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Joint Professional Military Education
Phase II Senior Level Course

College of Naval Warfare and Naval Command College

NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION MAKING

November 2016-February 2017 Syllabus

NSA
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
DEPARTMENT

November 2016

College of Naval Warfare
Naval Command College

NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION MAKING (NSDM) COURSE

SYLLABUS

FOREWORD

This syllabus and study guide contains both an overview and detailed description of the National Security Affairs (NSA) Department's course of study in National Security Decision Making (NSDM). Prepared for the College of Naval Warfare and the Naval Command College, it provides detailed session-by-session assignments and study guide material for daily class preparation. Administrative information is also included.

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NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION MAKING (NSDM) COURSE

1. COURSE OVERVIEW AND ADMINISTRATION

The National Security Affairs (NSA) Department's course in National Security Decision Making (NSDM) is designed to challenge senior-level students to engage with the dynamic complexities of today's rapidly evolving national and international security environment. The NSDM curriculum covers a diverse array of national, regional and global security issues, giving particular emphasis to understanding U.S. decision making dynamics at the national-strategic level.

The NSDM course offers a graduate-level survey in contemporary security studies that draws on a range of academic disciplines. These include international relations, foreign policy analysis, leadership studies, and other cognate fields. The course is designed to broaden strategic perspective while fostering critical thinking and analytic skills that will have lasting professional relevance. Illustrative focus areas include:

- How a dynamic international security environment shapes national security strategies and vice versa
- Current and emerging transnational and regional security issues facing the United States and its international partners
- International and domestic influences on the formulation of U.S. national security strategies, policymaking, and implementation
- Political, budgetary, bureaucratic, organizational, and leadership factors influencing decision making and implementation within complex national security organizations
- Military force structure as a tool supporting national security strategies, and the influences and processes that shape planning the future joint force
- The role of individual strategic-level leaders in the national security arena and lessons that can be inferred about effective leadership in this environment

The NSA department's approach to teaching relies heavily on a graduate-seminar format. Therefore most course material is engaged through seminar discussions. Although the course includes two "practitioner sessions" that will be presented in an auditorium setting, these will be followed immediately by seminar discussion.

a. Course Objectives. Our goal is to provide an educational experience that combines conceptual rigor and professional relevance in order to prepare students to be more effective participants in the decision-making environment of any major national security organization. The intended outcome of this wide-ranging survey course is not in-depth mastery of any particular issue or sets of issues, but rather to foster the strategic perspective, critical thinking, and analytic rigor that are needed by national security professionals working at the national-strategic level.

Our joint learning objectives include:

i. Increasing understanding of the national and international security environment including domestic and international political, cultural, organizational, and behavioral phenomena that influence national security decision making and implementation

ii. Increasing understanding of the attributes of effective strategic leadership and associated leadership concepts that will enhance students' ability to perform effectively as a decision-maker or member of a senior staff in the national security arena

iii. Enhancing skills to apply critical thinking and objective analysis to decisions involving complex, resource-constrained national security issues

iv. Increasing understanding of key concepts and issues involved in developing strategy, planning and programming future joint military force structure, and addressing implementation challenges

b. Learning Outcomes. The NSDM course of study in contemporary national and international security affairs has been designed as an integral part of the broader core curriculum. It supports the following Naval War College (College of Naval Warfare) learning outcomes:

i. Skilled in Formulating and Executing Strategy and U.S. Policy

- Prepared for the challenges of analyzing the complex factors critical to making strategy and selecting future forces
- Understand the context of the decision making process and the organizational, political, and behavioral influences on national security decisions
- Informed of the various dilemmas and paradoxes confronted by senior leaders in the formulation and implementation of national security strategies and policies

ii. Skilled in Joint Warfighting, Theater Strategy and Campaign Planning

- Understand the geostrategic landscape and international security environment and their impact on the development of strategy
- Comprehend the purpose and role of budget and acquisition processes in national security planning including executing strategy and selecting future forces
- Informed about the various practices and methods used by senior leaders to deal with challenges associated with the formulation of national security strategies and plans

iii. Capable of Strategically-Minded Critical Thinking

- Empowered with analytical frameworks to support the decision making process
- Skilled in applying these frameworks and course concepts, which incorporate the logic of force planning and an understanding of the international and domestic political systems, in order to provide a thorough understanding of how significant national security policy decisions are made

- Aware of critical thinking and decision making by real world, strategic level leaders

iv. Capable of Excelling in Positions of Strategic Leadership

- Skilled in the examination of "essential characteristics" displayed by leaders that enabled them to motivate and inspire during trying times and, in so doing, effectively apply those characteristics to senior leaders today
- Competent in strategic-level problem solving, creative thinking, and change management
- Informed about the unique challenges in leading from the front
- Confident with the full range of senior leader responsibilities

c. Course Framework. The NSDM course utilizes a long-established approach commonly used in political science called "Levels of Analysis" to provide an overall conceptual framework for the study of complex national and international security issues. This political science framework breaks down the analysis of national security affairs into three interrelated conceptual levels: *international/systemic, national/societal/organizational*, and *individual/leadership*. These "Levels of Analysis" are structurally embedded within the organization of the NSDM course in the form of three parallel thematic modules that we refer to as sub-courses. The three sub-courses within the NSDM course are: *Security Strategies* (focusing on the international strategic context of U.S. national security strategies); *Policy Analysis* (focusing on U.S. national and organizational decision-making processes); and, *Leadership Concepts* (focusing on leadership and individual leaders at the strategic level).

Within this overarching "Levels of Analysis" framework, the *Policy Analysis* sub-course also uses a supporting framework that identifies the diverse international and domestic political, organizational, and behavioral influences on the U.S. decision making processes.

d. Course Organization. The NSDM course includes the following major elements:

i.	NSDM (course-wide sessions/seminars)	5 Sessions
ii.	Security Strategies (sub-course seminars)	24 Sessions
ii.	Policy Analysis (sub-course seminars)	24 Sessions
iv.	Leadership Concepts (sub-course seminars)	22 Sessions
v.	NSDM Final Exercise (FX) (course-wide capstone)	10 Sessions

All individual session overviews specify objectives, guidance, and required readings. Individual session overviews are organized sequentially in separate sections of this Syllabus for each of the above major course elements. These individual session overviews provide the basis for planning daily reading and preparation and should be consulted well beforehand. Most course material is available in digital form on Blackboard. Students may access the session materials

directly from Blackboard or download them to an electronic reader device. Some material is not available in digital form and will be provided in hardcopy.

e. Course Requirements

i. *Individual Student Responsibilities.* Students are expected to prepare fully for each session and to participate actively and positively in classroom discussions. An inquisitive attitude and the willingness by all students to engage constructively with peers and faculty are essential prerequisites for a successful graduate-level seminar experience. Students are likewise expected to prepare fully for "practitioner sessions" by reviewing required readings beforehand, engaging guest speakers with relevant and insightful questions, and then contributing to subsequent seminar discussions.

ii. *Workload.* Every effort has been made to provide for a consistent reading and preparation workload from week-to-week throughout the trimester. NSDM is a graduate-level course that as a general rule requires approximately two hours of student preparation for every one hour of class time. Accordingly, on balance over the course of each week, students should expect to have approximately three hours of preparation required for every 90 minute seminar period. However, a significant peak in workload unavoidably occurs toward the end of the trimester when papers and exams are due. Students should take careful note of the due dates for assignments as indicated below in order to plan far in advance for effective time and workload management.

iii. *Required and Foundational Readings.* All *required readings* listed in the session overviews are critical and must be completed prior to class. These readings provide in-depth background on course concepts and serve as a basis for informed and lively seminar discussion. For those few required readings marked "scan", the professor will provide additional guidance prior to class. All required readings are provided either digitally or in hard copy. In addition, for some sessions one or two *foundational readings* may also be provided. These are not required reading for students who have a sufficient existing background in the session topic. Rather, these foundational readings are designed to provide background to assist students who do not possess adequate knowledge of the topic to understand and process the required readings. Most foundational readings are not available on Blackboard, but can be borrowed from the Academic Coordinator in C-315.

iv. *Study Guidance.* Session pages in this syllabus are primary study guides. For each session the syllabus page identifies the focus, objectives, guidance questions, and readings. Objectives for each session include references to CJCS Learning Areas that the session supports, which are provided at Annex E. Guidance questions should be used as an aid in preparing for class discussion. In some sessions, foundational readings are provided for those who do not have sufficient background on a topic to engage with the required readings. Case studies that have been assigned as required readings should be prepared for seminar discussion in accordance with instructions by individual faculty members. Students should read and analyze all case studies in advance of the seminar sessions.

v. *Non-graded Assignments.* The NSDM course includes several non-graded requirements that provide the opportunity to receive early feedback from faculty. These assignments give students an opportunity to assess their progress and comprehension of course material prior to completing graded assignments that are due near the end of the trimester. The following is a listing of ungraded course requirements:

Sub-course	**Requirement**	**Type Effort**	**Due Date**
Strategies	Paper Proposal	Written/Individual	5 December 2016
Leadership	Paper Proposal	Written/Individual	8 December 2016
Strategies	Paper Exchange	Written/Individual	12 January 2017
Leadership	Paper Exchange	Written/Individual	31 January 2017
NSDM FX	Seminar Presentation	Review/Seminar	21 February 2017

vi. *Graded Assignments.* An overall NSDM grade will be assigned to every CNW and U.S. NCC students. This course grade is based on the grades earned on individual graded assignments and a group grade for the FX. Any collaboration between students on individual graded assignments prior to the FX is strictly prohibited. Graded assignments, due dates, and weights assigned for the final NSDM grade are as follows:

Sub-course	**Requirement**	**Type/Basis of Evaluation**	**Date**	**Weight**
Policy	Examination	Individual. Ability to apply sub-course concepts in a logical and concise way to a case study. Take home. Exam distributed 23 January 2017	24 Jan 2017	25%
Strategies	Research Paper	Individual. A major strategy and/or force planning issue. Topic approved by 5 December 2016	6 Feb 2017	25%
Leadership	Essay	Individual. Ability to analyze, evaluate, and articulate on some aspect of senior leadership relevant to your future leadership opportunities. Topic approved by 8 December 2016	7 Feb 2017	25%
NSDM	Seminar Preparation/ Contribution*	Individual. Preparedness and individual contributions in the seminar.	Cumulative	10%
FX	Exercise	Seminar. Ability of seminar to apply all three sub-course concepts and present a coherent, professional presentation reflecting the seminar's unique NSS, NMS, and supporting force structure.	8-24 Feb 2017	15%

***AN IMPORTANT NOTE ON YOUR SEMINAR PREPARATION AND CONTRIBUTION GRADE.** Your preparation for seminar by mastering the required readings and contribution to seminar discussion is a key aspect of this course. Students will therefore be assessed on the cumulative quality of their individual seminar preparation and contributions over the course of

the trimester. This seminar preparation and contribution grade is based on the rounded average of contribution grades assigned in each sub-course. Student contribution is assessed by its quality. The goal is not to measure the number of times students have spoken, but how well they have demonstrated that they have prepared and understood the subject matter, enriched discussion, and contributed to a positive active learning dynamic. This caliber of commitment requires students to come prepared to take part in every seminar discussion by absorbing the readings, listening attentively, thinking critically, and offering informed comments on session topics. Students are expected to prepare for and be thoughtfully engaged in each seminar session. The seminar is a team effort. Not contributing in seminar undercuts the learning experience for everyone.

In addition to grades for individual assignments and seminar contribution, all students will receive a group grade for their seminar's performance in the NSDM FX. This grade will be determined by a three-member faculty team and assigned to the seminar as a group. Each seminar will be given the opportunity to grant additional credit to a limited number of students whom the seminar believes contributed disproportionately to the seminar's performance. A detailed description of this process will be provided in FX guidance.

vii. *Return Dates.* Grades will be returned to students by close of business as follows:

Policy Analysis Final Examination	7 February 2017
Security Strategies Paper	21 February 2017
Leadership Concepts Essay	21 February 2017
NSDM Seminar Contribution	23 February 2017
NSDM FX	24 February 2017

f. Grading Standards. Grades for all NSDM assignments are based on the standards set forth in the *U.S. Naval War College Faculty Handbook 2013* (chapter 3, section 7), which in part states:

> *"Historical evidence indicates that a grade distribution of 35-45 percent As and 55-65 percent Bs and below is commonly achieved by the overall NWC student population. While variations from this norm might occur from seminar to seminar and subject to subject, it will rarely reach an overall A to B-and-below ratio of greater than or equal to an even fifty-fifty distribution.."*

Common standards for numeric and associated letter grades for individual written assignments and for the group Final Exercise (FX) are as follows:

Letter Grade	***Numeric Range***	***Description***
A+	97-100	Work of very high quality; clearly above the average graduate level.
A	94-<97	
A-	90-<94	
B+	87-<90	Expected performance of the average

B	84-<87	graduate student.
B-	80-<84	
C+	77-<80	Below the average performance expected for graduate work.
C	74-<77	
C-	70-<74	
D+	67-<69	Well below the average performance expected for graduate work.
D	64-<67	
D-	60-<64	
F	0-<59	Unsatisfactory work.

Common standards for numeric and associated letter grades for individual seminar preparation/contribution are as follows:

Seminar preparation and contribution will be graded at the end of the trimester as a whole number on a 100-point scale. Students will receive a contribution grade as a whole number from each sub-course with the final NSDM grade comprised of a rounded average of the contribution grades from each sub-course as a whole number. The key criteria used to evaluate seminar contribution are:

- Evidence of preparation for class
- Positive impact on seminar environment
- Listening to and engaging with classmates
- Quality and originality of thought
- Clear and concise communication of relevant ideas

A+ (97-100): Contributions provide a wholly new understanding of the topic, expressed in a clear and concise manner. Demonstrates exceptional preparation for each session as reflected in the quality of contributions to discussions. Strikes an outstanding balance of "listening" and "contributing," engaging with classmates in a way that elevates the overall level of seminar discourse.

A (94-96): Contribution is always of superior quality. Unfailingly thinks through the issue at hand before comment. Can be relied upon to be prepared for every seminar, and contributions are highlighted by insightful thought, understanding, and in part original interpretation of complex concepts. Thoughts are generally expressed clearly and concisely, and engage with contributions of others.

A- (90-93): Fully engaged in seminar discussions and commands the respect of colleagues through the insightful quality of their contribution and ability to listen to, analyze, and build upon the comments of others. Ideas are generally expressed clearly. Above the average expected of a graduate student.

B+ (87-89): A positive contributor to seminar meetings who joins in most discussions and whose contributions reflect understanding of the material. Contributes original and well-developed insights.

B (84-86): Average graduate level contribution. Involvement in discussions reflects adequate preparation for seminar with the occasional contribution of original and insightful thought, with some consideration of others' contributions. Ideas may sometimes be difficult to follow.

B- (80-83): Contributes, but sometimes speaks out without having thought through the issue well enough to marshal logical supporting evidence, address counterarguments, or present a structurally sound position. Sometimes expresses thoughts that are off-track, not in keeping with the direction of the discussion. Minimally acceptable graduate-level preparation and participation for individual lessons.

C+ (77-79): Sometimes contributes voluntarily, though more frequently needs to be encouraged to participate in discussions. Satisfied to allow others to take the lead while showing minimal interest in course content and the views of others. Minimal preparation for seminar reflected in arguments lacking the support, structure or clarity to merit graduate credit.

C (74-76): Contribution is marginal. Occasionally attempts to put forward a plausible opinion, but the inadequate use of evidence, incoherent logical structure, and a critically unclear quality of insight is insufficient to adequately examine the issue at hand. Usually content to let others form the seminar discussions and demonstrates little preparation of the session's materials. Alternately, the student contributes but in a manner that is dismissive of others and detracts from the overall seminar discussion.

C- (70-73): Lack of contribution to seminar discussions reflects substandard preparation for sessions. Unable to articulate a responsible opinion. Comments reduce rather than promote constructive dialogue.

D-/D/D+ (60-69): Rarely prepared or engaged. Contributions are seldom and reflect below minimum acceptable understanding of course material. Engages in frequent fact-free conversation and adds little value to seminar deliberations.

F (0-59): Student demonstrates unacceptable preparation and fails to contribute in any substantive manner. May be extremely disruptive or uncooperative or completely unprepared for seminar.

FINAL NSDM COURSE GRADE: Grades assigned for all NSDM assignments will be expressed in whole numbers and in corresponding letter grades as shown above. A final course grade will be expressed as the unrounded numerical weighted average of all graded assignments, expressed to two decimal places, along with a corresponding letter grade as follows:

Letter Grade	***Numeric Range***
A+	97-100
A	94-<97
A-	90-<94
B+	87-<90
B	84-<87
B-	80-<84
C+	77-<80
C	74-<77

C-	70-<74
D+	67-<70
D	64-<67
D-	60-<64
F	0-<60

g. Grade Appeals. Students have the right to appeal grades. Students that wish to appeal a grade must notify the professor who assigned the grade within one week of receiving it. Any appeal that goes above the instructor will trigger an independent grading process where another faculty member will be assigned to provide a new grade based on an independent review. The results of this independent assessment process may therefore result in the original grade being raised, sustained, or lowered. The student may request an additional review of the work in question, whereupon the Department Chair will review the appeal and either affirm the new grade assigned based on the independent review, or assign another grade (higher or lower), which then replaces any previous grade assigned. In exceptional circumstances, the student may make a further appeal to the Dean of Academics, whose decision will be final.

h. Plagiarism. Occasional incidents of plagiarism require that we bring this matter to your attention. Plagiarism is defined in both the U.S. Naval War College Student Handbook and Faculty Handbook as follows:

Plagiarism: Plagiarism is the use of someone else's work without giving proper credit to the author or creator of the work. It is the act of taking ideas, writings, analysis, or the like from another and passing them off as one's own. Whether intentional or unintentional, plagiarism is a serious violation of academic integrity and will be treated as such by the command. Plagiarism includes but is not limited to the following actions:

- The verbatim use of others' words without both quotation marks (or block quotation) and citation.
- The paraphrasing of others' words or ideas without citation.
- Any use of others' work (other than facts that are widely accepted as common knowledge) found in books, journals, newspapers, websites, interviews, government documents, course materials, lecture notes, films, etc., without giving them credit.

Authors are expected to give full credit in their written submissions when utilizing another's words or ideas. Such utilization, with proper attribution, is not prohibited by this code. However, a substantially borrowed but attributed paper may lack the originality expected of graduate-level work; submission of such a paper may merit a low or failing grade, but is not plagiarism.

i. Seminar Assignments and General Schedule. Each student is assigned to a seminar group representing a balanced distribution of services/agencies and functional expertise. Three faculty members are assigned to a seminar's teaching team with each leading individual sessions for the three parallel sub-courses. Seminar, teaching team and classroom assignments are published separately.

Sub-course seminar sessions generally meet in the morning on Mondays through Thursdays. Individual class sessions are normally 90 minutes long (except for a few sessions covering topics that require more time). Course-wide "practitioner sessions" featuring guest speakers generally occur on Friday mornings or Monday or Tuesday afternoons. These normally involve 90 minutes with all students and faculty hearing from and engaging the speaker in an auditorium setting, followed by a one hour discussion within individual seminars. A course planning schedule containing meeting dates and times for all sessions is available on Blackboard. This is updated at least weekly to reflect schedule revisions.

j. Faculty Office Hours. Faculty members are available to assist in mastering the course material, to review progress, and for individual academic counseling as required. Faculty office hours also provide an excellent opportunity to review assigned tasks, to discuss general problems, and to provide informal curricular or instructional feedback. Faculty members are generally available outside of class hours throughout the week. Because professors also teach electives and perform other activities, students are encouraged to arrange appointments beforehand whenever possible.

k. NSA Department Key Personnel. If you require additional support or information in conjunction with your studies, or if classroom issues arise that you do not believe are being dealt with effectively and to your satisfaction by your instructor, please contact one of the following individuals as appropriate:

NSA Department Chair	Dr. David A. Cooper Room: C-318 Tel: 841-3540
NSA Department Executive Assistant	Prof. Dana Struckman Room: C-318 Tel: 841-3540
NSA Department Academic Coordinator	Mrs. Jill Marion Room: C-315 Tel: 841-4746
NSDM Security Strategies Sub-course Director	Dr. Paul Smith Room: C-313 Tel: 841-1096
NSDM Policy Analysis Sub-course Director	Dr. Nikolas Gvosdev Room: C-312 Tel: 841-6422
NSDM Leadership Concepts Sub-course Director	Prof. Al Shimkus Room: C-324 Tel: 841-7096

NSDM Final Exercise (FX) Coordinator	Prof. James Cook Room: C-321B Tel: 841-2195
NSDM Practitioner Session Coordinator	Dr. Hayat Alvi Room: H-339 Tel: 841-2034

NSDM SESSIONS

NSDM–1: NSA DEPARTMENT CHAIR'S WELCOME AND NSDM COURSE OVERVIEW

A. Focus

The National Security Affairs (NSA) Department educates students in contemporary security studies as a key element of the wider core curriculum. Our senior-level National Security Decision Making (NSDM) course focuses in particular on the complex decision making challenges that national security professionals face at the national-strategic level. This introductory session will address how the overall course has been designed in order to achieve its professional education goals.

B. Objectives

- Welcome students to the NSDM course of study in contemporary national and international security affairs.

- Provide an overview of the course's conceptual framework, educational goals, organization, and requirements.

C. Guidance

1. David Burbach provides an overview of the "levels of analysis" course framework that will be addressed during the Department Chair's overview and then discussed in more detail during the first seminar meeting (NSDM-2) immediately following this overview session.

2. The Introductory section of this syllabus (pages 1-10) and the introductory section of the sub-course study guides (pages 20-21, 79-90, and 140-142) will familiarize you with the basic course content, objectives, requirements, and schedule.

D. Required Readings*

1. Burbach, David T. "Levels of Analysis: A Conceptual Approach to Understanding National Security Affairs." Newport, RI: Naval War College faculty paper, September 2015.

2. Smith, Paul J. "The Nixon-Mao Rapprochement (1972) – Examining a Key Turning Point in History Using the 3 Levels Of Analysis Approach," Newport, RI: Naval War College Faculty Paper, September 2015.

3. *National Security Decision Making Syllabus* (Winter 2016-17), pp. 1-11, 20-21, 79-80, and 140-142.

* **IMPORTANT NOTE: These readings are for NSDM-1 and NSDM-2**

NSDM–2: INTRODUCTORY SEMINAR

A. Focus

The primary goal of this session is to introduce, discuss, and apply the "levels of analysis" political science framework that the NSDM course uses to conceptualize the study and analysis of contemporary national and international security affairs. It also provides an opportunity for faculty and students to introduce themselves and for seminars to address administrative issues.

B. Objectives

- Introduce, discuss and apply the "levels of analysis" course framework.
- Discuss how the organization of the course reflects this conceptual framework, including the synergistic roles played by the three parallel sub-courses, course-wide practitioner lectures, and the Final Exercise (FX).
- Identify the backgrounds and experiences of the faculty and students and discuss administrative matters.

C. Guidance

1. David Burbach recounts how national and international security affairs are commonly conceptualized using a "levels of analysis" framework, in which factors affecting events and decisions can be categorized at individual, national/organizational, and international system levels. Burbach then explains how this approach is embedded within the organization of the NSDM course: Your seminar will be conducted in three parallel tracks corresponding to the levels, with one member of your teaching team leading each track. Can you apply the "levels" framework to identify possible factors to help explain a recent event? For example, what are international, national, and personal factors that might explain Russia's moves against Ukraine, or the U.S. response to ISIS?

2. The case study by Paul Smith applies the "levels of analysis" framework by using it to analyze the rapprochement between the U.S. and China in the early 1970s. After years of enmity between the countries, leaders Richard Nixon and Mao Zedong led a strategic realignment – perhaps the most dramatic initiative in U.S. diplomatic history. That opening was a critical shift in the Cold War balance of power, and paved the way for the U.S.-China commercial relationship that is a key part of the global economy. The case study uses the "levels of analysis" framework to address questions such as why each nation perceived benefits from improving their relations, and what challenges each leader had to overcome in order to change national strategy.

As you assess different explanations, you might consider a 'counterfactual' approach – how would changing one factor have changed the overall outcome. For example, would U.S.-China relations have evolved differently if Hubert Humphrey (the Democratic nominee in 1968) had won the Presidency instead of Nixon? What if the Soviet Union had been much weaker in military capability?

3. The assigned sections from the NSDM syllabus provide an overview of the course including the three "levels of analysis"-based modules, as well as information on assignments

and relevant academic policies. You should read this material to become familiar with course requirements and to be prepared to ask any questions you might have of your seminar teaching team.

D. Required Readings*

1. Burbach, David T. "Levels of Analysis: A Conceptual Approach to Understanding National Security Affairs." Newport, RI: Naval War College faculty paper, September 2015 .

2. Smith, Paul J. "The Nixon-Mao Rapprochement (1972) – Examining a Key Turning Point in History Using the 3 Levels Of Analysis Approach," Newport, RI: Naval War College Faculty Paper, September 2015.

3. *National Security Decision Making Syllabus* (Winter 2016-17), pp. 1-11, 20-21, 79-80, and 140-142.

* **IMPORTANT NOTE: These readings are for NSDM-1 and NSDM-2**

NSDM-3: PRACTITIONER SESSION: CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

A. Focus

Nearly all NSDM students will eventually reach a point in their career where they are either participating in or advising participants in high-level civil-military interactions. As you read in Policy Analysis-1, former Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Michele Flournoy has said "Military officers are not supposed to shape the larger political context, but they need to understand the context in order to be able to offer useful advice." In Leadership Concepts-4, you had a chance to read and discuss theories of civil-military relations and military professionalism, and analyze these theories in light of U.S. historical precedent. This session provides an opportunity for students to hear from former DOD officials about how civilian policymakers and military officers interact in the real world, and what this means for the processes of formulating strategy and making policy.

B. Objectives

- Examine civil-military relations through the lens of former civilian political appointees who have engaged in national-level policymaking.
- Understand how military officers and civilian policymakers interact at the policymaking level.
- Consider how civil-military interactions affect the policymaking process and the formulation of strategy.
- Assess the degree to which real world civil-military interaction accords with, or departs from, prominent theories of civil-military relations.
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1b, 1d, 3a, 5a.

C. Guidance

1. In the Leadership Concepts sub-course, you focused on civil-military relations at the individual level and what military professionalism means to the military leader. How do civil-military interactions affect policy-making at the organizational and national level? How do they affect U.S. strategy on the international stage?

2. How do military officers, civil servants, and elected officials differ in their approaches to formulating strategy, and translating strategy into policy? How would you approach "translating" between these "different languages" Rosa Brooks describes? How do these differences in culture hinder "whole of government" approaches to policy, as described by Kori Schake?

3. How can military officers balance their roles as advisers in the policymaking process with their professional obligation to remain apolitical? As you read in Policy 1, outgoing director of the Joint Staff Lieutenant General David Goldfein has said that military officers must offer "their best … advice" knowing that decision-makers will receive that advice "based on the lens

that people are looking through. It doesn't mean that you change your advice. It just means that you understand the audience when you're offering it." What does this mean in practice?

4. Brooks suggests that there is no longer a clear distinction between war and peace. Do you agree? If there is not, how does this affect civil-military relations? Brooks argues that "[W]e can change the way we recruit, train, deploy, and treat those who serve, change the way we define the military's role, and reinvigorate our civilian foreign-policy institutions." What would this look like?

D. Required Readings

1. Davidson, Janine. "Civil-Military Friction and Presidential Decision Making: Explaining the Broken Dialogue," *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 43(1), March 2013. [review from Leadership Concepts-4]

2. Brooks, Rosa. "Obama vs the Generals," *Politico*, November 2013. [review from Leadership Concepts-4]

3. Schake, Kori. "State of Disrepair," *Foreign Policy*, April 2012.

4. Brooks, Rosa. "How the Pentagon Became Walmart," *Foreign Policy*, August 2016.

NSDM-4: LEVELS OF ANALYSIS – SIMULATION EXERCISE

A Focus

This simulation exercise is set in the South China Seas in the medium-term future. Most players will be assigned both an individual role and as a member of a team (although there are few individual players, such as NGOs and Multinational Corporations), and will have both team and individual goals and preferences. The goal for each player is to achieve the best outcome for their role preferences. You will have to deal with leadership issues within your team; inter-agency, bureaucratic, and other dynamics of domestic politics; and the behavior of other states and transnational actors. You will have to design and execute a strategy that achieves your purposes despite the efforts of other actors whose interests might be opposed to yours.

B. Objectives

- Engage with the Levels of Analysis framework through experiential learning.
- Gain better understanding of strategic decision-making dynamics in a complex, multi-level, multi-national environment.
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1a, 1b, 1c, 1d, 1e, 2c, 3d, 5a, and 5b.

C. Guidance

1. There will be a preparatory session three days before the game itself, in which the scenario and the mechanics of the game are described. Students will have a chance to ask questions, and groups/roles will be assigned.

2. Players will be assigned a role and a team, and will receive a role description including the player's interests, preferences, characteristics, and some constraints. Players will also receive information packets to help them navigate their roles.

3. Use what you have learned to determine a strategy for achieving your goals, while anticipating the personal, domestic politics, and inter-/transnational dynamics that may help or hinder your plans. Consider your possible courses of action, your sources of power, your potential allies and opponents; pursue your goals in the most efficient way possible.

D. Required Readings

1. Game Read-Ahead.

2. REVIEW Weatherbee from Policy 6

3. REVIEW readings from Strategies 10 (China) and 11 (Asia-Pacific)

NSDM-5: PRACTITIONER SESSION: FORCE PLANNING – STRATEGY MEETS BUDGET

A. Focus

P. H. Liotta and Richmond Lloyd, writing in the *Naval War College Review* in 2005, observed: "Today's decisions about strategy and force planning will fundamentally influence future strategy and force posture. Done well, such decisions and choices can prove a powerful investment in the future." This session provides an opportunity for students to hear from former senior DOD officials about how the interaction of strategic and budgetary factors can impact force planning decisions, including what influenced the process and how their efforts were affected by political realities.

B. Objectives

- Gain perspectives from former officials on budgetary realities for DOD at the beginning of a new administration, and how this impacts planning and programming for the future, including what current budgetary challenges may mean for future investments and personnel costs.
- Understand the "guns vs. butter" tradeoffs in the current defense and national budget and how senior officials must navigate between competing spending priorities.
- Assess the question as to whether strategy drives budgets or vice versa.
- Discuss how possible cuts in defense spending impact our defense industrial base. Are we in danger of losing the capability to produce certain armaments? How do changes in the technological base for the U.S. military affect the drafting of strategies for the future, as well as constrain possible policy choices?
- Discuss the difference between the base budget and Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funding; gain an understanding of why some strong supporters of the Defense budget want to move away from OCO funding.
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1c, 1e, 2c, and 4a.

C. Guidance

The presence of former senior officials provides us with the opportunity to compare the theory of force planning with the practice, at least in the instances under discussion. For example, some of the issues that could be discussed are:

- Did strategy actually drive the process?
- What other factors also come into play?
- Was the National Security Strategy (NSS) the appropriate strategy document or did DOD actually use the National Military Strategy (NMS), the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR),

or the January 2012 Strategic Guidance document? What do you see the new administration using to drive any changes it is making for the FY18 budget?

- What role did Office of Management and Budget (OMB) or the Congress play in pushing budgetary or other considerations over strategic ones?

D. Required Readings

There are no additional readings for this session.

NSDM SECURITY STRATEGIES
STUDY GUIDE, AY 2016-2017

1. Scope

The Security Strategies sub-course focuses on the international level of analysis in the study of national security affairs. It draws its theoretical basis from international relations theory and comparative politics to analyze the complex challenges posed by a dynamic international security environment, and how these affect the formulation of a coherent national security strategy and associated military strategies. This sub-course is aimed at providing students with a deeper appreciation of how the international system works, along with an understanding of the complex meanings of security, sources of national power, and the myriad forces that shape the international security environment. Students will be required to comprehend how practitioners of national security think about the importance of strategy, why and how national security strategies are developed, and their role in informing the force planning processes that are examined in the Policy Analysis sub-course.

The Security Strategies sub-course concentrates on:

- International security environment
- Regional studies
- Strategy development
- Research, analysis, and clear writing

The sub-course begins by introducing basic international security concepts, analyzes grand strategy alternatives, and emphasizes the necessity of systematically linking viable means to achievable ends in uncertain environments. These are the fundamental concepts and perspectives that will be used throughout the sub-course. These perspectives influence not only assessments of the international security environment, but also how decision makers react to, and consequently shape that environment as they attempt to advance and defend U.S. national interests and objectives within the strategic context of the international system. The interrelated concepts of national security and national interests and objectives provide the foundation for strategy development.

Building on the foundation of international relations and national security, we then turn to an assessment of the geopolitical and geostrategic landscape. Initially, the sub-course will cover those forces having the greatest impact on national security: globalization, economic organizations, and other transnational security challenges. Then we examine different regions of the world—Middle East, Central and South Asia, China, Asia-Pacific, Europe and Russia, Africa, and the Western Hemisphere—with a view both to U.S. and regional security concerns. Throughout all the sessions, particular emphasis will be placed on current and future threats to those interests.

Next, we focus on developing national strategies that address the strategic contexts studied in the first part of the sub-course. Strategy can be viewed as a game plan or a roadmap that links ends,

ways, and means. We will address the concepts, tools and techniques of the grand strategist, identifying all elements of national power and how they relate to the creation of a national security strategy. Concepts such as sovereignty, alliances, balance of power, deterrence and sources of war and peace will be discussed. The Security Strategies sub-course culminates with analyzing contemporary security strategies to include the National Security Strategy, National Military Strategy, and the maritime strategy.

Many of the areas covered in the Security Strategies sub-course ultimately will feed directly into the NSDM Final Exercise (FX), for example undertaking a strategic assessment of the future international security environment and developing key elements of corresponding national security and military strategies.

2. Sub-course Objectives

The overall objectives of the Security Strategies sub-course include:

- Analyze the international security environment and assess security challenges through regional studies.
- Assess international-level factors critical to developing security strategies.
- Explore how the strategic context provided by the international "level of analysis" provides a more complete understanding of National Security Decision Making.

3. Sub-course Requirements

Each student will prepare a thoughtful, well-developed and well-written paper that applies sub-course concepts to a major strategic issue. For detailed guidance, see the Security Strategies Paper Instruction annex to this NSDM Syllabus. Your Security Strategies professor will be available during topic selection and the development of the paper's thesis statement.

4. Sub-course Materials

As with all NSDM course materials, Security Strategies readings will be posted on Blackboard for student use. Students may access the session materials directly from Blackboard or download the materials to an electronic reader device. Some foundational readings, which are not mandatory but nevertheless encouraged for students seeking deeper background knowledge about a specific topic, are available in textbooks that will be held in reserve in C-315. These books can be checked out for a limited period of time as needed.

SECURITY STRATEGIES-1: INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

A. Focus

The NSDM Security Strategies sub-course is designed to assist students in analyzing security issues at the international level including the development of national and military strategies that advance and defend the national interests of the United States. Students will become familiar with major trends and changes in the international security environment. In addition, the sub-course seeks to facilitate student understanding regarding global political and economic systems, the complex meanings of security, the sources of national power and the relationship between the security environment and national strategy. Consequently, students will explore various grand strategies rooted in international relations theory. Because the sub-course emphasizes the importance of being able to gather information, analyze data, and produce a clear articulation of one's ideas, the graded event for this sub-course will be an analytic research paper.

B. Objectives

- Introduce the objectives and scope of the Security Strategies sub-course.
- Assess the relative position of the United States in the international system.
- Comprehend the purpose and procedures for the research and writing of the NSDM Security Strategies paper.
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1a, 1b, 1c, 1d, 1e, and 3a.

C. Guidance

1. Mackubin Owens examines how strategy influences the conduct of military operations, theater engagement and diplomacy, and the selection of military forces. He argues that there are several levels of strategy: "grand" or national strategy, military strategy, and theater strategy. In general, strategy describes how the national instruments of power, including military means, are applied to achieve national ends. As such, it constitutes a continual dialogue between policy on the one hand and such factors as geography, technology, and resources on the other. In the absence of strategy, bureaucratic and other non-strategic factors may come to dominate the size, shape and actions of our military forces. Given the challenges both Christopher Layne and Robert Kagan highlight (readings below), what are the core issues facing the United States during the coming decades? How does strategy, as described by Owens, help the United States advance and defend its national interests?

2. Christopher Layne argues that the world is undergoing a dramatic transition in the distribution of economic and military power. He argues that, while the United States will not disappear (and in fact will remain very powerful for the foreseeable future), its *relative* "power and influence over the international political system will diminish markedly from what it was at the apogee of Pax Americana." The United States will need to contend with newly-rising powers, such as China and Russia. Layne cautions that the "unwinding of Pax Americana" could herald an era of interstate rivalry or conflict: "Since no great power, including China, is likely to supplant the United States as a true global hegemon, the world could see a serious fragmentation

of power. This could spawn pockets of instability around the world and even general global instability." As a result, the United States may have to adopt some variant of offshore balancing (a grand strategy that will be examined in greater detail later). What indicators point to the world moving toward a multi-polar structure? Is the United States in decline? (and if so, is this trend cyclical or structural)? What is the link between the economy and national strategy?

3. Robert Kagan answers Layne's question and characterizes the relative strength of the United States in the international system. He argues that perceptions of U.S. decline ignore the U.S. position during the Cold War. Kagan notes: "To compare American influence with a mythical past of overwhelming dominance can only mislead us." Kagan does agree with Layne on several points. These include the importance of military power as a vital tool to prevent conflict, the relevance of national strategy, and the inevitability of U.S. decline. Kagan parts from Layne by suggesting it is unclear if decline will occur in decades or centuries, but this will be driven by American strategic behavior and the international security environment. What are the key trends that challenge American dominance? What are the lessons learned over the past decade that help explain how the United States behaves in the international system? What are the key factors that will shape national strategy that guides international actions?

D. Required Readings (39 pages)

1. Owens, Mackubin. "Strategy and the Strategic Way of Thinking," *Naval War College Review*, Autumn 2007 (Vol. 60, No. 4), pp. 111-124.

2. Layne, Christopher. "The Global Power Shift from West to East," *The National Interest*, May/June 2012, pp. 6-16.

3. Kagan, Robert. "Not Fade Away: Against the Myth of American Decline," Brookings Institution, February 11, 2012, pp. 1-16.

4. *National Security Decision Making Syllabus* (Winter 2016-17) pp. 20-21.

SECURITY STRATEGIES-2: INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY

A. Focus

Fundamental to assessing the security environment and developing grand strategy is answering a basic question: how does the world work? There is an extensive body of writing and thinking on this subject by international relations theorists. Theory plays an important role in all aspects of life helping to organize a complex world in ways that allow us to better understand what is happening. A theory purports to do three things: to describe the world, to predict how it might change, and to prescribe a response. Thus, policymakers and practitioners of grand strategy must be familiar with how theory can inform strategy and policy making. The three predominant theoretical perspectives -- realism, liberalism and constructivism -- influence the ways in which policymakers look at the evolving international security environment as well as their efforts to develop an overall grand strategy. Phenomena such as international anarchy, the role of states vs. ideas, international organizations, balance of power, democratic peace, globalization, and human nature are central to the discussion. It is important, therefore, to develop an understanding of and appreciation for the way you view the world at the outset of our effort to grapple with developing grand strategy.

B. Objectives

- Assess various theories of international relations to understand the different conceptions of how the world works.

- Comprehend linkages among the theories of international relations and begin to determine the implications for the development of grand strategy.

- Support CJCS Joint Learning Area 1a.

C. Guidance

1. Jack Snyder believes that international relations theory should tell us how the world works. His article provides an overview of the three dominant theories of international relations that experts feel have the most explanatory power in today's world: realism, liberalism and constructivism. Snyder discusses briefly where these theories are useful and where they are deficient. As you read them, consider which one provides the best explanation for how the international system works. What are the strengths and shortcomings of each theory? Is it possible to see the world operating completely in accordance with only one of them or is a combination needed? Which theory do you think provides the best explanation for how the world works? Which theory best explains American behavior in the international system?

2. John Mearsheimer, a prominent proponent of realism, maintained “the claim that security competition and war between great powers have been purged from the international system is wrong.” For Mearsheimer, great power conflict is likely, as it has always been, and is part of the basic motives that drive state behavior. Mearsheimer posits a variant he labels “offensive realism” where states “understand that the best way to ensure their survival is to be the most powerful state in the system.” Consequently, he believes that states are not content with the status quo, but seek hegemony to preserve their interests. Do you agree with Mearsheimer’s

characterization of great power politics? If he is correct, how does this affect U.S.-China relations or U.S.-Russia relations? Is a major power war the likely future scenario or is a more cooperative world possible/likely?

3. Patrick Morgan provides an overview of the historical roots and key provisions of liberalism, another important theory of international relations. Liberalism is far more optimistic about the possibilities of cooperation and security in international relations. While realism focuses on the likelihood of conflict, liberalism maintains that conflict is not inevitable. In fact, proponents of liberalism argue that international cooperation can flourish through institutions such as the European Union, the United Nations, and the World Trade Organization. In addition, liberalism maintains that the spread of democracy, increased economic interaction, and concern for human rights have been important liberal trends helping promote peace and security. What elements of liberalism do you think are correct indicators of how the world works? Which critiques of liberal thinking do you think provide important counter arguments?

4. In contrast to the other theories, constructivism is not driven by one assumption. Rather, it argues that *ideas* can change the way groups or individuals act in the international system. Its leading proponents suggest that world politics is "socially constructed," rejecting the realist claim that power is the sole driver of international politics. International change can occur through ideas and norms that affect the accepted standards of international behavior. For example, Martha Finnemore presents an argument that the norm of humanitarian intervention is not well explained by the other theories. Why do states intervene in humanitarian crises when there are no obvious national interests? Moreover, in the past, most humanitarian interventions were unilateral actions with no expectation of international legitimacy. Today, there is often an expectation that humanitarian intervention be authorized by the United Nations or some other multilateral body such as NATO. Thus, the construction of norms and ideas over time explains behavior in international relations in ways the other theories do not. Is Finnemore correct or does she overstate the role of norms? Is constructivism important to explain international relations?

D. Required Readings (84 pages)

1. Snyder, Jack. "One World, Rival Theories," *Foreign Policy*, November/December 2004, no. 145, pp. 1-10.

2. Mearsheimer, John. "Anarchy and the Struggle for Power," Chapter 2 in *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (WW Norton, 2014), pp. 29-54.

3. Morgan, Patrick. "Liberalism," in Alan Collins (ed), *Contemporary Security Studies*, 3rd ed. (Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 28-41.

4. Finnemore, Martha. "Constructing Norms of Humanitarian Intervention," in Karen Mingst and Jack Snyder (ed), *Essential Readings in World Politics*, 2nd ed. (WW Norton, 2004), pp. 102-118.

SECURITY STRATEGIES-3: NATIONAL INTERESTS, POWER AND GRAND STRATEGY

A. Focus

Grand Strategy can be understood as the synchronized application of all elements of national power to advance and defend national interests during peace and war. In general, strategy provides a framework for establishing priorities, choosing a strategic approach, and allocating the resources necessary to achieve national ends. In the absence of such a framework, responses are often incoherent and reactive, and resources are allocated on the basis of short-term parochial interests rather than long-term national ones. Grand strategy is based on broad based views of the world and goals to be achieved within that view. Those goals are largely based on national interests that reflect a political culture. But national interests can be difficult to define or agree on, and how enduring they really are may be questionable. In addition, this session will briefly examine the idea of national power—hard, soft and various other types—and assess why power is essential to any discussion of national interests and strategy. Finally, grand strategy archetypes will be introduced to guide thinking about interests, challenges, and approaches.

B. Objectives

- Assess the role national interests play in strategic planning.
- Comprehend strategy as the conceptual link between ends, ways, means and risk.
- Assess the four basic grand strategies that will be analyzed and evaluated later in the Security Strategies course.
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1a, 1b, 1c, and 1d.

C. Guidance

1. Derek Reveron and Nick Gvosdev offer a provocative forward look at where U.S. foreign and defense policy is headed today, in a world where American hegemony is in slow decline, but a genuinely multipolar world has yet to take firm shape. The authors examine various issues and regions from a "big-picture" strategic perspective, advocating a retrenchment of U.S. defense interests globally. They argue that the United States should become more selective in its engagements, especially militarily, as it seeks to share the international security burden with partners. Do you find the new grand strategy to be plausible? How do vital, important and peripheral national interests affect this strategic calculus? What are the greatest strengths and weaknesses of what they propose?

2. Stephen Walt argues that the United States should be "very selective in its choice of alliance partners" and cautions against extending security guarantees (especially NATO membership) to Ukraine following Russia's annexation of Crimea. The decision to create alliances is based on a cost-benefit analysis centered on national interests and Walt recommends asking the question, "What's in it for us?" when potential partners come calling. Do you agree with Walt's premise that "others need the United States a lot more than it needs them?" Should

the United States spend its capital, political or otherwise, supporting Kiev? How would Russian President Vladimir Putin respond?

3. Walter Russell Mead looks at America's position in the world and suggests that focusing only on traditional power (military) would be both incomplete and myopic. He first turns to Joseph Nye's notion of distinguishing "hard" power from "soft" power. Then he further dissects hard power into "sharp" (military) and "sticky" (economic) power. Mead argues that by using all tools of national power, the United States can address challenges to its national security interests such as stabilizing Iraq and preventing conflict with China. When designing strategy, how can a country achieve balance with the various tools of national power? How does overemphasizing one tool of national power place strain on the other tools?

4. Colin Dueck argues that American grand strategy has undergone "repeated changes in recent years" and attempts to explain why these changes are necessary. He presents four basic grand strategy alternatives: strategic disengagement [restraint]; balance of power realism [selective engagement]; primacy; and liberal internationalism. Although each will be discussed in greater detail later in the sub-course, it is important for the student to grasp a fundamental understanding of the importance of grand strategy, which Dueck defines as a plan that reconciles "foreign policy goals with limited national resources." Do you agree that defense spending, foreign aid, alliance behavior, troop deployments and diplomatic activity are all influenced by grand strategy? What grand strategy is the United States implementing today? When should a country change its grand strategy and what are the risks involved?

D. Required Readings (36 pages)

1. Reveron, Derek S., and Nikolas K. Gvosdev. "(Re)Discovering the National Interest: The Future of U.S. Foreign Policy and Defense Strategy," *Orbis*, Summer 2015, pp. 1-18.

2. Walt, Stephen. "Would You Die For That Country?" *Foreign Policy*, March 24, 2014, pp. 1-6.

3. Mead, Walter Russell, "America's Sticky Power," *Foreign Policy*, 29 October 2009, pp. 1-9.

4. Dueck, Colin. "American Grand Strategy, 2000-2004, *Review of International Studies*, (Volume 30, Issue No. 4), 29 September 2004, pp. 511-517.

E. Foundational Reading

1. Mead, Walter Russell. *Power, Terror, Peace and War: America's Grand Strategy in a World at Risk,* Alfred A. Knopf, 2004, pp. 1-58.

SECURITY STRATEGIES-4: DETERRENCE THEORY AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS

A. Focus

Throughout the Cold War, deterrence theory and nuclear weapons were a central part of U.S. strategy and defense planning. To be sure, deterrence is more than nuclear weapons but during the Cold War, they were almost inseparable. Both Moscow and Washington built thousands of nuclear weapons in a situation labeled "mutual assured destruction" (MAD) that maintained a strategic stalemate between these two adversaries. In the years following the Cold War, analysts gave far less thought to deterrence and nuclear weapons but over the past several years, that has changed. Many studies are examining the utility and application of Cold War deterrence concepts and are raising important questions about whether these ideas are appropriate for 21st century security challenges such as terrorism and cyber security among others. In addition, there has been renewed debate over the role of nuclear weapons ranging from the Global Zero Movement to the Obama Administration's efforts to reduce the importance of nuclear weapons in global security to those arguing the United States needs to upgrade its nuclear force and provide more credible options to buttress nuclear deterrence.

B. Objectives

- Identify and assess the role deterrence plays in protecting U.S. interests.
- Comprehend the challenges and limitations associated with deterrence and compellence.
- Evaluate the role and size of the U.S. nuclear force in the 21st Century.
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Area 1a, 3a, and 3c.

C. Guidance

1. Thomas Schelling's *Arms and Influence* was written in 1966 but remains one of the classic works on deterrence and coercion. Schelling lays out the basic concepts for using threats in achieving state goals and makes important distinctions between the use of force and threats to support diplomacy. He also examines the differences between deterrence and compellence, two different aspects of coercive strategy. Where do you see deterrence and compellence being utilized by states today? Are Schelling's ideas still appropriate for the current security environment?

2. Richard Betts argues that deterrence was "the essential military strategy behind containing the Soviet Union and a crucial ingredient in winning the Cold War without fighting World War III" but goes on to argue that deterrence has lost its way in recent decades, to the detriment of American security policy. He maintains that, since the Cold War ended, the United States has continued to rely on deterrence in places it should not have (e.g., Russia); rejected deterrence in places it should have (e.g., Iran); and been unclear about whether or not it has a strategy of deterrence in places where clarity is particularly important (e.g., China). In addition, Betts laments deterrence was once central to United States security policy, yet in recent years has "almost vanished from the vocabulary of strategic debate." He calls on American policymakers to revitalize deterrence and apply it where it is appropriate. Is Betts correct that "deterrence has

gone astray" in recent decades and if so, what aspect of the United States' security policy would you change?

3. John Klein raises two fundamental questions regarding nuclear weapons and security: what is the purpose of nuclear weapons and how many must the United States have? He provides an overview of Obama Administration thinking on the role of nuclear weapons as outlined in the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review that argues for nuclear weapons to play a reduced role in American security planning. After summarizing the arguments made by proponents of Global Zero, Klein argues that setting a minimum number of nuclear weapons is the wrong approach; maintaining an arsenal based on minimum numbers is arbitrary and might tempt an adversary to challenge deterrence. What is your answer to the questions regarding the role and number of nuclear weapons for United States defense planning?

4. The United States' strategic arsenal is getting old with multiple delivery systems and warheads due for replacement. Given the scope of this effort, some assessments have projected the total cost to be close to $1 trillion over the next thirty years. Adam Mount reviews the proposed changes and questions whether the United States can afford this. Is that the proper assessment? How would you prioritize the various elements of modernizing American strategic forces?

D. Required Readings (53 pages)

1. Schelling, Thomas. *Arms and Influence*, Yale University Press, pp. v-vi, 1-18, 69-79.

2. Betts, Richard K., "The Lost Logic of Deterrence: What the Strategy That Won the Cold War Can – and Can't – Do Now," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 92, No. 2 (March/April 2013), pp. 87-99.

3. Klein, John J. "Towards a Better U.S. Nuclear Strategy," *Journal of Strategic Security* 7, no. 3 (Fall 2014), pp. 84-94.

4. Mount, Adam. "A Pivotal Moment for U.S. Nuclear Arsenal," Council on Foreign Relations, October 13, 2014, pp. 1-4.

E. Foundational Reading

1. Woolf, Amy F. *U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces: Background, Development, and Issues*, Congressional Research Service, RL 33640, March 10, 2016.

SECURITY STRATEGIES-5: COMPARATIVE POLITICAL ECONOMY

A. Focus

A strong economy is a prerequisite for national security. Economic activity must provide a basic quality of life for citizens, while simultaneously providing sufficient resources to support those functions for which the state is responsible. History provides numerous examples of how states and other political entities have managed the economic behavior of individuals and groups, and there is no global consensus on which system is best. Some systems prioritize growth, while others prioritize stability, and others still prioritize the regime's ability to distribute patronage. Political economy refers to the processes by which market activity is structured and regulated by the political unit. An idealized pure free market optimizes the values of efficiency and individual liberty (to dispose of property as the individual prefers), but can also create instability and inequality. Political processes determine which values a state will prioritize (e.g., equality, stability, regime survival), and how it will adjust market mechanisms in order to produce those desired outcomes. Comparative political economy looks at how different states approach the issues of production and distribution of resources, and how the decisions those states make affect their security and relations with the rest of the world.

B. Objectives

- Assess alternative economic system theories and relate economic success to national security.
- Analyze the economic characteristics of a few different models and the advantages and disadvantages of each.
- Assess the relationship between successful states, failed states and economic systems.
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1a, 1b, and 1d.

C. Guidance

1. The reputation of (neo) liberal, laissez-faire free-market capitalism has suffered of late, largely as a result of the 2008 U.S. housing crash and the ensuing global economic crisis. This reignited a perennial discussion regarding whether there is one "best" economic system for the world, and if so, which one it is. This question is particularly important for the developing world, as many states have an opportunity to choose what kind of system they will build. Which one should it be? The United States has long been the champion of neoliberal free-market economics, and has shaped global institutions to promote that approach, but there are alternatives. What are they? How do they work? What are their strengths and weaknesses? Why might countries choose different systems? Lindsay Cohn's primer introduces key concepts; John Campbell and Ove Pedersen discuss the concept of "varieties of capitalism" and explore how two completely different systems can both "work."

2. As developing countries' economies grow, expand and mature, it is often the case that corrupt and ineffective political systems and actors become the primary deterrent to sustainable economic growth and improved quality of life. An existing narrative in the developed West and the developing world suggests that countries that develop a middle class will also move toward democracy – indeed, this was the basis of the Clinton administration's Engagement policy toward China. Another narrative urges developing countries to adopt democratic principles and practices in order to support modern economic growth and development. But are these cause-effect relationships real? Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and George Downs discuss what political science and economics have found about the relationship between a country's political system and its economic development.

3. One major difference in economic systems is how they choose to respond to economic downturns or crises. Two major strands of economic thought call for opposite strategies, and this can create serious tension when countries are trying to coordinate their responses (as the countries of the European Union must, or as the major world economies tried to do following the 2008 crash). Mark Blyth gives us a brief history of the philosophies behind stimulus and austerity, and makes an argument about why austerity doesn't work. What assumptions does his argument make? What does it imply about international economic coordination and cooperation? About the fate of the European Union? About economic policy in the United States?

D. Required Readings (46 pages)

1. Cohn, Lindsay P. "Introduction to Political Economy Part I: Comparative"

2. Campbell, John L., and Ove K. Pedersen. "Institutional Competitiveness in the Global Economy: Denmark, the United States, and the Varieties of Capitalism" *Regulation and Governance* (2007 issue 1), pp. 230-246.

3. Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, and George Downs. "Development and Democracy," *Foreign Affairs* (Sep/Oct 2005), pp. 77-86.

4. Blyth, Mark. "The Austerity Delusion: Why a Bad Idea Won Over the West," *Foreign Affairs* (May/June 2013), pp. 41-56.

SECURITY STRATEGIES-6: INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY

A. Focus

In the previous session we explored the debates on how states choose to organize their economies, both in theory and looking at practical examples and problems seen today. In this session, we focus on the economic relations *among* states. At the simplest theoretical level, we consider why and how countries interact with each other in the first place. We consider how international trade benefits economies, discuss the problems trade creates, understand how trade can take place using different currencies, and how the money and financial systems of different countries interact with each other. There is an inherent *political* component to the world economy and sovereignty governs political choices countries make in the international economic system. This session introduces some ideas about international economic governance and looks at the debate about what the global economy will look like in coming years.

B. Objectives

- Analyze what drives economic behavior among states and what motivates a state to adopt a specific set of international economic policies.

- Assess the advantages and disadvantages of global trade and considerations that drive state decision making with respect to international trade policy.

- Recognize how global economic competition can both strengthen as well as damage relations among global economic actors.

- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1a, 1b, and 1d.

C. Guidance

1. The primer by Lindsay Cohn introduces key terms and concepts necessary to understand basic IPE, and gives a brief history of the major international economic institutions and the main debates surrounding them. What do these arguments indicate about sources of regional and global instability? What do they say about the role and power of international institutions? Why do some people think globalization is good for everyone, and others think it is destructive?

2. The selection from *Naked Economics* (by Charles Wheelan) describes the basics of international monetary relations and the interrelationships among trade flows, government deficits, currency values, and interest rates. How do those variables relate in the case of the United States and China or create problems between EU countries? Wheelan also describes several different methods of global money governance from the past, such as the gold standard led by Britain before World War II, the managed system of "Bretton Woods," and the recent pattern of floating rates and lightly regulated international banking. What are some advantages or disadvantages of each? How might a rising economic power like China seek to alter the system?

3. Davide Furceri and Prakash Loungani's short piece is an empirical look at the results of liberalization of capital flows – a particular aspect of overall global trade and market liberalization. They note that, while this can bring clear gains to certain actors, it also causes

undesirable outcomes like increased inequality. What are the values and interests at stake when governments make decisions about international trade and flows of goods, services, capital, and labor? How should the costs and benefits be weighed against each other? What does this tell us about why certain states and certain groups within states resist certain aspects of globalization?

4. Robert Blackwill and Jennifer Harris argue that the United States has stopped using economics as a tool of statecraft (with the exception of sanctions) and need to learn to use it again. Are they right? If so, why did Washington's behavior shift in this direction? Should it change? What would have to happen for the United States to follow their advice?

5. Richard Connolly gives a specific account of how the United States and other partner states have used economic statecraft against Russia in the last few years, and what effects that has had on the Russian economy and strategy. Would he agree or disagree with Blackwill and Harris? What do his argument and evidence indicate about the effectiveness of "economic statecraft"? What do they tell us about the use of sanctions, in particular?

D. Required Readings (68 pages)

1. Cohn, Lindsay P. 2016. "Introduction to Political Economy Part II: International"

2. Wheelan, Charles. 2010. "International Economics: How did a Nice Country like Iceland Go Bust," Ch. 11 in *Naked Economics* (New York: W.W. Norton), pp. 243-269.

3. Furceri, Davide, and Prakash Loungani. 2016. "Opening up to Inequity" *Finance and Development* (March): pp. 43-46.

4. Blackwill, Robert, and Jennifer Harris. 2016. "The Lost Art of Economic Statecraft: Restoring an American Tradition" *Foreign Affairs* (Mar/Apr), pp. 99-110.

5. Connolly, Richard. 2016. "The Empire Strikes Back: Economic Statecraft and the Securitization of Political Economy in Russia" *Europe-Asia Studies* 68(4), pp. 750-773.

E. Foundational Readings

1. Robert Jackson and Georg Soerensen, *Introduction to International Relations: Theories and Approaches* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), chapters 7-8.

SECURITY STRATEGIES-7: EMERGING CAUSES OF CONFLICT

A. Focus

While mainstream IR theory provides a starting point to explain what motivates states to fight, it has been criticized for providing less insight into why non-state actors fight and for shedding little light on why war and conflict exist in the first place. Nor does it fully address why the level of conflict in the international systems seems to be, for the moment at least, in decline. The roots of human violence and conflict are ancient and evidence is mounting that aggression in human societies has both biological and cultural roots. However, non-violent competition and cooperation also appear to have similar roots. This raises important questions about the mechanisms and triggers of both peace and conflict.

This session will cover debates over the causes of war and human conflict and will attempt to highlight some of the more prominent factors put forth as traditional and emerging drivers of conflict. The readings draw from multidisciplinary and international perspectives including political science, anthropology, archaeology, biology, geography, peace and development studies and public health from Australian, Canadian, Israeli as well as American authors. The purpose of this session is not to provide generalized theories or templates, but rather to offer students a range of perspectives and questions, which can be used to analyze conflict and which will aid in contextualizing and assessing issues and threats that will be covered in upcoming transnational and regional sessions.

B. Objectives

- Consider global forces and factors that have the potential to be sources of conflict.

- Assess the strategic implications and challenges that these sources of conflict foreshadow, to include recognizing specific levels of risk, threat, vulnerability, and uncertainty inherent in each alternative, as well as the nature of the conflicts that might (or might not) emerge.

- Support CJCS Learning Area 1d, 1e, and 3e.

C. Guidance

1. Azar Gat reviews arguments from across the social sciences regarding what appears to be a long-term decline in human conflict and violence. Some of the factors cited for this decline include many of the issues addressed in this sub-course such as: industrialization, rapid economic growth, commercial interdependence, the liberal-democratic peace, cultural and social attitude changes, nuclear deterrence, and UN peacekeeping. Gat himself argues that peace has become more profitable than war. Nevertheless, war and violence have been central to human history and continue to plague many parts of the world today. Do you think conflict will continue to decrease or are we at a turning point? Could the changes in power in the international system such as we read about in Session 1 (and the National Intelligence Council's *Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds* 15-18, 59-61, https://www.dni.gov/index.php/about/organization/global-trends-2030) lead to a more conflict prone future?

2. According to Dominic Johnson and Monica Duffy Toft, the desire for and defense of territory have been persistent and recurrent elements of conflict throughout history. Many biologists and anthropologists argue that territorial behavior is widespread in both animals and humans because it can be an effective long-range strategy for survival and reproduction. Amongst humans, territorial conflict can result from an attempt to gain or secure material benefits (such as resources) or for non-material reasons such as defense of a "homeland" or sacred site. Do you think territorial behavior (and the potential for territorial conflict) is on the rise? If so, why and what might be driving this behavior? Do you share the authors' hope that territorial conflict can be predicted and prevented or are we on the cusp of a new era of territorial violence?

3. The role of identity (culture, religion, nationalism, and ethnicity) is widely recognized as a factor in conflict. However, according to Stephen Walt, it is nationalism that constitutes "the most powerful political ideology in the world." He argues that only nationalism can explain island disputes in East Asia, the rise in the number of countries in the world or why the European Union as an institution is increasingly in trouble. Do you agree with Walt's assertions about the power of nationalism? How might territoriality (as discussed in previous article) intersect with nationalism to produce conflict? Can nationalism be separated from other elements of identity (such as religion, ethnicity, and culture) and used to dismiss them as causes of conflict?

4. The issue of resource conflict has become important in security debates and related literature. However, despite the claims of some alarmists, the resource-conflict nexus is usually not linear and involves the interaction of different variables over space. Simon Mason breaks down resource and environmental conflict into four broad categories: resource curse conflicts, local resource scarcity conflicts, "hot spots", and interstate resource wars. Which type of resource conflicts do you think are most prominent today and which ones are likely to be important in the future? What resources do you think will be most likely to cause conflict (directly or indirectly in the future)? How might resource issues combine with other factors such as territory, identity, geopolitics, and economics to cause conflict?

5. The 21st century will see, for the first time in human history, the majority of the world's population living in cities. Traditionally scholars have viewed urbanization as more related to the expansion of security and, as Azar Gat mentions in the first reading, one of the "civilizing" processes that have helped reduce conflict over time. However, the rapid growth of cities in the developing world has caused many analysts to ask whether a dynamic is emerging in which cities will become new incubators of conflict and theaters of war. Kevin Savage and Robert Muggah suggest that urban violence may eclipse the violence associated with traditional warfare. However, they caution against taking simplistic security approaches and argue that broader humanitarian and human security type approaches are needed. Could urbanization become an emerging generator of conflict? Are alternative theoretical approaches to international relations and new governmental capabilities (military and civilian) needed to deal with this issue?

6. Rae Walker in *The Relationship between Climate and Violence* reviews the literature on climate change and violence from a public health and security perspective (See *Global Trends 2030,* pp. 30-34 for additional intelligence community perspectives). The second part of Walker's report relates directly to this sub-course because it focuses on the international level

with a discussion of civil and interstate war (using examples from regions that we will cover later in the course). Walker concludes that climate change is unlikely to be a sole causal factor of conflict at the international level, but that when combined with certain political and economic dynamics it may help fuel conflict. Do you agree with the author's main arguments? Why or why not?

D. Required Readings (47 pages)

1. Gat, Azar. "Is War Declining – and Why?" *Journal of Peace Research* 50:2 2012, pp. 149-157.

2. Johnson, Dominic and Monica Duffy Toft. "Grounds for Hope: the Evolutionary Science behind Territorial Conflict," *Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs Policy Brief* March 2014, pp. 1-2.

3. Walt, Stephen. "The (Con)fusion of Civilizations," *Foreign Policy* May 4, 2016.

4. Mason, Simon. "Environment Related Conflicts: Balancing Ecology and Politics," *CSS Analysis in Security Policy 2:24 Nov 2007*, pp. 1-3.

5. Savage, Kevin and Robert Muggah. "Urban Violence and Humanitarian Action: Engaging the Fragile City," *Journal of Humanitarian Assistance* January 16, 2012.

6. Walker, Rae. *The Relationship between Climate and Violence: a Literature Review* (Dandenong, Australia: SEHCP, 2012), pp. 1-18.

SECURITY STRATEGIES-8: TRANSNATIONAL SECURITY ISSUES

A. Focus

Transnational security issues have emerged as key challenges for states. They can be defined as "nonmilitary threats that cross borders and either threaten the political and social integrity of a nation or the health of that nation's inhabitants." Demographic, environmental, economic, and social trends suggest that transnational security issues will remain significant challenges in the decades ahead. These issues generally fall into one of two broad, though often inter-related, categories: process-based (transboundary pollution, climate change, infectious disease, etc.) and actor-based (organized crime, human trafficking, terrorism, maritime piracy, etc.). These issues usually involve or are conducted by non-state actors, although states may provide a facilitating environment, whether through deliberate action or simply inaction. Certain challenges transcend binary state versus non-state categories. Governments, however, are organized primarily to deal with other states and the primary focus for many military forces remains preparation for possible confrontation with other states, although the bulk of their daily 'security duties' may involve addressing transnational security issues. Finally, these issues are often characterized as the pernicious side of globalization and they may challenge conventional notions of sovereignty, strategy, geography and war.

B. Objectives

- Analyze how globalization helps to fuel and sustain transnational security issues.
- Comprehend the basic dynamics of transnational crime and terrorism.
- Assess and consider opportunities and challenges that transnational processes and security issues pose for strategy development.
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1a, 1b, 1d, and 1e.
- Support 2011 CJCS Joint Professional Military Education Special Emphasis Area 9.

C. Guidance

1. Carolyn Nordstrom argues that political boundaries do not match economic boundaries and that transnational security threats (such as crime) occur in the gaps between political boundaries and economic flows and that states as well as individual 'legal' consumers participate (wittingly and unwittingly) in the shadow movement of people and goods that comprise transnational criminal activity. She details this process through a case of transnational ("extra-legal") flows in the Middle East to demonstrate the complex and interwoven nature of transnational crime and how standard political maps (and hence by extension related international relations theories) do not capture reality on the ground. How can governments that are organized to deal with other states confront and develop strategies to deal with such transnational security dynamics (dynamics which states themselves also often contribute to by design or happenstance)?

2. The predominant actors in transnational terrorism today are al-Qaeda and the Islamic State (known by the abbreviations IS, ISIS or ISIL) and other likeminded groups and individuals. The International Crisis Group (ICG) report argues that we are witnessing a "Fourth Wave" of jihadist terrorism that is more potent than previous iterations. Transnational factors may operate globally but they vary from region to region and are rooted in local conditions. Consequently, such threats defy easy categorization, mapping, theorization and state response. What are the factors driving this "Fourth Wave"? How do the processes discussed by Nordstrom and patterns identified by the ICG converge in the case of IS and al-Qaeda? Again, how can states organized to deal with other states best combat such threats?

3. Peter Chalk describes contemporary violent transnational crime in the maritime domain (Armed Maritime Crime or AMC) arguing that it must be understood in the context of the international maritime industry which, although he does not use the term, often operates in an "extra-legal" fashion in the spaces between political boundaries and global economic flows similar to other transnational crimes. To what extent do you think AMC poses a strategic level security threat? How should state actors attempt to combat AMC and what role should non-state actors such as Private Security Companies (PSC's) have?

4. Gregory Treverton (et. al.) take on a different set of transnational challenges, those which are process rather than actor based such as climate change, water scarcity, and global pandemics. The authors label these issues "threats without threateners" since they tend to be the result of states and individuals acting in their own self-interest rather than acting to deliberately harm others. They argue that multilateral action is likely to be far more effective than unilateral and suggest four overlapping policy approaches that might be useful, assessing the strengths of weaknesses of each. What do these issues and these approaches mean for the United States government and the Department of Defense? Have the authors overlooked any promising approaches to these "threats without threateners" and their interaction with other transnational threats and causes of conflict?

5. The final article in this session is a short case study designed for students to determine whether and which transnational security threats should be addressed with militarized approaches and military technologies. While most analysts agree that transnational terrorism, crime, disease and environmental hazards have security implications, some question the appropriateness of highly securitized or militarized approaches in combatting these challenges. What do you think the role of militaries and militarized approaches should or should not be in combatting various transnational security threats?

D. Required Readings (56 pages)

1. Nordstrom, Carolyn. "Extra-Legality in the Middle," *Middle East Research and Information Project 261*, 2011, pp. 1-3.

2. International Crisis Group (ICG). *Exploiting Disorder: al-Qaeda and the Islamic State*, ICG Special Report, March 16, 2016, pp. 1-29.

3. Chalk, Peter. "Armed Maritime Crime," in Paul Shemella (ed.) *Global Responses to Maritime Violence*, (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2016), pp. 49-62.

4. Treverton, Gregory, Erik Nemeth, and Sinduja V. Srinivasan, "Threats Without Threateners? Exploring Intersections of Threats to the Global Commons and National Security," RAND Occasional Paper, 2012, pp. 1-12.

5. Pallett, Helen. "Drones for Wildlife: the Securitization of Conservation," *Geographical Journal* (Royal Geographical Society Blogpost), 2014, 2 pages.

SECURITY STRATEGIES-9: SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA

A. Focus

South and Central Asia are two major sub-regions of the world that fade from the American foreign policy radar screen during certain periods, but then dramatically reappear in others. Recent trends suggest, however, that Washington is focusing much more intensely on this part of the world, and will continue to do so for the foreseeable future. Geopolitical rivalries as well as cooperation between major powers can be found in these two sub-regions. In addition, South Asia confronts significant transnational and human security challenges such as terrorism, migration, climate change, and water scarcity. Farther to the north, Central Asia is emerging as a fulcrum of great power rivalry, particularly among Russia, China, and the United States. A major reason is competition over energy supplies, trade routes, and a reassertion of traditional spheres of influence. On the other hand, a recent countervailing trend has been the growing convergence between Moscow and Beijing, which is reflected in closer energy ties and the rising importance of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), in which China and Russia serve as the dominant founding members. Meanwhile Afghanistan continues to be a fledgling state attempting to develop its economy while simultaneously confronting a persistently difficult security environment. On this latter point, President Barack Obama on July 6, 2016 announced that he was "slowing the drawdown of [United States] forces" and giving U.S. forces "more flexibility to support Afghan forces on the ground and in the air." Overall and for a variety of reasons, South and Central Asia are positioned to play a significant role in the evolving geopolitics of the 21st century.

B. Objectives

- Identify and assess the United States' and regional actors' interests in South and Central Asia.

- Identify and analyze threats, challenges, and opportunities to the United States and other nations in South and Central Asia.

- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1a, 1d, and 1e.

C. Guidance

1. The World Bank Regional Outlook on South Asia reports that "regional growth remained robust at an estimated 7.0 percent in 2015, helped by strengthening activity in the region's largest economies." The report predicts moderate growth in the near future and highlights various challenges faced by particular countries, such as inflation, reduced farm outputs due to drought, banking sector vulnerabilities, fiscal deficits and so on. The report emphasizes South Asia's need for economic reforms and the demographic challenges that a number of countries face. Why is South Asia strategically important to the United States? What are the implications of economic weaknesses and challenges for South Asia's security and stability? How are demographic trends affecting the region's economic health and security?

2. More than 15 years after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the United States maintains a significant presence in Afghanistan. Kenneth Katzman's Congressional Research Service monograph on Afghanistan—and specifically the section "Security Policy: Transition and Beyond" (p.18 to p.41)—examines U.S. policies and strategies intended to address the security challenges in the country. He writes that the "stated U.S. policy goal is to prevent terrorist organizations that can plan attacks against the U.S. homeland, partners, and interests from regaining safe haven in Afghanistan." He lists a number of factors that are complicating U.S. efforts toward reaching these goals. Do you believe that the United States can overcome these challenges/barriers? Why is Afghanistan's security and stability important to U.S. interests? What are the strengths and weaknesses in current U.S. policies and strategies vis-à-vis Afghanistan? If you had the opportunity, what advice would you offer the new U.S. President regarding Afghanistan policy?

3. Jim Nichol's Congressional Research Service monograph on Central Asia analyzes American interests pertaining to this vast region comprised of five countries (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan). In his summary, he writes that the United States pursues a number of goals with Central Asian states, including securing their support for NATO operations in Afghanistan, gaining their cooperation toward the prevention of illicit smuggling of arms, drugs, persons and weapons of mass destruction (WMD). In addition, the United States seeks to promote free markets, democracy, human rights, energy development and so on. Why is Central Asia strategically important to the United States? What are the major challenges (for U.S. policy) in this part of the world?

4 Baba Umar's article about Kashmir's water crisis warns that India and Pakistan are locked in water conflict, which pertains to the Indus Water Treaty (IWT) and which also touches on the intractable dispute over Kashmir. What are the risks and challenges if India and Pakistan are not able to resolve the water dispute involving Kashmir? Why is this issue strategically important to the United States? How are climate change and water politics affecting this dispute? What needs to be done to prevent a "water war" between India and Pakistan, which are both nuclear-capable powers?

D. Required Readings (82 pages)

1. "South Asia," Regional Outlook, *Global Economic Prospects: Spillovers Amid Weak Growth*, World Bank Group, January 2016, pp. 139-147.
https://www.worldbank.org/content/dam/Worldbank/GEP/GEP2016a/Global-Economic-Prospects-January-2016-Spillovers-amid-weak-growth.pdf

2. Katzman, Kenneth. "Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy," *CRS*. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, June 6, 2016, pp. 18-41.
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL30588.pdf

3. Nichol, Jim. "Central Asia: Regional Developments and Implications for U.S. Interests." *CRS*. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, March 21, 2014, pp. 1-30; 43-47 U.S. Regional Economic & Trade Policy; 48-49 Energy Resources; 60-68 U.S. Security & Arms Control Programs & Assistance; and 74-75 Weapons of Mass Destruction.
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33458.pdf

4. Umar, Baba. “Kashmir: A Water War in the Making?” *The Diplomat*, June 9, 2016, pp. 1-6. http://thediplomat.com/2016/06/kashmir-a-water-war-in-the-making/.

E. Foundational Reading

1. Kaplan, Robert. *South Asia’s Geography of Conflict*. Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security, August 2010, pp. 4-17.

SECURITY STRATEGIES-10: CHINA

A. Focus

The rise of China is perhaps the most significant geopolitical event of the early 21st century. The National Intelligence Council once assessed that "few countries are poised to have more impact on the world over the next 15-20 years than China…[and] China will be a leading military power." Indeed, a World Bank study (*China 2030*) suggested China's economic ascendancy could eclipse the United States by 2030: "Even if China's growth rate slows as projected, it would still replace the United States as the world's largest economy by 2030." This will have huge implications for global natural resources and the environment. The World Bank noted that, as a result of China's rise, "the pressure on global supplies of energy, natural resources, food, water, and the environment will ratchet up rapidly." In addition, China's rising power is being felt in international currency markets. Recent evidence suggests that China is attempting to position its currency as a substitute for the U.S. dollar in certain international trade transactions. Finally, China is gradually emerging as a major military power with force projection capabilities (particularly evident with changes in its navy). With these capabilities, some argue that China is moving beyond a simple "Taiwan scenario" toward additional goals, including enforcing territorial claims in the South China Sea and East China Sea, protecting key sea lines of communications and, in the longer term, projecting force worldwide.

B. Objectives

- Assess the nature and implications of China's economic and political ascendancy.
- Recognize and assess United States and regional interests vis-à-vis China.
- Recognize and analyze threats, challenges, and opportunities to United States and other nations in China.
- Supports CJCS Learning Areas 1a, 1c, and 1e.

C. Guidance

1. In their co-authored piece titled *Revising U.S. Grand Strategy Toward China*, Robert Blackwill and Ashley Tellis argue that the United States should stop trying to integrate China into the international system and instead focus on balancing China's rise. This should be done, they argue, to protect the security of the United States and its allies, to protect the superior position of the United States in the global hierarchy and to maintain the strength of the liberal international order. The authors are pessimistic that Beijing and Washington can enjoy "peaceful coexistence" or any "new type of major power relations." Instead, the best that can be hoped for is "caution and restrained predictability by the two sides as intense U.S.-China strategic competition becomes the new normal." American diplomacy should focus on managing or mitigating tensions between the two countries although some conflicts are probably inevitable. Do you agree with the authors' assessments and conclusions? Why or why not?

2. You Ji's essay titled "China's National Security Commission: Theory, Evolution and Operations" addresses recent changes in China's governance structure. The author examines the implications of the recent creation of a National Security Commission (NSC), which has paralleled an "expansion of the definition of security." He asserts, among other things, that political security and national security are essentially "about CCP [Chinese Communist Party] security as the ruling party." The new (or emerging) NSC, according to the author, is a "major regrouping of Beijing's power structure and has boosted Xi's [Xi Jinping's] 'New Deal' of power recentralization for CCP revitalization." Are you convinced that the creation of the NSC is solely President Xi's attempt at power consolidation? What effect will the NSC likely have on China's future foreign policy? As the definitions of security continue to expand in China, what are the implications for civil society and human rights? What are the implications for U.S.-China relations?

3. In his essay on learning the historical lessons of the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895, Admiral Wu Shengli (former Commander in Chief, People's Liberation Army Navy) argues that the first Sino-Japanese War has important lessons for China's goal of building a modern navy. He chides his country's past mistake of having a "weak ocean consciousness." He argues that history demonstrates that "moving toward the ocean will lead to [China's] success and abandoning the ocean will lead to failure." Do you believe that China will become a great maritime global power despite past neglect of maritime space (as Admiral Wu argues)? What factors might constrain China's maritime (or naval) ascendancy?

4. In his essay titled "How Washington Should Response to the 'Road and Belt,;" Zhao Minghao argues that the United States may be overreacting to the emergence of China's "One Belt, One Road (OBOR)" initiative, which was announced by President Xi Jinping in 2013. Many perceive the U.S. response to the OBOR as well as the new Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) as reflecting a view within Washington that "China-initiated mechanisms may undermine American influence on the global economy." Do you believe the OBOR and the AIIB will more completely integrate China into the global economic system? Will China "embrace multilateralism and good governance"? What are the likely geopolitical implications (including effects on US-China relations)?

D. Required Readings (66 pages)

1. Blackwill, Robert D. and Ashley Tellis. *Revising U.S. Grand Strategy Toward China* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, March 2015), pp. 1-39.

2. You Ji, "China's National Security Commission: theory, evolution and operations," *Journal of Contemporary China*, 25:98 (2016), pp. 178-196.

3. Wu Shengli. "Learn Profound Historical Lessons from the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895 and Unswervingly Take the Path of Planning and Managing Maritime Affairs, Safeguarding Maritime Rights and Interests, and Building a Powerful Navy," China Military Science, April 2014, pp. 1-7 (of translated copy). Translated by the China Maritime Studies Institute (CMSI).

4. Zhao, Minghao. “How Washington Should Respond to the ‘Road and Belt’,” *China US Focus*, May 10, 2016, pp. 1-3.

E. Foundational Reading

1. *Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2016: Annual Report to Congress* (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2016), pp. 1-144.

SECURITY STRATEGIES-11: ASIA-PACIFIC

A. Focus

The Asia-Pacific region is one of the most dynamic in the world. Economic development continues at a steady pace, with trade, investment, and economic integration that remain on the rise, fueled primarily by China's dynamic growth but also with positive trends in most other countries. The United States has important economic ties to this vibrant region, a factor that has been central to the Obama Administration's "rebalance" to Asia. Yet while the economic picture in the Asia-Pacific is cause for optimism, a number of challenges and geopolitical friction raise serious concerns for the future of peace and stability in the region. North Korea's nuclear and ballistic missile ambitions show no sign of abating and a plethora of island disputes create numerous potential flashpoints for conflict. More importantly, uncertainties over China's strategic direction and rising military power raise further questions about future regional stability. Even the strength of China's economic growth has been questioned of late as signs surface regarding the sustainability of its high growth rates with potentially serious regional and global effects. With the growth of economic and military power in the Asia-Pacific and ongoing assessments that the 21st century will be an Asian century, it is essential for national security planners to have a clear and detailed understanding of this region.

B. Objectives

- Recognize and assess United States and regional interests in the Asia-Pacific region.

- Comprehend and analyze threats, challenges, and opportunities to United States and other nations in the Asia-Pacific region.

- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1a, 1c, 1d and 1e.

C. Guidance

1. In fall 2011, the Obama Administration announced the "pivot" toward the Asia-Pacific and subsequently introduced the January 2012 defense strategic guidance that declared the need to "rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific region." This policy was further enshrined in the 2015 National Security Strategy (NSS). These actions recognize the important interests Washington has and the determination to be an active player in Asia, particularly given the uncertainties of China's rise. Patrick Cronin details and underscores these interests, referring to the United States as a "permanent Pacific power." He goes on to take a look at the long term economic and security environment in the region, as well as specific challenges within the region, and closes with five specific recommendations. What do you think are the biggest challenges facing the United States in the region in the future? Do you agree with the author's recommendations on how to address challenges within the region?

2. Japan is one of the closest security allies of the United States, and one of its largest trading partners. As Yuichi Hosoya discusses, Japan has been struggling with the question of its national role in contributing to international peace and stability. Wrapped up in this question is

the issue of lessons to be learned from Japan's history during the 20th century, both its imperial aggression and its post-war commitment to non-aggression. Prime Minister Abe has worked to expand the role that the Japanese Self Defense Forces (SDF) can play in contributing to international security, particularly in the area of collective self-defense. What effect do you think the "three new conditions" will have on collective self-defense? Do you think it will allow for the expansion of the use of the SDF? What role do you think Japan should play in contributing to international peace and stability?

3. Understanding the inner workings of North Korea is a difficult task. Analysts continue to watch closely the power consolidation of Kim Jong-un and his efforts to put his own stamp on the regime. There are signs that the North Korean economy and society are changing though at a slow pace, particularly as the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's (DRPK) ability to seal off the country from outside information is increasingly challenged. How do you view North Korea in relationship to other security challenges in the region – is it more or less dangerous than disputes over territory in the East and South China Seas? Do you see a path forward towards reunification on the peninsula?

4. One of the chief potential flashpoints in Southeast Asia is the territorial/maritime disputes in the South China Sea. Several states in the region have laid out conflicting maritime claims with China's being most expansive and contradictory to international law. More recently, China has undertaken several island building ventures and pushed its claims in ways that have rattled nerves in the region. There is also serious concern for navigation rights throughout these waters. Michael McDevitt, RADM (ret) reviews the details of the many issues involved, describes the basics of U.S. policy, and provides an assessment of U.S. policy. What is your view of these disputes? How important are these disputes for U.S. interests? What are the potential solutions, and what would you recommend for U.S. policy?

D. Required Readings (55 pages)

1. Cronin, Patrick M. *Security Challenges in the Asia-Pacific Region: A U.S. Perspective* (Washington, DC: Center for a New American Strategy, 2013), pp. 1-25.

2. Hosoya, Yuichi. "Historical Memories and Security Legislation: Japan's Security Policy under the Abe Administration." *Asia-Pacific Review*, 2015 Vol. 22, No. 2, pp. 44-52.

3. Hayes, Peter and Roger Cavazos. "North Korea in 2015: "Yes, I Can!" Byungjin and Kim Jon Un's Strategic Patience." *Asian Survey*, Vol. 56, No. 1, *A Survey of Asia in 2015* (January/February 2016), pp. 68-77.

4. McDevitt, Michael RADM (ret). "The South China Sea: Island Building and Evolving U.S. Policy," in *Building a Regional Order in East Asia: Community, Conflict, Cooperation*, National Committee on American Foreign Policy, March 2016. pp. 44-57.

SECURITY STRATEGIES-12: AFRICA

A. Focus

Africa "has assumed a new, strategic place in U.S. foreign policy and in the definition of vital U.S. national interests," according to the high-level United States Africa Policy Advisory Panel. Economic growth, democratization and political transformation are positive trends, while transnational terrorism and illicit trafficking, persistent conflict, human insecurity and environmental stresses present complex challenges. Assessing the region's future security environment and developing and implementing appropriate strategies is further complicated by resource limitations, the fragile state of emerging African democracies and a highly fluid regional political-security situation. To make sense of this, this session examines three interlocking components: geography, the political-security environment, and U.S. strategy.

B. Objectives

- Identify and assess United States and regional interests in Africa.

- Identify and analyze threats, challenges, and opportunities to United States and other nations in Africa.

- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1a, 1c, 1d and 1e.

C. Guidance

1. The reading from Peter Pham surveys the United States' security interests in Africa, and recent strategy to support those interests, notably the creation of Africa Command in 2008. Pham suggests that terrorist threats from extremist groups, access to resources, and humanitarian concerns top the list. To respond to growing threats, after 9/11 the United States significantly increased military assistance and training in Africa and stood up a new geographic command. The main U.S. effort has been to build the capacity of partner nation's militaries through security cooperation. Do you agree with Pham's assessment of the United States' interests? Given competing priorities in other regions of the world, where should Africa rank in American security policy?

2. To many Americans, "Africa" has long signified poverty and economic stagnation. Always an oversimplification, that view today is particularly out of alignment with economic reality in the region. The continent overall has enjoyed its best decade since the 1970s, and several of the world's fastest growing economies are in Africa. The article on "Africa's Economic Boom" describes these developments, and offers reasons for both optimism and pessimism about the continuation of better economic performance. Which side do you find most compelling? What does it mean for regional security and for the United States' interests in Africa if the continent becomes wealthier? Are there any security risks posed by such growth?

3. The principal security concern for the United States in Africa today is violent extremist groups. The assigned report from the South Africa-based Institute for Security Studies provides a

geographic and historical survey of the rise and activities of extremist groups in the region. How do such groups in Africa, which have mostly operated locally, threaten U.S. interests directly or indirectly? In light of the causes and trends identified in the reading, what should the United States do in response, both overall and specifically through the U.S. Department of Defense?

4. Other world powers also have interests in Africa. The European Union has more trade with Africa than the United States, provides more economic aid, and conducts comparable security cooperation, for example. China's role has grown rapidly and Beijing is now the largest trade and investment partner; more than one million Chinese citizens live in Africa. China's security role has been much smaller than its economic engagement, so far. India has long-standing connections to East Africa, and Brazil is actively reaching out to lusophone Africa (Angola and Mozambique). How should the United States view China's role in Africa? A welcome contributor to meeting Africa's investment needs or a competitor for resource access and geopolitical influence? Is China a potential partner in fighting terrorists, criminal networks, and pirates operating from Africa?

D. Required Readings (80 pages)

1. Pham, Peter J. "The Development of U.S. Africa Command," *Journal of the Middle East and Africa*, vol. 5, no. 3, Fall 2015, pp. 1-30.

2. Devarajan, Shantayanan and Wolfgang Fengler, "Africa's Economic Boom: Why the Pessimists and the Optimists are both Right," *Foreign Affairs*, May/June 2013, pp. 1-9.

3. Cilliers, Jakkie. "Violent Islamic Extremism and Terrorism in Africa", ISS Paper 286, Institute for Security Studies (Pretoria), October 2015, pp. 1-32.

4. Elling Tjønneland, ed., *Rising Powers and the African Security Landscape* (Oslo: Christien Michelson Institute, 2014), ch 1, pp. 1 - 10.

D. Foundational Reading

1. Stock, Robert. "The Map of Africa" Ch. 1 in *Africa South of the Sahara: A Geographical Interpretation*, 3rd Edition (New York: Guilford Press, 2012), pp. 15-30.

SECURITY STRATEGIES-13: EUROPE AND RUSSIA

A. Focus

For most of the last century, Europe was critical to the U.S. global power position and at center-stage among America's security interests. While this changed after the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, there are indications that the European theater is once again becoming central to world geopolitics and thus merits renewed U.S. engagement. During the twenty years after the Cold War, Americans increasingly viewed Europe as a benign region for U.S. interests and a "producer" of security. The belief that Europe was now "whole and free and at peace" became the dominant narrative of transatlantic relations, even as Russia under Vladimir Putin began to re-emerge once again as a competitor. Russia, flush with oil money before energy prices had collapsed and eager to establish a sphere of privileged interest along its periphery, began charting an increasingly confident and adversarial position towards NATO.

Since the end of the Cold War, together with the United States through NATO, European allies figured prominently in multinational combat operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan, Kosovo and Libya, while assisting in efforts to counter illicit trafficking. However, Russia's seizure of Crimea in March 2014 and the subsequent war in Ukraine not only changed the regional security equation along Europe's eastern periphery, but also sowed divisions among the old and new NATO allies as to how best to respond to a resurgent Russia. After the 2014 NATO summit in Wales, while the alliance committed to taking additional steps to reassure the allies along the eastern flank, the Greek, euro, and MENA migration crises, and perhaps most importantly the Brexit vote in the United Kingdom in favor of leaving the European Union, have left Europe in turmoil, struggling to sustain its integration project. Today Europe continues to provide meager funding for its defense while also facing both economic and social issues that threaten to split it apart.

B. Objectives

- Identify and assess United States' and regional interests in Europe and Russia.

- Identify and analyze threats to as well as challenges and opportunities for the United States and other nations in Europe and Russia.

- Discuss the transformation of Europe since the end of the Cold War, focusing on how changes in Europe are likely to impact U.S. interests and transatlantic security cooperation.

- Assess the likely direction of change in European politics and security and how it is likely to impact the United States interests in the region and the future of NATO.

- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1a, 1c, 1d and 1e.

C. Guidance

1. The European Union has made efforts to project a common defense policy, but its principal impact has been in the area we call "soft power" – showing the way by the attractiveness of example. With its peace and prosperity, the EU is a powerful model for the rest of the world and most neighboring countries wish to join rather than resist it. However, Karen Smith argues that a combination of American military withdrawal from central Asia along with the euro crisis has drained Europe of its relative soft power. Are there policies available to the EU to regain its "soft power" prominence? Does Europe even care about its international influence? Will Russian resurgence change this equation?

2. Nikolas Gvosdev and Christopher Marsh explain how Europe became divided into opposing blocs after World War II and throughout the Cold War, which is key to understanding the nature of NATO in the 21st century. NATO's newer members are countries that experienced Soviet rule and today still fear Russian resurgence. They approach the problem of security in Europe differently than other members of the Atlantic Alliance. Is there a way to bridge "old" and "new" NATO, or is NATO now an outdated organization?

3. Ivan Krastev and Mark Leonard suggest that the Ukraine crisis shows that the European political model is not attractive to everyone and that the European order "has its limits." Europe remains divided on its priorities: despite Russia's Crimean annexation, most large European nations continue to decrease defense expenditures. Further, Mediterranean nations consider illegal immigration an even bigger security issue and no European is certain that the United States will respond if – say – Latvia is attacked. The authors suggest a plan for Europe to play to its strengths and not to encourage further Russian military adventurism.

4. In the aftermath of the Brexit vote to take the United Kingdom out of the European Union, *Politico* offers a survey of 17 top economists and policy analysts providing their assessment of the immediate and long-term impact of the British vote. The opinions presented range from negative prediction of serious economic consequences for the United Kingdom and Europe as a whole, to frank acknowledgements that the impact of the tectonic shift in European politics is impossible to predict. Most significantly, some are more concerned about the impact Brexit will have on the liberal international order than on the course European politics will take in the coming years. Either way, what happens in Europe after Brexit will have an impact on how the United States works with its European allies.

D. Required Readings

1. Smith, Karen. "Is the European Union's Soft Power in Decline?" *Current History*, March 2014, pp. 104-109.

2. Gvosdev, Nikolas K. and Christopher Marsh. "The Eurasian Space," Ch. 5 in: *Russian Foreign Policy: Interests, Vectors and Sectors* (Sage: 2014), pp. 157-199.

3. Krastev, Ivan and Leonard, Mark. "Europe's Shattered Dream of Order: How Putin is Disrupting the Atlantic Alliance", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 94 No. 3, May-June 2015, pp. 48-58.

4. "How Brexit Will Change the World," *Politico Magazine*, June 25, 2016. http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/06/brexit-change-europe-britain-us-politics-213990

SECURITY STRATEGIES-14: WESTERN HEMISPHERE

A. Focus

The Western Hemisphere is one of the most important and influential parts of the world with respect to global security and economic development. From a regional security perspective, some of the more important security issues are the illegal movements of people, narcotics trafficking, increased criminal and gang activity, transnational organized crime, as well as the confluence of Marxist insurgency movements and criminal cartels with established global terrorist organizations. Simultaneously, the region continues searching for the right balance between three competing economic systems: 1) extreme socialism led by authoritarian, populist leaders, 2) moderate socialism where democratically elected figures blend the virtues of public and private economic activity to promote trade and development, but also legislate programs designed to reduce poverty, and 3) a traditional neo-liberal, free-market form of capitalism. While the good news continues to be the number of countries with functioning democratic systems of government, the bad news is the very slow pace at which a majority of the population benefits from the increased economic activity. Complicating the diplomatic challenge is a long-standing suspicion and distrust of the United States. Countries of the region, particularly in the Caribbean and Central America, have experienced U.S. military interventions creating what continues to be a very difficult environment for U.S. foreign policy execution. U.S. policy-makers must accept the new "diplomatic competitiveness" as a more sophisticated Latin America increasingly engages with new partners such as China, India, Russia and Iran. The challenge for the current U.S. administration is to implement policies that both respect the growing economic and political independence of Latin America and protect the U.S. homeland from an alarming increase in regional transnational criminal activity.

B. Objectives

- Identify and assess United States and regional interests in the Western Hemisphere.

- Identify and analyze threats, challenges, and opportunities to United States and other nations in the Western Hemisphere.

- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1a, 1c, 1d and 1e.

C. Guidance

1. Latin America is significantly more important to the United States today than it has ever been. Increasing trade, closer cultural connections and a growing dependence on regional energy supplies combined with maturing political systems and a flair for diplomatic independence have complicated the relationship between the United States and Latin America. Understanding the complexities of this relationship has become a priority for U.S. diplomats tasked with implementing U.S. foreign policy. In Howard Wiarda and Harvey Kline's seminal text on Latin America, they present the many different facets that drive events in this complex and increasingly important region of the world. What are the key features of the geopolitical landscape? How are ideas discussed in comparative political economy affecting the region? How

can the United States overcome the challenge of historical intervention and create a constructive relationship with countries in the hemisphere?

2. The fragile relationship between the United States and Cuba continues to evolve. While the Cuban government incrementally relaxes centralized, authoritarian control over the economy and the Cuban people, it continues to resist meaningful change to entrenched political and economic systems established in the revolution over 50 years ago. The short reading by Michael Shifter discusses how the thaw in U.S.- Cuba relations is viewed from Latin America, and its future impact on U.S. foreign policy with Latin America. Has the thaw in U.S. – Cuban relations produced the desired results hoped for by President Obama's administration? To what extent should the United States demand meaningful changes and reform to Cuba's political and economic systems as well as Cuba's approach to human rights?

3. In "*Hemispheric Challenges: Latin America in an Era of Uncertainty*" Michael Shifter provides a contemporary snapshot of strategic challenges and opportunities in Latin America and the Caribbean. The recent fall in the price of oil and other commodities has slowed economic growth in much of the region and presented political leadership with the difficult task of reducing government spending without angering a new affluent and influential middle class. Shifter also suggests recent corruption scandals and failed economic policies have resulted in record low approval of the powerful economic and political elite throughout the region. Shifter argues that the potential for hemispheric cooperation is low due to the lack of a common agenda and conflicting strategic objectives. Is more cooperation and integration necessary to solve the economic and security challenges in the SOUTHCOM Area of Responsibility? What actions could the United States take to promote cooperation and integration in Latin America and the Caribbean?

4. It was the powerful forces of new world nationalism that forged the independent Latin America of today. Strong nationalistic feelings dominated the Latin American landscape until the end of the 20th century when the onset of globalization began to break down traditional barriers between states. In *Nationalism and Globalization in Latin America*, James Siekmeier describes these two competing forces and suggests there is a resurgence of nationalism in Latin America today among those who see neo-liberal globalization as an attack on their social and economic security. Can a state exist with the powerful forces of globalization and nationalism in competition with each other? How will a return to nationalism affect Latin America's dependence on globalization for economic growth and development?

5. In his essay, Matthew Taylor outlines the domestic issues challenging Brazil in 2016 and beyond, which in turn create challenges with the middle class. The impeachment of Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff has been prominent in the news, even in the United States. The involvement of former union organizer and Brazilian President Luis Inacio Lula da Silva, once a global icon and symbol of the power and potential of developing countries, is considered as well. How did the Rio Olympics affect Brazil's global reputation? What must Brazil do to regain its status as a leading regional and global power?

D. Required Readings (36 pages)

1. Wiarda, Howard and Harvey Kline. *Latin America Politics and Development,* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2011), pp. 3-16.

2. Shifter, Michael. "The US-Cuba Thaw and Hemispheric Relations," *Current History*, February 2016, pp. 75-76

3. Shifter, Michael. "Hemispheric Challenges – Latin America in an Era of Uncertainty," Horizons, CIRSD, Winter 2016, No 20, pp. 230-241.

4. Siekmeier, James. "Nationalism and Globalization in Latin America," *Current History*, February 2015, pp 68-72.

5. Taylor, Matthew. "Brazil in the Crucible of Crisis," Current History, February 2016, pp. 68-74.

SECURITY STRATEGIES-15: GREATER MIDDLE EAST

A. Focus

The Greater Middle East comprises Arabic-speaking countries from North Africa to Iraq, as well as Israel, Iran, and part of Turkey. This is a broad and diverse region, where religion, culture, politics, and changing demographics intersect and overlap. Additionally, this region is home to vast energy reserves supplying much of the world. It has also long been a region plagued by conflict and violence as forces inside and outside the Greater Middle East struggle for control and supremacy. For centuries, outside powers have helped define the region and its interests, and at times triggered instability. For a generation, this region has seen extensive U.S. military operations. In the near-term, U.S. security concerns in the region remain focused on "big questions" such as the Arab Awakening and its impacts, Syria, Iraq, Iran, terrorism, the rise of ISIS, access to oil and gas supplies, and furthering the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. This complex and vital region demands the strategist's closest attention to the interaction between conflicting policy objectives, strategy, and force requirements.

B. Objectives

- Identify and assess the United States' and regional actors' interests in the Greater Middle East.

- Identify and analyze threats, challenges, and opportunities to the United States and other nations in the Greater Middle East.

- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1a, 1c, 1d and 1e.

C. Guidance

1. Gabriel Scheinmann's article, "The Map that Ruined the Middle East," links the modern day crises and geopolitical and security dilemmas in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region to the original carving of the borders by the Sykes-Picot Agreement (1916) when the Ottoman Empire collapsed after WWI. According to Scheinmann: "While the Europeans found a better way to set their own borders, the states they carved out of the Ottoman Empire continue to burn and self-destruct." The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) specifically cites this agreement in its propaganda, and vows to undo the borders that the colonial powers created. How do the colonial map and its legacy affect U.S. policy relative to the MENA today? How do current crises like the Syrian civil war, Al Qaeda's resurgence in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen, the rise of ISIS (also abbreviated as IS or ISIL), the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the Persian Gulf countries' internal and regional issues, Iran's nuclear program and regional ambitions, and Egypt's troubled relationship with the U.S. since the "Arab Spring" revolution affect U.S. foreign policies? What is the best way to approach the region in today's geopolitical climate and configuration?

2. In Michael Weiss and Hassan Hassan's book, *ISIS: Inside the Army of Terror,* chapter 14 is entitled "Al-Dawla" (The State): The Islamic 'State' Sleeper Cells," and it provides details about the Army of Terror's rivalry with the Free Syrian Army (FSA), how ISIS rules over

civilians in territories it conquers, the ISIS strategy relative to Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, the ISIS-al Qaeda rivalry, ISIS's administrative makeup, ISIS sleeper cells, and ISIS economics. The Epilogue brings the ISIS-related developments up to date, emphasizing the importance of the role that Saddam-era former Ba'thists play in ISIS leadership, and the potential for ISIS-inspired violence in Western countries. The authors' last words in the book say, "The army of terror will be with us indefinitely." Given this reality, what is the U.S. strategy in dealing with ISIS in Syria and Iraq? What needs to be done to improve the strategy? Is there is a purely military solution to dealing with ISIS? What else needs to be accounted for in the non-military strategy against ISIS? What can the regional actors do to help contain/defeat ISIS, and what can the U.S. do to facilitate their strategy?

3. Mehdi Khalaji's article about Iran after the nuclear deal contends that the Iranian economy will become fully integrated into the global economy fifteen years following the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) – i.e., the Iran Nuclear Deal – and Iran's peaceful nuclear program will be "thoroughly legitimized." Khalaji analyzes what might possibly occur after the fifteen years, given certain internal changes within Iran, as well as the confidence building measures that the United States will need to take to ensure successful compliance with the agreement. Should the United States and Iran resume diplomatic relations? What are the strategic advantages and disadvantages of the JCPOA for the United States? What are U.S. national interests pertaining to Iran today, and vice versa, Iran's national interests pertaining to the United States? What about regional actors including the Arab states, Turkey, and Israel – how has the JCPOA affected their respective foreign policies? Why is it important for the United States to understand the regional actors' respective interests and foreign policies?

4. Andrew Korybko explains the major trends and geopolitical forecast pertaining to the MENA region for 2016 and beyond, which include increasing violence and instability; persistent conflicts in Syria, Yemen, and Iraq; crucial roles in regional geopolitics that Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Russia, and the United States will play; and the impact of declining oil prices on the economies of the Gulf Arab states. Do you agree with the author's assessment and predictions pertaining to the MENA region? What is missing from this assessment? What should U.S. strategies relative to the MENA region consider for the near-term and distant future?

D. Required Readings (57 pages)

1. Scheinmann, Gabriel. "The Map that Ruined the Middle East," *The Tower Magazine*, July 2013, Issue #4, pp. 1-9. http://www.thetower.org/article/the-map-that-ruined-the-middle-east/.

2. Weiss, Michael, and Hassan Hassan. *ISIS: Inside the Army of Terror*. New York: Regan Arts, 2015, pp. 210-235 (chapter 14); pp. 236-242 (Epilogue).

3. Khalaji, Mehdi. "Great Expectations: Iran After the Deal," *Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 38, n. 3, November 2015, pp. 61-75. https://twq.elliott.gwu.edu/sites/twq.elliott.gwu.edu/files/downloads/TWQ_Fall2015_Khalaji.pdf

4. Korybko, Andrew. “2016 Trends and Geopolitical Forecast: Mega Analysis of Europe, Eurasia and the Middle East,” *Global Research (Centre for Research on Globalization)*, Dec. 29, 2015, pp. 7-10. http://www.globalresearch.ca/2016-trends-and-geopolitical-forecast-mega-analysis-of-europe-eurasia-and-the-middle-east/5498329 - *Excerpt about the Middle East only*.

SECURITY STRATEGIES-16: GRAND STRATEGY AND STRATEGIC RESTRAINT

A. Focus

Foreign policy and defense planning decisions are guided by grand strategy. Based in international relations theory, grand strategy refers to a plan a nation uses to employ its tools of power to achieve national interests in the face of threats and challenges during peacetime and war. While the relationship among ends, ways, and means is universal, we will pay special attention to the development of American grand strategy. According to Walter Russell Mead, the changing nature of power and the global nature of American interests require the United States to use all its tools of national power to achieve its national security objectives.

The first of the strategies we will consider, strategic restraint, has deep roots in American history, linked to such luminaries as George Washington, Thomas Jefferson, John Quincy Adams and Dwight D. Eisenhower. It is also known by other names, including to "neo-isolationism," "independence," and "strategic disengagement." Advocates of strategic restraint define security threats and national interests narrowly, arguing that the United States need not play an active (let alone dominant) role in international affairs beyond those issues related to foreign trade. They hold that U.S. security is not affected by the vast majority of problems that occur beyond U.S. borders. Given the overall position of the United States today, the country is relatively safe. Indeed, restraint advocates say it is U.S. involvement that often causes anger directed against the United States, so that a less active foreign policy would actually generate fewer threats and win more goodwill abroad.

B. Objectives

- Assess the relative position of the United States in the international system and the role grand strategy plays in securing interests.

- Evaluate the utility of strategic restraint to advance and defend national interests.

- Evaluate the range of military, political and economic options available to national security professionals when developing grand strategy.

- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1a, 1b, 1c, 1d and 1e.

C. Guidance

1. Richard Haass' article "The Unraveling," takes a broad view of the many issues he sees "unraveling" in the world, and how the United States might approach those issues. He argues in favor of the "do no harm" tenets of realism, and says the United States must stay engaged. He also says that a domestically strong United States allows for an internationally strong United States which must remain an international leader. The article sets up the questions strategists must ask and the difficulties in trying to set a course on one particular grand strategy or another.

2. Barry Posen and Andrew Ross wrote one of the seminal essays on grand strategy in 1996. We are assigning the appropriate parts of this article for each of the grand strategy sessions. The rationale for this is as follows: the article allows the reader the opportunity to easily compare and contrast the various grand strategies with the consistent analytical language provided by a single article. In addition, the authors address some of the force planning implications of each grand strategy (which you will explore in greater detail in the Policy Analysis sub-course). Finally, given that the article was written two decades ago, it allows students to recognize and appreciate the enduring nature of grand strategy, notwithstanding historical context. For this session, we are assigning the introduction of the article and the section that addresses "neo-isolationism" (an analogue or synonym of strategic restraint). What are some key attributes of neo-isolationism (strategic restraint)? The authors describe this as the "least popular grand strategy option"? Assuming that you would agree with the authors' assertion, do you believe it would be considered true today? Why or why not?

3. The article "Come Home America," argues for a grand strategy of restraint. The authors reason that geography, nuclear deterrence, lack of rivals, and economic interdependence all make America extremely safe. As a result, they argue, the United States should "adopt a military policy of withdrawal", eschewing military intervention or forward basing of U.S. forces (they differ from 1930s style 'isolationists' in favoring continued, even expanded foreign trade). They think pulling back would actually reduce threats, by reducing anger at U.S. "meddling" and fear of U.S. domination. They believe that other powers would stop "free riding" and step up to do their part in securing the global commons. How do you evaluate their arguments? Do you agree that a U.S. pullback would lead others to step up? Although the article was published in 1997, do you believe that its primary arguments are still relevant for today (perhaps even more so in light of recent political trends in the United States)? Why or why not?

4. The article by David Edelstein and Ronald Krebs questions the validity of grand strategy. They question the process, saying it is dominated by only a few voices, with or without merit, and that these individuals are often not accountable for their decisions in any event. They further suggest that the very process may be a beehive of mischief for those with a vested interest in identifying certain preferred threats, in effect creating insecurities through self-fulfilling prophecies. Those opposed to the created strategy will claim an absence of strategy, or that it is doomed to fail and potentially even create conditions making that failure more likely. Strategizing, they argue, is a "no win" exercise. Ultimately, Edelstein and Krebs argue that the United States would be better off without the illusion of creating and adhering to grand strategy. Do you agree?

5. David Shlapak argues that America needs a strategy "shaped by the country's legitimate security challenges – not internal Pentagon politics." His argument begins with the premise that strategy is shaped to basically "feed the beast" that the Pentagon has become. He goes on to suggest that American exceptionalism is a hollow doctrine and our self-proclaimed global leadership has brought benefits neither to the world nor the United States. He argues in favor of a more modest strategy, to support more modest goals and, realistically, a more modest country. Will the American public support being "modest"? Will the military?

D. Required Readings (56 pages)

1. Haass, Richard. "The Unraveling" *Foreign Affairs*, Nov/Dec 2014, pp. 70-79.

2. Posen, Barry, and Andrew Ross, "Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy", *International Security*, Winter 1996/1997, pp. 3-14.

3. Gholz, Eugene, Daryl G. Press and Harvey M. Sapolsky, "Come Home, America: The Strategy of Restraint in the Face of Temptation," *International Security*, Spring 1997 (Vol. 2, No. 4) pp. 5-17.

4. Edelstein, David, and Ronald Krebs, "Delusions of Grand Strategy: The Problem with Washington's Planning Obsession," *Foreign Affairs*, Nov/Dec 2015, pp. 109-116.

5. Shlapak, David A. "Towards a More Modest American Strategy," *Survival*, April-May 2015, pp. 59-78.

STRATEGIES-17: BALANCE OF POWER REALISM

A. Focus

This session will examine the realist-based grand strategies of offshore balancing and selective engagement. Both strategies are driven by realist logic but arrive at different answers to the question of optimum U.S. political involvement and military intervention in key areas of the world. The central difference is how – and from where – the United States employs its military power. Offshore balancers arrive from the sea and would avoid prolonged basing of U.S. troops abroad. They see a benefit in not being dependent on allies to defend the American national interest abroad. Selective engagers would advocate the use of forward bases to project military power. Consequently, selective engagement strategy would rely on the two primary pillars of the American security architecture since the end of World War II: NATO and the U.S.-Japan Alliance, and the U.S. bases associated with those alliances. Both strategies are "selective" in that neither sees every world region as a "vital" national interest.

B. Objectives

- Identify, analyze and evaluate the components of offshore balancing and selective engagement to include its underlying assumptions, key concepts, objectives, risks, and force requirements.

- Evaluate the utility of offshore balancing and selective engagement in advancing and defending U.S. national interests.

- Assess the role of alliances in developing a successful security strategy.

- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1a, 1b, 1c, 1d, and 1e.

C. Guidance

1. Barry Posen and Andrew Ross continue their discussion of grand strategies by noting that selective engagement emerges from the realist tradition and focuses on the balance and concentration of power. This strategy stands solidly between "restraint" and "primacy" but the question that must be answered is how 'selective' is selective engagement? They argue that national security decision makers must be driven by their interpretation of vital American national interests and not be driven by "idealism or commitment to principle." Is it possible for the United States to have a grand strategy which does not take idealism and principle into account?

2. Robert Art believes that America's unipolar moment is finished: "It began with the breakup of the Soviet Union in December 1991 and ended with the collapse of Lehman Brothers on September 15, 2008." Fiscal pressures—exacerbated by the 2008-2009 financial crises—have eroded America's global position, although for the next decade or two, the United States will likely enjoy unparalleled military dominance. He argues that to protect American national interests, the United States should follow an internationally-activist grand strategy emphasizing a

forward defense posture, facilitated by key allies and overseas bases, with a particular focus on three key regions: East Asia, Middle East and Europe. How did he "select" these three regions as vital? Is this "activist" grand strategy in tune with the national mood of the American people? How do the required military capabilities for this strategy differ from those of primacy or isolationism?

3. In recent years, advocates of selective engagement have split on the question of the source and style of forward American military deployments. Mearsheimer and Walt in a recent article in *Foreign Affairs* make the case for "offshore balancing." This realist strategy eschews the need for forward bases and diminishes the importance of alliances while continuing to support the need to project American military power. How do advocates of offshore balancing make the case that theirs is the most effective strategy against global terrorism? How do the required military capabilities of offshore balancing differ from those of classic selective engagement?

4. This classic article by Stephen Walt dissects the meaning and importance of alliances. Since selective engagement strategies are dependent on alliances it is necessary to study the importance of this tool of foreign policy. What are the factors which enable alliances to persist or to fail? Can all grand strategies – even those based on personalities and ideology – employ alliances as a tool of national power? Does this article suggest that NATO and our Pacific bilateral alliances have promising futures?

D. Required Readings (48 pages)

1. Posen, Barry, and Andrew Ross. "Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy", *International Security*, Winter 1996/1997, pp. 15-21.

2. Art, Robert J. "Selective Engagement in the Era of Austerity," in Richard Fontaine and Kristin M. Lord (eds), *America's Path: Grand Strategy for the Next Administration* (Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security), May 2012, pp. 15-27.

3. Mearsheimer, John J. and Walt, Stephen M. "The Case for Offshore Balancing", *Foreign Affairs,* Volume 95, number 3, July-August 2016, pp. 70-83. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2016-06-13/case-offshore-balancing.

4. Walt, Stephen M. "Why Alliances Endure or Collapse," in *Strategy and Force Planning,* Naval War College Press, 4th Edition, 1997, pp. 325-343.

SECURITY STRATEGIES-18: LIBERAL INTERNATIONALISM

A. Focus

Liberal internationalism draws on the "liberal paradigm" in international relations theory. The strategy accepts the idea that world politics does not have to consist of zero-sum conflict; instead, economic trade, collective security, and transnational problem-solving offer win-win outcomes, and international institutions – including rules, norms, and organizations – facilitate the cooperation needed to achieve those gains. Liberals also generally agree that the nature of regimes matters; democracies are expected to be more peaceful and more open to trade and cooperation than are authoritarian governments. Supporters of liberal internationalism argue that the United States should adopt a strategy of multilateral cooperation, particularly through institutions like the United Nations, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, or the World Trade Organization. Important priorities would include: free trade, promoting human rights and democracy, security cooperation, and working on transnational problems like proliferation, terrorism, and climate change. Are there unique military missions that this grand strategy would require? How viable is this strategy in the current global environment?

B. Objectives

- Identify, analyze and evaluate the components of liberal internationalism to include its underlying assumptions, key concepts, objectives, risks, and force requirements.

- Evaluate the utility of liberal internationalism to advance and defend national interests.

- Comprehend the "democratic peace" theory and counterarguments, and evaluate the place of democracy promotion in U.S. grand strategy

- Support CJCS Learning Areas 1a, 1b, 1c, 1d, 1e, and 2c.

C. Guidance

1. Continuing with the examination of grand strategies by Barry Posen and Andrew Ross, the section on "cooperative security" (another term for liberal internationalism) argues that "a cooperative security strategy depends on international organizations to coordinate collective action." Cooperative security clearly belongs in the liberal tradition in international relations. It places a "premium on international cooperation to deter and thwart aggression." Do you believe that cooperative security (a.k.a. liberal internationalism) is a "realistic" grand strategy? Why or why not?

2. John Ikenberry offers a blueprint for a grand strategy of liberal internationalism in a world where American preeminence is waning. His piece is a response to those who fear that declining U.S. power portends a similar weakening of the liberal world order that the United States reinforced in the post-World War II period and has maintained since. He argues instead that, though U.S. power may increasingly be challenged, the liberal world order will not be; rising powers such as China do not want to contest this order according to Ikenberry but simply seek "to gain more authority and leadership within it." Do you find this description of the liberal order as operating to

most actors' benefit convincing? Why or why not? How should the United States proceed to best maintain this order?

3. "Democratic peace theory" is a key tenet of liberalism, holding that democracies are inherently more peaceful among themselves. Those interested in reducing the amount of conflict in the international system would, according to this argument, be wise to include democracy promotion in any grand strategy. Bruce Russett first lays out the empirical evidence for a "democratic peace" and then provides an argument as to what drives that outcome. Russett then moves on to potential explanations for the democratic peace. What do the cultural/normative model and the structural/institutional model he outlines each argue is driving this phenomenon? How convincing do you find each and why? What do you think the implications should be for U.S. policy?

4. Michael Boyle challenges the vitality of liberal values across the globe, including in the United States, in the face of populism, nationalism and growing authoritarianism. He bluntly states that the very foundations of the international order largely built by the United States are under attack. Boyle lays out what he considers the rationales for the attack, and cites evidence of how the rationales are being played out in Ukraine, Syria, and by China as a rising power. He concludes that if the United States wants to preserve the liberal order it painstakingly created and supported, that will require some domestic changes in attitude and policy. Do you find his thesis convincing? More importantly, preservation of the liberal international order has been considered vital to U.S. national interests. Is it still?

D. Required Reading (90 pages)

1. Posen, Barry, and Andrew Ross, "Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy", *International Security*, Winter 1996/1997, pp. 21-30.

2. Ikenberry, John. "The Future of the Liberal World Order: Internationalism After America," *Foreign Affairs*, May/June 2011, pp. 56-68.

3. Russett, Bruce. "The Fact of the Democratic Peace" and "Why Democratic Peace," in *Grasping the Democratic Peace* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), pp. 3-41.

4. Boyle, Michael. "The Coming Illiberal Order," *Survival*, April-May 2016, pp. 35-66.

SECURITY STRATEGIES-19: PRIMACY

A. Focus

When the Soviet Union collapsed on Christmas Day in 1991, the United States found itself relatively more powerful than any other international actor. Since then, U.S. power has continued to exceed that of its rivals. For those that advocate primacy as a grand strategy, that state of affairs should be actively maintained: the United States should not only dominate international politics, but international politics should be "Americanized" – characterized by market-oriented democracies. American primacists seek a preponderance of power to not only dissuade new competitors from emerging, but also to promote American values such as democracy, human rights and a global free market. Are there unique military missions this strategy would require, or at least that it would emphasize more than other strategies? What sorts of capabilities would be relatively more in demand for this strategy, and what capabilities less necessary?

B. Objectives

- Identify, analyze and evaluate the components of primacy to include its underlying assumptions, key concepts, objectives, risks, and force requirements.

- Evaluate the utility of primacy to advance and defend national interests.

- Support CJCS Learning Areas 1a, 1b, 1c, 1d, 1e, and 2c.

C. Guidance

1. Our final look at the article by Barry Posen and Andrew Ross provides us with a description of the grand strategy of primacy. In their analysis, Posen and Ross assert that primacy means maintaining a position of clear superiority over any other great power, discouraging even friendly nations from becoming peers, and accepting the burdens of global leadership. As Posen and Ross explain, primacy advocates believe such a unipolar world would be more stable and more secure than relying on uncertain balance of power configurations or unreliable institutions. Posen and Ross then detail some policy priorities and military capability implications. Did America follow a primacy strategy in the 1990s when this article was published? After 9/11? Should it have done so?

2. In the assigned portion of this 1999 article, William Wohlforth makes a theoretical case for unipolarity. Drawing on IR theory, he argues that a world dominated by a single great power can be very peaceful and very stable –preferable to a multipolar system. Moreover, he argues that so long as the hegemon is somewhat prudent and non-aggressive, other countries will tolerate unipolarity because attempting to break out would lead to even less security. How do you assess Wohlforth's claims about the benefits of hegemony? How might theorists in China, Russia, or Europe disagree? (Note: the first section of the article is not required; it is a 1999 take on the global distribution of power, superseded by Reading #19-4, Brooks and Wohlforth 2016).

3. In 2004, Charles Krauthammer made a case for U.S. primacy that emphasized "American exceptionalism" – what he and others see as unique international role for the United States based on

American values and the American political system. Krauthammer argues that to make the nation secure, American policy should seek to spread our democratic form of government and American culture and values. He argues that U.S. hegemony will be tolerated because of the benign, liberating nature of American policy. Do you agree with Krauthammer that for security, America needs a world that looks and thinks like America? How do you assess the "American exceptionalism" claim? Where do Wolhlforth and Krauthammer disagree about the logic of primacy and recommended U.S. policies? Are Krauthammer's arguments still relevant in 2016?

4. Many observers suggest that primacy is no longer a strategy open to the United States, given that China will soon overtake the United States as the world's largest economy. As you recall, the debate on American decline was featured in Security Strategies session #1. Stephen Brooks and William Wolhforth argue that in 2016, the world is still unipolar – specifically, they say, gross GDP comparisons are misleading and by meaningful measures the United States remains far ahead of China or any other competitor. The United States can and should maintain its global leadership, they recommend, despite the current domestic mood that appears to favor pulling back. Do you agree with their assessment of the global distribution of power? In addition, do you agree with their predictions about the reaction of the world to U.S. leadership or lack of it?

D. Required Readings (55 pages)

1. Posen, Barry and Andrew Ross. "Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy", *International Security*, Winter 1996/1997, pp. 30-41.

2. Wohlforth, William. "The Stability of a Unipolar World", *International Security*, vol. 24, no. 1 (1999), read pp. 23-41 (skip 5-22).

3. Krauthammer, Charles. "Democratic Realism: An American Foreign Policy for a Unipolar World", American Enterprise Institute, February 2004, pp. 1-13.

4. Brooks, Stephen G., and William C. Wolhforth, "The Once and Future Superpower" *Foreign Affairs*, May/June 2016, pp. 91-104.

SECURITY STRATEGIES-20: PAPER PEER REVIEW

A. Focus

One of the skill sets this course seeks to develop is effective written communication. Writing well requires practice. Even the best writers – especially the best writers – repeatedly revise their work to ensure that their ideas are clearly and powerfully conveyed. *How* you communicate your ideas is just as important as the ideas themselves, since a good idea that is poorly expressed can be easily overlooked or dismissed. Honest, critical, constructive feedback from others is a critical part of this process. A handout of these questions is included in your readings to print and use in preparing your comments for your peers.

B. Objectives

- Provide and receive critical feedback to two of your fellow students.

- Receive critical feedback from two of your fellow students.

C. Guidance

1. During this session, each student will be required to provide critical assessments on two colleagues' papers, noting the strengths and weaknesses of each. Using the questions below, assess your colleagues' papers. Be critical and thorough, but also be fair and constructive in your comments, as you would want your paper reviewed. As you read the papers, try to answer the following questions:

a. Does the paper have a clear Introduction that includes a discussion of the importance/relevance of the paper, a thesis and roadmap for supporting the thesis?

b. Is the thesis clearly stated? Is it consistent throughout the entire paper? (Is there alignment between the premise the author says will be examined, and what is actually done?)

c. Does the author convince you of the importance/significance/relevance of the paper? Why or why not?

d. What are the paper's chief arguments? Are they persuasive? Why or why not?

e. Does the paper present analysis rather than just descriptive information (as a research paper would)?

f. Are the issues' important dimensions fully explored? Others you would include?

g. Does the paper address counterarguments (not necessarily a 'counterargument' section, but a consideration of weaknesses, objections, or alternatives)? Is the response to the counterargument convincing?

h. Are the parts of the paper logically consistent with each other – for example, if there are recommendations, do they actually address the problems identified?

i. Does the paper make effective use of the space available? Are there sections that are too long or not needed? Is there any repetition or excessive wordiness?

j. Is the paper well-organized? Does it have a logical structure? Is that structure clear to the reader (e.g., use of the 'roadmap', good transitions, etc.)

k. Does the paper make good use of credible evidence to support its arguments? Are there claims that need more evidence? Complete and proper citations?

l. Are quotes well used to support points made, but not overused?

m. Does the conclusion go beyond a restatement or summary of the paper?

n. Is the paper written with proper grammar, word usage, sentence/paragraph structure? How could the writing style be improved? Does it need further editing, and then proofreading?

D. Required Readings (12 pages)

1. Security Strategies Paper Instructions, Annex A.
2. Comment Handout

E. Supplemental Readings

1. NWC Pocket Writing and Style Guide.

SECURITY STRATEGIES-21: NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

A. Focus

The National Security Strategy (NSS) serves as the approximate grand strategy document for the United States. The NSS defines U.S. security interests, objectives, and goals, and provides guidance to those agencies, such as the Department of Defense, that are charged with executing that strategy. Additionally, the document provides the executive branch with a key tool to justify its requested resources to Congress, while providing a strategic vision to help inform both domestic and international audiences. This session will identify the most important aspects of the NSS and assess its strengths and weaknesses as a strategic guidance document for all instruments of power.

B. Objectives

- Identify and analyze the major elements of the NSS and contending viewpoints.
- Assess the future impact of geopolitics on forthcoming National Security Strategies.
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1a, 1b, and 1d.

C. Guidance

1. In the discussion of the mechanics of putting together the nation's compendium of security strategies, the Congressional Research Service's "National Security Strategy: Mandates, Execution to Date, and Issues for Congress" provides the formal logic behind the NSS. Unfortunately, it also documents the decreasing frequency with which they are published. How frequently do you think an administration should publish an NSS? Why?

2. By the time this session is held we will know who the next President will be, and we might have some idea of what she/he thinks about foreign policy and national security. However, we will not have a new National Security Strategy. In thinking about what a new NSS might address, Bruce Jentleson has categorized for us three broad approaches to developing a national security strategy. What are these three approaches? What are the hallmarks of each? Which approach do you think the new President will adopt, or will she/he follow a different path?

3. The Obama administration has only published two National Security Strategies. The first was drafted in the midst of ongoing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, along with a global economic crisis. Although that NSS was far reaching in both scope and direction, some observers remarked that the key difference from its Bush-era predecessors was tone. In his foreword letter to the document, for example, President Obama wrote that the United States' "strength and influence abroad begins with the steps we take at home" and commits to renewing the economy that is "the wellspring of American power." The strategy recognized the need to "face the world as it is" and acknowledged that the United States cannot solve many of the challenges that exist in the contemporary security environment alone. After some delay, the Obama administration

finally released its second NSS at the end of February 2015. Does this second NSS adequately define the national security goals of the United States (i.e., the "ends")? How well does this NSS describe the linkage between "ends, ways, and means"? Does the NSS provide adequate direction for the Department of Defense to address strategic challenges now and in the future?

4. In his essay, Peter Feaver offers a critique of the Obama Administration's second NSS based on his extensive experience in developing NSS documents for Presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush. In his opening sentence, Feaver asserts that many of the assumptions underlying the Obama administration's first NSS have been challenged or debunked by the actual course of world events. Later, however, he also lists other aspects or issues that President Obama's second NSS "gets right." He asserts that the second Obama administration NSS features "less campaign hubris" and calls for a "bipartisan center." Do you think that a President's strategic approach should be static or should evolve over time? What are your thoughts on the prioritization of national security interests? Having read the NSS yourself, do you agree with Feaver's assertions?

D. Required Reading (64 pages)

1. Dale, Catherine. "National Security Strategy: Mandates, Execution to Date, and Issues for Congress," *Congressional Research Service,* August 6, 2013, pp. 1-6, 17-18.

2. Jentleson, Bruce W. "Strategic Recalibration: Framework for a 21st-Century National Security Strategy," *The Washington Quarterly,* Spring 2014, Vol. 37 No. 1, pp. 115–136.

3. Obama, Barack H. *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*. (Washington, DC: The White House, 2015), cover letter and pp. 1-29.

4. Feaver, Peter D. "Grading Obama's National Security Strategy 2.0," *Foreign Policy* (6 February 2015), pp. 1-7.

SECURITY STRATEGIES-22: NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY

A. Focus

On each even-numbered year, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs is required to determine "whether to prepare a new National Military Strategy" or update a preexisting one (per 10 U.S. Code §153). The National Military Strategy (NMS) is required to describe the ways and means through which the United States military will achieve the objectives of the National Security Strategy (NSS), the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) (or its successor document), and "any other national security or defense strategic guidance issued by the President or the Secretary of Defense." In essence, the NMS is one of the core documents that provides a common thread that integrates and synchronizes the activities and planning of the Joint Staff, Combatant Commands, Services and combat support agencies. In addition, the NMS details the Joint Staff's response to important shifts in the future security environment and national strategy by considering and developing "operating concepts" to support force planning, which is covered in the Policy Analysis sub-course. In this session, we will evaluate the NMS and how effectively the document supports the NSS, provides clear direction to strategic planners, and considers alternatives to the selected missions, capabilities, and attributes for the future Joint Force.

B. Objectives

- Analyze the major elements of contemporary U.S. defense strategic documents.
- Critically assess the National Military Strategy.
- Comprehend the importance and role of operating concepts.
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1a, 1b, 1c, 1d, 1e, 2e, and 3e.

C. Guidance

1. Peter Feaver provides necessary context for this session by describing the purpose and hierarchy of top-level national strategic documents (NSS, NDS, QDR) and where the 2015 NMS 'fits' within this process. He acknowledges that, in practice, these documents are not always published in accordance with this logical flow-chart for a number of reasons. Additionally, the budget is often produced independently from the strategy and Feaver offers a useful discussion of the associated challenges with this approach using the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance (DSG) and 2014 QDR as examples. Feaver also offers an analysis of the 2015 NMS: he praises Dempsey for his candor in assessing the security environment, while offering some criticisms of the document's responses. Do you agree with Feaver's analysis of the document? What do you think about the United States' hierarchical approach to strategy development? How big of a role should the budget play in strategy development?

2. In March of 2014, the secretary of defense released the Congressionally-required QDR. Building upon the DSG published in 2012, it outlined the future security environment and the defense strategy for the future, informed by resource constraints. The document also contained the Chairman's assessment of the QDR, including what he saw as the risks to the defense

strategy and ways the Department should prepare for the future. Did the QDR outline the threats and opportunities accurately? Did it miss something? Is it resource-informed or resource-driven? Is the strategy realistic based on available resources, or is there an "Ends-Means mismatch"? Do you agree with the Chairman's overall assessment? What about risk?

3. General Martin Dempsey argues that today's global security environment "is the most unpredictable I have seen in over 40 years of service." The NMS outlines the strategic direction for the Armed Forces of the United States and describes how the Joint Force will be employed to protect and advance U.S. national interests against state and non-state threats. Its national military objectives follow directly from the NSS and the NDS, while the strategy's 12 "Joint Force Prioritized Missions" provides a clear planning focus. Does the 2015 NMS provide sufficient guidance to the Joint Force? Can you link strategic direction from the NSS through the NDS to the NMS? Do the themes expressed in the NMS support the NDS and NSS?

4. A useful step in translating strategy into future forces is the development of operating concepts. In terms of strategy development, this means devising broad 'Ways' of employing military power to meet challenges and identifying general capabilities that might be needed to achieve the strategy's 'Ends.' Additionally, Evan Montgomery argues that operating concepts "directly influence military effectiveness," are catalysts for change and a "key component of a nation's overall military power." Do you agree? How important are operating concepts to a successful strategy?

5. The 2015 NMS references the 2012 Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (CCJO) and the concept of Globally Integrated Operations. The CCJO is a "high order vision" of how the future Joint Force will fight and is intended to advance new concepts and force attributes in the 2020 timeframe. Given the uncertainty of the global security environment, Globally Integrated Operations require the Joint Force to "quickly combine capabilities with itself and mission partners across domains, echelons, geographic boundaries, and organizational affiliations." Do you find the operational concept of "globally integrated operations" helpful? What do you think about the document's implications for Joint Force 2020? How do the desired force attributes differ from today's force, and would you recommend any changes?

D. Required Readings (53 pages)

1. Feaver, Peter. "How to Read the New National Military Strategy," *Foreign Policy.com*, 6 July 2015, pp. 1-5.

2. Hagel, Chuck. *Quadrennial Defense Review 2014*, US Department of Defense, 4 March 2014, pp. 1-25, 59-64.

3. Dempsey, Martin. *The National Military Strategy of the United States of America*, June 2015, pp. 1-24.

4. Montgomery, Evan. "Defense Planning for the Long Haul: Scenarios, Operating Concepts, and the Future Security Environment," *Center for Strategic and Budgetary Analysis*, 2009, pp. 15-18.

5. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. “Capstone Concept for Joint Operations,” U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, September 2012, pp. 1-16.

SECURITY STRATEGIES-23: MARITIME STRATEGY

A. Focus

Strategies are roadmaps guiding practitioners – operators as well as force planners – to achieve certain ends set forth by senior leadership. The United States has been the world's foremost seapower for several generations largely because its naval forces were built and adapted to meet national security requirements. In March 2015, U.S. sea service chiefs published a revised strategy entitled *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century: Forward, Engaged, Ready*. This session will enable you to witness the evolution of strategy as it responds to both changing national goals as well as revised threats and challenges. Further, you will be able to not only comprehend the substance of the new strategy, but also evaluate its relevance and application to the international security environment.

B. Objectives

- Understand the main tenets of the new U.S. Maritime Strategy, *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century: Forward, Engaged, Ready*.

- Critically analyze the strategic drivers and attendant operational concepts for this maritime strategy.

- Appreciate how changes in the security environment and national strategic guidance in different geographical theaters require changes in maritime strategy.

- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1a, 1b, 1c, 1d, 2a, 2b, 2c, 2f, 3e and 4a.

C. Guidance

1. The primary reading for this session is the 2015 Maritime Strategy. The former version of "A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower" was issued during a time in which the United States and its allies were engaged in two ground wars in Asia and the sea services played a secondary role (2007). The strategic discussion driven by the rise of more technologically sophisticated navies resulted in what became the Air-Sea Battle Concept (now the Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver in the Global Commons or JAM-GC). Together, they blend to become the basis for the new strategy. A scan of the topic areas as well as operational concepts of the new strategy should illustrate this point. In 2015, the international security environment had changed dramatically: we had largely withdrawn from Afghanistan and Iraq and the national defense focus had shifted to the Indo-Asia-Pacific (China) and Russia had just committed aggression in Eastern Europe as well as projected military power into the Middle East (Syria).

2. The *National Interest* article, "The New U.S. Maritime Strategy: A Navy Perspective" by William McQuilkin, Bruce Stubbs and Frank Michael, is a defense of the strategy written by its Navy Staff authors. It provides both background and logic for the choices they made. This new strategy was given the same name as its predecessor along with "Forward, Engaged, Ready". Why were these three words appropriate in the current security environment and not back in 2007? What are the operational concepts introduced in this document? Do they match the

security environment into which they are placed? Is there a regional prioritization in this strategy?

3. Admiral John Richardson assumed the position of CNO shortly after the Maritime Strategy was published and his subsequent imprint on the strategic debate was the short pamphlet entitled "A Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority." Although much of it addresses the development of high velocity learning and the Navy's core attributes, he lays out the security environment in which he expects the Navy to operate. He gives emphasis to high-end warfighting and accuses both Russia and China of "engaging in coercion." How do post-strategy publications like this enhance or detract from the strategic debate? Does this "Design" enable the Navy Staff to make better acquisition decisions?

4. The answer to the "how" question posed by strategies falls on the operation (or strategic) concepts found within the strategy. These concepts should be tailored to the presumed threat and should drive force planners to make budgetary decisions to support the strategy. "Distributed lethality" is a new operational concept which springs from the current strategy. Megan Eckstein explores the progress made by the Navy in the implementation of this concept and documents a number of weapons systems the Navy intends to utilize. What other operational concepts are fundamental to this strategy?

D. Required Readings (48 pages)

1. Dunford, Joseph, Jonathan Greenert and Paul Zukunft. "*A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower: Forward, Engaged, Ready,"* U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington D.C., March 2015, pp. 1-26.

2. McQuilkin, William, Bruce Stubbs and Frank Michael. "The New U.S. Maritime Strategy: A Navy Perspective," *The National Interest,* April 21, 2015, pp. 1-12.

3. Richardson, John M. "A Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority," Washington D.C., January 2016. pp. 1-9.

4. Eckstein, Megan. "A Year into Distributed Lethality, Navy Nears Fielding Improved Weapons, Deploying Surface Action Group," *U.S. Naval Institute Blog,* January 13, 2016.

SECURITY STRATEGIES-24: FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND WARFARE

A. Focus

The previous 23 sessions analyzed the international security environment and assessed the utility of various grand strategies to advance and defend national interests. This final session examines questions regarding the future of international security, conflict, and war and the position of the United States in the international system along with the challenges for defense planning that will accompany these circumstances.

B. Objectives

- Assess alternative views of the future of international security and analyze their strategic assumptions.
- Analyze the relevance of these views to the development of strategy.
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1a, 1b, 1c, 2f and 3e.

C. Guidance

1. In *Contexts of Future Conflict and War,* Jeffrey Becker suggests it is imperative for military officers to not only understand causes for and consequences of contemporary security trends but to also anticipate the new and different threats created at the intersection of security trend lines. For Becker, it is understanding and appreciating the context in which conflict, violence and war occur that is critical to developing future military strategies, operational concepts and supporting force structures. Becker offers five contexts for future conflict and war as examples of what the U.S. military ought to consider when developing future strategies, doctrines, capabilities and force capacities. Do you agree with the "context" approach to thinking about the future security environment? Would a security system designed to respond to specific threats rather than broad "contexts" provide more useful outcomes?

2. While security experts admit not knowing where or when the next major conflict will occur, they do – with great confidence – predict that the next conflict will rely heavily on advanced weapon and information systems such as artificial intelligence (AI) and robotics as well as biotic and nano-technologies. Technology is evolving at such a rapid pace that some believe the role of humans in conflict and war will decline to the point where outcomes are determined by competing platforms controlled through AI and advanced robotics. In *Will Humans Matter in the Wars of 2030,* Andrew Herr examines these phenomena to determine if this vision of the future is accurate or whether humans will continue to act as moral and ethical decision-makers in complex conflict environments requiring close cooperation at the computer-human interface. What specific characteristics do humans bring to the decision-making process in warfare dominated by advanced technologies? How might removing humans from decision-making processes in conflict create the likelihood of a more effective outcome?

3. Is warfare changing in the decades ahead? Today, strategists thinking about the future of war are planning for several possible futures to include major theater war, hybrid war, war on terrorism, and asymmetric war. In The *Future of Violence,* Wittes and Blum suggests what constitutes the various dimensions of future warfare are changing quickly and dramatically. New elements of war and violence include biotechnology, genetic engineering, robotics, nanotechnology, global cyber-networks, mass empowerment and ways of integrating new not yet imagined technologies. Is the Department of Defense as structured prepared to mitigate or defeat if necessary these new weapon systems of the future? Should resources be applied to defeating the technology behind these new threats or applied toward defeating the individuals controlling the new threats?

4. While there is some dispute surrounding the cause and rapidity of climate change, most agree the earth's climate is changing in a way that could dramatically alter numerous global eco-systems over the next 100 years resulting in significant change to the daily lives of millions of people. In *Confronting Climate Change and Reframing Security,* Dumaine and Mintzer suggest "climate change is 'everything change'" – a phrase to remind us that the earth's climate impacts every aspect of our lives to include the way we think about personal and national security issues. The article also suggests our response as individuals and nations should be to "reframe" the way we think about climate change as our contemporary view does not fully consider its impact on existing policies and security strategies. In what ways might climate change alter your view of the future security environment? How might climate change impact future national security and military strategies and supporting force structures? What - if anything - should the U.S. military do today to prepare for an uncertain future complicated by the negative as well as positive effects of climate change?

D. Required Readings (44 pages)

1. Becker, Jeffrey. "Contexts of Future Conflict and War," *Joint Forces Quarterly*, JFQ 74, 3rd Quarter, 2014, pp. 15-21.

2. Herr, Andrew. "Will Humans Matter in the Wars of 2030?" *Joint Forces Quarterly* 77, 2nd Quarter 2015, pp. 76-83.

3. Wittes, Benjamin, and Gabriella Blum. "The Distribution of Offensive Capability," *The Future of Violence: Robots and Germs, Hackers and Drones. Confronting A New Age of Threats,* (New York: Basic Books, 2015), pp. 17-37.

4. Dumaine, Carol, and Irving Mintzer. "Confronting Climate Change and Reframing Security," *SAIS Review*, vol 35, no 1, Winter-Spring 2015, pp. 5-16.

NSDM POLICY ANALYSIS
STUDY GUIDE, AY 2016-2017

1. Scope

The Policy Analysis sub-course is designed to increase your understanding of the U.S. national security policymaking system and the political, organizational, and bureaucratic phenomena that influence it. Within the overarching "Levels of Analysis" course framework, the Policy Analysis sub-course concentrates on the actors, organizations, and processes that develop national security policy at the level of the nation-state (in this case the United States, primarily), as well as the complex influences on national-level policymaking that emanate from the international political system and the broader domestic political system. The Policy Analysis sub-course draws its theoretical basis from the discipline of foreign policy analysis (FPA), which focuses on theories of national-level decision-making that are *applied to a specific country*, as opposed to the closely related field of international relations (IR) theory (covered by the Security Strategies sub-course), which focuses on the systemic level of the international system.

Beginning in the first session we will introduce and begin to apply five analytic perspectives that synthesize major insights drawn from the FPA discipline. Taken together, these five major FPA perspectives offer a range of conceptual approaches to understanding and analyzing national decision making processes and outcomes. The original perspective, the *Rational Actor Model*, has been supplemented by four additional explanations for understanding decisions: *Bureaucratic Politics*; *Organizational Processes*; *Palace Politics*; and, *Cognitive*. Each of these analytic perspectives provides distinctive conceptual insights into how and why national security decisions are made. These are incorporated into a broader "Policy Analysis Framework" which will be used throughout the sub-course as a tool to analyze U.S. national security decision making. This sub-course framework is designed to assist you in considering and assessing the myriad of interrelated factors that influence U.S. policymaking on any complex national security issue. Case studies based on real-world issues are used throughout the sub-course as a vehicle for applying the Policy Analysis Framework, and the Policy Analysis Examination will comprise just such an exercise in case study analysis.

The first part of the sub-course examines the complex global and domestic influences on national policymaking. We will also examine the various types of international actors, norms, and processes that can exert influence on the United States. We will then turn our focus on key actors, organizations, and processes within the U.S. Executive Branch's national security policymaking system, as well as the broader domestic political system—defined by both the other branches of government as well as key non-governmental actors--in which it operates. Throughout these sessions, we will consider each of the FPA perspectives in greater depth. This first part of the sub-course will conclude with a "contemporary policy analysis" case study, which provides an opportunity to apply comprehensively the Policy Analysis Framework – synthesizing and applying your understanding of the FPA analytic perspectives, the national security system, and international and domestic influences on policymaking – to a complex current policy issue. This in-class exercise is designed to help you to prepare for the Policy Analysis Examination in the subsequent session, which will require applying sub-course

concepts to analyze a case that will be similar in content and complexity to the contemporary policy analysis case.

The second part of the sub-course applies many of the proceeding sub-course concepts to examining the theory and practice of force planning. This force planning section complements parallel material in the other sub-courses and will help you to prepare for key elements of the NSDM Final Exercise (FX) in which you will need to bring together the "Levels of Analysis" including with a future force structure linked to national strategies and associated operating concepts. The FX is also an opportunity to apply your understanding of the various actors and influences in the policy making process, including a realistic understanding of political and organizational constraints, while applying your own insights into group decision making during the development of your seminar's FX process and products.

2. Sub-course Objectives

The objective of the Policy Analysis sub-course is to enhance your future professional competence as participants in the national security environment by increasing your understanding of:

- The international and domestic context of the decision making process and the organizational, political, and bureaucratic influences on U.S. national security decisions, and;

- The processes through which significant U.S. national security policy decisions are made.

3. Sub-course Requirements

You are expected prior to each class session to complete all required readings and carefully prepare your own case study analysis when case studies are assigned. At the end of the first part of the sub-course, a Policy Analysis Examination will require graduate-level analysis of a national security case study in which, drawing on the Policy Analysis Framework as appropriate, you will demonstrate your mastery of sub-course content and concepts to date.

4. Sub-course Materials

As with all NSDM course materials, Policy Analysis readings will be posted on Blackboard for student use. Students may access the session materials directly from Blackboard or download the materials to an electronic reader device. However, the following materials are not available in digital form and will be provided via hardcopy:

- *The National Security Enterprise: Navigating the Labyrinth*. Eds. Roger Z. George and Harvey Rishikof (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2011)

- *Mission Creep: The Militarization of U.S. Foreign Policy?* Eds. Gordon Adams and Shoon Murray (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2014)

POLICY ANALYSIS-1: INTRODUCTION TO POLICY ANALYSIS

A. Focus

The Policy Analysis sub-course is designed to increase your understanding of the international and domestic contexts, the Executive Branch actors and processes, and the political, organizational, and bureaucratic phenomena that influence national security decision making at the national and organizational level. Knowledge of these phenomena will increase your ability to continue to develop as an effective national security professional participant with increased responsibilities within the national security enterprise. This session is designed to provide a general outline of the sub-course structure and to introduce the Policy Analysis Framework that will be used as a tool for case study analysis, as well as to discuss the merits and uses of policy analysis by the national security professional.

B. Objectives

- Analyze the general parameters of the national/organizational level of analysis for national security decision-making.
- Examine the role of policy analysis in national security affairs.
- Examine the role of the national security professional in advising senior decision-makers.
- Introduce the Policy Analysis Framework that will be used as a tool for case study analysis.
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1a, 1c, 2c, and 3a.

C. Guidance

1. On June 28, 2013, the then-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Martin Dempsey, released a memorandum outlining the "Desired Leader Attributes for Joint Force 2020." In it, he noted that senior leaders need to understand the environment in which the United States utilizes all instruments of national power as well as the necessity to cope with surprise and uncertainty. On March 29, 2016, the current Chairman, General Joseph Dunford, observed that military officers and other national security professionals "need … to continue to think about how to most effectively use the military instrument and national power to address today's challenges." How does the structure and content of the Policy Analysis sub-course fit within the overall parameters of the National Security Decision Making (NSDM) course and work to better that understanding?

2. Roger George and Harvey Rishikof argue that the "national security enterprise"—which has been set up to "identify, deter and if necessary defend against international threats to the nation"—is a "series of concentric circles" with the executive branch departments specifically charged with security making up the nucleus but then consisting of other government agencies, Congress, the courts, and "a more informal set of players." How does the relationship between these components impact how national security policy is conceptualized, formulated and executed?

3. Analysts build frameworks in order to help them understand and analyze complex systems even while recognizing that they might not encompass every factor; as John Mearsheimer has noted, they are useful "in helping us make sense of the remarkably complicated world around us." Does the NSDM Policy Analysis Framework provide a workable conceptual tool for envisioning the principal influences on the national security process?

4. What value does a military officer or national security professional gain from probing more deeply within the "black box" of decision making? Is there a benefit, as Richard Snyder and his colleagues argued in 1954, for someone involved in the execution of foreign and defense policy to be able to "recognize the actual complexity underlying decisions (which includes individual biases and bureaucratic processes"?

5. Are policy decisions political ones? How should advice presented by national security professionals to senior decision-makers walk the line between professional and political advice? What is the proper role for the military within the policy process? Does "purely professional" advice exist? How do you assess the comments made by senior practitioners in the Richard Norton and Nikolas Gvosdev article as well as the arguments advanced by Sharon Weiner? (Elements of this discussion will then continue in your Leadership-3 session on the profession of arms and civil-military relations.)

D. Required Readings (65 pages)

1. George, Roger Z., and Harvey Rishikof. "The National Security Enterprise: Institutions, Cultures and Politics," and "Navigating the Labyrinth of the National Security Enterprise," in *The National Security Enterprise*, eds. Roger Z. George and Harvey Rishikof (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2011), pp. 1-10 and 331-350. **(Textbook not available on Blackboard, hardcopy will be provided.)**

2. Norton, Richard and Nikolas K. Gvosdev. "Being at the Table: The Policy Analysis Framework," Newport, RI: Naval War College, revised 2016. (9 pages)

3. Gvosdev, Nikolas K. "Should Military Officers Study Policy Analysis?" *Joint Forces Quarterly* 76 (2015), pp. 30-34. http://ndupress.ndu.edu/JFQ/JointForceQuarterly76/ShouldMilitaryOfficersStudyPolicyAnalysis.aspx.

4. Weiner, Sharon K. "Military Advice for Political Purposes," *Mission Creep: The Militarization of U.S. Foreign Policy?* Eds. Gordon Adams and Shoon Murray (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2014), pp. 192-209. **(Textbook not available on Blackboard, hardcopy will be provided.)**

5. *National Security Decision Making Syllabus* (Winter 2016-17), pp. 79-80.

POLICY ANALYSIS-2: FOREIGN POLICY PERSPECTIVES

A. Focus

This session presents a brief overview of the field of Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) with a focus on five theoretical perspectives derived from the discipline that will be used throughout the sub-course. These five perspectives illuminate many, but not all, of the factors that influence decisions made in national security policy. They are the Rational Actor, Organizational Process, Bureaucratic Politics, Palace Politics, and Cognitive Perspectives. The term "perspective" is to be emphasized—each perspective could be considered a lens that offers a particular angle, or view, on a foreign policy. Furthermore, each of the five perspectives could be considered a collection of concepts that have bearing on national security policy. Sometimes a particular perspective will go a long way toward providing the complete analysis of a particular policy. For some situations, a particular perspective could be nearly useless. The applicability of each of the five perspectives can vary widely, depending on the particular situation being analyzed. The utility of the perspectives is illustrated by applying them to a much-analyzed historical case: the Cuban Missile Crisis.

It should be emphasized that even the sum of the five perspectives introduced in this session is not a complete explanation of a particular decision. The perspectives, as presented here, focus primarily on the inner workings of the executive branch. As previewed in the previous session, elsewhere in the Policy Analysis sub-course we will shift our attention to the other domestic politics factors that play a role in many decisions involving national security. That noted, the five perspectives offer a powerful array of concepts that can help in the analysis of policy choices.

B. Objectives

- Analyze and explain policy decisions through the use of the FPA discipline and the five major FPA analytical perspectives that are presented in the sub-course.
- Utilize the five perspectives, theoretical paradigms that can aid an understanding of national security policy.
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1a, 1c, 2c, and 3a.

C. Guidance

1. Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) attempts to move beyond the abstraction of unitary state actors to understand the decision-making behavior of the individuals and organizations that compose state governments. According to Valerie Hudson, what are the "hallmarks" of FPA as a discipline? What contributions does FPA make to our understanding of international relations (IR) and IR theory, as discussed in Strategies-2?

2. Based on the work of Graham Allison, Stephen Krasner, Richard Snyder, Morton Halperin, James Rosenau, Robert Jervis, and others, five analytic perspectives were derived for use in this sub-course. What is the essence of each of the five perspectives? (Be prepared to summarize your understanding of each perspective in a single sentence.) How does each of the

perspectives provide a different lens for analyzing policy decisions? Are there national security situations where certain perspectives are likely to be more or less relevant? Do you see evidence of the use of these perspectives by decision makers and policy analysts? Is there a perspective you believe is over- or under-utilized, to dangerous effect?

3. In 1969, Graham Allison published "Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis," (later expanded into the full-length book *Essence of Decision*) considered to be one of the seminal works in the emerging FPA field. Allison, who served as an advisor to the Secretary of Defense during the 1960s, wanted to test whether the "rational actor model"—the dominant theory at the time as to how governments made national security decisions—explained the behavior of the Kennedy administration. How can each of the five perspectives shed light on the decision by the Kennedy administration to employ a blockade, and how this decision played out in the real world?

D. Required Readings (70 pages)

1. Hudson, Valerie M. "Foreign Policy Analysis: Actor-Specific Theory and the Ground of International Relations." *Foreign Policy Analysis*, 2005, pp. 1-30, read 1-13, skim pp. 13-21.

2. Gvosdev, Nikolas and Jessica Blankshain. "Policy Analysis Perspectives." Newport, R.I.: Naval War College faculty paper, June 2015.

3. Allison, Graham and Philip Zelikow. Excerpt from *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis.* 2nd edition. New York: Addison Wesley Longman, 1999, pp. 109-120, 224-236.

POLICY ANALYSIS-3: CASE STUDY: AMERICANS IN LEBANON

A. Focus

One of the principal objectives of the Policy Analysis sub-course is to increase student awareness of relevant political, organizational, and behavioral concepts that are useful in the analysis of national security cases. It is not uncommon for casual observers to seize on one or two elements of a case as the "key" factors that determined a particular policy choice. The student of national security affairs, however, must be aware of the entire spectrum of influences at work in a particular case, in order to grasp the true breadth of the policy environment, to gain a better understanding of how and why decisions are made. Maintaining this awareness of the overall environment is a major challenge, even for experienced policymakers at the highest levels, supported by hundreds or thousands of skilled staff members – as this session's case study makes abundantly clear. The goal of this session is to apply the analytical concepts introduced in these first two Policy Anlaysis sessions (as well as in the NSDM introductory session) in order to improve one's ability to understand the international and domestic factors that often influence strategic and, increasingly, even tactical national security decisions.

The Reagan administration's decision to twice deploy Marines as a response to the growing violence in Lebanon in the early 1980s is an example of policy decision-making undertaken in a highly complex international environment, but one also profoundly affected by domestic U.S. factors, the interplay between national policymakers in Washington and front-line military and diplomatic organizations, as well as the particular interpersonal dynamics which shaped the first term of the Reagan presidency. The Lebanon deployment resulted in the most extensive civilian and military casualties incurred since the Vietnam War—first when the U.S. embassy was attacked and later by the bombing of the Marine barracks at the Beirut airport—yet, despite these losses, the stated goals of the mission were not realized. When American military forces were withdrawn in February 1984, many wondered how the Reagan administration had become so deeply involved in the Lebanon crisis and why it believed a limited deployment could help to achieve policy objectives that, over time, appeared to be unattainable. This case, which has remained a case study of enduring relevance in the study of national security policy analysis, helps to illustrate the theoretical concepts discussed in the last session, and to show how they can be used to analyze actual policy decisions to provide answers to those questions.

B. Objectives

- Introduce sub-course concepts that will be used throughout the semester.

- Apply Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) theories and the levels of analysis to a major national security decision.

- Assess the five perspectives to produce analyses of national security decisions.

- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1a, 1b, 1c, 1d, 2b, 2c, 2e, 2f , 3a, 4b, 5a, 5b, 5c, and 5e.

C. Guidance

1. Based on the information in the case study and in the subsequent video, what were the international and domestic factors that affected the President's decisions, first to deploy Marines to Lebanon to facilitate the withdrawal of Palestinian fighters from Beirut, and then to return the Marine contingent in the wake of the massacres at Sabra and Shatila? Did any of these factors change over time? How accurately did decision-makers in Washington perceive the influences—both domestic and international--that ultimately had an impact in determining the success of their policy?

2. What insights into the decisions taken by the Reagan administration with regards to Lebanon can be provided by utilizing the levels of analysis and the five perspectives on decision-making that were introduced in NSDM-2, Policy-1 and Policy-2? Based on what you read in the case, would you agree or disagree with Kevin Wang's assertions that domestic political factors could be as important, or even more important, than the assessments of the international environment in driving policy choice? How do the observations of Margaret Hermann and her colleagues about leadership style—as well as the different perspectives—illuminate the dynamics of decision-making within the Reagan administration as outlined in this case?

3. In Policy-2, you read excerpts from *Essence of Decision*. In reading through the Lebanon case, could a similar analytical work have been developed based on this narrative? What does that suggest about the universal applicability of frameworks and perspectives in explaining national security decisions?

4. To what extent did the institutional and personal relationship between Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger and Secretary of State George Shultz impact the formation of policy on Lebanon? Did the policy process work to bring all available options and courses of action to the attention of senior leadership? On what basis were policy decisions about policy towards Lebanon reached? Does the "logic of the situation room" help to explain policy choices?

5. In Policy-1, Roger George and Harvey Rishikof note that in each administration there will be "a new layer of political actors" who are "somewhat divorced from power and not well versed in how to use the ways and means of institutional power but understanding their goals." Given that reality, how were the professional military concerns about the deployment (especially those raised by Colonels James Mead and Timothy Geraghty) assessed by higher echelons of the national security establishment? How were diplomats and other subject matter experts on the region able or not able to get their observations on the Lebanese situation into the deliberations of more senior decision-makers?

6. In Policy-1, you considered Sharon Weiner's arguments about the role of military/professional advice to policymakers, a topic further discussed in the concurrent Leadership-3 session on civil-military relations. After reading this case, should military officers (and other national security professionals) consider political, social, and economic factors when advising their military and civilian superiors? When is it appropriate to bring these factors into consideration when assessing strategic and tactical matters?

D. Required Readings (41 pages)

1. Hall, David K., and William R. Farrell. "Lebanon Revisited," Newport, R.I.: Naval War College faculty paper, March 1997. Edited by Andrew Stigler, 2013, and revised and updated by Nikolas Gvosdev and Thomas Nichols, 2016.

2. Gvosdev, Nikolas K. "Deploying the Levels and Perspectives," Newport, R.I.: Naval War College faculty paper, June 2016.

During the class session, students will watch a Public Broadcasting System documentary entitled "Retreat from Beirut" which will augment the readings which have been assigned.

POLICY ANALYSIS-4: TRADITIONAL ACTORS, RULES, & TOOLS IN THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL SYSTEM

A. Focus

Despite the considerable military, economic, and diplomatic power of the United States, U.S. national security processes and policies are often shaped by the actions of other actors such as states, intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in a constantly changing international system. Current trends toward greater and more complex economic, political, and military interdependence within the international political system (IPS) suggest that international actors may gain even greater influence in future U.S. policy making. For effective participation in the IPS, U.S. policy-makers must understand the full range of instruments available to influence international behavior, and to utilize the tools of globalization, and how others can use these same instruments to influence the United States. Studying the distribution of power in the international political system and the tools and rules used to exercise that power can give insight, and perhaps foresight, that can contribute to both better policy and better policy-making processes.

B. Objectives

- Identify and understand key actors, tools, and rules in the international political system.

- Assess how the international political system influences the U.S. national security decision-making process.

- Evaluate the impact of globalization on state power and the international system.

- Supports CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1a, 1d, and 2a.

C. Guidance

1. Amos Jordan, William Taylor, Michael Meese, and Suzanne Nielsen discuss the nature of sovereignty and power in international security, and how these concepts can be applied. Their chapter also addresses approaches to national security (collective security and alliances), as well as a range of possible revolutions in the technological and social realms that can impact how one thinks about security policy. Is sovereignty still a key factor, or is its importance in the international arena in decline? What recent developments conflict with the classical notion of sovereignty? How does one calculate a nation's power? What are the important aspects of power in the international system? Is soft power of increasing importance?

2. Cesare Merlini's paper considers the "specific influence exerted by societal change on international relations and, conversely, the degree to which mutable trends in world affairs, including their current regressive phase, interrelate with the transformations taking place across most societies," citing the Arab Spring uprisings and revolutions, global terrorist attacks, and ineffective policies of developed countries. Do you agree or disagree with his assessment? Why

and how are societal changes affecting international relations? What do U.S. policy makers need to consider in order to prevent past mistakes?

3. Jeffrey Rathke argues that it is imperative for the United States and NATO to strengthen deterrence against Russia. What are the main recommendations for achieving deterrence against Russia? What are the U.S. and NATO's security interests pertaining to Europe (especially Eastern Europe)? What are Russia's security interests in the region? Why should U.S. policy makers consider Russia's interests when devising U.S./NATO strategies? Why is deterrence important?

4. Jon Alterman's article, "ISIS (Re)Writes History," contends that ISIS is very selective in its appeal and references to history, but it is "modern" in terms of its geopolitical agendas. Why is history important for understanding ISIS? What do U.S. policy makers need to understand about the ISIS agendas and ideology? How does ISIS use history for justifying its ends, ways, and means?

5. In "Winning the War of Ideas" the authors contend that, "We are losing the broader 'battle of ideas' against a violent extremist ideology that is infecting a whole new generation of Muslim millennials and defining what it means to be Muslim in the twenty-first century. In failing to recognize this broader challenge, we are failing to confront the real-world manifestations of this ideology." How can the "battle of ideas" be won? What are the policy implications of this reality?

6. Christian Caryl's article about the world refugee problem emphasizes that it is not just Europe facing a refugee and migrant crisis. In fact, most of the host countries that suffer from refugee influxes are *developing* economies that are highly stressed. Caryl says, "The world's richest countries — including those that, like the United States, Canada, and Japan, are somewhat protected by geography from the full force of migration patterns — must come to terms with the fact that the magnitude of current displacement dictates a need for a truly global approach." What do U.S. policy makers need to consider regarding these political and economic crises? What role can the UN and other IGOs play in alleviating the pressures of the current and future migrant crises? Why is this an important issue for international security and order?

D. Required Readings (56 pages)

1. Jordan, Amos A., William J. Taylor, Michael J. Meese, and Suzanne C. Neilson. *American National Security* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009), 6th edition. Chapter 1, "The International Setting," pp. 11 - 22, starting at "Key Concepts."

2. Merlini, Cesare. "The Impact of Changing Societies on the Future of International Relations," *Center on the United States and Europe at Brookings*, Working Paper, January 19, 2016, pp. 1-32. http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2016/01/19-future-international-relations-merlini/merlini--impact-of-changing-societies-final-001.pdf.

3. Rathke, Jeffrey. "A NATO Strategy for the Eastern Flank," in *2016 Global Forecast*, edited by Craig Cohen and Melissa G. Dalton, Center for Strategic & International Studies

(CSIS), Washington, DC, 2015, pp. 44-45.
http://csis.org/files/publication/151116_Cohen_GlobalForecast2016_Web.pdf.

4. Alterman, Jon B. "ISIS (Re)Writes History," in *2016 Global Forecast*, edited by Craig Cohen and Melissa G. Dalton, Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS), Washington, DC, 2015, pp. 24-26.
http://csis.org/files/publication/151116_Cohen_GlobalForecast2016_Web.pdf.

5. Pandith, Farah and Juan Zarathe. "Winning the War of Ideas," in *2016 Global Forecast*, edited by Craig Cohen and Melissa G. Dalton, Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS), Washington, DC, 2015, pp. 134-137.
http://csis.org/files/publication/151116_Cohen_GlobalForecast2016_Web.pdf.

6. Caryl, Christian. "If You Think Europe Has a Refugee Crisis, You're Not Looking Hard Enough," *Foreign Policy*, February 2016, pp. 1-3. http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/02/02/the-weakest-links-syria-refugees-migrants-crisis-data-visualization/.

E. Foundational Reading

1. Stigler, Andrew. "The United Nations in the International Arena," Newport, R.I.: Naval War College faculty paper by Andrew Stigler, July 2016, pp. 1-12. (Provides a discussion of the role of the United Nations in international politics and the U.N.'s effects on U.S. foreign policy.)

POLICY ANALYSIS-5: INTERNATIONAL VALUES AND NORMS

A. Focus

The previous lesson discussed several important actors and rules in the international political system. This session discusses the power of ideas, values, and norms, selected developments in international law, the role of ideology, and humanitarianism and sovereignty issues. Each of these developments and concepts has major implications for the making and conduct of U.S. foreign policy. Though not easily measurable, ideas have always been important components of the international political system. Today, several important norms—ideas that govern behavior by shaping what actors believe is appropriate behavior—are in a state of flux. These developments will influence the nature, location and frequency of future military operations. Global actors are making difficult decisions about how to interact and what tools to use to help shape the future. As the world becomes more complex, proficiency with the full spectrum of tools of power and influence becomes increasingly important.

B. Objectives

- Identify post–Cold War concepts and organizations critical for analyzing the international political system.

- Analyze the current international political environment and some of its trends.

- Analyze new trends, actors, values and rules in the evolving international political system.

- Evaluate how these factors influence the U.S. national security decision-making process and how that process should adapt to new conditions.

- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1a, 1d, and 2a.

C. Guidance

1. Leslie Gelb and Justine Rosenthal's article, "The Rise of Ethics in Foreign Policy," argues that, "morality, values, ethics, universal principles … have taken root in the hearts, or at least the minds, of the American foreign policy community." Do you agree or disagree with their assertions? What role, if any, does "morality" play in international affairs? Who defines it? Is "ethics" prevalent in foreign policies? How does the United States deal with "ethical issues" in international affairs and foreign policies?

2. Richard Price's *Foreign Affairs* article about the "red line" drawn against Syria's Assad regime's use of chemical weapons, and the ethical, legal, and credibility arguments and issues pertaining to the U.S. position. What are the pros and cons for carrying out military strikes against the Assad regime? What are the pros and cons for not carrying out military strikes? What are the sovereignty issues involved in this case? What are the issues pertaining to the "Responsibility to Protect" civilians principle involved in this case? Given that the United States

is the world's superpower, what kind of ethical and legal obligations for the United States to act – whether militarily or otherwise – are present in this case?

3. Jeremy Page's article about China's defiance of the international court points out that a state's refusal to accept the international court's verdict is not unprecedented. "In 1986, the International Court of Justice in The Hague ruled in favor of Nicaragua in a case the Central American nation brought against the United States for aiding Nicaraguan Contra rebels and mining the country's ports in a bid to undermine its socialist government. The United States boycotted most of the proceedings, saying the court had no jurisdiction, and refused to observe its verdict, which granted Nicaragua an initial award of $370 million." What is the ethical dilemma of powerful states refusing to accept international legal decisions affecting them? How is the United States reacting to the China case? Is it consistent with its own precedent? What does this say about the impact and "fairness" of international legal frameworks on powerful states, and the states' behaviors in the global system?

4. Amitai Etzioni's article, "Defining Down Sovereignty," defines the term as: "the normative thesis that sovereignty should not grant a state absolute protection against armed intervention in its internal affairs by other states, and that instead the international community should condition such immunity on states living up to particular standards." States should not be immune to interventions on the basis of sovereignty in cases wherein values and norms, such as preventing genocide and protecting civilians, and also combating international terrorism, must be upheld. Do you agree or disagree with these premises? What are the implications of these values-based conditions for the sanctity of sovereignty? What are the pros and cons of these values and conditions? How do they affect the United States' interests and sovereignty?

5. Hooshang Amirahmadi argues that Western geopolitical interests and foreign policies over the last few decades have contributed to the rise of ISIS. He argues that constant violations of sovereignty, human rights, self-determination, and Western states' support for brutal autocratic rulers of certain Middle Eastern states have resulted in mass humiliation of Muslims. These factors have compelled many in the region to seek "Islamic solutions" to their humiliation, and one such entity – albeit extreme in its ideology – is the Islamic State. Do you agree or disagree with these arguments? What are the values-based and ethical responsibilities of states in the modern era? What are the implications of these arguments for the United States and its interests relative to the Middle East region and the Muslim world?

D. Required Readings (41 pages)

1. Gelb, Leslie H., and Justine A. Rosenthal. "The Rise of Ethics in Foreign Policy: Reaching a Values Consensus," *Foreign Affairs,* May/June 2003, pp. 1-9. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2003-05-01/rise-ethics-foreign-policy-reaching-values-consensus.

2. Price, Richard. "No Strike, No Problem: The Right Way to Nurture a Norm," Foreign *Affairs,* September 5, 2013, pp. 1-6. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/syria/2013-09-05/no-strike-no-problem.

3. Page, Jeremy. “China’s Defiance of International Court Has Precedent – U.S. Defiance,” *The Wall Street Journal (WSJ),* July 7, 2016, pp. 1-6. http://www.wsj.com/articles/chinas-defiance-of-international-court-has-precedentu-s-defiance-1467919982.

4. Etzioni, Amitai. “Defining Down Sovereignty: The Rights and Responsibilities of Nations,” *Ethics and International Affairs Journal*, March 10, 2016, vol. 30.1 (Spring 2016), pp. 1-14. https://www.ethicsandinternationalaffairs.org/2016/defining-sovereignty-rights-responsibilities-nations/.

5. Amirahmadi, Hooshang. “ISIS is the Product of Muslim Humiliation and the New Geopolitics of the Middle East,” *Carnegie Council for Ethics and International Affairs,* April 7, 2015, pp. 1-6. http://www.carnegiecouncil.org/publications/articles_papers_reports/729.

POLICY ANALYSIS-6: COGNITION, DOMESTIC POLITICS, AND INTRA-REGIONAL RELATIONS: HOW THE INSIDES OF OTHER STATES MATTER

A. Focus

Continuing our examination of the international system and how it affects U.S. security and foreign policy, this session looks at all three levels of analysis with respect to other countries. How leaders think, how their governments and economies are structured, and what their relationships with their neighbors are like, all have implications for the system as a whole and for U.S. interests and policy in particular. An inability to understand what motivates and constrains others' actions in the international system can lead to policy failure.

The cognitive perspective focuses our attention on how policymakers' existing beliefs and their mental constructs for interpreting information and making sense about the situations they face affect the policy process. Of particular importance are the risks of groupthink and mirror imaging in making inaccurate assessments both about one's own strengths and weaknesses as well as the intentions and capabilities of others.

The domestic politics/foreign policy perspective requires us to think about the systems, structures, and incentives within a state and society to understand its behavior. Is the regime democratic or autocratic? Federal or unitary? Transparent or opaque? Bureaucratic or personalist? Free-market or mercantilist?

Finally, the international system level has sub-systems, and these geographic regional sub-systems have their own dynamics that can affect the shape and dynamics of the overall system. Most states are not constantly thinking about *global* balances of power or trade; they are thinking about their next-door neighbors, and therefore their relationships with those neighbors may have greater weight in their behavior than a standard "black box" or "billiard ball" perspective might predict.

Any state must be concerned with understanding its context and environment, if it wants to craft appropriate strategy and policy. A great power with global interests, like the United States, has both a particular need and a particular responsibility to be aware of the internal and regional dynamics of the other members of the international system. The United States could easily get drawn into the disputes of others, or cause disputes between others, or get into unnecessary disputes, itself, if it fails to take these factors into account.

B. Objectives

- Analyze the impact of cognition and cognitive biases on decision making at the individual and group levels.
- Assess the impact of a decision maker's personal values, beliefs and other cognitive elements on national security decisions.
- Examine the impact of domestic forms of governance and domestic political conditions on how a country carries out its foreign relations.

- Examine the potentially confounding role of intra-regional relationships for standard IR theory.

- Support CJCS Learning Areas 1c, 1d, 2c, 2e, 5a, 5b, 5d and 5e.

C. Guidance

1. Robert Jervis's classic treatment argues that Realist and Rationalist explanations of state behavior often fail to account for human cognition and psychology. He notes that strategic behavior is possible only if the actor understands both his own and his opponent's interests, intentions, and risk-propensity. He states, "[t]he actor must therefore develop an image of others and of their intentions. This image may, however, turn out to be an inaccurate one; a decision-maker or analyst may, for a number of reasons, misperceive both others' actions and their intentions." He goes on to discuss multiple common problems of human cognition. How do cognitive factors affect how policy is made? How do assessments of what "the other" will do impact policy choices?

2. The Kevin Woods, James Lacey, and Williamson Murray reading goes into detail about Saddam Hussein's beliefs, thought processes, and cognitive biases, as well as how he ran his government. What does this tell us about other states' decision-making and policy-making in this instance? What does it tell us about how leader personality and domestic political structure can affect not only his/her own state's policy, but that of other states, as well? How should policymakers in Washington assess the propensity of other leaders and governments to engage in risky behavior and how should it affect U.S. guarantees and commitments?

3. Traditional theories of International Relations focus on the behavior of the great powers in the system and tend to assume that domestic politics don't matter for smaller/weaker states. These states are assumed to have no choices, due to the overwhelming nature of their security concerns. Giorgi Gvalia et al. argue that this is wrong, and that domestic politics and leader personalities can be important drivers of the foreign policy of smaller states. Should this matter for U.S. foreign and security policy? What does this tell us about "how the world really works"? Should it change our perceptions of international dynamics?

4. Finally, the reading from Donald Weatherbee introduces the complex domestic politics and intra-regional relations of Southeast Asia. He details the types of issues that have caused tensions and disputes, and the tools that the countries of the region have used to resolve those disputes. What does this tell us about the way most states in the world view their own national interests? What does it indicate about the challenges involved in coordinating collective action? What does it say about alternative perspectives regarding threats and acceptable solutions?

5. This session dovetails with the two Security Strategies sessions on Comparative and International Political Economy (Strategies-5 and -6). How do domestic economic concerns affect states' foreign policy choices? How do states use linkage politics to pursue their goals? How do economic considerations alter perceptions of power?

6. This session also builds on concepts that are being introduced and discussed in the Leadership Concepts sub-course. Is it possible to separate an individual's preferences, beliefs and worldview from how a) how that person will set up governing structures and b) how policy

is made, formulated, and executed? To what extent does a professional bureaucracy buffer the effects of individual characteristics?

D. Required Readings (102 pages)

1. Jervis, Robert. 1968. "Hypotheses on Misperception," *World Politics* 20(3), pp. 454-479.

2. Woods, Kevin, James Lacey, and Williamson Murray. "Saddam's Delusions: the View From the Inside," *Foreign Affairs* 85(3), 2006, pp. 2-26.

3. Gvalia, Giorgi, Bidzina Lebanidze, and Zurab Iashvili. "*Political Elites, Ideas, and Foreign Policy: Explaining and Understanding the International Behavior of Small States in the Former Soviet Union*.", 2011, Tblisi: Ilia State University Press, pp. 20-28; 37-59 (plus notes/references). ISBN 978-9941-18-089-7 or available http://eprints.iliauni.edu.ge/usr/share/eprints3/data/864/1/Gvalia%20et%20al._Political%20Elites%20(1)%20(1).pdf.

4. Weatherbee, Donald. "The International Actors in Southeast Asia" in International Relations in Southeast Asia: the Struggle for Autonomy", pp. 27-50, skim pp. 51-61. New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2009.

POLICY-ANALYSIS 7: DOMESTIC POLITICAL SYSTEM

A. Focus

The previous session introduced the idea that it is important to consider the ways in which the domestic political systems (DPS) of other countries constrain foreign policy and influence individual decision makers. In this session we continue to explore the importance of domestic politics in foreign policy analysis and begin our deep dive into the specifics of the American system. The DPS consists not only of the branches of government and their sub-organizations, but also encompasses the legal structure and societal elements that influence policy. While individual components of the American DPS will be addressed in subsequent sessions, this session is designed to provide an overview of what former National Security Advisor General Brent Scowcroft terms the "labyrinth of agencies and actors who participate in shaping American national security policy."

No single part of the DPS has sole responsibility for U.S. national security. In addition, no one part of the U.S. government can execute security policy in an effective manner without the cooperation and consent of other components. This session introduces the concept of the "national security enterprise" as the sum total of all domestic institutions involved with U.S. national security.

B. Objectives

- Analyze the components of the U.S. domestic political system
- Examine the Constitutional and legal roots of the U.S. policymaking process
- Assess the "invitation to struggle" between the executive and legislative branches as a factor in U.S. national security policy decision-making
- Examine the impact of the judiciary on national security affairs
- Appraise the importance of the societal environment and the institutional setting for U.S. national security policy
- Identify the factors promoting continuity and change in the policymaking process
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1a, 1b, 1d, 2c, and 3a.

C. Guidance

1. What are the responsibilities of the various elements of American government, as defined in the United States Constitution? How do the principles established in this document affect the national security decision-making process? How has the Constitution been interpreted to facilitate the modern national security system of the United States? How do these constitutional principles affect the organizations in which you serve?

2. Robert Putnam explores the linkages between domestic political systems and the international political system, which we discussed in previous sessions. How do the "two levels" of the bargaining game affect one another? Do you agree with Putnam that negotiators may face a tradeoff between strength at home and strength in international negotiations? Does the U.S. system of government make international interactions easier, or more difficult, than alternative structures?

3. James McCormick argues that the presidential form of government in the United States, as well as the deliberate fragmentation of power between the executive and legislative branches (the famed "invitation to struggle") and within the executive branch can both limit and enhance the "choices made by decision-makers and affect their implementation." Would a different structure for the U.S. government produce different national security decisions?

4. McCormick observes that the "political culture of the United States—the basic needs, values, beliefs, and self-images widely shared by Americans about their political system—stands out as a primary societal source of American foreign policy." Does this help to explain what the United States does in terms of its national security policy?

5. Under the informally adopted "political questions doctrine," the courts tended to refrain from many of the great struggles between the President and the Congress over the conduct of war and national security writ large. But a series of recent Supreme Court decisions suggest that adherence to this doctrine may be waning. What are the implications of having the judicial branch become "involved in a constitutional dialogue with the executive branch and the Congress in the national security arena," as Harvey Rishikoff poses? Can the executive branch's freedom of action in national security matters be limited by judicial review?

6. The Supreme Court case Zivotofsky v. Kerry concerns the constitutionality of a law allowing U.S. citizens born in Jerusalem to list their place of birth as Jerusalem, Israel on their U.S. passport. Does this law fall under Congress's constitutional power to regulate interstate commerce, or does it infringe upon the executive's power to recognize other states? Does the Supreme Court take foreign policy consequences into account when deciding the constitutionality of a law?

D. Required Readings (82 pages + skimming)

1. *The Constitution of the United States of America.* Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1997.

2. Putman, Robert D. "Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games." *International Organization*. 1998 42(3): 427-460. Read pp. 433-452, 456-460.

3. McCormick, James M. ed. "Introduction: The Domestic Sources of American Foreign Policy" in *The Domestic Sources of American Foreign Policy: Insights and Evidence*, 6th edition, Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2012, pp. 1-18.

4. Rishikof, Harvey. "The United States Supreme Court: The Cult of the Robe in the National Security Enterprise," in *The National Security Enterprise*, eds. Roger Z. George and

Harvey Rishikof (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2011), skim pp. 247-256, read pp. 256-263. **(Textbook not available on Blackboard, hardcopy will be provided.)**

5. SCOTUS blog coverage of Zivotofsky v. Kerry

    - Denniston, Lyle. "Argument preview: Court edges close to the Mideast cauldron" 1 Nov 2014
    - Howe, Amy. "Jerusalem passport case divides Court: In Plain English" 4 Nov 2014.
    - Howe, Amy. "Executive branch prevails in Jerusalem passports case: In Plain English" 8 June 2015
    - Kontorovich, Eugene "Symposium: Zivotofsky was not about recognition by Congress or by the President" 9 June 2015
    - Morrison, Alan "Symposium: President wins in Zivotofsky: Will there be another battle?" 9 June 2015
    - Ramsey, Michael "Symposium: Justice Thomas gets it right in Zivotofsky" 9 June 2015

POLICY-8: THE PRESIDENT AND THE MAKING OF NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

A. Focus

This session discusses the powers of the president in national security affairs. As discussed in the previous session, Article II of the U.S. Constitution outlines the President's responsibilities in the national security and foreign policy arenas. Over the last two centuries, wars and other emergencies have generally increased the power of the presidency, to the concern of many observers. The presidency emerged as a prime mover behind foreign policy well before the First World War and expanded its primacy throughout the Second World War and the Cold War. Since the Cold War, the increasing complexity of international problems has required that the president gain advice and information from a wide variety of expert sources, working within an ever-expanding executive branch. Some critics have argued that this has led to the creation of an "imperial presidency."

We often speak of "the President" both as an individual and as a collective entity made up of those on the White House staff who can act in the president's name or speak with his voice. Nevertheless, the Founding Fathers chose to vest the executive power in a single person. This means that the American presidency is deeply affected by the personality of its occupant. It also means that U.S. bilateral relations with other countries may depend on whether the president "connects" with his counterparts (other prime ministers, monarchs, chancellors or prime ministers) as discussed in PA-6. The personal strengths and weaknesses of a President tend to be magnified in an office that can serve as a crucible for whoever occupies it—an office that presents the ultimate test of a person's character, intelligence, and skills.

B. Objectives

- Examine the constitutional powers vested in the executive and analyze the role of the President in formulating national security policy.

- Analyze the changing relationships between the President and other branches of government regarding national security policy.

- Evaluate the relationships between the president and his key advisors within the formal and informal structures of the national security system.

- Examine the impact of Presidential personality on the executive branch and analyze various Presidential leadership styles and worldviews.

- Relate the material you covered in your Leadership class dealing with individual cognition and personality.

- Support CJCS Learning Areas 1a, 1b, 1c, 2c, 3a, 4a, 4c, 5a, and 5b.

C. Guidance

1. In the last session, you were asked to review the U.S. Constitution. Article II lays out the broad parameters of Presidential authority, but how should the brief phrases be interpreted? Curtis Bradley and Trevor Morrison provide a detailed—and recent—legal consideration of the limits to Presidential power viewed through a legal prism. How does "legal constraint" work to check Presidential preferences in foreign policy? What constrained, or failed to constrain, President Obama's actions with respect to Libya?

2. Brandice Canes-Wrone, William Howell, and David Lewis reexamine "the two presidencies thesis"—the theory that presidents are more powerful with respect to foreign than domestic policy—in light of new empirical evidence. What institutional factors do the authors suggest drive the "two presidencies?" What does their data on budgets and agency creation tell us about the validity of the theory?

3. Michael Nelson highlights the importance of the President providing a "strategic sense" and thus a unifying vision to the conduct and execution of U.S. national security policy. How much of this depends on the office versus the individual? What do you think of Nelson's observation that "powers alone do not define power?"

4. Fred Greenstein lists a series of qualities that he believes determine Presidential success. In assessing these qualities, how many are based upon the personality of the individual? How much depends on the team that surrounds the President? In Greenstein's assessment of the category of "organizational capacity", to what extent did different presidents embrace one or the other of the different perspectives that are offered in the NSDM Policy Analysis sub-course as their preferred way for decision-making?

D. Required Readings (65 pages)

1. Bradley, Curtis A., and Trevor Morrison. "Presidential Power, Historical Practice and Legal Constraint," *Columbia Law Review* 113:4 (May 2013), pp. 1131-1139; 1143-1152 (do NOT read footnotes, only primary text).

2. Canes-Wrone, Brandice, William G. Howell, and David E. Lewis, "Toward a Broader Understanding of Presidential Power: A Reevaluation of the Two Presidencies Thesis," *The Journal of Politics*, 2008 70(1), pp. 1-16.

3. Nelson, Michael. "Person and Office: Presidents, the Presidency and Foreign Policy," in *The Domestic Sources of American Foreign Policy: Insights and Evidence*, ed. James M. McCormick, 6th edition, Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2012, pp. 179-188.

4. Greenstein, Fred I. *The Presidential Difference: Leadership from FDR to Barack Obama*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009. Please read chapters 1 and 15 and scan chapters 10 and 13.

E. Foundational Reading

1. Howell, William G. "Presidential Power in the Modern Era," *Power without Persuasion: The Politics of Direct Presidential Action*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003, chapter 1, pp. 1- 23.

POLICY ANALYSIS-9: THE WHITE HOUSE AND THE PALACE POLITICS PERSPECTIVE

A. Focus

The term "palace politics" refers to the informal but extremely important interactions that surround major decisions in any large organization. In the context of the national security process, an examination of "palace politics" focuses on the circle of advisors and subordinates around a key decision-maker – in this case, the president – and takes as a starting point the proposition that access and influence, rather than titles or positions, are important factors in determining how policy decisions are made. The policy interests, career accomplishments and reputation of the people surrounding the president can vary greatly from official to official, and formal positions may not accurately reflect their informal power – or the lack of it. The "palace politics" approach, accordingly, centers on individuals and attempts to gauge their impact on policy.

This is different from the study of organizational processes, in which rules and operating procedures influence policy choices. It is also different from the analysis of bureaucratic politics, in which players in the bureaucratic game represent and defend the parochial interests of their own department or bureaucracy. Instead, a view toward "palace politics" tries to illuminate less obvious, but no less crucial, influences on policy, such as the personality of a given adviser, personal relationships among participants in the process (and especially with the president), and whether the people trying influence a decision have a familiarity with government that provides advantages in the competition to gain their desired outcome.

An understanding of "palace politics" is especially important to the analysis of security affairs. Many questions of national security are difficult to mediate through organizational routine, and they are often escalated to the level of decision-makers who are also elected politicians. With the exception of a handful of senior generals who have been elevated to the White House, American presidents do not usually come from a life in foreign policy or national security affairs, and thus they rely on networks of advisers and experts who do not fall into easily identifiable roles or categories.

In fact, the modern U.S. president is surrounded by a large apparatus of advisors and functionaries who are usually grouped together under a general but unclear rubric of "the White House staff." In the national security realm, this group includes the National Security Advisor and the staff assigned to the National Security Council, but it includes many others as well, from the White House Counsel's office to the Office of Management and Budget, as well as special advisors, envoys, or "czars."

On a less formal level, a president might also seek the advice of trusted friends or colleagues who have no obvious role in the White House. For example, President Lyndon Johnson, as a former Senate majority leader, relied heavily on Senator Richard Russell of Georgia for advice. President Ronald Reagan's inner circle included many figures from his days as California's chief executive whose connection to him predated his arrival in Washington. (Some of his staff lapsed by habit into referring to him as "governor" even after his election.)

Thus, the "palace politics" approach helps to focus on actors who have no constitutional basis for their participation in the policy process, such as the White House Chief of Staff or even the Vice President. Despite their nebulous formal authority, these two positions—along with their staffs—can nevertheless exercise a great deal of influence over policy. They may also be relatively powerless. Likewise, Cabinet secretaries may have power beyond their formal role, or be far weaker than their titles suggest. Indeed, Cabinet officials may find themselves excluded or marginalized from the President's decision-making process for any number of reasons.

This session focuses on two sets of dynamics: the President's reliance on his immediate staff to ensure that U.S. policy conforms to his preferences, and the efforts of members of his national security team to influence presidential thinking to advance their own agendas or to be able to claim the authority to act in the President's name.

B. Objectives

- Describe and illustrate the ways in which personal power, access and influence are applied on a situational basis to shape the national security decision making process.

- Analyze the dynamics between the professional and personal staffs in the White House

- Examine the tensions between the formal and informal processes and the role of presidential management styles in resolving or exacerbating that tension

- Identify the roles of the Vice President, National Security Advisor, the Chief of Staff, the White House counsel and other key White House staffers in the formulation of national security policy and how they interrelate with the officials in charge of the departments and agencies which execute national security policy

- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1a, 1b, 1c, 1d, 3a, 4a and 5a.

C. Guidance

1. David Auerswald's reading traces the development of the National Security Council staff since its inception. Why has the staff continued to grow? Based on this historical experience, what types of things can the NSC staff do well? Not do well?

2. Jeffrey Goldberg's interview with David Rothkopf raises important questions about the role and influence of the White House staff attached to the National Security Council and other Presidential advisors. Why do Presidents find utilizing their staffs more attractive than working through the national security bureaucracy? What are the weaknesses of such an approach? To what extent do the personal preferences and management styles of individual Presidents affect how the President uses his staff? What did Secretary Robert Gates have to say on this point?

3. What influence does the White House staff have on the policy process? Presidents often prefer to turn to most trusted aides and close friends for advice, such as the political advisors

who were part of a campaign. When does the lack of personal relationships with the President (and other key figures like the chief of staff) trump formal organizational roles in terms of access to and influence on the President? Likewise, how do actors with more formal power wield their positions in the games of "palace politics?" What is the full spectrum of variables and factors that must be considered in order to better understand how a particular White House functions?

4. Using the three main "roles" of the Chief of Staff—administrator, advisor, and guardian—how can the Chief of Staff influence national security decision-making? How important are the relationships and coordination between the National Security Advisor, the Chief of Staff, and the heads of the Departments of State and Defense? Where does the Vice President fit into this process, especially in the wake of the more influential roles played by Dick Cheney and Joe Biden in their respective administrations? How do you see Denis McDonough playing each of these roles?

5. The articles by Jeffrey Goldberg, David Samuels and *Politico Europe* look at the key staffers on President Obama's national security team. Using the Palace Politics prism, how do these staffers help explain national security decision making under President Obama?

D. Required Readings (76 pages)

1. Auserwald, David. "The Evolution of the NSC Process," in *The National Security Enterprise: Navigating the Labyrinth*, eds. Roger Z. George and Harvey Rishikof (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2011), pp. 31-54. **(Textbook not available on Blackboard, hardcopy will be provided.)**

2. Gates, Robert M. *Duty.* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2014), pp. 586-587.

3. Goldberg, Jeffrey. "A Withering Critique of Obama's National Security Council," *The Atlantic*, November 12, 2014.

4. Samuels, David. "The Aspiring Novelist Who Became Obama's Foreign-Policy Guru," *The New York Times Magazine*, May 5, 2016.

5. "Obama's Obama," *Politico Europe*. January 7, 2016.

E. Foundational Reading

1. Gvosdev, Nikolas. "Not in the Chain," Newport, R.I.: Naval War College faculty paper, 2014.

POLICY ANALYSIS-10: THE INTERAGENCY PROCESS

A. Focus

There are a variety of different ways to explain how government decisions are made. One perspective is that national security policy decisions are based on a rational assessment of national interests. In this light, policy choices are made by decision makers who carefully evaluate a wide range of possible options, understand the consequences of each option relative to well-defined national interests, and choose the option that best promotes those national interests.

The rational actor perspective examines decision making as rational choices (that is, seeking to maximize benefits and minimize costs) made by the state as a unitary actor. Rational choice theory emerged out of economics to become a widely used approach in the study of political science, sociology, psychology, business and law. Generally speaking, when discussing how decisions are made, rational choice argues that individual choices (or choices by unitary actors) drive social and political outcomes. Governments, like individuals, have preferences for different outcomes. Being rational, individuals will select a strategy that yields the highest utility for their chosen preferences.

The rational actor perspective was the default analytical tool until the work of Graham Allison and other FPA scholars began to identify other perspectives that could also help to shed light on national security decision-making, as was previously discussed in the Policy Analysis-2 session. In this session, we will analyze the interagency and the so-called "interagency process" to look at how decisions are made. The interagency processes of the U.S. government, starting with the National Security Council, were set up and structured based on the key assumptions that are found in the Rational Actor perspective; this session allows us to analyze the strengths and limitations of the Rational Actor perspective in explaining how decisions are taken in the interagency process.

B. Objectives

- Analyze the realities that make interagency cooperation difficult.
- Evaluate the basic argument of rational actor perspective and understand its implications for the study of decision making.
- Apply the concepts in the rational actor perspective to real-world situations.
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1b, 2c, 3a, 3c, 5a, 5c, and 5d.

C. Guidance

1. Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrated the importance of interagency cooperation in pursuing U.S. national security policy. Why was interagency cooperation difficult?

2. What is the interagency? Who is in charge of the interagency?

3. The National Security Act of 1947 (NSA) was passed in order to put structure to our national security policy making. Can you see elements of the rational actor perspective in this act? How successful has the NSA been in this regard?

4. What are the essential elements and assumptions in the rational actor perspective? Do the fundamentals of the approach have merit?

5. Do states tend to be more rational in some areas of foreign policy (such as economic policy, military acquisitions, human rights, etc.) than in other areas?

6. Gordon Adams' article discusses the structural budgetary imbalance between the military and the other components of national power. How do you see this influencing the interagency?

7. David Ignatius' piece discusses the difficulty of interagency cooperation with regard to the Islamic States. Is anyone at fault? Why or why not?

8. Bob Woodward's readings describe the decision making process President Obama used for the surge for Afghanistan. This was a long and drawn out process using the National Security Council to develop a consensus policy. Look at this decision from the rational actor perspective. What elements fit the perspective and what do not?

7. The Ignatius reading discusses the difficulty of interagency cooperation with regard to the Islamic States. Is anyone at fault? Why or why not?

D. Required Readings (60 pages)

1. Rosenwasser, Jon J., and Michael Warner. "History of the Interagency Process for Foreign Relations in the United States: Murphy's Law?" in *The National Security Enterprise: Navigating the Labyrinth*, eds. Roger Z. George and Harvey Rishikof (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2011), pp. 11-29. **(Textbook not available on Blackboard, hardcopy will be provided.)**

2. Allison, Graham and Philip Zelikow. *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuba Missile Crisis.* New York: Longman, 1999. Review Introduction and Conclusion.

3. Adams, Gordon. "The Institutional Imbalance of American Statecraft," in Adams, Gordon and Murray, Shoon (eds.) *Mission Creep.* (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2014), pp. 22-45. **(Textbook not available on Blackboard, hardcopy will be provided.)**

4. Ignatius, David. "Interagency battles are hurting the U.S.'s fight against the Islamic State," *Washington Post*, May 20, 2015.

5. Woodward, Bob. “Military Thwarted President Seeking Choice In Afghanistan,” “Biden Warned Obama During Afghan War Review Not To Get ‘Locked Into Vietnam’,” “Obama: ‘We Need To Make Clear To People That The Cancer Is In Pakistan’,” *The Washington Post*, September 27, 28, 29, 2010.

POLICY-11: THE CHALLENGE OF ORGANIZATIONS

A. Focus

As discussed in previous sessions, government policy and behavior are often summarized as actions chosen by a unitary, rational actor. Governments, however, are not individuals; governments are made up of many complex organizations, which themselves are made up of many individuals. Government organizations tend to be bureaucratic—they are characterized by hierarchical structure, formal lines of authority, specialization, and systems of standard operating procedures. Like all large organizations, government agencies develop their own unique cultures. These characteristics of organizations affect the way governments perceive problems, gather information, and respond to external events. Understanding how organizations behave in general, and how they respond to change and crisis in particular, is essential for the national security practitioner, military or civilian.

B. Objectives

- Examine the behavioral characteristics and limitations of large national security organizations in formulating and implementing effective policies.
- Assess the concept of government as a collection of organizations acting independently as opposed to the depiction of government as a unitary actor pursuing the national interest.
- Analyze how the organizational process perspective provides insights into how U.S. national security decisions are made.
- Assess how presidential directives and decisions taken by senior officials can be affected, altered, reinterpreted, or even blocked by national security organizations.
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1a, 1b, 1d, 1e, 2c, 2e, 3a, 4a, 4c, and 5c.

C. Guidance

1. In previous sessions, you examined how the rational actor model informed the creation of U.S. government institutions like the National Security Council and served as the theoretical underpinning of the interagency process. How does the organizational process perspective differ from—and complement—the rational actor perspective? What are the implications of viewing government decisions from this perspective?

2. Do you agree with Morton Halperin's argument (also made by Graham Allison)—that the U.S. government is not a unitary actor but a collection of organizations, each operating on the basis of its own standard operating procedures and routines (and thus responding to challenges or problems in terms of their impact on the organization)? What does this perspective do with the concept of "national interest," which is at the heart of the rational actor model? Is there a risk that "organizational interest" will be substituted in its place? How does organizational culture affect the national security decision making process?

4. What do James March and Herbert Simon mean by "the limits of rationality," and what does this have to do with organizational behavior? How do programs (standard operating

procedures), satisficing, and risk absorption compensate for the limits of rationality? How do these behaviors affect policy making and policy execution?

5. Paul Stephan notes that many in the bureaucracy—career civil servants who expect to remain in government after political appointees depart and administrations change—are resistant to change, particularly in the national security enterprise. Do you agree with this assessment? How can bureaucracies rely on statute, precedents and politics to resist administration preferences?

6. Consider your own organization and the organizations of your seminar colleagues. What standard operating procedures, cultural characteristics, or biases in these organizations assist or obstruct performance or policy making?

D. Required Readings (76 pages)

1. Halperin, Morton H., et al. "Organizational Interests," *Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy*, 2nd edition. Chapter 3, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2006.

2. March, James and Herbert Simon. "Cognitive Limits on Rationality" *Organizations*. 2nd edition. Chapter 6, Cambridge, MA: Blackwell Business, 1993. 157-192. Read pp 160-163, 172-179, 186-188, 190-192.

3. Stephan, Paul. "The Limits of Change: International Human Rights under the Obama Administration," *Fordham Journal of International Law* 35:2 (January 2012), pp. 488-509.

POLICY-12: POLICY COMPROMISES: BARGAINING AND SATISFICING

A. Focus

Rufus E. Miles, Jr. (1910-1996), an official who served in sub-cabinet positions in several Presidential administrations, coined his famous law—"where you stand depends on where you sit"—based on his experiences in government. In the last session, we used the organizational process perspective to examine how individual organizations within the national security apparatus process information an enact policy, with or without guidance from senior leadership. In this session, we introduce another perspective that focuses on organizations within the government—the bureaucratic politics perspective. This perspective emphasizes bargaining *between* different organizations within the government, with the heads of various organizations arguing for policies that protect or promote the interests of their specific agency or department. Policy options are therefore the result of compromises between competing bureaucratic interests rather than a sober assessment of which policy option best serves the national interest, or an automatic output of organizational routines. The resulting policy may not be the optimal choice for securing the "national interest," but is seen as acceptable to competing interests. You will have the opportunity to apply the bureaucratic politics perspective, and contrast it with the organizational process perspective, in brief case studies of the Afghanistan surge decision-making process and the Nuclear Posture Review.

B. Objectives

- Examine the proposition that policy results from a negotiated process conducted between representatives of different organizations who each evaluate a given national security problem in terms of threats or opportunities to their particular organization.
- Analyze how the bureaucratic politics perspective helps to illuminate the dynamics of interagency relations within the U.S. government.
- Examine how Presidential appointees to senior positions in the national security apparatus navigate between their positions as representatives of the President and advocates for the organizations they head.
- Assess how this perspective provides insights into how U.S. national security decisions are made.
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1a, 1b, 1c, 2c, 3a, 4a, 4c, 5c, and 5d.

C. Guidance

1. How does the bureaucratic politics perspective challenge the assumptions of the rational actor model? In David Welch's analysis, how does it differ from the organizational process model? What are the implications of this perspective for the types of policies that an administration might select?

2. What does Kevin Marsh's study of how the Obama administration settled on the "surge" in Afghanistan say about the relevance of the bureaucratic politics model for understanding policy? What are some of the limitations? Do you agree with Marsh's assessment that Afghan surge policy was the result of a compromise that resulted from bargaining between bureaucratic interests and with the President?

3. Can you apply Welch's propositions for Model II and Model III to Joanna Spear's discussion of U.S. nuclear policy during the first term of the Obama administration? Despite clear policy preferences of the President, did the President "suffer setbacks on nuclear policy at the hands of … the American bureaucracy"? How did different parts of the nuclear security enterprise affect the President's preferences over nuclear weapons policy? How could the bureaucracy ensure "business as usual"? How much was the policy constrained by organizational processes, and how much was the result of bureaucratic bargaining?

D. Required Readings (70 pages)

1. Welch, David. "The Organizational Process and Bureaucratic Politics Paradigms: Retrospect and Prospect," *International Security* 17:2 (Autumn 1992), pp. 112-146.

2. Marsh, Kevin. "Obama's Surge: A Bureaucratic Politics Analysis of the Decision to Order a Troop Surge in the Afghanistan War," *Foreign Policy Analysis* (2013).

3. Spear, Joanna. "More Business as Usual? The Obama Administration and the Nuclear Posture Review," *Contemporary Security Policy* 32:1 (2011), pp. 241-263.

POLICY ANALYSIS-13: EXECUTIVE BRANCH CASE STUDY: THE DECISIONS ON WHETHER AND HOW TO INTERVENE IN SYRIA

A. Focus

This session provides an opportunity to take a recent national security decision and apply the five perspectives on decision-making to assess a recent major national security decision--the series of decisions by President Barack Obama regarding whether and how to intervene in Syria. To what extent did decision-making within the Obama administration on this question approximate or fall short of the expectations laid out by the Rational Actor Model? Did different national security organizations--both military and civilian--attempt to shape the decision in accordance with their own organizational preferences? What sorts of negotiation took place over policy between the heads of the major national security actors in the executive branch--and was the final decision a result of compromises reached between different actors? How did those in the inner circle around the President attempt to influence the decision—and who had access to the President's ear? Finally, how did the President's own personal views, beliefs and perceptions impact the final decision?

B. Objectives

- Assess the different perspectives' utility in understanding the dynamics of decision-making within the Executive Branch on a major national security issue

- Apply policy analysis concepts by comparing the applicability of different theories of decision-making to an actual national security decision

- Evaluate the influence of organizational, interagency, and personality factors on the decision-making process at the Presidential level

- Apply the lessons of the previous sessions dealing with the Presidency and the Executive Branch

- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1a, 1b, 1d, 2a, 3b, 4c, 5a, and 5e.

C. Guidance

1. Christopher Hill was quoted as follows in Policy-2: "Understanding how foreign policy decisions are arrived at, implemented and eventually changed is not a matter of a single theory, even less of generalizing on the basis of a specific case. It involves doing justice to the richness and complexity of the foreign policy universe." In assessing this decision, do you find this to be the case, or do you believe that one perspective offers greater explanatory value in understanding the final decision?

2. Did the interagency process and the National Security Council system work to bring all policy options to the table and to the attention of the President? Was there an effective assessment of the costs and benefits of different courses of action? What lessons do you derive

from the assessment of how organizations and processes within the Executive Branch functioned in terms of developing policy on Syria?

3. As you read the case, consider the various national security organizations--both civilian and military (such as CENTCOM, the Air Force, the Navy, the special warfare communities, the State Department (particularly the Near East bureau), the diplomatic liaisons to NATO, and the CIA)—as well as the perspectives and concerns of Congress--and assess what their position as to the desirability of an intervention in Syria might be. Would some organizations be in favor of an intervention--and why? Why might others oppose it? Consider also how those organizations with a vested interest in seeing through the "rebalance to Asia" might react to a Syria mission. Would different portions of the national security bureaucracy have different perspectives on a possible Syria mission? Can you detect any influence organizational process might have had on decision-making?

4. How important was the make-up of the "room" when decisions were made? Would there have been a different outcome if Secretary Gates and/or Secretary Clinton were still holding their respective offices? Would a different NSC process have enhanced or blocked certain voices advocating for particular policy outcomes?

5. How did Presidential perspectives (and those of senior policymakers and advisors) on questions such as the responsibility to protect, the progressing humanitarian disaster, the trajectory of the Arab Spring, the efficacy of airpower, and the efficacy of training local fighting forces impact decision-making?

D. Required Reading

1. "Crisis in Syria: U.S. Responses," assembled by Policy Analysis Faculty. This reading will be made available on Blackboard.

POLICY ANALYSIS-14: CONGRESS AND NATIONAL SECURITY

A. Focus

As the noted constitutional scholar Edwin Corwin observed in 1955, the separation of powers outlined in the Constitution is "an invitation to struggle for the privilege of directing American foreign policy." This session examines the role played by Congress in the national security domain. Article I of the Constitution describes many of the specific powers of Congress (such as declaring war) while offering ambiguous guidance on the other roles of the legislature. At the same time, the Constitution offers Congress a number of potentially potent levers in policy debates, in particular the "power of the purse:" the right of Congress to have the final say over government funding.

Nonetheless, Congress faces many major obstacles in any effort to influence national security policy. The legislature of the United States is composed of hundreds of people and their staffs, and there is a wide diversity of views within Congress itself as an institution. The Constitution also grants the President considerable independence in the employment of the instruments of government in the area of national security. These prerogatives have been strengthened by an American cultural preference for an energetic chief executive.

In a system of separated powers, Congress has the power to vote on major programs and initiatives, but it cannot direct the daily operations of the Executive. As a consequence, how Congress exercises many of its powers is tied to its relationship with the Executive Branch. And because Congress is more connected to the American voter (by representing fewer people in more frequent elections than the Executive), Congressional activity is heavily influenced by the domestic and international environment in which national security decisions are made. At times of national angst – such as during the Vietnam War – Congress will demand, and gain, a more potent voice in foreign policy. By contrast, during times of crisis (such as the Cuban crisis of 1962), when the Executive Branch is reacting quickly to external threats and is deliberating in secrecy, Congressional influence on national security decisions may decline.

This session explores Congress' role in national security affairs, examines the levers of power that the Legislative Branch has at its disposal, and investigates how Congress uses these capabilities in order to influence the national security and foreign policy making process.

B. Objectives

- Identify the role of the Legislative Branch in the policy making process.
- Explain the interrelated, and at time conflicted, relationship between the Legislative Branch and Executive Branch in national security decisions.
- Examine the special relationship between Congress and the U.S. military.
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1b, 4a, 5a, 5b and 5c.

C. Guidance

1. Article I of the Constitution serves as the first reading, with the aim of reviewing the foundational authority establishing the separation of powers of our system of government. What aspects of Article I of the Constitution affects national security decisions? For each of these relevant aspects, why do you think the framers of the Constitution employed the language and guidance that they did?

2. Has Congress fared well or poorly, in your view, in attempts to participate in foreign policy debates? To what extent does Congress constrain Presidential authority, and is the role Congress plays too broad or too limited, especially when compared with the Executive's actions in national security affairs? The book chapter by Gerald Warburg and the complementing chapter from Amos Jordan et al. are particularly relevant for this question.

3. In matters of foreign policy, what are the important elements over which Congress has considerable control? Are there parts of the process over which Congress could exercise control, but chooses not to? What aspects of national security policy does Congress have *no* control over? Consider the Warburg chapter, the Stephen Knott reading, and the chapter from Jordan et al. in particular.

4. Stephen Knott argues that the notion of an "invitation to struggle" between Congress and the President regarding the direction of American defense and foreign policy has always been a lopsided affair, with the Executive Branch dominating the "struggle." How did the early days of the Constitution contribute to giving the President the advantage in this "struggle?"

5. Recall the Lebanon case study from earlier in the semester. How would you evaluate Congressional participation in this case? What impact did Congress have?

D. Required Readings (65 pages)

1. Review Article I in *The Constitution of the United States of America.* Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1997.

2. Warburg, Gerald Felix. "Congress: Checking Presidential Power," in *The National Security Enterprise: Navigating the Labyrinth*, eds. Roger Z. George and Harvey Rishikof (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2011), pp. 227-246. **(Textbook not available on Blackboard, hardcopy will be provided.)**

3. Jordan, Amos A., William J. Taylor Jr., Michael J. Meese and Suzanne C. Nielsen. *American National Security*, 4th edition (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009). Chapter 5, "Congress," pp. 103-122.

4. Knott, Stephen F. "The Founding Fathers and the War Power," Newport, RI: Naval War College Faculty Paper, June 2011.

5. Mazzetti, Mark. "Saudi Arabia Warns of Economic Fallout if Congress Passes 9/11 Bill." *New York Times*, April 15, 2016.

POLICY ANALYSIS-15: DIPLOMACY AND NATIONAL SECURITY

A. Focus

State and Defense have worked together closely since World War II. Today, we frequently speak about the D-I-M-E as reflecting the sources of American power with the "D" representing "diplomacy." Nevertheless, there remains considerable debate about the importance of diplomacy in the 21st century and misunderstanding about the mandate and capabilities of the Department of State. To be effective, national security practitioners—particularly military officers—must have a good appreciation of the scope, strength and limitations of diplomacy.

B. Objectives

- Demonstrate an understanding of the traditional role of diplomacy and the State Department in national security issues.
- Analyze the focus, capabilities, and limitations of the Department of State.
- Using the German unification case, appraise the potential for conflict resolution using diplomacy, including the role of the President, Secretary of State, and State Department proper.
- Examine the changes the State Department is undergoing in order to respond more successfully to the challenges of the last decade.
- Assess the challenges State has faced with regard to planning and budgeting.
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1a, 1b, 1e, 2c, 3a, 3c, 3d, 4a, 5a, 5b, 5d, and 5e.

C. Guidance

1. What are the missions of the State Department? How would you describe State's mission when compared to that of Defense?

2. What are the primary functions of the U.S. Foreign Service? How is it staffed and funded to conduct the mission of diplomacy?

3. How powerful is diplomacy? Can it be used effectively to solve problems? Resolve conflict?

4. What role did diplomacy play in resolving German reunification? What role did the Department of Defense (DoD) play with State?

5. Former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice called for "transformational diplomacy." What do you think of her proposal? Former Deputy Secretary Bill Burns' "10 Parting Thoughts…" presents his thinking on improving the State Department. What do you think of these proposals? In any dealings you have had with State Department/Foreign Service personnel, do you see them acting in a transformational manner?

6. How effective is "coercive diplomacy"? Are there ways to make it more effective?

7. Sanctions/coercive diplomacy are a tool that the United States is extensively using in Iran, Russia over the Ukraine, North Korea among other countries. What are the strengths and weakness of coercive diplomacy and sanctions?

8. The American Academy of Diplomacy in 2015 issued a report entitled "American Diplomacy at Risk." One of the reports major conclusions is that the "…increasing politicization undermines institutional strength." Does this issue matter?

9. Fifty-one State officers issued a "dissent channel" message objecting to U.S. policy vis-à-vis Syria. Annually, the American Foreign Service Association issues awards for effective dissent. Do you think State officers should have an institutional capacity to dissent? What career ramifications do you think dissenting has on a Foreign Service Officer's career? Can you dissent in the U.S. military?

D. Required Readings (65 pages)

1. Marks, Edward. "The State Department: No Longer the Gatekeeper," in Adams, Gordon and Murray, Shoon (eds.). *Mission Creep: The Militarization of US Foreign Policy?* (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2014). **(Textbook not available on Blackboard, hardcopy will be provided.)**

2. Ross, Dennis. *Statecraft: {And How to Restore America's Standing in the World}*. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2007, Chapter 2.

3. Burns, William. "10 Parting Thoughts for America's Diplomats," *Foreign Policy.* October 23, 2014.

4. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. "Transformational Diplomacy: Address at Georgetown University," Washington, DC: January 18, 2006.

5. Jervis, Robert. "The Challenges of Coercive Diplomacy," *Foreign Affairs*, December 3, 2012.

6. Hudson, John and Dan De Luce. "Diplomats' Dissent Bolsters Calls for U.S. Assault on Assad," *Foreign Policy* June 17, 2016.

POLICY ANALYSIS-16: INTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY MAKING

A. Focus

The Intelligence Community (IC) today includes 16 different agencies across the U.S. Government overseen by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. The role played by intelligence agencies, collectors, and analysts has changed over time, as the challenges posed by the international environment have transformed and grown, as new threats such as al Qaeda and ISIS/ISIL have emerged and threatened U.S. national security, and as lessons have been learned from intelligence successes and failures made in the past. In all these respects, however, one objective remains constant: enhancing the ability of the IC to provide critical and timely intelligence to policy makers while ensuring intelligence professionals remain neutral in policy decision making itself. This objective can be difficult to uphold, however, particularly in times of crisis and in the face of policy makers who quite naturally seek more definitive answers to critical national security concerns and support from the intelligence community to make hard decisions. The very nature of intelligence is uncertainty, yet policy decision makers must nevertheless make decisions on what to do. As a result, the relationship between policy makers and the Intelligence Community will remain one fraught with tension.

B. Objectives

- Examine the basic purpose, structure, and processes of the Intelligence Community.

- Identify key issues and dynamics in the relationship between intelligence professionals and national security policy decision makers, particularly when affecting matters of foreign and defense policy.

- Supports CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1a, 1b, and 3d.

C. Guidance

1. The formal U.S. Intelligence Community originates from the National Security Act of 1947 passed in the aftermath of World War II and in response to the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor. This basic structure was amended post-9/11 with the addition of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) to oversee the entire Intelligence Community, as outlined in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) of 2004.

2. How have intelligence successes and failures shaped the IC (e.g., the fall of the Soviet Union, the September 11, 2001 attack, the issue of WMD in Iraq in 2003, or the failure to anticipate Arab Spring uprisings), and how has the relationship between the intelligence community and policy decision makers changed over time? What characterizes this relationship today and why?

3. What cognitive, institutional, or cultural biases or other distinct ways of thinking can affect intelligence collection, analysis, products, and input into decision making? How is this

different from how policy decision makers view intelligence and incorporate it into policy decisions affecting US allies, friends, partners and adversaries? What sort of intelligence might change deeply held or long-established views (if any)? In what ways does the IC support policy decision making, and what role does the President's Daily Brief play?

4. What effect(s) does modern technology have on the intelligence collection and analysis functions and on how findings and products are received and employed by policy makers? What are the policy decision making implications from modern intelligence collection and analytical methods, bureaucratic structures, and the global scope of intelligence-related activities and interests?

D. Required Readings (42 pages)

1. Jervis, Robert. "Why Intelligence and Policymakers Clash," *Political Science Quarterly*, vol. 125, no. 2 (Summer 2010), pp. 185-204. http://www.psqonline.org/article.cfm?IDArticle=18584#

2. George, Roger Z. "The Art of Strategy and Intelligence," Chapter 11 in *Analyzing Intelligence: National Security Practitioners' Perspectives*, 2nd ed., Roger Z. George and James B. Bruce, eds. (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2014), pp. 181-195.

3. Priess, David. "All the President's Secrets: The History of the President's Daily Briefing," *Foreign Affairs* - Snapshot (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, February 26, 2016). https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2016-02-26/all-presidents-secrets.

E. Foundational Reading

1. Office of the Director of National Intelligence, *National Intelligence Strategy of the United States of America* (2014) http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/2014_NIS_Publication.pdf

POLICY ANALYSIS-17: ORGANIZED PRESSURE: THINK TANKS, LOBBIES, & INTEREST GROUPS

A. Focus

This session provides additional information and insights into the sometimes obscure world of foreign policy and national security think tank experts, interest groups and lobbyists. This community and network of non-governmental actors has grown significantly in size, scope, and influence over the past half century and is being replicated in various foreign capitals. But what impact are they having on U.S. national security policy decision making, how do they gain and wield their influence, and can it be measured? Can these actors affect how national security policy is conceived, developed, and executed? This session should raise questions about what types of power and influence such actors possess, how they seek to influence policies, lawmakers and policy decision makers, and what impact they and their ideas can have on national-level policy decision making and decision makers.

B. Objectives

- Examine the role that think tanks, interest groups, lobbyists and other non-governmental actors play in influencing policy and legislative decisions in the defense and national security realms.

- Analyze how these institutions and individuals function, why they function as they do, what stakes and interests they have in policy decision making processes, what impact they might have (or not) on policy agendas, alternatives, decisions and the implications thereof for policy making, as well as how outside actors' channels and levers of influence have formed and are changing in the 21st century.

- Develop the ability to critically assess the different sorts of data, products, publications, connections, and other sources of information, analysis, influence and inputs these institutions and actors use and produce as well as understand the networks they employ to try to influence policy decisions and decisionmaking processes.

- Evaluate under what circumstances outside actors might have the most (or least) impact on policy decisions and why.

- Supports CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1a, 1b, 2c, 3a, and 4a.

C. Guidance

1. The readings by Gerald Warburg and Ellen Laipson demonstrate particular examples of the influences of think tanks and lobbies on the national security enterprise. Do the tangible products and intangible influences developed by these organized efforts impact national security policy decision makers? If so, why and how?

2. John Kingdon's reading describes how actors outside the government interact with those inside to help set agendas, devise alternatives to perceived problems, and seek to take advantage of windows of opportunity that arise in addressing policies, politics, and problems.

3. Given the dynamism of the lobbying, think-tank, and non-governmental sector overall, what implications arise for the policy- and law-making processes, and what impact might such dynamics have on national security policy decisions and your role in supporting national security affairs? How do think tanks and other non-governmental actors work independently and cooperatively to try to influence policy decision making in the US and other countries? Are there differences in the how lobbies, interest groups and think tanks influence foreign policy as compared to domestic policy? If so, how, why and so what?

D. Required Readings (52 pages)

1. Warburg, Gerald Felix. "Lobbyists: U.S. National Security and Special Interests," in *The National Security Enterprise: Navigating the Labyrinth,* Roger Z. George and Harvey Rishikof, eds. (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2011), pp. 269-288. **(Textbook not available on Blackboard, hardcopy will be provided.)**

2. Laipson, Ellen. "Thinks Tanks: Supporting Cast Players in the National Security Enterprise," in *The National Security Enterprise: Navigating the Labyrinth,* Roger Z. George and Harvey Rishikof, eds. (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2011), pp. 289-300. **(Textbook not available on Blackboard, hardcopy will be provided.)**

3. Kingdon, John W. "Wrapping Things Up," in *Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policies,* 2nd ed. (New York: Little, Brown & Company: 1995), 196-208.

4. Medhora, Rohinton P., and John de Boer. "The Rise and Influence of the Foreign Policy Think Tank" (Tokyo: United Nations University Center for Policy Research, November 30, 2015), accessible online at http://cpr.unu.edu/the-rise-and-influence-of-the-foreign-policy-think-tank.html

5. *Faculty may supplement required readings with timely material(s) relevant to this topic.*

POLICY ANALYSIS-18: PUBLIC OPINION AND THE MEDIA

A. Focus

Public opinion potentially represents one of the most critical factors involved in policy making, yet it is not easy to energize or control. The U.S. Constitution specifies that Congress has the authority to declare war, implying that the framers of the Constitution believed that the branch of government that was, in some respects, more "attuned" to the will of the people should determine when the nation musters itself for war. Numerous actors in both the national security and the domestic political systems attempt to sway public opinion in an effort to influence and guide policy. No leader, including senior military leaders, can afford to ignore public opinion.

The majority of the U.S. public gets its knowledge of domestic and international events from mass media sources. Leaders in government (including senior military figures) and of special interest groups seek to harness the media to communicate their message and garner support for their agendas. This is not to imply the media is solely a passive participant in the process of forming public opinion, however. Great debates have raged regarding the role of the media in this process, particularly on the issue of how media outlets decide to shape their reporting. The sometimes uneasy relationship between the media and the military also bears on the formulation of public opinion. In recent years, the issue of how best to balance security needs against the constitutional right to a free press has raised significant questions regarding the public's right to be informed. This session focuses on public opinion, the news media, and the complex ways in which they can and do interact with each other.

B. Objectives

- Analyze and discuss the strengths and dangers of public opinion, how public opinion is formed, and how it can impact the national security decision making process.

- Appraise how the national and international media may influence public opinion.

- Assess the often uneasy relationship between the media and the military and how to balance the requirements of operational security and First Amendment rights.

- Examine media bias and its effects on public opinion and, by extension, policymaking.

- Evaluate how recent highly publicized "leaks" and the ever-present presence of social media might further complicate the relationship between public opinion, the media and national security decision making.

- Support CJCS Learning Area 2c, 5b, and 5d.

C. Guidance

1. Douglas Foyle's chapter offers an excellent survey of recent work on the intersection between public opinion and foreign policy. How is public opinion formed? How powerful a force is public opinion on national security decisions? Is the U.S. public sufficiently well-informed to have a say in national security policies?

2. John Diamond's chapter from the textbook provides a broad overview of the role, methods, and culture of reporters who work the national security "beat" within the traditional media. How does this insider's perspective track with your views on the media? How does the rapid evolution of consumer information technology alter the picture that Diamond paints?

3. The reading from Tom Breen discusses the opportunities available to a sophisticated military to manipulate media reports. What are the advantages and disadvantages of such tactics? How do moral considerations conflict with strategic considerations? Does modern information technology require changes in past practices?

4. John MacArthur is a journalist critiquing the media's reporting prior to the invasion of Iraq in 2003. Do you agree with MacArthur's assessment? Why would a supposedly liberal media fail to robustly investigate a Republican president's assertions? What does the industry's self-criticism say about the nature of the enterprise?

5. The report by Shibley Telhami offers data on public attitudes regarding two major national security concerns for the United States, ISIS and Syria. What is your reaction to these polling data? How should they influence U.S. policy? Is this an example of the U.S. public overreacting, or underreacting?

D. Required Readings (64 pages)

1. Foyle, Douglas C. "Public Opinion, Foreign Policy, and the Media: Toward a More Integrative Theory," In George C. Edwards III et al., *The Oxford Handbook of American Public Opinion and the Media* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), chapter 40, pp. 658-674.

2. Diamond, John. "The Media: Witness to the National Security Enterprise," in *The National Security Enterprise: Navigating the Labyrinth,* Roger Z. George and Harvey Rishikof, eds. (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2011), pp. 301-330. **(Textbook not available on Blackboard, hardcopy will be provided.)**

3. Breen, Tom. "Bad News: Should Media Manipulation be a Tool of War?" *Armed Forces Journal,* February 1, 2005.

4. MacArthur, John R. "The Lies We Bought: The Unchallenged 'Evidence' for War." *Columbia Journalism Review,* May/June 2003, Vol. 42, No. 1, pp. 62-63.

5. Telhami, Shibley. "American Public Attitudes Toward ISIS and Syria," Brookings Institution, January 8, 2015.

POLICY ANALYSIS-19: CASE STUDY: CULMINATING EXERCISE

A. Focus

A consistent theme stressed throughout the Policy Analysis sub-course is that it is essential for a national security professional to understand the range of international and domestic actors and influences that can impact theater security. Previous case studies demonstrated that it is possible to use sub-course principles to answer historical policy making questions, such as "why did President Reagan send Marines into Beirut the second time," as well as help weigh the probability, however broadly of future decisions. The ability to perform such analysis is quite useful for gaining insight into the interactions among the different components that make up the national security system, as well as the connections between the domestic and international political systems, and the influences of different patterns of decision making. In addition, these course concepts allow national security practitioners to also more accurately understand the forces at work in shaping current policy. This session provides an opportunity to comprehensively exercise and apply Policy Analysis concepts to a contemporary policy case study. It will allow students to use sub-course concepts to engage in policy analysis of a national security issue, to understand the organizational dynamics which may impact policy, as well as the interactions among the different components which make up the U.S. national security system, and the influences of both the domestic (U.S.) environment and the global (international) environment. The current policy analysis seeks to provide an opportunity to discuss current actors and influences, and the relationships among them.

B. Objectives

- Evaluate and assess the multiple and often competing influences that affect national security decision making on a contemporary policy issue.

- Assess and evaluate realistic policy objectives and evaluate the likelihood of various policy decisions using the tools provided in the Policy sub-course.

- Apply and synthesize sub-course concepts to provide an analysis of policy choices facing senior decision-makers

- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1a, 1b, 1d, 2e, 3a, 5b, and 5e.

C. Guidance

1. In examining the policy or scenario presented, what were the most important domestic and international influences on U.S. national security leaders? Why were these influences important? Be prepared to explain which of these influences you felt to be the most important and why they were the most important.

2. Did the international and domestic pressures affect all the actors in the national security system equally? What evidence did you find when you applied each of the five perspectives on

national security decision making? What insights do you gain from each of the perspectives? Which perspective, if any, provided the majority of explanatory power for the decision?

3. The well-known national security analyst Richard Kugler observes, “Any good policy analysis must start with a rich conceptualization of the key variables and their relationships.” How was the decision environment for this case set? At what level of the U.S. national security system was the issue primarily handled? What are the organizational influences at play? How does the U.S. domestic political system and the international context impact possible courses of action?

4. In 2011, former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger observed that that the U.S. Government is "too complex" these days, with "too many urgent things" forcing a focus on the everyday and preventing bold, strategic moves. Furthermore, even if a strategic thinker were able to undertake a bold initiative, "bureaucratic disputes" would almost surely bog the process down. (See URL: http://www.acus.org/new_atlanticist/kissinger-offers-mixed-reviews-obama-china-policy) How were various courses of action proposed, received, and dealt with by different government agencies, departments, and constituents? How did the interagency process deal with different recommendations for action?

5. This sub-course is grounded in the observation that “politics is the art of the possible.” How were strategic considerations—with an emphasis on finding optimal outcomes—reconciled with this dictum? Was the “best” strategic response to the question posed in this exercise diluted or even abandoned for reasons of politics?

D. Required Reading

1. A case study will be distributed in class prior to this session.

POLICY ANALYSIS-20: FINAL CASE STUDY ANALYSIS

A. Focus

This is a graded written exercise that will represent 25 percent of your overall NSDM grade. This exercise provides an opportunity for you to demonstrate your comprehension of the material presented in the Policy Analysis sub-course. You will be given a case study on a contemporary national security issue which provides the context for you to develop an analytical product using sub-course concepts and materials, relying on insights gained from the readings and sessions of the sub-course.

B. Objectives

- Synthesize the various concepts and theories presented throughout the entirety of this sub-course into a policy analysis of U.S. national security decision making.

- This analysis should be used to assess and evaluate which influences are the most critical in determining particular policy choices.

- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1a, 1b, 1d, 2e, 3a, 5b, and 5e.

C. Guidance

1. Additional guidance will be provided in class on the specific format and methodology for the written product you will be asked to submit. In addition, please review the guidance questions provided for Policy-19.

D. Required Reading

1. Materials will be distributed prior to the final case study analysis.

POLICY ANALYSIS-21: INTRODUCTION TO FORCE PLANNING

A. Focus

Force planning is the art of translating strategic guidance into the size and shape of the future force to advance and defend national interests. Force planning decisions are inherently political decisions, in that choices must be made about where to allocate scarce resources, how to posture the military to meet the president's needs, ways to prioritize missions, and approaches to accepting risk. In the short term, force planning aims to correct deficiencies in the current force based on operational demands. In the long term, force planning is designed to ensure the country has the military it needs for the future operating environment in spite of uncertainty, complexity and ambiguity.

Force planning is the product of three inter-related factors: strategic guidance, assessments of the future, and the policy making environment. By strategic guidance we mean the strategic choices that reflect a long-term approach to how the United States sees its role and interaction with the rest of the world. By assessments of the future, we mean those factors (new and persistent threats, changing demographics, prevailing ideas and ideologies, competing states, and transnational challenges such as climate change) that strategists must consider when developing ways and means to achieve the desired ends. These international factors, largely outside U.S. control, exert pressure (while also creating opportunities) on U.S. strategy and force development. Both of these first two strands have been and will continue to be covered in the Security Strategies sub-course. The third factor is the domestic policy making environment, by which we mean those domestic factors that converge, compete and sometimes conflict between the policy realm, the desires of strategy, and the requirements of national leadership. These impacts on force development include the intersection of corporate interests, Congressional interests (especially distributive politics), media, special interests, laws, and public opinion.

B. Objectives

- Analyze how strategic guidance is translated into a force structure that can execute operations in support of national strategic objectives.

- Assess the impact of the political environment and competing fiscal priorities impact force planning.

- Analyze and assess different approaches to force planning.

- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1a, 1b, 1e, 3a, 3b and 3e.

C. Guidance

1. Mackubin Owens explains the "strategic logic of force planning" and offers other approaches while noting that the force planner can never ignore domestic factors. He takes his bearings from the taxonomy that Samuel Huntington laid out in his book *The Common Defense*. In this seminal work, Huntington classified defense decisions as reflecting both strategic and

structural factors. Force planning, Owens asserts, lies at the crossroads of strategy and structure. Not only must force planners decide the right mix of forces in a defense budget, they must also come to terms with how much is enough? While the force planner might prefer to take a strategy-driven "top-down," approach, in practice, force planning all-to-often becomes a witch's brew in which structural elements intrude on the strategic logic of force planning. What strategic and structural factors do force planners need to take into account when developing a force structure? What insights does Mark Guzinger offer from the last 20 years of force planning? Is it ever possible for Congress to address military force structure and programs while remaining impervious to structural demands placed on them by lobbies, voters and the national mood?

2. Setting aside the merits of having 12 aircraft carriers, why do you think Representative Mike Conaway wrote an op-ed in support of the idea?

3. Based on the interview with Representative Randy Forbes, what are the other actors and influences that impact force planning?

D. Required Readings (46 pages)

1. Owens, Mackubin T. "Force Planning: The Crossroads of Strategy and the Political Process." *Orbis*, Summer 2015, pp. 411-437.

2. Guzinger, Mark. "Shaping America's Future Military toward a New Force Planning Construct," Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2013, pp. 17-28.

3. Conaway, Mike. "12th U.S. Aircraft Carrier Necessary In Increasingly Dangerous World," *Defense News*, April 21, 2016, pp. 1-2.

4. Cavas, Christopher P. "Interview: Randy Forbes, Chairman, House Seapower and Projection Forces Subcommittee," Defense News, April 24, 2016.

E. Foundational Reading

1. Gvosdev, Nikolas K. "Force Planning from Strategy to Procurement: Walking Through the Documents." Newport, RI: Faculty Paper, June 2015.

POLICY ANALYSIS-22: THE REALITIES OF FORCE PLANNING: FROM CONCEPTS TO CAPABILITIES

A. Focus

Force planning exists at the crossroads of strategy, international security, and domestic politics. Force planning must answer, at a minimum, three questions: 1) What characteristics should the force possess? 2) How much "defense" is enough? 3) What risks are associated with the force and how can we manage them? As Sean Sullivan has observed, the task at hand "is to allocate limited national resources to force structure development that provides relevant military capabilities against adversaries of the state in support of national interests and strategy."

National strategic documents set out the overall objectives for the U.S. defense establishment. Mandated by Congress, the Department of Defense (DoD) undertakes a comprehensive review every four years to balance strategic objectives with available resources, and, in turn, is expected to provide guidance that can translate strategy into resource priorities. This force planning construct is expected to address the challenges for which the U.S. military needs to be organized, trained and equipped to meet presidentially-directed operations. In addition, force planners must be able to translate the various concepts which have been developed as ways to execute and implement strategy into capabilities which can then be addressed by either materiel or non-materiel solutions. Ultimately, a force ought to be set up and equipped that is capable of implementing national strategy.

B. Objectives

- Analyze the policy making process that the U.S. Government uses to translate strategy into defense requirements and programs.

- Assess the process to allocate defense resources in support of the nation's defense in various scenarios.

- Appraise the process by which strategic concepts guide the development of capabilities and are turned into requirements.

- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1a, 1b, 1e, 3a, 3b and 3e.

C. Guidance

1. National strategic documents set the overall objectives for the U.S. defense establishment. The DoD regularly undertakes a comprehensive review to assess the force's ability to meet strategic objectives. Relying on a force planning construct, those responsible for developing military force structure attempt to answer the question, what will the government ask the military to do and what is needed to meet these objectives? The president communicates the answer through strategy and policy directives, and Congress communicates through authorities and appropriations. The various actors shaping military force structure consider the security environment where military forces will operate, the demands allies create for U.S. military

presence, defense budgetary priorities and constraints, and likely presidential uses of the military. How does budget impact strategy? How can the DoD leverage partners and allies more?

2. One of the enduring changes to defense planning that Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld made was the introduction of capabilities-based planning. In contrast to the Cold War model of "be better than the Soviets" or the 1990s model of threat-based planning against Iraq and North Korea, capabilities-based planning broadens the scope. It asks the question, what type of capabilities does the military need? What are the criticisms of this approach to force planning? What challenges are created between meeting today's needs while planning for the future? Should the validation of capabilities be separated from the assessment of their budgetary impact? In examining the force development process, is there a clear progression from the enunciation of concepts to the development of capabilities? Based on the Sean Sullivan and Moshe Schwartz readings, to what extent would you conclude that strategic considerations guide the development and procurement of weapons systems? To what extent does process and leadership lead to effective force planning decisions?

3. Evan Montgomery argues, "given the diverse array of existing and potential threats described, it seems increasingly clear that the U.S. military will have to reexamine its force structure, investment options, and methods of employment in order to remain highly effective across the range of very different—and very demanding—operational challenges that it must be prepared to face." Using scenarios can help identify gaps and excesses in current force structure. Considering the range of military operations, what are the most likely types of operations the U.S. military will engage in over the next 20 years? What are the implications for the current force structure described in the QDR in pages 39-41? What scenarios should the United States consider for major combat and what are the implications for each of the services?

D. Required Readings (70 pages)

1. Quadrennial Defense Review 2014 Report, Washington, DC: Department of Defense, February 2014, pp. 27-52, 59-64.

2. Schwartz, Moshe. *Defense Acquisitions: How DoD Acquires Weapons Systems and Recent Efforts to Reform the Process*. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service Report RL34026, January 2, 2013, pp. 1-14.

3. Sullivan, Sean. "U.S. Force Planning, the Decision to Apply a Capabilities-based Approach." Naval War College Faculty Paper, Sept 2012, pp. 2-13.

4. Montgomery, Evan. "Defense Planning for the Long Haul: Scenarios, Operational Concepts, and the Future Security Environment," Center for Strategic and Budgetary Analysis, 2009, Chapter 6, pp. 45-55.

E. Foundational Readings

1. 2017 Defense Posture Statement: Taking the Long View, Investing for the Future, February 2016.

2. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Guidance for Development and Implementation of Joint Concepts," CJCSI 3010.02D, November 22, 2013.

POLICY ANALYSIS-23: THE DEFENSE BUDGET & DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL BASE

A. **Focus**

While adjustments have been made over time, the overall approach to making defense programming, budgeting, and related resource decisions in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) has remained largely the same for decades. In fact, the current defense planning, programming, budgeting and execution (PPBE) system dates back to the 1960s; it remains a useful (if imperfect) tool to help policymakers make difficult strategic decisions. At the same time, policymakers are faced with a kaleidoscope of new 21st century challenges that are impacting strategy, force planning, budgeting and resourcing and in ways not always easily addressed by current processes nor in an era of mandatory budget caps on discretionary spending (which includes the defense budget). This session serves to connect our discussion of strategic ends and ways with means and to help identify and explain where and why there might be gaps in strategic logic.

In thinking about defense budgets and the defense industrial base, it is important to keep in mind that Article I of the U.S. Constitution granted Congress the power to raise revenue, borrow money for the United States and to create laws that appropriate money from the Treasury. Additionally, the Constitution requires Congress to provide and maintain a navy and to raise and support armies providing that no appropriation for the purpose of raising and supporting the army is longer than two years. Article II of the Constitution vests all executive power with the President and designates the President as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States. The United States Defense Budget is an annual appropriation by Congress and its content and funding level is the collaborative result of the Legislative and Executive Branches of government. It reflects numerous and often competing influences such as national strategy, trends in the international security environment, defense organizational interests, political and military leadership, national economic conditions and domestic politics.

The U.S. Defense Budget is developed through formal process and political art. It is the product of a complex, iterative, and analytical process of decision making. Current law requires the President to submit the budget proposal to Congress no later than the first Monday in February. However, DoD, the Services, and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) have been working on that budget for eighteen months before it is presented to the Congress. The President's budget submission is used to express the priorities of the administration and a recommended level of government spending. Once the President's proposal is received, the legislative process is engaged. Department and agency officials testify to explain and justify of their budget request. Congress then engages in legislative activity that creates a series of appropriations and mandatory spending bills that collectively represent the Federal Budget. Two simultaneous processes take place in the Congress: 1) the authorization process, which provides DoD with the authorities to undertake activities, and 2) the appropriations process, which provides the actual money.

In the coming fiscal years, the Defense Budget will be impacted by national strategy, statutory restrictions, domestic economic factors, and federal budget influences and constraints.

Historically, defense spending has decreased significantly after war termination. For example, using OSD Comptroller statistics, after the Korean War, the U.S. defense budget was reduced by 42% between 1952-56; reduced 29% after the Vietnam War between 1968-74; and 33% after the Cold War between 1986-98. In August of 2011, the Congress passed the Budget Control Act (BCA) of 2011. The act was a bipartisan compromise that allowed the Congress to increase the U.S. debt ceiling in exchange for a 10-year commitment from legislators to cap discretionary spending between 2012-2021. The BCA of 2011 anticipated mutually acceptable budget reductions. When this did not occur, it triggered automatic spending cuts under the BCA to enter into effect on January 2, 2013, a deadline subsequently delayed to March 1, 2013 when President Obama signed a sequestration order on that date. The Bipartisan Budget Act (BBA) of 2013 relaxed the sequestration caps for fiscal years 2014 and 2015, while extending the sequestration period from 2021 to 2023.

"Sequestration" is a process of automatic, largely across-the-board (discretionary) spending reductions under which budgetary resources are permanently canceled for the remainder of the fiscal year to enforce certain budget policy goals. It was first authorized by the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act (BBEDCA) of 1985, commonly known as the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act). Sequestration is of current interest because it has been triggered as an enforcement tool under the BCA of 2011 and, so, directly affects both near- and long-term policy decisions on strategic budgeting, programming, and resourcing.

The Department of Defense has sought to address the challenges posed by sequestration-related budget caps in various ways: by submitting budgets to Congress that do not reflect required defense spending reductions from the Budget Control Act of 2011 (citing the risks and likely shortfalls doing so would incur), or by shifting (or accepting Congressional actions to shift) some funds from the base budget to the supplemental or Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) fund, which is not affected by sequestration-related caps. These and other policy decisions also hold short- and long-term repercussions for strategic planning.

In addition to the budgetary realities, DoD must be aware of the impact its strategic and policy decisions have on the U.S. defense industrial base and vice versa. This issue involves not just questions of strengthening existing defense industry sectors, capabilities, and expertise (when, where, why, how and at what cost), but also how to maintain an increasingly commercialized and internationally dispersed defense industrial base that is competitive, innovative, and responsive to DoD's requirements.

B. Objectives

- Analyze the relationship among the projected future security environment, national strategy, strategic objectives, policy decision making and defense spending in the U.S.

- Understand the options, choices, and trade offs regarding future defense spending by the United States.

- Understand the role of the President, Congress, and Department of Defense in preparing and approving the defense authorization and appropriation process.

- Understand the challenge to DOD and the U.S. defense industry to maintain an innovative, superior, and efficient defense industry in a time of demanding challenges.

- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 3b, 3e, and 5b.

C. Guidance

1. How important is an understanding of the "means" available to DoD? What does that imply for our strategic "ways" and "ends"?

2. Gordon Adams and Cindy Williams describe the internal process used by DoD to validate programs and to establish a budget. Do you believe this approach continues to have merit? Why has it persisted for so long? What role does SecDef play in the process? The Services? Combatant Commanders?

3. In recent years, DoD has not submitted a budget consistent with the Budget Control Act of 2011. Why? What impact has this had on DoD's strategic planning, programming, budgeting and execution?

4. Sandra Erwin outlines a desired strategic shift by defense policymakers away from past asymmetric warfare to a focus on more conventional future warfare. Has this shift occurred? Why or why not? What implications would such a shift in strategic focus have on defense resourcing concerns?

5. Susan Epstein and Lynn Williams provide important background and the current status of supplemental or OCO funding. What impact does this have on defense resourcing as well as on other parts of the U.S. government involved in defeating threats and adversaries?

6. The Defense Science Board is an often important indicator of how the defense community of experts thinks about current and future strategic ends-ways-means concerns. The Task Force report explains briefly what these leading experts and advisers to the Secretary of Defense think represents a "Coming Crisis" for the U.S. defense industrial base in an age of fundamental change. What do you think of the list of "changes driving national security transformation" and how do these challenges impact defense decision making?

7. Finally, Erwin provides a brief portrayal of how decisions made in the E-ring of the Pentagon have far-reaching impacts down the defense industrial supply line on which defense planning, programming, budgeting and execution depend. As this logistical and technological supply base has become increasingly global, what implications does this hold for those making decisions in Washington?

D. Required Readings (52 pages)

1. Adams, Gordon and Cindy Williams. *Buying National Security: How America Plans and Pays for Its Global Role and Safety at Home.* (New York: Routledge, 2010.) Chapter 5, pp. 93-119.

2. Erwin, Sandra I. "Five Takeaways from the FY2017 Defense Budget," *National Defense* (February 15, 2016), http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/blog/lists/posts/post.aspx?ID=2086

3. Epstein Susan B., and Lynn M. Williams. "Overseas Contingency Operations Funding: Background and Status." Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, June 13, 2016, pp. 1-14, available online at https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R44519.pdf.

4. Defense Science Board Task Force on Defense Industrial Structure for Transformation. "The Coming Crisis" in *Creating an Effective National Security Defense Industrial Base for the 21st Century: An Action Plan to Address the Coming Crisis*, Washington, DC: US Department of Defense Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, July 2008, pp. 15-19, available online at http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/ADA485198.pdf

5. Erwin, Sandra I. "Survival of the Fittest in the Industrial Base," *National Defense* (May 2016), http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/archive/2016/May/Pages/SurvivaloftheFittestintheIndustrialBase.aspx

E. Foundational Reading

1. "How DOD Gets Money: A Primer on the US Federal Budget Process," *Defense Industry Daily*. February 13, 2012.

POLICY ANALYSIS-24: LITTORAL COMBAT SHIP – A CASE STUDY IN NAVAL FORCE PLANNING

A. Focus

What should the future U.S. Navy look like? Planning future naval forces is complicated by the fact that the U.S. Navy is the victim of its own success. As was the case in the years after World War II, there have been, until recently, no other navies to contest the U.S. maritime supremacy. As a result, the Navy has had some difficulty in justifying its force structure, a situation that will only become more difficult if defense budgets continue to tighten. However, the rising threat of China and Iran has provided the U.S. Navy with potential adversaries, as illustrated by the "pivot" to the Pacific and the emergence of AirSea Battle (ASB). However, some charge that these challenges have been overstated; indeed that it has been fashioned by policy makers precisely to justify ASB and a robust naval force structure. This session provides an opportunity to comprehensively exercise and apply Policy Analysis course concepts to a contemporary case study on force planning.

B. Objectives

- Analyze and apply the principles of naval force planning.
- Compare the difference in principles of naval force planning in relation to other force components.
- Assess how force planning decisions are made and how they are influenced.
- Analyze and discuss a specific force planning case study.
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1a, 1b, 1c, 1e, 3a, 3b, 3e, 5b, 5c and 5d.

C. Guidance

1. In an article written just as the United States was changing its strategic orientation in response to the end of the Cold War, Mac Owens laid out the difference between the "accountant's approach" to force planning, which depends on quantifying threats and the response to them; and the "war gamer's approach", which focuses on broader strategic assumptions that cannot necessarily be quantified. He contends that the former approach, while applicable to land and air force planning, is not the best approach for planning naval forces because the strategic requirements for naval forces are different from those for land and air forces. He argues that to plan naval forces against a quantifiable threat will lead to a naval force structure too small to carry out all of the strategic tasks that policy makers demand of the Navy. Do his points still apply today? What is the basis for naval force planning today? How would you justify current shipbuilding and naval aviation programs in terms of broader naval force planning goals?

2. For the last thirty years, the U.S. Navy and the Department of Defense struggled to determine what the appropriate force structure should be for the post-Cold War Navy. How was, what might otherwise have been a routine procurement matter, affected by the internal environment of the Navy and other external factors? Starting with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and expanding to encompass other U.S. and global elements (such as Congress, interest groups, the media, multinational corporations and foreign governments)—is the subject of this case study.

D. Required Readings (37 pages)

1. Owens, Mackubin Thomas. "Why Planning Naval Forces is Different," Defense Analysis, Vol. 9, number 1, 1993.

2. Santos, Joseph E., and Andrew Stigler. "Littoral Combat Ship – A TKO for the Streetfighter," A Case Study in Naval Force Planning, (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College, updated 2015).

NSDM LEADERSHIP CONCEPTS
STUDY GUIDE, AY 2016-2017

1. Scope

Within the "Levels of Analysis" course framework, the Leadership Concepts sub-course focuses on the individual level of analysis, taking as a given that *individuals matter* in the study of national security affairs. For example, if you wish to understand the end of apartheid in South Africa, it is not enough to understand the international context or the national-level processes of the South African government and domestic politics. You must also understand Nelson Mandela and F.W. De Klerk. Along the same lines, while international- and national-level factors played important roles in the U.S. Navy's sweeping changes in personnel policies during the 1970s, in order to understand this issue fully it is absolutely essential to understand Admiral Elmo Zumwalt. These examples illustrate how the Leadership Concepts sub-course plays a key role in a "Levels of Analysis" approach to national security affairs by examining how strategic leaders as individuals have responded (successfully or otherwise) to the challenges posed by the international context studied in Security Strategies, and how they navigated the national decision-making processes studied in Policy Analysis. Simply put, in any strategic context, *a person* leads their organizations, societies, and states—and it must be remembered that the selection of a strategy and the choice of policies ultimately comes down to an individual activity.

Within the Leadership Concepts sub-course, you will examine the innumerable challenges and "enduring tensions" that characterize leading at the strategic level. Leading is an intensely personal endeavor; one each of us must do in our own way. Thus, you will need to decide for yourself what you must learn and then dedicate yourself to learning it as you prepare for your next leadership opportunity, be it command or in direct support of a strategic-level leader. The Leadership Concepts curriculum will largely focus on the study of well-known senior leaders as a means to explore the issues and problems they faced, as well as how they approached those challenges. In that study, the sub-course will rely upon each student to bring their insights about leadership—based on individual experience as well as personal reflections from the readings—to highlight the most important elements that might be taken from the case studies.

The Leadership Concepts sub-course does not suggest that there is an "answer" to effective leadership nor rely on a specific leadership framework. Instead, the curriculum offers three broad areas for consideration when examining the leaders presented over the course of the trimester. First, all leaders are imbued with certain personal traits or "essential characteristics" that we call the ***content*** of leadership. Second, leaders are always faced with situations or conditions that require them to make difficult choices given the circumstances and norms under which they must operate. These circumstances form the specific ***context*** of leadership, which must be considered in any evaluation of what is effective and what is not. Finally and relatedly, leadership is a practical art—leaders do certain things in particular ways, which can be grouped under the broad heading of the ***processes*** of leadership.

Within this broad construct, the initial sessions for Leadership Concepts will introduce overarching concepts and theories of leadership. Here, you will consider ethics, the concept of civilian-military relations and the profession of arms, as well as different ideas about leadership styles and approaches. Next, you will examine biographical case studies on domestic and

international leaders that highlight real-world examples of real people making decisions within the international system and regions discussed in Security Strategies and/or the processes covered in Policy Analysis. In the final part of the sub-course in parallel with your study of force planning in Policy Analysis, you will examine leaders whose context was overly influenced by force planning, budgetary constraints, and changes that related to such.

In the final weeks of the NSDM trimester, seminars will transition to the Final Exercise (FX), where students must integrate the "Levels of Analysis" that they have been studying across the three sub-courses. The Leadership Concepts curriculum makes an essential contribution to this capstone group experience by having exposed students to real-world dilemmas, challenges, approaches, successes, and failures experienced by past strategic leaders. Students may face similar forms of strategic pressures and opportunities, pitfalls, and difficulties during the exercise that may replicate (albeit on a smaller scale) some of the leadership challenges examined throughout the course. The same individual leadership and communication skills, ability to influence, persuade, and convince others discussed during Leadership Concepts will all be reflected at the personal level during this event.

2. Sub-course Objectives

Leadership Concepts will give you an opportunity to prepare for (or further) the transition from leading in a tactical or operational environment to the challenges of participation and leadership at the national-strategic level. In the process, you will continue your personal growth as a leader and energize your professional curiosity about the subject in all its vicissitudes and vagaries. In that regard, Leadership Concepts presents readings and case studies that will stimulate discussion about the various aspects of senior leadership. Toward that end, the overall objectives of the sub-course are to:

- Comprehend how the "individual level of analysis" that is at the core of Leadership Concepts relates to the other levels in order to gain a more complete understanding of National Security Decision Making.

- Analyze and synthesize the "essential characteristics" displayed by leaders that enabled them to motivate and inspire their subordinates during difficult or trying times, and in so doing, discuss their applicability to senior leaders today.

- Analyze the dilemmas and paradoxes confronted by leaders in the case studies offered and discuss how those "enduring tensions" influence and affect the decisions faced by senior leaders today.

- Evaluate the various practices and methods used by leaders in the past to successfully (or not) deal with the challenges of their time, and in so doing, discuss what tools of leadership are needed or are appropriate for senior leaders today.

3. Sub-course Requirements

You are expected to read all material assigned and come to seminar prepared to offer your insights about how or why the various experiences you gain from your study of a past or present

leader may be of value in understanding contemporary senior leaders who confront similar or wholly different problems or challenges. Students will be evaluated on preparedness and individual *contribution* to the seminar, which factors into the 10% of the overall NSDM contribution grade. In addition, each student will author a 3,000 word maximum (approximately 10 pages) essay on some aspect of senior leadership that you consider to be important and relevant to your future leadership opportunities. The essay will account for 25% of the overall NSDM grade**.** For additional information on the essay, see the pertinent annex located later in this syllabus.

5. Sub-course Materials

Most sub-course materials will be posted on Blackboard for student use. Students may access the session materials directly from Blackboard or download to an electronic reader device. The following session materials are not available in digital form and will be provided via hardcopy:

- Howard, Ronald A., Clinton D. Korver, and Bill Birchard. "Draw Distinctions," in *Ethics for the Real World: Creating a Personal Code to Guide Decisions in Work and Life*. (Boston, MA: Harvard Business Press, 2008).
- Suesse, Jennifer M. "Margaret Thatcher," (Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Publishing, 13 May 1998).
- Austin, Robert D. and Richard L. Nolan. "IBM Corporation Turnaround," (Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Publishing, 14 November 2000).

LEADERSHIP CONCEPTS-1: INTRODUCTION TO LEADERSHIP CONCEPTS

A. Focus

This first session will review the goals of the Leadership Concepts sub-course. Your professor will make clear their expectations of each student's contributions to seminar discussion and analysis of the case studies that constitute the heart of the course. The Leadership Concepts sub-course is about senior/strategic leadership. Hence, one of the key objectives of this particular session is to elicit from students their insights about what they consider to be indispensable to successful senior/strategic leadership. Your professor will explain and discuss the two graded elements (essay and class contribution grade) that will be used to evaluate individual student performance during the Leadership Concepts sub-course.

As noted in the preceding sub-course overview and the NSA Faculty reading for this session, leadership is a multifaceted challenge that is arguably quite different at the senior leadership level. While the skills and knowledge derived from a career of leading at the junior and mid-grade levels are indispensable to future success as a senior leader, they are not in of themselves sufficient either to succeed at the next level or to understand the challenges and complexities of strategic leadership. Yet, as we all know and understand, there is no template or mold that can be used to prepare for the challenges that confront all senior leaders. Thus, the Leadership Concepts seminars that will follow this session are intended to search for insights and discuss the collective wisdom of the students who constitute each seminar in order to enable each person, in their own way, to determine how they will lead their organizations in the future. As Field Marshall Slim said in his musings about senior leadership, each must find and trust his own style of leadership and recognize that "no imitation was ever a masterpiece." Hence, this seminar session is intended to establish the precedents wherein each student shares their thoughts about the case study under examination and offers those insights he/she believes are important to understanding the unique problems and opportunities resident in senior leadership positions.

B. Objectives

- Review the content and general requirements of the Leadership Concepts sub-course as summarized in the preceding introduction to this study guide (pages Leadership 1-3).

- Discuss student views on senior/strategic leadership and the views of two historical leaders.

- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1b, 5a, 5b, 5f, and 5g.

C. Guidance

1. The "Introduction to Leadership Concepts" reading provides some general observations about senior leadership and lays out an approach for analyzing leadership case studies that students should consider, both for the case at hand and in analyzing their own leadership. It also conveys the methodology that will be utilized in the course; namely an open consideration and discussion of senior leadership that does not purport to convey universal and eternal "rules" or "takeaways." That said, students will discover recurring themes dependent on their own views

and seminar discussions, which can be used to build their own leadership approach and framework.

2. When reading Slim and Collins's perspectives on leadership, pay particular attention to how (or if) these perspectives have application to leadership at the senior level. Slim asserts that "command, on whatever level you exercise it, is very much the same thing. It is based on the same qualities." Do you agree? Has Slim identified the most important qualities necessary for command or are there others he has ignored? How does one reconcile the tension between "Will Power" and "Flexibility of Mind"? Is Collins correct when he asserts that the most important quality of leadership is "The Human Touch"? What does this concept mean to you? What is Collins talking about when he mentions "Health"?

D. Required Readings (38 pages)

1. NSA Faculty. "Introduction to National Security Decision Making Leadership Concepts," Newport, RI: Naval War College Faculty Paper, July 2013, edited by CAPT J. Scott McPherson, USN, July 2015.

2. Slim, William. "Higher Command in War," *Military Review* 70, no. 5, May 1990, pp. 10-21.

3. Collins, J. Lawton. "Leadership at Higher Echelons," *Military Review* 70, no. 5, May 1990, pp. 33-45.

4. *National Security Decision Making Syllabus* (Winter 2016-17), pp.140-142.

LEADERSHIP CONCEPTS-2: THE ETHICS OF SENIOR LEADERSHIP

A. Focus

The suggestion that O-5/6 and civilian-equivalent leaders should study ethics might seem redundant. Indeed, the vast majority of leaders at this level have already demonstrated a solid personal and professional ethical foundation that has been tested numerous times and in various situations. Nevertheless, there are several sound reasons to examine this topic further. The first and most obvious concerns the number of senior-level firings (including flag-level officers) for ethical violations over the last several years across the services. While these episodes are relatively low compared to the total number of those in command, the services remain concerned and somewhat perplexed by this disturbing trend. Second, Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) Phase II stipulates learning outcomes such as "analyze and synthesize," which are far beyond the requirements of JPME I and the "training" that occurs at the tactical level. This distinction is particularly important (and perhaps problematic) regarding ethics because anecdotal evidence suggests that most of us proceed through life assuring ourselves that we "already know this stuff." While this approach may suffice at the lower levels of leadership, it can be especially perilous as one assumes higher rank and responsibilities.

At the highest levels, senior leaders must deal with an array of ambiguous and complex external issues that eclipse those of squadron/battalion command and air wing/brigade-level leadership. External forces exert much more influence, and the leader at this level must attempt to maintain internal command and control of organizations so vast (and perhaps geographically removed) that they rarely see most of their subordinates. Relatedly, the "trickle-down effect" of ethics is often subtle yet nevertheless substantial—and that effect can be enormous when one is commanding tens of thousands of people. Finally, while not every issue is an ethical one, senior leaders must be able to distinguish between ethical and prudential issues because even the most pragmatic decisions at the tactical level may have ethical implications at the strategic level. In this regard, the examination of historical senior leaders reveals that ethics not only underpins their character, but often overarches the issues they face much more than we may realize.

Unfortunately, there is no definitive "process" that will ensure every senior leader makes the best ethical decision every time. That said, there is a logical way to approach the subject and therefore develop a personalized game plan before you are faced with the tough choices that accompany this level of leadership. This process should begin by deeply reconsidering the personal (moral) aspect of ethics, which remains a critical and foundational element of any level of leadership. Second, one must develop the ability to distinguish whether an issue is indeed an ethical one, and if so, its priority. Considering the complexity of senior leadership, this ability to draw distinctions between ethical, prudential, and legal issues becomes even more critical. Third, if you are faced with an ethical issue, it must be determined if there is actually a dilemma involved. Leaders can confuse an ethical dilemma with temptations and rationalizations that cloud an otherwise simple choice between right and wrong. Finally, senior leaders must consider the challenges of ethical leadership in high-performance, results-driven organizations such as the military. Leadership Concepts-3 will continue the discussion by exploring the profession of arms, civil-military relations, and your responsibilities in this regard. In session four, "Ideas about Leadership," you will consider different leadership traits, techniques, and cognitive biases—all of which are influenced by your ethical worldview.

B. Objectives

- Evaluate and analyze the individual aspect of ethics and moral worldviews.

- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1a, 5a, 5f, and 5g.

C. Guidance

1. J. Scott McPherson asserts that the consideration of "ethics" must begin with individual reflection on your own moral paradigm because it forms the heart of who you are as a national security professional and leader. Relatedly, how we morally see the world directly impacts how we make ethical decisions. He offers some distinctions between the personal and professional aspects of ethics, as well as several archetypal spectrums of moral worldviews, moral decision making approaches, and whether military officers should be held to a higher personal standard than other professionals. He suggests that in order to fully understand ourselves and our role in the military profession, we must be clear about what we really believe. Here you should consider what you believe and how (or if) that changes as one assumes more senior leadership positions.

2. The Howard, Korver, and Birchard reading posits a simple yet often overlooked point: not every issue or situation is necessarily an ethical one. While many issues could be considered ethical in nature or have ethical elements, others are strictly legal in nature or based on self-interests/practicalities that the authors term "prudential." This consideration is important because these issues are not necessarily the same. It also helps one separate ethical "dilemmas" from matters of ethical wrongdoing or self-interests.

3. The Balch and Armstrong reading begins the transition from a strict focus on personal ethics to how group dynamics can affect it. The authors suggest that people in high-performance organizations commit wrongdoing on the edges or grey areas, which is rationalized by achieving results. This produces renormalization, accepted-as-normal misconduct that they term the "banality of wrongdoing." They assert that "high performance organizations are favorable hosts for wrongdoing because high performance requires aggressive behavior at the ethical margins of what is acceptable," and that the leader can set the tone for such a vicious cycle through focusing exclusively on results. Senior-level leaders must consider the possible validity of this thesis, whether it may pertain to their organization, and especially, their role in the dynamic.

D. Required Readings (46 pages)

1. McPherson, J. Scott. "The Ethics of Senior Leadership," Newport, RI: Naval War College Faculty Paper, July 2015.

2. Howard, Ronald A., Clinton D. Korver, and Bill Birchard. "Draw Distinctions," in *Ethics for the Real World: Creating a Personal Code to Guide Decisions in Work and Life*. (Boston, MA: Harvard Business Press, 2008). (**Reading not available on Blackboard, hardcopy will be provided.)**

3. Balch, Dennis R. and Robert W. Armstrong. “Ethical Marginality: The Icarus Syndrome and Banality of Wrongdoing.” *Journal of Business Ethics,* March 2010.

LEADERSHIP CONCEPTS-3: CONTEMPORARY LEADER TRENDS

A. Focus

Part of being a good leader is to keep current regarding new and emerging trends in the field of leadership. This unit of study is based on three top choices by the leadership concepts faculty significant to security sector professionals but not covered as an entire unit of study in the course. For National Security Decision Making Leadership Concepts AY 2016, the three areas chosen for discussion are (1) emotional intelligence (2) toxic leadership and (3) leading in a social media environment.

B. Objectives

- Think about claims made by leaders in the late 20th century regarding what they believed to have been trending issues in defense and security organizations
- Explore three important 21st century trends in the security sector
- Gain an understanding of emotional intelligence as it relates to leading
- Review the concept of toxic leadership
- Reflect on the importance of social media as a both a useful tool and detriment to leading
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1a, 1c, 2f, 5a, 5b, 5c, 5d, 5f, and 5g.

C. Guidance

1. Walter F. Ulmer's work on trending issues in military leadership was originally published in 1998 then republished in *Parameters* in 2010-2011. While his concentration is on the U.S. Army, his thoughts are valid for the security sector in general. What are some of the themes he presented in the late 1990's? How many of them are still in evidence today? Why are the themes still important? The framework of the piece relies on a set of 'best practices.' What are these and which are still imperative in 2016? If you were to write an epilogue to this piece what would you say is missing and what is no longer relevant and why?

2. COL Shashank Ranjan, of the Center for Land Warfare Studies in New Delhi, India describes his viewpoint on the importance of emotional intelligence in senior military leadership. Why or why don't you agree with his concept of 'hollow symbioses? How do you judge yourself relative to the major constructs he presents on being emotionally intelligent? (Self-aware, self-regulated, your motivational traits, empathy, benevolence/humility/justice/tolerance and social skills).

3. The Consortium for Research on Emotional Intelligence in Organizations has developed a useful summary piece called an emotional competence framework that describes the many personal competencies that are important in being emotionally intelligent. Look at these

competencies and think about where your strengths and weaknesses lie. Why do you have the weaknesses and strengths you do? What can you do to turn your weaknesses into strengths?

4. George E. Reed published the book, *Tarnished: Toxic Leadership in the U.S. Military* in 2015. The first chapter of his book, "Nature and Scope of Toxic Leadership" has been selected to introduce the idea of toxic leadership. What is toxic leadership? How is it unique from 'being a bad leader?' What are some of the studies he relates? How can the military and security sector alleviate as much toxicity in their leadership echelons as possible?

5. Maj. Jana K. Fajardo, USA writes about leveraging social media as a leadership tool. Are you a 'social' senior leader? How important is it to understand the roles, responsibilities and power that social media plays in leading others? What can happen if as a senior member of your profession, you don't participate in social media?

6. INFOSEC, a private consulting company has developed a public access site on which they have posted a summary sheet entitled "Social Media Use in the Military Sector." What are some of the ways and means as a leader in the defense environment that you can utilize social media? How have you or your organization been impacted by data mining, malware and social networking? What new leadership roles has the social media environment encouraged and discouraged?

7. The Congressional Research Service Insights Sheet is a summary brief on social media as it is used as a tool of information warfare. This researcher's summary notes that social media is used as a cognitive weapon, to spread messages, to coordinate internet attacks and as a monitoring and analysis tool. Of these uses, how could you categorize them from least to most important within the security sector you come from? What leadership tools might be required in addressing these uses?

D. Required Readings (77 pages)

1. Ulmer, Walter F. Jr. "Military Leadership into the 21st Century: Another "Bridge Too Far?" *Parameters,* 1998/Winter, 2010, pp. 135-155. *http://strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/articles/2010winter/ulmer_jr.pdf*

2. Ranjan, Shashank. "Emotional Intelligence in Military Leadership," *Center for Land Warfare Studies Issue Brief, No 61,* September 2015. *http://www.claws.in/publication/issue-briefs/* (5 pages)

3. The Emotional Competence Framework. The Consortium for Research on Emotional Intelligence in Organizations (EI Framework) www.eiconsortium.org http://www.eiconsortium.org/pdf/emotional_competence_framework.pdf (5 pages)

4. Reed, George E. Excerpt from *Tarnished: Toxic Leadership in the U.S. Military*, Chapter 1, "Nature and Scope of Toxic Leadership", University of Nebraska Press, 2015. Potomac Books. (25 pages)

5. Fajardo, Jana K., MAJ USA. "Virtual Influence Leveraging Social Media as a Leadership Tool." *Military Review*, (January February 2014), pp. 4-14. http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20140228_art005.pdf

6. Theohary, Catherine A. "CRS Insights: Information Warfare: The Role of Social Media in Conflict." March 4, 2015, (IN10240) http://textlab.io/doc/4417365/information-warfare--the-role-of-social-media-in-conflict (2 pages)

7. INFOSEC Institute (Jan 31, 2013) "Social Media use in the Military Sector." http://resources.infosecinstitute.com/social-media-use-in-the-military-sector/ (10 pages)

LEADERSHIP CONCEPTS-4: CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS AND THE PROFESSION OF ARMS

A. Focus

The term "civil-military relations" refers broadly to the interaction between the armed force of a state as an institution and the other sectors of the society in which the armed force is embedded. The primary determinant of U.S. civil-military relations is, of course, the Constitution. Individuals have established precedents as well, no one more so than George Washington in instituting balanced U.S. civil-military relations. Civil-military relations presuppose differences between the leaders, institutions, values, prerogatives, attitudes and practices of a society at large and those of that society's military establishment. The state of civil-military relations in a polity can be judged as better or worse in terms of three criteria: 1) harmony between civilians and the military; 2) the resulting effectiveness of the military establishment; and 3) constitutional balance.

Though it is generally accepted that officers in the U.S. military are members of the "profession of arms," what is the basis of this acceptance? This session will consider the criteria used for assessing whether a group constitutes a profession, the advantages of being part of a recognized profession and, more importantly, the obligations associated with such membership.

This session provides an opportunity to reflect on what is important in civil-military relations, the status of this relationship today, the role you will play as a senior leader in these relationships, and the connection between civil-military relations and military professionalism.

B. Objectives

- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1c, 4b, 5a, 5e, 5f, and 5g.

C. Guidance

1. Jessica Blankshain offers a condensed review of the key civil-military relations topics you have encountered to this point in your career. She addresses the fundamental challenge of civil-military relations: how to reconcile a military strong enough to accomplish all the missions assigned to it by civilian leadership yet sufficiently subordinate to that civilian leadership so it does not threaten the civilian society it protects. She addresses the contributions to civil-military relations theory made by Huntington, Janowitz, Feaver, and others. Some argue that "good" civil-military relations exhibits some combination of the following: 1) comity and a low number of disagreements between civilian and military decision makers; 2) success in war and peace and the absence of policy-strategy "mismatches"; and 3) a lack of encroachment by either party to civil-military decisions on the "turf" of the other. Are these criteria useful? If so, how would you assess the current state of US civil-military relations?

2. Samuel Huntington's chapter on "Officership as a Profession" from his classic work *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* argues that military officers are part of a profession, separate from society and authorized by society to manage

violence in its name. What differentiates the U.S. military from the rest of society? The military claims to be a profession along the lines of medicine and the law. Is it? Why or why not? Do you agree with Huntington's basic definition of a profession? How do you respond to those who claim the military has become a self-interested occupation and a bureaucracy rather than a true profession?

3. The reading on General George Washington and General George C. Marshall is intended to provide insight into how U.S. civil-military relations have evolved over time based on precedents set by these two great leaders. Do the precedents of military professionalism set by Generals Washington and Marshall continue to be useful examples for a liberal, democratic society? Is it realistic to try to emulate Washington and Marshall in terms of their perception of "proper" civil-military relations?

4. Rosa Brooks suggests relations between President Obama and his senior military leaders were not as warm or effective as might be desired, at least in the fall 2013 time frame. Brooks is not the first to write of poor relations between an American president and his military leaders. There is a long history of rocky relations or, at least, rocky starts to such relations between the president and the military leadership. Whose responsibility is it to ensure the relationship between the president and his senior military leaders is effective and mutually respectful? As a new president prepares to assume his duties in January 2017, what can/should the military be doing now to ensure the best possible relationship between that president and the military is created as early as possible?

5. Janine Davidson offers insight into some of the causes of friction in current civil-military relations. She suggests there are three primary "…drivers of friction in the civil-military decision-making dialogue" and that the sources of these frictions are largely cultural differences between civilian and military leaders. The three frictions she identifies are the differing expectations for the nature of civilian control, the institutional friction caused by the different needs of the military planning systems and the presidential decision making processes, and the cultural differences that lead to different definitions of "risk" and "limiting escalation." Though she offers useful discussion about the nature of these sources of friction, she does not suggest how they might be mitigated or eliminated. As the new presidential administration prepares to assume power early next year, what should the military be doing now to recognize these and other potential sources of friction and to develop ways to mitigate them so effective and efficient civil-military relations can be established with the new administration as early as possible?

D. Required Readings (48 pages)

1. Blankshain, Jessica D. "A Primer on U.S. Civil-Military Relations." Faculty Paper, June 2016.

2. Huntington, Samuel P. "Officership as a Profession." Chapter 1 (extract) in *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations.* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1957), pp. 7-18. Edited by Prof William Calhoun and Lt Col Reginald R. Smith, USAF, Naval War College faculty, June 2010.

3. Calhoun, William M. and Kelley, Kevin P. “George Washington and George Marshall: American Precedent in Civil-Military Relations,” Newport, R.I.: Naval War College revised faculty paper, July 2016.

4. Brooks, Rosa. “Obama vs the Generals,” *Politico Magazine*, November 2013.

5. Davidson, Janine. “Civil-Military Friction and Presidential Decision Making: Explaining the Broken Dialogue,” *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 43, no. 1, March 2013.

LEADERSHIP CONCEPTS-5: IDEAS ABOUT LEADERSHIP

A. Focus

This session introduces a variety of leadership theories and concepts with two readings and a film. "Ideas About Leadership: A Short History and Description of Modern Leadership Theories," is a historical review of philosophies and concepts that have had an impact on leading. Each theory presented may be useful in guiding your personal reflections and observations about how to lead in a variety of situations as well as serve as channels of discovery about the leaders described throughout the course. "There are No Reluctant Leaders" is a short biography of General Ira Eaker, one of the originators and top three commanders of the Army Air Corps during World War II. In conjunction with the written documents, you will watch the film *12 O'clock High* during Leadership Concepts session 4A. Created in 1949, *12 O'clock High* is a story about the United States Army's Eighth Air Force and their mission to fly daylight bombing missions against Nazi Germany during the early days of American involvement in World War II. There is a unique interplay between junior, intermediate and senior levels of leadership throughout the film. In this session, your seminar will meet to discuss the readings and the film.

B. Objectives

- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1c, 2b, 5a, 5c, 5e, and 5f.

C. Guidance

1. There are many key theories of leadership described in the piece, "Ideas About Leadership". Note which of these ideas seem to resonate with you the most and contemplate how significant career experiences have resulted in your leadership development. Some pastures to consider are those that influenced you in both positive and negative ways, how your experiences have aided in times of uncertainty and change, how you use reflection of your experiences as a learning tool for yourself and others.

2. Three primary military professionals from real world events who had major influence upon the concept of daylight precision bombing are described in "There are no Reluctant Leaders". These three individuals are General Ira Eaker, General Carl 'Tooey' Spaatz and General Henry 'Hap' Arnold. Each is noted to some degree in the events and personalities found in the film, *12 O'clock High*. Think about the roles each of these leaders played in the formulation and implementation of a new philosophy of bombing but also think about their roles in the upper echelons of the newly formulated Army Air Corps and their effectiveness and talents as strategic thinkers.

3. There are few things more inspiring than seeing a natural leader in action as they lead a group and inspire them into action. All of us secretly want to have the ability to lead and inspire, and we hope that by watching others lead some of their charisma will rub off on us. It's understandable then that Hollywood would love to portray great leaders too, and there are countless films that deal with the subject. The film *12 O'Clock High* is a story telling instrument

that aligns with the theories presented in the "Ideas about Leadership piece. While you may have watched this film earlier in your career, in this course of study, it should now be viewed not from the cockpit and tactical perspective but from a senior leadership viewpoint. Think about how your now see this film compared to your years as an entry level careerist. Make practical use of the theories presented in your readings and see which are applicable during the series of events captured in the film.

D. Required Readings and Film (63 pages)

1. Raum, Mary. "Ideas about Leadership: A Short History and Description of Modern Leadership Theories." Newport RI: Naval War College Faculty Paper, August 2012.

2. Raum, Mary. "Ira Eaker, There are no Reluctant Leaders," Newport RI: Naval War College Faculty Paper, July 2010.

3. Zanuck, Darryl F. *Twelve O'clock High*, 20th Century Fox, 1949, renewed 1977. DVD.

LEADERSHIP CONCEPTS-6: MARGARET THATCHER

A. Focus

Margaret Thatcher can claim many distinctions. She was the first female Prime Minister of Great Britain. Her 11- year tenure was longer than any Prime Minister in the 20th century. She led Great Britain out of a period of serious decline and instilled in the nation a sense of pride and nationalism absent since the great victory of World War II. Moreover, she instituted an economic and social model known as "Thatcherism" that would influence "Reaganomics," affect the end of the Cold War, and impact nations seeking to reconcile the role of government within a free-market capitalistic and democratic framework.

However, she was also one of the most controversial leaders of the century. Many of her domestic and international initiatives were met with hostility among her colleagues and sometimes outright violence from certain segments of the population. Through it all, she maintained an iron-willed leadership style that can be described as pragmatic at best and ruthless at worst.

In the end, she was successful in reversing Britain's decline, but at the cost of widening the gap between the haves and have-nots while marginalizing and often dismissing her closest advisors. She finally accepted the advice—from virtually everyone in her own party—that her dictatorial style meant that she could no longer continue as Prime Minister. She resigned in 1990, not out of a sense of repentance, fatigue, or even accomplishment, but in the realization that all of her remaining supporters had fled; a situation that she bitterly described as "treachery."

B. Objectives

- Analyze the case of a strategic-level international leader through the concepts covered thus far in the NSA course and seminar discussions.

- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1b, 1c, 2b, 5a, 5b, 5d, and 5e.

C. Guidance

1. When one considers the case of Margaret Thatcher, numerous questions arise regarding her personal qualities, leadership style, and decisions—especially how she carried them out. Supporters argue that her domineering style was necessary given the situation, especially if she was to succeed in producing the change that Britain so desperately needed. Critics assert that all great leaders who do not possess and exercise that leadership quality of "the human touch," regardless of the situation, will eventually fail. Here, senior leaders—both civilian and military—should ask some hard questions. Is it important for senior leaders to maintain the human touch, even if dramatic change is necessary? How does a leader maintain a sense of determination and urgency without becoming dogmatic? What is the importance of knowing your own strengths and weaknesses as they relate to interaction with others? What is the role of physical and mental energy for the senior leader? Does image play a significant role for senior leaders? What qualities of Margaret Thatcher do you find useful, and what others are not? How about leadership style? Why should a senior leader care about advisors and allies beyond the

useful information they can provide? Finally, how can we know whether a leader has been "successful"?

2. The first reading from Jennifer Suesse covers Thatcher's early life to election as leader of the Conservative Party in Opposition in 1975. It highlights the essential element of any individual level of analysis and study of leadership; namely that an individual's early life experiences, influences, mentors, and "where they come from" in the philosophical sense matters a great deal. Equally, the reading highlights the environment (the context) in which Thatcher had to maneuver as she rose in stature and power. Students should consider these elements carefully.

3. J. Scott McPherson's reading picks up the story from the first reading's conclusion in 1975. It describes Thatcher's time as Opposition Leader and Prime Minister until her resignation in 1990. This reading further highlights the content of Thatcher the leader as well as the personalities and environment (both domestically and internationally) in which she had to lead. Most importantly, it describes many of the "processes" she utilized to lead.

4. The excerpt from Geoffrey Smith's *Reagan and Thatcher* describes the unique relationship between Thatcher and Reagan, as well as their influence on Mikhail Gorbachev and the end of the Cold War. It highlights the relationship of the three levels of analysis that frames the NSA course, and provides an example of the concepts of bilateral relationships (which will be covered in the Policy Analysis sub-course) and International Political Economies (IPE) via "Thatcherism." The concept of IPE will be covered in the Security Strategies sub-course.

5. The final reading is a short article from *The Economist,* and is one of the many articles published following her death in April 2013. It summarizes her life and leadership (much of which is already covered in the other readings in this session), but also adds some new information and depth concerning her legacy.

D. Required Readings (75 pages)

1. Suesse, Jennifer M. "Margaret Thatcher," (Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Publishing, 1998). **(Reading not available on Blackboard, hardcopy will be provided)**.

2. McPherson, J. Scott. "Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher," Newport, RI: Naval War College Faculty Paper, July 2015.

3. Excerpts from Smith, Geoffrey. *Reagan and Thatcher,* (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1991).

4. "No Ordinary Politician," *The Economist,* April 13, 2013.

LEADERSHIP CONCEPTS-7: RICHARD NIXON AND INDIRA GANDHI

A. Focus

Richard Nixon and Indira Gandhi led two of the world's great democracies through times of exceptional change and tribulation. Both came to politics at an early age. Indira Gandhi was born into the most politically powerful family in India. Richard Nixon was a Congressman by the age of 33, a Senator at 37 and the second youngest Vice President of the United States. Each earned a reputation for physical courage and became known for political ruthlessness and cunning. Both were devoted to their families.

B. Objectives

- Analyze two strategic political leaders through the concepts covered thus far in the NSA course and seminar discussions.

- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1b, 1c, 2c, 5a, 5b, 5d, 5f, and 5g.

C. Guidance

1. As national leaders, Richard Nixon and Indira Gandhi learned what it was like to order their military forces to war. At a point in their careers each assumed extraordinary powers. Scandal and allegations of corruption engulfed them both. Each was a polarizing force in their respective nations. Both knew the heights of popular adulation and both endured professional disgrace.

2. Yet there were significant differences between these two titans of political power. There are the obvious differences of gender, nationality, religion and culture. Indira Gandhi was a true daughter of privilege. Richard Nixon felt his climb up the ladder of success was a struggle he had won by force of will and his own bare hands. Indira Gandhi died in a blaze of small arms fire while in office. Richard Nixon died after decades of political exile, fully aware of his unique place in U.S. presidential history. But perhaps the greatest difference is in their historical legacies. Today Indira Gandhi is revered as her state's greatest leader after Mahatma Gandhi, even though her tenure in office was riddled with scandal and actions which threatened democracy in India. In contrast, Richard Nixon, while seen as gifted in the realm of foreign policy, is remembered for the illegal actions he ordered while president, a blatant disregard for the constitution he had sworn to protect and defend and being the only president to resign in disgrace from the office.

3. It would be easy to see this session as an exercise in exploring the idea of "the leader with the fatal flaw." It is true that Gandhi and Nixon were deeply human and did indeed carry flaws that were as large as or larger than their positive accomplishments. Yet, in many ways, such a course of study is too easy. A study of Richard Nixon and Indira Gandhi deserves more. These were towering leaders who spent a lifetime in unforgiving struggle, who bore enormous burdens and set the strategic direction for their states. In doing so they shaped, and continue to shape the world of today.

D. Required Readings (36 pages)

1. Knott, Stephen. "Richard Nixon," Newport, RI: Naval War College Faculty Paper, May 2009.

2. Norton, Richard J. "Resolute Action and Bold Decision: Prime Minister Gandhi," Newport, RI: Naval War College Faculty Paper, October 2008, revised by Prof. Joan Johnson-Freese, Naval War College Faculty, August 2009.

LEADERSHIP CONCEPTS-8: DWIGHT EISENHOWER

A. Focus

This session is focused on General Eisenhower, the man, the leader, the planner, and the consensus builder. It is a two part session divided between Leadership Concepts 7A during which a film will be shown followed the next day by the classroom discussion in Leadership Concepts 7B.

Dwight Eisenhower grew up in mid-America, Abilene, TX, in a stable and relatively happy family. He went on to graduate from high school, work two years in a creamery and obtain an appointment to West Point in 1911. At West Point, Eisenhower emerged as a natural leader and graduated in the upper half of his class in 1915. He spent the WWI years in the United States believing that he missed out on "his" war. From 1922-1924 Eisenhower served as General Fox Conner's executive officer in the Panama Canal Zone. General Conner was a profound influence on Eisenhower and assisted him in gaining admittance to the Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth where he graduated first in his class. It is about this point in Eisenhower's career that he was recognized as having significant potential. Along with General Connor, General Pershing also recognized Eisenhower as having potential as he was selected in 1927 to write for the American Battle Monuments Commission in Washington, DC and Paris. He then went on to serve as General Douglas MacArthur's chief military aide from 1933-1939, spending much of this time in the Philippines. In 1940 and 1941 he had a number of short tours which included Chief of Staff of the 3d Division and Chief of Staff of the 3d Army. In December of 1941 he was transferred to the War Plans Division, working directly for General Marshall, Army Chief of Staff, where he excelled in thinking, organizational, and people skills. He was selected to be the Commanding General, European Theater in May of 1942. It is here where we will begin to take a deeper look into the individual who had to make the right decisions for the eventual defeat of Germany.

B. Objectives

- Analyze the case of a strategic-level international leader, during war, through the concepts covered thus far in the NSA course and seminar discussion.

- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1a, 1b, 1c, 1d, 1e, 2b, 2e, 4c, 5a, 5b, 5c, 5d, 5e, 5f, and 5g.

C. Guidance

1. During this session, the movie "IKE: Countdown to D-Day," will be viewed. This movie is a reasonably accurate portrayal based on historical documents of the D-Day invasion starring Tom Selleck as General Eisenhower. This film reflects on the intricacy of the planning and the many, sometimes conflicting personalities involved, including Eisenhower who insisted on being named Supreme Commander. The film also addresses the complexity of negotiating and coordinating the most significant commitment of air, sea, and land forces in history. It also looks realistically at German forces, strong enough to strike back and deliver considerable damage if any part of the Allied plan is not executed well.

2. The case study focuses on Eisenhower the man and the many influences throughout his career which allowed him to become a highly successful strategic leader.

3. How did career mentoring by his seniors influence his decision making?

4. It is individuals who make decisions. Eisenhower was one of those uniquely talented leaders able to understand the strategic vision, adopt and adapt to organizational challenges, construct consensus based decisions, and apply personnel and resources in order to achieve strategic success.

5. Examine the essential characteristics displayed by Eisenhower that enabled him to motivate and inspire his subordinates during the preparations for the D-Day invasion. Is there any applicability to senior leaders today?

6. What were Eisenhower's personal traits, strengths/weaknesses? What were the effects of these traits on his interactions with superiors and subordinates throughout his career? What professional/personal experiences made him who he was? Did Eisenhower value professional military education? Was Eisenhower prepared to lead in WWII?

7. It is left to the student to decide what elements of Eisenhower's personality and leadership skills allowed the successes of his sometimes most contentious decisions.

D. Required Readings and Film (25 pages)

1. Shimkus, Albert J. "Eisenhower: The Right Man in the Right Job at the Right Time," Naval War College Faculty reading, August 2010, Revised March 2016.

2. Chetwynd, Lionel. IKE: Countdown to D-Day, 2004, Columbia TriStar, Culver City, CA. Film to be viewed in classrooms during Leadership Concepts – 7A session.

LEADERSHIP CONCEPTS-9: HYMAN RICKOVER
"Ignorance is not bliss; it is oblivion." -- H.G. Rickover

A. Focus

There is a significant difference between ideas and accomplishments, or between science and engineering. Where science supplies the ideas, engineering realizes those ideas. Nowhere today is the chasm between science and engineering epitomized more than in nuclear energy. Following World War II, Hyman Rickover felt, long before anyone else, that being first and staying ahead in nuclear energy was important to the national security of the United States. He acted as if he was personally responsible to the nation itself for his work. In the same way, he could often be an extremely difficult person to work either with or for. He was often rough and abrasive. He could shout and scream, but more often at subordinates or seniors he felt were not useful to his needs. Yet, when he needed to be, Rickover was engaging and even charming. Personal dominance, power, political coalitions and fear were his tools, and he used them to further the nation's lead in nuclear power. For all his unpleasant attributes, Rickover delivered, often overcoming significant efforts to end his career. It is not easy to overlook the caliber of his programs and the essential contribution his forces made to national security.

B. Objectives

- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1a, 1c, 5a, 5b, 5d, and 5g.

C. Guidance

1. The Bud Baker condensed biography of Rickover offers insight into how he developed into the person who led Naval Reactors for over 30 years. Rickover offers a unique opportunity to study a senior leader in a strategic environment whose main thrust is dealing with advanced and even potentially dangerous or deadly technologies. If success is measured by accomplishments, what made Rickover so successful? What can we learn from his sense of purpose? What can we learn from his leadership style?

2. Elmo Zumwalt's discussion of the challenges and obstacles presented by Rickover when Zumwalt was the Chief of Naval Operations offers a critical perspective of the consequences of Rickover's use of his various sources of power within the Navy over an extended period of time. Zumwalt states "There is almost no way for a CNO not to find himself in an adversary position to Rickover, because Rickover brazenly – though seldom openly – challenges the duly constituted authority of every CNO and indeed every Secretary of the Navy, every Secretary of Defense, and every president." Could such a situation exist in today's military services? How does one deal with an adversary with such sources of power?

3. Rickover's speech at Columbia University in 1982 offers insight into Rickover's leadership philosophy while also providing some specific suggestions about how to lead large, complex organizations. Though Rickover had a particular disdain for management, some of his leadership suggestions are consistent within management theories that have been read about and discussed during the Leadership Concepts session 4 while others are uniquely "Rickovian." Do

you agree with his demand for "courageous impatience?" How does one balance Rickover's call for attention to detail by senior leaders with his suggestion leaders too often allow "unimportant but interesting trivia" to dominate their time? Is his call for presenting important issues in writing relevant in today's short attention span environment?

4. This session, set during the Cold War, provides background for the Security Strategies session on Europe and Russia as well as the Strategic Restraint session. It also provides a telling example of the U.S. domestic political system as it illustrates the interaction between Congress, the President and the media.

D. Required Readings (66 pages)

1. Baker, Bud. "The Rickover Story: A Compilation of Selected Works," Newport, RI: Naval War College Faculty Paper, September 2008, edited by CAPT Mike A. Haumer, USN, and Professor Kevin P. Kelley, Naval War College Faculty, July 2016.

2. Zumwalt, Elmo R. Jr. "The Rickover Complication," extract from *On Watch*. (New York: Quadrangle, the New York Times Book Co., 1976), pp. 85-100.

3. Rickover, Admiral H. G. *Doing a Job* (*speech delivered at Columbia University in 1982).* Available at http://www.govleaders.org/rickover.htm.

LEADERSHIP CONCEPTS-10: DENG XIAOPING

A. Focus

In his introduction to *Deng Xiaoping – Portrait of a Statesman*, a collected set of essays in 1995, David Shambaugh described Deng as "one of the world's pre-eminent leaders of the 20th century [whose] impact will be felt well into the next century as China looms as the world's next superpower as a result of his reforms." For more than sixty years, he was a major figure in the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) rise to power and subsequent struggles to restore China as one of the world's major powers. Deng was twice selected as Time magazine's "Man of the Year," but as Shambaugh noted, "even though in the two stories in praise of him the editors could provide no empirical evidence that he had actually caused what they found good in China at the time, or that he believed what they thought he believed."

Deng lived a hard life that required him to use his wits, his innate intelligence and an indomitable will to survive three "purges" from powerful positions within the CCP, one lasting for nearly six years during the height of the Cultural Revolution. He was, despite all outward appearances, a hard man among battle-hardened men. Mao characterized him as a "needle wrapped in a cotton ball," and Henry Kissinger once described him as a "nasty little man."

B. Objectives

- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas: 1a, 1b, 1c, 2b, 2c, 5a, 5b, and 5d.

C. Guidance

1. As you read the case study, several questions pertaining to Deng, Mao and the rise of communist China will likely arise. You may wish to consider the following: Why was Deng able to survive and prosper for so long in a system that was so fundamentally Hobbesian? Why did Mao never allow Deng to be purged from the Chinese Communists? What did Deng learn from the disastrous Great Leap Forward and how did he use those lessons later in life? Deng was a master delegator, but always had his hand firmly on the helm. How did he do it? Why do you think Deng was predisposed to allow so much capitalism in the wholly committed socialist system of China? Why did Deng crack down so hard at Tiananmen Square in 1989? Why did Deng struggle so hard to find a suitable successor? While Deng had many positive attributes as a leader, what were his weaknesses? Of his many contributions to the rise of China in the 20th century, what do you think his enduring legacy will be**?**

2. This case should, as all Leadership Concepts should, raise questions about senior/strategic leadership in general. Do Western/Democratic political systems contain checks, balances and structures which would prevent the rise of a leader such as Deng? Are there other examples of the level of political resilience he displayed or is this a "one off" case? Even admirers of Deng admit he was ruthless. To what degree, if any, must a senior/strategic leader be ruthless in the performance of duty?

D. Required Reading (47 pages)

1. Ratcliff, Ronald. "Deng Xiaoping: The Indispensable Man," Newport, RI: Naval War College Faculty Paper, 19 August 2013, revised August 2016.

LEADERSHIP CONCEPTS-11: SENATOR SAM NUNN

A. Focus

Samuel Augustus Nunn served as a United States Senator from Georgia for twenty-five years (1972-1997). Nunn's term in office coincided with the war in Vietnam, the Cold War, the fall of the Soviet Union, and Operation Desert Storm. Nunn was considered to be the Senate's expert on defense affairs and "was looked upon with awe" by his colleagues in both parties. Nunn often broke with his fellow Democrats on domestic and foreign issues, if he believed, as Virginia Senator John Warner once observed, that his party's policies were contrary to "the best interests of the United States of America." Despite his reputation as something of a maverick, Nunn was a formidable force within the Senate due to his knowledge of defense issues and his diligent work in the Senate Armed Service Committee, particularly during the time when he served as chairman of that committee (1987-1995).

A moderate-conservative when it came to domestic affairs, Nunn also achieved considerable success in advancing domestic legislation including welfare reform and improvements in education. He was considered a "hawk" when it came to budget matters, and frequently voted with his Republican colleagues on these issues. Nunn is perhaps best known for his disputes with many of his conservative allies, including his effort to reform the Pentagon (known as the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986), and his advocacy of non-proliferation legislation (known as the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Act of 1991). In the case of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, Nunn was opposed by not only many of his allies in the military but also by the Reagan administration. Additionally, he led the opposition in 1989 to the confirmation of Texas Senator John Tower as Secretary of Defense, revealing once again a streak of independence in a body where tradition demanded that one should defer to a fellow Senator.

This session provides a real world example of the Security Strategies session on Strategic restraint as well as providing insight into the development of a National Security Strategy. It also meshes with the Policy Analysis lessons on Congress, The Presidency, Public Opinion and the Media, as well as Force Planning.

B. Objectives

- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1a, 5a, 5b, 5d, and 5g.

C. Guidance

1. Although Sam Nunn was regarded as one of the nation's foremost experts on military affairs, his vote against military action in the 1991 Gulf War may well have damaged his national political prospects. In retrospect, what factors led Nunn to make this decision, and did he foresee problems which did not become evident in that region until years later? Are his current efforts as the head of the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) consistent with his past? If not, what has changed him?

2. How was Nunn able to exert such influence in a system where partisan politics had seemingly become the primary motivation for so many? Could Nunn have achieved more? How important was Nunn's upbringing in terms of molding the qualities that made him such an effective Senator? Could Nunn be elected to the Senate today? If so, could he be as effective as he was during his terms in office? What are the attributes of a successful legislator as opposed to a successful chief executive? What difficulties might one encounter in making the transition from a legislative body to a position of leadership in an executive or administrative body?

D. Required Readings (63 pages)

1. Haumer, Mike A. "Sam Nunn: Senator of Defense," Newport, RI: Naval War College Faculty Paper, September 2013.

2. Bernstein, Paul I., and Jason D. Wood. "The Origins of Nunn-Lugar and Cooperative Threat Reduction, National Defense University Press, 2010.

LEADERSHIP CONCEPTS-12: LEE KUAN YEW

A. Focus

Lee Kuan Yew served as Singapore's first Prime Minister from 1959 to 1990. As Lee first takes office, the British grant Singapore full internal self-government in 1959. It gains full independence from Britain in 1963 and joins the Federation of Malaysia from 1963 until 1965 when Singapore is expelled. It becomes its own independent state and Lee continues to serve as Prime Minister until 1990 when Goh Chok Tong succeeds him. He continues to influence decision making in Singapore when Goh appoints him "Senior Minister" from 1990 to 2004. His service continues as Lee's son, Lee Hsien Loong becomes Prime Minister in 2004 and appoints him to the position of "Minister Mentor" until 2011, when he steps down.

From the time he is first elected Prime Minister in 1959 to the present, Singapore grows from an underdeveloped colony of Great Britain whose prime purpose is to provide a harbor and Navy base for England's Navy to a world leader in several economic categories. As of 2010, it was the fourth largest financial center, one of the top three oil refiners, the world's largest oil-rig producer, the world's second ranked casino gambling market, and a major hub for ship repair and overhaul services.[1] The World Bank has ranked Singapore the easiest place to do business in the world as of 2014.

Under Lee's leadership, Singapore, an island nation approximately three and a half times the size of Washington D.C. (less than one-fifth the size of Rhode Island) with no hinterland to provide natural resources, goes from "Third World to First" as he describes it in his book published in 2000 with the same title. "To understand Singapore" he said in a 2007 interview, "and why it is what it is, you've got to start off with the fact that it's not supposed to exist and cannot exist. To begin with, we don't have the ingredients of a nation, the elementary factors: a homogeneous population, common language, common culture and common destiny."[2]

B. Objectives

- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 5a, 5b, 5c, 5d, 5e, 5f, and 5g.

C. Guidance

1. The first reading, a case study, will initially look at Lee Kuan Yew's formative years before becoming Prime Minister including his experiences during Singapore's occupation during World War II by the Japanese, his education in England, his service as a lawyer in the 1950's, and his involvement in politics as one of the creators of the People's Action Party. The case will then explore the challenges he confronts as he becomes Prime Minister of a nation that becomes independent from its colonial master, Great Britain. It will examine the issues, the people, the relationships, and the challenges of first creating a vision for Singapore, and then implementing that vision as time passes and the context of his leadership changes.

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[1] Adam Shamim, "Singapore Miracle Dimming as Income Gap Widens Squeeze by Rich", *Bloomberg Business,* August 10, 2011

[2] Mydans, Seth "Lee Kuan Yew, Founding Father and First Premier of Singapore, Dies at 91", *The New York Times,* Mar 22, 2015

2. The second reading is an interview from 1994 with Lee Kuan Yew conducted by Fareed Zakaria who was serving as the Managing Editor of Foreign Affairs magazine at the time. In it, Lee reflects on his experiences as Prime Minister, his philosophy, and his thoughts about the future of Asia and the world.

3. As you read the case and the interview and prepare to discuss them in class, consider Lee's content as a leader. What were the critical events and experiences that made Lee the leader he became? How did he capitalize on his capabilities and strengths to influence people within his party as well inside and outside Singapore? How did his leadership environment change and how did he adapt to new challenges as they occurred? How was he able to extend his period of leadership when so many leaders enjoy a rather limited "shelf life"? What policies did he establish in Singapore that enabled it to attract investment from outside Singapore that enabled it to grow and thrive in an ever-connected world? How did he use the positive elements of Confucian culture to establish a positive value system in Singapore that enabled it to pull disparate groups together and work towards mutually beneficial goals? What incentives did he provide the people of Singapore that enabled him to create desired behaviors that produced desired outcomes? Are there lessons to be learned from Lee Kuan Yew and his approach to governance in Singapore that can be applied to other states in the world today or does this approach work only in a small, tightly controlled area like Singapore?

D. Required Readings (58 pages)

1. Ducey, Roger H. "Lee Kuan Yew," Newport, RI: Naval War College Faculty Paper, July 2015.

2. Zakaria, Fareed. A Conversation with Lee Kuan Yew," *Foreign Affairs*, March/April 1994: http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/49691/fareed-zakaria/a-conversation-with-lee-kuan-yew

LEADERSHIP CONCEPTS-13: NELSON MANDELA AND F.W. DE KLERK

A. Focus

While Nelson Mandela and F.W. de Klerk shared the Nobel Peace Prize in 1993, Nelson Mandela is clearly the more internationally known and revered individual of the two. Biographies abound and, at one time, mere rumors that Mandela was ill were enough to send ripples through South African stock markets. When the South African presidency passed from de Klerk to Mandela in 1994, with de Klerk then serving as Vice-President, apartheid was officially a thing of the past. It took both individuals to accomplish that shared goal. DeKlerk, however, represented the old guard and Mandela the new, and history has awarded accolades accordingly.

This is a two part session divided between Leadership Concepts-13A during which the film "Mandela and DeKlerk" will be shown, followed the next day by Leadership Concepts-13B for seminar discussion about the case. This case focuses on both the virtues and vices of the two men individually and the relationship of the two men together that allowed a rare systemic revolution of power by relatively peaceful means. Nelson Mandela transformed from a street fighter and fugitive to a statesman and diplomat during his twenty-seven year imprisonment. F. W. de Klerk initiated reforms to include concessions to non-whites in 1989-1990 which could never have been predicted based on his upbringing, his party platforms, or his prior actions. These two men changed a country and influenced the world.

> "It was this desire for the freedom of my people to live their lives with dignity and self-respect that animated my life, that transformed a frightened young man into a bold one, that drove a law-abiding attorney to become a criminal, that turned a family-loving husband into a man without a home, that forced a life-loving man to live like a monk. I am no more virtuous or self-sacrificing than the next man, but I found I could not even enjoy the poor and limited freedoms I was allowed when I knew my people were not free." Nelson Mandela, *Long Walk to Freedom: The Autobiography of Nelson Mandela* (Boston: Little, Brown & Co, 1994) 624.

> "For too long, we clung to a dream of separated nation-states when it was already clear that it could not succeed. For that we are sorry. Yes, we have often sinned…But that we were evil, malignant, and mean, to that we say no." F. W. de Klerk, October 9, 1992, in a speech in the Afrikaner town of Winburg, cited in David Ottaway, *Chained Together,* (New York: Random House, 1993) 63.

On December 5, 2013, South Africa and the world began a prolonged period of mourning the death and celebrating the life of Nelson Mandela. Mandela's achievements and ideals continued to resonate with people around the globe. In contrast, de Klerk's 75th birthday just two years earlier went virtually unnoticed by any but his immediate family and friends.

B. Objectives

- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 5a, 5b, and 5d.

C. Guidance

1. "Mandela: His 8 Lessons on Leadership" offers insights from Nelson Mandela, learned over many years of facing leadership challenges. Are these insights of any value to a senior military officer? How might you apply them in your future assignments?

2. The Robert Mnookin reading provides some background information on Nelson Mandela's early years and how these experiences influenced him when he began to recognize a negotiated agreement with the ruling government might be possible. Mnookin provides details on how Mandela's negotiation process with the government began and progressed in spite of numerous obstacles and setbacks. What were Mandela's interests during the negotiations and how did these differ from De Klerk's? Where did they overlap?

3. "And the 1993 Noble Peace Prize Goes to…" provides some additional biographical material on both Mandela and De Klerk. It highlights how very different these two South Africans were, yet they were able to work together to solve what many saw as an unsolvable problem. What enables a leader to appreciate not only his/her own challenges but also those of his/her adversary in order to find common ground?

4. "20 Years After Apartheid, South Africa Asks, 'How Are We Doing?'" suggests that much has changed in South Africa over the past 20 years, some for the better and some for the worse. Is it appropriate or even fair for us to assess the achievements of Mandela and De Klerk based on what has happened in South Africa after they departed their political positions?

5. "The End of South Africa" highlights the negative aspects of South African society in recent years and suggests a rather unconventional action the author feels the white South African community might consider. What would Mandela and De Klerk have thought of the current conditions in South Africa and the desirability of this proposal for a separate "city-state?"

6. The film, "Mandela and De Klerk," offers insight into how an agreement was reached by two very different leaders, both of whom had complex and demanding constituencies, in spite of numerous setbacks and the breakdown of trust. Consider the lessons of leadership to be drawn from the actions of Mandela and de Klerk both together and individually. Could one leader have been successful without the other? How might a leader turn a "sidelined" job into an opportunity for success and advancement? How does a leader know when to change organizational strategy? What is the role of risk and personal sacrifice in the art of leadership? How does a leader work with an adversary to accomplish mutually beneficial ends in spite of significant personal animosity? Within the dynamics of South African transformation, leadership was the catalyst of change; what can be learned about the impact of both of these leaders?

D. Required Readings and Film (41 pages)

1. Stengal, Richard. "Mandela: His 8 Lessons on Leadership," *Time*, July 11, 2008.
Forward written by Lt Col Reginald R. Smith, USAF, Naval War College faculty, July 2010.

2. Mnookin, Robert. "Bargaining with the Devil: When to Negotiate, When to Fight," Extracts from Chapter 6, pp 106-136. (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2010). Edited by Lt Col Reginald R. Smith, USAF, Naval War College faculty, July 2010.

3. Johnson-Freese, Joan. "And the 1993 Noble Peace Prize Goes to … ," Naval War College faculty case study, Newport, RI, July 2008. Revised by Lt Col Reginald R. Smith, USAF, Naval War College faculty, July 2010.

4. Myre, Greg. "20 Years After Apartheid, South Africa Asks 'How Are We Doing?'" National Public Radio Online, May 6, 2014.

5. Gelernter, Josh. "The End of South Africa," National Review Online, February 7, 2015. Wesley, Richard. Mandela and DeKlerk, 1997, Showtime Networks and Film Afrika Worldwide. Beverly Hills, CA.

LEADERSHIP CONCEPTS-14: COLIN POWELL

A. Focus

This session is focused on Colin Powel, and a life of public service spanning nearly 40 years. Colin Powell, the son of immigrants, came from a happy, stable family in New York that prepared him for a life of leadership. He went on to graduate from high school and attend the City College of New York where he graduated from the Army ROTC program. He served two tours of duty in the Vietnam War that left a lasting impression on his views toward the use of military force. A White House Fellow and graduate of the Army's Command and General Staff College and the National War College, Powell made the most of the opportunities presented to him. He rose quickly through the ranks. While he successfully commanded units in the field, Colin Powell gained prominence working for important policymakers in Washington D.C. Powell's time with Reagan administration members Casper Weinberger and Frank Carlucci enabled him to acquire a firsthand look into the workings of the national security process. Colin Powell served as President Reagan's National Security Advisor and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff under President George H. W. Bush.

B. Objectives

- Analyze the case of a strategic-level military and political leader though the concepts covered thus far in the NSA course and seminar discussions.

- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1a, 1b, 1c, 5a, 5b, 5c, 5d, 5e, 5f, and 5g.

C. Guidance

1. General Powell's time as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was pivotal for both his wartime leadership, and his influence on the size and strategy of the post-Cold War military. His vision of the future was influential in establishing the base force, in essence a Department of Defense led downsizing of military forces.

2. After the election of 2000, his leadership path culminated with his appointment as President George W. Bush's Secretary of State. Yet, during a tumultuous time in our nation's contemporary history, this soldier turned statesman was tested as Secretary of State in ways he did not expect.

3. Colin Powell faced numerous challenges leading a department unlike the military positions where he had enjoyed so much success. As Secretary of State, Powell grappled with advancing his foreign policy views which were opposed by influential people close to the President. He also sought to improve the State Department in the face of an administration consumed by war while trying to be an effective national strategic leader in a cabinet where he came to be perceived as "the odd man out."

D. Required Readings (52 pages)

1. Waters, Michael. "Colin Powell: His Path from Soldier to Statesman," Newport, RI: Naval War College Faculty Paper, June 2011.

2. Chestnut, James. "Political Foot Soldier: Colin Powell's Interagency Campaign for the Base Force," National War College Student Paper, National Defense University, 2002.

3. Gedda, George. "Colin Powell: Four Tumultuous Years," *Foreign Service Journal*, February 2005, pp. 32-40.

4. Brooks, Peter T.R. "A Legacy of Success," *Foreign Service Journal*, February 2005, pp. 27-31.

5. Jett, Dennis. "The Failure of Colin Powell," *Foreign Service Journal*, February 2005, pp. 22-26.

LEADERSHIP CONCEPTS-15: LOU GERSTNER AT IBM

A. Focus

Called "Big Blue," referring to its bold blue logo, IBM stood for fifty years as the icon of American business. It was a forward-thinking and superbly managed organization with a long history of success and innovation. It invested heavily in R&D and leading edge technology. Its culture was legendary and deeply rooted in strong values. IBM was often described as a "national treasure."

During the 1980s, IBM's external environment was rapidly changing, driven largely by new technology and international competition. IBM responded by introducing the Personal Computer (PC) and improving its internal procedures. By the end of the decade, personal computers had changed the way organizations used technology. There also had been a big change in what customers expected from their technology providers. Extensive disagreement broke out within IBM's leadership about the best strategy to respond to its deteriorating competitive position.

John Akers, IBM's CEO at the time, recognized the need for change and conducted a massive reorganization in 1988, including downsizing by 20,000 employees and closing 19 plants. By 1990, Akers' plan appeared successful. Decision cycles became shorter and the financial results improved. However, over the next two years, results once again deteriorated, this time precipitously. Stakeholders were skeptical and customers defected to competitors. The prognosis for IBM was bleak.

On April Fool's Day, 1993, Lou Gerstner took over as Chief Executive Officer (CEO) at IBM. Beginning his first day of work, he was unable to get into the headquarters building because he did not have a company ID. A cleaning person reluctantly let him in. The challenge was clear as he set out to lead this huge multinational technology company that manufactured and sold computer hardware and software. In three short years IBM went from being the second most profitable company in the world to losing $13 billon. IBM was facing a monumental crisis. The previous CEO for nine years, John Akers, had just been "relieved of command." Gerstner had to act fast -- IBM had only 90 days of operating cash left.

Gerstner had not even been one of IBM's top five candidates for the vacant CEO position. He had no computer industry experience. Previously, Gerstner was the CEO of RJR Nabisco (a conglomerate food and tobacco products company), headed the Travel Related Services group at American Express, and was a director at the famous consulting firm, McKinsey & Company.

In January 2003, Lou Gerstner retired from IBM. The company was again profitable. IBM had regained its credibility and leadership within the industry. The stock value was $80 per share, compared to $13 when he took over.

B. Objectives

- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 5b, 5c, and 5d.

C. Guidance

1. As you read the case, consider the following questions as you prepare for class. What is the root cause problem at IBM as Gerstner arrives? What part does organizational culture play in

the performance of the company during its period of prior success and as it declines before Gerstner's arrival? Are there similarities between IBM and the organizations in which you have served? What does Gerstner do when he first arrives? What makes him successful in turning things around at IBM? What can you learn from the case that you can apply in your organizations in the future?

D. Required Readings (31 pages)

1. Austin, Robert D., and Richard L. Nolan. "IBM Corporation Turnaround," Boston: Harvard Business School Publishing, 14 November 2000. **(Reading not available on Blackboard, hardcopy will be provided)**.

2. Schein, Edgar H. "How Leaders Embed and Transmit Culture," *Armed Forces Comptroller*, Summer 1986, pp. 6-12.

3. Kniskern, Henry P. "IBM History-Leadership and Culture," NWC Faculty Reading, Revised August 2013, pp. 1-5.

LEADERSHIP CONCEPTS-16: JOHN ARCHER LEJEUNE

A. Focus

Following the conclusion of World War I, the very existence of the United States Marine Corps was threatened more vigorously than possibly at any other time in history. Militarism was out of favor, the economy was in a shambles, and allegations of Marine Corps misbehavior in Haiti had become the subject of congressional debate. Many senior U.S. military officers, including some in the Navy, were convinced the Marines were obsolete and the time had come to disestablish the Corps. Internally, the Marine Officer Corps was divided into distinct camps, each with a very different strategic vision for the Corps.

The duty of dealing with these issues and literally saving his beloved Marine Corps fell to Major General John Archer Lejeune, the 13th Commandant of the United States Marine Corps. His challenge was further heightened by allegations that his appointment was the result of conspiracy, unethical dealings and political subterfuge. To carry out his mission, Lejeune would have to chart a new strategic direction, forge new political alliances, tame such disparate personalities as General Smedley Butler, two-time winner of the Medal of Honor and Colonel Earl H. 'Pete' Ellis, a pioneer of amphibious warfare, and brilliant strategist, who, at the time of his death, was on a secret intelligence mission to the Caroline Islands.

Few times task a senior leader as much as when an organization is at the crossroads of destiny. To stay the safe and familiar course is to guarantee disaster, yet every alternate pathway is fraught with risk and the real potential of failure. Under such conditions every bet becomes a strategic bet and leaders must decide which tools, tactics and techniques to employ. Today John Archer Lejeune has become increasingly recognized as a successful strategic leader who overcame many of the challenges facing military leaders today.

B. Objectives

- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 5a, 5b, 5c, 5d, 5e, 5f, and 5g.

C. Guidance

It is not surprising that military leaders have increasingly been "rediscovering" John Archer Lejeune as the parallels between his time as Commandant and those in which senior military leaders now find themselves grow ever more apparent. What are the differing "camps" present in military circles today? What qualifications and background might a modern Lejeune require to get the acceptance the original enjoyed? When it came to taking on assignments, Lejeune often found himself between a rock and a hard place. If he said no to a mission, his organization looked less relevant. If he said yes, his resources were stretched much more thinly. Is this the same dilemma facing U.S. military leaders today? Lejeune was not a drinker, but he protected Pete Ellis, because he treasured Ellis' brilliance. Lejeune did not like scandal, but he put up with Butler, who often produced "the wrong kind of ink," because of Butler's fighting and organizational abilities and his powerful political connections. It has been said that neither Ellis nor Butler (Medals of Honor and all) would have been allowed to remain on active duty today. How many excuses should a leader make for exceptional abilities? Lejeune believed his beloved

Corps lived under the threat of extinction every day. Today, aren't such fears needless, almost silly? For the past decade and more the military Service Chiefs have presented fairly united fronts and none have dared suggest the dissolution of the present – does this not imply every service has an assured future?

D. Required Readings (32 pages)

1. Norton, Richard J. "John Archer Lejeune: The Cajun Who Saved the Corps," Newport, RI: Naval War College Faculty Paper, May 2013, Revised August 2016.

LEADERSHIP CONCEPTS-17: CURTIS LEMAY

A. Focus

General Curtis E. LeMay had the opportunity to do what very few people ever get to do: lead at tactical, operational, and strategic levels. He led during the "hot war" of World War II, in Europe and Japan, and, again during the "Cold War", building and sustaining a nuclear deterrent force that countered the Soviet Union and its allies.

Forced to become the responsible figure in his family at age eight, he realized if he didn't find a way to feed his mother and brothers and sisters, no one else would. This experience molded him and shaped his personality for the rest of his life. He was bit by the "flying bug" early and found a way to get himself through Ohio State University and into the Army Air Corps, first flying open cockpit airplanes in the 1920's and then pursuit aircraft until he made the switch to bombers. Bombers, he felt, possessed the most important capability that air power brought: the ability to go beyond enemy lines, and eliminate the opposing force's ability to wage and sustain war.

From the time he arrived in bombers, he faced many difficult challenges and found ways to overcome them all. There were no instructions, no manuals, and very little guidance to assist him and his fellow air pioneers. To a problem solver and innovator like LeMay, it was a perfect opportunity to apply his skills. He developed procedures for overwater navigation with the limited technology available at the time. He demonstrated the ability to find a ship at sea and attack it. He built a B-17 bomb group from scratch and then took it to war in the opening months of World War II in the skies over Germany creating tactics and employment techniques that became the theater standard. He quickly progressed from group commander, to wing commander, to division commander. When America first fielded its newest bomber, the B-29 in the Pacific, LeMay transferred there to overcome its initial struggles in the war against Japan. He created a totally new strategy in that theater and initiated the firebombing of Japanese cities in an effort to avoid the ground invasion of the Japanese home islands, which he felt, would create even more casualties on both sides.

After the Air Force came into existence in 1947, he was put in charge of the service's research and development organization where he created the Rand Corporation, a private enterprise that overcame budget shortages in the post-war years. He was the commander of United States Air Forces Europe when the Soviets closed off all approaches to the allied sector of Berlin and initiated the Berlin Airlift in response. When that crisis was well on its way to being resolved, his talents were tapped again to turn Strategic Air Command around. He systematically tore down, and then built up an organization that controlled two legs of America's TRIAD and one that was ready to answer a threat within minutes of a decision being made by the national command authorities.

His final years of active duty service were spent in Washington as first, the Vice Chief, and then, the Chief of Staff of the United States Air Force where he advised the President, as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff during the Cuban Missile Crisis and the opening phase of the Vietnam War.

He was not blessed with extraordinary communications skills. He was gruff, and brutally honest, never shying away from bad news. His frank nature could make him appear callous and abrupt. Added to LeMay's blunt honesty, brutal sense of realism, and strong devotion to service

and country, was an odd combination of personality traits: a highly radical and innovative mind combined with an extremely conservative personality. As author Warren Kozac puts it; "He was a mass of inconsistency. While he hated bureaucracy, he chose a career in one of the largest bureaucracies in the world. He felt at times he was too soft to lead men into combat, yet he was viewed as a very hard man by everyone else."

B. Guidance

As you read the case and prepare to discuss it in class, consider LeMay's strengths and weaknesses. What were they and how did he compensate for his weaknesses and how did he capitalize on his strengths to influence people within his command and those outside it? How many different times did his context, his leadership environment, change? How did he adapt to these contextual changes? Was he always successful in adapting—where did he fail and why? Finally, what does LeMay teach us about the art and science of leadership?

C. Objectives

- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1a, 1b, 1c, 2b, 5a, 5b, 5c, 5d, 5e, and 5g.

D. Required Readings (74 pages)

1. Ducey, Roger H. "I'll Fly Lead: The Life of General Curtis E. LeMay," Newport, RI: Naval War College Faculty Paper, July 2012, revised January 2015.

LEADERSHIP CONCEPTS-18: STEVE JOBS

A. Focus

The name, Steve Jobs, is synonymous with most of the new concepts that have emerged from the mid 1970's to the 21st century in personal computing. Jobs began the company in the mid-1970's with co-founder Steve Wozniak, then left for a decade in the 1980's and 1990's and returned to become the Chief Executive Officer as the company began to falter financially and emotionally. By 2009, the Apple Corporation had designed and put to market 9 Apple II products, 22 PowerPC/CPU's, 8 drive systems, 13 input devices, 3 models of Mac Centris; 8 Classic Mac models, 4 iMacs, 11 Mac II series computers, 9 Mac LC Series systems, 12 monitors, 12 miscellaneous models, 12 Mac Performas, 34 Power Macs, 42 Mac Powerbook Portables, 13 Quadras, 10 MacServers, 15 networking systems, 9 models of the portable Newton, 25 laser writers and printers, 54 new software programs, 47 system software packages and 9 telecommunications products.

To study Jobs' efforts as a leader is to study the environment of organizational development. Organizational development is a deliberately planned effort to increase an organization's relevance and viability. In order for leaders to be effective in this atmosphere, they require abilities and talents to develop people and systems for future readiness to meet change and create settings where systemic learning and development can occur. Jobs was a catalyst for changing the basics of beliefs, attitudes and relevance of values in the computing industry, restructured Apple to better absorb disruptive technologies, shrinking or exploding market opportunities and ensuing challenges and chaos that were hallmarks of the world of personal computers. In doing so, some would argue he changed the world.

B. Objectives

- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 5a, 5b, 5c, and 5d.

C. Guidance

1. This case describes the *personal*, not technological, leadership history of Steve Jobs. It traces Jobs' life from his youth to his death in 2011. The story of Buddha (Siddhartha Gautama), who travelled from his birthplace of Lunbini, to Kushingara where he died and reached full enlightenment, is used as an analogy to link many of the major events and influential characters in Jobs' life. Because this unit is about organizational leadership, personalities and organizational settings are highlighted.

2. The term "entrepreneur' is most associated with Steve Jobs leadership effectiveness. He was charismatic and a design-driven pioneer of the personal computer revolution. His story is one of extreme ups and downs with big successes and just as large failures. Consider the environment in which this leader finds himself as well as the 20th and 21st century technological boom that occurred during his tenure as a profit sector leader.

3. Jobs' story is also the story of the growth and change of an individual into the role of a senior leader. Many themes may be discovered in Jobs' story including how to handle power struggles, the importance of creativity, technology development, marketing ideas and concepts to global audiences as well as the range of influence a single person can have in a complex environment.

4. Think about how this leader accomplishes 'putting a ding in the universe.' Senior executive leaders have big personalities and many are believed to be categorized as 'productive narcissists.' Justifications for extreme talent often exist in all organizations. Contemplate some of the reasons for this.

D. Required Reading (77 pages)

1. Raum, Mary. "Steve Jobs: From Lunbini to Kushinagar, Leading in Organizational Settings," Newport, RI: Naval War College Faculty Paper, August 2012.

2. Raum, Mary. "Justifying Steve Jobs," Newport, RI: Naval War College Faculty Paper, August 2012.

LEADERSHIP CONCEPTS-19: ADMIRAL ELMO R. ZUMWALT, JR.

A. Focus

Few admirals have led their navy during times as trying or turbulent as those faced by Admiral "Bud" Zumwalt in the early 1970's. Selected over thirty-three more senior officers including all of the serving four-star admirals, he was a controversial choice to lead the U.S. Navy during the waning years of the Vietnam conflict. He assumed command of a navy facing serious internal as well as external challenges that threatened its status as the world's finest maritime force. For many, Zumwalt is known only for his efforts to eliminate abusive Navy regulations that were unnecessarily demeaning and humiliating to enlisted and junior officer personnel. Less well known were his efforts to change Navy strategy and to rebuild an aged Fleet during a period of drastic budget cuts as the country withdrew its forces from Vietnam. His task was exacerbated by the growing threat from the Soviet Navy intent on reversing its naval failures during the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, a large number of admirals who refused to follow his lead, and a lack of political support from the Nixon administration led by Henry Kissinger who sought not to confront the Soviets but to orchestrate America's graceful decline in world power.

Many of the programs that Admiral Zumwalt developed as a part of his "Project Sixty" to modernize the U.S. Fleet were never implemented during his tenure as CNO. His efforts to rebalance the Fleet from a carrier-centric navy met with stiff internal resistance from both the powerful naval aviation lobby (both uniformed and civilian) and by Admiral Rickover and his equally powerful nuclear-power faction. His efforts to change U.S. Navy culture also foundered on the shoals of long-held naval traditions of all-powerful ship's captains and unquestioning obedience to orders from the Navy's chain of command.

B. Objectives

- Evaluate the actions of a Leader to make changes to organizational cultural values.

- Assess Admiral Zumwalt's plan for changes to Navy policy, operating concept, and force structure.

- Assess the influence of American societal issues (context) on Admiral Zumwalt and the U.S. Navy.

- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1a, 1c, 5a, 5b, 5c, 5d, 5e, 5f, and 5g.

C. Guidance

Without question, Zumwalt's methods to change an institution inherently adverse to change of any sort were immensely controversial. Why did he adopt the methods and processes he used? What made the Navy's senior officers so resistant to his proposals, both in the composition of the Fleet as well as in the personnel arena? Why did he feel so strongly about the need for making changes to personnel policies? The initiatives he developed to change the composition of the Fleet met with stern resistance from nearly every quarter of the Navy during

his tenure as CNO, but were adopted nearly wholesale during the Reagan buildup. What changed? What might we learn from his efforts to change the Navy that apply to today?

D. Required Readings (75 pages)

1. Ratcliff, Ronald E. "Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr. – the Promethean CNO," Naval War College Faculty reading, June 2012.

2. Sands, Jeffrey L. "On His Watch: Admiral Zumwalt's Efforts to Institutionalize Strategic Change," Alexandria, VA, Center for Naval Analysis, 1993, pp. 19-30 and 90-109.

3. Pierce, Terry C. "US Navy Disruptive Innovation – Aborted: Project 60 – Defensive Sea Control Warfare," in Warfighting and Disruptive Technologies: Disguising Innovation, New York: Frank Cass, 2004, pp. 155-163.

LEADERSHIP CONCEPTS-20: JOHN F. LEHMAN, JR.

A. Focus

The Vietnam War left the United States Navy, and the armed forces as a whole, in a state of disrepair. Throughout the 1970s, the lack of resources as well as the absence of a coherent naval strategy hampered the Department of Defense in building a Navy capable of countering a growing and more assertive Soviet navy. In 1981, the inauguration of President Ronald Reagan ushered in a new stance on military readiness, leading to one of the largest defense buildups in the history of the world.

John F. Lehman Jr. sought the position of Secretary of the Navy under Reagan because he had a vision for the future and believed he was capable of achieving this vision – a 600-ship Navy. As Secretary of the Navy, he pressed for the development of a coherent naval strategy and for reform of aspects of the defense acquisition system. The latter reforms enabled the Navy to grow substantially despite somewhat modest budget increases during his tenure.

Lehman is of interest to consider as a strategic leader for several reasons: First, he is something of a rarity among recent strategic leaders in that his primary professional focus was force structure. Despite substantial increases in defense spending, Lehman was forced to deal with fiscal realities and constraints, along with the pressure of the domestic political system, in fulfilling his vision of a 600-ship navy. In this regard and others, Lehman's story is relevant to today's strategic leaders.

Lehman succeeded where others who had previously recognized the need for transformation had failed. On the one hand, his success was the result of his consistent articulation of a coherent strategy to guide force structure. On the other hand, it also stemmed from his relentless, some would say abrasive, style of leadership. Lehman was contemptuous of bureaucratic norms and was willing to change or circumvent existing processes and conventions in order to achieve his goals. Nonetheless, while his brash and dogged style often helped him accomplish great things, it also contributed to Lehman's eventual loss of influence.

B. Objectives

- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1a, 1c, 1e, 5a, 5b, 5c, 5d, and 5e.

C. Guidance

1. What affect might having so many famous family members have on an individual? Who were the people who had significant influence upon Lehman? What was the nature of their relationship/influence on Lehman? Was there any indication that Lehman had inclination towards any of these ways of developing his subordinates?

2. What leadership style did Lehman exhibit? Was Lehman an insider or an outsider – does this theme have relevance in Lehman's case? If so, what is the frame of reference?

3. How did Lehman's reserve status affect his ability to drive change as SecNav? How might the fact that he is SecNav influence his performance as a naval officer? Might there be any ethical considerations with having such a dual status within the Department of the Navy? How did Lehman successfully navigate the DoD and Washington bureaucracies to achieve his goals? Was "the system" more of a barrier or an enabler for Lehman? Did he master working within the system and leveraging it to his advantage? Or did he learn how to get things done by circumventing the system? Or was it bits of both?

4. How did Lehman garner buy-in for his strategic vision? Are there notable similarities (or differences) with other figures who successfully sold a vision or concept? Lejeune? Jobs? Did Lehman simply repackage someone else's concept/strategy and sell it as his own?

5. Which of Lehman's techniques would still be effective and acceptable today? Which would be considered "out of bounds"? Beyond the individual level of leadership, what significant environmental aspects helped or enabled Lehman to implement major force structure changes? What were some of the favorable international/geopolitical factors (IPS)? The state and societal factors (DPS)? How well did Lehman assess and understand his environment? How did aspects of the strategic context change during Lehman's tenure and what influence did this have upon his effectiveness. Did this have an effect on his "shelf life" or "expiration date"?

D. Required Readings (50 pages)

1. Wright, Erik C., and Mackubin T. Owens, "John F. Lehman, Jr: The Secretary Who Ran the Navy," Naval War College Faculty reading, June 2012, updated August 2013.

LEADERSHIP CONCEPTS-21: DONALD RUMSFELD AND ROBERT GATES

A. Focus

To say the last decade was demanding and turbulent for the Department of Defense and its leadership, both civilian and military, is an understatement. In the center of this swirling pressure cell were two leaders of remarkable capabilities, and equally remarkable, yet differing, leadership styles. While the strategic and operational conduct of two wars can naturally consume much of the dialog about Secretaries Rumsfeld and Gates, their decisions and priorities regarding policy, specifically regarding defense resource allocation and force planning, is an equally rich pasture for discussion particularly following our two cases from a service chief and service secretary perspective.

Donald Rumsfeld, former collegiate wrestler at Princeton, Navy pilot, and four-term congressman, author of "Rumsfeld's Rules," "snowflakes" and "transformation roadmaps", was Secretary of Defense (for the second time) from January 2001 until December 2006 and holds the distinction of having been the youngest, the oldest, and the longest serving defense secretary. During this period, his tenure and leadership were, of course, largely influenced by the attacks of 9/11 and the ensuing wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. In the eight months prior to 9/11, however, he spent his initial time as secretary intent on "transforming the military" and "reasserting civilian control." He was met with significant friction and resistance from without and within the department, but from the moment Rumsfeld helped rescue injured workers from the burning Pentagon, thoughts about his leadership dramatically changed…at least for a while.

Robert Gates was sworn in as Secretary of Defense in December 2006. Gates, a former Director of Central Intelligence and president of Texas A&M University, inherited two foreign wars and the war on terrorism, but also a Pentagon in some disarray and with its relations with Congress and other agencies no better. Within a few days, the "anti-Rumsfeld" secretary traveled to Iraq, stating "failure in that part of the world would be a calamity." At the same time he clearly confirmed the U.S. commitment in Afghanistan. In short order, he also fired one CJCS, one VCJCs, two combatant commanders, two service secretaries, one service chief and one surgeon general, all for not heeding his call for operational focus on "job one."

B. Objectives

- Compare the leadership style of two leaders who executed the duties and responsibilities of the Secretary of Defense during time of war.

- Assess the actions of leaders to institute changes in organizational priorities and processes.

- Evaluate, compare, and contrast the actions of Secretary Rumsfeld and Secretary Gates regarding the U.S. concept of civil-military control.

- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1a, 1b, 1c, 1e, 5a, 5b, 5c, 5d, 5e, 5f, and 5g.

C. Guidance

What did Rumsfeld "get right," and what will be the long term impacts of his efforts to reform and even transform DoD? Was Rumsfeld better suited to be "Secretary of War" or "Secretary of Defense?" What is his leadership legacy concerning relationships with senior military leaders and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan? Are there elements of the current administration's strategic guidance/priorities for the Department of Defense that sound like they could have been written by Rumsfeld?

Robert Gates was the first Secretary of Defense to maintain his cabinet position through the transition between presidents of different parties. While he has been referred to by some as "the soldiers' secretary," he is not without his critics. What did Gates accomplish in his four and a half years as secretary? Did he focus on his role of "Secretary of War" to the detriment of long-term strategic force planning responsibilities? What portion of his relative success depended on his leadership approach? What is the "true" role of the Secretary of Defense? Does the leadership style of either Rumsfeld or Gates truly make a difference? These and other questions will be the focus of this seminar.

D. Required Readings (50 pages)

1. Kaplan, Robert D. "What Rumsfeld Got Right: How Donald Rumsfeld remade the U.S. military for a more uncertain world," *Atlantic Monthly*, July/August 2008, pp. 64-73.

2. Graham, Bradley. "Decline and Fall: Donald Rumsfeld's Dramatic End," *The Washington Post*, June 14, 2009. Article was also published as "Rumsfeld's Retreat: The Final Days of His Troubled Reign," *The Washington Post*, June 22, 2009, pp. 6-11.

3. Kaplan, Fred. "The Professional," *The New York Times Magazine*, February 10, 2008, pp. 40.

4. Wilkerson, Thomas L. "Sprinting Through the Tape," *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings* 134, July 2008, pp. 28-31.

5. Finel, Bernard I. "The Failed Secretary," *Armed Forces Journal*, September 2011.

6. Both, Max. "Why Is Robert Gates Angry?" *New Republic. com*, February 25, 2014. https://newrepublic.com/article/116500/duty-memoirs-secretary-war-reviewed-max-boot

LEADERSHIP CONCEPTS-22: COURSE WRAP-UP AND STUDENT REFLECTIONS

A. Focus

This two-hour session will provide you the opportunity to share your insights about leadership gained from your leadership essay, seminar discussions, and personal reflection during the Leadership Concepts sub-course. Formal presentations are neither required nor desired, but each student is expected to contribute their thoughts. The intent is to culminate the ongoing conversation you have had with your seminar about the various aspects of senior leadership that you have determined to either be enduring or unique at senior levels of leadership. You are encouraged to approach this session as if you were having a discussion with your subordinates and providing them with your observations and beliefs about leadership.

B. Objectives

- Discuss various aspects of senior leadership as reflected in individual student views at the culmination of the Leadership Concepts course.

- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1a, 1b, 5a, 5b, 5c, 5d, 5f, and 5g.

C. Guidance

Specific guidance will be provided by individual professors in the preceding session.

D. Required Readings

None.

NSDM FINAL EXERCISE (FX)
STUDY GUIDE, AY 2016-2017

A. Focus. The NSDM Final Exercise (FX) is the course capstone event that provides each seminar with the opportunity to integrate the "Levels of Analysis" by exercising selected concepts, skills, and material studied in the three NSDM sub-courses. Each seminar will act as a national strategic planning working group to produce and present an executive-level global strategic estimate of the future security environment over the next 20 years, the key tenants of a National Security Strategy and nested National Military Strategy that advances and defends U.S. national interests, operating concepts that describe how the future force will operate, a future joint force structure within budget guidance that supports the NMS and operating concepts, and an implementation case. These six elements will be synthesized and presented in a 45-minute executive-level briefing that is the final graded deliverable. Figure 1 provides an overview of the FX methodology. The arrows illustrate cross-cutting NSDM topics, the deliverable elements are depicted in the center, and faculty will facilitate discussions during teaching team consultations.

Figure 1: FX Methodology



B. Objectives

- Integrate NSDM course concepts through:

  - Development of a national security strategic assessment that describes the critical elements in the future security environment over the next 20 years.

  - Development of an outline for key tenants of a national security strategy and nested national military strategy that advances and defends U.S. national interests.

  - Development of nested operating concepts that describe how Joint Force 2036 will operate in the future security environment.

  - Development of force structure for Joint Force 2036 within prescribed resource constraints.

  - Development of an implementation case for an innovation related to the above strategies, operating concepts or force structure.

- Effectively organize, develop and present a 45-minute presentation that defines your future security environment assessment, outlines the seminar's proposed National Security Strategy and National Military Strategy, develops operating concepts, recommends a force structure within resource constraints, and presents an implementation case.

C. Guidance

- Your group is not writing actual national strategy documents. Instead, you are providing a 45-minute executive-level briefing that can facilitate development of the actual products. It is important to exercise imaginative and innovative thinking to create new or different concepts or capabilities to inform Joint Force development that can be supported within budget guidance. As appropriate, the seminar should identify and discuss how they have sought to mitigate or otherwise address any capability needs and gaps.

- During this group exercise, each seminar will organize itself to conduct research, analysis, deliberation, and product development. Although the schedule requires an extremely intensive process to conduct these functions, it includes sufficient time to execute the exercise requirements with careful time management. Although additional research from unclassified sources is encouraged and may be necessary, as a capstone project the exercise primarily requires the seminar to leverage internal expertise and draw upon the content of the NSDM curriculum. For example, ideas from seminar members' Security Strategies research papers, Leadership Concepts essays, and Policy Analysis examinations may prove useful to inform analysis, group organization and deliberation, and product development.

D. Requirements

- The NSDM FX graded "deliverable" is a 45-minute executive-level briefing. ***This <u>must</u> cover all six required components***: future security environment, national security strategy, national military strategy, operating concepts, force structure, and an implementation case. Failure to effectively cover any component(s) will have adverse grading consequences.

- The presentation should succinctly cover each of the six deliverable elements and explain both the underlying logic of each and how they are related (particularly for nested elements.) There is no specific format or template for the briefing, but effective presentation and communication represent part of what you are being assessed on and it is therefore up to each seminar to determine how best to communicate its ideas effectively within the time allowed. This is a graded activity and care should be exercised in product development to ensure the seminar's best ideas are captured and fully explained in an effective presentation.

- In addition to a grading process, seminars will compete in a parallel judging process to identify two top finalist seminars that will go on to present their work and engage with a senior judging panel of high level national security professionals in front of the faculty and their peers. At the conclusion of these finalist presentations the senior judging panel, in consultation the NSA Chair or another senior member of the faculty, will select one of these seminars to receive the Naval War College's *James V. Forrestal Award for Excellence in Strategy Development and Force Planning*.

- Although the seminar determines the number of briefers that deliver the final presentation to assessment panels, all students are expected to contribute to the discussion during the question and answer (Q&A) period.

Future Security Environment

- The seminar will present its strategic estimate of the security environment in 2036. This assessment should include as appropriate insights about the evolution that led to this future environment in 2036 including:

    - Near-term: from today out to 5 years
    - Mid-term: from 10 to 15 years
    - Far-term: from 15 to 20 years

- Identify states, non-state actors, or organizations in the security environment that may challenge the United States' ability to advance and defend its national interests looking out over the next twenty years.

- Identify the major strategic challenges that the United States will face in the future.

- Identify known or anticipated opportunities that the United States could leverage including those states, groups, or organizations that could potentially assist to advance and defend U.S. interests around the world.

National Security Strategy

- Formulate an outline for key tenets of a National Security Strategy (NSS) that broadly describes national interests and corresponding security objectives, the general methods to achieve those objectives across the instruments of national power, and the corresponding implications for allocating resources across those instruments.

- Consider the implications on the U.S. government, national security organizations, and recommend appropriate changes. In deciding future direction, identify the critical gaps that may challenge the ability of the U.S. government and the military to perform its missions to advance the objectives outlined in your seminar's NSS.

Military Strategy

- Formulate an outline for a National Military Strategy (NMS) that broadly describes how the military instrument of power will advance and, when necessary, defend national interests and achieve the corresponding objectives in the proposed NSS. Describe how the NMS supports the NSS.

- Broadly assess the risks inherent in your proposed military strategic approach.

Operating Concepts

- Articulate how the Joint Force will operate in the future security environment to meet the objectives of the NSS and NMS.

- Operating concepts are not necessarily limited to Department of Defense activities, but might also in some cases consider and describe interagency operations or initiatives. At the same time, ***joint military operating concepts must always be addressed*** as part of this deliverable element.

Force Structure

- Utilizing an online Force Development Calculator tool that will be provided, develop Joint Force 2036 that supports your NSS and NMS and utilizes your operating concepts and that is capable of advancing national interests, defending the United States, and achieving all of the strategic objectives assigned to the military instrument of power.

- You are required to develop your force structure within resource constraints. Specific budget guidance will be provided at the FX-1 session at the start of the exercise. The recommended force structure *must* comply with the fiscal guidance.

Implementation Case

- Identify one of the more challenging or ambitious aspects of your seminar's ideas that would require the supporting efforts of a senior leader to facilitate its successful implementation. This can be an element of your NSS or NMS, one of your operating concepts, or a feature of your force structure.

a. Based on the issue, the seminar will identify the senior leader charged with its implementation (for example, President, Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, CJCS, Service Chief, or Combatant Commander.).

b. Identify the relevant stakeholders (for example, Secretary of Defense, CJCS, Service Chiefs, Secretary of State, Congress, special interest groups, or foreign governments) that may oppose or support your initiative. What are their interests?

c. Address the full range of influences and obstacles associated with the implementation of your challenging or ambitious idea or innovation. The seminar must consider the influence of domestic politics and international relations (for example, organizational resistance, existing legislation or policies, industry sectors, media interest, lobbyists, or international norms).

d. Provide specific recommendations that explain how the senior leader could convince the relevant stakeholders to support the initiative's implementation. The recommendations should include a plan to overcome any identified opposition or obstacles, while directly addressing the stakeholders' interests (for example, the benefits of your initiative for the stakeholders).

e. Depending on the complexity of the initiative, the seminar's recommendations could include an implementation "timeline" or key milestones that describe specific actions that the senior leader would take in order to obtain necessary support.

E. FX Milestones

FX-7: Presentation Review

- This is an opportunity for the seminar to rehearse and refine the briefing based on feedback from their faculty teaching team before the graded event. The faculty teaching team will review and critique the brief and discuss the effectiveness of the presentation and the analysis that underpins its ideas and assessments.

FX-8: Faculty Evaluation

- Present and defend a 45-minute briefing to an assessment panel of three "external" faculty members (that is, not on the seminar's teaching team) from each of the three sub-

courses. Because this is insufficient time to present the full spectrum of the seminar's analysis, rationale, and conclusions, the seminar should prepare to respond to questions from the faculty panel during a 15-minute Q&A period. To help the faculty evaluate your decisions and rationale, each seminar shall provide three pure black-and-white paper copies (2 slides per page) of its brief and force structure matrix to the members of the faculty panel prior to the start of the presentation.

F. Grading and Award Judging

- Seminars will give a 45-minute final presentation and then engage in a 15-minute Q&A period with a faculty assessment panel. Grades will be based on *both* the presentation and the Q&A period. Faculty assessment panels at this phase of the assessment process can award a grade of up to 93 points for the entire seminar.

- Each faculty assessment panel will also select one of the seminars that they have assessed to move forward and present to an Executive Panel.

    - All members of seminars selected to move forward to the Executive Panel will automatically receive one additional grade point. The Executive panel will select two seminars whose members will move on to the final phase.

        - The Executive Panel has the discretion in extremely rare circumstances to award up to two additional grade points to all members of any seminar that it deems to have given a truly extraordinary presentation and Q&A of the highest conceivable quality.

    - The two finalist seminars give their presentation and engage in Q&A with a Senior Panel of high level national security professionals to compete for the prestigious *James V. Forrestal Award for Excellence in Strategy Development and Force Planning.* This culminating event will be held in Spruance Auditorium in front of all students and faculty. All members of the seminar selected by the Senior Panel to receive the *Forrestal Award* will automatically receive one additional grade point.

- In addition to grade points awarded to all seminar members as described above, each seminar will have the opportunity to recognize exceptional contributions by individual members. Since certain individuals in a seminar may have contributed to the FX process in a way perceived by their peers to be extremely valuable, each seminar will have the option to select up to four individuals deserving extra academic recognition through receipt of three additional grade points each. Alternatively, the seminar may instead decide to equally distribute one extra grade point to ever member if a majority perceive equality in effort.

    - The Faculty Team will distribute the Seminar NSDM FX Contribution Form during FX-7 Presentation Review.

- Students will complete the ballot and return the form to their Faculty Teaching Team no later than the end of the day.

NSDM FX DAILY SCHEDULE
Winter 2016-17

FX-1 0800-0820 (ODD/EVEN) Spruance Auditorium 0830-1215 (ODD) Seminar Rooms 0915-1300 (EVEN) Seminar Rooms	FX-1: Introduction and Assessment Methods
FX-2 0830-1300 (ODD/EVEN) Seminar Rooms	FX-2: Future Security Environment
FX-3 0830-1630 (ODD/EVEN) Seminar Rooms	FX-3: National Strategy Development
FX-4 0830-1630 (ODD/EVEN) Seminar Rooms	FX-4: Operating Concepts, Policy Initiatives and Force Structure Development
FX-5 0830-1630 (ODD/EVEN) Seminar Rooms	FX-5: Implementation Case Development
FX-6 0830-1630 (ODD/EVEN) Seminar Rooms	FX-6: Seminar Product Development
FX-7 0830-1630 (ODD/EVEN) Seminar Rooms	FX-7: Seminar Presentation Review
FX-8 0830-1630 (ODD/EVEN) Specific times and locations provided in FX-7	FX-8: Seminar Presentations to the Faculty Assessment Panels **Electronic copies of presentation and the force structure matrix are due to teaching team NLT 1400 on 21 Feb**
FX-9 0800-1200 (ODD/EVEN) Specific times and location provided at FX-8	FX-9: Seminar Presentations to Executive Panel **Electronic copies of presentation and the force structure matrix are due to teaching team NLT 1500 on 22 Feb**
FX-10 0800-1200 (ODD/EVEN) Spruance Auditorium	FX-10: Seminar Presentations to Senior Panel

FX-1: INTRODUCTION AND ASSESSMENT METHODS

A. Focus

The NSDM FX builds upon the concepts, issues, and topics examined in NSA. The Final Exercise provides the opportunity to integrate that knowledge during a complex, national security planning exercise. The NSDM FX also requires the seminar to leverage the experience of seminar members and their expertise to successfully develop the required products within the time allotted.

B. Objectives

- Comprehend the FX scenario, process, and products.
- Organize the seminar to develop and present the required FX products.
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 2c, 5a, 5b, and 5c.

C. Guidance

This opening session (FX-1) addresses the requirements, products, and processes of the FX and provides budget guidance for the force planning element. In an opening presentation in Spruance Auditorium the NSA Chair will give an FX overview and provide force planning budget guidance. Seminars will then meet with their faculty teams to discuss in greater detail the FX process including organization, decision-making, and knowledge management.

The seminar must decide how to organize itself to function as a strategic planning team. While there are many possibilities, in the past, seminars have started with a Chief of Staff and a seminar administrator. The Chief of Staff ensures the seminar makes progress, while the seminar administrator captures the seminar's discussion and intellectual activity to facilitate development of the FX deliverables.

The seminar must identify one member to be trained how to operate the Force Development Calculator by attending a one-hour "operators" training session at a time and date to be scheduled during the exercise.

As the exercise progresses, it can be useful to organize by function to facilitate product development. Each seminar has the responsibility to develop the analytic organization and process used to execute the FX. Given the inter-related nature of the product, teams cannot work in isolation of each other; integrating all deliverables is a key to success.

FX-2: FUTURE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

A. Focus

National Security Affairs provides critical thinking, analytical, and assessment methods useful in strategic assessment of the future security environment and the development of national strategies. Strategic assessment of the international political system provides an understanding of the future security environment. Assessment of the domestic political system provides an understanding of the domestic political environment, national interests, and national will. In these assessments, it is important to understand strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats to U.S. interests. This session provides an opportunity for the seminar to describe the future operating environment through a strategic estimate and assessment of the security environment in 2036. This assessment should include as appropriate insights about the evolution that led to this future environment in 2036 including: Near-term (from today out to 5 years); Mid-term (from 10 to 15 years); Far-term (from 15 to 20 years).

B. Objectives

- Identify states, non-sate actors, or organizations in the security environment that may challenge the ability of the U.S. to advance and defend national interests.

- Identify known or anticipated opportunities the nation should leverage, including states, non-state actors, organizations, or actors, to advance and defend U.S. interests.

- Identify important strategic and operational challenges the nation will face in the security environment.

- Broadly assess the risk inherent in your seminar's description of the security environment.

- Support CJCS Joint Learning Area 1b, 1d, 2a, 2b, 2c, 2e, 2f, 3a, 3b, 3c, 3d, 3e, 4a, 4b, 4c, 5a, 5b, and 5c.

C. Guidance.

The seminar will conduct a strategic assessment of the future security environment. The method of assessment or analysis is selected by the seminar. The strategic assessment will describe the seminar’s projection of the future security environment over the next twenty years.

FX-3: NATIONAL STRATEGY DEVELOPMENT

A. Focus

Broadly conceived, strategy is an instrument of policy in both war and peace. In general, strategy describes how the national instruments of power are applied by the state to achieve national ends. The expression of national strategy is contained in the National Security Strategy (NSS), which guides the state's use of all elements of national power. Using the NSS as a guide, military leaders develop a National Military Strategy (NMS). This document explains how the military instrument will be used to secure national objectives and strategies through the synchronized and integrated employment of military forces.

B. Objectives

- Formulate an outline for key tenets of an NSS that broadly describes national interests and corresponding security objectives, the general methods to achieve those objectives across the instruments of national power, and the corresponding implications for allocating resources across those instruments

- Formulate an outline for a NMS that broadly describes how the military instrument of power will advance and, when necessary, defend national interests and achieve the corresponding objectives in the proposed NSS. Describe how the NMS supports the NSS.

- Consider the implications on current US government organizations.

- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1a, 1b, 1d, 2b, 2c, 2f, 3a, 3b, 3c, 3d, 3e, 4a, 4b, 4c, 5a, 5b, and 5c.

C. Guidance

The seminar will develop the outline of a National Security and National Military strategy based on the seminar's projection of the future security environment.

- The strategic assessment conducted in FX-2 should be used during strategy development. This assessment provides an understanding of the international political system and the future security environment.

- The seminar should consider the use and employment of all elements of national power in the development of a National Security Strategy. This includes consideration of interagency coordination, multinational cooperation and contribution, and nongovernmental organization cooperation.

- In development of the National Military Strategy, the seminar should focus on the aspects and objectives from the National Security Strategy that will require the use of the military instrument of national power.

FX-4: OPERATING CONCEPTS AND FORCE STRUCTURE

A. Focus

This session allocates time for the seminar to develop Operating Concepts and a recommended Force Structure within specified budget guidance.

B. Objectives

- Develop Operating Concepts that describe how the Joint Force will operate in the future security environment.
    - Operating concepts are not necessarily limited to Department of Defense activities. Although joint military operating concepts must be addressed, you may also consider and describe interagency operations and specific policy initiatives that are integral to supporting the key tenets of your national security and military strategies.
- Develop Foreign Policy initiatives that support the selected strategy
- Develop a Force Structure within budget guidance using the Force Development Calculator
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1a, 1b, 1d, 2b, 2c, 2f, 3a, 3b, 3c, 3d, 3e, 4a, 4b, 4c, 5a, 5b, and 5c.

C. Guidance

This session allows the seminar to determine the "ways and means" for its selected strategy. Specifically, students are required to determine how the Joint Force will operate in the future security environment, what capabilities are required, and make difficult force structure decisions in a resource constrained environment.

The seminar will present 3 - 5 operating concepts (that may include policy or other initiatives) that describe new or enhanced ways that the Joint Force will operate in the future security environment. These concepts and initiatives need not describe all aspects of future operations, such as areas with little change, but should articulate your key innovations for implementing the proposed NSS and NMS.

<u>At least</u> one of your operating concepts must directly address the Joint Force (i.e., along the lines of current Joint Operating Concepts) that identifies a military problem relevant to your strategy, offers a core idea for dealing with it, and describes broad capability requirements for your recommended solution. That said, the seminar can recommend other "ways" including DoD initiatives (e.g., reforming Professional Military Education), interagency participation and activities, or specific policy initiatives (e.g., pursuing a new arms control treaty).

The recommended Force Structure must comply with exercise budget guidance which will be provided at the beginning of the exercise. Informed by its assessment of the future security environment, national strategies and operating concepts, the seminar will make force planning

assessments, discuss force structure alternatives, and then apply available resources in its force structure resource decisions.

The Force Development Calculator is a tool to assist the seminar in making force structure and resource allocation decisions. The seminar is required to use the Force Development Calculator during the force structure development process. Essentially, the Force Development Calculator is a web-based catalog of U.S. Forces with assigned relative cost values. The Force Development Calculator will generate a standard common graph that the seminar will include as part of its final presentation. Additionally, the Force Development Calculator will generate a Seminar Force Structure Matrix that the seminar will print and present to the faculty grading panels as part of its final product.

FX-5: IMPLEMENTATION CASE

A. Focus

This session provides time for the seminar to develop an Implementation Case.

B. Objectives

- Identify and explain a challenging or ambitious innovation or idea related to the seminar's national strategies, operating concepts, or force structure.

- Identify and discuss how to mitigate the challenges associated with implementation.

- Present a plan for effective implementation.

- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1a, 1b, 1d, 2b, 2c, 2f, 3a, 3b, 3c, 3d, 3e, 4a, 4b, 4c, 5a, 5b, and 5c.

C. Guidance

- Identify one of the more challenging or ambitious aspects of your seminar's ideas that would require the supporting efforts of a senior leader to facilitate its successful implementation. This can be an element of your NSS or NMS, one of your operating concepts, or a feature of your force structure.

  a. Based on the issue, the seminar will identify the senior leader charged with its implementation (for example, President, Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, CJCS, Service Chief, or Combatant Commander.).

  b. Identify the relevant stakeholders (for example, Secretary of Defense, CJCS, Service Chiefs, Secretary of State, Congress, special interest groups, or foreign governments) that may oppose or support your initiative. What are their interests?

  c. Address the full range of influences and obstacles associated with the implementation of your challenging or ambitious idea or innovation. The seminar must consider the influence of domestic politics and international relations (for example, organizational resistance, existing legislation or policies, industry sectors, media interest, lobbyists, or international norms).

  d. Provide specific recommendations that explain how the senior leader could convince the relevant stakeholders to support the initiative's implementation. The recommendations should include a plan to overcome any identified opposition or obstacles, while directly addressing the stakeholders' interests (for example, the benefits of your initiative for the stakeholders).

e. Depending on the complexity of the initiative, the seminar's recommendations could include an implementation "timeline" or key milestones that describe specific actions that the senior leader would take in order to obtain necessary support.

FX-6: SEMINAR PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT

A. Focus

This session provides time for the seminar to continue drafting the final presentation.

B. Objectives

- Effectively organize, develop and communicate a 45-minute presentation that outlines the seminar's strategic assessment, strategies, operating concepts, and force structure.

- Anticipate likely Q&As.

- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1a, 1b, 1d, 2b, 2c, 2f, 3a, 3b, 3c, 3d, 3e, 4a, 4b, 4c, 5a, 5b, and 5c.

C. Guidance

This session continues the preparation phase of the FX. The seminar should continue crafting its findings and conclusions into a 45-minute final presentation.

FX-7: SEMINAR PRESENTATION REVIEW

A. Focus

This session concludes the scheduled time for the seminar to complete its development of the FX products.

B. Objectives

- Effectively communicate a 45-minute final presentation on the seminar's assessment of the future security environment, proposed National Security Strategy and National Military Strategy, Operating Concepts, force structure, and an implementation case.

- Conduct a rehearsal of the seminar's product and receive feedback from the faculty teaching team.

- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1a, 1b, 1d, 2b, 2c, 2f, 3a, 3b, 3c, 3d, 3e, 4a, 4b, 4c, 5a, 5b, and 5c.

C. Guidance

This session concludes the preparation phase of the FX. The seminar should be prepared to present the briefing in a format that closely resembles the final product that will be graded in FX-8. The seminar will present a force structure that complies with FX fiscal guidance. The faculty teaching team will review the presentation and provide constructive feedback. The faculty team will provide guidance on the conduct of FX-8, including specific time and location for the seminar's presentation to the faculty grading panel.

By the end of this session, the seminar will complete FX product development and revise the presentation as appropriate. After the final changes are made, the seminar will submit the electronic briefing and force structure matrix via email or other electronic media to the faculty team and Professor Jim Cook (james.l.cook@usnwc.edu) no later than 1400 hrs.

During the Presentation Review, the teaching team will distribute the Peer Grade Ballot. The students will return their ballot to the designated NSDM teaching team member by the close of business that day. A copy of the ballot is provided on p. FX-18.

PRESENTATION REVIEW CHECKLIST

	Delivery Rubric
CONTENT	• Meets FX requirements • Estimate, NSS, NMS, Operating Concept, Force Structure and Implementation Case are aligned, consistent and mutually supporting • Innovative • Well argued
STRUCTURE	• Material logically presented • Distinctly describes the six required elements • Important ideas are evident and supported • Strong concluding position
SUPPORT	• Credibility of material • Assumptions validated • Verbal / Presentation synergy • Clear discussion of risks
STYLE	• Persuasively presented • Professional, engaging • Pace, tempo, delivery clarity • Audience contact
SUPPLEMENTAL	• Responds well to questions • Managed discussion • Seminar participation in Q&A

Seminar #____ NSDM FX Contribution Form

1. Guidance: Since certain individuals in a seminar might contribute to the FX process in a way perceived by their peers to be extremely valuable to the seminar's final exercise, the seminar members have the option to select up to four individuals deserving extra academic recognition and to receive three extra points each to their FX grade. Alternatively, the seminar will have the option of distributing one extra point to each student if a majority of students in the seminar perceive equality in effort.

2. Procedure and instructions: Select up to four individuals whose contributions to the seminar's FX effort were most valuable AND vote for either the "three points for the most valuable contributors" or "one-point-each option" below. If the "one-point-each" option is selected by a majority, no further action will be taken beyond giving everyone an extra point. If the "point-each" option does not garner a majority vote, three points each will be added to the four individuals receiving the highest vote totals. If an international officer is chosen as one of the top four individuals to receive three extra points, the NSA Department will notify the Naval Command College to highlight this accomplishment (in lieu of points).

Names of Up to Four Students Whose Contributions Were Most Valuable
1.
2.
3.
4.

Indicate preference by marking one box below:

☐ ***I would prefer the students whose contributions are voted most valuable receive three extra points each***

☐ ***I would prefer each student receive one extra point***

This process is completed during the Rehearsal (FX-7).

FX-8: SEMINAR PRESENTATION TO FACULTY ASSESSMENT PANEL

A. Focus

The seminar will brief an assigned panel composed of NSA faculty members other than its own teaching team.

B. Objectives

- Effectively communicate the seminar's national security analysis in a 45-minute presentation.

- Discuss the seminar's strategic assessment of the critical forces in the future security environment.

- Present the outline for the seminar's national security strategy and national military strategy.

- Present operating concepts that describes how the future force will be employed in the future security environment.

- Present a force structure within fiscal constraints that advances and defends U.S. interests.

- Develop an Implementation Case that describes how the seminar will effectively implement a challenging or ambitious innovation or idea that it has offered.

- Effectively answer questions asked by the faculty panel for 15 minutes in a clear, articulate and complete manner.

- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1a, 1c, 1d, 2a, 2b, 2c, 3c, 3e, 4a, 4b, 5b, 5c, 5d, 6b and 6c.

C. Guidance

The seminar is assigned a specific time and location to present their brief to the faculty grading panel. The seminar must provide three black & white copies of the presentation (handout format, two slides per page, pure black and white) and force structure matrix for use by the faculty panel. Since the NSDM FX is a team effort, it is important that all seminar members engage during the Q&A period. Grading will be based on both the presentation and Q&As.

At the completion of all briefings, the faculty panel will provide feedback to the seminar and assign a grade. Additionally, each faculty assessment panel will select one seminar to advance to

the Executive Panel presentation in FX-9. Members of these selected seminars will receive one additional point to their NSDM FX grade.

D. Grading Criteria

Seminars will ensure that all six required elements are included in their presentations. The faculty grading panel will penalize seminars that have products which are missing or have significant deficiencies based upon the following criteria:

- The strategic estimate, strategies, operating concepts, force structure, and implementation case are in alignment and reflect consistent analysis of the future security environment, strategy, operating concepts, and force structure decisions. Does the presentation consider geography, culture, and religion when appropriate? Does the brief present a broad overview of the significant military, economic, political, or social issues that would likely concern the United States? Is the information presented in a clear, logical and organized way?

- Does the brief clearly articulate national priorities including the relative importance of the various instruments of national power in addressing the future operating environment? Does the seminar's strategy address the issues identified in the security assessment?

- Does the seminar link the force structure to the security assessment? To what extent does the force structure support the strategies? To what extent does the force structure reflect the operating concept and necessary force attributes?

- To what extent does the seminar's presentation provide innovative, well-argued and imaginative approaches to meet security environment challenges anticipated in the next twenty years?

- Did the seminar choose a challenging or ambitious aspect of its presentation as an Implementation Case? Does the case identify the senior leader charged with its implementation and all relevant stakeholders? Did the seminar address the full range of influences and obstacles associated with implementing the innovation or idea? Did the implementation case provide recommendations that explain how the senior leader will convince the relevant stakeholders to support the initiative's implementation?

- Does the seminar present a force structure capable of executing strategic objectives within the prescribed resource constraints?

- How well did the seminar interact with the faculty panel?

FX-9: SEMINAR PRESENTATIONS TO NSDM FX EXECUTIVE PANEL

A. Focus

Selected seminars will brief an Executive Panel of senior faculty members (not from their teaching teams) who will select two finalist seminars to move on to the finalist phase.

B. Objectives

- Effectively communicate a 45-minute final presentation on the seminar's future security environment assessment, National Security Strategy and National Military Strategy, operating concepts, force structure, and implementation case.

- Persuasively explain and defend the seminar's conclusions by effectively answering questions posed by the panel members in a clear, articulate and complete manner.

- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1a, 1c, 1d, 2a, 2b, 2c, 3c, 3e, 4a, 4b, 5b, 5c, 5d, 6b and 6c.

C. Guidance

The faculty teaching team will provide additional guidance to the selected seminars on the conduct of FX-9, including specific time, sequence, and location.

FX-10: SEMINAR PRESENTATIONS TO SENIOR JUDGING PANEL OF HIGH LEVEL NATIONAL SECURITY PROFESSINALS AND FORRESTAL AWARD SELECTION

A. Focus

This is the culminating session of the NSDM FX. Two finalist seminars will give presentations in Spruance Auditorium and engage in Q&A with a senior judging panel. This session is attended by the College of Naval Warfare, the Naval Command College, the NSA faculty, and invited guests. One of these finalist seminars will be selected to receive the *James V. Forrestal Award for Excellence in Strategy Development and Force Planning*.

B. Objectives

- Effectively communicate a 45-minute presentation on the seminar's future security environment assessment, National Security Strategy and National Military Strategy, operating concepts, force structure, and implementation case.

- Persuasively explain and defend the seminar's conclusions by effectively answering questions asked by the panel members in a clear, articulate and complete manner.

- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1a, 1c, 1d, 2a, 2b, 2c, 3c, 3e, 4a, 4b, 5b, 5c, 5d, 6b and 6c.

C. Guidance

The two selected seminars will present their brief in dress uniform. All seminars in the College of Naval Warfare and the Naval Command College will attend this session. All members of the winning seminar receive one additional point to their NSDM FX grade.

ANNEX A
NSDM SECURITY STRATEGIES
Analytic Paper Instructions, Proposal Format, and Writing Primer

> The enormous irony of the military profession is that we are huge risk takers in what we do operationally -- flying airplanes on and off a carrier, driving a ship through a sea state five typhoon, walking point with your platoon in southern Afghanistan -- but publishing an article, posting a blog, or speaking to the media can scare us badly. We are happy to take personal risk or operational risk, but too many of us won't take career risk. Admiral James Stavridis, 2011.[1]

Admiral Stavridis was not the first admiral to encourage military officers to conduct research and write about subjects of relevance to their profession. Rear Admiral Stephen B. Luce described the Naval War College as "a place of original research on all questions relating to war and the statesmanship connected with war, or the prevention of war." Accordingly, you will conduct research and then write an analytic paper of 3000-3500 words (12-14 pages) on a topic related to any of the topics or course objectives covered in the security strategies sub-course.

When choosing a topic, ask yourself, "Why is this important to the United States in the future? Is this a paper the National Security Advisor would take the time to read?" Is there a connection to the international security environment?

1. DESCRIPTION

There are several types of writing and styles of writing. You are already familiar with many of them. In terms of types of writing, for example, here are three.

a) Research papers. When writing a research paper, you gather information and present it to the reader, sometimes drawing a conclusion, other times leaving it to the reader to draw their own conclusion. Research papers are often largely descriptive in the information conveyed.

b) Opinion papers. Opinion papers or essays often convey strong feelings, which may or may not be backed by information or fact. Personal thoughts and feelings are being expressed so words and expressions like "I think" or "we ought" are often used.

c) Analytic papers. In an analytic paper, the author has drawn a conclusion about a question or problem based on research, then conveys and defends that conclusion to the assumed largely uninformed reader. Description is used to present the problem and as evidentiary support for the analysis provided, but *original* analysis is key.

When writing, different styles are used to convey the intended message.

d) Journalistic writing is very "punchy," as the writer wants to draw the reader into the story and move it along at a pace to hold the reader's interest. Consequently, short – one or two line – paragraphs are sometimes used, as well as hyperbole and vivid description.

[1] Admiral James Stavridis, "Professionals Write," *Marine Corps Gazette*, May 2011, p. 83.

e) Writing without the use of full sentences has also become very popular due to mediums such as PowerPoint slides and texting. Brevity becomes key.

f) Expository Writing is writing to inform or explain. Examples include directions for traveling from Point A to Point B, or instructions for performing a task. The writer's view or opinion is completely absent from the text.

g) Novelistic writing is, as it sounds like, characteristic of novels. Vivid descriptions and conversational language are common, and hyperbole is often used to make a point.

h) Academic writing is formal and largely impersonal, toward providing a clear, unbiased message based on evidence and neutral assessment. Academic writing uses full sentences, full paragraphs, and structure, largely avoids personal pronoun use and follows standard rules of grammar.

You are writing an **analytic** paper using an **academic** style of writing.

2. SOURCES OF PAPER TOPICS AND GOAL

Given the complexity of developing and executing a national or military strategy, the paper challenges you to explore, in depth, an issue that is tied to the international security environment. You may select from a wide variety of topics covered by this sub-course; the table of contents in the syllabus may provide a starting point to identify topics you might select to research. Each session provides an overview of the subject, core questions to consider and a preliminary reading list. Reviewing current issues of major journals focused on defense and security issues can also be an excellent source of topic ideas, as well as give you an idea of what an analytic paper looks like. *Joint Forces Quarterly, Parameters,* the Naval Institute *Proceedings, Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy*, and *Orbis*, are all excellent sources that are available in the library and online. Once you have a general topic in mind, your Security Strategies faculty member can work with you toward refining it into an appropriate and viable question at the international level of analysis. It is crucial that your paper be able to answer the central question of how your paper topic connects with broader questions of national security **in the future international security environment**. The Security Strategies sub-course is forward-looking: while the past and present can provide inspiration for your paper, the paper must have an important, future-looking element to it.

Your paper is expected to meet the standards of graduate-level analytical writing meaning that, at a minimum it should be properly researched, cogently argued, and clearly written. You are expected to assess and evaluate, with appropriate evidence, your selected topic. Your seminar faculty member is available for consultation throughout the writing process including a mandatory tutorial meeting, but once the draft is submitted the student exchange process will be the primary means of feedback. While publication is not the primary goal of this assignment, student papers of particular excellence have evolved into articles published in professional journals such as the *Naval War College Review*, *Parameters*, the *Marine Corps Gazette*, the *Joint Force Quarterly*, and the *Air and Space Power Journal*, among others. Your faculty advisor or professionals associated with the Writing Center are available to advise and assist you should you wish to publish your paper, or to compete for the annual Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff essay contest or one of the many annual Naval War College paper competitions.

3. PAPER STRUCTURE

The **introduction** to your paper should explain the question you will be addressing and why the question is important. The question should not be one for which the answer is intuitively obvious, such as "should the US better protect itself against terrorism?" or "will the downturn in the US economy pose resource problems for the military?" It is usually best to avoid questions that are answered simply yes or no – as the answers are often intuitively obvious – though there are exceptions to that guideline. Evaluation of a policy, for example, can sometimes be binary. "Is the substance of the 2015 National Security Strategy (NSS) significantly different than that of the 2010 NSS?"

In your introduction, and within your first or second paragraph, you should present your **thesis.** You will have conducted research on your question. Based on that research, you will draw a conclusion and state it as a thesis that you can then defend. (As stated in the Writing Tips distributed by the NWC Writing Center, your thesis should *not* begin, "This paper will…" or "The purpose of this paper is…") A clear thesis statement is critical; it is the backbone of your paper. The more vague the thesis, the more trouble you will have defending it. A broad topic tends to generate a broad and generic defense. Given the paper word limit, you should think in terms of being able to present and provide evidence for three or four points in defense of your thesis.

Presentation of logic and evidence in support of your thesis, as well as your analysis, comprises the **body** of the paper. Your analysis will be based on your research and be presented to convince the reader. Because you are defending a position, you are not going to be giving "pros and cons" or "on the other hand" type arguments throughout the body. Knowing what to omit is as important as knowing what to include. You will need to include references, and may want to include quotations in this section as well. Information on how to properly identify your sources is provided below.

Because your paper is addressing a question, and intends to be as unbiased as possible, you will also be asked to consider possible **counterarguments** to your thesis (this can be accomplished within the body of the paper or with the addition of a separate counterarguments section). Keep in mind that the reader may well be aware of contradictory evidence you have discovered, and if you include it in your paper and address it, you may considerably strengthen your argument.

Your **conclusion** draws together the points that you have made in support of your thesis. It will also restate the importance of the question. New points, information, or parameters to your question or thesis should not be introduced in the conclusion. The readers should finish reading the paper with more than just information about a topic, but rather an understanding about how to deal with a problem and why.

Initially, you will be asked to select and hand in a research proposal to your Security Strategies professor. Based on the requirements outlined above, the following format should be used.

4. PAPER PROPOSAL EXAMPLES

a) **Research Question**: This is a question of a statement of a problem that will be addressed in the paper.

b) **Research Thesis**: This is a working statement that answers your research question or proposes a solution to your problem. It should be open to modification as you conduct your research. It should be future oriented at the international level of analysis.

c) **Research Importance**: In a paragraph or two, this section provides the context for your research and illustrates the relevance of your proposed line of research. It should squarely place your research question within the range of issues addressed by the Security Strategies curriculum. Why would the national security advisor read your paper?

d) **Research Approach:** In a paragraph or two, this section describes how you will answer your research question.

e) **Key References**: To be able to formulate a good research question, it is important to know what has been written previously about the subject. Once you conduct an initial review of the literature, identify at least three to five key references that you would use to begin your research. While it is easy to compile a long list of references on a subject, do you best to narrow the field to select the sources you think are best. Start with the syllabus and consult with the librarians and your professor.

Examples of a research proposal are offered below, but bear in mind that these are only examples and not school solutions. A good analytic paper can take many forms, and there are literally thousands of solid, researchable topics and questions.

Research Proposal Example #1

Research Question: How has Lula's "Third Way" approach affected his trade and security relationships with his neighbors and/or the USA?

Research Thesis: Since Lula implemented the Third Way approach, trade with capitalist regimes like the United States has fallen off, but trade with more statist economies such as Russia and China has increased. This has in turn affected international discussions of security partnerships.

Research Importance: While the majority of countries in Latin America are now democracies, those democracies are fragile in large part because of the large economic "gaps" within Latin American populaces. Governments rise and fall over economic issues, turning some toward Bolivarian models unfriendly to the United States. Therefore, understanding the rhetoric and underpinnings of Latin American economic models is important to understanding the future of Latin America.

Research Approach: It is important first to understand what constitutes "The Third Way," its origins and its evolution, and what countries are embracing it. Subsequently, it is critical

to examine how this policy has affected Brazil's international relationships (both within the continent and beyond).

Key References

Patrick Basham, "Is The Third Way at a Dead End?" CATO Institute, November 5, 2002. http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=4173

David Schwartz, "The Evangelical Left and the Future of Social Conservatism," *Society*, January 2012, pp.54-60.

Milton Ezrati, "Only the Beginning," *The International Economy*, Summer 2011, 70-73, 80.

Lael Brainard and Leonardo Martinez-Diaz, *Brazil as an Economic Superpower?* 2009

Riordan Roett, *The New Brazil*, May 2011.

Sebastian Edwards, *Left Behind: Latin America and the False Promise of Populism*, June 2010.

Research Proposal Example #2

Research Question: How effectively has U.S. strategy used measures aimed at countering ideological support to terrorism?

Research Thesis: The United States is waging a war of ideas against al Qaeda and but lacks the cultural awareness to carry out an effective campaign in this area.

Research Importance: The 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review outlines the "Long War." Within this Long War, countering ideological support for terrorism is a key component of the National Military Strategic Concept for the War on Terrorism. In order to counter the terrorists' ideology, it is essential to understand its origins and its focus.

Research Approach: Beginning with an understanding of what constitutes an ideology, I will analyze al-Qaeda communications to the West, compare them with responding measures envisioned in U.S. strategy, and offer alternatives that might increase the effectiveness of U.S. efforts.

Key References:

Berner, Brad K. *Jihad: Bin Laden in His Own Words Declarations; Interviews and Speeches*, (North Charleston, South Carolina: BookSurge Publishing, 2006).

Gerring, John. "Ideology: A Definitional Analysis," *Political Research Quarterly*, Vol. 50, No. 4 (December 1997).

Henzel, Christopher. "The Origins of al Qaeda's Ideology: Implications for US Strategy," *Parameters*, (Spring 2005), pp. 69-80.

Research Proposal Example #3

Research Question: What impact will the requirements of the Global Strike Joint Integrating Concept (JIC) have on future force characteristics?

Research Thesis: The Global Strike JIC is technologically-biased and ignores a number of military capabilities necessary for expeditionary warfare.

Research Importance: Since 2001, the United States has been moving toward capabilities-based planning, which does not consider threats directly. In the past, U.S. military planners considered appropriate counters to Soviet military capabilities. Today, concepts drive force planning decisions; a concept is a notion or statement of an idea--an expression of how something might be done. A capabilities-based approach focuses more on how the United States can defeat a broad array of capabilities that any adversary may employ rather than who the adversaries are and where they may engage joint forces or U.S. interests.

Research Approach: I will outline the Global Strike concept, evaluate the current force structure in light of the global strike requirements, and evaluate future capability options.

Key References:

Global Strike Joint Integrating Concept, Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2005).

Joint Defense Capabilities Study Team. *Joint Defense Capabilities Study Final Report,* (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2003).

Myers, Richard B. *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations,* (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2005).

Owens, Mackubin. "Strategy and the Logic of Force Planning," in *Strategy and Force Planning, 4th Edition* edited by Security, Strategy, and Forces Faculty, (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2004).

Rumsfeld, Donald. *Quadrennial Defense Review Report,* (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2006).

5. EVALUATION CRITERIA: The Security Strategies paper will comprise **25 percent** of your overall NSDM grade. In general, the greatest weight is placed on your ability to think critically and present original ideas. Research is required to conduct analysis, but the most important factor in evaluating your work will be the quality and depth of your own analysis, not the extent or description of your research. The overall evaluation of your paper will be based on the following general criteria: a clear thesis statement, logical organization, effective evidence, sound analysis, original thinking and proper style and format.

a) Clear thesis statement: A clear thesis is central to your writing as, again, it serves as the backbone of your paper. It **directly** answers the research question by providing your ultimate conclusion and should be located in your **first or second paragraph.** A thesis statement should be clear, concise, and to the point. Successive arguments and evidence presented in the paper should be linked to the thesis. As the thesis provides your ultimate conclusion, it should be

revised or refined as you encounter contrary evidence and evaluate competing claims regarding your topic.

The thesis, as well as the subsequent research and analysis, should be future oriented, tied to the international security environment and be something the National Security Advisor would want to take the time to read.

One of the most common mistakes that students make is taking on a subject that is too broad or too vague. While your thesis will be narrowed as you conduct your research and become more familiar with a subject, it is important to keep in mind that you should be aiming toward a thesis that can be supported by three or four specific points with examples.

A convincing thesis should:

Advance a specific proposition and rule out vague statements.

- Vague and general: Terrorism is a threat to U.S. national security.
- Focused: Groups like Al Qaeda (AQ) or AQAP have the capability to inflict severe damage on U.S. infrastructure, potentially damaging the U.S. economy and claiming lives

Answer a specific question.

- What specific capabilities does AQ or AQAP have that could damage U.S. infrastructure or inflict mass casualties?
- Refer to this question as you write to remind yourself what you are explaining.

Be revised when necessary to reflect new arguments or evidence.

- Through their sophisticated suicide bombing capabilities, AQ and AQAP can potentially inflict severe damage to vital U.S. infrastructure and cause death or injury to thousands of American citizens.

b) Effective Organization: Effective organization will always make your writing more convincing to your reader. A well-organized paper demonstrates a connection between its claims and its proofs, and it allows the reader to logically follow the author's train of thought.

People often describe a well-written paper as "having good flow." This term is vague and hard to translate into a concrete result. "Flow" implies a natural, effortless process, but organizing a paper is anything but effortless. While many experienced writers have internalized some effective patterns of organizing ideas in writing, organizing is and should be **actively constructed.** Creating a well-organized paper involves attention to all aspects of the way a paper is put together, both in terms of content and style (word choice and word order).

It is most often a good idea to draw up an outline at the start of the process as it will force you to concretely address the main points you wish to make. Everything in your paper should be in support of the thesis, except your consideration of the counterarguments.

Organization also involves selection – you may find as you are arranging your evidence and its presentation that something might fall away because it "doesn't fit." This will keep you from "spinning your wheels" with evidence that, while interesting, is not directly supportive of your

central thesis. That evidence or idea may be better placed as a footnote, or saved for another writing assignment. **Supplemental information placed in a footnote** can add to the strength of your paper, and is not included in the word count, though prudent use should be used of this approach.

Since the introduction and conclusion frame the body of the paper, it is often a good idea to finalize them last. You may want to draft them initially as a mental reminder regarding where you are going, but finalize them after you have fully developed your argument and presented all of your evidence. Allow your ideas to be tested against the evidence.

c) Effective Evidence: Evidence can take many forms, from the citation of experts on your subject to hard data of various kinds related to military, economic, social or other issues. Always bear in mind, however, that **you are not expected to make new discoveries or present previously unmade claims**. Rather, your evidence should illuminate and support your argument, as well as help you thoughtfully contend with the arguments of those who might reasonably disagree with your views and prescriptions.

It is also important to **vet your sources**. The Internet is a useful research tool, and a dangerous one. Some websites (government sources, for example) can be very valuable sources of information. Electronic databases such as Lexis-Nexis, Proquest and JSTOR are invaluable. However, some sites, such as blogs, commercial sites and personal pages are largely opinion rather than sources of information. If you find a useful piece of information from a suspicious source, use Lexis-Nexis or Proquest to try and find the same piece of information from a more reliable source.

Students are expected to give full credit in their Security Strategies paper when borrowing from, or referring to, the work of other writers or their own previous work. (By contrast, you do not need to provide citation regarding things that would be considered as common knowledge, such as famous dates or events.) Failure to do so may constitute plagiarism, a serious violation of academic integrity. The reader should be able to locate the reference in question. Use page numbers in footnotes or endnotes where appropriate. Online sources should offer the electronic link and the date accessed. In general, use the *Chicago Manual of Style*, as shown here or available at http://www.chicagomanualofstyle.org/tools_citationguide.html.

- Books:

Johnny Author, *Book Title* (New York: Macmillian, 2003), p. 18.

- Journal/Magazine:

Johnny Author, "Article Title," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 23, No. 4 (August 1996), pp. 23-24.

- Multiple Authors:

Johnny Author and Tim Co-Author, *Book Title*, (Washington: Brookings, 1999), p. 16.

- Chapter in an edited volume:

Tim Author, "Explaining Everything," in Alan Twining, ed., *Book with Many Chapters*, (New York: Random House, 1996), pp. 34-36.

- Website (this is somewhat flexible)

Johnny Author, "Title of Webpage," June 2006, available at http://www.website.com/article, accessed October 22, 2011.

NOTE: When citing a work for the second or more time, the full citation is not required. You may simply note the author's last name, title and page number.

- Second Reference to a book:

Author, *Book Title*, p. 6

- Second Reference to a journal article:

Author, "Article Title," p. 8.

d) Sound Analysis: Your conclusions must be based upon your analysis of the problem, review of the evidence presented, and examination of other pertinent factors. Your thesis is expected to be supported by logic and facts, not mere assertions or opinion. While evidence is required and important, remember that the research should **support** your thinking and analysis, not take the place of your own analysis. None of the citations should stand alone without your analysis or linkage to your topic. The facts rarely speak for themselves; rather, you must draw conclusions and illustrate their significance. Sound analysis also recognizes competing points of view and alternative explanations, and addresses these differences in a reasonable, thoughtful fashion.

e) Original Thinking: In general, the greatest weight is placed on your ability to think critically and creatively. The more you think originally, not just paraphrase another's work, the more credit will be given to you. You need not adhere to official DoD policy as you write your paper. In fact, your ability to devise new solutions to problems will have a direct impact on your final grade. There is a fine line between creativity and fantasy, however. Your ideas must first and foremost be workable and defensible.

f) Style and Format: As general guidance, prepare the paper in academic style suitable for a professional journal. Hacker & Sommers and the *NWC Pocket Writing Guide* both give extensive examples of correct grammar, punctuation and capitalization use, as well as footnote formats. In general, however, here are a few key points to keep in mind.

- Use full sentences. Keep sentences clear and concise. Ask yourself not if the sentence could be understood, but if it could be misunderstood. Sentences that include numerous clauses, commas or punctuation marks can be confusing.
- Part of writing a clear and concise sentence is to avoid "wordiness." Eliminate "deadwood' words and simplify clauses whenever possible (sometimes that means a new sentence). Avoiding wordiness can be important for word count as well as clarity.
    - The mayor of the village was responsible for feeding all of the people of the village even though many of the village inhabitants were hostile to his policies on food distribution.
        - The village mayor was responsible for feeding all of the villagers, though many were hostile to his food distribution policies.
    - The troops arrived in the rural, remote village with both food and medicine and immediately took those needed supplies to the Mayor of the village at his house.
        - The troops arrived in the rural village with food and medicine. They immediately delivered those supplies to the home of the village Mayor.
- Writing in the active voice is often more effective and clear.

- Active = Troops arrived with food and medicine.
- Passive Voice = Food and medicine were delivered by troops.

- Nouns and verbs should match as singular or plural; verb tense should remain consistent within sentences (and often, paragraphs).
  - Wrong = Bill and Tom was going to load the truck but when it rained they decide to wait.
  - Correct=Bill and Tom were going to load the truck but when it rained they decided to wait. (Plural noun with plural verb form/past tense throughout)
- Use full paragraphs. A full paragraph will expound on one thought or idea. That idea will be introduced in the first sentence. Elaboration, usually including quotes or references to other material, is contained in the middles sentence(s).The final sentence of the paragraph both wraps up the thought, and transitions to the next idea to be explored in the next paragraph.
  - Globalization has proven to be both a positive and negative force in the global system. In its simplest form, globalization is connectivity along political, economic and cultural lines. In economics, for example, globalization provides opportunities for individuals to receive microloans from sources far beyond the borders that would have constrained them prior. Yet this economic globalization also imposes rules on countries and organizations not in place prior, rules with a short-term negative economic impact. Many of these economic rules imposed as part of globalization have come to be known as the Washington Consensus, and add fuel to the notion that globalization is a Western or even U.S.-backed process.
- Paragraphs that go on too long get confusing. Break long paragraphs into shorter, but still complete thoughts.
- When referencing a person in your paper, the first reference should include a full name and brief identifier so the person will know why his/her opinion is important. The next time the name is used it can be the last name only.
  - Harvard Professor Samuel Huntington wrote his seminal work on civil military relations in 1981. Later, Huntington said of that work…..
- Your paper is expected to be free of major grammatical and spelling errors. Please remember that "spell-checking" is not the same thing as editing. Your word processor will not help you clarify what you meant to say; it will only tell you if your sentences, good or bad, contain properly spelled words.
- Be alert to using the correct form or a word, and whether or not you are or intended to use the possessive.
  - Wrong = Their going to meet after work for dinner.
  - Correct = They are going to meet after work for dinner.
- After you have completed the first draft of your paper, distance yourself from it for a day or two. Have someone read this paper for you – not only to proofread but for focus. Ask them what they thought your thesis was and whether or not you convincingly defended it. Is there anything that should be further explained? Are there redundant paragraphs?

6. TITLE PAGE: The title page should contain your name, paper title, seminar number, date and word count. You may use either footnotes or endnotes for citations, which will not count against the word limit. (You may also place short asides or minor clarifications in your footnotes or endnotes. Part of learning to write effectively is learning to write to a specified length.) A table of contents and an abstract are not necessary, and illustrations and tables should only be included if they are absolutely essential to the paper and are well explained in the text. A bibliography is not required.

7. PLAGIARISM is an issue that occurs from time to time at every institution (usually accidentally) and therefore requires this reminder. The Naval War College defines plagiarism as: 1) Duplication of an author's words without both quotation marks and accurate references and footnotes; 2) Use of an author's ideas in paraphrase without accurate references of footnotes.

8. MILESTONES

28 November 2016. How to choose a topic and write a thesis. Your Strategies professor will provide in-class instruction on how to choose a topic and write a thesis.

5 December 2016. Proposal submission due. Submit your research proposal using the format provided above in section 4.

14 December 2016. Writing skills day. Your professor will discuss writing pitfalls. As necessary, you should continue to consult with your professor during the writing process.

12 January 2017. Paper exchange day. Bring two copies of your draft to seminar and submit one electronically to your professor. Two peers from the seminar will read the draft, and provide comments using the session guidance. Each student, accordingly, will also receive a copy of two draft essays from two peers to provide feedback to them.

17 January 2017. Peer review day. Time will be provided in class for each student to both provide feedback to two peers and to receive feedback on his or her draft essay.

6 February 2017. Final due date. Students should provide a copy of the completed paper to his or her Strategies professor by the specified time.

ANNEX B

NSDM LEADERSHIP CONCEPTS
Leadership Concepts Essay Overview, General Guidance, Format, Timeline, and Grading

Overview

The Leadership Concepts *student essay* is one of two graded requirements used to evaluate student comprehension of NSDM Leadership Concepts course concepts and themes. The essay constitutes 25% of your overall NSDM grade. The maximum length of the paper is 3,000 words.

What is an essay?

The Purdue University Writing Laboratory describes an essay as a "shorter piece of writing" that requires a writer "to hone a number of skills such as close reading, analysis, comparison and contrast, persuasion, conciseness, clarity, and exposition" (https://owl.english.purdue.edu/owl/resource/685/01/):

> The purpose of an essay is to encourage students to develop ideas and concepts in their writing with the direction of little more than their own thoughts (it may be helpful to view the essay as the converse of a research paper). Therefore, essays are (by nature) concise and require clarity in purpose and direction. This means that there is no room for the student's thoughts to wander or stray from his or her purpose; the writing must be deliberate and interesting. (Ibid.)

The Purdue Writing Laboratory also identifies the four basic kinds of essay: the *narrative* essay that tells a story, *descriptive* essays that provide a written account of a particular experience; *argumentative* essays that are essentially short research papers; and ***expository essays*** that "require the student to investigate an idea, evaluate evidence, expound on the idea, and set forth an argument concerning that idea in a clear and concise manner." It is this last type of essay (the expository) that we expect the student to write for the Leadership Concepts paper.

Why an Essay?

First, the essay enables your professor to evaluate your assimilation of course material. While it is true that leadership cannot be taught, it is equally true that it can be learned. The student essay provides the best available means to assess what each individual has taken from the course.

Second, the essay provides you an opportunity to hone your skills of written persuasion. Your ability to craft a convincing, balanced argument in support of your point of view will be an invaluable skill as you ascend to more senior leadership positions.

Third, the essay allows you to make a very personalized statement about what you consider to be one (or a few) of the most important aspects or elements of senior leadership or command. As Field Marshall Sir William Slim stated, "Command is an intensely personal affair . . . no imitation was ever a masterpiece."

Finally, your thoughts about leadership are likely to be influenced by the collective wisdom of a group of smart and dedicated professionals who have come together to discuss and reflect about a subject that each of you have dedicated your lives to—leading others in worthwhile endeavors. As such, an essay is the most appropriate vehicle to convey your synthesis of those insights.

Essay Subject.

- You are free to choose the subject and content of your essay as it relates to leadership.

- Choose a subject, issue, or leadership challenge about which you are passionate.

- Your essay should express some idea, concept or conviction about an aspect of leadership and present the reader supportive claims for this main idea or theme.

- The work must be original and yours alone.

- Be daring – Be creative.

- Both the subject and content should reflect what you have taken away from the Leadership Concepts sub-course.

- The presumption is you would not have been able to write this essay before having taken the Leadership Concepts course. That is not to suggest you have not thought hard about your subject before, but we expect you will have developed your ideas more fully through the course readings, personal reflection, and seminar discussions.

- Do Not Write: A research paper (locate information about a topic, conduct research, take a stand on the topic and provide support or evidence in an organized report); an autobiography or biography (a specific account of your or someone else's life); or a book report (an evaluation of a work of fiction or non-fiction).

Format Guidance

- *General*. The U.S. Naval War College *2012 Writing and Style Guide* (http://www.usnwc.edu/ getattachment/a57e8a60-1b8d-42a7-83bb-d1c8e4767806/NWC-Pocket-Writing-and-Style-Guide-2012.aspx) contains all the necessary guidance regarding how to properly format your essay. If you have specific questions, contact your professor or the NWC Writing Center in Hewitt Hall.

- *Cover Page*. On the first page of your essay include the title of your essay, your name, seminar number, course name, and the word count (the cover page does not count against your word count).

- *Length*. The Leadership Essay is purposely targeted at 3,000 words. Quality essays are concise, coherent, and congruent. This limitation requires you to distill your thoughts and focus your writing.

- *Margins*. Use one-inch margins and double-space your text. Use 12-pitch font.

- *Introduction*. Explain what your paper is about and why the subject is important. Make clear why your idea is relevant to the subject of leadership. In essence, explain why someone should bother to take the time to read your work.

- *Make your essay compelling*. Write something your colleagues or others *want* to read. Done well, you should feel excited about your essay—if you don't, start over!

- *Writing Technique*:

    - Use short declarative sentences – action verbs usually work best.

    - Use adjectives and adverbs sparingly!

    - Write in first person (I, me, we) or third person (he, she, they).

    - Don't repeat yourself. Once is enough.

    - Rambling language usually is a poorly formed idea – seek focus.

    - Finally, <u>edit</u>, <u>edit</u>, <u>edit</u>. How many words can you remove and still retain your meaning?

Timeline

The important milestones for the Leadership Concepts Essay are as follows:

- **Explanation of Essay Requirement.** Your Leadership Concepts Professor will discuss the purpose, timeline, grading and objectives of the essay during the first few weeks of the Leadership Concepts course.

- **Initial Proposal**. Provide your essay topic and general ideas in writing to your Leadership Concepts professor no later than Leadership Concepts session-8 (**8 December 2016).** Your proposal should incorporate a short paragraph outlining the key ideas you intend to explore in your essay.

- **Faculty Tutorials.** Each student should meet with their Leadership Concepts professor to discuss your essay topic and explain your basic approach to exploring the material and arguments you intend to make in it. This meeting will be scheduled at a mutually agreeable date/time during the period **5 to 16 December 2016**.

- **Peer Review.** Each student will provide a nearly final draft of their essay to two assigned seminar classmates no later than Tuesday, **31 January 2017**. Peer reviewers will provide written feedback using the peer review evaluation form (see example below) and be prepared to discuss those comments with the essay author prior to the due date for the essay. Students are left to arrange a mutually agreeable date, time, and place to accomplish their peer review process, but should do so by Friday, **3 February 2017**.

- **Essay Due Date.** All Leadership Concepts essays are due to your professor no later than 1630 on Tuesday, **7 February 2017**.

- **Essays Graded and Returned.** Your Leadership Concepts essay will be returned with a grade, professor comments, and class contribution grade on **21 February 2017** during the Final Exercise (FX).

Grading Criteria

Your Leadership Concepts Professor will grade the essays in accordance with Naval War College guidelines with particular attention to:

- Clarity. Clear statement of essay's topic or purpose and the main points that support the author's intention or position.

- Persuasiveness. The author's position or point of view is conveyed convincingly through the logic of the arguments presented.

- Consistency. The essay's main points support the author's basic contention(s) and the conclusions that are reached flow from the preceding material.

- Completeness. The essay addresses all of the important dimensions of the subject and identifies likely objections your positions or conclusions.

- Objectivity: While your essay likely expresses an idea or opinion important to you, don't let it become an emotional rant. Support your ideas with logic and sound reasoning.

- Spelling and Grammar. Check and recheck to ensure your essay is free of spelling and grammatical errors. (Do not trust 'Spell Check' to check for you).

PEER REVIEW FEEDBACK COMMENT SHEET

After reading your colleague's essay, provide written feedback on the areas below. This sheet is merely an aid to facilitate the peer review process. It is **not** the 'top secret gouge.' Every item on this sheet is discussed in the syllabus' description of the assignment.

1. Is the **purpose** of the essay clearly stated? If not, how might it be better explained?

2. Did the author convince you of the **importance of the chosen topic**? Why or why not?

3. Is the **essay well-organized**? Does it **flow logically** from idea to idea?

4. Has the author remained **consistent with the purpose** of the essay during the discussion and conclusion? Are all parts of the essay connected and congruent?

5. Is the essay **objective** with clear, analytical thinking demonstrated throughout? Does the author rely too heavily on personal opinion?

6. Is the paper **complete**? Does the author omit any glaring issues or points that would seem to bear on the subject chosen?

7. Is the essay written with **proper grammar, word usage, spelling**, sentence, and paragraph structure? Does the essay adhere to a consistent style and format?

ANNEX C

DRAFT PAPER COPY – SURVEY MUST BE SUBMITTED ON-LINE
INSTRUCTIONS WILL BE DISTRIBUTED AT A LATER DATE

National Security Affairs
National Security Decision Making (NSDM)
End of Course Student Survey - Winter Trimester 2016-2017

Members of the NSDM Class of Winter 2016-2017 in the College of Naval Warfare and the Naval Command College, on behalf of the entire NSA faculty please accept my sincere thanks for your hard work during the current trimester. Your preparation and participation has enriched the educational experience of you and your classmates.

We are continually striving to improve the professional education that we provide for our students. I therefore would request your attention and focus one additional time on this important End of Course Survey.

Your frank and considered views are essential in order to assist us in assessing whether, where, and how modifications could be made to improve the course. Additionally, as teachers we want to know where we are effective individually and where we could improve.

This assessment tool is reasonably short. Your input will be treated completely anonymously and survey results will not be shared with individual faculty members until after all students have received final course grades. In order to ensure anonymity, you will need a password to access the online survey. Please see your seminar's academic representative for a password.

Thank you for taking the time to help us assess the curriculum and instruction of this course.

Sincerely,

DAVID A. COOPER, PhD
Professor and Chair,
National Security Affairs Department

Enter your password to continue.

Student ID _____

What seminar were you in?

1	7	13
2	8	14
3	9	15
4	10	16
5	11	17
6	12	

Section I: COURSE QUESTIONS

Please indicate whether you agree with the following statements using a scale where 7 indicates that you "strongly agree" and 1 indicates that you "strongly disagree". Please also provide feedback as appropriate in the spaces for narrative comments.

1. This course is likely to enhance my professional development.
   7 – STRONGLY AGREE
   6 – AGREE
   5 – SOMEWHAT AGREE
   4 – NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE
   3 – SOMEWHAT DISAGREE
   2 – DISAGREE
   1 – STRONGLY DISAGREE

Comments:

_____

_____

2. This course challenged me to think critically.
   7 – STRONGLY AGREE
   6 – AGREE
   5 – SOMEWHAT AGREE
   4 – NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE
   3 – SOMEWHAT DISAGREE
   2 – DISAGREE
   1 – STRONGLY DISAGREE

Comments:

_____

_____

3. The workload for this course was appropriately challenging.

7 – STRONGLY AGREE
6 – AGREE
5 – SOMEWHAT AGREE
4 – NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE
3 – SOMEWHAT DISAGREE
2 – DISAGREE
1 – STRONGLY DISAGREE

Comments:

_____

_____

4. The following contributed to achieving the stated objectives of this course:

	7 - Strongly Agree	6 – Agree	5 - Somewhat Agree	4 - Neither Agree Nor Disagree	3 - Somewhat Disagree	2 - Disagree	1 - Strongly Disagree
a. Seminar Discussions:	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
b. Readings:	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
c. Lectures (NSDM Practitioner Sessions):	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
d. Written Assignments:	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍

Comments:

_____

_____

5. Seminar discussions, readings, lectures (NSDM practitioner lectures) and writing assignments mutually reinforced my understanding of the themes of this course.

7 – STRONGLY AGREE
6 – AGREE
5 – SOMEWHAT AGREE
4 – NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE
3 – SOMEWHAT DISAGREE
2 – DISAGREE
1 – STRONGLY DISAGREE

Comments:

_____

_____

6. I was a diligent student in this course.

7 – STRONGLY AGREE
6 – AGREE
5 – SOMEWHAT AGREE
4 – NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE
3 – SOMEWHAT DISAGREE
2 – DISAGREE
1 – STRONGLY DISAGREE

Comments:

_____

_____

Section II: FACULTY QUESTIONS

Please indicate whether you agree with the following statements using a scale where 7 indicates that you "strongly agree" and 1 indicates that you "strongly disagree". Please also provide feedback as appropriate in the spaces for narrative comments.

1. My teaching team for this course was effective overall.

7 – STRONGLY AGREE
6 – AGREE
5 – SOMEWHAT AGREE
4 – NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE
3 – SOMEWHAT DISAGREE
2 – DISAGREE
1 – STRONGLY DISAGREE

Comments:

_____

_____

2. Please respond to the following statements regarding each member of your teaching:

a) Leadership Concepts: Please select the name of your Leadership Professor from the drop down menu. Professor's Name _____

i. This professor was effective overall.
7 – STRONGLY AGREE
6 – AGREE
5 – SOMEWHAT AGREE
4 – NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE
3 – SOMEWHAT DISAGREE
2 – DISAGREE
1 – STRONGLY DISAGREE

ii. This professor was effective at presenting course material.
7 – STRONGLY AGREE
6 – AGREE
5 – SOMEWHAT AGREE
4 – NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE
3 – SOMEWHAT DISAGREE
2 – DISAGREE
1 – STRONGLY DISAGREE

iii. This professor was effective at guiding seminar discussion.
7 – STRONGLY AGREE
6 – AGREE
5 – SOMEWHAT AGREE
4 – NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE
3 – SOMEWHAT DISAGREE
2 – DISAGREE
1 – STRONGLY DISAGREE

iv. This professor was effective at providing verbal and/or written feedback.
7 – STRONGLY AGREE
6 – AGREE
5 – SOMEWHAT AGREE
4 – NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE
3 – SOMEWHAT DISAGREE
2 – DISAGREE
1 – STRONGLY DISAGREE

v. This professor was effective at linking sub-course concepts with the unifying "levels of analysis" course framework.
7 – STRONGLY AGREE
6 – AGREE

5 – SOMEWHAT AGREE
4 – NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE
3 – SOMEWHAT DISAGREE
2 – DISAGREE
1 – STRONGLY DISAGREE

Comments:

_____

_____

_____

b) Policy Analysis: Please select the name of your Policy Professor from the drop down menu.
Professor's Name _____

i. This professor was effective overall.
7 – STRONGLY AGREE
6 – AGREE
5 – SOMEWHAT AGREE
4 – NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE
3 – SOMEWHAT DISAGREE
2 – DISAGREE
1 – STRONGLY DISAGREE

ii. This professor was effective at presenting course material.
7 – STRONGLY AGREE
6 – AGREE
5 – SOMEWHAT AGREE
4 – NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE
3 – SOMEWHAT DISAGREE
2 – DISAGREE
1 – STRONGLY DISAGREE

iii. This professor was effective at guiding seminar discussion.
7 – STRONGLY AGREE
6 – AGREE
5 – SOMEWHAT AGREE
4 – NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE
3 – SOMEWHAT DISAGREE
2 – DISAGREE
1 – STRONGLY DISAGREE

iv. This professor was effective at providing verbal and/or written feedback.
7 – STRONGLY AGREE
6 – AGREE
5 – SOMEWHAT AGREE
4 – NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE
3 – SOMEWHAT DISAGREE

2 – DISAGREE
1 – STRONGLY DISAGREE

v. This professor was effective at linking sub-course concepts with the unifying "levels of analysis" course framework.
7 – STRONGLY AGREE
6 – AGREE
5 – SOMEWHAT AGREE
4 – NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE
3 – SOMEWHAT DISAGREE
2 – DISAGREE
1 – STRONGLY DISAGREE

Comments:

_____

_____

c) Security Strategies: Please select the name of your Strategies Professor from the drop down menu. Professor's Name: _____

i. This professor was effective overall.
7 – STRONGLY AGREE
6 – AGREE
5 – SOMEWHAT AGREE
4 – NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE
3 – SOMEWHAT DISAGREE
2 – DISAGREE
1 – STRONGLY DISAGREE

ii. This professor was effective at presenting course material.
7 – STRONGLY AGREE
6 – AGREE
5 – SOMEWHAT AGREE
4 – NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE
3 – SOMEWHAT DISAGREE
2 – DISAGREE
1 – STRONGLY DISAGREE

iii. This professor was effective at guiding seminar discussion.
7 – STRONGLY AGREE
6 – AGREE
5 – SOMEWHAT AGREE
4 – NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE
3 – SOMEWHAT DISAGREE
2 – DISAGREE
1 – STRONGLY DISAGREE

iv. This professor was effective at providing verbal and/or written feedback.

7 – STRONGLY AGREE
6 – AGREE
5 – SOMEWHAT AGREE
4 – NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE
3 – SOMEWHAT DISAGREE
2 – DISAGREE
1 – STRONGLY DISAGREE

v. This professor was effective at linking sub-course concepts with the unifying "levels of analysis" course framework.
7 – STRONGLY AGREE
6 – AGREE
5 – SOMEWHAT AGREE
4 – NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE
3 – SOMEWHAT DISAGREE
2 – DISAGREE
1 – STRONGLY DISAGREE

Comments:

_____

_____

Section III: PRACITITIONER SESSION QUESTIONS

Please indicate whether you agree with the following statements using a scale where 7 indicates that you "strongly agree" and 1 indicates that you "strongly disagree". Please also provide feedback as appropriate in the spaces for narrative comments.

1. Please respond to the following statements regarding the practitioner session in Spruance Auditorium on **CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS** (NSDM-3):

a) The topic was relevant to the themes of the course.
7 – STRONGLY AGREE
6 – AGREE
5 – SOMEWHAT AGREE
4 – NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE
3 – SOMEWHAT DISAGREE
2 – DISAGREE
1 – STRONGLY DISAGREE

b) The speakers were effective in addressing the topic.
7 – STRONGLY AGREE
6 – AGREE
5 – SOMEWHAT AGREE
4 – NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE

3 – SOMEWHAT DISAGREE
2 – DISAGREE
1 – STRONGLY DISAGREE

2. Please respond to the following statements regarding the session in McCarty Little Hall on the **LEVELS OF ANALYSIS – SIMULATION EXERCISE** (NSDM-4):

a) The topic was relevant to the themes of the course.
7 – STRONGLY AGREE
6 – AGREE
5 – SOMEWHAT AGREE
4 – NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE
3 – SOMEWHAT DISAGREE
2 – DISAGREE
1 – STRONGLY DISAGREE

Comments:

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3. Please respond to the following statements regarding the practitioner session in Spruance Auditorium on **FORCE PLANNING – STRATEGY MEETS BUDGET** (NSDM-5):

a) The topic was relevant to the themes of the course.
7 – STRONGLY AGREE
6 – AGREE
5 – SOMEWHAT AGREE
4 – NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE
3 – SOMEWHAT DISAGREE
2 – DISAGREE
1 – STRONGLY DISAGREE

b) The speakers were effective in addressing the topic.
7 – STRONGLY AGREE
6 – AGREE
5 – SOMEWHAT AGREE
4 – NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE
3 – SOMEWHAT DISAGREE
2 – DISAGREE
1 – STRONGLY DISAGREE

Comments:

_____

_____

Section IV: ADDITIONAL COMMENTS

Please use this section to provide additional comments on any general or specific issues that you have not already addressed in the previous sections.

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ANNEX D

NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS (NSA) FACULTY

Dr. David A. Cooper serves as Professor and Chair of the Department of National Security Affairs. His areas of scholarly and professional expertise include nonproliferation and disarmament, weapons of mass destruction, multilateral negotiations and organizations, international relations, and foreign policy analysis. A scholar-practitioner, he served for nearly two decades on the professional staff within the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) where he held career rank in the Senior Executive Service (SES). His last SES assignment was with the then nascent U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), where he established and led a joint directorate (J-9) responsible for partnership and strategic communication. Prior to that he was the Principal Director for Homeland Security Integration, managing strategic planning and coordination of the Defense Department's various homeland security missions. Before that he served as the Director of the Office of Nonproliferation Policy, overseeing efforts to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction. In this capacity he also led the U.S. Delegation to the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) Operational Experts Group and served as the U.S. Representative to the United Nations Panel of Governmental Experts on Missiles. Previously he was the Director of the Office of Strategic Arms Control Policy, managing the negotiation and implementation of various nuclear treaties. He first came to the Pentagon in 1990 as a Presidential Management Fellow. He has a PhD in Political Science and International Relations from The Australian National University, a Master of International Affairs from Columbia University, and is a graduate of Oberlin College. He is the author of a book and various chapters and articles in journals such as *Foreign Policy Analysis*, *The Nonproliferation Review*, and the *Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations*. He is a member of the International Institute of Strategic Studies and a number of other scholarly and professional organizations. He has held previous academic affiliations with National Defense University, American University, and Georgetown University.

Lieutenant Colonel William A. Adler, U.S. Army, joined National Security Affairs Department in 2016. He is a graduate of University of Massachusetts with a BA in Political Science. He was commissioned as an Infantry Officer through OCS in 1996. His assignments include service in Germany, Washington, Texas, Georgia, and California. He has operational and combat deployments to Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan. His most recent assignment was as a Combined Arms Battalion Commander with the 1st Armored Division in Fort Bliss, Texas. He received his Master's in Military Arts and Science (History) through the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth in 2008.

Dr. Hayat Alvi teaches the Policy Analysis and Security Strategies sub-courses. Dr. Alvi is a member of the Greater Middle East Regional Studies program at the Naval War College, the Navy Language Action Panel (NLAP), and Languages, Regional Expertise, Cultural Awareness (LREC). She has served as the Director of International Studies at Arcadia University in Glenside, PA. Prof. Alvi also taught Political Science at the American University in Cairo, Egypt, for four years. Her specializations include International Relations, Political Economy, Comparative Politics, Islamic Studies, and Middle East and South Asian Studies. She is proficient in Arabic and Urdu. Her publications include numerous journal articles and these books: *Regional Integration in the Middle East: An Analysis of Inter-Arab Cooperation* (Edwin Mellen Press, 2007). *An Introduction to International Studies: Exploring Frontiers* (Linus

Publications, 2006). She is the co-editor of *Case Studies in Policy Making*, 12th edition (Naval War College). Her upcoming book is *Nonviolent Activism in Islam: The Message of Abul Kalam Azad* (Edwin Mellen Press), and a book about Tunisia's 2011 Jasmine Revolution.

Colonel Brett Bartholomaus, U.S. Marine Corps, graduated from Iowa State University and was commissioned in the United States Marine Corps in 1987. He served as a CH-46 helicopter pilot at stations in Kaneohe Bay, Hawaii, Jacksonville, North Carolina, and San Diego, California. He has deployed to Okinawa, Japan, Iraq, and with Marine Expeditionary Units in the Atlantic Ocean, Mediterranean Sea, Pacific Ocean, Indian Ocean, and the Arabian Sea. He has 3,500 flight hours. He has served in several billets to include Instructor Pilot, Aviation Safety Officer, Operations Officer, Executive Officer, Company Commander, Forward Air Controller, Aviation Combat Element Commander, and Deputy Commander. He served on several staffs to include Pacific Fleet Pearl Harbor, Headquarters Marine Corps Aviation, and Joint Task Force North. He graduated from the Naval War College with a Master of Arts in National Security and Strategic Studies in 2010. Prior to his assignment in the National Security Affairs at the Naval War College, he served as the Deputy Commander of Joint Task Force North in El Paso, Texas.

Dr. Jessica Blankshain is an assistant professor of National Security Affairs. She joined the department in July 2014 and teaches the Policy Analysis (NSDM) and Leadership Concepts (TSDM) sub-courses. Dr. Blankshain received her Ph.D. in Political Economy & Government from Harvard University in 2014. She is a former Graduate Fellow with the Rumsfeld Foundation and a former Research Fellow with the International Security Program at the Harvard Kennedy School's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. Dr. Blankshain's research interests include civil-military relations, bureaucratic politics, and organizational economics. She has taught a Harvard College undergraduate course on the Economics of National Security and was the Senior Resident Tutor at Mather House, one of Harvard's twelve undergraduate houses. Dr. Blankshain graduated from Princeton University with a B.S.E. in Operations Research and Financial Engineering, where she also received a certificate in Public Policy from the Woodrow Wilson School. After completing her undergraduate degree, she spent two years as an Associate Consultant in the Chicago office of the Boston Consulting Group.

Dr. David T. Burbach teaches the Security Strategies sub-course. Dr. Burbach received a B.A. in Government from Pomona College, and earned a Ph.D. in Political Science from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 2004. Before coming to Newport, Dr. Burbach was a Visiting Scholar at MIT's Security Studies Program, then spent two years on the faculty of the U.S. Army's School of Advanced Military Studies in Leavenworth, KS. He has also served as a defense policy analyst for the RAND Corporation, and as a technology consultant to several private-sector firms. Dr. Burbach has written on the politics of American national security policy, particularly on the relationship between Presidential decision-making and public opinion. His other areas of expertise include nuclear strategy and arms control, European regional security, energy and environmental policy, and force planning.

Commander Andrea H. Cameron, U.S. Navy, is a Permanent Military Professor teaching the Policy Analysis sub-course. She received her commission through NROTC at Marquette University. As a Surface Warfare Officer, CDR Cameron completed tours onboard USS Saipan (LHA 2), USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN 71), and the Expeditionary Warfare Training Group,

Atlantic, prior to laterally transferring to the Human Resources community. In the HR community, she held the positions of Executive Assistant/Admin Officer at NAS Fallon, Training Officer onboard the USS John C. Stennis (CVN 74), Deputy Director of Personnel at the Naval War College, and Director of Academic Programs at the Naval Postgraduate School. CDR Cameron also volunteered as an individual augmentee to an Embedded Training Team for the Afghanistan National Army. Over her career, she has participated in Operation Noble Anvil/Allied Force in Kosovo, Operation Southern Watch, Operation Enduring Freedom, and Operation Iraqi Freedom. CDR Cameron is currently completing a Ph.D. in Security Studies from the Naval Postgraduate School with research in civil-military engagement during humanitarian assistance/disaster relief. In 2011, she also completed a Doctorate Degree in Educational Technology from Pepperdine University with research about the Apple iPad in the academic environment. She also holds a B.A. degree in Political Science, a M.A. in Human Resource Development from The George Washington University, and a M.S. in Military Operational Art and Science from the Air Command and Staff College.

Lieutenant Colonel Chad Christman, U.S. Army, joined National Security Affairs Department in 2015. He is a graduate of North Dakota State University, and was commissioned as an Infantry Officer in 1994. His assignments include tours in Tennessee, Georgia, Colorado, Germany, California, Washington and Louisiana. He has served in Iraq and Afghanistan. His last assignment was at the Joint Readiness Training Center in Fort Polk as an Infantry Battalion Task Force Senior OCT. He earned a master's degree from Troy University in 2005.

Ambassador John A. Cloud teaches in the Policy Analysis sub-course. Ambassador Cloud recently retired after almost 32 years in the U.S. Foreign Service. He came to the Naval War College as the Department of State Senior Advisor. He has taught in all three sub-courses. Prior to coming to the Naval War College, Ambassador Cloud was the U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Lithuania. He previously served as the Deputy Chief of Mission at the U.S. Embassy in Berlin and the Charge d'Affaires ad interim at Embassy Berlin. He served as Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for International Economic Affairs on the National Security Council staff from 2001-2003. Ambassador Cloud was Deputy Chief of Mission at the U.S. Mission to the European Union from 1999-2002 and from 1996-1999 served as Deputy Chief of Mission at the American Embassy in Warsaw, Poland. Ambassador Cloud had earlier assignments in the State Department, Bonn, Mexico City and Warsaw.

Dr. Lindsay P. Cohn joined the National Security Affairs Department, where she teaches Policy Analysis and Strategy, in July 2014. Prior to coming to the Naval War College she was an Assistant Professor of Political Science and Co-Director of the Center for International Peace and Security Studies at the University of Northern Iowa, and worked as an advisor to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Combating Terrorism (OSD(P)/SOLIC/SOCT) as a Council on Foreign Relations International Affairs Fellow. Her research and publications deal primarily with military organizations, asymmetric conflict, international law of war/military law, and civil-military relations. She has held policy and research fellowships from Harvard University's Olin Institute for Strategic Studies, the Center for Transatlantic Relations, Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, the *Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik* in Berlin, the Free University, Berlin, and the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation. She is an alumna of Columbia University's Summer Workshop on the Analysis of Military Operations and Strategy (SWAMOS), a member of the Council of the Inter-

University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society, and on the board of the American Political Science Association's International Security and Arms Control section. Dr. Cohn has been invited to speak on issues of civil-military relations, military manpower, and military law at the University of Wisconsin, Madison, the *Bundeswehr* University, Munich, the Center for War Studies at the University of Southern Denmark, the *Centre d'Études et des Recherches Internationales*, Paris, the Watson Institute of Brown University, and the U.S. Military Academy at West Point. She has taught International Relations, International Security, Terrorism and Insurgency, U.S. Foreign Policy, Politics of the Middle East, Civil-Military Relations, and International Law and Politics. Dr. Cohn has received the Commander's Award for Public Service from the Department of the Army, for her work with UNI ROTC cadets preparing to deploy to Afghanistan, and the Award for Outstanding Achievement from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, for her work on Building Partner Capacity programs at SOLIC/SOCT. She received her BA in Political Science and Medieval History (with a concentration in Germanic Linguistics), and her PhD in Political Science (International Relations and Political Theory) from Duke University. Dr. Cohn lived in Germany for six years, and spent significant time doing research in France, the Netherlands, the UK, and Ireland. She is fluent in German and reads French, Dutch, Norwegian/Swedish, and Irish.

Professor James Cook is a professor of national security affairs and the Director for the TSDM and NSDM Final Exercises. He specializes in Strategy, Force Planning and the Middle East. A recently retired Army Air Defense Artillery officer, Professor Cook is a 1985 graduate of the United States Military Academy, West Point, New York, and a 2000 distinguished graduate of the Naval War College (College of Naval Command and Staff). He has served in a variety of command and staff assignments in Army tactical units located within the United States and Germany. Professor Cook served on the Army staff (G-8, Force Development) as the Theater Air and Missile Defense Systems Integrator, and was the Air Defense Artillery Colonels Assignment Officer at the U.S. Army Human Resources Command. He was appointed as the U.S. Army exchange officer at the United Kingdom's Joint Services Command and Staff College where he received an M.A. in Defense Studies from King's College London. Professor Cook also served as the Chief, Air and Missile Defense and Deputy G3 for the 10th Mountain Division, Fort Drum, New York, that included a deployment as the Deputy CJ3, CJTF-76, Operation Enduring Freedom, Afghanistan. He is an active participant in the Naval War College's International Engagement program where he lectures on strategy and international security matters. Most recently, he deployed to Afghanistan and served on the Regional Command-South staff from March to May 2011.

Captain Anthony Cowden, U.S. Navy, joined the National Security Affairs Department in September 2014. He was commissioned in 1984 through the University of Michigan Naval ROTC program. His initial assignment was to *USS MacDonough* (DDG-39), and in 1987 he reported to *USS Moosbrugger* (DD-980). In 1989 he left active duty and affiliated with the Navy Reserve. As a reservist he has commanded NR FFG Support Unit 101 and served as OIC of NR USFF Joint Task Force 700. Past non-command assignments were with Reserve units that supported *USS Miller* (FF-1091), *USS Affray* (MSO-511), *USS Clark* (FFG-11), Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command, Afloat Training Group Atlantic, OPNAV, Naval Warfare Development Command, U.S. Forces Korea, and SEVENTH Fleet. While serving in the OPNAV Navy Command Center Unit, Captain Cowden was recalled to active duty in November 2001 for two years to serve as Navy Liaison to the Joint Staff and Battle Watch Captain, Navy

Operations Center, in support of *Operations Noble Eagle, Enduring Freedom, and Iraqi Freedom*. In April 2009 Captain Cowden returned to the active duty component and was assigned to be Chief, Naval Forces Division, U.S. Military Training Mission, Riyadh, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Since then he attended the Naval War College as a student in the College of Naval Warfare and as a Gravely Scholar, and served as Assistant and then Deputy Chief of Staff for Theater Security Cooperation, COMSEVENTHFLT. Captain Cowden earned a BA from the University of Michigan in history, an MS degree from the University of New Haven in computer science, an MA degree from the Naval War College in National Security and Strategic Studies, and is the author of *The Naval Institute Almanac of the U.S. Navy* (Naval Institute Press, 2004).

Lieutenant Colonel Christopher Cunniff, U.S. Air Force, joined the National Security Affairs Department teaching in the Policy sub-course in July 2015. He earned a B.S. in International Affairs from Georgia Tech in 1997, a Master of Arts in Business Administration from Grantham University in 2007, and a Master of Military Operational Art and Science from Air University in 2010. He joined the Air Force in 1997 through the ROTC program. Lt Col Cunniff is a senior pilot with over 2,600 hours flying C-141 and C-17 cargo aircraft. He has flown combat and combat support sorties in support of Operations JOINT GUARDIAN, SOUTHERN WATCH, ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM. He has served on the staff with Air Mobility Command as a C-17 Courseware Director and Simulator Certification pilot and with the Air Staff as the branch chief for the Air Force's International Affairs Specialist program. Prior to his arrival at the Naval War College, Lt Col Cunniff commanded the 725th Air Mobility Squadron, Naval Station Rota, Spain where he was responsible for the execution of en route maintenance, aerial port, and command and control functions supporting United States Transportation Command's Defense Transportation System.

Professor Roger H. Ducey joined the NSA faculty in 2002 teaching the Policy course and serving as the senior Air Force advisor to the Naval War College. He retired after almost 30 years of service at the end of 2006. Since then he has taught in the JMO Department and currently teaches NSA's Leadership Concepts sub-courses. Just prior to coming to the Naval War College, he commanded the 319th Air Expeditionary Group (Provisional) deployed to Shaikh Isa Air Base, Bahrain in support of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM from October 2001 to March 2002 while serving as the 319th Support Group Commander at Grand Forks Air Force Base, North Dakota. He began his military career as a missile launch officer, attended undergraduate pilot training, and flew KC-135A, R, R/T, and EC-135 aircraft. He served as operations officer and commander of the 99th Air Refueling Squadron, deputy commander, 19th Operations Group, and commanded deployments in support of Operations RESTORE HOPE, RESTORE DEMOCRACY, DELIBERATE FORCE, and DENY FLIGHT. He served in various staff positions at Headquarters, Strategic Air Command and served as Deputy Chief, Aircrew Operations and Training Division, Headquarters, Air Mobility Command. He holds a Bachelors of Business Administration Degree in International Finance from the University of Miami and Masters Degrees in Aviation Management from Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University and in National Security and Strategic Studies from the U.S. Naval War College.

Dr. Thomas Fedyszyn has been a member of the U.S. Naval War College's Naval Security Affairs faculty since 2000 and serves as the College Director of the Europe-Russia Studies Group. He received a Ph.D. from the Johns Hopkins University in Political Science while on active duty. His 31-year naval career included military assignments as the U.S. Naval Attaché to

Russia and two tours at NATO Headquarters in Brussels. He commanded the USS Normandy (CG 60) and USS William V. Pratt (DDG 44) and deployed them to the Mediterranean, Baltic and Norwegian Seas. He was a principal contributor to both the Lehman-era Maritime Strategy and NATO's Strategic Concept (1991) following the Cold War. As a leader within NATO's Partnership for Peace Consortium, he is responsible for the Defense Education Enhancement Program (DEEP) in Azerbaijan. He has developed recognized expertise and has published widely in maritime strategy, NATO strategy and the Russian Navy. Published articles since January 2014 are, "The Russian Navy 'Rebalances' to the Mediterranean" and "The Putin-Roosevelt Connection" (U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings*) and "Russia's Navy Rising," "France's Mighty Mistrals to Russia," and "Everything you need to know about the New Security Strategy" (*The National Interest*).

Dr. Nikolas Gvosdev is the Course Director for the Policy Analysis sub-course. He was previously the Editor-in-Chief of the bi-monthly foreign policy journal, The National Interest. He started as executive editor of the magazine in 2001 and become editor in 2005. (He remains a contributing editor at The National Interest.) He was also a senior fellow for strategic studies at The Nixon Center, a Washington, DC think-tank. He received his Ph.D. as a Rhodes Scholar at St Antony's College, Oxford. He also holds masters' degrees from Oxford (in Russian and East European affairs) and Georgetown University (in international affairs). He writes widely as a specialist on U.S. foreign policy as well as international politics, especially as they affect Russia and its neighbors in the Eurasian space and the Greater Middle East. He also focuses on the interrelationship of politics, history, religion and culture. Prior to coming to The National Interest, he taught at Baylor University and was associate director of the Institute for Church-State Studies. He has also been an Adjunct Professor at Georgetown University and George Washington University in Washington, D.C and a visiting professor at Brown University. He is the author or editor of a number of books, including *Russian Foreign Policy: Interests, Vectors and Sectors*; *The Receding Shadow of the Prophet: The Rise and Fall of Political Islam*; and *Russia in the National Interest*. He is a weekly columnist for World Politics Review and a contributor to *Ethics and International Affairs*.

Lieutenant Colonel Jamison R. Hines, U.S. Army, joined the National Security Affairs Department in August 2014. He is a 1996 graduate of St. Bonaventure University with a degree in Political Science. He received his commission as an Infantry officer through Army ROTC as a Distinguished Graduate. After graduation from the U.S. Army Ranger School, his assignments included tours in the 82nd ABN Division, the 101st ABN Division (AASLT), and as Assistant Professor of Military Science at The Citadel. In 2006, LTC Hines became a Strategic Intelligence Officer (FA 34). LTC Hines earned his Masters of Science in Strategic Intelligence from the National Defense Intelligence College in Washington DC. His Strategic Intelligence tours include USTRANSCOM where he was the Americas Branch Chief and the PACOM Branch Chief as well as JFCC Global Strike at USSTRATCOM where he was the CENTCOM Targets Division Chief. He is a graduate of the Combined Arms and Services Staff School, ILE Common Core, the Post Graduate Intelligence Program, the Joint Combined Warfighting School (JPME II), the Defense Strategy Course, and the Theatre Nuclear Operations Course.

Dr. David P. Houghton recently joined the department and teaches the Leadership Concepts module of the intermediate-level Theater Security Decision Making (TSDM) course and the Policy Analysis module of the senior-level National Security Decision Making (NSDM) course.

He comes to us from King's College London where he was a Senior Lecturer in Defence Studies and holds a Ph.D. in political science from University of Pittsburgh. A highly accomplished scholar in the fields of foreign policy analysis, leadership theory, and security studies, he is the author of six books (including the award winning U.S. Foreign Policy and the Iran Hostage Crisis from Cambridge University Press) and over twenty five scholarly articles and chapters. He has held a number of prior academic posts including as Director of the MA program in international relations at University of Essex and as a visiting scholar at the Mershon Center for International Security Studies.

Dr. Christopher Jasparro is an Associate Professor of National Security Affairs and Director of the Africa Regional Study Group at the U.S. Naval War College where he specializes in African and Asian transnational and environmental security issues, terrorism, and cultural property protection. Prior to joining NWC in 2008 he held positions at the U.S. Marine Corps Command and Staff College and Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (DoD Regional Security Assistance Center – Pacific Command). He has also taught cultural geography at Framingham State University, Hawaii Pacific University, and the University of Kentucky as well as archaeological field methods for Harvard University and has extensive experience as a cultural resource management field archaeologist and crew chief. Dr. Jasparro has worked as a town planning advisor, transportation planner, rural development policy analyst and cartographer and served as a U.S. Naval Reserve officer (assigned to Office of Naval Intelligence, Naval Criminal Investigative Service, Joint Intelligence Center Pacific, and VAW-77). He was also a geographer for the Virginia Medical Reserve Corps from 2006 to 2008 and served as a Division Marine Safety staff officer for the U.S. Coast Guard Auxiliary from 2009 to 2010 and as Deputy Director for International Affairs from 2010 to 2012. He is a member of the U.S. Attorney (Rhode Island) Anti-Terrorism Advisory Council and the Combatant Commanders Historical and Cultural Advisory Group. Dr. Jasparro earned a Ph.D. in geography and a Graduate Certificate in Transportation Management from the University of Kentucky. He also holds a M.A. in geography from the University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill and a B.A. in anthropology and geography from the University of Vermont.

Commander Joseph P. Johnson, U.S. Navy, joined the National Security Affairs Department teaching in the Policy sub-course in 2016. He graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy in 1997 with a Bachelor of Science in Political Science. His operational experience was as a Naval Flight Officer in the EA-6B Prowler with operational tours in VAQ-141 and VAQ-130. His carrier deployments include combat operations in SOUTHERN WATCH, ENDURING FREEDOM, and NEW DAWN on USS ENTERPRISE (2001), LINCOLN (2006) and TRUMAN (2010). CDR Johnson also served as the Electronic Warfare Officer on Carrier Strike Group NINE, and as an FRS flight instructor in VAQ-129. His most recent shore assignment was working at the Pentagon for the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Financial Management and Comptroller in FMB-1 personally writing the Navy's ship maintenance budget as part of the President's Budget submission for three years. He holds a Master of Arts in Military Operations from the Air Command and Staff College (Distinguished Graduate, JPME Phase 1), a Master of Arts in National Security and Strategic Studies from the Naval War College (JPME Phase 2), and a Master of Business Administration from the Naval Postgraduate School. He holds subspecialty designations in naval strategy and defense financial management.

Dr. Joan Johnson-Freese has been a Professor of National Security Studies at the Naval War College since August 2002. From 2002-2010 she was the Chair of the NSA Department. Previously, she was at the Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies in Honolulu, HI, the Air War College in Montgomery, AL, and Director of the Center for Space Policy & Law at the University of Central Florida. Within the realm of international and national security studies, Dr. Johnson-Freese has focused her research and writing on space security issues, including technology transfer and export, missile defense, transparency, space and development, and globalization. Her book publications in that area include: Heavenly Ambitions: Will America Dominate Space? 2009; Space As A Strategic Asset, 2007; The Chinese Space Program: A Mystery Within a Maze, 1998; Space: The Dormant Frontier, Changing the Space Paradigm for the 21st Century, 1997; The Prestige Trap: A Comparative Study of the US, European and Japanese Space Programs, with Roger Handberg, 1994; Over the Pacific: Japanese Space Policy Into the 21st Century, 1993; and Changing Patterns of International Cooperation in Space, 1990. Articles written by Dr. Johnson-Freese in that area have been published in such journals as Joint Forces Quarterly, Nature, Space Policy, Issues in Science & Technology, World Politics Review, and The Nonproliferation Review. She is a Fellow of the International Academy of Astronautics; a member of the International Institute for Strategic Studies; a former member of the Space Studies Board of the National Research Council; the Editorial Board of China Security; a contributor to Breaking Defense; and has testified before Congress on multiple occasions regarding space security and China. She also teaches courses on Globalization & U.S. National Security, and Leadership in War & Peace at Harvard Summer and Extension Schools. Dr. Johnson-Freese's most recent book is Educating America's Military, (2013), focusing on Professional Military Education at the War Colleges. Other work on that topic has been published in Orbis, the USNI Blog, AOL Defense, Small Wars Journal and Best Defense.

Professor Kevin P. Kelley joined the National Security Affairs Department in July 1986. He spent his first 24 years on the faculty as the NSA Department's Executive Assistant. He teaches the Leadership Concepts portion of the NSA course. Prof. Kelley's expertise lies in the areas of strategic leadership, the U.S. defense resource allocation systems, and in the way national security policy making, and its implementation, are influenced. He has developed and executed programs on defense resource allocation processes and a systematic approach to national security strategy development and military force planning in support of the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies initiatives and for the Partnership for Peace. For over 20 years, he has also lectured and taught courses around the world, including in Germany, Hungary, Romania, Italy, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Belarus, Uzbekistan, Kenya, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Uganda, and Saudi Arabia. Prior to his arrival at the Naval War College, Prof. Kelley served as a logistician in the U.S. Navy, including tours of duty in Japan and Scotland. A 1984 Distinguished Graduate of the NWC, Professor Kelley has an undergraduate degree in economics from the College of the Holy Cross and he earned his Master's Degree in Business Administration from New Hampshire College. He was awarded a U.S. Department of Defense Executive Leadership Development Program fellowship in 1994. He taught at the Marshall Center in Germany under a one-year fellowship from July 1998 to June 1999.

Lieutenant Colonel Erich Kessler, U.S. Air Force, joined the National Security Affairs Department teaching in the Policy sub-course in April 2016. He earned a B.S. in Electrical Engineering from Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University, Prescott Campus in 1997, an M.B.A in Military Management from Touro University in 2008. He joined the Air Force in 1997 through

the ROTC program. Lt Col Kessler is a master navigator/electronic warfare officer with over 2,000 hours flying the T-43A and RC-135 S/U/V/W Reconnaissance aircraft. He has flown combat and combat support sorties in support of Operations SOUTHERN WATCH, ENDURING FREEDOM, IRAQI FREEDOM and UNIFIED PROTECTOR as well as sensitive reconnaissance operations. He has served on the staff at Nineteenth Air Force as the Chief of T-43 programs and the MAJCOM Electronic Warfare Officer for Air Education and Training Command. Prior to his arrival at the Naval War College, Lt Col Kessler was the Deputy Maintenance Group Commander for the 55th Maintenance Group at Offutt AFB, NE where he was responsible for maintenance actions on the OC/RC/TC/WC-135 and E-4B aircraft supporting six combatant commands and the National Airborne Operations Center which directly supports the President of the United States.

Dr. Stephen Knott is a Professor of National Security Affairs who joined the Naval War College faculty in July, 2007. Prior to accepting his position at the Naval War College, Dr. Knott was Co-Chair of the Presidential Oral History Program at the Miller Center of Public Affairs at the University of Virginia. He also served for seven years as an Associate Professor in the Political Science Department at the United States Air Force Academy. Knott received his B.A. in Political Science from Assumption College and his Ph.D. in Political Science from Boston College. He has taught courses on the presidency, congress, intelligence and national security, and American foreign policy. His books include *The Reagan Years*; *Alexander Hamilton and the Persistence of Myth*; *Secret and Sanctioned: Covert Operations and the American Presidency*; *At Reagan's Side: Insiders' Recollections from Sacramento to the White House*; *Rush to Judgment: George W. Bush, the War on Terror, and His Critics*; and *Washington and Hamilton: The Alliance That Forged America* (September, 2015).

Professor Laurence L. McCabe teaches the Security Strategies sub-course. A retired Navy surface warfare officer, Professor McCabe was assigned to cruisers and destroyers in Hawaii, California, South Carolina and Pennsylvania. He has deployed to every ocean in the world including the Caribbean and the Gulf of Mexico. Ashore Professor McCabe served as Flag Secretary to a Commander of a Carrier Battle Group on the aircraft carrier USS Constellation. He also served in the Pentagon as Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Navy for Resources and Programs. Professor McCabe also served as the Military Group Commander, U.S. Embassy in Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic for three years. Currently, as Director of the Latin American Studies Group, he has presented lectures in Mexico, Jamaica, Dominican Republic, Chile, Argentina, Peru, Bolivia, Uruguay, Costa Rica, and Brazil. In the Africa region, Professor McCabe has lectured in Cameroon, Seychelles, Mauritius, Madagascar, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania, South Africa, Botswana and Namibia among others. Professor McCabe lectures on global security and economic development, maritime security, national and military strategy, and globalization.

Dr. J. Scott McPherson joined the NSA faculty as a Permanent Military Professor in 2007. He retired from the U.S. Navy in 2016 at the rank of Captain following 31 years of service. He holds a Ph.D. from Salve Regina University and teaches a course there on Just War Theory. He is a recipient of the 2012 Admiral Thomas Weschler Award for Inspirational Teaching and a distinguished graduate of the Naval War College class of 2000, where he received the James V. Forrestal Award for Force Planning as a member of his NSA seminar. From 2000-2003, he served at the Pentagon in the Joint Chiefs of Staff's Directorate of Operations (J-3) as Executive

Flag Assistant to the Director for Information Operations and Chief of the Special Activities Division. While there, he was involved in the immediate response to 9/11 and planning of operations ENDURING FREEDOM in Afghanistan and IRAQI FREEDOM. In 2003, he was selected for the Permanent Military Professor program and reported to Newport, where he served as a professor and Executive Assistant to the Chair of the Strategy and Policy Department, then as the NSA Leadership Concepts sub-course Director. His operational experience includes duty as a Naval Flight Officer in the E-2C Hawkeye during operation EARNEST WILL in 1987, transition to the A-6E Intruder and participation in operations SOUTHERN WATCH in Iraq and RESTORE HOPE in Somalia, and transition to the EA-6B Prowler, where he earned Air Wing Strike Lead while deployed to the PACOM and CENTCOM area of operations in USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN 72).

Colonel Paul L. Muller, U.S. Marine Corps, joined the Naval War College faculty in February 2015 following back-to-back tours at Headquarters Marine Corps. A tank officer, he has commanded units around the globe to include combat with 3d Tank Battalion, Task Force Ripper, during OPERATIONS DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM. An experienced planner and Joint Qualified Officer, he has served as the J-3 Plans Officer for JTF-160 (OPERATION SEA SIGNAL), in the G-5 at Marine Forces Pacific, in the Joint Staff J-5, as the III MEF G-3 Exercises Officer, and as the Director, J-5 Policy and Plans, U.S. Forces-Afghanistan in OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM. From 2008-09, he commanded the 1st Recruit Training Battalion at Parris Island. Additionally, he holds qualifications as a Southeast Asia Regional Affairs Officer, and a Security Assistance Management Officer (CONUS). He received a B.S. in Electrical Engineering from the U.S. Naval Academy, and an M.A. in National Security and Strategic Studies from the U.S. Naval War College, where he was the 2008 recipient of the Stephen Bleeker Luce Award. Col Muller serves as the Senior U.S. Marine Corps Representative to the Naval War College.

Dr. Thomas M. Nichols teaches in both the TSDM Security Strategies and the NSDM Policy Analysis sub-courses. He is a former Secretary of the Navy Fellow and has held the Naval War College's Forrest Sherman Chair of Public Diplomacy. He previously taught international relations and Soviet/Russian affairs at Dartmouth College and Georgetown University. He is a former chairman of the Strategy and Policy Department at the Naval War College, for which he was awarded the Navy Civilian Meritorious Service Medal. He holds a PhD from Georgetown, an MA from Columbia University, the Certificate of the Harriman Institute for Russian, Eurasian and East European studies at Columbia, and a BA from Boston University. Dr. Nichols was personal staff for defense and security affairs in the United States Senate to the late Sen. John Heinz of Pennsylvania, and was a Fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, DC. He has been an Associate of the Davis Center for Russian Studies at Harvard University, and he is currently a Senior Associate of the Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs in New York City and a Fellow of the International History Institute at Boston University. Dr. Nichols has also been a Fellow at the John F. Kennedy School at Harvard University, where he held a joint appointment in the International Security Program and the Project on Managing the Atom. He also teaches courses at Harvard on "The Future of War" and "Nuclear Weapons and International Security." He is the author of several books and articles, including *The Sacred Cause: Civil-Military Conflict Over Soviet National Security, 1917-1992*; *The Russian Presidency: Society and Politics in the Second Russian Republic*; *Winning the World: Lessons for America's Future from the Cold War;* and *Eve of Destruction: The Coming*

of Age of Preventive War, a study of the revolutionary changes taking place in the way nations go to war. His most recent book is *No Use: Nuclear Weapons U.S. National Security* (University of Pennsylvania, 2014).

Dr. Richard J. Norton teaches in the Leadership Concepts and Policy Analysis sub-courses. Prior to assuming this position, he taught the Security, Strategy and Forces course, and served as Sub-course Director for the Policy Making and Process Course. Professor Norton holds a doctorate in International Relations from the Fletcher School of Law & Diplomacy; and retired from the United States Navy in 1996 with the rank of Commander. While on active duty, he served extensively at sea on cruisers and destroyers. He also served on Capitol Hill as a Senate Liaison Officer with the Navy's Office of Legislative Affairs and with several political-military assignments on senior military staffs. His military professional experience was focused on surface naval operations and national security policy. He has published articles on failed states, humanitarian early warning, emerging security issues as well numerous chapters in books on case studies related to national security decision making. Three national security volumes he has edited have been published by the Naval War College Press. He also teaches courses on military history. His most recent area of research is in South American and African regional military affairs and related peacekeeping, humanitarian and refugee operations. In 2004 his pioneering work on the phenomenon known as "feral cities" was included in the *New York Times* "ideas of the year." His most recent publication "Feral Cities: Problems today, battlefields tomorrow?" may be found in the 2010 inaugural edition of *The Marine Corps University Journal.*

Colonel Bradley Oliver, U.S. Air Force, joined the National Security Affairs Department teaching in the Leadership Concepts sub-course after graduating the College of Naval Warfare in June 2015. He earned a B.S. Sec Edu in Mathematics from Taylor University in 1992, a Masters in Operations Analysis from the Air Force Institute of Technology in 2007, and a Master of Arts in National Security and Strategic Studies from the United States Naval War College in 2015. He joined the Air Force in 1995 through Officer Training School. He began his Air Force career as an intelligence officer working with the U-2, RC-135 and SR-71. He is a command pilot with over 2,000 hours in F-15C/D, T-41, T-52 and T-53 aircraft. He has three operational F-15 tours which included two deployments to the Middle East. His staff time was served in the Pentagon in the Air Force Programming office as the chief programmer for the F-15 and F-117 programs. He has served as an executive officer at the Wing and HQ AF level. His operational jobs included chief of mobility, Flight Commander, Assistant Director Operations, F-15 Chief of Standardization and Evaluation and Director of Operations for two different squadrons. Prior to his selection to attend the Naval War College, Col Oliver commanded the 557th Flying Training Squadron at the USAFA with a mission to expose, challenge and motivate cadets toward a career in aviation.

Professor Michael Pratt is an Associate Professor in the National Security Affairs Department. He is a retired Colonel from the U.S. Air Force after serving more than 27 years on active duty. He graduated from the University of Maine in 1988 and received his commission through the Air Force ROTC program as a Distinguished Graduate. Professor Pratt earned a Bachelor of Science degree in Political Science and Masters of Business Administration from the University of Maine in 1988 and 1993 respectively. He also earned a Master of Arts degree in Human Resource Management from Webster University in St. Louis, MO in 2000 and a Master of Arts degree in National Security and Strategic Studies as a Distinguished Graduate of the Naval War College in

2010. As a member of the NSA Department, Professor Pratt has served in the role of Policy Course Administrator for both NSDM and TSDM, headed the Policy exam committee for three years, and drafted several policy exams. He earned his wings at Specialized Undergraduate Navigator Training in 1990 and was assigned to fly the KC-135 Stratotanker where he accrued over 4,000 flying hours as an instructor and evaluator. He has also flown more than 200 combat missions during 17 operational deployments in support of Operations DESERT STORM, ALLIED FORCE, ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM- to include the opening nights of Operation DESERT STORM and DESERT STRIKE. Immediately following the terrorist attacks of 11 Sep 2001, he deployed to NORAD where he was charged with implementing and leading every aspect of the combat air patrol (CAP) refueling operations for all of North America and Iceland, and later establishing permanent refueling operations for Operation NOBLE EAGLE. As the chief of CORONET Operations for Air Mobility Command, he designed, planned and executed the air refueling "air-bridge" for the longest strike mission in history-a 44-hour B-2 strike on Afghanistan and is credited with planning and executing the largest rotation of combat aircraft in history. Professor Pratt has commanded the 6th Operations Support Squadron at MacDill AFB, FL, the 819th Global Support Squadron at McGuire AFB, NJ and deployed as the commander of five Contingency Response Elements as part of USTRANSCOM's Joint Task Force Port Opening (JTF-PO) mission.

Dr. Mary Raum is a Professor in the National Security Affairs Department in which she teaches two curricula in the Leadership Concepts sub-course. She is a professional educator and scholar with additional significant experience in the fields of public policy, management consulting and executive administration. From 2007-2009 she served as Course Director for the Decision Making and Implementation curricula of the National Security Decision Making Department. Dr. Raum also teaches Feminia Militaris, an electives course about the role of the female in the military which primary topics of study are women warriors from 60AD to the present. Her past associations include staff positions in science and technology policy with the federal science advisory, State of Washington and the University of Washington and George Washington University. Past career affiliations include the Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory Submarine Technology Division, Matrix Consulting Group, The University of Maryland, Chapman University College, Central Washington University and Seattle Pacific University. Her current work affiliated travels have included an eight nation Jamaica Defense Force Conference, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations of the Dominican Republic and the United States Navy Southern Command. Dr. Raum is a valued subject matter expert in qualitative decision making and organizational behavior. Her active research program is allied with the field of movement pattern analysis-a comprehensive system for assessing an individual's core motivations in decision making processes based on the disciplined analysis of nonverbal behavior. Her work has been cited most recently in Nuclear Implosions the Rise and Fall of the Washington Public Power Supply System, as well as in the Office of the Secretary of Defense background document: "Decision Making Perspectives and Innovation". Her most recent peer reviewed article is "I Desire Therefore I Proliferate" for the Nonproliferation Review as well as an internal abstract entitled "When Group Dynamics Hurt our Personal Freedoms." Her book reviews have been published in the Journal of Minerals, Metals and Materials, The Non Proliferation Review, and the Peace Research Canadian Journal of Peace Studies. She has peer reviewed numerous books including The Double Helix, Technology and Democracy in the American Future: The Politics of Technology and the Technology of Politics and Portents for America's Third century Socio-Psychological of Information in a Democracy. Dr. Raum has

authored over 250 white papers as well as state and federal background materials for public testimony. Education: PhD, University of Washington dual degree in Engineering and Public Affairs, PhD studies George Washington University Science and Technology Policy; MAS Johns Hopkins University, BS University of Maryland, AA Spanish Language.

Dr. Derek S. Reveron is a professor of national security affairs and the EMC Informationist Chair. He specializes in strategy development, non-state security challenges, intelligence, and U.S. defense policy. He has authored or edited nine books that include U.S. Foreign Policy and Defense Strategy: the Evolution of an Incidental Superpower and Cyberspace and National Security. Rhode Island Governor Raimondo appointed him to the first ever State Commission on Cybersecurity. As a serving officer in the Navy Reserves, he has served with the Joint Staff, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, U.S. Southern Command, Naval Forces Central Command, and NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan. Dr. Reveron is a faculty affiliate at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University and teaches at the Extension School at Harvard University. Before joining the Naval War College faculty in 2004, Dr. Reveron taught political science at the U.S. Naval Academy. During graduate school, he formulated, implemented and evaluated democracy promotion programs for the NGO Heartland International. He graduated from the College of Naval Command Staff through the College of Distance Education Fleet Seminar Program and completed the Maritime Staff Operators Course at the Naval War College. He received an MA in political science and a Ph.D. in public policy analysis from the University of Illinois at Chicago.

Commander Sean Rich, U.S. Navy, joined the National Security Affairs Department in May 2016. He was commissioned in 1996 from the U.S. Naval Academy. He was designated a Naval Aviator in May of 1998. He completed aviation tours with VP-46 in Whidbey Island, WA flying the P-3C Orion, VT-3 at NAS Whiting Field flying the T-34C Turbomentor as a flight instructor, VR-56 at NAS Oceana flying the C-9B Skytrain II as a department head, and again at VR-56 flying the C-40A Clipper as the Commanding Officer. His staff tours were as an action officer at Fleet Forces Command and at Navy Reserve Forces Command as the Director of Warrior and Family Support. He earned an MA degree from the Naval War College in National Security and Strategic Studies in 2009.

Dr. Terence Roehrig is Professor of National Security Affairs, the Director of the Asia-Pacific Studies Group, and teaches in the Security Strategies sub-course. He has been a Research Fellow at the Kennedy School at Harvard University and a past President of the Association of Korean Political Studies. He has published several books including most recently *South Korea's Rise: Economic Development, Power, and Foreign Policy* with Cambridge University Press, a work coauthored with Uk Heo. In addition, he is a coauthor of *South Korea since 1980*, the sole author of two books, *From Deterrence to Engagement: The U.S. Defense Commitment to South Korea* and *The Prosecution of Former Military Leaders in Newly Democratic Nations: The Cases of Argentina, Greece, and South Korea* along with a monograph, *Korean Dispute Over the Northern Limit Line: Security, Economics, or International Law*, and is the coeditor of *Korean Security in a Changing East Asia*. His forthcoming book is entitled *Japan, South Korea, and the U.S. Nuclear Umbrella: Extended Deterrence and Nuclear Weapons* with Columbia University. He has published numerous articles and book chapters on Korean and East Asian security issues, North Korea's nuclear weapons program, the Northern Limit Line dispute, the South Korean Navy, deterrence, the U.S.-South Korea alliance, human rights, and transitional justice. His

work appears in the journals, *Asian Affairs*, *Asian Politics and Policy*, *Human Rights Quarterly*, *International Journal of Korean Studies*, *Journal of Asian and African Studies*, *Korea Observer*, *North Korean Review*, *Pacific Focus*, and *World Affairs*, and he has given presentations to groups at U.S. Forces Korea and the U.S. Embassy in Seoul along with JCS J-5 in South Korea. Dr. Roehrig received his Ph.D. from the University of Wisconsin-Madison and an MA from Marquette University, both in political science.

Commander Joe Santos, U.S. Navy, joined the NSA Department in 2012. He teaches in the Policy and Leadership sub-courses and assists in teaching the Gravely research elective course. A career submariner, he enlisted in the United States Navy in 1985. He attended Worcester Polytechnic Institute after being selected for the NROTC Program, where he earned a Bachelor of Science degree in Mechanical/Nuclear Engineering in 1995 and then re-entered the Nuclear Navy and the Submarine Force as a commissioned officer. While attending the Naval War College he earned a M.A. in National Security and Strategic Studies in 2010 and conducted in depth research focusing on developing Undersea Warfare Concepts of Operation in Anti-Access/Area Denied environments as a Gravely Scholar. At sea, his operational submarine tours include assignments in the USS TINOSA (SSN 606), USS MIAMI (SSN 755), USS VIRIGINIA (SSN 774) and USS NEVADA (SSBN 733). During these tours he conducted deployments to the North Atlantic, Mediterranean, South America, Pacific and Arabian Gulf, including combat operations in support of Operations in Kosovo and Iraq. Ashore he has served as a Nuclear Engineering Instructor, a Submarine Strike Officer, as a member of the Joint Staff, J-3, Global Operations Directorate, and on the CNO's personal staff in OPNAV N00X.

Professor Albert J. Shimkus, Jr. was selected to join the National Security Affairs (NSA) resident civilian faculty in December 2006. He initially taught in the Policy sub-course and was appointed course director in May 2007, teaching in this sub-course for 4 years. He was appointed the director of the Leadership Concepts sub-course in April 2016. Professor Shimkus taught as a military professor in the Naval War College's National Security Decision Making Department for 2 years, 1995 – 1997 and in the College of Distance Education for 7 years, 1998 - 2005. He enlisted in the U.S. Air Force in 1965, served as an independent duty medic at Bucks Harbor Radar Site, ME and completed a tour of duty at Bien Hoa Air Base, RVN in 1967 and 1968. After earning an honorable discharge he graduated from Memorial Hospital School of Nursing, Worcester, MA and Salem State College, Salem, MA with a Bachelor of Science in Nursing. He was then appointed to the faculty of Salem Hospital School of Nursing. Professor Shimkus received a direct commission in the Navy as a Lieutenant Junior Grade in 1977. He graduated from George Washington University in 1981with a Bachelor of Science in Nurse Anesthesia and practiced as a (CRNA) for over 25 years with numerous tours in support of deployed forces. He earned an MA in National Security and Strategic Studies from the Naval War College in 1993 and will complete the requirements to be awarded an EdD in 2016. His leadership tours included director of nursing, Naval Hospital, Guam, executive officer, U.S. Naval Hospital, Naples, Italy; commanding officer, U.S. Naval Hospital, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba and joint task force surgeon, JTF GTMO; deputy commandant, Naval District Washington; and commanding officer, medical treatment facility USNS COMFORT. Professor Shimkus retired from the Navy as a Captain (06) in 2007. He is a member of the Navy Surgeon General's Assessment cell. His areas of academic interest are the application of America's soft power as an element of the national security strategy and strategic health policy. He teaches Electives focused on Chemical and Biological Warfare and Current Southeast Asia Issues. He frequently

lectures on international cooperative efforts in the delivery of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief and ethical issues associated with the delivery of health care in operational military environments and at Joint Task Force Guantanamo, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.

Dr. Paul J. Smith joined the NSA department in July 2006 and teaches the Security Strategies sub-course. He was formerly an associate/assistant professor with the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (APCSS) in Hawaii. His research focuses on transnational security issues and the international politics of East Asia (with particular emphasis on the People's Republic of China). He has published articles in *Asian Affairs: an American Review, Buffalo Human Rights Law Review, Comparative Strategy, Contemporary Southeast Asia, Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict, Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, Harvard Asia-Pacific Review, Jane's Intelligence Review, Journal of Conflict, Security and Development, Journal of Third World Studies, Naval War College Review, Orbis, Parameters, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* and *Survival*. His chapter contributions have appeared in such books as *The Impact of 9/11 on Business and Economics: The Business of Terror* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), *Fixing Fractured Nations: the Challenge of Ethnic Separatism in the Asia-Pacific* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2010) and *Tiger's Roar: Asia's Recovery and its Impact* (M.E. Sharpe, 2001). He has written commissioned chapters or articles for the Council on Foreign Relations (New York), the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (Singapore), the Institute for Security and Development Policy (Stockholm) and the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (Geneva). His edited books include *Human Smuggling: Chinese Migrant Trafficking and the Challenge to America's Immigration Tradition* (Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1997) and *Terrorism and Violence in Southeast Asia: Transnational Challenges to States and Regional Stability* (M.E. Sharpe, 2004). He is author of the book *The Terrorism Ahead: Confronting Transnational Violence in the 21st Century* (M.E. Sharpe, 2007). Dr. Smith frequently provides commentary for national and international news organizations, including the *International Herald Tribune, Christian Science Monitor, Defense News, Japan Times, World Politics Review,* among others. Dr. Smith has lived and studied in the People's Republic of China, Taiwan and the United Kingdom and is conversant in Mandarin Chinese. He earned his Bachelor of Arts from Washington and Lee University, his Master of Arts from the University of London (School of Oriental and African Studies-SOAS) and his Juris Doctorate (law) and PhD (political science) from the University of Hawaii.

Dr. Andrew L. Stigler teaches with the Policy Analysis faculty, focusing on the international and domestic influences on U.S. national security policy. Stigler has published in *International Security, the National Interest, Joint Forces Quarterly,* and *The Naval War College Review*. He currently has a book under contract with the academic press Transactions (affiliated with Rutgers University), titled The Military: A Presidential Briefing Book. The work is a critical examination of the military from the standpoint of an incoming president, examining issues such as force planning, crisis response, presidential command during wartime, strategic change, and postwar reconstruction efforts. Stigler holds a BA in Government from Cornell University; an MA in International Relations from the University of Chicago; and a PhD in Political Science from Yale University. He has previously taught at Dartmouth College and Wesleyan University.

Professor Dana E. Struckman joined the NSA faculty upon his graduation from the Naval War College in June of 2006 and currently serves as the department Executive Assistant. Professor Struckman teaches in the Policy Analysis sub-course. His areas of expertise are nuclear

deterrence, ballistic missile systems and defense acquisition. He was commissioned in 1987 through the Air Force ROTC program and retired from the U.S. Air Force in 2010 in the grade of Colonel. A career missile and space officer, Professor Struckman had extensive operational missile experience, certified combat ready in both the Peacekeeper and Minuteman III weapon systems. Additionally, he served in a variety of staff assignments at headquarters Air Force Space Command, Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado and as a Program Element Monitor, Office of the Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, Pentagon, Washington D.C. Professor Struckman also served as a military advisor on space and missile issues to the Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Washington, D.C. as well as an on-site U.S. Government Verification Officer for NATO missile destruction compliance in Eastern Europe. Professor Struckman also served as a squadron commander in the 91st Space Wing, Minot Air Force Base, North Dakota. He holds a B.S. from the University of Nebraska, a M.S. from Lesley University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, and a M.A. in National Security and Strategic Studies from the United States Naval War College.

Colonel Dennis Sullivan, U.S. Army, joined the National Security Affairs Department in 2016. He graduated in 1988 from the United States Military Academy with a degree in Civil Engineering. He has a Masters of Arts degree in Computer Resources and Information Management from Webster University, and a Masters in Military Art and Science (MMAS) from the U.S. Army School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS). Colonel Sullivan was a distinguished graduate of the Naval War College (College of Naval Warfare) earning a Master of Arts degree in National Security and Strategic Studies in 2015. His previous assignment highlights include Fellow with the Chief of Naval Operations' Strategic Studies Group, commander of 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division at Fort Drum, New York and Afghanistan, the 10th Mountain Division G3 and the Regional Command-South CJ-3 for ISAF Joint Command in Kandahar Afghanistan, and commander of 2d Battalion, 22d Infantry Regiment at Fort Drum and Iraq.

Professor Sean C. Sullivan teaches in the Policy Analysis sub-course. He is a subject matter expert on defense planning and the Department of Defense Formal Resource Allocation processes. Professor Sullivan coordinates all curriculum development on Defense Resource Allocation and is the author of numerous related articles, readings, and case studies on formal defense planning processes. A retired naval officer, Sean Sullivan served in the United States Navy for over twenty years. He served at sea for over fifteen years in various surface combatants, amphibious ships, and afloat staffs. He deployed five times to the Western Pacific and Arabian Gulf and once to the South Eastern Pacific Ocean. Sean Sullivan attended the Naval War College, graduating in March 1999 with a Master of Arts Degree in Strategic Studies and National Security Strategy. He also holds a Bachelor of Arts degree in Political Science from the University of Rochester.

Steven C. Taylor, a member of the Senior Foreign Service with the rank of Minister Counselor, most recently he served as Chief Information Officer (CIO) after being appointed by the Secretary of State on April 3, 2013. Preceding his assignment as CIO, Mr. Taylor served in a number of positions in the Department, including Minister Counselor for Management in Cairo and Athens. His other overseas assignments include a Baghdad, Berlin, Bonn, London, Moscow, and Rabat. Mr. Taylor joined the Foreign Service in 1988. He is a native of Rhode Island and

holds both a Bachelors in Business Management and Masters in Management Information Systems from Boston University.

Commander Dale R. Waggoner, U.S. Navy, earned a Bachelor of Arts in Marine Biology from Linfield College, McMinville, OR in 1990. He enlisted in 1991 as a Nuclear Electricians Mate where he deployed twice aboard USS Henry M. Jackson, SSBN 730. He received a commission via Aviation Officer Candidate School in 1996 and subsequently earned his wings of gold in 1997 as a Naval Flight Officer. He flew the S-3B Viking with the Scouts of VS-24 from 1998 to 2002 where he deployed aboard USS Theodore Roosevelt, participating in Operation Noble Anvil, Kosovo, and later, Operation Southern Watch. He deployed a second time aboard USS Enterprise, participating in the opening salvos of Operation Enduring Freedom in 2001. He taught at the S-3B Weapons School from 2002 to 2004, during which time he was awarded a Masters of Arts in National Security and Strategic Studies from the Naval War College. He subsequently transitioned to the E-2C Hawkeye and deployed with the Bluetails of VAW-121 aboard USS George Washington. While attached to VAW-121, he served as the Naval Liaison Officer for the Coalition Coordination Center, CENTCOM. He also participated in the Katrina Humanitarian and Disaster Relief efforts. CDR Waggoner performed his Department Head tour with the VAW-124 Bear Aces, once again participating in Operation Enduring Freedom from USS Theodore Roosevelt. Upon completion of his Department Head tour CDR Waggoner was assigned to COMNAVAIRLANT as the Naval Aviation Flight Hour Program Manager. His most recent assignment prior to his assignment to the Naval War College was as the Strike Operations Officer aboard USS Theodore Roosevelt, participating in Operation Inherent Resolve.

Professor Kathleen (Kate) Walsh joined the faculty in 2006 and teaches Policy Analysis. Her research focuses on China and the Asia-Pacific region, particularly security and technology issues. She is an affiliate of NWC's China Maritime Studies Institute (CMSI), participates in NWC's Asia Pacific Study Group and Wylie Group, and is a member of the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations and the U.S. Council on Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP), among other professional associations. Her publications include: "China's National Security Strategy," in *Comparative National Security Strategies* (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2013), "China's Emerging Defense Innovation System: Making the Wheels Turn" in *Forging China's Military Might: A New Framework for Assessing Innovation* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University, 2013), "Enhanced Information Sharing in the Asia Pacific: Establishing a Regional Cooperative Maritime Cooperative Operations Center," in *Strategic Manoeuvres: Security in the Asia-Pacific*, James Veitch, ed. (Centre for Strategic Studies, New Zealand, 2009), and "The Role, Promise and Challenges of Dual-Use Technologies in National Defense," Chapter 7 in *The Modern Defense Industry: Political, Economic and Technological Issues*, Richard A. Bitzinger, ed. (Praeger, 2009), among many other publications and peer reviews. Prior to joining the NWC, Walsh was a Senior Consultant on China and international security matters, a Senior Associate at the Stimson Center, and Senior Associate at a for-profit DC defense consulting firm. Walsh has conducted numerous government- and foundation-funded studies, provided Congressional testimonies, and conducted numerous public presentations and senior-level government briefings. She was appointed a member of the National Research Council's *Committee on Global S&T Strategies and Their Effect on US National Security* (2009-10) and the NRC's *Committee on Assessing the Need for a National Defense Stockpile* (2007-8), among other high-level study groups. Her M.A. in international security policy is from

Columbia University's School of Public and International Affairs and her B.A. in international affairs is from George Washington University's Elliott School.

Melissa Welch serves as the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency's Faculty Representative and George H. W. Bush Chair of National Intelligence at the U.S. Naval War College (NWC). She began her assignment at NWC in August 2016 and teaches in the National Security Affairs Department. Within CIA she has served mainly in the Directorate of Operations (DO) specializing in intelligence collection and reporting. Ms. Welch has served overseas in Southeast Asia, Central Eurasia, Western Europe, and the Middle East, including close interaction with U.S. Military Intelligence elements in support of war zone operations. She has extensive experience working with foreign partners to enhance intelligence collection against high-value and strategic priorities. She has served in multiple assignments at CIA Headquarters, culminating in a Senior Executive position overseeing all aspects of DO intelligence reporting – from collection, production, and dissemination, through its ultimate use by policymakers, U.S. Military, and Intelligence Community analysts. Ms. Welch is a native of Newport, Rhode Island, and a graduate of NWC's College of Naval Command and Staff, earning a master's degree in 2002. She received a bachelor's degree from Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service and an International Baccalaureate diploma from the United World College of the Atlantic in Wales, UK. She is a 2016 recipient of the Presidential Rank Award and received CIA's Intelligence Commendation Medal in 2012.

Captain Erik Wright, U.S. Navy, teaches in the Leadership Concepts sub-course in the Theater Security Decision Making (TSDM) and the National Security Decision Making (NSDM) courses, and also teaches the George Washington elective. He earned a B.S. in Oceanography from the United States Naval Academy in 1988 and an M.A. in Strategic Studies from the Naval War College in 2011. A naval aviator, his command tour at Patrol Squadron FORTY-SIX (VP-46) included a deployment to the Western Pacific and command of Task Groups 72.2 and 72.4. He has also completed operational assignments with VP-23, VP-26, Air Test and Evaluation Squadron ONE (VX-1) and Carrier Strike Group EIGHT, with numerous deployments to the North Atlantic, Caribbean and Mediterranean Seas, and Arabian Gulf. His shore tours of duty included the Navy staff (OPNAV), serving in Anti-submarine Warfare and Electronic Warfare billets, and as an instructor and Deputy Director of the Navy's Command Leadership School here in Newport. He originally joined the NSA staff at NWC in the Fall of 2011 and spent 3 years teaching Leadership Concepts within TSDM and NSDM through 2014. CAPT Wright spent 2015 in Afghanistan and Qatar, as Officer-in-Charge of NAVCENT FORWARD HQ, supporting Navy Individual Augmentees throughout the CENTCOM AOR. He returned to NWC and the NSA department to resume teaching for the 2016-2017 academic year.

APPENDIX E TO ENCLOSURE E

SERVICE SENIOR-LEVEL COLLEGE JOINT LEARNING AREAS AND OBJECTIVES (JPME-II)

1. Overview. Service SLCs develop strategic leaders who can think critically and apply military power in support of national objectives in a joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational environment. Service War Colleges hone student expertise and competency on their respective Service's roles, missions and principal operating domains and focus on integrating them into the joint force, unfettered by Service parochialism across the range of military operations.

2. Mission. Each Service SLC is unique in mission and functional support. However, a fundamental objective of each is to prepare future military and civilian leaders for high-level policy, command and staff responsibilities requiring joint and Service operational expertise and warfighting skills by educating them on the instruments of national power (diplomatic, informational, military and economic), the strategic security environment and the effect those instruments have on strategy formulation, implementation, and campaigning. The goal is to develop agile and adaptive leaders with the requisite values, strategic vision and thinking skills to keep pace with the changing strategic environment. SLC subject matter is inherently joint; JPME at this level focuses on the immersion of students in a joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational environment and completes educational requirements for JQO (level 3) nomination.

3. Learning Area 1 – National Strategies

a. Apply key strategic concepts, critical thinking and analytical frameworks to formulate and execute strategy.

b. Analyze the integration of all instruments of national power in complex, dynamic and ambiguous environments to attain objectives at the national and theater-strategic levels.

c. Evaluate historical and/or contemporary security environments and applications of strategies across the range of military operations.

d. Apply strategic security policies, strategies and guidance used in developing plans across the range of military operations and domains to support national objectives.

e. Evaluate how the capabilities and limitations of the U.S. Force structure affect the development and implementation of security, defense and military strategies.

4. Learning Area 2 – Joint Warfare, Theater Strategy and Campaigning for Traditional and Irregular Warfare in a Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental and Multinational Environment

a. Evaluate the principles of joint operations, joint military doctrine, joint functions (command and control, intelligence, fires, movement and maneuver, protection and sustainment), and emerging concepts across the range of military operations.

b. Evaluate how theater strategies, campaigns and major operations achieve national strategic goals across the range of military operations.

c. Apply an analytical framework that addresses the factors politics, geography, society, culture and religion play in shaping the desired outcomes of policies, strategies and campaigns.

d. Analyze the role of OCS in supporting Service capabilities and joint functions to meet strategic objectives considering the effects contracting and contracted support have on the operational environment.

e. Evaluate how strategic level plans anticipate and respond to surprise, uncertainty, and emerging conditions.

f. Evaluate key classical, contemporary and emerging concepts, including IO and cyber space operations, doctrine and traditional/irregular approaches to war.

5. Learning Area 3 – National and Joint Planning Systems and Processes for the Integration of JIIM Capabilities

a. Analyze how DoD, interagency and intergovernmental structures, processes, and perspectives reconcile, integrate and apply national ends, ways and means.

b. Analyze the operational planning and resource allocation processes.

c. Evaluate the integration of joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational capabilities, including all Service and Special Operations Forces, in campaigns across the range of military operations in achieving strategic objectives.

d. Value a joint perspective and appreciate the increased power available to commanders through joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational efforts.

e. Analyze the likely attributes of the future joint force and the challenges faced to plan, organize, prepare, conduct and assess operations.

6. Learning Area 4 – Command, Control and Coordination

a. Evaluate the strategic-level options available in the joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational environment.

b. Analyze the factors of Mission Command as it relates to mission objectives, forces and capabilities that support the selection of a command and control option.

c. Analyze the opportunities and challenges affecting command and control created in the joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational environment across the range of military operations, to include leveraging networks and technology.

7. Learning Area 5 – Strategic Leadership and the Profession of Arms

a. Evaluate the skills, character attributes and behaviors needed to lead in a dynamic joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational strategic environment.

b. Evaluate critical strategic thinking, decisionmaking and communication by strategic leaders.

c. Evaluate how strategic leaders develop innovative organizations capable of operating in dynamic, complex and uncertain environments; anticipate change; and respond to surprise and uncertainty.

d. Evaluate how strategic leaders communicate a vision; challenge assumptions; and anticipate, plan, implement and lead strategic change in complex joint or combined organizations.

e. Evaluate historic and contemporary applications of the elements of mission command by strategic-level leaders in pursuit of national objectives.

f. Evaluate how strategic leaders foster responsibility, accountability, selflessness and trust in complex joint or combined organizations.

g. Evaluate how strategic leaders establish and sustain an ethical climate among joint and combined forces, and develop/preserve public trust with their domestic citizenry.