

...A HELICOPTER DESTROYER CONCEPT  
...PERSPECTIVE OF THE MSTs



# NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

## ARMED FORCES DAY



May 1969

# FOREWORD

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# CHALLENGE!

Historically the U.S. Navy--indeed, every branch of the Armed Forces--has lived in the cloister of isolation, protected from and uninvolved, for the most part, with the outside world of politics and the complexities of international affairs. The proud, proper, self-imposed traditions and code of the American professional fighting man have held the Armed Forces outside of political involvement and aloof from public controversy.

Now all this is changing. The military find themselves more and more--often involuntarily--drawn into the drama of world events "on stage," rather than as proficient military technicians in the service of the Nation.

It is the direct result of the revolutionary advance in communications--instantaneous communications.

It once was, with some historical exceptions that only Government leaders and diplomats were the spokesmen on matters affecting foreign policy. Today the commanding officer of a Marine regiment in Southeast Asia or of a 6th Fleet carrier in the Mediterranean is not even afforded the luxury of time for restatement or reconsideration before his most casual opinions are broadcast to the world. This evolution has occurred not from any new assumption of power by the military but principally because journalism and the television media have moved on a large scale from the police court to the world beat. They have the remarkable ability to make instantaneous and worldwide transmissions, not only of words but of visual events.



With this advance has come a form of news projection that attempts in 90 seconds to explain the fantastic complexities of modern war and diplomacy. It is at best an almost impossible task; yet the military cannot afford to ignore the weight and influence of this form of "public diplomacy."

Thus, the constant presence of public information in the spectrum of command has an inevitable effect on policy and planning for the command. For to ignore or neglect instant communications is to overlook one of the chief factors in the effects of policy and planning. The article by Captain Amme in this issue clearly demonstrates the need to predict relevant social parameters if long-range strategy is to be successful.

How, then, is the modern naval officer to deal most advantageously with this situation? It is no startling revelation to concede that the present situation is less than satisfactory. Public confidence in the excellence, the competence--in some cases, even the integrity--of the military is under scrutiny. The focus of public attention on the military, brought about by three wars in a generation and the unpopularity of the latest one, has instigated a questioning of how much voice the military has or ought to have in a democratic society.

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One answer to this problem, advocated recently in some circles, is a reversion to the position of the military in the latter part of the last century. The way to extricate ourselves from the tangled mesh of public criticism and interference, this argument goes, is to withdraw to the "military professionalism" of the past. The reason for the adverse direction that public evaluation of the Armed Forces has taken, it is suggested, is due to an overextension of the sphere of subjects to which we address ourselves. This line of reasoning holds that whenever the naval officer advises his civilian superiors on the formulation of foreign or politico-military policy, he exposes himself to a derogation of his position as a military professional. It is said that the Navy has a responsibility to its client, society, to foster and promote officers whose scope of competence is exclusively military. And whenever the Navy makes an effort to expand its expertise into those matters which touch upon economics, foreign policy, and other interests not within the strict province of the military scientist, the result is to dilute and weaken this client relationship. The naval service should retire, it is recommended, to its traditional cloisters and cease to trespass beyond the pale of assigned tactical and strategic considerations. Only then, when it has ensconced itself behind the sheltering walls of a limited body of military knowledge, will the Navy be protected from the scathing incursions of open journalism and frequent public attention.

On its surface, this argument is not unattractive. It would be comforting to believe that the answer to the challenge of the communications revolution is to abdicate from its implications.

It is true that Mahan was probably more instrumental than anyone else in the establishment of a distinct body of knowledge for the military profession--an individual discipline, as it might be called today. But the profound effect

his writings had, for decades, on the foreign policy not only of the United States but of other nations, bears witness, to the breadth and diversity of his understanding. This interrelation between military affairs and foreign policy is even more valid, more demonstrable, and more immediately important now, exactly because of the technological innovations with which we are currently faced. Mr. Robinson's lecture, for example, reproduced in this issue, examines the mechanics of the constant interaction of the various spheres of society in the United States today.


The inquiring focus of journalistic concern with the actions and statements of individual military commanders will not disappear, or even relax, simply because those commanders advert their attention from the broader nonmilitary aspects of their missions. Those aspects must of necessity persist, and with them will remain the demand for public examination.

We in uniform face today a novel and basic challenge: the challenge of excellence and integrity in an environment almost daily altered by the lightning progress of human ingenuity and technological change. Are we to meet this challenge by default, by imposing limitations on our thinking? Our client is society, to whom we provide a service of unique importance. But, confronted with these new demands, surely we best serve our client by an expansion, not a contraction, of our competence. Just as the United States since 1945 has shouldered an enlarged responsibility commensurate with a larger role in world affairs, and just as this country cannot avoid its widened responsibility by a return to the isolationism of the thirties, likewise the trend of recent events requires of the military an expansion of its professional expertise.

If there has lately been a rising tide of adverse criticism of the armed services--if the thrust of the criticism has been directed toward the handling of

issues which emanate from the non-military as well as military implications of service activities--and if the vehicle of this criticism has been open journalism, then the answer is indeed that the concept of military professionalism should change. It must include an understanding of open journalism and the public interest in all facets of military affairs. We ourselves must learn to be practitioners of open journalism, providing a comprehensive, candid, and sensitive explanation of our role, duties and responsibilities to a modern society.

The civilian and military relationship of mutual respect and understanding must always be the great strength of our democratic society. In this sense alone, an interchange should be continued and fostered between the civilian and military, and the constitutional principle of civilian control of the military thus strengthened and made more viable.



R. G. COLBERT  
Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy  
*President, Naval War College*



# THE MILITARY SEA TRANSPORTATION SERVICE

A lecture delivered at the Naval War College

by

Vice Admiral Lawson P. Ramage, U.S. Navy

on 6 February 1969

It is a real privilege for me to appear on this rostrum, particularly since you already have heard from the foremost authority on strategic mobility. Hopefully, this is an indication of your growing interest in sealift.

I have a twofold purpose in coming here today. In the first place, I want to provide information about one of the most important operations in the Navy, one that is little appreciated--the Military Sea Transportation Service, more generally referred to as MST'S. In the second, I want to speak about the significance of sealift to our national military posture and our overall economy.

Historically, MST'S has a record in which we take much pride. It was established just 20 years ago by a merger of the Army Transport Service with the Naval Transportation Service in a successful attempt to combine similar

functions to achieve greater efficiency and economy. In those 20 years MST'S not only has performed routine point-to-point transportation of personnel, cargo, and petroleum, but it also has been involved in practically every military emergency that has taken place: in Korea, Suez, Qnemoy, Lebanon, the Congo, the Berlin buildup, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, and now Vietnam.

As the executive agency for ocean transportation for the Department of Defense, MST'S comes under the Secretary of the Navy in his capacity as Single Manager for Ocean Transportation. And as a major operating command of the Navy, MST'S comes under the aegis of the Chief of Naval Operations. I also want to emphasize that MST'S is truly a military organization, and its primary mission is to be responsive to the needs of the combatant forces wherever they may be overseas.

To carry out the assigned responsibilities of MSTS, we have four major area commands around the world in addition to our headquarters in Washington. These area commands are located in New York, San Francisco, Yokohama, and Bremerhaven. Within these four commands are 20 offices strategically placed to meet the requirements of the military services.

Now there are 152 ships of all types in what we call the MSTS "nucleus" fleet because it is the basis of any expansion that may be required. Unfortunately, all but 20 of these ships are veterans of World War II and hence are nearing the end of their productive lives. The nucleus fleet has many capabilities, as represented by the variety of its composition. There are dry-cargo and small coastal ships, refrigerator and roll-on/roll-off ships, aircraft ferries, heavy-lift ships, tankers, and transports as well as an assortment of special project ships. Whenever the resources of this nucleus fleet do not meet the requirements placed upon MSTS, its capabilities are augmented by chartering the required tonnage from private owners. The combination of nucleus and chartered ships is what we call the MSTS "controlled" fleet. This fleet now runs to over 500 ships and at one period ran as high as 575.

In addition to the "controlled" fleet, MSTS uses space on the established steamship lines on regular routes to carry less-than-shipload lots of cargo.

The mission of MSTS is fourfold:

To provide an immediate sealift capability to support approved contingency or general war plans or other emergencies;

To plan for and be capable of expansion in time of emergency or war as necessary;

To provide sea transportation for personnel and cargoes of the Department of Defense; and

To meet all requirements of the Department of Defense (except those

met by fleet ships) for purposes other than transportation.

Since the establishment of MSTS we have consistently emphasized the obligation imposed by the first mission to respond immediately to requirements for sealift in time of military emergency.

With respect to the second of our missions, MSTS must be part of all planning involving logistic movements overseas. We are, in the final analysis, the sealift command; we are the specialists; we have the expert knowledge of what ships are available and where; of what can be loaded and what can be discharged with ships' gear; of what ports and harbors are suitable; of what the seagoing labor situation is and how to find crews to man the ships as well as the hundred-odd additional significant aspects of ship operation.

In this connection, I have been appalled in recent months to discover how many senior officers of all services, particularly those who are intimately concerned with forward planning, have no real conception of the problems of moving troops and equipment to the objective area. Therefore, I want to emphasize to you the fact that ocean transportation is a matter which demands, and must be given, the utmost thought and careful consideration.

Our experience in Vietnam is an excellent case in point. At the start of the major buildup in 1965, there was an immediate demand for large numbers of ships. It soon became apparent that sufficient tonnage could not be obtained from our limited maritime resources. Therefore, it was necessary to turn to the National Defense Reserve Fleet, and 170 old ships--veterans of two previous wars--were pulled out and activated over the next 2 years.

But even before the shipping situation eased, we ran into even greater difficulties at the other end. Saigon, the only deep-water port, soon became hopelessly congested; and ships were

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forced to wait weeks and even months to discharge until additional port facilities were constructed. To augment these facilities, tug and barge service was added in 1966; and subsequently, in July 1967, limited container service was inaugurated to Danang and later in November to Cam Ranh Bay, with shuttle service to Saigon and Qui Nhon. Even today, port and terminal services are barely adequate; delays in discharging ships are not uncommon. This is due primarily to the fact that port facilities have continually lagged behind the buildup in shipping.

My third mission, you will recall, is to provide sea transportation. To illustrate the magnitude of this responsibility, a few statistics are in order. To Vietnam alone, our lift of dry cargo during 1968 averaged 1.1 million measurement tons each month or 38,000 measurement tons every day. To other parts of the world we averaged, during the same period, an equal amount. Compare, as a matter of interest, those figures with that of our total airlift for the same period. We also transport vast quantities of petroleum products, the average being approximately 18 million barrels per month. It is significant that for the duration of the war in Vietnam, over 98 percent of all the cargo that has been sent there has gone by sea and has moved under the aegis of MSTs.

Finally, MSTs provides the seagoing platforms in support of the national space program and other scientific research projects, ranging from missile tracking and assistance in the Apollo shots to oceanographic and hydrographic studies. We take appropriate pride in the remarkable achievement of the U.S. Naval Ship *Mizar* in locating the remains of the *Scorpion*.

The *Mizar* is one of 36 special project ships we operate for various Department of Defense sponsored agencies. In doing so we operate under what is known as the Navy Industrial Fund. This financial

arrangement permits a common-use agency such as MSTs to charge its customers for services actually rendered. It gives the agency the flexibility to expand or contract its operations as dictated by prudent business management. We differ from a commercial enterprise in that we must make no profit and sustain no loss from our operations. If our revenue exceeds our expenses to any marked extent, our billing tariff rates are reduced; and, conversely, if our revenues are insufficient to defray our expenses, our rates must be raised. Special project ships and, in unusual circumstances, other ships are billed either on a per diem basis or, at the specific request of the sponsor, on a reimbursement basis.

Then, in accordance with the charter of MSTs, the following major functions are assigned by the Secretary of Defense to this command:

To maintain and operate the DOD ocean transportation system;

To provide ocean transportation planning support to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the unified and specified commanders, and the military services as necessary to implement the plans and operations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff;

To procure ships outside the MSTs fleet by bareboat, time, or voyage charter or by allocation from other Government agencies, and to produce cargo and passenger space in commercial ships; and

To plan the operations of and schedule MSTs-controlled ships.

We respond to the requirements levied on us by the so-called "shipper services"--better known to you as the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force--as well as the unified and specified commanders. If capability is short or there is a conflict between the requirements of the services for ocean transportation, the Joint Chiefs of Staff determine the priority of what should move first. In any event, it is our responsibility to provide the means to

accomplish the job to the satisfaction of the shipper.

In the process of matching requirements and capabilities, the shipper services provide MSTS with a forecast of their transportation requirements for the ensuing fiscal year. These serve as the basis for the MSTS operating force plan and the MSTS budget. The services also submit, on the 15th of each month, the specific requirements for the succeeding 4 months. These are used to plan for the actual utilization, acquisition, and disposition of shipping.

Our experience has been that the annual forecast is satisfactory for making up the MSTS operating force plan and estimating transportation costs, while the detailed requirements provided to us on the 15th of each month are generally pretty accurate for the succeeding month. Beyond that, the information is only useful as an indication of future trends and is an aid in planning.

Cargo destined to the continental United States from overseas is under the cognizance of the theater commanders. While the same routine of 4-months forward planning is followed, the unpredictability of retrograde cargo tends to nullify the long-range predictions. It often works out that cargo becomes available on a sporadic, rather than a planned and forecast basis. However, there is always adequate space for all retrograde cargoes.

In addition, at the strategic level we work closely with the Special Assistant for Strategic Mobility (SASM) in the JCS. In the MSTS charter the following stipulation is made:

The Joint Chiefs of Staff will . . . task MSTS singly or jointly with Military Traffic Management and Terminal Service (MTMTS) and the Military Airlift Command (MAC) to provide such information and assistance, within their respective capabilities, resources and areas of responsibility as may be required to enable the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Special

Assistant for Strategic Mobility to fulfill their movement responsibilities and implement their capability to act effectively as the interface between the military services and the single manager operating agencies.

In carrying out this relationship, we have a military member of the MSTS headquarters staff on permanent assignment as liaison officer with SASM. This has resulted in a mutually productive flow of information in both directions. This liaison officer attends the staff meetings of the Joint Transportation Board and serves on appropriate working groups within the secretariat.

Up to this moment, despite the heavy pressures of the Vietnam war, the need for a Defense Transportation Agency, which would absorb the present single manager transportation agencies, has not been apparent. To restructure these agencies to fit into one large complex would be inefficient at this time. Exactly what effect the establishment of a Defense Transportation Agency would have on the present procedures for providing sealift for the military cannot, of course, be projected until such a plan is available for review.

Now I want to describe the role of MSTS in support of operations in Southeast Asia in some detail because of the problems encountered and to indicate some of the solutions we have developed.

First, as I have already mentioned, we had to augment the capability of the privately owned American merchant marine by reactivating 170 ships from the National Defense Reserve Fleet. The first lesson we learned was that many of these ships were in worse condition than anyone had reason to expect, and the average cost of returning these ships to active service was therefore extremely high. In fact, some of the ships were placed in drydock and inspected, only to be condemned there and then as not fit for service. Twenty-eight other ships in marginal condition, which were acti-

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vated by reason of necessity have since been returned to NDRF for scrapping. Their places have been taken by container ships.

The obvious lesson to be drawn here is that ships built 25 years ago are obsolete, relatively inefficient, and unpredictable in their performance despite extensive repairs and costly overhauls.

Another area of concern is that of personnel. The merchant marine manpower pool in the United States is barely adequate to cover the hulls afloat. Crew shortages and consequent ship delays have been a continuing problem almost from the outset of the Vietnam escalation. Furthermore, our merchant seamen are getting old; a recent study showed the overall average age was about 50. The maritime unions have also developed very attractive pension plans which permit seafarers to come ashore after 20 years of sea service, regardless of age. Consequently, many men have retired, and more are expected to take advantage of these benefits as the demand diminishes for their services on the Vietnam pipeline.

The lesson here is that we may have ships in reserve, but we may not have the manpower to crew them. At the present time not many young men are being attracted to this service; and therefore we can expect that in any future contingency, if reserve ships are needed, the difficulties of providing qualified personnel will be very serious indeed.

Even with the augmentation of the merchant fleet from the NDRF, it has been necessary for MSTC to charter a large number of ships from all segments of the merchant marine. On 10 January 1969 we had a total of 150 ships under charter. In addition, it has been estimated that about 40 percent of the capacity of the ships in normal berth service is devoted to military cargo. The aggregate of the military lift, therefore, is about 60 percent of total capacity.

In this connection, it seems very

significant that in calendar year 1964 the total participation of U.S. ships in our waterborne foreign trade was 9.2 percent, whereas in calendar year 1967 it was down to 5.6 percent. The conclusion seems warranted that the American merchant marine is unable to carry on its business as usual and support a military operation of the size of Vietnam.

Possibly closely related to the military requirement in explaining the loss of commercial business is the fact that our fleet is old and noncompetitive. We had a total of 931 ships in the merchant fleet on 1 January 1969. Of this number, 670 were 20 or more years old. In other words, 68 percent of our active merchant fleet is obsolete, and the entire NDRF is over 25 years of age. Consequently, the reserve fleet is a disappearing asset. The Acting Maritime Administrator told a congressional committee last April that for the next 10 years the backbone of the NDRF would be about 130 ships which would be "mothballed" when they are released from active Vietnam service. The 37 Victory ships not activated were expected to be available only until 1975. To put it bluntly, by 1978 the NDRF will have disappeared as a source of augmentation for military sealift.

There is another lesson to be learned from our experience in supporting the operations in Vietnam. This is that the so-called "effective U.S. control" fleet of ships under Panamanian, Liberian, and Honduran registry is not really available except in times of all-out mobilization. To understand fully the significance of this statement, a few words of explanation are necessary.

There are 2,018 ships flying the flags of Liberia, Panama, and Honduras. However, only 412 ships of this huge fleet are owned by American citizens and thereby subject to recall by the Maritime Administration in the event of national emergency. While these ships are considered to be under "effective

control," they are not obligated to respond except when requisitioning of American flag ships is directed. However, no requisitioning of ships has been authorized since World War II. Furthermore, at the time the Suez Canal was closed in 1967, we appealed to owners of these "effective U.S. control" ships for help. Many ships were offered in. However, when we sorted through these prospects we found that only two were really serious candidates for possible charters.

The lesson here is important. The "effective U.S. control" fleet is not a bankable asset that military planners can depend on. Furthermore, since all these ships are foreign manned, they can be sailed only to such areas as their crews are willing to go.

Now let us look at another critical aspect of sealift. In recent years petroleum and its products have become increasingly important to military operations; and, therefore, the existence of a fleet of American tankers to carry the fuel needed by the combat forces worldwide is of major concern to logistical planners. Since October 1966 there has been a shortage of American tankers, and to effect required deliveries we have had to charter as many as 35 foreign tankers. Recently, with the bombing halt in Vietnam, we have finally been able to release all of these.

The lesson here is similar to one already noted. Just as the dry-cargo merchant fleet is unable to carry on business as usual and still support a Vietnam-size war, so is the tanker fleet. Our military airlift as well as combat operations could be seriously affected by a shortage of tankers. Furthermore, it should be recognized by the military that the needs of the civilian economy cannot be overlooked; and, therefore, it is proper to ask whether in any limited war there will be sufficient tankers to meet both military and civilian requirements.

There is one more lesson that de-

serves your consideration. This relates to the so-called "container revolution" which is sweeping through the merchant fleets of the world and, in all probability, will end in the virtual disappearance of the break-bulk common carrier which has served the ocean trade routes for so many years.

Our logistical support operations to Vietnam commenced with standard break-bulk ships. The obvious economies of using containers soon attracted the attention of Pentagon planners; but the lack of suitable real estate for the necessary marshalling yards and a shortage of piers and cranes to handle such ships combined to delay instituting container service until July 1967, or approximately 2 years after the commitment of American combat divisions to Vietnam. The container movement of cargo to Vietnam has been extremely successful, and we are continually increasing this service as fast as it can be accommodated.

This fact, however, should not blind us to the reality that the military must have conventional break-bulk ships for at least some of its cargo for the long-range future. The increasing substitution of the container ship for the conventional break-bulk ship is reducing the capability of the military to move its outsized and heavy equipment conveniently in ships of the merchant marine and may precipitate the decision to have the Government underwrite, for military purpose, ships which otherwise would not be economically productive for commercial purposes.

The situation confronting us is quite obvious. The military must have adequate and suitable shipping to support our forces overseas. If the merchant marine is unable to provide this kind of transportation, then the Department of Defense must find an alternative means of satisfying these requirements. Frankly, I cannot see our merchant marine as a potential source for such support unless there is a drastic change in our

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national maritime policies. Our current shipbuilding programs of 10 to 15 ships per year will never fill this void. Likewise, rising labor costs and recurrent strikes are having a devastating effect on the industry. Consequently, there is little incentive to build new ships as long as there is no hope of competing with the low-cost foreign carriers which do enjoy full support from their respective governments.

In any case, the Department of Defense must assume a greater share of this responsibility if it expects to get a piece of the action. Over the past 20 years MSTS has never acquired a single ship through any Navy shipbuilding program. Our only new dry-cargo ships, the USNS *Comet* and the USNS *Sealift* (both roll-on/roll-off types), were funded under special legislation. Our other fairly modern ships were obtained from the Maritime Administration.

Under the circumstances, MSTS has had to resort to the only other alternative available—a charter and build program. This is an arrangement where we provide a long-term charter for a ship to be built to our specifications by private capital. The gas turbine ship *Adm. W. M. Callaghan* was the first such venture. This ship is owned and operated by the Sunexport Company exclusively for MSTS.

In 1967 we went the same route for five new tankers. The first one has already been delivered; the remaining four are expected to be on berth by the end of the year. And we are currently negotiating for nine more tankers. All these ships are destined to replace the old T-2 tankers in our nucleus fleet.

Then, as you know, the DOD has been attempting to get approval for 30 Fast Deployment Logistic ships as an adjunct to the the C-5A's in support of its strategic mobility concept. For 2 successive years Congress has refused to fund the FDL program. Accordingly, this program has been revised downward to 15 FDL ships plus 30 merchant types

to be acquired by MSTS. In this year's budget submissions the DOD is seeking funds for three FDL's and authorization for MSTS to charter and build 10 of the cargo ships as a first increment in this program.

So, in appraising the usefulness of the MSTS active nucleus fleet, it must be remembered that included in the 152 ships are 36 special project ships operated for other Government agencies, three transports, 10 specialized carriers, plus 42 tired old LST's which provide shuttle service between ports in the Far East. In essence, then, the real heart of our fleet is comprised of only 39 dry-cargo ships of all types and 26 tankers. I must say the future holds little promise of any great improvement. As presently planned, acquisitions will be primarily replacements for the nucleus fleet.

Projecting our merchant fleet as it exists today forward to 1978, without any replacement program and assuming no attrition except that caused by time, we will have 182 ships that will be serviceable and 799 that will be over 25

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### BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY



Vice Adm. Lawson P. Ramage, U.S. Navy, did his undergraduate work at the U.S. Naval Academy (Class of 1931) and is a graduate of the Naval Postgraduate School, the Armed Forces Staff College, and the Naval War College. He has had extensive experience in the submarine force which includes Director, Antisubmarine/Submarine Warfare Division, OPNAV, and Deputy Commander, Submarine Force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet. Prior to assuming his present position as Commander, Military Sea Transportation Service, he was Commander First Fleet and, subsequently, Deputy Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet. Vice Admiral Ramage holds numerous medals and decorations among which is the Medal of Honor.

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years old. There will, of course, be some new construction, but how much is unpredictable at this time. And, finally, the National Defense Reserve Fleet will be wiped out by 1978.

Everyone will admit to a keen awareness of this situation, yet an apathetic attitude generally prevails. Ocean transportation is just taken for granted. Thanks to the massive building program just before and during World War II, there has been no real shortage of ships to date. Sealift has been provided in a timely and adequate fashion. But this industry, which has served so honorably and well, is now gravely sick. It is being kept alive primarily by large injections of Government-sponsored cargoes. But this is not enough. Ultimate survival will require major surgery through legislation as well as large transfusions of new blood. It's time that our patient be

placed in a private ward and subjected to intensive care.

The merchant marine has often been referred to as the fourth arm of defense, which may account for it being treated as a useless appendage. It is rather the basic pedestal or foundation upon which our whole defense posture rests. Without sealift it is impossible to move or support our combat forces overseas. Sealift has played a major role in every military engagement this country has undertaken since the turn of the century. It is needless to add that future planning that does not make provisions for adequate sealift will be totally invalid. Therefore, the needs of the military must be stated positively and emphatically; and programs must be prepared and supported by which sealift, so vital to our defense posture, will be available when needed.



The naval strength of the enemy should be the first objective of the forces of the maritime Power both on land and sea.

*Colonel G.F.R. Henderson, 1854-1903*

# PERSPECTIVES IN NAVAL STRATEGY

A lecture delivered at the Naval War College

by

Captain Carl H. Amme, Jr., U.S. Navy (Ret.)

on 11 February 1969

I am truly honored to be invited to talk with you today on perspectives of naval strategy. When I attended the National War College in 1960 I had the impression that the only people considered by the college administration as qualified to discourse on strategy were Ph.D.'s with Teutonic accents. Your invitation, therefore, is some kind of break in tradition as far as I am concerned. I do not yet have my doctorate, and I believe my accent is not too much different from the language of the tribe of naval officers.

I was particularly pleased to read in the pamphlet you send to all guest lecturers about the college's educational philosophy, a philosophy which stresses fundamentals and emphasizes that the application of fundamentals to strategic and tactical problems is an art-not a science. This is my view entirely.

Today I want to talk about some of these fundamentals, and, in doing so, I will outline a conceptual and methodological approach to perspectives in

naval strategy for the future. Naval strategic concepts are the product of the international strategic environment. Naval forces, in turn, are the product of the exploitation of human, economic, and technological resources. Changes in naval forces have, in the past, been primarily the result of assessing current capabilities and past experience and seeing whether technology could improve the ways of carrying out naval missions. What was mainly sought was new ways of doing old things. Once in a while some visionary and dedicated individual would come up with ways of doing *new* things. On the whole, however, the approach has been pragmatic. Whereas there have been notable cases where naval officers developed conceptual notions of seapower by reflective thinking, the connection between such conceptual developments and naval forces has been slow in materializing. This is mainly due to the fact that these conceptual developments were only vaguely understood by those in charge

of allocating funds in the Government--some of whom do not have the foggiest notion about seapower.

Perhaps figure 1 will illustrate what I mean. The thick arrows indicate the preponderant influence of technology on naval forces and the preponderant influence of the strategic environment on seapower concepts. You will note that the arrows linking up seapower concepts to naval forces do not have the important influence they should have.

Fortunately, between World Wars I and II, we had leaders in the Navy who understood these things. While they carried out the work of the Naval Establishment in accordance with the policies of the President and financial restraints imposed by Congress, they went right ahead with the work of providing the organizational, material and technical basis for a strategy that was significantly different from what was in the minds of the men constitutionally responsible for developing naval and foreign policy. Sometimes the military leaders had to indulge in a little dissimulation. In 1934, when the Chairman of the Military Affairs Committee asked General MacArthur whether war plans were based on the assumption of defense only (as was the stated policy of the administration), MacArthur replied: "Absolutely. The whole organization of the American Army would be different were it designed for offensive action."

Figure 2 bears out what I am saying. The seapower concepts blocked out in black borders were developments that came about from the actual combat experience. For example, the concepts of the "fleet in being" and the offensive use of destroyers were essentially changes in seapower concepts dictated by experience and actual operational requirements; likewise, the concept of massive air strikes and the demise of the battleship. We also had some experience in World War II about sustained carrier air operations, particularly at Okinawa. However, the seapower concept that

permitted our carrier task forces to remain offshore for sustained periods at Korea and Vietnam was essentially the result of the sanctuary concept--largely a conceptual development of the nuclear age as far as the Navy is concerned. You will note, on the other hand, that the other major changes (those not blocked out) were the result, not of operational experience, but of the thinking of naval officers who could foresee the strategic demands that might be placed on the United States. These naval officers include leaders like Adm. Charles M. Cooke who insisted on the larger 1,600-ton submarines that could support our interests in the Western Pacific. This was at a time when President Hoover was saying that "he would fight for the continental United States as far as anyone but he would not fight

I have put forward the proposition that seapower concepts are derived from the international strategic environment. These terms need to be defined. What do I mean by concepts? How do they differ from the principles of war deduced by Clausewitz, Jomini, Mahan, Mao Tse-tung, and earlier by Xenophon and Sun Tzu? Concepts are broader and less precise. Concepts are the way one applies the principles of war in a particular situation or environment--strategic or tactical. Seapower concepts can either be strategic or tactical. The seapower concept of utilizing the oceans to project U.S. power in all its forms overseas to the periphery is a strategic concept that can best be described as transoceanic. The seapower concept of utilizing carrier task forces for deep penetration airstrikes into North Vietnam is an application of the strategic transoceanic concept, but it is classed operational. Allow me to differentiate between strategic and operational concepts. A strategic concept is a composite formulation of national interests and objectives, environmental factors, and mission capabilities; while an operational concept is a composite formula-




Fig. 1--Interrelationship between seapower concepts and naval force capabilities




Fig. 2--Changing concepts of seapower

tion of military objectives, physical environment, and tasks or functions that the U.S. Navy might be called upon to perform.

Now, what do I mean by international strategic environment? Again, I refer to the fundamentals of your educational philosophy. These fundamentals are the factors of national power considered by some naval officers and others in the past that enabled them to foresee that strategic demands that might be placed on the United States and to anticipate the kinds of new missions the Navy would be required to carry out.

Figure 3 shows some of the complexity of the factors of national power in any given area. In the center block I have lumped the major environmental factors that a decisionmaker must consider before he makes a choice of strategic options. You will note that the arrow points in both directions. There is strong interaction on what leaders might want to do in pursuing goals of national interest and what they can do in light of the international strategic environment existing at the time. The first three factors are fairly self-evident. For example, it is quite clear that the existence of a power center such as Japan prior to World War II on the far side of the Pacific was a major consideration in building submarines of greater size and range than the Board had recommended. Geography is therefore an important factor in defining and delineating the strategic environment surrounding the use of seapower. The very existence of other navies must be taken into consideration. The great emphasis we placed on ASW is a direct result of the existence of a large Soviet submarine force. Anticipated or planned technological innovations will certainly change the strategic environment, even as it did when the Suez Canal, a technological innovation itself, shortened the route to Australia, enhanced the importance of Gibraltar and Malta,

and placed new strategic requirements on the British Admiralty to protect these posts.

The forces and factors in the first three categories can be reasonably forecast for the future. Geography is pretty nearly constant except that physical modifications may be made by developing harbors, building airbases and bridges. Strategic emphasis on certain locations may be changed as a result of technological or political factors. For example, the construction of supertankers that can circumnavigate the Cape of Good Hope at a financial advantage has made the Suez Canal much less important strategically. The size of navies and other armed forces and the quality of weapons can generally be anticipated with reasonable assurance. Where there is uncertainty, alternative estimates may be used.

The last three factors cannot be so easily assessed. The international alignment of nations in alliances, pacts, or just by common overlapping interests may change quite markedly. It took only a couple of years for Cuba to change from friendly cooperation with the United States to open hostility. It took less than a month for a crisis in the Middle East to build up and reach a climax that has changed the map of that region. Surely, an assessment of the international alignment of nations is an important factor in forecasting future environments. The same uncertainty applies to the internal situation in nations. In this factor I refer to the administrative competence of the various governments to marshal the necessary human and economic resources to carry out their purposes in the light of all the opportunities and constraints of the international environment. This varies from nation to nation. Some nations are quite effective; others are so ineffective as to experience coups d'etat at frequent and almost regular intervals.

Finally, the most uncertain factor of them all is the political constraints that




Figure 3

might be imposed upon the exercise of seapower in the future. Such constraints are based on a number of complex considerations. First, there are the nuclear weapons held by the superpowers and the fact that in every conflict or potential conflict since World War II the two superpowers have had an overlapping interest in avoiding a direct military confrontation. Second, territorial conquest and subjugation of peoples have less value on economic and military grounds for the two superpowers. Instead, Russia and the United States are involved in wooing the uncommitted nations to their cause by various means less hazardous than war. Third, in a conflict that does occur, the crushing use of military power by either superpower against a small nation is seen to create an unfavorable reaction in the world community that could possibly have long-range consequences. Whether or not such use of military power (Hungary, North Vietnam) would have unfavorable long-range effects for

the superpower concerned is of little consequence so long as it is believed that it might. Fourth, conflicts such as Korea and Vietnam, in which the United States has been involved, were fought for important and perhaps critical American national interests. But they were not vital. A nation fighting for its vital interest—such as Great Britain in World War II and Israel in the June 1967 war—is less inclined to practice restraints on the use of military forces.

Now let me deal with the top block on figure 3. If we study a nation's history and examine the official policy statements over a period of time, we can get some idea of the national goals and objectives. But we cannot attach relative importance among the many policy pronouncements without examining what actions the nation takes or has taken in pursuit of its goals. When these goals are translated into international actions, such as engaging in new commitments and political relations or in

withdrawing from old commitments and political relations, we may regard these actions as expressions of priority interest in the circumstances that exist at the time. This is illustrated by De Gaulle's action in withdrawing French forces from NATO. As early as 1959 we could derive from De Gaulle's statements and actions that he was dissatisfied with the NATO military security arrangements. Throughout the period until 1966, De Gaulle had made his position clear in terms of policy, but he had been circumspect in setting forth the specific and practical measures he intended to adopt. On 21 February 1966 he bluntly announced that he would withdraw the remaining French forces from NATO and that all foreign forces in France would . . . be under the sole control of French authorities. It was only then that the importance attached by De Gaulle to attainment of his policy goal was fully appreciated; the consequences are still being assessed.

This example points up the difficulty in projecting policy goals of nations. Goals considered important at one time in one context may not have that character at another time or in another context. Also, the relative importance attached to political goals by different states cannot be the sole criterion for action or the sole measure of acceptability of the costs of achieving policy objectives. The most serious and deeply felt needs for goal attainment (e.g., German reunification) may not be realizable unless states have at their disposal the means to facilitate agreement or to overcome constraints.

I think you will agree that we can find an acceptable definition of Soviet national goals and interests within the existing international strategic environment. For example, our comprehension of Soviet interests in Czechoslovakia was quite clear long before the invasion. What we could not gauge was the degree of importance attached to these interests by the Soviet leadership. This

could only be judged by the actions taken. Actions are important indicators, and it is safe to assume that if the Soviet Union plans to embark on a course of military intervention in other areas of the world not next door to its homeland, it will have to have the kinds of naval forces and the kinds of naval strategic and operational concepts to do so. Thus we have two things to examine: the numbers and types of ships in the Soviet Navy and the conceptual writings of Soviet military and naval leaders.

But before we go into these things, let us look at the side blocks of figure 3—U.S. and enemy strategic options. The enemy could be North Vietnam, Korea, Cuba, or China. This chart is designed for evaluating the strategic environment by areas. For the purposes of this talk, we shall use the Middle East as an area. If you accept the proposition that seapower concepts are derived from the strategic environment, then you must agree with my contention that we can not anticipate properly the demands likely to be placed on the Navy unless we analyze future plausible alternative strategic options of the powers concerned in a systematic way.

In considering Soviet goals and basic national interests, three plausible broad Soviet strategic options can be inferred.

1. As the first option, the Soviets might remain essentially on the defensive, holding on to the gains achieved and consolidating their position in Europe and the Middle East. They would seek to strengthen their economy and to gain a technological and military lead that might provide opportunities to further their national interest. In this setting they would seek détente and perhaps accommodation with the West, at least in Europe, and would try to exercise a restraining influence on any Arab action that might reopen armed conflict. In short, this strategic alternative would be a continuation of past and current trends.

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In this setting the Soviet Navy would play a strategically defensive role, protecting Russia's flank and deterring any nation from utilizing adjacent waters for hostile purposes.

2. A second option open to the Soviet Union issues from the possibility of a stalemate between the West and the Communists in Europe. The Kremlin has observed Communist setbacks in other areas of the world such as Indonesia, the split fomented by China's brand of communism, and the growing pervasiveness of U.S. influence in underdeveloped areas. The Soviets might undertake to expand their efforts to penetrate and subvert nations in the Middle East in an effort to gain strategic positions of influence vis à vis the United States and China.

In this somewhat more offensive strategy, the Soviet Navy would begin to roam further from home waters, make calls at foreign ports, and acquire some limited war capabilities for projecting military power ashore that can be exploited should the opportunity be offered.

3. A third strategic option is one in which the Soviet Union, harassed and opposed by China in the Middle East and elsewhere, seeks to establish a détente with the United States. Under this alternative it might have, for example, actively helped in bringing an end to the fighting in Vietnam and jointed the United States in guaranteeing the territorial integrity of the Middle East states. The Soviet Union adopts a more conciliatory attitude and restrained cooperation with the United States.

In this setting, the Soviet Navy would have to expand greatly its amphibious and air assault and air assault capabilities.

Although it has been almost ritual in the past to suggest that the Soviet Union might embark on a course of aggression in West Europe, this is not considered a plausible alternative. Fur-

thermore, if Russia did carry out such a course of action, it would rapidly result in a strategic nuclear confrontation. The actions of the Soviet Navy in such a highly implausible event would be in a deterrent or strategically defensive role.

Like the Soviet Union, the United States has strategic options. Two plausible strategic alternatives are:

1. To continue the policy of containment, seeking to block the expansion of Soviet power and communism even by military means.

In this setting the U.S. Navy requires forces that would permit projecting U.S. military power ashore quickly and even massively.

2. To reduce our commitments and to define U.S. national interest in a narrow sense, leaving the possibility that certain remote areas of the free world would turn to communism.

In this setting, the U.S. Navy would still require forces that would permit projecting U.S. military power ashore because there are still overseas areas such as Europe, Hawaii, and Japan, the security of which is vital to the United States.

A third strategic option, commonly referred to as "Fortress America" is too implausible to consider. It must be remembered that as long as Russia and the United States are the most powerful nations in the world, power will necessarily be exercised in pursuing conflicting goals and the hegemonical tensions between the two superpowers will remain the driving force for asserting prestige and testing resistance. What is at stake in these political tensions between the superpowers is domination. It is inconceivable that the United States would abdicate in the face of Russia's determined political offensive to acquire a dominating position in the world.

Figure 4 is a matrix matching the three strategic options of the U.S.S.R. with the two alternatives of the United States and is shown against three Middle

East environments. The plausibility comparison is based on judgment.

This was not a static comparison, for there are many political, economic, and technological changes that are encompassed in the assessments of plausibility. Blocks 1 through 6 suggest that the United States and the U.S.S.R. are at the same level of power as today. It does not suggest that the same absolute level of power would continue. For example, if the Soviet Union should elect to pursue strategic alternative II (Intervention in the Middle East), the United States would no doubt react and become stronger in order to continue the policy of containment (blocks 7, 9, and 11). For the U.S.S.R. to intervene militarily in the Middle East is rated plausible and only under the circumstances of Arab Dissension or Arab Crisis. It is hard to conceive that the U.S.S.R. would be asked to or attempt to intervene if the Arab nations are united and somewhat stronger. It is equally inconceivable that the United States would pursue a strategy of limited commitment in the face of Soviet intervention strategy. Hence the two "no's" and two "barely plausibles" in the four blocks on the second line.

Now what does this simple matrix say? It is not a predictive device. It is merely a method of demonstration which tends to stimulate imaginative investigation into more than one alternative. We can now develop detailed scenarios for each of the projections considered plausible and identify future indicators in each that might give us a clue as to whether the Soviet naval strategic concept will become more offensive in the future as some naval officers believe or whether Soviet naval strategy will continue to be mainly deterrent and defensive as Bob Herrick claims in his excellent book, *Soviet Naval Strategy*.

Earlier I suggested that we should look at the actions of the Soviet Navy

and the numbers and kinds of ships they are building.

Figure 5 illustrates the cumulative total of naval warships for the period 1946 to 1967 with projections to 1980 based on the nominal ship life of 20 years and the construction rate averaged over the last 10 years. The data comes from unclassified sources--mainly *Jane's Fighting Ships*. You will note that up to about 1960 the expansion of the Soviet Navy occurred in most major categories except amphibious warfare vessels and auxiliaries. Commencing in the early sixties, there was a sharp drop in the mine warfare force and a very slight increase in amphibious warfare vessels and auxiliaries. We know the Soviet Navy has two or maybe three helicopter carriers. But whether these vessels are to be used mainly for ASW or for amphibious operations, I will leave up to you. I personally doubt if they would be very effective in an amphibious assault role without the backing of gunfire support ships needed to make an amphibious assault feasible.

The projections to 1980 are merely a linear extension of the past. If, however, we find that the numbers and kinds of ships being built change radically from this projection, we might infer that the Soviet Union has elected one of the other strategic options. For example, an increase in amphibious capability might signal a naval strategic concept that is less defensive and more oriented for exploiting opportunities in other areas of the third world.

At the same time, we should keep an eye on what the military and naval leaders are saying. Much of the talk is couched in the obscure conventions normally used for ideological discourse. But once in a while we can get a pretty good idea what the Soviets are thinking. If the Soviet Navy continues to be dominated by the traditionalists in the army, we might expect more of the same kind of deterrent and defensive strategy. But we should remember that

		A ARAB DISSENSION		B ARAB COOPERATION		C ARAB CRISIS	
		U.S. (Containment)	U.S. (Limited Commitment)	U.S. (Containment)	U.S. (Limited Commitment)	U.S. (Containment)	U.S. (Limited Commitment)
I	USSR (Strategic Defensive)	MOST PLAUSIBLE 1	VERY PLAUSIBLE 2	BARELY 3	PLAUSIBLE 4	BARELY 5	BARELY 6
II	USSR (Inter- vention)	PLAUSIBLE 7	BARELY 8	BARELY 9	NO 10	PLAUSIBLE 11	NO 12
III	USSR (Detente)	NO 13	PLAUSIBLE 14	NO 15	BARELY 16	NO 17	NO 18

CODE:  = projections considered plausible

Fig. 4--Alternative strategic projections in different Middle East environments




Fig. 5--Soviet naval strength, 1946-67 and projections to 1980

the Kremlin leaders can adopt different strategic options a lot easier than we can.

So far, I have attempted to sketch a rather systematic way for examining future international strategic environments. Now, I'd like to touch briefly on some thoughts about future naval strategic and operational concepts for the United States that one might derive from such projections.

First, the overall naval strategic concept will continue to be transoceanic with the primary mission of projecting U.S. power in all its forms to the periphery of lands close to nations under the influence of Communist power. This, I believe, will hold true regardless of which strategic option the U.S.S.R., China, or any other potential enemy may select. Now in saying this, you may accuse me of stating the obvious, of "preaching to the already converted." But am I?

From the current mood of the country, we could make the following political assumptions about future possibilities of U.S. military intervention:

1. U.S. commitments will be minimized and kept as equivocal as possible.

2. In any crisis, the United States will make a pronounced effort to abstain from action outside the diplomatic realm.

3. Any military action by the United States is likely to be:

In concert with other powers, if possible

With as little force, as little damage, and as little provocation of the U.S.S.R. as appears achievable in pursuit of the objectives of U.S. action.

The last of these assumptions may appear to be a formula for the repetition of Vietnam frustrations, and possibly it is. However, the criticisms of the piecemeal escalation in Vietnam have not been widely persuasive. The case for the use of decisive military force at the outset of limited wars or interventions rests principally upon the

propositions that gradual escalation is in the end more costly, that the desired objective is, in fact, obtainable through dominant U.S. military force and not through lesser means of U.S. support, and that prompt, decisive action will not trigger the entry of some other major power that otherwise might not be drawn into the conflict. These propositions must be judged objectively in the context of each new military action that is contemplated. The problems that have attended gradual escalation in Vietnam are not proof that any other course would have been bound to succeed in Vietnam or that the Vietnam experience may be projected upon a situation involving different geographic factors, different arrangements of loyalties, different concepts of U.S. interests, and, in sum, different risks and opportunities.

The naval planner is, of course, obligated to develop capabilities and contingency plans to support even an improbable decision to deploy and use major military forces in any part of the world. In fact, and this is the crux of the matter, the demands likely to be put upon these capabilities and plans are increased by the probability that a U.S. decision to intervene in force would be postponed in favor of diplomatic efforts and limited aid until the operation would assume the characteristics of a perilous rescue.

The validity of the assumptions suggested, of course, can change. The interplay between the strategic options available to the major powers could result in a different perception of national interests, risks, and opportunities. Soviet or Chinese adoption of a more global strategic option might alter significantly the political values attached to certain nations and the perceptions of U.S. interests. This is why we must examine all the plausible strategic options the enemy might adopt.

The U.S. Navy's amphibious capability is perhaps the most important

component under the transoceanic strategic concept. As L.W. Martin said in his book *The Sea in Modern Strategy*, "the distinction between peacekeeping and limited war is one of optimism and hindsight . . . to embark on an administrative landing without preparation for possible assault is to place great trust in the accuracy of intelligence" and, I might add, great trust in the judgment of our political leaders as to the consequences of intervention.

Figure 6, prepared by Albert Wohlstetter, illustrates the tremendous logistical advantage available to a navy that can exercise command of the sea and protect its lines of communications. As you can see, the bottleneck is within the theater--getting supplies to the front line.

Now, I'd like to say a few final words about some political and psychological aspects that affect future operational concepts. Since World War II we have enjoyed naval superiority in 10 conflict situations in which we either intervened or contemplated intervention. In each of these conflicts our naval forces were treated as a sanctuary by the enemy. A sanctuary rests on two bases. First, the enemy must be convinced that any attack on our forces will be met by a range of additional military actions that would escalate--not merely expand--the conflict. This is probably the dominant consideration, but it is difficult to assess. The second basis is local tactical superiority which will protect our forces from a variety of counternaval actions of the enemy. Now, for years we have known about the Komar fast patrol boats and their surface-to-surface missile capability. We have usually regarded this weapon as a possible response, together with the Soviet naval aviation, to our carrier task forces operating on the flanks of the Soviet Union in time of war. Until the Egyptians used these Styx missiles against the Israeli ship *Elath*, we weren't too concerned. Suddenly, we have become aware of the

possibility that the Soviet Union might provide these weapons to other small nations who might not be restrained in their use. Suppose North Vietnam had this capability in the Tonkin Gulf? These are the kinds of things that might have been anticipated by a systematic evaluation in different areas of the world of the fundamental military, political, economic, and sociological factors such as I have outlined.

There is another area, the early stages of insurgency. In the past, counterinsurgency has been mainly the task of the Army and Air Force with the Navy playing a subordinate role equipping coastal and river patrols. But there are some features of insurgency in the early stages that suggest the Navy could have

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#### BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY



Capt. Carl H. Amme, Jr., U.S. Navy (Ret.), did his undergraduate work at the U.S. Naval Academy (Class of 1936), holds a master's degree in international relations from The American University, and is currently completing work on his Ph.D. at the

University of Southern California. He attended the National War College, served as an adviser to the NATO Defense College, Paris, and recently authored *NATO without France* (Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, 1967).

Captain Amme joined the staff of Stanford Research Institute in 1962. Since that time he has been engaged in research on strategic concepts, projections of future military/political environments, roles and missions, and problems of national defense. He directed a 2-year study to analyze the consequences of various arms control and disarmament concepts on the capabilities of military forces in the European environment. He has participated in studies dealing with the role of missile defense in Soviet strategy, conflicting views of NATO nations on the use and control of nuclear weapons, deterrence in the 1970 era and the role of the Navy, future concepts of seapower, and strategic projections for the Middle East.

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


Fig. 6--Lift from United States mainland and China border to Thai-Laos borders  
 Source: Wohlstetter and Reiney, 1966

a bigger role to perform. For example, insurgency operations are characterized by hit-and-run, small unit, and terrorist attacks over a long period with a slow buildup. What is needed to counter these attacks are fast communications, timely intelligence, and rapid movement of troops to the scene of action. These requirements just cannot be fulfilled in many areas of the world. In the past we have attempted to meet these deficiencies by providing field radios, trucks, aircraft, and helicopters and by building roads and airfields. But these things all take time.

But suppose we could provide a support carrier on LPII that could act as a mobile staging and airbase for government troops—not U.S. troops. Reconnaissance ground patrols that would take weeks of jungle travel to uncover the presence of guerrilla bands could be airlifted by helicopters to suspected campsites. Carrier aircraft could operate as communications relay points to the command ship, to field headquarters, and to government or embassy posts ashore. Quick reinforcements could be brought in by air.

Look at some of the advantages:

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First, terrorists can't attack the ships. Second, terrorists cannot depend on sympathizers to alert them about pending counterinsurgency operations. Third, U.S. troops ashore would be conspicuous by their absence. This last advantage would be especially valuable in Latin America where there would be tremendous resentment among the people to the presence of U.S. troops ashore.

I've tossed this idea out as the kind of perspectives we might develop that might stem directly from a systematic examination of alternative strategic projections. The Naval War College is the ideal place to do this kind of analysis. The end product could be the detailed organizational and logistic arrangements to support the concept.


I'm sorry that I don't have the time to discuss other interesting aspects such as the blockade, freedom of the seas,

ASW, and so forth. Perhaps we can cover some of these during the question period. The main point I have been trying to make is that naval strategic and operational concepts are shaped by the demands of the international strategic environment, that we must be more systematic in making alternative future projections, examining them in specific areas and in light of all the complexities of the fundamentals of national power and that from these projections of power interactions we might gain new perspectives of naval strategy and come up with operational concepts that we might otherwise overlook. Treating the future in global generalities in the light of current perceptions such as we do in our basic naval strategic study is not enough. We will invariably make wrong assumptions and overlook critical needs—as we have in prior wars.

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. . . Mahan, the maritime Clausewitz, the Schlieffen of the sea.

*Barbara W. Tuchman: The Guns of August, xviii, 1962.*



# NEW HORIZONS

## SOME THOUGHTS ON NEW SHIP CONFIGURATIONS (The Helicopter—Destroyer Concept)

A lecture presented at the Naval War College

by

Rear Admiral Thomas D. Davies, U.S. Navy

on 5 February 1969

The purpose of this discussion is to outline a conceptual ship which exploits the helicopter as the basis of its weapon system and to indicate the merit of such a concept by some rough comparative measure with today's destroyer types. This concept is presented as an example of possible unconventional ideas which might impact on our Navy's ships to provide some more "revolutionary" changes. A thoughtful consideration of today's rising cost of naval ships convinces one that some new ideas may be needed. Rough comparisons of our ship's characteristics with those of such types as the USCG high-endurance cutter (table I) and recent Soviet fleet additions seem to raise some question as to whether the products of our current procedures for configuring and designing ships are all that they might be. Somehow our system seems to be too inflexible to generate or accommodate

unorthodox ideas or noneconventional concepts. Hopefully, this discussion will generate interest and discussion to the point where an unorthodox concept will be given its day in court.

As a background for the comparison of an alternative ship configuration, I believe that some of the concepts of system analysis will be useful. These seem to provide a rational evaluation method for comparison of the proposed new concept ship with existing types. I will therefore digress with a short excursion into that somewhat controversial art.

I have often defined the system analyst as a man who "compares apples and oranges." Contrary to some opinion, such a comparison can be usefully made and provides the basis of the "trade-off" approach. Table II depicts a set of "indifference curves" used by the economist to show that

TABLE I--COMPARISON OF MODERN NAVY DE WITH HAMILTON

	NOTIONAL DE	USCG HIGH ENDURANCE CUTTER <sup>b</sup>
Displacement	4,000 <sup>a</sup>	3,050
Range--20 knots (approx.)	4,600	12,000
Shaft HP	35,000*	36,000
Maximum speed	27*	30
Crew accom (incl. off)	247*	187
Weapons	2 - 5 inch gun*	1 - 5 inch gun
	-	2 - 81mm mortars
	-	2 - 50cal M.G.
	ASROC*	HEDGEHOG
	Torp tubes*	Torp tubes
	Scanning sonar	Scanning sonar
	2 radars*	2 radars
	-	MF/DF, HF/DF
	ECM*	ECM
	DASH facilities*	Full helo fac's +1 helo (SIKORSKY)

<sup>a</sup>Raymond V.B. Blackman, ed., *Jana's Fighting Ships 1965-1966* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965), p. 358.

<sup>b</sup>U.S. Coast Guard unclassified pamphlet 1967-0-258-937, USCGC *Hamilton* (WHEC 715) (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1967), p. 8.


there are various combinations of apples and oranges (which plot along one of the curves) which provide the same total benefit--and consequently it is a matter of "indifference" to the user as to where on that curve his particular combination falls. Thus, from the standpoint of some undefined beneficial value to the user, each curve represents a set of combinations of equal value.

Actually, the curvature of the indifference curves also implies that there is a "saturation" effect in apples, oranges--or simply in numbers of weapons. That is, as an individual gets an increasingly greater number of oranges, he values them less and less. Thus, he will trade many oranges for only a few apples when he has an orange surfeit. In military terms the curvature implies that the military capability of the first increment of a weapon is of greater value

than later increments, a concept which seems to be realistic

Given a fixed sum of money to invest, the straight line represents various combinations of apples and oranges which can be purchased. Thus, this line is a trade-off line. Moving along it, you are trading off apples for oranges (or vice versa), holding investment fixed. The point of this idea is that there is an optimum point where the investment will buy the most beneficial value (represented by the point of tangency with one of the family of indifference curves). To the investor this point tells him the relative numbers of apples and oranges to buy with his fixed investment dollars in order to maximize his beneficial value. Note that the existence of this point depends on the assumption mentioned above which causes the "curvature" of the lines. With straight line

Table II



indifference curves there would be no optimum.

This discussion, of course, overlooks the real-world difficulties of placing actual values on the axes of the graph plus a host of other problems that could be raised by the practical man. Yet it does describe an approach that is useful—the concept of trade-off. The trade-off procedure clearly calls for *substitution* of one for another. As capability or beneficial values is added, some is also lost or removed—the net of these being an increase until the optimum point is reached. I reiterate this point because it is sometimes overlooked, and the trade-off becomes an add-on instead. Then, while the ship's costs necessarily include those of the added capability, they do not benefit from the reduction of the items which should be eliminated and

yet whose contribution to capability is masked. Under these circumstances, our trade-off becomes an add-on, and ship costs rise without any compensating increase in capability.

In order to apply the trade-off concept to ship configuration (or any weapon system), we need to face the problem of quantification of the military capability which is the beneficial value in the real world. Of course, real finite quantification is never possible; we do not even have units in which to express it. Nonetheless, we can sometimes provide partial quantification which allows us to rank alternative configurations and provides a basis for choice or optimization. One example is the development of a search rate under conditions in which the probability of detection during the search is unknown but can be

eliminated from consideration simply by providing that it is the same for alternative choices. I will develop several of these examples after we describe the ship; I believe that they will provide a feel for the selection of an optimum.

There is one final point as to the utility of system analysis in this type of exploration. It is the very apples and oranges aspect of the method which is essential to the evaluation of design which represents revolutionary departures rather than evolutionary development. If we are merely going farther with existing designs, no trade-offs need be studied at the individual ship level--there is no mystery about two guns ranking higher than one gun. The utility of system analysis comes when we are exploring the possibilities of substituting a component of an entirely different nature but which seems to give a similar capability in terms of ability to carry out the mission. If we can successfully quantify or rank such trade-offs, then we indeed have a way of evaluating unorthodox configuration.

We can approach the helicopter destroyer in just such a trade-off framework. Let us examine, for example, the trade-off of 5 inch guns and helicopters. We will use the 10-year-system costs since these encompass the effect of both investment and operating costs. Studies have indicated that the approximate 10-year cost of a 5 inch gun (including installation and operation) on a destroyer is about \$10 million. The approximate 10-year costs of an installed helicopter of about the *Sky Knight* size, equipped only to carry a set of missiles calculated to attack the same enemy that the 5 inch gun is oriented toward, is about \$3.3 million. (These costs are representative if there are a number of, say six to eight, helicopters sharing the same shipboard facilities). Thus we may say that the elimination of two 5 inch guns from our notional destroyer might allow a substitution of about six helicopters equipped to provide the same

type of capability--all within our original cost envelope.

Table III is a table of comparative firepower resulting from this trade-off. While it is only approximate and certainly does not cover all possible scenarios, it does address the interesting cases of a duel with a missile-launching surface ship and that of firing at some shore target of specific nature and which can be considered to be killed in some relatively short period of time. The feel one gets from this comparison is that the DH (Helicopter Destroyer), in which two 5 inch guns are replaced by six to eight properly equipped helos, should rank well above the conventional DD.

There are other trade-offs that can be made which seem to add to the higher ranking of the DH. If we add radar/ECM equipment to the helicopters, again at the expense of removing this equipment from the ship, we can show an interesting result in some search rates that can be developed. Table IV tabulates some rough values. For submarine detections I have considered passive acoustic only for initial detections, but I recognize that active localization equipment must also be considered. Thus the helo MAD and active sonar/sonobuoy capability trade off against the DD sonar used actively. In spite of the complexity of making a trade-off in this area, the search rates of table IV do certainly call for a substantially higher rank for the DH than the DD.

In another area we might trade off an air-to-air-missile-carrying helicopter against a shipborne surface-to-air missile system. Only the roughest of costs are available here, but they indicate substantially greater ratios than the six to eight helos for trade-off against each SAM system. If we assume a probability constant ( $P_k$ ) of .5 for our notional air-to-air missiles and an incoming raid of four antiship missiles, then a single helo airborne out of, say, eight on board (typical of a no-warning condition)

TABLE III--FIRE POWER

	DD	DH
Range at which DD can attack enemy surface ship	8/	60/
Range (approx.) of antisurface-ship missile	20	20
Pounds of warhead/min. delivered on surface targets (for short periods)		
At 5 miles distance	320	400
10 miles distance	320	400
20 miles distance	0	200
50 miles distance	0	66

TABLE IV--APPROXIMATE SEARCH RATES (IN SQUARE MILES PER HOUR)

	DE/DD	DH
Visual	200	1,200
Passive Acoustic	100	1,000
ECM	1,200	20,000
Radar	600	10,000

TABLE V--AAW FIREPOWER

Effective Kills Per Raid of 4 Antiship Missiles	DD	DDG	DH (6 Missions Per Helo)
	With Warning	Very Small	4
No Warning	0	3	3 ( $P_K = .5$ , 1 Helo)

could account for three of the threat. Two helos airborne could counter raids of four to six missiles or aircraft. It is difficult to develop this comparison further on an unclassified basis, but I believe that it can be shown in table V that here again the DH ranks above the DDG.

Of course, there are some obvious advantages to having such items as a radar or ECM at 3,000 to 5,000 feet altitude with a corresponding electronics horizon or a passive underwater listening device (sonobuoy) which can be placed 50 to 75 miles (or more) away from the ship or, for that matter, two pairs of eyeballs which can be sent 100 miles away to report on some activity there. Also worthy of mention might be

the COD capability providing material support to the ship when several hundred miles at sea. While it may be argued that one set of helicopters cannot do all of these things at once, there certainly can be substantial doubling-in-brass by the helos, as all of these capabilities are never demanded simultaneously. The composite helo unquestionably trades off even more favorably against the sum of the costs of guns, missiles, radars, sonars, and ECM equipment.

I think I should point out once again that the costs used in this article are of a very rough sort--intended to suggest how trade-offs might come out rather than show a finished result. However, it is noteworthy that costs are necessarily

approximate in the best of analytical studies of things that haven't been done. Consequently, where results indicate only some small improvement in capability, they are really insufficient basis for a decision. The interesting and useful cases are those where the results show large improvements which would not be wiped out by cost fluctuations one might expect in the real world.

I believe that the helicopter destroyer is such a case. The sample comparative capabilities I have given certainly suggest large increases which could not be reversed by reasonably small cost changes. Further, these are computed for specialized helicopters in each case, without applying the benefits which would seem to obtain from the composite helicopters where many of the fixed changes support several types of capability--for example, AAW and ASW capability. The big increment of capability is the addition of the air vehicle; multiple weapon systems added to this vehicle require smaller increments of cost.

It will be argued that the helicopter is vulnerable to counterfire, that it cannot operate in some degrees of foul weather, or that it cannot accomplish some of the things we now do with our destroyers. In each of these (and other) arguments, there is obviously a degree of merit. There is, however, a tendency to argue in terms of the single case of the helicopter facing some constructive hostile situation. I would point out that the consideration must be in terms of alternatives; that is, the destroyer must be placed in the same scenario with the helicopter destroyer and their relative capabilities ranked.

There will always be inadequacies in such arguments since scenarios are necessarily broad-brush, and many times their true nature does not meet the eye--even of experienced operational officer. In such items as shore bombardment, for example, we tend to use rounds-fired-per-month as a measure of

effectiveness; whereas, if we were able to examine military targets on the beach, we might find that helicopter weapons of an entirely different nature would be equally or more effective (napalm for example). Clearly, all arguments cannot be resolved by discussion or analysis; these serve only as suggestive guides--the real proof is in the "doing." If the analyses, done with reasonable accuracy and completeness, do support the view that in important areas there are large gains in capability, then our next step must be to build such a ship (or assemble it out of existing components) and submit it to the trial of operation for a period long enough to give us real insight into its beneficial value.

Turning now to the helicopter destroyer itself, I hasten to point out that I cannot produce an optimized ship but only a suggestion of what it might look like. There are certain practical factors which need to be considered in any ship. I believe the first of these is

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### BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY



Rear Adm. Thomas D. Davies, U.S. Navy, is a graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy (Class of 1937) and of the National War College. He has had a wide and varied experience in the conceptual design and operation of fleet aircraft. He was pilot of the P2V *Neptune*--The Truculent Turtle--on its world's distance record flight, he piloted the first P2V from the deck of a CVA, and held the transcontinental East to West speed record. In his duties dealing with development, he has served in the Office of Naval Research; with the Bureau of Aeronautics as Director, Contract Division; and subsequently assumed the position of Director of the Department of the Navy Program Appraisal Office, Navy Department. In March 1969, Rear Admiral Davies was attached as Commander Carrier Division 20 and assigned as Deputy Chief of Naval Material and Plans, and Chief, Naval Development, Washington, D.C.

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sea-keeping ability, and this would appear to call out a ship of 5,000 to 6,000 tons displacement with high freeboard and some effective form of stabilization (probably the so-called flume system since that functions independently of ship's speed). With the new ability of the DH helicopters to "reach out" for a hundred miles or more, top speed would appear to be of less importance and could be traded off for sea-keeping ability by departing from the narrow-waisted hull of the classical destroyer.

The ship, in this concept, functions essentially as a logistic base for the air vehicles and its weapon system. Beyond hangar and flight-deck space for the operation of its inventory of helos (six to eight), the hull should cater to the carrying of quantities of fuel (both ship and aircraft), weapons, and the hotel items for its personnel. Endurance is difficult to specify for such a loosely defined ship; it might be such as to provide an at-sea unrefueled operating

period of about 14 days at a speed suitable for escorting which might mean a tactically usable endurance of about 5,000 miles at 15 knots plus a reserve of about 2,000 miles at 20 knots. This would be matched by helo fuel for the same period which would provide about 1,000 hours of helo fuel plus a reserve.

In conclusion, I would note again that this is far from a finished ship design, but it is a concept that shows promise and needs to be prosecuted. The method I have described is an approach to ship configuration which I think may well be productive in accommodating and generating unorthodox and hopefully valuable ideas. I believe it can be applied usefully to other ships, and it should be. Finally, I note the importance of the use of the trade-off and the avoidance of the add-on if we are to really generate units of greater effectiveness for the Navy without finding ourselves with a dwindling inventory as a result of ballooning costs.



USCGC *Chase* (Hamilton class) is an example of the impact of a new propulsion system (CODAG) on ship capabilities. She is noteworthy for having very long range with weapons and equipment, comparable to a USN destroyer escort type, within a relatively modest displacement (about 3,000 tons). Outstanding habitability is another feature. (USCG photo).




U.S.S.R. Guided Missile Destroyer of the *Kashin* class displays an impressive array of equipment and weapons on a hull of about 5,000 tons displacement. The "knuckle" visible in the side suggests the designer's appreciation of the importance of "volume" in the ship. Her "payload," very high speed, and good endurance reflect some of the benefits of her gas turbine power plant.

Source: Raymond V.P. Blackman, ed., *Jane's Fighting Ships 1965-1966* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965).




U.S.S.R. patrol craft shows an unusual gas turbine power plant located in an afterdeck house with jets exhausting into the wake, producing a "rooster tail" at high speed.

Source: Raymond V.P. Blackman, ed., *Jane's Fighting Ships 1965-1966* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965).



A Possible Configuration for the Helicopter Destroyer. With flume stabilization, effective at low speeds. The flat top permits best orientation of hull to wind and sea for flight operations.



# THE BAROMETER

*The letter which follows was received by the President of the Naval War College and is published with his permission.*

I have read with great interest your Editorials "Challenge" in Volume XXI, Numbers 3 and 4 of the *Naval War College Review* to which I fully agree. I also understand the particular reference to the Mediterranean Sea in view of the quotation of Mahan.

But since you specifically mention the Indian Ocean, I would like to point out that there are two further examples to prove the Soviet change of mentality from a continental to a seapower, which are of the greatest importance to Europe and for the understanding of the European situation: I mean the change of the character of the Soviet Northern and Baltic Fleets. As you already pointed out in general terms in your first article, the Soviet Northern Fleet is expanding into the Atlantic with her submarines and missile-launching forces; on the other hand the modern Baltic Fleet represents for this theatre a powerful naval force with an important amphibious capacity and a corresponding amphibious assault element. Both were nonexistent some years ago, and they are now the best proof for the change from a defensive to an offensive maritime strategy in the confines of the Baltic. Furthermore, they can be supported by shore-based aircraft and missile-launching batteries as well as by Polish and East-German naval forces of a similar character.

These facts are of vital importance both to the Royal Danish and the Federal German Navies living in the immediate vicinity of the Soviet naval

threat posed in the Baltic and its approaches.

It might be useful to give these facts a wider publicity, also in Germany for a better understanding of our situation and the responsibilities as laid down by NATO.

I am fully aware of your objective to give a picture of the worldwide consequences brought about by the change in Soviet maritime strategy.

WOLF-DIETRICH BABBEL  
Captain (FGN)

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*Following is an excerpt of a letter from Professor Lyman B. Kirkpatrick of Brown University to the President of the Naval War College.*

. . . . .

I would like to take this opportunity to comment on the presence in my graduate seminar at Brown University on American Security Policy of students from the Naval War College. This seminar was presented during the first semester of this academic year and it was my pleasure to have among the students taking the course, Messrs. Fugett, Hendrieks, McCleave and Phillips from the War College. Also in the course were three other students either on active duty or with a military background and seven Brown graduate and undergraduate students. This combination proved to be most stimulating and beneficial. From every one of the Brown graduate and undergraduate students I received many comments as to how much they gained from the association with the officers from the War College. To many it gave a com-

pletely new perspective of the military, and it made them appreciate the quality of our officer corps. The civilians found their military colleagues to be highly intelligent, very thoughtful and obviously human beings of the highest

quality. I thought you would be interested in this observation.

. . . . .

LYMAN B. KIRKPATRICK  
Professor



A sea-officer cannot, like a land-officer, form plans; his object is to embrace the happy moment which now and then offers,—it may be this day, not for a month, and perhaps never.

*Nelson: To the British Minister at Genoa, April 1796*



On Board *Constitution*

As Chief of Naval Operations in the spring of 1932, Admiral William V. Pratt visited *Constitution*, then berthed in Newport. The Admiral's first cruise was under sail as a midshipman and his first duty was in *Atlanta* which carried a suit of sails to augment its steam plant. In his professional career, Pratt was to serve his early years in vessels that showed the transitional nature of the times. He was also to serve under the command of officers who showed too often that they had been trained to command an earlier breed of men.

# WILLIAM VEAZIE PRATT, U. S. NAVY:

## A SILHOUETTE OF AN ADMIRAL

by

Professor Gerald E. Wheeler,

Ernest J. King Chair of Maritime History

Within the past year, articles have appeared in the *Naval War College Review* and the Naval Institute's *Proceedings* that have examined the qualities of leadership possessed by a number of the Navy's most famous wartime leaders.\* These admirals have been immortalized in naval literature; their pictures and sculpted busts adorn the passageways and rooms of the Navy's schools; and most have been honored by having academic halls and destroyer-type vessels named for them. Besides their various leadership traits, they all share the common background of having achieved greatness in wartime. Most of those officers discussed by Professor O'Connor and Potter had served in World War I, a few with distinction; but all are remembered for their World War II accomplishments. Yet the fleets they commanded, particularly in 1941 and 1942, had been built and trained by a generation of naval

officers, the survivors of which cheered from the beaches as their successors faced the Axis fleets at sea. In this retired generation was one of the most illustrious admirals to roam flag country in this century--William Veazie Pratt. Were it not for the *William Veazie Pratt* (DLG-13), few today would have heard of him. Yet, during his 12 years of active service in flag grade, Admiral Pratt held every top sea command, served as President of the Naval War College, and retired after 3 years as Chief of Naval Operations. Had Admiral King not preempted it as a subtitle for his memoirs, Admiral Pratt's own biography might well be called "A Naval Record"!

William Veazie Pratt came from "down-Easter" stock, born in Belfast, Me., on 28 February 1869. Both his mother and father came from New England merchant marine families. Pratt's father had been an Acting Master, serving at sea in the South and North Atlantic Blockade Squadrons during the Civil War. Before his son's birth, Nichols Pratt entered the service of the Shanghai Steam Navigation Company and remained on the China

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\*Raymond G. O'Connor, "Reflections on the Characteristics of a Commander," *Naval War College Review*, October 1968, p. 37-43; E.B. Potter, "The Command Personality," *United States Naval Institute Proceedings*, January 1969, p. 19-25.

coast until retirement in 1906. Young Pratt was taken to Shanghai by his mother in 1871 and lived in China until it was time to begin school. Upon return to Belfast in 1877, he was cared for by his maternal grandmother. After schooling in Belfast and Farmington, Me., Pratt entered the U.S. Naval Academy in the spring of 1885.

Graduating number six of 35 in the class of 1889, Passed Midshipman Pratt began the long climb to flag rank. His "middle cruise" was served in *Atlanta*, one of the original modern naval vessels that constituted the "White Squadron" of the 1890's. Commissioned an ensign in 1891, Pratt was ordered to the China station for duty in *Petrel*, commanded by rugged Capt. Morris MacKenzie. In his manuscript "Autobiography,"<sup>†</sup> Pratt recalled having served under a series of difficult commanding officers:

While on the subject I might add that in my earlier Naval career, I sailed with almost every hardboiled senior in the service, save one, and I mean hardboiled, stern, able, just, efficient, with little tolerance for laziness or inefficiency. They were not the good fellows in the service; the ones easy to get along with; the kind most officers wanted to sail with. I thought at the time I was unlucky, but have come to realize that it was the best of fortune that my early training was under this type of men, and I was well trained. Deliver me from the skipper who tries to be the good fellow, when it isn't natural, just to gain popularity. He will be the first to fail you in trouble.

While *Petrel* wintered in Newchwang, protected from the frozen waters by a mud drydock, Ensign Pratt observed the defeat of Chinese troops in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895. From these observations he gained a lifelong respect for the Japanese and an equally deep abhorrence of military slaughter.

<sup>†</sup>Admiral Pratt's "Autobiography" was completed in 1939 but was never published. This manuscript and his official papers and correspondence are on deposit at the Office of Naval History, Washington, D.C.

From the China Station, Ensign Pratt was ordered in 1895 to the Naval Academy for 2 years of instructor duty in the Mathematics Department. At the Academy Pratt began to develop the amenities that later endeared him to his juniors. He enjoyed sports and practical jokes; he played poker well; and he lived the full life of the bachelor in elkh quarters on Stribling Walk. From teaching "wooden" sections in mathematics, this young ensign developed an empathy for the underdog that he never lost. In time he recognized that good leaders were not uncommon among those who stood toward the bottom of the Academy classes.

After completing 2 years in Annapolis, Pratt was ordered to sea in *Annapolis* the Navy's apprentice training ship; but with the outbreak of the Spanish-American War he was transferred to *Mayflower*, again under MacKenzie. Despite a myriad of attempts by her commanding officer to get *Mayflower* into action, Pratt was destined to spend his time at the dull routine of blockade. At war's end, and now a lieutenant (junior grade), he was shifted to *Newark* for duty in the Philippines. Under Capt. Bowman McCalla, *Newark* saw a great deal of action in the waters around Luzon during the Philippine Insurrection. In shore operations at Aparri and Vigan, Pratt came under fire and hauled himself creditably. Duty in wartime resulted in rapid promotion; and after 9 years as passed midshipman and ensign, Pratt moved to lieutenant after a mere 3 months in grade as a lieutenant (junior grade).

Following another 2 years on the *Severn* 1900-1902, Lieutenant Pratt was ordered to *Kearsarge*, flagship of Rear Adm. Albert Barker's North Atlantic Fleet. For its time, *Kearsarge* was the most modern of the Navy's battleships. Because of a series of transfers and a suicide, Pratt took over as navigator despite his relatively short time in rank as a lieutenant. Three years as navigator,

with a cranky admiral looking over his shoulder, gave him the careful schooling in shiphandling that established his service reputation as a blue-water sailor. He summed up his own views on navigating:

I learned from him (Rear Admiral Francis J. Higginson) to value the lead and compass, to an extent that we always navigated as if we were in thick or foggy weather. The result was that when fog suddenly struck us we were not nonplussed. Sights of course, plenty of them were taken, but lead and compass were the real reliance. As a matter of fact, they are today (1939), even as they were hundreds of years ago, the sailors' truest friends. You can't get aground if you keep deep water under the keel.

After a short tour in *Newark*, during 1906, Lieutenant Commander Pratt was again ordered to the Naval Academy, this time in the Navigation Department with collateral duty among the "wooden" plebes of the Mathematics Department. From there, in 1908, he was detailed to *St. Louis*, lying in reserve in Bremerton, as executive officer. His commanding officer, Capt. Albert Gleaves, he described as "an extremely able and smart officer, but a bit of a martinet." Because of an innate untidiness, a failing that Pratt recognized but never attempted to remedy, he had his problems with Gleaves. After a year in *St. Louis* and promotion to commander 1 July 1910, Pratt was ordered to the armored cruiser *California*, again as executive officer, Capt. Henry T. Mayo commanding. In preparation for a trip to Valparaiso, Pratt displayed another talent developed from several European cruises. He had a good palate for wines, and Rear Adm. Giles B. Harber, flying his flag in *California*, ordered him to select a cargo of California wines to be used for official entertainment. The ship's paymaster joined him in the selections; the rest is history. "After the test was over, the paymaster was incommunicado for another twenty-four

hours. I had lost all zest for my meals, and it was some time before I could look a bottle of wine squarely in the face."

With 3 years of sea duty completed in 1911, Commander Pratt received orders to the Naval War College to serve as an instructor in the Tactics Department. The President, Rear Adm. Raymond P. Rodgers, had been one of Pratt's commanding officers in *Kearsarge* and one he deeply admired. In his "Autohography," he admitted that

... as I look back and try to recall some outstanding incident... there seems nothing but a blank wall to face me and all that remains is the great and enduring influence of the War College, which hereafter throughout my naval career, yes, even after, was to influence and direct my life and its actions.

On the lighter side, Pratt and his wife Louise partied much, learned the most recent dances, and enjoyed horseback riding, including the hunt. Professionally, he felt that Capt. W. McCarty Little, then retired but head of the Tactics Department, educated him well in the field he was teaching. Pratt admitted that he was impatient with precision movements, the results of such maneuvers concerned him more. He felt this was another evidence of his sloppiness and disinterest in detail, yet he never really tried to correct this flaw. He justified his unconcern for details by concluding that leadership was the most important factor in military accomplishment.

Strange perhaps it may seem, the deeper I became involved in complicated mass movements, the less their inherent value appealed to me, but more and more there appeared as a dominating factor, not the things which an enemy might handle, but the inherent characteristics of the leader who used the material things which he held power over. And it was in this aspect that I saw Nelson: not the things which he did, but the man himself with all his strength and weakness.

To develop leadership, Pratt felt very strongly that younger men had to be delegated authority to act and to be held responsible.

Probably the most important assignment in Pratt's career came with his detachment from the War College in the spring of 1913. He was ordered to the Torpedo Flotilla of the Atlantic Fleet where he served as Chief of Staff to Capt. William S. Sims, one of the Navy's most inspiring leaders. The captain had been instructed by Pratt at the Naval War College and had been impressed. When putting his staff together, Sims requested that Commander Pratt be included. When Pratt reported to the Torpedo Flotilla, Sims was flying his broad pennant in *Dixie*, a destroyer tender; but he was soon given the light cruiser *Birmingham*. Pratt was not only Chief of Staff, he also commanded the flagship. In this "two-hatted" position he exercised his first command in his usual seamanlike manner. Ironically, he was blessed with a navigator who had little feel for his work.

As Chief of Staff to Sims, Pratt learned a great deal about leadership and educating junior officers to flotilla work. According to his biographer, Elting Morison, Sims had the "Nelsonian touch." He created his own "hand of brothers" and welded a flotilla of individual ships into a potent offensive unit. Within the flotilla, tactics was discussed by the conference method, a technique Sims and Pratt had learned at the War College. The flotilla commander messed with his staff and thus built up those personal bonds lacking in most naval staffs of the day. Sims recognized the pressing need for a flotilla doctrine; and through conferences with his destroyer captains, trial and error operations, and the creative ingenuity of his staff one was prepared. In later years Pratt was to emulate Sims in an amazing number of ways: conferences, messing, development of initiative in his juniors, loyalty to his subordinates, aggressive-

ness in destroyer tactics, and attention to the development or improvement of doctrine wherever he commanded. While with the flotilla, Pratt was selected for captain in June 1915 and reported to his next duty in his new rank.

Between November 1915 and January 1919 Captain Pratt was ashore. These were highly important years in the nation's history, and with war in April 1917 they became critical years in the life of any naval officer who hoped to move up in rank. The "Navy List" of 1915 contained the names of many officers who moved ahead of their Academy classmates because of meritorious achievement in the Spanish-American War. A distinguished record in a sea command, perhaps in combat with the enemy, was a traditional way for a captain to achieve flag rank. For a captain to man a desk throughout a war or to be relegated to a backwater command was almost sure preparation for terminating a career with four stripes. Pratt knew the "rules of the game" as played by the selection boards, and for that reason these years take on extra interest in analyzing his career.

After completing his examinations for captain in November 1915, Pratt was ordered to the Canal Zone to become the naval member of the Panama Canal Defense Committee. He was attached to the staff of Maj. Gen. Clarence Edwards, U.S. Army, wore a khaki uniform, and was normally addressed as "colonel." He enjoyed the year in Panama and concluded that the most valuable experience for him came from learning to work with Army types and to like them. In later years this capacity to deal well with the other services was to pay dividends for the country.

Pratt got a second exposure to the Army's way of doing things when he reported to the Army War College, as a student, at the end of September 1916.

Unfortunately for him, he was unable to enjoy the routine of the regular student. Because of the college's location in what is today, Fort McNair, the captain was within phone call or messenger despatch from the Navy Department. As relations with Germany deteriorated, particularly following the severance of relations in February 1917, Pratt began to spend little time at the college and most of his time at the War Plans Division of the Office of Naval Operations. By May, with the Nation at war, Secretary of War Newton Baker notified Pratt that the course was to be shortened, and he was to be detached on 19 May. If the captain had any dreams of going to sea, he was quickly disabused of them. Adm. W.S. Benson, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), assigned him as senior member of a "board on devices and plans connected with submarine warfare."

The next 18 months were frantic ones for the Navy, the Office of Naval Operations, and for Captain Pratt particularly. Without the title (until 18 August 1918), Pratt served as Assistant CNO. He handled the enormous routine of Admiral Benson's office and organized it to fight a war. He also worried about antisubmarine warfare, established a convoy control and routing system, kept an eye on the developments in mine warfare, and helped prepare policy papers. A measure of his value can be read in the seven despatches that Vice Admiral Sims sent from London pleading for the use of Pratt as his own Chief of Staff. Despite Sims' importuning and the captain's occasional hint that he would like a fighting command, Admiral Benson held Pratt in Washington. Recognizing that he might be irreparably damaging his assistant's career, Admiral Benson wrote the following for insertion into Pratt's promotion file:

Captain Pratt is my senior assistant and is charged with preparation of papers on policy and other matters of such an

important character that I have felt that the best interests of the Service would not allow me to consider his detachment. I have, therefore, refused to consider the question and I feel that, although it inflicts a personal hardship on Captain Pratt, the best interest of the Country and of the Service demand his retention on shore duty.

Another task that Pratt handled with magnificent finesse involved the ever testy Commander-in-Chief of Naval Forces in European Waters--Vice Admiral Sims. Like every theater commander, past and present, Sims believed that his command was the most important in the Navy. He pressed constantly for more staff, more ships, more munitions, more freedom to operate, and more control over other naval forces operating in European waters. He came to believe that Admiral Benson, out of stupidity and incompetence, was deliberately sabotaging his attempts to win the war. Pratt was truly trapped trying to sail between Scylla and Charybdis. He was a close and true friend of Sims, and he was a loyal subordinate of Admiral Benson. Through the years Pratt had developed an intense attachment to the administrative principle that loyalty had to move both ways. Ironically, Sims had driven this home to him again and again in the flotilla years. Now, on almost a weekly basis, he received long personal letters from Sims exchanging information and ideas and normally firing at least one salvo at the CNO. From time to time he would request Pratt to show these letters to Benson in order to cut bureaucratic corners. He normally enclosed carbons of his correspondence with Benson and occasionally sent Benson's letters on to Pratt. On the other hand, Benson usually showed Pratt his correspondence from Sims and asked his assistant to draft replies. In time, Benson found it difficult to read Sims' correspondence and at one point asked Pratt not to show him any more letters from Sims

because they upset him so badly. Fortunately, the war ended before the CNO collapsed or took action against his European theater commander. Despite this breakdown in interpersonal relations, Sims could still end his correspondence throughout this period with his famous leitmotiv—"cheer up". As one would guess, it was Pratt who collapsed. In the fall of 1918 he was forced to take leave to his home in Belfast due to total physical and mental exhaustion. He was apparently quite close to a disability retirement.

The World War might have ended on November 1918, but Captain Pratt was called upon twice more to fight administrative battles. In late November he took a quick trip to Paris to assist Admiral Benson who was fully engaged in what Harold and Margaret Sprout called "The Naval Battle of Paris." At question was the disposition of the German High Seas Fleet. A secondary question, but even more vital to Benson and the Navy's admirals, was whether the United States would build out of its 1916 and 1918 naval construction authorizations and thus surpass the Royal Navy in size and fighting power. While solving few problems, Pratt did learn, at first hand, how touchy the British were on the subject of American Naval strength. The visiting he did in England deepened his basic admiration for the English as a people. The second "battle" Pratt became engaged in again involved Admirals Benson and Sims. This occurred in the spring of 1920 and will be discussed later.

Upon return to the United States in late January 1919, Pratt relieved Capt. E.L. Beach and took command of *New York*. The captain was delighted to escape the desk and routine of administration in Washington. He was also thankful for the opportunity to command a modern battleship in the Atlantic Fleet. While Congress had modified the law requiring captains to serve 2 years at sea in order to qualify for

consideration by a rear admiral selection board, Pratt knew his chances would be diminished unless he met this requirement. Recognizing that they had endangered his career, Admiral Benson and Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels had certified officially that Pratt had been held ashore for the best interests of the Nation and the service. The two helped him further by the assignment to *New York* and in August 1920 by ordering him to relieve Rear Adm. Henry A. Wiley in command of Destroyer Forces, Pacific Fleet.

While commanding *New York*, flagship of Rear Adm. Hugh Rodman's Battleship Squadron Three, he was invited to mess with the admiral and his staff. Pratt accepted the invitation for he disliked the tradition of a ship captain dining alone. He deeply admired Rodman, particularly his seamanship, and apparently impressed the admiral through his own display of smart ship-handling. When the decision was made to establish a Pacific Fleet, consisting of the most powerful units in service, Rodman was selected to command it. He asked Pratt to join him as Chief of Staff, but the *New York's* captain preferred to stay in the battleline. Like many before him, he sincerely believed there was no finer duty than a battleship command. Duty in *New York* and association with Rodman's staff helped Pratt in another way; he began to evaluate men who would join his staffs through the years. The two officers who served him longest as aides or flag lieutenants, C.W.A. ("Jimmie") Campbell and Russell S. Berkey, were lieutenants in *New York* under his command.

While commanding *New York*, Captain Pratt was ordered to Washington in March 1920 for what must have been the most distasteful duty in his entire naval career. The Senate Naval Affairs Committee, chaired by Frederick Hale of Maine, had received permission to broaden an investigation of medals

awarded in the war into a full study of Rear Admiral Sims' charges that the Navy had been unprepared for war in 1917 and had prosecuted it badly once America entered the fighting. The admiral had laid out his charges in a letter to Secretary Daniels, dated 7 January 1920, and titled "Certain Naval Lessons of the Great War." Sims' intention in writing Daniels, and earlier in refusing to accept his Distinguished Service Medal, had been to get a public hearing and eventual reform and reorganization of the Navy. Though wishing to present his case professionally and impersonally, "Certain Naval Lessons" was a continuous enfilading broadside that took in Secretary Daniels, CNO Benson, and his close friend Captain Pratt. Secretary Daniels returned the fire in his traditional *ad hominem* manner—much to the delight of the press. Benson stuck to specifics and mostly proved that Sims was correct on the question of naval preparedness. His testimony, at times, had the flavor of Mark Anthony's declamation at Caesar's bier. Pratt managed to support both sides. There was unpreparedness in personnel and a balanced fleet; Sims was correct in calling for convoys; and Daniels and Benson had interpreted the situation properly by affording more protection to troopships than to merchant convoys. The captain, in his unpublished "Autobiography," said very little about the hearings. He summarized them in this paragraph:

When the congressional investigation took place, I was ordered from the Puget Sound Navy Yard . . . to attend all the sessions. There I sat with Sims; we were both sincere, but each held to his own opinions. We remained friends so much so that frequently I read over his evidence before it was presented. Once I found in it a statement I knew he would not like to make. Calling his attention to it, he thanked me and continued with his testimony. It turned out as I expected. Nobody was really to blame for our unpreparedness. It was rather inevitable—a state of

affairs bound to happen when we enter any war, rather more accentuated than would ever be the case again, but nobody culpably blameable.

Admiral Benson was succeeded as CNO by Robert E. Coontz, another admiral who knew Captain Pratt quite well and respected his abilities. In September 1920 he wrote informally to the *New York's* skipper and stated that Secretary Daniels "was inclined to do the best he can for you in regard to duty . . ." Pratt was offered his choice, the General Board or to relieve Rear Admiral Wiley in command of the Destroyer Force, Pacific Fleet. Though it meant additional sea duty, the captain opted to relieve the rear admiral. In either case, to use a current idea, it amounted to preselection for flag rank. On 1 November 1920 Pratt assumed his first flag command, though regulations required that he fly the broad pennant in the old cruiser *Birmingham* rather than breaking the two stars of a rear admiral.

Pratt's 6 months in command of the destroyer flotillas gave him an opportunity to prove that he was admiral caliber. It also gave him the chance to test what he had learned about leadership from "Billy" Sims and "Uncle Hughie" Rodman. In selecting a staff he looked for two qualifications in each man: ability and loyalty. Like Sims and Rodman, he drew them into a tightly knit body of friends and confidants. He eschewed the "yes man" and prized initiative. At mess with his staff, in conference with his destroyer captains, or on the bridge he wanted advice that was correct and not what his staff thought he desired to hear. The whole Pacific Fleet was a bit surprised at his selection of Capt. Frank Taylor Evans to be his Chief of Staff. Taylor Evans was blunt, opinionated, and reputedly difficult to work with; but he was a fine shiphandler and loyal to the core. For "flag" lieutenant he chose a lieutenant who had been an "E" turret officer in

*New York.* C.W.A. Campbell had "come up through the hawse pipe" and was to serve as Pratt's aide for 14 years--a naval record in itself. Two others need mention here. "Berk"--Lt. Russell S. Berkey--came from *New York* with Pratt and became "flag" secretary. With breaks for command or other sea duty, Berkey served almost 8 years with Pratt. Comdr. Hollis M. Cooley, the Force Engineering Officer, was to serve almost 8 years afloat and ashore with him. Years after retirement, Pratt summed up his philosophy of choosing subordinates:

In selecting the members of my staff, I never cared a snap of the fingers whether they were born in the cow yard or whether they first saw the light of day inside the walls of a palace. I never cared a straw, who their wives were, or what their wealth and social status might be, only as it affected their husband's manners, characters, and efficiency in attending to the business of the Navy. . . . I have had many staffs in the course of my naval career, many of the members following me from one appointment to the other. As I look back over the days past and gone, I can recall many a one, now a distinguished officer, who at one time or another served on my personal staff. I hope they liked the old man as well as he did them.

Pratt's destroyer force was long on ships and short on men, a condition that existed throughout the interwar years. He learned to "make do" with one-third of his force nested at a dock with a few maintenance crew aboard for all the ships. Another third operated under a limited condition with 50 percent crews. The other third was "fully manned," which meant 85 percent of war-time allowances. By rotating the vessels and moving crews liberally, a fair degree of material readiness resulted. Those destroyers that were fully operational were exercised liberally by Pacific Fleet Commander Rodman. He and Pratt were in perfect agreement that destroyers must operate aggressively and from doctrine. Smashups did occur, but

the admiral preferred to chance occasional damage to having his force become timid.

If Pratt had any doubts in the spring of 1921 that he would be selected for flag rank, he never revealed them in letters to his friends or family. When the flag selection ALNAV hit the fleet in early June, letters of congratulation cascaded in on him. Many have a common theme: he had done so much so well that selection had been absolutely mandatory. Typical was the "Dear Commodore: Congratulations will soon be in order for your 'two stars,' which after all is a rather amusing--if necessary promotion--considering the 'jobs' you've held, which very few rear admirals will ever be called upon to fill, or could fill." Soon after formal notice of selection, Pratt was detached from his command and ordered to the General Board. In September he was examined by the medical and professional boards and approved for the rank of rear admiral. When his vacancy occurred, he would date from 3 June 1921. It had been 32 very full years since he left the Naval Academy. His next 12 years in flag grade were to be even more tightly packed with events and great responsibility.

Under normal circumstances, Pratt's 2 years on the General Board would have represented a period of "marking time" while waiting for a sea command to become available and helping the Department with its long-range planning. In the years after the World War, the General Board was normally staffed by three fairly distinct groups of officers. The senior group consisted of some of the Navy's oldest admirals, now finishing up their time till mandatory retirement at age 64. Many had "flected up" to three and four star commands and were now again rear admirals. A second group was characterized by Pratt. These were "fresh caught" selectees or rear admirals who were getting accustomed to their new position in life.


Duty on the Board meant a lot of hard work, for they normally did the traveling and drafted the reports. On the other hand, it meant they were close to the seat of power and could do a little on-the-job career planning. The third group was made up of a few commanders or captains who might be on the rise or sitting out their 30 years and retirement. The latter group handled the secretariat functions of the Board. By executive order, the General Board concerned itself with war plans, naval policy, fleet organization and reorganization, naval construction planning, and ship design characteristics. Unfortunately for Captain Pratt (his number did not come up until 1 November), the United States was about to host the Washington Conference for the Limitation of Armament, and he would be called upon for unusually sensitive and possibly quite unrewarding work.

At the direction of Assistant Secretary of the Navy Theodore Roosevelt, Jr., the General Board began preparing an American position for negotiations concerning naval disarmament. For a while Pratt was merely a regular working member of the Board who drafted his share of the many position papers dealing with both technical and international relations questions. In September and October 1921 the Board became quite specific in its recommendations concerning the size of the major navies after agreement was reached. Unfortunately for the Board and those who believed in a large Navy, the head of the U.S. delegation, Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes, pressed for a lower total tonnage. After three reworkings still yielded a fleet in excess of 600,000 tons of capital ships, a smaller group went to work on the problem--Assistant Secretary Roosevelt, CNO Robert E. Coontz, and Captain Pratt. The latter was selected by Coontz because he knew him from wartime days in Washington and because the captain had a genuine mastery of the details

involved. Working from the principle that all nations should stop building capital ships at that moment and complete very few of the vessels on the ways, the three came up with the famous 5 - 5 - 3 ratios and a total capital ship tonnage not much in excess of 525,000 tons each for the United States, and Great Britain, and Japan. The "stop now" concept was Secretary Hughes', the details came from the Navy group, but for the rest of his career Pratt was to carry the onus of having scrapped over a million tons of old battleships, partially completed post-Jutland battleships and battle cruisers, and many drawers of blueprints for future construction.

Equally odious to those who disliked sinking *North Dakota* and the old *Iowa* and breaking up or destroying the new superdreadnoughts *Montana* and *Washington* was acceptance of article XIX in the Five Power Naval Treaty. This section called for maintaining fortifications in Guam, the Philippines, the Aleutians, and Samoa *in statu quo*. That article XIX was the key to bringing Japan's navy down to 60 percent of America's and was even more distressing to those who disliked the treaty. Ignored by most Navy critics was the fact that once Roosevelt, Coontz, and Pratt presented the details to meet Secretary Hughes' requirements, conference bargaining and the political sense of the civilian delegates took charge. No one in the U.S. delegation, outside the Navy technical staff, seriously believed the Nation would complete the 1916 and 1918 building programs then underway or that the Nation would build island operating bases west of Hawaii and fortify them.

Admiral Pratt's duty with the Washington Conference delegation added another area of expertise to his record--he was now a naval limitation specialist. Most officers anticipating further advancement would normally shun such an appellation; in current jargon it



Early Flag Commands

(LEFT) Rear Admiral Pratt's first sea command was Battleship Division 4 in the Battle Fleet from June 1923 till June 1925. From 1923, till Pratt's retirement in 1933, Lieutenant C.W.A. Campbell served as the Admiral's Flag Lieutenant. We see here Admiral Pratt and Lieutenant Campbell. (CENTER) From September 1925 until June 1927 Rear Admiral Pratt was President of the Naval War College. This portrait was taken in Newport. (RIGHT) After leaving the War College, Pratt assumed command of the Battleships, Battle Fleet and broke his Vice Admiral's flag. He was COMBATSHIPS from September 1927 till June 1928.

would hardly be "career-enhancing" and might appear positively "counterproductive." But Pratt was not an ordinary admiral. He proceeded to defend the treaty in several magazine articles and in public speeches. He had done no publishing before 1922; he now began to write regularly on the subject of naval limitation and international relations. The point he normally made was simple; he did not believe in disarmament or at least believed it so utopian that it would not occur in his lifetime, and therefore he believed in controlling international relations and international violence by limiting armament. He defended the ratios as a means of limitation and constantly stressed the need to build the U.S. Navy to full treaty strength. President Harding and Secretary Hughes deeply appreciated his professional support; on the other hand, he was suspected by several of his seniors of paving the way to advancement with battleship armorplates. Realistically speaking, it was probably lucky for Pratt that Admiral Coontz remained CNO into 1923 and then flew his four stars as Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet (CINCLANT) until the spring of 1925. On the political side, the Republicans remained in control during his 12 years in flag rank, and those who were in high office (Presidents Harding, Coolidge, and Hoover) knew his work and respected his integrity and fortitude.

Pratt's remaining 18 months on the General Board were less hectic. He participated in Admiral Rodman's study of the Navy's needs for naval bases, particularly on the West Coast, and drafted most of the final document. He can be credited with having sowed the seed that became Navy Day and for having recommended the day to be celebrated on 27 October--the birth date of President Theodore Roosevelt. In the spring of 1923 he observed the Fleet maneuvers in the Caribbean from *Henderson* in the company of Secretary of the Navy Denby, Admiral Coontz, and

most of the House and Senate Naval Affairs Committees members who were enjoying a business trip away from the less pleasant capital. He was sounded out on several sea command possibilities--the Special Service Squadron, the Scouting Force (vice admiral rank), or a battleship division in the Battle Fleet. He suspected, probably correctly, that the Special Service Squadron was a backwater command that would lead to even less impressive positions. The Scouting Force was more than likely beyond his reach; more importantly, it was in had condition. He confided to his wife: "The Scouting Force is all shot to pieces. Its morale is had. They can't shoot." At the end of the Caribbean trip, the Bureau of Navigation ordered Pratt to relieve Rear Adm. C.F. "Freddy" Hughes as Commander, Battleship Division Four, Battle Fleet. Elated at the news, the admiral wrote rather revealingly to Mrs. Pratt in April:

... it is the best sea duty assigned to any man in my class thus far. . . . I am immediately in the line of promotion and when the time comes I will go up with more actual experience in high command, probably than any officer on the list. They are not pushing me too fast. That would be bad, but I am distinctly being groomed. . . . Coontz tells me plainly that I am his choice to relieve McCully [Commander, Scouting Force] when his cruise is up. . . . Eberle [Admiral E.W.] the new CNO is a friend. Denby has nothing against me, and Roosevelt is for me. So all that is necessary is for me to make good.

When Rear Admiral Pratt broke his flag in *Pennsylvania* on 25 June 1923 and relieved Rear Admiral Hughes of command of Battleship Division Four (BATDIV 4), he was doing more than returning to sea. He was laying his reputation on the line and taking that first step up the line of sea command within the Battle Fleet. As we have seen, this was what he wanted. He would now be in direct competition with his contemporaries for higher com-

mands. He had succeeded as a battleship captain, now he had to convince Vice Adm. Henry A. Wiley (Commander, Battleship Divisions, Battle Fleet), Adm. S.S. Robison (Commander, Battle Fleet), Adm. R.E. Coontz (CINCUS), and Adm. E.W. Eherle (CNO) that he could handle the larger commands. It was almost traditional that the commander of the battleships, the Battle Fleet, or the U.S. Fleet had to have demonstrated his ability by commanding a battleship division at sea.

In taking over BATDIV 4, Pratt inherited a smoothly running division. Based on competition while in Hughes' hands, the division had been first in battle efficiency, engineering, athletics, and even rowing. He now had to continue to meet these standards. To help him handle his four battleships (*Pennsylvania* (flag), *Arizona*, *Mississippi*, *Idaho*), Pratt pulled together a small staff, the most important of whom had served in *New York* when he was captain and had moved with him to the Destroyer Force command. Lieutenants Berkeley and Campbell were there as flag secretary and flag lieutenant. Unlike most other rear admiral sea commands, a battleship division commander did not have a Chief of Staff. He was expected to exert his authority directly and to stand responsible for orders given. In this way his seniors would be able to compare Pratt directly with R.H. Jackson, L.M. Nulton, or H.J. Ziegmeier without wondering if a brilliant Chief of Staff had not really made success possible.

From the very beginning Pratt adopted his techniques of earlier years. He messed with his staff and encouraged these younger men to speak out. He conferred constantly with his battleship captains and made them feel a sense of "being on a team." At first he worked hard with his staff and captains to master the signals and tactical movements they ordered. Finally, he drilled them at sea as a single division and as

one of three divisions in the battleline. Whether when working out of San Pedro in the winter or north in Puget Sound during the summer, Pratt much preferred those periods of time when his division and a squadron of destroyers were working together alone. In his letters to his wife, haek in Belfast, he regularly complained about having "too many bosses" around. In tactics he was not timid in maneuvering his elephantine charges. Early in his command he wrote to Mrs. Pratt:

... naturally my experience at handling destroyers at high speeds gives me a certain amount of confidence in the ability of battleship captains to maneuver at a pretty lively rate. I daresay the most criticism of me will be along those lines. . . . Tommy rot. We are paid to fight and learn how to do it. Anyhow I know that the snappiest destroyer men have asked to be assigned to my division during the summer maneuvers.

At the conclusion of his summer of maneuvers and while the Battle Fleet was visiting San Francisco, Pratt was hurriedly summoned to Admiral Robison's flagship on 9 September. The night before a portion of Destroyer Squadron 11 had piled ashore north of the Point Arguello light at Point Peder-nales, known locally as Point Honda. The full scope of the catastrophe was not known, but the admiral was ordered to the scene and then on to San Diego to head a court of inquiry. Two days later the court was formally announced: Rear Admiral Pratt, President, Capts. G.C. Day and D.F. Sellers, Members, and Lt. Comdr. L.E. Bratton, Judge Advocate. Pratt's appointment had been recommended by Admiral Coontz and Assistant Secretary Roosevelt. Both felt that he would handle the assignment with the proper degree of sensitiveness to the Navy's and the public's interest. As in the case of the Washington Conference, Pratt was to find it very difficult to serve two masters--the Navy and the public.

The facts of the tragedy were not

difficult to establish: they stood almost completely revealed as the admiral looked down from the bluff above to the beach and rocks at Point Honda. Below lay seven four-piper destroyers being pounded to pieces: *Delphy*, *S.P. Lee*, *Young*, *Woodbury*, *Nicholas*, *Fuller*, and *Chauncey*. Later it was revealed that *Farragut* and *Somers* had grounded but had not suffered major damage. Twenty-three enlisted men (3 from *Delphy* and 20 from *Young*) had perished. The wrecks occurred a little after 2100 on 8 September 1923. While leading his ships in column at 20 knots on a 150 degree heading, Capt. E.H. Watson, squadron commander, signaled for the squadron to turn in *Delphy's* wake to 095 degrees. The turn was to take the squadron into the Santa Barbara channel between Point Conception and San Miguel Island; unfortunately DESRON 11 was 21 miles north of its estimated 2100 position. The court's job was to determine why such an enormous navigational error occurred, why the six other destroyers followed their leader to destruction, and should anyone be held responsible for the tragedy.

At the beginning of the court's hearings, Pratt tried to make it a closed affair because he distrusted newspaper reporting; but the public would not have it. After heavy complaints from the press, Secretary Denby and Admiral Coontz ordered open sessions. For Pratt it was a miserable position to be in. To his wife he commented after several weeks of hearings: "It is the worst job I ever had. Most of these men are my friends: I commanded the force, am looked upon as a destroyer man and a friend of the organization. Yet I have to give it the biggest knock it ever had... I have got to do this for the good of the Navy and because it is so." Conveying the truth to the public was particularly difficult for the court.

Before the hearings began, the newspapers had created a sympathetic atmo-

sphere for Captain Watson and his skippers. The catastrophe appeared to be the result of bad weather, perversely changing currents—perhaps due to the great Japanese earthquake the week before—and bad radio hearings from the Point Arguello radio station. More dramatically, the officers and men had acted efficiently and heroically once stranded. But as the hearings progressed, the destroyer captains, division leaders, and squadron commander gradually revealed that bad navigation techniques, dogmatic devotion to "follow the leader" doctrine, and abandonment by the destroyer commanders of individual responsibility for the safety of their ships had caused the disaster. By the close of the hearings the public and Secretary Denby wanted blood.

In its "findings" the court charged Captain Watson, Lt. Comdr. D.T. Hunter (CO of *Delphy*, squadron flagship), and Lt. I.F. Blodgett (navigator, *Delphy*) with "culpable inefficiency and negligence." Charges of negligence were lodged against Capt. Robert Morris (COMSESDIV 33), Comdr. W.S. Pye (COMDESDIV 31), Comdr. I.P. Davis (CO, *Woodbury*), Comdr. W.L. Calhoun (CO, *Young*), Comdr. W.S. Toaz (CO, *S.P. Lee*), Lt. Comdr. W.D. Seed (CO, *Fuller*), Lt. Comdr. H.O. Roesch (CO, *Nicholas*), and Lt. Comdr. R.H. Booth (CO, *Chauncey*). Court martial proceedings were ordered immediately for those charged, and in November Captain Watson, Lieutenant Commander Hunter and Lieutenant Commander Roesch were found guilty; Lieutenant Blodgett, the two division commanders, and the remaining five destroyer captains were acquitted.

Admiral Pratt had done as much as the public and the Navy expected. He had allowed the inquiry to speak for itself; nothing had been hidden. He personally wrote "the opinion of the court," and this controlled the recommendations. He had condemned bad navigation and insisted on the com-

manding officer's personal responsibility for his ship. Above all, he and the court deplored blind "follow the leader" doctrine; the report even invoked the independent spirit of Nelson at Cape St. Vincent and Copenhagen to show why orders cannot be blindly obeyed. Vice Adm. H.A. Wiley's court martial, in acquitting all but Watson, Hunter, and Roesch, placed the Navy's reputation in jeopardy again.

Pratt was pleased to close the court of inquiry and pick up his command again. He saw the division through the winter maneuvers in the Caribbean, the first of in which the U.S. Fleet exercised under a single commander in chief. The defenses of the Panama Canal were tested and found wanting; this finding became an annual occurrence. At the close of the concentration, the Battle Fleet stood north to visit New York and other major ports on the east coast, and Pratt finally managed to visit his family during a brief shore leave to Belfast. Later, in June 1924, tragedy struck his division when a flareback occurred in number two turret of *Mississippi*. There was little the admiral could do. A few days later he read the funeral service for the 47 dead from his division. A local minister in San Pedro rebuked him for assuming the clergy's role, but he believed his men would rather have the "old man" read the service than receive it from a stranger.

In early June 1925, while preparing for a Battle Fleet cruise to Australia, Pratt was detached from his command and ordered to the General Board for temporary duty. The Navy Department was planning to increase the defensive capabilities of the two aircraft carriers under construction, *Saratoga* and *Lexington*, but Secretary Curtis Wilbur (formerly a California judge) was undecided whether the proposed 3,000 tons added displacement for each carrier would contravene the Five Power Naval Treaty. Former Assistant Secretary Roosevelt was in the Himalayas and

Admiral Coontz was en route to Australia; besides, Pratt had worked so closely with the data and the technical committees that he was the logical person to consult. In his usual thorough manner, he prepared a 55-page disquisition on the treaty provisions. The answer, in short, was "yes." The carrier limit had been set at 33,000 tons, but this was done with the expectation that 3,000 tons more per carrier would be used for improved compartmentation. Pratt's own interpretation was supplemented by memoranda from former Secretary of State Hughes and international law specialist George Grafton Wilson of Harvard. This chore completed, and after a month of leave, the admiral proceeded to the Naval War College to relieve Rear Adm. Clarence S. Williams on 4 September 1925.

Pratt's 2 years in Newport are not noteworthy for any earth-shaking changes that he made at the War College; but he did leave his mark in a way traditional with him. Flag Lieutenant Campbell was again at his side; the rest of the staff was inherited from Williams. In keeping with the normal practice at the college, he spotted several bright students from the 1926 senior course and brought them aboard as staff members for his second year. Several outstanding students in the 1927 class he selected for his next scagoing staff. In this latter group was Capt. Royall E. Ingersoll, an officer he admired greatly and kept with him for his next 5 years. He and Ingersoll were to rewrite the "Fighting Instructions of the Battle Fleet," only to have them shelved by Admiral Wiley, the CINCUS. At the same time they also drafted a plan to reorganize the U.S. Fleet--this plan was rejected by CNO Hughes. Both documents were to become policy later--but we are getting ahead of the story.

Like every War College president before him, Pratt tinkered with the administrative and instructional organization of the institution. The staff was

divided into the functional divisions that a fleet staff might represent: war plans, policy and plans, logistics, personnel, material, supply, movement, communication, training, and information. The traditional departments of tactics, strategy, logistics, and law went into temporary eclipse; they were to return with the next president. Because of his longtime interest in international affairs, Pratt established close liaison with the State Department and began the custom of having Foreign Service Officers lecture to the students. He believed these gentlemen provided an interesting leavening for the college. To strengthen international relations further, Capt. Roy C. Smith, a retired officer, was asked to set up a continuing program in international law that would be oriented toward problem solving. While Pratt could not continue his custom of messing with his staff, he and Louise Pratt did bring them individually to the Admiral's House for a good meal and intellectual conversations late into the night. His correspondence of later years reveals that many of the more junior staff members valued these evenings highly.

In these years before World War II, the President of the Naval War College was an *ex officio* member of the General Board. Pratt took this collateral duty seriously and visited Washington regularly for the Board's meetings. It also gave him the opportunity to keep his name before the higher authorities in the Department. On the other hand, this was hardly necessary since he regularly advised Adm. E.W. Eberle (CNO) and Secretary Wilbur on naval limitation matters. Both in 1926 and again in 1927 he wrote lengthy memoranda analyzing the positions the Navy needed to take in future naval conferences. He stood unequivocally for equality with the Royal Navy, particularly in capital ships. As a token of the esteem he held for Pratt, Secretary Wilbur consulted with the Fleet's admirals and then sur-

prised the admiral by awarding him a Naval War College diploma at graduation in May 1927.

Pratt deeply disliked officers who engaged in special pleading for their own interests, but he was never hesitant to keep the Department informed of his preference for duty. He had requested a command in the Battle Fleet and was ordered to it by President Coolidge. His letter from the President designated him to relieve his classmate Louis R. DeSteiguer as Commander, Battleship Divisions (COMBATDIVS), Battle Fleet and to do so by 17 September 1927. In language Pratt was to see several more times, the President ordered: "In accordance with this designation you will assume the rank and hoist the flag of a vice admiral." The change of command ceremony was carried out aboard *West Virginia*, flagship of the battleship divisions and flagship of BATDIV 5, the division he was personally to command.

Vice Admiral Pratt was commencing 3 years of command at sea that would see him "fleet up" to Commander, Battle Fleet (COMBATFLT), with the rank of admiral and then up to CINCUS. Each move upward was not guaranteed; performance would count as would luck, timing and the goodwill of those above. As he took over the battleships command, above him were COMBATFLT, Admiral DeSteiguer, CINCUS, Adm. H.A. Wiley, and the CNO, Adm. C.F. Hughes. These officers, plus Secretary Wilbur and the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, Rear Adm. R.H. Leigh, would recommend the "1928 slate" to the President when the time came. Fleet rumors had anticipated that Pratt would get the Battle Fleet command in 1927 instead of DeSteiguer, but the rumors were just that. In early 1928 Pratt knew he would get the Battle Fleet and his fourth star, but he was disappointed. He had "understood" from Secretary Wilbur that he was to be CINCUS and therefore formally requested of CNO Hughes that his



#### Four Stars

Between 26 June 1928 and 30 June 1933 Admiral Pratt moved progressively through the Navy's top commands. (LEFT) In 1928-29 he was Commander Battle Fleet and wore his flag in *California* (inset). This photo was taken at NAS San Diego as Pratt and Rear Admiral J.M. Reeves, COMAIRONs, BATFLT, inspected the station in December 1928. (CENTER) Change of command ceremony was normally full-dress formal in the Navy of the 1920's. Admiral Pratt, CINCUS (left) has just been relieved by COMBATFLT by Admiral L.M. Nulton (center), who had in turn just been relieved as COMBATSHIPS by Vice Admiral L.A. Bostwick (right). The date was 21 May 1929. (RIGHT) As CNO (1930-33), Admiral Pratt enjoyed leaving Washington and visiting in the Fleet. His old friend, Admiral F.M. Schofield, hosted him several times in *California* and *Texas* while he served as COMBATFLT (1930-31) and CINCUS (1931-32). Though plagued by fragile health, Schofield's service reputation was that of an outstanding strategist and leader.

name he considered for command of the U.S. Fleet when Wiley stepped down in May 1929. In the fall of 1929, after CNO Hughes rejected his plan for reorganizing the U.S. Fleet, Pratt requested in a letter to Hughes that his name be considered for CNO when the appropriate time came "provided that I am considered qualified by service for the work, and my selection would not be subversive to naval interests."

Because of his heavier responsibilities, Pratt, as COMBATDIVS was allowed a large staff, and it grew progressively larger as he moved up. For chief of staff he inherited Rear Adm. A.J. Hepburn from DeSteiguer and felt extremely lucky to get this very capable officer. Hepburn would normally command BATDIV 5 in the name of Pratt. Campbell, of course, was there as flag lieutenant. Lt. Comdr. R.S. Berkey, "one of the most efficient officers I have ever known," reported aboard as flag secretary. His engineering officer, Comdr. H.M. Cooley, had served on his Destroyer Forces, Pacific Fleet staff and had just completed the senior course at the War College. The next year Captain Ingersoll left the War College staff and joined Pratt as assistant chief of staff. Of him, the admiral wrote: "A more highly trained, efficient officer I do not know. It was through his efforts solely that my nebulous, inchoate ideas of fleet operation were organized." In his "Antobiography" the admiral summed up his staffs: "If ever a man received loyal support from his staffs, from top to bottom, I am that lucky man. Without them I would have gone nowhere."

During the 3 years that Admiral Pratt exercised high command at sea, he strove constantly to improve the performance of the Battle Fleet. He was not satisfied with the way Fleet target practice was conducted; he felt Fleet tactical exercises could be improved; and he badly wanted to reorganize administratively the U.S. Fleet so that operations would be improved. What

bothered the admiral the most concerning target practice was the daily routine of steaming to sea from San Diego or San Pedro, trying to find an area free of merchant shipping and possessing the necessary 15 to 25 miles visibility, then firing and returning to port. He preferred to stay at sea for 5 days and then spend the weekend behind the breakwater. He believed that his routine developed more efficiency in shiphandling and better crew morale because of working more closely with their officers. He hoped that the idea, "that a ship is a home and not an office," would take hold. He recognized that this approach was not popular with Battle Fleet wives, but he pressed ahead with such scheduling. It should be noted that Louise Pratt remained in Belfast during most of Pratt's 2 years on the Pacific Coast with the Battle Fleet.

As we noted briefly before, the admiral did not have much luck with his attempts to change Battle Fleet tactical doctrine, but he did make significant contributions in his openminded approach to using aviation at sea. As commander of Black Forces in the Panama maneuvers of February 1929, he allowed Rear Adm. Joseph M. Reeves, Commander Aircraft Squadrons, Battle Fleet, to launch an attack by *Saratoga's* planes against the canal defenses. Setting up a small task group of *Saratoga* and *Omaha*, with a few destroyer plane guards, Reeves swept far south of the isthmus and then struck successfully at dawn from maximum distance. The next year carrier task groups became an established operating tactic. Admiral Reeves should be recognized as the "father" of the carrier task force system, but it took Pratt's midwifery to move from concept to operations.

Admirals Wiley and Pratt both disliked the administrative organization of the U.S. Fleet. Wiley proposed during 1928, while CINCUS, to reorganize the Fleet into "type forces." He would have

an admiral and vice admiral command the battleship force and a vice admiral and a rear admiral for each of the other types: carriers, cruisers, destroyers, submarines, and training squadrons. The whole Fleet, under CINCUS, would remain in one ocean—preferably the Pacific. Admiral Hughes, the CNO, would have none of it. Pratt, a few years later, renamed the fleets and almost accomplished what Wiley had in mind. Under CINCUS there was a Battle Force, Scouting Force, Submarine Force, and Fleet Base Force. A few more vice admirals were added, and the concept of CINCUS being an operational commander, as well as an administrative chief, became doctrine.

Yet there was only so much he could do; the "system" was stacked on the side of the *status quo*. Since 1919 the practice had evolved of allowing an admiral only 12 to 18 months (usually 12), with rare exceptions, in the top flag billets. Command of a battleship division usually lasted 2 years. The following chart shows how the game of "musical chairs" was played with the Navy's flag commands, and it also shows the pattern of movement among Pratt and his contemporaries.

Because the CNO normally served 3 years or until his 64th birthday, appointment to this position required a fortuitous combination of circumstances. The most important factor seemed to be that a likely candidate had to be in an admiral's billet and not have reached his 61st birthday when the incumbent CNO retired. Admirals Wiley and Leigh had "flected up" to the proper spot for becoming CNO in 1930 or 1934 but were too old at the critical point of selection. The decision on who should move from COMBATFLT to CINCUS was generally based on proven performance in the lower command. Again, as can be seen from the chart, appointment to COMBATDIVS was a type of "preselection" for command of the Battle Fleet. Occasionally there

would be a long jump from semiobscenity in the pack of rear admirals to a four star command, as in the case of Chase to CINCUS in 1930 or Schofield and Reeves to COMBATFLT in 1931 and 1934. These selections normally represented a recognition of long and effective service on a seagoing staff or the General Board. Admirals Reeves and Schofield, it must be admitted, did have the advantage of being close personal friends of Admiral Pratt.

The move upward for Vice Admiral Pratt from COMBATDIVS to COMBATFLT occurred on 26 June 1928. He relieved Admiral DeSteigner for the last time and broke his own four stars in *California*. He was reasonably sure that he would succeed Admiral Wiley as CINCUS when the proper time arrived, but there was always the possibility of a slip-up. His relations with Admiral Hughes had been cordial enough, but they were to become less so in the following 2 years. Both were sincere and honest men; but they disagreed on the need to reorganize the U.S. Fleet and, even more deeply, Hughes did not trust Pratt's views on naval limitation. Probably, from Hughes' outlook, Pratt seemed to have too much political influence. This had become evident when Pratt let the CNO know that he had expected to be CINCUS rather than COMBATFLT in June 1928.

On 21 May 1929 Pratt reached the pinnacle of success for the seagoing officer. In frock coats, cocked hats, swords, and medals and to the beat and sound of "ruffles and flourishes" and the roar of the *Texas*' 17-gun salute, he relieved Adm. Henry A. Wiley as CINCUS. Already he was beginning to think of a last tour of duty ashore, preferably back to the War College, and then to his newly finished home in Belfast. But events once more overtook the admiral, and national policies and politicians forced a change in his plans.

For 6 months Pratt carried out the traditional duties of CINCUS. In *Texas*

	1 Jan 1927	1 Jan 1928	1 Jan 1929	1 Jan 1930	1 Jan 1931	1 Jan 1932	1 Jan 1933	1 Jan 1934
CNO	ADM Eberle	ADM Hughes	ADM Hughes	ADM Hughes	ADM Pratt	ADM Pratt	ADM Pratt	ADM Standley
CINCUS	ADM Hughes	ADM Wiley	ADM Wiley	ADM Pratt	ADM Chase	ADM Schofield	ADM Leigh	ADM Sellers
COMBATFLT	ADM Jackson	ADM DeSteiguer	ADM Pratt	ADM Nulton	ADM Schofield	ADM Leigh	ADM McNamee	ADM Reeves
COMBATDIVS	VADM DeSteiguer	VADM Pratt	VADM Nulton	VADM Bostwick	VADM Leigh	VADM McNamee	VADM Sellers	VADM Sexton
BATDIV 4/1	RADM Chase	RADM Chase	RADM Cole	RADM Schofield	RADM McNamee	RADM Sellers	RADM Brumby	RADM Kempff
CHBUNAV	RADM Shoemaker	RADM Leigh	RADM Leigh	RADM Leigh	RADM Upham	RADM Upham	RADM Upham	RADM Leahy

he "showed the flag" in east coast ports and even took a small group of ships to visit his hometown. He planned maneuvers, tightened administration, and wrote a few Fleet letters encouraging sobriety and patriotism in one case and operating economy in another. Though he disliked formal entertainment, he attended his share of state functions, charity balls, and stag dinners for departing or retiring flag officers. When appropriate, he did enjoy inviting his guests to dine in admiral's country in *Texas*. Most of his entertaining was done without his wife since she preferred to stay in Belfast when he was on sea duty, though she did meet him regularly in Newport or New York when his flagship was north.

In the fall of 1929 naval limitation talk was again in the air. Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald of Great Britain had traveled to Washington to break an impasse in preliminary negotiations, and plans were laid for a naval conference to meet in London in January 1930. In November 1929 Admiral Pratt was called to Washington to discuss naval limitation with President Hoover and Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson. Satisfied with his views on the subject, the President asked him to head the delegation of naval advisers to the conference. The admiral accepted and set about assembling a body of officers to accompany him. The final delegation represented a good cross-section of the Navy's thinking on limitation and future ship construction. Diametrically opposed to Pratt on almost every issue considered was Rear Adm. Hilary P. Jones, then retired, a former CINCUS, member of the General Board, and Co-Delegate to the abortive Geneva Naval conference of 1927. He was suspicious of the British, was insistent on building only 8-inch gun cruisers, demanded tonnage parity with England in every category of naval vessels, and did not really trust limitation agreements or politicians who promised to build up to

treaty strength. Pratt, on the other hand, was a pragmatist. He trusted the English, probably because he was sure America would never fight them. He was convinced that Congress would never keep up with British building programs and therefore desired to set limits the Navy could attain and beyond which Britain could not build. As CINCUS he was more concerned with seeing a well-rounded treaty Navy described in an agreement, and then built, than in defending a particular type of vessel to the point of killing a conference.

Between January and April 1930, the London Naval Treaty was written. It did represent many compromises--so many, in fact, that Admiral Jones returned home in February. Yet, from Pratt's viewpoint, it provided for a well-rounded Navy, and it did set a firm upper limit for most categories of naval vessels for the three signatories: the United States, Great Britain, and Japan. Offensive to the General Board and those hostile to naval limitation was American acceptance of a new class of cruiser, the 10,000 ton 6-inch gun type. To Pratt and part of the naval delegation, the "London Treaty Cruiser" was a well-protected and adequately gunned ship. To those opposed, the new cruiser epitomized unnecessary compromise with the British and the rejection of General Board advice.

Upon return to his command in May 1930, Pratt was called to Washington to defend the London Treaty before the Senate Naval Affairs and Foreign Relations Committees. He did so with his typical directness and honesty. He believed the Navy described in the treaty could meet America's defense needs; but he also stressed the obligation of Congress to build the vessels since the Navy was not at parity with Great Britain. The treaty, of course, was agreed to by the Senate. For his actions, particularly his stand against the General Board, Pratt lost the friendship of

CNO Hughes. Undoubtedly he also lost the confidence of many officers in the Fleet who simply had no faith in naval limitation agreements or the willingness of elected officials to provide the ships allowed by the treaty. They could not believe that Pratt was naive; they had to believe that he had sold his integrity to obtain the highest position in the Navy—Chief of Naval Operations. Yet had those same officers read the admiral's articles and printed speeches, published steadily from 1923 to 1929, they would have found that he had been absolutely consistent through the years. He believed in limitation because he knew Congress would never build "A Navy Second to None" in an unlimited situation. This had been the premise of the 1922 Washington Conference delegates, a very political group. The admiral knew that the delegates of 1930—Secretary Stimson, Secretary of the Navy C.F. Adams, Senators David Reed and Joseph T. Robinson, and Ambassador Dwight Morrow—were no less politically sensitive than their predecessors.

After the stormy spring hearings in Washington, Pratt was delighted to take his flagship south, through the canal, and to the west coast for inspections and maneuvers. From the west coast he accompanied the Battle Fleet to Hawaii for gunnery drills and tactical exercises. Upon return to California and while preparing to return to the east coast, he was summoned to the Navy Department with the warning, "Be prepared to stay in Washington."

As CINCUS, Pratt was quite aware of the Navy's fiscal problems. He recognized that President Hoover's interest in naval limitation was two-edged: he wanted to reduce international tension and perhaps reach that utopia where swords would be beaten into plowshares; and he wanted to reduce national spending to achieve a balanced budget. The London Treaty reduced competitive naval construction, but the U.S. Navy had fallen so far behind in

cruiser building that catching up with the British and modernizing the battle-ships at the same time seemed to the President to be the road to national bankruptcy. When Admiral Hughes was insistent on building cruisers, he was met with the Presidential order to reduce the Navy's budget for fiscal 1932 by another \$30 million. At that time the CNO chose to retire.

Pratt was scheduled to relieve Hughes in November 1930, instead he took over on 17 September. The ceremony at Main Navy was simple; it stood in stark contrast to the 17-gun spectacle the previous year. Admiral Hughes stated simply to the assembled well-wishers, "I just want to say good-bye and to thank you for your loyal and cordial assistance, and I trust it will continue." The new CNO was equally brief: "I have nothing to say except that I am sorry to see Freddy go." The *Army and Navy Journal* was also sorry to see Hughes retire and lauded him for standing by the Navy. Pratt was given no cordial "welcome aboard" by either the *Journal* or the *Army and Navy Register*.

Once installed, the new CNO established a Planning Section, headed by Rear Adm. M.M. Taylor, to handle routine and relieve Pratt of the administrative trivia he detested. Later Rear Adm. John Halligan joined his staff in the newly legislated billet of Assistant CNO, and Taylor moved over to the War Plans Division. Lieutenant Commander Berkeley came ashore with Pratt, at the admiral's insistence, and Lieutenant Campbell was also at hand as an aide. Scattered through the various divisions of Operations were most of his seagoing staff. Captain Ingersoll and Comdr. W.W. Wilson were in Fleet Training, Commander Cooley in Material, and Lt. Comdr. C.T. "Cal" Durgin was in Ship's Movements. In short, if the "old man" needed a familiar face or two around when things were difficult, he would always find them in the building.

Two Fleet reorganization measures

were quickly hammered out by Pratt and his staff. On 8 October 1930, in his own name, the CNO ordered 48 ships removed from the active list and a personnel reduction of 4,800 enlisted men. The admiral believed the Fleet was adequate for defense and would be tightly organized by the reductions. Almost all active vessels now operated with 80 to 90 percent complements. The administration was grateful on two counts: the reductions would save almost \$11 million over a 2 year period; and Pratt had ordered this in his name, thus sparing the President and Secretary Adams any public complaints. The second reorganization, mentioned earlier, was the establishment of the four U.S. Fleet forces. The organization chart was signed on 15 November 1930, to take effect the following 1 April.

As time wore on and the national depression deepened, the Navy's morale sagged badly, and Pratt spent much of his time trying to help where he could. Service pay needed adjustment, and considerable time was spent by the CNO and the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation (BuPers today) testifying to this need before Congress. Even more serious to the officers was a "hump" problem that was overtaking the Naval Academy classes of 1911, 1912, and 1913. Whereas promotion opportunity approached 80 percent for most ranks, these classes were facing a 20 percent opportunity unless more lieutenant commander and commander billets were opened. Though Army Chief of Staff MacArthur joined him in pressing for improved pay, Congress delayed any real action here. The "hump" was broken by new rank percentages and lower retirement requirements. At all times in his testimony and in dozens of public speeches, Pratt stressed the theme that the Navy's personnel were committed people who were sacrificing heavily because of their loyalty to the Nation and the Navy.

Of even greater importance to the

Nation's defense, the CNO struggled manfully to get the President and Congress committed to a reliable schedule of ship construction. In late 1930 the General Board brought in a 15-year building program designed to bring the Navy to treaty strength by the end of 1935 and to provide a schedule of replacements for the battleships as they became superannuated. To the President and Congress the program was impossibly expensive--Pratt knew this too. He pressed for a 10-year schedule of cruiser construction and battleship modernization that would bring the Navy to treaty strength and parity with Great Britain. The service periodicals and the General Board again felt that he had sold out. To the *Army and Navy Journal* this smacked of "disarmament by example," an approach that ignored the sad lessons of history. With another naval conference due to be held in 1935, the General Board wanted a full treaty Navy to give the United States a position of strength for bargaining purposes. Many in Congress, and the President as well, appeared to believe that the United States could bring the other nations down to its size. This had not worked in 1927, and it was to fail badly in the 1935-36 London Conference. But by entertaining these ideas, Congress was unwilling to go along even with Pratt's modest 10-year program.

When the pressures of congressional hearings and concern about construction programs became unbearable, Pratt had an escape. He and Campbell would elude aboard a California-bound express and visit the Battle Force. The admiral enjoyed enormously the Fleet maneuvers each year. Pratt's brother Edgar lived in Los Angeles, and the two were quite compatible. Adm. Frank Schofield, as COMBATFOR and then CINCUS, was a dear friend and made him comfortable in *California* or *Texas*. And Adm. R.H. "Reddy" Leigh, who followed Schofield up the Fleet ladder, was equally ready to take the admiral

in. In his letters to his friends and wife, Pratt regularly mentioned the pleasures of clean, crisp, salt air and spray and enjoying the views from the admiral's bridge.

The elections of 1932 finished the job of turning out the Republican Party and brought an old friend of Pratt's to the Presidency. Yet the admiral had been a lifelong Republican, and he hated to see Hoover lose. He considered him one of the "ablest public servants" the Nation ever had. In a letter to Theodore Roosevelt, Jr., who was winding up his affairs as Governor General of the Philippines, he commented about the President: "Personally he must be very much relieved for he has had the most thankless job a man ever carried. I go out with the Administration as I am on March 1st an old crock of sixty-four and fit only for the scrap heap." In preparation for his retirement date, Pratt wrote a few notes of thanks to key congressional leaders and received a resolution of "thanks" and "well done" from the House Naval Affairs Committee. To his many service friends who wrote to wish him well after he "hailed down," he had a simple reply. "Of course it is not pleasant to have to give up after these many years of service, but it comes to us all and it is now my turn. So that's that."

But it wasn't quite "that." President-elect Roosevelt did not want Pratt to retire just then. He asked the admiral and Secretary Adams if something could not be done to keep Pratt in office. A ruling was sought from the Judge Advocate, Rear Adm. O.G. Murfin, and he decided that the 1929 statute governing retirement did not apply to the CNO. The age 64 retirement law specifically applied to those below the rank of vice admiral. Pratt was an admiral, therefore he could stay his customary 4 year term for CNO or until relieved by the President. So the admiral unpacked and went back to work. If he was embarrassed by the change, he never said anything

about it in his correspondence or public utterances.

President Roosevelt understood the Navy's need to build to treaty strength, but he was as short on public funds as Hoover had been. At first he tried economy measures, including a 10 percent cut in the salaries of all public employees. Pratt cooperated by suggesting savings through closing a half-dozen Navy yards. He also admitted that a third of the whole Fleet could be put in reserve and units rotated in and out of active status. But he recommended the rotation program only as a desperation measure. While cuts were made, by June the magic of deficit spending and pump-priming had been discovered. It was also finally recognized, after 30 years of naval speeches on the subject, that almost 90 percent of the cost of ship construction and materials was ultimately a labor charge. This led to a program of shipbuilding designed to cure national unemployment. The Navy, of course, was ready to do its part.

After almost 3 years of splendid misery as CNO, the skies appeared to be clearing for Pratt, but he was not destined to stay on. In April the White House announced that Vice Adm. William H. Standley, the Commander of the Scouting Force, would become the next CNO. He was not Pratt's first choice, that was reserved for his old Chief of Staff, A.J. Hepburn. But the admiral had to admit that Standley was the service's choice. He had not come up the Battle Fleet ladder, but he was competent and well liked. Pratt recognized the importance of having a following. He set his own retirement date for 30 June 1933.

Once again the letters poured in on Admiral Pratt. President Roosevelt wrote to "My dear Bill Pratt: I am really and honestly deeply sorry that you are retiring--sorry on my own account, sorry on account of the Navy and sorry on the part of the country." Congress-

man Carl Vinson of Georgia, Chairman of the House Naval Affairs Committee, wrote:

Before your retirement from active duty in the Navy, I desire to express to you the thanks of the Naval Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives for the very great assistance which you have rendered in the formulation of legislation pertaining to the Navy Department. . . . The Committee feels a very real sense of loss in realizing that our official relations are so soon to be terminated.

And, finally, from a young Battle Force captain, almost unknown to Pratt, came a letter that summed up much of the younger Navy's feeling for him: "I do not want to appear to say too much, but the quiet efficiency of your leadership in the Navy has been a real inspiration to me. Your kindly interest in younger officers, I can indeed assure you, has meant much more to them than you can ever know."

Upon relief by Standley, Admiral Pratt reverted to his permanent rank of rear admiral and went on the retired list. The ceremonies completed, he took the afternoon train to New York.

Like Hughes, Eherle, Coontz, and Benson--his predecessors as CNO--Admiral Pratt walked out of Main Navy and into the shadowed land of the retired officer. In 1937 he was raised to full admiral on the retired list by virtue of new legislation governing such matters. In January 1941 he was recalled to active duty for 6 months to advise the Navy on antisubmarine warfare. He evaluated and endorsed the concept of the escort carrier that helped to win the Battle of the Atlantic in World War II. He wrote occasional articles on international relations and naval affairs until 1940, and in January of that year joined the staff of *Newsweek*. From January 1940 through 1946 he wrote a weekly column dealing with the war and then international affairs in the postwar period. His Navy Department sources were good, and these articles were

among the best writings available to those who wished to understand the shifting tides of the war at sea.

At war's end he again returned to Belfast to enjoy his wonderful rose garden and home on Primrose Hill. His eyesight was very poor, and his public appearances became less frequent. He still maintained a deep interest in international affairs and kept up a fairly vigorous correspondence. In 1957 his health began to fail, and in the summer of that year he entered the Naval Hospital at Chelsea. He died on 25 November 1957.

A career of this length and importance, for the times, is hard to summarize in a few words. Though Admiral Pratt never analyzed or spelled out the reasons for his remarkable success, perhaps we can deduce a few of them from this "silhouette" we have drawn.

1. Without detracting from Pratt's positive qualities, it should be recognized at the beginning that competition for high command was quite different from today's. Out of his Naval Academy class of 1889, 15 of the 35 graduates reached flag rank. Almost the same figures hold for the classes of 1888 (12 of 35) and 1890 (15 of 34). What is remarkable about Pratt is that he held every Battle Fleet command, CINCUS, and then became CNO.

2. A second factor which contributed to his continuing rise was the fact that the Republican administrations of Harding, Coolidge, and Hoover felt a degree of gratitude toward Pratt for his work in the area of naval limitation. There were many other rear admirals who could have developed the technical expertise he displayed at the Washington Conference. By chance he was the junior rear admiral on the General Board, and to him fell the less interesting task of developing statistics for the studies. Once he was an "expert," his services could not be dispensed with. We saw that he was consulted in 1925, 1926, and 1927 and finally was called

upon again in 1929. The public defense he made of his advice and efforts was a reasonable activity for a man convinced of the soundness of his own judgments.

3. More basic to Pratt's rise was his willingness to work hard, with great personal deprivation, once he was assigned to a job. His activities as Benson's assistant demonstrated his enormous capacity for organizing and managing a stupefying workload under conditions of extreme pressure. In this position, and all fleet commands later, he put duty above family. His personal correspondence, within the family, displayed constantly the stresses that were generated. Fortunately for all, Louise Pratt was an independent spirit who could manage without her husband for long stretches of time.

4. In the Navy of Pratt's time, sound seamanship was indispensable for advancement. Like so many from Maine, he loved the sea and the shipboard life, yet he was respectful of the treachery ever present in that domain. His idols were smart shiphandlers like Morris MacKenzie, Raymond Rodgers, and Hugh Rodman. Though he normally found something good to say about any man, he was harshest in his judgments of those who conducted themselves badly at sea. The court of inquiry, following the Honda tragedy, spelled this out quite clearly.

5. It was quite obvious that Pratt had an open and innovative mind. He welcomed new doctrine, tactics, and new materiel. Because of this quality he was constantly tinkering with organization, always trying to make a unit operate more smoothly, be it a flotilla or a fleet. It was this interest in what was new that led him into the company of Joseph Mason Reeves and his gang of naval aviators. Perhaps it was this openness that allowed him to listen and learn from the younger officers of the Fleet. Throughout his correspondence there are numerous letters from officers quite

junior to him expressing their appreciation for his interest in their problems.

6. Finally, in his personal philosophy, Pratt was both a pragmatist and an optimist. He seldom believed that a struggle simply for the fight involved was worth the game. He worked constantly within the realm of the possible. If Congress would not build fortified naval bases in the Pacific, there was little reason to resist other agreements in the hope that Congress might change its mind. If the public did not want to increase the Navy, it was Pratt's view that this should be recognized as reality and plan soundly from there. And when the President called for economies and cuts in the Navy, Pratt did his best with what was left. He did not expect America to go to war in the 1930's, thus he felt that the Navy after economies was adequate for defense. The admiral was a deeply religious man, without a formal affiliation. Had it occurred to him, he would probably have felt quite comfortable with the motto of Admiral of the Fleet Lord John Fisher of Kilverstone--"Fear God and dread nought."

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#### BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY



Professor Gerald E. Wheeler is affiliated with San Jose College and currently occupies the Ernest J. King Chair of Maritime History at the Naval War College. He holds an A.B., M.A., and Ph.D. in History from the University of California, Berkeley, and his fields of specialization are American Diplomatic History, American Naval History, Modern Far Eastern History, and Philippine History.

Professor Wheeler has been awarded several research fellowships and in 1967 was awarded the Distinguished Teaching Award for California State Colleges. In addition to numerous articles, his publications include *Prelude to Pearl Harbor: the U.S. Navy and the Far East, 1921-1931* and, with P.E. Coletta, *An Outline of World Naval History since the Sixteenth Century*.

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# ARE OUR INSTITUTIONS FLEXIBLE ENOUGH?

A lecture presented at the Naval War College

by

Mr. Howard T. Robinson

on 4 March 1969

The true aim of our Government is freedom and equality for our citizens. The Government assumes the role of big brother, arbiter, innovator, and, finally, conciliator over all our many free institutions.

These institutions, or organized forms of social life, are developed, administered, and controlled by private citizens and generate political, economic, and moral powers distinct and separate from that of the elected Government. Consequently, many of society's rules of conduct are established outside the chain of Government command.

Assuming the foregoing to be valid, I plan first to examine the recent attitudes and behavioral patterns of persons for whom there are no organized institutions, the unorganized blacks, the poor, and the youth; and second to suggest how the current explosive activities of these groups can potentially influence our Nation's standing in the international community.

First of all, it is my premise, for which there is substantial supporting evidence, that our institutions bend under the force of organized pressure. That is to say, organizations acting as pressure groups stimulate and motivate institutional change; and since most citizens are associated in some manner with an organization, be it labor, medicine, veterans, education, religious groups, or one of the many thousand others, they are thus served reasonably effectively within currently acceptable limits. They communicate their desires for change through their organizations. The unorganized, on the other hand, are left to fight their battles as individuals. And since our institutions respond best to organized pressure, the unorganized are not capable of bringing about institutional change. If it were, at present, possible for *all* individuals to achieve membership in an established organization, we could dismiss the grievances of the nonaffiliated with the claim that their failure is a result of laziness or

unwillingness to participate, therefore they are unfit to receive the available fruits of our society. But the facts are that many who want to join and participate in established organizations, particularly in the case of the blacks, are denied the opportunity.

Many of our young intellectuals, both black and white, claim that the present institutions, set up to serve the values of a previous period in our history, are not relevant or responsive to the needs of our present technological society. A few days ago I asked a white student: "In which of our many institutions do you have the least confidence?" His reply was that what he disliked most was an inconsistency he found between the words and the acts of the total establishment. That instead of serious discussion on the issues between leaders and young people, he felt that representatives of the establishment were trying to "buy him off" with the "standard shorthand about being thankful" and offers of material advantages. Further to substantiate his claim, he noted that Federal fund transfers which were intended to alleviate the problems of the poor were disproportionately disbursed for high salaries to Government bureaucrats. And that the "maximum feasible local participation" concept of the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) legislation was not fully implemented because the bureaucrats insist upon maintaining too much control.

A second youth made the claim that current college education was not relevant to the needs of our present society. However, it was necessary to go through the motions of attending classes and passing irrelevant examinations in order to obtain a position where he could influence the course of events. Other students seemed concerned about social inconsistencies regarding sex, family life, and religion.

A young black man told me that he found the new left to be "decadent"

and went on to say that the new left only offered a new system of compromise for blacks and that it was dangerous for blacks to compromise at this time of heightened self-concern. In general, I find black students and, in fact, most young blacks to be seeking a new dignity through identification with what is described as a more favored self-image. They "turn off" when white professors try to teach about black history or about Africa. It is hard for them, they say, to believe that a white person can have the necessary sensitivity and insight to understand the "motivating aspects of black behavior." They recoil when a white professor is "passing" as an expert on Africa while using white values to justify his position.

"Big labor," "big management," "big Government," and "big organization" in general, with their built-in bureaucracies where standards of qualifications for entry are established, so claims our youth, to protect those already entrenched, are waving red flags which taunt the sensitivities of youth and other disaffected members of the population when they seek to persuade young people that things will be all right in due course.

Today, no protest movement is available for them to cling or turn to. The labor movement, and other similar organizations which once attracted the emotions and energies of the poor and the blacks no longer serve this purpose. Labor unions today are working almost exclusively to protect their dues-paying members. New members are sought; but, because of technological changes and more enlightened employment practices by employers, the unions' organizing efforts have, during recent years, met with limited success. Union members facing layoff due to technological changes are foreing leaders to turn in a large measure towards protecting their current bargaining rights. To meet this need, unions, of necessity, are more and more directing their or-

ganizing resources toward the highly trained white-collar and professional employees who have assumed positions within the enterprise for which blue-collar workers were not previously trained to undertake. The expanding areas in which union organizers are having success and consequently devoting a major share of their efforts and resources are education (i.e., teachers) and government civil servants, both Federal and local not the untrained poor. Fortunately, there are a few exceptions to this, however, and one important exception is the unions' efforts to organize the millions of farm workers. In addition, the AFL-CIO recently unveiled plans which will get it heavily involved in the housing field and education, on what appears to be a much wider basis than ever before, of its rank and file leadership. These activities represent flexibility and respond to demands for change.

Several years ago the civil rights movement attracted many young white and black intellectuals. Not so today. This is not altogether the fault of the whites: young black militants have made white civil rights workers unwelcome in these organizations. They say that the whites should work among their own people, alter their opinions about blacks, and that they (young whites) should respect black history and culture. Due to the lack of substantial progress in this area, young blacks are fed up with integration as a goal. This is not to suggest that if integration had had more rapid success there would not have been complaints. I believe there would have been complaints because the kinds of concerns of blacks today are not and were not within the framework of references of the established civil rights organizations. Consequently, neither the unorganized poor nor the blacks nor the young intellectuals have today an attracting magnet to engage them in practical goals such as integration and higher wages. They have turned

their criticism toward the broader institutional framework. They want substantive change not only in their lives but also in the direction and the "sincerity" of all our institutions. Many of our youth believe it is possible for this Nation to conduct its world affairs without Vietnam types of involvement or the necessity for the employment of our massive military power, if only we respected the rights of others and would neutralize our anti-Communist phobia.

The complaints of the unorganized poor and the blacks are less sophisticated. What they seek is a larger share of the material wealth. They want to have the existing institutions provide jobs, housing, education, health care, and, in general, a better and more dignified life. These are only a few of the things we hear being demanded by the unorganized poor and the blacks. A very limited shopping list indeed.

We must answer the question: How can present established institutions be responsive to the demands and needs of the unorganized blacks, the poor, and the young intellectuals? Can our military establishment meet the challenge of how to attract young men into the services? Can we inspire our servicemen, black and white, to behave better at home and particularly overseas. Or will it be necessary to dismantle the existing institutions and replace them with something else? At this point we can bring into sharp focus the question, "Are our institutions flexible enough?" My response to this question is an optimistic yes. But will this flexibility be demonstrated in time to avoid the kind of frustration which, in turn, causes institutional repression to what might otherwise be useful and valuable self-criticism.

There is already considerable evidence from the fields of social welfare, education, employment, and poverty, although not nearly enough in substance and size and not yet effectively communicated or administered, to support

my claim that our institutions are flexible but perhaps, it can be argued, not enough.

One needs only to examine the revolutionary nature of recent actions by educational institutions in providing black studies programs to get a feeling, albeit limited, of optimism. Several universities have gone so far as to advance the possibility of having black study programs lead to degrees. Upon first hearing of this I became personally indignant, "Why a degree?" I asked. I could justify the requirement that all Americans study black history at all levels of our educational system, but to grant a degree—I was not prepared to go that far until it dawned on me that we give degrees in Greek culture, medieval history, et cetera. These programs were advocated by black militants and supported generally by white students. This responsiveness is a good example of flexibility by our institutions of higher education.

Social welfare innovations have been made that go far beyond regulatory changes. These changes affect the very heart of the social welfare concepts. The new changes to which I refer are now effective in the State of Rhode Island and a few other states (self-declaration system) whereby a person need only apply and he will receive assistance without the demeaning investigations and restrictions previously associated with welfare. In addition to receiving money, the recipient also can qualify for education and training with which, hopefully, coupled with the cooperation of private employers, he will become a productive citizen. We have also made some upward substantive moves in our ability to employ our citizens but have failed to develop new methods leading to assurance of full employment. Black citizens suffer most the pains of unemployment. (Source: U.S. Department of Labor) Their unemployment rate is more than double that of white, and in spite of efforts to lessen this problem it

is increasing not only in percentages of unemployment but also in the spread within the earning gap, at certain levels, between whites and blacks. One positive sign is in the distribution of black employment which has shown important shifts over the past few years. There are currently more black executives, middle-level managers, professionals, black government officials, elected and appointed: there are more blacks in the civil service and the military. Major universities have employed black professors and are seeking more.

The list of positive responses to demands for change is long, but the list of demands for further changes is even longer, and as we open up the channels of communication between the leadership and the masses these demands will grow. For once the citizens know and understand what society can do, they will insist that it be done.

Our technological society today demands more from us: more education and technical training for each of our citizens and because of successes we have had technological achievement, we can afford a larger overall resource for dealing with our problems of housing, social welfare, and institutional changes, including the situation of race.

I have committed myself to an optimistic view about our institutions, not because of romanticism, but because of my faith in our demonstrated ability to do the necessary.

But do we have the ability to convincingly communicate the substance of our positive actions to the young, the unorganized poor, and the blacks? To communicate means to effectively employ their energies, their imaginations, and their talents in ways which provide them (and, in fact, all of us) an opportunity for a greater sense of values which offers a renewed personal dignity in productive enterprise.

Before I turn to show how all this affects our international standing, let me hasten to note that while I have

faith that we can meet the challenge, I believe that in doing so many of our norms of behavior will be in the process of undergoing serious change and that some organizations will be replaced. Our universities seem to be the first to begin reshaping themselves. Racial prejudice and the organizations supporting it will have to meet their deaths. Black citizens will find their dignity, and the unorganized poor among us will need to become organized--either with or without Government support.

Foreign nations, both our friends and our adversaries, will continue for some time to think "Why haven't you made your Constitution live as you said you would?" It is difficult for many of these nations to understand why such an economically powerful Nation cannot deal more effectively with its social and employment problems.

I do not think any of these nations doubt our military or economic powers. Our adversaries see our disturbances as a desirable weakness, one to be exploited. Our friends are perhaps a bit uneasy when they see our institutions challenged from within. They, in many cases, fail to understand or, for that matter, have faith in the strength and flexibility of our institutions.

Until recently we thought of poverty, student unrest, and violent demonstrations as a product of undeveloped societies. We now witness that our young people, students, the blacks, and the poor are stridently confronting our society and our institutions. The world public has been given liberal doses of violent opposition to established institutions and political instability all described as an inevitable part of the disorganization relating to the new and undeveloped nations. These reports were framed and evaluated in such a way as to lead one to believe that governments were teetering, and indeed many were.

Today these same kinds of reports, by the same public media, describe the

unrest and violent disorder which exist in most of the developed world. This, perhaps, could have been expected from the public opinion point of view of, say, France and perhaps even far-off Japan. But when it is evident that the most consistent of these violent demonstrations, concerning institutional response to public needs, are principally in what is considered by all nations the strongest nation in the world, there is cause to be concerned. For, in my opinion, the consistency of our internal problems is viewed by our enemies with mild surprise and our allies with shock and alarm. Our allies question these acts and wonder aloud about our viability as a strong nation. This very concern was pressed upon me not long ago by one of our leading ambassadors: He told me that a leading figure of his constituent country, which for the last 20-odd years has been one of our closest allies, had expressed to him the feeling which had previously permeated his government: that his government was often somewhat bemused by what they considered American mistakes and awkwardness in conducting international affairs. But in spite of this, his government respected

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#### BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY



Mr. Howard T. Robinson is a Foreign Service Officer and is currently a senior fellow at Wesleyan University. He has had a wide and varied experience in national and international labor affairs and in community activities dealing with minority problems. His most recent positions as a Foreign Service Officer were as Labor Adviser to the State Department's Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs (1964) and as the Asian Adviser to the U.S. Delegation to the International Labor Organization conferences in Geneva, Switzerland (1965-66). He has published numerous articles dealing with the labor movement in labor journals.

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our strength and our goodwill. But today, he said, that when talking with leaders of his country he finds a lessening of confidence, not in our military or economic strength, but in our ability to manage our institutions at home.

I judge this kind of misunderstanding to be an ignorance, on the part of some foreign governments, of the internal goals and functioning of our Government in managing our free institutions. This, of course, is coupled with a failure to comprehend the elasticity and strength of our private institutions. Such ignorance can, if we do not educate them about our internal strength, lead to costly and serious miscalculations. Consequently, I believe that increasingly those bureaucracies, civilian and military personnel that represents

our Government abroad will need to become and to stay knowledgeable of current developments at home to a degree not demanded heretofore, and that this new knowledge should become the basis for one of the most important dialogs we ought to develop in communicating with foreign nations. The new dialog ought to stress the commonality of our problems that, in order to survive, institutions must have a built-in flexibility.

It is safe, I believe, to assume that an enemy will give aid and comfort to those friendly nations with whom our relations are weak. If such nations are uncertain of our internal strength, it follows that they will make, for the sake of their own "self-interest," common cause with the enemy.

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The most complete and happy victory is this: to compel one's enemy to give up his purpose, while suffering no harm oneself.

*Belisarius, 505-565*

# URBAN INSURGENCY WAR GAME

An article by  
Colonel William F. Long, Jr., U.S. Army  
U.S. Army Adviser  
to the President, Naval War College

Social and political discontent is facilitated by the press of people on people in the packing boxes of the city. Manifestations of disorder range from riots in the urban environment to full-blown war in cities--from riots in Watts, Washington, Baltimore, Chicago, Tokyo, Berlin, London, through the May 1968 revolt in Paris to combat in Hue and Saigon in the 1968 Tet offensive. So the urban aspects of insurgency are very much on the minds of military men. This includes the faculty and staff of the Naval War College.

In the search to find better means of education in this nagging area of concern, a potential vehicle was suggested by Capt. Coleman Smith, Director of the War Gaming Department and an ardent advocate of using his Naval Electronic Warfare Simulator (NEWS) facility to apply principles and test doctrine.

In November 1968 a major naval command was engaged in a war game that exercised a contingency plan involving amphibious operations under appropriate U.N. regional authority.

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## BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY



Col. William F. Long, Jr., U.S. Army, did his undergraduate work at Otterbein College in political science and holds a master's degree in International Affairs from The George Washington University. He is also a graduate of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff School and of the U.S. Naval War College. He has served in China, in Korea, in Vietnam as an adviser, and as Commander of the 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division. Colonel Long is currently the U.S. Army Adviser to the President, Naval War College.

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The objective of the event was the protection of lives and property in a foreign city reduced to chaos by insurgency. This game focused upon the purely amphibious aspects of the situation; however, the plan did visualize a stability phase, which was not to be gamed. Captain Smith suggested that the unplayed phase of this game could be developed into an urban insurgency

war game for Naval War College educational purposes.

In early December 1968, Major General Cunningham (USAF) of the Directorate of Civil Disturbance Operations and Planning, Office of the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, visited the Naval War College, and the idea of developing an urban insurgency war game was discussed with him. As a result of this discussion and the potentiality of the NEWS as an arena for an urban insurgency war game, the President of the Naval War College, Vice Admiral Colhert, directed the development of a pilot model of an experimental game using Naval War College students as players.

Accommodating to the twin difficulties of the heavy student educational load and the crowded curriculum NEWS schedule, the period 24-27 January 1969 was selected as game time, and participants were to be volunteers from the faculty and student body. During the following few weeks, selected faculty members designed an urban insurgency war game with these characteristics.

**Objectives.** Two primary objectives were stated. The first was to test the feasibility of simulating an urban insurgency environment using the NEWS facility. The second was to evaluate such a game as an educational device to expose Naval War College students to the unique restraints and trials facing decisionmakers in an urban insurgency situation.

**Type and tempo of Game.** For simplicity and economy of players, a one-sided, continuous game played at a tempo of no more than 2 to 1 was selected. This combination offered ample opportunities for realism and player initiative, along with maximum control and flexibility of management for the game director.

**Game Scenario.** The scenario and operation plan of the previously played

fleet amphibious war game was selected as the basic framework. This capitalized upon naval expertise and existing background documentation. Further, the overseas setting was particularly compatible with the political-military portion of the curriculum. Three levels of command were established: a politico-military level, involving an embassy and Marine expeditionary brigade; an operational control level (battalion); and units in contact (company). The control group was selected to represent commands and agencies above and below player level. Also, it was recognized that only the top level of command was clearly appropriate for the level of a senior service educational institution. This was a price which was accepted, under the spur of time, in order to gain the background experience and documentation accumulated from the previous war game. In addition, every effort was made to simplify the game structure and reduce player and control requirements.

**Game Situation and Events.** After considerable discussion, a start situation of 0800, D+1 was established for the game. This located maneuver battalions ashore with virtually all initial combat objectives secured and ready to enter the "stability operations" phase of the plan. The selection of this start situation permitted the game to focus primarily on the law enforcement and civil affairs aspects of urban insurgency. To achieve this focus, the most difficult and time-consuming task was that of developing realistic game events and of devising a system for timely insertion of the events in order to drive the game at a challenging pace but in a realistic fashion. Therefore, a detailed control plan was necessary to maintain the momentum and to manage the direction of the game.

This task was accomplished by reviewing books, periodicals, reports, and documents written on the subject of

urban insurgency and extracting "type events." In the process, reports on the recent riots in Washington, Baltimore, and Detroit and historical studies on the Dominican Republic experience served as excellent source documents. The type events derived from this research were then arranged by category into a game events shopping list for later use.

The second step involved drawing up a general scheme of the way the game was to develop in each battalion area for the first 24 hours of game play. Each general scheme was then subdivided into three equal time periods and eight specific game events were prepared for each rifle company for each time period. Appropriate events to support each general scheme were selected from the shopping list. The final product was a game events matrix for each period with rifle companies appearing along the x axis and game events appearing along the y axis.

Basically, the same technique was used in preparing game events for insertion at the embassy/Marine expeditionary brigade level. Since battalions would be reacting to directions from higher headquarters and situations passed up from units in contact, no special management program was visualized for this command level.

**Observer-Participants.** Observer-participants were solicited from other schools and agencies which might have an interest in, and be able to make a contribution to, this kind of a game. Two responses deserve recognition: The U.S. Army Civil Affairs School, Fort Gordon, Ga., was represented by Lt. Col. Lawrence A. Stevens, whose assistance in the civil affairs area was continuous and invaluable; and Lt. Col. Walter R. Meade, USAF, from the Directorate of Civil Disturbance Operations and Planning, Office of the Chief of Staff of the Army, made a similar contribution to planning and playing

game events in the law enforcement area.

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After an orientation and rehearsal period on the 24th of January, the game was divided into three periods, and play was initiated on 25 January. Toward the end of the first 4-hour period, as the game was in a transition situation from combat to the initiation and stability operations, it became apparent that civil affairs considerations and physical assets (such as fire trucks, food, et cetera, from the Logistic Support Group and Engineer Group) were creating an anomalous situation. Players had not been provided in these areas. Therefore, when control inserted situations demanding use of these assets, players would then pass requirements back to control. This circular message drill was overworking and irritating higher level players and controllers and was the first weakness exposed by game play. The problem was discussed by the game director and his staff during the luncheon break, and tentative plans were made to rearrange player personnel. Player and control group personnel at company level and below experienced no difficulty in keeping pace with the problem during this period of play.

After the first hour of play in the second 4-hour period, it was evident that the difficulties experienced during the morning session were persisting, and the adjustments discussed during lunch should be tried. At this point, game play was halted temporarily, and player personnel were shifted to cover areas previously neglected. One player was taken from each of the six company command centers and used to create two new player groups--a Logistical and Engineer Support Command Center and a Civil Affairs-Military Intelligence Psychological Operation Command Center. The creation of these two new player groups permitted player personnel to fill more meaningful positions and supported the

change in attitudes and techniques as the game entered the transition period from emphasis upon combat to pacification. Game play was improved significantly as a result of these changes.

Following the second period of play, the Ambassador and brigade commander, the battalion commanders, and key members of their staffs met briefly in three locations and conducted independent critiques of the game for periods I and II. They were asked specifically to make recommendations concerning organizational and procedural changes that might result in improved game play. Their remarks were recorded on tape and were reviewed by the game director on 26 January. Based upon the results of reviewing these tapes, it was decided to eliminate company player positions and to assume company level input functions at control modules.

The first 30 minutes of the final game period were devoted to describing to all concerned the organizational and procedural changes resulting from critique recommendations. Specifically, these changes were:

Company level of play was eliminated completely and the six company players were redistributed, one each, to the six higher level player command groups, and the control group assumed the responsibility for all company level activity. The necessary communications adjustments were made in NEWS.

Game play was resumed at 0900 hours and continued without interruption until game termination at 1200 hours. Once again game play was improved significantly as a result of timely changes. The afternoon of 27 January was devoted to a plenary session critique of the entire game. The results of this critique and an analysis of individual comments by all concerned made these points:

This experimental effort proved that an urban insurgency situation can

be war gamed realistically using NEWS facilities. It also established the fact that such a game is an effective educational experience. However, the game director, the faculty, the NEWS staff, and the students made an exceptional effort to avoid the "identification syndrome," i.e., we did it, and it is good for everyone. It was the consensus that, with changes in level and other relatively minor adjustments, the game could be developed into an altogether appropriate Naval War College curriculum item. However, the size of the student body and the limitations of the NEWS facility would require the game to be conducted at least five times during an academic year. This is considered unacceptable both from a scheduling and interest point of view. For these reasons, it has been recommended that the game only be utilized as an extracurricular volunteer activity or integrated into the Naval War College President's concept of a large "politicomilitary/strategic/tactical war game" designed as a graduation exercise for all resident courses.

There is a need for changes in planning documents and operation orders. It became apparent as the game progressed that standard delineation of the units in existing planning documents and operation order formats is inadequate when dealing with highly specialized and relatively esoteric units. This is particularly true with civil affairs and psychological operation assets and certain types of logical support units, particularly those originating from a service other than that of the commander. Both planning and operations will be facilitated if documents and operation orders clearly list particular personnel competency and physical assets for these types of units. As the transition is made from combat to stability operations, an immediate and absolute evaluation of available noncombat assets is essential to decisionmaking at all levels. This conviction is being trans-

lated into Naval War College instruction and education at appropriate levels.

Political impatience and press pressure are facts of operational life in this environment. Thanks to the experience and imagination of Mr. Howard Simpson--the resident USIA Consultant--political impatience of local leaders, U.S. high levels of military and political command and of the regional organization representatives became a realistic aspect of the educational process involved in the game. This impatience demands the highest order of discipline, restraint, and moral courage on the part of the military and political leaders actively engaged. For this purpose the realistic environment developed in the NEWS through game events introduced by Mr. Simpson were uniquely beneficial. The same is true of pressures of the press and other media. During the game, commanders were hampered and sometimes hindered in their operations by requirements to deal with both accredited and adventurous freelance media men. Aside from real life, there is no other arena for conveying this message so effectively as a war game conducted in a scaled-in environment.

Fire will always be a factor. Inherent in any urban insurgency situation is the need to deal with fires resulting from combat operations, insurgent arsonists, or those caused by civilian carelessness. This game educated all participants to the overriding requirement to plan for this fact and make timely provision to supply equipment and military firefighters, while attempting to assemble, use, and protect the firefighting capability of the target city. Proper sensitivity to this phenomenon also includes requirements for detailed knowledge of water supply, electrical

powerlines, and utility carriers such as gas lines, et cetera.

Based upon the need to delineate assets and to be prepared to cope with inherent disasters such as fire, one of the major lessons of this game was that logistics planners for an amphibious operation under these circumstances must go beyond the normal back-step planning which starts by visualizing forces having seized combat objectives. In a situation where urban insurgency is a factor, planners must visualize the requirements for coping with fires, re-assembling civilian control personnel, reestablishing the utilities upon which the life of the city depends, providing for reestablishing food supplies, et cetera, as the terminal situation. This will emphasize the need to study the requirements for civil affairs personnel and physical assets. It may also change details such as loading plans and will certainly sensitize all levels of command and staff to the value of units and personnel frequently overlooked and neglected in the planning stage but desperately needed (and generally in larger numbers than can be immediately provided) once the operation reaches the stability phase.

One of the most valuable aspects of the game was the leadership, imagination, and enthusiasm of the players. One significant comment was made by Mr. Paul Stanke, State Department, and a student in the School of Naval Warfare. He played the role of U.S. Ambassador and remarked during the critique that he was surprised and pleased with the exceptional degree of responsibility toward law and order, the regard for civilian lives, and the acceptance of almost illogical restraints on combat operations by his military colleagues. This is both a goal and an accolade.

# THE STRATEGY OF COMMUNIST-DIRECTED INSURGENCY AND THE CONDUCT OF COUNTERINSURGENCY

A lecture delivered at the Naval War College

by

Dr. Michael C. Conley

on 28 October 1968

Let me address myself to two subjects during the next hour. First, I wish to propose a definition or a precept of what insurgency is, and then, secondly, I would say something about the essential requirements of a meaningful response to it. My attention here is directed particularly toward the Communist-dominated or influenced insurgency, but some of what I say would apply to other forms as well.

**Essential Strategic Factors in the Conduct of Insurgency.** Perhaps the best way to get at the subject of insurgency is to differentiate between three distinct periods during the insurgent process: (1) that moment at which it may be said that an insurgency exists, (2) at the other end of the spectrum, that moment when it may be said that the insurgent process has been completed if it is allowed to run full length, and (3) the intervening interval between the point of departure and the consummation of the phenomenon. To turn to the first of

these moments, I will argue here that an insurgent condition may be said to exist in all or a portion of a country as of the moment when three essential requirements have been satisfied.

First, there is present a body of men, trained and disciplined, who engage in

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## BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY



Dr. Michael C. Conley holds both a master's degree and a doctorate in history from Ohio State University. He has an extensive academic experience in the field of insurgency, has published numerous studies and articles on the subject, and, in addition, has been a guest lecturer at many institutions that are involved in the problems of dealing with subversive insurgency. Since 1964 Dr. Conley has been serving as Senior Research Scientist at the Center for Research in Social Systems of The American University.

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subversion as a profession. I would suggest that in the absence of that organization it is improper to speak of insurgency. Secondly, that body of men engage in activity at both the overt, or legal, and at the clandestine, or illegal, level. Lenin, at the commencement of the 20th century, spoke of a "legal/illegal" apparatus. We may better refer to it today as the overt/elandestine party organization. It operates at both levels. Where no definitive body of law exists, as is the case in some modernizing countries, the party may technically not be breaking the law, but in such a setting it will engage in the equivalent by acting contrary to custom. Third, that body of men engage relentlessly in getting a message out to the civil population, an ideology if possible, a body of slogans derived from an ideology in any case. The intent of that message will be to justify the illegal activities in which the body of professionals engage on the basis of some so-called higher law.

All three of these requirements, I would argue, are indispensable in the determination of when precisely the insurgent process may be said to have begun. In the absence of point three, as an example, you are dealing with the criminal, not the insurgents. When intelligence operations indicate that these three requirements have been met in a country or any portion thereof, then one can no longer act in the context of preventive insurgency. To the extent that the armed forces of that country have a counterinsurgent mission, they should become operational as of that moment. You do not wait until the guerrilla has popped up, for he may never pop up!

The phrases "incipient" or "latent" insurgency are unfortunately popular and widespread. If one insists upon employing those terms I would say they refer to the period of time before these three requirements have been met. Once

they have been met, it is no longer incipient.

Now, of course, these are only minimum requirements. The process can intensify beyond this point by taking recourse to any of three alternate general strategies. These strategies may be identified, using Communist terminology, as the United Front from Below, Right strategy, and Left strategy. It is a matter of crucial importance that one understand the essential strategic intent behind each of these alternate forms of insurgency. One must likewise understand, however, that an insurgency can switch from one of these strategies to another during its course. Let us take a look at each of these alternate strategies in succession.

The first of them, the United Front from Below, is also known as the "Four Class" or "War of National Liberation" approach. It is that form of insurgency which obtains presently in South Vietnam but which has also occurred in many other countries. Let me attempt to get at the essential strategy involved here with the simplified diagram shown in figure 1. The box to the upper right identifies a modernizing country's national executive. Beneath it we suggest the administrative hierarchy of government which may or, quite possibly, may not perform those regulatory and supporting functions for the mass of the indigenous citizenry suggested by the box to the lower right. Parallel to this structure of government we set a front within which the hierarchy of professional subversives is embedded, sheltered from public view, but free to determine the content of the front's public pronouncements and the direction of its activities. The task to be accomplished through the front is to make the nation's population act as though the front was a real government, not the de jure administration in office. The presumption of the insurgent is that if he persists in this venture long




Fig. 1--The strategy of the United Front from Below

enough, the people will begin to act as if the front is indeed the real government, whereupon it can displace the traditional government on a de facto basis. The traditional government is not destroyed as such, rather it becomes--and this is the crucially important word--irrelevant! You don't destroy it, you make it irrelevant, you displace it, and to speed up this process you employ the last element depicted in figure 1, armed force. Its task is (1) to place the civil population under duress, speeding up its reorientation towards the parallel shadow government; and (2) break such communications between the government and the civil population as may have previously existed.

You will notice that there are three crucially important parallel structures within the insurgent organization when it employs United Front from Below strategy. In a more systematized model they may be indicated as in figure 2. Indispensable to this form of insurgent strategy, once fully elaborated, are (1) the party of subversives who engage in revolution as a profession--the party apparatus down the center of the diagram; (2) the armed elements which it employs to speed up the process of reorganizing the civil population; and (3) the civil structure, the front, into which the citizenry are organized as the insurgency proceeds. At the conclusion of the insurgent process the civil organization is slated to become the new government of the country.

In South Vietnam this civil organization, of course, is known as the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (NFLSVN), while the military force is rather crudely referred to as the Viet Cong in popular American journalism. The party apparatus, finally, is the Dang Lao Dong, or, to use the Vietnamese Communists' own terminology south of the 17th parallel, the People's Revolutionary Party (PRP). This structure in its South Vietnam form is, in somewhat greater detail, suggested in

figure 3.<sup>1</sup> All three of these structures must be present when the insurgent has recourse to this form of insurgency. The structure produced is a threefold and not a twofold organization. When we identify the insurgent organization in South Vietnam as the Viet Cong/National Front, and fail to name those who run the show, we are engaging in a fundamental misnaming of the phenomenon with which we are confronted.

It is unfortunately one of the traditional characteristics of American study in the field of insurgency not to adequately identify the crucial body as the center of the phenomenon. When we were studying the Greek insurgents, we talked about the military forces of ELAS; we talked about the front--the EAM--but nobody said KKE, the Greek Communist Party. When we studied the Malayan insurgency, everyone identified the Min Yuen, which is the counterpart of the civil organization in a state of only partial elaboration, and it is easy enough to equate the CT's (Communist Terrorists) with the Viet Cong. But nobody said Malayan Communist Party. Uniformly, since the Americans took up the study of insurgency, in that form which we know as the United Front from Below, the central column in our diagrams has tended to be ignored. How can we build good counterinsurgency doctrine on a conceptual structure which misses the strategic center of the threat?

The United Front from Below is only one of three alternate strategies available for the escalation of an insurgency. The second one has been called Right strategy; this term has frequently been employed in Communist literature to

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<sup>1</sup>U.S. Dept of the Army, *The Communist Insurgent Infrastructure in South Vietnam: a Study of Organization and Strategy* by Michael C. Conley, DOA Pam. 550-106 (Washington: 1967). (Also found in Defense Documentation Center, AD 655-506/7).




Figure 2




Figure 3

identify this alternate ploy. The classic use of Right strategy occurs with the insurgents' participation in a coalition government. We would visualize the thrust of the insurgents' effort in figures 4 and 5. In the first of these diagrams, several of the ministers with portfolio in the government of a modernizing country are suggested together with the member parties to the coalition who put them in office. The Liberal Populists have provided the Minister of Economics within the coalition government; the Christian Socialists, the Prime Minister; the National Democrats, the Foreign Minister. The Party of Revolt, controlled by the insurgent apparatus, has also provided several persons. The Minister of Education, as an example, might come from the Party of Revolt. If they can carry it off at all, the Agriculture and Interior Ministers will come from the Party of Revolt.

The initial declarations issued by the Party of Revolt during the period when the coalition is being formed will fall in the general category of: We are simply one more of the left-oriented, reforming parties in country; shoulder to shoulder with other progressive forces in country, we will work to assure our country a brilliant future in a brave new world. The final coalition, once established, is indeed a genuine coalition government. Then a series of events of the following order will occur, stretched possibly over several years. The Minister of Economics arises one day in the deliberative assembly and calls for a new law which will make \$1.75 the minimum wage for an hour's work. Immediately, a member of the Party of Revolt stands up in the deliberative assembly and argues that nothing less than \$2.25 will do. And then, turning to the larger electorate outside the deliberative assembly, he asks, "And you, liberal populists, who are your true friends? The Minister of Economics or we of the Party of Revolt?"

The intent here is to progressively compromise and make impossible the position held by the Minister of Economics. Eventually, frustrated, he resigns from the government. There is a very serious question of who will fill the new post, conflict develops within the Liberal Populist Party. An opposition group breaks off, but a collaborating faction is prepared to go along with the remainder of the coalition government, and a man who is amenable to manipulation by the Party of Revolt takes over the position of Minister of Economics. Then, one day, the Foreign Minister is found in a compromising position in the red light district of town. Photographs are taken, but rather than use them for blackmail, they are immediately published in the newspapers. The Foreign Minister denies that the pictures are of him. They must have been taken of someone else who looks very much like him. When his explanation fails to win wide acceptance, he resigns to display his integrity; and the Prime Minister, supporting him to the hilt, tenders his resignation to demonstrate the integrity of his government as a whole. Fragmentation occurs once again in the parties of the coalition. But men amenable to the Party of Revolt fill the new slots in the coalition *in which suddenly there are nothing but communists and their followers! The insurgent has won.* And that victory is just as real as if he had done it with guerrillas. Now he can begin the physical liquidation of his public opponents. See figure 5.

Why is it so crucially important for us to understand that this also is insurgency? Consider the discussion currently of a possible coalition government in South Vietnam. We Americans will be inclined to say--if such a solution is accepted--"Fine, the war is over." But the Communist will say, "Those foolish Americans. Now we can move faster than before." The Dang Lao Dong would not stop its struggle; it would




Fig. 4--Right insurgent strategy




Fig. 5--Right insurgent strategy

merely switch strategies. The goal--the seizure of political power in Saigon itself--would not change.

The third strategy mentioned above is Left strategy, once again a term repeatedly employed in Communist literature. This is the least important of the three alternate strategies, but it has succeeded on occasion and consequently deserves a moment's attention. Left strategy is the strategy of the true believer who has performed an act of faith and believes, as an example, in Karl Marx's dialectical materialistic interpretation of man's history. He may believe that the Communist is the vanguard of progress, the wave of the future. Characteristic for the true believer is the conviction that the ultimate revolution against capitalism lies in the immediate future. He need only go out in the streets, declare the commencement of the revolution, and the masses--so he convinces himself--will rush to join him, forming columns of selfless patriots of the working class who throw themselves against the defenses of the government. After a brief period of street fighting, he believes, the seizure of power can be successfully completed and the new regime established. Left strategy, then, calls for the least amount of prior organizational work; it tends to see the city as the crucial theater of operations and expects victory to be had days or weeks away. We are dealing here, clearly, with that form of insurgency in which the counterinsurgent can make the largest number of mistakes and still win.

The United Front from Below, Right strategy, and Left strategy, then, are the three alternate strategies which may be employed to escalate an insurgency from the minimum requirements previously suggested. The consummation of the process, finally, comes with the seizure of political power nationwide. And this phrase, "political power," should be stressed, for this whole phenomenon is, first off, a political process,

not a military one. Where and how armed force will be employed is determined by a preeminently political command structure.

At this juncture then, we are prepared to pose a definition--or better, a description--for the term "subversive insurgency," to wit:

A subversive insurgency is a political struggle within a single country directed by a disciplined cellularly structured party that has the abilities to (1) exploit the dissidence in being in a country to embed itself politically within the population, (2) conduct illegal operations (or activities which conflict with social convention where an elaborated legal code is lacking) in addition to such overt and legal work as it may perform, and (3) relentlessly propagandize the populace with a political platform or ideology that justifies its activities. The party organization, in intensifying its threat, will adjust its propaganda activities and extra-party support organization structure, during any given period in its struggle, to conform with the imperatives of one of three alternate grand strategies (Left, Right or United Front from Below). Excepting cases where the first of these general lines is used, the party will conceive of its operations as occurring within a protracted time frame, and it will attempt to make the multiple forms of struggle in which it engages (those appropriate to the strategy selected and the domestic conditions obtaining) the essential means through which it progressively comes to dominate the political fabric of the society in which it is active. The period of the insurgency closes with the seizure of the instruments of political power in the country by the party organization, displacing the original government and its indigenous socioeconomic underpinnings with a restructured society organized to assure longevity to the new regime. The insurgent is under no obligation to stick permanently to any one of his alternate strategies during the

period of protracted political struggle. Indeed, if one studies the history of any Communist Party during any period in its history since the 1920's, it becomes readily apparent that it has jumped around from one strategy to another. Consider, as an example, the Yugoslav Communist during the World War Two period. The insurgency tended to start Left in 1941 (particularly in Montenegro and Serbia). It went United Front from Below in 1942 and 1943, entered into a Right strategy with the Subasic government-in-exile briefly in 1944, and turned toward the Left again in 1945.

Let me add yet one last facet to the discussion here of strategy. I am particularly concerned now with the two lines of United Front from Below and Right. In this context a word must be said about mass organizational work. The building of mass organizations is no helter-skelter affair. There are clearly apparent procedures for going about this activity. First off, what is a mass organization? I suggest the following formulation:

An officially freely established association of persons who either serve a common ideological principle or seek to effect articulated socioeconomic aims through integrated activity. (The criteria for membership may be determined by age, sex, profession, or place of residence.)

A PTA could be turned into a fine mass organization, but likewise a military unit, an agency of government, or a reading circle.

To indicate the fashion in which mass organizations are controlled, let us take a historical example from India from a peasant organization of the 1940's known as the Kisan Sabhas. The phenomenon briefly considered here is suggested in figure 6. The peasant organization in question was structured after the fashion of a territorial hierarchy, it will be seen, prior to its penetration by the Indian Communist Party (ICP). Starting at the bottom,

fractions derived from cells of the ICP penetrated the primary bodies of the future mass organization. At this point, command channels are clear. The Politburo of the party (or the Presidium of the party, depending upon the tactical terminology of the moment) provides direction down through the province and district committees to the locally operating cell.

When it became possible to penetrate the Kisan Sabhas at higher levels, however, command channels altered. The chain of command was from the Politburo to the province committee, as an example, and then to the province committee's own fraction inside the provincial body of the Kisan Sabhas. This latter body, the province fraction, acquired operation control over all other fractions within the province in which it was active. This meant that a distinct hierarchy of agents, parallel to the party itself, had been set up.

Once the All-India Kisan Sabhas executive offices were penetrated, this hierarchy of activists paralleled the ICP proper from top to bottom. The fraction at the All-India level acquired operational control over all subordinate fractions throughout the country. Policy, however, was made in the Politburo. The superordinate fraction did not make policy; its sole task was the supervision of implementation. This is a brilliant example of administrative streamlining. With respect to the Kisan Sabhas the party organization of the ICP at the province, district, and cell levels becomes the logistic base upon which the fractions call in the implementation of orders received from above through clandestine channels maintained within the mass organization itself. Such managerial skill in the building of control lines is one of the distinctive characteristics of the subversive "pro."

A still higher form of organization occurs when two or more mass organizations of the order just described are




Fig. 6--Command structure of Communist Party of India in a peasant mass organization

bound together by providing them with a common executive committee. Such a complex is referred to, technically, in Communist literature as a "front," that is to say, the words "front" and "mass" organization should not be used as interchangeable. If one wishes to be precise, he should take care to observe this distinction when working in this subject area.

A moment's reflection upon the nature of mass organizations in federation, under a single executive Committee, makes it readily apparent that the so-called National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (NFLSVN) is nothing more than a complex of mass organizations bound together by a national executive council. Clearly, this body does not run the show; it is simply the mouthpiece through which the party of "pro's" reaches out to the public at large.

The principles of mass organization work touched upon briefly to this point are crucially important, not only to the United Front from Below approach, but also to Right strategy. In both cases the insurgent must build mass organizations as a first priority order of business. An inability to perform this kind of work is a clear indication of one of two possible situations. Either the subversive political leadership is amateur, or the counter-insurgent is indeed doing his job correctly! In Cuba the counterinsurgent was not effective, but Castro was likewise an amateur. He did not have an effective political command until the Cuban Communist Party came over to him, providing him with the administrative know-how indispensable to the insurgent process.

In the light of what I have said thus far, I would suggest that the most important thing you can say about a Communist insurgent in a single sentence is this: He is, par excellence, an administrator of revolution! He is a revolutionary bureaucrat. Remarkable! Without precedent prior to the 20th

century. Organizational know-how lies at the heart of his competence, and verily I say: it is organizational know-how that must underlie our response to him. But this will remain impossible until we begin to work from a different conceptual base. More on this presently.

Yet another word in the general subject area. It is popular to draw a distinction between a Peking form of insurgency and a Moscow form of insurgency. And some people even add a Yugoslav form and so on and so on. It is my considered opinion--and nothing but that--on the basis of the evidence available to me that these popular distinctions are meaningless, that there is, in fact, no such thing as a peculiarly Peking or "oriental" approach or a unique Moscow approach. *There is only a Communist approach.* The conflict between Moscow and Peking centers around the following question: Should we go United Front from Below or Right? It is entirely possible for either party to use either line. However, while fighting with one another regarding the choice as to strategic line, neither Peking nor Moscow are asking whether one should or should not utilize mass organization.

Now Moscow happens to think today that the professional subversive should go Right. And Peking thinks the later 1960's are better suited for the United Front from Below.

A very real issue is at stake here, for if Peking, as an example, could actually provoke the majority of international Communist Parties to go United Front from Below, it would necessarily serve as a reflection of Moscow's de facto subordination to the will of Peking's leadership. However, the choice of strategies supported by either center at any given historic moment is altogether transitory. There have been periods when Moscow went United Front from Below and denounced the use of Right strategy as heresy. I cannot take the time here to recount in detail the

number of times this has happened, but let me assure you it has. And Peking has gone Right many times. There is clear-cut historical evidence of this as well. There is nothing about the Peking experience which obliges her uniformly to pursue the strategy of the United Front from Below into the indefinite future. Both countries use that specific line that best suits their external and internal interests at any given moment, denouncing the other strategies, as necessary, as heresy. Truth is a temporal matter, a function of tactics.

That Moscow should favor extensive negotiations today between us and the North Vietnamese, together with the creation of an allegedly neutral coalition government in Saigon, dovetails neatly with the policies of Right strategy which she is employing currently in Western Europe. There is nothing particularly unique in her desire to pursue in Asia that strategy which she is employing in many other parts of the globe. Nor does this mean she seeks genuine peace. All she wants is that the insurgent follow guidance that jibes with the Kremlin's assessment of its own best interests. I think the problem is just that simple.

**Responding to the Insurgent Administrator.** Now let me turn my attention to the subject of how one responds to this phenomenon. With the possible exception of those moments when the insurgent uses Left strategy, I would argue here that the essential genius of the insurgent process is its effort through time to make the government of the country under attack irrelevant to its own citizenry. Above all else, the insurgent is intent upon displacing the legal authority of the moment with an alternate authority which he controls. That new authority, of course, is the parallel shadow government in one strategic setting or the member party to a coalition government in the most probable alternate setting. In either case the

structure in question is the front within which the party's political command structure is embedded. Under both dispensations the insurgent is engaged in displacing the government first of all; the killing of persons and the destruction of buildings and supplies is of second-order importance. The guerrilla --one of the insurgent's weapon systems --impressed us Americans, however, to the point that we have come to conceive of insurgency as a war of attrition between opposing irregular/regular military forces. In point of fact, nothing could be farther from the truth! That is not what it is about. And if we insist upon perceiving the problem in this way, it is only because of our own conceptual inadequacy.

More relevant is the following proposition: To the extent that displacing civil authority is at the strategic heart of the insurgent process, so must the displacing of the insurgent's alternate political structure lie at the strategic heart of counterinsurgency. Your task is to displace the insurgency, and you do that by underwriting a better revolution to which you are morally committed because you are American or you are an allied officer of a free world country and for which we have the materiel requirement because we have the greatest productivity the world has ever seen. You displace the insurgency; you make it uninteresting; you compete at the grassroots to take those mass organizations away from him. It is only to the extent that he has those mass organizations available to him that he is capable of providing himself with guerrillas (if he decides to use them), intelligence, and supplies. If you can take those mass organizations away from him with a better revolution, he loses. If you choose not to respond at this level, then you will pour larger amounts of money and heavier and heavier commitments of men into a war which you will lose because you strategically do not understand what you are involved in.

The essential task of counterinsurgency is to give the peasant or the urban dweller good, solid, hard, selfish reasons as to why he would prefer your side. That's what it is about. And the sense of a military operation is that it facilitates either (1) establishing contact with that miserable peasant so you can make your offer known, or (2) pursuing that contract once established. A military operation that cannot be justified on one of these two counts should never be permitted to occur.

Now, I don't mean that in any narrow sense. Obviously, if you have good, solid intelligence to the effect that, say, a battalion-size unit is moving in the direction of a populated area in which you are heavily involved, then it is your obligation for political reasons to prevent it from moving any further. It's self-evident that if it gets into the area in which you are operating, it's going to inhibit any positive effort you make among the populace. I'm not suggesting for a moment that you don't need military force. Of course you do. But the "why" is the important thing. The military force is there to guarantee the political process. And every military operation should be planned with that as the paramount consideration. Until you have decided what you are going to do with the civilians that you reach by a military operation, it is senseless to carry it out. And until you have the capabilities of performing among that civil population the task which you have decided to perform, you don't initiate the operation. Now these are indispensable prerequisites if counterinsurgency is to be understood as displacing insurgency. This conclusion follows invariably from my precept or definition, if you will, of what the insurgent process is. Only by showing that my definition is wrong can you reasonably, logically reject my line of argumentation here.

If you will permit me to continue the line of thought I am pursuing here, I

will assert, next, that the most important thing you have to know to engage in counterinsurgency is the characteristics of the population with which you must work. Now that population is not going to be a uniform, homogeneous body. You will run into every conceivable human condition as you move from one group of persons to the next. One needs a device, a kind of typology, for differentiating the characteristics of the population groups among which you are working. I suggest such a possible device with the schematic in figure 7.

Let me talk my way through this little diagram, step by step. I create a system of eight boxes-pigeonholes, if you will-in which I will place human groups by differentiating, on the one hand, between four different kinds of inner group authority structures which may obtain in a village, a hamlet. Do keep in mind that this typology is for the analysis of groups at this local level; I am not attempting to characterize whole nations as such, but rather the microcosm of groups of, say 50 to 500 who make up that nation when added together.

Within the hamlet there may be groups with authoritative structures that might be labeled "pluralistic." By this I mean that what the group does is determined by consensus. The group does thus and so because that is what most of the members want to do. "Atomistic," by contrast, refers to a situation in which you are not really dealing with a human group but with an accidental aggregate in which there is no arrangement for arriving at consensus. On the other side, "hierarchical" refers to a group in which the decisions of the group are imposed from above. "Hierarchical" may be used as a synonym for "autocratic." Finally, I add on a fourth type of authority structure labeled "totalitarian."

There is a popular belief to the effect that being totalitarian is simply being autocratic, but even more so. If you get




Fig. 7—Typology for the ordering of groups & aggregates

more and more autocratic, eventually you're totalitarian. I argue that this is not the case, that totalitarianism is fundamentally different than autocracy. In an autocratic system—and any military organization, as an example, is autocratic—the individual's initiative is circumscribed. He may work only within a formally established jurisdictional area. However, within that delimited field he is indeed expected to use his initiative. The efficiency ratings of the military or naval officer, as an example, are determined in part by how much initiative he employs within the restricted area in which he is to exercise his own discretion. This is likewise a historical characteristic of autocratic governments in general. It is apparent in 18th or 19th century Prussia, of Austria, and any other number of countries.

A totalitarian system, by contrast, duplicates functions. Thus, in the Soviet state one finds an economic bureau in the military hierarchy, in the party hierarchy, in the Komsomol apparatus, in the formal bureaucracy of government, et cetera. But more important than this is the fact that the personnel of each of these structures, performing precisely the same function, never really know whether their execution of an order from above is the one that counts or not. The result is a formlessness, a shapelessness, that is constantly reinforced and sustained. Such a system is altogether distinct from the situation customary in autocratic groups and organizations.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>2</sup>Those who would pursue this point in detail are encouraged to read the brilliant work of Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (New York: Meridian, 1960). Particularly important on the point at hand are chapters 11, "The Totalitarian Movement," and 12, "Totalitarianism in Power," p. 341-459. For an updating and a modification of many of Arendt's conclusions, see also Alex Inkeles, *Social Change in Soviet Russia* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1968).

The second dimension in figure 7 involves the values that motivate group activities. What I am concerned with here is the "why" of working together as opposed to "what" they are doing. Why does the group engage in road-building? If the answer is, "Because tomorrow morning we will each get a dollar and a half pay," then the motivation is "instrumental." By "instrumental" I mean a concern with immediate pragmatic payoff.

But the response might be: "If not I, then my son, and if not my son, then my grandson will profit from what we do here today." If that is what I hear, then I'm dealing with a clearly transcendent motivation looking to a distant ill-defined future.

If these two dimensions are placed in just a position to one another as in figure 7, it produces a system of eight boxes. These are sufficient in number to permit meaningful differentiation, yet, at the same time, they are few enough so that one could actually utilize them in a battlefield situation. It is a realistic compromise between the extremities to which behavioral science might go and an oversimplification that would destroy purposeful differentiation.

In an initial attempt at establishing the utility of this device, a wide variety of groups are inserted into these eight boxes in figure 8. There may well be disagreement on the location of any specific group, but I am inclined to believe it will involve, on every occasion, only matters of degree. Thus, one might argue that major American political parties located in the instrumental pluralistic box, are in reality slightly further toward the hierarchical and the transcendent, but hardly anyone would counsel the complete relocation of the American party in a totally unrelated corner of the typology. Greater sophistication could be added, of course, by understanding the eight boxes to be not airtight compartments but relatively permeable locations along a spectrum of




Fig. 8--Typology for the ordering of groups & aggregates

infinitely variable possibilities. One pays a price, however, if he does this, for then the balance between differentiation and simplification is destroyed.

With this typology in mind, let us consider the issue of our impact as an example of Vietnamese society, particularly with the troop buildup after 1964. I would suggest that one of the characteristic effects of our operations in Vietnam has been to create aggregates that are Atomistic and instrumental. We move the population out of an area, bomb it thoroughly, stick the people behind barbed wire, and expect them to behave themselves. We are creating, in such a case, a body of people who belong to the right lower corner of the typology. The People's Revolutionary Party, or better the Dang Lao Dong, is more concerned with inducing a very different kind of movement which brings one to the next point I wish to make on the intent which must lie at the heart of counterinsurgency.

Consider in the context of this typology the subject treated earlier, mass organizational work. When the Dang Lao Dong engages in this activity, it is, from a social psychometric viewpoint, moving groups that are low and to the right, up and to the left. To engage in mass organization work, for the Communist, is to induce transcendent values and tight authority structure among civil groups that are possibly completely devoid of transcendent values and autocratic authority structure initially. Through mass work the party builds its following by drawing individuals into organizations where (1) controls from the top down may be progressively tightened, and (2) instrumental values can be displaced with transcendent values. The Communist seeks to move the individual from right to left along the horizontal axis of our matrix and from bottom to top along the vertical axis.

More important for our immediate purposes is the corollary to this general

theorem. Groups plotted in the right lower corner of the matrix are highly susceptible to a Communist Party's mass organizational effort, while groups located above and to the left of this position are less easily influenced, reaching near imperviousness in the upper left-hand corner.<sup>3</sup> Before an organization may be fitted into the Communist Party's scheme of things, the dynamic process developed by others must be reversed, moving the group, so to speak, down and to the right, before it can be built up again in line with the functional requirements of the Communist Party. In this context, then, a transcendent/hierarchical group of a non-Communist order is less easily amalgamated with a Communist structure, than an instrumental/atomistic body which has yet to evolve its normative patterns.

Returning to the priorities for the conduct of counterinsurgent political work, we may assert that those groups assigned locations low and to the right constitute the most probable target groups of Communist mass organizational activities. To inhibit the growth of an insurgent support structure and/or oblige the agit/prop cadre to surface where it can be located and removed, these groups must be provided with the

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<sup>3</sup>A number of cases of parallel transcendent totalitarian organizations with a single larger society have been provoked by the Sino-Soviet conflict, e.g., the Peking and Moscow oriented parties of India, Belgium, and a number of other countries. In each case, both Communist Party's would be plotted in category A of our matrix. Organizations in the proximity of the upper left corner tend to be vulnerable only at the level of their supreme leadership which could sell out. Such a development did occur in the Malaya Communist Party while Loi Tok was Secretary General. It should be noted, however, that the viability of that organization was not broken by this treachery. The transcendent values of the rank and file permitted the organizations not only to survive, but to recover quickly enough to provide leadership for the protracted guerrilla war of the later 1940's and early 1950's.

attributes of stable organizations. Where such organizations do not exist, they must be built. Where they lack structural sophistication or generate only instrumental commitment and low involvement, they must be strengthened or supplemented through the creation of complementary organizations. Transcendent content must be injected into their activities. Where hostile transcendent-oriented groups are identified (e.g., Communist-styled youth, women, labor, et cetera, "liberation" associations) an attempt must be made to alter these values or, failing this, parallel, government-oriented organizations with strongly transcendent values must be introduced and an attempt made to draw the rank and file membership of the hostile organization into the new competing structure.<sup>4</sup>

**Counterinsurgency: The Summing Up.**<sup>5</sup> Embraced within the concept "counterinsurgency" are a multitude of concurrent programs conducted by a wide variety of organizations. Normally, each of these organizations has arisen historically in response to some specific need, and each has its own professional orientation toward the population at large and its own criteria for determining its proficiency. Under conditions of domestic tranquility, this is as it should be; faced with insurgency, however, there must be an integrating principle for measuring effectiveness, namely: the organizations' contribution to the political integration of the popula-

tion around viable organizations compatible with security needs!

This is not to suggest that the armed forces should give up marksmanship or tax officials the collection of taxes. What it does mean is that these activities cease to be ends in themselves and must be reevaluated for their contribution to the imperative of political integration. Marksmanship or tax collection are now adjudged important, not because they are traditional interests of persons belonging to these two respective agencies of government, but because marksmanship or fiscal consistency contribute to a public environment in which integrative activities are more likely to succeed. Again, this is not to counsel shortsightedness. For the military unit to drop its guard in order to engage in some newfangled program that obliges it to suffer casualties and to surrender its tactical dominance of a given region, as a result, is hardly intelligent behavior. Where the military domination of an area is the prerequisite for positive action and requires the soldier's full time, strictly military activities must constitute the extent of his contribution. It is only important that the strategist have foremost in his mind the central purpose of counterinsurgency which is sociopolitical, not military, and which revolves about the issue of providing a new identity for the individual who has broken free from traditional cultural patterns and finds himself in a rapidly changing environment.

Working from this frame of reference, the devising of concrete operations presupposes the resolution of two large problem areas. The counterinsurgent must be armed with detailed, precise knowledge of the area in which he is to operate, but, equally important, he must fully appreciate the potentials of the agencies through which he is to work and the possible alternate fashions in which they may be grouped together for their combined effect.

<sup>4</sup>These two alternate possible approaches may be understood as the government's strategic counterparts of the communist Right and United Front from Below general lines.

<sup>5</sup>For a more exhaustive treatment of the basic principles of counterinsurgency, see American University, Center for Research in Social Systems, *Building Social Viability in an Insurgent Environment: a Positive Strategy for Displacing Insurgent Infrastructure in South Vietnam*, by Michael C. Conley (Washington: 1969).

Counterinsurgency conceived in this framework, then, is first and foremost a continuing, conscious effort at the integration of the populace through organizational work directed from the highest level of government and utilizing any and all agencies of state in behalf of its goal. To the extent that the individual is provided with an organizational identity inside a structure capable of engendering his loyalties and active participation, he is not available for recruitment by the insurgent. Where he has been compromised by the insurgent, he is offered the opportunity to alter his status by redirecting his loyalties to government-sponsored bodies. Such a

process must progressively weaken the insurgent by depriving him of his access to the civil population from which he draws recruits for his military and extra-military formations and in which he hides his political command structure. To initiate this work is to attack the problem of insurgency at its roots.

Counterinsurgency may be visualized then, broadly, as the complex of activities initiated and sustained by government through which organized groups are induced to support the government while the unorganized are progressively moved, one group after another, from the anonymity of proto-organizations to the stability of viable social groups.

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Communists . . . always seek to make use of their enemy and in the meantime take care not to be used by him.

*Chiang Kai-shek, 1887-, Soviet Russia in China*

## SOUTHEAST ASIA: STRATEGIC ALTERNATIVES AFTER VIETNAM

An article by

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The development of meaningful strategic alternatives in the Western Pacific area is predicated, first, on the framework of U.S. policy toward the region and, secondly, the identification of the threat to objectives being sought through the implementation of strategy in support of the overall policy.

**Basic U.S. Policy.** To provide the power base in continuing the tenets of the principle of self-determination; the principle promulgated in the Truman Doctrine to support the independence and freedom of nations; the principle of the U.N. Charter to maintain international peace and security; and to fulfill the obligations to which the United States is committed by multilateral (i.e., SEATO) as well as bilateral (i.e., South Vietnam, South Korea) treaties.

**Objectives.** In addition to the pronounced and implied goals in the stated basic policy, the "What We Want" stresses the primacy of clearly stated objectives being national interest oriented. These objectives include the U.S. desire to: (1) maintain international stability and security in Southeast Asia; (2) assist South Vietnam and Southeast Asia in economic development; (3) provide a climate for the development of democratic institutions and independent political growth in the region.

**Threat.** With respect to the second basic ingredient of the "grand strategy," the "Who Opposes" has been clearly defined in identifying Communist China's militancy as the existing and lingering threat to U.S. interests in Southeast Asia. Further, the potential of a resurgence of Soviet Union involvement in the region must also be recognized.

**Past Deficiencies.** Review of the results of U.S. activities in the area mark the basic policy as having been adequate and well-founded. However, the problem has been in the implementing strategy. Firstly, the strategy fell far short of a total strategy, being grossly deficient in meeting the requirements for economic, political, sociological, and psychological considerations pertinent to the region. From the standpoint of the military aspects, U.S. strategy has been one of unilateral gradual response culminating in engagement with the enemy in a major land war resulting from emplacement and buildup of sizable forces on Asia's mainland. Enjoying strategic mobility, the United States developed base facilities up to and within the combat zones (i.e., numerous strategic airbases and seaports and tactical airbases and ground force installations in South Vietnam and Thai-

land). However, only the strategic posture will be discussed.

In the past and through the present, U.S. forces and bases were and are deployed in the Western Pacific as follows:

Guam	14,000
Philippines	30,000
South Vietnam	535,000
Thailand	45,000
Taiwan	10,000
South Korea	55,000
Okinawa	40,000
Japan	40,000
Pacific Fleet	389,000
<b>TOTAL.</b>	<b>1,158,000</b>

Further, in considering the development of strategic alternatives, especially if they are predicated on the basic requirement for Asian collective mutual security arrangements, it is necessary to examine the indigenous military capability in the region.

Laos	80,000
Cambodia	37,850
Indonesia	352,000
Malaysia	33,200
Singapore	2,000
Burma	122,000
Thailand	126,330
Philippines	30,000
South Vietnam	645,000*
<b>TOTAL.</b>	<b>1,428,380</b>

\*(potential 800,000)

In addition, the military capability of the other non-Communist states with interest in the area must be considered.

South Korea	612,000
Taiwan	547,000
Australia	80,300
New Zealand	12,800
Japan	246,000*
India	977,000**
<b>TOTAL.</b>	<b>2,475,100</b>

\*(short-range potential)

\*\* (long-range potential)

Combining the last two forces above and adding the South Vietnamese additional potential of 155,000 provides a total combined potential military capability (excluding U.S. forces) for defense of the region of 4,058,480 personnel.

**Military Power Balance Posture after Vietnam.** The continued maintenance of a viable defense role for the United States in Southeast Asia is an absolute necessity in view of the unstable situation. However, caution must be exercised to insure that such force will only be used with prudence and only after all other objective measures have failed. In this regard the military force requirements should, first of all, be supplied by indigenous interests with the U.S. force as a backup. This backup should consist of substantial military power in the Western Pacific as a deterrent to aggression by hostile countries who will then have to consider the distinct possibility of dealing with U.S. counterforce. Not only this force, but also the U.S. nuclear capability, should be presented with sufficient credibility so that there should be no question as to U.S. intentions to employ its vast retaliatory power to meet the threat of Red China's conventional power as well as its potential nuclear blackmail.

The vital significance of the U.S. presence and military power base in Asia cannot be overstated, and the fear of a power vacuum after Vietnam is already casting longer shadows across America's relationships with East Asian and Southwest Pacific nations. The American military force presently deployed in the region totals 1,158,000 men, providing formidable protection for those countries having mutual defense treaties with the United States. Notwithstanding the current controversies (primarily politically motivated) over U.S. bases in Japan, Okinawa, and the Philippines, these countries recognize the value of this massive U.S.

protection in the face of Communist Chinese and potential Russian threat.

Viewing the present deployment of U.S. military forces in Asia, the question raised is whether, after Vietnam, U.S. power will be required in such overwhelming force on the mainland to support American objectives? Most probably not. Aside from a credible U.S. military presence in the region as evidence of American conviction to honor its commitments, a shift of force base structure, more suitable to U.S. needs, will most likely be adequate. With regard to indigenous military power bases in the non-Communist countries of the region, until such time that these became effective to meet internal as well as external aggressions, the United States should be prepared to aid these countries with a military presence. But, it must first be understood by the host state that U.S. forces will not be irrevocably committed to its defense on a permanent basis and that after its own capability is established, U.S. forces, except what is required to "show-the-flag," will be removed. The basic requirement must be clearly understood—that the primary responsibility for internal defense, and possibly for the long-term external defense as well, rests with the Asian state.

There are already hopeful signs that this strategy by the United States is beginning to bear fruit. South Korea is studying the establishment of a new collective security system similar to NATO for the defense of the Asian and Pacific region from the threat posed by Red China and North Korea. The new alliance would possibly be known as the Asian Pacific Treaty Organization (APATO) and include the United States and Vietnam war allies. Seoul has already contacted the free nations in the region. The U.S. role in this effort will be principally to provide air and naval support as well as nuclear defense of the area. A recent report in the *China News* indicated that Nationalist China will

support, in principle, the South Korean proposal.

**U.S. Deployment of Power Bases.** One important element in the "grand strategy" remains to be explored and assessed. That is the geographic location of foreign bases that this "grand strategy" requires. In considering the basic question—"onshore" vs. "offshore" posture—a major factor is the introduction of the giant C-5A logistics and troop transport aircraft and the proposed fast deployment logistics ship (F'DL) which may further reduce the requirement for overseas bases because they could provide a capability for speedy delivery of troops, equipment, and supplies to distant trouble areas. However, weighed against this capability is the question of whether emplacement of large American ground forces would more likely deter a potential aggressor than the acknowledged ability to rush in troops from the United States. In Southeast Asia other mitigating factors, previously discussed, are the U.S. treaty commitments and the psychological impact of troop withdrawals on allies. Furthermore, the cessation of hostilities in Vietnam will not, in any way, diminish the overriding U.S. national interest to maintain the balance of power in the region, to deny hegemony in the area by a hostile nation, and to assist the states in the region to preserve their independence.

As an adjunct to the end of the war, it is not inconceivable to assume a situation not unlike South Korea as the most optimum settlement attainable by the United States and its allies. However, in comparison, the scene in Southeast Asia is and will continue to be much more involved. The problem of instability, Red China's menacing threat, and Russia's potential involvement will still pervade the region. Neither should it be anticipated that the situation will drastically change in Laos where it is reported that an estimated 45,000 North Vietnamese are fighting.

Even should the adoption of an indigenous collective security role for Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) becomes a *fait accompli*, replacing a moribund SEATO, the attainment of an effective capability to repel external aggression should only be anticipated in the long term. In the interim, U.S. military support would consequently have to continue as the guarantor in consonance with America's commitments.

It should be noted that most of the U.S. forces in Asia were deployed to mount the war against North Vietnam. Obviously, with the cessation of hostilities, major reductions in this force, approximating an amount equal to that part directly involved in the Vietnam conflict, will be appropriate. These would be predominantly from the forces emplaced on the mainland. However, to support U.S. bilateral mutual security commitments, the force in being in South Korea would be retained, some force similar to that in Korea would be required in Vietnam, and a force would be required in Thailand. The emplacement of these forces would be needed at least to support U.S. short term objectives.

Regarding the six major airbases in Thailand, the decision on reduction will necessarily involve political as well as military considerations. However, it would appear that the U.S. decision would at least settle for maintaining some bases at a greatly reduced level of operation. Arguments for this action include, first, that these bases are the most visible evidence of the United States and Thailand's commitments to each other as well as to the non-Communist states in the region; second, maintaining an airbase posture, albeit reduced, is required for military purposes. It should be remembered that the genesis of the airbase building program in 1961 was part of SEATO's response to the Laotian crisis and that about 300 strike aircraft are now fully engaged "in

bombing the Communist-dominated eastern parts of Laos." Consequently, in view of the anticipated continuing malaise in Laos, it would apparently be prudent to retain, at least for the short-term, those airbases which are proximate to and involved in that current operation. In planning for the long-range, the ultimate decision will have to take into account the outcome of the controversies over the U.S. airbases in the Western Pacific including Okinawa, Japan, and the Philippines.

After due deliberation of the intricate problems involved, three possible structures appear to be worthy of consideration in the selection of suitable military power base posture after Vietnam. They are:

Option 1: Select bases on the rim of Asia, retaining the present configuration of the power base in South Korea, a greatly reduced operation in Thailand, and a peacekeeping force in South Vietnam. India may develop, in the future, to a degree where it can be included in the mutual defense arrangement. Also, concentrated effort should be expended by the United States to secure a more active and meaningful participation by Japan, Australia, and New Zealand in the total scheme. This option would retain the backup of the U.S. bases indicated in Option 2, below.

(a) In addition, consideration should be given to the potential utilization of the Singapore naval facilities by the United States after Britain's withdrawal. U.S. interest in that excellent facility, if deemed feasible, should be approached in low-profile, and negotiations for U.S. interests could be pursued through its allies such as Japan or Australia, both of whom have principal interests there. Arrangements could provide for joint utilization on a cost- and maintenance-sharing basis. The availability of this facility would provide a superior logistical capability for the U.S. Navy than it has at present. Also, operation of the facility would be economically advan-

tageous to Singapore and accrue psychological and political dividends to the allied partner or partners.

(b) Further, the feasibility of establishing a naval base on the northwest coast of Australia for nuclear-powered submarines should be explored to serve U.S. Navy requirements in the Indian Ocean.

Option 2: Withdraw to and maintain power bases on Japan, Okinawa, Taiwan, and the Philippines if this posture is considered sufficient to satisfy U.S. commitments and its superpower requirements. Guam and Hawaii would be backup; and the potential of Japan, India, Australia, and New Zealand would be developed.

Option 3: Withdraw to and build up the mid-Pacific islands such as Wake and Guam which, together with the military forces on Hawaii, offer sufficient proximity, under the fast deployment concept, without the political problems associated with bases on foreign soil.

However, regardless of the end position selected, it is vitally important that the shift in posture not be construed in any way as being a disengagement by the United States from its responsibilities and involvement in the region. It will still be imperative that the U.S. military presence be manifested by sea and air forces activities throughout the area; i.e., patrols and rights which provide the availability of ports and airbase facilities. With regard to airbases, base rights should provide, as a minimum, a U.S. housekeeping role to maintain the bases for future use should the need arise.

To arrive at a decision on the selection of any of the alternative end positions, one that would be most advantageous to the United States within the framework of its overall policy and objectives is probably the most difficult if not the most important part in the development of the "grand strategy." But, the caution here must be that whatever structure is decided upon, the

policy and strategy must not commit the United States too rigidly. Rather, it must provide for contingency options which will afford the United States maximum flexibility to respond to any conceivable situation or combination thereof. In view of the current world situation and foreseeable events that appear most likely following the aftermath in Vietnam, the position outlined in Option 1, above, is recommended as being the most favorable for the United States in satisfying its immediate and short-term requirements. However, from the standpoint of economy of resources, maximum effectiveness of forces, and minimum U.S. involvement, withdrawal outlined in Option 2 would be more preferential and should be pursued as a midrange objective (in the early future). If such action is precluded by the outcome of the current controversies over American bases in the Western Pacific being adverse to the United States, Option 1 should be revised to provide for a buildup of bases in South Korea and Thailand as the U.S. military power bastions in Asia. The posture as stated in Option 3 is not deemed to be practicable at this time but could be a goal for long-range attainment.

**Advantages.** In adopting either of the alternative military power base deploy-

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## BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY



Col. Murray Marks, U.S. Air Force, did undergraduate work at New York University and did graduate work at the University of Southern California in aviation safety. He has had a wide and varied experience in the Strategic Air Command (SAC) both at the operations and planning levels. His last position (1966-68) with SAC was as Chief, Plans and Projects, with the Headquarters, 1002 Inspector General Group. Colonel Marks is currently a student at the Naval War College School of Naval Warfare.

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ment structures proposed, the following advantages can be anticipated: (1) it would be far less costly than present or past strategies, providing for economy and maximum effective utilization of forces; (2) it would be more in consonance with U.S. military prowess in both air and seapower and at the same time minimize the potential for ground force confrontation against Asian numerically superior ground forces; (3) it would reduce the area for possible

on-the-scene tensions that could entrap U.S. forces; and (4) it would build a situation that would require Red China's attention to be primarily concerned with the Soviet Union and vice-versa.

Disadvantages, if any, are minuscule by comparison and confined mainly to present U.S. treaty obligations which could be worked out in a far more meaningful arrangement.



A swift and vigorous transition to attack--the flashing sword of vengeance--is the most brilliant point of the defensive.

*Clausewitz: On War, 1832*

# THE STUDY OF FOREIGN POLICY: A PERSPECTIVE

by

Professor Burton M. Sapin

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The study of foreign policy has been more noteworthy for the quantity than the quality of its intellectual products. Three recent developing trends in this field give some hope that tomorrow will be better. They should provide analytical tools and improved empirical research that will be helpful to the practitioner as well as the student of foreign policy.

In brief, scholars in this field are beginning to approach the subject matter with a more theoretical orientation, comparative approach, and a concern to strengthen the study of policy substance along with policy structure and process. None of these orientations are really surprising because they reflect broader trends in the effort at a more scientific approach to political phenomena. Indeed, given the laggard state of teaching and research in foreign policy, they represent something of an effort to catch up.

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There has been considerable interest in the development of conceptual frameworks, testable propositions, and more ambitious models and theoretical statements in the study of international politics. However, these have, for the most part, been directed to the study of relations among nations (e.g., alliances, conflict and conflict resolution, voting, and other political behavior in the United Nations) and to those interstate

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## BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY



Professor Burton M. Sapin did his undergraduate work at Columbia College, holds a master's degree from Columbia University and a Ph.D. from Princeton University. His primary interest is International Politics, specializing in American foreign policy and policymaking and foreign policy-military policy relationships. His most recent publication is *The Making of United States Foreign Policy* (Brookings Institution, 1966).

Professor Sapin has a wide and varied academic background and currently, while on leave from the University of Minnesota, occupies the Chester W. Nimitz Chair of Social and Political Philosophy at the Naval War College.

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relationships viewed as systems of activity. The one notable exception was a conceptual framework oriented to state decisionmaking, but it was not developed into a fullfledged set of hypotheses to be investigated, and relatively little empirical research was done in its precise terms.<sup>1</sup>

Thus, what one might refer to as state behavior, as distinct from interstate relations or international systems, has received relatively little theoretical attention. Those not committed to the more scientific study of political phenomena (and, hopefully, even some who are) might well answer--so what? This is a good question; and the answer is that in the absence of a concern with theory, some fundamental and tough questions have not been asked or, to be more precise, have not been systematically investigated.

There has been a great deal of research focusing on one or another of the components of the American governmental and political system--voting behavior, the press, pressure groups, the Congress, one of a number of executive units or agencies, career or noncareer personnel--and how it affects American foreign policy. Very rarely, however, has this factor, in turn, been placed in the context of the larger system and some effort been made to weigh its impact and importance. The impression one tends to be left with is that a lot of internal (as well as external) factors affect U.S. foreign policy, but it is far from clear what their net effects are. For example, the limitations imposed on the American system by the separation of powers modified by the checks and balances may be so fundamental that changes in the organization of the Department of State are bound to be only marginally significant in terms of impact on the quality of foreign policy performance. The point is that we have tended not to ask this kind of question and that the pressure of having to develop a theory of national foreign

policy behavior is probably the most effective scholarly means of getting it asked.

It may be argued that all the domestic factors are, together, of marginal importance when placed beside the compelling character of external events and situations. Even if they do not completely determine foreign policy choices, their impact, it is said, will far outweigh domestic considerations and limitations.

This is a moot point. For present purposes it suffices to point out that we have not even systematically explored the connections or "linkages" between external events and situations and foreign policy perceptions and responses in a variety of political systems. Scholars in the field are simply not in a position to state with confidence how different polities respond to identical or equivalent classes of external situations.

This kind of theoretical orientation leads very quickly to another observation and set of questions. It is clear that the study of international politics in the United States has been much too parochial in its approach and concerns. In international politics studies considerable attention is often given to the U.S. role in world affairs; and the examples used to illustrate more general points are often, understandably, drawn from American experience. The felony is compounded, if felony it be, by the follow-on courses offered at most American colleges and universities on American foreign policy and policymaking.

The inevitable emphasis on the study of American political institutions and behavior--American Government--has been balanced in the past 15 or 20 years by the very rich growth of courses in comparative government and politics and, in more recent years, by the burgeoning of first-rate research and theory development in the comparative government field. Both have been given added interest and support as a result of

greatly expanded attention to the politics of the less-developed countries.

The comparative approach has finally begun to extend to the foreign policy field, although the number of comparative foreign policy courses being offered and the number of comparative foreign policy or national defense studies being prepared or produced is still quite small. There may be some bandwagon or faddist elements involved in this development, but there are also legitimate and worthwhile intellectual purposes to be served.

To state them briefly, the comparative study of foreign policy should help put American patterns and problems in clearer perspective and, at the same time, sensitize the American interested in the external or international behavior of other nations—be he practitioner, scholar, or member of the attentive public—to be most influential in that behavior. Further, the systematic, comparative study of foreign policy formation and implementation in many countries should provide a firmer empirical base for the development of theories of foreign policy behavior which have some general applicability rather than being glorified propositions about American foreign policy performance.

Some illustrations may be helpful. Typically, American students of foreign policy have viewed the role of the Congress in foreign policymaking critically, negatively, sometimes with resignation, often with despair. In my view, Professor Waltz, in his *Foreign Policy and Democratic Politics*, has helped put the Congressional role in better perspective by comparing it to the role of the British Parliament in the British political system.<sup>2</sup>

Waltz assumes that national foreign policy performance will be more effective in political system where major policy issues tend to be directly confronted and grappled with and, in the process, given a full public airing; where, consequently, the public has some

notion of the nature and dimensions of major policy problems (and, therefore, a general base of support is usually available for the major directions of policy, if not all of its tactical details); and where elected executive officials and their subordinates in the great governmental bureaucracies are kept more alert and self-conscious about their activities and decisions by the ever-present possibility and the recurring reality of detailed legislative scrutiny of these activities. Given these assumptions, Waltz's conclusions are the separation of powers, the built-in legislative-executive rivalry and suspicion, and the considerable political power that still resides in Congress and its committees contribute significantly to such consequences.

It is not necessary to argue that the motives involved are all pure, that the traditional structure and institutions of the Congress are ideally suited to the needs of the late 20th century, or that the results would warrant the highest rating from some philosopher-king. These are patently absurd propositions. What Waltz is saying, and with much to support him, is that if one looks past the messiness of the process and the unappetizing character of some of the individuals involved to the net foreign policy consequences, these consequences are on the whole positive and desirable. And the point becomes much more effective when the functioning of the American political system is compared to that of its British precursor, usually assumed to be its superior in the political performance and outputs.

Waltz's effort to compare at the level of a total political system is daring and somewhat risky in terms of the state of our knowledge. Nevertheless, there would seem to be some real payoffs, in both increased understanding and stimulation of new research, in approaching foreign policymaking at this level. The following would seem to be prerequisites to doing such comparative analyses

with increasing rigor: 1. Detailed specification of those characteristics and abilities that make for effective foreign policy performance by any nation; 2. Propositions or hypotheses regarding those characteristics of the broader political system (and the narrower governmental system) that seem likely to produce the abilities specified under 1. A third step might involve generation and investigation of hypotheses regarding changes likely to produce improvement in the significant characteristics identified under 2.

All of this, admittedly, is bound to be somewhat speculative at the start, but it is speculation aimed in the right direction and likely to produce more useful empirical research and theoretical propositions. The examination and comparison in these terms of Western democratic systems, of various authoritarian systems, of democratic and authoritarian, of varieties of less-developed countries should prove most enlightening. Theories of foreign policy will have a broader empirical basis while our understanding of the patterns and problems of individual countries, including the United States, should be much improved.

Finally, I should emphasize that the approach at the level of the overall system represents one among a number of useful paths of inquiry. It does have the virtue of forcing the observer to weigh net consequences of individual elements and assess overall foreign policy performance. However, there is still room for useful comparative studies of foreign service personnel, arrangements for foreign policy-military policy coordination, purposes, policies, and detailed implementation of foreign aid programs, public opinion and foreign policy, and organization and functioning of intelligence and planning activities, to name just a few. The more general comparative study of public administration that is developing should produce relevant results for the student

of foreign policy administration, as should the very substantial work in comparative political systems, if more of its attention is focused on the externally oriented activities of these systems.<sup>3</sup>

The third of the recent trends that give hope for improved research and teaching in foreign policy relates to the substance of policy, as distinct from the various structures and processes that help influence and shape it. Two preliminary comments are in order. First, the expanded attention that is now beginning to be devoted to the more systematic and, hopefully, scientific analysis of policy substance is broadly directed to the public policy area; it is neither exclusively nor even substantially focused on foreign policy issues. Thus, it is somewhat optimistic and even misleading to label it a trend in the study of foreign policy. Having put foreign policy in its place, we can now proceed to examine some of the newer concerns and the glaring weaknesses they may help to remedy.

While recognizing that much that is relevant to policy and program choices will either be unknown or uncertain and that wise judgment and choice will always be necessary elements in any political system, there is still considerable room for improvement in the analytical underpinnings of policy. Underlying assumptions about interest, objectives, and salient characteristics of the external environment (including the behavior of other states and how it can be influenced) should be made explicit, spelled out in detail, and examined critically. Where appropriate, assumptions about the possible consequences of one's actions should be stated as hypotheses and some effort devoted in advance to specifying what will be regarded as confirming and disconfirming evidence.

Most foreign policy practitioners will dismiss such suggestions as the typically naive proposals of the ivory-tower

academician. Without bothering to offer "real world" credentials, it can at the outset he conceded that such efforts, even if carried on more assiduously than they now are in the bureaucracy, will often seem fruitless, devoid of practical results. Furthermore, they cannot guarantee the avoidance of major mistakes.

What seems essential here is a critical posture and approach to policy problems and the habit of taking nothing for granted, of questioning what seems unquestionable. In the field of national defense policy, many of the relevant factors can be (indeed must be) translated into quantitative terms—possible military targets and the weight of delivered explosives necessary to destroy them, estimated military capabilities of potential enemy (as well as friendly) nations, numbers of weapons, military units and related supply requirements to meet a variety of levels of anticipated external threat, desired capabilities to deal with such threats, and so on.

The ability to do this kind of analysis has improved dramatically in the last decade and has, in fact, become an integral part of military establishment decisionmaking. Used critically and responsibly, and with an awareness that the particular results obtained will depend on the assumptions made (not all assumptions being equally reliable and well-founded empirically), the economics and systems analysis approaches to defense policy can contribute to the increased rationality of choices in that field.<sup>4</sup>

The significant parameters of foreign policy choice do not lend themselves so easily to quantification. However, where it is possible to make such a translation (for example, in the objectives of foreign economic or military assistance programs), it should be done—not to produce some illusory sense of scientific precision but rather as another effort at self-consciousness and rigor in dealing with problems that can so easily be

dealt with intuitively or impressionistically.

Where programs and activities are being funded in pursuit of specified objectives in particular foreign countries, there is no reason why the resources devoted to various objectives in a single country or similar objectives in a number of countries should not be quantitatively measured, compared, and critically evaluated. Such analyses will not make it any easier to deal with foreign governments and their problems, but it may provide a more reliable basis for the evaluation of vulnerable programs and the allocation of limited resources. Here, there have been notable governmental developments.

The State Department began to introduce its own Comprehensive Country Programming System in the early 1960s and more recently, a Planning-Programming-Budgeting System (PPBS) has been introduced on a governmentwide basis. These innovations will probably not make basic policy choices any easier, but they should improve the ability to measure and compare programmatic activities and choose among them where necessary.<sup>5</sup>

Public policy and program issues often involve "experimentation" in the sense that there is considerable uncertainty about the nature of the relevant factors and that proposed or actual courses of action are exploratory or tentative efforts to see "what will work." Public officials are rarely willing to acknowledge such a state of affairs; and, as was suggested above, there is insufficient concern with premises, hypotheses, the nature of meaningful evidence, and so forth.

Since he usually has less familiarity with or leverage on the external environment than the domestic policymaker does vis-a-vis the internal environment, the foreign policy practitioner is less willing to approach his problems in an experimental frame of mind. Here, help is now at hand in the form of develop-

ments in the field of gaming and simulation. The foreign policy official, if he is so inclined, can now attempt an experimental creation or re-creation of a real world problem—be it another Berlin blockade, Dominican crisis, or some other—and let policy officials, professors, college students, and the like attempt to cope with it. It can be played in a variety of versions or re-played with the same scenario but a different group of simulated decision-makers.

If he is more ambitious intellectually, the policymaker can even use the computer to simulate international systems of considerable complexity. By varying assumptions about relationships and quantitative dimensions like military capabilities or economic resources, a great variety of international situations and systems of relationships can be simulated, examined, and compared as they unfold over time. The critical problems come at the stage of making assumptions about the dynamics of international relationships because what one is doing, in effect, is devising a theory of international politics that can then be translated (programmed) into the language of the computer.

If this stage of the operation can be handled with increasing sophistication and sensitivity to international political realities, the computer can play through a great variety of international situations and larger states of affairs. This kind of analysis is at its beginning stages; but if it proves a successful innovation, it should provide the policy official, as well as the academic theorist, with a tool for exploring and experimenting with many possible assumptions and hypotheses about the international arena.<sup>6</sup>

There are other interesting avenues opening up in the study of public

policy. Some political scientists with value or normative concerns are interested in clarifying the problems of priorities among values and, even more fundamental, the question of precisely how value choices are manifested in specific empirical situations or problem areas. No doubt the pragmatic public policy official spends little of his time agonizing over such intellectual dilemmas, but it is clear that he is in a business which involves almost constantly making choices regarding highly complex situation in which a number of values, sometimes conflicting, sometimes not clearly seen, are enmeshed. Once again, advances in the sophistication with which such analyses can be carried on should provide practical as well as philosophical benefits.<sup>7</sup>

In short, it looks as if the poverty of imagination and rigor with which public policy, and particularly foreign policy, problems have been studied is beginning to be remedied. Regarding this trend and the others briefly discussed in this essay, some perspective is in order. The study of international politics, comparative politics, foreign policy, and military policy in the United States has expanded in breathtaking, unbelievable fashion since the end of World War II. Nevertheless, it does not greatly strain modesty and honest self-doubt to suggest that all of these fields are at a relatively early stage of development in terms of viable theory and reliable data. Hopefully, in a decade or two we will be able to look back at this period and recognize it as a rich and necessary period of experimentation and exploration. For the moment, a certain modesty on the part of student and practitioner alike is probably an appropriate posture with which to approach contemporary problems of foreign policy and national defense.

## FOOTNOTES

1. See Richard C. Snyder, H.W. Bruck, and Burton Sapin, eds., *Foreign Policy Decision-Making* (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1962).

2. Kenneth N. Waltz, *Foreign Policy and Democratic Politics* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1967).

3. For more detailed (and theoretically sophisticated) comments on some of these points, see James N. Rosenau, "Pretheories and Theories of Foreign Policy," in R. Barry Farrell, ed., *Approaches to Comparative and International Politics* (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1966), p. 27-92.

4. See Charles J. Hitch and Roland N. McKean, *The Economics of Defense in the Nuclear Age* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960). Atheneum, 1966, paperback.

5. The Subcommittee on National Security and International Operations of the U.S. Senate Committee on Government Operations examined *Planning-Programming-Budgeting* critically and in detail during the course of the 90th Congress (1967 and 1968).

6. For a broad survey of the possible applications of the computer to foreign affairs, written by an experienced Foreign Service Officer, see Fisher Howe, *The Computer and Foreign Affairs, Some First Thoughts* (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., November 1966). Dept. of State Publications 8156.

7. Some of these matters are discussed in Charles E. Lindblom, *The Policy-Making Process* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1968), particularly Part One.


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Ψ

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I confess when I went into arms at the beginning of this war, I never troubled myself to examine sides; I was glad to hear the drums beat for soldiers, as if I had been a mere Swiss, that had not cared which side went up or down, so I had my pay.

*Memoirs of a Cavalier, author unknown, 17th century.*



## PROFESSIONAL READING

The evaluations of recent books listed in this section have been prepared for the use of resident students. Officers in the fleet and elsewhere may find these books of interest in their professional reading.

The inclusion of a book in this section does not necessarily constitute an endorsement by the Naval War College of the facts, opinions or concepts contained therein.

Many of these publications may be found in ship and station libraries. Certain of the books on the list which are not available from these sources may be available from one of the Navy's Auxiliary Library Service Collections. These collections of books are obtainable on loan. Requests from individual officers to borrow books from an Auxiliary Library Service Collection should be addressed to the nearest of the following special loan collections.

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Howe, Irving, ed. *The Dissenter's Guide to Foreign Policy*. New York: Praeger, 1968. 349p.

This book is a collection of articles, many of which have appeared in the magazine *Dissent*, for the purpose of furnishing signposts for the democratic and socialist left in the field of foreign affairs. The editor believes that unlike the left's harmonious point of view in domestic affairs, their position on foreign affairs has been marked by no general agreement or consistent tradition. According to the editor, the current wisdom of the left is an insufficient guide in the struggle for a more "humane, fraternal, and equalitarian society." The articles present all the theories for "What's wrong with American foreign policy?" America's policy-makers have either intervened too much (politically and militarily) or not enough (economically); have not recognized the demise of the cold war; are motivated by economic self-interest and self-aggrandizement; are too anti-Communist; and are too concerned with world stability and the status quo, rather than the creation of a new world to replace the inadequate one in which we now live. The offered solutions are varied: multilateralism; neo-isolationism, with a limited foreign policy and limited objectives; distribution of wealth to the poor nations through international economic planning and an international progressive income tax; modernization of the underdeveloped world by communism or a similar total revolutionary force. The left's aim of a

"humane, fraternal and equalitarian society" is commendable; however, their means are confusing and contradictory. They would like the United States to assume the responsibility for achieving a new millennium, but are suspect of her use of power, her motivations, and her interpretation of the national interest. They are against power blocs, but wouldn't mind United State collusion with the Soviet Union to maintain world order. They desire modernization in the underdeveloped world, but conclude that democracies would be too soft to achieve it; only communism could accomplish this mission. Pessimistic emotionalism substitutes for analytical thought in too many of the articles.

The reviewer's conclusions are that many of the signposts are really "detour" signs and that the left still lacks a consistent point of view in the field of foreign affairs. The more thought-provoking articles are those by Arnold S. Kaufman, William Pfaff, Henry M. Pachter, Gunnar Myrdal, Benjamin Schwartz, and George Lichtem.

R.A. BEAULIEU  
Commander, U.S. Navy

Javits, Jacob K., et al. *The Defense Sector and the American Economy*. New York: New York University Press, 1968. 100p.

This small book is based on three "Moskowitz" lectures sponsored by the School of Commerce of New York University to discuss various aspects of President Eisenhower's farewell message to the nation in which he warned of the danger to liberty of the twin threats of the "military-industrial complex" and the "scientific-technological elite." The three lecturers are Jacob Javits, Charles J. Hitch, and Arthur F. Burns.

Senator Javits of New York refers to the decision to create a small antiballistic missile defense against a potential Red Chinese nuclear threat to illustrate the fact that more public discussion is

needed before commitment to the decision of the "scientific-technological" elite. He also is concerned over the "narrow world of defense contractor lobbyists." It is the contention of the Senator that important national policy should not be made by a small group of special interests. Mr. Hitch agrees that the fears of President Eisenhower were reasonable, but he feels that the danger is exaggerated because many limitations constrain the military-industrial complex. Furthermore, the impact of the defense sector on the economy is hard to trace because of the paucity of detailed statistical material. Nevertheless, he tries to trace the major current impacts by industry, by business firm, by region, and by occupation. He also points out that defense spending greatly influences the conduct of research and development because it furnishes the largest source of funds in the United States. While some spillover from defense research can be expected, it does tie up large numbers of our best brains and large amounts of our best scientific research equipment. Mr. Hitch is not very concerned by the effects of a reasonable cutback in defense spending and he does not feel that "social cost" criteria can be applied to procurement by the defense sector. He favors specific, direct, and identified programs to help distressed regions rather than the distribution of defense contracts as the best public policy. Dr. Burns also is not worried about a conspiracy of the military-industrial complex but does see a number of important economic, social, and political impacts of the defense sector. In his opinion the very size of the defense budget could revolutionize financial problems of the American economy. Also he properly indicates that the vast size of the defense economy draws to itself economic resources that could be profitably employed in such areas as education, urban renewal, and conservation. Finally, he shows that defense emphasizes science, mathe-

matics, and foreign languages at the expense of the humanities and the social sciences and philosophy. This happens in a cloak of secrecy that tends to inhibit criticism of the Government by university administrators and professors who are benefiting from research grants.

From the political side, the vast military budgets and the methods of allocating funds to areas rather than to efficient producers could be a method of influencing votes and concentrating and perpetuating power. This use of defense expenditures for other than national security purposes is probably more a potential danger than a present one, but nevertheless a real threat to freedom and development. These three lectures well handle the problem raised by President Eisenhower and are worth reading.

P.L. GAMBLE  
Chair of Economics

Mansfield, Edwin, ed. *Defense, Science, and Public Policy*. New York: Norton, 1969. 224p.

For the Year 1967, national defense expenditures represented about 60 percent of the Federal administrative budget, while defense and space programs utilized a major share of the scientific and engineering talent in the United States. These factors are not expected to change greatly even if a successful conclusion to the Vietnam war is achieved. The effect of these conditions on the economy of the nation is the subject of this collection of articles and speeches. The selections are grouped in four parts, the first two parts relating to the impact of defense spending on the national economy and the decision-making process in the Department of Defense, and the latter two discussing military research and development and the relationship of basic research to civilian technology and the public policy.

Through a judicious choice of articles presenting many and varying viewpoints

on interrelated defense and science problems (in some cases strongly differing opinions in successive articles), the editor has given the reader an opportunity to consider many aspects of defense problems that are not readily apparent even to one seriously interested in these issues. The military reader, in particular, will gain an appreciation of some of the nonmilitary problems defense spending engenders and the relationship of the scientific community to military research. For those interested in a side-by-side comparison of the pros and cons of cost-effectiveness, Hanson Baldwin's attack on this procurement policy and Charles Hitch's defense of the technique are included. This book is recommended for anyone interested in, or concerned about, the effects of large defense budgets and government monopoly of scientific talent.

D.J. KERSHAW  
Commander, U.S. Navy

Osgood, Robert E. *Alliances and American Foreign Policy*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1968. 171p.

After having closed the cover, the reader is left somewhat exhausted and with the impression of having read two different books. At the outset the author does a creditable job of describing in general terms the alliance systems in the world today and explaining how and why they were developed. He defines and explains alliances, carefully distinguishing them from collective security agreements, and presents an excellent discussion in basic terms of the nature of the various types of alliances and other international relationships which are equivalent to alliances. Following a review of the development of American alliance policy, beginning with the Truman Doctrine, the author presents a detailed examination of alliances, past and present, throughout the world. It is here that the reader finds himself in another book;

one of conjecture, hope, careful estimates, and broad guesses about what may happen in the future. There is too much of this for the average reader to assimilate, and the result is a general blur of one prediction into the next. For the military officer without a background in international relations, the first two-thirds of the book can provide a very interesting and helpful look at the pros and cons of alliances. This same officer will find the last third of the book at once too detailed and too broad in its look at the future to be of any real help in his studies. This portion is recommended for supplementary reading by the advanced student who, in turn, may find the first part of the book rather basic.

R.W. DURFEY  
Commander, U.S. Coast Guard

Wentz, Walter B. *Nuclear Proliferation*. Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1968. 216p.

The author takes a new look at nuclear proliferation and in his words has "attempted to synthesize the fragments of political, military, scientific, and economic knowledge on the problem of nuclear proliferation." His book is easy to read and presents his case in a most convincing manner. The main thrust of his thesis is that proliferation as opposed to nonproliferation is in the best interests of the United States. He argues that nuclear weapons in the hands of responsible allies are a much more reliable counterthreat than an American monopoly on nuclear weapons and associated delivery systems. He also believes that De Gaulle is correct in his doubts of the United States committing herself to a nuclear war over Paris. The economic, political, and technological considerations of the potential members of the nuclear club are discussed and a projection made as to when they can or will create nuclear weapons. Dr. Wentz carries this further by estimating the number of weapons

that each country can produce on an annual basis. Chapters are devoted to Red China, France, India, Israel, West Germany, Japan, and the "Fringe Nations"—Australia, Belgium, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Italy, Sweden, and Switzerland. The author concludes that "Nonproliferation, as the sole objective of the United States' nuclear policy, is both unrealistic and contrary to American interests. In selected cases, proliferation should be encouraged." This work is extensively documented and should provide an excellent source of research material for students of arms control.

C.H. SELL  
Commander, U.S. Navy

Willrich, Mason. *Non-Proliferation Treaty: Framework for Nuclear Arms Control*. Charlottesville, Va.: Michie, 1969. 341p.

Mason Willrich, Professor of Law and Director of the Center for the Study of Science, Technology and Public Policy at the University of Virginia, has written a book that is as timely as it is thorough. As the author, from 1962 to 1965 Assistant General Counsel in the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, states in the introduction, his purpose "is to analyze the Non-Proliferation Treaty, to ascertain its meaning and explore its potentialities in terms of the specific problems which will be encountered if it is implemented." This objective and more he achieves. In addition to producing the complete "legislative history" of the treaty and providing the best textual analysis of its provisions yet published, the author also establishes a useful policy-oriented framework for anyone "seeking insight into the interactions between the process of international politics and technological innovation."

Professor Willrich's first three chapters describe the contextual, policy, and legal factors behind the treaty which he thinks "the preferred policy alternative in relation to the goal of avoidance of

nuclear war." The next four chapters analyze the Treaty in considerable detail, the author noting that its restraints "are in all major respects the same as the inhibitions the United States has already placed on itself." Finally, in a concluding chapter on future implications, the author expresses his hope that the structural changes in the international political system will occur before, in Einstein's words, "we drift to unparalleled catastrophe." The treaty, he believes, will buy mankind needed time in his quest for survival in the nuclear era. Five appendices containing the treaty and other relevant documents and a selected bibliography are included at the end of the book which, without doubt, will become an indispensable reference work on this key issue.

RICHARD B. LILLICH  
Charles H. Stockton Chair of  
International Law

Wool, Harold. *The Military Specialist-Skilled Manpower for the Armed Forces*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1968, 216p.

This book provides a scholarly study of the Armed forces requirements for military specialists and the methods of recognizing, analyzing, and meeting those requirements. It is based on surveys, records, and reports—primarily from the military services and the Department of Defense, many of them unpublished—but also from periodicals, other Government agencies, and the academic literature. It provides historical and objective accounts and statistics on which to build an understanding of the demand for and supply of military manpower. The author states his intent that his study will "contribute to what

will hopefully be a growing body of literature concerning the economics and sociology of military service." He traces the history of occupational specialization, from nonspecialization through the current demands of technology, standardization (or comparability), sociology, and economics. These demands have caused changes in practice and in policy which have simultaneously been affected by theories of management and human relations insights. The author provides statistics and analyses that are valuable condensations of masses of information needed by decisionmakers in the field of manpower management—recruitment, retention, compensation, and consideration of these components in relation to the draft. Whether the researcher is seeking authoritative source material for one of these components or the entire spectrum of manpower matters, he will find invaluable material in this study. Coverage is limited, however, as the author acknowledges in his introduction, to the study of enlisted manpower needs and supply and limited in the treatment of certain important aspects of military personnel systems such as planning, training, distribution, and utilization. His last chapter relates the historical trends and facts to possible manpower strategies for the future. In the current debates—both official and popular—on the draft and its alternatives, students of fact who do not intend to be guided purely by the national emotional viewpoint will find here a source of many rational, substantiated views of complex manpower problems.

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