benefits (benefits less cost) over time, which is equivalent to discounting both costs and benefits at 10 percent.<sup>23</sup> But risk-aversion means that uncertainty in benefits should cause a risk premium on benefits and an understatement of their value "to be safe." Similarly, "to be safe," risk averters should assume that costs are higher than the estimates indicate. The easiest way to implement these two safety policies is to use a higher discount rate for benefits (thereby decreasing their present value) and a lower discount rate for costs (thus increasing their present value).

To illustrate, consider once again the problem of retired costs. In hypothetical, academic investment decisions, it is

usually assumed that the initial cash flows are net expenditures followed by net returns through the remainder of the project's life. But if manpower is a particularly important consideration, as it is in weaponry (manpower not only produces the systems but mans them), then after the benefits have accrued from a weapon system's life, there will be substantial outlays to retired personnel who were part of that system. In fact, the life cycle investment profile used in popular Defense decisionmaking texts<sup>24</sup> should be supplemented by the hump of retired costs as indicated in figure 2. The present value of these distant retired costs may be insignificant at high discount rates, but at low rates their effect may generate a movement away from the accumulation of manpower intensive and toward more automated systems. The two-rate concept, by lowering the rate used for costs as compared to benefits, will bolster this effect. (Recent interest by DOD in life-cycle costing should not neglect these important discounting considerations. Specifically, the formal use of an arbitrary 10 percent rate would seem extremely unwise. Under constrained budgets, a 0 rate makes more sense.)

There are two second order effects which partially offset the movement toward automated systems. Both relate to the discount rate used for costs and are dependent on the fact that discount rates for costs are lowered relative to benefits. The first countereffect occurs because for all their inaccuracy, future costs are usually more predictable than




Figure 2

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future benefits. As Haveman points out, actual costs can be compared with estimated costs at project inception, but this is not true for actual benefits (for public projects). Speaking in the water resources area, he states, "Because the value of actual flood damage without a project can never be experienced once the project is constructed, actual flood control benefits... are neither easily nor accurately compared with pre-construction estimates of flood damage..."<sup>25</sup> Similar conclusions seem appropriate for Defense systems. Since the basis for cost estimation can be better related to past experience, the variance of actual cost from estimated costs is probably less than the variance of benefits. Consequently, the downward adjustment in the cost discount rate should be smaller than the upward adjustment in the rate for benefits.

By extending Haveman's two-rate concept, the second countereffect—conditional in nature—can be explained. If there is a difference in the estimability of different cost types and, specifically, if manpower costs are more predictable than most other cost categories, then the downward adjustment for manpower costs should be less than the downward adjustment for the other

types. Full evidence that the manpower costs are, in fact, more predictable is not immediately available, but in a study of 12 major weapon systems, Peck and Scherer found that actual development real costs averaged 3.2 times their original estimates.<sup>26</sup> It is not likely that manning levels of the same systems were underestimated by that much.<sup>27 28</sup>

Whatever the degree of counterbalance of the last two effects, both act only to retard, rather than prevent, downward movement of the discount rate for costs. The net effect of the two-rate rationale is to influence, correctly, the movement away from overly manpower intensive systems.

**Conclusion.** In touching on issues of manpower costing, supply-demand dynamics, capital/labor trade-offs, and discounting, we have implied that techniques exist which offer potential solutions for each problem. And even though it would be presumptuous indeed to claim that each issue can be solved, the first step toward solution is an awareness of problems and their causes. Hopefully, this discussion has increased both the interest and aware-

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### BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY



Lt. Comdr. Rolf Clark, U.S. Navy, is currently enrolled at the University of Massachusetts School of Business Administration under the Navy's Doctoral Studies Program. His area of concentration is mana-

gerial economics in the public sector. His operational experience has principally been in destroyers, and he has had experience as Tactical Analysis Officer at the Destroyer Development Group. He holds an M.S. in operations analysis from the Naval Postgraduate School.

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### BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY



Mr. Robert Comerford served in the U.S. Navy from 1959 to 1962. After receiving a master's degree in business in 1970, he entered the doctoral program at the University of Massachusetts, concentr-

ating in the field of business policy. He expects to complete this work in June 1975 and has accepted a position at the University of Rhode Island School of Business Administration.

ness of its readers to a problem in Defense manpower that has been neglected.

A final caveat is necessary. The fact that manpower inefficiencies are exposed does not mean that better decisions automatically follow. In fact, if hardware is treated in an exactly analogous way as manpower, then correcting the manpower oversights alone may lead

to a worse solution than if no change is made. It may be better to undercost both manpower and hardware equally than to choose a "second-best" solution with one of them treated properly and the other not. We have only discussed manpower issues here. The broader problem should be considered, however, before policy changes are recommended.

## NOTES

1. Department of Defense Instruction 7043.1 of 18 October 1972 (enclosure 2, p. 5) states personnel costs are charged according to "the cost of military personnel services involved directly in the work performed." The instruction is entitled "Economic Analysis and Program Evaluation for Resource Management" and is a prime directive for general guidance in Defense investment analyses.

2. For example, hardware "pipelines," that is inventories, normally are included in systems' costs, unlike manpower inventories.

3. For a preliminary description of NARM's relevance, see N. Hibbs, "An Introduction to NARM," Center for Naval Analysis Memorandum 1684-72.

4. As required by Department of the Navy Programming Manual, promulgated by Secretary of the Navy letter serial 435 of 5 June 1971 and including through change 13, pp. E-9, E-10, and J-2.

5. The points mentioned in this paragraph are opinions of the authors based on personal discussions with Department of Defense personnel engaged in both manpower planning and weapon system costing. These discussions, which were numerous, occurred during 1973 and 1974. Changes in costing procedures have changed since that time, but the essence of the above comments is still considered valid.

6. If the return of an additional unit exceeded cost, it would be "profitable" to buy the unit. If the return was less than the cost, the unit should not be bought.

7. The byproducts come in the form of "dual variables," which have far-reaching economic usefulness. For an introductory treatment of the underlying economic concepts, see A. Charnes, W.W. Cooper, and A. Henderson, *An Introduction to Linear Programming* (New York: Wiley, 1953).

8. The existence of incentives pay in the military and the flexibility in altering the time to advancement ameliorate these differences but do not cancel them.

9. See Naval Personnel Research and Development Laboratory "Computer Models for Manpower and Personnel Management: State of Current Technology," NAMPS Project Report No. 73-2, April 1973.

10. The manpower effects of the procurement process obviously extend well beyond the 5-year horizon.

11. The formal process of controlling dynamic processes is in the rubric of optimal control theory. An insight to the theory can be gained from Robert Dorfman, "An Economic Interpretation of Optimal Control Theory," *American Economic Review*, December 1969, pp. 817-831.

12. Some qualifications are necessary because of the extremely simplified example given. For example, decreases in recruits would lead to decreases in overall personnel, which may lead to decreases, vice gains, in skilled manpower. Obviously, the problem is multidimensional in the real world, but the multidimensional case is still solvable.

13. The authors feel that any gap between decisionmakers and analysts is due not to the shortcomings of analytic capabilities, but to the lack of interpreters between the two. Awareness of the needs of managers and the abilities of analysts should lead to accelerated gains in decisionmaking efficiency.

14. Gene H. Fisher, *Cost Considerations in Systems Analysis* (New York: American Elsevier, 1971), p. 228.

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15. U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, *The Economic Analysis of Public Investment Decisions: Interest Rate Policy and Discounting Analysis. Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Economy in Government*, 90th Congress, 2d sess., 1968, p. 1.

16. *Ibid.*; also see U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, *The Analysis and Evaluation of Public Expenditures: the PPB System. A Compendium of Papers Submitted to the Subcommittee on Economy in the Government*, 91st Congress, 1st sess., 1969.

17. This view is a result of arguments made by various observers of the political process. See, for example, Aaron Wildavsky, *The Politics of the Budgetary Process* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1964).

18. The 10-year figure represents an estimate of the time until the average active duty person (who will remain for a career) will retire.

19. U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, *Interest Rate Guidelines for Federal Decision Making. Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Economy in the Government*, 90th Congress, 2d sess., 1968, pp. 54-55.

20. Edward R. Fried, et al, *Setting National Priorities; the 1974 Budget* (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1973), p. 300.

21. "Risk-free" means that the exact values of future costs and benefits are known. "Appropriate" means the rate used corresponds to the relative time-preference of present to future goods. For background material on time-preference in both riskless and uncertain conditions, see J. Hirshleifer, *Investment, Interest, and Capital* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1970).

22. Robert H. Haveman, *Water Resources and Investment in the Public Interest* (Nashville, Tenn.: Vanderbilt University Press, 1965), appendix B. For readers familiar with state-preference theory and the fact that it provides theoretical equivalence to Haveman's approach, it is felt that for the problems considered here, Haveman's two-rate theory has practical advantages. J. Hirshleifer and David Shapiro state "... as a practical matter Haveman's two-rate proposal would probably be a defensible and workable improvement, in comparison with using a single discount rate that purports to be related to the average riskiness of the separate cost and benefit streams." This quote comes from their presentation to the Joint Economic Committee, "The Treatment of Risk and Uncertainty" in *The Analysis and Evaluation of Public Expenditures: the PPB System*, p. 517.

23. The 10 percent rate is specified in Department of Defense Instruction 7041.3 of 18 October 1972, "Economic Analysis and Program Evaluation for Resource Management," enclosure 2, p. 6.

24. For example, E.S. Quade and W.I. Boucher eds., *Systems Analysis and Policy Planning: Applications in Defense* (New York: Elsevier, 1968), p. 131.

25. Haveman, p. 160.

26. Merton J. Peck and Frederic M. Scherer, *The Weapon Acquisition Process: an Economic Analysis* (Boston: Division of Research, Graduate School of Business Administration, Harvard University Press, 1962), table 2.1.

27. Admitted, there exists some confusion here of risk in the form of variance and risk in the form of bias, a distinction promised earlier to be kept clear. The data is relevant to the degree that bias is probably so dominant because of uncertainty attached to these costs. The strong bias, if not present in the more predictable personnel costs, strengthens rather than weakens the argument for a smaller downward adjustment in discounting manpower costs.

28. Examples of systems considered are the B-58 bomber, F4H Interceptor, Polaris IRBM, Talos missile system, and the Nike-Zeus system.

The beginnings of the American combat involvement in Southeast Asia brought home the realization that revolutionary warfare was all but completely foreign to American military experience. In developing an effective doctrine for the conduct of the war, American planners could have profited from the French experience articulated in "*la guerre revolutionnaire*"—the work of those who had fought the same war 10 years before and who had already suffered through the expensive process of trial and error that the Americans were to repeat.

## LESSONS FROM THE FRENCH IN VIETNAM

An article

by

Dr. W. Scott Thompson

Last year at a conference on "The Military Lessons of the Vietnamese War," a discussion took place in which the relevant learning model for American counterinsurgency efforts in Vietnam was debated.<sup>1</sup> One person noted that his commanders at the Pentagon had warned him to be wary in Saigon of the orchestrator of the British success in Malaysia, Sir Robert Thompson, who was serving then in Vietnam as head of the British Advisory Mission. The gentleman was happy to observe to Sir Robert, who also attended the conference, that he had not heeded the warning—and had subsequently benefited from Sir Robert's wise counsel. Nowhere in the discussion did anyone mention the French. Is it simply because the French lost? History backs winners, and it perhaps is not natural to study a loser for lessons. It does not follow logically that the techniques and approaches of the loser are irrelevant to

a successor in battle; defeat the first time may have flowed from wholly exogenous factors. Perhaps there is more to it, and it is the primary purpose of this essay to question the conventional wisdom surrounding the discussion in this country of the French role in Vietnam to see if lessons might have been learned.

My specific aims here are three. The first objective is to investigate the difference between Vietnam and other postwar colonial situations; by working comparatively we can partially isolate the "Vietnam problem." To learn lessons from the French experience we must first ask what lessons they themselves learned. My second aim is thus to discuss the tenets of the doctrine that derived from the French experience, *la guerre revolutionnaire*, in the context of

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the French collapse in Indochina. My third objective is to examine what we did in fact learn, and what we might have learned, from the French in Vietnam. One great virtue of examining a relatively remote dimension of an on-going problem is that we have a chance to ask ourselves, with a sense of detachment, whether we missed some lessons two decades ago and whether there are some still to be applied in that theater or in others.

There is always something to be learned from a historical experience even though no two events, let alone two wars, are ever identical. As social scientists we try to disaggregate phenomena and compare the similar components for insight into the whole. The French experience in Vietnam, for example, offers all too much that was familiar to the American period; but because we neglected to think analytically and disaggregate, we overlooked the similarity of the various components and therefore failed to learn valuable lessons. Unfortunately, the trend continues. Today we find individuals who claim that there is little to be learned from the American war in Vietnam because it, like the French war, was so unique.

There were, of course, elements of the first Vietnamese war that were unique, far removed from what one might expect in the anticolonial, revolutionary atmosphere of the times. One significant example is the nature of the colony itself. Of all the territories of Africa and Asia, Vietnam was the most sophisticated at the time of colonization. Whereas many parts of Africa and Asia were populated by a variety of ethnic groups around or through which artificial lines were drawn on a map, Vietnam had a Confucian-mandarin administrative system of great complexity. When combined with the extensive brigandage and warlordism, the activities and multiethnic character of the hill country, it is easy to recognize

why it was particularly difficult for France to give the colony any real coherence in its 80 years of colonial domination. France was able to penetrate the elite and used it to rule the lowlands, and she made more progress in bringing the highlands into the state system than the Vietnamese had themselves done in a thousand years.

Yet, even with these accomplishments, France's governing machinery was inadequate to deal with the rampant anarchy prevalent in the immediate postwar period. The Vichy government that had existed during the war under the watchful eyes of the Japanese lost power when the Japanese decided to deny to the French what they themselves could not maintain and granted the colony a sham independence. Japan's surrender to the Allies came unexpectedly early, and European France was in no position to get back to Indochina in sufficient time and numbers to reestablish order. A famine in Tonkin complicated the situation, and to make matters even worse, there were intra-French scores being paid off, Western-Japanese scores, intra-Vietnamese and Chinese-Vietnamese scores. As a North Vietnamese put it, the "flexible tactics of the Indochina Communist Party" could be used to aggravate the situation in order to "sow confusion in the enemy ranks."<sup>2</sup> France, quite apart from her feelings about her colonial tradition, was trying to restore her honor in this period and would never have imagined abandoning Vietnam to such confusion, whether or not the Vietminh were Communist and even if there had not been a fair number of French nationals present.

This leads me to my third point: nowhere in the colonial world did an independence movement have so strategically favorable a position, so secure rear bases, and so much help from outside. Ho Chi Minh's party and army had help from the start—first from the United States, then from the Soviet

Union, and, after 1949, from China who not only trained 40,000 Vietminh soldiers but provided 20,000 troops who were active in the siege of Dien Bien Phu. What was advantageous for the Vietminh was disadvantageous for the French. Vietnam was well-nigh indefensible, given the length of French supply lines and the limitation of French resources.

My final point regarding the unique characteristics of post-World War II Vietnam is that its purportedly nationalist movement adhered to communism. The argument was often made in France, and later in America, that in no other colonial territory was the nationalist movement also Communist. By its nature, as a "nationalist" movement, its legitimacy would be so great as to doom an opposition from the start. It was a historical phenomenon, and it was argued that we should bend to the lessons of history and let the nationalists rule as they did elsewhere. This argument usually concluded with a rejection of the domino theory, for since the movement was basically nationalistic—like that of the Vietminh and later the Vietcong—it would not have any effect beyond Vietnamese borders (as if so basic a change of regime in any country is ever incidental to the neighbors).

The very essence of this argument must be questioned. Were the Vietminh the "nationalists" in the sense that the TANU was the nationalist party in Tanganyika, the FLN in Algeria, or the Congress in India? Recall that the Indochina Communist Party was founded by the effort of the Comintern in 1930 and, unlike any other political group in Vietnam in that period, had support from outside the country. Although it still had, according to Ho Chi Minh, only 5,000 supporters in 1945, its strength was sufficient to take over much of the countryside during the period of anarchy.

Furthermore, what evidence do we

have that Vietnamese considered the Vietminh to be the true nationalists? One rather impressive datum is that between 20 and 80 thousand southerners went north after the 1954 accords, while well over a million evoted them with their feet and went south. Indeed, the amount of coercion which the regime in the north found it necessary to use suggests that Ho himself did not feel confident that his countrymen would consider his movement to be coterminous with "nationalism."

A final point can be drawn from what the Vietminh did with the competition, that is the nationalists found in other groups. In a recent paper, Stephen Young has reminded us that during the period of Vietminh ascendancy, immediately after the end of the World War, the opposition was literally killed off.<sup>3</sup> Anyone with organizational ability, whether of the sects or of the VNQDD (Viet Nam Quoc Dan Dang), stood at risk. The late President Diem's brother was murdered as were thousands of others. By the time Ho was through, there was much less of an alternative to the Vietminh. The point to be made is that, precisely because of these very features differentiating the Vietminh from other "nationalist" movements, it was the one and only "independence" movement in the Third World that should have been opposed, and opposed with vigor.

In this country, from President Roosevelt down, perhaps the greatest criticism of the French was of their insistence on returning to Vietnam after the World War. Even assuming that the French felt responsible for saving their colonial subjects from anarchy, why did they not then do as we had done in the Philippines or as the British were doing in India? The answer lies in the French attitude toward colonialism.

The French were firmly committed to the *mission civilisatrice*—assimilation and association—and, indeed, such was

the goal of much of the elite of the French colonial world.<sup>4</sup> French sentiment is best expressed in the words of the colonial statesman Félix Houphouët-Boigny. Although his political party had been allied to the French Communists and he himself had been a minister of cabinet rank in the French Government, he had also opted against full independence when it was freely offered. As late as 1957 Houphouët-Boigny wrote that

[t]he presence of the French . . . has suppressed slavery . . . and has put an end to the quarrels which set different ethnic groups against one another; it has given its education to the masses and its culture to an elite; it has instituted sanitary and medical improvements without precedent . . . The seizure of power [from the French] has something exciting about it, we know. But the exercise of this power in a fashion consonant with national and human dignity is difficult.<sup>5</sup>

The French clearly considered that their contribution to Vietnam was of the essence and were unable to understand American antagonism. More important, the French believed that Roosevelt had sabotaged efforts to help them in Vietnam after World War II.<sup>6</sup> These differences of attitude explain why, at the critical hour in 1954, there was so vast a gulf between the French and American positions as to the disposition of American assistance.

The French Army fought very hard in Vietnam. Thomas Thayer's data show that the expeditionary force's combat death rate was 6.17 percent, compared to America's 3.6 percent, and losing 21,000 men killed in action or dying of wounds overall is proportionate to an American loss of over 100,000 men.<sup>7</sup> Yet in the end they failed largely because French policy in Vietnam was inconstant in purpose and lacked persistence. France, on the one hand, would

encourage the development of political associations and labor unions; then with the other hand harshly, even brutally, restrict their activities, seemingly at odds with their avowed policy. One finds this theme throughout the literature. As Lord David Cecil writes of Lord Melbourne, "Only too often have Governments of moderate change brought catastrophe on a nation by a weak, timid inability to control the disruptive forces which they themselves have let loose."<sup>8</sup> There is a growing body of theoretical literature—systematic, empirical research on the causes of revolution—which is stressing a similar point: obedience to the law is often less a function of relative deprivation, the revolution of rising expectations, or any other such thing than it is a function of the quality of authority, the consistency of authority, and the consistency of expectations by a populace that a government will act in a predictable way.<sup>9</sup>

The French inconstancy of purpose can be explained in a context which relates to the disaster of World War II and the inadequacy of French political institutions. However, the most pertinent point is the immediate division on the two great issues of the time—communism and colonialism. France, in Alfred Grosser's words, was "the microcosm of world politics," politically divided on both issues for reasons external to France. "Almost all Frenchmen claim to be liberals," he writes.

But this double cleavage [communism vs. colonialism] rendered a fully liberal policy almost impossible, for to give liberty to colonial peoples, there was only a majority [in Parliament] with the communists; but to defend the liberties that the communists would destroy [in France], the only majority was with those who refused them to Asians and Africans.<sup>10</sup>

Of course the situation was never so simple as Grosser's elegant and much

quoted lines would suggest. Among other reasons, the Communist record on colonial independence was inconsistent until 1956, and the French Communist position on liberation only became explicit when Moscow suddenly realized what a good thing the independence of French and British colonies would be for Soviet interests. French liberalism was hardly without evidence; from the Brazzaville declaration of 1944 onwards, French policy largely developed in directions highly favorable to her colonies. But it was the ups and downs, the eddies, the inconsistencies that were fatal. Furthermore, the United States must also bear its share of blame, as we encouraged the French, after 1950, to "stand firm" in Vietnam.

#### Learning from the French Experience: *La Guerre Revolutionnaire*

While the political climate in France apparently impinged on the leadership's ability to learn lessons from the disaster, it fully registered on the officer corps. Unlike the Americans who have been trying to put the Vietnamese war out of their minds, the French were faced with a wholly new insurgency in Algeria not long after Dien Bien Phu was overrun. There existed an immediate incentive to sort out what were the most important lessons from Indochina, and the French soldiers, in developing a veritable ideology of "la guerre revolutionnaire" correctly captured its essence. This incredibly overlooked exercise constitutes one of the most serious efforts to learn from mistakes after a war with which I am familiar and begins with some hypotheses about the balance of forces in the world as it relates to revolution.

**The World Balance and Revolutionary War.** It is worth recalling that, in the 1950's, American strategic doctrine rested on the notion of massive retalia-

tion, a concept that was hardly applauded in Europe. From this point it is easy to see how the French military developed the tenet that nuclear war was unlikely, owing to the nuclear stalemate. Hence the contest for supremacy between the West and communism would be fought in revolutionary struggles. The gains or losses from revolutionary war would have more impact on the overall balance than the actual physical advantages of gaining or holding a given territory would indicate. For example, the principal challenge to the American position in this hemisphere resulted from an insurgency—the Cuban one—which galvanized our effort to gain a counterinsurgency capability. It was also a revolutionary war that drained Portugal's resources and made the Communist Party potentially the strongest force in the nation; and recall that almost all of the major political changes in Asia have occurred through revolutionary war—the Chinese revolution, the wars in Indochina, the creation of Bangladesh, and so forth. The first French principle was therefore essentially right, and Paris got the point at least 5 years before Washington did.

**Psychological Conquest.** The second point of the doctrine is that revolutionary war, unlike conventional war, has as its object not the military defeat of the enemy army but the psychological conquest of the population. The French also learned how very effective psychological tactics could be in a modern democracy—that democratic elites harbor strong reservations against many of the tactics necessary to defeat an insurgency. Americans largely disregarded the French example and fell victim to the same problem 14 years later.

**The Role of International Communism.** The third tenet was that revolutionary warfare was composed and directed by international communism, a

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natural conclusion to have come out of Indochina.

As part of a doctrine, however, this third point was less natural in Algerian soil. French writers saw the FLN in Algeria as a symptom of communism, when it could be more accurately described as a nationalist reaction to French excess, encouraged by worldwide anticolonialism. These same writers saw analogies with Munich and the move to appease nazism. Thus Nasser, the abettor, was a new Hitler, and France would have to strike at him in order to get at the rear base of the Algerian insurgency. One can quote the French writers and make them look silly, yet they had a relevant point.

The odd fact is the prolonged time it took the Russians to recognize their own advantage. Not until the 20th Party Congress in 1956 did they really begin to see the great dividend that the anticolonial movement offered. However, once they saw an opportunity, the Soviets lost little time exploiting it. By 1960 Khrushchev was pounding his shoe on the U.N. rostrum, spreading cash around the Congo, proclaiming Arab, Asian, and African leaders to be "heroes of the revolution," and within a few more years his armed forces were beginning to use Vietnam as a testing ground for weaponry.

Many loyal and thoughtful Americans considered it a natural reaction to colonial rule when the newly independent states tended to take the Soviet side on cold war issues. In the 1960's, after all, the West was just as pertinently freeing itself from the colonies as the colonies were freeing themselves of their masters. We were all "discovering" that we did not need colonies to be prosperous. However, we do need resources, and after the October 1973 war it became quite clear that our prosperity required a dependable source of a variety of imports—chiefly oil—from the Third World.

The French were not unrealistic in

their comparison of the leftist nationalism of the FLN with the Vietminh, and if they were wrong in thinking the ideology was the same, they were right in seeing whose interests—in the international arena—were being advanced. The fact is that the Mediterranean is now, along almost the entire length of its southern littoral, in unfriendly hands, or at least in hands that do not see their interests coinciding with those of the West. And with the positions of Portugal, Italy, and Greece problematical with respect to the Western alliance and with a massive buildup of Soviet arms in central Europe proceeding apace, one begins to appreciate the French foresight.

**Fighting Fire with Fire.** The fourth tenet was that, given the existence of an international *guerre revolutionnaire*, the West must respond in a manner designed to save itself; it must fight fire with fire. In Indochina the Vietminh had used totalitarian principles to organize its community; it had brooked nothing to win; and it did not bother about the fact that refugees poured out wherever they could. (Indeed, that saved the regime some work.) Clearly the West would have to organize similarly and would be required to use any techniques of counterinsurgency deemed necessary.

It is better that western political leaders accept in advance that counterinsurgency work is to be nasty and tough, and decide upon the very limits of these critical frontiers if they wish to avoid debilitating and debasing the very principles for which they are fighting. The fact that the French soldiers had some pretty gruesome notions of what had to be done does not discredit their last point, for the obvious lesson was that this kind of war would have to be gruesome or abandoned; in any event, it would not have been they, in a state whose civilian leaders were supreme, who would have established the critical frontiers.

In sum, it strikes me that the French, for the most part, drew the correct inferences about their experience in Vietnam. They were discredited largely by the fact that these were applied, in the wrong sphere, to a nationalist revolution close to home.

It appears that the French were ahead of the times, or at least ahead of the Americans, in their thinking about the colonial situation. But try to find a reference in the literature where the "New Frontier's" stress on the importance of counterinsurgency activity is analyzed and find a single positive reference to the French! Reading the ideologists of *la guerre revolutionnaire* is precisely like reading Professor Walt Rostow's lectures of the early 1960's. The irony is further heightened when one realizes that in our past experiences and successes—in the World Wars, in the rebuilding of Europe—there was nothing remotely useful in preparing us for the kind of war we were to fight in Vietnam; nothing in our experience, since the turn of the century, in the Philippines.

### The American Phase

Perhaps the most striking point of the American phase of the war is that at the two most critical turning points we failed to place any importance on what the French had learned about Vietnam. The first time was, of course, 1954 when, after spending over a billion dollars on arms for the French Army, we failed, for relatively inconsequential reasons, to bail them out of the battle at Dien Bien Phu. To have done so would surely have been cheaper than trying to recoup losses later. The second time was almost a decade later, when the United States returned to Vietnam in force and never truly considered eliciting French advice.<sup>1 2</sup>

To return to the substantive argument: although there was bad blood between Washington and Paris in 1954

on Vietnam, at least Washington got the major question right, namely, to try to prevent the takeover of South Vietnam by Hanoi. Indeed, the American Government was very shrewd in its policy chosen after Geneva. Inevitably, in discussions of America's role in Vietnam, we hear the charge that the United States sabotaged the Geneva agreements and, in general, showed bad faith in discharging her international obligations. We did buttress Diem in his determination not to honor the prescription for elections in 1956. However, the United States was not a signatory to the armistice at Geneva nor was the State of Vietnam, and neither was, as Dennis Duncanson points out, "in control of combat forces and consequently could not in logic have been parties to the cease-fire."<sup>1 3</sup> The United States, in the final declaration, attached a caveat opposing the reunification of Vietnam by force subsequent to elections.

The Americans were by then well aware that the French had been dealt a diplomatic defeat out of all proportion to the actual military situation. We thus avoided being trapped at this point by the same agreements which the French had signed in their position of political weakness. Mao wrote in 1937 that "in guerrilla warfare there is no such thing as a decisive battle," and the Americans decided instinctively to heed this, as the French had not. We decided, in effect, to fight on with whatever we could—short of committing manpower. By disassociating itself as much as possible from the Geneva agreements, the U.S. Government made it that much easier to pick up where the French had left off, for it had realized the strategic importance of Vietnam.

But why, one might ask, would we not work with the French, and why would we refuse to learn anything from them after 1954 and 1964? For one thing, in the mid-1960's, French-American relations were more strained

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than ever. But clearly, the American problem in learning from the French has deeper roots. At one level it strikes at the American attitude toward colonialism, and at another it strikes at peculiar American conceits of the moment.

Colonialism, particularly a discussion of American-British or American-French differences in the matter of colonialism, is usually prefaced by noting that we fought a revolutionary war and had a revolutionary tradition. This argument is somewhat shallow, however, when one considers the United States during our period of "manifest destiny." Furthermore, the attitude of many Americans of the mid-1960's was compared by Professor Lowenthal to that in Wilhelmine, Germany.<sup>14</sup> The conceit of the moment was of our invincibility. American officials recited comparisons of our supply of equipment, men, and aircraft with that of the French—often ending with the refrain that "the French haven't won a war since Napoleon."

Had we worked closely with the French throughout the 1960's and decoupled de Gaulle's opposition to us on the NATO front from that on the Vietnamese front, the gains on the diplomatic front as well as the battlefield would have been well worth the effort. French prestige in the Third World was enormous in this period despite the fact that France was the only major power defying the United Nations on arms supplies to South Africa, despite France's bonded relationship with her former colonies in West Africa, her atomic testing in the Sahara, and so forth. Our policy and our war in Vietnam were grist for the French mill in Damascus, Teheran, Algiers, Santiago, New Delhi. To have had French help, or at least neutrality, would have helped enormously to defuse the international pressures that reinforced our domestic opposition to the war.

Substantive French help in battle would have been costly in pride and

money—for the French would have made this help psychologically or strategically expensive—but we ended paying the most exorbitant costs ever. My foregoing assumptions rest on the evident fact that nations easily decouple policies and cooperate on one and oppose on another with the same ally. It was, for example, official American policy not to dicker with the French area of influence in Africa, even when this might have been good leverage on Paris at the height of our differences, because we knew that the French position was sustaining order, which was a general, not just a French, goal. No power of importance has blanket policies for all countries; policies are treated selectively as the individual policy affects a country's interests. Indicative of the situation is a comment by Thomas Thayer.

Their military attaché in Saigon in 1964 was handpicked by the French government because of his exceptional knowledge of the English language, distinguished records in Indochina and Algeria. He was told to help the Americans in whatever way he could. During the first 18 months of his assignment, the only American who visited him to ask about the war was an American defense contractor of French origin.<sup>15</sup>

A French official recently said that the French officers would have loved to help—they were envious, as he pointed out, of the American opportunity; by the time of Dien Bien Phu the French officer corps had a very sophisticated notion of what was needed to win the war, and they would have loved to have a chance to apply it.

The most remarkable clue comes from the battle of Khé Sanh—so similar in so many ways to its deathly forerunner of 14 years earlier—except in outcome. In 1968 as the battle of Khé Sanh was building up, the American Air Force reportedly rounded up every

French general still alive who had been involved in the defense of Dien Bien Phu. Permission was gained from senior French authorities and the entire group, including one in his 80's, was flown to Saigon and set up in quarters where they could go over the full range of anticipated enemy plans. By this account they revealed every mistake from the earlier battle and gave generously of their advice. Khé Sanh as a battle was won.

If we could not have cooperated more with the French, at least we could ourselves have studied their war. Not only was the cycle and pattern of battle the same for both wars, but the physical location of battle was often the same. If, at the operational level, officers and troops had known that they were in a historically troubled area, where intense battles were fought by the French 15 years earlier at the same time of year, then they would have been somewhat less surprised by an enemy offensive. But the information did not trickle down. Certainly we learned quickly that supplies build up in the dry season for a spring offensive, but we were late to learn that one had to correlate the given offensive with what could be expected, on the basis of past experience, for that time of year—was it greater or smaller, not than the events of the previous month, but of the same time in the cycle.

Numerous false perceptions led us into Vietnam but, collectively, our failure to learn from the French experience and to better cooperate with them was our most grievous error. Thus, John Foster Dulles cabled Ambassador Douglas Dillon in Paris on the night of 5 April 1954, it was not possible "for us to commit belligerent acts in Indochina without full political understanding with France and other countries."<sup>16</sup> Because the French, who had been fighting

for 8 years, would not move over and grant us preeminence in their domain, we would, in the end, not support them—as if the stakes were only as big as the petty rivalries between French and American forces; as if the unwillingness of the French to produce a timetable for Indochinese development to our liking should justify our allowing the fate of a strategically important country to be determined by a strategically minor but psychologically important battle. For the first time in her history the United States, as Bernard Fall put it, "abandoned an ally to his fate while the ally was fighting a war that the United States had encouraged him to fight to a point far beyond his own political objectives and most certainly far beyond his own military means."<sup>17</sup> It is worth asking if a great power ever so foolishly and cheaply lost the opportunity to prevent a major loss and a major power has ever had to pay so high a price for its lack of foresight. There appear, indeed, to be some important lessons to be learned from the French experience in Vietnam. We failed to learn them once, but our own experience will hopefully prevent us from the same mistakes a second time.

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### BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY

Professor W. Scott Thompson did his undergraduate work at Stanford University and earned his Ph.D. from Oxford University; he is presently on the faculty of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy and has previously served on the faculties of the University of the Philippines and Chulalongkorn University in Bangkok, Thailand. Professor Thompson has authored *Ghana's Foreign Policy, 1957-1966: Diplomacy, Ideology, and the New State*, coedited with Colonel D. Frizzell *Vietnamese War* (forthcoming), and has written numerous articles for professional journals.

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### NOTES

1. "The Military Lessons of the Vietnamese War," Conference sponsored by the International Security Studies Program, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Medford, Mass., 3-4 May 1974.

2. Truong Chinh, quoted in Dennis J. Duncanson's important study *Government and Revolution in Viet-Nam* (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), p. 156.

3. Stephen Young, "Nationalism in Viet-Nam," mimeographed, 1974.

4. To be sure, the radical critic (Frantz Fanon, for example) would fault the French system all the more for demeaning the essence of the local spirit-culture by holding up an older, more developed, and more powerful one as the all-encompassing ideal for everyone.

5. Félix Houphouët-Boigny, "Black Africa and the French Union," Philip W. Quigg, ed., *Africa, a Foreign Affairs Reader* (New York: Praeger, 1964), pp. 270-271 (originally appearing in *Foreign Affairs*, July 1957).

6. See Elliott Roosevelt, *As He Saw It* (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1946).

7. Thomas Thayer, "Patterns of the French and American Experiences in Viet-Nam." (An insightful paper presented to an International Studies Program colloquium, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Medford, Mass., November 1973). The point is not that the French fought more valiantly, necessarily, than the Americans, who had vastly superior medical facilities, only that the French did fight very hard indeed.

8. Lord David Cecil, *Lord M* (London: Constable, 1954), p. 42.

9. Edward Muller, "A Test of a Partial Theory of Potential for Political Violence," *American Political Science Review*, September 1972.

10. Alfred Grosser, *La IV<sup>e</sup> République et sa Politique Extérieure*, 2d ed., p. 398.

11. See John S. Ambler's study, *The French Army in Politics 1945-62* (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1966) for background and analysis of the *guerre révolutionnaire* school.

12. At the presentation of an earlier version of this paper at the Naval War College in December 1974, one officer with experience in Vietnam objected to this point on the grounds that, in his own training period before being sent, he and his fellow officers were exposed to all the writings that were available from the earlier period, the problem being that most were in French. Random checking revealed that, as suspected, a rather superficial attempt was made in some training situations to familiarize soldiers with the previous French efforts in Vietnam. The evidence is insufficient to modify my original assertion, namely that we paid scarcely any substantive attention to the French period.

13. Duncanson, p. 9.

14. Oddly, in this very period Americans were coming, rightly or wrongly, to wonder whether their pressures on their British and French friends to decolonize in the immediate postwar period had been gratuitous and misplaced.

Thus the United States was coming full circle. It is worth asking what our anticolonialism gained us. Obviously a great deal of ill will in Britain and France, not to say all of Europe. In the Third World our "anticolonial" attitude was usually either taken to be just that—an attitude with no operational significance—as, in fact, our needs were on another level; or our attitude was taken to be gratuitous or hypocritical. Most often the accusation was that we were the "number one imperialist" country, so what difference did our position on European colonialism make—we had succeeded to their position, taking up where they had left off, or so it was seen.

15. Thayer.

16. *Pentagon Papers*, *The New York Times* ed. (New York: Quadrangle Books, 1971), pp. 40-41.

17. Bernard Fall, *Hell in a Very Small Place* (New York: Vintage Books, 1967), p. 461.

*The heritage of the much discussed "military-industrial complex" can be traced directly to the first of the truly modern weapons systems on which it now thrives—the large and expensive, steelplated, steam-propelled battleship of the late 19th century. Faced with the demands of building a new steel navy, men like Secretary of the Navy B.F. Tracy forged the basic links between industry and Government which proved beneficial to both, but which also led to the practices and expansive military budget with which we are all familiar.*

## **THE FORMATIVE YEARS OF THE NAVAL-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX: THEIR MEANING FOR STUDIES OF INSTITUTIONS TODAY**

An article prepared

by

B. Franklin Cooling

The so-called military-industrial complex, or MIC, did not date from Malcolm Moos or Dwight D. Eisenhower's oft quoted and much publicized statement in 1961 nor, if recent analysis by the media is true, is it likely to end in the post-Vietnam era. The proper relationship between national economic power, foreign policy objectives, and the national Military Establishment has been of concern to not only those intimately acquainted with the issues but to much of the literate public as well for nearly a century. From the isolationist cries of Senators and the press in the 1880's and 1890's to the recent shrill notes of Sidney Lens, Daniel Ellsberg, Gabriel Kolko and others, the questions surrounding the relationship and its implications for American society have been substantial.

Despite this easily recognized importance, however, historians have lagged behind and perhaps interpreted too narrowly the origins and formative years of the complex.<sup>1</sup>

To pinpoint a genesis in the chain of historical causality seems a hopeless task. Still, there are events the sheer magnitude of which gives them a certain causal autonomy. One might make a strong and simplistic case for tracing the origins of MIC back to the industrial revolution with everything since then as merely inevitable. Or one could say that the American Civil War spawned a new industrial order "composed largely of war profiteers and others who grew rich on government contracts and the requirements of national emergency, and who during the war and its aftermath were able to influence the economic

reconstruction." For purposes of further stimulating investigation, however, the organizational and personal aspects of an MIC might also be said to have begun in those crucial years between the Civil War and World War I. It was during these years that institutional arrangements between the military and industrial sectors were first attempted during peacetime. Styled a sort of "ancestral period" to the modern MIC by a few perceptive historians, it centers upon a naval arms race which involved most, if not all, of the industrial nations around the globe. Obviously too large a topic for definitive treatment here, it may be possible to indicate a few signposts along the twisting road which leads to the modern MIC. These guideposts illustrate quite well the jerry-built arrangements and personal touch—not necessarily calculated by the participants at the time—which shaped institutional arrangements between the U.S. Navy and industry.

The root of the complex, the great naval arms race, was itself bound within the dynamic phenomena we term "expansionism" and "imperialism." Driven by an almost messianic zeal, major European and, for the first time, non-European states occupied virtually all of Africa, the Middle East, and Asia. A new structure of international relations emerged with Germany, the United States, and Japan superimposed upon the old European power struggle, with an impact on the 19th century balance of power that was not clearly perceived until at least 1919.<sup>2</sup>

Added to international developments was an internal dynamism, linked directly to the post-Civil War industrial expansion in the United States. The Bessemer and open hearth processes spawned the age of steel; chemical knowledge was applied to industrial processes; systemization of the production, transportation, and utilization of electricity took place; a thirst for statistical data and the emergence of agencies

of interpretation prompted descriptions of the country, its economy, and its society. Finally, the demand for efficient distribution and rapid industrial production appeared. All were representative of the era. The most characteristic American approach was organization, and the characteristic American organization of industry by the mid-1880's was the corporation. Both vertical and horizontal trusts had appeared within the next decade, and bankers moved slowly through investment credit toward control of major sectors of American industry. On through the panic of 1893 and the turn of the century marched the giant combines such as U.S. Steel, International Harvester, the Du Pont Company, and Standard Oil.<sup>3</sup>

Paralleling such developments were technological trends relevant to shipyard construction. They have gone relatively unnoticed by recent scholars but remain quite relevant to the MIC and national power in that period. It is a simple truth that not until that time did anything like a modern advanced weapons system come into play—the gigantic, expensive, steel-plated, steam-propelled, heavily armed and armored warship. This advanced weapons system, requiring large sums of capital—to support the physical facilities for fabrication, materials, and manpower—and long lead times for planning and coordination, is quite symbolic of both the arms race and expansive military budget that came to serve as a hallmark of the mature military-industrial complex. Not only did it represent an occasion for profiteering from its inception but, in the mind of one analyst, "the interests ranged around the modern weapons system have created pressures that have permanently altered the private sector, the public sector and the relationship between the two."<sup>4</sup>

It is equally true that none of this could have begun until the proper moment in the state of the art,

especially in terms of high quality, mass produced steel. In dimension, steam propulsion engineering and screw propeller drives, breech-loading rifled ordnance in new types and calibers, and innovative (sometimes even bizarre) styles in naval architecture, all evidenced signs of development—development closely linked with the national and international tide of human development. Put bluntly, the overall movement to replace the U.S. Navy's wooden frigates and iron monitors of the Civil War era with a fleet of modern, steam-propelled, steel warships pointed almost naturally to new bonds between industry and the National Government, especially the military sector.

Therefore, a combination of factors—broad international responsibilities that had to be met, new and exciting tools apparently ready to be utilized, and a climate of domestic opinion sympathetic to experimentation and change—all set the stage for an exciting period in American affairs. Much has been said of the economic underpinnings of late 19th century expansionism.<sup>5</sup> But, whether commerce followed the flag or the flag followed commerce seems a bit academic today. The succession of stages were short from industrial expansion to the search for markets and raw materials, to a larger navy for protection of commerce complete with overseas bases. Almost inevitably one is faced with the question of national security as expressed through the historic role of seapower. Overlooked in this chain for so long were the ships—warships that were well armed, modern, and equal to those of any enemy (at least in the eyes of potential enemies).

The program got underway from 1881 to 1885 when Congress was persuaded to authorize construction of the "White Squadron," or "ABCD" ships, four unarmored vessels—three cruisers and a dispatch boat. Still, the state of mind and art in both naval and steel sectors mitigated against well-greased

slides for putting these ships into the water. Many old salts preferred sail rigs, wooden hulls, and smoothbore guns. Venerable admirals distrusted the steel industry's ability to provide the service with what their "Young Turk" subordinates kept pressuring as necessary for fleet modernization. In truth, the steel industry was geared for little more than its principal market—steel rails. Few steelmen knew anything about 15-ton stern sections, shaped bows, and massive sideplates for warships. The use of steel for boilers, bridges, and building frames was hardly off the drawing board. When American railroad expansion declined periodically, the steel industry sputtered and limped along awaiting the next burst of right-of-way construction. Nonetheless, John Roach, a Chester, Pa., shipbuilder, knew the right combination of subcontractors and suppliers, had sufficient political pull to win the Navy's bidding on the ABCD's, and started the "New Navy" on its way.<sup>6</sup>

Nobody was happy with Roach's products. Democratic politicians claimed Republican Roach had padded the GOP war chest, hence the award of contract. The U.S.S. *Dolphin's* snapped propeller shaft shattered what little faith the Navy's bureau chiefs could muster for industry's expertise with heavy forgings, and the service itself subsequently took over construction of the rest of the flotilla. Roach foundered financially, leaving a profound distaste in steel circles for Government procedures and inspectors. Nonetheless, the ABCD's alerted steelmakers to the potential market in open hearth structural steel plates, a potential market far greater than that for steel rails and one which might ease the transition into the postrailroad boom era for the steel industry.

Meanwhile, the Navy's rigid inspection procedures frightened steelmen. New warship designs called for heavy side armor, heavier gun forgings, and

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improved shaftings, all of which were unfamiliar to U.S. manufacturers. The absurdity of having to go abroad to potential enemies for materiel, however, soon became apparent to all. Secretary of the Navy William Chandler perceived in 1884 that: "Patience, forbearance, and liberal treatment of the manufacturers are necessary in order to encourage them to undertake the development in this country of . . . armor for naval vessels and ingots for heavy cannon."<sup>7</sup> Future civilian secretaries had to act as spur and counsellor to private industry in order to secure the Nation's first line of defense.

Government authorities in the eighties agonized over the problem. The U.S. Navy's Gun Foundry Board, the Army's Board on Fortifications, a Senate Select Commission on Ordnance and War Ships, and a House Commission on Ordnance and Gunnery all pondered problems of cast versus forged cannon and the subsidization of private industry versus outright development of Government factories. In doing so, the philosophical base of competition between Government and private industry in making ordnance, armor, and shaftings was compared with establishment of a virtual "business partnership," a sharing of technical knowledge, heavy investment in plant and equipment, and assured profit—whether measured in terms of capital or numbers of warships. The Government, for the most part, favored a scheme whereby industry provided the forgings (with appropriations carefully set aside by Congress as "insurance" for industry on their heavy plant investment) and supplied them to Government gun factories for final finishing. Similar plans were developed for armor since facilities for ordnance and armor forging were ostensibly interchangeable. Steelmen, worried about economic recession, apparently agreed as far as ordnance was concerned but preferred that armor be forged and finished solely by private industry. The

differences were somewhat subtle. The Government wished to stimulate free enterprise but at the same time assure the quality material to fit Government specifications and to prevent any industry combination against it. Industry was tempted by profits from a potentially lucrative new market but wary of Government inspections and the fact that overextension of heavy initial investments had often led to failure in the past.<sup>8</sup>

The ingredients in the 1880's will seem quite familiar to modern students of MIC, complete as it was with economic, political, strategic, and human dimensions. Congress, charged with providing for the national defense, was beset with both isolationist opposition to the funding for new ships and a limited understanding of the technical difficulties inherent in the program. As such, they were reluctant to set up funds as "insurance" or "subsidy" to lure steelmen into competitive bidding. Industrialists were conscious of economic recession and desirous of financial gain, but they remembered Roach's problems and myopically believed that huge initial investments for plant development without Government underwriting might be one-term investments with no civilian market. The American shipbuilding industry was anxious to regain its old stature among world leaders—eclipsed by the end of wooden shipping—and was acutely aware of profits, technical skills, and jobs. Also evident was a critical shortage of foreign risk capital for all U.S. industry. Railway schemes of the seventies had burned British investors, and they were far more willing to invest in "colonial" land schemes, mining, and transport rather than industry even at home in the United Kingdom. Then too there was nationalistic John Q. Public (63 million strong in 1890), bursting with pride as his country entered its second century of nationhood and wanting it to assume its proper place among world leaders. Of

course, on the naval side there were the chauvinistic men in blue and gold (usually the younger officers) with their own vested interests in promotion, command, and professionalism provided by new ships and squadrons. Finally came the succession of politically, economically, humanly motivated civilian secretaries representing Republican and Democratic administrations. Men such as William H. Hunt, William E. Chandler, William C. Whitney, Benjamin F. Tracy, Hilary A. Herbert, and John D. Long—aware of votes in steelmaking districts, jobs in navy yard facilities, prestige of political party in power, their responsibilities to the Nation, and the whole question of the United States on the international stage.

The logjam of rhetoric, investigation, and planning broke in August 1886 when Democratic Secretary Whitney secured not only funding for a naval gun factory at Washington to finish ordnance but enough ship authorizations to lure industrial giants into bidding on ordnance and armor forgings. Perhaps most important, Whitney was also given the responsibility to progress further with the business of rebuilding the Navy. Whitney could find only one firm, Bethlehem Iron, to undertake forgings of both ordnance and armor. That firm tried to erect a plant—relying on European tools and skill—but numerous difficulties led to delays in the delivery of armor. Gun forgings apparently proved to be no problem. But the heavy masses of steel for armor, the special needs of hard face and soft back and the massive shapings necessary were beyond the capabilities of the industry. In fact, the problems were never really solved until the Krupp firm perfected annealing and forging. Despite experimentation between steam and hydraulic hammers, the lack of success experienced by the steel firm rapidly reached crisis proportions by the time the Republicans again took power on the banks of the Potomac.<sup>9</sup>

A variety of new dimensions unfolded with the secretaryship of Benjamin Franklin Tracy, 1889-1893. Tracy, a New York lawyer, and Civil War veteran who had been commandant of the Elmira prison depot, lieutenant of Boss Tom Platt's organization, and compromise selection for President Benjamin Harrison's Cabinet was a greenhorn at naval matters. Still, his annual report for 1889 reflected a major shift in naval policy. Tracy based his goals on European naval trends, the seapower theories of Stephen B. Luce and Alfred T. Mahan, and his own belief that a two ocean battlefleet, consisting of heavily armored and armed battleships was necessary to protect the continental United States.<sup>10</sup> He convinced Congress of this, they gave him authorization to proceed with a program, and only Bethlehem's inability to provide the necessary armor brought the Secretary up short in the summer of 1890. Of course this gave Tracy time to experiment with various armor types—compound, all-steel, or nickel-steel—but as he told a Senate committee several years later,

... having the authorization to build three battle-ships and three large cruisers which would require about 14,000 tons of additional armor... I felt it necessary to found a second armor plant, because at 300 tons a month for each establishment... they could only furnish armor enough to build about two battleships a year.<sup>11</sup>

The procedures which Tracy used in meeting the armor crisis provoked a controversy which echoed for decades and set the pattern for the next step in the spawning of an MIC.

Tracy eschewed competitive bidding and went directly to William Abbott, chairman of Carnegie, Phipps and Company. Of course, Andrew Carnegie claimed patriotic motives in responding to the Navy's quest (despite his later

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stance with the anti-imperialists), but the profit motive might well have been a more accurate explanation for his firm's interest. While Tracy thought Carnegie should accept a lower price for armor because his firm could benefit from knowledge already gained by Bethlehem's costly trial and error, Carnegie balked at the suggestion:

Wish to help you out with armor and will do best possible but Bethlehem prices being lowest offered under strong competition. We cannot risk taking one iota less. Their prices almost if not quite as low as Britain pays. If you give us five thousand tons Bethlehem prices shall order necessary tools and go ahead otherwise must decline. Armor making no child's play.<sup>1 2</sup>

Meanwhile, Tracy moved in several other directions, experimenting with various types of armor—he had 12- and 13-inch shells fire pointblank at various types of armorplates, completely scandalizing admiralities around the world with proof that nickel-steel armor (which no one possessed at the time) was superior to anything else. Armed with this knowledge and despite Carnegie's distrust of nickel and nickel magnate S.J. Ritchie (who controlled Canadian Copper, supplier of the metal), Tracy persuaded Republican friends on Capitol Hill to permit nickel's inclusion on the free list in the McKinley tariff. When an inventor and manufacturer of nuts, bolts, screws, bicycle parts, punches and dies, railroad frogs, and plates for safes, H. Augustus Harvey, approached the department with a new idea for hardening steel, Tracy pushed the patent through appropriate Government channels in order to have it used in making "harveyized, nickel-steel armor"—the finest in the world. Even naval officers were permitted to help the steel firms fabricate the best armor, a somewhat suspect practice except that it gave the navy

"observers" the opportunity to keep steelmen in line.

A conference of shipbuilders and steelmen in Washington in October degenerated into a name-calling contest and demonstrated that various elements of an MIC are not always cooperative in the early stages or that Government officials like Tracy have anything like complete control over their civilian associates. But by November 1890 negotiations with Carnegie finally produced a contract calling for steel armor at Bethlehem prices (prices eventually settled at \$561.86/ton for "harveyized, nickel-steel armor"), possible future contracts, and the Government assuming the financial arrangements for foreign nickel patents and the supply of that metal. Testy Andrew Carnegie remained chary of Tracy's "pet nickel," as he called it, but even he had to capitulate in May of 1891 after the first successful testing of such plates. He wrote Tracy: "The favor with which you have regarded it [nickel] from the first is now in my opinion fully justified . . . our nickel-steel . . . excelled the Creusot plate . . . , which proved even our French competitor is behind us."<sup>1 3</sup> There was nothing the steelmaker admired more than success. Tracy retired from office in 1893 knowing that his major accomplishment had been in securing additional sources for the best possible armor. The Homestead strike of 1892 and technical difficulties plagued the Carnegie program, and while Bethlehem and Carnegie supplied 1,100 tons of armor by June of 1892, Tracy's program was at best only a qualified success. Congress expressed its displeasure at Tracy's failure to advertise for competitive bids in 1891; his successor Hilary Herbert thought he detected collusion between Bethlehem and Carnegie when various contracts seemed to show similar prices for both suppliers; and the national fires of the Populist and later the Progressive movements, stoked by economic depression,

made the matter of armor profits, the techniques of effecting government-industrial link-ups, and various other departmental procedures the subject of investigations on Capitol Hill for the next quarter-century. Moreover, it was not until March 1893 that Carnegie produced armor with regularity and not until 1895 that the contract reached completion.

The stormy Senate hearings in 1896 brought Tracy to the witness stand with "Pitchfork Ben" Tillman and others scrutinizing his operations regarding the involvement of naval officers with contractors while on active duty, departmental interference with patent decisions, and the practicality of the Government in establishing its own armor factory.<sup>14</sup> Tracy saw nothing of any conspiracy between Bethlehem and Carnegie, given the urgency of the armor shortage. He felt that justice had been served in disputing the claims of French armor firms for patent rights to the nickel process, naval officers helping private industry, expediting patents and favoring private citizens with projects of benefit to the U.S. Navy. The end justified the means, in Tracy's mind. When the question of high costs for armor arose—supposedly Carnegie had supplied the Russians with armor in 1894 at only half the asking price for the American Navy—he told Tillman and his colleagues:

I always had assumed that when the United States asked a firm to found a plant, without any guarantee of a specific amount of business to justify it, they would have to pay necessarily a larger price for that quantity than they would have to pay if they were giving a guarantee of continuous business from that time on.<sup>15</sup>

The issue, however, was far from settled. Indeed, the armor investigations of the Populist period were mere forerunners to those after World War I. Tillman and company recommended a

fair average price of \$300 to \$400 per ton (less than either Tracy or Whitney had paid), erection of a Government-owned armor plant, and they approved provisions of a recently enacted law excluding officers from employment with contractors having large dealings with the Navy. Moreover, they decided that "government officials ought not to promote a monopoly of the business of making armor through patents issued to the use of the Government to destroy patents held by foreigners."<sup>16</sup>

Secretary Herbert and his successor John D. Long both faced a strongly united steel industry undesirous of reducing prices to benefit the Navy. Furthermore, it appeared that the partnership, or close ties between steel and the Navy, evaporated as Progressive elements caused the U.S. Navy, with Congress, to regulate the steel industry in the interest of national defense. The dissolution was deceptive, perhaps, for once bonds had been forged, once new horizons for both the Navy and steel industry had been opened, neither could function completely without the other, and tactical shifts on the part of each never destroyed the structural framework of their operation. Tracy's response to the armor crisis bred new tentacles for a nascent MIC, due more to the novelty of the situation, the crisis in procurement, and the personalities involved in Government-business relations than to actual design. S.J. Ritchie and nickel, H. Augustus Harvey and his patented process, Robert P. Linderman of Bethlehem Iron, and Andrew Carnegie of steel all stood to profit. Even Tracy represented Carnegie in patent litigation after his departure from office. Still, and the thought may yet be useful in considering both sides of the MIC phenomenon in our own era, Tracy and his secretarial colleagues all forged a team between industry and Government which proved mutually beneficial. The two elements of this team represented an age when vested interest, patriotic

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and selfish motives were boisterously mixed in negotiations and maneuvers more native to a chessboard.

Tracy's contributions, for instance, exceeded the purely military implications for armor and ordnance production. His efforts related directly to the first successful fabrication of large, high-grade forgings in this country. In turn, with Tracy's guidance, this development led to the introduction of nickel steel into American steel production. Finally, introduction of the Harvey process and the domestication of high-grade armor and projectiles had importance for the manufacture of all hard steel since this metal held great promise for high-speed commercial machinery in the period.

The commercial significance of the Navy's technical innovations proved equally great. The harveyized nickel-steel contracts of 1890, 1892, and 1893 carried both Bethlehem and Carnegie firms over bleak depression years in 1893 and 1894 when rail and structural steel markets remained slack. In fact, the reputation for prosperity permitted Carnegie Steel to secure the lucrative Russian naval contract in 1894 on a world market dominated heretofore by Krupp, Schneider, and Whitworth.

So steelmakers in Pittsburgh and South Bethlehem, nickel mine owners in Canada, shipbuilders in Bath, Maine, and San Francisco as well as in Government yards at New York and Norfolk, and a myriad of smaller subcontractors for appurtenances and extra ship fittings all had reason to thank the U.S. Navy and secretaries like Tracy for their energetic moves to dispel the armor crisis of 1890. Overlooking the niceties of competitive bidding—Government officials working for private industry, favoritism to special interests, and continuing to pressure Congress for more ship authorizations—men like Tracy cultivated the nascent MIC and pointed the way for the whole line of controversies which have surrounded that phenomenon to the present day. By discovering a

second source of forgings, domesticating means for producing high-grade, heavy masses of steel (Carnegie and Bethlehem had to go abroad initially for European tools and expertise.) Tracy also set an added dimension to MIC. It is impossible to have a true MIC unless the ingredients are present at home—machinery, techniques, personnel, and proper linkage with other elements of the web whether they be subcontractors, high Government officials, ambitious military professionals (Mahan and his "mess-mates" as Peter Karsten styles them), and strategically placed friends on Capitol Hill (Nelson Aldrich, Thomas Reed, Charles Boutelle, Henry Cabot Lodge, and Hilary Herbert).

Given that the question of MIC may seem to involve something of a chicken and egg routine, the efforts of Tracy and the Navy may well have caused industry, Congress, and the bureaucracy to broaden their outlook and expand their facilities to meet the continuing challenges of the Industrial Age. While in the time frame 1881-1897 expenditures for the U.S. Navy doubled (\$15.7 million to \$34.6 million), neither figure amounted to much of the overall

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### BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY



Dr. B. Franklin Cooling did his undergraduate work at Rutgers University and earned his master's and doctorate in history from the University of Pennsylvania.

He has served as Park Historian with the U.S. Department of the Interior, as National Defense Historian with the Office of the Chief of Military History, U.S. Department of the Army, and continues as Curator of the U.S.S. *Olympia* (preserved in Philadelphia) and as a member of the editorial advisory board of *Military Affairs*. Dr. Cooling is currently the Chief of Research Studies, Military History Research Collection, Carlisle Barracks.

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Federal budget which for the same period rose from \$206.7 million to \$365.8 million. High tariffs permitted a surplus, veterans' benefits drained off more than the armed services, and since the Nation was neither building super-highways, underwriting massive education, health and welfare programs, nor propping up client states abroad, the MIC in the guise of the Navy of the period very quickly and subtly insinuated itself into the budgeting process. The "New Navy" of the eighties and nineties not only cut a wake toward American Empire abroad, but in this wake lay the foam and disturbance of what is called today the military-industrial complex.

Perhaps then it would be valuable for modern military and civilian students of our present military-industrial interlock to reflect somewhat on the past, or at least on the late 19th century. Therein lie some valuable insights into atmo-

sphere, procedures, and personalities. The U.S. Navy is naturally but a single aspect of the picture for there are definite international overtones, and one may suspect that the land service has equally fascinating "war stories" in its own archives. Eighty years ago the disclosures that Bethlehem and Carnegie were rigging bids, that naval procurement officers owned or had interests in some of the patents awarded for the processes of fabrication used by the steel industry, and that naval officers were in the habit of going on leave of absence in order to work temporarily for Navy contractors and then returning to active duty raised disquieting questions about the way the Government was procuring weapons. Suspicions were raised that the contractors were taking advantage of Government and the American people and, unfortunately, neither Congress nor the Executive pursued the matter with a killer instinct.

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*The American Civil War represented both a radical departure from conventional warfare of the past and a dramatic portent of warfare in the future. By recognizing this fact, Abraham Lincoln became its master, able to use its variety of economic, social, military, and political elements to ensure his objective of national reunion.*

# LINCOLN AND THE STRATEGY OF UNION

An article

by

Professor Craig L. Symonds

The period 1815-1914 has often been characterized by military historians as an era of limited wars, and such a generalization is at least partly justified. The French-Italian war of 1859, Prussia's wars of 1864, 1866, and 1870, the Crimean War, and the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-1878 were all conflicts which required something less than total mobilization and, with one exception, were all resolved short of the total destruction of the defeated power. One conflict during this period, however, proved to be an important exception. This war was fought not in Europe but in the United States where North fought South in a conflict that was anything but limited and which proved to be a more accurate barometer of future wars than anything that took place between European powers.

The American Civil War was an experience that we as a people are unlikely ever to forget, something for which we have had a fascination, almost a

preoccupation. Indeed, when discussing this particular war, historians often lose one of the principal advantages in the use of historical case studies—examining events sufficiently remote in time that they can be evaluated critically and without prejudice. The reason is fairly simple: It was, beyond doubt, the most traumatic national experience in our country's history—quite literally, a civil war fought by civilians, hastily armed and only masquerading as soldiers. In the words of Bruce Catton, "These were not armies that fought . . . They were simply huge assemblies of citizens, thrown into an enormous combat and left to fight their way out."\* For example, in 1860 the entire population of the South included only 1,140,000 white males between the ages of 15 and 40; over 900,000 of these actively

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\*Bruce Catton, *U.S. Grant and the American Military Tradition* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1954), p. 87.

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served in the army—nearly 80 percent! The number of men in arms on both sides eventually totaled over 2 million.

The casualty statistics are equally astounding. It is staggering to realize that more Americans were killed in combat during the American Civil War than were killed in the Revolutionary War, the War of 1812, the Mexican War, the Spanish-American War, World War I, World War II, and the Korean War all put together! In the Civil War we are counting casualties from both sides, but even so, it was by far the bloodiest war in our history. A unit which lost no more than 10 percent of its strength in any major action was considered to have been not seriously engaged. Losses of 50 percent were common, and even 80-90 percent were not unknown. By comparison, the worst casualties of World War II were at Tarawa (17 percent) and they nearly caused a national scandal.

Perhaps the most ominous portent of things to come was the extent to which devastation extended into the civilian community. There was no insulation from the effects of this war; it touched every corner of the Nation and every level of society. It was, in short, America's only experience with total war, and it was fought with a completeness and a vehemence that rival modern warfare. It was, after all, the American Civil War that prompted Sherman's biting epithet that "War is hell."

After the first year of warfare, the chivalrous attitudes of the field commanders were eliminated; devastation and pillage became the order of the day. The most notable examples were Sherman's march through Georgia and Sheridan's laying waste to the Shenandoah Valley. Whole cities were battered into ruin. Photographs of the Confederate capitol of Richmond taken a few days after its capture by the Union Army depict utter destruction, destruction which mirrored that found in other Southern cities such as Charleston, Atlanta, and Petersburg. This kind of war

was a totally new phenomenon, especially in the United States, and in the American Civil War its evolution can be clearly documented.

Newspaper sketches of battles fought in 1861 depict long ranks of well-dressed, well-equipped soldiers advancing over open fields with bayonets fixed—determined men advancing to meet their equally intrepid foe. Tradition called for the officers to place themselves in front of the troops to provide a conspicuous example for the men, and they are there in the artists' sketches, gesturing with drawn sword toward the objective. To be sure, the artists of the day were idealizing the conflict, but their portraits were by no means totally inaccurate. In 1861 fortifications were considered useful only for defending a strategic point such as the Capitol. Furthermore, in their handling of the raw, undisciplined troops which had been hurried to Washington to meet the crisis, Union field commanders felt that the only way they could maintain any degree of control was to keep them concentrated and urge them toward the enemy in the tight ranks depicted in the drawings. But as the enthusiastic green troops turned into hard-bitten professionals, this era soon passed. By 1864, as the two nearly exhausted armies peered at each other from elaborate fortifications, trench warfare with its dirt and disease had replaced the glories of the bayonet charge. Factories and granaries became legitimate targets for opposing armies. Campaigns began to be evaluated on the basis of their impact on public morale as commanders sought to destroy the enemy's will to win. Technology was partly responsible for this transformation, but perhaps even more important was the fact that, as Clausewitz warned, wars tend to approach their absolute form as a matter of momentum, especially when emotion runs high and the object of the war is unclear.

In this environment of total war,

with neither side entirely certain of the loyalty of its own citizenry, both sides suffered from what might properly be called the "traitor-under-every-bed" syndrome. Officers in the Union Army and Navy who had families in the South were automatically suspect in the eyes of patriotic Congressmen; it was often wondered, usually with a great deal of political rhetoric, whether such men could be trusted to prosecute the war with the necessary enthusiasm. Sometimes their doubts were justified; more often they were not. But the frequent attacks of overzealous Congressmen on Southern-born officers convinced many of the latter that their personal and professional safety lay in loudly supporting whatever popular measure was being considered by the majority of Northern Congressmen. Political neutrality, in other words, was no longer enough—perhaps it was not even possible.

As the war went on, the already fuzzy distinction between civil and military authority became even more obscured. Complicating the strategic prosecution of the war was the fact that different elements of the national body could not agree on the purpose of the war—or, if you would, on the "war aims." Was the war being fought to save the Union, to abolish slavery, or to ensure the continuation of Northern, especially Republican, political control of the Government? Was it, as the British claimed, a war of imperialism of the North over the South, or was it, as Senator Charles Sumner claimed, a moral crusade for justice and equal rights?

To President Abraham Lincoln the answer was clear. Lincoln took office on 4 March 1861 in the midst of the secession crisis, convinced in his own mind that secession was an illegal act. The Union, he proclaimed, was a marriage, not a "free love arrangement" which might be undone by any member at his whim. Lincoln's immediate

objective, therefore, was to restore that Union and, in the process, destroy the pretended government of the Confederacy. This objective he clung to throughout the war.

Lincoln did not act immediately. Half of his Cabinet urged restraint so as not to force Virginia and other wavering slave states into the arms of the newly formed Confederacy, while the other half urged immediate action in order to demonstrate the Union's seriousness and vitality. Lincoln listened to both sides noncommittally, but on 29 March he ordered that an amphibious expedition be got ready to relieve the besieged garrison at Fort Sumter. Word of his intention was relayed to Charleston, and irate Charlestonians delayed only long enough to deliver an ultimatum to Sumter's commander before opening fire.

Upon learning of the Confederate attack on Fort Sumter, Lincoln's reaction was immediate and unequivocal: he issued a proclamation declaring "that certain combinations of men" in certain states were in rebellion against the lawful authority of the Government, and he called for 75,000 volunteers to suppress that rebellion. Technically, he had no legal or constitutional authority to do so—Congress had not yet met—but, of course, he did it anyway, citing an obscure Militia Act of 1792 as authority. His action meant war.

Lincoln's second act was to turn to the Commander of the Army for military advice. In 1861 the Union commander in chief was the aged Winfield Scott, hero of the Mexican War. He has been characterized by many historians as no longer able to sit a horse, plagued with the gout, and prone to sleeping during the afternoons. In short, too old for command. (Even if he could still climb into the saddle, few horses could carry him very far. He weighed over 300 pounds!) But to give credit where it is justly due, Scott was a superb tactician and strategist, and the plan which the

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Union used to defeat the South was essentially the one he recommended to Lincoln in April 1861. His scheme was one of strangulation and exhaustion. He was not anxious to directly confront Confederate troops on the battlefield, not because he feared the result of such a confrontation, he had every confidence in Union victory, but because he hated the thought of a fratricidal war. He planned (1) a holding action in northern Virginia to pin down the Confederate main army and to protect Washington; (2) a tight naval blockade of the Confederate coast to prevent the enemy from importing arms and munitions from Europe and also to prevent their exportation of cotton; and (3) to divide the Confederacy along the Mississippi, again by using superior seapower. In this way he hoped that the South would come to recognize the extent of its dependence on the North and perhaps the Nation could be reunited without the loss of too many lives.

It was a vain hope. Nevertheless, Lincoln accepted the overall plan, and one of his first acts of war was to declare a blockade on the Southern States, a blockade which existed only on paper for the first year of the war because the Union Navy was simply not up to the task.

To blockade a coast 3,500 miles long, the Navy possessed only 42 commissioned warships, only 8 of which were stationed in or near home waters. The Navy therefore began a crash program of expansion commandeering yachts, tugs, and ferryboats for blockade duty (including, incidentally, the *America*, original winner and namesake of the America's cup). But despite these efforts, Confederate trade with Europe prospered into 1862 when the Union blockade finally began to become effective. The last of the Confederate ports was not closed until late in 1864, and the last Confederate man-of-war did not surrender until several months after Appomattox.

There were some serious legal problems incurred by the administration as a result of its declaration of a blockade. The Lincoln administration was maintaining the fiction that the Southern States had never legally left the Union—they were merely in rebellion. This was an important distinction designed to prevent foreign powers, particularly Britain and France, from recognizing the Confederacy and opening a mutually profitable trade in much needed arms. But the declaration of a blockade was an act of war, and as such it implied recognition of the Confederacy as a belligerent. Lincoln decided to avoid this dilemma by claiming that his act was designed to close the ports to trade, not to blockade them. He noted that since the municipal taxes and import duties could not be collected at certain Southern ports—for domestic reasons—that they should be closed to trade until those duties could be collected. However, this viewpoint had some pitfalls. If all that the Lincoln administration meant to do was close the ports, what possible justification did it have for stopping neutral ships at sea to inspect them for contraband? Just as there could be no political neutrality at home, the extremes of the war soon made it hard to recognize the rights of neutrals at sea, and, in the end, the administration had to settle for the name as well as the fact of blockade.

Lincoln did insist on one important modification to Scott's strategic plan. He wanted pressure to be exerted all along the line. He had a special attachment for Kentucky, his home state, and for eastern Tennessee, which had a great deal of Union sentiment. As a result, their liberation was given particular attention by the Army.

But this military policy of the Lincoln administration was felt by many, if not most, to be too passive. Congressional radicals and newspaper editors clamored for a more active strategy—to march the Union Army to

the gates of the Confederate Capital and there dictate the terms of surrender. The name they gave to General Scott's strategic plan, "Anaconda," was a derisive one: slow strangulation by a reptile as opposed to the bold swoop of the eagle.

Daily a banner headline ran across the top of page one of Horace Greeley's Washington newspaper: "On to Richmond." It would appear there every day, said Greeley, until the rebels were crushed. Likewise, many of the recently elected Republican Senators and Congressmen called for a more active strategy. They chafed under the daily national insult of the Confederate flag flying on the southern banks of the Potomac River literally in sight of the Capitol itself.

This should not have been a surprising reaction. In one sense this was the typically American reaction to any war—a quick kick to the solar plexus and then back to the business of peace. In advocating this "American way of war," the radicals placed great confidence in the zeal and elan of the volunteer soldiers. They disparaged the professionals—both officers and men—because they lacked the enthusiasm of the amateur and therefore had a basic lack of commitment. From their point of view, enthusiasm for the cause was far more important than professional competence or experience. They poked fun at bookworm generals who tried to win the war with "strategy"—meaning strategy alone—instead of by fighting—meaning a spirited frontal assault. They also protested Lincoln's policy on slavery.

They recognized at the very outset of hostilities that a civil war was a crisis of such consuming dimension that it would become possible to declare slavery illegal during the war. Lincoln, however, though he was certainly no friend to slavery, was hesitant to support legislation against it for fear of driving the border states out of the Union and into

the arms of the Confederacy. Missouri, Kentucky, Delaware, and even Maryland, which surrounded the Federal Capital, were all slave states fighting for the Union. Lincoln believed that his first goal was to preserve the Union; if freeing the slaves could help accomplish that goal, he would do it; if maintaining slavery in the border states would help win the war, he would do that. It was a pragmatic approach to the problem, but one that did not appeal to the more zealous abolitionists in Congress.

The wartime priorities of this group were somewhat different. Rather than national union, they envisioned the eradication of slavery as the primary political object of the war. These highly principled but unidimensional men came to be known as the Radicals, and through the skillful use of the congressional "Committee for the Conduct of the War" were able to fight a running political battle with Lincoln. Under the authority of this committee, the Radical Republicans continually sought to discredit conservative generals and to enhance more radical officers. One by one they persecuted officers who refused to agree that the eradication of slavery was the primary object of the war and even carried their headhunting to Lincoln's Cabinet by attempting to purge Montgomery Blair and William Henry Seward.\*

These efforts constituted a political confrontation with implications far beyond the future of slavery. They went to the heart of the problem of who makes national policy: the President or the Congress, a problem still the subject of argument today.

As much as the Radical view of the purposes and goals of the war contrasted with those of Lincoln, they were even more at variance with the view held by the Commanding General of the

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\*T. Harry Williams, *Lincoln and the Radicals* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1941).

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Army, George B. McClellan. Like Lincoln, McClellan felt that national union was more important than any legislation on slavery. In fact, he would have preferred that the Southern States be allowed to keep their slaves. McClellan also became the special target of Radical criticism because of his penchant for maneuver and drill rather than attack. His scheme for ending the war was, in effect, a grand-scale end run beginning with a seaborne landing at the end of the Yorktown peninsula from where he would march overland toward Richmond, using the sea for logistic support. It was a good strategic plan hampered by only two flaws. One, it uncovered the Capital. McClellan argued, quite rightly, that the Confederates could not mount an attack on Washington while he was assaulting their own capital, but whether out of fear or an attempt to discredit the general, Washington Congressmen prevailed on Lincoln to order McClellan to leave enough troops behind to protect the Capital in case of an attack. Naturally this weakened McClellan's attacking force. He protested the order though he had no choice but to comply. The second flaw was that the plan itself required speed on the part of the attacking force. The amphibious troops had to approach and surround Richmond before the defenders could construct strong defensive lines across the peninsula. Unfortunately, speed was lacking as McClellan proceeded slowly up the peninsula, laboriously dragging his siege guns along the unimproved roads. The Confederates responded with a series of entrenchments designed more to slow up his advance than to stop it. The Union general became increasingly hesitant as false intelligence reports reached him which credited the Confederate Army, now commanded by R.E. Lee, with twice as many troops as they actually had. Finally, in a series of battles (since named "The Seven Days") that were fought within sight of Rich-

mond itself, McClellan's moderately heavy losses convinced him that he should retreat.

Meanwhile, in Washington, McClellan's detractors were winning their arguments helped by McClellan's own hesitancy. After his withdrawal to Harrison's Landing—a withdrawal unjustified by the fighting—McClellan allowed his anger and frustration to get the better of him, and he sent a very injudiciously worded letter to the President suggesting that Lincoln would be much better off if he listened to McClellan for political and strategic advice rather than to the Congress. Lincoln was, and always had been, willing to listen to McClellan's strategic advice, but he was not about to allow him to dictate policy as well. The Harrison's Landing letter convinced Lincoln that McClellan had to be replaced.

Thus Lincoln had problems from both the Congress who thought he was too soft on conservative Democrats like McClellan and problems from conservative Democrats who felt that Lincoln was allowing the Radicals too much voice in the conduct of the war. Another group of antagonistic northerners felt that Lincoln had no business prosecuting the war at all. An unofficial coalition of pacifists, southern sympathizers, and people who were simply tired of war, collectively referred to as the "Copperheads," began to protest the continuing and apparently useless slaughter. They called for a negotiated settlement to the war—a peaceful separation, they said, was better than a bloody reunion. One of their basic objections to the Lincoln administration and its war was that in the process of conducting that war Lincoln saw fit to abridge many of the constitutional rights of the citizenry. One of his first acts as Commander in Chief was the declaration of martial law and the suspension of *habeus corpus*. Thousands of men were arrested on the most circumstantial evidence and thrown into

prison, sometimes after a brief military trial, often with no trial at all. All this in order to protect the Union from their opinions!

In retrospect, this should have been neither shocking nor even surprising to anyone since the declaration of martial law in battle zones was common during wartime even then. But this was the only case in American history where such actions were found to be necessary among our own citizens. Needless to say, it was not universally popular.

Lincoln's political difficulties were exacerbated by his inability, through the first 3 years of the war, to find a general who was willing to assume the responsibility for a sustained campaign in northern Virginia. What instead took place repeated itself with painful and embarrassing regularity: a fresh, well-trained Union Army would start out from Alexandria, meet an inferior but well-entrenched Confederate force, and, after enduring heavy casualties, retreat back to Alexandria. Congress would foment, a new commanding general would be selected, and in a few months the routine would begin over again. The Radical Republicans put forth their own champions, praising in turn McDowell, Pope, Burnside, and Hooker.\* The Democrats, of course, consistently clamored for the reinstatement of McClellan. Lincoln's problem, then, was twofold: to find a general who could win, but also to find a general who would, if not please everyone, at least antagonize no one.

Finally, in 1864, Lincoln found a general stubborn enough to pursue a consistent campaign against the enemy, Ulysses S. Grant. He was no hero of the Radicals because his political beliefs were moderate, but they could find no reason to have him sacked because he won, though the casualties he sustained were terrible. There was some objection

to making him a lieutenant general based on rumors that he was a drunk, was frequently sloppy and profane, and was certainly no gentleman. But Lincoln was thrilled by him. "If he drinks," Lincoln told one critic, "find out what brand he prefers and I'll send a case to my other generals." Lincoln's judgment of him was summed up in the terse phrase: "He fights!"

Starting out in May from his base north of the Rapidan, Grant tangled with Lee's army almost continuously until late June. He did not win battles, but he knew how to win the campaign. After each battle he moved his army to the southeast around Lee's right flank, forcing his opponent to scurry south to establish a new defensive line. The result was that both armies moved crablike in a south-southeast direction. None of Grant's predecessors had had the iron nerve to press Lee's dangerous army even after a tactical victory, such as Sharpsburg and Gettysburg, much less after a tactical defeat!

After a battle like Cold Harbor, for example, where the army lost 12,000 killed and wounded mostly during a climactic frontal assault which lasted only 8 minutes, any of Grant's predecessors would have fallen back on Washington. But Grant, ignoring the fact that Union casualties far outnumbered Confederate losses, slipped around Lee's flank and continued south. Grant never won a tactical victory after 1863, but he never lost an opportunity to press his outnumbered foe and drive him into Richmond. By mid-1864 Grant's army was occupying the same lines that had been abandoned by McClellan 2 years previous. But unlike McClellan, Grant pinned his enemy down and kept him down, preventing Lee from attempting a counterattack even if he had had the resources to do so, which he did not. Grant surrounded Richmond in the fall of 1864 and held it under siege for half a year. The city fell in April 1865.

Lincoln's confidence in Grant was

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\*See T. Harry Williams, *Lincoln and His Generals* (New York: Knopf, 1952).

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justified. In the end Lincoln was justified in more than his selection of a commanding general. His firmness over secession had made war probable; his resolve to reinforce Fort Sumter had initiated the hostilities; and his strategy of reunion had pointed the way to eventual victory. Could the war have been ended sooner or with less bloodshed? It is conceivable. But given the constraints, legal, diplomatic, political, and military with which Lincoln had to contend, it is hard to imagine how.

Lincoln's policy was national union. His military strategy, his foreign policy decisions, his political maneuvering, and his selection of a commanding general were all carefully weighed for the effect they might have on the war effort. Even the timing of his most difficult and perhaps most memorable decision, to announce the Emancipation Proclamation in January 1863, was a means toward this overall goal.

The Radicals had been calling for such a declaration since the outbreak of the war, but Lincoln had resisted their suggestions for fear that the border states would be driven out of the Union. But Lincoln also recognized that there were some potentially very great advantages to such an action. First, it would encourage the continued defection of those southern slaves who served a quasi-military function for the South—constructing fortifications and transporting munitions. Second, it would go a long way toward endearing the cause to Britain, long a world advocate of emancipation, and remove the threat of British intervention. Furthermore, and this must have attributed much to his decision, Lincoln's political coalition was being jeopardized by threats from both the right and the left.

Though his only political experience before his election to the Presidency

had been one term as a Congressman in the 1840's, Lincoln was a master politician. He had to walk a narrow tight-rope between the demands of Radicals that all Southern sympathizers or pacifists be thrown into jail or be shot and the demands of many Democrats that the South be treated not as a conquered province but as an erring prodigal son. He had to walk, too, between the conservative strategy of McClellan and the ferocity of the Radicals, between abolitionists from New England and slaveholders from the border states, between administration critics who felt he went too far and those who felt he did not go far enough.

As a politician Lincoln was an ideal Machiavellian. He was able to recognize the extreme nature of the war and the drastic measures that would be necessary to fight it; able to sidestep the limitations of 19th century warfare and to inaugurate modern, total war; and able to master all the means at his disposal, political as well as military. He was both lion and fox, often an unbending oak but sometimes a pliant willow. As a master of strategy and policy, he was perhaps the most gifted man our country has produced.

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### BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY



Professor Craig L. Symonds is a graduate of the University of California, Los Angeles, holds an M.A. from the University of Florida, and is a doctoral candidate at Florida. Professor Symonds was com-

missioned as a Naval Reserve officer in 1971, served on active duty until 1974, and is currently serving on the Strategy faculty of the Naval War College.

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# SET AND DRIFT



## WAR GAMING: THIRD GENERATION

by

Lieutenant Commander Abe Greenberg, U.S. Navy

During the past year at the Naval War College, the Center for War Gaming has been utilized by the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations in conducting an imaginative series of preliminary tactical games to explore new employment concepts for surface effect ships and patrol hydrofoils. Clearly, this comparatively new role for the center's gaming facilities needs further refinement, but results thus far appear so promising that a brief review of the history of war gaming at the College and its potential for the future seems in order.<sup>1</sup>

The Naval War College has used war games, in one way or another, ever since they were introduced into the curriculum in 1886 by Capt. William McCarty Little, whose name now honors the Chair of Gaming and Research Techniques at the College. Originally, games were conducted on chessboard-type game floors on which units were manually positioned. For more than 70 years,

with evolutionary improvements to permit greater tactical sophistication and a broader range of interactions, this same basic system was employed. The circular dispositions of World War II and the methods of operating several aircraft carriers in the same formation were played in this manner but, by the early 1950's, these manual first-generation gaming techniques were no longer responsive to the needs of students and other users.

The second generation of war gaming styles was unveiled in 1958, preceded by 4 years of planning and reconfiguring Sims Hall to accommodate the Navy Electronic Warfare Simulator (NEWS). The massive analog NEWS system, built around a large-screen display, was the College's first long step into automated gaming. The NEWS could automatically display and maneuver a total of 48 dynamic images, representing individual ships and aircraft or groups of those forces. Aside from displaying the platforms, the NEWS could also simulate weapons employment and assess damage when opposing forces engaged. Gradually, however, NEWS' capabilities were overtaken by swiftly expanding warfare

<sup>1</sup> For a comprehensive historical description of gaming at the Naval War College, see Francis J. McHugh, "Gaming at the Naval War College," *United States Naval Institute Proceedings*, March 1964, pp. 48-55.

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technology and new concepts of tactical coordination. Besides being limited in the number of forces which could be actively displayed, the NEWS inherently lacked the flexibility to deal realistically with the complex sensor and weapons systems which came to dominate naval tactics. Thus the automated gaming which had been envisioned with the NEWS never really materialized, and the system functioned principally as a useful but valuable adjunct to manual gaming. Once NEWS capabilities had fallen behind the curve of tactical development, not even the most innovative war gamers could do much to represent real world conditions.

Accordingly, by 1966, meaningful discussions had begun, pointed toward the future of war gaming at the Naval War College. Several alternatives were available:

- Expand and upgrade the analog NEWS system
- Revert to manual gaming using NEWS as a display system only
- Develop a new gaming system based upon the versatility of general purpose digital computers.

An expansion of the NEWS analog system to double or triple its platform capacity would prove costly and would not overcome the inherent limitations in an analog system. Emerging or futuristic weapon and sensor systems or platforms could not be modeled upon demand. The Navy and industry were shifting away from analog systems, thus making replacement parts and maintenance of such systems both difficult and expensive.

Reverting to manual gaming with the NEWS as a display system had the virtue of being inexpensive, but could not offer realism, timeliness of information, or the depth of detail required. Therefore, the complexities of modern naval warfare with its associated exacting logistic implications could not be effectively gamed.

The introduction of general purpose

digital computers as a system to assist gaming and simulation promised to alleviate most of the NEWS deficiencies. Programs could be specifically structured to game requirements. Real time information and exact logistic accounting became immediately available, and since the ability to change was designed into the system, it should be less susceptible to obsolescence. Thus the basic decision to develop the Warfare Analysis and Research System (WARS) as the third generation follow-on to manual gaming and NEWS gaming was made.

War gaming or decision gaming should not be confused with tactical simulation training so widely used elsewhere in the Navy. Decision gaming is a unique educational or analytical process with the primary emphasis upon human choices. This consideration makes the modeling of automated decision gaming far more complex than the reproduction of a single dimensional warfare capability such as anti-air warfare. The modeling complexities of war gaming stem primarily from the intricacies involved in constructing the Master Simulation Program (MSP) to provide a realistic framework for tactical or strategic decisions. The MSP utilizes a data base comprising platforms and their characteristics such as sensor configuration, weapon systems, motion, logistic, and environmental parameters. All of these factors are then combined and interrelated to develop units which can be operated individually or in various sized groupings employing a variety of current or futuristic tactics. Thus, the MSP is designed to simulate crisis or combat situations whose representation presents the player with a realistic confrontation. The MSP also provides a three-dimensional representation of the real world and allows the gaming area to be specified at anyplace on the earth. Game elements may be defined anywhere from a depth of 10,000 feet below or to an altitude of 200,000 feet

above mean sea level. In addition, physical environmental factors such as atmospheric effects on radar, ambient noise on sonar, and various sea states are included. The game rate can also be controlled as a one-to-one linear or a time base variable up to 40 times real time, and key decision points can be replayed. Combining the salient characteristics of command or force organization, platforms with their capability, vulnerability, sensor suits, weapons characteristics, and a range of damage/kill probabilities, a realistic decision base presentation is provided to the players. Opposing force capabilities can be altered to reflect environmental factors, damage degradation, and mission or doctrinal constraints. So, in the most basic of decision gaming, a one-on-one engagement analysis, such as a submarine vs. a submarine, applicable parameters such as depth, sensor performance, weapon capabilities, and environmental features are injected to influence gaming decisions by the players. Complexity escalates rapidly as scenarios become more sophisticated and forces are scaled upward or mixed.

WARS gaming offers three unique and significant user advantages which are not found in other U.S. gaming systems. First, and most significant, is the integrated nature of the system. Unlike analytic gaming models which are designed for a specific purpose, WARS has the potential to simulate the entire gamut of naval operations. Each individual model is designed to interact with all others, modifying a common game data base. Thus, events flow naturally, in a timely fashion, with no requirement to set up conditions at various stages.

The second major advantage stems from the ability to interject human decisions into the game as it is running. Most gaming models require the introduction of initial conditions, followed by a start-to-finish uninterrupted run. WARS permits the course of events to

be changed at any stage by human interaction without stopping or resetting the game and promptly reflects such interactions. Beyond the obvious value this offers in the area of decision-making experience, this capability permits each model to operate as an entire family of models, each modifiable as the game progresses in order to mesh with specific requirements or permit comparison of the effect of differing actions.

Finally, WARS interactive modeling permits a level of flexibility unavailable in other simulations. As a function of game objectives and activities, the user may select the level of participation he deems appropriate. Predefined (and on-line changeable) doctrine is used to guide the functioning of the system in areas in which the user does not desire to take direct control. For example, the system itself, left undirected, will determine the proper actions to take to counter an impending airstrike, including detection activities, threat assignment, fighter mission allocation, SAM assignments, and use of basic point defense weapons. Alternatively, however, the user can assume complete or partial control of any or all of these functions, and the system will respond to his directions rather than to its own doctrine guided decisions.

Thus, this type of computer assisted gaming offers the realism which forces a commander into decisionmaking situations he would otherwise encounter only in actual operations. Gaming also provides an exceptionally convenient vehicle for testing various operational plans and tactical concepts. It is particularly cost effective in exercise plan gaming prior to the essential but expensive live fleet exercises at sea.

At the moment, however, WARS is far from complete. The system design and installation schedule were deliberately developed for phasing over a period of years to permit incremental evaluation before proceeding to the

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next step. As each package of the new WARS hardware and software components is validated, the corresponding elements of the obsolete NEWS are eliminated. Accordingly, the partially installed WARS and partially dismantled NEWS are now functioning as a frequently frustrating but remarkably improved hybrid, and a wide range of users are enthusiastic about the future potential of the ultimate full-digital system.

In addition to supporting the resident curriculum at the Naval War College, the Center for War Gaming provides services for game sponsors outside the Newport area, including:

- The Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, currently conducting a series of exploratory advanced tactical war games, with the Center for Naval Analyses providing game direction.

- NATO and U.S. Fleet commands, who conduct on a regular basis various kinds of war games to test operational plans and force employment concepts. The respective staffs provide the players.

- The Naval Material Command which sponsors several games each year, generally oriented to new developments in sensors and weapons and utilizing Navy laboratory engineers/scientists associated with those systems as players.

- The Naval War Colleges of the Americas, who participate annually in a major Western Hemisphere convoy routing and protection game, remotely played from the South American coun-

tries concerned. U.S. Naval Reserve officers whose mobilization billets are in the Navy Control of Shipping Organization plan and play much of this game as the U.S. participants.

Figure 1 depicts the WARS data flow from its inception by the sponsor to postgame analysis. Following review of game results, the sponsor is, of course, free to replay the game at a later date, varying the parameters, players, or both, and again analyzing his results to exploit the "Monday morning quarterbacking" and "what if" capabilities of this kind of gaming.

The present developmental phase of WARS is structured around two major and two minicomputers with their peripheral storage and display equipment. Use of digital computers in gaming permits a faster and more extensive investigation of an engagement, tactic, or scenario than would otherwise be possible. The computer assumes the tedious duties of bookkeeping. Most important, however, players and umpires are relieved of the burden of manual labor involving computations, track update, damage assessment, and detection calculations. Unhindered by the minutia of bookkeeping, the gamer is free to concentrate on his thoughts, his tactics, and his decisions which, after all, is what war gaming at the Naval War College is all about.

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Lt. Comdr. Abe Greenberg is the WARS project officer at the Naval War College.





Fig. 1—WARS Game Data Flow



# THE BAROMETER

(Lt. Comdr. Edwin R. Linz, USN, comments on Professor Gaddis' article "The Cold War: Some Lessons for Policymakers," November-December 1974.)

Professor Gaddis' thoughtful analysis of American foreign policy during the cold war (*Naval War College Review*, November-December 1974) provides a rare opportunity for many of us to reflect on the decisions which have shaped present arrangements throughout the world. Although he credits U.S. foreign policy during the cold war era with achieving its ultimate objective ("to create and maintain, by means short of war, an international environment congenial to the survival and prosperity of the nation's domestic institutions"), he is critical of the efficiency of our approach.

With the benefit of hindsight, Professor Gaddis chides the architects of American postwar diplomacy for pursuing unattainable and mutually exclusive goals. One presumes that he would have preferred the simplistic approach of a classic sphere of influence policy. No evidence is put forth, however, to suggest that a more efficient adaptation of means to an end could have occurred if we had quickly cast aside the principles of self-determination and collective security at the end of World War II. In view of the presence of the Red Army in Eastern Europe, it was possibly naive and unrealistic to hope that anything other than regimes "friendly" to the U.S.S.R. would evolve; however, what policy other than self-determina-

tion would have been politically and morally salable in the United States immediately after the war? Roosevelt, for example, constantly complained to Stalin and Churchill that his negotiations on Poland had to be tempered by the reality of eight million Polish voters in the United States—few of whom, I suspect, were willing to trade their homeland for a policy of *détente*. In short, American postwar policy was an honest attempt to reflect the will of the Nation. There is no reason to believe that a unilateral change in policy would have led to better results.

In his discussion of the need for greater precision in the formulation of the proper response to threats, Professor Gaddis questions the American tendency to favor worst-case analysis. But what alternative approach has he offered? He suggests calculation of probability in assessing threats and selectivity in formulating response. Such principles have been an integral part of every American defense budget since World War II. Trade-offs are by necessity a way of life for the modern defense planner; few programs have enjoyed a *carte blanche* within the military budget. More basically, how would Professor Gaddis optimize the number of troops for the United States to station in Europe to counter a Russian invasion held back only by his perception of the results of a Soviet cost-benefit analysis study? And how does one properly devise a defense strategy against a latent first-strike capability unless a worst-case analysis is

used? When Armageddon is among the possible outcomes, is any other approach responsible?


Professor Gaddis exhorts us to seek an increased precision in defining interests, perceiving threats, and formu-

lating responses, but he gives us no improved methodology with which to seek these goals. More importantly, he has not demonstrated that greater precision implies greater prosperity—or even continued survival.

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## PROFESSIONAL READING

Gross, Feliks. *The Revolutionary Party: Essays in the Sociology of Politics*. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press. 280p.

Were I to seek insight into the complex world of radical politics, Feliks Gross' collection of essays, *The Revolutionary Party*, would appear perfectly suited. Here, one might guess from the title and a brief look at the table of contents, is a study of the structural patterns, loyalties, values, and goals which almost daily fill front pages with terrorist violence or the fall of an unpopular government.

Unfortunately, such is not the case. *The Revolutionary Party* is written along historical lines, focusing first on the development of the political party (revolutionary and otherwise) from Rome to 18th century France to the underground forces of the Second World War. This approach makes for interesting reading but, at the same time, leaves something to be desired if one's primary interest lies with current events. The Palestine Liberation Organization, for example, receives mention on but one page, and the IRA, subject of two paragraphs, is discussed only in terms of the earning power of its average member! In contrast, the Polish underground of World War II is the focal point of several of Dr. Gross' essays.

The fact that *The Revolutionary Party* does not address the subject matter in a way one would expect does not, however, entirely condemn it. Dr. Gross has used his examples to take a broad

look at the problem, discussing in turn the origins, dynamics, ideologies, and tactics of various party types without delving into the specifics of individual movements. Perhaps he has made use of the historical rationale: by avoiding specific and currently volatile subjects, one can also avoid much of the prejudice in discussing the issues involved. His intent notwithstanding, Dr. Gross' wealth of structural diagrams and models could have been of much greater value to both the political sociologist and general reader if he had made a greater effort to identify them with modern, currently active parties.

While each of the essays appearing in *The Revolutionary Party* are competent works in themselves, together they present a less than satisfying whole. Many of the essays deal with similar topics and tend to be a bit redundant. Further, the separate units do not always add to the total topic of the book. The section devoted to political assassination is certainly informative as to the goals and methods of mass genocide, selected political targets, et cetera, but never satisfactorily links the assassination type to a type of party or party goal. Neither does it comment on why a party would resort to such tactics. The last three essays or chapters are particularly guilty and almost seem to be in the wrong book.

With his book's title, Dr. Gross has capitalized on the recent fascination of the American public with political radicals, underground movements, and revolution, but in *The Revolutionary Party*

the accent is firmly on "party" and on the sociology of political organization. He has, I think, written an interesting book, failing largely in that it is directed at too narrow an audience, an audience where the general reader, still seeking insight into the world of radical politics, feels left out.

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Hollick, Ann L. and Osgood, Robert E. *New Era of Ocean Politics*, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974. 131p.

Borgese, Elisabeth Mann. *Pacem in Mariibus*. New York: Dodd, Mead, 1972. 382p.

The concepts of seapower and command of the sea are enshrined as indispensable fundamentals in the orthodoxy of naval thought. Alfred Thayer Mahan and Sir Julian Corbett provided their historical and philosophical justifications. These rest on three assumptions about the characteristics of the sea: (1) the sea cannot be reduced to possession; (2) own or enemy forces cannot subsist upon the sea; and (3) the sole positive value of the sea is that of a medium of communication.

In the last 30 years technological and political developments have severely challenged each of these three assumptions. Offshore oil rigs and deep sea mining prove that today the sea can very well be reduced to possession. The development of nuclear power and other technological advances permits naval forces to remain at sea for indefinite periods. The sea still remains a valuable medium of communication, but man's ability to use the sea in a variety of ways has made it intrinsically valuable for the first time in history.

Since the characteristics of the sea have changed significantly in the last 30 years, it behooves naval officers to become aware of the implications of

these changes. But implications are only conclusions drawn from a complicated mass of evidence embracing both technical and nontechnical or political factors. These political factors fall into what is now known as the area of ocean politics, a most pervasive and complex field which is literally as broad as the ocean itself.

With consummate skill, Ann Hollick in *New Era of Ocean Politics* explains the basic issues of ocean politics in terms of competing interests, each with valid arguments and positions, which are frequently in conflict with each other. She discusses the issues in terms of exploitation of the seabed, the breadth of the territorial sea, transit rights through straits, conservation and allocation of fisheries, and, finally, pollution. A common factor to all of these issues is the allocation of ocean space.

In reviewing competing national and transnational interests, she describes what she perceives as the sometimes Byzantine politics of the U.S. Government and its competing bureaucratic baronies. Her review of the processes of international negotiations and national policymaking is illuminating as well as succinct.

Robert E. Osgood completes this Johns Hopkins Study in International Affairs by reviewing United States' security interests in the use of the four major zones of ocean space: the seabed, the subsurface, the surface, and the superjacent air. He concludes his review of "U.S. Security Interests in Ocean Law" with a discussion of the possible advantages of a comprehensive law of the sea treaty: (1) uniformity—there would be no need to make *ad hoc* arrangements with the various littoral states; (2) bargaining position—the United States can make concessions in some areas in order to ensure transit rights; and (3) the political advantage of a resolution of conflicting interests in one treaty applicable to all states.

An entirely different approach is

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taken in the collection, *Pacem in Mari-bus*, edited by Elisabeth Mann Borgese. These articles were originally produced by the *Pacem in Mari-bus* Convocation in Malta in 1970. Their common thread is a deep concern for the establishment of an international regime to regulate and to exploit the resources of the sea for the benefit of all of mankind. To this end, Mrs. Borgese proposes to internationalize ocean resources in a draft treaty which she includes in the appendix.

The normative internationalists see the central problem of ocean politics as the just distribution and rational utilization of the resources of the sea. They are all too aware that technology has produced the means to reduce the ocean to possession of states or individuals, but they are also aware that this has not yet occurred, which gives them a sense of urgency in the establishment of a rational regime.

Even though their ideas may strike some as utopian and far out, they have succeeded in raising some fundamental questions which must be addressed, no matter what conclusions one reaches, such as: who or what is to have dominion over and possession of the wealth of the oceans and on what terms? The problems they discuss cannot be ignored, especially by professional naval officers whose operational environment is the air above the sea, the subsurface and the sea itself.

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Kaplan, Morton A., ed. *NATO and Dissuasion*. Chicago: University of Chicago Center for Policy Study, 1974. 150p.

It is a commonplace by now that NATO has paid too much attention to its deterrent strategy at the expense of its war-fighting strategy and to the consequent detriment of both. Morton

Kaplan and associates at the Chicago Center for Policy Study have, with this volume, proposed a new strategy to bridge NATO's gap between deterrence and war-fighting strategies. The Kaplan group's new strategy is called "dissuasion" and has three major elements. First, noting the vulnerability and the arguable character of such weapons systems as Pershing missiles and quick reaction aircraft capable of delivering nuclear warheads into the western Soviet Union, Kaplan's group suggests withdrawing them some distance to decrease both vulnerability and provocative invitation to Warsaw Pact strikes. Secondly, they advocate dissuasion of Warsaw Pact forces from participation in any aggressive move against the NATO countries by threatening the East European countries with drastic nuclear punishment and—in the dully menacing language of strategic studies—"high collateral damage" if those countries contribute to a Soviet-led or Soviet-directed attack. Thirdly, in the event that conventional warfare, once begun, should not go well for NATO and that the United States, Great Britain and France should prove unwilling to use strategic nuclear weapons for the sake of NATO's integrity, the authors propose a final component of the strategy, called "quick transfer," in which an unspecified number of fully armed Polaris submarines would be turned over to the NATO country or countries prepared to use them as last ditch deterrent or punishment against Warsaw Pact forces, including the Soviet Union. To be effectuated in any contingency, that last proposal would require pre-training of crews from the NATO countries that might wish to resort to the measure someday.

There are serious criticisms of the strategies proposed. The first, made repeatedly by writers from European nations, is that Kaplan and his associates overestimate the freedom of decision left to the Warsaw Pact nations. Those

nations could not dissociate themselves from a Soviet initiative no matter what the cost, these writers say. Worse, the proposal to remove Pershing missiles and quick reaction aircraft from forward positions may weaken the credibility of American commitment to use nuclear weapons in defense of the NATO countries and would force precisely the kind of political accommodation to Soviet pressures—the so-called Findlandization of Europe—that NATO planners most wish to avoid. As for the quick transfer idea, the critics agree that the only country interested in assuming the responsibility of taking over and perhaps using such weapons as Polaris submarines would be Germany, and that such weapons in the hands of the Germans—even prospectively in their hands—would destabilize all of Europe, East and West, including the Soviet Union, and would therefore be not only unacceptable but dangerous strategy.

Readers of this volume will have to decide for themselves the ultimate value of the strategy of dissuasion. Surely they will be able to agree, as do all the writers represented in the volume, that NATO's problems are great and urgent. But many assumptions and arguments in the book depend on subjective appraisals of important elements: political and military relations among the Warsaw Pact countries, the balance and capabilities of conventional forces in Europe between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, the ambiguous nature and implications of nuclear doctrine and deployment amidst these other complications. Each reader's personal estimate of such factors will influence his assessment of the proposed strategic innovations.

There is one sign of hope. In the last year, despite the failure of the much heralded Year of Europe, the problems of continental politics and defense have received an increasingly high level of attention. One recent Undersecretary of State has written that in the United States, contrary to popular belief,

policy trickles upward rather than trickling, or flowing, downward. If that is so, then to the extent that real contributions to an improved NATO strategy and force can come from the United States, a new and improved era of strategy and policy in NATO is at hand.

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Sarkesian, Sam C. *The Professional Army Officer in a Changing Society*. Chicago: Nelson-Hall, 1975. 268p.

Sam C. Sarkesian's book *The Professional Army Officer in a Changing Society* leaves the reader with mixed feelings of respect and regret. Formerly a career Army officer and now a professor of sociology at Loyola University of Chicago, Mr. Sarkesian possesses both the experience and perceptiveness that produce interesting and penetrating insights into contemporary service life. His major point is that the Army must not drift off into isolation from today's society but instead must insure a role for itself that will earn respect from that society and attract dedicated new officers is one that is certainly well taken.

Unfortunately, however, the book is flawed in several respects. The least of these flaws, some nagging distractions, are several minor factual errors. To name but a few, Sarkesian refers to an important officer record form (Form 66) that is no longer employed; he describes the mechanics of an efficiency report form that was last used in 1972; he appears to equate the CGSC and War College, two different levels of Army schooling; he has lieutenant colonels serving on battalion staffs; in discussing below the zone promotions, his percentage figures are quite incorrect; he asserts that 600 officers each year attend senior service college, double the actual number; in two slips that are difficult to understand, an old trooper gives an incorrect figure for monthly

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jump pay, and as a former instructor at West Point uses "West Point Military Academy," a term that would be reserved for lay articles.

More disturbing are the questionable assertions that the "hard core professionals," as junior officers, are the West Point graduates and that "the top levels are dominated by academy-trained officers." This reviewer's experiences would not support the first contention, and statistics and organization charts would not seem to support the second. About 20 percent of the book deals with West Point and its graduates, thus adding to the more than adequate coverage on this subject. One begins to wonder if it is not perhaps time that Annapolis or the Air Force Academy take its turn.

The final weakness of the book is perhaps unavoidable and Sarkesian acknowledges it in his epilog. His active duty ended in 1968, and the manifold changes of disengagement from Vietnam and conversion to an all-volunteer force lessen the value of his perceptions as an insider. The additional changes, both within the Army and in American so-

ciety and during the period between the writing of the book and its appearance in the bookstores, compound the problem. It is even less clear now, under the impact of recession, rising unemployment, and reduced force levels, whether the military is in any real danger of isolating itself from society or whether it will have serious difficulties in attracting well qualified officers and men. The basic question appears to be: Is what we have seen been just another swing of the pendulum or is society indeed moving off in a new direction? If the former, books such as this lose their relevance.

For all the criticism, there is no question that this book is worth reading and belongs on the shelf of the concerned professional soldier. It is to be hoped that Sarkesian, having now written his avowedly descriptive book, will wait perhaps a year or so to let the volunteer Army settle in a bit and will then publish an unabashedly prescriptive work to place on the shelf beside it.

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