BOOK REVIEWS

HOW COMFORTABLE WILL OUR DESCENDENTS BE WITH THE CHOICES WE'VE MADE TODAY?

John Lewis Gaddis is the Robert A. Lovell Professor of History at Yale University and one of the preeminent historians of American, particularly Cold War, security policy. *Surprise, Security, and the American Experience* is based on a series of lectures given by the author in 2002 addressing the implications for American security after the 11 September attacks. It is a succinct and masterful statement of the central national security dilemma that presently faces us.

For many, especially critics of the current administration, President Bush's post-9/11 policies in response to the threat presented by militant Islamism represent a radical and scary departure from historical U.S. policy. Many putatively are aghast at the introduction of preemptive/preventive war into the National Security Strategy adopted in September 2002 and the apparent shift to a harsh hegemonic unilateralism.

Gaddis argues that far from being a radical departure, the Bush administration's response to the attacks represents considerable continuity with American historical tradition. Twice before in

U.S. history, American assumptions about national security were shattered by surprise attack, and each time U.S. grand strategy profoundly changed as a result.

After the British attack on Washington, D.C., in 1814, John Quincy Adams as secretary of state articulated three principles to secure the American homeland against external attack: preemption, unilateralism, and hegemony. The Monroe Doctrine, proclaiming American hegemony in the Western Hemisphere, was declared unilaterally and preemptively in reaction to the Spanish empire's collapse in Latin America (though in practice it was enforced by British naval supremacy, not American power).

For over a century, the United States expanded its territory and influence through force majeure exercised against "failing states," another phenomenon by no means new in our times. Florida was ceded by Spain under pressure in 1810, Texas and the Southwest were taken from a chaotic Mexico in the mid-nineteenth century, overseas Spanish possessions

were seized in 1898 after an ostensible "terrorist" attack on USS *Maine,* and myriad lesser interventions took place in Latin America and the Caribbean. Fear of multilateral entanglement peaked with insistence on being an "associated power" during World War I, rejection of the League of Nations, and pre–World War II isolationism. America remained content with hegemony in the Western Hemisphere and unilateralism in dealings with other nations and international organizations; preemption of the dictators in the 1930s, always infeasible domestically, would have been impossible given European democracies' appeasement policies.

Transportation revolutions from the late nineteenth century onward diminished the value of geographical separation that underpinned this strategy, as spectacularly proven by the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941. Obliged by necessity—the United States had insufficient power to defeat both Germany and Japan in a reasonable amount of time and at an acceptable cost—to depart radically from unilateralism, President Franklin D. Roosevelt moved quickly to establish a "Grand Alliance" with Britain and the Soviet Union.

By the end of World War II, America "was able to move in a remarkably short period of time from a strategy that had limited itself to controlling the western hemisphere to one aimed at winning a global war and managing the peace that would follow. Equally significant is the fact that FDR pulled off this expanded hegemony by scrapping rather than embracing the two other key components of Adams' strategy, unilateralism and preemption."

To keep allies with widely disparate war aims together, FDR sought to "embed conflicting unilateral priorities within a cooperative multilateral framework. . . . If the present war could provide the incentive to build structures and procedures that would prevent new [wars], then all would benefit." Absent this, "there was sure to be something worse, whether in the form of a less than decisive victory against Germany and Japan, or a postwar economic collapse, or even a replay of the post–World War I retreat by the United States back into the unilateralism of the nineteenth century that had . . . contributed to the coming of World War II. The result was de facto American hegemony, but in contrast to anything John Quincy Adams could ever have imagined, *it was to arise by consent.*"

Gaddis argues that this was the radical departure in U.S. security policy, not what has happened since 11 September. Since World War II, the underlying principle vis-à-vis other nations was that "there should always be something worse than the prospect of American domination," a condition easy to maintain during the Cold War standoff with the Soviet Union. This ensured an "asymmetry of legitimacy" between the United States and the Soviet Union that "did much to determine how the Cold War was fought and who would ultimately win it." Preemption as policy routinely was rejected on the basis that, given the lessons of the bloody world wars, an impossibly high moral ante was needed to justify starting a war and incurring the inevitable costs for an unknown benefit, even in the face of a clear and present danger.

But what if there is no longer "something worse"? One curious question

post–Cold War is why there have been no serious efforts among other nations to build countervailing groupings to "balance" near-hegemonic U.S. global power, French urgings notwithstanding. "The reason, very likely, was the habit of self-restraint Americans had developed—because they had had to—during the Cold War, a habit they did not entirely relinquish after it ended."

The shocking and lethal nature of the 9/11 attacks, coupled with the fact that they had been executed by a mere group of zealots, resulted in a rapid, radical change in U.S. national security strategy. Key Cold War assumptions no longer applied. The post–Cold War international environment was *not* benign; terrorists were neither deterrable nor containable like states but potentially had equivalent lethality; the international state system had declining authority; and there was no longer a security environment in which all the players knew and respected the rules.

The 2002 National Security Strategy avers that the United States will "identify and eliminate terrorists wherever they are, together with the regimes that sustain them." Though multilateral action is preferred ("The United States will constantly strive to enlist the support of the international community"), unilateral preemption may be necessary ("We cannot let our enemies strike first."). The United States will maintain de facto hegemonic power sufficient "to dissuade potential adversaries from pursuing a military build-up in hopes of surpassing, or equaling, the power of the United States." The strategy seeks to make such implicit hegemonic power palatable by linking it to such universal principles as "No people on earth yearn to be oppressed, aspire to servitude, or

eagerly await the midnight knock of the secret police." Lastly, the strategy and subsequent policy statements argue that terrorism (that we care about) is spawned largely by the lack of representative institutions in tyrannical regimes; thus "terrorism—and by implication the authoritarianism that breeds it—must become as obsolete as slavery, piracy, or genocide" through the spread of democracy. Gaddis finds much to respect in this strategy, particularly its intellectual coherence. However, he notes glaring flaws in its execution. The "most obvious failure has to do with the relationship between *preemption, hegemony, and consent.*" The run-up to and aftermath of the Iraqi war have raised doubts about the willingness of much of the world to consent to American hegemony if used to preempt in the absence of compellingly clear and present danger, doubts aggravated by the fact that the Bush administration "has never deployed language with anything like the care it has taken in deploying its military capabilities." It is this lack of multilateral "consent"—and the supposed departure from widely accepted historical norms—that has animated much of the opposition to current policies both at home and abroad.

This poses a problem that will not soon disappear. As Gaddis notes, "the means we choose in this post-September 11th environment could wind up undermining the ends we seek. It is also possible, though, that the ends we seek, given the new threats we face, can be achieved only by means different from those that won World War II and the Cold War. This much at least is clear: the dilemma is a difficult one, and its resolution will largely determine the relationship

between surprise, security, and the American experience in the 21st century."

Gaddis closes with a poignant anecdote. One of his Yale undergraduates "asked in the dark and fearful days that followed September 11th, 'Would it be OK now for us to be patriotic?'" to which he responds, "Yes, I think it would." This is a commentary both on the smug self-indulgence of many elites during America's post–Cold War "vacation from history" and on the uncomfortable "disconnection in our thinking between the security to which we've become accustomed and the means by which we obtained it." It is intellectually fashionable in many venues today to condemn the sometimes morally ambiguous policies that have nonetheless brought us the national security we historically have taken for granted. But as Gaddis notes: "The better approach, I think, is to acknowledge the moral ambiguity of our history. Like most other nations, we got to where we are by means that we cannot today, in their entirety, comfortably endorse. Comfort alone, however, cannot be the criterion by which a nation shapes its strategy and secures its safety. The means of confronting danger do not disqualify themselves from consideration solely on the basis of the uneasiness they produce. Before we too quickly condemn how our ancestors dealt with such problems, therefore, we might well ask ourselves two questions: What would *we* have done if we had been in their place then? And, even scarier, how comfortable will *our* descendants be with the choices we make today?"

JAN VAN TOL
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Burke, Jason. *Al-Qaeda: Casting a Shadow of Terror.* New York: I. B. Tauris, 2003. 304pp. $24.95

As the United States enters its fifth year in the war on terrorism, too little is known about al-Qaʿida. Though several top al-Qaʿida operatives, like Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, are now in custody, and detainee reporting from Guantanamo Bay, Bagram Airbase, and other locations provides a historical snapshot of the pre-9/11 organization led by Usama Bin Laden, the United States still lacks the vocabulary to understand how and why terrorism threatens. This is partly due to the impact of global counterterrorist operations (the Congressional Research Services notes that three thousand suspected al-Qaʿida members have been detained by about ninety countries), conflicting strategies within Bin Laden's organization (global legion of militants or global inspiration), and the diversity of groups that compose contemporary depictions of al-Qaʿida (the Egyptian al-Jihad, the Indonesian Jemaah Islamiyah, or the Kashmiri Haarakat ul-Mujahidin, to name three of the many disparate nationalist groups lumped together with al-Qaʿida).

Jason Burke, a chief reporter for the London *Observer* who spent about four years in Pakistan and Afghanistan, argues that al-Qaʿida (Arabic for "the base of operation" or "foundation") is an overused term and mischaracterizes the nature of international terrorism. In contrast to the pre-9/11 view that Bin Laden is al-Qaʿida, or the post–Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (Afghanistan) view that al-Qaʿida is a global coalition of factions, Burke argues it is less an organization than an ideology. "Osama

bin Laden did not create it nor will his death or incarceration end it"—he has been a "peripheral player in modern Islamic militancy." Al-Qaʻida is bigger and different from Bin Laden and his Egyptian deputy Ayman al-Zawahiri. The word denotes a purpose, not an organization.

Throughout the book, Burke weaves a personal narrative drawing from his experiences on the ground and upon a deep understanding of international terrorism. He argues, "contemporary Islamic militancy is a diverse and complex historical phenomenon." It is driven by local political grievances, economic frustration, and government repression.

Burke's two-year-old assertion that al-Qaʻida is more of an ideology than a group is gaining currency and is now more widely accepted within the U.S. government. The Defense Department has now defined "countering ideological support for terrorism," or CIST, as a major component of its strategy in the global war on terrorism. In order to win this war, it is simply not enough to protect the homeland, neutralize terrorists, and eliminate terrorist safe havens. Rather, the goal is to create the conditions that prevent terrorism from becoming an international threat. As such, the Bush administration's efforts to promote democracy and eliminate tyranny are seen as the means to establish pluralism and to provide opposition groups a nonviolent venue to express grievances. In many authoritarian countries today, there are few options for peaceful regime change. Burke's travels and interviews led him to the conclusion that "as national Islamic movements, moderate or violent, are crushed or fail, anger is channeled into

the symbolic realm and into the international, cosmic, apocalyptic language of bin Laden and his associates."

Burke's work adds to the Defense Department's effort to analyze, by deconstructing al-Qaʻida, what motivates radical terrorist groups and understand why the United States is increasingly a target. For Burke, "the world is a far more radicalized place now than it was prior to September 11th." It is the freelance operators without obvious connection to any group who should worry us the most; without a peaceful way to resolve their perceived injustice, they resort to violence.

The distance from 9/11, counterterrorism successes with international partners, and the lack of additional attacks in the United States allow for a more thoughtful debate on why the United States is perceived negatively in the world and how local conditions spawn terrorist movements. For those who are ready for the answers, Burke's book is a good place to start. He not only corrects conventional misunderstandings of al-Qaʻida but offers a good representation of the radicalism the United States is attempting to contain.

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Diamond, Jared. *Collapse: How Societies Choose to Fail or Succeed.* New York: Viking, 2005. 525pp. $29.95

In his Pulitzer Prize–winning *Guns, Germs and Steel,* Jared Diamond, professor of geology at UCLA, used a blend of history, archaeology, geography, and anthropology to explain how Western civilizations rose to dominance. In *Collapse,*

Diamond uses the same approach to explore what causes some civilizations to fall into ruin while others survive or prosper. This second volume is perhaps more important in that it goes right to the heart of today's global war on terrorism and to steps that the West can take to minimize the potential for catastrophic failure, not only in the developing world but in the West itself.

Diamond contends that the collapse ("drastic decrease in human population size and/or political/economic/social complexity, over a considerable area, for an extended time") of many past societies is tied to unintended ecological suicide. He tracks this idea through a number of case studies, including the failed Polynesian cultures on Easter Island and in the southwest Pacific, the Anasazi and Mayan civilizations in the Americas, and the Viking colony on Greenland. His analysis includes lists of environmentally based causes, and decisions that societies either made or failed to make that ultimately determined their fate. He then traces these same ideas to today's world and hazards some projections into the future.

This process of ecocide is measured in eight interrelated categories: deforestation and habitat destruction; soil erosion, salinization, etc.; poor water management; overhunting; overfishing; the introduction of harmful alien species; population growth; and the increased per capita impact of people. Historically these categories have worked in tandem over time to produce collapse. This was true even in situations where conditions were not inherently catastrophic. A case in point is the demise of the Norse civilization in medieval Greenland. The Vikings' once-thriving colony died out, clinging to a maladapted cultural heritage to the last. As the Vikings' society withered, their Inuit neighbors survived by adapting to the changing climate wrought by the mini Ice Age of the Middle Ages.

Diamond also notes the recent emergence of four new categories that add to the concern: climate change caused by humans, the buildup of toxic chemicals in the environment, energy shortages, and full human utilization of the earth's photosynthetic capacity. Diamond's discussion of these points tends to the esoteric, but several points are clear. Global warming, degradation of soils and fishing grounds through toxic poisoning, and decreasing availability of reasonably affordable energy are real problems. More importantly, they are part of a larger issue—that of the earth's capacity to sustain a growing population striving to achieve first-world status. The global, political, and social strains of billions of people aspiring to consume resources on a scale equaling that of Western societies is bound to be disruptive.

Diamond recognizes that there is more to the problem of collapse than that. No radical "tree hugger," Diamond is neither narrow-minded nor anti-business. He takes a broad look at a variety of contributing factors, including climatic change, hostile neighbors, declining support from friendly neighbors, and most importantly, a society's response to environmental degradation.

By way of illustration, Diamond opens with a case study of Montana. Once one of the wealthiest states, Montana is now among the poorest. This change flowed from multiple factors: deforestation, pollution from mining, introduction of foreign plant and fish species, loss of soil fertility and productivity, and

degradation and shortage of water. Diamond points also to a growing disparity between the super-rich flocking in to enjoy the scenery and the economically distressed local population whose means of livelihood are being eroded, and the political tensions that inevitably result.

This same confluence of problems, many coming as a result of conscious decisions on the part of leaders or citizens, is being played out across the globe. One would expect Africa, the perennial loser in such comparisons, to hold the anchor position as the continent most likely to fail. Not so. Australia heads the list, due to the legacy of aggressive importation of harmful species; government policies that promote and reward deforestation and soil ruination; destruction of aquatic habitats needed for sustainable fisheries; and other problems. Diamond opines that these conditions are not irreversible but that the continent's sustainable population is probably around eight million, somewhat less than half its current level. While one may question the exactitude of the eight-million figure, his case of overpopulation in relation to sustainability over time is well made, at least in terms of capacity for food production.

Turning to Africa, Diamond offers an instructive analysis of the Rwandan genocide. Taking a Malthusian view over the more common Hutu-versus-Tutsi source of disruption, he demonstrates how a complex mixture of poverty, fear, and opportunism, not tribal affiliation, drove the genocide. In the final analysis it all came down to land. As the population exceeded the land's ability to sustain it, the traditional fabric of Rwandan society was ripped apart. This situation was exploited by government, tribal, and even religious leaders who turned the destitute against the merely poverty stricken. The result was the mass murder of people who had some land by those who had none.

For all the apparent doom and gloom, Diamond is cautiously optimistic about the future. Despite past failures, there are too many stories of societies successfully adapting to changing circumstances for us to despair. Technology can also contribute to success, though we are wise not to consider advances as a panacea. As to the importance of turning things around, he notes that today's terrorists may be well educated and moneyed but argues that "they still depend on a desperate society for support and toleration." He further notes, "well nourished societies, offering good job prospects . . . don't offer broad support to their fanatics." Perhaps it is this angle, if not that of survival itself, that holds the greatest interest for today's national security community.

THOMAS E. SEAL
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George, Roger Z., and Robert D. Kline, eds. *Intelligence and the National Security Strategist: Enduring Issues and Challenges.* Washington, D.C.: National Defense Univ. Press, 2004. 564pp. $150

The current climate of reform and blame affecting the intelligence community can deflect attention from its substance and value as a contributor to policy and military operations. Lost in the shuffle of reorganization and finger-pointing are issues that will consistently remain important challenges—matters of defining and improving analysis,

educating intelligence consumers on the possibilities and constraints of intelligence, dealing with the embedded and new challenges of collection in a world dominated by previously unimagined threats, and balancing security with the need to share. It is against this backdrop that the editors, George and Kline, have collected essays by an impressive list of authors addressing many of the issues especially salient to intelligence practitioners and their consumers in this time of reflection and reform.

The anthology provides an excellent baseline for educating any analyst or consumer, new or experienced, on many of the issues consistently at play within the intelligence community. Providing content and context to the issues of requirements, collection, exploitation, analysis, and consumer use, the book provides an excellent foundation for understanding the challenges inherent in each part of the intelligence cycle. It is ideal for its intended use as a textbook for future analysts and policy makers, and is equally suited for anyone interested in how the intelligence community and its components operate.

The book is well organized, providing different perspectives on important issues. The organization allows the reader, as any great anthology does, to pick up the book and select an article or group of articles. An additional benefit of the thoughtfully considered collection is the diversity of perspectives. Essays by practitioners, theorists, and consumers each give glimpses into every role that might not otherwise be known. This range of views helps meet the stated intentions of the book—to stir thought on how the community does and should work and how it

should best serve all of its diplomatic, policy, and military consumers.

Some sections are particularly thought provoking. The essays devoted to "Intelligence and the Military," for example, make the reader consider what kinds of options are available and should be pursued in strengthening the relationship between military and civilian intelligence practitioners and agencies: Where should the lines for collection, analysis, and dissemination be drawn or redrawn in order to exploit most effectively each group's relative strengths? Or more basically, what are the real strengths of each outfit? What should they be?

The parts devoted to the "Challenges of Analysis" and "The Perils of Policy Support" produce valuable insights into how the different organizations are configured for their roles in the intelligence process. The "Challenges of Analysis" section describes some of the ongoing challenges of analysis and how the CIA, primarily, has developed methods to address these challenges. "The Perils of Policy Support" describes how consumers view and use intelligence. However, and though both of the last-named sections provide interesting insights into how each side currently operates, they offer little in the way of suggestions for improving the status quo. Perhaps an additional article in each of these sections, proposing or otherwise articulating several options for the way ahead, based on current legislative language or the state of debate, would be warranted in a future edition.

Deception, while a critical issue, probably gets too much play. Its treatment is a bit too founded in historical examples. In the realms of open sources, cyberspace, and network-centric adversaries, deception

issues and means of evaluation are different. While practitioners and consumers should necessarily be encouraged to learn the lessons and benefits of deception, perhaps this section should be coupled with the one devoted to open-source analysis to discuss the still unwieldy problems of the future of intelligence—reams of information from a variety of unknown sources that current "INT" equipment and methods are not ready to handle.

Overall, this book is remarkably valuable to any course dealing with the intelligence community. As it is used in classes, the outcomes of the debates it will inevitably create should themselves become anthologies for future readers.

JAMIESON JO MEDBY
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William J. Lahneman, ed. *Military Intervention: Cases in Context for the 21st Century,* Oxford, U.K.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004. 224 pp. $26.95

Most students of international affairs would agree that understanding the causes and results of military interventions is one of the more pressing security issues facing the United States in the early years of the twenty-first century. William Lahneman, program coordinator of the Center for International and Security Studies at the University of Maryland, has assembled a gifted group of analysts to examine seven instances of military intervention and, through the use of a common set of pertinent questions, attempt to reach a deeper understanding of interventions, while identifying ways to increase the chances of success in an intervention.

The eleven contributors to this volume have impressive credentials. Together, they compose a potent mix of security scholars and practitioners. In addition to Lahneman himself, of special note are William Zartman and John Steinbruner. Zartman is the Jacob Blaustein Professor of International Organizations and Conflict Resolution, and the Director of Conflict Management at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University. John Steinbruner, Director of the Center for International and Security Studies at the School of Public Policy, University of Maryland, is also the author of *The Cybernetic Theory of Decision* (Princeton Univ. Press, 2002), a seminal work in the study of decision making.

Military Intervention examines six cases of military intervention: Somalia (1992), Bosnia (1991–94), Haiti (1994), Rwanda (1994), Sierra Leone (2000), and East Timor (1999). A seventh case involving Cambodia is also provided, although in this instance, rather than focusing on a single intervention, the authors examine interventions from 1806 to 2003. Lahneman's stated intention was that each case be examined through the lens of nine discrete questions, ranging from the nature of the intervention force to the extent to which nonmilitary aspects of the intervention were necessary and sufficient to produce a lasting peace. As analytical approaches go, this one seems well suited to support comparative analyses and cross-case lessons. Unfortunately, as is sometimes the case with a collection of essays, some authors approached this requirement with more rigor than others. The essay on Rwanda, written by Gilbert M. Khadiagala, follows the formula most closely; the chapter on

Cambodia veers the farthest from it. Editing a volume of this nature can be a thankless task, but Lahneman would have been better served by insistence that his contributors specifically answer his questions. The lack of such consistency may obscure elements the cases have in common, resulting in a missed opportunity to increase a systemic understanding of intervention.

That said, this volume is a useful addition to the body of work that, to paraphrase Alexander George, attempts to bridge the gap between the realms of academic theory and practical application. Of particular value in this regard is the first chapter of the book, written by Steinbruner and Jason Forrester. The authors confirm what many security professionals have long believed, that "civil conflicts are actually economic battles over the control of resources waged under conditions in which allocation can not be managed by legal methods or legitimate government domination."

Other chapters are less useful. First, with the possible exception of East Timor, there are deeper and more complete descriptions of the crises to be found than those in this book. Second, in some cases, the author's conclusions raise questions that beg to be answered but are left hanging. For example, David Laitin, writing on the intervention in Somalia, argues that "early, decisive action" could have been taken. Yet he acknowledges the political will for such early action was lacking and does not address how such resolve might have been created. Laitin also fails to ask how an early intervention operation in Somalia could have been terminated. Could the applicable mandate have been achieved, or would long-term stability have required the presence of

peacekeepers? Furthermore, Laitin perpetuates the idea that only eighteen U.S. servicemen were killed in the battle of Mogadishu. This number does not take into account the deaths of two soldiers assigned to the reaction force, nor does it acknowledge the Malaysian soldier who lost his life during the rescue effort. This may seem a small point, but it raises troubling questions about the depth of Laitin's research.

Steven Burg's analysis of the intervention in Bosnia reveals different shortcomings. The key point of the chapter—that states do not mount serious interventions unless national interests are involved—is widely accepted. However, Burg's chapter contains both unsupported assertions and a lack of detail concerning aspects of the case that may not be familiar to the lay reader. Still, his identification and description of seven stages of intervention is both thought provoking and useful.

As mentioned earlier, the case on Rwanda is well written and argued. Khadiagala does not insult the reader's intelligence by asserting that Western states could not have intervened in time—he clearly attributes their failure to act in Rwanda to a lack of political will. More debatable is his assertion that both sides in the conflict were counting on external actors to save them from a weak peace agreement. The evidence presented seems sketchy, especially given the Revolutionary United Front's reluctance to allow any effort at a political settlement until it had conquered the country.

The cases on Haiti, East Timor, and Sierra Leone are straightforward. Their respective conclusions include the ideas that fostering peace is conducive to long-term U.S. security, that valid political processes are central to peace, that

military intervention alone is not enough to "end a conflict whose basic cause is state collapse," and that peacekeepers may be better served by developing successful strategies to transfer power than by focusing on "exit strategies." These conclusions are well supported, and it is difficult to argue with any one of them.

The case of Cambodia, presented in such a different fashion, concludes that future military intervention in Cambodia is unlikely. The analysis predicts that other interventions—notably exploitative economic ones—will increase and that the forces of globalization will prove injurious to the average Khmer. Unfortunately, the chapter ends before explaining these findings in detail.

The final chapter, written by Lahneman himself, is in many ways the most valuable. Lahneman provides his own summary of the book's cases, then identifies a variety of challenges and prescriptions associated with intervention operations. These findings range from the commonsense ("A coalition of willing states should conduct military intervention") to the provocative ("Operations taken solely for humanitarian reasons tend to be too little and too late").

In the final analysis, Lahneman's book is less useful for the insights it provides into the specifically examined cases than for the questions it raises that should be answered before any intervention is ordered. This work is also an invitation to deepen the current national discussion on intervention and nation building. As Lahneman suggests, this discussion is too important to be confined to the ivory tower; the invitation should not go unanswered by the academic and security communities.

RICHARD NORTON
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Moore, Jeffrey M. *Spies for Nimitz: Joint Military Intelligence in the Pacific War*. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2004, 336pp. $29.95

Despite its title, this book is not about spies but about what is referred to in today's parlance as "intelligence preparation of the battlefield": a sustained process of research and analysis, based on all source collection efforts, that identifies important aspects of potential combat environments. Intelligence preparation of the battlefield provides planners and commanders with "combat intelligence"—about the terrain, weather conditions, enemy order of battle and dispositions—needed to conduct an upcoming operation. For instance, without knowledge of tidal conditions, currents, the composition and slope of a beach, or the location of underwater obstructions and mines, amphibious operations can be doomed to failure before they begin.

In this history of the performance of U.S. intelligence in the Pacific during World War II, Jeffrey Moore links the intelligence provided to planners by the Joint Intelligence Center Pacific Ocean Area (JICPOA) to the outcome of the major amphibious assaults against Japanese-occupied islands. Intelligence preparation of the battlefield, always important, was of great strategic significance in the "island hopping" campaign undertaken by the United States. Planners had to identify atolls or islets that were lightly defended by the Japanese yet possessed the anchorages, landing strips, and flat terrain that made them suitable as operating bases for the next stage in the campaign. When intelligence analysts provided accurate pictures of the battlefield, operations

generally went smoothly and U.S. casualties were light. When they underestimated enemy strength, failed to warn the assault of strange topographic conditions, or failed to anticipate shifts in enemy strategy, the outcome was a grinding attritional battle that generated high losses.

American intelligence analysts and planners knew very little about the Marshall, Mariana, or Caroline Islands. Of course, many of the atolls and islets targeted in the American march across the Pacific were extraordinarily isolated and had been inhabited mostly by Polynesians before the war. More surprisingly, planners also knew little about *American* islands that had been seized by the Japanese in the immediate aftermath of Pearl Harbor. Guamanians who had left their home island when the Japanese invaded had to be consulted about topography, road networks, and tidal conditions to support plans for the assault on Guam. The U.S. Navy had supposedly been planning operations against Japan for years; it is hard to explain why so little effort had been made to gather basic information about the Pacific islands.

In assessing JICPOA's performance, Moore identifies a perplexing trend—that U.S. intelligence actually deteriorated as the war progressed. Intelligence performed relatively well against early targets (Kwajalein, Eniwetok, Tinian, and Guam), probably because these atolls were lightly defended by the Japanese and relatively few fortifications had to be identified in the planning of shore bombardment. At the start of the war, the Japanese mostly constructed beach defenses, which were easy to spot by submarine and aerial reconnaissance. There were also some early

successes in the exploitation of Japanese material and personnel. Documents that were left behind in Guam by the Japanese Thirty-first Army headquarters were a windfall of information about Japanese defenses across the Pacific. JICPOA, however, lacked the translators and analysts needed to go through these materials quickly, a phenomenon that is referred to today as "information overload." The tempo of the campaign was so fast, and intelligence analysis so slow, that important information often reached commanders after a battle was already joined, by which time information could yield only diminishing returns.

Worse, as the war progressed, the Japanese constructed increasingly sophisticated and well camouflaged fortifications in depth, and the time available for U.S. analysts to survey and identify island defenses decreased. Operations were executed in rapid succession, and JICPOA could no longer keep pace. Intelligence estimates decreased in quantity and accuracy just as Japanese defenses were increasing in strength and lethality. The attitudes of senior U.S. officers also changed, as American materiel superiority began to take its toll on the Japanese. Intelligence preparation of the battlefield took a backseat to maintaining the momentum of the drive across the Pacific. Commanders were more interested in bringing the overwhelming weight of U.S. naval, Marine, and army units quickly to bear against the Japanese so that the ghastly attritional campaign might end as soon as possible. As Moore notes, the island campaigns were brought to an end not by brilliant maneuver but by the virtual annihilation of Japanese garrisons.

Moore looks on the bright side of JICPOA's modest performance, but he finds only one outstanding success by its analysts during the war. Ironically, it was in support of an amphibious operation that never occurred, the planned invasion of Kyushu in the autumn of 1945. Because Japanese garrisons usually fought to the death and inflicted high casualties on attacking forces, the five hundred thousand defenders of Kyushu were capable of turning the opening phase of the attack on the home islands into a bloodbath. JICPOA's accurate estimates of the steady buildup of Japanese forces on the island led military planners to support a less costly way to end the war in the Pacific—the use of the atomic bomb against Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945.

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Lacquement, Richard A., Jr. *Shaping American Military Capabilities after the Cold War.* Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2003. 211pp. $67.95

Richard Lacquement provides an important narrative history and critical analysis of the Defense Department's official policy studies and reviews from the end of the Cold War through the early administration of George W. Bush. The book addresses several key themes, highlighting the scope and speed of military reform efforts and the failure, in the author's view, of defense transformation. Each chapter provides a review, discussion, and critique of the official documents on American defense policy and strategic thinking in the post–Cold War decade. The book traces the major themes and issues in the official Defense Department policy reviews, including the 1990 Base Force, the 1993 Bottom-Up Review, the 1995 Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces, and the 1997 and 2001 Quadrennial Defense Reviews.

Lacquement is an Army field artillery officer who has served on the faculties of the U.S. Military Academy and the Naval War College. *Shaping American Military Capabilities after the Cold War*, his first book, is based on his Princeton University doctoral dissertation. It is the product of serious academic research that is informed throughout by the sincere search of a soldier-statesman for better ideas in the development of the U.S. armed forces' capabilities to serve the nation's current and future security needs.

From Les Aspin, through William Perry and William Cohen, to Donald Rumsfeld, defense secretaries and their official policy documents have addressed the Defense Department's and services' efforts at transforming the post–Cold War military. Lacquement's argument is that more change throughout the 1990s would have been better. He contrasts the influence of outsiders, mainly political defense reformers, to that of insiders, members of a mostly conservative military culture and status quo–oriented senior military leadership. Lacquement characterizes Bill Clinton's defense secretary, Les Aspin, and Connecticut senator Joseph Lieberman as champions of innovation, while portraying the Joint Chiefs of Staff chairmen Generals Colin Powell and John Shalikashvili as resistant to revolutionary new thinking on defense issues.

In tracing the evolution of these official policy documents, Lacquement comes out on the side of the glass-half-empty view of the Defense Department's attempts at reshaping post–Cold War military capabilities and service organizations and programs. He argues that major weapons programs and service budget shares overrode sound strategic thinking; that innovation champions were stymied by senior officers; and that incrementalism prevailed over transformation. Lacquement is clearly on the side of the proponents for more, better, and faster defense transformation.

Toward the end of his book, Lacquement also raises important questions regarding the nation-building capabilities of U.S. forces engaged in current complex counterinsurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. For instance, he calls for additional civil affairs and psychological operations forces. In recent military history, those nation-building debates have gone back to the arguments over the appropriate roles and missions of U.S. ground forces in the war in Vietnam (Lacquement cites Andrew Krepinevich, Jr., *The Army and Vietnam* [Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1998], for instance). Nevertheless, his arguments lend an element of currency to those engaged in Iraq and Afghanistan policies regarding "postconflict" and stability operations. The final chapter, "Evaluation and Recommendations," introduces possibilities for engaging in some out-of-the box thinking on winning the next war by leveraging technology and the revolution in military affairs; supporting effective peace operations; and fighting the global war on terrorism while improving homeland defense. These are significant enough research topics for a second book.

What this work does not provide is an assessment of the innovations that were attempted and in some cases executed during the Clinton and early Bush eras. My hunch is there were innovations at many levels within the Defense Department, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the services, and the combatant commands that deserve additional attention and more research. For instance, how are we to explain the relative successes in the use of military capabilities to achieve political objectives in Balkans peacekeeping, as well as in the wars in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq? Would a more thoroughly transformed military have resulted in even fewer American and civilian casualties, and better coordinated NATO operations in Kosovo? More effective combined, joint, and special operations in Afghanistan; or a quicker completion of the conventional battles in Iraq?

Lacquement's book, carefully read, provides critical insights into the assumptions and themes in the evolution of the key policy and strategy documents in the decade following the end of the Cold War. *Shaping American Military Capabilities after the Cold War* serves to inform and ground a study of the history of major Clinton-era defense policy reviews. Gauging the size, scope, and speed of change while retaining the readiness and military capabilities to defend against current and emerging threats, of course, represents an important research agenda. For all these reasons, *Shaping American Military Capabilities after the Cold War* is an important book for students of international security and American

defense policy, and especially readers interested in defense transformation.

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Bell, Christopher M., and Bruce A. Elleman, eds. *Naval Mutinies of the Twentieth Century: An International Perspective.* London: Frank Cass, 2003. 288pp. $125

Throughout this excellent collection of essays on what might rightly be called the mystique of mutiny runs a significant thread—that from centuries of laws and regulations governing naval conduct and discipline there has emerged no precise or universally accepted definition of mutiny. Ambiguity has clouded every effort to create one. The only consistent element, despite the number of crewmen involved and the growth of simple disobedience into violence, is the necessary presence of usurpation and subversion of authority.

This is evident in what thirteen writers contribute here, in an authoritative and attractive style and tone. The mutinies they have selected for study are of a character so dramatic that no matter how scholarly the approach and painstaking the research, each tale is likely to intrigue the reader. Certain selections may be familiar: the Russian battleship *Potemkin,* the mass uprising that shook the German High Seas Fleet in 1918, Invergordon, and the Port Chicago mutiny. The authors—Robert Zebroski, Michael Epkenhans of Germany's Otto von Bismarck Foundation, Christopher M. Bell, and Regina T. Akers of the Naval Historical Center—tackle their subjects with fresh appraisal and zeal. The bloody *Potemkin* revolt led to the fall of

the Romanovs. The mutinous German seamen sabotaged their government's war effort. The Invergordon mutiny threw Great Britain off the gold standard. Thanks mostly to the NAACP's brilliant young lawyer, Thurgood Marshall, the Port Chicago episode not only struck a blow at racial discrimination but highlighted the endless debate of what constitutes a mutiny. Also, it should not be forgotten that President Clinton's pardon of Freddie Meeks in 1999 still leaves the names of forty-nine African-Americans on record as the only convicted mutineers in U.S. naval history.

The lesser known mutinies are dealt with by equally qualified experts with comparable skill and revelation. In 1910 the fury of Brazilian sailors against brutal employment of the lash reflected that country's discontent. After winning minor reforms from the ruling class, the men of the dreadnoughts *Minas Geraes* and *Sao Paulo* continued to show the Brazilian flag above subequatorial waters, maintaining their country's reputation as South America's leading naval power. The mutiny in the Adriatic Sea aboard the Austro-Hungarian armored cruisers *Sankt George* and *Kaiser Karl VI* in February 1918 is said to have helped bring down the Hapsburg monarchy. Yet as the author of "The Cattaro Mutiny, 1918," Paul G. Halpern of Florida State University, asserts, the revolt lasted only two days. Its causes were traceable to bad food, boredom, and plain war-weariness. Also mutinous, after four years of war with Germany, were French sailors when ordered into war against Russian Bolsheviks. While this event is the principal focus of the essay by French history professor Philippe Masson, notice

might have been taken of concurrent mutinous outbreaks prompted by the same disinclination to fight Russians, after fighting Germans, onboard British warships off Archangel and among American troops in the same region.

Homesickness and wartime restrictions were among the reasons why Australian tars defied their officers in 1919. The Chilean navy's revolt had its roots, as had that of the men of Invergordon, in the world economic depression, but the Chilean navy's revolt is notable as the first naval mutiny crushed by air bombardment. Indian sailors in the waning years of the British Raj staged lower-deck protests against their officers; the Canadian fleet developed "a tradition of mutiny" in the 1930s; and the Chong-qing mutiny off Manchuria in 1949 "played a pivotal role in the . . . founding of the People's Republic of China."

Each story is briskly told, thoroughly detailed, and accompanied by comprehensive source data. Perhaps fortunately for riddle lovers, the question persists—what *is* a mutiny? Many of the Port Chicago fifty awaiting trial were bewildered, believing that a mutiny involved a crew overthrowing its officers and taking command of the ship. High-level brass can be just as confused. At a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing following the Vietnam-era disturbances on the U.S. aircraft carriers *Constellation* and *Kitty Hawk,* the chairman asked Admiral Elmo Zumwalt, then Chief of Naval Operations, to define mutiny. Zumwalt passed that one on to his lawyer. The chairman wondered aloud if the *Caine* mutiny of Herman Wouk's novel, though fictional, was not the real thing; the CNO suggested that what happened on the *Bounty* was a genuine mutiny.

This book mentions these troubles on the American flattops only in passing. Were all the episodes it covers truly mutinies? Let the question rest. This is a fine book, eminently readable, and as definitive as any work can claim to be on the still mysterious matter of mutiny.

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Brown, Stephen R. *Scurvy: How a Surgeon, a Mariner, and a Gentleman Solved the Greatest Medical Mystery of the Age of Sail.* Markham, Ont.: Thomas Allen, 2003. 254pp. $23.95

The conquest of scurvy played as great a role as any naval battle in the history of England's domination of the world during the Age of Sail. Today we understand that scurvy is a condition caused by dietary deficiency. The typical menu for a sailor in the eighteenth century consisted of biscuits, salt beef, salt pork, dried fish, butter, cheese, peas, and beer—hardly sources of vitamin C. According to the 1763 annual register tabulation of casualties among British sailors in the Seven Years' War with France, of 184,999 men, 133,708 died from disease, primarily scurvy, while only 1,512 were killed in action. Such numbers are hard to comprehend today.

Brown implies that America won its independence because the ravages of this disease prevented the British fleet from maintaining an effective blockade. Only a few years later, having conquered scurvy, the same navy thwarted Napoleon from mounting an invasion force and sustained a blockade preventing the French and Spanish from consolidating their ships into an effective fleet.

This book is a definitive history of scurvy. It had been known among the ancients, but its effects became truly dreadful during the Age of Sail, when ships would be at sea for months on end. The beginnings of a concerted search for its cure might be ascribed to the ill-fated circumnavigation of the world by George Anson in the years 1740–44. Five warships and one sloop began the journey, but only one ship returned. Scurvy had felled so many men that ships had had to be scuttled and abandoned for lack of sufficient crews. When Anson became First Lord of the Admiralty, he encouraged scurvy research and made changes to shipboard hygiene.

Three names stand out in the search for a cure: James Lind, a surgeon, performed controlled experiments; James Cook, a mariner, managed to circle the globe without his men's succumbing to scurvy; and Gilbert Bane, a gentleman, was able to overcome tradition-bound prejudices and persuade the Admiralty to issue daily rations of lemon juice, which finally eliminated the dreaded disease.

Scurvy is important reading for today's naval officer, not only because it tells a historically fascinating tale but also because it examines how progress was made by "thinking out of the box" and going beyond the assumptions of the times. As early as the early seventeenth century open minds discovered a cure but did not fully understand why it relieved the effects of the disease.

"Common sense" at that time made the approach seem implausible, and the cure was lost. Scurvy was eventually defeated, but its cause was not fully understood until the twentieth century. The Nobel laureate Albert Szent-Gyorgyi isolated ascorbic acid in 1932, and today we are able to buy inexpensive megadoses of vitamin C.

The story told by Stephen Brown is fascinating in the way it ties together seemingly disconnected events to show that cause and effect are not always linear. Vasco de Gama recorded the first naval outbreak of scurvy during his 1497 voyage around the Cape of Good Hope. Iroquois Indians helped Jacques Cartier's crew survive scurvy while wintering on the banks of the St. Lawrence in 1534. The East India Company defeated scurvy in the early 1600s, but, as we have noted, the cure was lost. Scurvy developed during the Irish potato famine of 1847 and appeared among the Forty-Niners of the California Gold Rush.

Scurvy: How a Surgeon, a Mariner, and a Gentleman Solved the Greatest Medical Mystery of the Age of Sail will fascinate the history buff, the health-conscious reader, and anyone who can appreciate the difficulty we as humans have in accepting empirical evidence when it appears to contradict the conventional wisdom. At the very least, the reader will find interesting the story of how sailors endured the Age of Sail.

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