




THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN MERCENARIES IN PERSPECTIVE

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

March 1969



FOREWORD

The *Naval War College Review* was established in 1948 by the Chief of Naval Personnel in order that officers of the service might receive some of the educational benefits available to the resident students at the Naval War College.

The material contained in the *Review* is for the professional education of its readers. The frank remarks and personal opinions of the lecturers and authors are presented with the understanding that they will not be quoted without permission. The remarks and opinions shall not be published nor quoted publicly, as a whole or in part, without specific clearance in each instance with the lecturer or author and the Naval War College.

Lectures are selected on the basis of favorable reception by Naval War College audiences, usefulness to servicewide readership, and timeliness. Research papers are selected on the basis of professional interest to readers.

The thoughts and opinions expressed in this publication are those of the lecturers and authors, and are not necessarily those of the Navy Department nor of the Naval War College.

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Cover: Mock Battle Unfolds on an Electronic Screen at the United States Naval War College at Newport, Rhode Island.

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CHALLENGE!

The proposition to erect the institution now known as the Naval War College was not received with favor by the naval profession. It was said to be chimerical, impracticable, and wholly uncalled for. Moreover, there was no precedent for such a thing to be found in history.

Luce: "The U.S. Naval War College,"
U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings,
June 1910.

One of the first challenges facing the Naval War College in its early years was that of survival--survival in a world of rival bureaus, professional criticism, and outspoken hostility. "In six months my boys will be eating their grub in the lecture room of the War College!" stated the commanding officer of the training station at Newport.

To meet this challenge--to devise "an advanced course of professional study" which would establish for all time the worth of the College to the Navy and to the Nation--it was necessary to "collect, digest, and arrange in suitable form for instruction the branches which it (had) to teach" and, concomitantly, develop methods and techniques for the analysis, study, and practice of both the science and art of war. One of the techniques developed during those formative years was war gaming.

War gaming had long been a recognized educational technique for training Army officers. But at the time the College was struggling for its existence, the application of war gaming techniques to naval operations was a rela-



tively unknown and virtually untried art. The staff of the College developed gaming into a "laboratory method" for the simulation of naval warfare and established it "as a recognized part of the College curriculum." As developed, the purpose of war gaming was to provide "a practice field for the acquirement of skill and experience in the conduct or direction of war, and an experimental and trial ground for the testing of strategic and tactical plans."

One of the early presidents of the College observed: "The strategic game teaches the Admiral how to dispose his forces in a maritime campaign, the tactical game how to handle his fleet in action." During the winter of 1906-07, as a result of studies and tactical games, "Battle Plan No. 1 . . . was perfected and sent to the Fleet for trial." Capt. William McCarty Little in an article in the December 1912 issue of the *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings* stated that "The principle of the concentration of the Fleet, now generally accepted in our navy, was the direct result of a strategic game . . ." conducted in 1903.

Adm. William S. Sims, famed World War I naval commander and postwar president of the Naval War College, wrote: "The principles of the war game constitute the backbone of our profession . . . At the Naval War College our

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entire Fleet . . . can be maneuvered on the game board . . . against a similar fleet representing a possible enemy . . ." During the 1920's and 1930's, many of the officers who were to become the leaders of World War II participated in these games, among them Fleet Admirals King and Nimitz, and Admirals Spruance and Halsey. After World War II, Admiral Nimitz said: "The war with Japan had been reenacted in the game rooms (of the College) by so many people and in so many different ways that nothing that happened during the war was a surprise-absolutely nothing except the Kamikaze tactics toward the end of the war; we had not visualized those."

During the 1950's, gaming and simulation became an accepted operational research technique; its uses spread to industry and research activities. Each of the services established service-level gaming activities, that of the Navy under the Assistant to the Chief of Naval Operations for War Gaming Matters. The Joint Chiefs of Staff established the Joint War Games Agency to conduct political-military games and coordinate the joint-gaming activities of the various services. Business organizations and universities adapted gaming techniques to their training requirements, one of the first such management games appearing after "an exploratory visit to the Naval War College" by its designers. At the College many changes were made in both the scope and techniques of gaming. A global-level political game was developed, an electronic war gaming system installed, and joint and combined operations games devised. More recently, portions of CNO-sponsored studies have been subjected to the interplay of opposing teams of officers; fleet exercise and war

plans have been gamed by the officers responsible for their planning and execution. Commenting on a recent fleet game, an amphibious group commander stated: "Unlike real force exercises, (in games) opposing sea and air forces can exchange 'live' weapons and suffer damage with a real impact on planned force employment." He noted also that plans could be examined and staffs trained "with an economy of ships and men so necessary today."

Despite the impressive contributions of war gaming to date, we cannot—we will not—rest on our oars; as in the past we will continue to expand the scope of gaming, improve its techniques, update its facilities. The possibility of increased curriculum gaming will be examined; greater participation by fleet commands encouraged. More political, economic, and logistic factors will be incorporated into our games; liaison with other gaming activities, military and civilian, improved. The possible extension of gaming techniques to other areas such as counterinsurgency and management will be considered. Can the Soviets "out-flank NATO to the South, without firing a gun?" What about a "Fight and Talk" situation? Games can dynamically examine these problems, move versus countermove. Tensions in the Middle East? A multisided game should provide greater insight into their causes, suggest and test possible courses of action to meet future contingencies.

Present short-range plans for the College's gaming facility include the installation of digital equipment, an improved display system, better communications; long-range plans envision a new and viable large-scale gaming center, one that will incorporate new gaming concepts and new equipment. With the extension of gaming into new

and vital areas, and with the aid of improved facilities and equipment, gaming will continue to provide "a practice field for the acquirement of skill and experience in the conduct or direction of war, and an experimental and trial ground for the testing of strategic and tactical plans," thus helping the College meet the challenges

of tomorrow in much the same manner as it did when, in its early years, the College was struggling for survival.



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by

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INTRODUCTION

Adm. Arthur W. Radford, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in testifying before a Congressional Committee stated:

The importance of the Middle East to the free world can hardly be over-estimated militarily and economically. First, its huge oil reserves now supply most of the wants of Europe, and their loss would be disastrous. Secondly, its geographic location is astride the lines of communication between West and East, and, thirdly, it is only in this area that the Soviets have no buffer states.¹

The Eastern Mediterranean, located at the juncture of Europe, Asia, and

Africa has been the historical crossroads of invading armies for centuries. Explored by many of the Western Powers it remains one of the most strategic areas in the world today.

Russian aspirations in the Eastern Mediterranean date back to Peter the Great. Turkey, lying athwart the Straits between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean, has often experienced Russian probes but has successfully resisted them with the alternating and occasionally combined support of Great Britain, France, and Germany. Russia's plea for support of her ambitions was exemplified in the Hitler-Stalin Pact of 1939.

Faced with a power vacuum that resulted when the British, for economic reasons, were forced to evacuate the area, the United States in 1947 countered Russian ambitions with the Truman Doctrine. Notwithstanding these efforts, the Soviets along with the United States supported the establishment of the Jewish State of Israel in 1948. This gave Russia a voice in the Middle East, ensured the departure of British authority from Palestine, and the promise of continued Arab-Israeli conflict.

More recent events that have further complicated Western interests are the Arab-Israeli War of 1967 and the British decision to withdraw forces east of Suez. The Soviets have apparently viewed the existing political environment as an opportunity to project their influence in this vital area. It would appear that Russia has nothing to gain from preservation of the status quo in the Middle East. The assistance given to Egypt and Syria today, for the same reason that Israel was supported in 1948, appears to be the one factor most likely to upset the political balance in the Eastern Mediterranean.

The most significant evolution in Soviet foreign policy since 1955 is the change from a continental to a global strategy. Nowhere has the change been more apparent than in the "gray" areas between the Soviet and Western spheres of influence--one such area being the Eastern Mediterranean.

The purpose of this paper is to make a realistic appraisal of Soviet objectives in this vital area of the Eastern Mediterranean. The geographic area of the Eastern Mediterranean is described herein as Greece, Turkey, Syria, the Levant, Egypt, and the sea area extending from the Strait of Otranto to the eastern boundary of Egypt. It is from the relatively recent penetration of this area that avenues lay open for further expansion of Soviet influence. Although the paper mainly concentrates on the area

defined above, when discussing such topics as foreign aid, projection of seapower, and military bases, reference will be made to the greater Middle East and strategic waterways therein, to further illustrate Soviet influence in the area.

I--RUSSIA'S HISTORICAL INTEREST IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

The "great northern power" that has sought so consistently since the seventeenth century to extend its power to the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf has found its way impeded . . . by human opposition. Only the Bosphorus-Dardanelles Channel, with the Sea of Marmora--in which vessels can be employed--provides an easy, natural passage way from the Black Sea into the Aegean, whence Turkey could be flanked, and on into the Mediterranean with its limitless opportunities for the application of power. But the Turkish Straits lie at the eastern door of Europe, and it is inevitable that they should have been most jealously guarded, not by the Turks alone but by the dominant powers of Western and Central Europe, as well.¹

Dr. Hoskins is one of numerous scholars who acknowledges and emphasizes the strategic significance of the Eastern Mediterranean to both the Soviet Union and Western democracies.

The Ottoman Empire of the Turks, a most formidable military power, a ruler of three continents, and the terror of the Christian world dominated the Mediterranean until the 19th century. The Ottoman Turks conquered the Arab world, gained a foothold in Eastern Europe at the expense of the Byzantine Empire, and swept around the Black Sea and turned it into an Ottoman lake.²

Although Russia appeared on the Eastern political scene in the ninth century, there was no major friction beyond limited border raids. It was not until the reign of Peter the Great that Russia exhibited any real interest in extending its boundaries. Determined to

establish a foothold on the Black Sea and gain access to the warm water ports of the Mediterranean, Peter captured the Turkish Black Sea fortress of Azov in 1696. Russian preoccupation in the Russo-Swedish war and the alliance between Turkey and Charles XII of Sweden allowed the Turks to regain possession of Azov in 1711.³

Russian aspirations in gaining a foothold in the Mediterranean began to take form by events commencing in the 18th century. These occurrences were centered around the evolution of Western Powers, becoming world powers, the rise in Tzarist objectives of expansion, the decline of the Ottoman Empire, and the counteractions of Western power to Russia's southern expansion.

Catherine the Great continued the Kremlin's policy in the Middle East. When Russia became involved with the Poles, the Turks declared war on Russia. Catherine then dispatched the Baltic Fleet around Europe, and it annihilated the Turkish Navy at Chesme. The Russian Fleet continued "mopping up" operations in the Aegean Sea and in 1772 occupied Beirut where the Russian flag flew over the Arab population for 5 months.⁴ Although the naval effort failed to penetrate the Dardanelles, the treaty concluded in 1774, coupled with subsequent pressure on the Ottoman Empire, gained for Russia additional territory and free navigation in the Black Sea.⁵

Catherine's son Paul attempted to penetrate the Mediterranean and the Adriatic Sea by diplomatic means rather than the use of force. Through the combined efforts of Russia and the Turks, the Ionian Islands were liberated from the French. Russia had now secured an Adriatic base of operations for exercising control of the Balkans. The arrival of Napoleon in the Middle East resulted in the first defensive alliance between Russia and Turkey, in which Russia was granted free passage through the straits, and the strategic waterway

was closed to the warships of other foreign powers.

These successful Russian advances were not going unnoticed by the British but efforts to muster an immediate British response in the area were overshadowed by the spectacular rise of Napoleon. In 1798 the Napoleon expedition successfully landed at Alexandria. Although suffering a crushing naval defeat by Lord Nelson a month later, Napoleon preserved his army and made advances into Syria and Palestine. Napoleon's adventure failed to establish France in the Middle East; however, Charles Moran describes it as having the following effect:

This historical importance of the French expedition to Egypt far transcends any question presented by the conflict between revolutionary France and conservative England. Bonaparte had demonstrated that a small army of resolute men in control of the country which by its location dominated the shortest route to India could compel Great Britain to forsake the broad oceans over which her fleets roamed at will and concentrate on a restricted but intricate area. . . . The French plan was not a diversion; it was more than a mere colonial venture. It was a bold flight of major strategy. . . .

By 1812 Napoleon's Middle Eastern adventures had ceased, and Russia's southward expansion was resumed. Britain, with great commercial interests in the Mediterranean, saw the need to promote actively the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. Turkey's appeal to the great powers for regulations to operate the straits resulted in a "neutralization" policy in the Treaty of 1809. Though Russia was denied access to the Mediterranean, she was assured that no hostile fleet would attack her Black Sea possessions.⁷

In 1832 Turkey faced the invasion of an expeditionary force headed by the Egyptian, Ibrahim Pasha. The Russian Fleet came to the rescue of the Sultan. According to the Unkiar Iskelessi treaty that followed, Russia became guardian

of the Straits and the Ottoman Empire became dependent upon its powerful northern neighbor.⁸ A later war between the Ottoman Empire and Egypt resulted in the intervention of European powers principally Great Britain, who were alarmed by the Russian influence in Constantinople. The subsequent convention of the straits in 1841 once more checked Russian influence and placed the Ottoman Empire under joint European protectorate.⁹ The groundwork was being laid for the formation of an anti-Russian bloc, which was soon to challenge Russia in the Crimean War.

The Crimean War ensued after Nicholas I countered Napoleon the Third's efforts to strengthen the French influence in the Near East with a demand for protection over Orthodox Christians throughout the Ottoman Empire. Russian invasion into Turkish provinces caused England and France to declare war in 1854. The Treaty of Paris, which followed the fall of Sevastopol, excluded the Russian Fleet from the Black Sea and restricted the construction of defense installations along its shores. The defeat of Imperialist Russia by no means ended her efforts in territorial expansion as it was unrealistic to expect Russia to tolerate the harsh provisions.

In 1877 when Turkish upheavals occurred in the Balkans, the Russians once again invaded and were successful. However, from the big powers' point of view, the peace demands that were dictated at San Stefano seriously upset the balance of power in the East.¹⁰ The diplomatic defeat for Russia, at the Congress of Berlin, accompanied by British occupation of Cyprus and followed by the occupation of Egypt, restored a balance of power through the substitution of British for Ottoman power. Britain had no outstanding interest in Cyprus until the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869. The vital character of the canal was obvious from the standpoint of world trade and empire affairs, and the Cyprus defense post was

occupied as part of a plan to block the advance of the Russians to the Eastern Mediterranean.¹¹ In the meantime, Great Britain feared that the Suez Canal might be closed to her in time of war. This prompted the Convention of Constantinople, in 1888, in which the big powers agreed to neutralize the canal.¹²

At the turn of the century, German influence in the Ottoman Empire was manifest, and at the outbreak of World War I Germany and Turkey concluded a secret alliance treaty. Germany's aim was that Turkey would divert some Russian and British energies from the war in Europe. Turkey's effort toward neutrality ended when Russia declared war on the Ottoman Empire after two Turkish battleships, manned by German crews, attacked the Russian Fleet in the Black Sea.¹³ The allied Russian campaign ended in failure but the overall allied victory left Turkey thoroughly humiliated.

At the Treaty of Sevres in 1920 it was agreed to internationalize the straits and to demilitarize the adjacent zones. Constantinople was to remain under Turkish control. The Ottoman Empire died and the Allies divided the spoils. It is significant to note that imperialist Russia had not penetrated the Middle East Arab world but did become a diplomatic ally of Turkey through the difficult years of the rebirth of the Turkish nation under Kemal Ataturk. Having repudiated the Treaty of Sevres and secured Soviet Assistance by a treaty of friendship signed in 1921, Ataturk concentrated on the war of independence for the new Turkish Empire. In the Treaty of Lausanne that followed, Turkey improved her position. Aside from resolving territorial demands in her favor, she had asserted her mastery of the straits by making the Turkish member president of the International Straits Commission.¹⁴

Between the year 1924, in which the Lausanne Treaty was signed, and 1936 no incident occurred to challenge either

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the naval security of the Black Sea powers or the neutrality of the straits. However, in 1936 the Italian attack on Abyssinia, coupled with the Spanish Civil War, placed the Eastern Mediterranean in danger of war and the straits at the merey of hostile attack. Turkey's request for early revision of the Treaty of Lausanne resulted in new negotiations at the Convention of Montreux.¹⁵

Most important among the provisions of the convention, Turkey was authorized to refortify the zone, and the duties of the International Straits Commission were transferred to the Turkish Government. Continued Russian demands for the revision of the provisions of the Montreux Convention have been unsuccessful.

The secret negotiations between the Germans and the Russians prior to World War II in which they attempted to define their respective spheres of influence clearly illustrated Soviet design in the Middle East. In the Hitler-Stalin Pact concluded in 1939, Russia demanded a land and naval base in the Bosphorus-Dardanelles area and claim to an indefinite area in the general direction of the Persian Gulf.¹⁶ As one author puts it, "The Nazi-Soviet Pact was a disaster for the West and a master stroke of Soviet diplomacy. It revealed what the world had to confront when it faced traditional Russian foreign policy goals overlaid with Communist ideology."¹⁷

The turn of events in World War II found Russia invaded by Germany. Although Turkey was encouraged by Russia to join the Allies and was pressured by Germany to join the Axis by playing on Soviet intentions in the Hitler-Stalin pact, she remained neutral until the final phase of the war.

The Soviets once again failed in World War II to penetrate the Eastern Mediterranean by force or pressure. However, after the war, the Soviets continued demands for bases on the straits, threatened the integrity of Tur-

key and Iran, and attempted to establish a Communist regime in Greece.¹⁸ By 1947 Britain was no longer capable of maintaining the status quo in the Eastern Mediterranean. If Greece fell into the hands of the Communists, Turkey would become vulnerable, and the Soviet Union would gain access to the Mediterranean. In the interest of maintaining American security and European stability, the United States sought to fill the vacuum through the Truman Doctrine and the commitment of \$400 million of direct aid to Greece and Turkey.

Russia's southward expansion throughout history was marked by attempts to gain complete control of the Turkish Straits. Such a victory would have meant destruction of the Ottoman Empire and freedom to project her power into the Eastern Mediterranean. History demonstrates that whenever Russia was on the verge of obtaining this ideal objective, she invariably ran into the counterattack of Britain and other European powers who, by determined effort, prevented her attainment of this goal.

Although the Truman Doctrine stemmed the tide of Soviet influence on the Eastern Mediterranean, the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948 and the bitter rivalries among the Arab nations created a political environment suited to the future exploits of the Soviet Union.

The year 1955 constituted an important landmark in Soviet relations with Eastern Mediterranean countries. The Baghdad Pact no longer presented a barrier to Soviet expansionism. The Soviet Union leapfrogged the "Northern tier" and concentrated on the Arab core of the Middle East.

II-SOVIET OPPORTUNITY ARISES

The Soviet objectives in the Eastern Mediterranean have been to extend their influence by encouraging unrest among the peoples of the area and forcing

withdrawal of the West. The Soviets have used every means possible, short of direct conflict, to counter Western influence.

Arab-Israeli Conflict. In the Arab nations to the south of the northern tier, the Soviets have relied largely on diplomatic maneuver and propaganda to aggravate dissent in the Arab world. Attempts by the Soviets to retain their hold on northern Iran after World War II were not successful as was its attempt to gain influence in Turkey. Failing in this, the Soviets turned their attention to Palestine. The Jews, in seeking a state in Palestine, were breaking Britain's grip on the Middle East. Anything which contributed to the weakening of the Western position in that area was welcomed by Moscow. Although traditionally anti-Zionist, the Soviets supported the establishment of a Jewish state.¹ This provided the opportunity for Moscow to gain a voice in the Middle East affairs. By supporting the Palestine partition, the Soviets ensured the departure of the British troops and authority from Palestine and continued Arab-Jewish conflict. This offered the prospect of instability in the Middle East for an indefinite future and the creation of an atmosphere whereby Moscow could best pursue her objectives.

The establishment of Israel during the initial Arab-Israeli conflict in 1947-49 had several far-reaching effects on the political balance in the area. It was a major factor in unifying the Arab nations to the point they are today; it punctuated the decline of United States, British, and French influence in the Middle East; and it invited further Russian influence and expansion into the Middle East.²

In the early 1950's Israel leaned more on the West. Moreover, Israel could not overlook the fact that Jews of the Soviet Union were forbidden to emigrate to Israel. After the Arab-Israeli

war the Soviets were convinced that they could not use Israel as a lever for improving their position in the Middle East.³ As Israel swayed more to the West, Soviet-Israeli relations deteriorated. In late December 1955 the new Soviet attitude in Arab-Israeli relations was expressed by Communist Party Secretary Nikita S. Khrushchev who stated, "from the first day of its existence the State of Israel has been taking a hostile, threatening position toward its neighbors. Imperialists are behind Israel, trying to exploit it against Arabs for their own benefit."⁴

It would appear that Russia has little to gain from the preservation of the status quo in the Middle East. The assistance given to Egypt and Syria today, for the very same reason that Israel was supported in 1948, appears to be the one factor most likely to upset the political balance in the Eastern Mediterranean.

It has been asserted that the Soviets knew in advance of the Arab-Israeli conflict in June 1967, that the Arabs would be defeated, and by sacrificing the arms and equipment previously given to the Arabs, the Arabs would be totally dependent on the Soviet Union. Others say that the Soviet Union could not have planned such a defeat.⁵

In 1957 Walter Laqueur wrote:

Russia has no vested interest in a victory of Egypt in a possible war despite the assistance rendered; one can imagine, on the contrary, that the conditions for the growth of Communism in a defeated Egypt or Syria would be better than an Israel which has lost a war... if Egypt should prevail in the arms race against Israel... Soviet prestige will increase enormously. If Egypt should be defeated for a second time, Communism (and thus indirectly the Soviet Union) will again be the main beneficiary. It is--heads I win, tails you lose.⁶

Another writer, Christopher Emmet, gave credence to this theory after the Arab-Israeli conflict in June 1967. It

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was assumed that Nasser, not the Soviet Government, was in the driver's seat in building up the recent Arab-Israeli crises, and that the Soviet objective was to defeat or weaken Israel and change the Middle Eastern military balance of power. But what if the Soviet objective was not the defeat of Israel but control of the oil through the weakening or overthrow of conservative Arab Governments and through an increasing Arab dependence on Soviet support? In this case, Israel was a vital bone of contention which divided the Arabs from the West.

This Soviet purpose would be served either by the intensification of the Israeli-Arab cold war, through increased guerrilla activity and renewed blockade of the Gulf of Aqaba, or by a hot war. Either would drain Israel's economy, cut off or reduce the flow of oil to the west, threaten the fragile British economy by temporary loss of oil revenues and the probable hlockade of Suez, force the United States to the expense of oil deliveries from the Western Hemisphere for Europe and for the war in Vietnam. True there has been Arab criticism of the lack of Soviet intervention and a temporary loss of Soviet prestige, but the Arabs are more bitter, weaker, and more dependent on the Soviet than ever.⁷

The Soviet Union appears satisfied to encourage movements of a national character in which the hatred of imperialism and Western domination can be exploited. Moscow hoped to take advantage of Anglo-American disagreement over the Palestine issue. Withdrawal of the British presence without any increase of American influence would result in a power vacuum which the Soviet Union might exploit. Once it was clear that the United States was replacing Britain in Israel and the leaders of Israel were looking to the United States for protection, the Soviet Union had to reappraise its policy.

Neo-colonialism. The Arabs stongly desired to reaffirm their independence after World War II. The continued pre-

sence of allied forces on their land added to their existing discontent and frustration. This resulted in a powerful struggle for Arah nationalism. Thereafter, the Arabs resented any type of client-patron relationship with the West. These emotions are common for new states gaining full independence as expressed by Navy Secretary Paul H. Nitze in speaking to the Naval Academy in 1965, he stated, "whatever their shortcomings, their tendency is to blame someone else. The greater their weakness, the more compelling the need to find others to h blame. Rue for inadequacy generates protest against inequality . . . every lack is laid to experience of colonial status. The result is the aspiration of getting even."⁸

Arab nationalism, encouraged by resentment of former colonial rule, constitutes a strong sentiment among the Arab nations. They all appear to desire a change, hut disagree on the kind of change and the method initiating the change. This turmoil has even created friction in the relations among the Arab states. Unable to advance militarily and economically on their own, some of them have looked to the Soviet Union for support. One reason may be the Soviet model of economic development. On the other hand, Western efforts to establish a Middle East Command, the Baghdad Pact, and the Eisenhower Doctrine were highly resented by some Arah states. They maintained that the remnants of West-European Colonialism were more a threat than the Soviet Union. The relationship which involved military cooperation was viewed as a form of neo-colonialism.⁹ In this respect the Soviets held the advantage since they have never appeared in the Middle East as a colonial power. Accordingly, the Soviets have taken full advantage of this opportunity in the form of anti-neo-colonial propaganda.

Arab Nationalism and Communism. It has frequently been asserted that the

two ideological movements of communism and Arab nationalism would join forces in order to reach a common goal: the destruction of the status quo in the Mediterranean. Although cooperation between the Soviet Union, Egypt, and Syria is evident, one writer doubts that Soviet control can be decisive.

Arab nationalism seeking to escape from authority of the West and Russian communism seeking to weaken the strategic position of Great Britain and the United States, but there is no natural compatibility between Moslem and Communist goals. No political party in the Arab World, except a small Communist group proposes more than a temporary threat combination; to go further would merely exchange one alien authority for another. . . . If communism effectively penetrates the Middle East it will be on the heels of a Soviet expansion by arms. All other signs of its presence are significant only in the concept of an Arab-Moslem struggle against Western imperialism.¹⁰

This evaluation assumes rationality on the part of the Arab leaders and masses. However, continued Israeli victories contribute to a response of hatred and possible loss of rationality.

After 1955 the Kremlin recognized the national bourgeoisie as revolutionary in its struggle against colonialism and imperialism even though it was not socialist in its objectives. The immediate objective was to remove Western influence and gain Soviet prestige. The concept envisioned was the greater the internal instability and the weaker the bourgeoisie leadership, the greater the Soviet chances to exploit a socialist revolution.¹¹

By disguising themselves as Arab Nationalists the Communists carried out the instructions given them by Lenin in 1920. "All the Communist parties must assist the bourgeoisie democracy in colonial and backward countries, but must not merge with it."

The support of the national liberation movement in return for Arab support of Soviet policies was not in accord

with the true Communist ideology. Although the Soviets outwardly encouraged Arab unity, the Arabs seemed more divided than ever. Unable to advance progressively in this environment the Soviets turned their attention to the progressive countries in the Arab world. Logically the center of attention was Egypt, with the strongest leader and the best potential for developing some sort of socialist state.¹²

In the year 1956 the Soviets gained prestige in the Middle East when the West attacked the Suez. Since 1951 they had proclaimed the falsehood of Western insistence on the necessity for defense of the Middle East against Russian attack. Although alarmed by the attack, they were not hesitant on pressing home that the Soviets were the defenders of the Middle East.

When Nasser was asked by Mr. William Attwood in an interview published by *Look* magazine, 25 June 1957, whether he was still of the opinion expressed in 1954 when he said that he thought Communist methods and tactics in all Arab countries "are directed to stirring up disorder and hate," he replied in the affirmative: "I think their objectives are dangerous and that is why the Communist Party is illegal in Egypt."¹³ Nasser confirmed this when in 1956 the government continued to send Communists to prison while receiving Russian arms.

In a recent interview with Mr. Attwood, Nasser stated, "we certainly feel more friendly with the Russians than with the West, but we are still unaligned. There is no coordination of policy . . . the Russians support us economically and in the United Nations. We appreciate this help, but we don't feel it limits our freedom at all."¹⁴ This can be interpreted that Egypt still has the same suspicious attitude regarding communism.

Possibly Nasser has observed the Turkish precedent which demonstrated the results of a national revolution

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directed against the West. John C. Campbell, a Middle East expert, showed in 1957 that the Turks went through their nationalist revolution a generation ago. It was directed largely against the West, and Soviet help was welcomed as a means of winning the fight. Turkey then went through a period of neutrality while it consolidated its independence, and finally turned to the West when it perceived the full implications of the Soviet threat.

Analogous to this was the Kremlin support to General Peron until his overthrow in 1955. Peron was endorsed by the Kremlin because he was anti-British and anti-American. Furthermore, Mossadegh of Iran was supported by Moscow until his downfall in 1953, despite his anticommunism because he endeavored to deny the United States and Britain any form of influence.¹⁵

In December 1958, Nasser declared that, "We shall smite down anybody who is opposed to Arab nationalism; the Communist party in Syria working against our unity and against Arab nationalism." This was one of the first attacks made publicly against Communist activity. The feeling of the Arabs themselves is expressed in the Arab meaning of communism as shown by Sharahi in 1966, "Communism, shuyu'iyah, is a 'bad' name in Arabic; it generates mistrust rather than fear. For the masses, Communism constitutes an alien movement with an unintelligible philosophy: for the nationalists, it is an antinationalist doctrine and is therefore opposed."¹⁶

The Arab movement toward unity will probably be supported as long as it can be used as a weapon against the West and Israel. Despite Arab nationalism and a conflict in ideological beliefs, the Soviets have established a foothold in the Middle East. Since the end of the June 1967 war, Russia has advised Egypt that she would be resupplied with military equipment only if she stopped the "milk and water" socialism. How-

ever, Nasser stalled and the arms kept coming, and now about 90 percent have been replaced.¹⁷ To what extent the Soviets will go to meet their objectives is an open ended question.

Aswan Dam Project. The year 1955 marks the period when Russia became firmly established in the Middle East.¹⁸ In that year a kind of bargaining took place which was focused on the supply of arms to Egypt and the financing of the Aswan High Dam. The Egyptian economy has steadily drifted toward Russia ever since the Czech arms deal. Russia repeatedly offered to finance the High Dam project for repayment in cotton and rice over a 30-year period. Nasser was more willing to accept Russian foreign aid as the anxiety for the building of the dam increased. Egypt used her neutrality and the Russian financial offer as a lever in negotiating with the Western Powers.

In December 1955 the United States and British Governments assured their support in the High Aswan Dam project. However, United States long-term aid commitment for the dam was linked as a source of Arab-Israeli tensions and a possible future threat to U.S. cotton exports if Egyptian irrigated land was to be used to grow cotton.¹⁹ Nasser's hesitance on accepting the offer, coupled with his anti-Western actions, resulted in United States withdrawal of the aid offer.

The Soviets were in no hurry to grant aid for the dam for fear of losing prestige should the rift with the United States be only temporary. Assured of a Soviet triumph, the Soviets agreed to finance the dam in 1958. As the need for the dam grew more pressing, Nasser negotiated in terms that he would have never been willing to grant to the Western Power. One writer states that, "history will record that Anglo-American policies not only transferred the achievement to Russia, with all that meant as an example to the under-

developed regions of Africa and Asia, but forced Nasser to accept terms tying him to the commitment."²⁰

The extensive development program is being paid for by Egyptian cotton, the most important agricultural foreign exchange earner, bringing in about \$150 million a year. The Soviet bloc has provided the market for cotton and other agricultural commodities for which Egypt cannot find sufficient customers in Western markets.²¹ Another writer states:

It should have been realized at the time that the Dam was no mere grandiose whim of Nasser's. It was an absolute must for Egypt. The Government of the United Arab Republic has no sympathy with Communism as a way of life--indeed, it is dangerous to be a Communist in the United Arab Republic--but it had to get money and help for the dam from whomsoever it could. The Russians were waiting and willing. The opportunity to win friends and influence Africa was handed to them, one might say, on a plate.²²

On the other hand, Nasser gave little evidence of seeking to improve his diplomatic position with the West. He continued to purchase arms from Eastern Europe and took a hard line against the Baghdad Pact. He recognized the People's Republic of China contrary to an agreement made with the American Ambassador which required prior notice of such a decision. He was instrumental in supporting terrorist raids into Israel; in promoting inflammatory broadcasts of Cairo radio to East Africa; in stalling for financial terms for the High Dam and pronouncing false reports that the Soviet Union had offered a loan on better terms; these actions, if avoided, might have assured Western aid to Egypt.²³

In the meantime the Soviets observed an opportunity and responded. In the case of the dam the Soviets have advanced about 30 percent of the \$1 billion cost. This has paid for equipment and technicians, which at one time numbered 2,000. Ibrahim Zaki, deputy

director of the government's Aswan High Dam Authority, said, "For the Egyptians this is our prize, it makes up for sacrifices, frustrations and defeats elsewhere."²⁴

Practical versus Ideological Factors. It is evident that practical rather than ideological factors have determined Soviet policies in the Middle East. The Communists have no quarrel with Arab nationalism as long as the Arabs concentrate their efforts against the West. While the Soviets have supported the Arab states, they have never supported unity for the Arab world. The apparent strategy is to reduce the influence and prestige by suitable available means even though local Communists may have to ride out events behind prison doors. The Soviets have taken every advantage of the Arab resentment of British and French rule and the Zionist invasion of the Arab world.

It is quite apparent that Moscow is not inclined to pursue a major military attack to obtain its objectives in the area. The fact that they have made impressive gains without resorting to the use of armed force is all the more reason to believe that direct attack is improbable. As John C. Campbell stated in 1961, "one of the great perils of the coming year may be the gradual advance of Soviet power in such areas as the Middle East without the resort to anything that international law or world opinion would call an act of overt aggression."²⁵

III--SOVIET FOREIGN AID AND ASSISTANCE

During the past dozen years, economic and military aid to less developed countries of the Eastern Mediterranean has become a key instrument in the Soviet effort to project its presence. The Soviets needed only to present themselves as an additional source of political and economic support to find a number of willing recipients. The Soviets give

high priority to the establishment of policies in these countries which would enhance their influence and eliminate the influence of the West. As one writer puts it, "the national liberation of colonial peoples and their ultimate amalgamation with world communism have always been accorded high priority in Communist strategic thinking."¹ The purpose of this chapter is to discuss various means of Soviet economic penetration in the Middle East and to some extent a comparison with other areas. (Unless otherwise indicated, the economic data contained in this chapter is taken from the Congressional Joint Economic Committee Report of 1966.²)

Economic Aid Program. The year 1955 marked the initial major penetration of Soviet aid in the Middle East. Since that time the Soviet Foreign Aid Program can generally be broken down into four periods. In the first stage, 1955-57, both economic and military aid served as the initial entree into the Middle East, and the Russians seemed to offer aid indiscriminately. In the second stage, 1958-61, the Soviet aid program was more selective in nature. The political aspects of the Soviet aid program were shown by the preference given to Egypt and Syria.³ The two countries received \$760 million in credit. This was three times as much as that given to India as during this period nearly 30 percent of the total Soviet aid went to the Middle East.

The third stage, 1961-63, showed a decrease in the Soviet aid program. The major recipients, having recently been granted large aid extensions, were in the initial phases of their 5-year development programs. By this time the Soviets had also negotiated aid agreements with a number of African countries. The fourth phase commenced with Soviet aid reaching a new high of \$1 billion in 1964. The United Arab Republic and India received about two-thirds of the total aid program for use in their forth-

coming 5-year plan. Subsequent Soviet aid commitments seemed to be project oriented in contrast to umbrella-type lines of credit frequently extended in the past.

The Soviets have repeatedly strived to dismantle the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) and with this objective allocated nearly 85 percent of all aid in 1965 to Iraq, Pakistan, Turkey, all members of the pact. Some of the member nations have already begun to question the usefulness of CENTO and have tended to stress the economic rather than the military nature of the pact.⁴ Iran has accepted extensive economic aid from the Soviet Union since the United States discontinued the aid mission which has been in operation for 16 years. The main project is the Iranian natural gas line, which the Soviets are helping finance for a 12-year pledge of gas delivery.⁵

Technical Assistance. The less developed countries desire for rapid economic expansion requires substantial technical and professional skills. The Soviets fully realize that technical assistance and academic training must go hand in hand with foreign aid to these countries.

In the 10-year period from 1955 to 1965, about 50,000 Soviet economic technicians have been employed in less developed countries. In the same period the Soviets have provided more than 20,000 personnel with technical training in the Soviet Union. Over one-third of all Soviet economic technicians have been employed in the Middle East. As early as 1951 it was reported that Russian diplomats, technicians, and civilian employees were streaming into the Middle East.

The administrative experience of officials in recipient countries has caused problems in the rapid construction of Soviet prestige projects and has prolonged the employment period of Soviet technicians. The reluctance of

the Soviet Union to assume complete administrative responsibility for an aid project has brought about costly work stoppage and delays. However, an effort to curtail delays was exemplified in the recent dispatch of Soviet specialists to study the Indian steel plants to ensure more efficient production. One Western official remarked, "It's a new kind of aid, you build a plant, then you guarantee that you will keep it working to capacity."⁶ Economic advisers and Soviet experts are frequently employed to ensure completion of a project on time as was done in planning the oil field development in Syria.⁷

One of the major technical assistance objectives is to supply the local population with technical skills needed to ensure successful completion of the aid projects. Accordingly, assistance takes the form of technical training programs in the Soviet Union for persons who will be employed as supervisors, foremen, and skilled technicians on Soviet-aided projects being constructed in the recipient country. This type of training generally consists of 6 to 12-month programs except for some of the highly specialized training which may run for as long as 3 years. It was estimated that by the end of 1965 the Soviet Union had provided technical training for about 7,000 trainees from less developed countries. About 85 percent of all trainees have been from countries in Asia and the Middle East.

Among other technical training techniques employed by the Soviet Union is the construction of technical institutes and vocational training centers in the less developed countries. These centers offer training in most industrial and agricultural skills required below the supervisory level. In the United Arab Republic, 20 training centers which can train about 4,000 workers during one training session have been constructed under the \$175 million credit extended by the Soviet Union in 1958. The most important way of transferring simple

technical skills to large numbers of workers is through on-the-job training programs. The usual practice is to have a worker assigned to each Soviet technician employed on a construction project. This aid technique has the advantage of leaving the feeling of having participated in the construction of the project.

Academic Training. An important program for establishing and maintaining contact with the emerging elite in many less developed countries is the provision of scholarships for academic study in the Soviet Union. The costs of this training generally are borne by the Soviet Union in the form of scholarship aid. In the peak year of 1962, more than 3,400 students enrolled in academic programs. The number of new enrollees in subsequent years has declined with an estimated 1,300 students entering the Soviet Union in 1965. The decline may be attributed to a more stringent selection process or the growing volume of reported dissatisfaction by Soviet nationals with the presence of these students. Another factor may be the increasing student discontent with the conditions under which academic programs must be pursued; for example, inadequate facilities and financial assistance, racial discrimination, and political indoctrination.

Military Aid Program. Perhaps the most dynamic aspect of the Soviet aid effort in the less developed countries has been the military assistance program. Since the inception of the military aid program in 1955, the Soviet Union has provided about \$4 billion worth of military assistance. The major recipients have been the United Arab Republic and Indonesia, each having obtained more than \$1 billion worth of military equipment. Soviet military assistance to the less developed countries has been the primary vehicle for achieving a position of influence in some regions vital to Western interests

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and has had an immediate impact on the regional balance of power.

Military assistance to countries has often provided the basis for expanding other political and economic ties. Accordingly, Soviet credits for economic development have followed soon after the signing of an arms agreement. The recipient finds that involvement takes on a snowballing effect and before he is able to counter this trend, he finds his political survival is dependent upon Soviet assistance. Nowhere is this more exemplified than in Egypt.⁸

The manpower base in many countries is not able to command, operate, and maintain the modern military equipment. The dispatch of large numbers of Soviet military technicians to less developed countries has proved to be necessary. The Soviets have planted advisers deep in the ranks of the Egyptian armed forces. Nasser claims about 1,000 Soviet advisers are present in Egypt.⁹

A large part of the Soviet military technical assistance program consists of training military personnel at military installations in the Soviet Union. It is estimated that 18,000 personnel had been trained by the end of 1965. Indonesia and the United Arab Republic have accounted for the bulk of this training.

By offering technical and academic training programs and the use of its technical personnel, the Soviets have established close relationship with individuals who will hold important positions in their countries. The Soviets have placed emphasis on the student exchange program with one objective being to convert a selected few to their way of thinking and indoctrinating them to serve as missionaries for spreading the party line. However, in this endeavor the Soviets have had little success as the Arab leadership has remained quite independent.

Although the Soviets have a wide range of aid programs, it would seem

most likely that the greatest aid commitment will be concentrated in the Middle East in an effort to outflank NATO and eliminate CENTO. Illustrative of this is Turkey who has signed an agreement with the Soviets for the supply of equipment, materials, and technical services for seven major industrial projects.¹⁰

According to V. F. Garbuzov, the Soviet Union Minister of Finance, the Foreign Economic Relations Plan for 1968 envisages an increase in the foreign trade turnover of 7.4 percent and the 5-year period about 33 percent. This will mean broader trade ties and economic and technical assistance to the United Arab Republic, Syria, Algeria, India, and Pakistan and also with countries bordering the Soviet Union--Afghanistan, Turkey, and Iran.¹¹

IV--EXPANDING SOVIET NAVAL PRESENCE

We have thus far considered the successful projection of Soviet influence into the Middle East and have examined the role that foreign aid, trade, and technical assistance played. Let us turn our attention now to the potential problem of Soviet naval presence in the Eastern Mediterranean, with a view toward assessing future Soviet objectives in that area.

The Russians have had a policy of territorial expansion since the days of Peter the Great, and they have long been interested in developing their naval power. However, their geographical location and lack of open ports have greatly hampered the development of both a navy and a merchant marine. They are fully aware of the part that seapower has played in the United States ability to influence events around the world, particularly in the Eastern Mediterranean. Parenthetically, the effect of these actions should not be overlooked in explaining the Soviet naval buildup there.

The Growing Concern. In SECNAV Notice 5720, the Secretary of the Navy gave credence to the projection of Soviet seapower when he stated, "Events daily continue to indicate that the Soviet Navy, long known to be increasing in numbers and quality of fighting ships, now also is embarked on a plan to break out of the confines of adjacent sea areas."¹ Several prominent authorities have recently shown concern when they stated:

Soviet presence in the Mediterranean had all the earmarks of a concerted effort to alter the strategic balance . . . a strong Soviet power position in the Mediterranean, supported by a string of client states along its southern shore, would give the Russians not only control of key resources essential to the European economy, but positions to menace the flow of shipping on which that economy's survival depends.²

The Soviet is now permanently established in the Mediterranean and is astride the northern exit of the Suez Canal. They have, as predicted been offered a base in Aden, which gives them an opportunity, which should they wish to do so, to interfere with the only other trade route to Europe round the shores of southern Africa.³

The shift of the Soviet Union to a maritime strategy is certainly one of the most startling strategic developments of this decade. Indeed it may be one of the major strategic changes in the twentieth century. The failure of ambitious nations to appreciate seapower often has led to their defeat.⁴

The recent Soviet buildup in the Eastern Mediterranean is not surprising in an area that has historically been a source of conflict among the big powers. The withdrawal of Britain from east of Suez has caused a power vacuum in the Eastern Mediterranean area.

Soviet Navy Post-World War II Development. It was evident to the Soviets that the new world alignment after World War II indicated an ever-increasing need for naval power. Although the atomic bomb had changed

the nature of war, Stalin nevertheless approved a naval shipbuilding program consisting of a huge fleet of submarines, a large fleet of destroyers, and a fleet of cruisers. In 1948-1949 the *Sverdlov* class of 20,000 ton "light cruisers" and the *Skorrry* class destroyers along with the first postwar, long-range submarines were planned for construction.

At the time of Stalin's death in 1953, much of the construction program was laid down or completed. However the aircraft carrier program had not commenced. The strides made in the missile and nuclear technology fields caused reevaluation in Soviet military strategy, and the decision was made to forego plans for aircraft carrier construction. Accordingly, about 1954 it was decided to cease further construction of light and heavy cruisers, since they would require carrier support for high seas operations.

The New Fleet. The mid-1950's marked a change in Soviet naval thinking. In consonance with the nuclear age the Russian naval strategists decided to concentrate on a fleet of small, missile-armed ships and a nuclear-powered submarine force armed with missiles.⁵ Between 1955 and 1958 the Soviet shipbuilding program shifted from conventional submarines, destroyers, and escort construction to submarines capable of launching ballistic missiles and destroyers equipped with surface-to-surface missiles. The construction program included missile destroyers of the *Kashin* and *Kynda* class coupled with the *Komar* and *Osa* class patrol boats. (A *Komar* class patrol boat fired the missile that sank the Israel destroyer *Elath* in October 1967.⁶) Although the submarine fleet was reduced to about 400 in number, 300 are capable of long-range cruising, and 40 to 50 are now nuclear-powered.

Along with this buildup, the Soviet merchant marine increased from a 3.6 million deadweight tons in 1949 to 9

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million today, with a fleet of 20 million tons planned by 1980.⁷ Adm. John S. McCain, Jr., as Commander in Chief of U.S. Naval Forces Europe, pointed out that the "Soviet Union has one of the most modern merchant fleets in the world, and it is rapidly growing. They have over 1,200 merchant ships today . . . in five years' time, they could have the world's largest and most modern merchant marine."⁸

Carriers Mark Shift in Soviet Policy. In the late fifties the Soviets apparently depended on guided-missile destroyers and Badger bombers to counter carrier strike forces. In the early sixties a reversal in Soviet naval strategy was indicated when Fleet Adm. Segie Gorshkov stated:

In the past our ships and naval aircraft have operated primarily near our coasts . . . concerned mainly with operations and tactical coordination with ground troops. Now we must be prepared through broad offensive operations to deliver crushing strikes against sea and ground targets of the imperialists on any point of the world ocean and adjacent territories.⁹

The reason for the decision to begin carrier construction is not known. However, the U.S. ability to project sea-power to the troubled spots throughout the world, as during the Cuban missile crisis, certainly has not gone unnoticed.

Following the announcement of Soviet carrier construction, Vice Adm. William E. Ellis, Chief of Staff of the Supreme Allied Command, Atlantic, stated, "they never before felt the need for carriers as contrasted to the United States or Britain because they didn't have many overseas commitments. Apparently their thinking is changing."¹⁰ Although the present carriers are designed for launching helicopters rather than jets, Adm. Ephraim P. Holmes, Commander in Chief of the U.S. Atlantic Fleet, stated that, "with their growing awareness of NATO strategy, it wouldn't surprise me a bit if

they decided to have carriers for high performance aircraft."¹¹ Most likely the present carriers are designed for the dual role of antisubmarine warfare and helicopter assault.

The New Era. According to Harland Cleveland, U.S. Ambassador to NATO, in July 1967 a total of 46 Soviet ships were operating in the Mediterranean, including some of the latest guided-missile cruisers and about 10 submarines, together with numerous support ships.¹² More revealing statistics were presented by Adm. Charles D. Griffin, Commander in Chief, Allied Forces, Southern Europe, when he stated that the Soviet Navy ship days in the Mediterranean have increased over 600 percent in the past 3 years. The monthly average of Soviet combatant ships in the Mediterranean has increased nearly 1,000 percent during the same period.¹³

Senator Spong from Virginia, citing the *Times Dispatch*, Richmond, Va., asserting that in recent months the Soviet strength in the Mediterranean has caused increasing concern both within the United States and in NATO Alliance, said, "that shortly after the Middle East war in June of 1967, Soviet ships in the Mediterranean came close to matching United States vessels in number if not in strength."¹⁴ Representative Keith from Massachusetts noted the rapid growth of the Soviet merchant fleet, "increasing at the rate of 100 new ships a year."¹⁵ There have been indications that the Soviets are trying to develop a Polaris type submarine for operations in the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets.¹⁶

In the past the global mobility of U.S. amphibious forces has proven an effective military counterweight to Soviet political mobility in the limited warfare situation. Hitherto the Soviet Navy has lacked any organized amphibious element. However, the relatively recent naval construction program gives

the Soviet Navy a possible new capability of projecting power ashore by use of vertical envelopment backed by surface-to-surface and surface-to-air missile equipped fleet which might well restrict Western actions in "crisis management" situations.

Exploiting Naval Presence Short of Base Rights. The Soviet Fleet seems capable of extended periods of operations at sea and can call at Algerian, Syrian, or Egyptian ports to relax, replenish, and refuel. To seek actual Soviet logistic bases on Arab territory would be a radical departure from the Kremlin's policy of maintaining no bases or troops on foreign soil, drawing maximum public relations advantage from this procedure.¹⁷

The Soviets have upheld this policy since the withdrawal from their former submarine base at Vohra, Albania, in 1961. They have consistently made the liquidation of foreign military bases a strong point in nearly all their proposals for disarmament and as a vehicle for propaganda attack. The Soviets consider the neutrality of a country as a first step in disengaging the Western Powers from ties with foreign countries. In this regard they are aware that a country is not neutral when it is granting base rights to a third party.¹⁸

As an argument for withdrawal from overseas bases the Soviet Union has used the Cuban missile crisis. "The problem of military bases maintained . . . close to the borders of third parties is a sign of the instability of international relations and provocation throughout the world. They are an inherent danger against the country which they are spearheaded and the countries in which they are located."¹⁹ Some Soviet writers espouse that, "Military bases and troops on foreign territory are utilized in efforts to suppress the national liberation movement, to trample on the sovereign rights of states and interfere in their home and foreign policy."²⁰

Admiral McCain has contended that "seapower can be deployed over nearly three-quarters of the earth's surface without the need for negotiations for base rights and overflights rights." Seapower is capable of providing aircraft facilities, repair facilities, communication facilities, hospitals, barracks, stores, fuel, and ammunition. The mobile base is further capable of launching ballistic missiles and air strikes coupled with the ability to place military troops ashore.²¹

By copying the U.S. Navy's supply ship or "fleet" train system the Soviets have reduced the requirement for the need of naval bases. The Soviet view on naval base rights was vividly expressed by Leonid Brezhnev at the conference of Communist and Worker's Parties of Europe held at Karlovy Vary, Czechoslovakia in April 1967:

There is no justification whatever for the constant presence of the U.S. Fleet in waters washing the shores of Southern Europe. One would like to ask: What are the grounds, twenty years after the end of World War II, for the U.S. Sixth Fleet to cruise the Mediterranean and to use military bases, ports, and supply bases in a number of Mediterranean countries? This poses a serious threat to the independence of all coastal countries. The time has come to demand the complete withdrawal of the U.S. Sixth Fleet from the Mediterranean.²²

To cope with the nonavailability of naval bases in the Mediterranean, the Soviets have been successful in acquiring visitation rights similar to the U.S. procedure in Hong Kong. Agreement has been made between the United Arab Republic and Soviet Union that the Alexandrian Naval Arsenal will maintain and repair Soviet fishing boats in the Mediterranean. The Soviet Union will provide the necessary equipment and parts.²³ The Soviets will probably seek this method of ship repair rather than contend with the ramifications of formal base rights involving a fenced perimeter, excluding foreign nationals.

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On the other hand, indications are that the Soviet Union is negotiating to take over the naval base at Mers-el-Kehir, Algeria, when the French move out.²⁴ Possible efforts toward establishing a naval base on Egyptian territory prompted Dr. el-Zayyat, head of Egyptian Information Organization to state, "we are against giving bases to anyone and certainly against giving bases to the Soviet Union or the United States or any country." However, the possibility of a naval refueling station or other facilities was not ruled out.²⁵ Since the Soviet Union has outfitted the Egyptian Navy, Soviet ships visiting Egyptian ports have available large stocks of spare parts and Soviet naval technicians are on hand.²⁶ Further indication of Soviet interest in naval facilities was evidenced by Admiral Gorshkov's trip to India in February 1968 when it was reported that he was trying to line up a world system of ports of call and bases.²⁷ This move was followed by the announcement of the impending visit of Soviet warships to Indian ports where they could refuel and perform repairs.²⁸

People to People Program. The U.S. Public Affairs regulations draw attention to the importance of international community relations. "Ships visits to overseas ports are one of the main instruments for promoting international good will and favorable community relations."²⁹ The Soviet Navy, long confined to its borders, now is reaping more rewards than Western Powers from Mediterranean port visits due to their political advantage in the area. One writer states that "Russian culture follows the Red flag," citing that in Alexandria young girls are quitting belly dance classes and attending Russian ballet classes. Soviet folk dance groups tour the major Arab cities.³⁰

In Admiral Griffin's discussion of Soviet seapower he points out that the Arab people are the objects of flattery, attention, state visits, gifts, special

favours, and advice.³¹ Further credence was given to the effect of Soviet influence on the littoral Mediterranean states port visits by a Jordanian writer discussing United States and NATO concern for Soviet presence in the Mediterranean and asserting that "the danger lies not in the presence of the Soviet fleet, but the cordial reception of that fleet in ports from Latakia to Mers-el-Kehir to the Atlantic."³²

NATO's Southern Flank. NATO's outstanding success in achieving its goal of blocking Soviet expansion in Europe has made predictable the direction of Soviet efforts elsewhere. Prior to World War II, northern Africa and the Levant were under the umbrella of European powers. Now they are independent nations subjected to Soviet influence.

To the north lies the long coastlines of Greece and Turkey exposed to uncertainties of naval action. The possibility of a renewed Cyprus confrontation involving two NATO allies fighting in the presence of the Soviet Fleet obviously is of concern to NATO.

NATO authorities have discussed the feasibility of a multinational naval force to counter the growing Soviet Fleet in the Mediterranean. The concept envisions the naval support of Italy, Greece, Turkey, and the United States.³³ Such a fleet may offer a means of resolving the difference of Greece and Turkey over the Cyprus problem, and their active military cooperation might divert their attention to the common threat from the Soviet Union.

Soviet construction of a first aircraft carrier confirms Russia's interest in maintaining a military force capable of intervening outside Russian borders. The large-scale buildup of naval forces in the Mediterranean demonstrates the Soviet desire to play an influential politico-military role in the area. Although the power equation in the Mediterranean has shifted, the Soviet naval

arm is not yet of a dimension to counter the U.S. Sixth Fleet. However, psychologically, even small forces can be used to influence regional conflicts and inspire Communist elements ashore. Soviet naval power is magnified by the extent to which they are able to gain political favor in countries rimming the Mediterranean such as Syria, Egypt, and Algeria.

As one writer puts it, "The Mediterranean's strategic importance . . . involves something much bigger than the flow of Middle Eastern oil westward. Whoever controls this waterway holds enormous military, political, economic, and diplomatic leverage on the countries around it, inevitably affecting a sizeable hinterland in Africa, the Middle East and Europe as well."³⁴ Seapower has given the Soviets an important voice in steering the course of events in the Mediterranean, with further capability of extension through the Suez, to the Indian Ocean and the coasts of southern Africa.

V--POSSIBLE FUTURE SOVIET OBJECTIVES

The Eastern Mediterranean has become, during the period 1967-68, one of the main storm centers of world politics. It appears to have become, as far as the Soviet Union is concerned, the most promising area in the world for the extension of its influence. Thus, events concerning Soviet movements in that area are now followed by the United States with a far greater measure of attention than previously. It appears that current Soviet policy seeks to prevent an agreement between the Arab countries and the West and peace between Israel and the Arab states.

There is no question in regard to the extensive gains that the Soviets have made in the Eastern Mediterranean in recent years. Their growing seapower, the willingness to support Arab nationalism, and the continued extensive economic and military aid all point to

further Soviet efforts to counter Western influence in the area. In 1966 King Hussein of Jordan described Soviet objective in the Arab world as follows:

... to destroy everything really Arab every connection that an Arab has with his past and to destroy his confidence and the possibility for him to make progress. . . . The Arab world was always a Russian target, even during the days before Communist threat ever existed. At the present time this area is of particular importance to the Soviets because they have suffered so many setbacks in the rest of the world in Africa, in Asia. They also have a great deal invested here. I believe there is a new Soviet policy and that this policy aims at the control of this area. I think the Soviets are prepared to go very far in this matter--almost to the point of a confrontation with the Free World.¹

Mediterranean Steppingstones. The Soviets can be expected to stir animosities between the Turks and the Greeks over the island of Cyprus in order to weaken NATO's southern flank and thereby reduce Western influence in the Eastern Mediterranean. Soviet control of this strategic position would provide a jumpoff point for further subversion in the area.

It seems logical that the Soviets will exploit the vacuum left by British disengagement from Malta unless prompt Western action is initiated. It is ironic that one of Britain's greatest naval heroes, Lord Nelson, back in 1799 wrote: "The Russians are anxious to get to Malta and they care for nothing else."² In 1899 Alfred T. Mahan compared the strategic position of Malta with that of Puerto Rico, "there is for us the necessity to hold and strengthen the one [Puerto Rico] . . . and its immediate surroundings, that there is for Great Britain to hold the other [Malta] for the security of her position in Egypt, . . . use of the Suez, and for the control of the route to India."³

Soviet Aid Program. In an effort to preserve political prestige and the advantages acquired in its struggle for influ-

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ence in the Middle East, the Soviet aid program can be expected to continue. The drive to expand economic ties on a commercial basis with Lebanon is a striking example.⁴ The Soviets most probably will continue to make long-term aid commitments and be willing to accept commodities in repayment. In consonance with this the Egyptians are making long-term payments of cotton and other agricultural exports for the arms supplied by the Soviets since the June 1967 war.⁵ Although Russia has suffered losses in billions of dollars of military aid in the Middle East, as in Indonesia, her Communist ideology and support of nationalism will cause her to continue to probe soft spots with the intent of increasing her influence in areas around her borders. An expert on the Middle East gives this view, "Where doors are open Russia will walk in. . . . There are many doors open in the Mediterranean and the Middle East, and you'll find Russia walking in."⁶

Most likely the Soviets will emphasize military aid because of the immediate political effect of such aid and the greater degree of dependence it generates. However, arms aid to the Arab world could backfire if used in conflicts contrary to Soviet purposes as in an inter-Arab war. Still the Soviets have a standing offer of arms to the Arab countries. As yet the Jordanians have not accepted this offer. However, as Hussein of Jordan is pressured by Arab critics inside and outside the country for refusing to accept Russian arms, it is possible that Jordan might be forced to reverse its position. Other countries as Sudan and Yemen have not hesitated to accept Soviet military support.⁷

Middle East Oil. Much of the Middle East area is capable of oil production. Control of the oil flow would provide a bargaining power over the European countries. Since the Soviet Union exports its own oil, it is unlikely that Moscow desires direct control of Arab

oil. Undoubtedly they will strive for a voice in selling oil to the West and over the terms of that oil trade. In Syria the Soviets have achieved a breakthrough in Middle Eastern oil by a recent agreement signed with Iraq.⁸ One writer sees the Soviet strategy as:

. . . elimination of Western powers and influence. Arming the Syrians and Egyptians and helping the Yemen republicans were part of the plan to undermine the conservative and more pro-western states. Eventually, according to this plan the revolutionaries would inherit in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf, and the western hold on Arab oil would disappear. Russians would control the Arab crossroads and the movements and cost of Arab oil in Europe.⁹

It seems likely that any Soviet economic move to control the Middle East oil industry could cause a conflict of interests among the Arab states. A restriction on the oil flow from the Middle East would cause the previous recipients to search for other sources and consequently deprive the Arab world of its primary survival product. In the face of strong Arab nationalism, the Soviets would most likely move cautiously in such a venture.

Aircraft Carrier Construction. As the British phase out their aircraft carriers, the Soviets have made the decision to construct that versatile warship. The extent to which the Soviets intend to pursue this construction program is questionable. However, the Soviets have long shadowed U.S. carrier operations in the China Sea and in so doing have gained an appreciation of their capability. The present carriers appear to be designed for helicopter assault which provides an effective means for projecting power ashore and can be influential as a politico-military device in turning the tide in local conflicts such as Lebanon. The embarked helicopters undoubtedly possess antisubmarine detection systems which would serve to enhance Soviet antisubmarine capability.

One reason why the Soviets have not yet commenced the construction of a CVA type aircraft carrier bears on the premise that their shore-based naval air arm will support surface forces operating within tactical range of these aircraft. For surface forces operating outside the range of shore-based tactical aircraft, the Soviet strategy may be to rely on surface forces equipped with surface-to-air and surface-to-surface missiles for offensive and defensive operations in lieu of carriers capable of operating high performance aircraft. However, the future capability of the present Soviet carriers to operate high performance vertical takeoff and landing (VTOL) aircraft should not be ruled out.

* * * * *

In summary, the Soviets will undoubtedly continue to support the Arab cause against Israel. Full use will be made of the United Nations forum, hoping to find favorable support for her cause. Since Russia is apparently against Arab unity it appears she will follow a policy based on relations with individual states like the present policy with the northern tier countries. Arab nationalism will be supported as long as it will enhance her position in relation to the West. Having established a firm foothold in the radical Arab states, it is expected that a determined effort will be made to gain influence in the conservative states. Russia's recent experience with the Warsaw Pact nations will further restrain her from making satellite states in the Arab world.

The danger lies not only in the Soviet foothold in the Eastern Mediterranean but in the extension of that political and naval power eastward toward Malta and Gibraltar and southward through the Suez and the Red Sea into the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean, thereby being in a better position to influence "third world" events. They are expected to avoid seeking formal

base rights, which involves undesirable political overtones. Their main objective seems primarily political. They will endeavor to raise their own prestige and influence by control of the Arab military establishment and create a military presence that is disadvantageous to the West. Although Moscow does not visibly support the exportation of revolution, as her military capability for projecting power overseas increases, this concept may come under critical review.

While Moscow has experienced occasional setbacks in the Middle East, the overall balance sheet displays a definite credit accumulation, and the potential for further Soviet influence in the Arab world appears ever more promising. However, the yet superior Sixth Fleet, strong Arab nationalism and even Arab overtures of preferring Western support are all obstacles to Soviet objectives of seeking warm water ports; mastering of sea lines of communications; and the

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influential voice in the distribution of Arab resources. It seems safe to predict that the Soviet Union will avoid a direct confrontation with the United States in the Middle East unless she holds a

superior power position. The 1967 Middle East crisis was a striking example of this. Anything less is an open ended question which depends primarily on the actions of the West.

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
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SUEZ 1956--Some Military Lessons



by

Rear Admiral H.E. Eccles, U.S. Navy, (Ret.)

(In his February article "Military Theory and Education," Rear Admiral Eccles discussed the nature of and the need for a comprehensive military theory. In this paper he critically examines the Suez crisis within the context of his previous work.)

The discussion is prefaced with a chronological listing of significant events which are relevant to the crisis. This listing is provided for two purposes. First, it will be helpful in refreshing the reader on the crisis scenario. Second, it serves to identify events and personalities that were especially influential in decision situations. Ed.)

 CHRONOLOGY--SUEZ

29 November 1947	U.N. General Assembly voted partition of Palestine.
14 May 1948	State of Israel proclaimed.
15 May 1948	Arab forces invaded Israel.
24 February 1949	Arab-Israeli Armistice signed.
11 May 1949	Israel admitted to United Nations.
25 May 1950	Tripartite Pact to maintain Mideast peace (United States-United Kingdom-France).
3 March 1951	General Razmara, Premier of Iran, assassinated.
28 April-May 1951	Dr. Mossadegh became Premier of Iran and nationalized oil.
1 September 1951	U.N. Security Council called on Egypt to lift blockade of Israeli ships in Suez and Straits of Tiran ignored by Egypt.
----- 1952	Britain decided to build hydrogen bomb.
26 July 1952	King Farouk of Egypt abdicated. Replaced by Colonel Naguib.
5 March 1953	Josef Stalin died.
19 June 1953	Egypt proclaimed Republic.
20 August 1953	USSR announced test of H-bomb.
October 1954	Colonel Nasser replaced Colonel Naguib in Egypt.
24 September 1955	Egyptian arms agreement with Russia and Czechoslovakia --much larger than previous assistance.
24 September 1955	President Eisenhower--heart attack.
December 1955	United States announced its help for Aswan.
1 March 1956	Jordan dismissed General Glubb.
10 May 1956	Israel, Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon announced unconditional cease-fire agreements.
9 June 1956	President Eisenhower--Operation for ileitis.
28 June 1956	Workers revolt in Poland.
Mid-July 1956	U.S. Senate Appropriations Committee requested Dulles to abandon Aswan project. Dulles refused.
17 July 1956	Representatives of United States cotton interests requested Dulles to reconsider refusal to abandon Aswan project.
18 July 1956	Dulles telephoned Eden that United States was withdrawing from Aswan.
19 July 1956	Dulles informed Egypt that United States had withdrawn Aswan offer.
26 July 1956	Egypt seized Suez Canal.
27 July 1956	Eden telephoned Pincau in Paris. Decision to take swift decisive military action.

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28 July 1956	Military weakness of British and French disclosed to their governments.
29 July 1956	Tripartite talks opened in London.
31 July 1956	Colonel Pricur arrived in London with French capabilities.
1 August 1956	Dulles arrived London, conferred with Lloyd and Pineau.
2 August 1956	Royal Proclamation recalling 20,000 reservists. French Fleet began concentration at Tonlon. British Chiefs of Staff reported 6 weeks needed to mount suitable force.
Early August 1956	Three-power talks. British naval forces moved into Eastern Mediterranean and troops to Cyprus. Anglo-French joint planning staff started work.
16-23 August 1956	First London conference of maritime powers--18-Nation Plan.
1 September 1956	Israeli General Staff informed of Anglo-French Plan to seize Suez Canal (Operation <i>Musketeer</i>).
3-9 September 1956	Menzies Mission to Cairo. Nasser rejects 18-Nation Plan.
7-10 September 1956	Israeli-French planning began to be specific.
11 September 1956	Dulles proposal for Suez Canal Users Association (SCUA).
1-15 September 1956	Colonel Mangin, aide to Bourguès-Mannonry, conferred with Ben Gurion, coordinating plans.
11 September 1956	Canal pilots withdrawn.
20 September 1956	Two representatives of French Government conferred with Israel's government in Tel Aviv. Field Marshall Montgomery conferred with Eden.
23 September 1956	Britain and France, against advice of Dulles, asked for meeting of U.N. Security Council.
26 September 1956	Original D-day for <i>Musketeer</i> .
1 October 1956	SCUA formally inaugurated. French-Israeli military staff work started.
2 October 1956	Dulles stated SCUA Plan had "no teeth in it."
4 October 1956	Border incidents between Israel and Jordan.
5 October 1956	Security Council met. Eden taken ill in hospital.
10 October 1956	French-Israeli discussions reported to selected British officials. Israeli forces raided Kalkillah, Jordan, as diversion.
11 October 1956	Monkton resigned as Minister of Defence. British Ambassador Makins left Washington without relief. New Ambassador Caecia did not report until 8 November.
12 October 1956	Iraq offered to move troops to Jordan. British informed Israel that they would support Jordan if Israel attacked.
13 October 1956	The Six Principles adopted by Security Council but guaranteeing resolutions were vetoed by Soviet Union.

- 14 October 1956 General Challe proposed to Eden at Chequers that Israel attack Egypt and that French and British intervene and occupy Suez Canal.
- 16 October 1956 Eden and Lloyd conferred at Hotel Matignon with M. Mollet and M. Pineau. Blackout of information from London to Washington begins.
- 17 October 1956 Ben Gurion identified Egypt as Israel's "real enemy."
- 18 October 1956 Monkton's resignation announced.
- 21 October 1956 Iraq denied intention to station troops in Jordan.
- 19-21 October 1956 Poland defied Kremlin leadership and elected Gomulka.
- 22 October 1956 Ben Gurion flew to France with Dayan; conference at Sevres.
Algerian rebel leader, Ben Bella, arrested by French; taken from Moroccan State Airways plane at Algiers after interception by French Air Force.
- 23 October 1956 Hungarian revolt started.
- 22-27 October 1956 Jordan placed army under Egyptian command.
- Last week in October, 1956 Two squadrons of Escadron Dijon fly to Lydda, Israel.
- 25 October 1956 Israel secretly mobilized. Eden informed of Israeli decision to invade Sinai.
Lloyd informed Nutting that Israel would act and Britain and France would issue ultimatum and then bomb Egyptian airfields.
- 26 October 1956 M. Joxe at Quai d'Orsay assured Mr. Dillon that France had no warlike intentions toward Egypt.
- 28 October 1956 British warned Israel against any attack on Jordan.
- 28 October 1956 Premier Nagy announced Russians had agreed to withdraw.
- 29 October 1956 Israel invaded Egypt.
(4:00 p.m.) Israeli paratroops dropped on Mitla Pass.
- 30 October 1956 Franco-British ultimatum delivered in London. Israel
(4:15 p.m.) accepted in 4 hours. Egypt rejected in 9 hours.
(5:00 p.m. GST)
(12:00 noon EST)
- U.N. Security Council met in New York.
- M. Alphand told President Eisenhower at White House that he knew of no plans for war and French intentions were honorable.
- 31 October 1956 Ultimatum expired--French escort vessel *Kersaint* fired on
(4:30 a.m.) Egyptian destroyer *El Awal* off Haifa.
Flight from pound sterling critical in New York.
- 1 November 1956 Russian troops surrounded Budapest.
- 2 November 1956 U.N. Security Council voted "cease-fire" resolution.
(2:30 a.m.) Air reconnaissance showed extensive blocking of Canal.
(evening) Egypt accepted cease-fire.

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- 3 November 1956
(morning)
(evening) Dulles to hospital. Operated for cancer. Herbert Hoover, Jr. acting as Secretary of State. Israel accepted cease-fire. Anthony Head (Minister of Defence) flew to Cyprus.
- 4 November 1956
(morning) Head, General Keightly and Admiral Barjot completed plan of paratroop attack on Port Said.
- 4 November 1956 Anthony Nutting's resignation announced. Labor Party demanded Eden's resignation. Hungarian Revolt crushed.
- 5 November 1956
(dawn) Airborne assault on Port Said. U.S. Federal Reserve selling pounds. Soviet Union threatens intervention. Mentions volunteers and nuclear weapons.
- 6 November 1956
(4:00 a.m.)
(early morning)
(morning)
(10:00 a.m.)

(11:55 p.m.) MacMillan telephoned Washington for loan to support pound sterling. Eisenhower telephoned Eden demanding cease-fire. Main Anglo-French force landed at Port Said. United States agreed to loan to Britain on condition of cease-fire. U.S. Election Day. President Eisenhower reelected. Anglo-French cease-fire.
- 6 November 1956 Run on the pound became critical. Dulles underwent major intestinal surgery (cancer which later killed him).
- 7 November 1956 U.N. General Assembly created U.N. Peacekeeping Force. Dulles began to resume control of U.S. Department of State.
- 9 November 1956 Ben Gurion agrees to withdraw Israeli troops from Sinai except Gaza Strip.
- 12 November 1956 Nasser agrees to entry of U.N. forces into Canal Zone.
- 14 November 1956 Ten U.N. Observers at Port Said. First contingent of U.N. troops arrives.
- 23 November 1956 Eden goes to Jamaica on sick leave after turning Cabinet over to Butler.
- 23 November 1956 General Keightly ordered to reembarc.
- 3 December 1956 British and French agree to withdraw.
- 11 December 1956 International Monetary Fund loaned \$1.3 billion to Britain.
- 22 December 1956 Last Franco-British troops depart Port Said.
- 7 March 1957 Israel completes withdrawal from Gaza Strip.
- 25 March 1957 Canal substantially cleared. Traffic resumed.

SUEZ 1956-- SOME MILITARY LESSONS

Introduction. From 1945 to 1956 the whole Near East was a welter of hatred and conflicting national and tribal interests intensified by religious differences. The State of Israel had come into being by a combination of terrorism, sabotage, illegal immigration, and the genuine legitimate aspirations of the long-suffering Jews. Western political society had a deep sense of guilt for the unspeakable horrors of the Nazi regime but, even so, was unable to provide adequate reception and home for the suffering innocents. England was torn between her traditional friendship for the Arabs and the consequences of the Balfour Declaration and the Palestine Mandate. France was embittered by its failure to reestablish herself in Syria, the tragedy of Indochina, and the Algerian revolt, all superimposed on the divisions and tragedy of the German occupation.

The United States was in the process of making so many treaties and agreements that a special effort was required merely to inventory them, let alone understand them. The Jewish political power center of New York was vigorous and very influential in the election year of 1956. The manner in which Russia had taken over Eastern Europe, the Chinese Communist success, and the Communist policy of pervasive aggressive subversion posed the threat which created NATO. The United Nations was struggling to cope with intractable problems. Over everything there loomed the growing size and number of nuclear weapons, the grave controversial problems of "strategic warfare" and "deterrence."

Government leaders were worried, overworked, and worn down by incessant air travel. Ambassadors were downgraded by proliferation, and decisions were being pushed to the top of Govern-

ment. Desk men in the State Department strove to gain access to their overworked superiors. The problems were almost always both equivocal and ambiguous. Thus at the very time that the problems demanded clear incisive thinking and clear communication between allies, circumstances combined to interfere with clarity of thought and this led to inadequate communication. Hence the situation and conditions which made careful analysis more important also made it more difficult.

In this atmosphere, when the United States withdrew its offer of a loan to assist in the construction of the Aswan Dam, President Nasser of Egypt seized the Suez Canal on 26 July 1956. From then until mid-October, Secretary of State Dulles sought to reach a peaceful resolution of the problem. At the same time the British and French made plans and deployed forces in preparation for the use of military force. In mid-October the United States had lost touch with its close NATO allies, France and Britain, who were collaborating with Israel in the planning for an attack on Egypt.

In late October the Hungarians revolted, and just before the Russians moved in with overwhelming force Israel attacked Egypt. In the next few days, as Russia crushed the Hungarian revolt, the United Nations called for a Suez cease-fire, Britain and France attacked Port Said, and the Canal was blocked by the Egyptians.

In the midst of this extreme military political confusion, there was a cease-fire in the Suez on 6 November, and on 14 November a United Nations peace-keeping force started to move into the area.

Since that climactic two weeks of 23 October to 7 November, dozens of commentators have examined the

events, appraised the actions, and speculated on what might have been. Though another 25 or more years may pass before historians have access to most of the facts of the Suez crisis of 1956, and even though all interesting points will never be finally clarified,¹ there now is enough well corroborated evidence to draw important even if limited lessons.

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Political decision will always be an art that largely depends on how the immediate situation and operating factors are perceived by the responsible men at the time decisions are made. In great matters of state, particularly in the framework of an alliance, the manner in which politicians perceive their national interests and obligations is highly intuitive. I will not discuss what objectives should have been sought, what policies pursued, or what might have happened if these had been other than they actually were. I will emphasize those factors which I believe influenced the course of events in a decisive way and the relation of these to some of the fundamentals of sound strategy and military decision. Since many of the principal leaders involved seemed to have been surprised by the manner in which events actually unfolded, I start by stating the truism: strategic realism requires the analysis of objectives, the challenge of assumptions, and the appraisal of expectations.

The lessons of Suez center around one fateful event—the decision to use force as made in a telephone conversation between Eden and Pineau on Friday, 27 July, the day after Nasser's seizure of the canal. This intuitive decision was made without any major cabinet or staff discussion and with nothing that even approached an *estimate*.² Geoffrey McDermott, deputy to Patrick Dean who, in turn, was in charge of the political and military intelligence and

planning of the Foreign Office, comments:

On our side of the Foreign Office we never doubted that Eden was determined to have his war. Menzies missions might come and go, Suez Canal Users Association meetings drag on, negotiations take place at the United Nations and elsewhere. These were subterfuges intended to show that 'no stone had been left unturned' before force was used. They failed even as subterfuges.³

While the 27 July agreement was not a formal signed accord, it nevertheless was sufficient to set in motion a series of consequences that tended to blind the protagonists to facts later to be disclosed. We cannot expect political-military decisions always to be made by a process of rigorous logic. But all too often the process of rigorous logic is disregarded by men who feel that such major decisions should be reached on a purely intuitive basis or by a consensus of advisors.

The emotional commitment of a high-level politician brings many psychological forces into play. There is a difference between steadfast pursuit of a clear objective and stubborn adherence to a fatally defective decision or plan. When the situation is complicated by an aroused angry public opinion, the psychosis of frustration, and an inner need to compensate or to live up to a fictitious image, the stage is set for a great disaster. Throughout history there are many instances in which a major wrong decision, once reached, acquired overriding momentum and led to disaster even though significant changes to the original situation clearly dictated a new estimate.

Interests and Objectives of the Principals. Since no formal Franco-British appreciations, staff studies, or major agreements are as yet available,⁴ the primary and secondary political and strategic objectives must be deduced from the record of conversations and

messages. The apparent major political objective of the Franco-British intervention was to bring about the fall of Nasser in order to install a government more sympathetic to their national interests and to forestall the development of an aggressive Arab power structure which could lead to a third world war. Israel had a simple, straightforward national objective: the preservation of the State of Israel.

Thereafter, the partners in the campaign had a variety of secondary or subordinate objectives which were generally, but not always, harmonious. Israel sought:

1. Territorial realignment both to improve its military position and to provide economic viability.

2. The use of the Suez Canal and freedom of access to Elath on the Gulf of Aqaba.

3. Freedom from fellaheen raids and other acts of terrorism and sabotage in order to improve their political, social, and economic position.

The secondary Franco-British objectives and interests were more complex. They were partially shared by Israel but did not necessarily have the same order of importance either among themselves or with Israel. For example--to maintain freedom of passage of Suez in order to protect their commercial and economic interests. In the case of Britain:

1. Protect their lines of communication to the Indian Ocean and Western Pacific.

2. Maintain the sanctity of formal treaties and agreements.

3. Reduce the growth of Communist influence in the Middle East.

In the case of France, to reduce the Arab support of the Algerian revolt.

The U.S. Government understood these interests and shared them to a high degree.⁵ There were, however, several complicating factors. The earlier anticolonial attitude of President Roosevelt had created a sense of mistrust both

in Britain and France. The French thinking was influenced by the disunity within France in World War II, by the major defeat in Vietnam, and by the extreme violence of the Algerian affairs. These combined to create a feeling of frustration which was not conducive to poised logical analysis. To some degree, an unfavorable physiological-psychological condition influenced Anthony Eden. Furthermore, the British Government and people were unhappily aware of the decrease in Britain's stature as a world power. Again, this did not favor cold, clear logic.

Besides the Middle East oil reserves, the United States had two important interests: the strength and harmony of the NATO Alliance and the preservation and useful development of the United Nations. While Britain and France shared those interests, their importance had either been blurred by their emotional frustration or pushed into a subordinate position by their intuitive evaluation of their other interests. Also, the intense mutual dislike of Anthony Eden and John Foster Dulles created an element of mistrust which disastrously impeded vital communication and greatly influenced Eden's decisions. Here we have the tragic paradox that at a time when the formulation of a good strategy made the analysis of objectives and interests imperative, such analysis was impeded, if not wholly prevented, by psychological pressures and personality conflicts. Thus, instead of there being anything remotely approaching a sound strategic concept, there was merely a series of haphazard improvisation in France, Britain, and the United States.

The consequences were that in the development of so-called strategic plans the lack of conceptual unity produced a situation where the military commanders of the operation had no clear idea of the political aims of the campaign⁶ and there was general confusion among the planners and operational

commanders.⁷ At this time Field Marshall Montgomery was Deputy Supreme Commander of the NATO forces in Europe. His 1962 remark in the House of Lords is significant:

... The Prime Minister asked me if I would come over and see him. . . . I said to him, ' . . . what is your object? What are you trying to do?' and he replied: 'To knock Nasser off his perch.' I said that if I were his military adviser . . . that object would not do. I should need to know what was the political object when Nasser had been knocked off his perch--because it was that which would determine how the operation was best carried out, what was the best disposition for our forces, and so on. *In my judgment, it was the uncertainty about the political object of our leaders which bedevilled the Suez operation from the beginning.*⁸ (Italics supplied.)

A specific lesson to be derived is: when conceptual unity is missing, high command has the obligation to recognize its absence and must either take compensating measures or change the basic course of action. Again, from the standpoint of strategy, interests, and objectives, the uprisings in Eastern Europe in October created a new situation and changed the relative values of the basic interests previously mentioned. But by the start of the Hungarian revolt on 23 October, the Franco-British-Israeli plans were so far advanced and the British and French were so committed to them that no reevaluation of interests, objectives, or strategic decision was made. When the channels of communication to the United States were cut off on 16 October, the element of good faith which is vital to a successful alliance was destroyed.

Tactics. The tactical critique of the Suez operation brings out a number of major features.

1. The striking success of the Israeli tactical concepts and execution.

2. The difficulty of adjusting tactical plans to changes in the timing of the operation.

3. The difficulty of adjusting the tactics to the differing concepts of the British and French commanders.

4. The difficulty of adapting the tactical plan to the snubterfuge of the Franco-British ultimatum and of overcoming the handicap imposed by the desire to minimize civilian casualties.

5. The enormous handicap imposed on tactics by the logistic limitations.

6. The exasperating handicap caused by the British planners not having a clear understanding of British political and strategic objectives.

Since in the last decade the Israeli Sinai campaign has been extensively explored in books and periodicals, it is not necessary to discuss it at any length. The basic Israeli strategic concept of a swift, decisive tactical operation was dictated by their national ethos, geography, and economy and by the size, quality, disposition, and political disunity of the enemy forces. This tactical concept depended on high morale and training, leadership which stressed aggressive initiative, and on a simple but technically excellent and austere logistic system. On this basis, and on excellent intelligence, a tactical doctrine of close air-ground coordination and high risk was developed and fully justified by the course of events. All in all, it was a superb illustration of the nature and virtue of "Weapon Morale."⁹ To a high degree, Israeli doctrine was based on the theories of Sir Basil Liddell Hart, the British military historian and analyst. It depended heavily on excellent reconnaissance and thus was well suited to the special conditions of the area.

General Sir Charles Keightly, Commander in Chief, Allied Forces, reported that the cumulative effect of lack of harbors, landing craft yards, and airfields in Cyprus, the limited landing craft and air supply resources together

with necessity for much unloading and reloading

... was to make a requirement for a longer period between the executive order to start operations being received and the date it was possible to land on the mainland of Egypt. The period of notice which had been accepted for the start of operations was 10 days, although in the event we got little more than 10 hours.¹⁰

The Anglo-French tactical planning difficulties during the period 17 to 25 October were considerable. The initial plan of 10-14 September called for 8 to 10 days of bombing of troop movements and defenses plus propaganda after a 48-hour attack on the Egyptian air force. It was assumed that the Allied fleet could then land troops at Port Said without opposition. But the French commanders opposed delay.¹¹ The situation was further confused by British reluctance to start bombing Egyptian airfields until 72 hours after the start of the Israeli attack.

By 4 November the tactical situation had been confused by the lack of clear-cut objectives. To make matters worse¹² Eden began "to interfere in the detailed running of the planned operation... the commanders cursed the speed of communications which made possible this kind of interference."¹³

Curiously, about 3 November the Israeli high command made a series of suggestions which would lead to the more rapid seizure of the tactical objectives and thus contribute to the better attainment of the supposed strategic-political objectives. These suggestions were turned down because they would be an admission of collusion!¹⁴ In other words, when at the critical moment it seemed possible to push the plan through to tactical success, the modification was rejected because the consequences as to cost were not acceptable. Thus, while the disadvantages of collusion were suffered, the advantages were not fully exploited.

The final irony of the Franco-British strategic-tactical planning was that even if all the physical objectives had been attained on schedule, the stated purpose of the operation would not have been accomplished. In other words, the plan failed the test of SUITABILITY. Nevertheless the plan was approved and executed.

The limited success that was achieved was due to the professional competence of the Allied leaders and troops at the level of unit tactics and was achieved in spite of the deficiencies of grand tactics and strategy. Nevertheless, the final decision to cease fire, induced by a variety of political and economic factors, was an example of failing to make a strategic exploitation of a tactical success. This principle was recognized in the most ironic and, to the British, the most fantastic comment of the whole crisis. "Selwyn Lloyd, visiting Dulles in hospital in November, received a final blow almost comic in its incongruity: 'Why did you stop?' Dulles asked."¹⁵

Strategic Economical and Logistical Relations. At the highest level of political-military decision, considerations of strategy-economics and logistics tend to coalesce. Economic factors limit the combat forces one can create; logistic factors limit the combat forces one can employ. These fundamentals were clearly shown throughout the whole crisis.¹⁶

One of the British national objectives was to maintain the economic advantages of the continuing use of the canal. One of the major elements in the estimate of the situation should have been: what are the economic consequences of the proposed course of action?

After World War II the British were faced with a difficult, long-range strategic choice. Should they build atomic nuclear weapons and delivery systems? Their economic capabilities had been greatly reduced by the losses of the war

and a major effort had to be made to rebuild the cities and industrial facilities. There simply were not enough economic resources available to build even a small atomic weapons system and yet maintain large conventional warfare forces at a high level of operational readiness. It is neither necessary nor feasible to examine all the complicated arguments and considerations which affected the final decision. Britain chose to build a small but necessarily very expensive nuclear system. They accepted the reductions thus imposed on their other forces largely because of their concepts of strategic-military prestige and deterrence.¹⁷ In effect, they adopted a "weapon strategy." At the time the decision was made—with a few exceptions, such as Sir Stephen King-Hall—they did not appreciate the extent to which their strategic flexibility would be reduced. This became strikingly apparent on 27 July, the day after Eden and Mollet had mutually determined to take swift and decisive military action against Egypt. The British Armed Forces had absolutely no logistic capability to take such action in the Eastern Mediterranean. While the deficiencies were widespread and included almost every logistic category, the single most decisive factor was tank landing craft. To make matters worse, even in cases where material support was available, the forces were not adequately trained. Because of economic stringencies imposed by the Algerian war the French were in a similar position of impotence.¹⁸

It seems almost the ultimate irony that even after months of preparation, when every bit of evidence indicated that the United States would disapprove the Franco-British intervention, and when the mounting disagreement within the British Government and the dissent of the opposition all showed that swift effective action was the only hope of strategic success, the British and French logistic capabilities were still not enough

to provide for the coordinated close timing of the independent elements of the tactical operation. Thus, even though by the first of November, the Israeli partner had performed brilliantly, the supporting airstrikes had been effective, and the British ultimatum had expired, the airborne assault was not launched until dawn of 5 November, and the seaborne force not landed until the morning of 6 November. This when Israeli success had been apparent on early 3 November, and both Israel and Egypt had accepted the United Nations cease-fire demand by the evening of 3 November. This inordinate delay in timing had been caused by the inexorable logistic facts of the seaborne assault. It allowed public dismay and world indignation and reaction to build up to such an intolerable degree that finally, on 6 November at midnight, when the invasion forces were on the brink of significant success, the Anglo-French forces ceased fire.¹⁹

One of the major factors in the British decision was economic. In the face of American opposition to British policy, it was no longer possible to maintain the value of the pound sterling.²⁰ Logistics had dominated tactics, and economics had weakened logistics. But even when tactics had finally achieved partial success, it had fallen prey to economics, and strategy, prestige, and politics were then in chaotic shambles.

Strategy and National Values. The relations between strategy, logistics, economics, and tactics are in many cases relatively simple, quite clear, and, in some cases, tangible and quantifiable with considerable accuracy. In other cases, of course, they can involve more complex intangible and subtle aspects. Moral values, prestige, credibility, and the integrity of command, however, are all intangible matters where opinions differ widely, and quantification is impossible. And yet these elements are the foundation for the structure of the

tangible effective application of power and force in protracted human conflict. These intangibles form the basis for the aspirations and emotional attachments of men which, when they differ, create the conflict and, when they coincide, create the loyalties which make possible the force that is used in conflict.

A national strategy which is contrary to the moral values of the nation concerned is not likely to succeed. National values are represented not so much by the immediate feelings of the majority of the people on any particular day as they are by the continuing attitude of these people as expressed in their day-to-day behavior over the years.

The element of moral sanction is seldom clear and complete. In our harsh world of protracted violent conflict, many situations arise where the moral element is either uncertain or equivocal, and the element of time does not permit a formal, deliberate estimate. Sometimes, in these cases the national interest may justify the use of military force in spite of a high degree of moral uncertainty. High political military command has the paramount obligations to appraise and be willing to accept the consequences of such use of force and to insure that the force is directed toward a clear purpose and is adequate to accomplish it. Hans Morgenthau's comment on the Bay of Pigs applies equally to Suez:

... All nations will continue to be guided in their decisions to intervene and their choice of the means of intervention by what they regard as their respective national interests. There is indeed an urgent need for the governments of the great powers to abide by certain rules according to which the game of intervention is to be played. But these rules must be deduced not from abstract principles which are incapable of controlling the actions of governments, but from the interests of the nations concerned and from their practice of foreign policy reflecting those interests.

The failure to understand this distinction between abstract principles and national interests as guidance for a policy of the intervention was in good measure responsible for the fiasco of the Bay of Pigs in 1961. The United States was resolved to intervene on behalf of its interests, but it was also resolved to intervene in such a way as not openly to violate the principle of nonintervention. Both resolutions were legitimate in terms of American interests. The United States had an interest in eliminating the political and military power of the Soviet Union, which used Cuba as a base from which to threaten the security interests of the United States in the Western Hemisphere. The United States also had an interest in avoiding whatever would jeopardize its standing in the new and emerging nations. The United States failed to assign priorities to these two interests. In order to minimize the loss of prestige, the United States jeopardized the success of the intervention. Instead of using concern for prestige as a datum among others in the political equation—that is, as an interest among others—it submitted to it as though it were an abstract principle imposing absolute limits upon the actions necessary to achieve success. In consequence, the United States failed three. The intervention did not succeed; in the attempt we suffered the temporary impairment of our standing among the new and emerging nations; and we lost much prestige as a great nation able to use its power successfully on behalf of its interests.²¹

A wholly professional military force made up of highly selected volunteers who are largely indifferent to domestic politics and who are motivated primarily by their loyalties to their flag or their king—to the traditions of their own organization and to their officers and military associates—can be used effectively in many ways where it may not be suitable to commit the full power of the nation. In particular, it can be employed to achieve a political purpose in special situations, usually small scale, where the strategy-values relationship is either unclear or equivocal. In this connection we should appreciate the great distinction between swift overt

action in a dangerous crisis and the long-range deliberate deception, subterfuge, and obvious absurdity of the Franco-British Suez intervention.

There is a great difference between the shock to one's sensibilities engendered by the former and the insult to one's intelligence by the latter.

One, as in the case of the Russian suppression of the Hungarian revolt, may produce anger, but it also induces respect and credibility. The other, as in Suez, produces nothing but disbelief and contempt. One may be considered to be in the national interest; the other defeats the national interest.

Logistics. To the student of logistics there were no logistics surprises in the Suez crisis. Throughout the entire planning and conduct of operation the fundamental logistic factors exerted their influence almost precisely in accordance with the expectation of logistic theory based on historical analysis of World War II.

In Israel the logistic system was in harmony with the strategic and tactical concepts. It was based on technical excellence, the citizen army concept, and the ability to improvise. It was completely responsive to the needs of tactical command. The logistic snowball was controlled by an austere exercise of discipline. Since the strategic and tactical concepts did not include a prolonged campaign, they were within the capability of logistic resources, and thus logistics factors did not exert their ultimate limiting effect. The flexibility and mobility of the defense concept and system, based on "weapon morale," permitted the strategic exploitation of tactical success. All in all, it was a striking illustration of the logistics aspects of operational readiness and combat effectiveness. Finally, since the Israeli strategic concepts were in harmony with French policy and since France was the chief source of Israeli logistic support, the relatively small

logistics deficiencies of the Israeli forces disclosed in the early planning were readily made up by their ally.

The Franco-British logistics similarly confirmed basic concepts and principles. Logistics is a comprehensive, coherent process with its roots in the national economy and its payoff in the tactical operation of the combat forces. In its producer phase, economic factors limit the combat forces which can be created, and in its consumer phase logistic factors limit the combat forces which can be employed. As previously stated, the British economy could not support both an atomic weapon system and mobile flexible nonatomic combat forces.

Anthony Eden states the government position clearly:

The extent and costs of these defense preparations were formidable and ever increasing. Soon after the general election of 1955 I decided we must make economies in the defence programmes without sacrificing the power to strike back at any aggressor. . . . The economy of the country could not be expected to stand this mounting strain. . . . I believed that we should run the least military risk by making some cuts in the forces and equipment designed for use in global war and, more particularly, those contributed by the United Kingdom to N.A.T.O. . . . There was some difficulty in reconciling the treasury's view—with the services' estimate of what was essential. . . . In the Royal Navy, we reduced the plans for the active and reserve fleets, scaled down the capacity of some overseas bases and cut expenditures on war reserves. In the Army, the strength but not the fighting power of units was reduced, also the size of the strategic reserve. In the Royal Air Force, a small reduction was ordered in the medium bomber force and larger ones in Fighter and Coastal Commands.²²

Hugh Thomas comments:

There could be no immediate riposte by Britain. This fact was known to the cabinet by lunch time 28 July. Nasser claims now to have made a similar appreciation of likely speed of British

reaction from Egyptian liaison officers working secretly in Cyprus, Malta and Aden: it was clear to us that Britain would not be able to have a military movement before three or four months.²³

Similarly, the French economy could not support both the strain of the guerrilla war in Algeria and mobile flexible forces suitable for the Egyptian campaign. Thus, the logistics aspects of operational readiness and combat effectiveness were clearly demonstrated by the situation disclosed.

Paul Johnson wrote more explicitly:

The next morning, there was swift disillusionment. In Paris, MM. Mollet and Pineau received a brief report from the Ministry of Defence which revealed a grave state of unpreparedness. A section of the Mediterranean fleet was at Toulon and could be ready to move within forty-eight hours; but its solitary carrier was equipped with only twenty-five modern planes capable of fighting on approximately equal terms with Nasser's Russian-built MIG 15s and 17s. The fleet could not be in the eastern Mediterranean in less than a week. There were three active squadrons of Mystere-4 long-range jet fighters in Germany, but it would take ten days or more to transport them and their maintenance equipment to the Mediterranean; in any case, they would be useless if based in Algeria; the farthest point from which they could hope to operate was Cyprus. All France's remaining jets were too short-ranged even for this. As for ground forces, there were three infantry battalions in barracks in the Algiers area, and two more on the French south coast; but they had no landing craft of any description. Two brigades of paratroops were already engaged in Algeria; they had received, moreover, no parachute training for over a year, and would certainly need a fortnight's re-training. Troop transport planes could be provided, but it would take some time. As the morning wore on, it became rapidly evident that France was materially incapable of taking forceful action by herself against Nasser.

The news in London was even worse. As the *News Chronicle* revealed in a

striking article on October 31, we had three parachute battalions in Cyprus; but they also had had no training for months; since no parachute training-chutes were available in Cyprus, the men would have to be flown back to Britain for re-training. There were eight infantry battalions in Cyprus, but not one solitary landing craft; the nearest supporting artillery was in Germany. Part of the 10th Armoured Division, it is true, was scattered about Libya; but they also were without tank transports. Scattered infantry battalions in Aden and East Africa were equally stranded and immobile. We had no modern long-range fighters anywhere in the Middle East or Mediterranean areas, and only two active squadrons of Canberra bombers—both based on airfields in Arab countries which would certainly forbid their use for operations against Egypt. The Mediterranean fleet was available, but its carriers were only equipped with obsolescent aircraft. Army transport and dock specialists, essential for any sizable amphibious operation, were scattered all over the British Commonwealth. Above all, the decisive factor was tank landing ships. A calculation showed that a force capable of effecting a landing in the Canal Zone, and of defending itself against the assaults of the Egyptian forces, would require a minimum of seventy. We had precisely two; the rest of our fabulous D-day armoury had been sold, destroyed or allowed to rot in 'mothballs.'

By the weekend it was clear that the invasion was off—or, rather, postponed; the determination of Sir Anthony and his French allies remained unshaken. Orders were issued in both capitals for emergency mobilisation plans—including the recall of reservists and the re-activation of reserve equipment—to be drawn up at once. Meanwhile, time had to be gained. The military preparations must, with all speed, be concealed behind a smoke-screen of negotiation. What could the resources of diplomacy achieve?²⁴

And Randolph Churchill writes:

But even if the manpower and time had been available, there was not the shipping to convey troops to Egypt for a seaborne landing. Particularly lacking were L.S.T.s for the armour. Once again British political and strategic

judgment had been found wanting. The new base in Cyprus, which was supposed to replace the bases in the Suez areas, was, as at the time of the Jordan affair five months before, still incomplete and unprepared. The air base at Akrotiri had not been completed, the harbour at Limassol had not been begun, and the mobile strategic reserve had not materialized. Without these, Cyprus could only be a hostage to fortune instead of a bastion and a springboard. Jordan and Libya, on which Eden had counted when he espoused the evacuation of the Suez Canal base in 1954, were equally useless. In Jordan a Government unfriendly to Britain was not likely to allow an increase in British forces stationed in the country. In Libya the terms of the Anglo-Libyan treaty made it quite plain that military facilities would not be extended to Britain when there was a dispute with a member of the Arab league.

This state of military unpreparedness was staggering and humiliating. With hasty improvisation, the Services tried to make good their deficiencies. The Mediterranean fleets of Britain and France began to assemble at various ports with orders to prepare to sail. Some Army units in Britain were, as early as July 31, alerted to move at twenty-four hours' notice—among them the Life Guards and the Grenadier Guards at Windsor. In Algeria similar preparations were made among the French troops. R.A.F. transport aircraft engaged on routine troop movements were recalled or held in England. Canberra jet bomber squadrons flew from their United Kingdom bases to Malta. The Troopship DUNERA, outward bound for Hong Kong, was recalled to home waters on August 1.²⁵

The operational aspects of the Suez crisis lasted too short a time and the documentation is not available to make any comments on the application of management techniques to the logistics problems. Obviously, systems analysis was not used in the strategic programming decision described by Mr. Eden. Under the circumstances it is doubtful how it might have been usefully applied. The overriding factor in the decision to

build a "nuclear deterrent" obviously was wholly intuitive and based on a plausible but questionable assumption as to the utility of a small nuclear capability.

* * *

In addition to the manner in which logistic fundamentals dominated the Franco-British-Israeli intervention, they were also a dominant element of the United Nations peacekeeping force, UNEF. The U.S. Navy was given primary responsibility for the logistics of its organization and support. Since time was a critical factor in the political effectiveness of this force, its logistics assumed transcending political-psychological importance. While a fully documented story does not seem to be available, certain facts are known.

The normal legal, financial, and administrative rules and procedures of the U.S. Department of Defense were wholly ignored. The task was delegated to a captain in the office of the Chief of Naval Operations who moved a cot into his office and stayed there for 4 or 5 days except to go to the head. He maintained frequent telephone contact with Dr. Ralph Bunche at U.N. headquarters in New York and with various four-star and other generals who controlled supplies, equipment, and air transport.

At first, all dispatches were highly classified but after about 48 hours the communications system had become so clogged by the task of decoding and the physical exhaustion of the junior officers in the coding section that they were shifted to plain English unclassified. It is estimated that about 95 percent of all dispatches dealing with UNEF were logistical and most of the remaining 5 percent concerned command relations.

Thus again, in the crunch, we see another illustration of Ruppenthal's phrase, "the tyranny of logistics."

The Decision. All the elements and factors herein discussed come into critical focus in the major decision at the top level of political-military authority in each nation concerned. The day is long past, if there ever were such a day, when the political authority could make a political decision and then turn the problem over to the military authority for a military decision and subsequent action.

In some nations, such as the United States, the Constitution combines the chief political executive and the commander in chief in one office. In some cases a military dictatorship seizes and holds the chief executive office and power. In other cases parliamentary government provides essentially the same unity of authority.

Regardless of the circumstances of authority, the chief political executive now exercises military command and thus it is essential that he view and understand the military problem from the perspective of command.

The political and military problems must be intuitively integrated in the mind of the one man who combines political and military authority. This is the essence of decision. The political authority must have the technique and take the time to explore the military aspects with the service chiefs themselves. No facade of agreement should interfere with the direct presentation of a blunt professional appraisal.

The military portion of this section, dealing with the problem of decision making and control, has been divided into certain specific interlocking and overlapping parts in order to facilitate research and education. Each of these parts merits extensive specific study which can be effectively disciplined only if the military problem is seen as a coherent structure, with a body of substantive knowledge and a number of fundamental principles.

The first element in the classic approach to military decision is to identify

the problem which requires a decision to be made.²⁶ In the Suez crisis a specific problem was posed for Great Britain, France, Israel, and the United States by Nasser's seizure of the canal. Clausewitz observed that the first task of generalship is to decide the question, "What kind of war is it?" In this case the seizure posed a different problem for each of the four nations mentioned. The problem for no one of them could be separated from the context of their continuing problems of politics, economics, and military security. In the case of Israel the conflict with the Arab world was obviously the most urgent. In the case of Great Britain, France, and the United States, there was a common element of concern for collective security within the NATO pact, a concern for world order in the context of the United Nations, and a concern for the economics of world trade. Furthermore, each nation had its own special interests which varied somewhat from those of common concern.

At this point two major questions can be posed: To what degree must national sovereignty be sacrificed in order to deal successfully with the major problems of world affairs today? The old and rather romantic concept of untrammelled national sovereignty as being an absolute value or a viable, absolute entity is completely mythical.

Is the problem posed by the seizure a "puzzle" for which there is a specific solution, or a "difficulty" which must be surmounted or endured but for which there is no specific solution?²⁷

In retrospect, and with some oversimplification, it appears that the British and French saw the crisis as a puzzle, the United States saw it as a difficulty, and the Israeli saw it as an opportunity.

From the recognition of the type of problem and the analysis of the overall situation, we pass on to the analysis of objectives. As previously mentioned, this derives from the national interests. But more than this, because of the

interdependence of so-called sovereign nations, practical wisdom calls for considering the interests and objectives of one's allies and associates. It appears that in spite of protracted conversations, letters, and dispatches this important element was inadequately accomplished in the period 27 July to 16 October. An important part of the analysis of objectives is to consider (A) what constitutes a satisfactory accomplishment of one's objectives, and (B) what change in the basic situation or in opponents' reaction will influence the objectives. This last is both subtle and important and constitutes more a part of the supervision of the planned action than an important part of the initial estimate. In the Suez crisis its importance was strikingly illustrated in the different reactions to the Hungarian revolt which broke out on 23 October.

The next logical step is to consider the means available and the means opposed. In the purely military part of the estimate this includes relative fighting strength. The sad facts of time and distance related to logistic capabilities and state of training of forces as disclosed on 27 and 28 July should, at this point, have brought about a very thorough reevaluation of objectives.

It seems clear that the British military staff fully appreciated this point but it is also clear that civilian political control which completely dominated the situation²⁸ chose to override these facts of life.

At this point, if they have not been considered earlier, the question of assumptions becomes important and should be treated with rigor. In a military estimate an assumption is not merely something believed to be true; it is rather a matter so critical to the success of a plan that the plan will fail if the assumption is not true. This matter is so important that for every explicit assumption there should be an alternate plan to be used should the assumption prove false. Otherwise, the planned

operation should be canceled.

In the broader political sense, the assumption, while it need not be treated with equal rigor, still requires identification and challenge. For example, both Eden and Mollet assumed that, if unchecked, Nasser would develop the menace and the power of Hitler.

The British assumed that the Egyptians could not successfully operate the canal without Western assistance. The British seemed to have assumed that the canal could be secured before the Egyptians could block it.²⁹ The British apparently assumed that the invasion should bring about the fall of Nasser and that he would be replaced by a friendly government.

The British, the French, and the Israeli all seemed to have assumed that because of its presidential election, the U.S. Government would acquiesce in a *fait accompli*. There is no evidence of any alternate plan being prepared or even being seriously considered.

The United States assumed that Mr. Dulles' skill as a lawyer and negotiator would be sufficient to restrain Britain and France from attempting to use force. Implicit in this there seems to have been the further assumption that the British and French would take the same view of the NATO and U.S. interests and commitments as did the United States.

The next step in the estimate is to develop and compare various courses of action in order to make the basic decision. Many people who give lip-service to the idea that this should be an orderly, logical process, nevertheless, in practice say in effect to their staff: "I have decided what I am going to do; now make a study to justify my decision." In effect, this is what Eden and Mollet did in their first conference in late July. This method certainly did not work well in 1956, and it is not recommended. But regardless of how high command reaches a decision, the classic tests of a military course of action

should be applied: Suitability, Feasibility, Acceptability.

Suitability: Will the action accomplish the purpose I have in mind? Will it accomplish the objective?

Feasibility: Is it possible to carry out this course of action with the tactical and logistical resources that are available and in such a time frame that it will meet the test of suitability?

Acceptability: Am I willing and able to accept the consequences as to cost involved in taking this course of action? In other words, is the accomplishment of the objective worth the price I will have to pay measured in terms of the values at stake?

Obviously, to make even a rudimentary evaluation of these basic criteria one must have a clear purpose in mind and must be able to express it in terms that are suitable for analytical evaluation. Here, precisely, is the central fault of the Franco-British collaboration and Field Marshall Montgomery identified it in conversation with Prime Minister Eden on 20 September.³⁰

The classic tests prove the objective. The evidence is clear that regardless of how the Franco-British objective is deduced or interpreted it fails to meet three of the classic tests of a course of action. If *Musketeer* had been subjected to such a formal test by competent, responsible officers, its failure to pass any one of the criteria would have disclosed the fatal fault in the objective. If it was so tested, then the action in overriding the results of the test was an act of arrogant folly and a violation of the integrity of command.

The U.S. Position. It is impossible to draw any conclusion as to the merits of British and French action without considerable discussion of the position and action of the United States.

The American position and behavior during the summer of 1956 was, in the

view of Mr. Eden, equivocal and unrealistic.

In *Full Circle*, he presents an account of the course of events that summer. While this obviously is less than completely true, it does explain his reaction to American action.

Mr. Eisenhower was recuperating from a serious illness and with his normal dependence on his staff and "completed staff work," it is unlikely that he was, in fact, following the course of events as closely as the situation demanded. Mr. Dulles is now dead. His legalistic attitudes and the close intuitive manner in which he reached his decisions have been commented upon by many who have admired his devotion and strength. The combination of these two aspects, however, seems in retrospect to have deceived Mr. Eden and led him on to expect positive action when in fact such action was never contemplated seriously.

It seems clear that delaying tactics of the United States in August and September laid the foundation for later adverse developments; particularly, it gave the British and the French Governments the feeling that the United States could not be trusted. In the meantime they recognized that the course of events was more and more restricting their political freedom of action. This developed a sense of frustration which understandably contributed greatly to the irrationality of the final act in the tragedy.

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Dulles in the summer of 1956 indulged in a haphazard series of improvisations aimed at an objective which was never clearly expressed to Mr. Eden. Without a clear common objective, there could be no unity of thinking and no clear communication between the British and American leaders. However, after Eisenhower's letter of early September, Eden had no reason to believe

that the United States would support *Musketeer*.

When the Hungarian crisis arose it presented opportunities for concerted diplomatic and political action by NATO and the United Nations in areas whose importance far transcended the immediate Middle East situation. The Franco-British-Israeli action obscured the Hungarian crisis and diverted the attention of ourselves, our allies, and the neutrals from the major world issue in which the central issues of the cold war were crystal clear.

This, of course, does not excuse the U.S. behavior from 1 August to mid-October. It does explain why world and considerable British opinion was generally against Mr. Eden. Mr. Eden should have realized that the American election would influence American behavior in the Middle East; particularly, it would tend to inhibit decisive action at a time when Mr. Eden recognized the need for such decisive action. The American public had been deceived or lulled by Mr. Eisenhower's and Mr. Dulles' overoptimistic statements at press conferences.

This was not Mr. Eden's fault—he was helpless to change this. Very understandably, this created a sense of great frustration. However, Mr. Eden should have been experienced enough to recognize this vital if unfortunate fact, and he should never have expected Mr. Eisenhower and Mr. Dulles to have acted other than they did when he intervened. Therefore, he should not have intervened unless he had both the power and the will to move swiftly and decisively without U.S. acquiescence or support. One cannot use force slowly and gently in a situation such as this; one either does not use force at all or one uses it decisively.

Eden's great mistake was to undertake a project which could not succeed without U.S. support when he had no reason to believe he would have that support. To say that Mr. Eisenhower

and Mr. Dulles should have supported him is beside the point. While Herman Finer is a strong, even violent, critic of Dulles, the factual statements in his book, *Dulles Over Suez*, are consistent with other evidence and merit close attention. A few excerpts from this and from an article by Winthrop Aldrich, then the U.S. Ambassador to Great Britain, illuminate the situation.

Finer wrote:

His [Dulles] diplomatic virtuosity was at his brightest at the First London Conference. But his triumph, the eighteen-power proposal, was bought by public, specific, and clear official American commitments to uphold British and French legal and political rights in Suez against Nasser. His allies were entitled to believe he intended to honor these commitments. He then made the critical mistake of refusing to lead the mission to Cairo which was to present the proposal to Nasser.

When the British and French, and especially Sir Anthony Eden, sincerely and urgently proposed to appeal to the United Nations, while there was still some fluidity in Nasser's fait accompli, Dulles obstructed the move. Instead, he constrained them (because he had force majeure) to accept a kind of stopgap, the Suez Canal Users' Association. He was fully conscious of the fact that the plan was unworkable, because it contained no means of compelling Nasser to accept it. Dulles promised it would make a 'dry ditch' of the Canal. He knew quite well that to boycott the Canal was the only 'teeth' the Association might have, but when Nasser threatened war if the Association tried to have its ships pass through the Canal, Dulles, in panic, dropped the 'teeth.' He had no genuine plans to help his allies economically on his avowed road to peace and justice. The allies concluded that Dulles had beguiled them by prevaricating persuasions into the morass of SCUA to win time and deflate their expectations of justice, and so they further lost faith in his sincerity, friendship, and clarity of mind.³¹

In substantiation Aldrich wrote:

After Nasser had turned down the Eighteen Nations Plan, the British were

ready to take the matter up in the Security Council of the United Nations and to ask for immediate action against Egypt. Secretary Dulles, however, persuaded them not to do so. He had conceived of a new plan afterwards known as the Canal Users' Plan. In retrospect it is apparent that the British and Secretary Dulles never saw eye to eye regarding this second plan. Almost at once it became plain that Eden thought of it as having been devised to justify the use of force as a last resort. Although every effort was made to make our position clear, the British regarded the plan as a slap in the face to Nasser. This became evident from Eden's statements in Parliament on September 11th in which he said he was urging its adoption as a preliminary to the use of force if Egypt did not cooperate. Secretary Dulles, on the other hand, thought of the plan as a desirable step in keeping the users of the Canal together in order to work out a good arrangement with Egypt for its operation. Failing this, it could still prepare the way for the submission of the matter to the Security Council. This difference in point of view led to great and continuing misunderstanding.

The British had been told over and over again at the highest levels that we wished to do everything possible to avoid the use of force, and for force to be used without any warning was a profound shock.

One of the chief difficulties during the Suez crisis was that Eden was in doubt whether the various plans put forward by Dulles were intended to bring about the results which Eden himself desired, or to thwart them.

... I did everything in my power to prevent Eden from misunderstanding Dulles' position but I do not think I was successful. I believe that at the last moment Eden thought that, faced with a fait accompli, we were going to recognize what he believed was Britain's vital interest and would support him.³²

In the climactic period 5-6 November the threat of Russian volunteers and of atomic war, the flight from the pound, the opposition of the Commonwealth Nations, and the demands of the American Government combined to place

intolerable pressure upon Eden. Finer wrote:

The Soviet Union, its hands deep in the blood of Hungarian men, women, and children, and impotently denounced by a vote of the Security Council and the General Assembly, now used its usual tactic, diversion and counterattack. Its leaders, who had an acute perception of what was happening within the United States government, in regard to the chastisement of Britain and France, and of the division of public opinion in Britain and France, made a series of atomic blackmail threats. These they conveyed through their press agencies and by letters direct to the Prime Ministers of the attacking governments and to the United States. . . .

Bulgakin's notes to Britain, France, and Israel were issued at 11:30 p.m. on November 5, that is, Paris and London time (or about 5:30 p.m. November 5 in Washington, D.C. and New York). By this time, the British and the French governments were caught in their own juridical toils concerning cease-fire between Egypt and Israel. Now, at a moment of maximum diplomatic weakness, that is, when the juridical principal of the UNEF had been accepted by the United Nations, Eden was trapped by his own publicly announced reason for moving on Suez. And at this moment came the maximum manipulation of fears by the Soviet Union; meanwhile, the pressure of the good Mr. Lodge at the United Nations did not relax. . . .

... Eden had committed himself to a military enterprise which he considered just, but the justice of which was spurned by his strongest and most preferred ally. In this policy he was challenged by a majority of nations, including the Asian and African members of his own Commonwealth, and criticized in every edition of the nation's press, and denounced by the Established Church and universities (both divided), and called to account in face-to-face debates in Parliament. All this required a sheer physical fortitude, a robustness of body and nerves, which Eden may never have had, and certainly did not have now. . . .

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He was up again at 9 a.m. (November 6) ready for work, and soon

afterwards a Cabinet meeting was in session. It continued throughout the morning. A long debate ensued on whether to cease fire. R.A. Butler, the most moderate member of the Cabinet, recommended the cease-fire in some such terms: A substantial part of the Canal was now occupied. Could much more be gained politically by continuing further up the Canal? Perhaps whatever could be achieved if the whole Canal were taken could still be obtained diplomatically on the basis of present gains? He believed that the additional potential political gains were not sufficient to offset the losses in the opposition of the United States and the world in general. Furthermore, there was just a chance that Russian volunteers would arrive. It looked as though Butler, and Heathcote-Amory, Minister of Agriculture, a Conservative worthy, and Sir Walter Moockton, Paymaster-General, were prepared to quit the Cabinet if a cease-fire was not ordered.

In addition, Harold Macmillan was compelled to report the very serious dollar-sterling situation. Financiers, sober as well as speculative, had been acting on the assumption that the pound must surely be devalued, considering the financial drain of war and of fear among all the nations which used sterling as their world-wide currency. On November 6 alone, \$300 million was needed to supply those who had titles to sterling balances.

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... On November 5, the U.S. Federal Reserve Bank was selling some of its sterling to avoid losses of its holdings. There is no doubt that State Department officials, now headed by Herbert Hoover, Jr., and advised by George M. Humphrey at the U.S. Treasury, suggested that the Federal Reserve Bank do this, as a means of avoiding loss, but also as a leverage over British-Suez operations. Those in the State Department and the White House, in the absence of Dulles, wanted an immediate cease-fire. The British Treasury advised the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Harold Macmillan, that the Bank of England needed one billion dollars to stop the devaluation of the pound by buying it.

Early on Tuesday morning, November 6, Macmillan phoned to Washing-

ton seeking substantial support, including help in making a call on British quotas in the International Monetary Fund. It was then about 4 a.m. in Washington, and no answer could be obtained at once. But the answer did come during the British Cabinet meeting that started at about 10 a.m. London time. A loan would be available, but on the imperative condition that a cease-fire be announced by Britain by midnight of November 6, that is, that same day!

Faced with a disastrous loss of the reserves needed to sustain all Britain's economic activities, the Cabinet was compelled to agree to a cease-fire. It was in America's power to sustain the British finances without asking for a cease-fire; it was America's policy to use her control over British finances to dictate the cease-fire, to exact it. Macmillan was taking astute and heroic measures to ferret out every resource to meet the obligations and stem any panic. His view, based on American and other speculative operations against the pound, prevailed. Eden agreed to a cease-fire.

In the night of November 5/6, that is, probably early morning on November 6, Eden was called on the telephone by Eisenhower. Later, Christian Pineau (December 20, 1956, in the National Assembly) declared that American pressure had been 'formidable.' The gist of the phone call to Eden was: 'I demand that you give the order to cease fire at once, if you want to preserve Anglo-American solidarity as well as peace. I cannot wait any longer.' It was in the nature of an ultimatum: the deadline was not later than November 6, midnight.

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In fact, it was not until November 13, when the talk was still of Russian and Chinese volunteers, that the American government responded to its allies' wishes and the Russian threats categorically. It did so then for its own sake, its own power and security and interests. The spokesman was General Gruenther, Commander in Chief of the NATO forces in Europe. Also by this time, UNEF had committed the Allies to withdrawal: they would not start fire again!

Gruenther declared:

If the Soviet Union carried out its threat to use guided missiles against Western European countries, we should immediately retaliate and the Soviet Union would be destroyed. That is as certain as that night follows day.

But--Russian power, in spite of Admiral Radford's advice that the Soviets could do nothing of what they had threatened, did play a decisive part in the general thinking and diplomacy of Washington. . . .³³

Finer further commented:

The British and French never came anywhere near to sensing the fearful degree of anger generated in the White House by Israel's entry into battle. They did not foresee the missionary zeal, efficiency, and speed with which the American leaders would press action in the United Nations. . . .³⁴

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There is a major overlap between the controllable and the uncontrollable areas of human conflict. Herbert Rosinski in his masterly short paper, "New Thoughts on Strategy," wrote: "It is the element of control which is the essence of strategy: control being the element which differentiates true strategic action from a haphazard series of improvisations."³⁵

Almost to the last, Dulles thought he had control. It came as a great shock to learn that he had lost control. Any decision to use force demands an appraisal of the power available. The simple fact that Britain and France did not have the comprehensive military-economic political power to retain the initiative meant that they lost the element of control and were forced into haphazard improvisation. This was clearly shown by their maneuvers during the debates in the United Nations on and after 30 October.

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One of the most fundamental attributes of an effective alliance is good faith. This essential element of good faith creates and demands as a further

necessity that a country does not confront an ally with a fait accompli affecting the other country's vital interest. In particular, good sense would indicate that if such a desperate measure appears necessary, one's expectations as to the consequent behavior of one's ally should be modest. No statesman should assume that the ally will follow his lead, when that ally has been deceived.

These elementary facts of statesmanship, diplomacy, and international politics should have been second nature to Anthony Eden. The fact that he ignored them in 1956 and has subsequently attempted to justify his conduct can be ascribed only to a deterioration of his mental capacity and moral perception.

This all emphasizes the importance of being able to identify the central issues in any complex problem. This, of course, cannot be done unless one has, first, had analytical experience and, second, understands the basic theory and principle in the area concerned.

From the foregoing it is evident that:

1. The American officials thought that the U.S. position was clear and some thought that it was consistent.

2. U.S. officials thought that this position was being adequately communicated to Eden and other foreign officials.

3. In early September some officials began to feel that the U.S. position was not completely understood.

4. Until the diplomatic blackout of 16 October, U.S. officials seemed to feel that the situation was under control.

5. The American position as expressed in public statements, official acts, and personal and official correspondence was in fact inconsistent, ambiguous, and equivocal in many points.

6. These elements derived from the great diversity and inner contradiction of American interests and from the unwillingness or inability of American officials to order these interests in specific terms.

7. These inconsistencies and uncertainties were frequently expressed in the various and, at times, almost parenthetical escape clauses that could have originated in the typical language habits of a clever lawyer, in personal uncertainty, or both.

8. The domestic political atmosphere of a presidential year was conducive both to uncertainty in policy and equivocation and ambiguity of language.

9. These facts and attitudes encouraged Nasser in his intransigence and confused and exasperated British and French officials and encouraged Israelis to seize an opportunity. In other words, they encouraged the very qualities and stimulated the very events they were designed to prevent.

10. All in all, there was no identification and clarification of the central issues. Conceptual unity was not attained. It was all a matter of haphazard improvisation which in no sense could be called a national strategy.

The Middle East and Atlantic policy of the United States obviously failed to such a degree that a complete collapse was barely averted. The repercussions of this failure have influenced most of the U.S. actions and policy ever since. Such major failure poses some very difficult questions.

First, what were the causes of this failure?

Certainly they were not simply caused by the weakness or foolishness of one man or even one group.

In examining policy, do we ask the wrong questions? Do we underrate some forces and overestimate others? Do our government leaders argue for a position better than they analyze it? Certainly all these faults occur frequently and can be expected to continue.

Do we expect too much from policy? Do our attempts to do too much so clutter the minds of our executives and their staffs and so choke the channels of communication that even the major problems tend to be examined hastily,

superficially, and with little consecutive thought by the senior responsible officials? Is our government so overcentralized that the inadequate delegation of authority further clutters the time and saps the energy of our senior officials in Washington?

Has the proliferation of small states so increased the requirement for highly qualified personnel in the foreign service and placed such a burden on communication as to introduce mediocrity and sluggishness into the diplomatic system?

These and similar questions will not be readily answered. But one in particular deserves comment. Do we expect too much from a policy? Hans Morgenthau's previously quoted remarks are pertinent. He pointed out the distinction between principles and interests and the need for policy to be guided by interests rather than the abstract principle. But even so, we should think further.

International policy is not formed by a political party and then carried out. Policy instead is dominated and almost wholly formed by the play of events as they are perceived and interpreted by the men in power in accordance with their own special concepts and habits of thought.

The methods and procedures used by the U.S. Government in dealing with the events of 1956 were the usual conventional methods of thought and procedure that have been generally accepted as the best practicable way of doing the business of government. The men involved were as able, as dedicated, and as upright as we can expect to see in such position of authority.

But the formulation of policy is quite different from the overt use of military force. Policy can be changed and at times readily modified. Overt military force, particularly in the nuclear age, however, has its own special characteristics and sets special forces into play that cannot be changed so readily. Thus the decision to use military force in support of a policy poses

an intellectual challenge of a higher order of difficulty than the normal demands of policy and the normal decisions of government. This is one of the major lessons of Suez just as it now is of Vietnam.

Consequently, when the issue of the use of military force is being discussed with an allied government, special care must be taken to keep the channels clear and the discussion unambiguous.

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Many of the lessons of Suez eventually were reflected in U.S. policy and behavior--for example:

The strengthening of the so-called General Purpose Forces and the establishment of a stronger ready amphibious force and improved mobile logistic support.

The formation of the U.S. Strike Command.

The formal concept of Prepositioning.

The establishment of a Special Assistant for Strategic Mobility to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

A more specific approach to the evaluation of Operational Readiness.

The great care that was taken to inform our allies of the situation and our position in the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962.

Ironically, however, these improvements did not take place as a direct result of Suez because so many of the fundamental faults of Suez were repeated by the United States in the Bay of Pigs. So it can be said that some of the obvious lessons of Suez gradually sank in when they were reinforced by the comparably foolish and disastrous handling of that affair.

Military Concepts and Principles. The foregoing brings us to a group of concepts and ideas which evolved over many years of military analysis much of

which took place before World War II and formed the heart of *Sound Military Decision* published in 1936 by the U.S. Naval War College.

Regardless of how it be defined or organized in any particular nation, the highest level of military command is in reality vested in the highest political authority in the nation. This political-military linkage further combines with management to form a continuum of executive authority which must blend policy, strategy, logistics, tactics, and operations in coherent action devoted to the national interests and national security.

While the military aspects of the overall problem must be subordinate to the political, military considerations are a major factor in the political decision.

As a consequence of the thermonuclear threat, the level of tactical defeat that is acceptable to attain a higher strategic objective has been raised to a level never before visualized by military scholars. This and the resulting strict political control of all military action have placed a great burden on military command leadership to maintain combat morale and effectiveness under adverse political restraints.

The classic principle of military decision emphasizes the interweaving of thought as integrated in the mind of the responsible commander by requiring the test of each proposed course of action for:

1. *Suitability*--Will it accomplish the mission? Attain the objective? This involves both strategy and politics.

2. *Feasibility*--Can it be accomplished with the means available? This involves tactics, logistics, and economics.

3. *Acceptability*--Are the consequences as to cost acceptable? This involves politics, economics, and logistics.

While it is not likely that in the contradictory environment of world politics the strict military meaning of

the word "assumption" can always be applied, it is important for those who have the burden of decision to understand it.

Sound Military Decision comments:

The word assumption, when used to denote a basis for a plan, signifies 'the taking of something for granted.' It does not mean a conjecture, a guess or a probability. The proposed action, resulting from a decision made under an assumption, is designed to be taken only upon the disclosure of the truth of the assumption. The fact that the assumption upon which the plan is based may prove false indicates the advisability of developing several plans based on various sets of assumptions. . . . *The visualization of valid and useful assumptions frequently makes the most serious demands on professional knowledge and judgment.*³⁶

In political-military affairs, an assumption does not have to be formal or explicit in order to influence decisions and action. In some instances false assumptions seem to carry great authority even though after the fact they are clearly recognized as mere plausible, attractive myths.

The establishment of conceptual unity as to the purpose to be attained and of assumptions underlying the plan is of vital importance and is a primary responsibility of high command regardless of whether command is vested in an individual or a group. This requires the analysis as well as the statement of objectives.

Military force should never be used except to accomplish a political purpose. The man who initiates, controls, and terminates the use of military force must have a clear idea of this political purpose. He must be alert for unexpected developments which invalidate the assumptions on which his plan is based or which alter the nature and primacy of the objectives sought.

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Strategy is the comprehensive direc-

tion of power to control situations and areas to attain objectives.

Tactics is the immediate employment of specific weapons and forces to attain the objectives established by strategy.

Logistics is the creation and sustained support of specific weapons and forces to be tactically employed to attain strategic objectives.

It behooves policy to insure not only that military strategy pursue appropriate aims but that the work of strategy be allotted adequate means and be undertaken under the most favorable conditions. Thus strategy and tactics are inseparable, and understanding between civil and military leaders is essential.

It is the duty of tactics to insure results appropriate to strategic aim.

It is the duty of strategy to give tactics the power appropriate to the results demanded.

It is the duty of strategy to insure that the tactical struggle be initiated under conditions favorable for attainment of objectives.

The functions of command are threefold: to create combat forces, to support combat forces, and to employ combat forces.

Strategy governs the comprehensive employment; tactics governs the immediate employment; and logistics has the dual role of both creating the forces and thereafter providing their sustained support.

Command and management are not synonymous. The responsibilities of command are greater than those of management because command establishes the purpose for which military force is employed and involves ultimate questions of life and death. Command, however, must use a variety of management procedures and techniques throughout the military system.

As the link between the war front and the home front, the logistic process is at once the military element in the nation's economy and the economic

clement in its military operations. Thus there are two phases to the coherent process of logistics: the producer phase and the consumer phase.

Management is a group of procedures and techniques which enter the military system primarily as they are used to control the specific functions of the two phases of logistics.

Operations is a blend of tactical action and logistic action to attain the objectives set by strategy. The logistic action must take place before the tactical action becomes possible. Thus, the logistic system must be in harmony both with the economic system and with the tactical concepts and environment of the combat forces.

Economic factors limit the combat forces one can create. Operational logistic factors limit the combat forces one can employ.

Readiness = Degree of ability of a unit/ship to perform its designed mission. It includes status of personnel, equipment, supplies, maintenance, facilities, intelligence, and training. It also incorporates "performance," "endurance," and "preparedness."

Effectiveness = Performance x Availability x Utilization.

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We now must ask a group of fundamental questions: What kinds of power and force can be used effectively to accomplish a political purpose? What kinds of power and force cannot be used to accomplish a political purpose? What changes in the basic political-military situation can shift a particular kind of power and force from one category of usability to the other? How does one measure, report, and evaluate combat and operational effectiveness and readiness?

An accurate appraisal of one's own operational effectiveness and readiness

is a vital element in any decision to use military power and force. These questions will not be achieved easily or quickly. They will best be achieved through a disciplined continuing exploration of military theory.

Summary and Conclusion. The evidence on the Suez crisis of 1956 is coherent, consistent, and has such an atmosphere of authenticity that any major contradiction or invalidation when the complete archives of Great Britain, France, and the United States are made available seems unlikely.

The pros and cons of the Aswan Dam controversy are beyond the scope of this paper. Nevertheless the student of military history and theory must understand how the cancellation of the proposed loan triggered events which had other causative components stretching far back into history. He should be particularly interested in the factors which caused the ineptitude of the political-military decisions made after the seizure of the Canal.

The 28 July reports from the military staff to the cabinet that swift decisive military action would be impossible should have alerted Mr. Eden and M. Pincau to the dangerous realities of the problem. Thereafter a thorough military estimate of the situation should have been made before deciding the course of action. In partial extenuation of their action we should realize that the equivocal attitudes and maneuvers of Mr. Dulles inhibited rather than encouraged such rigorous analysis.

Eden and Dulles each misjudged the strength of the other's commitment to opposing policies and the degree to which this opposition was supported, in one case by the momentum of a bad plan, and in the other by his associates in government. Neither seemed to recognize the nature and significance of his own assumptions and of the other's assumptions, concepts, and perception of his country's national interests. This

misjudgment was accentuated by the use of the transatlantic telephone to discuss matters which are not susceptible to clarification by such an imperfect method of communication. We do not know the extent to which ill health, excessive workload, and the strain and readjustments of extensive travel by air influence the thought process of individual men. We do not know the extent to which cancer influenced Dulles' emotions and thought process. We know that because of his two recent serious illnesses, Eisenhower's doctors and personal staff were solicitous in protecting him from excessive mental and physical strain. We know that Eden's health was bad and that his illness was of a type associated with lack of poise and sound judgment.

The problem of Israel was clear and unambiguous. She considered that her national existence was at stake; she was constrained by circumstances to a relatively simple strategic concept. Her people, many of them recently freed from unspeakable misery, clearly understood the issues and the national interest, were inured to sacrifice, and were unafraid of risk.

On the other hand, the problems of Britain, France, and the United States were extraordinarily difficult. Their national interests were complex and diverse: the issues posed were uncertain and at times ambiguous. Both France and Britain were suffering from frustration and memories of past power. The United States, in an election year, was in effect trying to be all things to all people and thus had interests which were almost overtly contradictory.

The Israeli situation is unique; few, if any, nations have such a clear sense of purpose and interest. By contrast, the situation of the other powers is typical of the present and the foreseeable future. Contradiction and ambiguity in the face of equivocal threats are normal expectancy for these nations. Even though we cannot expect strict logic to

govern high-level political military decisions, it certainly should influence the expectations of those who decide and plan. Because of the life and death aspect of command, this is particularly important for the military professional. When the politician exercises the authority of a military commander, he also assumes the obligation to know what he is doing and to understand the effect of his decision and actions on military operations.

The influence of the forthcoming U.S. presidential election permeated the thinking of all American politicians who were making policy during the summer and autumn of 1956. This influence also extended abroad, particularly to England, France, Israel, and Egypt. One can never know the precise manner and degree that it affected the course and timing of events. It did affect the basic thinking of the dominant individuals.

The question of to what degree one can be frank and open with the leaders

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY



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He has had a variety of duty in submarines, destroyers, cruisers, battleships, and in 1946-47 commanded the U.S.S. *Washington*. Prior to his retirement in 1952, he was Assistant Chief of Staff for Logistics, Commander Allied Forces, Southern Europe. His publications include: *Military Concepts and Philosophy*; *Basic Logistics*; *Command and Control*; *Command Logistics*; *Cuba-October 1962*; and numerous articles for professional journals.

Rear Admiral Eccles is currently engaged with a logistical research project with The George Washington University and acts as a consultant for logistics to the Naval War College.

of an allied state is a difficult matter of intuition. It involves the analysis of one's own objectives, the evaluation of allied and opponents' objectives and intentions, and an evaluation of the degree of confidence one has in the allied leaders. This latter point has two aspects; confidence in their integrity and discretion, and confidence in their ability to control their own governments and nations.

This is an extraordinary combination of intelligence, information, psychological appraisal, and faith. Its very complexity emphasizes three major factors in top level decision: the analysis of objectives, the examination of assumptions, and the vital importance of character and intuition. Neither organizational devices nor quantitative evaluations can help very much with this aspect of a major political military problem. Of all the lessons of Suez, this seems to be the most important and the most enduring.

Finally, these fundamentals should

be studied and pondered so that they will be second nature to our commanders, be they civilian or military. Then when new crises inevitably arise they will be an integral part of their intuition, their professional judgment. When, under the pressure of events, the formal thought process must be telescoped, these factors and relationships will take their proper place and exert their proper influence. If anyone counters with the remark that it is not practicable to expect such leaders thus to study and meditate, that person must be prepared to accept the disastrous consequences of such ignorance and neglect.

In retrospect, the points made seem so obvious as to be almost trite. Yet it was the failure to understand them and their significance, the failure to apply sound, long-established principles which produced one of the greatest military-political disasters of our time.

Strategic realism requires the analysis of objectives, the challenge of assumptions, and the appraisal of expectations.

FOOTNOTES

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5. Nutting, Minister of State in Eden's Cabinet, kept no records of their discussions with France and Israel leading up to the attack on Egypt.
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7. Thomas, p. 90, 111.
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12. Thomas, p. 109-116.
13. Johnson, p. 102-103; Thomas, p. 140.
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17. Henry E. Eccles, *Logistics in the National Defense* (Harrisburg, Pa.: Stackpole, 1959), p. 30-41.
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18. Johnson, p. 43-45; Keightly; Thomas, p. 41, 42, 48.
 19. Johnson, p. 92-103; Churchill, p. 278-281; Keightly; Thomas, p. 129-144.
 20. Thomas, p. 145-158.
 21. Hans Morgenthau, "To Intervene or Not to Intervene," *Foreign Affairs*, April 1967, p. 430-431.
 22. Eden, p. 414-415.
 23. Thomas, p. 41-42.
 24. Johnson, p. 43-45.
 25. Churchill, p. 245-246.
 26. I use the term "classic approach" to represent the "Estimate of the Situation" which had been issued from 1910 until 1936 by the Naval War College. This estimate, based on rigorous historical analysis, was then included in the War College publication, *Sound Military Decision*, and republished in 1942.
 27. Eccles, *Military Concepts and Philosophy*, chap. IX, "Command Decision," particularly p. 124-127.
 28. Thomas, p. 158.
 29. Johnson, p. 105-106.
 30. Thomas, p. 90.
 31. Herman Finer, *Dulles over Suez* (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1964), p. 493-494.
 32. Wintrop W. Aldrich, "The Suez Crisis," *Foreign Affairs*, April 1967, p. 541-552.
 33. Finer, p. 421-433.
 34. *Ibid.*, p. 372.
 35. Eccles, *Military Concepts and Philosophy*, p. 36-46.
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Battle should no longer resemble a bludgeon fight, but should be a test of skill, a maneuver combat, in which is fulfilled the great principle of surprise by striking "from an unexpected direction against an unguarded spot."

B.H. Liddell Hart: Thoughts of War, xiv, 1944

SET AND DRIFT



Establish Contact. Winter 1968-69 was one of the most active for the War Gaming Department in recent years. The final fleet war game of the season, ESTABLISH CONTACT sponsored by COMSECONDFLT, had all the characteristics of a grand finale because of its scope, duration, and high level of representation. ESTABLISH CONTACT was a milestone for the War Gaming Department in that it incorporated a greater number of major command participants than had heretofore been assembled at the Navy Electronic Warfare Simulator

(NEWS). The senior naval commander and sponsor of the game was Commander Second Fleet, Vice Adm. B. J. Semmes, Jr. Other flag-rank players were: Rear Adm. I. C. Kidd, Jr. (COMCRUDESFLT 12), Rear Adm. R. N. Charbonnet (COMCARDIV 6), and Rear Adm. F. H. Price, Jr. (COMCRU-



The Umpire Area of the Navy Electronic Warfare Simulator during ESTABLISH CONTACT, a recent fleet game.

DESFLOT 8). Capt. K. C. Gummerson (COMSERVRON 2) was also a player, and senior officers from COMASW-FORLANT and COMCARDIV 16 staffs also participated.


ESTABLISH CONTACT was created for the purpose of exercising participating commanders and their staffs in the conduct of striking force operations in a general war environment. The game provided a test vehicle for Commander Second Fleet's general War Plan and the supporting plans for participating commanders. Nearly all types of actions currently conceived for modern naval warfare occurred in realistic simulation ranging over a 2,400 mile square ocean/land area. Four working days of real time were required to accomplish play of 5 game-days.

War gaming has long been a vital concern of the Naval War College. The words of Admiral Laning, President of the Naval War College 1930-32, are as applicable for ESTABLISH CONTACT as they were for his time frame 40 years ago.

Every nation must develop skill in war so vitally important, or ultimately pay for not having done so.


To develop war skills without being at war is difficult. A man may spend a lifetime thinking of and studying war operations and by so doing develop many ideas as to how to win them but unless they can be tested in practice, he will never know whether they will win against those of an opposing commander. The Naval War College was devised to provide such tests. In miniature, it pits naval forces against each other in every conceivable form of war operation and by constantly measuring results and applying losses as they occur, the miniature operations become almost exactly those of actual war.

ESTABLISH CONTACT was the last chapter in 1968's highly successful fleet war game season and postgame critique indicated that the game sponsor and participating players clearly benefited from the experience. The Department now welcomes a 1969 characterized by expanding support to the fleet with increased interest in Naval conflict simulation utilizing the NEWS.



A Command Center of the Navy Electronic Warfare Simulator during ESTABLISH CONTACT.

MAHAN



The Man, His Writings and Philosophy

A lecture delivered at the Naval War College

by

Captain Jack E. Godfrey, U.S. Navy

Faculty, School of Naval Warfare

I am told that a few years ago--at the National War College--a speaker commenced by telling his audience: We are starting on the same foot, because you haven't heard this lecture and I haven't read it. I assure you that is not the case today. For I have found this to be a very fascinating subject over the last couple of years.

A number of years ago, a secretary of war wrote of "The peculiar psychology of the Navy Department which frequently seemed to retire from the realms of logic into a dim religious world in which Neptune was God, Mahan His prophet, and the United States Navy the only true church." He also spoke of "The Gospel according to St. Mahan."

At the opening of this Naval War College in 1884, its first president, Commodore Stephen B. Luce, said: "We

must find one who will do for naval science what Jomini did for military science." A few years later he said of a member of the founding faculty, "He is here--his name is Mahan." As we shall see, Mahan did become--and still remains--the foremost philosopher of seapower.

Last year our King Chair of Maritime History was occupied by Professor Ray O'Connor from Temple University, and you'll be privileged to hear more from him later this year.

I have to recognize him at this time because I've plagiarized a couple of items from a speech he gave here last year on naval strategy in the 20th century. To illustrate that historians and statesmen for many centuries have recognized that seapower is an essential element of national greatness, Professor O'Connor used a number of quotes,

some as follows: From Pericles in the 5th century B.C.--"A great thing in truth is control of the sea"--and Themistocles, "He who commands the sea has command of everything." Much later then, Sir Walter Raleigh said: "Whosoever commands the sea, commands the trade; whosoever commands the trade of the world, commands the riches of the world, and consequently the world itself." Fleet Adm. Chester W. Nimitz on his retirement, said of Sir Walter Raleigh's quote:--"This principle is as true today as when uttered, and its effect will continue as long as ships traverse the seas."

I have used these quotes partially to whet your appetite for a closer look at Mahan's doctrines.

It is important early in your study here to gain an understanding of the historical basis of the principles of war. Some feel that the classical principles of warfare have become outmoded as a result of the technological revolution. One of my aims is to show the great extent to which Mahan's lessons from history are still valid.

It is not my purpose to preach Mahan's gospel; rather it is to introduce you to the man, his writings and his philosophy of seapower--hopefully to stir your interest in studying him further this year. Perhaps someone in this audience will grasp the opportunity to transform Mahan's penetrating theories and update them to fit today's situation. Mahan himself would be elated with the possibilities. He was primarily an analytical historian, and only secondarily a propagandist for his views. In studying him you should discover a cause and effect relationship between seapower and national greatness. From Mahan's evaluation of these relationships, he developed and propounded his theories of seapower as an instrument--perhaps an indispensable one--for projecting and expanding U.S. power and influence throughout the world.

Mahan was an advocate of increased strength and readiness during the time of hiatus in the Navy--indeed, in the entire military and diplomatic posture of the United States. His writings bear the imprint of his times and must be considered in historical context. Perhaps a fascinating sequel to Mahan's writings could be entitled the "influence of Mahan upon seapower."

At this point we should briefly examine the high points in Mahan's life and career.

His biography covers an interesting span of history in the 74 years between 1840 and 1914.

He was brought up in a scholarly as well as military background. His father, Dennis Mahan, graduated from West Point, and after 4 years' study in Europe, served on the faculty of the Military Academy for the rest of his life.

Dennis Mahan was keenly interested in military strategy and tactics. By coincidence the "... fascination that the career of Napoleon exercised over Professor Dennis Mahan was much like that which the career of Nelson was to exercise over Alfred Thayer Mahan."

The son developed an early interest in the Navy by reading sea stories from the Academy library. Against the advice of his father, who considered him ill-suited for any kind of military career, he entered the Naval Academy, and graduated in 3 years. His junior officer cruise in the frigate, *Congress* took him down the east coast of South America. His various tours of sea duty during the Civil War were mostly involved in the maritime blockade of the Confederacy.

During a brief interlude on the Naval Academy faculty he became acquainted with Stephen B. Luce, and he went back to sea in the U.S.S. *Macedonian* under Luce's command. This began a lifelong association which eventually turned Mahan to his literary career.

His cruise to the Asiatic station as second in command of *Iroquois* provided his only firsthand acquaintance

with the Western Pacific, but aroused an interest that persisted all his life. On this cruise he first became greatly impressed with British seapower, which he witnessed everywhere he went.

For the next 14 years Mahan rotated between sea and shore duty on routine assignments. He was promoted from lieutenant commander to commander in 1872, and to captain in 1884.

It was while in command of a small ship off the west coast of South America that he received the call from Commodore Luce to teach Naval History and Tactics at the War College. He couldn't be relieved immediately, so he commenced research in preparation for his forthcoming lectures. He had always been an avid reader of history, and now he tackled this study in earnest.

By the time he reached his new assignment he had begun writing. His early lectures became the substance of his first book: *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History: 1660-1783* which was published in 1890 while President of the Naval War College. There were favorable reviews abroad almost immediately, especially in Britain, and this is understandable because it was so flattering of that country's maritime history. A Major Moll of the U.S. Air Force analyzed this phenomenon with considerable accuracy in an article in *Military Affairs* when he said: "The British found that an American had articulated the naval and maritime policies which the British, by accident or unconscious genius, had blundered through in their centuries' long rise to world supremacy."

Recognition in the United States was slower in coming and especially within the Navy. In 1893 he was ordered to command the U.S.S. *Chicago* flagship of the European squadron. By this time he was a celebrity on the other side of the Atlantic, especially in Britain, and was wined and dined by royalty, and others high in government. He was awarded honorary degrees by both Oxford and

Cambridge. His net effect of all this was to widen the world interest in his books.

Mahan's triumphant reception in every port didn't go down too well with his admiral, who found himself playing social second fiddle to his celebrated flag-captain, and there was continual friction between them. After this cruise, Mahan wrote with bitter humor, "Great believer as I am in concentration of force, I am disposed to question the advisability of concentrating and Admiral's command in a single ship."

He retired in 1896 as a captain after 40 years of creditable but undistinguished naval service. We know him now as Rear Admiral Mahan, but his final promotion was the result of general legislation that affected all retired officers who had served during the Civil War and was in no way intended as a distinction.

So much for the man himself. What about the world he lived in and the Navy he was a part of? These also influenced his writing.

From pictures of two of Mahan's ships—the frigate *Congress* in which he served his first sea duty and the protected cruiser *Chicago* Mahan's major combatant command—it's very evident that the transition from sail to steam was still in progress over this 40-year period.

Our country's merchant marine declined during and after the Civil War. The ensuing decades of peace and westward development of the United States stimulated little or no popular interest in a Navy. The Navy went back to canvas. A general order in 1869 directed that all naval vessels should have "full sail power" and that the captain had to make an entry in his logbook in red ink whenever he used steam.

However, by 1881 there was a beginning of our expansion of foreign trade and some recognition of the need for a stronger Navy. Between 1885 and 1889, 30 new ships were authorized. I bring this out to make clear that at the

time Mahan started his lecturing and writing, we had already begun a modest naval building program. But not much thought was devoted to the proper employment of naval forces. The commonly held theory was that the function of the Navy was commerce, raiding, and coastal protection. Naval thinking needed direction and the Navy needed a mission.

In the somewhat confused world of technological change and hurgooning imperialism of the turn of the century, Mahan's new interpretation of the meaning of seapower and its proper application in maritime strategy had real meaning.

Many of the first books were compilations of his lectures on Naval History which he delivered at the Naval War College. During the period of his presidency here he published the first two: *The Influence of Sea Power on History*, and *The Influence of Sea Power Upon the French Revolution and Empire*. Once he got started, he was a highly prolific writer, averaging about a book a year for the rest of his life—20 books in all, plus more than 100 essays and articles. It is striking to look in Room N-22 outside our library at the volumes he produced. His books were mainly histories, biographies, or writings on naval subjects. The wide range of his intellectual curiosity is revealed by a sampling of titles of his many articles.

- "Hawaii and Our Future Sea Power"
- "Possibilities of an
Anglo-American Reunion"
- "The Isthmus and Sea Power"
- "Strategic Features of the
Caribbean Sea & Gulf of Mexico"
- "Lessons of the War with Spain"
- "The Boer Republic and
the Monroe Doctrine"
- "The Problem of Asia"
- "The Apparent Decadence of
the Church's Influence"
- "Principles of Naval Administration"

- "The Persian Gulf and
International Relations"
- "The Russian-Japanese Conflict"
- "The Submarine and its Enemies"
- "Germany's Naval Ambition"
- "Armaments and Arbitration"
- "Twentieth Century Christianity"

Note that his interests were world-wide and covered the spectrum from naval affairs to international relations and included excursions into religion. To illustrate that he exerted widespread influence in his time, Admiral Hlayward had discovered an article written by Mahan setting forth the reasons why women should not be given the right to vote.

When his first book was published in 1890, he was gratified to receive promptly an assessment from a civil service commissioner in Washington named Theodore Roosevelt who said, "During the last two days I have spent half my time, busy as I am, in reading your book. I am greatly in error if it does not become a naval classic." These kind words started a relationship which had a great impact on the naval and foreign affairs of the United States at the turn of the century.

Mahan did not actually inspire the world naval armament race at the turn of the century. It was already in progress when his first writings were published. But in short order he became the most quoted authority when navalists of the various competing nations argued their shipbuilding programs. After he became internationally famous, his own countrymen began to pay attention to him.

Mahan's philosophy of seapower was translated into action by Theodore Roosevelt, first as Assistant Secretary of the Navy, and later as President. The views of these two were sponsored in Congress by Senator Henry Cabot Lodge. The collaboration among these three was reflected in the spectacular

growth of the Navy. There were only 9 armored ships when Roosevelt took office in 1901. Six years later, by 1907, the Atlantic Fleet had 16 battleships and the Pacific Fleet had eight armored and eight light cruisers.

In his last years Mahan was apprehensive that he had oversold his philosophy, and in the wrong quarter. Germany had no naval history, and therefore the German Kaiser swallowed Mahan complete, and started to build a navy to support his drive for a colonial empire. Mahan watched this growing threat to British seapower with the greatest concern. He repeatedly admonished the British to accelerate their naval arming, and with World War I imminent, he went so far as to recommend that Britain strike before it be too late. Our Government was trying to remain neutral, and Mahan's pronouncements were considered inflammatory. By Presidential direction a general order was issued forbidding the military to publicize views on the impending war.

At any rate there is no doubt his writing had tremendous influence at home and abroad.

Now it is time for us to examine some of the writing that caused all the turmoil.

It was not easy to categorize Mahan as a writer. There is no doubt about his credentials as an historian—he was elected President of the American Historical Association. But he was a very special kind of historian—one who put maritime interest in the foreground of world events. Repeatedly in his chronicles, he pauses to drive home one or another of his favorite principles of maritime strategy. He constantly sought, in his own words, “to wrest something out of the old woodensides and twenty-four pounders that will throw some light on the combinations to be used with ironclads, rifled guns and torpedoes.”

At the outset of his research he turned to Jomini, the great philosopher on military strategy, for guidance as to

general principles and became convinced there must be some of these principles that apply equally to land and sea warfare. The most evident heritage from Jomini is that war and diplomacy are inseparable. Mahan was not acquainted with the military philosophy of Clausewitz at the outset of his writing but, on later reading of his works, found himself in close agreement. Mahan double-checked and underlined Clausewitz' passage: “Wars are in reality only the expressions or manifestations of policy itself.”

For purposes of this lecture I am not going to spend any time in description of his writings as history or biography, but I will mention in passing that they almost all deserve careful reading.

Also, from this point on I will dwell mainly upon Mahan's major theses. These fall into two main areas: a philosophy of seapower and principles of naval strategy.

First as regards to philosophy of seapower. The term itself was not invented by Mahan, but as one writer said, “It belongs to him.” He gave the term a meaning significantly different from an exact parallel with “landpower” and “airpower.” “Seapower” according to Mahan means, not just naval power, but rather the combination of a thriving merchant marine and the protection of a strong Navy.

He saw the prosperity of a country bordering on the sea as depending greatly upon the development of its internal productive capacity and support of foreign trade borne by its own merchant shipping—with colonies as sources of raw materials and markets. Britain was his model for proper exploitation of seapower.

In evaluating the commercial factor of seapower as expounded by Mahan, keep in mind that British seapower at its peak of influence owed much to the primitive state of land transportation. For example, goods sent from the northwest of Germany to southern Ger-

many could be transported more quickly by sea than by land: it went through the English Channel, the Mediterranean, the Dardanelles and all the way up the Danube.

Mahan measured a nation's potential for greatness according to how it stood with respect to each of these principal conditions affecting the seapower of nations:

- Geographical Position
- Physical Conformation
- Extent of Territory
- Number of Population
- Character of the People
- Character of the Government

These are fairly obvious factors and are cataloged and explained at some length in the first chapter of his first book, of the "influence" series.

With regard to geographical position: England had a great advantage over Holland and France, two of her greatest rivals, because she wasn't distracted by the necessity of defending-or extending-her land boundaries, nor the need to maintain a large army. Furthermore, her position athwart the principal trade routes was a great lever in wartime.

He saw advantages and disadvantages in the position of the United States. We were protected by distance from invasion. However, we were out of the mainstream of world trade, and this became one of Mahan's arguments for construction of the Panama Canal-to provide a principal trade route we could exploit and dominate. Later, with the canal under construction, he became a strong advocate of our acquiring bases in the Caribbean to control and defend the approaches to the canal. You might ponder some disadvantages of Russia's position today with regard to poor access to the sea.

Physical conformation has numerous facets. I was surprised to learn that Mahan considered a wealth of natural resources a somewhat negative factor in

the development of seapower. He characterized Britain as being "driven to the sea." Mahan was impatient for America to awaken from her absorption with internal development and develop an interest in foreign trade, the building of a merchant marine and a Navy to protect it.

Other aspects of physical conformation are more obvious, such as: easy access between coastal areas and the interior, numerous harbors and degree of continuity of coastal area. In the latter regard, he considered the position of France, Spain, and the United States disadvantageous because of their separate coasts on two different seas. Such separation makes possession of key straits and control points like Gibraltar and the Panama Canal a strategic matter of greatest national interest.

The next two factors, extent of territory and number of population, go together. When both are large there is a potential for greatness, and vice versa, as in the case of Holland for example, whose maritime strength was limited by the small population and territory of her home base.

There is an element of weakness in large territory with a small population. This situation makes the territory difficult to defend with inadequate forces. On the other hand, overcrowded Britain provided a thrust toward the sea and colonization.

Under character of the people, Mahan mainly considers their enterprising energy, their inclination to trade and follow the sea, and to colonize. He held there can be no production, no foreign commerce, and no Navy without these qualities in a sufficient number of the people.

One character of the government that Mahan continually harped upon was the degree to which it supported a Navy. He said "popular governments are not generally favorable to military expenditures, however necessary . . ." and especially during peacetime. We who

witnessed the headlong demobilization of the United States after World War II can agree with Mahan as to this. He dedicated himself and much of his literary efforts to this particular problem for the remainder of his life after retirement. He wrote copiously in favor of American economic expansion, overseas trade, and the building of a U.S. Navy second to none--unless it were Great Britain's.

A careful scrutiny of Mahan's view of seapower reveals how closely it is based upon his research on the position of Britain relative to the continental European powers with whom she vied for dominance. He was an ardent anglophile. This somewhat biased view may have accounted for whatever there is of Mahan's concept of seapower that has eroded with time.

Development and improvement of overland transportation systems have reduced reliance on sea transport for shorter hauls, improved the mobility of land-based forces, and increased the vulnerability of naval bases. Airpower has challenged naval dominance over coastal and narrow seas.

His thesis that national economic prosperity is based upon trade, a merchant marine, and colonies has also eroded with time. Trade certainly remains important. However, the world has gotten away from the practice of each country carrying its own goods only in its own bottoms. Mahan felt strongly that peacetime shipping should be commensurate with the nation's needs in wartime so that the economy could be maintained and the wartime effort supported.

His accent on the need for colonies was based upon his admiration of the British Empire. He visualized a closed economic system between mother country and colonies. This theory, of course, is outmoded. Modern, relatively free international trade has demonstrated vastly greater economic potential.

His emphasis upon colonies as sites for vitally needed naval bases was a reflection of his lack of faith in alliances. However, even here he was somewhat inconsistent, for he always advocated that we maintain friendship with Great Britain and was willing to see us base the size of our Navy upon the presumption that in war we would not have the British Navy against us.

In his emphasis upon colonial expansionism, therefore, Mahan was more in tune with the imperialistic climate of his own day than he was accurately prophetic of the conditions of our own times. However, I suggest that if you substitute the phrase, "free trade, friends and allies" for Mahan's "shipping and colonies" as objects for the protection of a strong Navy, his concept is still valid.

Mahan's conception of seapower was based upon his observation of the struggle for dominance among the various maritime and continental powers of Europe. Francis Bacon identified two concepts or philosophies of warfare: The continental was typified by Napoleon and codified by Clausewitz. The maritime was typified by Nelson and codified by Mahan.

The present world confrontation finds the principal powers arrayed against each other, to be principally maritime on one side and continental on the other--the free world maritime and peripheral, and the Communists in control of much of the great expanse of the Eurasian Continent. The power struggle between the continental and the maritime systems is by no means decided. Certainly the growing Soviet maritime strength, in all its manifestations, poses some new dimensions in this struggle, and we have not yet digested the implications of it.

And how does "seapower" figure in this struggle? Much as it did in the period of history chronicled by Mahan. His thesis may be criticized for its overemphasis upon economic im-

perialism. But look beyond his first chapter, where he provided this restrictive definition, to the bulk of his history. I am persuaded that he conceived of the same broad concept of seapower that we do: The vehicle for projection of national power in all its sea-transportable manifestation--military, economic, political, and psychological. So we do Mahan no disservice if we update his term, while giving him full credit for being the first to expound it.

But let's turn now away from Mahan's concept of seapower and examine his strategic principles. He didn't provide a ready catalog, but those who have abstracted his most often repeated lessons from his abundant writings, generally agree the most important ones are these: CONCENTRATION, OBJECTIVE, OFFENSIVE, and COMMUNICATIONS. Let's examine each of these.

First, CONCENTRATION. Mahan said, "The fundamental object in all military combinations is to gain local superiority by concentration."

At the time Mahan began his writing on seapower and during most of the period covered by his "influences" series of history, there were two main theories on how best to exercise command of the sea. The British favored concentrated ships of the line employed against the main force of the enemy; the French practiced "Guerre de Course," or commerce destruction by wide-ranging cruisers. The French theory had been favored by Mahan before the call to lecture at the War College, but in the course of his research he became a convert to the principle of concentration.

In contrasting the relative effectiveness of these two strategies he said: "It is not the taking of individual ships or convoys, be they few or many, that strikes down the money power of a nation; it is the possession of that overbearing power on the sea which drives the enemy's flag from it, or allows it to appear only as a fugitive,

and overbearing power can only be exercised by great navies."

Over and over he admonished "Never divide the fleet." Upon the outbreak of the Spanish American War when the Spanish Fleet was known to have sailed for the Western Atlantic there was a great clamor to disperse our Atlantic Fleet along the coast to protect individual seaports from bombardment. A lot of political pressure was applied in behalf of this scheme. Mahan, sitting as a member of the Naval Board of Strategy, advised the administration to keep the fleet in a position where it would be able to quickly concentrate when the destination of the Spanish Fleet became apparent. The result was the blockade before Santiago and the destruction of Cervera's Fleet, when it was forced out to face the concentrated American Fleet.

The Spanish American War provided Mahan strong backing for his views on concentration. This principle was further strengthened by the Russo-Japanese War. The Japanese concentrated first upon destruction of the Russian Navy at Port Arthur--and then upon the Russian Baltic Fleet as it entered the straits of Tsushima.

However, the issue of concentrated battle fleets vs. commerce raiding, or "Guerre de Course," remains alive. Mahan did not foresee the employment of the submarine as a commerce raider. Twice in the 20th century have submarines come near severing the Atlantic lines of communication. In both world wars they were defeated by concentration of merchant shipping into convoys and the timely development of countermeasures by the Atlantic allies. In the Far East in World War II, Japanese air and surface domination of Far East waters did not prevent U.S. submarines from cutting the Japanese lines of communication--employing a method of warfare that Mahan disapproved.

And now once again we maritime powers face the threat of continental power preparing to dispute our control of the sea, by concentrating on a submarine fleet, while also effectively building an impressive capability in surface combatants and merchant marine with which power can be projected worldwide.

To counter this threat we must consider how best to employ our overriding domination of the surface and the air and periphery of the sea and bring to bear all the necessary ASW, and other countermeasures, that will preserve the essential truth of Mahan's principle of concentration.

Regarding OBJECTIVE, according to Mahan "The proper objective is . . . the organized military force of the enemy."

This principle of the physical objective possibly was best illustrated by Lord Nelson in his relentless pursuit of the French, even across the Atlantic Ocean and back, culminating in his great victory at Trafalgar. Nelson did not bother about the likely intentions of the French. He figured that if he could gain contact and bring the French to combat, the intentions would take care of themselves. He did not hesitate to abandon his assigned area command. He pursued his true objective: the enemy naval fleet. I'll have more to say about this principle a little later.

About the principle of the offensive, Mahan said, "War, once declared, must be waged offensively, aggressively. The enemy must not be fended off, but smitten down." He recognized the usefulness of a "fleet in being" as a strategy for inferior naval powers, with some usefulness in tying down substantial forces of a superior maritime power. But to Mahan a defensive strategy could never be decisive. He repeatedly showed how aggressive forcing of engagement and acceptance of risk favored victory. His admiration was reserved for aggressive types like Nelson and Rodney--and the exceptional Frenchman, Admiral

Suffren. These commanders accepted numerical inferiority in combat and achieved brilliant victories by the ferocity of their attack and the superiority of their preparations and tactics.

With regard to COMMUNICATIONS, Mahan said, "As an element of strategy they devour all other elements." This is in large part the essence of the term "command of the sea." Communications means the flow of supplies between bases and home territory and forces, the maintenance of contact between elements of the forces, and the ability to move, and reinforce. It means the ability to land and support armies. Interruption of communications can be disastrous.

Napoleon's campaign in Egypt was a bold effort to sever England's communications and trade with her East India Empire. It failed because Napoleon overestimated the security of his own lines of communication through the Mediterranean and underestimated the ingenuity and aggressiveness of Nelson, who ambushed and decisively defeated the French Fleet in the Nile. This also was a classic example of pursuit of the proper objective. In this one brilliant stroke Napoleon's communications were

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY



Capt. Jack E. Godfrey, U.S. Navy, is a graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy, did advance work in Aviator Safety at the University of Southern California and holds an M.S. from The George Washington University in international affairs. As a naval aviator he has had a variety of assignments in fighter squadrons and has served as ship's company on several aircraft carriers, the last being the U.S.S. *Hornet* where he acted as Navigator and later as Operations Officer. Captain Godfrey is a graduate of the Naval War College, School of Naval Warfare, and is currently assigned to the faculty as Head of the Sea Power and National Strategy Study.

severed, his campaign petered out, and he had to ignominiously steal home, leaving his army behind him.

The British thoroughly understood the importance of interior lines and central positions which supported them. Throughout history they have sought to dominate the English Channel, exits from the North Sea, and strategic points on access routes like Gibraltar and Malta.

Mahan's prescription for America regarding communications included: Hasten the construction of the Panama Canal; acquire central positions to dominate communications in the Caribbean and the approaches to the canal; develop bases in Hawaii, Samoa, and Guam.

We can find fault with Mahan in one detail or another. He laid himself open to this kind of criticism by a tendency to be dogmatic.

There is still a lot of mileage in Mahan's philosophy of seapower and his principles of strategy. Their careful study provides a rich background of our better understanding of modern maritime strategy.

Any of his strategic principles might still be employed in much the same manner as Nelson or Rodney did upon one occasion or another. And also they might not. So don't apply Mahan's--or anyone else's--principles of war blindly or by rote but in the light of the circumstances that confront you and your own good common sense. Our consultant in the Chair of Maritime History year before last has some comment regarding Mahan's philosophies. He spoke of charges leveled at Mahan over the years that he failed to appreciate the impact of technological change. He went on to say, however,

that the anti-Mahan school of naval strategy exaggerates the extent to which technological change undermines his basic principles and that much evidence exists in Mahan's writings that he was aware of the necessity to constantly revise seapower theories to take account of this factor. He likens the situation to our country's government and politics based upon our constitution, the original meaning of which has been vastly expanded. Still we feel a debt today to the original framers and follow their basic philosophies. Likewise we should study Mahan not because he set down holy writ needing no extension or amplification, but because he established solid foundations upon which future generations could build with assurance. Mahan said, in fact, "The conduct of war is an art, having its spring in the mind of man, dealing with very various circumstances, admitting certain principles; but, beyond that, manifold in its manifestations, according to the genius of the artist and the temper of the materials with which he is dealing. To such an effort, dogmatic prescription is unsuited; the best of rules, when applied to it, cannot be rigid, but must have that free play which distinguishes a principle from a mere rule."

It has also been suggested that Mahan's philosophy of seapower, and his outlook on war and peace, have significant application today in the limited war climate. Maybe Mahan's "imperialistic" application of seapower tends to settle international problems on a limited basis rather than by global conflict. In conclusion, I could suggest that it might be an intriguing project to trace the idea of limited war from Mahan to the present.

THE WAR COLLEGE YEARS OF



Admiral Harris Laning, U.S. Navy

Edited by

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Introduction. The account which follows this introduction was extracted from the unpublished autobiography of Admiral Harris Laning, U.S. Navy. The manuscript, *An Admiral's Yarn*, was written in 1937-1938 during the admiral's final active duty as Governor of the Naval Home in Philadelphia. The original manuscript is in the custody of the admiral's daughter, Mrs. D.S. Pepper of Hartford, Conn., and a full copy is in the library of the Naval War College.

Admiral Laning begins his autobiography with the observation that "It is a far cry from the rolling prairie of Illinois to the rolling sea, and a still

farther cry from moving flat-bottomed boats on the Sangamon River to commanding the Battle Force of the United States Fleet." In traversing that distance, of space and time, Harris Laning moved steadily, unobtrusively, and always competently ahead. Lacking a political patron or a senior friend to clear a path for him, and spending little time in Washington to mend fences or build new bridges, he was forced to depend on his own intelligence, energy, and old-fashioned "devotion to duty" to move forward and upward. Occasionally chance put him under the command of men who remembered his outstand-

ing work and they saw that he had further opportunity to use his great talent. Occasionally Laning "bucked the system" in order to get duty he desired or to work in a way he felt was correct; in almost all cases he succeeded. Perhaps this luck was also determinant in his progress.

Harris Laning was born in Petersburg, Ill., on 18 October 1873. He entered the Naval Academy in the spring of 1891, after a year at the Peekskill Military Academy, and graduated eighth in his class of June 1895. As a Naval Cadet (later called Passed Midshipmen) he served in *Philadelphia*, a small cruiser and flagship of the Pacific Station. From *Philadelphia*, Laning was transferred to *Oregon* and had his first exposure to the large ships and gunnery departments of the new Navy. Commissioned ensign in June 1897, Laning was detailed to *Marion*, a second-rate wooden hull sailing cruiser. The major armament was smoothbore and muzzle-loaded. From *Marion* he moved to her newly rebuilt sister ship, *Mohican*; still in wooden walls.

The Spanish-American War brought rapid changes to the Navy and to Ensign Laning. Risking reprimand, he requested transfer to a fighting ship and in the spring of 1898 was assigned to *Monadnock*, a west coast monitor. *Monadnock* was steamed, and towed, to the Philippines to reinforce Dewey's fleet but only arrived in time for war's end. With the outbreak of the Philippine Insurrection in February 1899, Laning got all the action he desired. In *Monadnock* he directed gunfire support to Army troops in the so-called "battles" of Malate, Parañaque, and Colocan. He refurbished and commanded the antique Spanish gunboat *Panay*. In this maritime relic he suppressed smuggling to the insurgents, patrolled and mapped the waters throughout the islands, and managed to survive several typhoons at sea through superb seamanship.

Upon return to the United States in the summer of 1900, Ensign Laning married Mabel Clare Nixon of Santa Barbara and took up his new duties at the Naval Academy in the Department of English, History and Law. In June 1901 he was promoted to lieutenant junior grade and a year later to lieutenant. After a tour as watch officer and gunnery officer in *Dolphin* (1902-1905), Laning returned to the Naval Academy to the Ordnance and Gunnery Department. He had caught the attention of Lt. Comdr. W.S. Sims, Inspector of Target Practice, because he had brought *Dolphin* up to number one rank in gunboat class shooting. At the Naval Academy he made his mark in training the Naval Academy and the U.S. Navy's rifle teams. In 1907, largely due to Laning's training methods, the Navy team swept all national competition. During this tour Laning's only daughter, Hester, was born in 1906.

From 1907 to 1910 Lieutenant Laning served in the new battleship *Nebraska* as navigator and electrical officer. The jump from *Oregon* to *Nebraska*, in terms of gun batteries and electrical systems, was almost of the magnitude of the change from *Marion* to *Oregon*. In *Nebraska* Laning made the famous world cruise of 1907-1909. During it he trained a Navy rifle team that defeated the Australians in a special challenge match.

In the summer of 1910 Laning was promoted to lieutenant commander and was again detailed to the Naval Academy. He directed athletics; captained the U.S. Rifle Team to gold medals in the 1912 Olympic Games; and returned to head the Department of Navigation during his last year. Ever interested in navigation, Laning changed the department's stress away from theory and back to practical application. For this he almost acquired sainthood among the midshipmen.

At the close of the academic year in

June 1913, Lieutenant Commander Laning was ordered to Bath, Me., to command the newly built destroyer *Cassin*. A year later, with the close of the Tampico incident, he took command of the Atlantic Fleet's Reserve Destroyer Flotillas at Charleston. With this he was promoted to commander.

From October 1916 to April 1919, Commander (then Captain) Laning worked in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations as Head of the Officer Personnel Division. With America's entry into war in April 1917, the Navy quickly divined that all regular officers barely met the needs of the existing fleet. The nation had an enormous naval building program underway, and this was soon augmented heavily by ships needed for antisubmarine warfare and convoy duty. Laning's assignment was to see that the Navy was properly manned and that the incoming flood of Reserve officers received proper indoctrination and training before sea duty assignment. Frozen in his position by Chief of Naval Operations W.S. Benson, he never got to sea during the Great War. By spring 1919 Captain Laning was Acting Chief, Bureau of Navigation.

From Washington Captain Laning went to sea as Chief of Staff to the Commander, Destroyer Forces Atlantic and in 1921 was detailed to the Naval War College as a student and then as Head of the Department of Tactics. His friend from *Dolphin* and *Cassin* days, Rear Admiral Sims, was then President of the War College. He had recognized Laning's talents and saw that they were utilized. The autobiography extract below tells the story down to 1924.

Upon completion of 3 years at the Naval War College, Captain Laning was ordered to the command of the battleship *Pennsylvania* and took it on the great 1924-1925 cruise to the Antipodes. In 1926 he was placed in command of the Naval Training Station, San Diego. Here he was promoted to rear admiral in the summer of 1927. He

immediately went to sea in September as Chief of Staff to the Commander, Battle Fleet, and in June 1928 began a 2 year tour at sea as Commander, Battleship Division Two in the Scouting Fleet. Despite their age, coal-fired boilers, and employment for midshipmen summer cruise ships, Admiral Laning brought his division up to a level of smartness and gunnery efficiency equal to the newest divisions in the Battle Fleet. In June 1930 he was relieved of Battleship Division Two and assumed the presidency of the Naval War College. The extract below gives more detail on this duty.

After being relieved at the War College in May 1933, and a hurried cross-country drive, Laning broke his new three-starred flag in *Chicago* as Vice Admiral and Commander, Cruiser Divisions. In fleet operations he proved to be resourceful, and several surprises in the maneuvers of 1934 and 1935 were the result of his initiatives.

On 1 April 1935 Laning began his final year of sea duty. He described it in his *Admiral's Yarn*:

On April 1, 1935, with all the pomp prescribed for the ceremony, I took command of the Battle Force. After reading my orders aloud and announcing assumption of command, I directed the Captain of my flagship, the *California*, to break my flag. The four starred flag of an admiral then flew out from the masthead and as it did, the *California* fired a salute of seventeen guns. The moment was tense for me marking as it did attainment of my life's ambition—the rank of Admiral in the Navy.

At the conclusion of that year of high command, Admiral Laning hauled down his flag, "flected down" to his permanent rank of rear admiral, and began a terminal tour as Commandant of the Third Naval District. Upon retirement in December 1937, he was requested to continue on active duty as Governor of the Naval Home, Philadelphia. The work was not pressing and here he completed his *Admiral's Yarn*.

Admiral Laning died at the Philadelphia Naval Hospital on 2 February 1941 and was interred in the cemetery at the Naval Academy. On 1 August 1943 the Admiral was further honored when DE 159, U.S.S. *Laning*, entered service.

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Naval War College Student. Though the Naval War College has a vital place in our national defense, few nonmilitary people know anything of it. The College is on an island in Narragansett Bay in Newport, R.I., but as there is not anything spectacular to be seen there and as the War College is not open to the public, even sightseers do little more than glance at it from a distance. Excepting those interested in naval features of our national defense, few people give any attention to the War College.

Yet, in spite of that, the College does more toward the development of sound fighting ideas in the U.S. Navy than does any other agency. Most Americans seem to believe that naval fighting power is measured by the types and numbers of ships possessed, little or no thought being given to the fact that unless men give life to them, ships are as inanimate as ore in the mountains. In any country fighting ships are merely the tools of its navy. What is done with those tools depends on the skill with which they are handled. It is the aim of the Naval War College to develop in the higher officers of the Navy such skill in the use of their ships and weapons as to obtain the utmost power should war come.

Another idea also prevalent in the country is that having been 4 years at the Naval Academy, its graduates are fully prepared for practically everything pertaining to naval warfare. Nothing could be farther from the fact. At the Academy young men of college age simply learn the A.B.C.'s of a profession that requires a lifetime to master. When

a young man graduates, he is merely beginning the naval profession, and what he later becomes depends, naturally, on his ability. Like great surgeons or doctors, our great war commanders become great through practicing their profession, not through intuition or inspiration. However, in the medical profession, doctors and surgeons have almost instant practice while in both the Navy and Army actual professional practice is to be had only in the event of war—which we endeavor to avoid.

Every nation must develop skill in war so vitally important, or ultimately pay for not having done so.

To develop war skills without being at war is difficult. A man may spend a lifetime thinking of and studying war operations and by so doing develop many ideas as to how to win them but unless they can be tested in practice, he will never know whether they will win against those of an opposing commander. The Naval War College was devised to provide such tests. In miniature, it pits naval forces against each other in every conceivable form of war operation and by constantly measuring results and applying losses as they occur, the miniature operations become almost exactly those of actual war.

By carrying out battles, campaigns, and even entire naval wars in miniature, the College develops in officers the skill and wit essential to operating the Navy's fighting tools successfully so vitally important in our national defense.

The system used at the College is spoken of as the "Applicatory System" because student officers train for high command in war by actually applying their knowledge of fighting to the winning of war situations, since in war no one situation is quite like another and what might win in one case could bring complete disaster in another.

All that can be done for prospective high commanders is to give them an understanding of the principles of fighting that tend to success when followed,

and then have him practice in applying those principles to the fighting of the force he commands.

Because ability to fight skillfully, regardless of the situation, comes only through practice, the War College does not have lessons, recitations, or examinations, nor is there any attempt to measure the relative ability of students. Thus there is not any competition in class standing, each student working solely to perfect himself in war strategy and tactics. Certain students do, of course, show up better than others as winners of fights but no attempt is made to rate them in that ability. Each officer is therefore strictly on his own and works his utmost to perfect himself in the art of naval warfare.

The student course covers 11 months and during that time an officer taking it has no other duty than perfecting himself for high command in war and preparing himself for the greatest responsibility a man can have, that of winning for his country should he be chosen for high war command.

Had an officer no other incentive, the game of war even when played in miniature is one of intense fascination for it surpasses all other competitive games. In other games the stake, if any, is small and the reward of winning applies generally to an individual or to small groups of individuals. But the stake in war is often the very existence of a country and its people, and the contestants are entire nations. The teams for war contests often have as many thousands or even millions of men on them as other teams have persons, and those men operate the most powerful weapons of destruction man can devise or create. A country's navy is a team made up of many teams. One large ship often requires a team of over a thousand men to work it, groups of ships of one type form type group teams, and type group teams are formed

into fleet teams to fight the battles of war.

Little wonder there is fascination in practicing war with such teams, and still less wonder that the officers who are to command and operate such teams in war should devote every minute of their 11 months at the War College to perfecting themselves for that task. But even so, they are not completely prepared for war when they finish the course. They may be well versed in the principles to observe when fighting, but constant practice in operating fighting teams must ever continue to win the finals in war contests.

Until I became a student at the War College, I thought my previous work was as important as it had been interesting and, of course, for one in low command, it was. However, as soon as I realized, from the College course, what I would be responsible for if chosen for high command, the picture of life changed for me. Instead of dealing with only the relatively minor war duties for which officers in low command are responsible, I had come to the point where I might be responsible for the important war duties of a high command. Not much longer would I have only to carry out the plans and orders of someone else. I, myself, might be called on to do the planning and ordering, and since it was ever my ambition to be an able high commander in the Navy, I bent every energy to preparing myself to make good in the role.

Looking at my future in that light I worked feverishly on the War College course and, in particular, strove to perfect myself in naval fighting through the war operations conducted in miniature. It proved worthwhile, for about a month before my student course ended I was sent for by the President of the College, Admiral Sims, who, having told me that my work at the College warranted it, invited me to join the War College Staff as head of the Department of Tactics.

That invitation to be head of the Tactics Department hit me like a thunderbolt for, until I received it, I had no idea my work as a student warranted such recognition. I knew I had given all of my time, energy, and ability to the course and had been quite successful in winning miniature war games, but I had never thought of even a minor place on the War College Staff. I had given a little consideration to the duty I would have after completing the course and, being desirous of continuing my study of war, had decided to request assignment to the Army War College as a student. Should that request be granted I would have 2 months between courses, and my little family and I had planned to spend them with my wife's sister who had a delightful summer place in the almost virgin forests of Western Oregon.

As we had practically made up our family mind as to what we wanted to do after my graduation I was completely surprised when Admiral Sims asked me to join the College Staff. Since I was not too confident of my ability to make good on the job, was keen to continue my study of war by going to the Army War College, and realized that 2 month's vacation in the woods of Oregon was quite essential to my keeping physically fit, I felt compelled to explain the situation to the Admiral. When I had done so he said,

Laning, the College wants you and if you will take the position I believe I can arrange everything else to your satisfaction. As the tactics work of the College course does not start until a month after the course opens, you can have your two month's leave and still be back in time for it. When that course is ended and you wish to attend the Army War College course, I think I can arrange it. Under those circumstances, will you accept the billet?

Quite naturally I said I would.

On the War College Staff. The War College was just starting the second month of the course when I assumed charge of the Tactics Department.

During the first month the students had devoted their time to reading and studying the causes, nature, and conduct of wars, but in the second month they began strategy and tactics. The work covered the same ground mine had, in the course, except for the addition of a pamphlet on tactics titled *The Naval Battle*, a not too long treatise on the team play of a modern fleet when fighting which, without my knowing it, had been called from the thesis on tactics I had submitted at the end of my student year.

At the time I took the course, students were required to submit four theses on war subjects during the year, and I utilized mine to make a rather complete resume of the general principles I would observe were I responsible for fighting operations. As I wanted to be ready to win in battle I went into considerable detail in the one on tactics but since what I wrote was intended only to crystallize sound ideas in my own mind and was in no way intended for anyone else, you can imagine my surprise on returning from leave to find it had been published by the College as a guide for students in the conduct of naval battles. By that action the College brought home to me that I was no longer responsible merely for perfecting myself for high command in battle but was responsible for training all officers who came to the College for it.

For two years, until that tour of shore duty ended, I remained Head of the Department of Tactics. I had learned much during my student year but it was only a smattering to what I learned in the 2 years I was on the College Staff. Although my department was an intensely busy one I was able, during these years, to attend the weekly lectures and discussions of national and international affairs, enter the discussions of international law, study the strategic problems under consideration, and participate in all critiques on them.

But of all the College work, what I considered the most interesting as well as the most important, was that of training officers for battle command.

Although preparing officers for conducting war has always been the primary purpose of the War College, a byproduct of doing that had become of tremendous importance since the miniature war operations of the College are really research by which every detail of naval warfare becomes tested and evaluated. Because of that fact the College had gradually grown to be a guide for the entire Navy.

Its influence may not be realized even by naval officers, but it is my opinion that much of our naval advancement in recent years has resulted from War College research.

Because of the importance of the College, both to the Navy and to the entire United States, it appeared to me that its work in naval tactics should be progressive from year to year and that student officers of our class should take up tactical work at about the point the preceding class left off. As a student, I had found it impossible to do that since no record had been kept of the miniature battles of the preceding classes, and it was largely because of that deficiency that I summarized in my thesis on tactics what my class had learned.

That summary had now been made a starting point for the new classes and hence *The Naval Battle* had become the connecting link for a progressive development of battle tactics.

Realizing that, it occurred to me that if we would correct, revise, and add to *The Naval Battle* pamphlet each year the sound fighting ideas developed by successive classes, we would have not only what would enable one class to start tactical work where its predecessor stopped but also the pamphlet would be a guide for even a fleet in battle. I therefore determined to use the pamphlet that way, and in order that the principles enumerated in it would be

based on recorded data, I started making full records and analyses of each miniature battle fought as I was confident the results would be well worth the effort.

Histories and analyses of battles from which sound principles of fighting can be deduced are essential in the study of tactics. However, because real naval battles are fortunately few and far between, not only are they too rare to provide sufficient information but also the only records we have of them are not from exact data but from recollections of men participating in them. For that reason what we have concerning real battles is both incomplete and incorrect, often leading us to wrong deductions.

In miniature battles which can be stopped instantly to permit the accurate plotting of movements and the measuring of the effects of gun fire, torpedoes, bombs, mines, et cetera, there are no uncertainties. Causes and effects are accurately determined.

When I was a student we had but one modern naval battle to study--the Battle of Jutland. Though that battle had been fought 4 years before, I started to study it closely and found the records too incomplete to permit more than a general conclusion.

Although we studied that battle thoroughly we learned little from it. However, great and important though the Battle of Jutland was, we could not learn everything about naval fighting from it. Worse than that, even when I studied it, the Battle of Jutland was already almost as outmoded as the Battle of Trafalgar. The characteristics of naval ships had changed greatly after it, and two startling new types had been added to fleets, which were not present at Jutland at all. We were in a new area of naval warfare, one quite different from Battle of Jutland days.

The changes in characteristics so affected the capabilities and limitations of surface ships alone as to necessitate

radical changes in the battle tactics of a fleet made up only of surface ships, but the addition of underwater and air forces to fighting fleets brought about still greater changes. At the time the World War ended, neither submarines nor aircraft had taken part in a major naval battle so no one knew much about their use.

Inasmuch as both were extremely powerful hitting types, it was essential that the U.S. Navy know how to utilize them to best advantage and how to defend against them. It was therefore to a post-Jutland type of naval battle that the War College devoted its energies, paying particular attention to air and underwater forces of modern fleets.

As can be imagined, the changes in tactics necessitated by the makeup of naval fighting teams were very great. The fundamental principles of fighting that centuries of war had proved to be immutable were, of course, the same as ever, but in the application of those principles almost everything was different.

Still, great though the changes in fighting methods would be, we went into them with zest. We assembled all known data on characteristics, capabilities, and limitations of each of the modern types of naval craft and having established rules based on them to govern our miniature battles, we went to work.

The task of making a complete record and analysis of every battle fought was enormous, for the ramifications in naval battles are innumerable. They come from the complicated operations of opposing fleets, the ships of which fight not as individuals but as teams made up of many groups of ships. Of the half dozen or more types of ships in a modern fleet, only battleships operate together as a unit. Cruisers, destroyers, aircraft carriers, submarines, and aircraft operate in groups, each having a particular position and role in the team play of a battle.

Since sea battles are between fleets, every part of which does its fighting while maneuvering at high speed, it is practically impossible to picture actual battle for any particular instant even though every part of each fleet knows exactly where it is and what it is doing at the instant.

To visualize such a picture for an entire battle at sea is, of course, impossible. Nevertheless we could and did make them of our miniature battles from which we deduced the corrections, additions and changes to make in *The Naval Battle*.

Doing that work took much time and application but by it I, myself, gained considerable knowledge of the new naval fighting as did both the College staff and students. Still it took a man from outside the College and Navy to make us realize the extent of our learning.

Usually civilians are not permitted to watch the College war games, but one day while we were at work on the big game at the end of my first year on the staff, the President of the College, Admiral Sims, sent for me, introduced me to Mr. — of Harvard University, told me the gentleman was making a study of the research work being done in our colleges and universities, and was particularly interested in the work we were doing.

He directed me to allow the gentleman to watch our battle and to explain our method of fighting it.

Our visitor watched our fight closely for several days and on departing said to me:

Captain, I am reluctant to leave this fascinating game, the most interesting I have ever seen. No wonder you Navy men enjoy it. But I did not come here to see your war game but rather to study what you are doing in research work. I am making a study of such activities for Harvard University so felt obliged to see what the Naval War College is doing. I want you to know that I am amazed at what I have found here. I thought the research conducted

at our universities was about the last word on that work but at the Naval War College I find the most thorough example of it. Through the work here not only do naval officers learn how to fight their fleets but at the same time you determine for the United States the line it should follow in its naval policy, naval building and naval operations. The United States is indeed fortunate in having this kind of a research laboratory and in deriving such great knowledge from it.

As that statement not only encouraged us but made us realize clearly the value of our teachings, we could not but work the harder to perfect the new edition of our pamphlet on battle. No attempt was made to force the students to observe the principles and methods of fighting set forth in it. On the contrary, the idea was simply to make available what the College had learned so as to give the United States the best battle Navy in the world.

Not all officers agreed with the ways of fighting suggested in the pamphlet, and, of course, every officer sought to improve on them if possible. During my second year on the staff, a group of the cleverest tacticians among the students came to me and said that though the conclusions enumerated in the pamphlet seemed sound, they believed there were better methods and they intended to find them. As I was merely the analyst of the battles fought, held no brief for what seemed proved by them, and wished only to make the U.S. Fleet the best at fighting in the world, I was delighted at their attitude. Therefore, the group took up its self-imposed task with all the support I could give.

The group looked into every idea in the pamphlet and thought up many new ones to try out against them but strange as it may seem, the methods of *The Naval Battle* proved so sound that one by one the group members became convinced that if there were better ways to fight, they could not discover them. Nevertheless, they could and did suggest a few improvements in the pamphlet.

That proof of the soundness of our ideas impressed me greatly and I had considerable faith in them not only as regards the tactical employment of modern surface ships but even of submarines and aircraft. As these latter types, having proved their hitting power in the World War, were being proclaimed by the press as having revolutionized naval warfare, it was essential that the U.S. Navy learn immediately the best ways to use them and for the War College to ascertain those ways.

It mattered not to the Navy what type or types of craft—surface, sub-surface, or air—might dominate the war, provided the United States was better prepared to use them than anyone else. The College research therefore had first to make certain what could be done with the new types and then how to accomplish it.

Through the research, the War College became the pioneer of modern ways of fighting on the sea, and although I did not realize it at the time, I soon found, however, that what we were learning was considered most important by both the Fleet and the Navy Department. Although we made no direct recommendations to either, both began studying our pamphlets based on the research work we had done. I also noted that several officers in places of responsibility in the Fleet and Navy Department often inquired in personal letters about the work we were doing at the College concerning certain jobs for which they were responsible. One was from a friend holding an important post in the Navy Department's Bureau of Aeronautics which is largely responsible for the aircraft policies of the Navy. He asked what our research seemed to prove.

As in the case of submarine and surface craft, the College had devoted much energy to aviation research, not as to aircraft design but as to the place of aircraft in up-to-date sea warfare. About all that had been done in naval aviatio

up to that time was to develop airplanes for it. How the planes would reach enemy ships and how they would operate when there, was still unknown to the Navy though nonseagoers were shouting that airplanes would blast surface ships from the sea. So we researched naval air activities thoroughly both as to offense and defense. In investigating aircraft, we gave the officers commanding miniature fleets a rather free hand in the use of aircraft.

They were allowed to have planes of any type and to carry as many as their ships had room for, the only restriction being that planes had to operate in accordance with the capabilities and limitations as established by aviators familiar with planes.

That freedom of action in aviation work brought forth an extraordinary number of ideas, both as to the offense and defense. No sooner would officers on one side try something new in offense than the officers on the other side would work up a defense against it. With about 50 keen officers familiar with sea conditions in each of the opposing fleets, each trying to win for his side, everything that any of them could think of was tried out. But from that welter of tests, certain points as regards aircraft and air fighting in sea operations, began to establish themselves as facts. Gradually we came to know what aircraft could do or could not do.

With that knowledge we were able to decide on the proper aviation equipment for our miniature fleets and to know the principles of fighting that equipment should observe.

I wrote to my friend in Aeronautics, giving him the summary of our deductions not thinking they would be of great help. You can imagine my surprise, a few weeks later, when I received a dispatch order to appear before the General Board of the Navy for a hearing on naval aviation. The General Board of the Navy recommends to Congress the

naval policies and building program for our country, and I knew that in preparing its recommendations the Board often called on the Navy's experts for information on technical points. However, not being an aviator, I thought some mistake had been made when the Board called me on an aviation hearing and as soon as I reached the Navy Department, I hurried to my friend to learn what was up.

In reply to my query he said:

You know, Laning, the General Board is now at work on its recommendations to Congress and a few days ago called on this Bureau for aviation suggestions. Probably influenced by the insistence of the press that planes would blow up all surface ships, the Board had about decided to recommend only one type of plane for the Navy, a heavy bomber. It may be that if you had not written that letter to me, the Bureau would have concurred in the recommendation, but the letter opened our eyes. Until we received it the officers of the Bureau could suggest only such aviation procedure as could be deduced through sitting here thinking. But the War College deductions were not of that kind for instead of presenting untested visions, you have conclusions drawn from many visions all thoroughly tested to determine the soundest ones. The correctness of your deductions were so self-evident that, as soon as we read them, we decided to make them our recommendations to the General Board. However, when we did that, the Board thought them only the flights of fancy of aviators so we suggested they call on you to give the results of the War College research. All you have to do is to give the Board your War College conclusions and explain how they were reached.

What my friend said did not particularly reassure me so when I appeared before the Board at ten o'clock I still was not convinced I could give any worthwhile information. However, the longer the Board and the aviators before it quizzed me, the more important the results of our research appeared to be. We had started with the newspaper idea that airplanes could destroy ships, ports,

and anything else on the earth's surface with their bombs and machine guns, and we went on from there only to find from our miniature battles the bombers would encounter every form of defense the opponents could devise. From those defense activities it quickly became apparent that not all planes, carried by a fleet, should be of the bombing type but that an efficient air force had to have speedy fighting (or combat) planes too. Then, again from using planes for other essential purposes, we found that types other than fighters were required in sea work--scouting planes and observation planes. Now since the total number of planes any fleet can have is the number it can carry in its ships, we had to apportion that total number among the several types we found to be necessary. By actual trial we established for our tiny replicas of the navies of the world, the air equipment each should carry.

It was as to the equipment for our own fleet that the General Board wanted information, so I gave our conclusions as best I could without notes or preparation.

As I told of our "step by step" progress, the members of the Board and the aviators present showed intense interest and asked innumerable questions. I think the Board was antagonistic to me when the hearing started but as it went on the conclusions the War College had arrived at seemed to be axiomatic, once the Board had a picture of our battles. At the end of the hearing, the President of the Board said to me, "Captain, what you have said has cleared up many points for us. The War College research seems to have developed such sound conclusions as regards naval aviation that this Board will call on the College soon for its conclusions on other naval matters."

It was some weeks before I knew the extent to which our College deductions on aviation had been adopted by the General Board and then I learned that

its recommendations to Congress exactly conformed to the conclusions the College had come to for its fleets. That recommendation further proved the value of our aviation research but inasmuch as our researchers also covered underwater and surface craft operations, I came to the belief that at the College we had probably learned as much about other features of naval warfare as we had about aviation. To one whose great ambition was to be an able high naval commander, that belief was a great comfort.

Among the many points our researchers studied was the effect of the Treaty Limiting Armaments on the United States, which Treaty came into being while I was at the College. You may recall that the conference leading to the Treaty was suggested by the United States, as was the proposal to reduce the likelihood of war by so limiting and balancing naval armaments that though each of the great powers would have a navy sufficient for its defense, none would have one sufficiently strong to be sure of winning an aggressive war against another signatory power. As the United States was, at that time, about to become the greatest naval power in the world, and as everyone wished to avoid the terrific cost of competitive naval building, the other nations were quick to accept our proposals.

To my mind, the treaty that resulted was probably the best move toward peace the world has ever known, for if the signatory powers lived up to its terms, rival navies would be so nearly balanced that none would have a winning advantage over another in war. However, it should be noted that the value of the treaty came entirely from the balancing of naval strengths. Unless they were kept in balance in accord with the terms of the treaty, it would be worthless as a war preventative.

Until the terms of the treaty were known, the miniature navies of the War

College continued to be replicas of the navies of the world. However, as the various changes in navies were made, our little navies were changed to conform to them. For most navies those changes were small and were generally additions, but for the United States, the changes were great and were subtractions. The United States had to scrap most of the splendid new ships it was building to reduce its navy from the strongest in the world to what it was allowed by the treaty.

To those who believed that having the strongest Navy in the world was the surest way of preventing another country from attacking us, our scrapping of the best fighting ships in the world seemed a terrible calamity. However, if by the United States suffering it, war between any of the great powers could be prevented, it was perhaps not too great a price to pay. As the terms of the treaty became known, the College changed its little navies to conform to them, and by the time the treaty was ratified our research was being based entirely on "treaty navies." We soon knew what the changes meant to the United States.

Shortly after it had been ratified I was in Washington and on the street encountered the Chairman of the House Naval Affairs Committee. As I had previously had many contacts with him during the World War, he greeted me warmly, but I was surprised when he said, "Captain, you are just the man I want to talk to about this Disarmament Treaty. Can you meet me in the Naval Committee room at the Capitol this afternoon?" I said I could, and when I arrived there, he drew me at once into his private office and demanded to be told whether or not the treaty was a success. As no one could answer that unless he knew the treaty was really preventing war, I had to admit I did not know. Then I added,

Of course you realize it cannot possibly be a success unless the powers

signing it maintain their navies at exactly the strength assigned them by the treaty. That fact applies to the United States as well as to other countries. The treaty is not a disarmament treaty but one to balance naval strengths by limiting armaments. Therefore, although we have to scrap ships of certain types to get down to our limit in them, we must actually build ships of other types.

As I said that the Congressman appeared enraged, shook his fist at me and shouted, "That is just the way with you Navy men. No sooner than we agree to disarm then you tell us we must keep armed. We cannot count on you for anything." With that the "pow-wow" ended.

That gave me my first intimation of the danger to the United States in the treaty. All during the conference leading to it, the press and pacifists spoke of the conference as a "Disarmament Conference." When it ended in a treaty intended to prevent war by limiting and balancing naval armaments, the treaty was spoken of as the "Disarmament Treaty." Because of that wrong title many unthinking people believed there would be no war if only the United States would disarm itself.

In this way a mere misnomer caused great trouble for the United States as foreign countries, pacifists, and even some of our legislators playing politics advocated our practical disarmament. I have since seen misnomers create similar trouble as, for instance, when an embargo act meant to eliminate a possible cause of war became spoken of as the "Neutrality Act." However, it did not prove as harmful as did the calling of the treaty limiting naval armaments a "Disarmament Treaty." That name so befuddled the country that after scrapping our excess ships in certain classes, we would not build up the classes we were short in. For years the country did no naval building and, as a result, the United States not only ceased to be the greatest naval power in the world but

quickly went so far below the strength assigned to it, that it was almost down to third place.

Our failure to do our part in keeping naval armaments in balance completely wrecked the scheme of making war improbable. Although the idea had originated with us and was a splendid one, it was the failure of the United States to do its part that ruined us. When other countries realized we had permitted our Navy to drop from first place to a poor second, they refused to renew the treaty, so not only has rivalry in naval building returned but also the United States is forced to far greater building programs to catch up than would have been necessary had its Navy been maintained at treaty strength. Not only has preventing war by balancing naval armaments been lost to the world but, in addition, our country is forced to enormous expenditures to regain its naval standing.

Of course we could only surmise these results as that tour of duty at the War College was drawing to a close. The knowledge I had gained there on naval fighting I hoped would be of use to the fleet were I Chief of Staff to a high command but I realized that should I be given such an assignment at that time, it would probably finish me in the Navy since too much staff duty seemed frowned upon in the selection of officers for flag rank, and I was soon to be up for selection.

I never quite understood why staff duty was not considered important since not anything else better prepares an officer for high command than being an assistant to an officer in that position. Apparently the important thing with selection boards is whether an officer under consideration has commanded a capital ship. Although I might be of vastly more value to the Navy, at the moment, in a Chief of Staff job, I knew that if I were to be of any value to it later on, I must qualify for selection. Accordingly I made a written request

for command of a battleship and was informed I would be so assigned.

While waiting for the orders, I received a letter inviting me to become Chief of Staff to the Vice Admiral in command of battleships. As I was a great admirer of that admiral and would have dearly loved to assist him in operating the Navy's battleline, about which I had learned so thoroughly, declining that invitation was not easy. Nevertheless I felt obliged to say the only duty I could afford to accept was the battleship command promised me.

At that point I understood one of Satan's temptations, for the admiral promptly sent word that if I would be his Chief of Staff for the 1 year more he would command the battleships, he would see to my getting command of our best battleship at the end of that time. As the proffer was flattering and apparently met my requirements, I was rather prone to accept it but decided to think it over before doing so and after much thought declined the offer once more.

When my orders came they assigned me to command the battleship *Pennsylvania*.

President of the Naval War College.
In June 1930 I took over my new duty, and on 14 July the College year opened. Inasmuch as training for high naval command must keep abreast or even somewhat ahead of the changes in sea warfare brought about by new inventions and improved methods and equipment, the College courses are anything but static. They must keep up with naval developments, actual and proposed, and by employing them in miniature war operations, practice students in their use. It is through doing so that the applicatory system of training prepares officers not only for conducting the wars of today but also those of tomorrow.

Though not always credited with being "up-to-date" in making the most

of new ideas in sea warfare, the U.S. Navy, thanks to its War College, probably has the most advanced officer personnel in the world. Although the fleet as used by the College for its games is only such fleet as our country has actually built or is building, the navies that oppose it are given every known improvement whether the United States has adopted it or not.

Since students operate other navies as well as our own in the war games, nothing new is overlooked, be it for the surface of the sea, under it, or in the air. Every form of attack and defense that hundreds of skilled officers can think of is tried out so that very little, if anything, connected with fighting at sea is neglected. Nevertheless, in spite of that fact I have often heard men completely uninformed concerning war on the sea express a belief that a certain weapon or type of ship will dominate all others and should replace them when, as a matter of fact, what they advocate has generally been thoroughly tested at the College and perhaps been found wanting.

For instance, the Navy is frequently criticized because it does not accept as a fact the complete domination of the sea by air or underwater forces, and its officers are said to have some ulterior motive because they do not admit it.

Those critics fail to realize that naval officers, more than anyone else, want to win our wars on the sea and care little as to the kind of weapon used, if the weapon is legal and will bring victory. For that reason they try out every device, every method, and every suggestion, but they advocate only such as bring satisfactory results. The writings and talks of columnists and others unacquainted with sea warfare or with the practical utilization of sea weapons cannot make the Navy adopt their ideas unless proved sound. It tries out every new and feasible suggestion in the hope of finding a more certain way to win in war but it does not and should not accept an idea unless it is very worth-

while. Novice suggestions are seldom that.

Though the Naval War College devotes most of its time to practicing war operations, its students are required to study the policies of the various world powers to ascertain how they may conflict with our own. Where friction appears possible, students study ways to fight best in support of our policies should war come because of them. That of itself takes much study and time and, coupled with practicing the actual fighting operations of the war, fills the College with work. Every detail of possible wars must be tested if students are to derive the maximum of preparation from the course. Perhaps the College staff gets even more from it than do the students since for the 2 or 3 years an officer serves on the staff he must analyze and actually measure the results of the fighting operations.

It is evident that members of the College staff become unusually well versed in naval warfare, from the "grand plans" for an entire war to the very details of the fighting that may occur in it. That fact is as true for the President of the College as for any other staff member but since the President has to direct all College activities to the end of best preparing our officers for high command in war, I soon found myself an unusually busy person. Fortunately there was no necessity to drive the students. Being mature and energetic officers of middle age seeking skill in the use of naval fighting material and desiring only to perfect themselves in operating it in war, the College had only to point the way for them. As with everyone else in the Navy, students immediately put every energy into accomplishing it when informed of the task ahead of them.

Few activities in life are carried on with as great intensity as those of the Naval War College and for that reason the work is not only of great importance to the United States but also to

every other country that might become our enemy in war. There is little doubt that possible enemies would give much to learn the ways our Navy would fight in war and because of that fact they are constantly seeking information about the course at the War College. Not only do they study all public utterances of those at the College in the hope of obtaining some hint as to what may be developing there but also their naval attachés make periodic official visits to the College for any information that may be gathered by looking it over. The visits of foreign attachés probably net them little since in appearance the College is supremely innocuous.

In the large, somewhat rambling building, with desk-filled rooms of staff officers and students, fairly good-sized but rather bare game rooms, and a library, there is little to be seen.

War games are not carried on before visitors so about all they see is a number of officers working at desks. Game equipment is almost nil, and the tiny lead ships used in the games tell nothing of the characteristics of the ships they represent in battle. Since visitors to the College may look at its interior without learning a thing about its work, attaché visits are infrequent and not too worrisome. But talk outside the College can be.

This bothered me, personally, for no sooner had I become President than I found myself in considerable demand as a speaker. Since I am gifted in that art, it was apparent, however, that I was wanted not for my oratorical ability but rather because as President of the Naval War College I was a student of international policies and how our Navy would operate in war in support of a U.S. policy.

This was of great interest to the citizens of our country, of course, but probably of even greater interest to the foreign governments with which we might have war. For that reason, and because my position was that of a

follower rather than that of a leader in national affairs, I dared not talk about them lest, inadvertently, I give away what might be national secrets. Accordingly, I resolved never to speak publicly on War College affairs.

Although that resolution caused me to decline most of the invitations to speak on Atlantic or Pacific problems sent me by organizations especially interested in them, I still had much talking to do. Having the prestige of the War College behind me and being the senior naval officer thereabouts, I think every patriotic, civic, or historical organization that met in the vicinity requested me to be present and to give a talk, the Society of Cincinnati, Sons of the Revolution, D.A.R., G.A.R., Spanish War Veterans, American Legion, Chambers of Commerce, Rotary Clubs, and many others. Fortunately, I was generally expected to talk about patriotism, civic affairs, or history, hence I succeeded in complying with such requests, but they proved an onerous duty and took far too much valuable time. Even though not forewarned, I would be called upon to "say a few words" so I had always to be prepared for an extemporaneous talk at any gathering of that type which I attended.

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Not all of my activities outside the War College were of a speech-making nature. Many were social, since my official position opened much of Newport's society life to us, and many were civic since I was the highest naval or military officer on duty in that locality. We became familiar with the Casino, the Reading Room, Bailey's Beach, the annual tennis tournaments, horse shows, flower shows, the Clambake Club, and, in fact, with all the centers of Newport's social life.

There were conventions, yacht races, and dedications of historical spots, as well as visits by high U.S. officials, foreign military or naval leaders and

contingents of our own and foreign fleets. In arranging to handle those important events, city officials of Newport always invited the local naval and military authorities to assist, and we took pleasure in doing so as they generally were most interesting.

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The distinguished men who came, unheralded, to Newport to address our classes were indeed an important factor in our work. Almost every Friday afternoon during the College year, one of them would give an "up-to-the-minute" confidential talk on some aspect of world affairs, so what we termed the "lecture course" was possibly as complete a presentation of the international situations of the moment as could be made. Fortunately for the College, which had but little money to spend on them, the lectures were not expensive, usually costing little more than the expenses incurred by the visitors. They were patriotic citizens doing what they could for our national defense without monetary reward. If reward was theirs, it possibly came from the prestige of being a Naval War College lecturer. Hence, at small cost to the Government, the officers who were being prepared to lead its Navy in war gained much knowledge that would be extremely useful to them.

Perhaps the College President gained most from the lecturers as they were not only guests at his house for luncheon but all during their visits, and the intimate contacts were not only tremendously interesting but I learned much concerning international relations.

Among the most famous of Newport's visitors were France's great military leader, Marshal Petain, and our General Pershing. They came the year of the sesquicentennial of the surrender at Yorktown, and in recognition of the part it had in bringing about that surrender, an official delegation from France had been sent, headed by Mar-

shal Petain, to represent it. The celebration was quite elaborate but Newport was a bit chagrined not to have had a part in it as the French forces had first landed there but, although the help of France had made winning at Yorktown possible, there should have been some recognition of the close connection of Newport with the Yorktown forces. The city of Newport invited the French delegation to visit it officially. The invitation was accepted, and immediately after the Yorktown celebration the French Squadron that brought the delegation came to Newport with it, accompanied by General Pershing.

That visit helped to refresh our memories of many details of the part that Rhode Island, Narragansett Bay, and particularly Newport had taken in the birth of our country. Histories made mention of them, of course, but I had only a brief knowledge of them. However, when Marshal Petain came to Newport they were recalled in full, and I came to realize the historical importance of my surroundings.

Though Newport's sesquicentennial observance of the arrival of the French forces in the Colonies could not compare with the elaborate ceremonies that pictured the Battle and Surrender at Yorktown, it was illuminating. All of Newport and much of Rhode Island took part in it, and Marshal Petain was given a busy day, even including a banquet at night where I was called upon to "say a few words," and somehow they managed to visit the War College where they made brief addresses.

It might appear that with so many outside diversions the training of officers for high war command would suffer but it was so arranged that every forenoon and most afternoons were devoted entirely to it with no interruptions permitted. Thus there was a vast amount of training from which emanated byproducts of inestimable value to our national defense.

I have previously told how, during my first tour at the College, we came to understand the part aviation would have in sea warfare and were able to advise what the Navy's aviation policy should be. On this second tour we found the College could recommend policies as regards other types of naval craft too and thereby considerably increase its value to the country.

That the College could contribute much to the plans for national defense had long been recognized, so much so that its President was, ex officio, a member of the Navy's General Board. To my mind that membership was of inestimable value not alone to the Board in drawing up naval policies but also to the College in preparing officers to conduct war with the Navy created under the Board. I therefore took tremendous interest in the work of the Board and particularly strove to use my connection with it to aid both it and the College.

To illustrate how close the relationship is between the work of the College and that of the General Board, I need but to recall to you how the aircraft policy of the Navy had been established through their close cooperation. That policy however was but one of many that had to be determined. Not long after I took over the presidency, there arose a question as to the submarine policy we should follow. That policy had become badly obscured because of an interpretation given to the popular slogan "A Navy for Defense Only." For some reason a "Navy for defense" was believed by many persons of national influence to be one suited only to preventing an invasion of our homeland. Apparently defense against anything but invasion was not contemplated even though the country could be as effectively bled to death by the cutting of the distant arteries of its economic life as by a stab in the heart of its homeland. A question had arisen as to the type of submarines the country should

build. It was being strongly advocated that all our submarines should be of a small type suitable only for use close along our coasts.

Naturally the War College gave considerable attention to the use of submarines in national defense, and it soon became apparent that subs restricted by size to only coastal operation would be of little help in protecting far distant national interests. Furthermore, they would have to be so numerous as to actually cost the Government more than would a sufficient number of the deep sea type.

The College reported what it had learned about them to the Navy Department and our doing so had some effect. At least, the only subs built since then have not been solely for coast defense. They can go to any port where defense measures must be applied.

In such manner the value to the Navy and country of the "byproducts" of the War College training courses became emphasized, and the College was asked to develop more of them. We replied that if we had officers for the purpose we could do so but that as the College staff was already overworked in merely carrying out training operations, the only way to develop the "byproducts" fully would be to establish a "research department" for that special purpose. Accordingly, officers were sent to the College for it, and having only that work to do, quickly began to gather worthwhile facts concerning many details of sea warfare that theretofore had not fully materialized. We obtained data as to the amounts of ammunition, fuel, and supplies that would be required in certain distant operations; as to the probable amount of damage (not the kind) in such operations and for which repair facilities should be provided; as to where and what fleet base should be prepared for them, and of other vitally important details too numerous to mention. In addition to training the officers for high command, the College had

become an almost perfect research laboratory for every detail of naval warfare.

Among the many recommendations made by the College was one concerning the so-called "light cruisers." Under the terms of the Washington Treaty Limiting Armaments, the United States was permitted to have a specified amount of cruiser tonnage, of which a certain portion could be used only for "light cruisers" carrying guns of 6-inch caliber or less. The rest of the tonnage could be used for what is known as "heavy cruisers" with guns of not over 8-inch caliber, and the United States had already laid down its allowed quota of ships of that type. It had not, however, decided on its program for "light cruisers," and considerable discussion had arisen as to what the size and characteristics of such ships should be. Each of several types, all differing in size, armament, defense, et cetera were being advocated but which type would be the most effective for the United States could not be determined merely by argument.

The War College was directed to ascertain by miniature fighting operations the relative merits of the several types. The order came just before the Christmas holiday period, and there not being any other time for the research work required, the College staff devoted its supposed holiday period to it. What was proven surprised many of us but the conclusions reached were sufficiently irrefutable to decide the type of light cruisers the United States should build under the terms of the treaty. That type was adhered to as long as the treaty limiting armaments remained in force.

The War College's research activities being so valuable to the General Board, it was difficult to understand why, in later years, the President of the College was no longer a member of it.

During the winter of 1932 I was informed that in the spring I would accompany the fleet on the annual war

problem as assistant to the chief umpire. I was delighted with the assignment since it would place me in a position to observe all the fleet had accomplished at the time of its greatest training activity and the latest forms of war operations at sea.

Interlude at Sea. The umpire duty lasted about 2 months, and I enjoyed it thoroughly. I joined the fleet at San Pedro and as the Commander in Chief took me into his own quarters and mess, I had close contact with all fleet activities without being responsible for any of them. To one who theretofore exercised important responsibility in maneuvers, being in the midst of them without such responsibility was as delightful an experience as it was interesting and unique.

I will not dwell on the inspiring work of the trip as it would make poor reading for the layman though it was of intense interest to me.

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
When I arrived once more at the War College, I still had another year as President before I was due for the last tour of sea duty I could have before being retired from the Navy for age. Having another year to devote to naval warfare in miniature, I worked harder than ever to prepare myself for my next command. Externally that last year the College was quite like the two that preceded it but internally it provided the finishing touch to my study of naval warfare.

It is sometimes said in our country that high war commanders are chosen for "political pull" rather than for fitness. This may or may not be the case but all of my naval life I have wanted my high command to come through fitness not pull. Not one peep did I hear concerning it during all that winter. I knew I would be sent to sea when summer came but not an inkling of my next command was even rumored.

About the middle of April a break came. As I left home one morning to go to my office, the garbage man with his wagon was in the roadway and as usual we passed the morning hail. Then to his "Good morning" the garbage man added, "Congratulations on your being made a vice admiral." When I questioned him, he said he had read it in the little Newport paper along with the new command assignments and I was to command cruisers with the rank of vice admiral. When I reached the office, clerks coming from town verified the news but it took me some moments to get over the jolt of the garbage man

knowing more about my future orders than I did.

I was greatly pleased over becoming a vice admiral and having a "three-star" admiral's flag hut even more so to command the "heavy cruisers," the Navy's newest and fastest large ships. For the 3 years I was President of the War College we had continuously utilized those ships in miniature wars so I felt well versed in their war operations. I did not have long to wait to utilize my knowledge as I was directed to assume command on 26 May. I therefore had to leave the College soon after the slate was announced.



A military, or a naval man, cannot go very far astray, who abides by the point of honor.

Raphael Semmes, 1809-1877

EIGHTY YEARS OF WAR GAMING

A monograph prepared by Mr. Francis J. McHugh
War Gaming Department

The Naval War College term for the year 1886 began on 6 September. It ended 19 November, just 11 weeks later.

The Saturday, 20 November 1886, *Newport Daily News* reported the end of the College year and published a list of the lectures delivered during the term. One of them was titled "Colomb's War Game." It had been given by William McCarty Little, a retired naval lieutenant and unofficial member of the College staff.

As far as is known, Colomb's Game was the first naval war game. Invented by Captain Colomb of the British Navy in 1878, it appeared 54 years after Lieutenant von Reisswitz's "War Game of Prussia," the first of the land warfare games.

Colomb's game was played as a pastime by a small number of British naval officers, and variants were introduced into European navies including the Russian, Italian, and Austrian. In this country Little studied the game and, recognizing its potential, discussed the subject with Capt. Alfred T. Mahan, President of the Naval War College. The result was Little's 1886 lecture, the first scheduled talk on war gaming.

Little's lecture appears to have had no impact on students and staff and was

apparently soon forgotten. However, many years later the 1898 edition of Major Livermore's war gaming classic, *The American Kriegsspiel*, stated that the naval Kriegsspiel had been practiced in the United States since 1886 as "suggested at first by Lieut. Wm. McC. Little."

In 1887 Little became an official member of the staff of the College and in that capacity delivered six lectures on war gaming. These talks covered the entire field of war gaming and all its possible applications to naval warfare. They aroused the interest of the staff and students and, according to Knight's and Puleston's 1916 *History of the United States Naval War College*, led to the adoption of war games as part of the College course. After 1894 all students at the College participated in regularly scheduled games.

Games featuring the strategic employment of naval forces in a maritime campaign were played on charts with pins and symbols. Those dealing with battles between opposing forces were conducted with miniature ships on checkerboard-like floors called game or maneuver boards.

Prior to a game the staff of the College prepared a hypothetical military situation. One such imaginary conflict

resulted from an assumed attempt by Germany to begin a Panama Canal, while the United States was supposed to be building a Nicaraguan Canal. The Germans were assumed to have an advanced base in the Azores. The students were divided into two groups. One group represented the United States, or Blue Navy; the other, the German, or Black Navy. Both sides prepared campaign and battle plans as they would for an actual war. Opposing admirals issued orders, and the chart game began as cruisers scattered on scouting missions, and battleships, oilers, and transports formed cruising dispositions and steamed toward the Caribbean.

When the opposing fleets closed to within gunfire range, the chart game ended. Then miniature ships were positioned on the game board and the battle fought as a board or tactical game. The rules of the game were based on fleet and historical data and the knowledge and judgments of experienced naval officers. After the game the records were analyzed, and staff officers summarized the strengths and weaknesses of opposing strategies and tactics.

Other games helped prepare the Navy for the Spanish-American War and for possible conflicts with the superior British Navy in U.S. home waters. As the result of these latter games, the College in 1895 pointed out the strategic benefits that would result from a Cape Cod Canal.

Situations were also devised and games conducted to examine the defenses of the Pacific coast and island possessions against possible Japanese and German operations.

When classes were not in session at the College, the staff conducted its own games for such purposes as devising and testing scouting and battle plans for the fleet. Staff gaming ended in 1911 when the College shifted to a longer curriculum year.

With the beginning of World War I, situations that were likely to arise if the United States entered the war were studied and gamed. Following the war, data obtained from naval battles and operations were incorporated into the rules of the game, and a completely new system was devised for computing the effects of all naval weapons against all possible targets. New and larger game boards and gaming facilities were constructed, and new fleets of miniature ships obtained.

The circular dispositions used in World War II were devised on the game board, and the employment of carriers and aircraft in the games provided future fleet commanders with an insight into the capabilities of integrated sea and airpower. The Japanese, or Orange Fleet, often provided the opposition, and innumerable island-hopping Pacific campaigns were played. Some of these games included amphibious ships not in being at the time of play. This is one of the advantages of war gaming, for games, unlike fleet exercises, can employ the forces and weapons of the future as well as those of the present.

After World War II an electronic maneuvering board system was designed to replace the game boards. This system, now known as the Navy Electronic Warfare Simulator, or NEWS, was installed in the center wing of Sims Hall.

BIOGRAPHIC SKETCH



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The installation was completed in 1958. The following year a war gaming department was established to program and conduct games on the NEWS and to maintain this highly complex electronic war gaming system.

For the first 6 months of each calendar year the NEWS is used for conducting games for the students of the School of Naval Warfare, the School of Naval Command and Staff, and the Naval Command Course, a course for senior naval officers of friendly nations. The second 6-month period of each year is reserved for the fleet. During this time two types of games are conducted. In one type, fleet commanders and their staffs play at the College. In a second type, known as "remote-play," admirals and staffs play from their own operations control centers or from their own ships and are connected to the NEWS

by "secure" communications links. Remote-play games have involved east and west coast commands as well as operations control centers in Hawaii and Iceland. Some games have involved both Canadian forces and Canadian war gaming facilities.

The remote-play game is one of the most realistic and valuable types of war games ever devised. It is one of the many contributions that the Naval War College has made to the art of naval war gaming during the past 80 years. And if, at some future date, a building is constructed at the College for purely war gaming purposes, it will not be surprising if it is called "Little Hall" in honor of the naval officer who introduced naval war gaming to the College and who was the first to perceive its many possibilities.



The value of history in the art of war is not only to elucidate the resemblance of past and present, but also their essential differences.

Sir Julian Corbett, 1854-1922

A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE OF MERCENARIES

by

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(This is an excerpt from a research paper in which Colonel Dodenhoff quite exhaustively examines the problem of employing mercenaries, using the Congo as a case study. Space precludes the complete publishing of this work but instead excerpts will be presented in this and the following issue. The current article features a brief history of mercenary activity while the follow-on will examine the use of mercenary forces in the mid-1960 Congo rebellion. These works are not only interesting reading, but should serve to place the employment of mercenary forces in a perspective that is more objective than normally appreciated by the U.S. military professional. Ed.)

The use of mercenaries is probably as old as war itself. Mercenary armies have appeared in almost every highly organized society in history and played an important role in the ancient world—Philip II of Macedonia was delivered as a hostage to Thebes; on returning to Macedonia he seized the throne and later, in concert with mercenaries, occupied Thebes and deprived the Thebans of their independence; foreign mercenaries appeared in the armies of Alexander the Great and were well represented in the Roman Legions; with their own citizens acting as captains, the Carthaginians employed mercenary soldiers in the Punic Wars with the Romans.

The Heritage. Mercenaries were common to all armies, but generally they were engaged for a single campaign only. In England, Harold had a body of Danes in his army when he defeated the Norwegian king. These were the famous “housecarls” (from the Anglo-Saxon *huscarl*) who were hired soldiers originally established in the kingdom of King Canute (1018-1035).¹

Later during the Battle of Hastings in 1066, “one of those battles which at rare intervals has decided the fate of nations,” there were Normans, Frenchmen, Flemish, Bretons, and soldiers of fortune from a dozen other nations who were attracted by the prospect of conquest. William realized that the army he

needed to invade England could not be recruited from Normandy alone, since by feudal law he did not possess the power to call out his vassals for service overseas. However, William's cause attracted many followers, for the conquest of so extensive and wealthy a country as England offered unlimited plunder and estates to soldiers of fortune and land-hungry sons of nobility. Volunteers flocked to William's standard from every quarter of France and from beyond its borders. They were staking their lives against riches and power which William the Conqueror, Duke of Normandy, had sworn would be theirs if they won and survived the battle.²

The mercenary officer was the dominant type from the breakdown of feudalism to the latter part of the 17th century. He had his origins in the free companies which flourished during the Hundred Years War (1337-1453). Under the mercenary system the officer was essentially an entrepreneur, raising a company of men whose services he offered for sale. Success was judged not by professional standards but by pecuniary ones. An army was composed of separate units, each the property of a different commander. The mercenaries were individualists, to some degree in competition with each other; they possessed neither common standards nor corporate spirit. Discipline and responsibility were absent. War was a predatory business, and the ethics of a predatory business prevailed.³

One of the most famous of all mercenary groups were the Swiss fighting men, who were hired, sometimes by the Swiss cantons themselves, for service throughout Europe to form many famous bodyguards. The Swiss Wars produced a famous Swiss infantry that frequently sold its service where it was profitable. Swiss auxiliaries formed a regular contingent in many of the armies of Europe, especially of Italy and France. Over 1 million served in France

from the time of Louis XI to Louis XIV (1665-1715). As the reputation of the Swiss fighting men rose they became to be widely employed by the French, and they gradually displaced the Scottish personnel of the royal bodyguard, rendering loyal service often in adversity. Over 700 Swiss Royal Guards, for example, were massacred at the Tuileries in Paris, defending Louis XVI from the mobs of the Revolution. The Swiss were granted the motto *Honneur et Fidélité*, and their name became synonymous with faithful service throughout France. However, in 1859, the Swiss confederacy forbade the recruitment for service abroad. The remnants of this force, the Papal Swiss Guards in Italy, have shrunk since then to a mere ceremonial bodyguard.⁴

Machiavellian Admonishment. *Condottieri* was the name given to soldiers of fortune, leaders of the mercenary military companies who were in the service of the Italian States during the latter Middle Ages. Owing largely to the wholesale condemnation of the system by Machiavelli, the Italian *condottieri* became regarded as a byword for greed, treachery, and incompetence. Machiavelli considered them as such in the following appraisal:

Mercenaries and auxiliaries are useless and dangerous, and if anyone supports his state by the arms of mercenaries, he will never stand firm or serve, as they are disunited, ambitious without discipline, faithless, bold amongst friends, cowardly amongst enemies, they have no fear of God, and keep no faith with men. Ruin is only deferred as long as the assault is postponed; in peace you are despoiled by them, and in war by the enemy. The cause of this is that they have no love or other motive to keep them in the field beyond a trifling wage—which is not enough to make them ready to die for you. They are quite willing to be your soldiers so long as you do not make war, but when war comes it is either fly or decamp altogether.

Mercenary captains can be either very capable men or not; if they are, you cannot rely upon them, for they will always aspire to their own greatness, either by oppressing you, their master, or by oppressing others against your intentions; but if the captain is not able, he will generally ruin you.⁵

In reality, however, the *condottieri* took his profession seriously. He studied war as a fine art, fought with skill and bravery, and sought to win fame even more than money. He was, however, bound by no ties of patriotism to the state which he served; his interest was to prolong war rather than end it. The necessity of buying up leading captains to prevent them from taking service with an enemy strained the financial resources of even the wealthiest of Italian rulers. The Milanese, on the death of Duke Philip, hired Francesco Sforza against the Venetians, who had overcome the enemy at Caravaggio, and then allied himself with them to oppress the Milanese, his own employers. The father of Sforza, being a soldier in the service of Queen Giovanna of Naples, left her suddenly unarmed, by which she was compelled, in order not to lose the kingdom, to throw herself into the arms of the King of Aragon. The Venetians and Florentines increased their dominions by means of such force, but of the capable leaders whom they might have feared, not all conquered; some met with opposition, and others directed their ambitions elsewhere. The one who did not conquer was Sir John Hawkwood, the Englishman who commanded the "White Company," whose fidelity could not be known as he was not victorious, but everyone admits that had he conquered, the Florentines would have been at his mercy. Hawkwood, who died in Florentine service in 1394, fought for 30 years for various masters and was typical of the many English, Spanish, German, and French captains whose companies fought in Italy.⁶

Perhaps over a long period and during her many wars, France has employed mercenaries as much, if not more, than most other countries. Foreign soldiers, in particular, came to be associated with the French King's bodyguard, a practice which began in the 9th century, developed, and remained a tradition until 1830.

Middle Ages. For centuries Scottish soldiers had a fighting reputation in France second to none. It is recorded that as early as 886 the King of France had a Scottish bodyguard. In the year 1400, for example, the Scottish contingent was about 7,000 strong and included 75 archers.

During the 15th and 16th centuries, Scottish mercenaries were periodically employed by the French kings, and for a short time there was even a body of Scottish gendarmerie. It may come as a surprise to some that the traditional forerunner of the French Foreign Legion were the Scots. For a good many years Scottish mercenaries held a place of pride in the French military life, but they began to be rivaled by the Irish, especially in the latter part of the 17th century. The Irish mercenary had, of course, frequently appeared upon the French scene, and by 1714 there were seven Irish regiments in the pay of France.⁷

Wild Geese. In the latter part of the 17th century and after the Jacobite War in Ireland, the members of the Irish Brigade distinguished themselves on many battlefields on the continent—Foteny, Ramillies, Blenheim, and Loudun. The military articles of the Treaty of Limerick provided the authority for the Irish military personnel to take service in a foreign country.⁸

After the siege of Limerick, in which the Irish defenders, almost without ammunition, had repulsed the well-equipped veteran army of King William

III, the treaty, agreed to on 24 September 1691, provided that the garrison could march out of the city with "arms and haggage, drums beating and colors flying." Additionally, the treaty provided that the officers and soldiers who wished might go to any foreign country, with the government providing them with ships. Almost 20,000 of these Irishmen went to Brest and entered into French service. These military emigrants were the vanguard of the vast exodus of 450,000, the flower of Irish manhood, that departed Ireland during the 1691 to 1745 time period.

A second stage of the Hibernian Diaspora caused the dispersion of Irish soldiers from France over the southern and eastern European kingdoms. They never made their way, however, to these dominions in the same number as they did to France, nor did there exist the strange racial affinity that has always bound them to the Spanish; and yet, possibly no dynasty appreciated their services more than the House of Austria. The Emperor Francis Stephen once wrote: "Our troops will always be disciplined; an Irish coward is an uncommon character, and what the natives of Ireland even dislike from principle, they will generally perform through a desire of glory." The careless cosmopolitanism of this time period ensured a welcome for any able soldier in nearly every army of Europe, and it was inevitable that many of the wandering Irish should have taken service in an Empire whose very existence was a negation of nationalism.⁹

Numbers of the gentry attained distinguished positions on the Continent. The Irish military emigration was by no means democratic in character. For peasants and laborers there could be no prospect other than service in the ranks, while the members of noble families took the honors bestowed upon them as no more than their due.

Gen. Patrick Sarsfield, the defender of Limerick, went to Brest with the van-

guard of the "Wild Geese" preferring service with the French to that of the English. He later was entrusted with the contingent of Irish troops which represented more than half of the force intended for the invasion of England in May 1692. It was only after the decisive British naval victory of La Hougue that plans for the invasion were shelved.¹⁰

Ulysses, Baron Brown, an Irish colonel of horse [sic] in the Austrian Army was ennobled for his military service by the Emperor. His son became one of Maria Theresa's most successful commanders, Field Marshall Ulysses Maximilian von Browne, "The Eagle," who was considered to be a consummate general and an able negotiator. Von Browne faced Frederick the Great in Silesia during the War of the Austrian Succession and later in the Seven Years' War where he was defeated and mortally wounded at Lobositz in Saxony.¹¹

Many of these wandering soldiers of fortune or their descendants attained high positions in their adopted countries. Among them, to mention only a few, were Leopold O'Donnell, who became premier of Spain, Count Taaffe, premier of Austria from 1879 to 1893; Bernard O'Higgins, the Liberator of Chile; President MacMahon of France; and General Keller, the "Russian" general killed in the Manchurian campaign in the Russo-Japanese war in July 1904.¹²

With these half million "Wild Geese" spread throughout Europe, leaving their mark of military professionalism, none would have imagined that the sign of the "Wild Goose" would "fly" again some 273 years later. The scene this time was to be in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in the heart of Africa; a mercenary force once again trying to sustain a nation in chaos, once again in a conflict that involved powerful external forces. However, in this endeavor they were condemned rather than applauded.

Hessians and America. Possibly no event in history has had a more decided effect on the American philosophy of mercenary employment than the experience in the American Revolutionary War. This event has been inculcated in American history texts for almost 200 years and probably provides the main basis for the derogatory connotation of mercenary operations in the American view.

Throughout the 18th century, Hessians and Hanoverian regiments were constantly in the pay of the British Government. Frederick II of Hesse hired out 30,000 of his men to fight for Great Britain in the first American war. These troops included some of his best regiments, all drilled on the Prussian system and officered by experienced men. The *Jäger Corps*, who rivaled the American riflemen, were the best soldiered troops on the British side. One-third of the British forces under General Howe were Hessian troops. Due to amnesties, desertions, and combat losses, only 17,313 returned to Europe after the war's end. The landgrave of Hesse, who sold his troops at so much a head, received upward of \$2,500,000 for Hessian soldiers lost in that struggle.

In U.S. history, the term Hessian is often indiscriminately used for all the German mercenaries who fought on the British side during the Revolutionary War. American history paints a disdainful and contemptuous account of these hirelings who fought for pay against the American patriots. The long line of battles in which the Hessians actually distinguished themselves, such as Long Island, Fort Mifflin, Brandywine, and White Plains, as well as Newport and Charleston, are minimally covered in American history, while the victories of Washington on Christmas Eve at Trenton and later at Princeton are enthusiastically described as infusing new life into the patriotic cause and regaining confidence in Washington both at home and abroad.

Chasseurs Britannique. Not as well known as the Hessian were other mercenaries who fought on the American Continent. After the French Revolution a considerable number of French royalists emigrated to Germany. Day by day more of these *émigrés* arrived in Germany and the Rhineland princes permitted them to enlist and arm volunteers. Though the French demanded the disbandment of these troops, the conflict that followed between France and Austria-Prussia would not have broken out if the course taken by the Revolution had not placed the French royal house of Louis XVI in danger. With Louis XVI's execution and the outbreak of the Continental War in 1793, the British decided to increase the size of their army by the addition of a large body of foreigners. Accordingly, in 1794 an act was passed for the embodiment of the "King's German Legion" consisting of 15,000 men. These troops, who were increased in the course of the war to nearly double that number, distinguished themselves in various engagements. Corps of the French *émigrés* fought as the *Chasseurs Britannique* (a *corps d'élite* of sharpshooters) in the Peninsula War and in America. This particular foreign legion was disbanded in 1815, the officers being placed on half pay.¹³

The British Contribution. British-born soldiers have often served abroad in the pay of foreign governments. English mercenary soldiers were by no means left out of the picture, and over a period of time a number of English regiments were in the service of France. There was one in the 16th century, two in 1646, oddly enough known as the "Stewarts Regiment" and the "Bavaria Regiment," but it seems that in spite of the titles the personnel were English.

Although the number of Scottish, Irish, and English, especially the latter, declined as the use of other foreign troops increased, their traditions lin-

gered on, and there were invariably British units of one kind or another in foreign service. Englishmen, Scotchmen, and Irishmen singularly or in bodies served during troubled times in most European countries.¹⁴

During the Crimean War, the British Government enlisted the aid of foreign stipendiaries of German, Swiss, and Italian nationalities. About half of the troops enrolled became efficient soldiers by the time hostilities ceased, however, they were later dishanded at a great cost in gratuities.

La Legion Etrangere. The most renowned of all mercenary forces in the history of the world, the French Foreign Legion, also saw service in the Crimean War. This legion of strangers (*Legion Etrangere*) of many nationalities distinguished itself significantly in battle with some 900 of the 3,200 legionnaires dying of wounds during the war. This body of foreigners, many of whom were "men with a past," volunteered for service with France and fought valiantly in the Crimea.

Despite the many years of peace, Paris in 1830 was not unlike Germany after the 1939-1945 war. The convulsions of Europe had left a hopeless flotsam of displaced, transplanted foreigners loitering along the boulevards which Napoleon had built to glorify his triumphs. Veteran soldiers who had fought for the Empire and the Republic were penniless and desperate. They were ripe for any trouble. On the other hand, they were potentially useful for anyone who could harness their displeasure.

The idea of forming a mercenary battalion of foreign undesirables appealed to Louis Phillipe who had come to the throne in August 1830, and also to the authorities in Paris. Principally, such a battalion would remove them from the streets of the capital. France's manhood had been decimated in the Napoleon campaigns and further heavy

French losses in other campaigns would not be popular.

Originally the Legion was organized in Toulon on 9 March 1831, founded by a Royal Ordinance, written on a small piece of official French War Office notepaper. Ten days after the original ordinance it was thought to be necessary to forbid Frenchmen to enlist in the legion, but they still could and did, simply by declaring themselves either to be Swiss or Belgian.

By the beginning of July the framework of the first battalions had taken shape, and a Swiss officer, Colonel Stoffel, was appointed to command. Colonel Stoffel, an experienced officer of ability, and French officers who had been sent to help him energetically tackled this wild tangle. Mixed among the wild variety of ex-soldiers and would-be soldiers were some who were obviously physically unfit for military life. Several contemporary accounts of these detachments describe them as motley groups wearing remnants of a gaudy variety of military uniform; some were too old, some were too young, many were unfit, and frequently many were drunk.

Colonel Stoffel asked for more officers and a number of French *sous-officers* to train this new formation and to enforce discipline. Although by the end of the year five battalions were functioning passably well, there were some minor reorganizations the next year. Later, when recruiting became better organized, another two battalions were formed, making a total of seven in all. These were composed of companies of men of the same nationalities, as follows: 1st--former Swiss Guards and Hohenlohe; 2nd--Swiss and German; 3rd--Swiss and German; 4th--Spanish; 5th--mixed but mainly Italian and Sardinians; 6th--Belgian and Dutch; and 7th--Polish.

The legion fought well and helped in the conquest of Algeria. They also later fought creditably in the Franco-Prussian

War and added to the history of mercenaries on the American Continent by fighting in Mexico, helping to place Maximilian on the throne. Later the legion fought with distinction in the Great War, World War II, and Indochina.

Most English-speaking people's concept of the Foreign Legion stems from romantic fiction and films which contain shoddy emotions, banal situations, and glaring inaccuracies of fact. The world's children of all ages loved the Foreign Legion. Despite novels by Marie Louise de la Ramée who wrote *Under Two Flags*, under the pseudonym Oida, and Percival Christopher Wren's *Beau Geste* and *Beau Sabreur*, the Foreign Legion is an outstanding example of the triumph of a way of life over the literature written about it. Despite millions of published words of blame and praise, of truths, half-truths, and lies, the legion has remained essentially the same for more than a century. Politics and the changing social currents of the world have been the determining factors in its enlistments, its casualties, and even beyond; the legion, surviving major and minor wars with great external pressures, ultimately met disaster, not from outside but from within. The legion that now exists at Aubagne, near Marseille at Camp de la Demande, has survived this disaster and still remains the world's most famous mercenary organization.

French public opinion is divided on the legion. Some citizens feel it is disgraceful that their country should hire foreigners to fight its battles. With a certain logic that may be cynical, French Governments have viewed the question in this manner: "There are foreigners who wish to fight for us, and we have battles to be fought. Is it not true, that for every foreigner who dies in battle, the life of one Frenchman is saved?" This logic is the result of a long tradition in France which many French military historians ignore. It is not widely known that over the course of

centuries the French have employed more mercenary soldiers than any other Western nation. Its Foreign Legion is only the last in a long line of mercenary units. Contrary to general belief, relatively few British and Irish have joined the legion. Still fewer Americans joined the legion until hundreds of young Americans joined during the Great War and paid what they considered to be their personal debt to Lafayette by fighting as mercenaries on French soil.¹⁵

Frontiersmen Legion. Another kind of legion was formed during the Great War, one that was not so romanticized as the French Foreign Legion, but one that would have great similarities to another white legion recruited 50 years later for a mission in Africa, quite close to the same area of conflict.

In April 1915 the Legion of Frontiersmen left London for British East Africa. It is doubtful whether a more remarkable, romantic regiment has ever left Britain to fight abroad. They were, in fact, adventurers and soldiers of fortune collected from all over the world, officially dubbed the 25th (Service) Battalion, Royal Fusiliers (Frontiersmen). But in East Africa they were to be known as "The Old and Bold."

The battalion, 1,166 strong, had been recruited by a South African War veteran, Col. D.P. Driscoll, D.S.O., who had raised and commanded the famous Driscoll Scouts in South Africa. The recruiting was partly done by advertisements in the newspapers and partly by word of mouth starting with Driscoll and his friends—some of them the original Legion of Frontiersmen that existed even before the war. Recruits included F.C. Selous, the famous naturalist, explorer, and hunter and friend of Theodore Roosevelt; W.N. Macmillan, an American millionaire of enormous physique (his sword belt was 64 inches in diameter); Cherry Kearton, the photographer who had specialized in photo-

graphing big game; famous hunters like George Outram and Martin Ryan; a millionaire from Park Lane; a royal servant from Buckingham Palace; a number of late members of the Foreign Legion; ex-cavalry officers from the 9th and 21st Lancers; a naval wireless operator; a circus clown; cowboys from Texas; several publicans; musicians from the dance band at the Empire; London stockbrokers; a number of Merchant Navy officers; Americans from the U.S. Army; a lighthouse keeper from Scotland; Angus Buchanan, a naturalist who had been in the Canadian Arctic Circle when war broke out and had not heard of it for nearly three months—he made his way to join the Frontiersmen via Hudson Bay Port and London; miners from Australia and the Congo; prospectors from Siam and the Malay States; pearl fishers; an opera singer; a professional strong man; an Irishman who had been sentenced to death by the President of Costa Rica; British officials and merchants from Hong Kong, Mexico, China, and Egypt; a number of troopers from the Northwest Mounted Police; music hall acrobats; a lion tamer; and last, but by no means least, an ex-general of the Honduras Army, who became a sergeant in the Frontiersmen and built them a bombthrower. One of them, Lt. Wilbur Dartnell, was to be awarded the posthumous V.C. in a minor engagement shortly after the battalion's arrival. They had joined into a kind of Buffalo Bill army for adventure and for patriotism. They were not to know that they were to get little but wretchedness. Before the war was over most of them were to die in a remote, inhospitable country a long, long way from Tipperary.¹⁶

The American Experience. The American public's philosophy towards mercenaries is almost universal on two counts. First, that mercenaries are considered a part of a foreign scene, and secondly, the term mercenaries is com-

mon parlance for lacking allegiance, being unscrupulous and unprincipled. However, the American participation in mercenary activities demonstrates many examples of actions, by both governments and individuals, that parallel the events that have previously occurred on foreign soil and with foreign nationals.

In the 18th century it was not out of the way for a naval officer of one country to enter the service of another when his own state was at peace. For example, the British Navy reduced its personnel from 110,000 to 26,000 after the War of American Independence which meant that hundreds of officers were without employment; at least 20 of them entered the Russian service.

Kontradmira! Jones. No sooner had the war been over than the Congress of the United States gradually started liquidating our impoverished Revolutionary Navy. Within a short time period all of the ships had been sold or given away leaving the new nation with neither a navy nor a naval program. At the end of the war all the men that remained in the naval service were paid off and turned adrift on the beach. The people of the fledgling nation were so fearful of a monarchical form of government and everything that the Old World represented, they went to remarkable lengths in sacrificing the Navy to prevent the possibility of scheming politicians using it to enslave their own people. It was in this atmosphere that the foremost naval hero of the small American nation, John Paul Jones, on recommendation of Thomas Jefferson, took service with the Imperial Russian Navy in April 1788. Flag rank was what Jones had always coveted, and it was the principal motivation that attracted him to the Russian service. The Empress Catherine II first created him as Captain of the Fleet with the rank of Major General. In Russia he was later known as *Kontradmira! Pavel Ivanovich Jones* (Paul, the son of John).

He even hoped thus to impress Congress. He wrote to Jefferson begging him to use his influence to have him promoted to Rear Admiral USN, as a gesture to "gratify the Empress." But as America now had no navy, there was even less chance of Jones getting flag rank than there had been during the war. He does not appear to have been attracted by the Russian pay (about \$145 a month—however, it was twice what he had drawn in the American Navy).¹⁷

Immigrant Mercenaries. The amount of money paid to John Paul Jones while in the Russian Navy was not too different from the sum that was involved in a far more sobering account of mercenaries; one that is not well advertised for obvious reasons. In Hamburg, Germany, early in 1864, advertisements appeared in several newspapers which offered unmarried, male immigrants free passage to the United States, a bonus of \$100, a guarantee of employment for three years, at the minimum rate Americans were earning in the same job (\$12 a month), plus food, lodging, and medical attention. The purpose of this advertisement was for the recruiting of Germans, by the agents of the Governor of Massachusetts. The Provost Marshal of Massachusetts, when questioned later, indicated that it was explained to these "immigrant mercenaries," orally, in German, that they were joining the Union Army. However, it is doubtful if any were aware that they would soon be wearing a "Blue Union snit" fighting the Confederate forces.

These "mercenaries" were originally landed at Gallop's Island near Boston and later were posted to the 20th Massachusetts Volunteer Infantry and the 35th Regiment of Massachusetts Volunteers on the banks of the Rapidan. With the Union Army pushing men into action as fast as they could produce them out of recruiting sources, the Germans were split up among the Massa-

chusetts companies, sent into combat unable to understand what was happening or what they must do or where the dangers lay; in a few days, many were stumbling to their deaths in the wilderness.¹⁸

Blue and Grey Foreigners. Significantly, these "immigrant mercenaries" were not the only foreign mercenaries to take service with one of the contestants during the American Civil War. Officers who had previously been in the service of the Prince of Prussia or the Swedish kings, and others, took leave of absence from their service to fight in the war. Among the more notable were Major Heros Von Borecke, Brevet Brigadier Generals Von Egloffstein, Von Blessingh, Von Schack and Von Vegasack. Heros Von Borecke, who took service with the Confederacy and became J.E.B. Stuart's Chief of Staff, was previously on the staff of the Prince of Prussia. Baron Fred W. Von Egloffstein and Louis Von Blessingh both had military training and experience in the German Army before coming to America for the Civil War. Von Egloffstein and Von Blessingh were both breveted brigadier generals United States Volunteers, USV for war service. George Von Schack came to the United States on a 3-year leave of absence from the Prussian Army where he had served as a Captain of Cavalry. He also was breveted a brigadier, USV during the Richmond campaign in 1862. Baron Ernest Mattais Peter Von Vegasack received a special furlough and "recommendation" from the brother of the King of Sweden to go to Washington during the Civil War. He fought as a private at Yorktown and Williamsburg, later rising in rank to brevet brigadier general and awarded the "Congressional Medal of Honor" on 23 April 1863 for "serving successfully as ADC and advantageously changing the position of troops under fire at Gaines Mill, Virginia, 27 June 1862, while covering Fitz John Porter's retreat."

Upon returning to Sweden in August 1863, the Swedish king allowed him to wear this "foreign decoration" and eventually Vegesach retired as a major general in the Swedish Army. The significance of a mercenary soldier winning the nation's highest award is unique in the annals of our nation's history. Understandably, this event is probably not well known by the average American.¹⁹

The Khedives Knight Errants. Not all of the American experience with mercenaries has been associated with foreign nationals. In certain events in military history, Americans have been hired into an army not of their own country. Such was the case of some 50 officers from both sides of the American Civil War who, after the fighting ceased, were unable to face the rigors of civilian life and took service with the Khedive of Egypt in the 1870's. Some wanted the security of position that belongs to military life; some wanted to atone for dishonorable incidents of the war; some simply sought adventure. Many of them had fought in three conflicts—the Seminole, Mexican and Civil Wars—and soldiering was all they knew.

The Khedive was eager to avail himself of the skills of these officers in engineering, navigation, surveying, exploration, and conquest. The half a hundred Union and Confederate officers who went from the United States to Egypt had a high degree of technical excellence, superior training, and a rich experience. They were for the most part graduates of West Point and Annapolis. They had perfected their training with experience on the high seas or on the American frontier; they had fought Indians, Mexicans, and each other, gaining experience in the management of men, in the logistics of supply, and in the tactical requirements of armed conflict.²⁰

These Union and Confederate officers who put on Khedive's uniform were

recommended for service by no lesser personage than the head of the American Army. Gen. William Tecumseh Sherman, who from his own ranks, and who had gained high appreciation of the merits of others against whom he had fought, had recommended most of them to the Egyptian ruler. In the Union and Confederate service they had held rank from lieutenant to major general. Interestingly, no conflict arose between them over the issues of the Civil War, and the wearers of the Blue and Grey dwelt peacefully together in Egypt.

However, major problems and differences were experienced between the Americans and the Egyptians. These Americans were required to face and deal with people of a different culture and different religious background, of imposing an American technical advanced society upon deep-rooted and established alien systems, of communicating American concepts of efficiency, order, law, and system to the Egyptians, and of resolving their own internal conflicts. All these factors contributed in some degree to the abortive attempt by Ismail to expand the influence of Egypt into Abyssinia. After the defeat of Rati Pashas' Egyptian force at Khaya Khor and Gura in 1876 by King John, the Negus of Abyssinia,²¹ American military prestige dropped severely. Those Americans who had officered and advised the Egyptian forces at Gura were blamed for the defeat and were methodically cashiered from the Egyptian service. The loss of 10,000 men, 10,000 new Remington rifles, and 25 cannons was a defeat not easily overlooked by the Khedive.²² Memoirs of this period of history by some of the principals provides interesting information on the participation and names of these American soldiers of misfortune.

Gen. Charles Pomeroy Stone, U.S. Volunteers, who one day would build the pedestal for the Statue of Liberty, was the senior American officer in Egypt. Gen. William W. Loring, late a

colonel in the U.S. Army, later a major general in the Confederate service, and still later Féréek Pasha and general in the Army of the Khedive of Egypt, served during the disaster at Gura. Col. Charles Chaillé-Long of the U.S. Volunteers served as Chief of Staff to Gen. Charles George "Chinese" Gordon for a period prior to his explorations. "Chinese" Gordon, a British officer, had fought from Crimea to China and also took service with the Khedive. Chaillé-Long is primarily known for his explorations of Uganda, Lake Victoria, Nyanza, Karuma Falls, Juba River, and Lake Alhert.²³

Generals Colson and Field, and Col. William McEntyre Dye, Capt. David E. Porter, son of the Union naval commander, and others—men of ability, of experience and adventurous spirit agreed to serve in any war except a war that would be fought against the United States.²⁴ Their pay was approximately that of similar grades in the U.S. Army, and for those who served in any of the distant provinces an additional 20 percent was awarded. In general, the men from the Confederate service took a grade no lower than they had had in the Army of the Lost Cause with the Khedive paying transportation costs between New York and Cairo. Should a man become ill during his term he could accept a two months' severance pay and resign. The heirs of any man who died in service received a full year's pay, and the widow of any who died in battle or of battle wounds would receive gratuitous benefits unless she remarried or until the majority of her youngest child.²⁵ The veterans of the Blue and Grey who worked for the Khedive and their descendants would soon go forth to other parts of the world and once again hire themselves out to a foreign army. However, it was not until a quarter of a century later that a significant enlistment took place in France.

Americans in the Legion. Hundreds

of young Americans, together with other young men throughout the world, joined in the great adventure in 1914 by joining the French Foreign Legion. Except for the legion, there was no corps that they could regularly enter as Americans. Forty thousand is considered a rough estimate of these young war heroes who were too eager to wait. The Americans who entered the service of France after the outbreak of war were volunteers recruited from all classes of society. Millionaires, and there were some, writers, lawyers, engineers, boxers, butchers, explorers, and especially university students.

The legion, now 84 years old, provided a constitutional loophole that no other fighting army could offer. The technicality that allowed Americans to enlist in the legion without forfeiting their U.S. citizenship lay in the wording of the enlistment contract itself. Legion volunteers were not required to swear an oath of allegiance to France, only to the flag of the legion itself. The contract required only that the legionnaire promise "to serve with faithfulness and honor and to follow the corps, or any fraction of the corps wherever the government wished to send it." This saved the Americans their citizenship. They joined in such numbers that one regiment, the 1st, became regarded as an American enclave and, as such, a prime tourist attraction for visiting French generals.

On 8 August 1914 *Le Journal Officiel* in Paris advised: "The Minister of War has authorized the acceptance of foreign volunteers for the duration of the war only. However, no enlistments of foreigners can be received until 21 August 1914." Impatient for the arrival of the enlistment date, the Americans gathered each morning in the garden of the Palais-Royal to learn the rudiments of close-order drill. They were trooped around the square by a outtime West Point cadet named Charles Sweeney, 32,

from Spokane, Washington. At first Sweeney's marchers numbered about 20 Americans who had been living in Paris at the outbreak of war; but the straggling ranks began to fill with countrymen who had been traveling on vacation in different parts of Europe, and by others arriving from the States on almost every boat that reached harbor. After nearly three weeks Sweeney had worn himself hoarse, but by then his ragtag platoon executed facing and flanking movements so well they were actually applauded by the French who gathered daily to watch the fun.

On 21 August the swearing-in ceremony was held in the great courtyard of the Hotel des Invalides, repository of so much of France's military history. The huge golden dome that sheltered the remains of Napoleon Bonaparte looked down on the blinding white yard filled with colorfully uniformed army officers, silk-hatted diplomats, and the hodgepodge of Americans, Englishmen, Poles, Spaniards, Russians, Italians, Greeks, South Americans, Servs, Croats, Arabs, Sicilians, Norwegians, Swedes, Danes, and others whose nationality could only be guessed at. The yard rang with patriotic speeches defying Germany and promising revenge for the humiliation of 1870; they praised the "selfless act of so many foreigners who wished to contribute their part of courage and blood to the history of France." When the last paper had been signed, 43 Americans were accepted as privates in the *Legion Etrangere*. Their pay would be 30 cents a month.

Many a name personality on the American scene became a mercenary for this paltry sum. Some of those that served would delight any romantic. Alan Seeger, a renowned poet; Algernon Satoris, grandson of Ulysses S. Grant; William L. Bresse, son-in-law to Hamilton Fish, the American statesman; Edward Genet, descendant of the French Minister to the United States, deserted from the U.S. Navy; and others

left wives, families, and jobs to be "engaged in glory alone." With rare exceptions, Americans who came to repay their personal Lafayette debt to France proved to be good fighters. Americans such as Norman Prince; Victor Chapman; Kiffin Rockwell; Denis Dowd; William Thaw, the Pittsburgh millionaire; Elliott Cowdin; Lufbery; Bert Hall; Paul Pavelka; and James MacConnell and the rest later rendered significant service to the French Army while in the *American Escadrille*.²⁶

It was the legion group and the volunteer ambulance drivers serving in the American Field Service that provided, in many cases, the appointments into the French Air Service. These "Legionnaires of the Sky," American volunteer aviators in World War I, saw much frontline action and heavy casualties. The *Escadrille Americain*, N.142, in the French Air Service, later called the *Lafayette Escadrille*, was created in April 1916. Many of these "Galahads of the Air" had previously been bloodied in the mud of France and the trenches of the Marne or Verdun battles. The motives that inspired their beliefs and guided their footsteps were many and varied but practically all had one common instinct—courage, backed by an abundant measure of sacrifice that probably seems idiotic in these materialistic days.²⁷ Who is to say whether these were "patriots," "volunteers," or mercenaries? Certainly the views of France, United States, and Germany all differed on the designation of these men. Parochial and subjective views provided differences in meaning and interpretation; when compared they were all held in a different perspective.

Abraham Lincoln Brigade. In more recent times, 3,300 Americans volunteered and participated in the Spanish Civil War. They were grouped, together from individual and bodies of volunteers, into the International Brigade (XV Brigade) which was formed in 1937

as the III Battalion--Lincoln-Washington (usually referred to as the Abraham Lincoln Brigade). They manned the John Brown Field Battery and participated in some of the heaviest fighting of the Civil War. Testimony to this was the death of 1,600 Americans in the war with the remainder all being wounded once, and some being wounded as many as three times.²⁸

Communist and leftist ideological overtones were a part of the recruitment of this group. It is interesting to note that few, if any, Americans fought for the Nationalists. Practically all of the American combat troops, service and auxiliary units supported or fought on the Republican side.²⁹ The only reported American to fight with the Nationalists appears to be a pilot shot down in October 1937. Some would argue that these men were altruistic and noble, while others, based on an opposing ideology, would paint these troops as fully mercenaries.

Flying Tigers. In the spring of 1941 Americans once more served as soldiers in a foreign army with no question this time as to the pay motive. The American Volunteer Group under the command of Claire Chennault with Meriam C. Cooper as Chief of Staff and 200 U.S. Army Air Force, U.S. Navy, and Marine pilots on "leave of absence" flew antiquated P-40 fighter planes and fought against the Japanese as mercenary air soldiers of fortune, a "Foreign Legion of the Sky." This group, known as the Flying Tigers because of their grinning tiger shark P-40's, provided the only bright spot on an otherwise darkened and bleak scene for the Allies in the Pacific. They provided a stopgap to the Japanese drive in China and eventually contributed to driving the Japanese from the Chinese soil and the air above.

This unorthodox group of "wild, gun-toting Texans," wearing high-heel cowboy boots to fly their P-40's, was a

hotshot outfit--tough and arrogant, as invincible as they were temperamental, and sometimes as equally undisciplined. A goodly amount of good green American dollars was deposited to their credit in an American bank, and that was why many were there. However, not all of them were so motivated. For the best of them and even some of the mediocre ones would have done the same, even if there had been no money.³⁰

Eagle Squadron. During the same time period of World War II, another group of flying "volunteers" entered the scene with American pilots flying in the service of a foreign government. This time, however, the theater of operations was halfway around the world from their China compatriots. The unit designation of these flying Americans was called the "Eagle Squadrons" who were to fight in England during the Battle of Britain.

America was still at peace in the early 1940's, but some of her young men were very much at war. They were transport pilots, crop dusters, washed-out cadets, students, and other adventurous youths who had gone to Canada and enlisted in the Royal Canadian Air Force or Royal Air Force units.

In October of 1940 these Americans were transferred to the newly organized 71st Royal Air Force Pursuit Squadron, the first of the Eagle Squadrons. These Americans wore Royal Air Force uniforms with the distinguishing Eagle Squadron patch on the left shoulder. The 71st was soon joined by the 21st and the 133rd Squadrons as more Americans signed. Many of the adventurous flyers became aces in the "Battle of Britain." One in particular was Flight Lt. Chesley Peterson, now a major general in the U.S. Air Force.³¹

The Americans were not the only nation contributing aviation personnel to the Royal Air Force. At one time in December 1941 the Fighter Command

numbered 34 "foreign" squadrons as compared to 66 British. In addition to the three American, of the foreign squadrons ten were Canadian, eight Polish, four Australian, three Czech, two Belgian, and one each New Zealand, Norwegian, Newfoundland, and French. This grouping into "national" squadrons was only accomplished after the arrival of the British reinforcements from war training organizations. Previously, the unique camaraderie in these squadrons had been the international flavor of these organizations.³² Once again, whether patriotic or venal in motive, in reality the composite nature of these squadrons and their nonnational characteristic easily falls within the Webster definition of mercenary.

Postwar Reservoir. Before the age of intense nationalism, characterized by World Wars I and II, it was not uncommon for men of talent and ability to serve faithfully and with distinction in the political and military establishment of countries other than their own without being regarded as traitors. In the past, as the feudal organization of warfare decayed and capitalism emerged, mercenaries formed the nuclei of many armies. With the full development of capitalistic society, national armies took more and more the place of the professional adventurers in search of gain. The period after the Great War; the Revolutionary Wars of the United States, Russia, and France; the Civil Wars of the United States, Britain, and Spain; the Wars of Succession; Continental, Peninsula and Carlist Wars have always developed a large number of trained military personnel who have accepted service in some mercenary force, normally after a war in their own country.

Modern Mercenaries. After World War II an unprecedented number of trained guerrilla warfare and counter-insurgency experts was turned loose in a restless world of former colonial and

underdeveloped areas. In many of those areas newly emergent states began organizing and staffing intelligence agencies as one of the status symbols associated with the trappings of sovereignty. World War II produced a manpower pool of trained, hardened, and unemployed former soldiers and partisans. Many of these individuals were unable to integrate themselves into the postwar life of their respective countries. These "centurions" needed the security of an organization with high morale and esprit de corps. When associated with such a unit, they move up rapidly in one of several elite, special force organizations.³³

It may be very important and meaningful that the United States possibly solved a major problem by "unwittingly" forestalling the possibility of ten million potential mercenaries by subsidizing its veterans with the provisions of the G.I. Bill. As lucrative as this program was, however, not all of this group were satisfied at being so occupied. Some still needed the "Big Battalion" of institutionalization, while others appeared to be motivated by idealistic reasons.

First in 2,000 Years. Such may have been the case of Col. David Marcus, known by his *nom de guerre* as "Mickey Stone." An American citizen, he was a graduate of West Point who had served on General Eisenhower's staff in Europe with the rank of colonel. He helped draft the Italian, German, and Japanese surrender terms and was a member of the U.S. delegation to Teheran, Dumbarton Oaks, Yalta, and Potsdam. He volunteered for service with the Hagana during Israel's war of independence. He had been appointed as a single commander for all forces operating in Jerusalem and the Corridor after the initial failure in Latrun in May 1948. Specifically, on 28 May 1948 he was given his first command in Hagana as the Supreme Commander of the Jerusa-

lem front with authority over Etzioni, Harel, and the 7th Brigade. Here Marcus was appointed the first "general" of an Israeli army in 2,000 years--and ironically he was an American. Under his guidance and drive the Israelis began to launch small-scale attacks, initially not too successful in gaining ground but the benefit derived by his hammering away was that the pressure on Jerusalem was relieved, and attention could be directed against Latrun. Mistaken by one of his own sentries, Col. Marcus was killed on 11 June 1948, just hours before the cease-fire, and his body was returned to the United States for burial at West Point.³⁴

As can be expected in this late 1940 conflict, there was more than one volunteer that participated in the fight. Jewish and non-Jewish volunteers from Canada, South Africa, Australia, Britain--former Royal Air Force and Army Air Force pilots--came to help Israel. Some even brought their own aircraft, such as Mody Allon, a former officer of the South African Air Force, who subsequently became the Commander of Israel's first combat squadron.

Fledgling Falcons. When the war ended in 1949 the Israeli Air Force had grown to 249 aircraft of 57 different types, flown by pilots from 28 countries speaking 14 different languages. At the war's end, traditionally, these air mercenaries packed up and left. National Israeli pilots trained in Israel now held the air defense reins of the country. At this time France, herself involved in a war in Algeria, was providing the fledgling Israeli falcons with the necessary modern aircraft in order to guarantee Israel's security.³⁵

It was not too unusual at this time to telephone collect to Miami in response to an advertisement in a local midwest newspaper--relating to "adventure, high pay and flying"--to be told that "you will be contacted." That night, or soon after, two local businessmen or elders of

the Jewish faith would arrive at the individual's home and briefly outline the flying proposition, indicating that his citizenship was not in jeopardy. In a few days, if the individual was still interested, a sum of old, crumpled money of all denominations and condition would be exchanged, a passport miraculously presented, a ticket to Miami, then one to Washington or Baltimore, then on to New York, and soon--usually within five days--the recipient would find himself in Europe or the Middle East flying missions in support of Israel's war of independence. In each case, he was passed from individual to individual and given a ticket for only the next stage of the trip.

The Seconded Leave. Ironically, at this same time orders were being received by Sir John Bagot Glubb (Pasha Glubb) of the Jordanian Arab Legion that all British Army seconded officers were immediately to leave their commands and withdraw from battle. The reason for this order was that the U.N. Security Council, at a meeting on 29 May 1948 had adopted a British resolution calling for a four weeks' truce in Palestine. The resolution called upon all governments to refrain from sending war materials to either side. However, there was no mention in the resolution for the recall of foreign nationals who might be fighting. The British Government, however, presumably bowed to pressure in New York to withdraw its regular officers from the Arab Legion.

The withdrawal of the British officers was a shattering blow. They included all operational staff officers, both the brigade commanders and the commanders of three out of the four infantry regiments, and all the trained artillery officers. The British officers were not a little aggrieved, particularly since they were aware of the activities of Col. David Marcus. Pasha Glubb, not a regular officer in the British Army at this time, received a communication

from the British Legation. This document referred to a British law known as the Foreign Enlistments Act. Under this act Glubb was exposed to a charge of having taken service "without His Majesty's cognizance," with a foreign power.³⁶

The Citizenship Stake. While Pasha Glubb could retain his citizenship and was able to convince the Legation authorities that they had no cognizance over his presence in Jordan, not so was the case with the Americans. The Walter-McCarran Act of 1952 spelled out details that had previously been vague on the conditions of American citizenship law. It specifically barred Americans from serving in a foreign army, voting in a foreign election, or entering the regular employ of a foreign government. All restrictions were subject to certain exceptions, but basically the offenses incurred the forfeiture of American citizenship.

In a test case involving an American who had served with Castro's army in Cuba, the Supreme Court affirmed that service in a foreign army would incur the loss of citizenship. However, this ruling by the Court was reversed by the decision of 29 May 1967 specifically because of the "loss of citizenship" aspects of the case. Service in a foreign army, however, remained illegal with other penalties. Thus, what had been legal, or at least not illegal, for the Americans who flew for France before 1917, or for China before Pearl Harbor, or fought in Allenby's Jewish Brigade against the Turks in 1916-1918, or in Israel's Army against the Arabs in 1948, suddenly became illegal in 1952.³⁷

French Anguish. While the United States and Great Britain were having problems with their nationals serving in foreign lands, so was another country on the Continent. In France many ex-soldiers and partisans, having acquired a taste for violence and adven-

ture during World War II, promptly reenlisted for colonial service after the war. Embittered and disillusioned by their experience in Vietnam, many of them sought compensation by a victory over native nationalists in North Africa. After six years of frustration, hard-corps militants, including general officers, organized an illegal Secret Army Organization (OAS) and waged a relentless underground war of terror and assassination. As in all extremist cases, terror begets counterterror with many being killed on both sides. When the plot for seizing power in France and Algeria was uncovered, many showed up in other areas of Africa. These and many other underemployed or unemployed militants appeared in the Congo crisis and reappeared in other active political warfare theaters when they occurred. Many of these freelance mercenaries were adventuresome, fanatic, and frequently embittered personalities; their petty intrigues constituted a threat to the peace of the turbulent area in which they sold their services. However, their activities also complicated and frequently embarrassed the political warfare operations of the major powers.³⁸

Swedish Surprise. While a considerable number of incidents involving French, British, Irish, Scotch, German, Italian, including the American mercenary experience has been related, the foregoing cannot be considered a complete study of mercenary activity since ancient times. However, it does provide a considerable number of examples of events which have been found, in many cases, to be repeated in reviewing the events in the Congo. Perhaps there are few items of a similar nature on which Americans are so sharply divided. Depending on one's reading, or having been exposed to propaganda of one side or the other, the idea of mercenaries has developed strong opinions on the part of the American public. These opinions are not necessarily joined by other

nations, even though they are considering the same historical event. The Hessians in the American war were thought of differently in Europe than in America. The Americans in the Spanish War were considered as mercenaries by the Nationalists, regardless of the "idealistic" nature of their adventure. Surely, Lafayette, Pulaski, and Von Steuben were considered as mercenaries by the British regardless of the "patriotic" label by the American Revolutionaries. On the contrary, no one among the Western nations considers the Swedish elements in the United Nations peace-keeping forces anything but being associated with high forms of idealism. Apparently, however, the opposite has been justly claimed. This is typical when examining cases of most wars involving international forces.

In accordance with the General Assembly resolutions, the donor governments required the United Nations to reimburse them for the *overseas allowances* they paid their men while in the Congo. Some governments, notably Sweden, also required reimbursement for the *salaries* of their men and officers. In referring to a presentation given at a private conference on United Nations Security Forces held in Oslo, February 1964, by Major General Rikhye, the military advisor to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Ernest W. Lefever wrote: "All Swedes serving in the United Nations Forces were *mercenaries* and not members of the Swedish Army."³⁹

Some countries cannot send units of their national army outside the country by law and have, therefore, to raise a volunteer contingent. In most cases the unit that is sent is a reserve unit in which the men had their training while serving the army some years previously and just before going abroad receive a refresher course of a few weeks.

So was the case in the Congo with the United Nations paying \$48 a month for the Indian soldier and \$625 a month

for the Swedish "soldier." The reference to Swedish "mercenaries" was compared with a later account, expanded by the same author and publisher, for an official account of the Congo story for the United Nations. Ironically, in the similar section of the official version, references to the Swedish contingent were listed as "volunteers."⁴⁰

Reflection. With all the evidence of history complete with examples of mercenary operations, with all types of nations participating; the idealistic, the pragmatic, the globalist, the small, the large, including our own country—why then the strong opinions voiced against mercenaries? Have we been absorbed with the Machiavellian admonishment against the use of mercenaries? Is it our past experience with Hessians in the Revolutionary War that is incorporated into our thoughts, or perhaps the legality of the situation as expressed in the Walter-McCarran Act of 1952 that taints our thinking toward the use of mercenary forces? Surely, mercenary operations have been a part of the

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY



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African scene almost from the first days of the European explorations. Possibly we have been the subject of powerful and subtle propaganda which has turned us away from the very force that has sustained Africans and kept them from communism. The difficulty of establishing the truth becomes increasingly difficult as additional facts are uncovered. It would be convenient if the researchers could, by various "scientific" methods when analyzing the total documentary evidence, read with factual certainty what is true and what is false. Documentary evidence cannot be ignored, however falsified, but whenever

it is in conflict with elementary common sense it is regarded with extreme diffidence. The 35 nations involved in the Congo operations, plus the superpowers of the United States and the Soviet Union and their allies, all viewed the mercenary situation differently. An objective view, rather than long-standing subjective evaluation, is required in order to determine and qualify the rhetorical question as to whether a mercenary force can provide internal and external security for the fledgling nations of Africa, and if the answer is yes, what are the pitfalls?

FOOTNOTES


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We are so outnumbered there's only one thing to do. We must attack.

*Sir Andrew Browne Cunningham:
Before attacking the Italian fleet
at Taranto, 11 November 1940*



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Group 3: International Relations and Counterinsurgency.

Group 4: Strategic Planning and International Law.

NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ORGANIZATION, NWC 14. 2 Installments--28 Points total--14 Points per installment. A study of the National Security Council; the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Office of the Secretary of Defense; Headquarters of the Military Departments; Unified, Joint, and Combined Organizations; International

Security Organizations; and Foreign Aid Programs.

COMMAND LOGISTICS, NWC 15. 3 Installments--39 Points total--13 Points per installment. A study of basic logistic considerations, logistic elements and functions; interrelationships of strategy, tactics, and the basic elements and functions of logistics; the impact of future developments and trends of warfare upon the field of logistics; and the impact of future developments in the field of logistics upon the concept of warfare from the command viewpoint.

INTERNATIONAL LAW, NWC 16. 6 Installments--102 Points total--17 Points per installment. This course is designed to provide the student with the means to gain an understanding of principles of international law having to do with the organization of the world community with emphasis on areas of naval interest and with specific application of these principles to the naval officer's profession.

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, NWC 17. 6 Installments--96 Points total--16 Points per installment. This course is designed to furnish students with a disciplined study of international relations. It is organized so as to provide basic definitions, concepts, and functions of organizations which facilitate the conduct of world affairs. As international relations greatly influences policies of national security and subsequent national strategy, serious students of this course will significantly enhance their professional qualifications.

MILITARY PLANNING, NWC 18. 2 Installments--30 Points total--15 Points per installment. A study of the systematic techniques of logical analysis as applied to military planning using a problem situation; and an introduction to staff organization, functions, staff studies, and planning directives.

NAVAL OPERATIONS, NWC 19. 2 Installments--34 Points total--17 Points per installment. A course comprising a study of the characteristics of four major weapons systems and considerations for their employment; submarine, antisubmarine, attack carrier, and amphibious forces. The student need select and complete only two of the four installments; however, a combination of the submarine and antisubmarine installments may not be selected.

STRATEGIC PLANNING, NWC 20. 2 Installments--44 Points total--22 Points per installment. A National Security Council level study of national objectives, interests, and policies and their relation to national strategy; and strategic planning at the level of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

COUNTERINSURGENCY, NWC 21. 4 Installments--60 Points total--15 Points per installment. This course provides a means for the student to prepare himself for positions of responsibility which involve the planning and conduct of counterinsurgency programs and to acquire an understanding of the possible contributions of all governmental departments and the need to integrate their available capabilities into effective programs to attain our national objectives.

MILITARY MANAGEMENT, NWC 22. 3 Installments--39 Points total--13 Points per installment. This course will provide the student an opportunity to further his appreciation for the principles, processes, concepts, applications, and techniques inherent in sound military management. It is structured to highlight the following areas of interest: the functions of management; the history and background of managerial thought; interdisciplinary foundations for management; defense as an economic problem; scientific aids to decisionmaking; the role of computers; Navy planning, programming, and bud-

SUMMARY OF CORRESPONDENCE COURSE OFFERINGS AND BENEFITS

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE CORRESPONDENCE COURSES		GROUPS (Recm order of taking)	NC&S level	NW level	No. of Install.	Retirement Points	EARN Documents
(CS Code)	(ABBR)					Reserve Off only	
71 Nat & Internat Sec Org	(NISO)	1	x		2	@14 ea.= 28	Ltr for Selection Jacket & Certificate for Course
72 Military Planning	(MP)	1	x		2	@15 ea.= 30	"
72 Naval Operations	(NO)	2	x		2	@17 ea.= 34	"
72 Command Logistics	(CL)	2	x		3	@13 ea.= 39	"
72 Military Management	(MM)	2	x		3	@13 ea.= 39	"
<u>ALL FIVE COURSES ABOVE</u> – Graduate of "The Correspondence Course of Naval Command and Staff"							Special Diploma & Ltr for Selection Jacket
72 Int Relations	(IR)	3		x	6	@16 ea.= 96	Ltr for Selection Jacket & Certificate for Course
71 Counterinsurgency	(CI)	3		x	4	@15 ea.= 60	"
73 International Law	(IL)	3		x	6	@17 ea.=102	"
72 Strategic Planning	(SP)	4		x	2	@22 ea.= 44	"
<u>ALL NINE COURSES ABOVE</u> – Graduate of "The Correspondence Course of Naval Warfare"							Special Diploma & Ltr for Selection Jacket

getting; the management of resources; and future trends in military management.

* * * * *

Successful completion of individual courses is recognized by the award of a certificate and the issuance of a letter of completion. Notification of successful course completion is forwarded to the Chief of Naval Personnel, or other appropriate authority, for inclusion in the student's selection jacket.

* * * * *

The President of the Naval War College will award diplomas to those students completing selected groups of correspondence courses which closely parallel the studies offered at the resident schools of Naval Command and Staff and Naval Warfare. These diplomas

certify that the designee is a graduate of the Correspondence Course of Naval Command and Staff or the Correspondence Course of Naval Warfare.


The Correspondence Course of Naval Command and Staff. Graduation from this course indicates successful completion of five correspondence courses: National and International Security Organization, Military Planning, Naval Operations, Command Logistics, and Military Management.

The Correspondence Course of Naval Warfare. Graduation from this course indicates successful completion of the Correspondence Course of Naval Command and Staff plus four additional courses: Counterinsurgency, International Relations, International Law, and Strategic Planning.



Authority without wisdom is like a heavy ax without an edge, fitter to bruise than polish.

*Anne Bradstreet: Meditations
Divine and Moral, c. 1670*



PROFESSIONAL READING

The evaluations of recent books listed in this section have been prepared for the use of resident students. Officers in the fleet and elsewhere may find these books of interest in their professional reading.

The inclusion of a book in this section does not necessarily constitute an endorsement by the Naval War College of the facts, opinions or concepts contained therein.

Many of these publications may be found in ship and station libraries. Certain of the books on the list which are not available from these sources may be available from one of the Navy's Auxiliary Library Service Collections. These collections of books are obtainable on loan. Requests from individual officers to borrow books from an Auxiliary Library Service Collection should be addressed to the nearest of the following special loan collections.

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Department of the Navy
Washington, D.C. 20370

Commanding Officer
U.S. Naval Station (Guam)
Library (ALSC), Box 174
San Francisco, Calif. 96630

Commanding Officer
U.S. Naval Station
Library (ALSC), Bldg. C-9
Norfolk, Virginia 23511

Commanding Officer
U.S. Naval Station (Pearl Harbor)
Library (ALSC), Box 20
San Francisco, Calif. 96610

Commanding Officer
U.S. Naval Station
Library (ALSC)
San Diego, Calif. 92136

Gardner, John W. *No Easy Victories*.
New York: Harper & Row, 1968.
177p.

John Gardner for President! And without doubt he would make an excellent one. In *No Easy Victories* he explains the great domestic issues of our time with wisdom, clarity, humor, warmth, and obvious love for the human condition. Mr. Gardner has held many high federal appointive positions, including Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare from 1965 until his resignation in January 1968. He speaks with intimate knowledge of government power and responsibility. The book is a collection of excerpts from Mr. Gardner's speeches and writings while he held public office. It pursues no central theme and advances no particular point of view. It is a series of observations recorded during rare moments of reflection in a very active life. It reminds one of the Chinese philosopher Lin Yutang's classic *The Importance of Living*. It is enlightening and uplifting. It cuts through the fog of confusion existing in our society to explain the apparent American sickness of the Sixties. It addresses the need for personal commitment, the sophisticated dropout, the public mood, the quality of life, education, the life and death of institutions, the pursuit of meaning, leadership, and the individual and society, to list only a few examples. Though he is not specific about programs to solve our problems, one gets the impression that the author could find solutions. Illustrative of the

book is Mr. Gardner's conviction that "Our prospects never looked brighter and our problems never looked tougher." *No Easy Victories* is essential reading for every professional who, through narrow specialization, is in danger of losing his perspective on life.

D.A. MORTON
Commander, U.S. Navy

Harris, Elliot. *The "un-American" Weapon*. New York: Lads, 1967. 211p.

In his opening chapter, the author presents the thesis that the use of psychological operations "to capture men's souls and covertly control their will" is foreign to Americans' national creed, and, thus, it is considered by many U.S. citizens to be "un-American." For this reason, he believes that U.S. governmental officials have been reluctant in the past to exploit psychological warfare to its fullest in the formulation and implementation of national strategy. He goes on to state that the national attitude in this regard must change and that the nation must "drain its psychological and political warfare reservoirs" if it is to win its struggle with the Communist world. Unfortunately, Mr. Harris offers little in the way of useful analysis to support his thesis in the remaining chapters of his book. He elects to rely on a rather disjointed historical account of various psychological operations conducted in the Vietnamese and Korean campaigns and during World War II to prove his point. Although this is an interesting and relatively factual documentation of the efforts made by both sides in psychological operations during these conflicts, its relevance to the author's central theme is somewhat questionable. Despite this general shortcoming, the book does offer some useful insights. One concerns the growing importance of POW's as a target population in psychological operations. Another points up the relative vulnerability of Western nations to what the author

describes as the "fatigue factor" (difficulty in maintaining support of the body politic during a protracted conflict) inherent in prolonged limited war, and how the Communists have capitalized on this phenomenon in the conduct of their "psy-op" program. The book also serves as a valuable source of both themes and techniques that have been used in psychological operations in the past.

L.J. FITZGERALD
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army

Roskill, Stephen W. *Naval Policy between the Wars: the Period of Anglo-American Antagonism, 1919-1929*. London: Collins, 1968, v. 1.

This is the first of a projected two-volume study of British naval policy in the years 1919-1939. The author is well known for his superb three volumes dealing with the British naval effort in World War II, *The War at Sea*, and for his interpretive histories, *White Ensign* and *The Strategy of Sea Power*. This present work is thoroughly documented from manuscript sources, government documents, and the applicable materials in print. It also possesses a splendid bibliography, useful tables of comparative naval statistics, and lists of First Lords of the Admiralty, Sea Lords, Secretaries of the Navy, Chiefs of Naval Operations, and various British and U.S. fleets commanders. As a retired Captain, R.N., Roskill writes from the viewpoint of both a participant and historian. He starts with a description of the Admiralty and the top level of command in the Royal Navy and compares this with its American counterpart. He also traces out the budgetary process in each country as it applies to naval authorizations. With this foundation, the history of Anglo-American naval relations is traced, largely in 2-year increments, through the decennium 1919-1929. Special chapters are devoted to the war

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of intervention in Russia (1918-1920), the Washington Naval Conference of 1921-1922, and the Geneva Naval Conference of 1927. There are also four scattered chapters that deal with "the naval aviation controversy."

The book is particularly valuable because of its focus on the internal struggle, within the British Cabinets and Admiralty Boards, for funds to advance the Royal Navy after the World War. In justifying new programs, the Royal Navy had to present its view of the world; to an American reader, this information is enormously useful. Probably because the Royal Navy was not as effective in carrier warfare as it should have been during World War II, Roskill pays considerable attention to the unsuccessful fight carried on to retrieve the Fleet Air Arm from the Royal Air Force. From this contest can also be traced the failure in training and properly equipping those air units that did operate with the Royal Navy. The author supplies a great deal of information about U.S. naval aviation to show the effectiveness achieved by America in integrating aviation into the fleet.

If there is a major criticism of the book, it would be the author's lack of focus on naval policy that the title anticipates. Roskill describes naval bills, funding, conferences, the Singapore naval base, naval aviation, and personalities galore; but he does not really tell us what was British naval policy in this period. It may be that they had none. About the closest he comes, in widely separated chapter fragments, is to say that the British Navy was based on a one-power (United States) standard; was not supposed to fight the U.S. Navy; and had to review annually its requests for funds against the "Ten-Year Rule"—the assumption that the British would not be at war in the next ten years.

G.E. WHEELER
E.J. King Chair of Maritime History

Servan-Schreiber, Jean J. *The American Challenge*. New York: Atheneum, 1968. 291p.

The American Challenge represents a detailed and thought-provoking thesis of what the author, M. J.J. Servan-Schreiber, describes as the American technological and managerial penetration of Europe. He is extremely concerned over the growing influence of American industry in Europe, saying that "Fifteen years from now it is quite possible that the world's third greatest industrial power, just after the United States and Russia, will not be Europe, but American industry in Europe." This book guides the reader through a careful investigation of the American industrial venture into Europe during the last decade. It analyzes the factors that have previously occasioned, and continue to contribute to, the growth and success of American industry in Europe. The author then projects an image of an America of the 1980's and its impact on the world. He sees a widening of the gap between American industry and the rest of the world as the result of advancing technological innovations and social changes. He declares that it is essential now that Europeans wake up to this American industrial challenge and treat it as a more serious threat than the ever potential thermonuclear war between the Great Powers. M. Servan-Schreiber submits a very critical evaluation of what he calls the present archaic "state of the union" of French and European industry. He points out the weaknesses of the business practices and techniques of Europe and proposes a solution to counterattack the challenge of American industry before Europe becomes an American satellite.

The American Challenge is not a denouncement of American industry with its advanced practices and capabilities in Europe; on the contrary, the author professes great admiration for these American industrial character-

istics. The book is an urgent plea to European industry to unite and change its practices and techniques before it succumbs to the sheer force of an ever growing American industrial presence in Europe. This volume is well written and

to the point. It is highly recommended for all interested in economics and international relations.

G.H. KAFFER, JR.
Commander, U.S. Navy



In war, the defensive exists mainly that the offensive may act more freely.

Mahan: Naval Strategy, 1911



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In the art of war there are no fixed rules. These can only be worked out according to circumstances.

Li Chuan, fl. 7th century A.D.