

Interim Military Planning
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NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

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FOREWORD

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
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DIFFICULT ASPECTS OF MILITARY PLANNING

An article prepared by
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(This essay is based upon lectures presented at the Naval War College on the subject of Military Planning by the author, who is a member of the Correspondence School faculty. LCDR Bacchus recently prepared and edited the Naval War College publication, *Naval Planning*, 1966, which is used in correspondence courses and in the resident schools. Ed.)

DIFFICULT ASPECTS OF MILITARY PLANNING

Plan: a method, implying mental formulation and sometimes graphic representation, for carrying out a design.¹ The word "planning" therefore implies mental, but not necessarily also verbal, application of *method* to achieve something. The place of planning in military enterprises is manifest, if not inescapable. Equally obvious is the fact that we must rely upon written plans in our present and future operations as forces become increasingly interdependent.

Most of the early years of a naval officer's career are spent executing rather than forming plans. Viewed from this vantage point, military directives, materiel plans, emergency plans, and the like must present an uninviting area for examination. Seemingly, the "doers" spend their time on an endless treadmill of training, tests, exercises, and deployments instigated by superiors who, to a greater or lesser degree, may seem to have failed to appreciate the complexity of the tasks demanded or the fallibility of the tactics and forces employed. If this sounds familiar, let the indictment rest on both levels, for in all probability the lower echelons have too little understanding of plans in general, while the planners may often be guilty of not completing the planning cycle; i.e., revising old plans and effectively supervising execution of plans to make them work better.

Recognizing, then, the all-pervasiveness and shared responsibility for planning of each military officer, let us consider where most difficulties originate. In doing so, those whose interest lies in other forms of planning than the common field of naval operational planning will want to associate themselves with other terms in place of those applied to the military planning process. Since the same basic logic system is used in executive-level government or business decision making, the difference in planning procedures is chiefly a matter of terminology.

Before going further with this discussion, the fact that I am currently engaged solely in the academic exercise of military planning should be acknowledged. Fortunately for me, I had small staff planning experience before coming to the War College. Now I have daily contact with those ambitious officers who are pursuing the exacting and often exasperating (but hopefully always interesting) planning efforts required to complete several of our correspondence

courses. The Naval War College has long been pre-eminent in the field of military planning--for somewhat more than 50 years. The close resemblance of the Navy's tactical doctrine manual, *Naval Operational Planning* (NWP 11 series), to the *Naval Planning* text used at the War College is far from coincidental, since primary reviewing cognizance of the former rests here. For those unfamiliar with the latter publication, it is a locally printed planning manual which amplified NWP 11(A) somewhat, particularly in the 1966 edition. Detailed study of this subject is undertaken in the *Military Planning* correspondence course.

While procedures used in military planning seem perfectly straightforward to those familiar with planning steps and terms, it is readily apparent there are numerous difficulties associated with the earliest efforts of most planners. My purpose will be to examine the military planning process in order to help solve some of the problems and difficulties most frequently encountered.² This treatment will be limited to the most common problem areas involved in completing the Commander's Estimate of the Situation and the Development of the Plan phases. (See Figure 1.) The latter process is not titled or given specific staff effort by services other than the Navy.

General Problem Areas. Before relating specific planning difficulties to the various steps of these two phases of the military planning process, a discussion of some of the general problem areas common to many aspects of the process will be useful.

The first general problem is a matter of the attitude of the planner; he must discipline his mind to accept and use the complete process as it is set forth in *Naval Operational Planning*, NWP 11(A). Upon first reading, there is a normal tendency to look at the military planning process as being too long, too time-consuming. In the case of simple military problems, this is obviously true. However, as the problems become more and more complex, additional time spent in concerted, conscious planning becomes necessary to ensure even a minimum of success; ideally the results will more than justify the planning effort expended.

The second problem is misinterpretation of the ideas expressed in the planning publication, giving rise to a "battle of semantics." Sometimes words which convey more than one meaning may be used, resulting in contradictory or conflicting

SCHEMATIC MODEL OF THE FOUR PHASES OF THE MILITARY PLANNING PROCESS




Fig. 1 - The Military Planning Process

interpretations by various members of the planning group. The best way to avoid these battles is to rely upon standard terms³ and, when discussing subjects where terminology is not yet standardized, to recognize the pitfalls and, through free and frank discussion, reconcile any differences.

A third general difficulty is to plan on the wrong level. As planners expand upon the well-defined initial areas of a plan, they will inevitably begin to consider matters that are actually the responsibilities of their superiors or their subordinates, or of another command on the same level. The error arises when the planners lose sight of their own mission. In the case of planning at too low a level, for example, the problem becomes evident when the planner finds himself going into great detail and thereby doing the planning for a subordinate commander. To avoid this difficulty, one should frequently ask himself this question: "Is this my responsibility, or is it the responsibility of my superior or subordinate?" I would suggest, also, that the mission be typed on a card, and kept before you as a continuous reference throughout each step of the planning process.

Fourth, it is easy to misunderstand the purpose of each part of the military planning process. For example, many planners may feel that various steps in the Development of the Plan process are merely a repetition of previous steps. The best answer, in my opinion, lies in a better understanding of the process, which can be acquired only by actual practice.

The matter of attitude toward the planning procedure was mentioned earlier. Each of us looks at a problem through our own eyes. In dealing with individual solutions to problems presented in some of our correspondence courses, I have found three situations where too little attention is given to some aspect of the recommended planning process. The first is apparent when steps have been omitted, evidently because the planner has found the analytic procedures difficult as a result of his own inexperience with military planning methods. What is needed is the ability to break down a complex problem into simpler, easily-solved components. Experience gained through practice should overcome this difficulty.

The second situation results from individual backgrounds and personal experience. In any lengthy

mental process there is a tendency to prejudge the problem and thereafter resolve all decisions on the basis of past experience, or to cling to a familiar solution which has been used successfully in situations that appear to be similar. The word "successfully" is, of course, entirely too frail a log to ride. How 'successful? Will an enemy repeat *his* mistakes? By no means is it intended that personal experience should be discounted in solving military problems, but at the same time staff methods and analytical problem-solving techniques should be used to guard against narrow prejudgment. Here are two questions which one should frequently ask: "Am I excluding any available actions before coming to the choice of a course of actions?" and, "Am I keeping an open mind for the possibility of a better course of action?"

The third situation is the failure of the planner to reconsider aspects of the problem after introducing new ideas or changes into the concept of the chosen course of action. In other words, the planner neglects the cyclic nature of planning. After altering the chosen course of action, the planner must return briefly to preceding steps in the planning process to consider the effect of the change on the manner in which previous conclusions were reached. (See Figure 2.) This may seem to be an exercise in tedium, especially after the previous steps have been very carefully performed; nevertheless, recycling through the planning process is mandatory. Upon reconsideration of the mission, it may become apparent that contemplated actions are no longer restricted only to the tasks assigned or, upon considering probable interactions with the enemy, the revised course of action may be unduly cautious, or may involve entirely unforeseen new risks.

The final difficulty in the general category which I have been discussing is the failure to interrelate the various steps of the planning process. Each step should add to the considerations of preceding steps so that the process is accumulative rather than repetitive. This problem can also be overcome through greater familiarity with the process.

Suggestions for Most Common Problem Areas. In summary, observing the seven suggestions which follow should reduce the errors stemming from the difficulties which I have just discussed:




Fig. 2 - Supervision of the Planned Action

1. Study the military planning process more than once in order to fully understand each step and its purpose.

2. Understand every term thoroughly and choose words carefully to prevent misunderstandings.

3. Never lose sight of the mission, thereby keeping the plan on the appropriate level.

4. Don't omit portions or steps in the planning process. If it seems that a step does not apply, review the planning process carefully before omitting it.


5. Keep an open mind as decisions are approached. In other words, don't fall back on the most familiar course of action until all others have been studied also.

6. Remember it is necessary to return to earlier stages in the process whenever a significant change is made.

7. Understand and apply the interrelationship of steps so that planning is accumulative.

Next, I will discuss briefly various steps in the planning process and identify some common difficulties. The cure for these difficulties, in almost every case, will be found in the seven suggestions just given.

Steps in Commander's Estimate. The first step to be considered is Step 1 in the Commander's Estimate of the Situation: The Mission and Its Analysis. (See Figure 3.) The planner's purpose at this point is to study the mission in detail in order to determine that he is undertaking all that he should, without attempting also to perform another commander's task. The most common problem arises from failure to consider properly the purpose behind the assigned mission. As you know, the statement of the mission consists of the task and the purpose; the latter is drawn from the statement of the superior's decision--what *he* intends to accomplish. If the planner's task reads, "Deny the enemy the use of support facilities on Xray Island," there might be various ways in which the task could be accomplished. However, if the



NOTE: This is an expansion of the first phase of the entire process shown in Figure 1.

Fig. 3 - The Estimate of the Situation

superior's mission requires subsequent use of the Xray support facilities by own forces, it would be unfortunate if the subordinate chose to destroy the facilities simply because he had overlooked the purpose portion of his mission. The planner may also discover that there are important limitations or special considerations which must be kept in mind as he studies the mission.

A second problem arises in the interpretation of the meaning of the task assigned. This is something which may also occur later when formulating Own Courses of Action and the Decision. I refer specifically to such words as "attack," or "interrupt." Words like these should be avoided because the meaning applied to them by a superior and his subordinate might well be different. If I were to tell the commander of the White force to "attack" Green forces, I might intend that he should render them incapable of further action; however, he might construe it to mean harass and delay them. This is an example of the problem of semantics, to which we referred earlier.

I believe that there is nothing particularly difficult about Step 2 in the Commander's Estimate: Considerations Affecting Possible Courses of Action. (See Figure 3.) There is little difference in the amount of work necessary to draw up considerations which are excellent or merely satisfactory; in either case quantities of tedious staff work may be involved in a large or difficult problem situation. The differences in the usefulness and value of these considerations may be great when an experienced staff forms very clear conclusions as to the effect of each factor.

Step 3 of the Estimate the Opposing Courses of Action, (see Figure 3), is, perhaps, the most formidable stumbling block of the entire planning process, simply because the inexperienced planner often gets started in the wrong direction. Coming more to the point, the biggest troublemakers are the derivation of valid Enemy Capabilities, the listing of tentative Own Courses of Action, and the preliminary testing of these for suitability. This is probably less than one-fourth of the work the typical planner performs in Step 3, and yet his planning may end in failure because he hasn't aimed his efforts at a proper solution. In some cases the planner suffers from a lack of imagination, or an inability to break the problem into easily understood components--which was mentioned

earlier. The best solution in such cases is further practice, preferably under the guidance of an advisor. Even among more experienced planners, I have noted two additional difficulties in this same area, which I will discuss.

Deriving Enemy Capabilities. The first problem is the tendency in deriving the list of Enemy Capabilities to apply the same tests of suitability, feasibility, and acceptability which are required for testing Own Courses of Action. Only two tests should be applied to the tentative Enemy Capabilities: first, "Is the enemy capable of this action if I do not effectively oppose him?" and, second, "Would this enemy action affect my ability to accomplish my mission?"⁴ If any other test is applied to the listed Enemy Capabilities, the planner is probably involving himself in the unprofitable and dangerous game called "dealing in enemy intentions." Enemy Capabilities must not be deleted from consideration because "Doing this won't fulfill his mission," or "It wouldn't be a profitable course of action for the enemy." We are not to judge such matters, and should certainly not base our plans on assumptions of what the enemy will or will not try to do, *but rather on what he can or cannot do.*

Own Courses of Action. The second problem I mentioned was listing of tentative Own Courses of Action. Oftentimes a planner produces several incomplete courses of action. In such cases he has neglected or misunderstood the suitability requirement for appropriate Own Courses of Action. Because each Own Course of Action is a potential decision, each must be capable of fulfilling the mission by itself.

The solution to both of these problems can be found in two suggestions already made: (1) study the mission; and (2) understand both the purpose and procedure prescribed in the planning process.

Analysis of Opposing Courses of Action. The final part in Step 3 of the Estimate is the Analysis of Opposing Courses of Action (see Figure 3), which may be considered as a "mental war game" where the commander visualizes the interaction between own and enemy forces. This is the real heart of the Estimate. The information developed in these analyses forms the basis for the ultimate decision. In this sub-Step, the commander considers each Enemy Capability in opposition to each Own Course of Action. For example, if the planner has listed two Enemy Capabilities and

three Own Courses of Action, he will have to perform six analyses. Let us look at one of these analyses to see how it is done, remembering that each analysis must be performed in the same manner.

There are four phases to an analysis.⁵ The planner begins with the Enemy Capability in question and considers all the actions the enemy can take. For example, if the listed Enemy Capability is "destroy merchant shipping," the planner must weigh carefully all the possible ways that the enemy could accomplish the destruction; e.g., independent submarine operations, "wolf-pack" tactics, surface raiding units, mining of ports or narrow passages, etc.

Next, the planner considers the actions necessary to carry out the listed Own Courses of Action, according to the concept developed in the preceding step. Each requirement to carry out the Own Course of Action is considered: offensive actions, defending own forces, logistic support, etc. These considerations can be brief; the planner needs only to review what actions are necessary to combat threats and complete the stated course of action.

Third, the planner analyzes the possible interactions between his forces and the enemy's which might occur, as visualized when the enemy's actions are opposed by own forces. This is the heart of the "war game" and requires all the imagination and experience available to the planner. From these interactions the planner draws conclusions as to the probable outcome of the "mock battle." Some of the areas in which conclusions are necessary are: the probable outcome, probable losses, the decisiveness of the action, and the extent to which the course of action will accomplish the mission.

This same procedure is followed for the remaining combinations of Enemy Capabilities versus Own Courses of Action, and the planner ends up with a list of retained Own Courses of Action which become the basis for Step 4 of the Estimate: Comparison of Own Courses of Action.

My final suggestion before going to Step 4 is to remember the interrelationship of steps when proceeding through the analysis part of Step 3. The purpose in Step 4 is to test and compare the various courses of action so that the best one can be selected; if the conclusions reached in Step 3 have been pointed

toward this purpose, the planner will find that his efforts have been more than repaid.

Comparison of Own Courses of Action. In comparing courses of action in Step 4 in order to arrive at a decision, there are only a few rules given in NWP 11(A) and a relatively simple format to follow. Sometimes planners omit a portion of this step, which often results in serious problems. And there is another difficulty in which even experienced planners may become involved.

After comparing the courses of action and applying the tests to each, the planner is required to weigh the relative merits of the various courses of action. At this point there is a tendency to try to improve upon the remaining courses of action by combining the features of one or more with the one which seems to be most favorable. Perhaps one course of action is more feasible but another seems to have the advantage in acceptability. It is here where the difficulty arises: there is no assurance that the combined course of action will still be feasible or acceptable, even though the originally tested courses of action were. Because new factors and increased requirements must have been introduced into the plan by this combination, the planner should recycle at least briefly through Step 3 for reanalysis to assure himself that he still has a course of action which is suitable, feasible, and acceptable, and that it actually improves upon those courses of action which were considered previously.

When these things have been accomplished, the planner is ready to state the decision, which is the final step of the Estimate of the Situation. This should present little difficulty.

The Development of the Plan. The Development of the Plan procedure usually causes less difficulty than the Estimate of the Situation. (See Figure 4.) One common problem is the tendency to underrate the necessity to do every step called for in the process. In any lengthy mental operation, the mind frequently overlooks previously noted points; this should be a sufficient answer to the question of why the Development of the Plan process is necessary. On the other hand, there is no need to devote lengthy consideration to each step in the process in every situation.

I have two points regarding Step 1 of the Development of the Plan to discuss. Step 1 should not




Fig. 4 - The Development of the Plan

be difficult, but frequently portions are skipped over or only lightly considered. Remember this: some factors were determined back in Step 2 of the Estimate⁶ and may not have been given enough emphasis during the later steps in the process of selecting a course of action. Now the planner can well afford a few minutes thought about these factors before he formulates his broad concept of the operation.

The purpose of drafting a broad concept of the operation so early in the Development of the Plan also may not be well appreciated. This broad concept comes from the commander, or at least from one of his most experienced staff officers. In a large operation, it may be used immediately to draw up an outline plan for dissemination to subordinate commands so that their planning may proceed. In any case, all staff departments are dependent upon the concept of the operation for guidance in every aspect of their concurrent planning efforts.

Assumptions. Step 2 involves consideration of assumptions. Often there will be no need for assumptions, but the question should always be considered at this point.

Component and Friendly Force Operations. The next step requires the determination of Component and Friendly Supporting Operations. This is where the planner weighs the question of whether the objective can be accomplished best by keeping the forces under his command intact or whether his forces should be divided into smaller task units to carry out component operations.

This question brings up the choice in emphasis between two military principles which may seem to conflict: "unity of effort," and "span of control." If the operation is large, no doubt it will be necessary to divide forces, and decentralize control; if the planner is particularly concerned about self-defense, his inclination may be to minimize subdivision in order to give greater defensive strength to each component. This can present a difficult decision, and this step therefore becomes the heart of the Development of the Plan process.

NWP 11(A) gives three basic criteria for situations in which the subdivision of forces is recommended.⁷ These are: (1) for the efficient fulfillment of tasks which, by their very nature, are more

appropriately performed by a component force (for example, Hunter/Killer and Patrol Plane Groups); (2) because of diverse physical characteristics of units (for example, a group of logistic support ships); and (3) to provide timely action against widely separated physical objectives (for example, two Attack Carrier Groups). Of the various pitfalls of this step, I believe the most common one is to overdivide a task force.

A review of the most common requirements in an operation is provided in NWP 11(A).⁸ The term "requirements" is often confused with another word, "tasks." The planner should look up both terms when he reaches this point in the Development of the Plan to plant their meanings firmly in his mind. Here they are:

"Requirements: Inherent needs which must be fulfilled in order to accomplish the commander's mission."⁹

"Tasks: Objectives to be attained by the commander through the employment of his forces."¹⁰

The text of NWP 11(A) follows with a discussion of the procedure for considering each requirement and developing the necessary tasks to accomplish the mission.¹¹ The process has been amplified for clarity in *Naval Planning*, 1966.¹² (See Figure 5.)

These requirements have first been considered in the formulation of a concept for the chosen Own Courses of Action in the Estimate and again in the analysis of the Own Course of Action. In Step 1 of the Development of the Plan, this concept has been refined so that every offensive action, and many other actions for meeting defensive or supporting requirements, are briefly outlined. Now the planner considers each in turn, noting the force and the means within that force, and then considering whether subdivision is advisable and, if so, what type of subdivision is suitable. This procedure is carried through each requirement essential to the completion of the mission. Naturally, this process calls for considerable knowledge of the types of naval operations involved.

Component Forces' Requirements. Once all component operations have been tabulated, the commander moves on to Step 4 of the Development of the Plan:

REQUIRE- MENTS	TASKS	TO BE DONE BY (OWN/ FRIENDLY (FORCE)	MEANS? (TYPE OF FORCE)	SUBDIVISION NECESSARY? (YES/NO)	TYPE/NO. OF SUBDIVISIONS
OFFENSIVE	1. Destroy Black air- fields in Areas Yoke and Zulu	TF 77 (own force)	2 CVAs	Yes	2 Attack Carrier Striking Groups
	2. Interdict Black shipping by air and surface action	Same	2 CVAs, 2 CAGs, 12 DDs, 6 DDGs	Yes	2 Attack Carrier Striking Groups 1 Surface Striking Group (when formed)
	3. Destroy Black Cruisers by air and surface action	Same	Same as Task 2	Yes* *May be necessary if presence of surface threat develops.	Same as Task 2
DEFENSIVE	1. Provide ASW Screen to Surface Com- batant Units (CVAs &CAs)	TF 77	18 DDs	Yes	2 Attack Carrier Striking Groups 1 Surface Striking Group (when formed)
	2. Provide air defense of surface com- batant forces	TF 77	2 CAGs, 6 DDGs, Carrier Air Wings (on 2 CVAs)	Yes	Same as Task 1
LOGISTIC					
INTELLIGENCE					
MOVEMENT					

Fig. 5 - Sample Procedure for Examining Requirements

Determine Subdivision Strength and Coordination Requirements. (See Figure 4.) Let us assume that a force commander determines to divide his force into components, one of which is an Underway Replenishment Unit consisting of oilers. It would seem prudent in war to provide an escort for the oilers, but the question arises as to how many destroyers can be spared for this purpose. The commander must consider the tasks assigned to all his subdivisions and the various needs for this type of ship. To do this, the commander must project himself into the position of each of his unit commanders and visualize their requirements. On this basis he is then able to most efficiency assign his destroyers. Following this same logic, the commander must envision all the other requirements of his subordinates and then assign specific ships to units in order to achieve the best balance.

In many cases, the number of ships each subdivision should have will be fairly obvious to the planner. The establishment of necessary coordination between subdivisions and friendly forces is not usually as simple. Because only the commander can require this mutual support and coordination, this is an extremely important responsibility of the staff planner. Sometimes a look at the problems involved in coordinating separate forces might cause the planner, after due consideration, to do away with subdivisions in order to unify forces for a more inclusive common task. He might then use detached tactical units as the need arises.

If Step 4 of the Development of the Plan gives planners much difficulty, reference to NWP 11(A) should be helpful. An outline of certain determinations the planner should make as he proceeds through this step is provided for guidance.¹³

Steps 1, 3, and 4 of the Development of the Plan have been discussed at some length. There does not seem to be as much value in discussing Steps 5, 6, 7, and 8 extensively, since these remaining steps are relatively straightforward and therefore present little or no difficulty to the planner. From the work accomplished in Steps 3 and 4, the Task Organization (Step 5) falls easily into place. Steps 6 through 8 are more familiar matters: assigning tasks, preparing amplifying instructions, solving command and administrative logistics problems, and then compiling information for subordinates.

The aim of this discussion has been to add to the planner's understanding of the military planning process. The greater familiarity he has with the process, the clearer and more valuable it should become. The reader is encouraged to forward suggestions for improving upon the planning procedures now in use.¹⁴ In this manner it is hoped that the military planning process will be made easier to use and more closely related to the needs of staff planners and commanders.

The nature of warfare has changed a great deal in the past half-century, but decision-making processes change more slowly or not at all. In recent years the use of computers for automatic data processing has led to a new art--computer programming--which in turn has meant that a new group of people are examining those processes of the mind employed in decision making. Therefore we can, no doubt, look for further development of the military planning process.


FOOTNOTES

1. *Webster's Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary*, Springfield, Mass.: Merriam, 1963.
2. The procedures and terms used in NWP 11(A) generally agree with those used in Army and Air Force planning. For example, see the *Joint Staff Officer's Guide*, AFSC Pub. 1, Armed Forces Staff College, Norfolk, Va., August 1965.
3. See *Naval Warfare Terms*, NWIP 10-3(A) and the *Dictionary of United States Military Terms for Joint Usage*, JCS Pub. 1.
4. *Naval Operational Planning*, NWP 11(A), p. 2-19.
5. *Naval Planning*, 1966, p. 2-30, 2-31. (Naval War College publication)
6. NWP 11(A), p. 2-11 through 2-18.
7. See pages 3-5, 3-6, and Figure 3-3 of NWP 11(A).
8. *Ibid.*, p. 3-6, 3-8.
9. *Naval Planning*, 1966, p. 2-29.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 2-6, 2-7.
11. NWP 11(A), p. 3-8.
12. *Naval Planning*, 1966, p. 3-13.
13. NWP 11(A), p. 3-11.
14. It should be noted that NWP 11(A) was reviewed by the Naval War College, as primary reviewing activity, in July 1965. Change 2 to this manual is forthcoming, and the triennial review is again due by July of 1968.

BIOGRAPHIC SKETCH

Lieutenant Commander Wilfred A. Bacchus, U.S. Navy, holds a B.S. from the U.S. Naval Academy and an M.A. in International Affairs from The George Washington University. He has served on various surface ships and is qualified in submarines. He commanded the *U.S.S. Barracuda* (SST 3) and the *U.S.S. Spot* (SS 413); and he was Executive Officer and Navigator on the *U.S.S. Baya* (AGSS 318) and the *U.S.S. Pomodon* (SS 486).

Lieutenant Commander Bacchus served on the staffs of Commander, Submarine Flotilla One, and Commander, Submarine Flotilla Five. He is a 1964 graduate of the School of Naval Command and Staff, Naval War College. Since that time he has been a member of the staff, Naval War College.



WAR GAMING AND THE NAVY ELECTRONIC WARFARE SIMULATOR

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In June of 1963, a group of young Naval Reserve officers reported to the Commander, Barrier Forces Atlantic, for their annual tour of duty. These officers were immediately assigned to their wartime mobilization billets in an overseas Operations Control Center for a full-scale wartime training exercise. This was not a fleet exercise; it was a war game, for at that time, as now, there were neither the forces nor the funds to conduct a full-fledged fleet exercise with wartime numbers of submarines and aircraft, both friendly and enemy.

The Reserve officers were told that it was a war game, that the contact and amplifying reports were being transmitted from the umpire area of the

Navy Electronic Warfare Simulator at Newport, Rhode Island, and not from submarines on barrier stations or aircraft on patrol. But the situation developed so naturally, and the reports sounded so "real," they soon forgot it was a game and thought and worked as though "the whistle had blown."

In addition to training his Operations Control Center personnel, the game enabled the Commander, Barrier Forces Atlantic, to try out his war plan against opposition, and to see for himself if any loopholes existed, if any changes should be made.

Few of the participants in the game realized that they were making history--war gaming history--because this game was the first naval war game in which the players were stationed in one nation, the umpires in a second. It also represented another milestone in gaming at the Naval War College, the home of the Navy Electronic Warfare Simulator, commonly known as the NEWS.

War gaming was introduced into the Naval War College some 80 years ago. In those early days there were three types of games: the duel, the tactical, and the strategic. The duel game simulated a conflict between two battleships; the tactical game, the interactions between two fleets; and the strategic game simulated a naval campaign.

There were two subdivisions of the tactical game. One consisted of games in which the area of play represented the open sea; the second, those in which the playing area represented inland waters such as Gardiners Bay at the eastern end of Long Island. In the latter games the superior British Fleet was usually the offensive force; the ships and land fortifications of the United States, the defensive side. As the result of such games the Naval War College, in 1895, pointed out the strategic benefits that would result from a Cape Cod Canal.

The duel and tactical games were played with model ships and gridded boards or floors. The gridded areas were known as "game boards" or "maneuver boards." The strategic games were conducted on charts or maps, and pins or symbols were used to represent the opposing forces.

In those early days, the College's mission was twofold: to prepare officers for higher command,

and to conduct naval studies and research. For example, Adm. Stephen B. Luce, the founder of the Naval War College, noted that one of the first tasks presented to the College faculty was to devise a system of naval tactics. To accomplish this latter part of the mission, the staff conducted many duel and tactical games, often replaying the same situation over and over. The results of these games were used to make decisions on the relative merits of naval tactics and to devise scouting plans, approach dispositions, and battle plans. These plans were then sent to the Fleet for further evaluation. Games were also used to assist in the preparation of war plans such as those used in the Caribbean during the Spanish-American War. In addition, data generated during staff plays was used in the preparation and umpiring of curriculum games. Extensive gaming by the staff ended in 1911 when the College shifted to a longer curriculum year.

Curriculum or student gaming was initiated shortly after staff gaming was introduced. It was employed extensively to assist in achieving the educational part of the mission, and it soon became the aim of the College to give each student an opportunity to act as a commander-in-chief in at least one war game.

Prior to a curriculum game, the staff prepared a hypothetical but plausible conflict situation. One such imaginary situation resulted from an assumed attempt by Germany to begin a Panama Canal while the United States was supposed to be building a Nicaraguan Canal. The Germans were assumed to have an advanced base in the Azores.

The students were divided into two groups. One group represented the U.S., or Blue Navy; the other, the German, or Black Navy. Both sides prepared campaign and battle plans as they would for an actual war. Opposing admirals issued orders, and a strategic game began as cruisers scattered on scouting missions, and battleships, oilers, and transports formed cruising dispositions and steamed toward the Caribbean.

When the opposing fleets closed to within gunfire range, the chart game ended. Then, miniature ships were positioned on the game board and the battle fought as a board or tactical game. The rules of the game were based on fleet and historical data, and the knowledge and judgments of experienced naval officers.

After the game the records were analyzed, and staff officers summarized the strengths and weaknesses of opposing strategies and tactics.

While the students were preparing their plans for execution during war games, it became apparent that the Navy needed some sort of a formal planning process. After some study, the German Army planning system was selected and adapted to naval operations. Now known as "The Military Planning Process," this planning system has been studied and practiced ever since.

Games helped prepare the Navy for the Spanish-American War and for World War I. Following the latter war, data obtained from naval battles and operations were incorporated into the war game rules, and a completely new system was devised for computing the effects of all naval weapons against all possible targets. New and larger game boards and gaming facilities were constructed and new fleets of miniature ships obtained.

The circular dispositions used in World War II were first used on the Naval War College game board in the early 1920's, and the employment of carriers and aircraft in these games provided future fleet commanders with an insight into the capabilities of integrated sea and air power. The Japanese, or Orange, Fleet often provided the opposition, and innumerable island-hopping Pacific campaigns were played. Some of these games even included amphibious ships not in being at the time of play. This is one of the advantages of war gaming, for games, unlike fleet exercises, can employ the forces and weapons of the future as well as those of the present.

At the end of World War II it became apparent that the detailed and time-consuming gaming procedures that had proven so useful in the less complex prewar world were not suited to the tempo and educational requirements of the postwar curriculum. Consequently, steps were taken to update gaming techniques and concepts. One short-range approach resulted in the progressive simplification and acceleration of the traditional methods with increased emphasis on umpire judgment and less reliance on formal rules and procedures. A second and long-range approach envisioned some sort of electromechanical game board. This led to the design and construction of the Navy Electronic Warfare Simulator.

The NEWS was completed in 1958, and the large game rooms at the College with their checkerboard-like floors were transformed into lecture halls and coffee messes. During that same year the Navy War Games Program* was established, and the NEWS made available to Fleet commands from July through December of each year. In 1959 a War Gaming Department was established at the College to design and conduct games for both the College and the Fleet and to maintain and operate the simulator.

The NEWS is especially designed, constructed, and operated so that naval officers can exercise command and control of assigned forces under simulated combat conditions and the pressure of continuous time. It occupies the center wing of Sims Hall at the Naval War College and contains 22 player spaces known as command centers, a large umpire area, and several supporting equipment areas. Each command center contains communications and plotting facilities, simulated sensing devices, and controls for maneuvering ships, flying aircraft, and firing weapons. By the proper selection and programming of facilities and controls, a command center may be used to represent almost any conceivable location from which a naval commander and his staff might operate. For example, if a command center is programmed to simulate the bridge or combat information center of a single ship, then the course, speed, and weapons controls are activated so that the player-commander can exercise direct control over his ship. But if the command center is used to represent an operations control center, then course, speed, and weapons controls are not activated.

When the players in a game act as ship, submarine, and aircraft commanders, one-half of the command centers are assigned to the White, or friendly, side, one-half to the Green, or enemy, forces. One

*The Navy War Games Program consists of two parts. One is based on NEWS gaming, the other on digital computer gaming. The latter part of the program is under the supervision of the Assistant for War Gaming Matters in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. "The Navy War Games Program," by John B. Davis and John A. Tiedeman, *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, June 1960, contains a description of both phases.

command center on each side is assigned to the respective task group commanders. Through appropriate communications nets, the task group commanders receive reports and intelligence from subordinate commanders and exercise command and control over them. The subordinate commanders, in their own command centers, exercise command and control over their individual ships and aircraft. This type of game is known as a unit-level game since the lowest level player-commanders are individual ship and aircraft commanders.

But what if all players function at the task group and higher levels? Who commands the ships? Who pilots the planes? The umpires of course! From the umpire area they act as lower echelon command and supporting personnel and report and respond to their player-superiors in the same fashion as ship and aircraft commanders in a unit-level game, a fleet exercise, or an actual war.

During a unit-level game, the actions and interactions of opposing ships and aircraft are evaluated automatically by the simulation equipment in accordance with preprogrammed data, and these evaluations, as well as interforce communications, are monitored and controlled by umpires stationed in the umpire area. In higher level games, there are some automatic evaluations, but most of the interactions are evaluated by the umpires in accordance with predetermined rules and data, or in accordance with their professional judgment.

The heart of the umpire area is a large screen which represents the area of operations. On this screen are projected or displayed the locations and movements of all forces, and associated display boards, meters, and matrices of lights indicate their current operating status. In addition, other equipment is added as needed to meet the requirements of a specific game. For example, for a task-group-level game, facilities are installed so that the umpires can control the ships and planes.

The equipment areas are located at the rear of the umpire area. These contain the simulator's electronic and electromechanical equipment, programming facilities, projectors, communications patch panels, and so on. One area also contains the game-speed controls. These controls enable game speed to be varied, at the discretion of the game director,

from normal clock time up to 10 or even 20 times normal clock time.

With the exception of the School of Naval Warfare Strategic Game and a Naval Command Course manual game, all College curriculum games are now conducted on the NEWS by the War Gaming Department. These include games for the School of Naval Warfare, the School of Naval Command and Staff, and for the Naval Command Course, a course for senior naval officers of Allied nations. All of these games are in different areas of operations, all are based on different situations, forces, and plans. Because of the number of students in each of the schools, some games are played twice or even four times, with about one-half or one-quarter of the student body participating in each play.

As in pre-NEWS gaming, the students are grouped into realistic military command structures, presented with a hypothetical but plausible situation, and assigned forces and a mission. The student commanders and staffs make an estimate of the situation and prepare their plans. Then they attempt to carry out their plans during the play of a game, which means, of course, in the face of an approximation of the opposition they would encounter in the real world.

War Gaming Department officers read the players' plans and, based on these plans, assign command centers and command center facilities to the player-commanders and their staffs and specify planned communications nets, umpire area equipment and displays, and ship and aircraft characteristics. Then, enlisted personnel from the Department arrange the facilities and equipment and program specified characteristics into the simulator.

The war gamers also prepare two sets of game rules, one for the players, a second for the control group. This group is composed of a game director, umpires, and supporting personnel such as clerks, messengers, and console operators. The player rules explain how the players are to use the available command and control facilities in their assigned command centers; the control group rules delineate the organization of the control group, assign duties, describe procedures, and provide data.

Since all current curriculum games are conducted at the task group and higher levels, the

umpire organizations are tailored to meet these levels of play. This is accomplished by assigning a group of officer-umpires to support, monitor, and evaluate the decisions and actions of each of the task group commanders. These groups are known as modules. Each module is headed by an officer from the War Gaming Department, and each contains officers from the College faculty and student body who possess the experience to maneuver forces in response to player-superiors and to provide intelligence in a realistic and meaningful manner.

From 1887 when Lieutenant William McCarty Little introduced war gaming into "Luce's War School" until 1963, all curriculum games were "two-sided," that is, one group of students prepared and executed the plans of the friendly side and a second group performed the same functions for the opposition or enemy side. During 1963 a "one-sided" curriculum game was played. Since, an increasing number of student games have been of the "one-sided" variety. In this type of game the opposition plan is prepared by the War Gaming Department with the advice and assistance of the faculty of the cognizant school and, during the play, the plan is executed by an umpire group known as the "opposition" module.

As mentioned previously, during the earlier days of the College the staff used war gaming to devise Fleet tactics, and when the Atlantic Fleet anchored in Narragansett Bay for somewhat lengthy periods of time, the College occasionally conducted short courses for groups of Fleet officers. During these courses the Fleet officers participated in curriculum games. But it was not until the completion of the NEWS and the establishment of the Navy War Games Program that the Naval War College gaming facilities and personnel were made available to Fleet Commanders for gaming their own specific problems with their own personnel.

Because the NEWS was made available to the Fleet, the U.S. Naval Destroyer School at Newport, R.I. requested that a game be designed and conducted for its students. Such a game was developed by the War Gaming Department of the College and, since 1962, has been played by members of most of the four annual graduating classes.

The purpose of the Destroyer School Game is to provide the students of that school with training and practice in antisubmarine-warfare carrier-group

operations. Students act as commanders and staff members at the group, screen, and individual ship levels. Using the proper voice calls and communications procedures, they issue orders and transmit and receive reports over simulated tactical radio nets. They maneuver ships, vector aircraft, and employ weapon systems and, in so doing, obtain not only training and practice, but also an insight into the complexities and uncertainties of the command and control problems of modern antisubmarine warfare. This enables them to better understand and appreciate the roles they will soon be playing in the Fleet.

In the early stages of Fleet gaming, it became apparent that most Fleet commands were not familiar with the war gaming capabilities of the Naval War College or the potential of Fleet gaming. Consequently, in 1960, the College established an annual four-to-five-day war gaming course for Fleet officers. Graduates of the course brief their parent commands on the value and limitations of gaming and its possible applications--if any--to the problems faced by their respective commands. This year's course, which was described briefly in the February issue of the *Naval War College Review*, will be held at the Naval War College from 20 to 23 March.

During the first four years of Fleet gaming, commanders and their staffs played all their games from the command centers of the NEWS in much the same manner as War College students play curriculum games. Then, as a result of this experience with Fleet gaming, the College devised a new type of war game, the remote-play NEWS game. In this type of game the participating commands, i.e., the players, operate from their own operations control centers rather than from NEWS command centers, and the players and umpires are linked by outside secure communications lines instead of internal NEWS communications circuits.

The first remote play was conducted in 1962 for the Commander Fleet Air Quonset and his staff. The following year a game was played for the Commander, Barrier Forces Atlantic, and then a much larger game known as the Canadian-United States Training Exercise was conducted. This involved six east coast operations control centers and the war gaming facilities of both the Naval War College and the Canadian Joint Maritime Warfare School. A game involving the movement of an amphibious task force to its objective area was conducted in 1964. In this game the

commander and his staff played from their flagship which was tied up at its pier in Norfolk. And one year later the first remote-play game was conducted for U.S. and Canadian Pacific Coast Commands. The players functioned from their operations control centers on the West Coast and Hawaii.

Since 1962, the number of Fleet games has been split about equally between local and remote plays. In the former, it is easier to stop the game, reposition forces, try a different approach, and conduct on-the-spot critiques with all hands participating. On the other hand, remote plays eliminate the problems that arise when officers are away from their commands and enable the players to exercise and test their own command and control facilities and personnel. Remote-play games are more adaptable to task group and higher levels of play; local play games can be conducted readily at any desired level from the unit on up.

Both local-play and remote-play Fleet games are usually "one-sided" games. The opposition is planned and executed by officers of the War Gaming Department with the assistance and advice of the sponsoring Fleet Command, the faculty of the College, and often with the aid of other commands. For example, for an antisubmarine warfare game, submarine commanding officers might be ordered to the College to play the opposition from either the umpire area or the command centers, depending on the requirements of the game.

Fleet games are conducted for a variety of reasons. One might be to familiarize the staff with an operations order prior to an at-sea exercise and, as one Carrier Division Commander observed: "To make our mistakes in the NEWS before we get to sea." Another reason might be to try out some new tactics, or a different formation, and a third, to implement a war plan, to check its command and control procedures, and to observe the possible effects of enemy actions.

The Fleet games--like the curriculum games--do not provide formulas for victory, or quick and easy solutions, or even reams of data. But they do provide their planners and players with command and control experience and with greater insight into the complex military problems of today and tomorrow. And it is because of these reasons that the scope of Naval War College gaming is increasing with each passing year. For example, games conducted during

1966 indicated that the planning and play of NEWS games by experienced naval officers provide valuable contributions to the naval warfare analytical studies sponsored by the Chief of Naval Operations.

To keep pace with the increasing demands for its services, the War Gaming Department of the Naval War College maintains a small but continuous research effort aimed at improving and expanding gaming techniques and services. Current planning includes improved communications capabilities for remote-play games, additional and more responsive display facilities, a digital computer support capability, and the introduction of management gaming into the curriculum. Thus, as always, Naval War College gaming looks to the future in order that it may continue to better serve the College and the Fleet.

BIOGRAPHIC SKETCH

Mr. Francis J. McHugh is the Operations Research Analyst in the War Gaming Department of the Naval War College. He has been associated with war gaming for many years and is the author of *Fundamentals of War Gaming*. His articles have appeared in the *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings* and other publications.



Correspondence Courses in Perspective

Are Naval War College correspondence courses really worth the effort? Could an officer spend his limited time more usefully in other professional study programs? What real benefits and rewards do such courses confer?

Commander Keith Robertson, USN, the first regular Navy officer to complete all eight Naval War College correspondence courses, has this to say in a letter to the Editor:

Thank you so much for your considerate and unsolicited copies of your *Naval War College Review*. It was a pleasant surprise.

I am also most appreciative of your congratulatory note. Of course, my accomplishments are minor when you consider the faithful and arduous output of the Naval War College Staff that administers the Naval War College courses. Work such as you supervise is the heart of the system that makes advance study possible. Thanks again, and, keep up the good work.

CORRESPONDENCE COURSES IN PERSPECTIVE

Other students in the Correspondence School have provided these enlightening observations:

A retired Rear Admiral in the U.S. Naval Reserve who completed the Naval War College course in *Counter-insurgency*:

A good refresher on a world situation that will be a part and parcel of life in the future, and an insight into what should be called 'modern war.'

A Lieutenant Colonel in the U.S. Army who completed the course in *National and International Security Organization*:

This course has inestimably improved my understanding of the difficulties faced by our diplomatic and military personnel throughout the world. The interrelationship of the various security pacts and other international complications seem staggering to the lay person.


A Lieutenant in the U.S. Navy who completed Installment TWO of the course in *International Law*:

Every person in the military should understand his rights and immunities in foreign countries. Conversely, he should be aware of the limits and restrictions to which he is subject and his susceptibility to local jurisdiction. Installment TWO of the correspondence course in International Law has given me a better insight in this regard.

A Lieutenant in the U.S. Navy who completed the course in *Military Planning*:

This course has been quite demanding, but rewarding. I don't feel I have previously encountered a course so comprehensive, complete, and instructive. The essay style coupled with practical preparation of the staff study and commander's directive is a particularly effective teaching device. It has whetted my appetite for other War College correspondence courses.

CORRESPONDENCE SCHOOL

An illustration of a desk with several books, some open and some closed, and a rolled-up document tied with a string. A rectangular box is superimposed over the books, containing the text 'COURSE DESCRIPTIONS'.

COURSE DESCRIPTIONS

The President of the Naval War College extends the benefits of the College to nonresident military officers and selected government employees by offering appropriate correspondence courses. These courses are constantly reviewed and updated to keep them in consonance with the resident courses.

Naval War College correspondence courses are available to all officers of the United States military services of the grade of Navy Lieutenant (or equivalent) and above in active service or in the inactive reserve. Selected government employees of the grade GS-10 (or equivalent) and above may enroll in these courses, also. The waiver of rank or grade may be granted for qualified individuals in lower grades. Applications from active duty officers should be by letter via Commanding Officer or by the enrollment card provided in this issue of the *Review*. Applications from inactive duty officers should be by letter via Commandant, Naval District, or command maintaining record.

Effective 1 August 1966, the Chief of Naval Personnel approved an increase in Naval Reserve retirement-point evaluations of Naval War College correspondence courses. The description of courses which follows reflects the increased retirement-point evaluations. With the new evaluations, all of which are over 12 points per installment, the satisfactory completion of each installment will be creditable instead of each two-installment unit.

CORRESPONDENCE SCHOOL COURSE DESCRIPTIONS

The correspondence course program is designed so that the student may proceed in an orderly manner from subject to subject. Prerequisites are not required, nor is it mandatory that the recommended pattern be followed. However, based on experience, it has been determined that an officer benefits more by progressing in the following general manner, moving from Group 1 toward Group 4:

Group 1: Military Planning and/or National and International Security Organization.

Group 2: Naval Operations and/or Command Logistics.

Group 3: International Relations and/or International Law, and Counterinsurgency.

Group 4: Strategic Planning.

NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ORGANIZATION, NWC 14. 2 Installments--28 Points total--14 Points per installment.

A study of the National Security Council; the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Office of the Secretary of Defense; Headquarters of the Military Departments; Unified, Joint, and Combined Organizations; International Security Organizations; and Foreign Aid Programs.

COMMAND LOGISTICS, NWC 15. 3 Installments--39 Points total--13 Points per installment.

A study of basic logistic considerations, logistic elements and functions; interrelationships of strategy, tactics, and the basic elements and functions of logistics; the impact of future developments and trends of warfare upon the field of logistics; and the impact of future developments in the field of logistics upon the concept of warfare from the command viewpoint.

INTERNATIONAL LAW, NWC 16. 6 Installments--102 Points total--17 Points per installment.

This course is designed to provide the student with the means to gain an understanding of principles

CORRESPONDENCE SCHOOL COURSE DESCRIPTIONS

of international law having to do with the organization of the world community with emphasis on areas of naval interest and with specific application of these principles to the Naval Officer's profession.

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, NWC 17. 6 Installments--96 Points total--16 Points per installment.

This course is designed to provide students with an understanding of the primary elements, dynamics, and institution of international relations and their effect on the relations of nations.

MILITARY PLANNING, NWC 18. 2 Installments--30 Points total--17 Points per installment.

A study of the systematic techniques of logical analysis as applied to military planning using a problem situation; and an introduction to staff organization, functions, staff studies and planning directives.

NAVAL OPERATIONS, NWC 19. 2 Installments--34 Points total--17 Points per installment.

A course comprising a study of the characteristics of four major weapons systems and considerations for their employment; submarine, antisubmarine, attack carrier, and amphibious forces. The student need select and complete only two of the four installments; however, a combination of the submarine and antisubmarine installments may not be selected.

STRATEGIC PLANNING, NWC 20. 2 Installments--44 Points total--22 Points per installment.

A National Security Council level study of national objectives, interests, and policies, and their relation to national strategy; and strategic planning at the level of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

COUNTERINSURGENCY, NWC 21. 4 Installments--60 Points total--15 Points per installment.

To provide a means for the student to prepare himself for positions of responsibility which involve the planning and conduct of counterinsurgency programs and to acquire an understanding of the possible contributions of all governmental departments and the

CORRESPONDENCE SCHOOL COURSE DESCRIPTIONS

need to integrate their available capabilities into effective programs to attain our national objectives.

* * *

Successful completion of individual courses is recognized by the award of a certificate and the issuance of a letter of completion. Notification of successful course completion is forwarded to the Chief of Naval Personnel, or other appropriate authority, for inclusion in the student's selection jacket.

The President of the Naval War College will award diplomas to those students completing selected groups of correspondence courses which closely parallel the studies offered at the resident schools of Naval Command and Staff and Naval Warfare. These diplomas certify that the designee is a graduate of the Correspondence Course of Naval Command and Staff or the Correspondence Course of Naval Warfare.

The Correspondence Course of Naval Command and Staff. Graduation from this course indicates successful completion of four correspondence courses: National and International Security Organization, Military Planning, Naval Operations, and Command Logistics.

The Correspondence Course of Naval Warfare. Graduation from this course indicates successful completion of the four courses required for the Correspondence Course of Naval Command and Staff plus four additional courses: Counterinsurgency, Strategic Planning, International Relations, and International Law.

THE

BAROMETER


READERS' COMMENTS

This section has been established to provide a forum for the useful exchange of ideas between *Naval War College Review* readers and the Naval War College.

Unofficial comments by the readers on articles which appear in the *Review* are encouraged and will be considered for publication in subsequent issues.

Comments should be addressed to:

The Editor
Naval War College Review
Naval War College
Newport, Rhode Island 02840



**U.S. COUNTERINSURGENCY ASSISTANCE
TO RURAL VIETNAM IN 1964**

A Research Paper written by
Major Thomas E. de Shazo, Jr., U.S. Army,
School of Naval Command and Staff

(This study focuses on the South Vietnamese rural situation in 1964. Since that time, a number of changes have occurred in the administration of various U.S. programs in South Vietnam. Keeping this in mind, the reader, nevertheless, should find the author's eye-witness account interesting and his analysis provocative. Ed.)

INTRODUCTION

Modern involvement of the United States in the support of various counterinsurgency campaigns has led to a great deal of improvisation and experimentation. This study attempts to evaluate a particular experiment in U.S. support of the Republic of Vietnam: the Subsector Advisory Program which deployed small teams of U.S. Army advisors to the Vietnamese district/Subsector. This extension of American representation into rural Vietnam produced some surprising results. With the prospects high for the United States being obliged to expand the project or to repeat it elsewhere, an attempt is made to derive useful lessons from the Vietnamese experience.

In order to distill the unique lessons of Vietnam into something of general usefulness, the author examines in turn the chief elements that determined the 1964 rural situation. They are: a strong residue of historical influences, the people, the Communists, the Government of Vietnam, and the U.S. assistance structure. In each case the rural aspects are emphasized to construct as accurate a picture as possible of the environment and circumstances of subsector team operations. With this background the achievements and problems of subsector advisors are inspected. Personal evaluations form the basis of much of that discussion. During 1964-65 the author was a member of the J3 (Operations Plans and Analysis) Section of the MACV staff, and was assigned duties that included: (1) speaking to all incoming advisors during the initial buildup, (2) visiting and interviewing approximately 40 teams, (3) leading seminar discussions of team operations and problems with members of all teams after they had been six to nine months on the job, and (4) close coordination with other U.S. and Vietnamese agencies in the support and evaluation of the program.

Finally, from the specifics of Vietnam in 1964 the author generalizes and formulates recommendations for guiding future U.S. counterinsurgency assistance programs.

A glossary of abbreviations used is included as Appendix I.

I-BACKGROUND

Myth, legend, and some historical fact combine in unknown proportions to tell of the first Vietnam--the kingdom of Van Lang which came into being in 2879 B.C. In 258 B.C., after reigning more than 2,600 years, the ruling Hong Bang Dynasty was overthrown by a northern aggressor, the King of Thuc, who merged the two countries into the second Vietnamese Kingdom, Au Lac. With the demise of Au Lac 50 years later, authentic Vietnamese history commences.

By now the reader is probably wondering how a study that purports to examine a modern situation has opened with an excursion through prehistory. Recognizing that the stage must be set, he might still feel that a "historical sketch" has grown like Topsy. The fact is that a cursory recital of important dates and events would hardly suffice to put today's situation in full perspective. Even after a year in Vietnam working on the problems addressed in this study, the author did not sense the full impact of past events on current events. The flat statement that Vietnam has long been the object of Chinese aggression, or that French rule was oppressive, requires some elaboration to offer substance and insight, and perhaps even to convince. Myriad prejudices, fears, and other influences that have been bred in history guide key individuals and the masses alike in a very decisive manner today. The author does not promise to explore or even identify each of these influences, but feels that a brief review of the historical ingredients is worth the effort.

Chinese Rule and the Fight for Independence. In 207 B.C. the Chinese general Trieu Da confirmed legend by incorporating Au Lac into the new Kingdom of Nam Viet /Nam Viet/ a land comprising the Red River Delta and a large chunk of southern China. Populated chiefly by the Viet tribe, it had only recently come under Chinese rule. The enterprising governor, Trieu Da, took advantage of internal crises in China to grab off Nam Viet as a private state. By 111 B.C., however, China had consolidated under the new Han dynasty and Vietnam began a thousand years of subjugation by the Chinese.¹

¹The bulk of the information presented here regarding the years prior to 1900 is drawn from Buttinger's excellent history, reference 2, bibliography.

The Vietnamese struggled actively for independence through the duration of Chinese rule. Almost continuous low-level insurgency was punctuated by 10 major rebellions, some of which established temporary Vietnamese home rule. In 939 A.D. the Vietnamese were able to make it stick but were obliged to weather at least five major Chinese invasions between then and the 15th century.

The March South. In 1407 the Chinese were able to restore their rule, but only temporarily--20 years later they were ousted with emphasis in an eruption of nationalistic Vietnamese vigor that was to carry 400 years and a thousand miles to the Gulf of Siam. It was not a smooth road however. Occupying the coastal strip extending southward from the Vietnamese state in the Red River Delta was the kingdom of Champa. The Cham's domain extended over present day Vietnam almost as far south as the Mekong Delta. The Delta and the interior highlands belonged to the Cambodian Empire which owned most of the Indochinese Peninsula. In 1471 the Vietnamese defeated Champa decisively and annexed her territory. The only remnants of this highly civilized nation are about 20,000 Chams living in scattered groups along the central South Vietnam coastal plain. Their decline has been so great that they are often mistaken for another of the aboriginal Montagnard tribes.

Civil War. The great Vietnamese March to the South was slowed for 300 years by civil strife that began in the mid-16th century. Fortunately for Vietnam she was free from foreign wars during this long and frequently bloody civil war. Despite brief periods of reunification it was not until 1802, when the southern faction prevailed, that unity was permanently restored.

Western Intervention. In the 16th and 17th centuries the Portuguese, those "pioneers of Western colonial brutality and corruption" (2:204), competed with the English, French, and Dutch for advantageous trade positions. The Portuguese and Dutch even backed opposing sides in the Vietnamese civil war. By the turn of the 18th century Vietnamese resistance was making trade unprofitable, and after 1700 Portuguese and French missionaries contended for Vietnamese souls.

In due time Christian teachings were regarded as undermining the moral basis of Confucianist society, and the Catholic Church was outlawed. The Christian

doctrine of individual responsibility clashed with the Confucianist role of the family as a religious and civic institution, and with such inherent characteristics as polygamy, ancestor worship, and absolute parental authority. Although contained and occasionally oppressed, Catholic communities survived.

During the 18th century, though military conquest was lacking, French dreams and plans for exploitation of Indochina thrived. Toward the end of the century the French missed an opportunity to back Gia Long in his slow climb to power in Vietnam. Once in power without official French backing, Gia Long moved toward isolation from the West. His successors translated this trend into one of open hostility which included the execution of missionaries. A French attack on Tourane (Danang) in 1847 confirmed Vietnamese resistance.

French Conquest. By the middle of the 19th century the French were no longer able to resist joining the other Western powers in Far Eastern expansion and, in 1858, they embarked upon the conquest of Indochina. The reigning dynasty (Nguyen) had degenerated to general oppression of the peasants who became concerned only with personal survival, making the job much easier for the French. In 1883 the Treaty of Protectorate ended Vietnamese independence. Twelve years of bloody French "pacification" of the Red River Delta were required to make the conquest complete. The events of this period have had profound effect on subsequent Vietnamese political and sociological turmoil and have sowed the seeds of the violent nationalism that today has been generally turned to Communist purposes.

The advent of the French brought to a close another historical trend of modern significance--the Siamese/Vietnamese reduction of Cambodia.

French Rule, 1900-1940. The French began by dissolving the Vietnamese governmental structure and replacing Vietnamese control at all levels. A figurehead emperor was selected and controlled by a French Governor General. Although economic development was initiated it was tightly controlled by the French monopoly and was directed toward quick returns rather than long-term progress. The French and a small group of their Vietnamese collaborators became the elite minority.

These factors, coupled with the resulting drastic changes in social structure, cultivated succeeding waves of nationalism that grew to insurrection. The years prior to World War I saw mass demonstrations, terrorist attacks, and three abortive revolts. Following World War I economic prosperity and cautious French reforms led to a warming of Vietnamese-French relations. The old revolutionary movement declined to be replaced by the new "bourgeois" nationalist movement.

In 1925 Bao Dai, aged 12, became Emperor, and in China Ho Chi Minh founded the precursor of the Indo-chinese Communist Party. When a violent rebellion was staged by another nationalist group in 1930, the Communists quickly agitated strikes, demonstrations, and terrorism. French reaction was severe and extended to mass executions and the use of aircraft against villages. (2:436)

In the early 1930's revolutionary movements paled in the face of firm French control, and the latter initiated a few political reforms. The Minister of Interior in 1933 was Ngo Dinh Diem, who resigned that year feeling the French were frustrating true reforms.

Although the second major uprising against the French occurred in 1940 after the start of World War II, it belongs to the prewar era as much as to the war years. In this case, expected Japanese support failed to materialize, and the French were permitted to put down the rebellion, again with mass executions. (2:439)

World War II and Japanese Occupation, 1940-1945. During World War II the French colonial administration functioned under the Japanese occupation until removed by the Japanese in March 1945. The formation of a puppet Vietnamese Government under the Japanese nurtured the Vietnamese dream of eventual independence.

The Communists used the war years well in a drive to capture the nationalist banner. Vo Nguyen Giap organized and led guerrillas in Tong King. Ho Chi Minh, in exile in China, attempted to maneuver nationalist exile groups and Allied support toward a covert objective of Communist control. Alternately subsidized and jailed by the Chinese Nationalists, by the end of the war Ho was recognized as the strongest Vietnamese in exile and was even receiving

some U.S. aid. (2:442, 1:107) The Viet Minh had been able to strengthen Communist cells and their paramilitary organization throughout Vietnam. They then began to direct attacks against rival nationalist groups.

In March 1945 the Japanese delivered what may have been the *coup de grace* to French rule by disarming and interning the French Army and Administration. Bao Dai was installed as Emperor and promptly asked Diem to form a government. Diem either declined or was vetoed by the Japanese. Various nationalist groups came out in the open, mostly condemning the French. General de Gaulle's promises of more freedom in the future were rejected in favor of full independence the Vietnamese felt was within their grasp.

Following Hiroshima on 7 August 1945, the Viet Minh ordered a general uprising and outmaneuvered other nationalists to gain control of Hanoi and the north after Japanese surrender on 15 August. In the south the Communists were weaker and had to settle for a share of the government as a member of the United National Front comprising the Hoa Hao and Cao Dai sects, and others. Bao Dai abdicated in favor of the Viet Minh on 24 August and the Communists temporarily controlled the entire country.

The Viet Minh-French War, 1946-1954. Over U.S. objections, the Allies agreed to turn Indochina back to France, who forthwith set about reconquest. (2:442, 1:107-112) The south was taken by force with British help, but the Communists were so firmly established in the north that France was forced to recognize and negotiate with Ho's Hanoi Government. Negotiations fell through, the Hanoi Government formed an army under Giap, and in December 1946 the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) government fled Hanoi, and the French-Viet Minh war commenced in earnest.

Although initially on the defensive, the Viet Minh were able to sustain themselves on guerrilla tactics and gradually extended their control over the rural areas, pushing the French back into the larger cities which they firmly controlled.

The French were unyielding in their refusal to consider full Vietnamese independence and continued attempts to set up an anti-Communist state within the French Union. In 1949 ever-willing Bao Dai

agreed to head such a government, against the advice of ultranationalist Diem. The Viet Minh reacted with an epidemic of assassinations of leaders of all opposing nationalist groups and sects, including the influential leader of the Hoa Hao.

The world formally aligned itself in 1950. Russia and China (now Communist) recognized Ho's regime, and material Chinese support started to flow. The West recognized Bao Dai's apparatus and the United States, still at odds with French policy, furnished reluctant aid.

In 1951 the French thwarted a premature Viet Minh escalation toward conventional warfare and forced their return to guerrilla tactics. But opposition to the war was growing in France, and in early 1952 the Viet Minh wiped out French gains and drove them further back into the urban areas. True Vietnamese nationalist support of the French-sponsored government deteriorated, and even Bao Dai tended to dissociate himself from his own Government with extended absences on the Riviera.

The Big Four agreed to the Geneva Conference on Indochina in 1954. Dien Bien Phu was already in a desperate situation when the conference opened on 25 April. On 6 May Dien Bien Phu fell, on 6 June the French agreed to Diem as premier of South Vietnam, and on 29 June the French started evacuation of the Red River Delta.

The Diem Government, 1954-1963. The Geneva Agreement awarded the Communists half of the country outright and bright prospects for absorbing the remainder. The surprising strength and energy of the Diem Government was to upset the Communist schedule for annexation of South Vietnam. Few people, in or out of the Communist camp, expected South Vietnam to survive long before succumbing to Communist pressure. Ngo Dinh Diem began to cleanse the government of the pro-French, colonialists, and pro-Communists, and initiated programs to reform the administration and establish firm authority. U.S. aid, which swelled at the close of the Korean war in 1953, enabled large scale resettlement of the one million refugees from the north and strengthened Diem's overall posture. The French position declined in the face of Diem's opposition and increasing U.S. participation. Finally Bao Dai, still in France and still Emperor, ordered Diem out of office in April 1955. Diem refused, formed a Revolutionary Council,

and established himself firmly in power. Dominant French influence was at an end. Diem overcame dissident internal opposition, posted a victory over Bao Dai in a national referendum, and defied Hanoi.

Although Diem had replaced the monarchy with a republican government, legitimate opposition had considerable difficulty even early in his reign. It was not clear at first whether this was a characteristic of a government under the pressure of insurgency or was a feature of Diem's rule.

During partition of the country Communist leadership cadre were left behind in the south. A civil war was initiated almost immediately. The Viet Cong capitalized on unsettled conditions to build up their political and guerrilla organizations.

Diem created the South Vietnam nation. The first years of his rule, 1954-1959, produced a remarkable recovery, but by 1961 his gains had been reversed. His growing authoritarianism was provoking internal opposition and discrediting the Saigon Government with the people. The Viet Cong were permitted to identify as the true Vietnamese nationalists.

U.S. support mushroomed to become the real basis of Diem's staying power. U.S. military strength in Vietnam grew: 327 personnel in May 1960; about 1,000 by the end of 1960; about 2,000 by the end of 1961; 4,000 in early 1962; 5,000 in mid 1962; 9,000 before the end of 1962; 12,000 in early 1963; and 14,000 by the end of 1963. Total aid passed the \$2 billion mark in 1963. (11:14,38,42,46,57,62,107)

In April 1960 an opposition group called for drastic economic, administrative, and military reforms. Thereafter anti-Diem rumblings were almost constant. A military coup in November of that year failed and was followed by SS-type political repression to the accompaniment of reform promises. In February 1962 two of Diem's own Air Force pilots strafed his palace in what was apparently a private venture.

The opposition eventually began to appeal to the United States, already uncomfortable with Diem's abuses. The United States continually called for reforms, and each step of aid escalation seemed to follow a cycle: U.S. concern, U.S. study, U.S. pressure to reform, Diem promise of reform, U.S. aid

increases, U.S. concern, U.S. study Diem was insistent that aid distribution be tightly controlled by his minions, rejecting direct U.S. dealings with the rural "consumer." Any solution that freed the flow of aid from the restrictions of red tape and graft would also free subordinates from a large measure of Diem's power.

The possibilities for exploiting the situation were not lost upon the Viet Cong. Security from Viet Cong attacks and terrorism deteriorated steadily after 1960. In October 1961 Diem proclaimed a state of national emergency and requested U.S. combat units, observing that he was no longer fighting just a guerrilla war. Regular Viet Cong units, fully equipped and heavily armed, were attacking in strengths of up to two battalions. Insecurity had reduced the area under cultivation by almost a quarter million acres. (11:31) The United States was recognized as an important enemy by the Viet Cong.

The chain of events that were to lead to the demise of Diem maintained fever pitch from June 1963 on. Buddhist monks cremated themselves in public; riots and martial law alternated in the larger cities; national elections were postponed and then rigged; and the Viet Cong prospered in the countryside. Throughout, the United States was pressuring Diem for extensive reforms. Deep concern prompted continuing reappraisals, but as late as September 1963 the United States seemed reluctantly resigned to working with Diem.

On 1 November 1963 a military *coup d'etat* overthrew the Government and Diem was assassinated. A provisional military/civilian government promised popular elections when conditions permitted, and U.S. recognition quickly followed.

Current Events. The events of late 1963 and 1964 are the subject of subsequent chapters. A chronology of the important national events of this period is attached in Appendix II.

II--THE ARENA AND THE PLAYERS

Geographical descriptions of Vietnam abound, and a detailed look at geography is not important to this study. The purpose here is to describe the rural "arena" and the people found there, noting the extraordinary variety of almost every aspect of

rural Vietnam. While taking great pains to reveal the hidden homogeneity of the Vietnamese we must also recognize the more obvious features that impose a strong initial impression of anything but uniformity.

There is a surprising and confusing range of climate, geography, population density, economy, and prosperity across the rice-rich Mekong Delta, through the populous urban districts around Saigon, and north into the wild highlands or along the fishing communities on the coastal lowlands. On the development scale the relatively prosperous economy of Gia Dinh Province, at one extreme, contrasts with the frontier status of several highland provinces.

The People. Numerous racial stocks are found: Cambodians in the Delta and along the border, clusters of Chinese in the larger cities, over 30 separate Montagnard tribes in the central highlands, the remnants of Chams along the central coast, and Vietnamese throughout. Religions are as varied: Theravada and Mahayana Buddhists, Catholics, Hoa Hao, Cao Dai, Confucianists, animists, mixtures, and religions of convenience to promote local success or survival.

Despite this, Buttinger holds that it ". . . is not the people of the plains but the minority groups in the mountains who constitute the chaos of races, civilizations, and languages characteristic of Vietnam no less than of the whole of Southeast Asia." (2:26) He further points out the single Vietnamese language spoken from one tip of the country to the other and the "remarkable" cultural unity and physical identity.

At the risk of seeming to lionize the race it might be well to quickly look at origins and development for pertinent characteristics. The Vietnamese are a distillation from a number of waves of humanity that have spilled across their land through the centuries. These include peoples related to the Australian aborigines and negroids of Melanesia (2:27), Indonesians, Thai, the Viet (a non-Chinese mongoloid tribe), and others. Regardless of the labels, one particular mixture survived to develop distinctive homogeneous features of a separate people. It was one that possessed a special vitality that allowed survival in the highly selective process which saw many others displaced, absorbed, or simply dwindle and disappear. The Vietnamese race that evolved had the resilience to prevail over its

neighbors on the Indochinese Peninsula and to resist tenaciously domination by the Chinese, Mongols, and Europeans, ". . . remaining in all likelihood the strongest barrier against a Chinese advance into Southeast Asia to this very day." (2:38) This people developed a high order of community cooperation and strong family bonds. Social organizations and administrative bodies were developed early. The great Vietnamese "March to the South" was a series of group migrations of sufficient numbers and types of people to form communities similar to those left behind. Successive valleys and river deltas were occupied as the soldier/peasant lent this conquest as much a peaceful aspect as a military one by turning to both cultivation and defense of newly acquired lands.

Rural Detachment From Central Government.

Beyond the highly centralized seats of government, first in Hanoi and then Saigon, ". . . provincial autonomism has always been strong. It derived its unfortunate vigor from an economy that could prosper locally no matter what happened 10 miles away." (2:170) This village-level economy and society, with limited external dependence, has been a blessing that has preserved national unity through misrule, civil war, and foreign intervention. Thus we see today an apparently curious detachment among the rural populace. Aside from certain political and administrative officials who are controlled directly by the national government, the farmer seems unconcerned with national problems, successes, failures, coups, programs, etc. At times he even seems reluctant to do battle in what we call "his own defense."

Effects on U.S. Programs. From all of this we can draw some conclusions that have relevance to our external (U.S.) program of support to rural Vietnam. First, we find beneath a confusing veneer of racial diversity a unique, dynamic Vietnamese people. This race occupies among its territories a very desirable piece of real estate--the fertile Mekong Delta. Next it should be apparent that the inconsistencies of the rural scene impose handicaps on the design and implementation of support programs. A great deal of tailoring is necessary to fit aid to local requirements and aspirations. It also becomes very difficult to arm a prospective advisor with adequate specific background on the social, economic, cultural, or religious environments he will probably encounter, not to mention the possible local military and political situations.

The Viet Cong. Half of the rural insurgency equation is the local Vietnamese who happens to be a VC (Viet Cong). He is generally described as dedicated, capable, tough, wily, and possessing practically all other desirable soldierly qualities. A typical current appraisal (9:16) states ". . . the effectiveness of the Vietnamese Communist fighting man, or Viet Cong, far exceeds that of any guerrilla warrior heretofore confronted by this Nation." This is probably true. Whether or not one accepts *all* of the superlatives attributed to the VC, there still remains the necessity to account for the apparent sharp contrast between the typical VC and non-VC.

Much of the Viet Cong's zeal can be laid to the successful Communist appropriation of the nationalist cause, discussed in Chapter I. This is somewhat confirmed by a recent opinion survey of some 150 knowledgeable Vietnamese and Americans as to the precedence of VC motivational factors. The results showed (guessed) the most important to be: (1) Communist propaganda (i.e., he is not a dedicated Communist, but is influenced by the propaganda), (2) effectiveness of VC leaders, and (3) misguided nationalism. (9:20-22)

A moderate view of VC motivation is submitted. Excluding regular troops and cadres infiltrated from the north, the average VC probably knows little of communism. He fights with more enthusiasm than singleness of purpose. His motivation varies from individual to individual and from time to time, but is a mixture of picking the winning side, looking to personal survival, reaction to past oppressions and injuries done by Saigon governments, anti-colonialism, and adherence to Communist ideology. Emphasis is on personal interests. The "typical" nonimported rural VC has been drawn into the war. He would have preferred to remain aloof, but the hostilities touched him in some manner (VC threats, kidnapping, Government shelling or bombing) that forced him to pick a side. He felt the Government could not provide him security, or local VC strength did not permit his opting for the Government. In many respects the considerations that motivated him to become a VC are exactly those that motivated another to fight against him on the Government side. The author feels that the overwhelming majority of the rural population desires a return to peace under *any* conditions; given a choice, a lesser majority would prefer peace under the GVN (Government of Vietnam) to life under a VC installed Communist

government. It is primarily the GVN's inability to assure security that permits Viet Cong recruitment.

Viet Cong Strategy and Techniques. The fundamental importance that Communist insurgency doctrine assigns to controlling rural areas is common knowledge. Basic strategy calls for movement from rural to urban areas, that is, seizure first of large areas of the countryside, then small and medium villages or towns, and finally large cities. Giap applied this theory (14:94), and Lin Piao's Manifesto (6:48) recently reaffirmed Mao Tse-tung's "Basic Strategy of People's War" for future campaigns.

With an objective of winning and mobilizing the entire population, political considerations usually call the tune. Encroachment begins with propaganda teams in rural hamlets followed by the development of popular organizations controlled by agents. From these grow units and bases. At various stages appropriate pressure is brought to bear on recalci-trants.

The classic Communist strategy of a "united front" is adhered to; the broadly popular goals of national independence and socio-economic reform obscure purely Communist objectives. (1:10) When control is sufficient People's Committees re-distribute land and abolish government taxes, in due time, of course, substituting some form of Communist taxation. Redistribution of land has been a particularly effective device at winning converts and retaining their support.

How does this appear to the local GVN official or to his U.S. counterpart? Armed VC propaganda teams detain captive audiences in hamlets, villages, and along major communications routes. Assassination squads mark any effective government official, limiting his freedom of movement, and consequently his effectiveness and prestige. Government effectiveness is reduced, its contact with the people weakened, and VC authority substituted. Commerce and transport move or are stalled at the apparent will of the Viet Cong, who cleverly combine interdiction capabilities with propaganda. There is constant competition for the peasant's tax money as well as other forms of support such as collection of intelligence.

Locally recruited Government Regional and Popular Force platoons and squads oppose local VC units.

Each side is occasionally reinforced by regular units. The Government attempts to hold and expand its influence outward from administrative, commerce, and communications centers. The VC attempt to erode this sphere of government control. Ambushes, minings, attacks on outposts and fortified hamlets, and mortar and small arm harassment play accompaniment to political assassinations and propaganda.

The Vietnamese peasant has been fighting this war for centuries. He has been buffeted by oppressive and neglectful rule, civil war, terrorists, and propagandists of all persuasions, but has remained the fibre that sustained each return to stability. His desire for an eventual non-Communist stability is not as dead as the preceding paragraphs might suggest. Large numbers of peasants in all parts of South Vietnam have abandoned their farms and fled to the protection of GVN controlled cities, giving stark evidence of the unacceptability of VC control.

III--THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM

Whether a heritage of the French colonial administration or earlier systems, the Government tends toward a unitary form: that is, a unified structure in which the highest levels retain all possible power and authority, delegating, but not transferring, only that considered necessary.¹ In 1964 the link from Saigon was the weakest in the GVN chain. It transmitted the inertia and confusion of the central government to all lower echelons. It imposed many of the conditions on rural politics that promoted graft and lethargy at these levels. Officials often found themselves financially liable for funds honestly expended implementing the programs of previous administrations. Province and District Chiefs are usually appointed by the administration in office with a view to consolidating power and rewarding supporters, with more regard for political loyalty than administrative ability or honesty. This last is intended to be chiefly critical of the system rather than of the lower officials. The


¹Most of the material in this chapter is based upon personal observations of the author in Vietnam, 1964-65, and upon *MACV Guide for Subsector Advisors*, ref. 13, bibliography. Material in ref. 13 which was written by this author is quoted without further credit.

latter, if not talented, well-trained, and perfectly motivated, were reasonably conscientious and capable. In fact, their calibre is surprisingly high when one considers the many years of bloody attrition of the talent available, particularly Communist assassinations of opposing leaders at all levels.

GVN Political Subdivisions. Politically the central government deals directly with each of the 45 provinces shown in Figure 1. Provinces are composed of a number of districts which varies from two to eleven, depending on the province. There were about 240 districts nationwide in 1964, although the total fluctuated slightly as new districts were spawned or old ones absorbed. The creation and dissolution of districts, and sometimes provinces, was not a frequent practice but was continuously rumored. A military purpose of improving GVN control was usually announced, but covert political rewards or penalties were often involved. About a dozen villages comprise each district. It should be noted that the Vietnamese village is not a town or population concentration. It is a specifically defined rural area which may include population centers. Districts are entirely subdivided into village tracts. Villages are in turn subdivided into hamlets, which more closely resemble towns but still include neighboring rural areas. In some parts of the country the canton, another echelon, is interposed between district and village.

Administration of the Government. A predominant feature of the 1964 governments--their military cores--is not unreasonable in the light of conditions then obtaining. The civil administrative channels through which the central government would normally extend itself to the people were duplicated and sometimes supplanted by military channels. Up and down the line, Army officers held civil posts concurrently with their military assignments. Figure 2 outlines these echelons.

The Province Chief, normally a Lieutenant Colonel, had the added title and duties of the Sector Commander. (Sector is the military designation for province.) He owed his position to Saigon connections or to one of his military superiors, the Division or Corps Commander. The Province Chief/Sector Commander supervised and coordinated the operations of a civilian staff and a military staff with which he simultaneously administered the province and commanded the local counterinsurgency campaign. The civil staff



<u>LEVEL</u>	<u>CIVIL ADMINISTRATION ECHELON</u>	<u>MILITARY ECHELON</u>
NATIONAL	<u>Ministries of Interior, Health, Education, Agriculture, Public Works, etc.</u>	<u>Minister of Defense and military High Command.</u>
REGIONAL	(None)	<u>Corps Tactical Zone.</u> (5 to 15 prov.)
DIVISIONAL	(None)	<u>Division Tactical Area.</u> (2 to 11 prov.)
PROVINCIAL	<u>Province</u> (In 1964 all provinces but Quang Tri had a single military Province Chief/Sector Commander. The Province/Sector varied in size from 25,000 to 800,000 sq. km. and in population from 30,000 to 850,000.)	<u>Sector</u>
DISTRICT	<u>District</u> (A single military officer almost invariably served as the District Chief/Subsector Commander. Areas ranged from 67 to 4875 sq. km. and populations from less than 2,000 to over 200,000.)	<u>Subsector</u>
CANTON	<u>Canton</u> (Found in only a few provinces.)	(None)
VILLAGE	<u>Village</u> (From 2 to 57 villages might be found in a District.)	(None)
HAMLET	<u>Hamlet</u> (From 1 to 48 hamlets might be found in a village.)	(None)

Source: Numerical data from Rand Corp., ref. 15, bibliography.

Fig. 2 - GVN Military and Civil Administrative Echelons in 1964

included various "services," each of which answered directly to a Saigon national ministry, e.g., Health, Education, Police, Public Works, Postal, etc. Although he was responsible for their overall results, the Province Chief had only a nebulous authority to "coordinate" the operations of these agencies. For the conduct of the military campaign he was rarely provided regular troops on a permanent basis. His command usually consisted entirely of locally recruited, lightly armed Regional and Popular Forces (RF and PF). If the Sector Commander was fortunate he had one RF company available as a mobile force. The remainder of his force in 1964 was usually tied to static security of the provincial capital, district towns, bridges, and other key installations.

The District. Traditionally the District Chief is the lowest civil servant appointed by the central government, whether under the emperors, the French colonial administration, the Diem Regime, or today's GVN. Although formally appointed by the Minister of Interior, he too is an Army officer who probably owes his selection to a Corps Commander. The District Chief/Subsector Commander has civil and military responsibilities that closely correspond to those of his superior, the Province Chief/Sector Commander, including a pair of matching titles. The big difference is that the District Chief is the highest government official having significant direct contact with the people. His ancient Vietnamese title translates to "Father and Mother of the People," suggesting the potentialities of the position. The District Chief is intimately involved in almost every aspect of the social and economic rehabilitation of the nation as no other official is. The focus of this thesis is on district level.

The district civil and military staffs are often described as miniature of the provincial staffs. This was not quite accurate in 1964 when the GVN was just beginning to give attention to improving the staffs at district level. The author examined about two dozen staffs in late 1964 and found them widely dissimilar with no two organized alike. The reservation that no district was typical, even in the organization of its administration, must preface the description that follows.

The District Chief usually had an administrative/personal staff of secretaries, clerks, messengers, drivers, and perhaps a few bodyguards or laborers. The total was about one to two dozen, and they handled

such functions as taxation and financial affairs, legal transactions, official registry of births, marriages, and deaths, and issuance of identity cards. In addition, several technical services operated in the district. As in the case at Province, the District Chief supervised and coordinated the operations of these services, but each maintained independent channels to its respective national ministry, through the corresponding agency at Province. The Health Service, as an example, would probably maintain a dispensary and a maternity in the District Town (capital) and in some villages, operate aid stations in other villages and in some hamlets, and dispatch health visitors to additional friendly hamlets. The medical staff would probably not be trained beyond nurse or midwife proficiency. The Vietnamese Information Service (VIS) would probably maintain an information booth in the District Town, broadcast news and music over a public address system, distribute leaflets and government magazines, and field a few traveling information teams of about three members each. Similarly, other GVN ministries operated agricultural, educational, postal, police, youth and other agencies within the district.

The Subsector Commander's military staffs in 1964 were as inconsistently organized as their civilian counterparts. Most had some sort of operations section and a complicated intelligence organization that was intermingled with the police organization and sprinkled with personal agents. Command relationships were also inconsistent if not indefinite. In some cases command of regularly assigned troops was shifted up, down, and laterally according to the type of operation being conducted. Communications sections usually functioned, but personnel and logistics responsibilities were rarely set. A government program to furnish psychological warfare/civil affairs officers to each subsector was just getting underway by the end of 1964. For troops, the Subsector Commander had Popular Force platoons around the District Town and in some villages, and PF squads in defended hamlets and on other static posts, with possibly one or two platoons available as a mobile force.

Village and Hamlet Administration. Villages were governed by legislative Village Citizen's Councils and executive Village Administrative Committees. The Citizen's Council was elected for two year terms by universal, direct, secret ballot and in principle represented each hamlet. The Citizen's

Council is intended to provide democratic representation in the local government, but in some cases the people proved disinterested, rendering the Citizen's Council inactive and impotent. In this event the Village Administrative Committee, which is appointed by the Province Chief upon recommendation of the District Chief, governed by default.

Hamlets were administered by a Hamlet Chief and a Hamlet Committee, most members elected just as the Village Citizen's Council. The Hamlet Chief was appointed by the District Chief.

Cadre. An important and potentially powerful part of the government's effort to reach the people is the cadre program, or more correctly, programs. Basically, the intention is to provide trained personnel to help hamlets return to the GVN orbit. The cadre organize and administer a hamlet until it is capable of recruiting its own police, conducting elections, etc. Cadre specialists provide technical advice and assistance on medical, agricultural, and other matters. Unfortunately coordination was almost nonexistent and by the end of 1964 there were almost 40 types of cadre in the field. The results can be guessed: control was poor, missions unclear, cadre misused. With a limited manpower pool, high requirements for talent, low pay, and high casualties, it is not surprising that the quality of personnel also suffered.

IV-U.S. ASSISTANCE TO RURAL VIETNAM

The 1964 Country Team consisted of four principal agencies: the U.S. Embassy, the U.S. Operations Mission (USOM), the U.S. Information Service, and the Military Assistance Command-Vietnam (MACV). The Embassy was coordinator and director and generally depended upon the other members to provide U.S. representation below the top governmental levels.

U.S. Information Service. USIS had a dual function of serving U.S. interests in the information field and of advising and supporting the Vietnamese Information Service (VIS). An American USIS representative was assigned to each Vietnamese Region, or Corps Tactical Zone. This Regional Representative attempted to visit each subordinate province about once a month, but on this basis had limited effectiveness at the rice-roots level. Each provincial staff

was assigned a USIS representative who was actually a Vietnamese trained and employed by USIS. As seen earlier there was normally a VIS section on the district staffs, but USIS representatives, Vietnamese or American, were rarely assigned below provincial level.

U.S. Operations Mission. An extension of the Agency for International Development, USOM was generally responsible for implementing the massive economic and other civic programs of U.S. assistance. Its various departments--Health, Education, Agriculture, Public Safety (Police), and Public Administration, to name a few--advised counterpart GVN ministries and agencies in Saigon and in the countryside. Each province had at least one regularly assigned USOM Provincial Representative. Although not assigned below province level, there were numerous USOM specialists available for consultation in all fields. Examples were Regional Public Safety Representatives advising in police matters, and advisors to special forestry, irrigation, agricultural research, or fishery projects.

Under USOM guidance a police radio network was established that extended communications and improved security to many isolated villages and hamlets. Similar USOM supported programs endeavored to extend medical and educational facilities eventually down to each hamlet. (13:8-13) Cooperating with USOM in many provinces were American IVS (International Voluntary Service) personnel who worked chiefly in agricultural and educational activities. (13:13)

Viet Cong interference, of course, imposed major transportation and logistic difficulties, propagandized against the programs, and even razed some projects. USOM officials were not always happy, either, with their inability to get the GVN mechanism to function smoothly in its own behalf and their lack of accurate knowledge of what was actually being accomplished by the GVN. These frustrations were not unique to USOM officials within the American community.

U.S. Military Assistance Command-Vietnam. MACV provided the large program of military advice and assistance to the Armed Forces of the Republic of Vietnam. Until 1964 U.S. staffs and advisory teams were assigned to assist Vietnamese units and staffs down to regimental and sector levels. During 1964, advisory teams were deployed with battalions and

subsectors. Figure 3 outlines U.S. advisor representation by GVN echelon.

Sector Advisory Teams had from six to fourteen members with no standard organization, each tailored to the requirements of its counterpart Sector Staff. In addition to the Sector Advisor, there were various combinations of operations, intelligence, psychological warfare/civil affairs, and Regional Force/Popular Force advisors. The Vietnamese Sector Commander/Province Chief had a military counterpart in the Sector Advisor and a U.S. civil counterpart in the USOM Provincial Representative. Formally designated the Provincial Committee, these three often functioned well as an authoritative and effective instrument of U.S./GVN policy. The family of U.S. advisors at Province was, however, oriented to provincial level operations and problems and often restricted in its contacts with outlying rural areas.

The Subsector Advisory Program. In February 1964 a decision was reached in Saigon to extend the U.S. advisory effort down to the Vietnamese District. A few experimental teams were planned for March and April and, if these were successful, the program would be expanded later in the year. Just which districts would eventually have teams was to be determined primarily by U.S. advisors at the sectors.

In retrospect this seems a logical step in extending the capabilities and effectiveness of the U.S. teams already assigned to assist Province Chiefs. In early 1964, however, the plan was not without its detractors. They argued that the small GVN district staff would be overwhelmed with advice and advisors; Communist propaganda of imperialist U.S. takeover would be bolstered; the introduction of a purely military team below the MACV-USOM-USIS "balance" at Province could easily disrupt other programs; undesirable exposure of U.S. personnel was obvious and unavoidable.

Nevertheless, April and May saw the pilot teams deployed. One officer and a noncom went to each of 13 districts in provinces neighboring Saigon. The first casualty was reported within six hours of the arrival of the first team on station. The slightly wounded noncom returned quickly to duty, and there were no more casualties the rest of the summer.

These experimental teams, just as those that were to follow, found the going slow at first.

<u>GVN ECHELON</u>	<u>USIS</u>	<u>USOM</u>	<u>MACV</u>
NATIONAL	Large	Large	Very large
REGIONAL	USIS Regional Representative	USOM Regional office with several specialists	Large Corps Advisory Team
DIVISIONAL	None--served by Regional Representative	None--served by Regional office	Large Division Advisory Team
PROVINCIAL/ SECTOR	No U.S. citizen, one VN national in USIS employ	USOM Provincial Representa- tive with possibly one assistant	Sector Advisory Team of 6 to 14 members
DISTRICT/ SUBSECTOR	None	None	Subsector Advisory Team of approx. 5 members in about half of the districts

Fig. 3 - U.S. Advisory Representation by GVN Echelon in 1964

Considerable difficulties were expected (and encountered), but there seemed to be no standard Vietnamese district staff and little similarity between districts. Slowly each advisor pieced together a picture of the organization of his district--the staff he and his counterpart were to work with. The GVN, in fact, was in the process of expanding district staffs and experiencing its own growing pains. The attrition of trained talent has already been mentioned. Subsector Commanders were left to make the individual arrangements that best utilized the available manpower, and some very odd organizations resulted.

By the end of May some encouraging signs were beginning to emerge. Isolated and remote districts had become closer members of the provincial family. Communications improved with the addition of U.S. radios, but more important was the fact that people, rather than just messages, moved back and forth. The districts were less likely to be overlooked in provincial affairs and planning. Military ties were quickly improved. Strengthening of economic and social bonds followed. Later, as the teams got firmly established, other advantages accrued. Support of all types became more responsive to actual district requirements. The District Chief gained new prestige and the United States got fresh insight into local conditions, requirements, and popular attitudes. It turned out that the pilot teams *did* "meddle" in USOM and USIS affairs, but to the general benefit of these activities. Advice and assistance was furnished in planning and executing educational, economic, agricultural, public works, health and sanitation, youth, and information programs. The MACV teams at districts became *de facto* U.S. Country teams. Some devoted up to 80 per cent of their efforts to non-military matters, with a 50-50 split common between military and civil activities.

Not all of this was apparent when Ambassador Lodge and General Westmoreland met Secretaries McNamara and Rusk in Honolulu in June. However, initial indications were clear enough for the decision to expand the program with 100 additional teams throughout the country.

Plans and preparations ensued for a September through December buildup. A type five-member team was selected as follows:

Subsector Advisor	Major or Captain
Assistant Advisor	Captain or Lieutenant
Operations/Intelligence	
Sergeant	E6
Medical Advisor	E6
Radio Operator	E5 or E4

Prospective team locations were established from lists submitted by advisors in the field, but neither size nor location was rigidly set forth. Headquarters, MACV, delegated authority to relocate and tailor the composition of the teams to match the changing local situations. Based on the lessons learned by the pilot teams, the subsector teams were instructed to extend the capabilities of USOM and USIS as concurred in by those local representatives. A two-week advisor school was established in Saigon to handle the rapid influx.

Results of the Subsector Program. The buildup began on schedule and by year's end was essentially complete. In its course it verified most of the features demonstrated by the 13 experimental teams, winning over the skeptics. The contributions of these teams was substantial. It seems only logical that the District Chief/Subsector Commander who had dual civil/military responsibilities would approach his sole American counterpart on the entire spectrum of his problems. With very few exceptions excellent cooperation between U.S. agencies in the field promoted the expansion of Subsector Team assistance.

Although ill-prepared for these duties from the standpoint of formal training, the subsector advisor had a number of inherent advantages that were quickly and invariably utilized.

The American had firsthand experience with a working democracy that is acceptable to its people. He was thus able to see abuses of government that were invisible to, or underrated by, GVN officials. This applies particularly to the traditional American view of a military that is a *service* to the people rather than a master to be served *by* the people.

Perhaps most important, the advisor was an outsider with fresh insight who had not been lulled by the status quo. He was energetic, inquisitive, and imaginative, perhaps too much so for his weary and cautious counterpart. The American spotted and drew attention to chronic problems such as the abuse of

minority groups, the failure to set responsibility and demand action, or GVN officials and cadre who were withdrawn from the people. His presence appealed to the Subsector Commander's pride as a military officer and leader of the people. With an outsider looking on the Vietnamese felt obliged to at least maintain the appearance, which in itself made for improvement.

Regardless of his background, the advisor usually had wide, albeit superficial, experience with a modern civilization: communications, transportation, sanitation, medical facilities, educational institutions, community associations, police, etc. He at least knew the proper service to be performed by each cog. Furthermore, he probably had a useful background in some area such as agriculture, automotive mechanics, or electronics.

From a military standpoint the advisor's long years of formal peacetime training had left him at a disadvantage on tactical knowledge applicable to this situation. He was acutely aware of this but didn't always realize what advantages his own military experience had given him. He knew how military organizations, command and supply channels, and communications systems *should* function. He wasn't a thoroughly trained "nuts-and-bolts" man on all matters, but he was well aware of the general acceptable standards and the end results that were necessary. To the advisor it was an obvious shortcoming, for example, if there were no logistics section, or if the radio station and Operations and Intelligence Center closed down overnight. Each advisor had to prove it to himself, but the basic tactics he had absorbed through the years were generally applicable. Once he gained confidence, his counterpart's mistakes became glaring. Fire support channels were improved, unrealistic plans recognized, and attention was drawn to security lapses and repetitious patterns of operations that were ineffective and dangerous.

Benefits Realized. A summary of the effect produced by the Subsector Advisory Program should be accompanied by the emphatic reservation that no two teams faced the same situation or produced identical results. Generally speaking, then, the following beneficial effects were realized.

1. Support of all types--military, economic, political, GVN, and U.S.--flowed more

regularly to the district. In the opinion of the majority of advisors, this was the prime benefit. Advisors pointed out requirements to their counterparts, showed them what support was available, assisted in the preparation of requests, followed up requests through parallel U.S. channels, and assisted with deliveries.

2. The Subsector Commander was inspired to greater energy and aggressiveness by the presence of another professional soldier monitoring his activities.

3. The U.S. teams lent prestige to local officials and in a sense conferred stability on local government, improving the GVN presence with the people.

4. Districts were integrated more closely into the provincial family. Improved communications and coordination saw the Sector Commander consulting Subsector Commanders more routinely on matters of mutual interest.

5. General functioning of the GVN organizations was improved as District Operations and Intelligence Centers were manned 24 hours a day, and responsibilities were set in other important areas.

6. U.S. supervision of aid flow was extended closer to the primary level of utilization, and the United States was provided an independent source of information on actual progress and requirements. Graft was a more hazardous pursuit, and face-saving optimistic reports were exposed. GVN planning became somewhat more realistic as a consequence.

7. Finally, the U.S. team itself usually made a favorable impression. The medical specialist proved invaluable in fostering pro-U.S. and pro-GVN attitudes, customarily treating hundreds of civilians weekly. Many advisors taught English classes in local schools, and many had other talents that contributed to civic projects.

Problems Experienced. The difficulties the Subsector Advisory teams experienced, and generally overcame, were formidable. The problems will be separated into three broad categories: those

resulting from VC reaction, deficiencies in U.S. implementation, and those connected with GVN reception of the program.

Viet Cong Reaction. Because the VC reaction had not clearly developed by the end of 1964, this aspect must be briefly and superficially treated. Four Subsector Advisors, all officers, were killed during 1964 and the first few days of 1965, but none of the deaths could be clearly tied to specific VC motives against subsector advisors in preference to other Americans. A terrorist killed the first, Major Virgil Greany, while he was inspecting a prospective site for an aid station in Binh Duong Province. The circumstances indicated a chance encounter. In Phu Yen Province Major John Stoneburner was killed from ambush along a main road while coordinating friendly troop operations. In early January 1965, Captain James Ray, a Rhodes scholar assigned to Nha Be District near Saigon, was killed while accompanying Regional Forces on an offensive night operation. The circumstances surrounding the death of Captain Wayne Kidd in the Mekong Delta are not available.

By the end of 1964 a clear VC reaction had not resulted. Propaganda, terrorism, and general interference, to be sure, had been directed at these teams, but the VC had apparently not selected them as special rural targets. Increased casualties corresponded approximately to increased exposure. Developments in the first half of 1965 were more foreboding. In February an entire team was killed or captured in Phuoc Long Province, and by summer there was evidence of other specific, if uncoordinated, VC action against Subsector Advisory Teams. Hopefully, the introduction of U.S. combat units has diverted VC attention and energies; however, further analysis along these lines is beyond the scope of this study.

U.S. Problems of Implementation. Most problems of this nature arose from the accelerated "crash" deployment schedule. From almost a standing start in June, there was an attempt to form, train, equip, deploy, and support five-member teams in 113 mostly inaccessible rural districts of Vietnam.

The personnel input was successfully achieved at some expense to activities in the continental U.S. and with considerable personal inconveniences suffered by the individuals concerned. However, personnel in sufficient numbers and of exceptional quality and enthusiasm were delivered on time.

Unfortunately, the same cannot be said for the quality of training given the prospective advisors. A two-week school was established in Saigon as an interim measure until December when CONUS (Continental United States) training facilities could begin to meet the new demands. The Saigon school accomplished about as much as could be hoped from a two-week school despite many handicaps. There were precious few guidelines, and of course no experienced Subsector Advisors to serve as instructors. Compounding the problem of forming a faculty was the one-year tour which depleted the pool of experienced U.S. personnel by rotating each advisor soon after he became thoroughly grounded. And finally, many obvious restrictions prohibited training which could provide each advisor with the most useful tool of all--some facility for speaking Vietnamese.

Poor logistic support competed with the lack of specific useful training as the most common difficulty. In the opinion of this observer the responsibility must be shared. The most obvious villains were the notoriously poor GVN systems through which the support was to flow, and VC interdiction. Next, and less obvious, some parts of the U.S. staff seemed to presume that the subsector program could be smoothly superimposed on the existing structure without much extra effort. Many U.S. personnel failed to recognize that the U.S. structure was growing a new echelon: its most remote and possibly its most important. Primarily, though, logistics problems too had their roots in the speed of the buildup. There was not much time to plan nor to oil GVN machinery. Logisticians had to make do with whatever equipment could be acquired *and supported* in sufficient quantity and in short time. Initially advisors found vehicles, radios, automatic weapons (conversion kits for M2 carbines), medical supplies, quarters, and many house-keeping items in short supply.

Formal channels of control and responsibility relating to subsector teams were reviewed extensively in late 1964 and early 1965. It was generally recognized that they were operating as U.S. Mission teams rather than as merely military teams. Questions arose as to whether they should restrict themselves to purely military functions, or should be formally designated U.S. Mission teams in order to improve U.S. operating relationships. A few temporary instances of conflicting interests had occurred, such as subsector team medics unwittingly competing with USOM supported health facilities. However, this writer

observed overall U.S. interagency cooperation in the field to be excellent, and found USOM and USIS representatives eager to utilize the MACV Subsector Advisory Teams. Barring a reorganization of the entire U.S. advisory structure, the present control of subsector teams seems the best. The Subsector Advisor has a single superior and clear responsibility to discharge first those duties for which he is best trained--military duties. At the same time he has the opportunity to contribute to the operations of other U.S. agencies to the extent the situation permits.

The MACV echelons below Saigon were also subject to some failings. Headquarters MACV was prompted by the ever-changing situation to delegate authority for subordinates to change subsector team locations and to tailor team composition within respective allocations. It was imperative that the knowledgeable officer on the scene have the authority to exercise his judgment in matching deploying teams to likely locations and to support available. Unfortunately, the authority that left Saigon did not always filter down through U.S. channels as far as necessary. Sector Advisors who bitterly resented a "requirement" to deploy a subsector team to an ineffective location, or without an interpreter or proper equipment, were usually surprised or skeptical when informed that authority had been repeatedly delegated for subordinate senior advisors to exercise their own judgments in such cases. Indeed, it would have been a miracle if all of the personnel and equipment had been simultaneously available to each district. Ergo, many of the woes that were laid to Saigon could have been eased by delegation of authority *through* intermediate levels. Another problem arose when teams were freely relocated, however--logistic support was sure to lag even further.

In some areas of Vietnam something of a schism developed between U.S. Army advisors assigned to combat units and those with pacification-wide duties, the latter including subsector advisors. Each advisor identified closely with his counterpart and/or his mission. In the extreme, the "combat" advisor might be pictured as wanting to solve the Vietnamese problem with overwhelming military force. ("We need ___ divisions to march abreast from one end of this country to the other.") He saw the "pacification" effort as a waste of time and valuable resources in a fruitless attempt to influence a people who, in the final analysis, would respond only to superior force.

The "pacification" advisors saw a purely military solution as empty, although most of them were getting as full a measure of fighting as anyone. Any popular acquiescence based solely on military might would be certain to evaporate upon removal of the military force. The subsector advisor and his ilk gave great attention to social, economic, and other development that must impress upon the people the desirability and inevitability of life under the GVN.

The criticism with which many advisors concluded their evaluations were words to the effect that the subsector advisory program is ". . . a great idea with great potential, but my team got to this district about two years too late." This is an understandable attitude of a conscientious professional towards any difficult task, particularly one related to a deteriorating situation such as that in South Vietnam in the years 1960-64. Even if he is repeating thoughts that originated with his Vietnamese counterpart, he adds to a strong argument that timely effective assistance at the district level is the key to a successful U.S. program. Without dragging up too many ghosts of previous chapters, the critical importance of this echelon as regards contact with the people should be reemphasized.

Failings Related to the GVN. Most GVN shortcomings have already been mentioned or hinted at: impossibly slow logistic support, the natural resentment of old hands at naive but critical onlookers, and the fact that any improvements that the advisor might work were dependent first on his ability to deal with his counterpart.

The most crippling GVN failing was in providing interpreters. Two interpreters were programmed for each team, but it was almost a year after the first teams were deployed that there were enough for one per team. In the meantime most teams functioned some months using sign language and pidgin English. The degradation of team effectiveness can be imagined. This problem, like most others, can be blamed in part on the unexpected expansion, but even so interpreter training in adequate numbers did not begin until 1965.

Many Americans feared that the new U.S. channels would supplant, rather than support, the GVN apparatus, and that the Vietnamese would be quick to shift responsibility for certain operations to the Americans. Most advisors were sensitive to this

pressure and carefully directed their efforts towards making the GVN machinery operate instead.

Advisors in the field often complained that their counterparts were never notified through GVN channels of plans for U.S. subsector teams. Headquarters, MACV, might be hard put to document thorough coordination in the early stages of planning, but sporadic activities within GVN, such as off-again-on-again interpreter training, testify that the information was there. Coup-inspired shufflings of key GVN personnel and rapid rotation of U.S. personnel made continuity difficult. At any rate, the problems of advisors in the field were complicated by a dearth of instructions issued by GVN to match those of the United States. It is hard to say whether any U.S. solution to this problem was possible under the circumstances.

It should be noted that the foregoing parade of problems includes the significant and the minor, some that are still unresolved and others that have disappeared. They were all presented so that they could be sifted for useful lessons. The entire list is not descriptive of each team.

V-CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The East-West conflict in Vietnam is not simply a post-World War II, or even 20th century, event. It has been developing for centuries. The Vietnamese have been resisting the threat and fact of Chinese encroachment for 2,000 years. French intervention, although more recent, has been no less important. Their forceful termination of Vietnamese self-rule and disruption of traditional patterns left the Vietnamese frustrated and disillusioned. The Western order, personified by the French, did not offer adequate compensation for the changes it had wrought. French social, political, and economic control allowed the Vietnamese little opportunity for social acceptance, for a voice in his own government, or for a chance to improve his economic position. The revolutionary cauldron was allowed to fill as all nonviolent outlets were blocked.

Sun Yat-sen had already linked the concept of social revolution to national independence when the Japanese victory over Russia in 1905 bolstered Asian dreams of expelling the Europeans. In the 1920's communism combined nationalism with a revolutionary

technique for controlling social change. The drastically unsettled conditions of World War II brought the Vietnamese pot to a quick boil, and the Viet Minh were there to direct and profit by the forces of the nationalistic explosion.

The Viet Minh operated clandestinely or openly as the situation seemed to warrant. When expedient, it allowed itself to be merged with other nationalist groups, apparently losing its identity but always strengthening itself at the expense of these other groups. It was careful not to fully identify itself with communism, announcing only a goal of "independence." In short, the Viet Minh manipulated the tremendous forces of nationalism toward communism.

The anti-Communist camp got a temporary reprieve thanks to the unexpected dynamism of Diem's early rule. In the final analysis, though, Diem did not change the social conditions that led to and sustained the insurgency.

The Viet Cong take a page from the Viet Minh book and modify it only slightly. While Viet Cong reliance on Communist support and a Communist future is admitted, propaganda emphasis is on the defeat of non-Communist "oppression."

Lin Piao's Manifesto of October 1965 promises the Asian, African, and Latin American application of Mao's strategy of movement from rural power bases to eventual control of nations. (6:48) From the central importance of the rural population to Communist insurgency doctrine, there must be derived a correspondingly vital relationship in counter-insurgency doctrine. Communist insurgency begins here; successful counterinsurgency must be concluded here. The Communist exploitation of government vulnerabilities to "steal" the peasant allegiance too often successfully hides the fact that insurgent appeal to the peasant is not invulnerable. There are many normal benefits of a benevolent government with which the insurgent cannot hope to compete (dependent of course on the stage of the insurgency and governmental determination). These include educational and medical services, police protection, public transportation systems, a technically advanced information program, and, in more successful stages, a rural economy that permits local growth.

The characteristics of South Vietnam as it emerged from French rule were not at all unique

among new nations. The Congolese, for example, had been absolutely excluded from top administrative, social, and economic posts and were additionally handicapped by having no tradition of self-government predating Belgian rule. It is not an astounding observation then that, by and large, the nations susceptible to insurgency are weak in experience, hence ability, to administer themselves and extend their authority and benefits to the people. Strengthening the vital links between the government and the people is an essential task in counterinsurgency (COIN).

Until the Agency for International Development (AID), the Peace Corps, or some other U.S. agency has the mission and personnel to fully accomplish this task under combat conditions, the U.S. Army can expect to fall heir to the bulk of it. This is especially true when the military side of the COIN is inspected (pun intended). The COIN will be won when local militia, fighting with a grudge on its home ground, takes the insurgent to task. It follows from this that the lower the rural level of effective military assistance, the better the return will be.

So, general Communist intentions and this narrower look at Vietnam both emphasize the rural arena. A conclusion is reached that an effective governmental presence at district (or its equivalent) level must have high priority in any U.S. program of assistance. A further conclusion is drawn that U.S. Army personnel must be prepared to implement the rural portions of U.S. assistance.

However, these conclusions spawn more questions than answers. We certainly can't afford a huge standby corps of specialists for each country that might request COIN assistance, and we can't wait for U.S. involvement to begin our preparations. The answer must necessarily lie in a compromise arrangement that can construct a foundation for expansion, avoiding, or at least recognizing, the problems of the expansion in Vietnam. Insofar as possible, deliberate planning and execution must compensate for necessary weaknesses in training.

It is therefore recommended that an agency be established to maintain plans for extending U.S. assistance to rural areas in countries where extensive U.S. COIN assistance is likely. This might be a new "Counterinsurgency" agency, responsible for all other aspects of COIN, or the mission might be assigned to some existing establishment. Regardless

of its origin, it must have representation and close support from all interested governmental departments. This agency would be responsible to:

1. Identify (in each country) the highest governmental echelon that has significant contact with the people, and from this determine the lowest echelon at which it is practical to assign U.S. advisors. In Vietnam the strong family and village bonds make the village or hamlet the ultimate objective of persuasion. But there are thousands of villages and several times as many hamlets, precluding assignment of advisory teams to each. The next higher level, district, is in close contact with the people and in more manageable numbers.

2. Develop suitable team locations and team composition, emphasizing tailoring teams to match local requirements. Even if civilian technicians and specialists will not be available in quantity, or on short notice, military advisors can be assigned with regard for special backgrounds.

3. Develop clear areas of responsibility for advisory teams and rules for control and support of the teams. Clearly specify such things as which officials have the authority to move or withdraw teams and who must be notified of such actions, who directs team operations, what are team relations with other agencies, and who provides what type of support or is responsible that it is provided through the host government.

4. Maintain local background material and demographic data for reproduction and issue to incoming teams. This information should have specific local applicability, giving each team an outline of significant social, cultural, religious, economic, and, if possible, political conditions.

5. Maintain data on communications, vehicular, housing and other support requirements. From such information as a particular team requiring two radios capable of reaching 35 miles over mountainous jungle terrain, nationwide and then worldwide contingency hardware requirements are constructed.

6. Determine types of support likely to be in heavy demand and/or short supply, and stockpile or locate as practical. Plan its movement to the countries in question.

Finally, we cannot avoid the fact that we have examined a Vietnamese, not an American war. The Vietnamese have been striving for centuries toward their own goal of independence, from the Chinese and others. The dictatorial traits exhibited by many in the procession of recent South Vietnamese leaders have fed Communist propaganda, obscuring popular nationalistic aspirations. We should not fall into the insulting and self-defeating practice of regarding Vietnamese interests and authority as subordinate to our own in South Vietnam. It is quite possible that elsewhere we will be dealing with diverse aboriginal tribes who will lean on us almost entirely to guide them from the jungle to nationhood. In nations such as South Vietnam we will be shoring up indigenous administrations of peoples who are fiercely proud of their separate national identities and traditions of self-rule. The only conclusion of general applicability that might be gleaned from this is that U.S. assistance should be carefully geared to the capabilities and actual requirements of the people assisted--their experience and desire for self-rule, their national homogeneity, vitality, and purposefulness.

APPENDIX I

GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS

- ARVN - The Army of Vietnam.
- COIN - Counterinsurgency.
- DRV - The Democratic Republic of Vietnam.
The Communist Government in Hanoi.
- GVN - The Government of Vietnam. The
pro-Western Saigon Government.
- MACV - The U.S. Military Assistance Command in
Vietnam.
- PF - Popular Forces. A GVN paramilitary
force that is recruited and employed
in members' home districts. Lightly
armed and organized in squads and
platoons.
- RF - Regional Forces. A GVN paramilitary
force that is recruited and employed
in its home province. Organized in
platoons and companies. Armed with
60mm mortars, light machine guns, and
lighter weapons.
- RVN - Republic of Vietnam. The Saigon
Government. Synonymous with GVN.
- SVN - South Vietnam. Used to refer to the
land itself or to the Government (GVN).
- USIS - United States Information Service.
- USOM - United States Operations Mission.
Generally responsible for U.S. advice
and assistance of a civil nature, with
the exception of that related to the
Information Service.
- VC - Viet Cong. The Communist insurgents in
South Vietnam.
- VIS - Vietnamese Information Service.
- VN - Vietnam, Vietnamese.

APPENDIX II

SIGNIFICANT EVENTS OF LATE 1963 AND 1964

The following chronology is taken from *Deadline Data on World Affairs*, ref. 11, bibliography.

- November 1963 - U.S. aid is resumed in full force following temporary suspension during the anti-Diem *coup d'etat*. Viet Cong activities and successes are high.
- December 1963 - The first phase of a power struggle within the new government ends quietly and inconclusively. Viet Cong exert strong pressure in the Mekong Delta. The U.S. reverses its prediction of an early victory.
- 6 January 1964 - The new government is formally established under Major General Doung Van Minh (Big Minh). The VC have further successes and GVN control of the countryside continues to deteriorate.
- 30 January - Major General Nguyen Khanh deposes Big Minh.
- 7 March - Khanh announces an extensive reform program.
- 4 April - Khanh's government appears shaky as its Minister of Interior resigns predicting others will follow.
- 5 April - Khanh's Deputy announces additional reforms.
- 8-10 April - VC are victorious in the Delta.
- May - VC terrorism is high, there are signs of lack of Buddhist support for Khanh's government. President Johnson announces that aid to Vietnam will jump and requests an additional \$125 million for the year.
- 1-2 June - A conference is held in Honolulu by Secretaries Rusk and McNamara, Ambassador Lodge, and General Taylor, "prompted by continuing disintegration of anti-Communist forces and positions in (Laos and South Vietnam)."
- 7 June - Catholics demonstrate against governmental favoritism of Buddhists.
- 17 June - Viet Cong are active in the provinces neighboring Saigon.
- 7 July - Gen. Taylor arrives to assume the office of Ambassador.

- 14 July - The U.S. announces it will increase its military forces in VN by 600 immediately.
- 27 July - The U.S. announces it will increase its military strength to a new total of 21,000.
- 2-4 August - U.S. destroyers exchange fire with DRV PT boats, sinking some.
- 5 August - U.S. air attacks against DRV PT boat bases.
- 11 August - Viet Cong propaganda is directed at U.S. Advisors.
- 16 August - Military Revolutionary Council elects Khanh as President and abolishes Minh's ceremonial job. The MRC with Khanh as Chairman is the supreme authority in South Vietnam.
- 19-24 August - Anti-government riots by students, Buddhists and others in all urban areas.
- 25 August - Khanh promises the MRC will limit itself to purely military affairs and that a new Head of State will convene a national congress.
- 26-28 August - Riots in all large cities. Catholic-Buddhist clashes.
- 27 August - The MRC repeals the Constitution and sets up a ruling triumvirate of Khanh, Minh, and Tran Thien Khiem, former Defense Minister. MRC then dissolves itself with the promise that the triumvirate will convene a national assembly within two months to elect a national leader.
- 29 August - Triumvirate appoints Nguyen Xuan Oanh to head a caretaker civilian government.
- 1 September - Deputy Premier Nguyen Ton Hoan resigns, protesting Khanh's planned return to power.
- 3 September - Khanh resumes the Premiership.
- 8 September - Minh is awarded the ceremonial job of Chief of State, Khanh retains power.
- 11 September - Khanh ousts rivals from key positions: Generals Tri and Thieu.
- 13 September - Coup against Khanh fails.
- 15 September - Khanh arrests five military commanders for their part in the attempted coup. Viet Cong call for a general campaign to take advantage of unstable conditions in the GVN.

- 20 September - Revolt by the Montagnard tribe Rhade. Demands range from representation in Saigon to an autonomous state.
- 21-23 September - Strikes in Saigon and rubber plantations.
- 26 September - Seventeen member civil High National Council is appointed.
- 30 September - Four government officials, including the Deputy Premier, resign.
- 18 October - A U.S. report shows casualties rates are two-to-one in favor of the Viet Cong.
- 20 October - The High National Council announces a constitution providing for gradual return to civil control.
- 24 October - HNC elects civilian Phan Khac Suu as Chief of State, and he appoints civilian Tran Van Huong as Premier. Khanh remains Commander-in-Chief.
- 1 November - The Viet Cong successfully attack U.S. installation at Bien Hoa Air Base.
- 4 November - A 15 man civilian government is installed under Premier Huong.
- 5 November - The Chairman of the High National Council, Nguyen Xuan Chu, resigns in protest against the new government.
- 9 November - Devastating floods strike central Vietnam.
- 22-24 November - Students and Buddhists demonstrate and riot against the government and rival groups.
- 25 November - Martial law declared in Saigon.
- 11 December - Huong announces U.S. aid will be increased.
- 12 December - Buddhist leaders begin protest hunger strikes.
- 16 December - The rich An Lao valley in northern SVN falls to the VC after a three day battle.
- 20 December - The Armed Forces dissolves the High National Council and arrests seven members.
- 22 December - Khanh announces the HNC will not be reactivated and strongly criticizes U.S. interference. U.S. State Department warns that a duly constituted government is the basis for U.S. support.
- 24 December - Viet Cong terrorists blow up U.S. B.O.Q. Brink in Saigon.
- 26 December - Martial law is extended.

In January 1965, Huong was removed by the Armed Forces Council and full power rested with Khanh. In February, Khanh was ousted and a weak civilian government installed, which voluntarily returned control to the military in June 1965.

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
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BIOGRAPHIC SKETCH

Major Thomas E. de Shazo, Jr., U.S. Army, holds a B.A. in Psychology from Duke University and has studied Mechanical Engineering at the University of Arizona. He has served as Battery Commander, Field Artillery Battalion, in Korea and Germany. In 1964 he was assigned to the Operations and Plans Office, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam.

Qualified in Tube Artillery, Missile Artillery, and Nuclear Warhead Assembly, Major de Shazo also served as an instructor and Branch Chief at the Army Artillery and Missile School, Fort Sill, Oklahoma.

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**THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA:
GOALS AND TACTICS**

A lecture delivered
at the Naval War College
on 19 August 1966

by

Professor King Chen

It is a great pleasure to deliver an address here today on "The Foreign Policy of the People's Republic of China: Goals and Tactics." To avoid confusion, I will use the terms "Communist China," or "Peking," for the People's Republic of China; and "Nationalist China," or "Taiwan" for the Republic of China.

In order to understand the goals of Communist China's foreign policy, it is necessary to understand first the principles and theoretical foundations upon which Peking's foreign policy is based. And in order

to understand the tactics of Peking's execution of her policy, it is helpful to discuss first the characteristics of her tactics. Therefore, I will divide my speech into four parts: first, the principles and foundations of Communist China's foreign policy; second, the goals of her policy; third, the characteristics of her strategy and tactics; and, fourth, her tactics.

Principles. In my personal view, Peking's foreign policy is based upon three theoretical principles: (1) national interests, (2) nationalism, and (3) communism. The first principle--national interests--is a fundamental element on which every foreign policy should be based. To maintain and promote national interests is a task for every government, Communist or not. This is true in the United States, whether it be the Jefferson Administration or the Johnson Administration. This is also true in the Soviet Union, whether it be the Czarist Government or the Kosygin Regime.

In the case of China, both the Imperial Government in the past and the Communist Government at present operate on the same theme, and yet what are the items of national interests which Communist China values in her policy-making today? Generally speaking, they can be summarized in the following few items:

1. The preservation of Communist China's territorial integrity, national security, and political entity.

2. The maintenance of China's independence, freedom, peace, and stability.

3. The promotion of China's strength and prosperity, such as political power, military strength, economic development, and social and people's welfare (industrialization and modernization).

4. The maintenance and promotion of China's prestige, honor, pride, and world leadership.

5. The maintenance of the Chinese Communist way of life: communal, militant, and revolutionary.

6. The creation and maintenance of a militant Communist culture.

7. The development of Chinese Communist philosophy--Maoism.

From the above items we understand first that one of the reasons for Chinese Communist entry into the Korean War was for the preservation of her security and for her big power status. Secondly, we know that China's quarrel with Russia is not only for Communist ideology, but also for national interests, such as China's desire to become a world power, industrialization, and the development of a nuclear capacity. Thirdly, we should realize that internal affairs and national strength play a very significant role in Chinese foreign policy-making. Sometimes foreign policy is only a reflection of internal situations.

The second principle is nationalism. Chinese nationalism is different from Russian, German, or French nationalism. So important is this principle that in some cases it even exceeds the two other principles. It deserves our whole attention. Chinese nationalism, in a precise sense, is a strong reaction to the Western imperialism and colonialism in China in the past century. This has a historical significance. Throughout the years before the West came to China, China had maintained a world view that she was a kingdom in the center of the world in terms of geography and culture. Geographically speaking, Asia was the only "world" to China. Surrounded by other nations in Asia, China was the biggest and most powerful state in the world. Culturally speaking, China regarded Confucianism the best philosophy in the "world" and Confucian culture the most advanced culture on earth. For these two reasons, the Chinese Government viewed all the other peoples as barbarians, beyond the influence of Chinese civilization. The Chinese made little initiative to contact foreigners. If they had to, they treated them officially like "barbarians." For instance, throughout the Ching Dynasty the Imperial Government maintained an office for foreign affairs; its name was called "The Office of Barbarian Affairs."

According to this traditional concept, there was no equality between China and foreign nations. Imperial China looked down upon the so-called barbarian states, and a tributary system was established to deal with foreign affairs. The tributary system

meant that foreign states, mostly Asian, paid tribute to the Chinese Empire once in two, three, four, or ten years, depending upon the distance of the local nation to the Chinese Empire; they offered precious materials, such as gold, diamonds, furs; and also they recognized and accepted Chinese overlordship. For instance, during the Ching Dynasty Korea paid a visit to China almost every year, Annam once in one to twelve years, and Laos and Burma occasionally. In return, the Chinese Government was to fulfill the obligation of military protection requested by the tributary states and also paid back precious materials, such as Chinese silk, paintings and books; sometimes the Chinese exchanged visits with the tributary states and married Chinese princesses to the young kings of barbarous states!

To the Chinese in the past this kind of a tributary system was a deficit business. The system resulted in some strong effects on the Chinese side: (1) Culturally and intellectually it built up China's cultural preeminence over the other peoples; it also created a Chinese mind which found it hard to accept other political philosophies. (2) Psychologically, it developed a stubborn mind, which found it difficult to compromise with other states on an equal level. (3) Politically, the power of the empire yielded to no one except to those of stronger conquering power such as Ghengis Khan, and political dominance over the Asian area of the world became an established order. This attitude remained the same when the Chinese began to deal with the Westerners. For instance, in 1857 an Imperial Edict to the Kwang-tung Province Viceroy clearly instructed the Viceroy to handle the British barbarian affairs. Not only the British, but also the American, German, and French barbarians.

This strong and proud Chinese Empire was repeatedly defeated by the Westerners and Japanese after the middle of the 19th century: the Opium War in 1842, the Franco-British joint military invasion in 1857-58, the Sino-French war over Indochina in 1885, the Sino-Japanese war over Korea in 1894-95, and the Boxer Uprising in 1900. All these conflicts ended up with Chinese defeat accompanied by great humiliation and bitterness. The result was the loss of a large portion of the Chinese territory, the partition of China into the spheres of interest, the presence of foreign military forces, foreign control of customs, concessions and lease of territories, extraterritoriality, and unequal treaties. This was

a great change to China from the position of master of the world to a semicolonial status.

At this juncture, Sun Yat-sen's Republican Revolution was launched with a strong sentiment of Chinese nationalism. The three "People's Principles," namely, nationalism, democracy, and the people's welfare, were supported by thousands of people, particularly the intellectual. Sun Yat-sen's demand for China's complete independence and equality among world powers and for the restoration of China's greatness won enthusiastic nationwide support during and after his time. His successor, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, used both nationalism and antiwarlordism as two powerful means to lead the nation since he came into power in 1926.

The Chinese Communists, too, use nationalism as a useful means to rally support to their foreign policy. As early as 1922, the Second Congress of the Communist Party set forth to establish a Chinese Federal Republic by unifying China Proper, Tibet, Sinkiang, and Outer Mongolia. It asked that Outer Mongolia be a part of China. In November 1931, before the establishment of the Provisional Soviet Government in China, the Chinese Communists stated that the aims of their foreign policy were the immediate abrogation of all unequal treaties, immediate withdrawal of all foreign military forces from China, etc. Since 1949 the Peking Regime has time and again announced that one of its aims in foreign policy is to regain Chinese interests and the position of the past. This explains why Communist China took back Tibet in 1950, why she intervened in the Korean war, and why she is assisting the Vietnam Communist revolution. This is by no means to say that the Chinese Communists are entirely for nationalism, but it is true that they use nationalism as a means to call for the peoples' support. Without Chinese nationalism the Peking Government would find itself in greater difficulties in mobilizing the people.

The third principle of a Chinese Communist foreign policy is communism. Ever since the Communist revolution in Russia the ideological connection between foreign and internal affairs is to be found in Lenin's theory. Lenin opposed the separation of foreign policies from domestic politics. This theory has a perpetual meaning in the Chinese historical context because, as I mentioned before, foreign imperialism was actually a dominant force

on the Chinese scene throughout the 19th century. Applying Lenin's theory to China, the Chinese Communist Party announced that it was antifeudalism, antiwarlordism, and anti-imperialism. In 1949, after the Peking Regime was established, a Chinese Communist said: "The foreign policy of the People's Republic of China is founded upon the specific principles of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin, and on a scientific knowledge of the laws of social development Chairman Mao . . . uses this knowledge in shaping the national policies."

Although this quotation could well prove that communism is another theoretical principle of the making of the Chinese foreign policy, yet since Communist China quarreled with the U.S.S.R, what brand of communism has Peking employed in making her foreign policy? Apparently it is Mao Tse-tung's communism. The meaning of Mao's communism in foreign policy could be summarized in a few points:

1. It is a thesis of unity in internal and external affairs. Internally it is anti-feudalism, antiwarlordism, antibureaucratic capitalism; externally it is against imperialism, and for proletarian internationalism.

2. It regards anti-imperialism as its international duty which the Chinese Communists will fulfill in due course.

3. In the struggle for the fulfillment of its international duty, it emphasizes the peasant revolution in the rural areas rather than workers' uprising in the cities; stresses the importance of the national liberation movement in individual countries led by its revolutionary formula: party, army, and united front; and upholds the principle of the encirclement of Western Europe and North America from Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

4. It maintains high militancy and is anti-modern-revisionism.

5. It claims to be the revolutionary model for developing countries.

Goals of Peking's Foreign Policy. After we have discussed the three major principles, we are now in a position to understand more easily the goals of Peking's foreign policy. In 1949, when the Peking

Regime was just established, the Chinese Communists pronounced the goal of their foreign policy as follows: first, to protect China's independence, freedom, and integrity; second, to work for lasting international peace and friendly cooperation between all countries; third, to establish cordial relationships with friendly foreign governments; fourth, to unite with the Soviet Union and other Communist states in the struggle against imperialism, particularly American "imperialism;" and, finally, to protect the rights and interests of overseas Chinese. Again in 1958 a Chinese Communist theoretician expressed Peking's world views. He emphasized anti-imperialism and the final victory of the Socialist countries.

These two statements I just mentioned do not present us with a complete picture of the goals of Peking's foreign policy. From my personal observation its goals could be summarized under three categories: (1) national security, the basic goal (short-range goal); (2) the restoration of China's greatness (middle-range goal); and (3) world leadership (long-range goal).

The first goal, national security and self-preservation, is the most fundamental objective of China--to preserve her territorial integrity and to maintain political entity. Only by maintaining her security can Communist China obtain internal stability, develop her economy, promote her military strength, and support aggressive policy abroad. A few weeks before the Chinese Communists entered into the Korean war, for instance, Chou En-lai had repeatedly warned the United States that the United Nations' operations in Korea had threatened the security of Communist China. In another case, in 1954, when Khrushchev and Mao Tse-tung were still on their honeymoon, an agreement concluded by these two men in Peking said that they would seek "unity in action directed to safe-guarding the security of the two states." They were thinking of a potential threat from the United States. In 1961 Marshall Lin Piao, now much in the news as Defense Minister, instructed his army that self-preservation and security should be the first consideration in Peking's military operations at home and abroad. Undoubtedly, Peking has succeeded in maintaining this fundamental goal.

The second goal, the restoration of China's greatness, is a middle-range objective. Since I have

previously devoted some time to the discussions of the Chinese nationalism, this objective is easy to understand. This goal should be further defined in two aspects. The first aspect is the desire to regain the full territory and standing of the Chinese Empire in the past, including the elimination of all privileges of foreign powers. This explains why Peking has used military means to occupy Tibet, to try to take back Outer Mongolia from Khrushchev, and to seize complete control over Port Arthur, Dairen, and the railroads in Manchuria. The second aspect is the desire to regain China's leading position in Asia. Many students of Chinese affairs have asserted that Communist China would sooner or later conquer Southeast Asia by military force because of her historical relations with Southeast Asian nations, her population and food problem, and the rich resources in the area. But I doubt it. What the Chinese Communist Government would like to regain is a tributary-style relationship with Asian countries. In other words, Peking wants to establish a Chinese Monroe Doctrine in Asia. This scheme implies three major points: first, the exclusion of all Western influence from Asia, particularly that of the United States; second, the settlement of Asian affairs by the Asians; and third, the hegemony of Communist China over the area. The relationship between the Chinese Government and other Asian nations during the period 1953 to 1958 had reached a similarity to the traditional style, and a strong opposition to American presence in Vietnam and shows Peking's effort to exclude American influence from the area. To the Chinese Communists, China's greatness cannot be restored in full unless the United States gets out of Asia.

The third goal, world leadership, depends upon mainly China's capacity of being a world power. In the past 16 years Communist China has tried hard to move toward this direction by launching the Great Leap Forward and other movements in order to hasten her industrialization and the development of her nuclear capacity. We can be sure that to be a world power with a nuclear capacity is a strong desire of Communist China today. As Foreign Minister Chen Yi said three years ago: "Even if we had no pants to wear, still we would prefer to build atomic bombs." They are going to have atomic bombs very soon although they wear pants with many patches, even the leaders in Peking.

For world leadership, Peking is facing at least two challenges from foreign countries: one is from the United States and the other from the Soviet Union. The U.S. containment policy in Asia has blocked Communist China from further expansion. For China the starting point to assume her world leadership is in Asia. This is another basic reason why Communist China would like to see the United States go. In Africa and Latin America, it is also the United States who stands firmly in the way of all of Peking's advance. This has limited Communist China's leadership in the non-Communist world to a significant extent. The second challenge, the Soviet challenge, is equally harmful to Communist China. The Chinese Communists intended to seek a share of the leadership of the world Communist movement as early as 1946. In that year Liu Shao-chi, Chairman of the State, told an American writer, Anna Louise Strong, now still in Peking: "China is a semifeudal and semicolonial country in which a vast number of people live at the edge of starvation, tilling small bits of soil. Its economy is agricultural, backward, and dispersed There are similar conditions in other lands of Southeast Asia. The courses chosen by China will influence them all."

In November 1949 Liu Shao-chi openly advised Asian Communists that the path of a Chinese Communist revolution should be the basic path for liberation of peoples of other colonial and semicolonial countries. Since the Sino-Soviet dispute was brought to the open, these two Communist nations have competed for leadership in the world Communist movement, as well as in the non-Communist world. The Sino-Soviet dispute has already gone *beyond* the realm of ideology. It has already entered into the arena of a power struggle involving national interests. On the one hand, Communist China desired to become a world power, and the Soviet Union prevented her from being so; Communist China attempted to regain Outer Mongolia and lost territory from Russia, and the Soviet Union refused to discuss it with Communist China. On the other hand, the Soviet Union, since the downfall of Khrushchev, wanted to achieve unity within the Communist bloc and Communist China refused to cooperate; the Soviet Union invited Communist China to take united action against the United States in Vietnam; Communist China turned it down flatly. But the argument goes like this now. The Soviets have said to the Chinese, "Yes, you Chinese are very clever, hard working, and patient, but you are poor, you are backward, and you are betrayers." And the

Chinese talked back, "Yes, you Russians are as tall as a pagoda, as big as a Buddhist temple, as strong as a buffalo, but as stupid as a Russian."

To the present moment the dispute has reached a point of no return. Unless a drastic change takes place, there will hardly be an ending to the argument. This conflict does greater harm to Communist China than to the Soviet Union, and a Chinese world leadership is further limited by this Soviet challenge. If Communist China had ever planned to dominate the world, as some people observe, then these two challenges--American and Soviet--have already served to check Peking's ambition.

Characteristics of Tactics. In the analysis of the tactics of Communist China, I have drawn a tentative formula of three characteristics. This could also be called a three "C" formula. The first "C" is the *Chinese* characteristic, the second "C" the *Communist* characteristic, and the third "C" the *Chou En-lai* characteristic. By the first "C" (the Chinese characteristic) I mean those aspects of interpreting the world situation and reacting to it--sometimes impulsive, sometimes isolated, but all the time with hard-working character and patience. This characteristic is common to many Chinese leaders. Mao had fought and waited for about 30 years before he defeated his enemy, and Chiang Kai-shek has been working and waiting for 15 years in Formosa for a chance to go back to the Chinese mainland.

By the second "C" (the Communist characteristic) I mean those aspects which distinguish the Chinese Communist from the Nationalist and their imperial predecessors, and which are learned from the teachings of Marx, Lenin, and Stalin; they are secrecy, fanaticism, aggressiveness, and hard approach, but also zigzags, flexibility, retreat, and caution.

The third "C" (the Chou En-lai characteristic) distinguishes Chou En-lai from other Communist leaders in Peking, with his strong personal character that is rational but cautious, constant but flexible, firm but ever adaptable.

Based on these three characteristics, Peking operates its diplomatic tactics by means of militant action, diplomacy, party propaganda, international front organizations, and religion.

Tactics. Communist Chinese tactics could be divided into three groups. The first group contains a dual approach--hard line, soft line, fanaticism, aggressiveness, etc. The second group is caution, flexibility, zigzags, etc. And the third group is protracted struggle. In operation of the first group of tactics, the dual approach, Peking depends upon the situation both internal and external. If the situation is favorable to hard line, it pushes hard and makes a fanatic drive. When the situation shows gain for a soft line, then Peking, or I should say Chou En-lai, will turn up with a smiling face accompanied by soft words and sometimes with handsome gifts to various countries.

Three cases will suffice to explain the hard line--the Korean war, the Sino-Indian border conflict, and the Vietnam war today. In the case of the Korean war, the United States did not really make a threat to the Chinese security as Peking claimed she did, but Peking intervened with the calculation that the war would not spread into China. This intervention was to prevent the military unification of North Korea with the South by the U.N. forces, and to vie for a big power status. These two objectives were achieved by Peking. At the Geneva Conference in 1954 on Korea and Indochina, Communist China's position as a big power was well self-imposed and was praised by some nations from both Communist and non-Communist blocs. Some observers at that time even made a premature judgment that, due to the Chinese intervention in Korea, Western imperialism in Asia was dead. The Indian border conflicts in 1959 and 1962 were originally caused by the Tibetan revolution in 1959. China was angry at India because India reported the Tibetan revolution to the world and also helped the Dalai Lama and his followers. The militant attitude of Communist China toward India gained some support from Indonesia and North Vietnam, although Communist China lost many friends. Communist China's increasing support to Vietnam since 1961 is a hard policy to push the American out of the peninsula through the local national liberation movement. Since Communist China is not directly involved in the fight, this hard line costs China very little in financial and manpower resources.

Communist China's soft line has been most effectively employed during 1953 to 1958, whereby Peking gained many friends. The fine principles of peaceful coexistence and the Bandung spirit

characterized this period. The soft line also applied to Burma at a time when Communist China was using a hard policy towards India. Later, soft policy towards Pakistan and hard policy towards India were used in parallel since the Indian-Chinese conflict over the border area.

Another aspect of soft policy is economic aid. Communist China is not rich and has received a large amount of aid from Russia, yet she offered aid to Communist and non-Communist countries in the world. Until 1965 Communist China has offered, as we know, a total of \$2,148,200,000 to Communist and non-Communist nations. These recipient nations run from Outer Mongolia all the way down to Ghana. International front organizations are also employed by Peking as a means in diplomacy, and so far there are 31 international front and friendship organizations in action in various countries.

The second group of the tactics is caution, flexibility, and retreat. At the Geneva Conference in 1954 the meeting was stalemated for some time at disagreeable proposals for the composition of the suggested international supervision commission. It was Chou En-lai who took the initiative to persuade the Communist side, mainly the Viet Minh, to accept a compromise proposal of three members: Canada for the Western nations, India for the neutral countries, and Poland for the Communist bloc. As Sir Anthony Eden wrote in his book, *Full Circle*, "From that moment, the tangled ends of the negotiations began to sort themselves out." At another Geneva Conference in 1962, when Communist China was under strong pressure from the United States and other participants, Chen Yi made concessions to a compromise proposal for a neutral Laos. He said, "We are in no hurry. We can wait five, ten, or more years and the Laotian revolution will eventually be successful." Peking's zigzags and retreat tactics operate in a pattern of three steps forward, and then two steps backward, or two steps forward, and one step backward, so eventually it advances. Sometimes it looks as though Peking retreats, but actually it advances. At the Bandung Conference in 1955, Chou En-lai went there originally to form a militant bloc against Western imperialism, but the anti-Communist atmosphere at a conference led by Turkey and other countries compelled Chou En-lai to change his mind. To the participants' surprise, Chou virtually became a peacemaker in the arguments between the anti-Communist group (15 of them) and the neutral group (12 of them).

The participants either liked his performance or supported his peacemaking mission. It seemed that Chou En-lai was retreating at the conference; actually he gained support and new friends.

The third group of tactics is protracted struggle. In discussing Communist China's tactics, let us not forget the Chinese characteristics of patience and hard work, and particularly Mao Tse-tung's guerrilla tactics of protracted struggle. Peking has time and again told its people that "setbacks strengthen revolutionists." In the Chinese Communist view, setbacks are only temporary retreat. Peking plans its policy on a generation basis, while Washington plans its policy on the presidential four-year basis. So, Peking calculates that in any struggle against an enemy you should make a fast advance when you can; otherwise, you should drag on for a long time, and the enemy will eventually will lose its patience and Peking will triumph.


In concluding my address, I would like to point out that although Peking is cautious and flexible in conducting its policy, it still makes mistakes and has had setbacks. As we know, in the past year it suffered diplomatic failures in Indonesia, Africa, and Cuba. And China's relations with North Korea are declining. These failures are due mainly to Peking's misinterpretation and miscalculation of the situation in Indonesia, Malawi, Kenya, and Burundi; so when Chou En-lai said to Kenyatta in 1964 that Africa was ripe for revolution, Kenyatta rebutted it and said that Africa had already had its revolution: "We don't want any more."

Isolation of Communist China is the result of both the Chinese doing and the American containment policy. Communist China is a strong challenge to the United States, but there is nothing to be worried about. On our part we should study the Chinese Communist situation constantly. Our attitude towards Communist China should be calm but not ignoring, should be alert but not alarmed, should be firm but not stubborn, and should be flexible but not drifting. We should face the reality to keep ourselves informed, and above all be patient all the time. If we make good progress in our society, I do not think that communism will be the wave of the future, and I don't believe that Communist China will dominate the world in our time.

BIOGRAPHIC SKETCH

Professor King Chen was educated at National Chengchi University, the University of Virginia, Pennsylvania State University, and Columbia University. He has been assigned as Associate Professor of Political Science at New York State University, Oswego, New York; and is presently Assistant Professor of Political Science, Chinese Studies Center, Brown University.

Professor Chen is author of "Overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia," *Thought and Time*, (Formosa), May 1955; "North Vietnam in the Sino-Soviet Dispute," *Asian Survey*, September 1964; and "Peking's Strategy in Indochina," *Yale Review*, June 1965. He has two books in progress: *China and the Vietnamese Communists, 1941-48*; and *North Vietnam and the Sino-Soviet Dispute*.



Professional Reading

The evaluations of recent books listed in this section have been prepared for the use of resident students. Officers in the fleet and elsewhere may find these books of interest in their professional reading.

The inclusion of a book in this section does not necessarily constitute an endorsement by the Naval War College of the facts, opinions or concepts contained therein.

Many of these publications may be found in ship and station libraries. Certain of the books on the list which are not available from these sources may be available from one of the Navy's Auxiliary Library Service Collections. These collections of books are obtainable on loan. Requests from individual officers to borrow books from an Auxiliary Library Service Collection should be addressed to the nearest of the following special loan collections.

Chief of Naval Personnel (G14) Department of the Navy Washington, D.C. 20370	Commanding Officer U.S. Naval Station (Guam) Library (ALSC), Box 174 San Francisco, Calif. 96630
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Commanding Officer
U.S. Naval Station (Pearl Harbor)
Library (ALSC), Box 20
San Francisco, Calif. 96610

Commanding Officer
U.S. Naval Station
Library (ALSC), Bldg. C-9
Norfolk, Virginia 23511

Commanding Officer
U.S. Naval Station
Library (ALSC)
San Diego, Calif. 92136

BOOKS

Clark, Joseph J. and Barnes, Dwight H. *Sea Power and Its Meaning*. New York: Watts, 1966. 138p.

This book appears to be intended for the same audience as that to which the standard "Sea Power" briefing is given--the relatively uninformed and, perhaps, uncritical. That reader who is either of the foregoing will find the volume an easy-to-read overview of sea power; one which provides palatable answers to the problems raised by Communist aggression, the population explosion, and the possible exhaustion of natural resources. The book follows a logical progression of topics: Mackinder's concepts of geopolitics, Mahan's theories of the effect of sea power upon history, the deterrent effect of United States and Allied naval forces, the cold and limited war utilization of naval power, the historical evolution of United States naval forces, and lastly, the science of oceanography. Some readers may find reason to question the objectivity of some of the historical "facts" included, particularly those occurring during our expansionist era from 1890 to 1920. When dealing with the naval contribution to victory in World War II, some statistics and relative figures seem to be viewed through a rather salt-rimed porthole--and from some distance off the beach. Editing by those with more experience in specialized fields (one notes no such acknowledgments) would have avoided the errors in ship identifications and evolutions so obvious in the photographic portion as well as in the nondoctrinal treatment of amphibious operations and construction battalions. The above comments should not be construed to derogate the value of this book as background reading for non-naval officers anticipating duty with the Navy, or its value as a source for a sea power address. Caution, however, is advised in extracting facts more definitive than the 75/25 water/land ratio.

E.H. ARKLAND
Lieutenant Colonel,
U.S. Marine Corps

PROFESSIONAL READING

Eich, Hermann. *The Unloved Germans*. New York: Stein and Day, 1965. 255p. (DD 76 .E453 1965)

This book is a monumental effort in research attempting to prove that the Germans as a nation and a people are not really as bad as the author believes history has painted them. The author travels deep into the records to find relevant material, primarily cultural in nature, that describes the German people, their character, their feelings, their attitudes, their desires, and above all, their hopes. He has compiled an exhaustive amount of data. He quotes philosophers, historians, poets, painters, musicians, song writers, playwrights, statesmen, heads of government, and, in fact, all apparently who ever had anything to say about Germany and the German people, both from within and without Germany, good or bad. He starts with the Roman historian Tacitus (50-110 A.D.), whose essay "concerning the geography, the manners and the customs of the tribes of Germany" was intended as a lesson to the Romans in courage and virtue. The author discusses the Germany of Bismarck, the Franco-Prussian War, World War I, the birth of the Third Reich, the tragedy of the Jews, World War II, and post-World War II Germany through 1964. The book seems to have been written primarily for German consumption. Michael Glenny translated the original German text into English. The author's conclusions seem directed at the German people and the "German conscience." The whole purpose of *The Unloved Germans* is an attempt to prove that good and evil are not confined by time or frontiers and that they are not to be found in one nation alone. The book is very difficult to read, mostly uninteresting except for some historical detail, and not recommended for any purpose.

R.H. GOODELL
Colonel, U.S. Army

Macmillan, Harold. *Winds of Change, 1914-1939*. New York: Harper & Row, 1966. 584p.

Winds of Change is an extremely interesting, readable, useful autobiographical account of the exciting period of time from 1914 to 1939, as recounted by Harold Macmillan. He states at the beginning of the Prologue that he started to write the book on 4 August 1964, the fiftieth anniversary of the outbreak of the First World War. The next 25-year period then

is the subject of this book and deals with the demise of an old world and birth of a new one. The book will be particularly useful largely from the historical point of view. There is much detail, of course, regarding Mr. Macmillan's own personal career, experiences, and observations. During the First World War, he was commissioned in the Army Reserve, wounded at the battle of the Somme in 1916, and spent the remainder of the war in, or attached to, a hospital. His portrayal of the battlefields and of the men in World War One is particularly vivid. He served in the House of Commons from 1924 to 1939. He then accepted a post in the Ministry of Supply under Churchill in 1940, followed, after the war, by his appointments as Minister of Defence, Foreign Secretary, and Chancellor of the Exchequer. He succeeded the ailing Anthony Eden as Prime Minister in January 1957. His discussions of the period, 1914 to 1939, therefore, are done in retrospect from a vantage position of great responsibility, coupled with his own direct involvement at lower levels of services. The accounts of happenings and decision-making processes are lucid and straightforward, and certainly add to the accumulation of historical knowledge of the period.

Two appendices, "The Price of Peace," published in 1938, and "Economic Aspects of Defence," published in 1939 are useful additions to the book, further providing enlightenment of the period.

J.E. GODFREY
Captain, U.S. Navy

Merchant, Livingston T., ed. *Neighbors Taken for Granted*. New York: Praeger, 1966. 166p.
(E 183.8 .C2M37)

Neighbors Taken for Granted is a collection of essays written by prominent Americans and Canadians which examines American-Canadian relations. Included among the contributors to the book are Dean Acheson, James Reston, General Charles Foulkes, and Bruce Hutchison. The author, who wrote the beginning and final essays, stated that his purpose was to contribute to better understanding of Canada by Americans and of America by Canadians. From the American point of view, the purpose was achieved. Throughout the book the theme of the disparity between the two nations in terms of national power, along with the

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Canadian struggle to maintain national identity and independence, is stressed. In developing the theme, the divergent paths taken by the two North American countries in achieving nationhood are examined, in addition to the positions of the nations on current major world issues. The area which probably causes the most friction between the two nations, American economic influence in Canada, comprises the major part of the book. Other problem areas, including continental defense, NATO, control of nuclear weapons, and the general ignorance of Americans about Canada, are presented.

Perhaps the greatest value of the book lies in its analysis of the problems between the two nations and the origins of these problems. The fact that the problems are recognized by the leaders of the nations combined with the unique border arrangement between the two countries, indicates that the harmonious relationship is not likely to change in the immediate future. However, if this relationship is to continue, the volume points out that the peoples of the two nations should never pay the curiously mixed compliment and insult of taking each other for granted. Although the book cannot be considered a must for all officers, it certainly is an enlightening analysis of American-Canadian relations.

R.H. WILSON
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Phillips, Cabell B.H. *The Truman Presidency*. New York: Macmillan, 1966. 463p. (E 813 .P5 1966)

In the field of political science--as in so many other disciplines which deal with the examination of the method by which humans handle both domestic and international problems--the individual is lost behind the facade of his actions. In Phillips' biographical history of Harry S. Truman, the individual is never forgotten. Using a technique similar to that employed by Fletcher Knebel in his melodramatic fictional works *Night at Camp David* and *Seven Days in May*, Mr. Phillips presents an interesting, moving, and suspense-filled drama about the man who was the 32nd President of the United States. Offering the reader a brief but perspective glance at Truman's youth, Mr. Phillips leads you through the cigar-smoke-filled rooms behind the Pendergast political machine as Truman emerges as the "Senator from Pendergast," to that fateful day in

1945 when President Roosevelt died, catapulting this man to the Presidency. The reasons and the personal considerations offered by both President Truman and those intimately involved in such major decision areas as the dropping of the atombomb, the Potsdam Conference, postwar domestic problems, the 1948 Presidential campaign, and Korea are explored in depth by Mr. Phillips.

For any student of history or political science, or, for that matter, any individual who is interested in reading about a most important segment of our nation's history, *The Truman Presidency* is highly recommended. For the student the book is well foot-noted and contains an excellent bibliography. For the casual reader, Phillips' journalistic style provides easy as well as informative reading.

C.O. WAKEMAN
Commander, U.S. Navy

Twining, Nathan F. *Neither Liberty nor Safety*.
New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1966.
320p. (MA 23 .T88)

General Nathan F. Twining, USAF retired, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from 1957-1960, has compiled a chronology of events, dating back some 25 years, which portrays current questionable trends in our political-military relationships. In numerous cases he has objectively and authentically shown where political decisions emanating from the offices of the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense have overruled the recommendations of the United States' highest military body, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to the detriment of the country's national interest and security. Such cases in point are the 1958-1961 uninspected moratorium on nuclear testing, the TFX, nuclear carriers, military value of cost/effectiveness, the "missile Maginot Line," sanctuaries and getting bogged down in a ground war in Vietnam, centralization of power in the hands of a single Secretary of Defense, and many other matters of equal importance. It is not a question of "hind-sight is always better than foresight" or Monday morning quarterbacking, because in the particular time, place, and circumstance of the cases cited the true facts were known and clearly explicit to the decision makers at the time. It is for this reason that General Twining was prompted to lay out for

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appraisal by the American people current trends in present political-military relationships which undoubtedly will have a profound impact on the future of America--indeed the world. The author implies quite vividly, as stated in his title, that there is "neither liberty nor safety" in the continuation of such trends, and he strongly advocates immediate reversals, which are quoted in part, as follows:

An essential element of defense policy would appear to be a reversal of the trend toward complete and detailed control at the top which came in with Secretary of Defense McNamara. The Secretary of Defense should certainly sit on top of the defense establishment with respect to the general policies of business administration, management procedures, and in the adjudication of differences of military viewpoints. However, he should not be in position to ride roughshod over professional military judgment and at the same time to be able to invoke pressures which tend to muzzle the professional establishment in its traditional dealings with both the public press and the Congress of the United States.

This book is extremely well written, easily read, and understandable; it is highly recommended for the professional military man and civilian alike.

R.N. PETERSON
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