

BOOK REVIEWS

A CALL FOR RESTRAINT

Posen, Barry R. *Restraint: A New Foundation for U.S. Grand Strategy*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univ. Press, 2014. 234pp. \$29.95

Sometimes, less is more. “More” may seem the order of the day in U.S. security policy, between ISIS, Ukraine, and other issues, but MIT political scientist Barry Posen offers a powerful cry for “less!” His book *Restraint: A New Foundation for U.S. Grand Strategy* calls for doing less, promising less, and spending less than the United States does today. The book is not a plea for isolationism or disarmament, but it makes a convincing case that America’s current strategy of “liberal hegemony” is both wasteful and counterproductive, creating more problems than it solves. Posen’s strategy is not entirely novel—it is a form of offshore balancing—but *Restraint* is a worthy contribution. The book offers the most thorough and theoretically grounded rationale for offshore balancing to date, as well as practical diplomatic and defense planning recommendations, in a concise and well-organized monograph.

Posen has not always been in the restraint camp. A long-standing scholar of grand strategy, in the 1990s Posen favored “selective engagement”—maintaining U.S. alliances and forward presence in Europe, Asia, and the Persian

Gulf, but eschewing liberal interventionism or pursuit of global primacy. Why should America now pull back? First, Posen argues, the relative economic and military strength of the United States has eroded; supplying security while allies take a free ride is not affordable. U.S. soft power has also been diminished by the excesses of liberal hegemony. The Iraq war, the Kosovo war (the geopolitical consequences of which Americans underestimate), NATO expansion, “color revolutions,” and the like convinced China, Russia, and even democracies like Brazil that America is not a status quo power, and many nations now affirmatively challenge U.S. activism. Third, nationalism remains a potent force—contra the predictions of liberals—meaning that an anti-United States stance is good politics in many countries, and that U.S. meddling in other regions motivates nonstate extremist groups.

Posen recommends two basic changes in U.S. military intervention and military posture. He believes the United States should avoid intervention by force in other nations’ politics—whether preemptive regime change or

“humanitarian” operations in the middle of civil wars. The more fundamental change he advocates is for the United States to withdraw gradually from security guarantees and permanent forward basing of American forces. Pulling back would incentivize allies—NATO, Japan and South Korea, Israel, Saudi Arabia, etc.—to provide more of their own security. Posen recognizes and accepts that some allies might go nuclear in response, but he sees such proliferation as less risky than U.S. entanglement, particularly since some allies treat U.S. support as a blank check for reckless behavior. In Posen’s world, the United States would rely on local power balancing to prevent the rise of regional hegemons in Eurasia, on nuclear deterrence as an ultimate backstop for the United States, and on “command of the commons” both to prevent power projection by others against U.S. interests and to facilitate American involvement in Eurasia if that becomes necessary.

Perhaps the most compelling case against this minimalist approach comes from fellow realists like Robert Art, who would agree with the critique of liberal hegemony but argue that the costs of U.S. alliances and forward basing are better than the risks inherent in letting local powers sort out power relationships on their own. The United States might be safe from attack, but regional wars could damage the global economy, bringing painful recessions to American citizens. Posen does address that argument, responding essentially that there is a great deal of ruin in a global economy (apologies to Adam Smith). True, there is much alarmism on the subject, particularly around oil shocks, but one still wonders about applying past examples of neutral countries doing fine during

major wars to today’s tightly coupled supply chains and financial markets.

Posen also offers force structure implications. Many grand strategy proposals leap directly from foreign policy ideas to laundry lists of weapons to purchase or cancel. To his credit, Posen conducts the intermediate linking step of identifying military missions and broad operating concepts (the guidance provided—in theory—by a National Military Strategy). The core recommendation is to design a force for securing “command of the commons,” i.e., sea, air, and space. This is an idea Posen has advocated for some time, but is fully appropriate to offshore balancing. The Navy fares very well in his recommended force structure, e.g., keeping nine carriers, while the Army and Marines take the bulk of cuts. Overall Posen thinks spending 2.5 percent of GDP on defense would suffice, a 25 percent cut from today’s base budget.

While it is suited to his strategy, some might criticize Posen’s proposed force as too conventional in its details—i.e., emphasizing aircraft carriers in the face of growing threats like the Chinese DF-21 missile. There is room for more attention to such emerging challenges. That said, Posen’s strategy would have little requirement for close-in U.S. strikes against the Chinese or Russian homeland versus being able to thwart an *adversary’s* attempts to project power across open oceans at *us*.

For those familiar with the grand strategy literature, the broad case in *Restraint* is in line with those of other offshore balancers, like John Mearsheimer, Steve Walt, and Christopher Layne. What Posen adds is a comprehensive theory-grounded analysis of the problems of liberal hegemony and merits of an offshore approach, backed by forty-five

pages of endnotes. Uniquely, the book also develops practical recommendations for implementing the strategy with serious attention to timelines and regional nuances. Where Layne's *Peace of Illusions* traces historical failings of the hegemonic approach, *Restraint* is a timely, fleshed-out policy proposal.

Ultimately, many policy makers will never get past page 1, where Posen defines American national security interests as the traditional sovereignty, safety, territory, and international power position. Threats to those are modest and Posen makes a compelling case they are best managed through limited overseas commitments. On the other hand, many in Washington believe American hegemony—euphemized as “leadership”—is *in and of itself* a fundamental interest, and that *no* economic and physical risks are acceptable. That one televised beheading five thousand miles away can so alarm America suggests this will not change soon. For those willing to think critically about America's security needs, however, *Restraint* offers a deeply logical challenge and a thoughtful blueprint.

DAVID T. BURBACH



Stavridis, James G. *The Accidental Admiral: A Sailor Takes Command at NATO*. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2014. 288pp. \$32.95

In the early days of the Second World War, General Eisenhower, the first Supreme Allied Commander of Europe, struggled to keep the alliance together. One of the more interesting anecdotes about this struggle is when he almost fired a member of his staff because the officer was, shall we say, culturally insensitive. The story goes that an American

officer, a colonel on Eisenhower's staff, insulted a British officer by calling him a *British* bastard. Ike wasn't pleased. Ike threatened to bust him down to private. Being a bastard, he said, was not a national characteristic. All were equal in the eyes of the allies. But admittedly, handling NATO has not gotten any easier over the years. Secretary Gates, prior to his departure, had some choice words for the alliance, urging more NATO members to meet the required 2 percent of their GDP on defense spending. America, he noted, continues to pick up the slack—from Afghanistan to Libya. Yet the alliance remains.

Admiral James Stavridis, USN (Ret.), most recently Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) and commander of U.S. European Command (EUCOM), and unofficially, the Navy's advocate of the well-known John Adams quotation—“Let us tenderly and kindly cherish, therefore the means of knowledge. Let us dare to read, think, speak and write”—has written an enjoyable memoir of his time in Eisenhower's old chair.

Stavridis's memoir stays away from criticism of U.S. officials and discussions of contentious closed-door meetings. This is in contrast to two other high-profile, former administration officials' memoirs—those of Ambassador Christopher Hill and Defense Secretary Leon Panetta—which were published around the same time to much hoopla. While Stavridis was dual hatted as SACEUR and EUCOM his reputation around the headquarters was one of civility and intelligence, certainly not a bad combination. Stavridis says he wants to show the reader not what happened during his four years, but rather why it happened. He proceeds to take the reader on a tour

of challenges: from the toppling of Qadhafi to the civil war in Syria, Israeli security, a resurgent Russia, the Balkans, and finally, of course, Afghanistan. Thus the first few chapters are a whirlwind of individuals, meetings, and events. Among all this, he often pauses within chapters to highlight some of the more important senior military and political officials that make up the NATO alliance.

Stavridis spends considerable time in these early chapters setting up the facts—stating what happened—and then trying to balance it against why it happened and what he learned from it. The first part of the book, however, feels rushed and compressed, and even in his best efforts the balance tilts toward more numbers and facts and away from a deep exploration of the why. If there was one weakness, this is it. You are left wanting more discussion on how the policy was shaped in Washington and in Brussels. What was the dialogue during these many meetings? And why was it persuasive? The second part of the book shines. Here he discusses leadership, strategic planning, innovation, and strategic communication. All of these chapters are excellent and well worth the price of the book. In one chapter, Stavridis talks about the actions that led to Generals McChrystal's and Petraeus's resignations—and his own stumbles. It is here he almost passes the George Orwell test. Orwell once said, "Autobiography is only to be trusted when it reveals something disgraceful. A man who gives a good account of himself is probably lying, since any life when viewed from the inside is simply a series of defeats." And for Stavridis it is not all good. Stavridis explains that he was nominated to be the Chief of Naval Operations, following

what was, by many accounts, a successful tour as the supreme allied commander. This was not to be. He describes, plainly, that some of his official travel was not properly paid for, and a single trip was deemed questionable by the inspector general. He accepted responsibility for his and his staff's mistakes, and made reparations. Although he was cleared by the Secretary of the Navy from any wrongdoing, the long investigation was enough to complicate the political winds that are Washington, and the Secretary of Defense had to remove his nomination. While certainly not rising to Orwell's definition of disgraceful, nonetheless, it was not his shining hour.

For this reader, the stories of his days commanding USS *Barry*, beautifully captured in his book *Destroyer Captain*, remain my favorite. Its style, written in a journalist's hand, is intimate and moving—a man that loves the sea yet knows he is human and only can go as far as his crew takes him. Still, his new memoir is a refreshing dose of honesty, intelligence, and reflection—much needed in today's Navy and tomorrow's leaders.

CHRISTOPHER NELSON



Winklareth, Robert J. *The Battle of the Denmark Strait: A Critical Analysis of the Bismarck's Singular Triumph*. Havertown, Pa.: Casemate Publishers, 2012. 336pp. \$32.95

From Johnny Horton's 1960 ballad "Sink the Bismarck" to James Cameron's *Expedition Bismarck* for the Discovery Channel in 2002, the sole sortie of the German battleship in May 1941 has held the attention of both the general public and naval historians. The latter mainly concentrate on the destruction of

Bismarck on 27 May after a lucky aerial torpedo hit disabled the ship's steering mechanism. Not so Robert Winklareth. His focus instead is on *Bismarck's* "singular triumph" in destroying the British battle cruiser *Hood* three days earlier. A 38 cm shell from its fifth salvo sliced through *Hood's* armored side below the aft turrets, setting off first the 4 in. secondary armament magazine and then the main 15 in. magazine. Only 3 of its complement of 1,421 survived.

So, what is new? Winklareth, a military weapons systems expert, traces all action at sea in five-second intervals. He primarily uses translated German records of the battle of the Denmark Strait to offer a salvo-by-salvo analysis, to re-create the speed and headings of the major combatants, and to determine the precise firing angles and effects of the heavy guns. Unsurprisingly, the book is highly detailed and a feast mainly for naval engineering and gunnery enthusiasts. It is complemented by countless charts, diagrams, photographs, and pencil drawings (by the author). Winklareth's own battle is with the (unnamed) historians who claim that just before the engagement with *Hood*, *Bismarck*, in a mere six minutes, came up the port side of the heavy cruiser *Prinz Eugen*, crossed its wake to its starboard side, and then recrossed the cruiser's wake to take up position on its port side again (15–16, 258). What he calls a "reversed photo" error resulted in this assumption. Few will cross swords with the author on this matter.

On the other hand, serious historians of the battle will take umbrage at two of Winklareth's strong statements, both on the first page (11) of the book. His claim that the battle of the Denmark Strait "was undoubtedly one of the most

famous and most important naval battles of World War II" will raise the hackles especially of historians of the U.S. Navy in the Pacific 1941–45. And his second claim, that the encounter between *Bismarck* and *Hood* "is perhaps the most documented event in naval history," will come as news to German naval historians who are all too aware of the fact that *Bismarck's* war diary (*Kriegstagebuch*) went down with the ship.

With regard to the broader aspects of the battle of the Denmark Strait, Winklareth spends a great deal of time sketching out the past histories of the German and British navies as well as the major ship designs of the two powers. The actual artillery duel between the German battleship and the British battle cruiser, in fact, consumes but half a dozen pages of chapter 13. Unfortunately, there is no attempt to place "Operation Rheinübung," the German sortie into the Atlantic, into the wider context of Grand Admiral Erich Raeder's double-pole strategy of attacking Britain's maritime commerce with two modern battle fleets in the Atlantic Ocean, while a third fleet of elderly battleships tied the Royal Navy down in the North Sea. The reader deserved this analysis.

HOLGER H. HERWIG



Untermeyer, Chase. *Inside Reagan's Navy: The Pentagon Journals*. College Station: Texas A&M Univ. Press, 2015. 352pp. \$25

The Washington diary is something of a lost art these days. Instead, we have to be satisfied with books of instant journalism using largely anonymous sources or memoirs too often tendentiously crafted after the fact. Chase Untermeyer is a

wonderful outlier. Apparently, Untermeyer started keeping a diary at age nine, and has already published excerpts covering his initial Washington service as executive assistant to Vice President George Bush (1981–83). This latest volume covers the period of his service in the office of the Secretary of the Navy (1983–88), during the tenures of John F. Lehman and later James Webb as Secretary of the Navy. The result is an engaging portrait of the glories and miseries of life within the Beltway. Though lighthearted and refreshingly modest, Untermeyer’s book also offers up telling anecdotes and keen insights into the practice—or lack thereof—of civilian control of the United States Navy at a critical juncture of the Cold War.

Though he had served briefly in the Navy as a very junior officer, Untermeyer was the classic political appointee. Born in Texas and educated at Harvard, he became involved in Texas politics and was elected to the statehouse in 1976. After his stint working directly under the vice president, Untermeyer was appointed initially as Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Installations and Facilities, and then for some four years served as Assistant Secretary for Manpower and Reserve Affairs. Both jobs are political plums, offering many opportunities for ingratiation of the holder with defense contractors and members of Congress. Untermeyer makes no attempt to hide his own ambitions, or the intoxicating effects of constant mingling with the good and the great not only in Washington but on many tours of inspection or protocol in the provinces. (At one point, he charmingly announces that he has at last become a “toff”). But he also makes clear that he took his responsibilities seriously and was intent on serving the boss well.

And what a boss! To get the flavor of John Lehman, it is hard to improve on this riff of Untermeyer’s at Lehman’s farewell party at the Naval Observatory in April 1987: “People have asked me, what’s the difference between Jim Webb and John Lehman? And I’ve said that the thing to remember is that Jim is a former Marine officer. Tell him to take a hill, and he’ll take the hill. But with John it’s a little different. Tell him to take a hill, and the first thing he’ll do is get together with Mel Paisley [perhaps best described as his *consigliere*] for a few drinks to concoct the plan. . . . Then John will start a competition among real estate agents over the purchase price of the hill. Next he’ll go to the senator in whose state the hill is located and make a deal: the Navy will build the chrome bumper-guard assembly for the Trident sub in his hometown if the senator will slip an amendment into the Wild and Scenic Areas Act to purchase the hill. Then, with the money saved from the competition, John buys another Aegis cruiser.”

Lehman’s methods did not appeal to everyone, and in fact could be outrageous; but he could claim results. He nearly achieved the “600 ship Navy” for which he lobbied so ferociously. But the Navy leadership was ambivalent toward him. He had a habit of breaking Navy crockery—for example, by forcing the Naval Academy to put more humanities in its curriculum, and by engineering the retirement of Admiral Hyman Rickover (the story of Rickover’s tantrum in his departing courtesy call with Ronald Reagan is told with great relish at the beginning of Lehman’s memoir *Command of the Sea*). Anyone concerned about the current state of civil-military relations in Washington would do well to read this book.



Armstrong, Benjamin F., ed. *21st Century Sims: Innovation, Education, and Leadership for the Modern Era*. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2015. 176pp. \$21.95

Over a century after first being composed, the writings of Admiral William S. Sims continue to have relevance to all Navy leaders. Benjamin Armstrong has compiled a selection of *Proceedings* articles (originally published between 1905 and 1940) and provides an informative perspective of the character and career of Admiral Sims and the impact of his initiatives on innovation and commitment to leader development. Armstrong introduces us to the young Lieutenant Sims as he begins his journey of revolution in Navy strategy, education, and ship design. From the deck plate to the President of the Naval War College, we gain an appreciation for Admiral Sims's career and his achievements from this compelling collection of his writings that resonate with the challenges of the twenty-first century.

Armstrong's commentary provides us with insights into each topic's relevance. From the "Gun Doctor" and "The Battleships of High Speed" to the chapter on military character, we view the development of Admiral Sims as a military leader as someone who challenges the bureaucracy of the military institution. In his lecture on military character, Sims reflects on the qualifications of a military leader and emphasizes a strong moral character as essential for the development of a military leader. While this was written in 1916, this topic remains critical for the development of twenty-first-century military leaders. Sims's perspective provides a lens for the reader to evaluate breaches in ethics,

morality, and decision making in the twenty-first century. Sims challenges each person to view character as an element of leadership and effective decision making. He commands officers that "it is the duty of every officer to study his own character that he may improve it." Upon reflection, this is perhaps the most important message taken from this volume of articles, as moral character underlies and reinforces decision making. Today, in an era during which our nation's military leaders have committed numerous ethical violations, there is a moral imperative to develop military character as part of the education process of every military officer. For it is from the foundation of their moral character that leadership matures and enables our nation's military leaders to build a bridge of trust between the military and our nation.

This collection of Sims's writings and Armstrong's analysis provides a lens for us to view and share Sims's perspectives as he moves through the pre- and post-World War I period. Although Sims's career was nearly a century ago, the issues he addressed remain current, including acquisition reform, technological deficiencies, and the need to educate Navy leaders. Armstrong invites us to accompany Sims on his journey as he moves across Europe, inspecting and reporting on the deficiencies of gunnery and battleship designs. Imagine, if you will, meeting the young Lieutenant Sims as he moves around Europe checking on the newest advances in ship design. A young Lieutenant Commander Sims boldly sparks criticism with his critique of gunnery techniques, technologies, and platforms, as he sets the course for a career of innovation. Impervious to criticism, Sims challenges bureaucracy and is the first to push for a change in

gunnery and the development of continuous-aim fire. He begins to innovate!

Sims forged the Navy in preparation for World War I with his focus on naval gunnery, battleship design, and destroyer operations. Always the rebel and revolutionary, his insights were grounded on firsthand knowledge and experience. Sims was a critical thinker whose ability to evaluate technologies and platform designs was matched by his determination to fight for those changes required for military readiness. He abhorred risk-averse behavior and what he termed “military conservatism,” referring to the “dangerous reluctance to accept new ideas.”

From Sims’s perspective, the opportunity for officers to conduct war games served to enhance the development of critical thinking skills and innovative operational solutions. He would enjoy exploring advanced technologies, such as drones, networks of autonomous, unmanned systems, and artificial intelligence, and would integrate these technologies into military war-fighting capabilities. Sims would be the first to accept and adopt these technologies to gain a military advantage.

As President of the Naval War College, Sims exemplified a career dedicated to the education and development of Navy leaders. Throughout his career, Sims emphasized the need for the development of leaders with strong moral character, who were capable of strategic thinking and effective decision making.

Sims continues to inspire and challenge a new generation of Navy leaders. Sims would remind us that the main objective of the Navy is to prepare for war! He cautions us to be aware of our own fleet’s vulnerabilities and tasks us to remain

vigilant with regard to maintaining military readiness. While I would not presume to know how he would handle each of the military crises in today’s military operational environment, I would offer that Sims would applaud the Naval War College’s commitment to excellence in education and its commitment to developing revolutionary innovative naval warfare concepts through war gaming.

In conclusion, Sims serves as a model for all leaders and challenges us to examine our personal and professional development. How do we compare in our dedication to duty, our commitment to discipline and moral courage, our ability to innovate, and our ability to challenge ourselves continuously by learning? One could argue that we need a young Lieutenant Sims today if we are to remain a world power. The question is, Would we recognize a Lieutenant Sims in the twenty-first-century Navy?

This is a welcome addition to the 21st Century Foundations series from the Naval Institute Press, informative, inspiring, and a must-read for those interested in leader development. The bibliography provides further reading recommendations to enhance the reader’s interest in this topic.

YVONNE R. MASAKOWSKI



Kaiser, David. *No End Save Victory: How FDR Led the Nation into War*. New York: Basic Books, 2014. 408pp. \$28

David Kaiser’s *No End Save Victory* stands out as the best of several books published in 2014 that examine FDR’s leadership during the interlude between the fall of France and the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December

1941. In contrast to Lynne Olson's *Those Angry Days: Roosevelt, Lindbergh, and America's Fight over World War II*, Susan Dunn's *1940: FDR, Willkie, Lindbergh, Hitler—the Election amid the Storm*, and Nicholas Wapshott's *The Sphinx: Franklin Roosevelt, the Isolationists, and the Road to World War II*, Kaiser extends his analysis beyond the domestic struggle between Roosevelt and the isolationists. While his analysis includes discussions of congressional politics, neutrality legislation, the America First Committee, and the election of 1940, it encompasses additional dimensions that shaped FDR's foreign and security policy ranging from the role of ULTRA and MAGIC intercepts to naval and military advice regarding capabilities and force development. Kaiser presents a wide-ranging analysis of policy, strategy, capacity, and mobilization during a period when danger loomed but much of the public opposed direct military intervention in the ongoing conflicts in Europe, China, and the Atlantic. His cast of individuals and institutions includes not only the familiar top tier of figures and committees but the military planners, labor union bosses, business leaders, and second tier of executive officials who translated FDR's visionary ideas into tangible plans and policies.

Kaiser is particularly skillful in three areas. Most strikingly, his narrative does a marvelous job of capturing the flavor of FDR's decision making. While highly organized individuals such as Secretary of War Henry Stimson and Army Chief of Staff George Marshall could be driven to distraction by the president's intuitive—sometimes meandering—approach to strategy and planning, the reader gains an understanding of what Roosevelt was doing. He was exploring and creating options. He was testing

ideas and concepts, sometimes dropping them and sometimes merely pocketing them for later use at the appropriate time and place. Kaiser repeatedly points out how Roosevelt prodded subordinates to provide him feedback on various germinating concepts months and sometimes years before they became policy, with Lend-Lease, the destroyers-for-bases deal, the occupation of Iceland and Greenland, and the oil embargo of Japan among the concepts he examined discreetly and informally well before he unveiled his intentions to cabinet members, congressional leaders, and allies.

Second, Kaiser makes clear that FDR was thinking in terms of victory over the Axis powers even while Marshall, Hap Arnold, and others remained focused on hemispheric defense and building up American forces in 1939 and 1940. Even before the outbreak of war in Europe, Roosevelt grasped the importance of airpower, pushing for a huge air force “so that we do not need to have a huge army.” Likewise, the Two-Ocean Navy Act passed in the summer of 1940, providing the U.S. Navy with the means to mount offensives in the Pacific even while supporting Anglo-American amphibious assaults in the Mediterranean and France in 1943–44.

Lastly, Kaiser takes on the latest generation of literature postulating that FDR sought to find a “back door to war” against Germany by implementing an oil embargo of Japan that he knew would provoke a Japanese military response. Kaiser weighs the evidence very carefully, and while he concludes that FDR was fully aware that implementing the embargo might lead to war with Japan, FDR was reacting to MAGIC intercepts that indicated that the Japanese occupation of southern French Indochina

was designed to prepare the way for the conquest of Singapore and the Dutch East Indies. FDR, aware that Japan had plans for continued expansion, simply did not see why the United States should supply Japan with the means for its southward drive. Kaiser puts it as follows: “The American embargo did not lead the Japanese to decide on a southward advance. That decision had taken place before the American freeze of Japanese assets” (258).

Kaiser’s work is a must-read for those interested in strategy, policy, and the preparation for war. Kaiser rates Roosevelt’s performance very highly. While the book lacks a bibliography, the endnotes confirm that the work rests on a thorough use of both primary and secondary sources. Those seeking to understand how Roosevelt prepared the United States for a war he viewed as inevitable will find this book insightful, delightful, and multilayered.

DOUGLAS PEIFER



Fisher, David. *Morality and War: Can War Be Just in the Twenty-First Century?* Oxford Univ. Press, 2012. 320pp. \$30 (paperback)

David Fisher’s recent book, *Morality and War*, offers an account of the philosophical foundations of the just war tradition that integrates various contemporary forms of ethics into a new approach he calls “virtuous consequentialism.” He argues against moral skeptics and antifoundationalists, insisting that some account of the underpinnings of morality must be given if moral prescription is to maintain its normative force and not collapse into relativism. For Fisher, thinkers as diverse as Isaiah Berlin and

Michael Walzer succumb to a false dichotomy; the impoverished moral vocabulary of the twentieth century forces them to oscillate between two extremes—an infallible totalitarianism and a groundless liberalism. In this picture, any attempt to define what is required for all humans at all times and everywhere to flourish is seen as the attempt to subjugate one’s own choices to an irrationally inerrant worldview, which in the postmodern age is criticized as feigning objectivity for the interests of prevailing power structures.

Countering this, Fisher adopts an Aristotelian approach to moral theory. Aristotle’s teleology allowed him to understand the life of virtue as both necessary for all human flourishing and pluralistic in its manifold expression. Both the athlete and the artisan might flourish as human beings just so long as they possess the virtues, even if it is understood that courage, justice, and the rest are expressed in very different ways between the two; and a soldier’s courage is the same even when comparisons are made between drastically different times and places.

Yet despite this endorsement of Aristotle, Fisher believes that no single moral theory—Aristotelian virtue ethics, utilitarianism, deontology—adequately accounts for the complexity of our contemporary moral lives. Therefore, his project combines consequentialism with virtue ethics because he sees each as having something the other requires to make sense of contemporary morality. Fisher argues that to know what the right thing to do might be in a given situation we must reflect on how our actions conduce to human flourishing but also understand our actions’ consequences. That is, virtue

theory provides but one piece of what is required and cannot fully account for the richness of our moral experience.

Fisher's hybrid approach results in a theory about war that rejects a firm distinction between the morality of the individual and that of the political community. He answers Plato's question "why be just?" by saying that one should be just because it is in one's self-interest. However, Fisher advocates an understanding of self-interest that goes beyond what he thinks is a post-Enlightenment preoccupation with selfish individualism and takes into account our communal nature as social animals. Justice is necessary for the proper functioning of society, and since man is fundamentally a social animal then justice is required for his own flourishing. Just as utilitarianism's cost-benefit calculations are otiose when explaining how mothers, fathers, sons, and daughters relate to each other in families, so too, Fisher argues, for societies as a whole.

Still, consequences matter; and Fisher wants to demonstrate that no theory of virtue is complete that ignores them. He thinks our communal nature enables virtue ethics and consequentialism to become united in a way that helps answer questions about justice—including justice in war. Fisher's approach reinterprets the moral precepts of the just war tradition and argues not only for their adequacy but for their necessity in the contemporary moral evaluation of war.

The result is an interesting and admirably lucid attempt to fill the gaps in contemporary moral theory while rendering it serviceable to the just war tradition. *Morality and War* is, therefore, an important contribution to a growing body of literature that attempts to make various aspects of Aristotelian

ethics serviceable to normative reflections about warfare. It is no wonder that Fisher's book won the prestigious W. J. M. MacKenzie Book Prize by the Political Studies Association in 2013.

Fisher, who died in March 2014, had a distinguished career in the British Civil Service, serving as a senior official in the Ministry of Defence, the Foreign Office, and the Cabinet Office, before taking up a post at King's College London as a Teaching Fellow in War Studies. His ability to combine practical know-how with theoretical sophistication was a rarity, and *Morality and War* demonstrates this with aplomb. For example, he concludes his book by offering several practical proposals, focused mainly on the UK Ministry of Defence, that seek to help improve justice in war.

Despite these abilities, Fisher's approach is ultimately inadequate. His rejection of a thoroughgoing Aristotelian view, one without references to modern moral theories such as utilitarianism, is motivated by important misunderstandings and misappropriation of Aristotle. While Fisher's insistence that a reinterpretation of the just war tradition must include aspects of the recently resurgent virtue ethics approach is refreshing, his rejection of key tenets of Aristotle's views—from the doctrine of the mean to the unity of the virtues—led Fisher to adopt modern consequentialist doctrines that sour what promised to be a thoroughly Aristotelian approach to the ethics of war. As such, many virtue ethicists would argue that Fisher's theory offers a distasteful blending of traditions without sufficiently exhausting the resources Aristotle offered.

Furthermore, Fisher's charge that no contemporary moral theory can

adequately account for the complexity of our contemporary moral lives rests on epistemological presuppositions that take the moral speech acts of the present as an epistemic starting point rather than as resulting from historical contingency. Finally, Fisher leaves questions about the adequacy of the just war tradition in accounting for contemporary warfare largely unexamined.

JOSEPH M. HATFIELD



Emerson, Stephen A. *The Battle for Mozambique: The Frelimo-Renamo Struggle, 1977–1992*. Solihull, U.K.: Helion, 2014. 288pp. \$35

Stephen Emerson has written the definitive work on the war in Mozambique between Frelimo (Front for the Liberation of Mozambique) and Renamo (Mozambican National Resistance) that began in 1977 and ended with the signing of the General Peace Agreement in October of 1992. It would be an impressive effort to capture just the fight between these factions vying for control of Mozambique, then newly independent after 450 years as a Portuguese colony: Emerson goes much further. He describes the complex environment in which this struggle takes place—overshadowed by a larger Cold War and bordering countries like South Africa with its own fight over apartheid, as well as the war against white minority rule next door in Rhodesia.

Emerson traces the beginnings of Frelimo and its armed struggle against Portugal. Despite its success in gaining independence from Portugal in 1975 after over a decade of war, Frelimo struggled with postindependence nation building. Formed by opponents of the Marxist-aligned Frelimo, Renamo

initially achieved operational effectiveness by obtaining arms, logistics, training, intelligence, and planning support from a Rhodesia seeking to counter Frelimo's support of Robert Mugabe and the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) forces. Mugabe's eventual success in establishing an internationally recognized Zimbabwean state cost Renamo its major benefactor. In the 1980s, however, Renamo gained a new partner in its fight against Frelimo from the South African government of P. W. Botha looking to create instability in its "frontline states" as a way to stave off support for the African National Congress. This patronage allowed Renamo to continue its fight against Frelimo—now the ruling party of an independent Mozambique—for another thirteen years.

The conflict's ebbs and flows affected every part of the country and its inhabitants. Between 800,000 and 1 million Mozambicans were killed in the fighting, and more than 2 million were displaced. The war's effects included a plundering of natural resources and environmental disasters made worse by drought. An end to the Cold War and South Africa's apartheid regime—coupled with leadership changes in Frelimo itself and all-around war exhaustion—eventually enabled peace talks and a successful settlement.

The Battle for Mozambique benefits from Emerson's decade of research. It reflects his access to formerly classified Rhodesian military documents coupled with the firsthand accounts gleaned from hundreds of hours of interviews with both former Frelimo and former Renamo fighters as well as Rhodesian and South African military and civilian personnel. The descriptions of

operations and battles are graphic and bring a reality not seen very often.

A longtime resident of southern Africa, Emerson is a renowned scholar of African affairs, having served as Chair of Security Studies at the U.S. National Defense University's Africa Center for Strategic Studies, and as head of the Africa regional studies program at the U.S. Naval War College. His knowledge and experience make *The Battle for Mozambique: The Frelimo-Renamo Struggle, 1977–1992* a must-read for anyone seeking to understand the history and challenges of the African continent.

ROGER H. DUCEY



Epstein, Katherine. *Torpedo: Inventing the Military-Industrial Complex in the United States and Great Britain*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 2014. 328pp. \$45

Kate Epstein's book about the relationships between the torpedo and the creation of the military-industrial complex builds on her earlier work about naval tactics, in particular her essay in the April 2013 *Journal of Military History* about "torpedoes and U.S. Navy battle tactics" before World War I. (See Katherine C. Epstein, "No One Can Afford to Say 'Damn the Torpedoes': Battle Tactics and U.S. Naval History before World War I," *Journal of Military History* 7, no. 2 [April 2013], pp. 491–520.) Here she goes after much bigger "fish"—excuse the pun. Epstein wastes no time in getting to her primary thesis in this fascinating monograph about the development of the torpedo as a weapon system in the United States and Great Britain. She begins boldly: "Thus, in addition to the part they

played in the origins of the military-industrial complex, torpedoes were at the nexus of the international arms race, globalization, and industrialization after World War I." Epstein takes the reader on a journey back in time to relate a story little told and even less known.

The modern self-propelled torpedo, invented and improved in the last half of the nineteenth century by the Englishman Robert Whitehead, was naval warfare's first "fire and forget" weapon. Like breech-loading rifles and artillery, also products of the nineteenth century, it changed the landscape of war in its environment—the maritime domain. Just as breech-loading rifles increased the lethality and scope of land warfare, so too did the torpedo, but on unimaginable scales in a very short time period. As Epstein notes in her introduction, "Over a fifty-year period the speed of torpedoes had increased by roughly 800 percent, and their range by 5,000 percent. They were the cutting edge of technology." When combined with other so-called disruptive technologies, like the airplane and the submarine—that is, technologies so unique that they break sociopolitical, commercial, and military paradigms—they had the potential to and, in fact, did throw existing notions of sea power, naval tactics, and even maritime strategy into question. It was no accident that the great maritime strategists—A. T. Mahan and Sir Julian Corbett—emerged during the period of the torpedo's rise to prominence as sailors recast their thinking about naval tactics in the modern age in part because of cutting-edge technology.

Epstein builds on the work of historian William McNeill and his arguments about the emergence of "command technology" in the nineteenth century,

which she defines as “technology commanded by the public sector from the private sector that was so sophisticated and expensive that neither possessed the resources to develop it alone.” Because the public sector could not deliver expensive new technology on its own, it “had to invest in [research and development] by the private sector.” Her larger argument about the emergence of military-industrial complexes in the United States and Britain hinges on this relationship, and torpedoes represented what one might call an agency technology, providing a forcing function for public and private sectors to overcome the difficulties in solving complex military problems—problems that could only be solved in partnership. Throughout the book Epstein emphasizes, constantly, the contingent nature of these developing relationships—that the actors did not conform to some script. They simply wanted to solve difficult, complex problems, and their decisions shaped how the military-industrial complexes and both countries developed as a result.

In her closing Epstein makes conclusions that get to the heart of today’s discussions about American decline, technological challenges, and innovation and that may seem counterintuitive—especially in light of the challenge of China and antiaccess and area denial (A2/AD) strategies. These may be of some comfort to the pessimists out there who claim America is in an irreversible decline. The British had a larger research and development infrastructure in both public and private sectors precisely because they were the naval hegemon of that era. Even though many of their decisions vis-à-vis technology seemed more cautious than those made by American naval officers—who were somewhat credulous in embracing new

technological ideas—the British came out ahead in developing better torpedoes in the long run. It also seems counterintuitive that the British would do better than the weaker Americans in developing a weapon that threatened Britain’s naval hegemony, but that is precisely what happened. The British did better in developing the “weapon of the weak” than the relatively weak Americans, who would have seemed to have had more interest in such weapons. The British went further, realizing savings in the long run as they envisioned a future without battleships, using flotillas of torpedo craft and battle cruisers to protect their interests. This future essentially came to fruition during and after World War II as the new battle cruiser—designed to patrol the global commons and protect British maritime interests—evolved into the aircraft carrier. As for torpedo flotillas, what emerged during the Cold War were submarine and antisubmarine fleets of very large size both to dispute and to protect those same sea lines should all-out war break out.

The one critique this reviewer has of the book involves the impact of the Russo-Japanese War on torpedo development during the period covered by this book. Japan’s opening torpedo attack on the Russian fleet in 1904 at Port Arthur was not exactly a “coming-out party” for the weapon system: 85 percent of the Japanese torpedoes missed their targets. Perhaps the Americans and British thought they had solved the clear problems that torpedoes presented in their design and use, but a mention of this key episode in the development of the torpedo—a flop on opening night if you will—would seem merited. Nonetheless, Epstein’s book goes places and discovers truths that few other books on naval history have. Although it is not

an easy read, the arguments it makes are of vital interest to naval strategists, innovators, and those interested in the complex relationships and processes that are now part and parcel of the national defense paradigm.

JOHN T. KUEHN



Friedman, B. A., ed. *21st Century Ellis: Operational Art and Strategic Prophecy for the Modern Era*. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2014. 150pp. \$21

21st Century Ellis is a solid contribution to the Naval Institute's 21st Century Foundations series and the scholarship regarding the touted U.S. Marine Corps visionary Lieutenant Colonel Earl "Pete" Ellis. The strength of this volume lies in the compilation of most of Ellis's scholarly works. B. A. Friedman has assembled five articles written by Ellis in the decade between 1911 and 1921 (a total of about 110 pages) into four chapters. Ellis's text is supplemented by Friedman's introduction and additional commentary highlighting the value of Ellis to both his contemporaries and current executors of the operational art.

Friedman arranges the essays by subject rather than chronologically. This allows the reading of the book by section without any loss of flow or context. Chapter 2, the shortest, reviews Ellis's First World War experience in France on the staff of John A. Lejeune. Chapter 3 is substantially longer but unlike the preceding chapter is perhaps of more applicability to modern practitioners. Two lectures prepared by Ellis during his tenure as a faculty member at the U.S. Naval War College examined the challenges of fighting a naval campaign in the western

Pacific. Composed in 1911–12, these proved prescient in their assessment of the tension building between Pacific naval powers and the war they would fight after Ellis's death. There is great legitimacy to the editor's claim that "Ellis predicted war with Japan in 1912."

Chapter 1 may be most relevant to Marines of this century. Ellis draws from his substantial experience fighting counterinsurgency in the Philippines during the early years of last century. His seventeen-page article "Bush Brigades" provides a solid foundation for any twenty-first-century warrior preparing for service in Iraq or Afghanistan. The editor summarizes how Ellis's tenets are strongly reflected in the Marine Corps's *Small Wars Manual* as well as today's counterinsurgency doctrine, while lamenting the "ill use of many of these tenets" in more-modern conflicts. A current practitioner would benefit by paying attention to Ellis's words.

The final chapter built around Ellis's work, chapter 4, is the longest and the major impetus behind Friedman's effort. Ellis is frequently viewed by Marines as the man who laid the template for modern amphibious operations. Read in detail, Ellis's article "Advanced Base Operations in Micronesia" reinforces that view. Ellis systematically takes a reader through the requirements for an advance across the Pacific to be successful. Many of these tenets informed Marine Corps development prior to the U.S. entry into the Second World War, laying the groundwork for highly successful amphibious operations in both the Pacific and European theaters.

While successful in providing a new generation of military practitioners easy access to Ellis's work, *21st Century Ellis* could have more successfully achieved

the book series's stated purpose of asking "the right questions." With the operational factors of time, space, and force still vital to success, few questions with which the Marine Corps must struggle in the twenty-first century relative to Ellis were asked. The editor's acceptance of "Air-Sea Battle" as a valid concept relative to Ellis falls short. The editor's comments fail to question shortfalls of the current Navy-Marine Corps team to sustain the logistics necessary for any large-scale amphibious operations in the maritime environment of the Pacific—a setting whose scope and scale have not changed since Ellis's day. Questions should be asked about whether current equipment procurement can fulfill the tenets Ellis was prescient in defining should they become required again in this century. This solid work of scholarship, produced by a junior Marine Corps officer, missed a chance to challenge current Marine Corps efforts by failing to ask tough questions the way that Ellis did a century ago. So, for practitioners of war, *read this book*, but keep a paper and pen handy to scribe your own tough questions for the future.

DAVID C. FUQUEA



Friedman, Norman. *Fighting the Great War at Sea: Strategy, Tactics and Technology*. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2014. 416pp. \$85

This title is the most recent "tour de force" from this prolific and authoritative naval historian. It is a massive undertaking in almost every way, from its imposing 12" × 10" coffee-table format to its 360-plus pages (over 400 with notes) filled with dense, small print and lavishly illustrated with contemporary photographs. People familiar with

Friedman's other works will understand that it is no exaggeration to say that the detail that he provides in these captions alone could form the framework for any number of smaller, themed books were they to be collected and organized differently. So, coffee-table format it may be, but this is a serious work, covering all aspects of the maritime war in an encyclopedic fashion. The endnotes alone run to forty-plus pages and, while we may lament the imprecise citations in some areas, the notes are filled with further ideas to stimulate still more work in the future.

In many ways this is a book that only Dr. Friedman could have attempted; most others would have shied away from the immensity of the task and back into the comfort of a focused analysis on a smaller, more easily bounded theme. Friedman, however, has an almost unique ability to sweep across the disciplines, picking out the main points and delving into both the historical and technological detail where necessary. A case in point is his exposé of the loss of the three British battle cruisers at Jutland, a tragedy that he lays squarely at the feet of the poor magazine practices prevalent in certain quarters of the Grand Fleet at the time and not, in spite of the official sanction, the result of any undue design flaws in the ships themselves. Such an approach is not an easy one, and some may feel that the book sits rather uncomfortably between the true historical monograph or narrative and a specialist reference work as a result. Technically speaking, it is neither. The text is not chronological and is too dense and concentrated to be read easily from cover to cover, while the inconsistent citations, although far better than in other works, will likely still aggravate the serious scholar. Enticing and unattributed

comments like “in the words of one senior officer . . .” or “Jellicoe’s pre-battle correspondence reveals . . .” can make for a frustrating start for a researcher.

What the volume does do very well is to provide a technically well-informed, strategic, and tactical analysis of the main events from a maritime practitioner’s perspective. As Friedman himself explains in his introduction, “It is not a full, operational history, but instead it explores various themes in the naval history of the war, many of them technological and tactical.” He opens, logically enough, by examining the prewar strategic aspirations and expectations of the main protagonists, following with two very useful chapters on the resources available to each side and their expectations with regard to the new technology. Somewhere here in these first four chapters, however, there is arguably one of his few omissions, and this would be a more detailed coverage of Admiral “Jackie” Fisher’s interdependent and comprehensive series of reforms drawn out for the Royal Navy between 1902 and 1907. While admittedly taking place well before the period covered by the book, they (and Fisher’s character) were hugely influential in shaping the navy that fought the Great War—from the ships that it built to the intellectual leanings and the polarization of attitudes within the officer corps. Given the depth with which Friedman covers the other, related subjects and the controversies surrounding the advent of the “all-big-gun” ship to which he later refers, this would have been a useful foundation and might have enriched the rather truncated and one-sided discussion on the rationale for the battle cruiser that comes later in chapter 8.

The second half of the text examines the nature of the ships themselves, starting

with the capital ships and the fleets into which they were organized, before moving on to consider the newer forms of warfare, including inshore warfare, amphibious warfare, submarines and their counters, trade protection, and mine warfare. This is where Friedman excels, his eye for detail and technical acumen allowing him to describe accurately the precise ways in which new technologies altered the very nature of the maritime problem. As has often been said, while the big fleets and the capital ships that make them up may underwrite the notion of a nation’s claim to sea control and act as its overall guarantor, it is the smaller craft that actually exercise it. So it was with the Great War, and Friedman amply recognizes this point, affording each and every aspect of the naval problem good coverage, thereby cementing the comprehensive nature of his work. Here again, though, the interrelated nature of some of his chosen themes, and in particular the first eight chapters, which deal with differing aspects of essentially the same capital-ship dilemma, can lead to a tendency toward repetition, which is unfortunate, even if understandable.

The overall message, though, is timeless—as valid today as it was one hundred years ago. Friedman concludes that the strategic flexibility conferred by allied sea power was the decisive factor, allowing the allied powers to continue to trade and to run the world’s economic engine for their benefit across the maritime trade routes while denying the same luxury to the Central powers. As Friedman explains, the fact that Ludendorff was not beaten in the west was ultimately irrelevant. Ludendorff’s lack of viable allies by 1918 meant that he had no other options but to hold on in the west: a path that was as futile as it was exhausting.

The only bright light was the submarine offensive, which, for a while at least, looked as though it might threaten the British trade security. Once the allies recognized the threat, their subsequent mastery over the sea gave them all the options they needed to maintain an unpredictable and intolerable pressure over their adversary, an advantage that could only lead to one outcome.

In summary, this is not a book for the casual-interest reader. It will, however, suit those who have a background in the basics of the period and in maritime warfare generally, and who wish to know more. Dr. Friedman's research credentials are impeccable, and the huge amount of factual detail he has unearthed will be sure to delight many. While not definitive in any individual theme area, there is nothing comparable in either depth or scope out there, and for this reason, if no other, this book is likely to become a standard work on the naval aspects of the Great War.

ANGUS ROSS



Patalano, Alessio. *Post-war Japan as a Sea Power: Imperial Legacy, Wartime Experience and the Making of a Navy*. London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2015. 272pp. \$112

The Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) is one of the world's most powerful naval forces. As Alessio Patalano points out in his new history of the JMSDF, *Post-war Japan as a Sea Power*, its surface force is twice the size of that of the Royal Navy's, and Japan has three times as many submarines as France. However, the JMSDF has been the focus of surprisingly little writing by international historians. In fact,

prior to Patalano's welcome contribution, only three English-language books have been dedicated to the subject: Jim Auer's *The Postwar Rearmament of Japanese Maritime Forces, 1941–1971* (Praeger, 1973); James Wolley's *Japan's Navy: Politics and Paradox, 1971–2000* (Lynne Rienner, 2000); and Euan Graham's *Japan's Sea Lane Security, 1940–2004* (Routledge, 2005).

Post-war Japan as a Sea Power is particularly important because it offers unique insight into JMSDF history by exploring its organizational and cultural identity. Patalano investigates the extent to which the modern JMSDF draws on the experience and culture of its predecessor, the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN), through access to previously unavailable archival materials, specifically records from the service's education system, recruitment data, and internal JMSDF guidance documents such as the *New Instructions* issued by each incoming chief of staff from 1961 to 2012. On top of this bedrock of archival research, Patalano, a professor at King's College London who averages several months a year in Japan, took advantage of his well-developed relationships with JMSDF officers of all ranks to conduct both focused interviews and group surveys. Patalano's extensive research reveals how heavily the IJN legacy influences the structure, role, and strategic outlook of the JMSDF.

When Japan sought to establish a maritime security force in the aftermath of World War II, its leaders studied the IJN—both its dramatic rise and catastrophic defeat. Patalano explains that the founders of the JMSDF, many of them IJN veterans, determined that the prewar navy had been plagued by its narrow professional focus. They concluded that IJN leaders and planners had

failed to match naval strategy to national security requirements. The result was an impressive fleet designed to defeat another major navy rapidly in blue-water action, when a more flexible force capable of securing and defending vital maritime interests might have served Japan better. The force structure and mentality of the IJN led to dramatic success for Japan in the early stages of World War II, but those gains could not be sustained, and Japan's poorly guarded sea lines of communication became a vulnerability that American submarines exploited to decimate Japan's merchant marine and undermine the Japanese economy.

As a direct result of this experience, writes Patalano, the founders of the JMSDF sought to ensure that Japan's new navy would have a broad, *maritime* focus rather than a narrow *naval* one, and that new generations of naval leaders would anchor their maritime strategies in Japan's national policy objectives. These leaders also worked to make the JMSDF immune to the internal rivalries that wracked the IJN in the 1930s by centralizing the JMSDF's command functions under a single Maritime Staff Office reporting to a single chief of maritime staff firmly under the control of civilian bureaucrats. The JMSDF's study of the IJN's failure to secure its sea lines of communication during World War II influenced the prioritization of sea-lane defense during the Cold War. Additionally, interservice rivalries that weakened the efforts of the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy during World War II were addressed postwar by the consolidation of initial officer training to foster interservice cooperation and camaraderie. Yet the IJN is more than a mere cautionary tale—its esprit de corps and traditions live on in the modern JMSDF.

Patalano's outstanding work falters only when the author attempts to explain the JMSDF's current tactics as a function of its IJN heritage. While the IJN's influence on the JMSDF is undeniably proven by the book's analysis, the links between the JMSDF's identity and its tactics are not clearly traced. It is the reviewers' experience and assessment that JMSDF tactics are generally either adopted directly from the United States or the product of analytical efforts to maximize the effectiveness of the force's combat systems vis-à-vis perceived threats. While it is logical that culture and identity elements are strong influences on those analytical processes, Patalano's argument lacks tangible examples to delineate this connection clearly. The link between JMSDF strategic culture and IJN heritage is clear, but the relationship between the IJN and modern JMSDF tactics is tenuous.

Well articulated, broad in scope, and drawing on sources not previously accessed by Western researchers, Patalano's work delves into previously unexplored territory essential to making sense of Japanese decision making in the maritime domain. Given rapidly developing events in East Asian waters, *Post-war Japan as a Sea Power* deserves attention from anyone seeking to understand maritime affairs in the Asia-Pacific.

CARLOS ROSENDE AND JOHN BRADFORD



Oliver, Dave. *Against the Tide: Rickover's Leadership Principles and the Rise of the Nuclear Navy*. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2014. 178pp. \$27.95

Hyman Rickover almost single-handedly delivered nuclear power to the United

States Navy and, when this was combined with submarine and missile technology, gave the United States the assured second-strike capability that was the bedrock of Cold War deterrence. Rickover also ruled his nuclear navy for decades, setting unrivaled standards for safety and performance while also becoming one of the most controversial military officers of the twentieth century.

Dave Oliver, a retired rear admiral and veteran submariner who joined the Navy in the nuclear navy's adolescence, had a career that provided him both a unique opportunity to observe Hyman Rickover, and a chance to think deeply about what might be referred to as "the Rickover method." This book purports to examine that method, with a particular emphasis on Rickover's leadership style and how he changed naval and submarine culture. Oliver does this by focusing on large themes, such as "planning for success," and "innovation and change." He populates each chapter with descriptions of Rickover in action and more than a few personal anecdotes that in some cases simply beggar the imagination. The result is a fast-paced volume that reads much more like a memoir than a scholarly study of leadership or management. From this perspective, *Against the Tide* is a success. The book also has value as a window into a branch of the Navy that, for reasons good, bad, and inevitable, was insulated, isolated, and opaque to most outside observers.

Readers who approach this work with the hope of learning how to achieve similar results to Admiral Rickover's will be disappointed. In part this is due to Rickover's unique story, his consistent refusal to produce any form of comprehensive autobiography or memoir, and the complexity of his career. Rickover

is a hard man to understand truly and perhaps impossible to replicate. Oliver points out that Rickover himself occasionally deviated from his own first principles, but fails to explain why that happened. In another case Oliver argues that Rickover was able to anticipate the future far more accurately than almost all his peers, but offers no suggestion about how this gift might be replicated. Here too, questions arise. One of the examples used to demonstrate this prescience involved the admiral pulling an answer for a technical problem from a stack of solutions, written long ago, that he kept in his desk. The scene is dramatic, but leaves the obvious question; if Admiral Rickover, with his ability to anticipate the future, foresaw the problem, why didn't he fix it beforehand? In another example, toward the end of the book Admiral Oliver offers the observation that "hard work and focus can succeed for anyone." Yet in earlier chapters he makes a very convincing argument that Rickover's controversial interviews and ruthless "culling of the herd" of prospective and serving nuclear officers was warranted because some of those men, including one from his own wardroom, no matter how hardworking and focused, lacked what it took to be a successful officer on a nuclear submarine.

Oliver, when all is said and done, openly admires Admiral Rickover. He tries to maintain a balanced approach when it comes to identifying and analyzing Rickover's blind spots and personal weaknesses but still minimizes some of Rickover's less commendable attributes—while engaging in occasional hyperbole when it comes to describing the admiral's detractors. For example, Oliver refers to Admiral Rickover's "adversaries" as "attacking with the

viciousness and mindlessness of a pack of stray dogs.” The imagery is bold, but the truth is that, as later described by Oliver, some of those adversaries were principled officers with different and often broader portfolios and perspectives whose opposition to Rickover was anything but mindless.

To its credit, this book touches on and invites thought and discussion about more than a few attributes of senior leadership, including personal accountability. Rickover was quick to dismiss subordinates who he felt had failed his program—yet the degree to which he would be willing to sacrifice his own position and power is less clear, particularly when even many of his supporters feel the admiral clung to power too long and eventually became a detriment to the program he had created. Another area involves personal and professional ethics. Oliver seems to make the point that when the stakes are high enough, the ends do justify the means and a successful outcome justifies questionable or even illegal actions. This invites a subsequent discussion involving the deepest questions of what it is to be an officer and member of the profession of arms.

Perhaps the most surprising aspect of Admiral Oliver’s book is the revelation that the author identifies Admiral Rickover as a manager and not a leader, contrary to what Rickover desired and believed. Today, Admiral Rickover is among the leadership biographic cases senior students study at the Naval War College and the question—Was he a leader or manager?—always comes up. While there are some students who agree with Admiral Oliver, the majority identify Rickover as a leader. However, all are agreed Rickover should be credited

for daring greatly, building to last, and being most worthy of continued study.

RICHARD J. NORTON



Dubbs, Chris. *America’s U-boats: Terror Trophies of World War I*. Lincoln: Univ. of Nebraska Press, 2014. 206pp. \$24.95

Chris Dubbs, a Gannon University executive, followed a fascination with his discovery of a First World War German submarine wreck in Lake Michigan. He pursued meticulous research through collections of First World War U-boat accounts and recorded American attitudes on the war and the public fascination with submarines. Throughout the book, he grabs the attention of readers as he skillfully recounts the arrival of the German freighter submarine *Deutschland* in the United States to reopen trade with Germany, the horrors that U-boats caused during the war, and the end of the war, when the allies claimed U-boats as war prizes. His well-cited account of events in the United States, at sea, and in Europe between 1916 and 1920 entertains readers with riveting images of German submarines and crews, the perils of war at sea, and public reaction and debates on the war. Dubbs offers an informative and historically accurate description of the impact U-boats had on the evolution of warfare and the subsequent employment of submarines as offensive weapons in war. He concludes his book with a note on the entrance of the United States into the Second World War, when Admiral Harold Stark, Chief of Naval Operations, ordered U.S. submarines to commence unrestricted submarine warfare against Japan, thereby disregarding the moral outrage

against sinking ships without warning. USS *Swordfish* (SS 193) consummated the intent of that order nine days after 7 December 1941 when it torpedoed a Japanese freighter. *Swordfish*, commissioned on 22 July 1939, was certainly designed and constructed based on exploited First World War U-boat technology.

Dubbs has never served in our Navy or been identified as a naval warfare analyst; however, his account of submarine technology and warfare describes in compelling detail the phases of a revolution in military affairs brought about by offensive employment of submarines.

Dubbs details capability/countercapability phases and the evolution of technology that began a revolution in military affairs. While this aspect of the book is not Dubbs's main focus, it serves as a textbook lesson for naval innovators and strategists in understanding the narrative on submarines and submarine warfare that continues today in the form of the U.S. Navy's undersea warfare dominance.

Dubbs offers details on how Germany, with the initial advantage of superior submarine technology, executed a strategy designed to intimidate the United States and then threaten American and allied shipping at sea and American cities along the Atlantic coast.

Imagine a Chinese high-speed freighter submarine arriving at the Port of Los Angeles to deliver bulk consignments of rare earth minerals. Imagine there were no known accounts of the Chinese freighter submarine being constructed or warnings of its passage until it surfaced west of Santa Barbara Island. Imagine its arrival in LA, with fanfare, public fascination, and U.S. government mortification.

This hypothetical arrival of a Chinese freighter submarine today is comparable to Dubbs's account of the 1916 prewar arrival of *Deutschland*. *Deutschland* commenced its surface transit through the Chesapeake Bay bound for a call on the Port of Baltimore on 9 July 1916. *Deutschland* delivered not only rare dyes from Germany but strategic communications that the British blockade of Germany was ineffective against German submarines and that German combat U-boats could arrive undetected along the Atlantic coast.

Deutschland's technology and apparent ability to transit the Atlantic established the first phase of a revolution in military affairs. It demonstrated superior German U-boat operational and functional capabilities to wartime enemies and potential adversaries.

Other accounts of German U-boat capabilities strengthened the initial demonstration of a strategic capability that provided Germany with a means of achieving strategic ends. Dubbs's detailed accounts of U-boat exploits, while compelling reading, also inform present-day arguments for operating forward with superior war-fighting capability.

Throughout the book, maritime warfare is recounted in deep detail including tactical maneuvers and operational effects that have strategic consequences in warfare. Phases of a classic revolution in military affairs are brought into focus as submarine operations versus antisubmarine warfare illustrates a response cycle to the introduction of unrestricted submarine warfare in the Atlantic. Wartime incidents described by Dubbs are certainly significant revelations for some readers and provide persuasive details related to military-political affairs for strategists. Those narratives

alone are well worth a serious reading of Dubbs's wartime U-boat operations.

The revolution in military affairs created by U-boats in the First World War had a dramatic effect on the public, the conduct of the war, and the near attainment of German strategic aims. According to Dubbs, German U-boats were a major focus in negotiating the armistices that ended the war.

Dubbs chronicles the debate by American Navy leaders on the benefits of taking U-boats as war prizes. They had to be convinced that there were benefits to crewing U-boats with American submariners and crossing the Atlantic. Dubbs also introduces American submariners in his account of these events. Those officers would later emerge as leaders of the submarine force in the Second World War. Their efforts to inject First World War U-boat technology into U.S. submarines formed the basis for the U.S. Navy's undersea warfare dominance today.

America's U-boats is an important book for naval warfare professionals and submariners. It conveys a near-complete history of the origins of submarine warfare and the revolution in military affairs that submarines have delivered to maritime and strategic warfare then and now.

WILLIAM F. BUNDY



O'Connell, Aaron B. *Underdogs: The Making of the Modern Marine Corps*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 2012. 400pp. \$18.95

In *Underdogs*, Aaron B. O'Connell (U.S. Naval Academy) presents a cultural history of the U.S. Marine Corps from 1941 to 1965. A lieutenant colonel in the Marine Corps Reserve, O'Connell explores

how mistrust among the Marine Corps, other military services, and civilian policy makers often motivated Marines to distinguish themselves. In response, Marines cultivated relationships with formidable allies in the U.S. Congress, media, and even Hollywood to disseminate their narratives to the public, which ultimately benefited the institution. Students, scholars, and general readers interested in military culture or the Marine Corps should find the volume useful.

O'Connell's purpose is to explain the Marine Corps's rapid growth from an undersized force of fewer than twenty thousand Marines in 1939 to a force peaking at nearly five hundred thousand Marines in 1945 and settling around two hundred thousand Marines by 1965. His thesis is that culture forms a vital tool for military organizations. O'Connell argues three main points: that Marine Corps culture was unique, that it helped the group thrive, and that it impacted American society as well. To his credit, O'Connell presents both positive and negative implications of these dynamics, highlighting subjects ranging from esprit de corps to alcohol abuse.

The author supports his arguments with extensive sources, examining archival material such as military and government records, personal papers, letters, and diaries, as well as published sources such as newspapers, magazines, films, and recruiting commercials. He makes good use of the *Marine Corps Gazette* and *Leatherneck* to present stories that Marines told. He also scrutinizes surveys, public opinion polls, memoirs, and oral history transcripts. A major strength of the volume is the inclusion of interviews that O'Connell conducted with Marine veterans, which personalize the broader narratives of the book.

First, O'Connell explores the massive expansion of the Marine Corps that occurred during World War II and the resulting stories that comprised the group's culture. He explains that Marine Corps culture functioned much like a religion in that it "bound people together in a system of shared obligations and beliefs." World War II reinforced those ties, since most Marines served in the Pacific, and the Corps suffered more than twice the casualty rate of other military services.

Second, he considers the dissemination of these stories to American society between World War II and the Korean War. Brigadier General Robert L. Denig's public relations specialists, known colloquially as Denig's Demons, eventually worked with nearly five thousand newspapers across the country. Other examples included the Toys for Tots program, which started in 1947, and the Marine Corps's collaboration with Hollywood in Republic Pictures' *Sands of Iwo Jima*, which included participation by more than one thousand Marines.

Third, the author studies the Marine Corps's mobilization of political power in the U.S. Congress. He explores avid supporters of the institution such as Paul H. Douglas (D-Ill.) and Joseph R. McCarthy (R-Wis.) and explains how their efforts protected Marine Corps missions and budgets. O'Connell rightly points out the irony that Marines' political efforts often "argued against militarism and excessive military influence in politics, even as they became the most politically activist branch of the armed services." For example, a nebulous group of influential supporters known as the Chowder Society led Marine Corps congressional efforts from relative obscurity.

Next, O'Connell explores American culture and civil-military relations after the Korean War. He analyzes stories about participants in the iconic Marine Corps battle at the Chosin Reservoir during the winter of 1950 and then investigates problems resulting from Marine Corps culture after the Korean War. Central among these difficulties was the 1956 Ribbon Creek scandal. This incident caused the deaths of six Marine recruits and resulted in the court-martial of Staff Sergeant Matthew C. McKeon for marching them through swamps around Parris Island, South Carolina.

Finally, the author considers the influence of culture on military strategy. He details the rise of Marine air-ground task forces (MAGTFs), which had both positive and negative implications. This novel structure provided scalable and relevant power projection capabilities focused on low-intensity conflict, but also risked militarization by making deployments easier to initiate for civilian policy makers.

Underdogs is a valuable addition to an understanding of military culture and illustrates how military organizations are unique. O'Connell contributes useful concepts such as "narratives of Marine exceptionalism"; "cultural discipline"; and "cultural politics," which relate culture to military institutions, militarization, and power. Ultimately, *Underdogs* explains how and why the Marine Corps created a distinctive identity after World War II and illuminates the dynamic and symbiotic relationship between the Marine Corps and American society.

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