BOOK REVIEWS

THE EXPANSION OF NATO

Simon, Jeffrey. *Hungary and NATO: Problems in Civil-Military Relations.* Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 2003. 131pp. $26.95
Simon, Jeffrey. *Poland and NATO: A Study in Civil-Military Relations.* Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 2004. 195pp. $28.95
Simon, Jeffrey. *NATO and the Czech and Slovak Republics: A Comparative Study in Civil-Military Relations.* Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 2004. 307pp. $34.95

The enlargement of the European Union and the consummation of the second wave of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's expansion in the spring of 2004 would tempt one to believe that the postcommunist transition is coming to a close as a kind of normalcy settles over the region. Jeffrey Simon's careful and informative series of books concerning civil-military relations in four Central and Eastern European countries reminds us that in important respects, transition is still under way. Or rather, given the state of civil-military relations across the region, we should hope that it is, for the difficulties that postcommunist states face in democratizing, rationalizing, and strengthening their military-security apparatuses are still manifold. Placing Simon's insights against the backdrop of NATO's own strategic transition—the outcome of which is very unclear—one has continuing reason to worry about the stability of postcommunism. By extension, European security is at stake insofar as stability and security stem from constructive military-societal relations, sophisticated defense expertise, and well institutionalized democratic accountability.

In each of the three volumes, which cover Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia (now the Czech and Slovak republics) respectively, Simon provides a detailed chronology of defense reforms since communism's collapse. In all cases, Simon's narrative is set against four consistent criteria to which he continually refers as he assesses the merits and shortcomings of reform. The four criteria revolve around: the division of civilian authority in democratic societies; parliamentary oversight, especially in matters of budgeting; subordination of general staffs to civilian institutions; and military prestige, trustworthiness, and accountability. According to Simon's analysis, Poland has clearly been the best at transforming its military-security apparatus, despite some fairly serious

setbacks in the early 1990s. Measured in terms of the four criteria, the Czech Republic has fared somewhat better than its Slovak counterpart, which, after the "velvet divorce" of 1993, found itself building a range of military and security institutions from scratch. The biggest surprise in the series for students of the postcommunist transition will be how poorly Hungarian civil-military relations have developed—especially given Hungarian politicians' strenuous efforts to enter the alliance.

These books are essential reading for anyone writing on NATO, because, concerning as they do half of NATO's newest members, the problems within these states will no doubt have some bearing not only on the functioning of the alliance but also on its political orientation. Certainly, there are few people better placed to report on events and persons crucial to the military-security reform process than Jeffrey Simon, given his long-standing role as a leading American adviser to postcommunist governments on how to advance institutional change in this area. More generally, those interested in the postcommunist transition and cross-national variation would do well to spend time trying to understand this somewhat arcane sector's evolution, not least because military-society relations carry with them implications for democratic consolidation. Admittedly, Simon does not make this an easy or inviting task. He has evidently been so close to the intricacies of reform that one unfamiliar with the issues or the personnel could conceivably drown in the detail.

Despite the particular challenges that Simon's intimate portrayal poses, I would nevertheless suggest that his findings provide some puzzling questions for the literature on postcommunist transition. For example, Poland and Hungary are very often grouped together as states whose strong opposition to state socialism made them especially susceptible to Westernizing reform. The more repressive nature of the Czechoslovak regime contributed to relatively less political competition after the transition, allowing policy errors to endure. Although Poland's ability to exploit NATO's criteria for membership in order to achieve reform confirms the democratic opposition hypothesis, Hungary's relatively poor performance in restructuring the military and accompanying political oversight raises new questions about what provides the impetus for reform. The military could require explanations distinct from those that cause variation in other kinds of political and economic reform. On the other hand, the logic underpinning the democratic opposition hypothesis is sufficiently broad that national defense establishments should be susceptible to Westernizing influences.

With specific respect to military-security reforms, Simon points repeatedly in all three volumes to problems that can plague civil-military relations generally, as well as to those issues that may be peculiar to the region. The lack of civilian expertise in former Warsaw Pact countries figures prominently in the initial failure to formulate effective restructuring such that new lines of authority allow ministries of defense to take on the bulk of planning and management. From lack of civilian expertise flow other problems, including the failure to provide transparency, discipline military malfeasance, or dedicate adequate funding to militaries in decline. Other perennial issues have included

the lack of acceptance of civilian control as NATO defines it—among both military personnel and civilians, tension between general staffs and ministries of defense, and a behavioral gap between formal institutions and lived experience.

The news from Central Europe is, of course, not all bad. Probably owing to the legacy of some form of political control dating back to the Warsaw Pact, in combination with public enthusiasm for communism's collapse, none of the militaries in question has in any serious way attempted to interfere in the democratic transition. More often than not, politicization of the armed forces has been the will of errant politicians rather than ambitious generals. On the whole, attempts at reform have been consistent with NATO's objectives of improving transparency and accountability. Parliamentary committees have gradually gained competence over a decade and a half and are increasingly comfortable exercising their authority over defense budgets. Nevertheless, in spite of the generally positive trajectory, Central and Eastern European states continue to have real trouble committing the necessary resources to reorient their capabilities toward NATO's evolving strategic challenges, democratic political control has not been fully established in some instances, and, in the Czech Republic and Hungary in particular, backsliding away from initial goals has been evident since their accession in 1999.

The massive variation over time and across the issues under consideration leaves one wishing that Simon had used his vast knowledge to impose some order on the data. This is especially the case with respect to the following two questions: What accounts for such variation across countries, and what difference has NATO made to the domestic politics and foreign policies of Central and Eastern European countries? Although standard explanations of postcommunist performance by themselves generally do not explain this variation very well, Simon's analysis does provide some starting points. The combination in Poland of having had a strong democratic opposition committed ultimately to Westernization and a relatively high level of public respect for the armed forces as an institution, despite the military's past participation in domestic repression, proved to be a big advantage relative to the Czech Republic or Hungary. In the latter two instances, while the existence of democratic oppositions under communism (albeit in different forms) certainly informed transition in positive ways, the very low standing of the armed forces in these societies inhibited complete reform. Slovakia is the reverse of both variables—it has a relatively high level of respect for the military coupled with a political ambivalence toward Westernization, as opposition movements in the other three countries conceived of it under state socialism.

On the second question, concerning the extent to which NATO enlargement has shaped domestic political reform and, equally important for regional stability, informed foreign policies, Simon has remarkably little to say. This is a shame, because someone of Simon's stature could be a powerful advocate for NATO's engagement in domestic policy reform on the basis that the consolidation of democratic oversight, defense budget transparency, and humane treatment of conscripts improves the quality of governance in postcommunist

states. We might infer from Simon's books that he is skeptical of NATO's transformative capacity and truly does view the evolution of civil-military relations as primarily a domestically generated phenomenon. This would be a difficult conclusion to defend, however, given that Simon himself points out that NATO made the Czech-Slovak relationship much easier to manage after the split than it otherwise would have been. Beyond that single, very important insight, the reader is left wondering whether the logic of NATO's stabilizing capacity could be extended elsewhere.

In all likelihood, NATO's inclusiveness has not only stabilized relations between states in Central Europe and between Russia and former Soviet satellites, but it also improved the quality of a range of domestic institutions throughout the region. Speculating about postcommunist Europe without NATO's engagement, one imagines a historically vulnerable set of states with all the domestic dysfunctions that accompany acute military insecurity. All of the democratic adaptations that NATO requires to improve the interface with its members and consolidate a particular set of values would have been the subject of protracted debate. Moreover, without NATO's support, those values, even in the most Western-oriented societies, might never have prevailed. There is indeed evidence of the contingent nature of democratic civil-military relations in the Polish case, where a series of crises and dissent over the value of democratic control delayed the subordination of the general staff to the Ministry of Defense. Although Hungary, Slovakia, and, to a lesser extent, the Czech Republic continue to have problems in consolidating democratic civil-military relations, it is worth asking where these countries would be if NATO had never introduced the norm as a desirable and functional feature of democratic governance.

For those concerned with NATO's impact on the region, Simon's series is, of course, an invaluable resource in understanding exactly what happened. Yet one has to look further than Simon to see the subtle, as well as the not-so-subtle, ways in which NATO has transformed the politics of postcommunist Europe. Now would be a particularly apt time for Simon to contribute to the debate about whether NATO has salutary political effects, because as the strategic environment has worsened, the United States in particular is manifesting less interest in the quality of democratic institutions in new member states than in foreign policy support for wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Although cultivating policy loyalty might be politically expedient, NATO could be missing an opportunity afforded by the transition's political and institutional fluidity to facilitate reforms that would not only improve the quality of domestic governance but also help consolidate a widening democratic community.

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Kaufman, Joyce P. *NATO and the Former Yugoslavia: Crisis, Conflict and the Atlantic Alliance.* Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 2002. 231pp. $74

As the world steps farther away from the Cold War, the evolving structure of the international system continues to fascinate informed citizens as well as professional scholars. In this work, Joyce Kaufman, professor of political science at Whittier College, contributes to the debate on the evolution and future of the Atlantic Alliance, particularly as the situation in the Balkans confronted a post–Cold War (and expanding) NATO. In detailing the events between the collapse of Soviet communism (1990) and the attack on the twin towers (2001), the author makes a forceful case for the need for a unified NATO alliance that is willing to use force if necessary to quell international instabilities.

Kaufman's effort is particularly helpful in plotting the movement of theory into practice in international relations. While no one at NATO headquarters in 1990 suggested that the world had not materially changed with the fall of the Berlin Wall, the alliance's premier strategists could only make reasonable guesses about this "new world," as they drew up the alliance's Strategic Concept of 1991. It took the decade-long dissolution of the former Yugoslavia to force alliance planners to appreciate the detailed complexities of this world.

In one sense, this book is merely a confirmation of much of the conventional wisdom on diplomatic theory and the operations of alliances. On numerous occasions the author explicitly makes the point that diplomatic threats without military power are in vain; collective decision making is tortured, difficult, and slow; domestic politics intrude on the capacity to be statesmanlike; and the absence of a clear enemy provides an inducement for an alliance to lose focus. However, as Kaufman develops the story with names, personalities, and events, the reader can watch these theories come to life.

No one expects that alliance strategy would be made in a vacuum, and this work clearly and persuasively shows how constraints of domestic politics must be factored into NATO politics. Of particular interest to makers of American foreign policy is Kaufman's documentation of how the United States evolved from an attitude that the Balkans was a "European problem" to being the alliance's most forceful advocate for military intervention.

This work's principal flaw is that its sources are almost exclusively official NATO documents and interviews with the people directly associated with those documents. The story is told from NATO's viewpoint by someone who spoke to insiders but was not herself a member. Unfortunately, this provides the reader with a conventional, albeit well supported, interpretation of events.

However, this work's positive attributes overwhelm this shortcoming. This easy-to-read historical account provides significant value for the student of international affairs, because it documents a perfect contemporary test case of how alliances evolve in the face of a changing security environment. While most pundits saw the Balkans as the most likely spot for crisis and conflict in Europe a decade ago, few would have guessed that the NATO alliance would have ultimately achieved such a preeminent role in its resolution. Indeed, just prior to the signing of the London Declaration in 1990, numerous editorials were suggesting that while NATO had done an admirable job during the Cold

War, we should make preparations to "turn out the lights" in Brussels. Today, as we find ourselves involved in a global war on terrorism, the United States is faced with a similar quandary. Does NATO have the capacity, flexibility, and will to engage the international terrorist movement? Do our European allies view the threat of terrorism as we do, allowing for unity of action and willingness to use force? Do adversaries such as al-Qa'ida allow the alliance to consider the entire globe its ultimate area of responsibility? Can NATO, as Madeleine Albright asked, move to a more expansive concept of collective security? These questions may also require a decade to resolve, but Kaufman previews the kind of difficulties the alliance is likely to encounter en route and sheds some light on the ultimate answers.

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Purdum, Todd S. *A Time of Our Choosing: America's War in Iraq.* New York: Times Books, 2003. 319pp. $25

The late *Washington Post* publisher Philip Graham once said that journalism is the first draft of history. Todd S. Purdum's *A Time of Our Choosing: America's War in Iraq,* is the first draft of the history of the U.S. occupation of Iraq. Months before the Department of Defense made the controversial decision to embed reporters within U.S. units, Purdum was in Iraq reporting the war.

The military's major criticism of the practice is that those assigned to the same unit throughout the campaign would only have a "soda straw" view of the war and would thus miss the big picture. Others (primarily the media) were concerned that reporters would lose their objectivity once the shooting started. However, Purdum's professional work puts that argument to bed.

Early on, Purdum states that his task was to "draw the work of my colleagues into a single narrative." In other words his job was to bring those "soda straws" together into a comprehensive and concise chronicle of the war. He certainly has the necessary credentials for the task—he has worked for the *New York Times* for over twenty-five years and is a former White House and diplomatic correspondent.

Although Purdum's narrative style is appealing, it is his ability to bring together all the different material that makes this book hard to put down. One reads of the Bush administration's intensive efforts to convince a skeptical world of its case for invasion and of the debate over UN Security Council Resolution 1441. Divisions deepened as Secretary of State Colin Powell and France's charismatic foreign minister Dominque de Villepin both courted the United Nations and public opinion. Meanwhile, military planning proceeded at the Pentagon and U.S. Central Command. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and Deputy Secretary Paul Wolfowitz, expecting the Iraq army to implode, deployed a force much smaller than that of the nearly 550,000 troops in Operation DESERT STORM. Their plan was a test of a new American style of warfare that engaged large numbers of special operations forces and used highly accurate precision weapons and new technology in the form of unmanned aerial vehicles.

The book's primary focus is the relentless twenty-one-day fight to Baghdad by the Marines on the right flank and the Army on the left flank. Purdum excels in tying together all the resulting reporting. What emerges is a factual and very human account of the intense ground campaign. Included are events of 23 March, which saw the ambush of the 507th Maintenance Company and the devastating losses suffered by the 11th Attack Helicopter Regiment. The brief campaign also saw some excellent soldiering, such as the feint and race for the Karbala Gap and the "Thunder Run" armored thrusts into central Baghdad. Ever the concise chronicler, Purdum also discusses the northern front that was opened by the airdrop of a thousand paratroopers, and the operations conducted by the British in and around Basra. Purdum weaves all this together in such a way as to make this work an excellent read for military professionals and armchair strategists alike. It is a bit thin on the air and naval aspects of the war, due to the lack of threat posed by the Iraqi air force and navy and because the bulk of the embedded reporters accompanied ground units.

One of the successes of the program, however, was how the reporting brought out the human side of the war. Purdum discusses numerous examples of how the war directly affected such individuals as the U.S. Army officer who, after witnessing the results of an air strike, commented, "It's a helluva thing watching people die," or how an Iraqi man, his hands swollen from recent beatings by Iraqi security forces, emotionally thanked the Americans for saving him.

The book's main strength—its immediacy in telling the whole story of the conflict—is also a major drawback. Toward his conclusion, Purdum recounts the events of July 2003 surrounding the deaths of Saddam Hussein's infamous sons, Uday and Qusay. One of the vexing questions remaining was the whereabouts of Saddam Hussein. The coalition would wonder about the fate of the former Iraqi leader for another five months. The book concludes before Saddam's capture in December.

Future historians and scholars will no doubt revisit this war and debate endlessly on the merits of preemptive self-defense, the effectiveness of the coalition of the willing, and whether the outcome achieved was the one desired. For now, however, Todd Purdum's *A Time of Our Choosing* will more than suffice as the first draft of history.

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Bush, Richard C. *At Cross Purposes: U.S.-Taiwan Relations since 1942.* Armonk, New York: M. E. Sharpe, 2004. 320pp. $27.95

For years, "one China" has meant two completely different Chinas masquerading as one country—the People's Republic of China (PRC) and Taiwan (a.k.a. the Republic of China [ROC]). The PRC is huge, with a population of 1.3 billion, while Taiwan has only twenty-two million people in comparison. There are other differences as well: Taiwan is rich, with a per capita income in 2003 of over $23,000, versus the PRC's per capita $5,000; Taiwan's 5 percent unemployment rate is half, its 1 percent poverty rate is a tenth, and its seventy-seven-year life expectancy is

five years more than those of the PRC. More importantly, during the past decade Taiwan adopted a multiparty democracy, while the PRC has only one legal political party that is holding tightly onto its autocratic powers—the Chinese Communist Party.

How can two such divergent Chinas possibly reunite? What role has the United States played in their sixty-year standoff? These are the questions that Richard C. Bush, former chairman and managing director (September 1997 to June 2002) of the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT—the pseudo–American embassy in Taipei), asks in *At Cross Purposes.*

Bush starts with an extremely useful historical summary of the origins of the PRC-Taiwan problem. He asks, for example, what would have happened if Chiang Kai-shek had not requested in 1942–43 that Japan cede Taiwan to China. Would there even be a PRC-Taiwan problem today? After all, China at one point considered, then rejected, demanding Okinawa as well. If circumstances had been different, could Taiwan have remained a part of Japan or a UN protectorate, or even been given its independence?

Bush argues that the great powers' (the United States, the United Kingdom, and China) decision at Cairo to return Taiwan to China was the real origin of the "one China" problem, even though cross-strait tensions did not erupt until after the Nationalist retreat from the mainland in 1949. To this day, the PRC takes this World War II decision very seriously. For example, from 21 to 26 July 1995, the PRC marked the fiftieth anniversary of the July 1945 Potsdam Declaration, which confirmed the Cairo Decision, by lobbing "test" missiles off Taiwan's shores.

After World War II, the U.S. government quickly found itself in a dilemma, since it appeared obliged to support the repressive Kuomintang. February 28, 1947, was the beginning of the massacre by the Nationalists, who arrested and killed hundreds, perhaps thousands, of Taiwanese; it was followed by an era known as the "White Terror." Nationalist repression on Taiwan continued for more than three decades, until 10 December 1979 and the Kaohsiung Incident, which was the turning point in Taiwan's transition to democracy.

Following Washington's decision to recognize the People's Republic of China in 1978 (part of America's Cold War strategy aimed at the Soviet Union), Taipei's increasing dependence on Washington for security actually gave the United States greater leverage to sponsor democratic reforms. Thus, quixotically, democratic reforms in Taiwan appear to have been spurred rather than halted by U.S. recognition of the PRC.

It is understandable that Bush, as former head of the American Institute of Taiwan, would want to credit U.S. diplomats and government officials with sponsoring Taiwan's democratic development (one chapter even investigates the impact of the U.S. Congress and Taiwanese-Americans on this process). Granted, this is a subject he knows well; however, lest Taiwanese democracy be mistaken as simply an American knockoff, even Bush is forced to admit that these non-Taiwanese factors "made but a tertiary contribution to the democratization of Taiwan" when compared to the impact of Taiwanese reformers both inside and outside of the Nationalist

party. For better or worse, Taiwan's democracy is completely homegrown.

To evaluate how Taiwan's democracy and the Sino-U.S. Cold War diplomacy impacts relations today, Bush discusses the four diplomatic communiqués and congressional acts that have regulated U.S.-PRC-Taiwanese relations, including the Shanghai communiqué (1972), the U.S.-PRC normalization communiqué (1978), the Taiwan Relations Act (1979), and the U.S.-PRC communiqué on arms sales to Taiwan (1982). The commitments included in these four "sacred texts" were not trivial and have created fixed constraints on Washington's and Beijing's behavior. Although necessary to defeat the Soviets, these diplomatic agreements have often worked to the PRC's advantage in putting diplomatic pressure on Taiwan to accept its "one country, two systems" formula.

As for what will happen in the future to this "one China" conundrum, Bush cautions that Taiwan's recent democratic reforms have not given twelve million voting Taiwanese their own seat at the table in any future cross-strait talks leading to Chinese reunification. Democracy will make any satisfactory political solution of the PRC-Taiwan divide even more difficult to negotiate. He cautions, therefore, that the "Taiwan and China positions are sufficiently at odds that they cannot be papered over. If the stalemate is to be broken peacefully, either Beijing will have to abandon one country, two systems, or Taipei will have to accept it." Since neither of these options appears likely, one is forced to conclude that PRC-Taiwan reunification can only be accomplished as a result of war.

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Goldman, Emily O., and Leslie C. Eliason, eds. *The Diffusion of Military Technology and Ideas.* Stanford, Calif.: Stanford Univ. Press, 2003. 415pp. $75

This book offers a rich collection of research papers on very important topics: the much discussed revolution in military affairs (RMA), and the less discussed diffusions of new military technology and the accompanying changes in military doctrine to other countries. The authors were carefully chosen experts in history, political science, and sociology, who address the very important factors of national culture as they affect the application of new military technologies.

The product of a series of workshops, this work owes a considerable debt to the prodding of Andrew Marshall, Director of Net Assessment in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, who has been encouraging scholarly analysis of the full implications of the RMA.

Although recognizing the ambiguities relating to the exact definition of such a "revolution," the book does not get bogged down in the debate, but rather directs its analysis to the sociological, cultural, bureaucratic, intellectual, and other processes by which such revolutions are, or are not, replicated. Military weapons may spread through arms sales, the commercial development of "dual-use" technologies, or by simple imitation, but the military doctrines appropriate to such new kinds of weaponry sometimes do not spread so rapidly.

There are some very stimulating and provocative historical case studies, including the foreign penetrations of the past five centuries into South Asia, the development of "blitzkrieg" armored

warfare in World War II, aircraft carriers, and the Soviet impact on Arab armies (Soviet tanks were delivered, but Soviet doctrine was not adopted). More recent examples include the Soviet approach to managing the Warsaw Pact, the "special relationship" that has existed since 1945 among English-speaking democracies, and the patterns of nuclear proliferation and the spread of information technology.

This work is directed to both the social scientist and the policy practitioner. The chapters are well written and rich in detail, with excellent footnotes, thus making this a handy volume for anyone doing research in these areas.

There are times when the unifying theme of the diffusion of "technology and ideas" becomes so broad that it seems to include everything militarily that has happened or that is going to happen, for what else is there to a strategic confrontation but the weapons owned and how they will be used? Yet this work brings the subject into sharper focus, revealing how ideas about the appropriate use of weapons do not always travel as well as the weapons themselves. The introductory outline thus helps to maintain that focus, and the concluding chapter by Emily Goldman and Andrew Ross is extremely valuable for sifting out the recurring patterns that emerge from the evidence presented.

Among the important conclusions mentioned are that transformation leaders do not long monopolize their transformations; leaders are frequently surpassed by followers; leadership effecting a military transformation is no guarantee of victory; and wholesale replications of the innovations of a transformation may not be necessary. Most central to this work is the finding that "software"(ideas and doctrine) does not travel as well as "hardware" (physical weapons). The explanation for this last limitation is the basic theme of the entire book.

Collections of conference papers often do not hang together well, or when they do, they typically do not wander far enough away from a simple theme. This book suffers from neither drawback, being rich and eclectic in the materials it offers, yet at the same time remaining focused on an important set of questions. It offers a great deal for anyone concerned with the military-technology revolution.

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Record, Jeffrey. *Making War, Thinking History.* Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2002. 216pp. $28.95

Jeffrey Record is professor of strategy and international security at the Air War College, Maxwell Air Force Base. He is the author of four books and numerous monographs on U.S. military strategy and has extensive Capitol Hill experience, including service as a professional staffer for the Senate Armed Services Committee.

This work assesses how the experiences of Munich and Vietnam influenced presidential decisions on the use of force in every administration from Harry Truman to Bill Clinton. Both Munich and Vietnam are regularly invoked in current political debate in an attempt to justify a viewpoint, especially since the Cold War foreign policy consensus has broken down in recent

years. The terms have become shorthand for "appeasement" and "quagmire." Yet the real influence of these two cases on presidential decision making about the use or nonuse of force has been subtler, and has depended considerably on the background of individual presidents and on the formative experiences they brought with them into office.

For some presidents, historical analogy was an explicit factor in their use of force. After 1945, there was broad consensus that "Munich is about *whether* to use force and about what can happen when force is *not* used." Thus Truman based his 1950 decision to intervene in Korea on what happened, or more precisely on what did not happen, in Munich, noting that a president "must make the effort to apply this knowledge [of history] to the decisions that have to be made." John F. Kennedy was heavily influenced during the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 by Barbara Tuchman's *The Guns of August* (1962). Munich was a powerful factor in leading both Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson into Vietnam, on the basis of the imperative to stop cross-border aggression.

Vietnam is a more complex matter. Indeed, thirty years after Vietnam, there is still little agreement on the lessons from that conflict. There are many arguments about *how* force should have been used there, many implying that the "right" use of force would have resulted in a U.S. victory, or at least not a defeat. Others argue that Vietnam "teaches that force should have never been used in the first place, thus rendering moot discussions about the amount of force necessary and how it should have been employed."

Record traces the predominant post-Vietnam schools of thought that influence political discussion today. He discusses major intellectual themes, such as Caspar Weinberger's six "tests" for use of U.S. military force, later subsumed by Colin Powell's principle that "winning meant going in with overwhelming force, getting the job done quickly, and getting out cleanly"—though he notes wryly that the real world is rarely that immaculate. Another policy discussed is the imperative to avoid anything like Vietnam. Presidents have been more willing to cut their losses in places like Lebanon and Somalia. "On balance, post-Vietnam presidents have displayed significantly greater risk aversion, and especially sensitivity to incurring casualties, than their predecessors. In this they have been reinforced by an even more timid Pentagon."

The consequences have been great. Indeed, the lessons of Munich were the basis for U.S. Gulf intervention in 1990–91. "The haste with which the Bush administration terminated the war . . . reflected a Vietnam-driven dread of involvement in postwar Iraq. This fear of getting sucked into a bloody Arab quagmire drove the Bush administration to end the war prematurely," with all the dire consequences that follow today. Similarly, "U.S. behavior before and during Operation ALLIED FORCE [in Kosovo] constituted the most dramatic display to date of the Vietnam syndrome at work and its operational and political consequences for American foreign policy." Indeed, Saddam was not wholly foolish to wonder whether the United States would really invade Iraq in March 2003.

Moreover, the continuing differences within administrations over what Vietnam means has been actively harmful to American policy. The deeply hostile relationship between George Shultz and Caspar Weinberger, based on their differing views of the post-Vietnam use of force as a tool of American foreign policy, damaged the Reagan administration. Similar ongoing antagonism between Colin Powell and Donald Rumsfeld has done considerable harm to U.S. post–11 September strategy and policy execution.

Record briefly ponders whether the 1991 Iraq war constitutes a third seminal case that could serve as a historical marker, but then suggests not, because it did not entail "bloody and soul-searing foreign policy disasters." Yet it suggests another key issue, namely the recurrent American failure to tie in a war's military ending with political and strategic objectives. Examples include the abandonment of Europe in the aftermath of World War I; the failure to take Berlin in April 1945, when doing so might have forestalled some of what was to come in the Cold War; and the premature cease-fire ordered by George H. W. Bush, which is not unconnected with why we occupy Iraq today (which in itself may yet become another instance).

Reasoning by historical analogy has many pitfalls. While analogy may be helpful in making decision makers ask the "right questions" in a current crisis, "past employment and deployment of the Munich and Vietnam analogies suggest that they can teach effectively at the level of generality, but are insensitive to differences in detail." Whatever the utility of reasoning by historical analogy as a tool of policy formation and implementation, it is clear that policy makers will continue to be influenced by past events and what they believe those events teach. It is also clear that a presidents' (and key advisers') knowledge of history varies widely and that reasoning by historical analogy is but one of a host of factors at play in presidential decision making, that "every president's knowledge of past events is different and is subject to political bias." Perhaps the greatest actual effect of historical analogy is how it frames the worldviews of key protagonists, not how it may lead to "the right answer" in new situations.

The 2003 Iraq invasion and its aftermath make this book particularly interesting and topical. While the cases discussed end in the 1990s, surely the "lessons" of Munich and Vietnam (and likely the first Gulf War) influenced the post-9/11 views of President George W. Bush and other key actors about how to react to al-Qa'ida and what to do about Iraq and Saddam and other perceived threats. In fact, one of the reasons the Bush administration has come under such fierce criticism in the national security realm is that its decisions and actions are so counter to the general run of post-Vietnam American policy, as described in *Making War, Thinking History.* This book provides a good framework for thinking about the vital security issues the United States faces today.

JAN VAN TOL
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Wright, Evan. *Generation Kill: Devil Dogs, Iceman, Captain America, and the New Face of American War.* New York: Putnam, 2004. 354pp. $24.95

Generation Kill may be the best war book to have such an interesting title since *The Naked and the Dead*. The book's author, *Rolling Stone* contributing editor Evan Wright, was an embedded journalist with 1st Recon Battalion when it made its rush north into Iraq at the head of the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF) during the 2003 invasion. The title might lead one to expect a sensational account of young people desensitized by video games and brutalized by rap music engaging in random acts of violence—a book perhaps combining titillation and moral censure in an uneasy mixture. It would be a mistake to pass up Wright's book because of its title. He has produced a thoughtful, well written story that people in the military should read. This book perhaps belongs to the genre of "hip" journalistic accounts of war like Michael Herr's *Dispatches* about Vietnam, or Bob Shachochis's *The Immaculate Invasion* about Haiti. Lacking any military background, Wright proves to be a quick study, as a good journalist must be. His fresh viewpoint provides valuable insights into the world of a Marine unit in combat.

The title does betray one of the book's few incorrect assumptions, which is that the generation of young men in their late teens and early twenties who fought in this war are different in some essential way from the Marines of the past. Wright says that the Marines of Iraq belong to "what is more or less America's first generation of disposable children," but his observations about the men of 2d Platoon, B Company, 1st Recon are similar to those made by Phillip Caputo and James Web about the Marines of Vietnam. Many were dispossessed, underprivileged, "disposable," or abandoned. Wright also marvels at the disparity in social origin among the enlisted ranks. It was ever so. A writer in World War II observed that the Marine Corps seemed to be made up of a combination of dead-end kids and boys named Percival. The language, music, and mores have changed, but more continuities exist than Wright appears to realize.

Just as the people who fought and are fighting in Iraq now are both different from and similar to those who fought in previous wars, the conflict is both similar to and different from those of the past.

The invasion of Iraq was distinguished by a rapid advance into an enemy country, unexpected resistance by irregulars, and a great preponderance of accurate firepower on the part of U.S. forces. None of this was exactly unique or unprecedented, but all these factors gave the war its tenure and feel for those involved. Wright experienced all this, and he lets us know again and again that the sum of these characteristics was to make problematic the notion and practice of rules of engagement (ROE). Marines found themselves moving quickly through unfamiliar and often hostile territory, opposed by an enemy who usually wore no uniform and who was often unscrupulous about using civilians for deception and concealment. These Marines had at their disposal enormous firepower, and in general they hit what they aimed at, but where to fire and how much?

No one encountered these questions more often than the men of 1st Recon. Based on his observations, Wright states that the ROE give the illusion of order amid chaos, when in fact it is left up to the individual or small unit leader to make a determination in a situation

that may be changing from minute to minute. The decision will be based on instinct born of training, individual disposition and character, and the perception of immediate danger. These perceptions were often as limited as those of soldiers in any war. For all our new technology, the fog of war descended as quickly and completely as a desert sandstorm, and even on sunny days and clear nights it could blank out an individual's surroundings beyond a narrow range.

These are points worth having driven home, and Wright's descriptions of the events he witnessed are vivid and often moving. Some of the best writing is in the quotations of the Marines of 2d Platoon. When the Marines accidentally shoot and kill an Iraqi child in her father's car at a roadblock, a corporal later states, "War is either glamorized—like we kick their ass—or the opposite—look how horrible, we kill all these civilians. None of these people know what it's like to be there holding that weapon."

Wright's book represents American war writing in its maturity. He avoids the pitfalls of glamorizing or moralizing. Many of the Marines he writes about are complex men. The staff sergeant nicknamed "Iceman" is an efficient and a somewhat emotionally remote professional fighting man who is also a sympathetic figure. It would be easy for Wright to dislike General James N. Mattis as a man of a different generation and completely different outlook, especially once Wright learns that he and the rest of Recon Battalion have been functioning as a diversion, a virtual decoy, during the attack north. The portrait of Mattis that emerges, however, is understanding and even admiring. Wright has the common sense to realize that sometimes leaders must risk their own in war, and that he himself must have the courage to accept his role as a tactical pawn when his profession as journalist requires it.

Recon units are different. They probably contain a higher percentage of the "natural warrior" type than do other Marine Corps units. These fine-tuned combat thoroughbreds often come across as sensitive and complex. Despite the implications of the title, it is often these young men, rather than the elders, who display the greatest humanity and restraint. The Marines of 2d Platoon were sometimes surprised to find that they preferred saving or preserving life to taking it.

Make no mistake, these are the Marine breed—"Generation M." No apologies are needed for the wars they fought. We should be humbled and instructed by their example. After the rush of combat comes reflection, and after the battle is the effort to restore and rebuild. Courage will always be required of soldiers in war, but it is also required of us to be wise, if we can.

REED BONADONNA
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Saccone, Richard. *Negotiating with North Korea.* Hollym International Corp., 2003. 215pp. $22.95

Perhaps the potentially most volatile part of the world is North Korea. Talks between the United States and North Korea seem to be a series of impasses, confrontations, brinkmanship, threats, and blusters. The usual explanation for this state of perpetual frustration for U.S. negotiators is that they are dealing with an enigmatic regime that has no

regard for peaceful resolution of the confrontations between it and the rest of the world. This work provides an alternate path for understanding and working toward more successful negotiations than has been the historical case for over half a century.

Richard Saccone, retired U.S. Air Force, alumnus of the Naval Postgraduate School, has spent over fourteen years in the Koreas. He has written six books on Korea covering history, culture, tourism, and business, and he is well qualified to discuss the topic of negotiations. He is a former representative for KEDO, the Korean Peninsula Development Organization, building nuclear power plants as required under the 1994 Agreed Framework between the United States and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Saccone currently teaches international relations and national government at St. Vincent's College in Latrobe, Pennsylvania.

Saccone explains such concepts as *Juche* (self-reliance), *Kibun* (spirit), and *Cheymyon* (saving face) in a manner that goes deeper than the caricature-like definitions found in the common press. Examination allows the reader to appreciate that the concept of communication requires both sending and receipt of information and ideas by at least two parties. When I was a college student, I read an essay by the noted semanticist S. I. Hayakawa about *denotation* and *connotation*. *Negotiating with North Korea* reveals that American negotiators may have been concentrating on the denotative aspects of communication and neglecting the connotations. It gives me hope that negotiations can progress beyond the cultural misunderstanding and confrontational nature of U.S.–North Korea relations.

Fully half the book concerns itself with the tactics used by North Korean negotiators. Saccone enumerates them in forty specific categories, which include threats, loaded questions, requests for compensation, red herrings, and appeals for fairness. This by itself is useful, but the author offers specific examples and provides countertactics that will help negotiations go forward to a mutually acceptable conclusion. The forty specifics are grouped into eight general headings: coercion, offensiveness, manipulation, assertiveness, confounding, obstruction, persuasion, and cooperation. Understanding and appreciating the analysis and advice provided by Saccone should allow U.S. negotiators greater success.

For example, one category, labeled "Lessons of History," points out that North Korean negotiators are generally much better versed in past meetings and negotiations than American negotiators, who tend to be constantly rotated. Saccone provides the following advice, "The best counter to lessons from history is another lesson of history. This requires considerable preparation. U.S. negotiators are notoriously ignorant of history. If one is ignorant of the record you cannot even be sure that what the opponent is quoting is correct. Do your homework and counter history with lessons of your own choosing." Saccone's advice appears obvious, but the United States too often neglects to heed the obvious.

This work should be required reading for all who must deal with North Korea. Saccone understands its negotiating behavior. He distinguishes between myths and reality, and offers alternatives to improve U.S.-Korea relations. However, this work should not be confined

only to those involved with North Korea. Anyone involved in negotiations will benefit from this book.

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Betts, Richard K., and Thomas G. Mahnken, eds. *Paradoxes of Strategic Intelligence: Essays in Honor of Michael J. Handel.* London: Frank Cass, 2003. 210pp. $114.95

The essays in this collection were written for an international conference held in honor of the late Michael J. Handel at the U.S. Naval War College. Handel wrote several seminal pieces in the relatively new field of intelligence studies, and his colleagues are to be complimented for producing this impressive Festschrift. Betts and Mahnken put together an impressive group of practitioners and academics to write on various aspects of the work of intelligence agencies. It begins with four articles of a theoretical nature, followed by three articles that focus on historic case studies.

This volume appropriately opens with a classic by Handel on strategic surprises, published almost thirty years ago, which serves as an excellent introduction to a book devoted to intelligence. It is typical of Handel's general thinking on strategic affairs, pointing out several paradoxes inherent to the potential for strategic surprise that have become the common wisdom of the intelligence field. Handel claims that due to the great difficulties in differentiating between "noise" and "signals" (relevant information), all data amounts to noise, making the collection of additional information designed to clarify the situation additional noise. Handel also stresses the paradox of estimating risk. The riskier a military course of action, the less a rival anticipates and prepares for it, paradoxically making its eventual adoption less risky. Handel also suggests that successive intelligence successes increase not only the agency's credibility but also the risk of strategic surprise, because its conclusions will be less subject to critical questioning. There is also the self-negating prophecy. A warning of an impending attack triggers military preparations that in turn prompt the enemy to delay or cancel his plans. Such a scenario makes it almost impossible even in retrospect to know if the military preparations were warranted. Another scenario that may lead to a strategic surprise is a quiet international environment that may be used to conceal the preparations for an attack. Following a fascinating analysis of the problems of perception, the politics of intelligence, and the organizational and bureaucratic features, Handel reaches the realistic conclusion that surprise is almost always unavoidable.

The second article, by editor Richard K. Betts, starts with the unconventional premise that politicization of intelligence services is not necessarily bad, and sometimes it is even advisable. Betts presents two opposing models of intelligence work. The first portrays the intelligence agency striving to achieve professional credibility by presenting thorough analysis, while the second depicts the intelligence organization stressing the supply of data that is useful and relevant to decision makers. In the second case, the managers of intelligence organizations make compromises and tailor the information

to influence the decision-making process. Betts points out that there is inevitable tension between maximizing credibility and utility, but he makes a convincing case for reducing this tension by accepting a certain level of undefined politicization. Betts's recommended recipe for minimizing the damage of politicization in the intelligence community is organizational pluralism.

Woodrow J. Kuhns, a senior CIA official, next points out that despite the fact that a significant number of intelligence failures have been documented, there is no clear track record for estimates or warning judgments issued by the intelligence community. Moreover, there is no accumulated knowledge for distinguishing between failures attributed to collection, or to analysis. Nevertheless, Kuhns still tends to regard intelligence forecasts as closer to science than to pseudoscience, despite the methodological problems in producing forecasts, and suggests additional systematic research to clarify the issues he has raised.

James J. Wirtz then discusses the theory of strategic surprise and admits to operational difficulties. Wirtz claims that every curriculum of the officers corps stresses strategic surprise as a force multiplier, and as such, military doctrine is predispositioned to carry out surprises. Wirtz elaborates on the risk paradox first mentioned by Handel, pointing out the attraction of surprise for the weaker parties of the conflict. At this point, Wirtz argues that surprises may produce only temporary spectacular results, leaving the general balance of forces to finally determine the result of armed conflict. Nevertheless, Wirtz concludes that strong countries such as the United States must do their best to prevent unpleasant surprises—such as 9/11, for example.

John Ferris reviews the evolution of British military deception during the two world wars. He provides a detailed narrative on the deception efforts that were highly regarded by the British generals. Ferris argues that deception benefits the stronger player in the conflict and the one holding the initiative, but he displays skepticism of its final utility. This article could have benefited from heavy editing, as it is deficient in organization and in the use of theoretical concepts.

Uri Bar-Joseph's article addresses the question of why some Israeli intelligence officers—even at the highest rank—erred in their estimates of the probability of an imminent war in 1973. He argues convincingly that the two officers most responsible for the intelligence failure were Y. Bandman and E. Zeira, making the more general point that organizations cannot transcend the weaknesses of their personnel. However, Bar-Joseph could have made this important point concerning the human factor by explaining the lack of a strategic warning before the 1973 war without belittling other reasons for the main misfortunes of the Israeli military in its encounter with the Egyptian and Syrian armies.

The final chapter, by Mark M. Lowenthal, who is also with the CIA, looks at the U.S. war-fighting doctrine that originally emphasized information dominance (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1997), and subsequently more modestly aspired to superiority only (2000). Lowenthal warns against the belief that technological advances can remove the fog of war. Even the best technologies need appropriate

doctrine to be useful. He argues cogently that advanced intelligence systems have their own vulnerabilities, and that lacunae of information are inevitable both before and during war. Moreover, by using examples from the American Civil War, Lowenthal demonstrates that good information about the enemy's moves and intentions is not enough for winning the battle. It is generalship, the human factor, that will continue to be decisive in the outcome of a war.

This is an excellent introductory collection for students and the professional reader to the gamut of issues with which the field of intelligence grapples.

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Clancy, Tom, with General Tony Zinni (Ret.) and Tony Koltz. *Battle Ready.* New York: Putnam, 2004. 440pp. $28.95

This excellent book documents the military and postmilitary career of General Tony Zinni, USMC (Ret.). It should appeal to any reader interested in the U.S. military, the U.S. Marine Corps, and national security affairs.

The book follows an engaging and mixed style. Clancy and Koltz use short biographical sections to introduce phases of General Zinni's career. At the end of each phase, Zinni's own words (in italics) pick up the action. One has the sense of being right there with the general, sharing his experiences and watching him develop into an exceptional military role model and leader.

The book actually begins with the end of Zinni's career. It is November 1998, and he is halfway through his last assignment as the sixth commander in chief of Central Command. We are introduced to the refined thinking of a fighting soldier and leader, thinking based on his extensive tactical, operational, and strategic experience in war, conflict resolution, and peacemaking. At that time, Zinni's immediate focus was Saddam Hussein and supporting the UNSCOM (United Nations Special Commission) inspectors under Richard Butler. By mid-December, UN teams began departing Iraq. What follows is the four-day, preplanned attack of Operation DESERT FOX. Although the planning for the attack provides insight into General Zinni's war-fighting skills, such as the importance and execution of surprise, it is the introduction to his breadth of strategic thinking that is most interesting.

At the start of his command in August 1997, Zinni proposed a six-point strategic program for Central Command to President Clinton's secretary of defense, William Cohen. His objective was to take a more balanced approach to a wide range of evolving security issues, not just Iraq and Saddam Hussein. After presenting the program to Cohen and senior members of Congress, Zinni was politely told to "stay out of policy and stick to execution." That raises an important point for military officers preparing themselves for high command. Civilian control of the military and selfless military service to the country are fundamental to our government, going back to George Washington and George Marshall. Based on the rest of the book, it is apparent that Zinni consistently struck that delicate professional balance between the truthful, informed, and forceful advice and respect for civilian authority.

A further example of this followed DESERT FOX. General Zinni asked himself what would happen if Iraq suddenly collapsed. Who would pick up the pieces and help rebuild the country? To examine these questions, Zinni sponsored a war game called "Desert Crossing" in late 1999, with a wide range of government agencies and representatives. In his words, "The scenarios looked closely at humanitarian, security, political, economic, and other reconstruction issues. We looked at food, clean water, electricity, refugees, Shia versus Sunnis, Kurds versus other Iraqis, Turks versus Kurds, and the power vacuum that would surely follow the collapse of the regime (since Saddam had pretty successfully eliminated any local opposition). We looked at all the problems the United States faces in 2003 trying to rebuild Iraq. And when it was over, I was starting to get a good sense of their enormous scope and to recognize how massive the reconstruction would be." Although the game failed to stimulate government-wide planning, the episode at the start of the book is compelling. One wonders at Zinni's background, and how he developed the interest, knowledge, and experience to conceptualize and deal with such complex theater-level issues.

The general served two tours in Vietnam, where he suffered life-threatening combat wounds and illnesses. His time there was fundamental to his development: "The biggest lesson, in fact, is learning how to be open to surprising new experiences and then turning that openness into resourceful and creative ways of dealing with challenges you face." Zinni builds on that insight along with the sensitivity and ability to work effectively within other cultures, a skill he developed during his first tour as an adviser with the South Vietnamese marines.

Zinni's rise to the rank of general in December 1986 followed command, staff, and professional military education assignments, emphasizing operational competence. However, it is his first assignment as general to deputy director of operations at the U.S. European Command in 1990 that impressed upon him the nature of the rapidly changing world following the collapse of the Soviet Union.

The reader is taken through Zinni's subsequent assignments: director of operations for Combined Task Force RESTORE HOPE in Somalia, commander of the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF), and commander in chief of Central Command. After his retirement from the military in the summer of 2000, Zinni's experience and diplomatic skills are further called into service for peacemaking and conflict resolution around the world, offering us further insight into such complex, ongoing situations as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Battle Ready makes clear that Zinni has the credentials, both professional and personal, to present his forceful and unvarnished opinions, honed by a lifetime of service to his country. This book should be of particular value to military officers of all services preparing for higher command in this volatile world.

HENRY BARTLETT
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Wildenberg, Thomas. *All the Factors of Victory: Admiral Joseph Mason Reeves and the Origins of Carrier Airpower.* Washington, D.C.: Brassey's, 2003. 326pp. $27.50

Admiral Joseph Reeves was an important influence on the development of American naval aviation during the interwar period, but like many other senior officers who served in peacetime, he has not received the attention he deserves. Thomas Wildenberg, building upon his previous work on dive bombing in the U.S. Navy prior to the Battle of Midway, strives to honor Admiral Reeves with a scholarly biography focused on his professional life and contributions.

Wildenberg argues that Reeves's background, attention to improved training and doctrine, and ability to push innovation within the existing organizational structure were key factors behind the nascent idea of carrier strike forces, which subsequently came to maturation during the U.S. Navy's Pacific operations in World War II. Like another well known admiral, William Moffet, Reeves was a true pioneer in naval aviation. He was among the first to recognize its potential and work out the practical application of this new form of warfare within the fleet.

Reeves followed a unique career progression. Wildenberg traces Reeves's scholastic and athletic achievements as a young engineering naval cadet at Annapolis; his combat experience during the Spanish-American War; conversion to an ordnance specialization; various sea and shore appointments before reaching command of the battleship USS *North Dakota;* time as a student and tactical instructor at the Naval War College; and his entry into the naval aviation world at the age of fifty-two. As Commander Aircraft Squadrons, Battle Fleet onboard the experimental carrier USS *Langley,* Reeves challenged his flyers to solve a "thousand and one questions" to which even he did not have the answers. He concentrated the squadrons for intensive training and practice with new types of aircraft then being delivered. After a short stint with the U.S. delegation to the 1927 Geneva Conference, Reeves was promoted to rear admiral and returned to lead naval aviation from an experimental status to full-fledged integration into the fleet.

Wildenberg's description of Reeves, with entourage in tow, personally directing the movement of planes around *Langley*'s flight deck when a subordinate officer named John Towers dared to report that no more could be crowded onboard, is priceless. The new purpose-built aircraft carriers USS *Lexington* and *Saratoga* provided the means for Reeves to test novel concepts of deployments in peacetime fleet exercises on a larger scale—the turning point being Fleet Problem IX in January 1929, when Reeves launched the mock aerial strikes against the Panama Canal described so well by Wildenberg at the book's opening. Thereafter, Reeves quickly rose in responsibility before his retirement as commander in chief of the U.S. Fleet with the rank of admiral in 1936—the first naval aviator to hold the appointment.

During World War II Reeves returned to the Department of the Navy to coordinate Lend-Lease activities on behalf of Secretary Frank Knox, as well as to act as U.S. naval representative on the Combined Munitions Assignment

Board alongside Harry Hopkins. Having given so much to his country, Reeves died on 25 March 1948.

Although a powerful speaker and orator, Reeves published very little and left behind no personal papers. In writing this biography, Wildenberg has done an admirable job of detective work, collecting together information from a diverse range of official and private sources. He uses a 1943 Princeton University undergraduate thesis based on interviews with Reeves, but little remains known of the admiral's family and personal life, other than the impression that he was a lonely man devoted full-heartedly to the navy. A ruthless streak in Reeves's character, however, comes out in his treatment of hapless Lieutenant Commander Robert Molten—an episode to be repeated during a run-in with a Royal Navy ordnance officer, Stephen Roskill, in Washington, D.C., during the summer of 1944. Wildenberg's conclusions about Reeves's attitude toward the British might have been tempered by closer study of his wartime work on the Combined Munitions Assignment Board. No reference is made in the book to Reeves's working files from the Lend-Lease Office of Record in Record Group 38 at the National Archive and Records Administration, or the diaries of Vice Admiral James Dorling, his British naval counterpart on the Combined Munitions Assignment Board at Greenwich's National Maritime Museum. In Reeves's second service tour, he facilitated American production behind the global war effort at sea and actually excelled in office work and the numbers game.

Even though biographies are somewhat out of fashion today and Wildenberg shows a tendency to give a little too much weight to the man than to larger international trends in naval aviation at the time, Reeves clearly pressed, with single-minded determination, the existing technological and doctrinal limits of U.S. naval aviation and prepared his forces accordingly.

The book, which offers interesting insights into experimentation and innovation for future warfare in peacetime navies, is highly recommended for specialist historians and interested general readers.

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De Kay, James Tertius. *A Rage for Glory: The Life and Times of Commodore Stephen Decatur, USN.* New York: Free Press, 2004. 237pp. $25

Accomplished historian and author James de Kay captures the essence of an age, as well as the spirit of a man, in his biography of Commodore Stephen Decatur. This finely written narrative, aimed at a general readership, may lack the scholarly apparatus expected of historical monographs, but it certainly does not lack the scholarship and analysis that is the hallmark of de Kay's work. Yet if this book sometimes appears to be a cross between an action-thriller and a hagiography, there is a reason. Decatur's active quest for fame and glory, as well as the deep sense of honor that would clip short his thread of life at age forty-one, earned the commodore a place in the hearts of his countrymen perhaps more appropriate for a saint. His name still echoes in those of some forty-five towns, five warships, and numerous other pieces of Americana.

Born amidst the upheaval of the American Revolution in 1779, Stephen Decatur spent his youth steeped in the twin influences of a national hubris born of victory against the tyrannical British Empire and a family tradition of seafaring, usually against that same entity (Dutch and French ancestry, and the master of a privateer as a father). His time as a midshipman during the Quasi-War with France may have lacked in naval action, but it certainly imbued in Decatur the ethos of the quarterdeck, that almost mystical triumvirate of glory, fame, and honor that not only defined a gentleman but all too frequently forced recourse to the *Code Duello.* It is de Kay's analysis and presentation of this triumvirate that is the strength of his study of Decatur.

From 1801 through 1815, Decatur earned a place in the pantheon of naval heroes. His part in the burning of the frigate *Philadelphia* at Tripoli in 1804 made him the darling of the nation. Further daring actions against the Barbary corsairs catapulted the young lieutenant over the heads of other officers to the rank of captain. In October 1812, Decatur steered his *United States* to victory over HMS *Macedonian,* then fought an even harder battle with Washington for prize money. Trapped in New London by a British blockade in 1813, he shifted his flag to the large frigate *President* in 1814. Beset by a British squadron shortly thereafter, Decatur surrendered the largest American warship lost during the War of 1812. Exonerated by a court of inquiry, he proceeded to regain his lost honor by leading a squadron to thrash soundly the Barbary corsairs in 1815. De Kay's portrayal of these actions is excellent, using imagery appropriate to the concepts of glory, fame, and honor, central to the story. More importantly for general readers, naval jargon of the era is minimized; thus they do not become lost somewhere between the gudgeons and the mainsail clewlines.

The commodore spent his few remaining years as a member of the Board of Navy Commissioners. Then, on 22 March 1820, Stephen Decatur paid the ultimate price for his honor. Fellow captain and former mentor James Barron and he exchanged shots on a traditional dueling ground outside Washington. Mortally wounded, Decatur died a few hours later. Winding through de Kay's last chapters in the life of this American hero is a fascinating conspiracy theory involving the "bad boys" of the early U.S. Navy: Jesse Duncan Elliot, Captain William Bainbridge, and Captain James Barron. In de Kay's mind, there exists little doubt that both Elliot and Bainbridge contributed as much as Barron to the death of Decatur. His arguments are convincing.

Historians, particularly those familiar with the era, may be somewhat disappointed with this book. De Kay presents a narrative driven by specific events; thus, details such as Decatur's contributions to strategic planning during the War of 1812 are missing. On the other hand, those souls less knowledgeable of the U.S. Navy during the Age of Sail will have little to disappoint them and much to gain from reading this exciting biography of a most famous American naval officer.

WADE G. DUDLEY
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Thomas, Evan. *John Paul Jones: Sailor, Hero, Father of the American Navy.* New York: Simon and Schuster, 2003. 381pp. $26.95

America seems to have lately rediscovered its founding fathers, if recent best-seller lists are any indication. As much as the infant republic needed thinkers and statesmen such as Thomas Jefferson, John Adams, and Ben Franklin, it also required those who were willing to fight and turn their aspirations into reality. Francis Marion, Daniel Morgan, "Mad" Anthony Wayne, and even Benedict Arnold were among the warriors who concretized fine words and ideas into battlefield deeds. One more name that belongs on this fierce list is John Paul Jones, the father of the American navy.

Thomas, a *Newsweek* editor and amateur sailor, offers a marvelous portrait of a proud, insecure, ferocious, and highly ambitious figure. He convincingly suggests that Jones was that most elemental of American characters, the self-made man. Although Jones most likely never made the celebrated declaration "I have not yet begun to fight" during the epic sea battle between his *Bonhomme Richard* and HMS *Serapis,* he did possess an unconquerable spirit. This is a splendid biography of John Paul Jones.

The penniless son of a Scottish gardener on the run from the law, John Paul adopted the surname Jones and sailed to America. Possessing an unslakable thirst for glory, a genius for seamanship, a combative nature, and a Gatsby-like desire to be recognized as a gentleman, Jones offered his services to the cause of American independence. Along the way, he accumulated many grievances—some imagined, many not. He did not feel appreciated or rewarded by Congress. Jones watched desirable commands handed over to corrupt and incompetent hacks, and he suffered mutinous crews and disloyal officers. Indeed, comparison with Benedict Arnold, another prickly sort, is instructive. Both gifted men were at times disgracefully ill used. The difference is that Jones ultimately placed duty over self.

In Thomas's hands, the real-life story of this courageous master and commander is every bit as enthralling and humorous as any Patrick O'Brien novel. Thomas writes colorfully of blackguards and mistresses, salty sea dogs and young midshipmen, bloody quarterdecks and Parisian salons. He also provides a thrilling description of Jones's apotheosis—the *Bonhomme Richard* and *Serapis* duel. His depiction of riding out a terrific storm is better than the obligatory chapter found in fictional yarns, as are the evocations of the sights, sounds, and smells of shipboard life in the age of sail. Simultaneously, Thomas perceptively evaluates Jones as tactician, strategist, and leader. Unparalleled at tactics, Jones was also surprisingly advanced as a strategic thinker who devised schemes to bring the war to the British home islands and foresaw the need for the United States to field a blue-water navy. It is only as a leader that Thomas finds Jones wanting. Audacious, persistent, and visionary, the brittle Jones lacked what we today would call team-building skills to inspire subordinates to consistent greatness. Nevertheless, Jones's legacy is well summarized by the words engraved on his tomb at Annapolis: "He gave our navy its earliest traditions of heroism and victory."

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