

ALTERNATIVE FUTURES IN WAR AND CONFLICT

Michael Renner

The vast majority of today's armed conflicts are not traditional wars between states or coalitions of states, but rather internal conflicts. The fighting is done as often by paramilitary forces, guerrilla groups, ethnic militias, vigilante squads, and even criminal gangs and mercenaries as by regular, uniformed soldiers. Small-arms proliferation is a key phenomenon, a challenge that needs to be addressed urgently.

Out of a total of 108 armed conflicts during 1989–98, as tallied by the Conflict Data Project at the University of Uppsala, Sweden, ninety-two took place exclusively within the boundaries of a single country. Another nine involved intrastate conflict with foreign intervention. Just seven wars during that decade were interstate wars.¹As one analyst has suggested, “The future is Chechnya.” Indeed, it is the present and the future.

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THREATS TO PEACE AND SECURITY

In 1999, three interstate wars were active: the border war pitting Ethiopia against Eritrea, Indian-Pakistani clashes over control of Kashmir, and an on-again, off-again U.S.-British aerial bombing campaign against Iraq. The Chechen, East Timor, and Kosovo conflicts are today hybrid cases: Chechnya had become separate from Russia, a de facto entity after the 1996 war, although it was not internationally recognized as a sovereign state. East Timor, on the other hand, had never been part of Indonesia, even though it had been occupied since 1975.

Kosovo was part of Yugoslavia during the 1999 war and remains so officially, but it is now under international occupation and administration and is severing all ties to Yugoslavia.

Clearly, there will continue to be at least some interstate conflicts. The relationship between India and Pakistan, for example, is again at a low and may well degenerate into large-scale violence. Given that both countries are now nuclear powers, this cannot but be an extremely worrying situation to the rest of the world. But it is less clear that U.S. military policy will in any way be able to affect the outcome and make full-scale war between the two neighbors less likely. Imaginative, committed diplomacy would seem to be a far better approach.

We also cannot exclude the possibility that relations with the Russian Federation will deteriorate to the point of a new cold war (though Russia is now far weaker militarily and economically than during Soviet times). This may call for a policy of military preparedness, but a strong argument can be made for a different approach. Russia having been ignored and even humiliated by the West (in Nato's expansion, the Kosovo war, etc.) and having suffered through the economic disaster of the past decade (during which Moscow's policy was heavily influenced by Western advice), it would seem that a Russian strongman—President Vladimir Putin?—would find substantial support for a hard-line foreign and military policy. It is high time to rethink U.S. policy toward Russia and to acknowledge that a focus on military deterrence (in the event of significantly deteriorating relations) may be the worst of all options.

It is important to realize that the violence of many contemporary armed struggles is less an expression of clear political or military objectives (such as invading a neighboring country or annexing territory) than of the chaos emanating from state failure. An underlying factor is the inability of states to create or maintain conditions conducive to the welfare of their populations. More than 40 percent of the states in the bottom half of the Human Development Index in 1998 (published in the UN Development Program's human development report) experienced war on their territories sometime during the previous decade.²

What this suggests is that we are dealing far less than heretofore with traditional scenarios, in which threats are readily identifiable; the nature of conflicts is increasingly diffuse and complex. There is little point in trying to predict a successor to the "Soviet threat" (in the sense of an all-encompassing, bipolar-type struggle), because it is highly unlikely that one will materialize, notwithstanding all the conjecture about China. An American military response or deterrence posture may be close to irrelevant for most conflicts we may expect.

So why should the United States be concerned? Internal conflicts are more likely to trigger humanitarian concerns than security issues. But intrastate fighting can spill over borders to destabilize a larger region (as in Central Africa at

present); it can draw outside intervention, which in turn may lead to confrontations among larger powers; it can cause large-scale refugee flows, with debilitating political consequences in host countries; it can lead frustrated partisans to resort to desperate, terrorist measures to gain the attention of a neglectful world or to seek revenge against outside powers that are supporting, or are seen to be supporting, an opposing side.

Professor Paul Kennedy and others have referred to “pivotal” states—those that warrant close attention by the United States, where the American stake in sociopolitical stability is high but the risks of political collapse are high as well.³ This focus may seem to make eminent sense; there is a need to prioritize, and some conflicts affect the United States (or the world as a whole) more than others do. The difficulty is that what starts out as a limited conflict in a “noncritical” region can snowball into a major problem. The conflict in Rwanda serves as an instructive example. Even when genocidal violence took place in Rwanda in 1994, the Clinton administration preferred not to get involved in the conflict; it blocked proposals to reinforce UN peacekeepers in the country to stop the killings, and it took pains to avoid the term “genocide” in reference to the situation. The rationale was that Rwanda was simply not important enough to the United States. However, this judgment turned out to be a major mistake; the Rwanda conflict subsequently spilled over into the former Zaire, and it continues to fester. Several neighboring countries, including Angola, Namibia, Zimbabwe, Rwanda, and Uganda, have decided to intervene in the spillover civil war. It is far from clear at this time what the long-term consequences of that conflict will be for the region. This example suggests that it may be a wiser policy to focus on human rights and human well-being than on supposed “strategic” interests in deciding which conflicts merit U.S. attention.

The “health” of societies—their economic well-being, their ability to assure a reasonable degree of social justice and equity, their ability to preserve their natural environments—is in fact ultimately the most important issue, and no amount of defense spending and military sophistication can repair its loss. In fact, one can argue that too great an emphasis on military means may absorb the very resources that are needed to guarantee a healthy society.

A multitude of pressures and instabilities threaten to shred the social fabric of many societies today, particularly those in the developing world. A toxic brew of growing disparities in wealth, persistent poverty, increasing unemployment and job insecurity, population growth, and environmental degradation is provoking ever more social discontent and polarization.⁴

Governments that show themselves unable or unwilling to deal with these accelerating pressures stand to lose legitimacy. When they do, people turn to the more immediate group or community to which they belong in search of

support, identity, and security. But individual groups in such situations often feel they must compete directly against each other for scarce resources and services; governments may even encourage such splits, in classic divide-and-rule fashion. All too often, the end result is a polarization and splintering of societies, literally inviting violent responses to unresolved problems. Reacting to such problems, central governments may seek to impose authoritarian solutions. Whatever they do, the society may unravel and collapse.

Social and Economic Inequities

In recent decades, the gap between rich and poor has grown dramatically. According to statistics compiled by the UN Development Program, in 1960 those in the top 20 percent worldwide had thirty times the income of those in the bottom 20 percent; by the beginning of the 1990s, they had almost sixty times as much, and in 1997, seventy-four times.⁵ This gaping disparity is replicated within individual countries, more severely in some than in others. In the context of globalization, the inequitable distribution of economic opportunities and social burdens is becoming more pronounced. Sharp economic inequities are producing cleavages and discrepancies that may lead to social conflict and perhaps even collapse.

The lack of adequate numbers of jobs in countries with burgeoning youthful populations is creating widespread social discontent. Worldwide, an estimated sixty million people between the ages of fifteen and twenty-four already cannot find work. The pressure on labor markets is bound to intensify with strong population growth. The phenomenon of legions of young adults and adolescents with uncertain and often poor prospects for establishing a livelihood may be one of the greatest threats to political stability anywhere—triggering criminal behavior, feeding discontent that can burst open in street rioting, or fomenting political extremism.

China, for instance, is struggling to provide sufficient employment for hundreds of millions of its people as it prunes state-owned industries and slashes their workforces, and as the economic gulf between coastal areas and the interior widens. An estimated one to three hundred million itinerant Chinese laborers are drifting from rural to urban areas, and in and out of towns. It is very much in question whether these people will be able to find secure and adequate employment. The lack of jobs may have fatal implications for social stability in China and may well make internal conflict more likely in the future. Critical decisions await China as it moves ahead with a combination of economic liberalization and political repression. This is a more realistic danger than external Chinese aggression.

Unemployment and severe economic hardship and uncertainty nourish extremist politics and violence. Although the particular circumstances of each case need careful analysis and can generate vastly different outcomes, a few additional examples underline the potential dangers. One is Kosovo, where the Kosovo Liberation Army had little difficulty enlisting fighters from among a population that is predominantly young and unemployed. In Rwanda, extremist Hutu leaders recruited primarily uneducated, unemployed youths—individuals who had little hope of gainful employment and a steady livelihood—into militias that carried out genocidal violence in 1994 against ethnic Tutsi, whom the leaders depicted as responsible for the country's problems. Lack of jobs and dim economic prospects have also played an important role in fueling the savage conflict in Algeria. In East Timor, the violent gangs armed by the Indonesian military to thwart the territory's move toward independence were drawn in part from among the ranks of the unemployed. While not every unemployed person of today will become tomorrow's extremist shock trooper, people's willingness to tolerate and perpetrate violence will be far higher if they have little hope for the future.

Environmental Stress

In this connection, environmental conditions are increasingly critical. The depletion of water resources, excessive exploitation of fisheries, degradation of arable land, and deforestation, among other problems, not only affect human health and well-being and imperil the habitability of some regions but play an important role, as is increasingly understood, in generating or exacerbating conflicts.⁶

Many natural systems—such as croplands, forests, and freshwater sources—show signs of increasing stress.⁷ If climate change becomes a full-blown reality, it will compound present environmental challenges. Rising sea levels, shifting vegetation zones, and changing precipitation patterns are among the key impacts of climate change. If heavily populated coastal areas are inundated and crop harvests in some regions are decimated by more frequent droughts, to cite just two possible consequences, there could be dramatic increases in food insecurity. A flood of environmental refugees—displaced residents of engulfed coastal areas and farmers compelled to abandon their parched lands—may find it difficult to find new livelihoods in already crowded cities and may even clash with host communities. It is obviously impossible to predict either the dynamics of such a scenario or how well societies will cope, but in all likelihood, such changes would translate into a sharp increase in human conflict.

Countries whose economies are heavily geared toward agriculture, or other sectors that directly depend on the health of the natural-resource base, are most immediately confronted by environmental problems. The needs and interests of

contending groups tied closely to the land—farmers, nomads, ranchers, and resource extractors—often are at odds and remain unreconciled. Conflicts over scarce land and water abound. As cases from Mexico, Nigeria, Sudan, Papua New Guinea, India, and other countries show, poorer communities, minority groups, and indigenous peoples typically bear the brunt of adverse environmental change, particularly that triggered by oil drilling, mining, logging, and large-scale dam and irrigation projects.

Depending on how environmental transformation translates into the social, economic, and political realms, environmental decline could grow into an increasingly significant factor in violent disputes in the coming decades. What matters most in this regard is not necessarily the hardships of environmental degradation per se but the fact that the harmful impacts will be felt unevenly by

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different social strata, communities, and countries. This unevenness may well reinforce social and economic inequities and deepen patterns of polarization in society. For instance, the Sardar-Sarovar dam and irriga-

tion project in India's Narmada Valley will primarily benefit a small number of wealthy farmers, while the burdens—flooding of villages and arable land, decimation of local fisheries, and loss of ancestral land and cultural monuments—will fall on hundreds of thousands of poorer peasants.

Because it is the weakest and poorest countries that most readily succumb to environmental challenges, it is tempting to conclude that only marginal areas around the globe will be affected, not the regions of "strategic" importance to the United States. This is likely to be a miscalculation. Let us again look at China. Eleven of China's interior provinces, collectively home to a third of the country's population, are faced with severe water shortages and soil erosion. Soil degradation and outright loss of cropland are putting increasing strain on China's agriculture. If China were to become a major grain importer in coming years and decades, it surely would drive up world food prices and affect other grain importers, many of which might not be able to afford a higher import bill. China is also facing rising internal disputes over water sharing. Large-scale river-diversion projects could trigger major interprovincial conflict and pose challenges to the central government. For instance, a planned diversion of the Huang He (Yellow River) would benefit Shanxi Province (which is struggling with chronic and severe water shortages) but potentially cripple northern Henan and northwestern Shandong Provinces during the dry season.

On the whole, environmentally induced conflict appears to be far more likely within than between nations (although the repercussions of internal conflicts

can, of course, be felt beyond the borders of the affected country). Water is one of the issues around which substantial transboundary conflicts exist—for example, among the countries sharing the waters of the Nile (Egypt, Sudan, Ethiopia), the Euphrates (Turkey, Syria, Iraq), the Jordan and Litani (Israel, Jordan, Syria), the Ganges (India, Bangladesh—between whom at least temporary agreement has been reached), the Mekong (Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, Vietnam, China), and the West Bank aquifers (Israel and the Palestinians).

There are three ways in which environmental breakdown may be of concern to the United States. One regards the political repercussions of environmental change: conflict that is at least in part fueled by environmental change and may destabilize a given country or region. This encompasses scenarios that do not differ substantially from the kinds of conflicts that we are familiar with today.

The second concerns people who have been referred to as “environmental refugees.” Water scarcity, soil erosion, desertification, and other environmental calamities are now contributing to the uprooting of large numbers, though reliable (or even simply uncontroversial) estimates do not exist. The influx of people into another region or country can impose a considerable burden in terms of increased competition for land, water, jobs, communal facilities, and social services. This is especially the case if the host country’s economy is already stagnant or in decline, or if the influx is sudden and massive. Although population movements do not inevitably cause conflict, the potential for trouble is present. This is particularly the case where political leaders or challengers are eager to stir up antifoigner sentiments.

The third concerns the impact of environmental change itself. The gathering threat of climate change is probably the best illustration. If extensive climate change becomes manifest, no individual country or society—no matter how rich or militarily powerful—will be able to shield itself from the consequences. Because China relies heavily on coal (the most carbon intensive of the fossil fuels) to sustain economic growth, its share of worldwide CO₂ emissions has risen dramatically. As climate change is transformed into a reality rather than a prediction, the pushing and shoving among nations over who is to blame for the calamity will rise to a fever pitch. Already, commentary in the United States is indulging in finger-pointing, singling out China as a culprit. Clearly, if China does not move away from a coal-dominated energy system, it will aggravate the likelihood that climate change will wreak major havoc. But it is the United States and other Western nations that have, over the course of the last century, pumped the bulk of carbon into the atmosphere and who are therefore, in a sense, primarily responsible. It is possible that in a warming world, accusations and counteraccusations will contribute to a rise in political tensions.

So the questions arise: What policies are required for the security of the environment? How do we influence nations who are damaging the world environment? What must be deterred? The last question may point to a dead end, however; no conceivable military strategies are appropriate for addressing environmental threats. Entire economic structures cannot be changed at gunpoint.

Although a whole new field of inquiry—"environmental security"—has emerged, it is worth stressing that environmental change is hardly ever consciously employed as a "weapon" by one state against another. The burning of the Kuwaiti oil fields by Iraq and the defoliation of Vietnamese jungles by the United States are examples of environmental destruction for military or other hostile purposes, but the preponderance of environmental change arises as the result of the ordinary working of economies, day after day. Just as the Chinese are not burning coal in their power plants in order to inundate coastal areas of the United States, Americans are not driving their cars in order to cause more powerful storm surges in India or more severe droughts in Africa. Therefore, and even though environmental change can become a "security threat," military responses are inappropriate.

Globalization

What prospects does globalization hold for matters of peace and security? As national economies become more and more integrated and as economic interests coincide less and less with national boundaries, will there still be a major role for national armed forces? It is tempting to conclude that increasing interdependence will of necessity lead to new cooperation and that armed forces will become superfluous. This expectation is reinforced by the dawning recognition that individual nations are unable to cope on their own with such global challenges as climate change and other transboundary forms of environmental degradation.

Can economic integration, then, be an antidote to violent conflict? This seems to be a premise of many advocates of economic globalization. In fact, globalization's challenge to traditional notions of territorial-based security may over time make military-centered concepts of security less relevant—but such an outcome is by no means guaranteed. There is, indeed, danger in expecting that the erosion of economic borders will inevitably lead to political integration far beyond national boundaries and to the melting away of remaining enmities. Economic integration may be an effective antidote to warfare between industrially advanced states that are close to the commanding heights of the world economic system (and are therefore most likely to benefit from it), but far less so for those who are at its periphery.

Because it deeply affects the prospects for social and economic development, the process of globalization too carries the potential for tension and conflict.

The benefits and burdens of globalization are distributed in spectacularly uneven fashion, heightening disparities between and within nations. Because it entails severe dislocation and social pain, and because it is experienced as a challenge to local control and democratic accountability, economic globalization tears at the very fabric of many societies.

POLICY CHALLENGES AND OPTIONS

The Cold War may be over, but it has left a deadly legacy. East-West geopolitics ascribed strategic value to certain parts of the developing world, mostly for reasons of resource endowment or geographic location; the industrialized countries accordingly intervened in a variety of ways, arming their protégés to the teeth. Once this confrontation ended, the significance of many once-indispensable allies vanished. “Hot” Cold War battlegrounds like Afghanistan, the Horn of Africa, or Central America, abruptly abandoned, reverted to backwater status.

What remains are the weapons that were so liberally spread around the planet by both superpowers and their allies. Together with pervasive cultures of violence and stunted political systems, the surfeit of weapons makes for fertile ground for violent and authoritarian responses to unresolved problems—including the social and environmental challenges discussed earlier. Of particular concern are small arms—weapons that are cheap, require no organizational or training infrastructures for maintenance and operation, can be used even by children, can be easily transported and smuggled, and are rugged enough to have a long life. No precise figures exist, but it is believed that there are currently some five hundred million small arms in worldwide circulation, including more than a hundred million assault rifles.⁸

Michael Klare, director of the Five College Program in Peace and World Security Studies in Amherst, Massachusetts, argues that “the abundance of arms at every level of society means that any increase in intercommunal tensions and hostility will entail an increased likelihood of armed violence and bloodshed.”⁹ The dispersal of arms to private armies and militias, insurgent groups, criminal organizations, and other nonstate actors feeds in many societies a cycle of political, communal, and criminal violence that in turn causes even greater demand for guns.

Nonproliferation and the Universality of Disarmament Norms

All this undercuts a frequent assumption of contemporary security analysis in this country: that the possession of unrivaled weapons technology and power-projection capabilities is a key advantage for the United States, and by extension that if there is no U.S. military response to a particular crisis or development, there will be no response at all. But in the post-Cold War era, military-technological superiority is of far less utility than when the United

States was still locked in competition with the Soviet Union. Given the enormous proliferation of weaponry of almost all kinds and calibers, and the strong likelihood that any given advanced arms technology will eventually spread to other countries, a strong argument can be made that the United States has a key interest in establishing internationally accepted and effective norms and standards to curb the production, possession, and trade of arms; there are few such restraints today.

It has been U.S. policy for several years to pursue “nonproliferation.” This approach is designed to deny access to advanced weapons and military technology

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to any state except the United States and a few close allies—a glorified military apartheid system. While nobody can argue that a deliberate proliferation policy would make the world any safer, it is unlikely that a narrow nonproliferation strategy

will prove workable. No country that felt itself under a severe threat would acquiesce to it. Any realistic policy of armament restraint would have to accept the principle of universality and apply to all states equally. That would seem, from the U.S. viewpoint, tantamount to adopting a policy detrimental to one’s interests. However, in today’s world, one’s own security is typically enhanced by making others feel secure as well.

There are additional nontraditional, multilateral security policies that may yield greater benefits than unilateral ones. They include cooperative international policies, improved early conflict recognition and conflict prevention, and strengthened international institutions and norms. Unfortunately, such goals have in recent years been neglected, even undermined.

It is interesting, however, to contrast current U.S. policy with its stance in the aftermath of World War II. Back then, the United States played a central role in creating the United Nations and other multilateral institutions. Today, when at last there is no superpower competition to thwart the effectiveness of the UN, the United States has abandoned multilateralism and is instead pursuing a policy of exceptionalism. That is, the United States would like to see other powers respect existing rules, norms, and constraints but does not wish to be bound by them itself. In fact, the other major powers do not either, failing, like the United States, to see the value of creating multilateral institutions that support their interests without draining their resources. They, like this country, frequently see international treaties and norms as eroding national power. A different view would suggest that though the United States, by strengthening rules and norms that make the use of force by any state less likely, might “lose” the ability to

exercise its military power in unrestrained fashion, it would also lose the need to do so.

Exceptionalism, however, has led the administration and Congress to block progress on emerging international norms. When the majority of nations decided to ban antipersonnel land mines, the Clinton administration refused to sign; when the United Nations drafted an agreement to outlaw the recruiting by armies of children age seventeen or younger, the United States objected; when the statute for a new International Criminal Court was drawn up in Rome in 1998, the U.S. delegation was one of a handful that voted against it.¹⁰ Meanwhile, Congress has brought the United Nations to the brink of financial insolvency by withholding legally owed contributions. Face-to-face discussions between representatives of the UN Security Council and the Congress hold some promise that the issue of U.S. financial arrears will be resolved, but a true breakthrough has yet to occur.

Institution Building and Conflict Prevention

It is imperative that the world community put far greater emphasis on preventing violent conflict—not only because conflicts are hard to resolve once they start (witness Bosnia and Kosovo and the major, long-term U.S. commitment required by these interventions) but also because the United States and other powers will naturally be selective about which conflicts they get involved in, hence allowing savage tragedies like Rwanda, Angola, or Sudan to go on indefinitely.

Much could be accomplished by building a conflict-early-warning network, establishing permanent dispute-arbitration centers in every region of the world, putting more weight behind preventive diplomacy, and establishing a corps of skilled and experienced people to serve as roving mediators on behalf of the international community.¹¹ Conflict prevention is not an exact science, to be sure; it more resembles a trial-and-error process. On one hand, there will be cases when warnings of impending violence turn out to be false alarms. On the other hand, though, the international community would do well to build some redundancy into the conflict-prevention apparatus, so that a variety of efforts can be launched to ward off mass violence. Preventing the eruption of disputes into full-scale hostilities is by no means an easy task, yet its difficulties pale beside those of ending fighting once large-scale bloodshed has occurred.

Of course, conflict prevention through mediation will not always work; additional tools are needed. In particular, peacekeeping missions will need to be re-fashioned so as to fulfill the true meaning of the word “peacekeeping,” instead of being last-minute fire brigades. In the course of the last few years, we have come to associate peacekeeping with futility—too few people equipped too poorly and dispatched too late, unable to keep a peace that scarcely exists. What is

needed is a well trained, permanent force maintained under UN auspices for preventive deployments. It would be dispatched in response to clear signs of imminent violence, either along national borders or even within countries. Such an intervention would not be an end in itself but rather an attempt to provide space for mediation efforts.

Currently, U.S. policy is to constrict the UN's capability to engage in successful peacekeeping and to limit the involvement of American personnel in United Nations missions. It is time to chart a new course, to signal to the rest of the world that this nation is serious about multilateral peacekeeping and conflict prevention.

NOTES

1. Margareta Sollenberg, ed., *States in Armed Conflict 1998*, Report 54 (Uppsala, Sweden: Uppsala Univ., Department of Peace and Conflict Research, 1999).
2. Project Ploughshares, *Armed Conflicts Report '99* (Waterloo, Ont.: Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, Summer 1999).
3. Paul Kennedy, Robert S. Chase, and Emily B. Hill, "Pivotal States and U.S. Strategy," *Foreign Affairs*, January–February 1996.
4. This is discussed at length in my book *Fighting for Survival: Environmental Decline, Social Conflict, and the New Age of Insecurity* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1996).
5. United Nations Development Programme, *Human Development Report*, various editions (New York: Oxford Univ. Press).
6. The literature on the links between environment and conflict has grown rapidly in recent years. See, for instance, the author's *Fighting for Survival*; Thomas Homer-Dixon and Jessica Blitt, eds., *Ecoviolence: Links among Environment, Population, and Security* (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1998); Donald Kennedy et al., *Environmental Quality and Regional Conflict: A Report to the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict* (Washington, D.C.: 1998); and Alexander Carius and Kurt M. Lietzmann, eds., *Environmental Change and Security* (Berlin: Springer, 1999). See also the occasional reports published by the Environmental Change and Security Project of the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington, D.C.
7. See the Worldwatch Institute's two annual publications, *State of the World* and *Vital Signs* (both published by W. W. Norton in New York), for example.
8. For more detail, see the author's *Small Arms, Big Impact: The Next Challenge of Disarmament*, Worldwatch Paper 137 (Washington, D.C.: October 1997).
9. Michael T. Klare, "Light Weapons Diffusion and Global Violence in the Post-Cold War Era," in *Light Weapons and International Security*, ed. Jasjit Singh (Delhi: Indian Pugwash Society and British-American Security Information Council, December 1995).
10. See Michael N. Schmitt and Peter J. Richards, "Into Uncharted Waters: The International Criminal Court," *Naval War College Review*, Winter 2000, pp. 93–136.
11. I have discussed these proposals at greater length in *Ending Violent Conflict*, Worldwatch Paper 146 (Washington, D.C.: April 1996).