

## BOOK REVIEWS

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### ACTIONS MATTER—WORDS ARE OF LITTLE CONSEQUENCE

Daalder, Ivo H., and James M. Lindsay. *America Unbound: The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy*. Brookings Institution Press, 2003. 200pp. \$22.95

Three years of George W. Bush's presidency have dramatically altered the world's geopolitical stage. Following the tragic events of 9/11, American military power was used to topple the Taliban in Afghanistan and Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq. At the same time, the United States has irked some of its long-standing allies through its use of force, blunt political statements, and rejection of international agreements such as the ABM Treaty, the Kyoto Protocol (on global warming), and the International Criminal Court.

Discerning a coherent foreign policy framework guiding these actions has been difficult. The most authoritative source has been the national security strategy of 20 September 2002, and most of the president's advisers have published articles in the leading foreign policy journals and newspapers. These writings, however, present contrasting views, leaving some with the impression of a president who is attempting to balance several disparate policies.

Enter *America Unbound* by Ivo Daalder and James Lindsay. Exhaustively documented, with 477 footnotes squeezed

into two hundred pages, this book, by two Clinton administration National Security Council staffers, is a readable, balanced, and concise work that explains the present administration's theory behind the practice. These two authors, who know as much about how foreign policy is translated into action as anyone, have accomplished an empirical analysis of the actions and statements of President Bush and his advisers, discovering and articulating the worldviews behind their decisions. Along the way they also debunk some commonly held beliefs.

Daalder and Lindsay deliberately focus their analysis on President Bush. They claim that rather than his being manipulated by his advisers, Bush is the key decision maker when it comes to foreign policy, basing his actions on his deep personal convictions and a coherent worldview that:

- An America unconstrained (unbound) by alliances, traditions, and friendships is safer
- American power should be used for America's, and hence the world's, benefit

- No strategic peer competitor should be allowed
- America is best safeguarded by preemptive strikes against threatening states.

Using statements made by Bush while a presidential candidate, the authors show that his worldview has not only been consistent since he was appointed to the office but was reinforced by 9/11. The events of that day provided Bush with the means to execute his revolutionary foreign policy.

Daalder and Lindsay show that Bush is guided by a few corollaries. One is that states matter—the best way to attack terrorism, and terrorist groups, is to attack the states that harbor them. Another is that actions matter—what one says is of little consequence. A third is that if the United States leads, others will follow.

We are introduced to new labels, or more precisely, to people referred to as “neocons,” whom the authors describe as democratic imperialists. This group, which includes presidential advisers Paul Wolfowitz, Richard Perle, and William Kristol, argues that the United States should use its overwhelming force to remake the world in its own image, embracing nation building and the spread of democracy.

Alternatively, Daalder and Lindsay label George Bush, Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld, and Condoleezza Rice as “assertive nationalists,” who also believe that the United States should use its overwhelming power to rid the world of all the bad people, although they do not support attempts to remake the world in America’s image. Both groups, however, share a deep skepticism of Wilsonian international law and the

institutions and treaties by which it was propagated. This has enforced an alliance between them that encourages the use of American military power, though the groups remain divided on their ultimate objectives.

*Unbound America* is, ultimately, a criticism of President Bush’s policies, his foreign policy unilateralism in particular. The last chapter asserts that “the fundamental premise of the Bush revolution, that America’s security rested on an America unbound, was profoundly mistaken.” The authors base their case not so much on growing anti-American sentiment throughout the world as on the position that the complex foreign policy goals now confronting America cannot be solved with a “go it alone” policy.

Daalder and Lindsay’s assertion comes early in the “revolution.” Saddam Hussein is in U.S. custody; Afghanistan is adopting a constitution; Libya’s Mohammar Qaddafi is agreeing to give up his weapons of mass destruction programs; Iran is agreeing with European diplomats to a nuclear nonproliferation treaty protocol; Saudi Arabia has announced its first-ever elections; dialogue is being renewed among Syria, Israel, and the PLO; and finally, China has engaged itself to help solve the issue of North Korea’s nuclear weapons program. It remains to be seen whether President Bush will be proven correct in his belief that strong-armed leadership will result in a strong following and make the world safer.

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Murray, Williamson, and Robert H. Scales, Jr. *The Iraq War: A Military History*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press (Belknap), 2003. 312pp. \$25

The pairing of Professor Williamson Murray and retired Army major general Robert Scales, Jr., is a potent and unusual combination of combat experience and superb scholarship. *The Iraq War* captures both the strategic underpinnings of the war and the operational designs that led to the stunning success of the initial military campaign of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. The end product is an extremely rare occurrence—an insightful overview and assessment of the second Gulf war produced while the guns were still warm.

That this duo joined forces to produce such a superlative history is not unexpected. Murray's reputation as a military historian of the first rank was recently confirmed in his highly acclaimed *A War to Be Won* (Harvard Univ. Press, 2000), an operational-level perspective of the Second World War coauthored with Allan Millett. Murray's credentials also include his role as the principal author of the Gulf War Air Power Survey, a history of air operations in Operation DESERT STORM. His partner in this current effort is a model soldier-scholar, combining a thirty-year military career as an Army artilleryman with solid credentials, including a Ph.D. in history from Duke University, a tour as Commandant of the Army War College, and several previous books on firepower and future conflict. He was also the project director and principal author of the U.S. Army's official history of the first Gulf war. The critical themes of his previous book, *Yellow Smoke: The*

*Future of Land Warfare for America's Military* (Rowman & Littlefield, 2003), on the future of land power in the twenty-first century, are suffused throughout *The Iraq War* and help put the last conflict into a larger historical setting.

This book is a pleasure to read, combining lucid prose and mastery of both history and operational detail to permit the reader to grasp clearly the dynamics of the race to Baghdad. Unlike the initial reporting of the fighting by embedded journalists, these analysts are not limited to a narrow "soda straw" viewpoint of the war. They put the war in its proper strategic and historical context, and the conduct of the fighting in its proper place with the evolving changes in the conduct of war. The crisp text is artfully edited, and it is amplified by several dozen photographs and a set of high-quality color maps. The latter are all-too-rare additions to history texts and further distinguish this book from pretenders.

The concluding chapter provides critical insights on the political and military implications of this war. This chapter alone is worth the price of the book; one can only hope that it will be widely distributed among the halls of Congress as well as in the educational centers of the U.S. armed forces. This evidence of the enduring nature of war, with its immutable fundamentals, will not surprise realists, combat veterans, or military historians. Nonetheless, it should be required reading for enthusiasts of the putative "dot.com" economy and their irrational exuberance for information technology. As Murray and Scales stress, despite overwhelming technological superiority, commanders "had to make decisions of life and death under

split-second pressures and an unprecedented barrage of information that was often ambiguous, uncertain, contradictory, or quite often wrong.” The authors acknowledge a number of changing characteristics in war, including the emphasis on speed, precision, simultaneity, and the need for modular force structure, interdependence between service units, and jointness at lower levels. Yet they also stress that true knowledge was rare. No matter how sophisticated the intelligence collection, a real picture was rarely formed until a human being laid eyes on the target. Finally, the authors adroitly connect the growing complexity of today’s battlefield with the need for high-quality leaders who have been immersed in an intensive training and education regimen. The adaptability of U.S. commanders made up for strategic and intelligence inadequacies. It was this mental agility that permitted the creative, quick thinking that was so evident as American forces transitioned from deliberate planning at Central Command to reacting to real but unforeseen circumstances on the ground.

This final chapter overlooks a critical shortfall in U.S. strategic readiness. The U.S. military must become adept at “multidimensional operations” to combat insurgencies and prop up failed states. Murray and Scales admit that the United States could have been better prepared for the transition to stability operations, and they admit that its military is inclined to “avoid the messy business that lies beyond clear-cut, decisive military operations.” The U.S. military excels at *combined arms*—the combination of infantry, armor, and artillery to enable fire and maneuver. It is not as good at *combined means*—

employing other instruments of national power, including the full panoply of the interagency community toward a desired end state. The American way of war is unsurpassed at the fighting aspects of war, but this does not necessarily translate to winning the peace. This shortfall was manifested by the failure of both the Bush administration and the military to prepare fully for its occupation of Iraq and the continuing need to conduct the sort of nation-building activities that are occupying the U.S. armed forces in Asia. The Pentagon is now examining innovative organizational and doctrinal changes to address the problem. However, the solution lies beyond that five-sided structure and must include a maladroit national security architecture that has resisted substantive post–Cold War realignment.

This is a remarkably impressive work, especially since it was produced so close to the fighting. Undoubtedly, a more comprehensive assessment of the war will eventually be produced, probably years from now when distance, objectivity, and primary source material are available. For the foreseeable future, however, *The Iraq War* will be the definitive history of this complex and multifaceted campaign.

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Art, Robert J., and Patrick M. Cronin, eds. *The United States and Coercive Diplomacy*. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 2003. 442pp. \$19.95

The threat of force is an instrument of statecraft—an instrument that U.S. presidents have not been afraid to use. When successfully employed, the threat of force can deter an adversary from embarking upon an unwelcome course of action or coerce an adversary to cease undesirable activities. Scholars and practitioners both acknowledge that of these two means of force, coercion is by far the more difficult to execute.

*The United States and Coercive Diplomacy* attempts to increase our understanding of coercive diplomacy by building upon works of other scholars of international relations, in particular Alexander George, the noted scholar of international relations. The appearance of this book is especially timely, since the 1990s witnessed numerous attempts on the part of the White House to employ coercive diplomacy—a trend that has continued to the present day. Given such potentially contentious issues as the North Korean and Iranian nuclear programs, Chinese-Taiwanese relations, and the global war on terror, it appears that coercive diplomacy has a high probability of continued use.

The editors take a straightforward approach to their subject. A brief introduction by Robert Art defines the term “coercive diplomacy,” discusses its use by national leaders, and describes the structure of the book. In the following seven chapters, contributing authors present seven case studies that have involved U.S. efforts to employ coercive diplomacy. Each study seeks to determine whether coercive diplomacy was successful and why success or failure resulted. These studies are followed by a concluding chapter in which Art reviews the contributors’ findings and

provides his own comparisons. He then offers general conclusions regarding coercive diplomacy and several recommendations that national leaders should consider.

Taken in its entirety, *The United States and Coercive Diplomacy* is a worthy book, deserving attention from those in both academia and government. The writing is articulate, the chapters well organized, and the conclusions reasonable. More importantly, this book belongs to the all-too-small family of books that contribute to, as Alexander George once wrote, “bridging the gap” between academicians and national leaders, between theory and practice.

That said, there are some drawbacks to this work. Structurally, it would have benefited if the contributors had followed a common format when presenting and analyzing their various cases. Also, the definition of the term “coercive diplomacy” lacks precision, as Art readily admits. However, it is clear that coercive diplomacy employs a threat of force, and sometimes the use of force, to get a target (the recipient of the coercive threat) to do something that the coercer wants but that the target does not. The editors make a point of distinguishing between coercive *efforts*, which do not involve the threat of force, and coercive *diplomacy*, which does. While the inclusion of the threat of force clearly marks a coercive threshold, a deeper discussion of coercive efforts would have been of significant interest to those who may have to use coercion as part of statecraft. Even more problematic is the question of the degree of force required to distinguish coercive diplomacy from war. Robert Art notes that the line is not easily drawn or distinct; the discussion and case studies

reinforce that observation. Presumably the distinction is an important one, and potentially there are different cautions and prescriptions to be followed for the different strategies.

The cases examined in the book are well chosen and have been studied at the Naval War College. They examine the efforts made by the Clinton administration to use coercive diplomacy in Somalia, Bosnia/Kosovo, and Haiti; in the 1995–96 Taiwan Strait confrontation; to coerce the North Koreans into abandoning their nuclear weapons program; and several attempts to use coercive diplomacy against Saddam Hussein from 1990 to 1998. The final study discusses the use of coercive diplomacy in the U.S. response to terrorism. Interestingly, and perhaps inadvertently, the cases are presented in ascending order of quality.

The Somalia case, written by Nora Bensahel, concludes that providing security for humanitarian relief efforts was a success for U.S. coercive diplomacy. As Art points out, there can be a fine line between compellence and deterrence. Bensahel's study would seem to make a stronger case for a successful deterrent strategy being initially employed, not a coercive one. However, there can be no doubt that this turned into an attempt to use coercive diplomacy as a tool in the nation-building efforts that subsequently followed, and that it failed.

Both the Somalia and Bosnia/Kosovo discussions suffer from brevity. Of course, a certain degree of editing is inevitable for these complex and lengthy cases, but too much has been left out, most notably a detailed discussion of the impact of the Croatian ground

offensive that occurred in conjunction with the NATO air campaign in 1995. It could also be argued that the Kosovo campaign was an exercise in coercive diplomacy from beginning to end and never truly transitioned into a "war." The meticulous selection of targets, some of which were chosen more for psychological than purely military impact; the extremely limiting rules of engagement employed by NATO; and the eventual introduction of the threat of a ground campaign make Kosovo appear to be a case of "tightening the screw" vice a failure of coercive diplomacy. Of course, both conclusions are debatable.

Robert Pastor was privileged to be present at the last-minute, face-to-face negotiations between General Raul Cedras (the leader of the Haitian coup), Jimmy Carter, Colin Powell, and Sam Nunn. Pastor's account is spellbinding, but it can be argued that he overstates the importance of these negotiations in his presentation of the Haitian case. Art again deflects much of the criticism associated with this observation when he admits that the Haitian case is not easy to categorize. Is it a case of successful coercive diplomacy at the last minute, or one of the shortest and least sanguinary combats on record, given that Cedras did not capitulate until after receiving positive confirmation that an invasion force was en route?

Jon B. Alterman's discussion of Iraq, like that of Somalia and Bosnia/Kosovo, covers much temporal ground in relatively few pages. Among the more significant questions addressed is whether the Tomahawk missile attacks conducted against Iraq in response to the discovery of a plot to assassinate former president Bush were truly an example of coercive diplomacy. It seems at least

equally likely that the attacks had nothing to do with coercion and were simply a form of reprisal.

Three of the final four cases, written by William Drennan (Korea), Robert S. Ross (China-Taiwan), and Martha Crenshaw (war on terror), are very good. Both Drennan's and Crenshaw's work deserve special mention. Drennan advances the argument that it was North Korea, not the United States, that successfully employed coercive diplomacy in the Korean nuclear crisis, and he offers compelling justification for his conclusion. Crenshaw takes on the extremely topical and thorny issue of whether coercive diplomacy has even a remote chance of success when employed against extremely dedicated nonstate actors. The well laid out conclusion is that it is not possible to use coercive diplomacy directly against such actors but it is possible to use coercive diplomacy against state actors that may also be involved.

In many ways Art's final chapter is the capstone piece of the book—as it should be. One of his major conclusions is that efforts to use coercive diplomacy fail two out of every three times. To his credit, he takes care to temper this finding with caution. For example, he admits that leaders may embrace a strategy of coercive diplomacy to convince a domestic audience that “everything has been tried” to gain support for war, rather than any effort to truly change the target's behavior. Thus some historical examples of “failures” of coercive diplomacy may have been initiated with no expectation of international success. He also

tangentially touches another potential category of “failure” that should have been explored in greater depth and might skew the percentage of failures attributed to coercive diplomacy. One of Art's prescriptions for policy makers is that coercive diplomacy should never be attempted unless one is willing to go to war if the effort fails. Sound advice, but even a state that has already decided to go to war should perceive a long-shot attempt at coercive diplomacy not as a policy failure per se but merely as an option with a chance, however small, of a large payoff with potentially no cost.

Art distills the findings of this book into six guidelines for practitioners who wish to employ coercive diplomacy. Four of these were initially postulated by Alexander George; their wisdom is reconfirmed by the research in this work. Two additional guidelines are described as prerequisites for having a chance at successfully utilizing coercive diplomacy. “Demonstrative denial” is a form of coercive diplomacy that works better than “limited punishment.” The other type of coercive diplomacy has already been mentioned. These guidelines are far more than just a reiteration of “common sense” or “good diplomatic practices,” but true aids and cautions to decision makers and should not be taken lightly.

The United States Institute for Peace should be commended for backing this project, which deserves an audience both inside academia and inside the Beltway.

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Macgregor, Douglas A. *Transformation under Fire: Revolutionizing How America Fights*. Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2003. 320pp. \$34.95

This book provides an exceptional look at a complex subject—bringing the U.S. Army into the twenty-first century. Building on the themes presented in his book *Breaking the Phalanx: A New Design for Landpower in the 21st Century* (Praeger, 1997), Macgregor again calls for the Army to leave behind, once and for all, its “garrison” mentality and fully embrace a joint expeditionary mindset. He sees an army whose transformation has bogged down because it chooses to focus too narrowly on new technology whose performance to date has fallen short of expectations.

The value of this book is the constructive manner in which it describes how the Army (like all services, for that matter) should transform from a Cold War force to one that is capable of meeting the nation’s requirements in the new century. Macgregor provides a lucid and well reasoned argument on what is wrong with the Army’s current approach to transformation. He asks several simple but demanding questions: Whom and where do we fight? How should we fight? Most importantly, what is the strategic purpose for the Army in the future?

Macgregor makes clear that transformation must be more than wholesale replacement of current equipment using new information and nanotechnologies. Rather, what is needed, he insists, is greater emphasis on developing fresh ideas about how to restructure and reorganize the current force. Such change must be made in conjunction with a

rationally evolved plan that replaces legacy equipment with tools that will generate the desired combat *effects* needed in the future. In his view, the Army already has the skills and 90 percent of the technology and platforms it needs; what is missing is a “joint organizational structure and combat leadership philosophy” needed to exploit an effects-based operational framework.

The current global war on terrorism, in Macgregor’s view, provides the perfect opportunity to change the Army. Yet such transformation must not risk losing what is clearly the finest fighting force in the world today. America’s current and future enemies are resourceful and imaginative and will find ways to obviate or mitigate current U.S. tactical and strategic advantages, especially where equipment and material are concerned. To meet these evolving challenges, Macgregor repeatedly admonishes the Army to develop and articulate a concept for joint maneuver and land strike that embraces a joint operational architecture.

Leveraging ideas presented in other forums, the author recommends that the nation’s security planners begin developing military command and control organizations that are regionally focused and structured to incorporate land, air, and sea elements into a joint architecture integrated with and subordinate to current regional combatant commanders. To be effective their forces must be capable of seamlessly plugging into such regional command and control arrangements. The Army in particular, with its indigenous hierarchical and top-heavy command structure, is ill suited to do so and must change if it is to do its part in the joint fight.

Throughout this work, Macgregor provides specific and concrete examples of problems and solutions. He explains, for instance, how the Army should align itself in a joint architecture based on combat maneuver groups composed of light reconnaissance, airborne assault, aviation combat, and early deploying support. The purpose of such groups is to integrate lean fighting units with powerful strike assets that are not only lethal in combat but have the necessary strategic agility to achieve rapid decisive results. Lest the reader think that Macgregor is a proponent of smaller and lighter forces, he also makes clear there can be no substitute for superior firepower in any fight. In examining the most recent U.S. combat experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq, Macgregor notes that the real challenge of the close fight is that “the advantage of information dominance diminishes considerably”; “old-fashioned firepower delivered in mass” remains essential.

The conclusion reminds us that the nature of warfare will continue to change and that the need for transformation will only grow in importance as our enemies adapt to our past successes. The process of transformation, he points out, however, is not the sole responsibility or purview of the Army—it requires the best civilian and military minds. Macgregor’s effort goes a long way toward furthering that thinking and is a must read for those who wish to enter the military transformation debate.

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Karnad, Bharat. *Nuclear Weapons and Indian Security*. New Delhi: Macmillan India, 2002. 724pp. Rs795

Roy-Chaudhury, Rahul. *India’s Maritime Security*. New Delhi: Knowledge World, 2000. 208pp. \$42.64

Analysts and observers interested in global security issues would do well to pay closer attention to the always rich debate in Indian security circles about that country’s future national policies, supporting budgets, and force structures. India is a rising power with a rapidly growing economy, an increasing military budget, and in some key areas, a newly enhanced national will to translate its potential into broader influence on the world stage. These two books are excellent examples of the national debate on how India should use its power to protect and advance its growing national interests. Each covers specific elements of India’s national security—nuclear weapons and maritime security.

Bharat Karnad is an unabashed advocate of a robust Indian nuclear weapons structure, doctrine, and policy. Karnad, a national security policy analyst at an Indian think tank, the Centre for Policy Research in New Delhi, was a member of the First National Security Advisor Board to the National Security Council of India. In that capacity, he was a member of the Nuclear Doctrine Drafting Group. In the wake of India’s May 1998 nuclear weapons tests, the group produced a draft nuclear doctrine that was submitted to the National Security Council in August 1999. (After significant delay, the essence of the doctrine was adopted formally in January

2003.) The author is squarely and proudly in the realist school of political science, basing his arguments and assessments on the proposition that the world is an anarchic place, that states are the primary international actors, and that power—with military power at its core—is all that matters.

The book is sweeping in scope. Karnad is prescriptive and uses his interpretation of history to create a strong case for his prescribed end state for India and its nuclear forces. This end state consists of a nuclear force for India containing 350–400 nuclear warheads/ weapons, some with megaton yields, and a set of delivery systems that includes “sizable numbers” of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and long-range cruise missiles. Given what the author assumes will be the ICBM force’s problems with accuracy, he recommends a countervalue strategy that he deems sufficient to deter U.S. intervention in Indian affairs. He also notes that a force of this size and structure would be sufficient to achieve notional parity with China.

While it is easy to focus on the headline-making conclusions that arise from Karnad’s tome, a reader would do well to take the time to read the entire piece carefully. The first half of the book is a comprehensive history and analysis of India’s evolution as a nuclear power. In this section, the author convincingly challenges conventional wisdom about the teachings and actions of India’s revered “father of the nation,” Mahatma Gandhi. Karnad argues that the nation’s misinterpretations of Gandhi’s teachings gave rise to a mistaken, and strategically misguided, “moralpolitik” that limited India’s ability to act decisively to advance and protect its own national

interests in a Hobbesian world. In fact, the author seeks to debunk the oft-cited link between this moralpolitik and traditional Indian culture and values as expressed in the texts of ancient India. The result of this political philosophy, which championed morality in pursuit of interests and led to “doctrinaire positions on the exercise of force” was that India as a collective lacked the will to achieve power in the decades following its independence.

In the second thematic half of the book, a 250-page chapter 5, Karnad uses more recent historical examples and analyses of real and potential great-power scenarios to make the case that India must fashion a set of nuclear doctrines, policies, and capabilities to advance its regional and global interests. Specifically, he warns against deterrence by “half-measures,” noting that India cannot rely on other powers to protect it. Specifically, he argues that U.S. and Indian interests, even currently, are likely to converge only in the short term and that India must have the military wherewithal, specifically in the nuclear realm, to ensure that it does not become a vassal of Washington.

Roy-Chaudhury’s book also delves into an element of India’s national security and the appropriate policy to address it, but his area of focus is one less fraught with potential controversy—maritime security. His recommended course of action, that India adopt a new maritime security policy to update and expand the outdated and inadequate Ocean Policy Statement of 1982, is also less alarming. Roy-Chaudhury’s study is a natural follow-up to his *Sea Power and Indian Security* (Brassey’s, 1995), which was favorably reviewed in the Summer 1996 issue of this journal. While his

previous book chronicled Indian naval developments, this work deftly outlines the maritime dimensions of India's security—economic, political, and military—and suggests the development of an overall policy framework to tie them together.

Roy-Chaudhury is currently a Fellow for South Asia at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) in London. This book was written while he was a research fellow at the Institute for Defense Studies and Analysis (IDSA), a think tank funded by India's Ministry of Defense. While at IDSA, Roy-Chaudhury specialized in naval and maritime security affairs, and the combination of his time in this environment and his previous studies makes him eminently qualified to produce a volume on such a subject.

The author outlines India's impressive economic growth in the last decade and the international, particularly maritime, implications of that trend. In essence, India has become more dependent on trade for its prosperity, and, in turn, it has become more reliant on such imported resources as crude oil, with consumption of petroleum products rising during the 1990s more or less at the same rate as India's gross domestic product—about 7 percent per annum. Roy-Chaudhury picks up the concerns of his first book about the importance of a viable national merchant fleet in addition to a navy for a country's security, noting that India's rapidly growing trade is not being met by a similar growth in either India's merchant fleet or port handling capacity. The author describes a range of international economic groupings to which India became a member in the 1990s

and how those may bolster even further India's trade ties.

He goes on to discuss India's rights and interests in its exclusive economic zone, the maritime portions of India's long-standing rivalry with Pakistan, and the rise of such new, nonstate security issues in the Indian Ocean as piracy and arms and narcotics trafficking. He highlights the changing capabilities of four countries with naval presence in the Indian Ocean, making the case that more traditional security issues remain salient and indeed may grow in their maritime dimensions. He then essentially picks up from his earlier book and describes the Indian Navy's modernization over the decade of the 1990s. Here he notes that despite increasing maritime security issues and increased attention paid to the navy, the recommended force structure outlined in 1964, consisting of fifty-four principal combatants, has yet to be reached. Where Karnad attributes shortfalls in India's nuclear forces primarily to a lack of political will, Roy-Chaudhury makes a more mixed case for the navy's shortfall. He notes the lack of funding over the years, the collapse of India's primary supplier (the Soviet Union) in the early 1990s, and the slow transition of India from a buyer of combatants to a builder.

Roy-Chaudhury concludes, after a discussion of naval cooperation, that the various dimensions of India's security that rely on the sea are growing more important, not less. Therefore, he recommends that the Indian government as a whole, not just the navy or the Ministry of Defense, adopt a national-level maritime security policy, essentially an updated and expanded ocean policy statement. He was brought into the National Security Council Secretariat to

implement such a recommendation. While a draft policy was drawn up in 2001, it has yet to be promulgated, pending the formation of greater institutional links among various Indian ministries with responsibilities in this area. The Ministry of Defense was tasked to initiate such an interministerial coordinating body, but so far the policy has not been formalized. Even without such a public policy, India is moving ahead with enhancing its maritime security in all its spheres.

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Smith, Edward A., Jr. *Effects Based Operations: Applying Network-centric Warfare in Peace, Crisis, and War*. Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense Command and Control Research Program, 2002. 545pp. \$20

“Effects-based operations [EBO] are coordinated sets of actions directed at shaping the behavior of friends, foes, and neutrals in peace, crisis, and war.” This definition is offered in Edward Smith’s long, tortuous study, *Effects Based Operations*. Substitute the terms “speeches by the president,” “negotiations by diplomats,” or “economic sanctions” for “effects-based operations,” and the emptiness of this definition becomes all too evident.

The major difficulty with this work, however, lies in the following passage: “The very nature of military competition should make it clear that would-be foes will attempt to exploit any warfare niche in which they believe the United States and its allies cannot successfully engage. Logically, these would-be foes will see exploitable niches wherever

network-centric and effects-based operations are least applicable. Urban and guerrilla warfare, counter-terrorism operations, peacekeeping efforts, and hostage rescues are just a few examples.” With this statement, Smith has gratuitously undermined the importance and value of effects-based operations (dragging network-centric operations along in the process), for those “niches” constitute the shortlist of operations U.S. military forces will be undertaking for the foreseeable future.

This is a complex and ambitious book, which progresses from a general discussion of EBO through chapters that illustrate the relationship with network-centric operations, discuss operations in the cognitive domain, and describe how complexity factors into the picture. Toward the end of the book an operational example is offered before some general conclusions are reached.

Effects-based operations, we are repeatedly reminded, focus on the mind of man. The “effects-based strategy is conceived and executed as a direct assault on the opponent’s will and not a by-product of destroying his capability to wage war.” Just what the “opponent’s will” constitutes is not clearly addressed. Is it the will of the soldiers in the field, the will of the civilians supporting the effort, or the will of the leadership? The differences in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM are noteworthy. The will of the Iraqi armed forces was quickly broken, as they threw down their arms and fled. But was the will of Saddam, of the brothers Hussein, or of the Iraqi resistance broken? How can one confidently determine a change in will, and how can one be totally sure that the change is permanent? No

theory is offered to help the reader understand how to break the will of fanatics.

In a long, intricate work there are bound to be contradictions, but when they cut to the core of the argument, they become disconcerting. For example, one reads: “In effects-based operations, therefore, actions and their effects are not and cannot be isolated. They are interrelated.” But later the author writes, “If those disproportionate effects are to shape behavior in the direction we want, however, we must figure out first how to trace the path of an action to a certain effect, and then how to plan the right actions to set the chain in motion.”

None of this means that effects-based operations should not be pursued—only that Smith does not have it quite right. Better, one should think carefully about EBO in terms of *objectives*. Rear Admiral Henry Eccles provided in these pages over twenty years ago the key insight in this regard: “The objectives represent ‘the effect desired,’ what one is seeking to achieve by the use of military force.” Eccles guides one to the recognition that the selection of objectives provides the desired effect—hence the basis for effects-based warfare. Of course, one can select objectives for which the effects either are monumentally difficult to achieve or can never be clearly determined. To change the will of, say, Osama Bin Laden falls squarely in this latter category.

Unfortunately, the publisher of this book did not do Smith or his readers any favor by printing the text in a sans-serif font in a fully justified format. There is a reason why books and newspapers use serif fonts—“kerning” of letters and words makes them significantly easier

to read in small type sizes. The book also lacks an index, which makes finding items quite a feat, and the footnotes do not correlate with the text.

*Effects Based Operations* is presented in the first person plural. Employment of the first person plural has two serious drawbacks—consistency and advocacy. On some pages “we” takes on at least three separate meanings—U.S. decision makers, the author himself, and the author and his reader. In other places “we” appears to refer to the U.S. Navy, and elsewhere to U.S. military forces. This proves rather confusing for the reader, who is continually challenged to discern to whom the author is referring. Use of the first person, moreover, gives this book the tang of an in-house, partisan staff study rather than a dispassionate analysis.

Finally, the bibliography is thin, omitting such important works as General David Deptula’s *Effects-Based Operations: Change in the Nature of Warfare* (Aerospace Education Foundation, 2001) and Paul Davis’s *Effects-Based Operations (EBO): A Grand Challenge for the Analytical Community* (RAND, 2001).

All in all, this book was a disappointment, weighed down by its length, its complexity, and its many flaws.

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Voorhees, James. *Dialogue Sustained: The Multi-level Peace Process and the Dartmouth Conference*. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2002. 470pp. \$24.95

For over thirty years, the Dartmouth Conference has been a multifaceted arena for sustained dialogue between the United States and the Soviet Union (later the Russian Federation). The conference, structured in plenary meetings and task forces, enabled the two super-power adversaries to edge slowly toward greater understanding. It was one of the earliest efforts to engage the Soviets outside of official channels, and it succeeded, although sometimes in Cold War fits and starts, by bringing together a consistent group of experts.

In his detailed history of the Dartmouth Conference, James Voorhees connects first-person reflections and memories of the participants with documentation of Dartmouth planning and reporting. He also undertakes a thorough review of the literature and engages two long-time conference participants, Harold Saunders and Vitaly Zhurkin, to analyze the lessons learned.

All three are well placed to reflect upon the value of the Dartmouth process. Voorhees is an associate of, and Saunders is the director of international affairs at, the Kettering Foundation, the institution that funded the conference for many years and served as its intellectual “home.” Zhurkin, director emeritus of the Institute of Europe in the Russian Academy of Sciences, began his participation with the conference in 1971.

The result is a book that brings the Dartmouth process alive against the backdrop of key events in the U.S.-Russian relationship, beginning in the 1950s and extending almost to the present day. In that respect, it is good reading for anyone interested in the history of the Cold War.

This work is also important because it describes the continuing value of the process. Yevgeny Primakov, a long-time participant, expressed this well when he wrote to Saunders during the book’s preparation: “The whole history of the Dartmouth meetings demonstrates the usefulness of such non-official group[s]. . . . [F]ormal contacts do not exclude the necessity of non-official exchange of opinions in particular between those people who have the capability to report their impressions and conclusions after such exchanges to the highest state officials.”

Furthermore, the process has had valuable offshoots, such as the Inter-Tajik Dialogue, which Saunders cochaired from its inception. The dialogue has been effective in resolving what seemed to be an intractable civil war in Tajikistan. Dartmouth, in short, has given birth to some productive notions of conflict resolution, and Voorhees, Saunders, and Zhurkin describe their potential well.

The book’s shortcomings are in two areas. First, its description of government policy making falls prey to oversimplification. Anyone who believes that political appointees stick to making policy and professional bureaucrats stick to implementing it has never watched the British television comedy *Yes, Prime Minister*, the classic program that chronicles relations between minister and mandarin in the British government. Its lessons apply equally well in Washington, and probably also in Moscow. That aside, if the book had acknowledged more of a symbiotic relationship between political appointees and bureaucrats in the policy-making process, it might have granted an even more influential role to the

Dartmouth Conference. In other words, the meetings and briefings that the author recounts, involving many layers of the U.S. government, probably provided multiple points at which Dartmouth insights could enter U.S. policy.

The book's second problem is rather scant recognition that Dartmouth was largely a "closed loop system" on the Russian side, involving "the same, limited number of figures whom the Soviet authorities permitted to have this kind of access to Americans." Undoubtedly, the stalwarts of the cooperation from the Institute of the USA and Canada and other institutes had links into the Soviet policy-making system. Nevertheless, the limitations on who could participate meant that for many years the dialogue lacked access to key areas of expertise, such as arms control, on the Russian side—a fact that Voorhees freely acknowledges.

It is also worth considering whether the benefits of a close and continuing relationship with a few chosen people were, in the end, the dialogue's downfall. In the 1990s, as more and more Russian experts from a variety of institutions became available, they migrated into a plethora of international security and policy forums. Because it was full to capacity, however, the Dartmouth Conference was not always able to accommodate this "new blood." One Russian participant expressed the dilemma well: "We have lost our audience. The government isn't interested, and besides our institutes have lost their influence."

Despite these problems, the Dartmouth process clearly played a vital role in developing communications between the two superpowers during the Cold War. As this book makes clear, the

conference's legacy will abide in the conflict-resolution techniques to which it gave life.

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Lipsky, David. *Absolutely American: Four Years at West Point*. New York: Houghton Mifflin, 2003. 336pp. \$25

Steven Covey advises us to start with the end in mind, so here it is. If the reader knows of a young person who aspires to attend a college-level military academy, any one of them, give that person this book to read, cover to cover.

David Lipsky has written an entertaining and sobering book about life as it is lived at the U.S. Military Academy. He did so by living in Highland Falls, New York, for four years and by having unprecedented daily access to the cadet students and their mentors. The book inspires, using a quiet style of observation that captures the poignancy and irony of moments without being judgmental.

Lipsky, a journalist for *Rolling Stone* magazine, periodically chronicles modern college campus life. He admits to having been reluctant to take on the West Point assignment, because he had been brought up not to like the military. Jann Wenner, his publisher and boss, convinced him otherwise.

So, as the author states in the preface, he learned to road-march, live and navigate in the woods, recognize ranks, and absorb other basic military knowledge. Along the way, he experienced an epiphany: "Not only was the Army not the awful thing my father had imagined, it

was the sort of America he always pictured when he explained . . . his best hopes for the country. A place where everyone tried their hardest. A place where people—or at least most people—looked out for each other. A place where people—intelligent, talented people—said honestly that money wasn’t what drove them. A place where people spoke openly about their feelings and about trying to make themselves better.”

The author followed a class at West Point from first (plebe) year through graduation. Lipsky finds that the students there experience elements of campus life not unlike those on civilian campuses: sex, cliques, the Internet, alcohol, and in a very minor way, drugs. He also learns to appreciate the academy’s motto: “Duty, Honor, and Country.” As one student reflects on the experience, he states that “becoming a military officer isn’t just a profession, it’s a calling.” Lipsky illustrates how life at West Point is not easy. The tension and stress between the normal temptations of modern American life and the peculiar structures, strictures, and norms necessary to become a commissioned U.S. Army officer sometimes prove too much.

However, those who persevere make for the most interesting stories. We learn of the “golden boy,” a self-motivated cadet who finds himself unable to chose infantry as a branch and anguishes whether he should “take five and fly” to live with his true love or follow the calling. There is the “sad sack,” who, because he has a terrible time performing physical tasks, is routinely targeted by his tactical officers for separation and yet stubbornly hangs on and

graduates, to the astonishment and admiration of his peers. There is the “reluctant leader,” who only wants to play football but is transformed into a first-rate tactical leader who leads a rag-tag orienteering team to a moral victory.

Not all of Lipsky’s stories are inspirational, however. He also discusses, without judgment, a very real phenomenon in the military—the gap between teaching high standards and values, and practicing them. So objective are Lipsky’s observations that one wonders if he realizes what he’s reporting. The most moving story, and a prime example of high standards and values, is the one of a department head—a combat veteran lieutenant colonel who sets for cadets exceptionally high standards and inspires them to achieve those standards (one cadet preserved the stub of this officer’s cigar in a plastic bag as an icon). When one of the colonel’s subordinate officers produces a highly controversial and politically incorrect report, the colonel takes responsibility for it, protecting his subordinate from an investigation that could end his career. However, for his actions, the colonel was dismissed from the Army because he “failed to exhibit the three Army values: Honor, Respect, and Loyalty.” There is true irony.

Still, this is a small affair in the effort to mold character at West Point. Let the cynicism and skepticism wait for now. This work is a testimony to the eternal hopefulness and idealism of youth. Read it and remember.

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Massie, Robert K. *Castles of Steel: Britain, Germany, and the Winning of the Great War at Sea*. New York: Random House, 2003. 880pp. \$35

This work is the sequel to Pulitzer Prize-winning author Robert Massie's *Dreadnought: Britain, Germany, and the Coming of the Great War* (Random House, 1991). It is a sweeping narrative of World War I at sea. While it focuses primarily on the struggle between the main German and British fleets, it also examines the German U-boat campaign, other revolutions in undersea weaponry, the pivotal role of good intelligence, and the broad geographic scope of the war. The book provides a clear sense of how important the clash of British and German navies was to the war's eventual outcome, and it illustrates how Winston Churchill's dramatic description of Admiral John Jellicoe, commander in chief of the British Grand Fleet, as "the only commander who could lose the war in an afternoon" could be an accurate one.

This is also a cautionary tale of failures and missed opportunities. In the earliest stages of the conflict, we see both sides baffled when their opponent's actions do not match prewar assumptions. The German naval strategy, for example, was based on the certainty that the British would immediately attack the German fleet or institute a close-in blockade. When this did not happen, Massie writes, "the premise on which the Germans had based their strategy was overturned." Consequently, German admirals "discovered that they did not know what to do." When the German fleet, on the other hand, did not come charging out for a fight, the British public, expecting another Trafalgar,

became annoyed with the navy's "unwillingness" to act. Each side scrambled to formulate a new strategy. There is a clear lesson here—flexibility, not plans set in stone.

The author shows that the most costly strategic failure, however, was the German resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare. By no means is this a groundbreaking interpretation, but in these pages the course of action leading to the decision is made clear. The failure of the vaunted High Seas Fleet to carry out its anticipated task of whittling down the Grand Fleet painted the Germans into a strategic corner from which they eventually saw unrestricted submarine warfare as their only alternative.

Despite these explanations of strategy, *Castles of Steel* is also a readable and dramatic work. The narrative rushes along, with a desperate hunt for the enemy in the vast Pacific, with fleets and squadrons that speed toward each other without a hint of the other's presence, and with battle cruisers that appear out of the mist to shell unsuspecting coastal villages and then slip quietly away. Action in the North Sea, the book's primary theater, culminates in a gripping four-chapter account of Jutland. Meanwhile, the fog of battle makes command and control difficult, even with the new technology of wireless communication. In the words of British admiral David Beatty, the war at sea became "a conflict with the unexpected," despite the best-laid plans. The reader can sense the drama and urgency born of this uncertainty on every page.

Yet while acknowledging the great narrative allure of vast fleets fighting for control of the seas, some readers might question the relevance of such a lengthy analysis. After all, was it not the overall

experience of the First World War that marked the passing of the Mahanian ideal of climactic shoot-outs between battleships and pointed to new realities in naval strategy? Almost from the time the echo of the guns in the North Sea faded, naval strategy shifted to things radically different from decisive battles between capital ships. The strategic framework of *Forward . . . from the Sea* appears to have little in common with Jutland or Dogger Bank.

Nevertheless, the struggle to adapt to this shift is part of the experience we see unfolding in *Castles of Steel*. Jellicoe came to realize that his fleet's primary purpose "was not destruction of the enemy fleet, but command of the sea with the accompanying ability to maintain the blockade." Ultimately, we see a successful adjustment on the strategic level by the British, contrasted with a complete failure of German grand strategy.

Finally, this is clearly a well researched book. Telling figures on German economic imports show precisely the effect of the British blockade. Information on the coal consumption of ships could easily have been left out, but because of its inclusion, we have a much better understanding of a ship's limitations and abilities. The reader comes to know the characters involved in the drama, and we can thereby understand their choices better. Robert Massie's careful attention is evident throughout the book and contributes to its stature as a seminal volume in understanding World War I at sea, as well as the evolution of seapower and strategy in the early twentieth century.

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Mayor, Adrienne. *Greek Fire, Poison Arrows & Scorpion Bombs: Biological and Chemical Warfare in the Ancient World*. New York: Overlook, 2003. 319pp. \$27.95

Adrienne Mayor's recent effort is a comprehensive review of the use of biological and chemical weapons by ancient cultures. Mayor is an independent scholar of the classics and folklore who lives in Princeton, New Jersey. She has been published in *MHQ: Quarterly Journal of Military History* and various archeology journals, and she is the author of *The First Fossil Hunters: Paleontology in Greek and Roman Times* (Princeton Univ. Press, 2000); a similarly titled program is scheduled for the History Channel in July 2004.

This work describes in detail the use of weapons of mass destruction by the ancient cultures of Greece, Rome, China, India, Islamic regions, and Mongolia. Mayor presents a much needed update of the historical use of these weapons. If modern scientists appear to understand the nature and effects of chemical and biological weapons through their expertise in biochemical and molecular sciences and epidemiology, ancient civilizations created and used similar weapons by empirical evidence alone.

The (mythical) first use of a biological weapon in the ancient world was by Hercules, who dipped his arrows in the venom of the slain Hydra. Ancient myths may also reflect the realities of their time. Descriptions of poisoned wounds in the Trojan War accurately depict the effects of snake venom and other toxins, lending confirmation of the use of this type of weapon. In AD 198–99, the citizens of Hatra (the

remains of this city are located south of Masul, Iraq) successfully defended their city from a Roman attack by the use of clay-pot bombs likely filled with scorpions and other venomous insects gathered from the surrounding desert. Hannibal catapulted earthenware jars filled with venomous snakes during a decisive naval battle against King Eumenes of Pergamum between 190 and 184 BC.

One of the greatest current concerns in homeland defense today is the protection of food and water supplies from intentional contamination. Mayor presents evidence that purposeful poisoning of food and water sources as a military tactic was once commonplace. The earliest documentation of poisoned drinking water referenced is from Greece in 590 BC, when hellebore was used to poison the water source of the city Kirrha by the Amphictyonic League, causing the inhabitants to become “violently sick to their stomachs and all lay unable to move. The Amphictyons took the city without opposition.” Aeneas the Tactician in 350 BC wrote a siegecraft manual recommending that military commanders “make water undrinkable” by polluting rivers, lakes, springs, wells, and cisterns. A more recent analogy is presented with the Iroquois’ use of animal skins to cause illness in the water supply of over a thousand French soldiers during the eighteenth century.

The earliest recorded use of incendiary weapons was of flammable arrows by Persia against Athens in 480 BC. Chemical additives soon followed in order to enhance burning characteristics against more sturdy defenses. The use of fire and incendiary material was an important tool during early naval battles. During Alexander the Great’s siege of

Tyre in 332 BC, the Phoenicians refitted a large transport ship as a floating chemical firebomb with sulfur, bitumen, pitch, and kindling material. The Phoenicians ignited the ship just before it struck a pier on the fortified island; the pier was destroyed.

Greek fire, an ancient predecessor of napalm, was a weapons system used to attack ships during naval engagements. Pressurized distilled naphtha was pumped through bronze tubes aimed at ships. The delivery system was capable of shooting liquid fire from swiveling nozzles mounted on small boats. It was first used to break the Muslim navy’s siege of Constantinople in AD 673, and again saved the city from this fleet in AD 718. From the seventh century, the Byzantines and Arabs formulated variations on Greek fire, which resembled napalm, for “it clung to everything it touched, instantly igniting any organic material—ship’s hull, oars, rigging, crew, and their clothing. Nothing was immune.” A paper published for Napoleon claims to have rediscovered the lost recipe for Greek fire, with the disturbing title “Weapons for the Burning of Armies.”

A thread throughout Mayor’s history is unease or taboos associated with biological and chemical weapons. Victims of Hercules’ poison arrows included Chiron, a centaur who taught the medical arts to humans, and Hercules’ son, Telephus. Such instruments violated the “traditional Hindu laws of conduct for Brahmans and high castes, the Laws of Manu.” In 1139 the Second Lateran Council decreed that Greek fire and similar burning weapons were “too murderous” to be used in Europe. A modern chemical weapon tragedy recounted by Mayor is the 2 December

1943 German bombing of the SS *John Harvey*, which was docked in Bari, Italy, secretly holding two thousand M47A1 sulfur mustard (H) bombs. The explosion exposed U.S. personnel and Italian citizens to chemical weapons, which resulted in hundreds of deaths.

This work imparts seminal information on the use of biological and chemical weapons in the ancient world, and as such it provides an outlook missing from much current thought about this era. It is highly recommended.

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Rubin, Barry, and Judith Colp Rubin. *Yasir Arafat: A Political Biography*. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2003. 354pp. \$27.50

The Palestinian people would have been better off as citizens of Israel. That is a conclusion one can reach after digesting the political biography of Yasir Arafat by the veteran Middle Eastern writer-reporter team of Barry Rubin and Judith Colp Rubin.

The book is clear on its takeaways. To understand Arafat, you must understand the “struggle” as well as his record of failure. Arafat now holds the record for creating, and remaining the leader of, the planet’s longest-running revolutionary movement, while at the same time failing to bring the Palestinian struggle to a successful conclusion.

In his adult life, Arafat has spent five decades as a revolutionary, forty years as chief of his own group, thirty-plus years as a leader of an entire people, and seven years as head of a government.

Despite all the opportunities and responsibility, Arafat has not brought the Palestinian people peace, victory, or an independent state. His failures and his own vision of the “struggle” have cost the Palestinians dearly. When, in 2000 at Camp David, he was offered a recognized Palestinian state on generally reasonable terms, he walked away. His rejection of the offer ignited the current *intifadah*.

This fresh dissection of Arafat should be of great interest to *Review* readers looking for insight as to why the United States has often appeared “eager to give Arafat another chance” in its own quest to broker a lasting Middle East peace. For years, no matter how many times Arafat proved unreliable, the United States found reasons to give him another chance. Either he is indispensable to the peacemaking process, or he is the lone remaining roadblock. If the United States is ever to break this maddening cycle, it must first know Arafat for who he really is.

The Rubins’ portrait of Arafat may be the most intimate to date, exposing him to the reader and asking questions that beg for answers. How did such a man become the leader of his people? What human “tools” does Arafat exploit?

If one reads only a single chapter, make it “Being Yasir Arafat.” Reading like a psychological profile from a CIA dossier, this chapter not only details some of Arafat’s most intimate behavior, habits, beliefs, and idiosyncrasies but goes on to connect the dots to provide the *why* of his behavior: Why does Arafat forever wear the traditional Arab *kaffiya* head garb, and why is it folded a certain way? Why does he always sport the scruffy beard? Why is he always dressed in a military uniform when he

is a political leader? Explanations of these quirks provide colorful insight into this man's character.

Violence is a pervasive theme of Arafat's life. Despite his professed commitment to the peace process, Arafat is a demonstrated man of violence, the Rubins charge, well connected to global terrorism. The Rubins present strong evidence that Arafat not only has a long history of duplicity in terrorist events but in many cases personally plotted, encouraged, and triggered the violence himself. As early as the mid-1970s, the Palestinian Liberation Army had a record of involvement in skyjackings, bombings, assassinations, and murders. Arafat learned from experience, despite what world leaders told him, that violence paid.

Overall, the Rubins evince abhorrence of Arafat. It appears there really is little to like about the man. Among other traits, in the Rubins' view, he is petty, arrogant, megalomaniacal, and disingenuous. The Rubins carefully place evidential anecdotes to support their portrayal. Typical is Arafat's purported response to the question of why he lied so much—"I would kill for Palestine, so you don't want me to lie for Palestine?" The book keeps his deplorable traits in plain sight, as a policeman would say, "where it can't hurt you." However much one would just want him to go away, his prominent role in contemporary Middle Eastern affairs cannot be ignored.

This book performs a valuable service as a primer on the characters, organizations, and connections in the shadowy world of Middle Eastern terrorism and Islamic radicalism. A short but useful glossary and chronology further help one make these associations.

This is a pure biography. It is impressively documented with thoughtful analysis, deliberately focused on Yasir Arafat. It is not intended as a history of the Middle East, the Arab-Israeli conflict, or Israel. However, for readers who are already certain about Arafat's character, the Rubins' account may surpass even the most critical assessments.

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Kerrey, Bob. *When I Was a Young Man: A Memoir*. New York: Harcourt, 2002. 270pp. \$26

Bob Kerrey's absorbing memoir tells the story of his coming of age in the Midwest and his loss of innocence in Vietnam, where he was grievously wounded. Congressional Medal of Honor recipient, former governor and senator from Nebraska, Kerrey opens and closes his book by describing his efforts to keep a promise he made to his dying father—to learn how his father's brother died in World War II. He states that he wanted this work to be about his father and his uncle but that the story he ended up telling "is not the story I intended to tell."

Kerrey first recounts his vintage childhood in Lincoln, Nebraska, and earning his pharmacology degree at the University of Nebraska. In 1966, knowing he would likely be drafted, and inspired by Herman Wouk's *The Caine Mutiny*, Kerrey joined the Navy and entered Officer Candidate School. Once commissioned, he volunteered for underwater demolition team training, and after completion, he was selected for the

Navy's new special-mission SEAL (sea, air, land) combat teams.

After more arduous training in weapons and tactics, Kerrey was soon sent to Vietnam. He writes, "To say that I barely had a clue about what I was doing in Vietnam understates the case." He led two SEAL missions in Vietnam in early 1969 that redefined and transformed his life. In the first mission, he led his six-man squad at night into the small village of Thanh Phong, where high-level Vietcong were suspected of meeting. The resulting firefight, in which women and children were killed, caused Kerrey to feel "a sickness in my heart for what we had done." He states, "The young, innocent, man who went into Vietnam died that night. . . . I had become someone I did not recognize." On his next mission, just over two weeks later, his right foot was nearly entirely blown off. Kerrey writes, "With difficulty I pulled myself upright so I could direct my men." He tied off his mangled leg with a tourniquet and injected himself with morphine. His war had lasted barely two months.

Kerrey had much of his right leg amputated. He then started the long and painful process of recovery at the Philadelphia Naval Hospital. He chose Philadelphia because it was the farthest from his home and the people he knew. He wanted to recover alone, and he "did not want to have to answer questions

about what I had done in the war."

While there, Kerrey also learned that he had been submitted for the Medal of Honor for his last mission. Not feeling deserving, he was told by friends that "no one ever does," and that he must "accept this award for everyone who should have been recognized but was not." Kerrey's chronicle of his recovery with other critically wounded is perhaps the most poignant and memorable portion of this eloquent memoir. He was discharged from the Navy in December 1969, determined to make the most of his second chance and "begin his second life with gratitude."

Kerrey's candid and moving story starts and ends with a quest, but he does not offer a neat resolution for the anguish caused by his violence in Vietnam. Although unable to find out enough information about his uncle's death in the Philippines in 1944, he was perhaps able to keep his promise to his father after all, by honoring his uncle as a soldier "who should have been recognized but was not." Kerrey was also able to come to terms with his experiences during the war. Kerrey's spare and haunting story is a meaningful addition to the literature of war.

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