




U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE  
— Est. 1884 —  
NEWPORT, RHODE ISLAND

## Joint Professional Military Education Phase I Intermediate Level Course

College of Naval Command and Staff and Naval Staff College

# STRATEGY AND WAR

November 2016–February 2017 Syllabus



**S & P**  
STRATEGY AND POLICY  
DEPARTMENT

**STRATEGY AND POLICY DEPARTMENT  
NAVAL WAR COLLEGE  
Newport, Rhode Island**

**FOREWORD**

This syllabus for the Strategy and War Course for the College of Naval Command and Staff and Naval Staff College, November 2016–February 2017 provides both an overview and lesson-by-lesson, detailed description to assist students in their reading and preparation for seminar. Administrative information is also included.

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## STRATEGY AND WAR COURSE DESCRIPTION

### Course Objectives and Content

The Strategy and War Course addresses Intermediate-Level College Joint Learning Areas and Objectives for Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) established by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff via the Officer Professional Military Education Policy (OPMEP), CJCSI 1800.01E, signed 29 May 2015. Apart from meeting OPMEP objectives, the Strategy and War Course addresses additional areas of emphasis put forward in the United States Navy's guidance on Professional Military Education, the intent articulated by the President of the Naval War College, and strategic challenges highlighted by the Department of Defense. Lastly, the course reflects the experience and judgment of the Naval War College faculty and assessments offered by the students.

In the waning days of the Vietnam War, Admiral Stansfield Turner served as President of the Naval War College. He saw a glaring need to revolutionize the Naval War College curriculum. Rather than training officers, Turner sought to develop a curriculum that would educate leaders. Admiral Turner argued,

If you attempt to make this a prep school for your next duty assignment, you will have missed the purpose of being here. If we trained you for a particular assignment or type of duty, the value of this college would be short-lived. We want to educate you to be capable of doing well in a multitude of future duties.... Your objective here should be to improve your reasoning, logic, and analysis.<sup>1</sup>

The Strategy and War Course embodies Turner's mission to place education over training by obliging students to grapple with the complex interrelationship among policy, strategy, and operations to lift the students' perspective above the level of tactics while also sharpening critical thinking concerning joint matters. The Strategy and War Course utilizes a case study approach integrating a diverse array of academic disciplines, including history, economics, political science, and security studies, to assess both historical and contemporary conflicts. This methodology exposes students to a tapestry of historical case studies in which senior policy and military leaders, as well as staff planners, encounter and mitigate persistent undercurrents of tension between policy, military strategy, and operational outcomes. This will enable students to understand more fully the complex relationship among national resources, military objectives, and national security policy.

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<sup>1</sup> Vice Admiral Stansfield Turner, "Challenge: A New Approach to Professional Education," *Naval War College Review* 25, no. 2 (November-December 1972): 6.

The course stresses the crucial importance of multinational cooperation while integrating all elements of national power. Moreover, it instills in students the ability and awareness to perform comprehensive assessments at all stages in a conflict, and to communicate such assessments with clarity and precision. Finally, the course drives students to think critically—beginning in the planning phase of operations—about desired end-states, war termination, and post-conflict transitions.

After examining past conflicts in a disciplined way, students are better equipped to grasp the values of the profession of arms as espoused by the U.S. armed forces. Students comprehend more fully the capacity of U.S. military forces to conduct the full range of operations in pursuit of national interests. Moreover, students better understand why and how the U.S. military establishment is organized to plan, execute, and sustain joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational operations.

In war, of course, the enemy always seeks to stymie the best-laid plans while imposing high risks and costs. The Strategy and War Course emphasizes that a war's outcome is contingent upon the actions taken by those engaged in the conflict. Skillful adversaries seek to exploit strategic vulnerabilities and operational missteps. Skillful adversaries also seek to employ surprise, denial, and deception to their advantage. Furthermore, an enemy's capabilities might prove difficult to overcome. Asymmetric strategies and capabilities can create an operational environment that precludes decisive outcomes. Adept strategists and operational planners understand that the enemy's determination and actions help decide the war's outcome. This course amply illustrates the truism: "the enemy has a vote."

Critical strategic thinking serves as the hallmark of the Strategy and War Course. Admiral James Stavridis, former Supreme Allied Commander Europe and current Dean of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, observes:

The armed forces have always needed independent-minded officers who dare to read, think, write, and publish the innovative ideas that can change the course of history. Now, as America enters an era of international flux and budgetary stress reminiscent of the interwar years, the services need skilled, outspoken strategic thinkers more than ever.<sup>2</sup>

We achieve this goal through graduate-level interdisciplinary seminars employing a unique methodology built upon two core components: the study of foundational theories of war and the close analysis of historical and contemporary case studies.

The written works of prominent strategic thinkers—notably Carl von Clausewitz, Sun Tzu, Mao Tse-tung, Thucydides, Alfred Thayer Mahan, and Sir Julian Corbett—provide analytical frameworks that students use to understand the interrelationship

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<sup>2</sup> Admiral James Stavridis, (U.S. Navy, ret.), e-mail communication with Professor James Holmes, June 22, 2016.

between strategy and operations. The influence of these classic works on current strategic thought cannot be denied. Reflecting on his education, General Colin Powell wrote, “Clausewitz was an awakening for me. His *On War*, written 106 years before I was born, was like a beam of light from the past, still illuminating present-day military quandaries.”<sup>3</sup>

The case studies provide a means to evaluate and discuss how strategic planners and military leaders in real world circumstances have successfully—or unsuccessfully—addressed the problems associated with using force to attain national objectives. The historical case studies provide an opportunity to examine three distinct types of war, or “boxes of war.” The first box comprises major, protracted wars fought between coalitions in multiple theaters for high stakes. The second box refers to regional wars fought within single theaters, typically for shorter times and often for lesser stakes. The third box comprises insurgencies fought within single countries, against failing, emerging, or well-established states.

We study multiple cases involving each box of war. In several cases, these three types of war overlap, resulting in “wars within wars.” During the Vietnam War, for example, there was an insurgency in South Vietnam, overlaid by a regional war between the United States and North Vietnam, all within the context of a global Cold War. In-depth analysis of wide-ranging case studies involving the use of force prepares students to think not only about current strategic and operational problems but also those they might face in the future.

To prepare future operational and strategic leaders, students in the Strategy and War Course analyze the leadership and actions of some of history’s most famous admirals and generals. Studying these historic figures provides insight into recurrent problems confronting senior leaders and planners as they craft strategies for carrying out wartime operations. However, the need for skilled leadership extends beyond senior military leaders. Their staffs—not to mention coalition and interagency partners—must be prepared in intellect, temperament, and doctrine to undertake different types of operations, assess and fight a diverse array of enemies, and make transitions between phases of war as well as between war and its aftermath. Leaders and planners must overcome uncertainty and friction that hinder the execution of operations. Finally, successful leadership at the strategic and operational levels of war requires an understanding of the dynamic interaction between politics, strategies, and operational realities. Concepts for command and control of operations—such as mission command—will be examined against the realities of wartime experience. Students will come to understand how to receive and interpret the commander’s intent and then operate with limited oversight to achieve strategic effects.

“Looking forward, it is clear that the challenges the Navy faces are shifting in character, are increasingly difficult to address in isolation, and are changing more quickly. This will require us to reexamine our approaches in every aspect of our

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<sup>3</sup> Colin Powell with Joseph E. Persico, *My American Journey* (New York: Random House, 1995), 207.

operations,” according to Admiral John M. Richardson, Chief of Naval Operations. It is of the utmost importance to educate joint warfighters capable of levelheaded strategic and critical analysis. The goal of the Strategy and War Course is to provide such an education through historical and contemporary case studies as well as foundational theories of war to expose the complex relationship between political objectives and the ends, ways, and means of strategy. As Admiral Richardson notes, “The nature of war has always been, and will remain, a violent human contest between thinking and adapting adversaries for political gain. Given this fundamental truth, the lessons of the masters—Thucydides, Clausewitz, Sun Tzu, Mao, Corbett, and, yes, Mahan—still apply.”<sup>4</sup>

## **Student Outcomes**

The Naval War College has developed Intermediate-Level Professional Military Education Outcomes. These outcomes, developed in synchronization with the Joint Learning Areas and Objectives set forth in the OPMEP, represent the Naval War College’s expectations for those who successfully complete the College of Naval Command and Staff and Naval Staff College at the Naval War College. The outcomes applicable to the Strategy and War Course are listed below and are followed by bulleted points to explain how the Strategy and War Course supports them.

### Capable of Critical Thought with Operational Perspectives

- Empowered with analytical frameworks to support policy and strategy decision-making
- Master the meaning of a wide range of classic and contemporary conceptual frameworks for relating the operational and strategic levels of war
- Aware of critical thinking and decision-making by real world, strategic leaders and their staffs
- Competent in operational level problem solving, creative thinking, and risk management

### Skilled in Applying Operational Art to Maritime, Joint, Interagency, and Multinational Warfighting

- Aware of maritime, joint, interagency, and multinational operations and their strategic effects
- Skilled in applying sea power to achieve operational and strategic effects across a wide range of conflicts
- Capable of integrating operational capabilities with other instruments of national power to achieve enduring strategic effects
- Understand challenges in accomplishing interagency and multinational coordination

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<sup>4</sup> Admiral John Richardson, *A Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority*, Version 1 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Navy, January 2016), 4.

### Prepared for Operational Level Leadership Challenges

- Able to think strategically about all types of wars and strategic actors
- Skilled in evaluating alternative strategic and operational courses of action
- Enhanced cultural awareness of critical geostrategic regions
- Skilled in persuasive leadership by practicing the craft of writing clearly and speaking articulately about operations, strategy, and policy objectives
- Understand the importance of strategic communication in reaching multiple audiences

### Effective Maritime Spokespersons

- Understand classic works on sea power and maritime strategy
- Steeped in the maritime dimensions of warfare
- Understand warfare at sea—past, present, and future
- Conversant in full range of naval capabilities
- Skilled in applying naval perspective through use of analytical frameworks
- Aware of naval operations and their strategic effects

### Course Themes

<p style="text-align: center;"><b>STRATEGY AND WAR COURSE THEMES</b></p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>MATCHING STRATEGY AND OPERATIONS THE PROCESS</b></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"><li><b>1. THE INTERRELATIONSHIP OF POLICY, STRATEGY, AND OPERATIONS</b></li><li><b>2. INTELLIGENCE, ASSESSMENT, AND PLANS</b></li><li><b>3. THE INSTRUMENTS OF WAR</b></li><li><b>4. THE DESIGN, EXECUTION, AND EFFECTS OF OPERATIONS</b></li><li><b>5. INTERACTION, ADAPTATION, AND REASSESSMENT</b></li><li><b>6. WAR TERMINATION</b></li></ol> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>MATCHING STRATEGY AND OPERATIONS THE ENVIRONMENT</b></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"><li><b>7. THE MULTINATIONAL ARENA</b></li><li><b>8. THE INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT</b></li><li><b>9. CULTURES AND SOCIETY</b></li></ol>
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The Strategy and Policy Department has developed nine interrelated themes for use in the Strategy and War Course. These themes are neither a checklist of prescriptions nor a set of “school solutions,” or conventional wisdom, for the conduct of war can never be reduced to a formula. Rather, they are sets of questions designed to provoke thought and discussion. They will be used throughout the course because they are of great importance for understanding the reasons for military effectiveness and ineffectiveness in contemporary war. The themes are not designed to provide answers. Rather, they provide overarching context for analysis and decision-making. These themes are a starting point for undertaking critical, strategic thinking and fall into two broad categories: those dealing with the process of matching strategy and operations and those concerning the environment in which that process takes place.

## **MATCHING STRATEGY AND OPERATIONS THE PROCESS**

### **1. THE INTERRELATIONSHIP OF POLICY, STRATEGY, AND OPERATIONS**

Did the belligerents clearly understand and spell out their political objectives? How much did each participant in the conflict value its political objectives? Did political and military leaders use the value of the political object to determine the magnitude and duration of the effort, and to rethink the effort if it became too expensive? Did political and military leaders anticipate and manage the conflict’s likely costs and risks? Were the benefits and rewards of war worth the likely costs and risks?

Did the political leadership provide the military with quality strategic guidance? Did such guidance restrict how force could be used, and, if so, with what impact on the chances for success? Did the belligerents adopt military strategies that supported their policies? What was the relationship between each belligerent’s political and military objectives? What assumptions did both statesmen and military leaders make about how achieving military objectives would contribute to attaining political objectives?

How did each belligerent think the principal campaigns and major operations it undertook would support its strategy and ultimately its policy? To what extent did campaigns and major operations actually support the strategies of each belligerent? Did the political and military leaders think carefully in advance about how the other side would respond militarily and politically?

### **2. INTELLIGENCE, ASSESSMENT, AND PLANS**

How reliable, complete, and accurately interpreted was the intelligence collected before and during the war? Was a serious effort made to analyze the lessons of previous wars, and, if so, how did it affect planning for the war at the strategic and operational

levels? How successful were each belligerent's efforts to shape enemy perceptions of its capabilities and intentions?

How accurately did civilian and military leaders foresee the nature of the war on which they were embarking? How well did each belligerent know itself, its allies and partners, its enemy, and third parties capable of affecting the outcome? Did each belligerent consider the possibility that the enemy might act unpredictably or less than rationally, resort to asymmetric warfare, or use weapons of mass destruction if they existed?

Did each belligerent utilize a formal, flexible, and thorough planning process? Did it include allies in that process, and, if so, with what results? Did the plans correctly identify the enemy's center or centers of gravity and critical vulnerabilities? Were the strategic and operational plans informed by a sound grasp of the relationship between political ends and military means? To what extent did the plans rely upon deception, surprise, and psychological operations? Did planning adequately allow for the fog, friction, uncertainty, and chance of war? What assumptions, if any, did planners make about how other instruments of power—diplomatic, informational, and economic—could help achieve the political objectives? Did the initial plans consider how and when the war would be terminated and what the requirements of the anticipated postwar settlement would be?

### **3. THE INSTRUMENTS OF WAR**

Did political and military leaders understand the strategic and operational capabilities, effects, and limitations of the different forms of military power at their disposal? Did military leaders properly take into account operational, logistical, or other physical constraints on the deployment and employment of available instruments of war?

Did the military leadership understand how to integrate the different forms of power at its disposal for maximum operational and strategic effectiveness? Did those in command of the different instruments of war share common assumptions about how the use of force would translate into the fulfillment of political objectives? What limitations prevented one side or the other from achieving optimal integration of different forms of military power?

How well did the belligerents exploit opportunities created by technological innovation? Did a belligerent successfully turn asymmetries in technology to strategic advantage? Was there a revolution in military affairs (RMA) prior to or during the war, and, if so, did its tactical and operational consequences produce lasting strategic results? Did any military or political disadvantages result from technological innovation?

#### **4. THE DESIGN, EXECUTION, AND EFFECTS OF OPERATIONS**

Was each belligerent's operational design informed by a lucid and coherent vision of the desired end-state, an accurate net assessment, and a healthy understanding of political and military risk? Did each belligerent concentrate effort against the enemy's centers of gravity while protecting its own? Did the operational design synchronize, sequence, and phase operations for maximum strategic effect, and did it aim at producing chiefly kinetic or chiefly psychological effects? Did the design of operations try to deceive or surprise while anticipating a wide range of possible enemy responses and countermeasures?

Did operational leaders keep the ultimate strategic and political purposes clearly and constantly in view while prosecuting operations? How coherent, agile, and effective was each belligerent's system of command and control, and did the execution of operations unfold according to the commander's intent? To what extent were operations joint and combined in execution? Did operational leaders exploit promising opportunities, parry or counter unexpected enemy operations, or control the tempo of the war? Did either side try to delay a decision, and why? Did either side—or both—make a transition from offense to defense or from defense to offense? Did operations receive the logistical support necessary for success?

How did campaigns and operations affect the enemy's material capabilities, command structure, and will to fight? Did the mix of operations undertaken maximize the campaign's strategic effects, and did operational leaders foresee and try to bring about these effects or benefit from good fortune or enemy missteps? How important were joint and combined operations to the outcome of the campaign? Did a belligerent rely too much on military force?

#### **5. INTERACTION, ADAPTATION, AND REASSESSMENT**

How accurately did the belligerents foresee the consequences of interaction with their enemies? Did unexpected enemy action disrupt prewar strategic plans? How did interaction with the enemy affect the nature (and perceptions of the nature) of the war? Was interaction among the belligerents asymmetric, and, if so, in what sense and with what consequences? Was one side able to make its adversary fight on its own preferred terms? If not, how well did strategists and commanders adapt to enemy actions? How skillfully did a belligerent react to enemy operations and adjust to the fog and friction of war?

If a belligerent chose to open a new theater of war, did this signify a new policy objective, a new strategy, an extension of previous operations, a response to failure or stalemate in the original theater, or an effort to seize a previously unanticipated opportunity created by the course of the war? Did it make operational and strategic sense to open the new theater, and, if so, did the belligerent open it at the correct time? Was the environment of the new theater favorable to operational success? How did the new

theater influence the larger war? What role did maritime power play in opening the theater, supporting operations there, and closing the theater?

Did the outcome of key operations induce the belligerents to adjust or radically change their strategic and political goals? If an additional state or party intervened in the conflict, did the intervention force either side to reshape its policy or strategy, and, if so, how? If there were changes in policy or strategy, were they based on a rational and timely reassessment of the relationship between the political objectives and the military means available?

## **6. WAR TERMINATION**

Did either belligerent squander realistic opportunities to bring about a successful end to the war? If a belligerent was committed to removing an enemy's political leadership from power, did that commitment result in a longer war or heavier casualties? If negotiations began before the end of formal hostilities, how well did each side's operations support its diplomacy?

Did the winning side carefully consider how far to go militarily to end the war? Did either side overstep the culminating point of victory in an attempt to maintain military pressure on its adversary? Alternatively, did the winning side fail to go far enough militarily to give the political result of the war a reasonable chance to endure? Did the victors carefully consider what to demand from the enemy to fulfill their political objectives? How and why did the losing side stop fighting? Was there a truce, and if so, to what extent did the terms of the truce shape the postwar settlement? Did the postwar settlement meet the political objectives of the victors? Did the concluding operations of the war leave the victors in a strong position to enforce the peace?

To what extent did the postwar settlement's stability or instability stem from the nature of the settlement itself? To what extent did civil-military relations on either side contribute to the stability or instability of the settlement? Did the nature of the war affect the durability of the settlement? Did the victors maintain their strength and will to enforce the peace?

## **MATCHING STRATEGY AND OPERATIONS THE ENVIRONMENT**

### **7. THE MULTINATIONAL ARENA**

Did political and military leaders seize opportunities to isolate their adversaries from potential allies? If so, how successful were these efforts, and why? Did the belligerents attempt to create coalitions? If so, what common interests, policies, or other factors unified the coalition partners? Did coalition partners coordinate strategy and

operations effectively while sharing the burdens of war, and what were the consequences if not? How freely did coalition members share information, intelligence, and material resources?

Did the coalition's strategies and operations solidify the coalition or split it apart? To what extent did coalition partners support, restrain, or control one another? If a coalition disintegrated, was its demise the result of internal stress, external pressure, or a combination of both? Did coalition dynamics work for or against efforts to match operations to strategy, and strategy to policy? How did the action or inaction of allies contribute to operational success or failure? What impact did coalition dynamics have on the process of war termination? Did the winning coalition endure past the end of the war?

## **8. THE INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT**

How were each belligerent's military forces organized? How well did that system of organization facilitate planning, executing, and training for joint and combined operations? Did a regular process exist to coordinate the use of military power with the employment of other instruments of national power to attain political objectives? If so, how effective was that process? How might it have been improved? How well did military and civil agencies share information and coordinate activities?

If there was rivalry among the military services, how did it affect the design and execution of operations and strategy? Were the relations among military and political leaders functional or dysfunctional and what were the consequences? How did any lack of clarity or constancy in the political aims affect the wartime civil-military relationship? How did the political and military leadership respond if the military could not achieve the objective? Were there excessive political restraints on the use of force?

How did military leaders respond if political leaders insisted on operations that promised significant political gain but at a hefty military cost? How did the civilian leadership react if military leaders proposed operations that promised significant military rewards but at significant political risk? How attuned were military leaders to the need to manage risk?

## **9. CULTURES AND SOCIETIES**

How did the belligerents' cultures, ideologies, values, social arrangements, and political systems influence the design and execution of operations and strategies? Did a belligerent possess a discernible "strategic culture," or way of war? If so, did adversaries exploit these factors? If the war was an ideological struggle either in whole or in part, how did this ideology affect the war's course and its outcome? If the war involved a struggle for mass political allegiance, did culture or values give either belligerent a clear advantage?

Was the relationship among a belligerent's government, people, and military able to withstand the shock of battlefield reverses or the strain of protracted war? If the war was protracted, how successful was the victorious side at weakening its adversary from within? Were information operations conducted, and were they founded on a solid grasp of the psychology and culture of the target audience? Did each belligerent's military strategy deliver sufficient incremental dividends—periodic successes or tokens of success—to maintain popular support for the war? Alternatively, did the strategy and operations diminish domestic support for the war?

Did belligerents attempt to mobilize and manage public opinion, and, if so, with what success? Did the passions or indifference of the people affect the development and maintenance of an effective policy-strategy match?

### **Course Process and Standards**

**1. Methodology.** Each case study will be examined in-depth through a combination of faculty presentations, readings, tutorials, student essays, and seminars.

**2. Seminar Assignments.** Each student has been assigned to a seminar for the duration of the course. Each of these seminars will be led by a faculty team composed of a military officer and a civilian academic.

**3. Presentations.** Students will attend faculty presentations relating to each case study. These presentations enhance knowledge of the case study, provide insight into difficult strategic problems, and stimulate discussion and learning in seminar. At the conclusion of each presentation, the speaker will address questions about the presentation from the audience. This question and answer period is considered an integral part of the presentation. Students are encouraged to avail themselves of this opportunity so that others in the audience may benefit from the question and the speaker's response.

**4. Readings.** Before seminar, students are expected to have read the books and articles assigned for that week's topic, as well as the student essays prepared for that week. These readings are the only assigned texts for the course. They are the only readings required for seminar preparation, for the writing of essays, and for the taking of the final examination. Books must be returned to the Publication Issue Room immediately upon completing the requirements for the course.

**5. Course Requirements.** In addition to attending presentations, completing the assigned readings, and contributing actively in seminar discussions, students will write three essays: two seminar essays and one final examination. In computing the final grade, the following percentages will be used:

**Essays—25 percent for each of two essays**

**Final Examination—25 percent**

## **Seminar Preparation and Contribution—25 percent**

A final course grade of B- or above is required for an award of a master's degree. Grading will be in accordance with [Chapter III, Section 7 of the 2013 U.S. Naval War College Faculty Handbook](#).

**6. Seminar Essays.** Each student will submit two essays of no more than ten double-spaced typewritten pages (Times New Roman, 12-point font) on questions listed in the syllabus. For matters relating to the format for documentation and bibliography, students should consult [The Chicago Manual of Style](#). The seminar moderators will assign students their two essay questions at the beginning of the term. In the preparation of essays, students will find all of the information required to answer the questions in the readings assigned for each case study. Students shall not consult any reading outside of those provided without procuring written permission from their moderators.

Students will submit a copy of the completed essay to each moderator no later than 0830 on the day before the seminar meets. Essays that are submitted late without the permission of the moderators will receive severe deductions. Please see the section titled "Grading Standards for Written Work" for a more complete explanation of penalties for late work. In addition to submitting a copy of the essay to the moderators, the student will distribute a copy of the essay to each member of the seminar, as the papers are a part of the assigned readings for the week. Students must read the essays prepared by their seminar colleagues before the seminar meets.

The essay offers an opportunity to undertake a strategic analysis of issues where the information available is substantial. A good essay is an analytical "think piece" in which the author presents a thesis supported by arguments based on the information available in the assigned reading. A good essay will demonstrate five elements: it answers the question asked; it has a thesis; it marshals evidence to support that thesis; it considers, explicitly or implicitly, counterarguments to or weaknesses in the thesis and supporting evidence; and it does the above in a clear and well-organized fashion.

These five elements serve as the foundation for a grading rubric that articulates the expectations for the essay, sets base criteria for grading, clarifies the standards for a quality performance, and guides feedback about progress toward those standards. The ability to compose a succinct thesis, to marshal the evidence to prove it, and to address the most important counterarguments to that thesis are, taken together, the hallmark of analytical thinking that allows students to communicate ideas with clarity and precision.

**7. Final Examination.** Students will take a final examination at the end of the term. This examination will cover the work of the entire course.

**8. Grading Standards for Written Work.** All written work in the Strategy and War Course will be graded according to the following standards:

**A+ (97-100):** Offers a genuinely new understanding of the subject. Thesis is definitive and exceptionally well-supported, while counterarguments are addressed completely. Essay indicates brilliance.

**A (94-96):** Work of superior quality that demonstrates a high degree of original, critical thought. Thesis is clearly articulated and focused, evidence is significant, consideration of arguments and counterargument is comprehensive, and essay is very well-written.

**A- (90-93):** A well-written, insightful essay that is above the average expected of graduate work. Thesis is clearly defined, evidence is relevant and purposeful, arguments and counterargument are presented effectively.

**B+ (87-89):** A well-executed essay that meets all five standards of a seminar essay as outlined above. A solid effort in which a thesis is articulated, the treatment of supporting evidence and counterargument has strong points, and the answer is well-presented and well-constructed.

**B (84-86):** An essay that is a successful consideration of the topic and demonstrates average graduate performance. Thesis is stated and supported, counterarguments considered, and the essay is clear and organized.

**B- (80-83):** Slightly below the average graduate-level performance. Thesis is presented, but the evidence does not fully support it. The analysis and counterarguments are not fully developed and the essay may have structural flaws.

**C+ (77-79):** Below graduate-level performance. The essay is generally missing one or more of the elements described above. The thesis may be vague or unclear, evidence may be inadequate, analysis may be incomplete, and the treatment of the counterargument may be deficient.

**C (74-76):** The essay fails to meet the standards of graduate work. While it might express an opinion, it makes inadequate use of evidence, has little coherent structure, is critically unclear, or lacks the quality of insight deemed sufficient to explore the issue at hand adequately.

**C- (70-73):** Attempts to address the question and approaches a responsible opinion, but conspicuously fails to meet the standards of graduate-level work in several areas. The thesis may be poorly stated with minimal evidence or support and counterarguments may not be considered. Construction and development flaws further detract from the readability of the essay.

**D (56-69):** Essay lacks evidence of graduate-level understanding and critical thinking. It fails to address the assigned question or present a coherent thesis and lacks evidence of effort or understanding of the subject matter.

**F (0–55):** Fails conspicuously to meet graduate-level standards. The essay has no thesis; suffers from significant flaws in respect to structure, grammar, and logic, and displays an apparent lack of effort to achieve the course requirements. Gross errors in construction and development detract from the readability of the essay, or it may display evidence of plagiarism or misrepresentation.

**Late Work:** Unexcused tardy student work—that is, work turned in past the deadline without previous permission by the moderators—will receive a grade no greater than C+ (78). Student work that is not completed will receive a numeric grade of zero. Please see [Chapter III, Section 7 of the 2013 U.S. Naval War College Faculty Handbook](#).

**9. Pretutorials and Tutorials.** These conferences will normally be with the students who are preparing essays, but may be used for any other consultation desired by either the students or the faculty moderators. A pretutorial is required for every essay. It is meant to assure that the student understands the essay question. A required tutorial session will follow, in which the thesis of the essay will be discussed. Students who are writing essays should conduct a tutorial session with their moderators no earlier than one week before the date on which the essay is due. All students are encouraged to take advantage of these individual tutorials with their moderators as an aid in the preparation of their seminar essays.

**10. Seminar Preparation and Contribution.** Student contribution to seminar discussion is an essential part of this course. It is vital that students prepare for seminar. Each member of the seminar is expected to contribute to the discussion and to help the group as a whole understand the critical strategic and operational problems examined by the case study as well as the course themes and objectives.

The goal in assigning a classroom contribution grade is not to measure the number of times students have spoken, but how well they have understood the subject matter, enriched discussion, and contributed to their seminar colleagues' learning. This caliber of commitment entails that each student come prepared to take part in discussion by absorbing the readings, listening attentively to presentations, and thinking critically about both. The seminar is a team effort. Not to contribute or to say very little in seminar undercuts the learning experience for everyone in the seminar. Preparation and contribution will enhance the quality of the seminar. Additionally, it will facilitate the students' ability to demonstrate that they are able to comprehend and synthesize the course material and communicate their thoughts with clarity and precision.

Seminar preparation and contribution will be graded at the end of the term according to the following standards:

**A+ (97-100):** Contributions indicate brilliance through a wholly new understanding of the topic. Demonstrates exceptional preparation for each

session as reflected in the quality of contributions to discussions. Strikes an outstanding balance of “listening” and “contributing.”

**A (94-96):** Contribution is always of superior quality. Unfailingly thinks through the issue at hand before comment. Arrives prepared for every seminar, and contributions are highlighted by insightful thought, understanding, and contains some original interpretations of complex concepts.

**A- (90-93):** Fully engaged in seminar discussions and commands the respect of colleagues through the insightful quality of contributions and ability to listen to and analyze the comments of others. Above the average expected of a graduate student.

**B+ (87-89):** A positive contributor to seminar meetings who joins in most discussions and whose contributions reflect understanding of the material. Occasionally contributes original and well-developed insights.

**B (84-86):** Average graduate-level contribution. Involvement in discussions reflects adequate preparation for seminar with the occasional contribution of original and insightful thought, but may not adequately consider others’ contributions.

**B- (80-83):** Contributes, but sometimes speaks out without having thought through the issue well enough to marshal logical supporting evidence, address counterarguments, or present a structurally sound position. Minimally acceptable graduate-level preparation for seminar.

**C+ (77-79):** Sometimes contributes voluntarily, though more frequently needs to be encouraged to participate in discussions. Content to allow others to take the lead. Minimal preparation for seminar reflected in arguments lacking the support, structure, or clarity to merit graduate credit.

**C (74-76):** Contribution is marginal. Occasionally attempts to put forward a plausible opinion, but the inadequate use of evidence, incoherent logic structure, and critically unclear quality of insight is insufficient to adequately examine the issue at hand. Usually content to let others form the seminar discussions.

**C- (70-73):** Lack of contribution to seminar discussions reflects substandard preparation for sessions. Unable to articulate a responsible opinion. Sometimes displays a negative attitude.

**D (56-69):** Rarely prepared or engaged. Contributions are uncommon and reflect below minimum acceptable understanding of course material. Engages in frequent fact-free conversation.

**F (0-55):** Student demonstrates unacceptable preparation and fails to contribute in any substantive manner. May be extremely disruptive or uncooperative and completely unprepared for seminar.

**11. Grade Appeals.** A request for a review of a grade on written work (weekly essays or final examination) may be made to the Department Executive Assistant no later than one week after the grade has been received. The Executive Assistant will then appoint two faculty members other than the original graders for an independent review. Anonymity will be maintained throughout. The second team of graders will not know the student's identity, the seminar from which the essay came, or its original grade. They will both grade the paper independently as though it were submitted for the first time, providing full comments, criticisms, and a new grade. The new grade will replace the old one. The student may request an additional review of the work in question, whereupon the Department Chair will review the appeal and either affirm the grade assigned on appeal or assign another grade (higher or lower), which then replaces any previous grade assigned. In exceptional circumstances, the student may make a further appeal to the Dean of Academics, whose decision in the matter will be final.

**12. Academic Honor Code.** Plagiarism, cheating, and misrepresentation of work will not be tolerated at the Naval War College. The Naval War College diligently enforces a strict academic code requiring authors to properly credit the source of materials directly cited to any written work submitted in fulfillment of diploma/degree requirements. Simply put: plagiarism is prohibited. Likewise, this academic code (defined in [Chapter III, Section 6 of the 2013 U.S. Naval War College Faculty Handbook](#)) prohibits cheating, and the misrepresentation of a paper as an author's original thought. Plagiarism, cheating, and misrepresentation are inconsistent with the professional standards required of all military personnel and government employees. Furthermore, in the case of U.S. military officers, such conduct clearly violates the "Exemplary Conduct Standards" delineated in Title 10, U.S. Code, Sections 3583 (U.S. Army), 5947 (U.S. Naval Service), and 8583 (U.S. Air Force).

*Plagiarism* is the use of someone else's work without giving proper credit to the author or creator of the work. It is passing off another's words, ideas, analysis, or other products as one's own. Whether intentional or unintentional, plagiarism is a serious violation of academic integrity and will be treated as such by the College. Plagiarism includes but is not limited to the following actions:

- a. The verbatim use of others' words without both quotation marks (or block quotation) and citation.
- b. The paraphrasing of others' words or ideas without citation.
- c. Any use of others' work (other than facts that are widely accepted as common knowledge) found in books, journals, newspapers, websites, interviews, government documents, course materials, lecture notes, films, and so forth without giving credit.

Authors are expected to give full credit in their written submissions when utilizing another's words or ideas. While extensive utilization, with proper attribution, is not

prohibited by this code, a substantially borrowed but attributed paper may lack the originality expected of graduate-level work. Submission of such a paper may merit a low or failing grade, but is not plagiarism.

***Cheating*** is defined as giving, receiving, or using of unauthorized aid in support of one's own efforts, or the efforts of another student. (Note: NWC Reference Librarians are an authorized source of aid in the preparation of class assignments but not on exams.)

Cheating includes but is not limited to the following actions:

- a. Gaining unauthorized access to exams.
- b. Assisting or receiving assistance from other students or other individuals in the preparation of written assignments or during tests (unless specifically permitted).
- c. Utilizing unauthorized materials (notes, texts, crib sheets, and the like, in paper or electronic form) during tests.

***Misrepresentation*** is defined as reusing a single paper for more than one purpose without permission or acknowledgement. Misrepresentation includes but is not limited to the following actions:

- a. Submitting a single paper or substantially the same paper for more than one course at the NWC without permission of the instructors.
- b. Submitting a paper or substantially the same paper previously prepared for some other purpose outside the NWC without acknowledging that it is an earlier work.

**13. Student Survey.** Student feedback is vital to the future development of the Strategy and War Course. Your responses are treated anonymously and student information that is requested (seminar number, graduation date, and service) is used only to create standardized reports. The survey is designed to provide case study feedback on a weekly basis and overall feedback at course completion. You are highly encouraged to contribute your responses throughout the course rather than complete the entire survey in one sitting at the end of the course.

During the first week of the course, student seminar leaders will distribute randomly generated passwords to each student in their seminars. Use this password throughout the course and do not share it with others. A paper copy of the survey is included in the syllabus to provide a convenient place to record your draft feedback on lectures and seminars. You will still need to enter your responses electronically for the survey to be valid. Thank you in advance for your time and effort in completing this important assessment of the Strategy and War Course.

**14. Online Resources.** The main repository of online resources for the Strategy and War Course is Blackboard. On Blackboard, students can access the most current versions of the syllabus, course calendar, presentation schedule, and selected readings. Moreover, lecture handouts and presentation audio files will be posted on Blackboard along with other supplemental information including material specific to individual seminars. Lecture presentation audio files will be posted to Blackboard twenty-four hours after the

lectures are delivered. Students may also request a copy of these audio files from the NWC Classified Library (students are requested to furnish blank CD/DVD media in order for the library to meet this request).

The Strategy and Policy Department site on the War College web page also contains the course syllabus and course calendar. The information on this site may not be as current as the information on Blackboard, but will be of use to the general public and alumni. To access this site go <http://www.usnwc.edu>, click on Departments on the right side of the page, and click on Strategy and Policy under Departments.

There are two types of readings assigned in this course that are only available online. 1) Documents noted as “Selected Readings” are available electronically through Blackboard. 2) Readings that are noted with web links in the syllabus are not available through Blackboard and must be downloaded from the NWC network. Compliance with copyright restrictions requires these linked readings be downloaded individually and in some cases the student must download the document while physically at the Naval War College.

Please refer any questions to Christine Mello (Strategy and Policy Department Academic Coordinator), [melloc@usnwc.edu](mailto:melloc@usnwc.edu); 401-841-2188; Strategy and Policy Department, Office H-333.

## STRATEGY AND POLICY DEPARTMENT FACULTY

**Professor Michael F. Pavković** currently serves as Chair of the Strategy and Policy Department and the Vice Admiral William Ledyard Rodgers Professor in Naval History at the College. He received his B.A. in History and Classics from the Pennsylvania State University and his Ph.D. in History from the University of Hawai‘i at Mānoa. Before joining the Naval War College, he served as an Associate Professor of history at Hawai‘i Pacific University, where he also coordinated the programs in Diplomacy and Military Studies. He has presented papers at national and international conferences and has also published a number of articles, book chapters, and reviews on topics relating to ancient, early modern, and Napoleonic military history. He is co-author of *What is Military History?* (Polity Press, 2nd edition, 2013). He is currently completing a book on sea power in the ancient world. He has held summer fellowships at West Point in Military History and at Harvard University’s Dumbarton Oaks Center for Byzantine Studies.

**Captain William A. Bullard III, U. S. Navy**, the Executive Assistant of the Strategy and Policy Department, is a native of Fall River, MA and a 1990 graduate of Worcester Polytechnic Institute with a B.S. in Electrical Engineering. He holds a M.S. in Applied Physics from the Naval Postgraduate School and a M.A. in National Security and Strategic Studies from the U.S. Naval War College. A Surface Warfare Officer, he served as the 70<sup>th</sup> Commanding Officer of USS CONSTITUTION, and the pre-commissioning Executive Officer of USS MOMSEN (DDG 92). He has served operational tours aboard USS JARRETT (FFG 33), USS CAYUGA (LST 1186), and on the staffs of COMUSNAVCENT, COMDESRON FIFTY and COMCMDIV THREE ONE, all in Manama, Bahrain. He has previously served as a Military Professor in the Strategy and Policy Department, Deputy Division Chief, Homeland Division, in the Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate (J5) of the Joint Staff, and an instructor at Surface Warfare Officers School (SWOS) in the Maritime War Fighting (N73) directorate. His most recent assignment was Officer in Charge of Expeditionary Combat Readiness Center Forward / Commander, Task Group 56.6 in Afghanistan, Qatar and Bahrain, where he oversaw the deployment, support and re-deployment of Navy Individual Augmentees in Afghanistan, Iraq, and throughout the CENTCOM AOR.

**Commander Thomas C. Baldwin, U. S. Navy**, graduated from the U. S. Naval Academy in 1992 with a B. S. in Oceanography and holds a M. A. in Diplomacy from Norwich University and a M. A. in National Security and Strategic Studies from the U. S. Naval War College. As a Naval Aviator, CDR Baldwin has logged over 2,500 hours flying the SH-60B and MH-60R. Operational flying tours include Helicopter Anti-submarine Squadron Light FIVE ONE (HSL- 51) and Helicopter Anti-submarine Squadron Light FOUR NINE (HSL-49). CDR Baldwin also served as a Catapult and Arresting Gear Officer in USS CARL VINSON (CVN 70). He has deployed to the Western Pacific, Indian Ocean, and Persian Gulf in support of Operations SOUTHERN WATCH, IRAQI FREEDOM and ENDURING FREEDOM. CDR Baldwin commanded Helicopter Maritime Strike Squadron FOUR ONE (HSM-41). Staff tours include Flag Aide to Commander, Navy Region Southeast; Special Assistant for Congressional

Matters to Commander, Navy Personnel Command; and Knowledge and Resource Manager, International Military Staff, NATO Headquarters, Brussels, Belgium.

**Lieutenant Colonel Daniel Bard, U.S. Army**, is a 1996 graduate of the United States Military Academy where he earned a B.S. in Mechanical Engineering. He holds a Master's Degree in Administration from the University of Central Michigan. He is a 2009 graduate of the Army's resident Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, KS. An Armor Officer, his assignments include Stryker Reconnaissance Troop Commander, Instructor at the Armor Captains Career Course, Chief of Initiatives for the Commander, U.S. Army Armor Center, Battalion Operations Officer, Battalion Executive Officer, Capability Portfolio Manager – Department of the Army G-3/5/7, and most recently, Commander, 1<sup>st</sup> Battalion, 310<sup>th</sup> Infantry Regiment at Fort McCoy, Wisconsin. He has deployed once to Bosnia and twice to Iraq.

**Lieutenant Colonel Chris Bresko, U.S. Army**, is a 1995 graduate of the U.S. Army Officer Candidate School after spending 11 years in Enlisted service. He earned a B.S. in Criminal Justice from Columbus State University in 1999 and a Master of Arts degree from the Naval War College in 2007. As an Infantry Officer, LTC Bresko's assignments include Rifle Platoon Leader, Rifle Company Executive Officer and Infantry Battalion S1, Infantry Company Commander, Observer/Controller (O/C) at the Joint Readiness Training Center, Provincial Lead Mentor to the Afghan National Police, Infantry Battalion Executive Officer and Battalion Operations Officer, Division Deputy G3 Operations Officer, Infantry Brigade Deputy Commander and Commander of 2<sup>nd</sup> Battalion, 47<sup>th</sup> Infantry Regiment and most recently as Chief of Staff for a Joint Task Force in support of Operation Freedom Sentinel. He has deployed once to Bosnia, once to Kosovo, twice to Iraq and three times to Afghanistan.

**Professor Stanley D.M. Carpenter**, College of Distance Education Strategy and Policy Division Head also serves as the Naval War College Command Historian. He holds degrees from Florida State University (Ph.D.), University of St. Andrews (Scotland) (M.Litt.) and University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill (A.B. with Honors) as well as graduate studies at King's College, University of London. Professor Carpenter also teaches courses in the online graduate degree programs for Norwich University, American Public University, and Hawai'i Pacific University. He retired from the US Navy in June 2009 with the rank of Captain after thirty years' service, both Active Duty and Reserve, having held several commanding officer and senior staff positions. Professor Carpenter's publications include *Military Leadership in the British Civil Wars, 1642-1651: 'The Genius of this Age'* and *The English Civil War* as well as chapters in *Nineteen Gun Salute: Case Studies of Strategic and Operational Naval Leadership in the 20th Century* and *One Hundred Years of U.S. Navy Airpower*. In 2016, he published *Resurrection of ANTIMONY*, the first in a series of World War II maritime-action-adventure historical novels. A second *ANTIMONY* novel will be published in 2017. He is also a contributor to Oxford University Press Bibliographies Online. His current research project focuses on the British strategic perspective in the Southern Campaign of 1778-81 of the War for American Independence.

**Professor Michael Aaron Dennis** received his doctorate in the history of science and technology from the Johns Hopkins University in 1991. After postdoctoral fellowships at the Smithsonian Institution's National Air and Space Museum, as well as the Science Studies Program at the University of California, San Diego, he served as an Assistant Professor in Cornell University's Department of Science and Technology Studies as well as a member of the Peace Studies Program. After his time at Cornell, he worked as an adjunct at several universities in the metropolitan Washington, DC area, including Georgetown University's Security Studies and Science, Technology and International Affairs Programs; he also taught courses on technology and national security in George Mason University's BioDefense Program. His research and writing focus on the intersection of science, technology and the military with a special emphasis on World War II and the Cold War. He is currently completing a book manuscript on this topic, entitled, *A change of state: Technical Practice, Political Culture and the Making of Early Cold America*. His 2013 article, "Tacit knowledge as a factor in the proliferation of WMD: The example of nuclear weapons," won a prize from the Editorial Board of *Studies in Intelligence*, the journal in which it appeared.

**Professor Andrea J. Dew** holds a B.A. (Hons.) in History from Southampton University in the United Kingdom, and an M.A.L.D. and Ph.D. in International Relations from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University. In addition, she also lived in Japan for eight years where she studied advanced Japanese at the Kyoto Japanese Language School. Professor Dew has served as a Research Fellow at the Belfer Center for Science in International Affairs at Harvard University, and Senior Counter-Terrorism Fellow at the Jebson Center for Counter Terrorism Studies at the Fletcher School. She is the co-author of a book on armed groups, entitled *Insurgents, Terrorists, and Militias: The Warriors of Contemporary Combat* (Columbia University Press, 2009). Her most recent publications include "Exploiting Seams and Closing Gaps: Lessons from Mumbai and Beyond," *Journal of Strategic Studies*, and a co-edited book entitled: *Deep Currents, Rising Tides: The Indian Ocean and International Security* (Georgetown University Press, 2013). Dr. Dew is the Co-Director of the Center on Irregular Warfare and Armed Groups (CIWAG) at the US Naval War College.

**Professor Frank "Scott" Douglas** earned his Ph.D. from Columbia University's Political Science Department, where he focused on the use of air power for compellence in Bosnia and Kosovo and on developing strategies to coerce authoritarian regimes. Since coming to the Naval War College in 2004, he has also focused on building a strategic appreciation of the GWOT and is currently working on a manuscript entitled *Killing an Idea: A Strategic History of the War Against Al Qaeda*. Professor Douglas is also a direct commission Naval Reserve Intelligence Officer, who served from 2009-2010 with a special operations task force in support of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. In addition, he served as a civilian academic advisor to Regional Command South West (RC(SW)) in Afghanistan during the AY 2011-12 Winter trimester. Dr. Douglas also holds an M.A. from Johns Hopkins University, School of Advanced International Studies, where he concentrated in Strategic Studies, and a B.S.F.S. degree from Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service. Additionally, he earned a regional studies certificate in East and Central Europe from Columbia's Harriman

Institute and received a Foreign Language Area Studies Fellowship for Serbo-Croatian. Aside from his scholarly work, he has served as an election observer in Bosnia and as the director of a volunteer English teaching program in the Czech Republic from 1993-1995. As a reservist, he has also had the opportunity to support the CNO's Strategic Studies Group for seven years, to serve as a liaison to the Republic of Korea Navy during *Ulchi Freedom Guardian '12*, and serves currently as the CO of a Naval Special Warfare Intelligence support unit.

**Professor John Garofano** served as Academic Dean from July 2009 to July 2015. Previously he taught in the National Security Affairs (2003-07) and Strategy and Policy (2007-09) Departments, with a focus on international relations theory, military intervention, civil-military relations, and the Korean and Vietnam wars. He held the CAPT Jerome Levy Chair in Economic Geography from 2006 to 2010, introducing lecture series on economics and running international conferences on the subject, the latest resulting in *The Indian Ocean: Rising Tide or Coming Conflict?*, co-edited with Dr. Andrea Dew published by Georgetown University Press in 2013. Dr. Garofano's research interests include military intervention, Asian security, and the making of U.S. foreign policy. Publications include *The Intervention Debate: Towards a Posture of Principled Judgment* (Strategic Studies Institute: 2002), *Clinton's Foreign Policy: A Documentary Record* (Kluwer: 2003), and articles in *International Security*, *Asian Survey*, *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, *Orbis* and the *Naval War College Review*. He remains active in the study of Southeast Asia, civil-military relations, and the ongoing wars. In 2011 Dr. Garofano deployed to Helmand Province, Afghanistan, to support the First Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF) in areas related to assessment and re-teaming. Prior to joining the War College Dean Garofano was a Senior Fellow at the Kennedy School of Government. He has taught at the U.S. Army War College, the Five Colleges of Western Massachusetts, and the University of Southern California. Dr. Garofano received the Ph.D. and M.A. in Government from Cornell University, an M.A. in Security Studies from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (Bologna/ Washington), and the B.A. in History from Bates College.

**Professor Marc A. Genest** is the Forrest Sherman Professor of Public Diplomacy in the Strategy and Policy Department and is Co-Director of the Center on Irregular Warfare and Armed Groups (CIWAG) at the Naval War College. He is also the Area Study Coordinator for the Insurgency and Terrorism electives program. In 2011, Professor Genest served as a civilian advisor at Division Headquarters for Regional Command – South in Kandahar, Afghanistan, where he assessed the division's information operations campaign. In 2009, Dr. Genest received the Commander's Award for Civilian Service from the Department of the Army for outstanding service as a Special Advisor to the Commander of Task Force Mountain Warrior while stationed in Regional Command – East in Afghanistan. Dr. Genest earned his Ph.D. from Georgetown University in International Politics. Before coming to the Naval War College, Professor Genest taught at Georgetown University, the U.S. Air War College, and the University of Rhode Island. While at the University of Rhode Island, Professor Genest received the University's Teaching Excellence Award. He also serves as a political commentator for local, national, and international radio news and television stations, as well as for Rhode Island

and national print media. In addition, Dr. Genest worked on Capitol Hill for Senator John Chafee and Representative Claudine Schneider. Dr. Genest has received fellowships and grants from numerous organizations, including the United States Institute of Peace, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the Harry S. Truman Foundation, the Foundation for the Defense of Democracy, Smith-Richardson Foundation, and the Bradley Foundation. Professor Genest's books include: *Negotiating in the Public Eye: The Impact of the Press on the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force Negotiations*; *Conflict and Cooperation: Evolving Theories of International Relations*; and *Stand! Contending Issues in World Politics*. He has also written articles dealing with international relations theory, strategic communication, American foreign policy and public opinion.

**Professor Michelle Getchell** earned her Ph.D. in History at the University of Texas at Austin, where she focused on US foreign policy, Soviet studies, and the international history of the Cold War. Before moving to Austin, she earned a BA in History at the University of California at Santa Cruz and an MA in History at California State University Northridge, where she wrote an MA thesis on the Reagan administration, the Nicaraguan counterinsurgency, and the international drug war. Her work has been funded by the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations and the American Councils for International Education, and has appeared in the *Journal of Cold War Studies*, *Southern California Quarterly*, and *Beyond the Eagle's Shadow: New Histories of Latin America's Cold War*. From 2014 to 2015, she was a Dickey Center & Dean of the Faculty Postdoctoral Fellow in International Security and US Foreign Policy at Dartmouth College, and in the summer of 2015, she was a Summer Research Fellow at the Kennan Institute of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. She is currently completing her first monograph, an examination of US-Soviet-Latin American relations in the Cold War.

**Professor Gregory S. Groth** is the U.S. Department of State Faculty Advisor to the U.S. Naval War College and a 2015 graduate of the Naval War College. He has served in the U.S. Foreign Service for twenty years as an Economic Officer, most recently as the Political/Economic Section Chief at the U.S. Mission to the Rome-based U.N. Food and Agriculture Organizations (2011 to 2014). Mr. Groth served as the Economic and Commercial Section Chief in Haiti from 2008 until 2011, including before and after the January 2010 earthquake. He has worked extensively in West and Central Africa, including three years as the Economic and Commercial Section Chief in Kinshasa, DRC (2005 - 2008) and the State Department's Regional Refugee Coordinator for West Africa in the aftermath of the Liberian Civil War (2003 – 2005). Mr. Groth served earlier tours in Haiti, Hungary and Washington, D.C. Before joining the Foreign Service, Mr. Groth worked in the non-governmental organization field in West Africa (Senegal, Mali) and was a Peace Corps Volunteer fish culture extension agent in then-Zaire from 1979 to 1982. He holds a B.A. in Biology, Middlebury College, and an M.S. in International Agricultural Development from California Polytechnic State University. Mr. Groth speaks French, Haitian Kreyol and has working knowledge of German, Hungarian and Tshiluba, an African Bantu tongue.

**Commander Aaron R. Hager, U.S. Navy**, is a 1998 graduate of the United States Naval Academy with a B.S. in English. He holds an M.A. in National Security and Strategic Studies from the Naval War College. Designated a Naval Aviator in 2000 he was then assigned to Helicopter Anti-Submarine Squadron FOURTEEN, part of the Forward Deployed Naval Forces in Japan. He did multiple deployments on the USS KITTY HAWK in support of Operations ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM. He then served as a flight instructor at Helicopter Training Squadron EIGHTEEN. After which he served as Flag Aide for Commander, Standing NATO Maritime Group ONE. Next he was the Air Operations Officer for Destroyer Squadron THIRTY-ONE. While at DESRON-31 he served as advance team lead and embassy liaison in East Timor and the Federated States of Micronesia for USNS MERCY's Pacific Partnership 2013 deployment. Shortly after that he completed an Individual Augment assignment as the Electronic Warfare Officer for the 18<sup>th</sup> and 130<sup>th</sup> Engineer Brigades in Mosul, Iraq. Upon return from Iraq he completed his department head tour with Helicopter Anti-Submarine Squadron SEVEN completing another deployment in support of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM aboard USS HARRY S TRUMAN. After completing his department head tour he attended the Naval War College and was afterwards selected as a Director Fellow for the CNO's Strategic Studies Group XXXIII. Finally, he joined Tactical Air Control Squadron ELEVEN as the Detachment ONE Office in Charge; completing a deployment in support of Operation IRAQI RESOLVE aboard USS ESSEX.

**Professor Phil Haun** joined the faculty of the U.S. Naval War College in January 2016 as Professor and Dean of Academics. His areas of scholarly and professional expertise are coercion, deterrence, air power theory, strategy, international relations, and security studies. Phil served for 29 years as an active duty U.S. Air Force officer and A-10 pilot with combat tours in Iraq, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan. He commanded an operational A-10 squadron, served as the Senior Air Force Advisor at the U.S. Naval War College, and prior to retirement commanded the Air Force ROTC Detachment at Yale University. His military education includes a National Security Fellowship at the JFK School of Government and he is a graduate of the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, USAF Command and Staff College, and USAF Weapons School. He holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from MIT, an MA in Economics from Vanderbilt, and an AB in Engineering Studies from Harvard. He taught Economics at the Air Force Academy, Strategy and Policy at the U.S. Naval War College, and Military History and National Security Studies at Yale University. He is a research affiliate with MIT's Security Studies Program. His latest book with Stanford University Press is *Coercion, Survival & War: Why Weak States Resist the United States* and his latest article with *International Security* is "Breakers of Armies: Air Power in the Easter Offensive and the Myths of Linebacker I and II in the Vietnam War".

**Professor Jacqueline L. Hazelton** is a scholar of international relations. Her research interests include international security, compellence, asymmetric conflict, military intervention, counterinsurgency and insurgency, terrorism and counterterrorism, the uses of military power, and U.S. foreign and military policy. She received her Ph.D. from the Brandeis University Politics Department. She holds an MA in International Relations from the University of Chicago, an MA in English Language and Literature from

Chicago, and a BA in English, also from Chicago. Hazelton previously taught at the University of Rochester and spent two years as a research fellow at the Belfer Center, Harvard Kennedy School. Before returning to academia, Hazelton was an Associated Press journalist whose posts included New York, Washington, and Tokyo.

**Professor James Holmes** is a Phi Beta Kappa graduate of Vanderbilt University and earned graduate degrees at Salve Regina University, Providence College, and the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. He graduated from the Naval War College in 1994, earning the Naval War College Foundation Award, signifying the top graduate in his class. Before joining the Naval War College faculty, he served on the faculty of the University of Georgia School of Public and International Affairs, and as a research associate at the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Cambridge, MA. A former U.S. Navy surface warfare officer, he served in the engineering and weapons departments on board USS WISCONSIN (BB-64), directed an engineering course at the Surface Warfare Officers School Command, and taught Strategy and Policy at the Naval War College, College of Distance Education. His books include *Theodore Roosevelt and World Order: Police Power in International Relations*, *Chinese Naval Strategy in the 21st Century: The Turn to Mahan* (co-author), *Indian Naval Strategy in the 21st Century* (co-author), *Red Star over the Pacific: China's Rise and the Challenge to U.S. Maritime Strategy* (co-author), and *Strategy in the Second Nuclear Age: Power, Ambition, and the Ultimate Weapon* (co-editor).

**Captain Carol Hottenrott, U.S. Navy**, is a 1987 graduate of the University of Pennsylvania with a B.A. and M.A. in Political Science/International Relations. She also holds an M.Phil. degree from The George Washington University. Captain Hottenrott has served extensively in the Pacific and Central Command Areas of Responsibility and her recent operational sea tours supported both OPERATIONS IRAQI FREEDOM and ENDURING FREEDOM. She commanded Destroyer Squadron NINE which embarked in USS ABRAHAM LINCOLN (CVN 72), Commander Task Group IRAQI MARITIME based on the Al Basrah oil terminal, USS HOWARD (DDG 83), and USS PELICAN (MHC 53). Shore tours included joint duty as a Senior Operations Officer at the National Military Command Center in the Pentagon; Congressional liaison in the Appropriations Matters Office for the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Financial Management and Comptroller; and Director, Maritime Warfighting/Department Head curriculum at the Surface Warfare Officers School (SWOS). Prior to reporting to the Naval War College, Captain Hottenrott served as the Deputy Director, Defense Plans Division at the U.S. Mission to NATO in Brussels, Belgium.

**Professor Timothy D. Hoyt** is the John Nicholas Brown Chair for Counterterrorism Studies. Dr. Hoyt earned his undergraduate degrees from Swarthmore College, and his Ph.D. in International Relations and Strategic Studies from The Johns Hopkins University's Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies. Before joining the Naval War College's Strategy and Policy Department, he taught at Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service. He has testified before subcommittees of the House Committee on International Relations regarding terrorism in South and Southwest Asia, and is regularly involved in discussions on security issues in those regions with the

U.S. and other governments. Dr. Hoyt's recent publications include studies on the war on terrorism in South Asia, the limits of military force in the global war on terrorism, the impact of culture on military doctrine and strategy, military innovation and warfare in the developing world, U.S.-Pakistan relations, and the impact of nuclear weapons on recent crises in South Asia. Dr. Hoyt served previously as Co-Chairman of the Indian Ocean Regional Studies Group at the Naval War College. He is the author of *Military Industries and Regional Defense Policy: India, Iraq and Israel*, and over 40 articles and chapters on international security and military affairs. He is currently working on a book on the strategy of the Irish Republican Army from 1913-2005, projects examining U.S. relations with India and Pakistan, studies on arms control and arms racing during and after the Cold War, and analyses of irregular warfare and terrorism in the 20th century.

**Professor Colin F. Jackson** studied at the University of Pennsylvania's Wharton School (M.B.A., Finance), Johns Hopkins' School of Advanced International Studies (M.A., International Economics and Strategic Studies), Princeton University's Woodrow Wilson School (B.A., Public and International Affairs), and completed his doctoral work in Political Science at MIT (Ph.D., Political Science—Security Studies). Professor Jackson's current research includes work on civil wars and insurgency, economics and strategy, public and private sector risk management, organizational learning, and intelligence operations. In 2011, Professor Jackson deployed as a mobilized Army reservist to Afghanistan where he served as the Executive Officer for Policy Planning for the Deputy Chief of Staff of Operations, International Security Assistance Force Afghanistan. Prior to entering academia, Professor Jackson worked for several years in the corporate sector in financial trading, telecommunications, transportation markets, and power development. He also served four years on active duty with the United States Army in Germany as an armor and cavalry officer. Professor Jackson continues to serve as a military intelligence officer in the U.S. Army Reserve.

**Professor Burak Kadercan** is an Assistant Professor of Strategy and Policy. He holds a Ph.D. and M.A. in political science from the University of Chicago and a B.A. in politics and international relations from Bogazici University in Istanbul, Turkey. Dr. Kadercan specializes in the intersection of international relations theory, international security, military-diplomatic history, and political geography. Prior to joining the Naval War College, he was Lecturer in International Relations at the University of Reading (United Kingdom) and Assistant Professor in International Relations and the Programme Coordinator for MA in International Security at Institut Barcelona d'Estudis Internacionals (IBEI). In addition to Reading and IBEI, he has taught classes on the relationship between war and state-formation, privatization of military power, research methods, international security, diplomatic history, foreign policy, and nations and nationalism at the University of Chicago, University of Richmond, and Bogazici University. He is currently working on three projects. The first project scrutinizes the relationship between territory and interstate conflict, with an emphasis on nationalism's place in the said relationship. The second explores the conceptualization of empires in IR theory and historiography with a special focus on the case of the Ottoman Empire. The third project, in turn, examines the association between civil-military relations and the production as well as diffusion of military power. Dr. Kadercan's scholarly contributions

have appeared in outlets such as International Security, Review of International Studies, International Studies Review, International Theory, and Middle East Policy.

**Commander Michael J. Koen, U. S. Navy**, graduated from the University of Texas, Austin, in 1992 with a B. S. in Aeronautical Engineering and holds a M. A. in National Security and Strategic Studies from the U. S. Naval War College. As a Naval Flight Officer, CDR Koen has logged over 2,500 hours flying in the EA-6B and NE-3A. Operational flying tours include Electronic Attack Squadron ONE THREE SIX, NATO AWACS and Attack Squadron ONE THREE NINE. CDR Koen also served as Assistant Navigator in USS ABRAHAM LINCOLN (CVN-72) and Strike Operations Officer in USS NIMITZ (CVN-68). Joint tours include Operations Branch Head at NATO's Joint Electronic Warfare Core Staff and Military Analyst/Project Manager at the Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Center. He has deployed in support of Operations SOUTHERN WATCH, ALLIED FORCE, ENDURING FREEDOM, and IRAQI FREEDOM.

**Commander Timothy P. Kollmer, U.S. Navy**, is a 1991 graduate of Stony Brook University with a B.E. in Electrical Engineering. He holds an M.A. in National Security and Strategic Studies from the U.S. Naval War College. A submariner, he has served as Commanding Officer of Naval Submarine Support Center, New London and completed operational tours on USS WYOMING (SSBN-742), USS MARYLAND (SSBN 738) and USS SCRANTON (SSN 756). He has deployed to the Mediterranean Sea, the Northern Atlantic Ocean and the Arabian Gulf. Shore assignments include tours at Nuclear Power Training Units in Ballston Spa, New York and Charleston, South Carolina and on the staffs of Commander Submarine Development Squadron TWELVE and Commander, Submarine Squadron TWO.

**Commander Robert A. Krivacs, U.S. Navy**, is a 1991 graduate of the United States Naval Academy with a B.S. in Economics. He holds an M.A. in National Security and Strategic Studies from the Naval War College. Designated a Naval Aviator in 1993, his operational experience includes Western Pacific, Indian Ocean, and Persian Gulf deployments while forward deployed in Guam with Helicopter Combat Support Squadron FIVE as well as Helicopter Combat Support Squadron ELEVEN. He served as Air Boss on USS DULUTH while stationed off of Aden, Yemen following the bombing of and in support of USS COLE. His staff tours include being a Fleet Replacement Squadron Instructor in Helicopter Combat Support Squadron THREE, a Placement Officer in the Bureau of Naval Personnel (BUPERS), and deputy director of PERS-44 in BUPERS. In 2007, he served as 4<sup>th</sup> Stryker Brigade Combat Team, 2<sup>nd</sup> Infantry Division (4/2 SBCT) Electronic Warfare Officer in Iraq. Responsible for 4/2 SBCT electronic counter-IED efforts and electronic attack, he supported and patrolled with the 38<sup>th</sup> Engineering Company, 4<sup>th</sup> Battalion, 9<sup>th</sup> Infantry Regiment, 2<sup>nd</sup> Battalion, 12<sup>th</sup> Field Artillery Regiment, 2<sup>nd</sup> Squadron, 1<sup>st</sup> Cavalry Regiment, 2<sup>nd</sup> Battalion, 23<sup>rd</sup> Infantry Regiment and 1<sup>st</sup> Battalion, 38<sup>th</sup> Infantry Regiment operating out of Camp TAJI, north of Baghdad and Forward Operating Base WARHORSE in the Diyala Province.

**Professor Heidi E. Lane** is Associate Professor of Strategy and Policy and Director of the Greater Middle East Research Study Group at the Naval War College. She

specializes in Comparative Politics and International Relations of the Middle East with a focus on security sector development, ethnic and religious nationalism, and rule of law in transitioning societies. Her co-edited book *Building Rule of Law in the Arab World and Beyond* was published in 2016. She is currently completing research on a book manuscript about counterterrorism and state liberalization in the Middle East. She has served as a visiting research affiliate with the Truman Institute for the Advancement of Peace at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, a U.S. Fulbright scholar grantee in Syria, and as a research fellow with the International Security Program at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University. She is currently a senior associate at the Center for Irregular Warfare and Armed Groups (CIWAG) at the Naval War College and also serves as Associate Editor for the *Review of Middle East Studies (ROMES)* with Cambridge University Press. She taught as a visiting instructor in Department of Government, Claremont-McKenna College before joining the US Naval War College in 2003. Dr. Lane holds a M.A and Ph.D. in Islamic Studies from the Center for Near Eastern Studies, University of California, Los Angeles and a B.A. from the University of Chicago. She is trained in Arabic, Hebrew, and Persian and is proficient in German.

**Lieutenant Colonel Nathan Maker, U.S. Marine Corps**, is a Marine artillery officer and native of New England who graduated from the University of Connecticut in 1993 with a B.A. in History, earning his commission through the Marine Platoon Leaders Class Program. His operational experience includes multiple tours with the 1st and 4th Marine and Divisions as well as a three year tour at U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM). At USCENTCOM LtCol Maker served as the J3 Plans Division Joint Fires Branch Chief, a multi-service and multi-discipline organization responsible for designing and implementing theater-strategic lethal and non-lethal targeting strategies for the USCENTCOM commander. He holds a M.A. in National Security and Strategic Studies from the U.S. Naval War College and a M.A. in U.S. History from American Military University.

**Captain Ralph J. Marro, MSC, U.S. Navy**, enlisted in the U.S. Navy in 1984. After graduating from boot camp, he attended “A” and “C” schools and served as a hospital corpsman (pharmacy technician) at Naval Hospital, Newport, in Newport, RI from 1985-1988. After separating from the Navy to complete his academic studies, he obtained B.S. and M.S. degrees in radiological health physics from the University of Massachusetts-Lowell and has served as a commissioned officer since 1995. After completing initial Officer Indoctrination School and Radiation Health Officer (RHO) training, he was assigned to the Naval Dosimetry Center in Bethesda, MD from 1995-1997. From 1997-1999, he served as the Medical Department Division Officer and RHO on board the submarine tender, USS EMORY S. LAND (AS 39). From 1999-2002, he served as Assistant Director, Radiation Health Division at Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard & IMF, Pearl Harbor, HI. From 2002-2005, he served as the Radiation Safety Officer at Naval Medical Center, Portsmouth, in Portsmouth, VA. From 2005-2008, he served as Deputy Program Manager for the Nuclear Test Personnel Review Program at Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), in Alexandria, VA. From 2008-2010, he served as the Director, Radiation Health Division, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard, in Kittery, ME. He then

attended the Naval War College in Newport, RI, and was awarded a M.A. degree in National Security and Strategic Studies and Joint Professional Military Education Phase II credit. Before reporting as the Director of Source Operations at Armed Forces Radiobiology Research Institute (AFRRI), in Bethesda, MD, he deployed to U.S. Pacific Command to provide radiological support as part of Operation Tomodachi. While at AFRRI, he was selected as the U.S. Navy representative for the Dose Assessment Recording and Working Group, and was lead author for the DTRA Technical Report “Radiation Dose Assessments for Fleet-based Individuals in Operation Tomodachi.”

**Professor John H. Maurer** is the Alfred Thayer Mahan Professor of Sea Power and Grand Strategy and served as the Chair of the Strategy and Policy. He is a graduate of Yale University and holds an M.A.L.D. and Ph.D. in International Relations from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University. He is the author or editor of books examining the outbreak of the First World War, military interventions in the developing world, naval rivalries and arms control between the two world wars, and a study about Winston Churchill and British grand strategy. He served on the Secretary of the Navy’s advisory committee on naval history. He holds the positions of Senior Research Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, on the Editorial Board of *Orbis: A Journal of World Affairs*, the Academic Board of Advisers of the International Churchill Centre, and Associate Editor of *Diplomacy and Statecraft*. His current research includes work on Winston Churchill and Great Britain’s decline as a world power. At the Naval War College, he teaches in the advanced strategy program and an elective course on Winston Churchill as a statesman, strategist, politician, soldier, and war leader. In recognition for his contribution to professional military education, he has received the U.S. Navy’s Meritorious Civilian Service Award and Superior Civilian Service Award.

**Professor Kevin D. McCranie** received a B.A. in History and Political Science from Florida Southern College, and an M.A. and Ph.D. in History from Florida State University. Before joining the faculty of the Naval War College, he taught history at Brewton-Parker College in Mount Vernon, Georgia. In 2001, he held a fellowship at the West Point Summer Seminar in Military History. Specializing in warfare at sea, navies, sea power, and joint operations during the “Age of Sail,” he is the author of *Admiral Lord Keith and the Naval War against Napoleon* (University Press of Florida, 2006), as well as *Utmost Gallantry: The U.S. and Royal Navies at Sea in the War of 1812* (Naval Institute Press, 2011). His articles have appeared in *Naval History*, *The Journal of Military History*, and *The Northern Mariner*.

**Colonel Paul R. Murphy, U. S. Air Force**, is the Alan Sheppard Professor of Air & Space Warfare and Senior Air Force Advisor to the President of the Naval War College. A graduate of the Boston Latin School, with a B.A. in Computer Science from Northeastern University. He has a M.A. from Embry Riddle Aeronautical University, an M.A. in Logistics & Mobility from the AF Institute of Technology, and M.As in National Security Studies from both the College of Naval Command & Staff (Distinguished Graduate), and the Air War College (Academic Distinction). Additionally, Col Murphy attended Joint Forces Staff College (McArthur Foundation Award), and is a graduate of the USAF Advanced Study of Air Mobility (ASAM) course. A command pilot with over

3,500 flying hours, he has held several key staff billets at Headquarters Air Force (A8PM the air mobility & special-ops programs portfolio & Chair of the Global Mobility Panel), USSTRATCOM J3/4 and Air Mobility Command (Chief of Programming, Force Structure & Installations). Prior to the Naval War College, Col Murphy commanded the 305<sup>th</sup> Air Mobility Wing (KC-10 & C-17s) at Joint-Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst, was Vice Commander of the 380th Air Expeditionary Wing (KC-10, U-2, RQ-4, AWACS), Southwest Asia, and Deputy Group Commander of the 55<sup>th</sup> Operations Group (RJ-135, WC-135, COBRA BALL, COMBAT SENT, E-4/NAOC) Offutt AFB, NE. He is also a graduate of, and later commanded, the USAF's KC-135 Weapons Instructor Course, Fairchild AFB WA. He has a range of contingency, humanitarian relief, combat, combat support, special operations, and nuclear alert experience stretching from DESERT STORM through current operations in Iraq, the Horn of Africa and Afghanistan.

**Professor Nicholas Murray** received his B.A. Hons. in War Studies from King's College, University of London. He holds a M.St. in European History and a D.Phil. in Modern History from the University of Oxford. He is also a Fellow of the Royal Historical Society. Prior to joining the Naval War College, he served as associate professor of military history at the US Army Command and General Staff College. While there, in addition to his faculty and teaching duties, he served as coordinator for the master's degree program in history, completely revamping the program during his tenure. Additionally, he assisted with the establishment of the Art of War Scholar's program. For the above he received the Department of the Army Commander's Award for Civilian Service, and for his teaching he was named Civilian Educator of the Year for History in 2013. For his continued work in these areas, in December of 2014 he was awarded the Department of the Army Superior Civilian Service Award. He is the author of *The Rocky Road to the Great War: the evolution of trench warfare to 1914*. He has also written articles on fortification and the evolution of warfare in the 19<sup>th</sup> and early 20<sup>th</sup> centuries, and he is currently editing two books. His recent focus has been on professional military education (PME) on which he has published several articles and op-eds. Based upon his research into PME he was asked to assist the Undersecretary of Defense (P&R) with advice on the revision of PME, and with the establishment of a program for improving the teaching of strategy to the services.

**Commander Michael O'Hara, U.S. Navy** is a Permanent Military Professor in the Department of Strategy and Policy. He received his Ph.D. in Political Science from Columbia University. He holds an M.Phil. and M.A. from Columbia University, and an M.A. in English from the University of Rhode Island. He is a 1995 graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy and the 2010 honor graduate of the Naval War College (M.A. with Highest Distinction). In 2015-16, he was an appointed National Security Fellow at Brown University's Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs. His operational experience includes carrier-jet aviation (S-3B Viking) and naval intelligence with flying and staff deployments in three aircraft carriers and in Kabul, Afghanistan. His research interests include coercion, diplomatic communication and signaling, and decisionmaking.

**Professor Sarah C. M. Paine** is the William S. Sims Professor of History and Grand Strategy. She earned a B.A. in Latin American Studies at Harvard, an M.I.A. at Columbia's School for International Affairs, an M.A. in Russian at Middlebury, and a Ph.D. in history at Columbia. She has studied in year-long language programs twice in Taiwan and once in Japan. She wrote *Imperial Rivals: China, Russia, and Their Disputed Frontier* (M. E. Sharpe, 1996) Jelavich prize, *The Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895* (Cambridge, 2003), and *The Wars for Asia, 1911-1949* (Cambridge, 2012) PROSE award and Leopold Prize, and edited *Nation Building, State Building, and Economic Development* (M.E. Sharpe, 2010); and co-wrote with Bruce A. Elleman *Modern China: Continuity and Change 1644 to the Present* (Prentice Hall, 2010) and co-edited *Naval Blockades and Seapower, Naval Coalition Warfare, and Naval Power and Expeditionary Warfare* (Routledge, 2006-11), and *Commerce Raiding and Navies and Soft Power* (NWC Press, 2013, 2015). She has received year-long grants twice from the Fulbright Program (Taiwan, Japan) and IREX (Taiwan, Soviet Union), and one year each from the Committee for Scholarly Communication (China); Hokkaido University (Japan); and the National Library of Australia, a Chiang Ching-kuo Foundation fellowship, and an Earhart Foundation grant (Australia); and a Hoover Institution National Fellowship (Stanford).

**Commander Michael J. Riordan, U.S. Navy**, graduated with distinction from the U.S. Naval Academy (B.S., History Honors, 1994) and the U.S. Naval War College (M.A., National Security & Strategic Studies, 2006). He holds a Master's Degree in International Public Policy from the Johns Hopkins University Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, a Master's Degree in Business Administration from Salve Regina University, a Legislative Certificate from Georgetown University, and subspecialties in National Security Studies, Education, and Strategy. He is a graduate of the National Defense University's Joint Forces Staff College. A Surface Warfare, Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD), and Joint officer, CDR Riordan has deployed to the Persian Gulf, led EOD operations in Kosovo in 1999 as part of the initial Kosovo Stabilization Force (KFOR), deployed in support of Special Operations Command Europe (SOCEUR) contingency missions, and directed EOD operations across U.S. Southern Command. He has served as a Defense Sensitive Support officer meeting national intelligence community requirements; as an associate fellow on the CNO Strategic Studies Group (CNO SSG); and was the first naval officer assigned to the Joint IED Defeat Task Force in support of combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Previously, CDR Riordan served as Director of Congressional Affairs at U.S. European Command and senior Congressional advisor to the Commander, U.S. European Command and Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR) following a Defense Legislative Fellowship in the office of Senator Edward M. Kennedy (D-MA), Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee's Subcommittee on Sea Power.

**Professor Nicholas Evan Sarantakes** earned a B.A. from the University of Texas. He has a M.A. from the University of Kentucky, and holds a Ph.D. from the University of Southern California. All three degrees are in history. His first two books looked at the battle and occupation of Okinawa: *Keystone: The American Occupation of Okinawa and U.S.-Japanese Relations* (2000), which was followed by *Seven Stars: The Okinawa Battle Diaries of Simon Bolivar Buckner, Jr. and Joseph Stilwell* (2004). His next book looked at coalition warfare: *Allies Against the Rising Sun: The United States, the British*

*Nations, and the Defeat of Imperial Japan* (2009). His fourth book, *Dropping the Torch: Jimmy Carter, the Olympic Boycott, and the Cold War* (2010), is a diplomatic history of the 1980 Olympic boycott. His most recent book is *Making Patton: A Classic War Film's Epic Journey to the Silver Screen* (2012). He is currently writing a book on the battle of Manila, and another on the home front in World War II. He has written a number of articles that have been appeared in journals and publications such as *Diplomatic History*, *English Historical Review*, *The Journal of Military History*, *Joint Forces Quarterly*, and ESPN.com. He is a Fellow of the Royal Historical Society and has received five writing awards. He previously taught at Texas A&M University—Commerce, the Air War College, the University of Southern Mississippi, and the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. He is a book review editor for *Presidential Studies Quarterly*.

**Professor George Satterfield** holds a Ph.D. in history from the University of Illinois. Before joining the Naval War College, he served as an assistant professor at Morrisville State College, and as an associate professor at Hawaii Pacific University, where he taught courses in history. Dr. Satterfield is the author of *Princes, Posts, and Partisans: The Army of Louis XIV and Partisan Warfare in the Netherlands, 1673-1678*. This book received a distinguished book award from the Society for Military History. Dr. Satterfield is also the author of articles on several topics in military history, including irregular warfare and revolutions in military affairs.

**Professor Tim Schultz** is the Naval War College's Associate Dean of Academic Affairs for Electives and Research. He joined the Strategy and Policy Department in 2012 as an Air Force colonel and became the Associate Dean in 2014 after retiring from active duty. Prior to joining the Newport faculty he served as the Dean of the U.S. Air Force's School of Advanced Air and Space Studies from 2009-2012 at Maxwell AFB, Alabama. Tim earned his Ph.D. in the History of Science and Technology from Duke University in 2007. His research interests include the transformative role of automation in warfare and the impact of technological change on institutions, society, and military strategy. He is a 1988 graduate of the U.S. Air Force Academy and studied at Colorado State University, Fort Collins (M.S. in Cellular Biology), the Air Command and Staff College (M.A. in Military Operational Art and Science), and the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies (M.A. in Airpower Art and Science). He spent much of his military career in the high-altitude reconnaissance community as a U-2 pilot enjoying the view over interesting regions of the globe.

**Commander John Michael Sheehan, U. S. Navy** is a Naval Aviator commissioned through Aviation Officer Candidate School in May 1989. Commander Sheehan holds degrees from the United States Naval Postgraduate School (Ph.D. in Security Studies), George Mason University (M.A. in American History), Columbia College (M.B.A.), United States Naval War College (M.A. in National Security and Strategic Studies), and San Jose State University (B.S. in Aeronautics). An attack pilot, Commander Sheehan served in VA-115 at NAF Atsugi, Japan and aboard USS Independence (CV-62). In 1995, he joined VA-196 for the final Intruder deployment, serving as a Forward Air Controller/Airborne. He transitioned to the EA-6B, and served two tours with VAQ-141 as Prowler Tactics Instructor and Night Vision Goggles Instructor. He has logged over

3,500 flight hours and 750 arrested landings on 9 aircraft carriers. Ashore, CDR Sheehan served on the Joint Staff in J-5 Strategy as the lead for Security Cooperation and Global Posture Realignment. He subsequently served as engagement lead for South and East Africa at United States Naval Forces Africa in Naples, Italy. In 2010, he was selected as a doctoral candidate in Security Studies at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School. After earning his doctorate, he joined the faculty of the United States Naval War College in October 2013.

**Commander William Shipp, U.S. Navy**, graduated from The Pennsylvania State University in 1997 with a B.S. in Geography and holds an Executive Masters of Business Administration from the Naval Postgraduate School. A Naval Aviator, CDR Shipp has logged over 3,300 flight hours in the H-46D, SH-60F, HH-60H, and MH-60S completing five deployments and participating in dozens of exercises. Operational flying tours include Helicopter Combat Support Squadron ELEVEN (HC-11), Helicopter Anti-Submarine Squadron FOUR (HS-4), and Helicopter Sea Combat Squadron EIGHT (HSC-8) where he served as the Commanding Officer. In addition, CDR Shipp served as a Fleet Replacement Squadron Instructor Pilot at Helicopter Sea Combat Squadron THREE, the Aviation and Safety Officer onboard the USS DUBUQUE (LPD-8), and an Action Officer in the J-5 at United States Africa Command.

**Captain Gabriel E. Soltero, U.S. Navy**, graduated from of Rice University in 1994 with a B.A. in History and Political Science. He holds an M.A. in International Relations from Tufts University's Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy and is a distinguished graduate of the U.S. Naval War College with an M.A. in National Security and Strategic Studies. A naval aviator flying the H-60 helicopter, Captain Soltero's operational assignments include Helicopter Antisubmarine Squadron Fifteen (HS-15), Commander, Strike Force Training Pacific, Helicopter Antisubmarine Squadron Four (HS-4), Helicopter Sea Combat Squadron Fifteen (HSC-15), and Helicopter Sea Combat Squadron Two Five (HSC-25). He served as Commanding Officer of HSC-15 at NAS North Island, CA and HSC-25 at Andersen AFB, Guam. Captain Soltero has completed multiple overseas deployments to the Mediterranean, Middle East, and Western Pacific and accumulated over 4,000 flight hours. His shore assignments include tours as an instructor pilot at Helicopter Antisubmarine Squadron 10 (HS-10), Deputy Director of the Joint Search and Rescue Center at Al Udeid Air Base, Qatar, and as the Kosovo Desk Officer at Allied Joint Force Command Naples, Italy. He joined the faculty of the Naval War College in September 2016.

**Professor David R. Stone** received his B.A. in history and mathematics from Wabash College and his Ph.D in history from Yale University. He has taught at Hamilton College and at Kansas State University, where he served as director of the Institute for Military History. He has also been a fellow at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences at Stanford University. His first book *Hammer and Rifle: The Militarization of the Soviet Union, 1926-1933* (2000) won the Shulman Prize of the Association for Slavic, East European, and Eurasian Studies and the Best First Book Prize of the Historical Society. He has also published *A Military History of Russia: From Ivan the Terrible to the War in Chechnya* (2006), and *The Russian Army in the Great War: The Eastern*

*Front, 1914-1917* (2015). He edited *The Soviet Union at War, 1941-1945* (2010). He is the author of several dozen articles and book chapters on Russian / Soviet military history and foreign policy.

**Lieutenant Colonel Paul Theriot, U.S. Air Force**, is a Military Professor in the Strategy and Policy Department. He holds a Masters in Aeronautical Science from Embry-Riddle University, is a 1998 graduate of the U.S. Air Force Academy and a 2011 graduate of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. He is a graduated C-17 Squadron Commander and his operational experience includes a deployed command tour, an Air Mobility Liaison Officer deployment to Bagram AB, Afghanistan and multiple flying deployments with C-17 flying squadrons since 2000. His staff experience includes two years serving on the Air Staff in the Operations Plans and Requirements directorate at the Pentagon, Washington, DC.

**Professor Anand Toprani** is a specialist in energy geopolitics and great power relations. He earned an A.B. in History from Cornell University, an M.Phil. in Modern European History from University College, Oxford, and a Ph.D. in History from Georgetown University. He was also the recipient of the Smith Richardson Predoctoral Fellowship in International Security Studies from Yale University and the Ernest May Fellowship in History & Policy from Harvard University. Dr. Toprani previously served as an historian with the U.S. Department of State and as a strategic analyst at U.S. Central Command. His academic work has appeared or been accepted for publication in scholarly journals such as *Diplomatic History*, the *Journal of Strategic Studies*, and the *Journal of Military History*, and he is currently preparing a manuscript on oil and grand strategy for publication.

**Professor Michael F. Van Vleck**, a 1981 graduate of the United States Merchant Marine Academy, Kings Point, New York. He holds a B.S. in Marine Transportation and a M.A. in National Security and Strategic Studies from the Naval War College. He has completed the Defense Leadership and Management Program (DLAMP) and Advanced JPME program at Joint Forces Staff College. He holds a USCG Master's license and is a retired Captain, US Navy Reserve. He has 27 years of commercial maritime and Military Sealift Command experience afloat and ashore. Prior to his assignment at the Naval War College, he was assigned as Military Sealift Command Pacific/Naval Fleet Auxiliary Force, West Deputy Director, later restructured as Deputy Commander, Commander Sealift Logistics. Professor Van Vleck reported to the Naval War College in 2005 to lead, manage, and field the Online Professional Military Education continuum for junior officers and enlisted sailors. He is a member of the College of Distance Education Strategy and Policy faculty.

**Lieutenant Colonel Noah Villanueva, U.S. Army**, is a 1994 ROTC graduate from Campbell University where he earned a B.S. in Biology. He holds a Master's of Education degree with a specialization in Human Resources from the University of Louisville and a Ph.D. in Business Organization and Management with a specialization in Human Resource Management from Capella University. He is a resident graduate of the Army's Intermediate Level Education course. His most recent assignment was as the

Division Chief for the Field Artillery MOS, Directorate of Training and Doctrine, Fires Center of Excellence. He has served on four deployments- twice in Bosnia as a Fire Direction Officer and Fire Support Officer with 3ID and twice in Iraq as an Operations Officer and Fire Support Officer with 1ID and 3ID, respectively. Currently, he is pursuing an MBA with a specialization in Information Technology Management from American Military University.

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## I. MASTERS OF WAR—CLAUSEWITZ, SUN TZU, AND MAO

**A. General:** Although modern military technology has revolutionized many dimensions of warfare, the logic of war remains unchanged. This reasoning explains the continuing relevance of Clausewitz's *On War*, Sun Tzu's *The Art of War*, and the writings of Mao Tse-tung (Mao Zedong) as conceptual frameworks for the study of strategy and war. Clausewitz's *On War* and Sun Tzu's *Art of War* illustrate how theory and principles of war apply to the operational and strategic levels of war. *On War*, the more systematic and detailed of the two classics, breaks down wars into several different categories, ranging from wars of armed observation through wars of limited objectives to wars aiming at the total defeat of the enemy. Clausewitz also deals specifically, if briefly, with national uprisings, similar to modern insurgencies. In this way, he distinguishes the different kinds of wars we will examine and discusses the relationships among the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war. *The Art of War*, too, looks at the entire spectrum for the use of military force, from what we would call deterrence and operations other than war at one end to the extermination of the adversary's state at the other.

Clausewitz and Sun Tzu also agree that political authorities must determine the political objectives in any war. They discuss at length the relationships among national objectives and the military objectives that will help secure them. At the same time, the authors recognize that the pressures faced by political elites and military commanders invariably give rise to tensions between civilian and military leaders regarding the best means to be employed. They consider the nature of war to be a reflection of the dynamic relationships among the political authorities, the people, the military, and the physical environment within which the conflict is taking place.

The two authors present different approaches to the operational planning of wars. For example, intelligence and deception at all levels of war are of central importance to Sun Tzu. Clausewitz, however, is pessimistic about the accuracy of intelligence and the utility of deception at the operational and tactical levels. In general, Sun Tzu advocates more reliance upon information operations and maneuver warfare to impose surprise and uncertainty on the adversary, while Clausewitz puts his trust in the application of concentrated force at a decisive point. The Strategy and War Course includes many examples of the successful application of both of these principles, allowing students to analyze, assess, and contrast their relevance.

Although both Clausewitz and Sun Tzu recognize the inevitable influence of chance and irrationality upon warfare, they nevertheless see war as an essentially rational political activity that they endeavor to describe with clarity and precision. Clausewitz in particular wants leaders to see war as a rational act by stressing the identification of the national interest, the correlation of ends and means, cost-benefit calculations, careful planning, and the assessment of the opponent's objective, military potential, and probable behavior as well as one's own. A central tenet of Sun Tzu is that the sole purpose of the military is to secure and ultimately enhance the wealth and power of the state. Both authors also demonstrate that war requires the coordination of all instruments of national

power—diplomatic, informational, military, and economic—and stress the critical role of multinational coordination, or, as they would put it, alliances.

U.S. joint and service doctrine is derived from concepts and definitions of Clausewitz and Sun Tzu. Current official documents, such as the *National Security Strategy of the United States* and the *National Military Strategy of the United States*, restate Clausewitz’s concept of the policy-strategy match. Meanwhile, other sources of strategic guidance, such as those dealing with information warfare and transformation, are consistent with Sun Tzu. Still, while both texts give considerable emphasis to analyzing the relationship between policy and strategy in war, they also provide the analytical tools that apply to the operational level of warfare. Both texts explore ethical tenets of the profession of arms, including the value of education in the art of war. Both authors were deeply concerned with the intellectual development of leaders in the profession of arms whom they identified as essential to the security of the state. They expected those who follow them to develop the concepts and skills that are essential to the rigorous critical analysis by elaborating theory and studying military history—the skills that will prepare today’s leaders to devise and evaluate alternative courses of action as a way to achieve strategic success in the future. Their expectations are the same as those of the Naval War College. *On War* and *The Art of War* are natural points of departure to begin thinking critically about strategy and war.

Mao is the third major strategic theorist examined at the beginning of the Strategy and War Course and is the preeminent strategist for weaker states and non-state actors. His writings drew upon other great works on strategy and politics, including Clausewitz and Sun Tzu. Indeed, Mao’s work represents an important synthesis of *On War* and *The Art of War*. In *On Protracted War*, Mao develops a strategy for how a non-state actor could gradually build organizational strength to mobilize its armed strength to defeat more powerful state adversaries. Asymmetric strategies employing irregular warfare—such as terrorism, insurgency, and information operations—loom large in Mao’s writings. Mao blended theory with his experience as a strategic practitioner. He led the Communists to victory in the Chinese Civil War, demonstrating how an initially weak political organization in pursuit of revolutionary objectives could overthrow the existing regime and, subsequently, wage a global ideological struggle. Mao’s success has inspired leaders of other extremist movements, including al Qaeda, to look for guidance in his writings and life. Mao’s writings raise important questions for ethical discussions regarding war and statecraft, and have great relevance for understanding contemporary long wars involving extremist groups that employ subversion, propaganda, political agitation, popular mobilization, terrorism, and insurgency to defeat their enemies.

## **B. Discussion Questions:**

1. Clausewitz emphasizes the primacy of politics in waging war. He writes: “Policy will permeate all military operations.” At the same time, the pervasiveness of policy “does not imply that the political aim is a tyrant.” Political considerations do not determine “the posting of guards,” and “policy will not extend its influence to operational

details.” How can we differentiate and reconcile the first statement with the others? Does Clausewitz’s view of the proper relationships between war and politics and between military and civilian groups differ from that of Sun Tzu? See in particular Book 1, Chapter 1 and Book 8, Chapters 6A-6B of *On War* and Chapter 3 of *The Art of War*.

2. Clausewitz and Sun Tzu agree that, although war can be studied systematically, it is an art, not a science. What are the implications of this assumption for the critical analysis of strategy and war?

3. What does Clausewitz mean by critical analysis?

4. Among Clausewitz’s most important concepts are the culminating point of victory, the center of gravity, and the need to be strong at the decisive point. How useful are such concepts for strategic and operational leaders as they strive to comprehend, assess, and reevaluate their environment accurately and continuously?

5. Sun Tzu dramatizes and emphasizes the role of intelligence in warfare. Meanwhile, Clausewitz states: “The only situation a commander can know fully is his own: his opponents he can only know from unreliable intelligence.” Clausewitz goes on to contend that this “can lead him [the commander] to suppose that the initiative lies with the enemy when in fact it remains with him” (Book 1, Chapter 1, Section 18 of *On War*). Comparing these two views, what is the proper role of intelligence in determining a course of action? To what extent does intelligence allow commanders to predict, anticipate, operate, and prevail in the uncertain environment of war?

6. Clausewitz explains and emphasizes the need to understand the importance of three interrelated aspects of war: reason, passion, and the play of chance, creativity, and uncertainty. What is the role of each in war, and do they interact differently at the operational level of war as opposed to the strategic or tactical? What challenges do these aspects, particularly passion, present for ethical leadership and the profession of arms?

7. Sun Tzu argues, “To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill” (Chapter 3 of *The Art of War*). Meanwhile, Clausewitz states, “Since in war too small an effort can result not just in failure but in positive harm, each side is driven to outdo the other, which sets up an interaction” (Book 8, Chapter 3B of *On War*). Are these two statements contradictory or complementary? What are the dangers of adhering to only one of these statements?

8. In Book 1, Chapter 2 of *On War*, Clausewitz refers to “operations that have *direct political repercussions*, that are designed in the first place to disrupt the opposing alliance, or to paralyze it, that gain us new allies, favorably affect the political scene, etc.” At the operational level, does this contradict his guidance in the chapter’s introduction that “the fighting forces must be *destroyed*”?

9. Clausewitz recognizes that war can be fought for either a limited or an unlimited objective. How do they differ from each other? Is one type of war more political than the other?
10. Some contemporary observers have argued that technological innovation might soon lift the fog of war completely, thus invalidating some of Clausewitz's most important insights. Do you agree?
11. As we strive to understand the contemporary security environment and the potential contributions of all instruments of national power, which do you regard as more relevant to the war against al Qaeda and Associated Movements (AQAM): *On War*, *The Art of War*, or the writings of Mao?
12. How might Book 5, Chapter 4 of *On War* be rewritten to assist joint leaders in the execution of national strategies and policies in relation to modern warfare, either within one service or in the context of joint warfare?
13. Leaders often need to anticipate and recognize change. Did Mao radically modify Clausewitz and Sun Tzu for the circumstances of revolutionary war in the twentieth century, or was he merely adapting them?
14. Sun Tzu puts a premium on acquiring a decisive superiority in the information domain to make timely, bold, and effective decisions in war. How realistic is it to expect that one side can gain such a decisive information edge against a competent adversary?
15. What are the principal strategic and operational tenets in Mao's writings that weaker actors can employ to defeat more powerful adversaries?
16. What role did Mao assign to intelligence, military deception, psychological operations, and information security in his writings on strategy and war?
17. In Book 1 of *On War*, Clausewitz explains the challenges presented by friction and the fog of war. If a commander communicates with clarity and precision, to what extent might these challenges be mitigated?
18. How do Clausewitz, Sun Tzu, and Mao address the role of ethical considerations in decision-making on politics, strategy, and warfare?
19. What roles and responsibilities do Clausewitz, Sun Tzu, and Mao assign to military leaders in policy and strategy decision-making?
20. The phrase "the enemy gets a vote" is commonly used in today's discourse. How do Clausewitz, Sun Tzu, and Mao address the role of the enemy in war?

### C. Readings:

1. Clausewitz, Carl von. *On War*. Edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976. Pages 61-63, 69-71, 75-123, 127-150, 156-174, 177-222, 258-262, 282-291, 357-359, 370-376, 479-487, 524-528, 566-573, 577-637.

[This translation of *On War*, undertaken by the historians Howard and Paret, with a commentary by the strategic analyst Bernard Brodie, was much heralded when it appeared in 1976, in the immediate aftermath of U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War. Forty years later, it remains the most widely read English-language version of Clausewitz's work.]

2. Sun Tzu. *The Art of War*. Translated by Samuel B. Griffith. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980. Pages 63-149.

[Griffith's experience in the United States Marine Corps, as well as his deep understanding of Asian languages and cultures, make his translation of this important text on war both scholarly and approachable for the professional military officer.]

3. *Seeing Red: The Development of Maoist Thought on Insurgency*. (Selected Readings)

[These extracts from Mao's writings on insurgency, including his famous *On Protracted War*, were selected by Bradford Lee, emeritus professor in the Strategy Department, who has added introductory comments about each excerpt from Mao's writings.]

4. Handel, Michael I. *Masters of War: Classical Strategic Thought*. London: Cass, 2001. Pages 1-52, 155-164.

[Handel, a former professor in the Strategy Department, argues that despite differences in emphasis and substance, there is a universal or unified strategic logic which transcends the wide gaps in time, culture, and historical experience of various nations. Students are encouraged to challenge Handel's thesis and assess the extent to which culture might impact planning and operations. Other chapters, appendices, and charts in this book are assigned later in the course to serve as a useful reference.]

5. Van Riper, Paul K. "The Relevance of History to the Military Profession: An American Marine's View." In *The Past as Prologue: The Importance of History to the Military Profession*, edited by Williamson Murray and Richard Hart Sinnreich. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006. Pages 34-54. (Selected Readings)

[Lieutenant General Van Riper provides an assessment of the value of history for the study of strategy and reflects on the value of his education at the Naval War College for his development as a member of the profession of arms.]

**D. Learning Outcomes:** This case study, the first of the Strategy and War Course, introduces students to some of the greatest writers on strategy and operations. Their theories have significant overlap with the Learning Areas and Objectives put forward in the OPMEP. This case study supports:

- CJCS Joint Learning Areas and Objectives 2c, 3c, 3d, 3e, 3g, 4e, 4f, 6a, 6b, 6c, 6d, 6e, and 6f. Emphasis will be placed on the following topics, enabling students to:
  - Comprehend the relationships among the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war (3c).
  - Comprehend how theory and principles of war pertain to the strategic and operational levels of war (3d).
  - Comprehend how the theorists address the employment of all elements of national power for obtaining the nation's political objectives in war (3e).
  - Comprehend the relationships among national objectives, military objectives, and conflict termination, as illustrated by previous wars, campaigns, and operations (3g).
  - Comprehend the role of society and culture in the use of force (4f).
  - Become empowered with analytical frameworks to support the decision-making process (6b).
  - Comprehend competing interpretations about the basic values and principles associated with the profession of arms (6a and 6c).
  - Analyze how the theorists addressed in this case study account for adaptation and innovation (6f).

## II. DEMOCRACY, LEADERSHIP, AND STRATEGY IN A PROTRACTED WAR—THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR

**A. General:** The Peloponnesian War provides a prototype case study to evaluate key concepts and analytical frameworks to comprehend the interrelationships among the political, strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war. Although this conflict occurred in ancient Greece, it yields fresh insights for analyzing strategy and the employment of all instruments of national power to achieve strategic objectives. In this war, a sea power and democracy, Athens, fought the Peloponnesian League, a coalition of Greek states led by a militaristic land power, Sparta. The contest resulted in a war lasting twenty-seven years.

The historian Thucydides provided an epic account of this struggle. Thucydides served as an Athenian general in the Peloponnesian War and wrote about what he experienced in living through the struggles that convulsed the world of the Greek city-states. He meant for his history to be “a possession for all time,” and that has indeed turned out to be the case. In testimony before Congress, General Martin Dempsey, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, used insights from Thucydides as an analytical framework for assessing the intentions of Iran. General Dempsey stated: “Thucydides in the 5th century B.C. said that all strategy is some combination of reaction to fear, honor and interests; and I think all nations act in response to one of those three things.”<sup>5</sup> All wars, Thucydides wrote, will resemble the conflict between Athens and Sparta, as long as human nature remains the same. His account of this particular struggle was meant to provide a general understanding of the dynamics of war.

Moreover, understanding this one conflict serves as a point of departure for analyzing enduring problems of strategy and war. Thucydides supplies archetypes of the recurring problems of strategy, including the nature of strategic leadership, homeland security, the disruptive effects on society and politics of a biological catastrophe, the decision to mount joint and combined operations, the cultivation of domestic and international support in a long war, and the confrontation with an enemy possessing asymmetric capabilities. Additional strategic problems highlighted include sea control, the assessment of an enemy from a radically different culture, the impact of foreign intervention in an ongoing war, the use of revolution to undermine an adversary’s government or alliance, the constraints and opportunities derived from geopolitical position, the ethical conundrums inherent in the use of violence to achieve political ends, and the unique problems, strengths, and weaknesses of democracies at war.

Thucydides offers a parable in examining how a great democracy lost a war to a bitter rival and, as a result, lost its way of life. Learning from the example of Athens may help us to think clearly about the strategic challenges of democracy in our own age. To be sure, the differences between Athenian democracy and modern liberal, representative

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<sup>5</sup> General Martin Dempsey, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Response to Representative Tom Price of Georgia during a Hearing before the Committee on the Budget, House of Representatives, February 29, 2012, Serial No. 112-22, p. 36, <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-112hhrg72697/pdf/CHRG-112hhrg72697.pdf>.

democracy are as glaring as the similarities are intriguing, and the differences are cultural as well as institutional. Nonetheless, the fate of Athens is a spur against complacency in considering alternative futures confronting the United States. Whereas Clausewitz and Sun Tzu encourage rational calculations about the interests of the state, Thucydides reveals the extent to which passion always threatens to escape rational control in time of war, with fatal consequences for both policy and strategy. In Thucydides' recounting of the plague in Athens, the civil war in Corcyra, the witch hunt for religious heretics in Athens, and the revolution and counter-revolution in Athens, he indicates the moral depths to which people can fall, with not merely democratic institutions, but civilization itself proving extraordinarily fragile in the face of the passions unleashed and encouraged by this war. Thucydides' account of the horrors of war—atrocities involving the mass murder of men, women, and children, torture and killing of prisoners, widespread destruction of property—raises the profound question of whether war can ever be a rational tool of statecraft. Additionally, he illustrates the moral and ethical dilemmas that confront leaders in wartime.

Thucydides also emphasizes the extent to which politics shapes both strategy and policy. So while Thucydides takes pains to describe unfolding battles, he also presents political speeches and debates, with different leaders (Archidamus, Pericles, Cleon, Demosthenes, Brasidas, Nicias, Alcibiades, etc.) competing for the power to set policy, frame strategy, and execute operations as commanders in far-flung theaters. The goals of the belligerents and the strategies they chose to achieve them are not self-evident at any stage of this war. The leaders of different cities in Thucydides' account often lie or reveal only part of what they have in mind. As we peer through Thucydides' fog of politics, his account underscores the limits of understanding in any war. Not only do chance, friction, and uncertainty make every strategic decision a gamble, but the private interests and ambitions of different political and military leaders can also triumph over the interests of the state. Clearly, strategy is a continuation of politics in this war, with military commands often divided to reflect the balance of political factions at home. Relations between political and military authorities frequently proved decisive in the success or failure of campaigns, as witnessed by the military operations of the Spartan commander Brasidas, and the Athenian commanders Alcibiades and Nicias.

The origins of this great war appear to lie in something trivial: a dispute between two Greek cities, Corcyra and Corinth, over control of Corcyra's colony, Epidamnus. The dispute eventually drew Athens, Sparta, and their allies into a struggle that lasted nearly three decades. Yet as Thucydides' account unfolds, he makes a case that the truest cause of the war lay in something deeper: Sparta's fear of the growing power of Athens. The efforts of Sparta's allies (Corinth especially) to persuade the Spartan leadership to attempt the overthrow of the Athenian Empire before it dominated the rest of Greece, and the refusal of the Athenian political and military leader, Pericles, to yield to demands from the Peloponnesian League highlight what each side meant to achieve (policy) and how it meant to succeed (strategy). Which side was trying to preserve the status quo? Which was trying to overturn it? Is it possible that each side was trying to preserve a different understanding of the status quo? What was at stake for the states and leaders involved in the war? How did leaders hope to harness the means at their disposal to

achieve their aims? What gave either side hope of success? Were the aims and strategies realistic?

Simple answers to these questions are difficult to find. Not only would the struggle be an asymmetric contest between a land power and a sea power, it would also be a conflict between two coalitions with different strengths and weaknesses. The coalitions were led by two cities with radically different characteristics. Sparta was a militarized regime in which an elite group of citizens, who began their training at age six and served in the army from twenty to sixty, brutally dominated the majority of the population, the helots, whom the Spartans had enslaved several hundred years before. Sparta also had a complex constitutional system of government with multiple checks and balances, making it the most admired city in Greece for its political stability and seeming moderation. Fearing slave revolts, Spartans rarely ventured far from home or stayed away too long. The Athenians, however, were energetic, innovative, and adventurous. They consistently tested the limits of the possible and journeyed almost everywhere in the known world. Their democratic system of government and way of life made them the freest people in Greece at home, though abroad even Pericles admitted that Athens ruled its allies like a tyrant by demanding tribute at the point of a sword. Trade and tribute from its allies made Athens extraordinarily wealthy, while Sparta was self-sufficient, living off the labor of the helots. If Sparta's regime sometimes made it too cautious, Athens' regime perhaps made it too bold. Thucydides views this war not merely in terms of the military capabilities, plans, and objectives, but also in light of all the relevant economic, diplomatic, cultural, geopolitical, institutional, and social dimensions of strategy.

The Greek tradition of warfare consisted of hoplites (heavy armored infantry) from two different cities massing against each other to fight for some contested piece of ground. Wars might be won by one battle fought on a single day. Sparta excelled in this type of warfare, given its military's high level of training. However, the Spartans were unprepared materially and intellectually for the Athenian revolution in military affairs, namely the long walls that enabled Athens to feed itself by sea and withstand a lengthy siege of the city. Predictably, as the conflict unfolded, Athens, the sea power, found it difficult to bring its military strengths to bear against Sparta, the land power, and vice versa, thus producing a protracted stalemate. As much as anything, frustration with the stalemate fueled vengeful passions that led the war to escalate and pushed each side to violate the traditional ethical standards of ancient Greece, even when doing so was not necessarily strategically productive. Yet success for both sides depended on finding a way to make strategy a rational means to political ends. Hope of decisive victory appeared to depend as much on more comprehensive approaches that compensated for strategic weaknesses through other means of national power (diplomacy, intelligence, and economic aid), as on gaining leverage through traditional strengths on land or sea. So Thucydides reveals each side reassessing initial policies and strategies. The Athenians, for example, opened a new theater at Pylos in the Peloponnese to inspire a revolt of the helot slaves against the Spartans. Sparta's ally Corinth used revolution to knock Athens' ally Corcyra out of the war; and Sparta uncharacteristically took the initiative to "liberate" Athens' allies in a daring land campaign in the distant theater of Thrace.

The strengths and weaknesses of Pericles' initial strategy, including his remarkable ability to communicate with the Athenian people, as well as the leadership qualities of the Spartan King Archidamus, deserve close examination for how well the two leaders matched their policy aims with the capabilities at their disposal. The successes and failures of their successors also provide an opportunity to assess strategic adaptation in wartime. In particular, the skill of the Spartan commander Brasidas in combined operations and the ingenuity of the Athenian commander Demosthenes in joint and unconventional operations supply models for thinking about how theater commanders can use such operations for strategic effect. Whereas the pious Athenian commander Nicias seemed to be a conservative Spartan in Athenian clothing, the daring Athenian commander Alcibiades no less often personified the energetic, innovative spirit of Athens, both when he served as a commander and advisor and when his playboy lifestyle so offended the Athenians that they tried him in absentia and sentenced him to death. If Nicias' caution in Sicily lost the opportunity for Athens to exploit its potential gains and avoid disaster, much credit belongs to the Spartan theater commander Gylippus for exploiting Athenian mistakes in Sicily. The ultimate model of strategic adaptation, however, may be Lysander, the Spartan admiral, who found a way to defeat Athens after twenty-seven years of war. To better understand these strategic leaders, the readings include several biographical sketches from Plutarch, who discusses their personalities and accomplishments in greater detail than does Thucydides.

Given the length and costs of this war, not merely to Athens and Sparta, but to all of Greece, it is worthwhile asking whether each side should have reassessed its political goals and sought to make a lasting peace. Thucydides shows Athens and Sparta seeking peace but never quite managing to terminate the war—Athens during the plague that killed as much as a third of its people, Sparta after its defeats at Pylos and Sphacteria, and both Athens and Sparta after Sparta's victory at Amphipolis. Whether conflict termination failed because one side or the other demanded too much politically or did not go far enough militarily to compel its enemy to do its will is a matter of dispute. So, too, is whether the Peace of Nicias, which Thucydides considered nothing more than an unstable truce, could have produced a lasting peace in Greece or was doomed to failure because it had not eliminated the original causes of the war and lacked effective enforcement mechanisms. Since the largest land battle of the war, at Mantinea, occurred during the Peace of Nicias, students must critically analyze whether the Athenians would have done better by committing more forces to aid their principal ally on land, Argos, to defeat the Spartan army decisively, or by laboring to fix the peace before it broke down completely. Ironically, the climax of Thucydides' account, the Sicilian expedition, was set in motion while Athens was still technically at peace with Sparta, thus making it possible for the Athenians to avoid having to fight on two fronts when it went to war in Sicily.

Thucydides' account of the Athenian expedition to Sicily reads like a novel or, perhaps more accurately, a Greek tragedy. It shifts back and forth between the home front in Athens and the field in Sicily, providing a case for examining how events inside Athens shaped the planning and execution of the joint campaign, and vice versa. Despite its overwhelming material advantages, Athens found itself bogged down in a protracted

siege of a walled city, exactly the worst strategic option from Sun Tzu's point of view. The Athenians faced a complex operating environment in Sicily and a tough adversary in Syracuse, a city-state almost as populous as Athens. Whether the resulting quagmire and ultimate loss of the elite of the Athenian army and navy occurred because of unclear political goals, inadequate strategy, poor assessment, or poor execution of an otherwise sound strategy and operational plan remains a matter of vigorous debate. With defeat in Sicily, Athens faced a coup at home, revolt among its allies, and intervention by Persia on the side of Sparta and its allies. If Athens had not overextended itself, then perhaps Athens might have won the war or at least avoided catastrophic defeat.

Nonetheless, the Athenians proved remarkably resilient. They recovered from defeat in Sicily to continue the war for almost another decade. However, the Athenian debacle at the Battle of Aigospotamoi in 405 resulted in Athens' surrender the following year. Whether Sparta and its allies could have defeated Athens without the Persian involvement that enabled them to overthrow Athens at sea is another disputed question. Perhaps Athens' defeat resulted more from poor generalship rather than the faults of Athenian democracy.

Thucydides' account of the strategic failure of this great democracy supplies an opportunity to look at ourselves in the mirror. To what extent do modern democracies reflect the characteristics of ancient Athens and how much can we learn from the Athenian experience? If Clausewitz and Sun Tzu were right to suggest that self-knowledge is the foundation of any effective policy and strategy, then is Thucydides' account of the rise and fall of Athens a valuable beginning for understanding the problems a modern democracy is likely to experience in war?

## **B. Essay and Discussion Questions:**

1. Which leader did a better job of net assessment and of comprehending the security environment prior to the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War: Pericles or Archidamus?
2. Did it make sound strategic sense for Sparta to embark on a war with Athens before Sparta had acquired a more powerful navy?
3. Evaluate Spartan strategy and conduct of operations up to the Peace of Nicias. What were the strengths and weaknesses of the Spartan strategy? Did the strengths outweigh the weaknesses?
4. How well did the sea power, Athens, compensate for its weaknesses and exploit its strengths in fighting against the land power, Sparta?
5. How well did the land power, Sparta, compensate for its weaknesses and exploit its strengths in fighting against the sea power, Athens?

6. Did either Athens or Sparta have an opportunity to deliver a decisive blow during the war and, if so, why did it fail to do so?
7. Which side, Athens or Sparta, did a better job of strategic adaptation before the Peace of Nicias?
8. Which theater commander was more skilled at using joint and combined operations to produce significant strategic effects, Demosthenes or Brasidas?
9. Was undertaking the Sicilian expedition a good strategy badly executed, or bad strategy?
10. How effective were different instruments of state power in achieving the policy objectives of Athens and Sparta? Was a more comprehensive approach called for?
11. In light of the Athenian joint campaign at Pylos, the Spartan combined campaign in Thrace, and the campaigns of both Sparta and Athens in Sicily, explain the risks and rewards of opening a new theater in an ongoing conflict.
12. Which strategic leader in this war came closest to fitting Clausewitz's definition of a military genius? Which leader best managed the fog, friction, and chaos of war?
13. Which leader in this war came closest to Sun Tzu's ideal of a great general? Which leader was most effective at exploiting surprise and uncertainty?
14. Athens sued for peace unsuccessfully in 430 B.C., as did Sparta in 425 B.C., and even the Peace of Nicias broke down almost immediately. Why did these efforts at war termination fail?
15. In light of the campaign of Brasidas in Thrace and the many quarrels among Athenian military and political leaders, in what ways did problems in civil-military relations impede strategic effectiveness?
16. "Sparta and its allies did not defeat Athens so much as Athens defeated itself." Do you agree?
17. What does the experience of Athens reveal about the problems democracies are likely to face in fighting a protracted war against determined, ideologically hostile adversaries?
18. How strategically effective were the strikes by Athens and Sparta on each other's homelands?
19. What moral and ethical dilemmas confronted the people and leaders of Athens in their strategic decisions?

20. Honor, fear, and self-interest are presented in Thucydides' history as motivating the actions of leaders and peoples in their search for security and prosperity. How did these three motives shape the policy and strategy decisions of leaders in Athens and Sparta?

21. Athens could not afford to suffer a catastrophic loss in the maritime domain; when the Athenians lost command of the sea, they lost the war. What then accounts for the risks run by Athenian leaders in the employment of their naval forces?

22. How well did the leaders of Sparta minimize risk in the employment of their army?

23. What principles of effective communication can be learned from studying the speeches of the strategic leaders presented in Thucydides' account of the Peloponnesian War?

### **C. Readings:**

1. Strassler, Robert B., ed. *The Landmark Thucydides*. New York: The Free Press, 1996. Books 1-8 (pages 3-548).

[Thucydides covers all nine of our course themes in his account of this war, compelling his readers to think through the problems of strategy and war.]

#### *Key Passages:*

Book I – Pages 3-85 (With emphasis on the speeches).

Book II – Outbreak of the War, pages 89-107.  
– Pericles' Funeral Oration, the Plague, and the Policy of Pericles, pages 110-128.

Book III – Revolt of Mytilene, pages 159-167.  
– The Mytilenian Debate, pages 175-184.  
– Civil War in Corcyra, pages 194-201.

Book IV – Athens' Success at Pylos, pages 223-246.  
– Brasidas in Thrace, pages 263-272.  
– Brasidas Captures Amphipolis, pages 279-285.

Book V – Peace of Nicias, pages 309-316.  
– The Alliance between Athens and Argos, and the Battle of Mantinea, pages 327-350.  
– The Melian Dialogue, pages 350-357.

Book VI – Launching of the Sicilian Expedition, pages 361-379.

Book VII – Athenian Disaster, pages 427-478.

Book VIII – Reaction to Athenian Defeat in Sicily, pages 481-483.

2. Plutarch. *The Rise and Fall of Athens: Nine Greek Lives*. Translated with an introduction by Ian Scott-Kilvert. New York and London: Penguin, 1960. Pages 252-318.

[Plutarch’s biographies of Alcibiades and Lysander deal with several key course themes and concepts: the nature of strategic leadership especially as it relates to critical thinking, decision-making, adaptation, and innovation; the impact of democratic politics on strategy, policy, and civil-military relations; and debates about conflict termination within Sparta.]

3. Strassler, Robert B., ed. *The Landmark Xenophon’s Hellenika*. New York: Anchor Books, 2009. Books I.1-II.2 (pages 3-52) and Appendix O (pages 438-444).

[Xenophon was an Athenian aristocrat, soldier, and philosopher. His *Hellenika*, or “History of Greeks,” carries on Thucydides’ narrative of the war to its conclusion. Also included are fragments from the *Histories* of Diodorus Siculus which cover the key naval battles of Arginousai and Aigospotamoi.]

4. Kagan, Donald. *On the Origins of War and the Preservation of Peace*. New York: Doubleday, 1995. Pages 15-74.

[Kagan’s account is helpful for understanding the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War as well as the geopolitical context and the coalition dynamics of fifth century B.C. Greece.]

5. Mahan, Alfred Thayer. *Naval Strategy Compared and Contrasted with the Principles and Practice of Military Operations on Land*. Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1915. Pages 222-230. (Selected Readings)

[In this selection from a published series of lectures, Alfred Thayer Mahan evaluates the Athenian plans for the campaign in Sicily against his own theoretical prescriptions and provides insightful critical analysis of how the campaign might have been better executed.]

**D. Learning Outcomes:** Thucydides argues that human nature does not change. Enduring questions arising from the conflict between the Athenian Empire and the Peloponnesian League remain with us today. This case study forces the students to apply the above contention about the timelessness of human nature to objectives set forth in the OPMEP as well as those that focus specifically on naval matters. This case study supports:

- CJCS Joint Learning Areas and Objectives 2c, 3a, 3c, 3d, 3e, 3f, 3g, 4b, 4f, 4g, 6b, 6c, 6d, 6e, and 6f. Emphasis will be placed on the following topics and how they relate to the Peloponnesian War so as to enable students to:
  - Understand alternative courses of action in the face of complex operating environments from this historical case and apply them to the current environment (2c).
  - Comprehend how commanders assess requirements and create forces to meet those needs (3a).
  - Analyze the relationships among the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war (3c).
  - Analyze considerations for employing joint forces and how theory and principles of war pertain to the operational level of war (3d).
  - Analyze the relationships among all elements of national power and the importance of interagency and multinational coordination in these elements, including homeland security and defense (3e).
  - Analyze a plan for employment of joint forces at the operational level of war (3f and 4b).
  - Analyze the relationships among national objectives, military objectives, and conflict termination (3g).
  - Analyze the diverse influences of geography, regional politics, cultures, religions, and philosophy of governance and its effect on military operations (4f).
  - Analyze strategic leadership at the theater level of command (4g).
  - Analyze the critical thinking and the decision-making by real world, operational level leaders (6b).
  - Analyze the extent to which passion always threatens to escape rational control and affect the values of the profession of arms (6c).
  - Analyze the extent to which historical leaders demonstrate archetypes of Mission Command that are relevant to today's Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational Environment (6d).
  - Analyze the effects of adaptation and innovation on the planning process (6f).
  
- Additional objectives including Naval Professional Military Education. The students will:
  - Understand operational warfare at sea—past, present, and future.
  - Become skilled in applying sea power to achieve strategic effects across a range of military operations.

### III. SEA POWER, JOINT AND COMBINED OPERATIONS, AND IRREGULAR WARFARE—THE WAR FOR AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE

**A. General:** At dawn on June 29, 1776, five days before the Continental Congress signed the Declaration of Independence, the largest European maritime expedition in history arrived outside New York City to enable the British Empire to regain control of its rebellious colonies in North America. Britain sent 10 ships of the line—the battleships of their day—along with some 60 smaller warships, 100 troop transports, 10,000 seamen, 23,000 British soldiers, and 10,000 Hessians to crush organized resistance in New York in a massive joint operation. Another 500 auxiliary ships were strung out across the Atlantic behind the armada to tend to every logistical need. Within a month, the British had virtually destroyed the recently constituted Continental Army under General George Washington. His original force of 10,000 Continental soldiers and 9,000 militia was outflanked and forced into hasty retreat. Washington was only able to avoid complete envelopment and total destruction of his army through an emergency evacuation.

Suffering from massive desertions, worn out by forced marches, and often without food, shoes, or shelter, Washington's fleeing army was reduced to no more than 3,000 men by December 1776, with many of the remaining soldiers' enlistments due to expire at the end of the month. The British campaign, led by two brothers, Admiral Richard Lord Howe and General Sir William Howe, had spectacular operational success, but surprisingly failed to achieve the British political objective of restoring obedience to the Crown. This case explores why the British failed and the Americans, the weaker power by any conventional standard, achieved their independence in a protracted revolutionary war that foreshadows many of the insurgencies against occupation forces of the modern era. In doing so, it examines the challenges of matching operations to strategy in a volatile and uncertain environment.

The War for American Independence is of strategic interest because it provides an opportunity to study three different types of war at once. It was a war within a war within a war: an irregular or partisan war for the allegiance of the American people; a conventional war between the Continental Army under George Washington and the British army supported by the Royal Navy; and after the British defeat at Saratoga in 1777, a global conflict among the great European maritime powers that stretched beyond North America to include fighting in the English Channel, the Mediterranean, the West Indies, the South Atlantic, and the Indian Ocean. Moreover, the War for Independence is of operational interest because its decisive battle, the joint and combined operation of French and American forces at Yorktown, compels us to investigate the circumstances and conditions under which such campaigns are most likely to yield their desired strategic results.

A revolutionary war hinges on the struggle for the political allegiance of a group of people. That defining characteristic links the War for American Independence to more recent insurgencies, some of which we shall study later in this course. Nonetheless, the "liberal-republican" political ideology of the Patriots fighting for independence was quite

different from that of more recent revolutionaries. The British found it difficult to understand the motivations of their enemy, even with the advantage of similarities in language and culture. This proved to be a liability for Britain and a significant asset for revolutionary leaders seeking to sustain and expand their base of political support.

The Patriots relied on all of the elements of national power and a mix of conventional and unconventional military operations. Patriot leaders employed these efforts differently, however. Washington preferred the conventional, while General Nathanael Greene, of Rhode Island, led a strategically effective operation coordinating regular and irregular forces in the Southern Campaign. American support for the revolution was not unanimous, especially at the beginning of the conflict. Insurgents had to earn support and deny it to their enemy, who sought to do the same. Hence, this conflict requires us to examine how insurgents and counterinsurgents fight to sustain the loyalty of their followers, win the support of neutrals and the undecided, and marginalize the influence of their adversaries. The War for American Independence also affords us a chance to evaluate how well both sides understood the security environment and the potential contributions of all instruments of national power available to them.

This case also invites an effort to understand the impact of foreign intervention in an ongoing war and the challenges of multinational cooperation. France intervened in 1778 followed the next year by Spain, and the Dutch joined the conflict in 1780. This made the war in the colonies a war within a larger global struggle against Britain and its empire. As the war expanded, the British had to reassess their strategic priorities as their colonies in the Caribbean, the Mediterranean, and India became vulnerable. Meanwhile, France faced the challenge of how to develop the capabilities of American land and sea forces.

The global war was principally maritime in nature, fought for the control of the sea lines of communication between Europe and various colonies and outposts. This global naval conflict provides us with an opportunity to consider the strategic uses of sea power in light of the theories of Alfred Thayer Mahan. As a member of the faculty and President of the Naval War College, Mahan wrote his famous book, *The Influence of Sea Power upon History*. By examining Mahan's critique of British naval strategy during the war, we confront enduring strategic issues: geopolitics, commerce and the material foundations of strategy, naval preparedness, land versus sea power, joint operations, naval concentration, when to risk a fleet, the decisiveness of naval battle, and the uses and limits of blockades.

This case explores the strategic effects of joint and combined operations. Successful British joint operations at New York in 1776 and at Charleston in 1780 failed to yield the desired strategic results. Yet, the only significant French and American joint and combined operations of the war, the siege of Yorktown by both land and sea, broke the will of the British government to continue the war. Jointness is not an end in itself, but one means among many to achieve strategic success. Understanding why the British failed to obtain their desired strategic results but the French and Americans succeeded

may enable us to discriminate between the kinds of joint operations that win wars and those that do not.

Both of the major protagonists, but especially the colonists, also grappled with surprise and uncertainty. Assessing how well they anticipated and responded to unexpected events may help us understand the eventual outcome. Yet many other factors also deserve attention, such as the nature of the war, the availability of local support and intelligence, control of sea lines of communications, allied cooperation, civil-military and intra-military relations, command structures, coalition leadership, and the need to keep pressure on the enemy without passing the culminating point.

This case explores the evolution of George Washington as commander of the Continental Army from the darkest days of the War for Independence, when catastrophic defeat seemed all but inevitable for the Americans, to his greatest triumph at Yorktown. Washington's partisans ascribe much of the credit for American victory to his strategic and operational leadership, his understanding of the profession of arms, and his capacity for making ethical decisions. After numerous mistakes, he adapted and matured enough to deny the British early victory, protract the war, and seek decisive battle when opportunity allowed. As much by necessity as by choice, he employed a "Fabian" strategy, or one that avoided large high-stakes battles in favor of wearing out the British through an attritional campaign. Although this approach required staying on the strategic defensive for most of the war, it enabled the Continental Army to survive. Tactical offensives supplied incremental dividends until Washington could seize the initiative and transition to the strategic offensive. However, even during the war, some questioned Washington's skill both as a strategist and as an adaptive operator. In fact, many thought that the outcome of the revolution could be explained more by British blunders. A critical analysis of Washington's leadership and the failures of the British may thus help us come to terms with the nature of strategic and operational leadership itself.

Finally, it is imperative to consider the political context in which the military strategy developed, since Washington did not bear the responsibility of leadership alone. Having served in the Second Continental Congress, Washington knew most of the political leaders of the revolution, many of whom were well-versed in the strategic uses of information, diplomacy, intelligence, and foreign aid. Congress consciously employed the Declaration of Independence as a means of strategic communication and as an information operation. Nonetheless, the political organization of the Americans complicated winning the war. Congress represented a coalition of independent states wary of any central authority that might become dangerous to their own liberty. Without the authority to raise troops and revenue on its own, Congress often found it difficult to support Washington's rag-tag army in the field, with many wondering whether inflation, bankruptcy, desertion, and even mutinies in the army were a greater danger to American independence than the British.

The War for American Independence case study includes readings from multiple perspectives including Patriot, Loyalist, British, and French. The variety of viewpoints allows students to better grasp multiple sides of a strategic problem and particularly

highlights the concept of interaction. For example, a stronger appreciation of British decision-making offers a window into the British war effort and helps explain why an American victory was anything but a foregone conclusion. The personalities of the British military and political leadership as depicted in the readings offer a glimpse into how the British leadership framed and acted on a series of growing political and military crises within the context of an irregular, conventional, regional, and ultimately global war.

## **B. Essay and Discussion Questions:**

1. What was the apparent likelihood that the Americans could win their struggle with Great Britain when the United States declared its independence in July 1776?
2. Was the British decision to pacify American resistance by force of arms counterproductive to Great Britain's overall objectives?
3. Assuming that the War for American Independence was a struggle for the allegiance of the American people, compare how well the strategies and operations of American and British commanders were suited to the nature of the war.
4. Why did British military successes in North America during 1776 fail to produce a decisive victory over the Americans?
5. In 1778, after France entered the war, did the British still have a chance to win the war?
6. Given the international environment and the instruments of national power available to the Americans, could the United States have won its independence without the assistance of France?
7. Why did British leaders find it so difficult to reassess and to adapt their strategy during this conflict?
8. Why was Great Britain unable to translate its naval strength into decisive strategic effects during the War for American Independence?
9. Why did British joint operations in the southern colonies between 1778 and 1781 fail to win the war for Britain?
10. Was American success in achieving independence due more to the strategic skill of George Washington or to the operational and strategic mistakes of the British?
11. Given the overwhelming British victories in New York and New Jersey in 1776, how were American leaders able to avoid catastrophic defeat and eventually win the war?

12. How well did Washington and his British counterparts anticipate and respond to the surprise and uncertainty created by the fog and friction of the war?

13. The United States fought the War for Independence as a coalition of thirteen separate states in alliance with France. How well did George Washington and the Continental Congress manage these different coalitions?

14. How well did the Patriots use information operations, deception, and intelligence during the War for American Independence?

15. Was George Washington's decision to engage the British in the New York and New Jersey campaign of 1776 counterproductive to overall American strategic interests?

16. In *The Influence of Sea Power upon History*, Mahan was harshly critical of British naval strategy during the War for American Independence. Do you agree with his critique?

17. Who would rate George Washington better as a general: Clausewitz, Sun Tzu, or Mao?

18. Why did Britain maintain most of its empire at the conclusion of the War for American Independence, while the end of the Peloponnesian War resulted in the destruction of the Athenian Empire?

### **C. Readings:**

1. Ferling, John. *Whirlwind: The American Revolution and the War That Won It*. New York: Bloomsbury Press, 2015. Pages 4-318.

[Ferling traces the events that led to civil conflict and a transformation of politics and society in America. The result was the War for American Independence, the outcome of which Ferling argues was contingent on leadership and strategy and was in doubt until the very last year of the conflict. Even during the peace talks, the United States might have emerged from the war far weaker and more vulnerable than it actually did were it not for adept American diplomatic efforts in war termination.]

2. Weigley, Russell F. *The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1977. Pages 3-39.

[In what is widely considered a classic study, Weigley examines American strategy from the perspective of both conventional operations and partisan warfare, suggesting a symbiotic relationship between the two.]

3. Mackesy, Piers. "British Strategy in the War of American Independence," *Yale Review*, vol. 52 (1963). Pages 539-557. (Selected Readings)

[Mackesy explains the rationality of British governmental strategy, including the decisions made by George III and Lord Germain. Mackesy analyzes British advantages during the war that made the ultimate American victory far from inevitable.]

4. O'Shaughnessy, Andrew Jackson. *The Men Who Lost America: British Leadership, the American Revolution, and the Fate of the Empire*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2013. Pages 4-14, 83-122, 165-203, 320-352.

[O'Shaughnessy offers a red team analysis of the strategic environment built around the perspectives of key British personalities and decision-makers. The assigned chapters include General William Howe and Admiral Richard Howe; Secretary of State for the Colonies, Lord George Germain; and the First Lord of the Admiralty, the Earl of Sandwich.]

5. Mahan, Alfred Thayer. *The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783*. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1918. Pages iii-vi, 1-89, 505-541.

[Mahan's study examines the elements of sea power and analyzes where Britain went wrong with its naval strategy, all the while advancing a "blue water" theory of war at sea.]

6. Pritchard, James. "French Strategy in the American Revolution: A Reappraisal," *Naval War College Review* 47, no. 4 (autumn 1994). Pages 83-108. (Selected Readings)

[Pritchard examines the French decision for war, the French alliance with both the Americans and the Spanish, and the global naval war.]

7. "Fundamental Documents of the American Revolution." (Selected Readings)

[These readings prove useful for understanding the cultural, social, material, institutional, and international dimensions of strategy during this war. The first document dates from 1775 and provides Edmund Burke's skeptical British assessment of a war with the thirteen colonies. The next document is the Declaration of Independence. This is followed by a set of documents essential for comprehending Washington's Fabian strategy. The final two documents provide short responses to the Declaration of Independence by colonists who remained loyal to Britain.]

**D. Learning Outcomes:** This case study supports the OPMEP by applying the theories, themes, and frameworks developed throughout the course to examine the concepts of sea power, traditional, and irregular warfare as well as joint and coalition operations. This case study supports:

- CJCS Joint Learning Areas and Objectives 2c, 3b, 3c, 3d, 3e, 3f, 3g, 4a, 4e, 4f, 6b, 6c, 6e, and 6f. Emphasis will be placed on the following topics, enabling students to:
  - Comprehend command relationships between ground and naval commanders (3b).
  - Comprehend the interrelationships among the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war (3c).
  - Comprehend the theory and principles of traditional and irregular warfare at the operational level of war (3d).
  - Comprehend the relationship among all elements of national power and the importance of interagency and multinational coordination in these elements (3e).
  - Analyze a plan for the employment of joint forces at the operational level of war (3f).
  - Comprehend the relationships among national objectives, military objectives, and conflict termination, as illustrated by previous wars, campaigns, and operations (4a).
  - Comprehend the factors of geopolitics and culture and how they relate to strategy (4f).
  - Comprehend how critical thinking and the decision-making by real world, operational level leaders coped with surprise and uncertainty (6b).
  - Comprehend the values of the profession of arms as demonstrated through the generalship of Washington (6c).
  - Analyze the effects of adaptation and innovation on the planning and operations (6f).
  
- Naval Professional Military Education objectives. The students will:
  - Become skilled in applying sea power to achieve strategic effects across a range of military operations.
  - Understand concepts of naval strategy as put forth by Mahan.

#### **IV. MARITIME STRATEGY, JOINT OPERATIONS, AND WAR TERMINATION IN A LIMITED REGIONAL CONFLICT—THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR**

**A. General:** This case examines the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905), a regional conflict between an established great power and a rising challenger that sought to overturn the balance of power. Whereas Russia had been the dominant Eurasian land power throughout the nineteenth century, Japan started modernizing only in 1868. Little more than a generation later, it defeated China in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895 and then fought Russia in 1904-1905. These were remarkable feats for a resource-poor island state. Japan's strategy reveals many of the key elements necessary to prosecute a regional war, notably well-thought-out coordination of the diplomatic, informational, military, and economic elements of national power, equally well-coordinated land and sea operations, and foresight with regard to war termination. At the same time, however, Japan took an enormous risk in challenging a power possessing resources on a continental scale. In contrast, Russian strategy illustrates the dangers of failing to understand an adversary's culture and military potential. Despite Japan's success, however, this limited war did not resolve the underlying problem of regional instability caused by failing regimes in Korea and China, where the land combat took place.

This conflict reveals fundamental geostrategic problems such as the relationship between land and sea operations. Moreover, it considers the overarching role of the profession of arms. Despite major advantages in resources, men under arms, naval vessels, interior lines, and strategic depth, Russia lost the war to a rising power whose military transformation Russian policy-makers had grossly underestimated. The limited carrying capacity of the Trans-Siberian Railway and the Chinese Eastern Railway (the Manchurian link to Vladivostok and Port Arthur) precluded a rapid buildup of Russian ground forces. This deficit in land transportation allowed the Japanese to achieve numerical superiority in the first half of the war. Japanese forces also imposed surprise and uncertainty on their opponents. The navy launched a surprise attack on the Russian naval base at Port Arthur in Manchuria, allowing armies to land on the Asian mainland in both Korea and China. The Russo-Japanese War thus demonstrates how the weaker antagonist can win a limited, regional war. It also highlights the consequences for the stronger belligerent should its leadership fail to produce theater policies and plans, innovate, or exercise sound judgment in a complex and uncertain environment.

Yet Japan's initial gains did not put a rapid end to the conflict; instead, it lasted for almost nineteen months. The fighting on land revolved around the desperate siege of Port Arthur (May 1904-January 1905) and huge battles fought in Manchuria: Liaoyang (August-September 1904), Shaho (October 1904), and Mukden (February-March 1905). Neither army proved able to deliver a knockout blow. Rather, Russian forces eventually retreated into the interior of Manchuria, stretching Japan's supply lines and limited manpower.

Naval operations loom large in determining the outcome of this conflict. Whereas Japanese naval and land forces understood their interdependent relationships, Russian

naval forces coordinated neither internally within their service nor with Russian ground forces. The squadron at Vladivostok caused consternation among the Japanese when it disrupted commercial traffic, but for only a very short time. The Japanese kept the Port Arthur squadron bottled up in port except for a brief period when Russian mines sank two of Japan's six battleships and Admiral Stepan Makarov commanded sorties that threatened Japanese sea communications. After Makarov went down with the Russian flagship *Petropavlovsk* in April 1904, the Port Arthur squadron reverted to inactivity. The Imperial Japanese Army ultimately destroyed the squadron at anchor in the process of taking Port Arthur.

In contrast to Russian paralysis at sea, Japanese naval forces commanded by Admiral Tōgō Heihachirō focused on neutralizing Russian naval forces so that the Imperial Japanese Army could land men and supplies unimpeded on the Asian mainland. Indeed, the Japanese achieved a series of notable successes at sea. The Battle of Tsushima—at which the Russian Baltic Fleet was annihilated after steaming 18,000 miles from the Baltic Sea to Northeast Asia—is often depicted as a classic example of a decisive fleet engagement. The Imperial Japanese Army, however, failed to annihilate its primary opponent, the main Russian army in Manchuria. By dividing forces between Manchuria and the joint operation against Port Arthur, Japanese commanders denied themselves the numerical superiority necessary to envelop Russian land forces.

This war illustrates the relationship between operations and war termination. Japan suffered from exhaustion by spring 1905, having used up its financial and manpower reserves. Although Russia managed to overcome transportation bottlenecks, reversing Japan's numerical superiority in theater, the defeats suffered by the Russian armed forces provoked outbreaks of revolutionary violence throughout the empire. Russia's will to fight thus evaporated even as it overcame its logistical deficiencies. War-weariness led both sides to accept President Theodore Roosevelt's offer to mediate an end to the war. Roosevelt won the Nobel Peace Prize for his diplomatic efforts.

Examining the Russo-Japanese War provides a useful starting point for understanding the geopolitics, societies, and cultures of Northeast Asia, and for understanding how the resulting complex, dynamic, and ambiguous environment molds planning and operations to this day. The Russo-Japanese contest for primacy on the Korean Peninsula precipitated the Russo-Japanese War. Later, rivalry between the Soviet Union and Japan would shape the Chinese Civil War (1927-1949), while the rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union lay at the heart of the Korean War (1950-1953).

Also, an in-depth examination of the Russo-Japanese War highlights enduring problems in strategy and war. First, this conflict demonstrates how a weaker power can wage war for limited aims against a stronger adversary. That Japan was only partially successful in achieving its aims and experienced popular dissatisfaction with the war's outcome illustrates the difficulties associated with such an approach.

Second, the case shows how difficult it can be to wage war amid rapid technological change. Before the war many naval experts maintained that modern torpedoes would revolutionize war at sea. The erratic performance of these weapons during the war deflated such expectations. Conversely, naval mines, quick-firing artillery, and machine guns yielded surprisingly important operational results. At the same time, the scale of the ground battles—in particular the carnage on display at Port Arthur and the Battle of Mukden—foreshadowed the horrors of trench warfare a decade later in the First World War. Yet neither the belligerents nor foreign observers completely understood these phenomena or their implications.

Third, the engagements on land and sea raise important questions about the interactions between land and sea power and the possibilities for combining different kinds of military power to produce strategic outcomes. For example, the Russians' stubborn defense of Port Arthur imposed hard choices on Japanese army and navy commanders. Until they took Port Arthur, army leaders felt compelled to face hostile forces on two fronts, besieging the port while also fighting the main Russian force in Manchuria. The Japanese navy, furthermore, had to maintain its blockade of Port Arthur as long as the Russian squadron there survived. If Tōgō's fleet had withdrawn to refit and prepare for the arrival of the Baltic Fleet, it would have permitted Russian warships to escape—endangering the sea routes connecting Japanese expeditionary forces with their sources of supply in the Japanese home islands, and thus placing the land campaign in jeopardy. Joint operations ultimately allowed the Japanese to capture Port Arthur, easing these dilemmas. For its part, Russia suffered endemic problems in army-navy cooperation—an oversight that benefited its opponent.

Fourth, the war affords an opportunity to review the writings of Alfred Thayer Mahan and functions as the student's first exposure to the British maritime theorist Sir Julian Corbett. This case served an important purpose for both Mahan and Corbett by allowing them to test and adapt their theories to modern naval war. They analyzed the strategic effects of Japan's use of sea power and joint operations. The Russo-Japanese War, then, can be used to compare and test ideas about sea power, naval strategy, and the proper relationship between armies and fleets. Although Russian forces could reach the front either by land or by sea, they had to traverse vast distances. Japan enjoyed much shorter lines of communication but depended on its navy to deploy and sustain troops on the Asian mainland. Russia could have prosecuted the war without a navy; Japan had no such option. In addition, Russia could rebuild its navy at its own shipyards, while Japanese yards could not construct state-of-the-art battleships. These differences raise interesting strategic questions. When should Russia or Japan have risked its fleet? Was it better for Russia to preserve the Port Arthur squadron, or to employ it actively and risk its destruction? Should the belligerents have focused on prosecuting the war at sea or on land? If on land, how far inland?

Finally, the war's end sheds light on how to translate military achievements into political results. Tokyo went to war only after using diplomacy to improve its chances of strategic success. In other words, the leadership shaped the international arena ahead of time. It concluded an alliance with Great Britain to isolate Russia while planning in

advance for American mediation. It carefully integrated diplomatic, informational, military, and economic instruments into planning, prosecuting, and terminating the war. During hostilities, military leaders seized Sakhalin Island as a bargaining chip for peace negotiations, and coordinated with political leaders to terminate the conflict before the military balance swung toward Russia. By contrast, St. Petersburg's handling of the conflict suffered from dysfunctional civil-military relations and a leadership incapable of integrating the elements of national power. Such shortcomings helped the weaker party eke out a narrow victory.

## **B. Essay and Discussion Questions:**

1. Was Japan's success in this war due more to the strategic and operational skills of Japanese leaders or to Russian blunders?

2. Clausewitz places great weight on military genius. Would better generalship on the Russian side have allowed Russia to prevail in the land campaign in Manchuria?

3. How well did Japanese operations cope with Russian strengths and exploit Russian weaknesses?

4. Which side should have accepted greater risk in its fleet operations?

5. What were the most important operational mistakes made by the Japanese, and how might the Russians have exploited them?

6. How did the land and sea operations that took place around Port Arthur affect the conflict's outcome?

7. What enduring lessons about war termination in a conflict fought for limited aims can be learned from studying the Russo-Japanese War?

8. Should Japanese leaders have made the transition to the defense earlier, as opposed to staying on the offensive at Mukden?

9. Many contemporaries were struck by the leniency of the Peace of Portsmouth toward Russia, given its poor military performance. Could Japan have secured a more advantageous peace?

10. Both Mahan and Corbett found evidence in the Russo-Japanese War to support their strategic theories. Whose analysis of the conflict is more persuasive, and why?

11. How did the operations of the Imperial Japanese Navy contribute to the war's outcome?

12. George Washington successfully executed a Fabian strategy during the War for American Independence. Why did a Fabian strategy work in Washington's case but not for the Russians?

13. Based on an assessment of rewards, feasibility, and risk, what alternative course of action for the employment of its naval forces offered Russia the greatest potential strategic rewards?

14. Was Tsushima a decisive victory?

15. "The paramount concern . . . of maritime strategy is to determine the mutual relations of your army and navy in a plan of war." (Corbett, *Some Principles of Maritime Strategy*, page 16) Did Japanese or Russian commanders do a better job planning operations so that ground and naval forces mutually supported each other to achieve strategic objectives?

16. Could an alternative Russian strategy have overcome Japan's geographical advantages?

17. Were the rewards Japan hoped to gain worth the risks it took by fighting a superior Russian opponent?

18. Did Japanese or Russian military leaders better understand and exploit the transformation of land warfare?

19. Did Japanese or Russian military leaders better understand and exploit the transformation of naval warfare?

20. Judging from the Russian experience in this conflict and the British experience in the War for American Independence, is distance from the theater an insurmountable problem?

### **C. Readings:**

1. Warner, Denis and Peggy. *The Tide at Sunrise: A History of the Russo-Japanese War, 1904-1905*. New York: Charterhouse, 1974. Pages 3-20, 154-286, 299-416, 427-480, 498-538.

[The Warners, journalists with long experience in Asia, provide a detailed description of the war on the operational and strategic levels. They paint a vivid picture of Russian shortcomings, a picture which may understate Russian capabilities.]

2. Fuller, William C. *Strategy and Power in Russia, 1600-1914*. New York: Free Press, 1992. Pages 362-407.

[Fuller, a professor emeritus and former Chair of the Strategy Department at the Naval War College, describes the Russian diplomatic situation and state of the empire on the eve of the war, along with the evolution of Russian strategy during the hostilities.]

3. Mahan, Alfred Thayer. "Retrospect upon the War between Japan and Russia." In *Naval Administration and Warfare*. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1918. Pages 133-173. (Selected Readings)

[Mahan presents his controversial and influential assessment of the naval strategies of Russia and Japan.]

4. Corbett, Julian S. *Maritime Operations in the Russo-Japanese War, 1904-1905*. Vol. 2. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press and Newport: Naval War College Press, 1994. Pages 382-411. (Selected Readings)

[Corbett outlines Japanese strategy and sketches an alternative Russian strategy, while the Appendix discusses the strategy that the Russians actually did employ.]

5. Corbett, Julian S. *Some Principles of Maritime Strategy*. London: Longman, Green, 1911. Reprint, Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1988. Pages 3-106.

[Corbett shows how a sea power can deploy its navy to achieve strategic objectives against a land power. He emphasizes the utility of joint and peripheral operations, and offers his theory of command of the sea.]

6. Evans, David C. and Mark R. Peattie. *Kaigun: Strategy, Tactics, Technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1887-1941*. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1997. Pages 81-132.

[This study of the Imperial Japanese Navy examines Japan's prewar preparation for a conflict with Russia, along with the wartime realities. Of particular note is the ability of the Imperial Japanese Navy to successfully undertake technological and doctrinal innovation in an era of near-revolutionary change in both of these areas.]

7. Harrison, Richard W. *The Russian Way of War: Operational Art, 1904-1940*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2001. Pages 5-23. (Selected Readings)

[Harrison demonstrates how the development of military technology changed the nature of land warfare, creating a new operational level of war distinct from tactics and strategy. He shows the difficulties both the Russians and Japanese had in mastering the new realities of the battlefield.]

**D. Learning Outcomes:** This case study supports the OPMEP by applying the theories, themes, and frameworks developed throughout the course to examine a regional, limited war and the importance of joint maritime strategy. This case study supports:

- CJCS Joint Learning Areas and Objectives 2c, 3b, 3c, 3d, 3e, 3f, 3g, 4a, 4b, 4e, 4f, 4g, 6a, 6b, 6c, 6d, 6e, and 6f. Emphasis will be placed on the following topics, enabling students to:
  - Undertake critical analysis of problems in the volatile, uncertain, and complex environment of the Russo-Japanese War and apply such concepts to the current environment (2c).
  - Comprehend joint force command relationships (3b).
  - Comprehend the interrelationships among the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war (3c).
  - Comprehend how theory and the principles of war pertain to the operational level of war across the range of military operations (3d).
  - Comprehend the national efforts by both Russia and Japan and their respective use of all elements of national power (3e).
  - Comprehend the relationships among national objectives, military objectives, and conflict termination as illustrated by the campaigns and operations of the Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese Wars (3g).
  - Comprehend the fundamentals of joint operational planning (4b).
  - Comprehend the roles that factors such as geopolitics, society, culture, and religion play in shaping planning and execution of joint force operations in a regional, limited war (4f).
  - Comprehend the challenges that leaders face in developing strategies and plans (4g).
  - Comprehend the critical thinking and decision-making skills needed to recognize change and adapt to surprise and uncertainty (6b).
  - Analyze the skills needed to adapt and sustain innovation (6f).
  
- Additional objectives including Naval Professional Military Education. The students will:
  - Understand classic works on sea power and maritime strategy through the works of Alfred Thayer Mahan and Sir Julian S. Corbett.
  - Be skilled in applying sea power to achieve strategic effects across a range of military operations.
  - Understand operational warfare at sea—past, present, and future.

## V. PREWAR PLANNING, WARTIME REALITIES, REASSESSMENT, AND ADAPTATION—THE FIRST WORLD WAR

**A. General:** The First World War has been described as “*the great seminal catastrophe*” of the twentieth century.<sup>6</sup> By war’s end, the German, Austro-Hungarian, Russian, and Ottoman empires had collapsed. Sixteen million Europeans, mainly conscript soldiers, had died, while many tens of millions more were scarred physically and emotionally. The war precipitated the decline of European dominance and facilitated the rise of the United States as a global power and the creation of the Soviet Union. The enormity of sacrifice and the disgust with the war’s outcome provided fertile soil for extreme political views to take root, including fascism in both Italy and Germany. At the same time, the trauma of war left people in Britain and France so averse to the idea of another great power war in Europe that they found it extremely difficult to counter the rising fascist threat. Many historians have therefore argued that there is a causal link between the First World War and the even more destructive Second World War. Yet few in 1914 could have predicted that war would prove so catastrophic or have such long-term repercussions.

Before the First World War, Europe stood at the height of its international dominance and prosperity. Technological innovation, industrialization, and globalization—particularly in international trade, finance, and information—had brought higher standards of living to much of Europe. Even so, there were troubling signs. Each of the European great powers worried that the strains of globalization and industrialization would cause it to fall behind its rivals.

Furthermore, security concerns led to alliances and arms races, both on land and at sea. By 1914, the great powers, which today would be referred to as peer and near-peer competitors, stood in armed camps ready to use force to maintain or advance their positions in the international order. Ever-larger militaries, sustained by nationalism as well as industry, commerce, and rising living standards, created volatile, uncertain, and ambiguous conditions for war on a scale never before witnessed. Moreover, military officers had become increasingly dedicated members of a profession of arms who focused on critical issues of how to mobilize armies rapidly and employ them effectively. Many military planners believed at the onset of war in 1914 that a quick, decisive victory was possible through high levels of planning, preparation, training, and morale.

However, they had not fully thought through what the consequences would be if their plans failed. No state managed to attain its war aims quickly. Alliances caused the war to expand, preventing any one power from obtaining a decisive superiority over its opponents. The firepower of the industrial age created battlefields of unprecedented lethality. The prewar strategic plans of both the Central Powers (Germany and Austria-Hungary) and the Entente (Britain, France, and Russia) failed in great part because they failed to understand and adapt to the evolving interrelationship among the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war. The war became protracted. In an effort to

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<sup>6</sup> George F. Kennan, *The Decline of Bismarck’s European Order: Franco-Russian Relations, 1875-1890* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), 3.

innovate, strategic leaders turned to novel instruments of warfare such as submarines, poison gas, and airplanes, challenging existing ethical norms of warfare and gradually erasing the distinction between combatants and noncombatants.

The ubiquitous images of trench lines cutting across the Belgian and French countryside have created a popular mythology about the war. In reality, operations were far more diverse than the trench deadlock of the Western Front. An Eastern Front extended from the Baltic to the Black Sea. Heavy fighting took place in theaters involving the Ottoman Empire, stretching from the Balkans, to the Caucasus, to Egypt, and to modern Iraq. Even on the Western Front, the war was not fought solely between trench lines. Three quarters of the casualties on the Western Front occurred during the first and last years of the war, which were periods of movement rather than static operations.

The war began in August 1914 with a daring German offensive designed to knock France out of the war before its Russian ally could fully mobilize. The German plan sought to provide a solution to the strategic dilemma created by the Franco-Russian military alliance of 1893-1894 and particularly by the significant numerical military disadvantage resulting from the alliance. The Germans, moreover, realized that they needed to end any conflict quickly, since Germany lacked the economic resources to wage a long war and a protracted struggle could undermine the social order in Germany.

Field Marshal Alfred von Schlieffen, the Chief of the Imperial German General Staff from 1891-1906, concluded that only an offensive against France offered the prospect of a quick decision. Once Germany had defeated France, it could take advantage of its interior lines of communication to redeploy its army eastward against Russia. France's fortified border with Germany made the prospect of a quick German victory more difficult. Schlieffen determined that the German army would need to march around this fortified zone by sending most of its forces through neutral Belgium, Luxembourg, and possibly the Netherlands. German leaders recognized that a preemptive attack on France through Belgium would all but guarantee British intervention. They believed, however, that it was worth risking a broader conflict in order to enhance Germany's position in Europe by defeating France.

Though French planners expected a German offensive, they did not know the particulars of its timing, strength, or location. To meet this offensive, the mobilization directive known as Plan XVII called for concentrating French land forces along the German border. Once hostilities commenced, Marshal Joseph Joffre, the commander of the French armies, believed that he could disrupt the German offensive with his own offensive, striking at the flank of the advancing German armies in southeastern Belgium and attacking into the Alsace region as a diversion. The Germans had, however, correctly anticipated French intentions. During the first weeks of the war, several French armies nearly destroyed themselves in a series of ill-conceived attacks. Though the Germans relentlessly pushed back the French forces and the army of their newly arrived British ally, they failed to obtain a decisive victory. As the Germans neared Paris,

their command and control broke down, and French forces finally brought the exhausted Germans to a halt.

The German war plan remains the object of considerable controversy since its failure set the stage for the grinding slaughter of almost three years of trench warfare. Studying war plans allows students the opportunity to conduct critical analysis in light of tactical, operational, and strategic constraints as well as alliance considerations. Certainly, all belligerents had failed to completely anticipate and recognize the uncertain and complex nature of this war. Such circumstances create a fertile field for students to analyze whether more effective military options were available.

Like the ground war, the war at sea would take diverse forms that would highlight competing strategies against the backdrop of new technological innovations and operational concepts. Naval leaders in the years before the First World War became increasingly interested in both the newest technologies and strategic planning. Navies went through nothing short of a technological revolution. The transition from wooden to steel hulls and from wind to coal and later oil for propulsion, coupled with new communications and weapons technologies, brought unprecedented reach, speed, and lethality to naval warfare.

Concurrently, theoretical writings about naval warfare proliferated. Previous case studies have introduced students to Alfred Thayer Mahan and Sir Julian Corbett. Both wrote in the pivotal years before the First World War, and their writings influenced debates about sea power, maritime strategy, and naval operations. Mahan's theories gained wide currency among naval and policy leaders of almost every great power in the years before the First World War, and his writings arguably contributed to prewar naval arms races. Corbett's writings, accentuating the importance of joint operations, had a more limited impact, being focused on British strategic and operational problems.

Many expected a decisive battle between the British and German fleets to occur in the North Sea during the first months of the war, but leaders on both sides avoided risking their expensive fleets in hopes that events ashore would yield a decision. As the war on land deadlocked, the enduring strategic question about the proper use of navies in war reasserted itself. Were fleets too costly to risk? Or could one side gain command of the sea through battle, and for what purpose? Within the North Sea, the two sides faced a highly lethal environment populated by mines, submarines, torpedo-armed flotilla craft, coastal artillery, and capital ships. Although the British and German fleets did fight a sea battle at Jutland in 1916, questions remain about missed opportunities for the Royal Navy given its numerical superiority and the battle's ambiguous strategic effect.

Meanwhile, the struggle to control the sea lines of communications played out in two attritional struggles that proved very different in concept and international reaction. Britain, with the dominant navy, could physically control the sea lines of communication by conducting a distant blockade of Germany. Each year the war continued, the results became more devastating for Germany's economy as well as the morale and health of its people. In response, the German navy conducted a *guerre de course* or commerce-raiding

campaign, a traditional strategy of weaker naval powers. By using new submarine and torpedo technologies to sink merchant shipping, Germany's commerce-raiding strategy broke with international norms. In the first days of 1917, the Germans made the critical decision to institute unrestricted submarine warfare, allowing submarine commanders to sink any ship on sight. The objective was to take advantage of Britain's dependence on imported resources (particularly food) and thus starve Great Britain into submission. German leaders had to balance the ethical implications of disregarding international law and provoking the almost inevitable hostile response by the United States against the potential strategic reward.

As Great Britain became increasingly committed to fighting alongside France on the Western Front, British leaders also sought to develop joint solutions to the deadlock on the Western Front. These solutions entailed strategies that utilized naval power to project ground forces into peripheral theaters in hopes of obtaining disproportionate strategic effects on the war's outcome. Some have argued that this was the traditional British way of war, often used with success in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In 1915, the British spearheaded the Dardanelles Campaign against one of Germany's allies—the Ottoman Empire. British commanders aimed at taking the Ottoman Empire out of the war while opening a line of communication with Russia through the straits between the Mediterranean and Black Sea. Attempting to break through this contested zone proved more costly than envisioned and showcased the complexity of planning and executing a joint operation as well as the difficulty of extracting decisive results from peripheral strategies. Although the Allies did manage to wage more successful peripheral campaigns in the Middle East and the Balkans, one should question whether the potential strategic rewards of these campaigns and the diversion of forces from the principal theater in France were worth the cost.

On the Western Front between the spring of 1915 and 1918, the German, French, and British militaries never ceased in their efforts to break the deadlock. This involved constant attempts to adapt in the midst of an uncertain and constantly evolving environment. Such endeavors furnish students of strategy with a case for understanding the difficulties of reassessment and adaptation in war. Both sides developed infiltration tactics, aircraft, tanks, and the rudiments of what eventually became known as combined arms operations.

By the spring of 1918, both sides were preparing offensives to end the war. The Germans struck first, taking advantage of resources freed up by their victory over Russia in hopes of winning on the Western Front before significant American land forces reached France. In a series of four sequential offensives in the spring of 1918, German armies at great cost almost drove a wedge between the British and French armies, temporarily breaking the trench deadlock before grinding to a halt. Students should assess the reasons for the failure of the German offensive as well as the role of the United States in the German decision to ask for an armistice in late 1918.

Understanding the relationship among national security objectives, military objectives, and war termination from 1917 to 1919 remains a valuable strategic

challenge. In hindsight, the treaties ending the war—particularly the Treaty of Versailles that ended the German participation in the war—contributed to postwar instability. The victors (with the exception of the United States) were exhausted and poorly positioned to enforce the peace, but the costs of the war were unprecedented and forced the victors to seek aims commensurate with the price they had paid. To complicate the postwar settlement, the United States, the only power not exhausted by the war, decided to disengage politically and militarily from the international system. Moreover, Russia, Austria-Hungary, and the Ottoman Empire were in the throes of revolution. Were these the conditions of a doomed peace? As Clausewitz highlighted, the end of one conflict can plant the seeds for future wars. Given the state of the belligerents and the possible choices the victors could have made, was there a better means of war termination that could have prevented an even greater tragedy a generation later, when the nations of Europe became engulfed in the Second World War?

## **B. Essay and Discussion Questions:**

1. Contrary to the expectations of many European statesmen and soldiers, the First World War became a protracted war of attrition. Why did the quick, decisive victories anticipated in 1914 not materialize?
2. Was the Schlieffen Plan a good strategy badly executed, or a bad strategy?
3. Did the Schlieffen Plan fail because of poor execution on the part of German military leaders or the actions of Germany's opponents?
4. To what extent and with what result did Britain and Germany follow Mahan's principles of sea power and naval warfare during the First World War?
5. A noted writer on strategy argues: "The Great War gave far more support to Corbett's views rather than Mahan's." Do you agree?
6. To what extent and with what result did Britain follow Corbett's principles of maritime strategy during the First World War?
7. Did Britain commit a strategic miscalculation when it became involved in major land operations on the European continent, forsaking Corbett's strategic advice that Britain's comparative advantage rested in its ability to conduct limited maritime war?
8. After the First World War, the British naval leadership made the following critique: "some of the principles advocated [by Corbett] . . . , especially the tendency to minimize the importance of seeking battle and of forcing it to a conclusion, are directly in conflict with their [the leadership's] views." Is this a fair critique of Corbett's theories?
9. Were British and German leaders too risk-averse in the use of their main battle fleets?

10. Was the Dardanelles Campaign a good strategy badly executed, or a bad strategy?
11. Once the fighting deadlocked on the Western Front by the end of 1914, what strategic courses of action should the countries of the Entente and Germany have adopted?
12. Clausewitz argued that when the cost of fighting exceeds the value of the object, rational strategic leaders should seek a way to end the war. Why did the leaders of the great powers find this guidance so difficult to follow in practice during the First World War?
13. Were military leaders too slow to learn lessons from combat experience and adapt to the changes in warfare brought about by new technologies?
14. Did leadership at the operational and strategic levels of war adequately account for the ethical dilemmas posed by the use of blockades and submarines in commerce warfare?
15. Was the German decision to implement unrestricted submarine warfare in January 1917 a good strategic course of action? If not, what better courses of action were available to German leadership?
16. In the spring of 1918, the German offensives on the Western Front scored some initial successes. Why did these offensives ultimately fail?
17. Which strategic theorist examined so far in the course provides the best insight into German defeat and Allied victory in the First World War?
18. What impediments hindered the Allied and Associated Powers in achieving unity of effort while executing a strategy to defeat Germany? To what extent did they overcome these impediments?
19. What key questions did the Allied and Associated Powers need to address in the war termination phase of this conflict? How well did the leaders address these questions?
20. Critics of Clausewitz's strategic theories maintain that his emphasis on concentration of force and the pursuit of victory by attacking an adversary's center of gravity provided poor strategic guidance for waging war at the beginning of the twentieth century. Do you agree?

### C. Readings:

1. Kagan, Donald. *On the Origins of War and the Preservation of Peace*. New York: Doubleday, 1995. Pages 81-99, 145-205, 285-307.

[Kagan provides an overview of the causes of the war as well as showing that negotiation between great powers was possible, despite conflicts of interest. He also describes the end of the war and the problems of establishing a stable peace after the conflict. It would be helpful for students to delay reading the last section of Kagan (pages 285-307) until after reading Strachan (Reading No. 2) in its entirety.]

2. Strachan, Hew. *The First World War*. New York: Viking, 2004. Pages 35-64, 99-340.

[Sir Hew Strachan presents a lucid account of this catastrophic conflict, providing essential background information for evaluating the policies and strategies adopted by Britain, France, Germany, and the United States. He counters traditional perceptions of the strategic deadlock on the Western Front by stressing the novelty of the war's technology and the operational and strategic challenges faced by leaders on both sides.]

3. Paret, Peter, ed. *Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986. Pages 281-325, 510-526.

[The assigned chapters provide an invaluable introduction into Germany's operational doctrine and the evolution of its general staff system, as well as an analysis of the problems wrought by the enormous advances in technology before the war.]

4. Doughty, Robert A. "France." In *War Planning 1914*, edited by Richard F. Hamilton and Holger H. Herwig. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010. Pages 143-174. (Selected Readings)

[Doughty assesses the prewar development of French war planning, command structures, and instruments of war. He then analyzes how effective these were given French performance in the war's opening campaign.]

5. Kennedy, Paul. *The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery*. Atlantic Heights: Ashfield Press, 1987. Pages 205-265.

[Kennedy examines Great Britain's response to the growing threats faced in the maritime domain at the beginning of the twentieth century. Chapter 8 addresses the problems and constraints Britain faced in the midst of naval competition in a rapidly changing technological environment in the years before the First World War. Chapter 9 provides an assessment of British naval operations during the war.]

6. Cohen, Eliot A. and John Gooch. *Military Misfortunes: The Anatomy of Failure in War*. Paperback edition. New York: Free Press, 2006. Pages 133-163.

[Two former professors in the Strategy Department examine operational failure in war by exploring the Dardanelles Campaign and the landings at Gallipoli.]

7. “In Search of Victory: First World War Primary Source Documents.”  
(Selected Readings)

[This compendium of primary source documents addresses pivotal points in the war when leaders reassessed and adapted. The first of these points involves the reassessment following the initial failure of the war of movement in the fall and winter of 1914. The second point of reassessment involves German decision-making culminating with the decision to undertake unrestricted submarine warfare in the spring of 1917. The final point of reassessment highlights war termination planning by the Allied powers in 1918.]

8. Stevenson, David. “The Failure of Peace by Negotiation in 1917.” *The Historical Journal* 34, no. 1 (1991). Pages 65-86.  
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/2639708>

(Note about hyperlinks: Due to copyright restrictions readings such as the one above must be downloaded individually by each student. In many cases, the student must download the document while physically at the Naval War College and connected to the school’s network.)

[Stevenson analyzes the attempts to end the war in 1917 and why they resulted in failure.]

9. Offer, Avner. *The First World War: An Agrarian Interpretation*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991. Pages 354-367. (Selected Readings)

[Offer provides an account of the flawed assessments and planning assumptions behind Germany’s decision to embark on a disruptive, asymmetric strategy of unrestricted submarine warfare.]

10. Baer, George W. *One Hundred Years of Sea Power: The U.S. Navy, 1890-1990*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994. Pages 64-82.

[In this award-winning book, Professor Baer, a former Chair of the Strategy Department at the Naval War College, provides an overview of the United States Navy’s role in the First World War, including the anti-submarine campaign against Germany.]

11. Stevenson, David. “1918 Revisited.” *Journal of Strategic Studies* 28, no. 1 (2005). Pages 107-139.  
<http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/01402390500032096?needAccess=true>

[Stevenson analyzes the war’s ending, examining the failure of the German spring offensives and the different policy goals of the Allied leadership. Stevenson helps us not

only understand how the First World War ended, but also grasp enduring problems in war termination.]

**D. Learning Outcomes:** This case study supports the OPMEP by applying the theories, themes, and frameworks developed throughout the course to examine prewar planning, adaptation, and innovation as well as naval and joint maritime strategies. This case study supports:

- CJCS Joint Learning Areas and Objectives 2c, 3c, 3d, 3e, 3f, 3g, 4f, 6a, 6b, 6c, 6e, and 6f. Emphasis will be placed on the following topics, enabling students to:
  - Undertake critical analysis of problems in the volatile, uncertain, and complex environment of the First World War and apply such concepts to the current environment (2c).
  - Examine the relationships among the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war as well as the application of strategic theory to the operational level of war (3c).
  - Analyze a plan critically for employment of joint and multinational forces at the operational level of war (3f).
  - Comprehend the relationships among national security objectives, military objectives, and conflict termination, as illustrated by previous wars, campaigns, and operations (3g).
  - Comprehend the roles that factors such as geopolitics, geostrategy, and society play in shaping planning and execution of joint force operations across the range of military operations (4f).
  - Comprehend critical thinking and decision-making skills needed to anticipate and recognize change, lead transitions, and anticipate or adapt to surprise and uncertainty (6b).
  - Comprehend the ethical dimension of operational leadership and the challenges that it may present when considering the values of the profession of arms (6c).
  - Analyze the importance of adaptation and innovation on military planning and operations (6f).
  
- Additional objectives including Naval Professional Military Education. The students will:
  - Comprehend operational warfare at sea—past, present, and future.
  - Comprehend the theory and practice of applying sea power to achieve strategic effects across a range of military operations.
  - Comprehend how naval and military power must be integrated with other instruments of national power.

## **VI. WAGING TOTAL WAR: INTERDEPENDENCE OF SEA, AIR, AND GROUND OPERATIONS—THE SECOND WORLD WAR IN EUROPE**

**A. General:** The Second World War was nothing less than a struggle for survival. One of the world's most powerful countries, led by a regime espousing an extremist ideology, sought to conquer a continent and impose upon it a program of genocide and slavery. The Nazi regime under Hitler's leadership, coupled with Germany's immense military, industrial, and scientific power, overran continental Europe in the war's opening stages. Turning back these German conquests and ultimately destroying Hitler's tyranny required that the political and military leaders of Germany's adversaries make superior policy and strategy choices to marshal a total war effort that included mobilizing their economies for war, deploying huge armies, navies, and air forces, and convincing their peoples to endure immense sacrifices.

Prior to and at the war's onset, Germany scored a series of stunning diplomatic and military successes. Between 1939 and 1941, German military forces occupied Europe from Norway to Greece and Poland to France. Germany's only serious setback was the defeat in the Battle of Britain. Unable to force Great Britain to make peace, Hitler faced stark strategic choices. One option entailed continuing to focus German operations against Britain, including a submarine campaign targeting merchant shipping to starve the United Kingdom. Additionally, Germany would also support its coalition partner Italy by carrying out a peripheral strategy against Britain in the Mediterranean and the Middle East. A second option involved attacking the Soviet Union in an effort to secure resources to power the German war machine. This option meant violating the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact, which had enabled Hitler to throw the main weight of German forces against Poland, France, and Britain. Hitler decided to attack the Soviet Union, a task that he had contemplated since he first entered politics after the First World War, without terminating Germany's war against Britain. As a result, Germany became mired in a protracted struggle of attrition, fighting in the West, in the Mediterranean, and in the East.

Hitler's aims in the East called for the destruction of the Soviet state. He considered the vast natural resources in Soviet territory as essential for a resource-poor Germany to carry out his quest for global hegemony. Moreover, Hitler hoped that the defeat of the Soviet Union would convince Britain's leaders to make peace and accept German hegemony in Europe in exchange for guarantees of the British Empire's survival. The German campaign in the Soviet Union eventually became the largest theater of land operations in world history. From the beginning, it was a fight to the death between two irreconcilable worldviews, in which the Germans abandoned civilized norms of warfare, carrying out the mass murder of enemy soldiers and civilians by shooting, starvation, and gassing. The German armed forces willingly complied with Hitler's decision to wage a war of extermination and were responsible for Germany's greatest war crime besides the Holocaust: the murder through starvation and mistreatment of over two million Soviet prisoners of war during the autumn and winter of 1941-1942.

Operation BARBAROSSA, the codename for the initial German assault on the Soviet Union, made incredible gains. By late 1941, German forces had pushed to the gates of Moscow, laid siege to Leningrad, and overrun the Ukraine. They stood ready to invade the Caucasus and seize the Soviet Union's rich oil fields. These gains, however, did not lead to the collapse of the Soviet state. When the Germans again advanced the following year, they were checked and then defeated at Stalingrad. From 1943 onward, the Soviet Red Army pushed the Germans back. Defeating Germany came at a high cost for the peoples of the Soviet Union, who suffered the bulk of Allied casualties in the war against Germany (between 20,000,000 and 30,000,000 Soviet soldiers and civilians were killed) while inflicting the overwhelming majority of German military casualties.

The existential threat posed by Nazi Germany forged an unlikely coalition between the Western democracies and the totalitarian Soviet regime. The extirpation of the Nazi regime required both hard fighting and strategic cooperation. Alliance cohesion was no simple matter. Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin worked to build and maintain the Grand Alliance, which held together long enough to achieve victory over Germany and its Axis partners, Italy and Japan. While the Grand Alliance subscribed to a common strategic vision for defeating "Germany first," the Allies argued over the proper timing of the Second Front (a large-scale invasion of German-occupied France) and the exact role that it would play in the defeat of Nazi Germany. Not until the summit meeting at Tehran in November and December 1943 that brought Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin together for the first time was the Second Front controversy resolved with an agreement to conduct Operation OVERLORD in mid-1944.

The Soviet contribution to the defeat of Nazi Germany on the Eastern Front must be balanced against the role played by the Soviets' British and American allies. American and British leaders faced difficult strategic choices in reconciling disputes over the timing and location of future operations, resource allocation, and competing political objectives. Before opening the Second Front in June 1944, the British and Americans fought in the Atlantic, the skies over Europe, and the Mediterranean. Operations in the Mediterranean placed Germany in an attritional struggle that diverted precious resources away from the Eastern Front. In addition, Allied operations in the Mediterranean eventually forced Germany's ally Italy out of the war. The decision by the British and Americans to open theaters in French North Africa, followed by operations in Sicily as well as mainland Italy, raises important questions about Allied strategic decision-making. Did American and British leaders make the best strategic choices among the viable operational alternatives open to them for employing their resources?

In the Atlantic, the British and Americans fought to secure the sea lines of communication linking Great Britain with the world. The cumulative loss of merchant shipping in the Atlantic imposed a severe constraint on the strategic options open to the Grand Alliance. Britain's dependence upon imports made defeat in the Battle of the Atlantic tantamount to defeat in World War II. The Allies used naval, air, scientific, and intelligence assets to protect merchant ships from the German submarine fleet. The relative importance of each of these instruments to Allied success in the Battle of the Atlantic, however, remains open to dispute.

The so-called Combined Bomber Offensive included efforts by Britain's Royal Air Force and the United States Army Air Forces to accelerate Nazi Germany's collapse. Aerial bombardment was a new form of warfare, and this case study allows us to explore both the expectations of Allied leaders and its actual results. To provide a frame of reference, the readings include the writings of Giulio Douhet, an influential theorist of air warfare who wrote between the two world wars. Critics of Douhet maintain that his theories suffered from unjustifiable optimism about bombing's efficacy that led to the waste of scarce resources and the barbarization of war. Even so, his writings have proven influential in the development of air power strategy.

Allied leaders utilized intelligence and deception efforts as force multipliers. Although these efforts could be compromised and required skillful implementation, they did on occasion yield significant advantages for the Allies. Some historians have even argued that the success of Polish, British, and American cryptanalysts in breaking Axis codes dramatically shortened the Second World War in Europe. An examination of World War II in Europe provides a valuable opportunity to assess the role of intelligence and deception in warfare.

The development of the Anglo-American coalition through operations in the Mediterranean, the Atlantic, the skies above Europe, and the intelligence domain paved the way for Operation OVERLORD in June 1944. But how should students of strategy critique the relative importance of these operations to the success of OVERLORD and the defeat of Nazi Germany? For example, how much did the Allied success in the Battle of the Atlantic contribute to the ability to move the invasion force to Britain and sustain it both there and in France? Or, what role did air superiority play in increasing the invasion's chance of success? Moreover, a political agreement at the highest levels on the scope and timing of the invasion had to occur. How did Allied leaders come to such an agreement despite very different American, British, and Soviet conceptions of how the war should be won?

On D-Day, June 6, 1944, the Western Allies invaded France, bringing to bear more than 10,000 aircraft and 200 major warships. Over 57,000 Americans landed at UTAH and OMAHA beaches, while 75,000 British and Canadians waded ashore at beaches codenamed GOLD, SWORD, and JUNO. After two weeks, there would be approximately two million American and Commonwealth troops in France. D-Day was the most complex and intricate joint and combined amphibious operation in the history of warfare, but it hardly assured victory against Nazi Germany. First, the invaders had to secure, protect, and expand their lodgment in France through weeks of hard-fought actions in Normandy. The Soviets on the Eastern Front contributed by launching BAGRATION, an offensive that ended up destroying German Army Group Center and driving the Germans back to Warsaw. A combination of factors, including the German's lack of air power, overextension on multiple fronts, dwindling fuel stocks, and material and numerical inferiority, ultimately allowed the Allies to break out from Normandy in August 1944 and liberate most of France by the year's end.

At the center of Allied discussions of strategy and operations was General Dwight D. Eisenhower. As Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces in Europe, he had to execute operations in an uncertain, joint, and combined environment, holding together a multinational coalition that included generals with clashing opinions and personalities. Eisenhower has been both widely praised for his diplomatic skill and criticized for some of his operational decisions. His leadership is perhaps the single most instructive example in this course of the problems inherent in leading the armed forces of an international coalition, and the readings give us the opportunity to reach our own assessment of his performance.

Despite the massive defeats suffered on the battlefield by Germany during 1944, the downfall of the Nazi regime required hard and costly fighting. The last months of the war in Europe witnessed the Allies invading Germany from both east and west. Although facing imminent defeat, Germany continued to offer stiff resistance: American combat deaths in April 1945 were as high as any other month of the war in Europe, while Soviet casualties during the Battle of Berlin alone numbered more than 300,000. Did other, less costly options exist, and what do these heavy losses indicate about the cost of defeating a resolute, fanatical, ideological opponent facing what seemed to be hopeless circumstances?

## **B. Essay and Discussion Questions:**

1. Germany won a quick victory over France in 1940. Why did Germany fail to gain a quick victory over Great Britain and the Soviet Union?
2. “The Second World War was decided on the Eastern Front. All the other fighting fronts were of secondary importance.” Do you agree?
3. Did Germany have viable strategic options after Operation BARBAROSSA failed and the United States entered the war?
4. Without Allied success in the Battle of the Atlantic and the Combined Bomber Offensive, was opening the Second Front in France possible?
5. What were the most important strategic and operational factors behind the Allied victory in the Battle of the Atlantic?
6. “Mahan’s strategic theories are largely irrelevant for explaining the course, conduct, and outcome of the war at sea fought by the Western allies against Nazi Germany.” Do you agree?
7. Prior to the outbreak of the Second World War, there were many who predicted that air power would play a decisive part in the next great power war. To what extent did the performance of Allied air forces in the European Theater of Operations from 1943 to 1945 confirm these predictions?

8. Which was more important in the struggle for command of the air in the European Theater of Operations in the Second World War—technological innovation or effective air power strategy?

9. In what ways did the rise of air power during the Second World War change the relationship between sea and land power?

10. How would Sun Tzu have evaluated the exploitation of intelligence by the Allied leaders?

11. An analyst of the role played by intelligence in the Second World War writes: “If the Axis had possessed the best intelligence and the Allies the worst, the Allies still would have won.” Do you agree with this assessment?

12. Given the differences of opinion between Washington and London concerning strategy, how effective were United States and British leaders in developing new ways of working in a joint and combined operational environment?

13. How well did Eisenhower manage the fog, friction, uncertainty, and chaos of war?

14. What lessons can one draw from the period covered in this case about the elements that make for a strategically effective multinational coalition?

15. How effectively did Allied leadership mitigate risk when planning and executing OVERLORD?

16. Which contributed more to the Anglo-American victory over the German armed forces between 1942 and 1945—the Allies’ superior application of force or the errors of Germany’s leaders?

17. Was the victory of the Allies practically inevitable in view of their economic and manpower superiority?

18. Germany launched major offensives to obtain a quick victory over France in 1914 and again in 1940. Why did Germany succeed in 1940 but fail in 1914?

19. “Germany’s defeat in both world wars would not have come about without the arrival of a powerful United States Army in France.” Do you agree?

### C. Readings:

1. Murray, Williamson and Alan R. Millett. *A War to Be Won: Fighting the Second World War*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000. Pages 1-142, 262-335, 374-483.

[Murray and Millett's narrative history of the Second World War focuses on the operational level of war. The selections assigned cover the entire war in Europe from its inception in September 1939 until the surrender of Germany in May 1945.]

2. Doughty, Robert. "Myth of the Blitzkrieg." In *Challenging the United States Symmetrically and Asymmetrically*, edited by Lloyd Matthews. Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, 1998. Pages 57-79. (Selected Readings)

[Doughty addresses the mythology surrounding the German campaign against France and the Low Countries in May-June 1940. He also explains why Germany was unable to replicate its success the following year when it attacked the Soviet Union.]

3. Wegner, Bernd. "The Road to Defeat: The German Campaigns in Russia 1941-43." *Journal of Strategic Studies* 13, no. 1 (1990). Pages 105-127. (Selected Readings)

[Wegner addresses the first years of the war on the Eastern Front from the German perspective to showcase how German strategic choices relating to the war against the Soviet Union contributed to Germany's eventual wartime defeat. Wegner also provides details on the role of Nazi ideology and decision-making by Hitler and his generals.]

4. Matloff, Maurice. "Allied Strategy in Europe, 1939-1945." In *Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*, edited by Peter Paret. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986. Pages 677-702.

[Matloff provides a policy and strategy overview of the Grand Alliance in the European Theater of World War II.]

5. Larrabee, Eric. *Commander in Chief: Franklin Delano Roosevelt, His Lieutenants and Their War*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987. Reprint, Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2004. Pages 412-508.

[Larrabee provides an assessment of Eisenhower's leadership during the Second World War. He also deals with the major operational controversies of the Normandy campaign, many centering on the relationship between Eisenhower and Montgomery.]

6. "The Anglo-American Strategic Controversy, 1941-43." (Selected Readings)

[These primary documents—a proposed strategy by the British Chiefs of Staff in December 1941, a counterargument, in effect, written by General Marshall around March

1942, a September 1943 discussion of American and British military leaders, and an account of the first meeting between Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin at Tehran in November 1943—illustrate the critically different strategic concepts of the British and Americans and show how their dispute was finally resolved.]

7. Douhet, Giulio. *Command of the Air*. Translated by Dino Ferrari. Washington: Air Force History and Museums Program, 1998. Pages 3-10, 15-19, 31-35, 49-61, 125-129. (Selected Readings)

[Douhet was an Italian general and strategic theorist of air warfare. *Command of the Air* was written in the aftermath of the First World War. Douhet sought to show that offensives by fleets of bombers would prove the decisive instrument in future wars.]

8. O'Brien, Phillips. "East versus West in the Defeat of Nazi Germany." *Journal of Strategic Studies* 23, no. 2 (June 2000). Pages 89-113.  
<http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/01402390008437792>

[O'Brien reconsiders the traditional view that Soviet ground forces were largely responsible for the defeat of Nazi Germany. He highlights the importance of American Lend-Lease aid to the Red Army and, even more, the powerful effects of the Anglo-American strategic bombing of the German homeland. This article can be read as a counterargument to O'Neill's thesis about strategic bombing.]

9. O'Neill, William. *A Democracy at War: America's Fight at Home and Abroad in World War II*. New York: The Free Press, 1993. Pages 301-319. (Selected Readings)

[O'Neill argues that aversion to casualties in a democratic political system led Americans to put misguided hope in air power as a high-tech, low-cost way to victory in the Second World War.]

10. Cohen, Eliot A. and John Gooch. *Military Misfortunes: The Anatomy of Failure in War*. Paperback edition. New York: Free Press, 2005. Pages 59-94.

[In this study, Cohen and Gooch examine operational failure in war by exploring American anti-submarine warfare during the initial stages of the U.S. involvement in the Second World War.]

11. Hinsley, F. H. "The Influence of Ultra in the Second World War." In *Codebreakers: The Inside Story of Bletchley Park*, edited by F. H. Hinsley and Alan Stripp. New York: Oxford University Press, 1993. Pages 1-13. (Selected Readings)

[Hinsley addresses the potential decisiveness of intelligence obtained through Anglo-American codebreaking. Specifically, Hinsley analyzes how effectively the Anglo-American allies exploited their ability to read German coded signals traffic and how the

Allies used this information to influence naval and land operations in the European Theater of the Second World War.]

12. Baer, George W. *One Hundred Years of Sea Power: The U.S. Navy, 1890-1990*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994. Pages 189-205, 222-231.

[Baer provides an overview of the United States Navy's role in the Battle of the Atlantic and in supporting the Allied landings in the Mediterranean and at Normandy.]

**D. Learning Outcomes:** The Second World War in Europe case study supports the OPMEP by applying the theories, themes, and frameworks developed throughout the course to examine how they can be applied in a large, coalition, unlimited war. This case study supports:

- CJCS Joint Learning Areas and Objectives 1a, 1c, 2c, 3a, 3b, 3c, 3d, 3e, 3f, 3g, 4a, 4b, 4f, 4g, 6a, 6b, 6c, 6d, 6e, and 6f. Emphasis will be placed on the following topics, enabling students to:
  - Comprehend the considerations, including the security environment, for employing joint forces and how theory and principles of war pertain to the operational level of war (3a and 3d).
  - Comprehend joint force command relationships by assessing strategic leadership at the level of theater command (3b).
  - Analyze a plan for employment of joint forces at the operational level of war (3e).
  - Comprehend the relationships among national objectives, military objectives, and conflict termination (3g).
  - Comprehend the relationships among the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war (3c).
  - Comprehend the relationships among all elements of national power and the importance of interagency and multinational coordination in these elements (3e).
  - Comprehend the relationship for both Germany and the United States among national objectives and means available (4a).
  - Comprehend the fundamental concepts of joint operation planning and phases of operations including command of air and sea, isolating the battlespace, amphibious assault or entry, buildup, and exploitation (4b).
  - Comprehend examples of how geopolitics, strategy, and ideology shaped the debate over the direction of the war (4f).
  - Comprehend the role and perspective of the Combatant Commander and staff in developing various theater policies, strategies, and plans (4g).
  - Comprehend the relationship of society, ideology, political leadership, and the changing character of war as exemplified in this case to the values of the profession of arms (6a and 6c).

- Comprehend the necessity of critical thinking and decision-making by real world, operational level leaders in the face of change, surprise, and uncertainty (6b).
  - Analyze the application of mission command by strategic in a joint, intergovernmental, and multinational environment (6d).
  - Analyze the importance of adaptation and innovation on military planning and operations (6f).
- Additional objectives including Naval Professional Military Education. The students will:
    - Understand operational warfare at sea—past, present, and future.
    - Become skilled in applying sea power to achieve strategic effects across a range of military operations.
    - Become aware of the strategic effects of air power.

## **VII. VICTORY AT SEA: MILITARY TRANSFORMATION, THEATER COMMAND, AND JOINT OPERATIONS IN A MAJOR MARITIME WAR—THE SECOND WORLD WAR IN THE PACIFIC**

**A. General:** The Second World War in the Pacific was the most intense and most lethal maritime conflict ever fought. It featured the main types of naval platforms on which the United States Navy still relies: surface combatants, submarines, and aircraft carriers. Aviation emerged as an integral instrument of war in the maritime domain. Near the end of the war, Japanese leaders resorted to kamikaze tactics employing “human cruise missiles,” foreshadowing naval warfare in the age of precision strike. The Pacific War also illuminated the importance of information superiority and the electromagnetic spectrum in warfare. Above all, the Pacific War highlights the enduring importance of mastering skills necessary for joint warfighting.

The Pacific War presents an extraordinarily rich menu for exploring a central theme of the Strategy and War Course—the strategic effects of operations. Initial surprise attacks occurred in December 1941. Japan seized the initiative, but to what end? Then, pivotal campaigns occurred at Midway and in the Solomon Islands in 1942. Success in these endeavors enabled the United States to seize the initiative in the Pacific while simultaneously pursuing victory in Europe. The global character of the war required U.S. strategic leaders to set priorities between theaters, providing resources and capabilities to achieve U.S. national interests in both Asia and Europe while minimizing the risk of defeat in either. For America, a combination of what Rear Admiral J. C. Wylie identified as “sequential” and “cumulative” strategies loomed ever-larger. Finally, in the war termination phase during the summer of 1945, U.S. leaders debated which courses of action would lead directly to a Japanese decision to accept unconditional surrender. That debate ended with the first and only uses of nuclear weapons in the history of warfare.

In 1931, the Japanese army seized Manchuria. This was Japan’s bid for resource security to combat trade restrictions imposed by Western powers during the Great Depression. Six years after seizing Manchuria, Japan expanded hostilities deep into central and south China. The United States quietly supported China, but the value of the object for the American people and government was too low to uproot isolationist sentiment. As Japan sought additional resource security by seizing new territories, including part of Indochina, the U.S. government responded with embargos on war material and resources. When oil was added to the embargo list in August 1941, Japanese leaders decided to execute military and naval operations that were heavily contingent upon surprise to seize the oil fields of the Dutch East Indies and eliminate the Western military presence in Asia.

Initial surprise attacks are a prominent feature of the Strategy and War Course. In 1941, the transformational possibilities of carrier aviation prompted Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku, commander-in-chief of Japan’s Combined Fleet, to alter the traditional thrust of Japanese naval war planning against the United States. Rather than waiting to engage the U.S. Pacific Fleet as it advanced across the Pacific, Yamamoto advocated a preemptive

attack on the fleet using carrier aviation. American political and military leaders failed to anticipate a carrier aviation strike on Pearl Harbor. Moreover, United States Navy and Army commanders on Oahu failed to prepare an adequate joint defense of their bases.

That the United States was caught by surprise reflected the difficulties of assessing an adversary from a very different culture—difficulties that Americans have experienced repeatedly since 1941. That such surprise proved strategically counterproductive for Japan demonstrates that it too found it hard to understand its adversary. A good exercise in critical analysis is to evaluate the alternative courses of action open to Japan in 1941, both in terms of likely operational results and potential strategic effects.

Japan achieved extraordinary operational successes from December 1941 into the spring of 1942. In a noteworthy aberration from the normal pattern of bitter inter-service rivalry between the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy, Japan's military forces executed a brilliant series of joint operations in Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific. Through these operations, Japan seized territory rich in valuable strategic resources, including oil. Never had a country gained control over such a broad area of the world in such a short time.

The United States, with its prewar plans badly disrupted and its battleship force largely incapacitated, had to adapt to radical change in its security environment while improvising responses to the Japanese onslaught. It did so under new naval leadership, with Admiral Chester Nimitz assuming command of the Pacific Fleet and Admiral Ernest King becoming Chief of Naval Operations and Commander-in-Chief of the United States Fleet. King and Nimitz were able to lead the transition that transformed ways of waging maritime warfare by drawing upon remarkable technological and conceptual developments in air, amphibious, and submarine warfare.

The first stage of the Pacific War drew to a close during the spring of 1942. Though Japan's conquests were immense, its leaders were no closer to terminating hostilities against the United States. Midway became Japan's next objective. As the Midway operation unfolded, both Nimitz and Yamamoto confronted one of the most important strategic decisions a naval commander may face: when to risk the fleet. Mahan's writings, which inspired Japanese naval leaders at least as much as their American counterparts, highlighted the strategic importance of risking the fleet but never fully addressed the operational concept of risk management. Students should seek to understand why both Yamamoto and Nimitz were willing to risk their fleets at Midway, and also how the two commanders managed that risk. The way Nimitz put his trust in both his intelligence officers and his subordinate commanders is especially worth pondering.

The American victory at Midway made a U.S. counteroffensive feasible. Admiral King became the primary proponent of an operation to confront recent Japanese advances in the Solomon Islands. Despite the Europe-first priority guiding Anglo-American strategy, President Franklin Roosevelt diverted significant military assets away from the

fight against Germany in order to promote his general strategic concept of waging a war of attrition against Japan. The upshot was a landing by United States Marines on the island of Guadalcanal in August 1942. The ensuing campaign on and around Guadalcanal is an instructive example of joint operations that depended on the coordinated use of ground, air, and sea forces. Though not without considerable inter-service conflict, the Americans obtained hard-won strategic effects. Great numbers of Japanese ships were sunk and aircraft destroyed. Japan could ill afford losses of such key elements of its military power. The naval battles around Guadalcanal are a particular topic of discussion in the Joint Maritime Operations Course, while the Strategy and War Course highlights the decisions by both the United States and Japan to engage in the campaign and the resulting strategic effects.

As President Roosevelt had anticipated, the attrition suffered by the Japanese at Midway and in the Solomon Islands put them at an ever greater material disadvantage as American war production began making its full weight felt in late 1943. As a result, the United States was able to execute an increasingly effective combination of sequential and cumulative strategies. Cumulative strategies sought to degrade Japan's war-making potential through the targeting of industry and critical sea lines of communication. The latter became the target of American submarine operations while the United States Army Air Force based bombers in China to destroy Japanese industrial production. Sequential strategies focused on a two-pronged American offensive across the Pacific. One prong island hopped through the Southwest Pacific under the operational leadership of General Douglas MacArthur. The other prong drove across the Central Pacific under the operational leadership of Admiral Nimitz, employing new fast-carrier task forces, at-sea logistical replenishment, and amphibious units. Nimitz and MacArthur provide two examples of leaders attempting to manage risk while seeking strategic effects in an uncertain operational environment.

The Joint Maritime Operations Course examines the operational art of managing the convergence of the Central and Southwest Pacific prongs at Leyte Gulf in late 1944. The Strategy and War Course examines the operational and strategic risks and rewards of dividing American forces into separate prongs from late 1943 through late 1944. Students should consider whether the assets that flowed to one of these two prongs might have been used to obtain a greater war termination payoff elsewhere in the Pacific or more broadly in the global war, especially considering that the United States and its allies had agreed that Germany was the primary enemy.

The Pacific War provides a controversial case study in war termination. As American forces developed bases in the Marianas in order to bomb the Japanese home islands, some Japanese leaders began to realize the scale of the strategic defeat that awaited them. Before the atomic bombings in August 1945, the emperor refused to confront the Japanese military leadership on the issue of peace. In traditional practice, the emperor reigned but did not rule. This allowed Japanese military leadership to circumvent civil authority. When American forces took Okinawa in June 1945, the emperor of Japan began to exert influence behind the scenes in favor of a negotiated settlement to end the war, but Japanese military leaders remained determined to fight to

the bitter end. They anticipated that by inflicting great casualties on American forces invading Kyushu, they could compel the United States to back down from its policy of unconditional surrender. Students should consider divisions in Japanese political and military leadership as they consider American options for war termination in 1945.

Within the American government, there was significant debate about two competing war termination objectives. First, what operations would most expeditiously elicit Japan's surrender? And second, how to obtain Japan's surrender with the minimum of American casualties? Had the war not come to an abrupt end in August 1945, there would have been further inter-service conflict over the planned invasion of Kyushu in the autumn of 1945.

Given the ethical issues raised by the destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, historians and others have argued ever since over whether it was necessary for the United States to use nuclear weapons. The use of atomic weapons underscores the difficulties in understanding new technologies, their ethical implications, and their strategic effects. It is worth noting that no American political and military leaders expressed strong moral misgivings during the summer of 1945.

From the perspective of not only military operations during the Pacific War but also long-term political relations with Japan after the war, this case study has a strong claim to be the greatest American strategic success ever. But from another perspective, the outcome of the Pacific War spelled future trouble for the United States. American war termination strategy and policy, focused as they were on Japan itself, made virtually no provision for shaping the postwar fate of the broader Japanese Empire. In Asia, just as in Europe, the United States thought too little, too late, about the regional balance of power that would emerge from the war. East Asia emerged as the world's most violent region for more than thirty years, witnessing a civil war in China, major conflicts in Korea and Vietnam, and political violence and insurgencies all over Southeast Asia. The Pacific War's ending, then, did not bring peace to the region but created a new set of geopolitical conditions and ideological antagonisms that will claim our attention as we move forward in the course.

## **B. Essay and Discussion Questions:**

1. According to Clausewitz, "The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish...the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature" (*On War*, pages 88-89). Did Japanese leaders embark on the Pacific War with a sound concept of the likely nature of the war?

2. In December 1941, the Imperial Japanese Navy was arguably the world's best. Why did that superiority not lead to victory in the Pacific War?

3. If Japan had confined its December 1941 attacks to Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific rather than attacking Pearl Harbor, what would have been the likely strategic effects for both Japan and the United States?
4. Germany's Blitzkrieg concept and Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor both leveraged surprise. Was the use of surprise the most effective means for obtaining the political end-states sought by Germany and Japan?
5. After successfully executing operations in Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific by the spring of 1942, what should Japan have done next?
6. Which had the greater impact on the outcome at Midway: how Admiral Yamamoto designed and executed his operational plan or how Admiral Nimitz interacted with his subordinate commanders and his intelligence officers?
7. Compare how well Admirals Nimitz and Yamamoto managed the fog, friction, uncertainty, and chaos of war.
8. Did Japan lose the Pacific War because it was obsessed with winning decisive naval battles?
9. Given that the Pacific War was part of a larger global war, did it make operational and strategic sense for Japan to open, and for the United States to contest, a new theater in the Solomon Islands in the summer of 1942?
10. Which peripheral operation offered more potential, the Athenians' Sicilian expedition or the United States' campaign on Guadalcanal?
11. Many prominent military analysts agree that concentration is the most important principle of war. In light of this principle, did the United States commit a strategic error by dividing its forces between the Southwest Pacific and Central Pacific offensives from late 1943 to late 1944?
12. Were sequential or cumulative strategies more important for attaining U.S. objectives in the Pacific War?
13. Mahan did not foresee the role that aviation and submarines would come to play in naval warfare. Did these changes make his strategic theories irrelevant?
14. Was MacArthur or Nimitz more effective at managing risk while maximizing strategic rewards?
15. What does the Pacific War suggest about the risks posed by inter-service rivalries in the operational domain of war?

16. Evaluate the alternative strategic courses of action open to the United States for terminating the Pacific War. Was any better course of action available than the one actually executed?

17. Thucydides highlighted the erosion of both ethical standards and strategic rationality in a democratic political system engaged in a protracted war against a hated adversary. Does that classical observation apply to the United States as the war against Japan unfolded?

18. Did U.S. intelligence activities throughout the Pacific War assist decision-makers more at the operational level of war or at the strategic level of war?

19. Admiral Nimitz famously said that prewar study at the Naval War College was “so thorough” that “nothing that happened” in the Pacific War was “strange or unexpected,” except for “the kamikaze tactics toward the end of the war.” Some historians, on the other hand, stress the importance of United States military leaders’ ability to improvise and adapt as circumstances changed in the Pacific. Are these views contradictory?

### **C. Readings:**

1. James, D. Clayton. “American and Japanese Strategies in the Pacific War.” In *Makers of Modern Strategy*, edited by Peter Paret. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986. Pages 703-732.

[This reading provides an introductory overview of the Pacific War from the perspective of both the United States and Japan. James also outlines national and military strategies in World War II for both belligerents. He provides a broad assessment of the war by linking theaters in China and India with the Pacific War.]

2. Paine, S. C. M. *The Wars for Asia, 1911-1949*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012. Pages 171-220.

[In this award-winning book, Professor Paine of the Strategy Department provides an overview of the Second World War in Asia. Rather than merely focus on the war between the United States and Japan, Paine addresses the critical importance of Japan’s broader war in Asia and particularly its war with China. The focus is on Japan and Japanese decision-making at the national level. Specifically, Paine highlights decision-making about terminating the war.]

3. Evans, David C. and Mark R. Peattie. *Kaigun: Strategy, Tactics, and Technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1887-1941*. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1997. Pages 447-486.

[This reading by Evans and Peattie is designed to work in conjunction with the previous reading by Paine. Whereas Paine provides the political and strategic context from the Japanese perspective, Evans and Peattie assess the Japanese navy at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels. The authors highlight Japan's inter-service rivalry from the navy's perspective. Significant attention is paid to Japanese plans for war with the United States.]

4. Baer, George W. *One Hundred Years of Sea Power: The U.S. Navy, 1890-1990*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994. Pages 119-189, 206-221, 231-272.

[Baer provides an overview of the U.S. Navy's preparations in the 1930s and then assesses the navy's role in the development of American policy, strategy, and operations in the war against Japan. The Baer reading is designed to be the U.S. counterpoint to the previous two readings which focused on Japan.]

5. Warner, Denis and Peggy. "The Doctrine of Surprise"; Miller, Edward S. "Kimmel's Hidden Agenda"; and Cohen, Eliot A. "The Might-Have-Beens of Pearl Harbor." *MHQ: The Quarterly Journal of Military History* 4, no. 1 (autumn 1991). Pages 20-25, 36-43, 72-73. (Selected Readings)

[This reading offers three different perspectives on Pearl Harbor. The Warners, authors of the main reading in the Russo-Japanese War case, offer an explanation of the Japanese proclivity for surprise; Cohen analyzes why American military leaders were surprised; and Miller presents an analysis of the operational plan that Admiral Husband Kimmel intended to execute if his fleet had not been the victim of the surprise attack.]

6. Parshall, Jonathan B. and Anthony B. Tully. *Shattered Sword: The Untold Story of Midway*. Washington: Potomac Books, 2005. Pages 19-59.

[This book provides one of the best accounts in English of the Japanese side of the pivotal naval battle at Midway in June 1942. The two chapters selected for this reading address the strategic debate from which the decision to attack Midway emerged and provide a close analysis of Admiral Yamamoto's operational plan.]

7. Larrabee, Eric. *Commander in Chief: Franklin Delano Roosevelt, His Lieutenants, and Their War*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987. Reprint, Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2004. Pages 305-411.

[Larrabee's book contains a series of biographies addressing the operational and strategic leadership of key American commanders in World War II. Chapters highlighting General MacArthur and Admiral Nimitz are assigned in this case study. The depiction of MacArthur highlights his actions regarding the Philippines, New Guinea, and more broadly the Southwest Pacific advance. The assessment of Nimitz addresses fleet operations, with particular emphasis on decision-making at Midway and later in the advance across the Central Pacific.]

8. Prados, John. *Combined Fleet Decoded*. New York: Random House, 1995. Pages 312-335. (Selected Readings)

[This reading provides a detailed analysis of the roles of signals intelligence and information superiority in the American naval war against Japan. The assigned excerpt shows how the ability of American codebreakers to read Japanese operational messages helped Admiral Nimitz formulate his plan to engage the Japanese carrier force at Midway.]

9. Lee, Bradford A. “A Pivotal Campaign in a Peripheral Theatre: Guadalcanal and World War II in the Pacific.” In *Naval Power and Expeditionary Warfare: Peripheral Campaigns and New Theatres of Naval Warfare*, edited by Bruce A. Elleman and S. C. M. Paine. London and New York: Routledge, 2011. Pages 84-98. (Selected Readings)

[Lee, emeritus professor in the Strategy Department, emphasizes the American strategic decision to contest Japanese operations at Guadalcanal and highlights the strategic effects obtained from the operation.]

10. O’Brien, Phillips. *How the War Was Won: Air-Sea Power and Allied Victory in World War II*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015. Pages 374-429. (Selected Readings)

[The assigned chapter from O’Brien’s book chronicles the air and sea battle against Japan during the critical period from Guadalcanal through Leyte Gulf. O’Brien highlights the attritional struggle against the Japanese air and naval forces. He shows how Guadalcanal set the stage before addressing the interrelationships among the Southwest Pacific, the Central Pacific, the air, and the submarine campaigns.]

11. Wylie, J. C. “Excerpt from ‘Reflections on the War in the Pacific,’” Appendix A. In *Military Strategy: A General Theory of Power Control*. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1989. Pages 117-121. (Selected Readings)

[This brief analysis of the Pacific War by an American admiral who served as a faculty member at the Naval War College after the Second World War distinguishes between “sequential” and “cumulative” strategies and shows how both influenced the outcome of the Pacific War.]

12. Rosen, Stephen Peter. *Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991. Pages 130-147. (Selected Readings)

[Rosen, who served on the Strategy Department faculty at the Naval War College and is now a professor at Harvard, emphasizes the major adaptations that the American submarine force had to make to become operationally effective in the Pacific War.]

13. Bernstein, Barton. “The Alarming Japanese Buildup on Southern Kyushu, Growing U.S. Fears, and Counterfactual Analysis: Would the Planned November 1945 Invasion of Kyushu Have Occurred?” *The Pacific Historical Review* 68, no. 4 (November 1999). Pages 561-609.  
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/4492371>

[This study assesses the alternative strategic courses of action open to the United States during the summer of 1945, underscoring the casualty-aversion of American political and military leaders as they sought to bring about the final defeat of Japan. It provides important context for assessing the decision to drop atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.]

14. Kort, Michael. *The Columbia Guide to Hiroshima and the Bomb*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2007. Pages 81-116. (Selected Readings)

[Kort addresses the United States’ decision to use atomic bombs in 1945. The author charts a variety of arguments put forth by scholars, including alternatives to using the atomic bombs, the relationship between the bombings and war termination, Japanese intentions to continue the war if the bombs were not dropped, and ethical issues in using atomic bombs.]

15. “The Blue Team: Documents on U.S. Policy, Strategy, and Operations in the Pacific War.” (Selected Readings)

[This compendium, put together by Professor Lee includes an important speech from President Roosevelt in February 1942, Admiral Nimitz’s operational plan and “Letter of Instruction” to his subordinate commanders for Midway, the minutes of a crucial June 1945 meeting at the White House that considered war termination options, and other primary source documents that shed light on American policy, strategy, and operations vis-à-vis Japan.]

**D. Learning Outcomes:** This case study on the Second World War in the Pacific supports the OPMEP by applying the theories, themes, and frameworks developed throughout the course to examine how they were applied in a period of rapid technological innovation by theater commanders using joint forces in the largest of all maritime wars. This case study supports:

- CJCS Joint Learning Areas and Objectives 1a, 1c, 2c, 3a, 3b, 3c, 3d, 3e, 3f, 3g, 4a, 4b, 4e, 4f, 4g, 6a, 6b, 6c, 6d, 6e, and 6f. Emphasis will be placed on the following topics, enabling students to:
  - Analyze the capabilities and limitations of U.S. military forces in the Pacific War (1a).
  - Comprehend how the U.S. military was organized to plan, execute, and sustain operations in the Pacific War (1c).

- Undertake critical analysis of problems in the volatile, uncertain, and complex environment of the Pacific War and apply such concepts to the current environment (2c).
  - Comprehend the security environment within which joint forces are employed and how theory and principles of war pertain to the operational level of war (3a and 3d).
  - Comprehend joint force command relationships (3b).
  - Comprehend the relationships among the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war (3c).
  - Comprehend the relationships among all elements of national power and the importance of the whole of government response to Japanese aggression in the Pacific (3e).
  - Comprehend the relationships among national security objectives, military objectives, conflict termination, and post-conflict transition (3g).
  - Comprehend the relationship among national objectives and means available (4a).
  - Comprehend the fundamental concepts of joint operation planning (4b).
  - Comprehend how geopolitics, geostrategy, society, and culture influenced the course of the Pacific War (4f).
  - Analyze the issues facing combatant commanders when attempting to execute operations in coordination with political and policy matters (4g).
  - Apply the role of the profession of arms to the contemporary environment by exploring a historical case that gave the sea services their vocabulary about sea control, carrier aviation, and amphibious combat (6a).
  - Comprehend the necessity of critical thinking and decision-making by real world, operational level leaders (6b).
  - Analyze the importance of adaptation and innovation on military planning and operations (6f).
- Additional objectives including Naval Professional Military Education. The students will:
    - Understand operational warfare at sea—past, present, and future.
    - Understand the theory and practice of applying sea power to achieve strategic effects across a range of military operations.
    - Assess the strategic effects of nuclear weapons in war termination.
    - Assess the strategic and tactical effects of nuclear weapons.
    - Understand the history of professional military education and its effectiveness in preparing a new generation of leaders for command and staff positions.

## **VIII. CLASH OF IDEOLOGIES: FIGHTING AND TERMINATING A MAJOR REGIONAL WAR—THE KOREAN WAR, 1950-1953**

**A. General:** This case study examines the strategic and operational challenges that the United States faced in fighting a major regional war as a leader of a coalition against a determined ideological adversary. The time, place, and type of war that erupted on the Korean Peninsula in 1950 caught the United States materially, strategically, institutionally, and intellectually unprepared. Nonetheless, in response to North Korea's aggression, the United States immediately decided to intervene in the fighting under the auspices of the United Nations (U.N.). The Korean War allows us to gain a greater understanding of the capabilities and limitations of U.S. military forces to conduct a full range of military operations in pursuit of national interests.

After suffering initial military setbacks, the U.N. counterattacked. Its breakout from the Pusan perimeter and landings at Inchon (Operation CHROMITE) were masterpieces of surprise, deception, and joint warfighting. Operation CHROMITE also highlights the fundamentals of joint operational planning. These remarkable operational successes, however, did not bring about a rapid end to the conflict. Instead, the war became even more difficult to end. As U.N. forces sought to exploit their victories and keep the pressure on the enemy by advancing into North Korea, China intervened in the fighting and the United States found itself embroiled in a major regional war. The failure to estimate China's strategic intentions and operational capabilities correctly contributed to one of the worst battlefield reverses American arms ever suffered. While U.N. forces eventually halted and pushed back the Chinese offensive, the fighting did not end. Instead, a costly, two-year stalemate took hold on the battlefield. The stalemate proved immensely frustrating to Americans, who had come to expect that their wars would have decisive and unambiguous results.

Profound differences in ideology and strategic culture between the belligerents further complicated net assessments, operational planning, strategic choice, and negotiation tactics. The erratic course of the American intervention in Korea reflected the complexities of the first major war fought for limited aims in the nuclear age. The case highlights the difficulties faced by political leadership in developing clear strategic intent while empowering and trusting military commanders in the theater of operations. The result was a failure to calibrate political objectives, keep strategy aligned with policy, and isolate adversaries. In particular, Washington failed to reach agreement on key strategic issues with the theater commander, General Douglas MacArthur. An examination of this case study highlights the contrast between the so-called American way of war and the strategic preferences, operational art, and negotiating styles of hardened ideological enemies who sought to break the will of the American people, government, and armed forces while fighting in defense of coalition partners.

The origins of the Korean War can be found in the profound changes that occurred in the international strategic environment immediately after the Second World War. Vast areas of the globe suffered political, social, and economic chaos. In Asia, post-conflict stability operations were complicated by the entry of the Soviet Union into

the Pacific War in August 1945, the actions of indigenous communist movements, and the return of colonial powers in places like Vietnam and Malaya. Because of the rapidity with which peace came—at least a year before many had anticipated—the process of terminating the Second World War in Asia tended to be ad hoc. Korea was a prime example. As a former Japanese colony, it was partitioned between American and Soviet forces at the 38<sup>th</sup> parallel, based on negotiations that took less than a week. Attempts to form a single government that would unite a divided people broke down, and a short-term demarcation of zones of occupation became a defining line between Stalin’s proxy Kim Il-Sung and the American-supported government of Syngman Rhee, both of whom retained the objective of uniting Korea.

Despite the heightening of Cold War tensions in a series of crises ranging from the presence of Soviet forces in Iran in 1946 to the victory of the Chinese communists in 1949, the Truman administration originally did not expect a major military conflict, and it drastically downsized American forces from 1945 to 1950. Military planners, for their part, assumed that the next war would be similar to the Second World War (except that nuclear weapons would be used earlier) and ruled out Korea as a place to fight. U.S. policy-makers focused their attention on defending Europe from numerically superior Soviet forces. The problems associated with the postwar military reductions and the search for a peace dividend give a historic perspective to the downsizing of United States forces after a major conflict.

This case examines how the broad strategic guidance set forth by George F. Kennan in his influential “X” article and later by Paul Nitze in NSC-68 helped shape American strategy during the early years of the Cold War. The larger international strategic environment played a key role in shaping the strategic and operational courses of action available to those fighting in Korea. While the Korean War remained confined in geographic scope, it was fought between two global coalitions. This competition between two ideological blocs both complicated the matching of policy and strategy and raised the specter that the fighting in Korea might expand into a larger regional or even global conflagration involving the use of nuclear weapons. The leaders in both coalitions made their decisions at the operational and even tactical levels of war with an eye toward controlling escalation. Hence, our study of the Korean War allows us to gain a greater understanding of the interrelationships among the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war.

An in-depth examination of the Korean War also highlights how the United States struggled to master the complexities required to think critically and strategically in applying joint warfighting principles and concepts to complex multinational operations. The physical accessibility of the Korean theater played to American strengths as a naval and air power. At the same time, the terrain of the peninsula negated many U.S. advantages in ground fighting, especially against the lighter and less road-bound Chinese forces. This case study thus permits an assessment of the strengths and limitations of specific instruments of war—sea, air, land, and nuclear—for achieving strategic objectives. The bounded nature of this conflict further provides an opportunity to analyze the importance of interaction, adaptation, innovation, and reassessment in wartime. In

particular, this case provides an example of the difficulties inherent in accurately determining both the culminating point of attack and the culminating point of victory.

This case study is also valuable for understanding the importance of intelligence, deception, surprise, and assessment in strategy and war. Failing to foresee China's intervention in the Korean War was one of the most dramatic intelligence failures in American history, along with Pearl Harbor and 9/11. Whether the failure to understand China's intentions and actions was an example of simple ignorance, the difficulties of assessing adversaries from different cultures, willful disregard of clear warnings, or a triumph of operational secrecy on the part of the enemy remains an issue hotly debated among historians. Further, it is possible to explore the ways in which commanders and planners might mitigate the risks when intelligence is inadequate and the adversary is difficult to understand.

In addition, the Korean War highlights the special problems encountered in terminating a conflict fought for limited aims. The process of war termination in Korea was frustrating to American statesmen and commanders alike, leaving a legacy that directly affected the U.S. conduct of the Vietnam War and the 1990-1991 Gulf War. While the United States ultimately realized its aim of preserving an independent South Korea, China's intervention and the protracted negotiations with the Communists greatly increased the costs of the war. American leaders also found that in trying to reach a settlement with adversaries, they faced vexing problems in managing coalition partners. Negotiating and fighting with the enemy formed but a part of the complex strategic problem in war termination that confronted American decision-makers and military commanders.

The ethical challenges associated with the values of the profession of arms are highlighted in the tense civil-military relations during the Korean War. The National Security Act of 1947 created the Department of Defense and the joint military establishment that endures to this day. Korea was the first conflict the United States fought with this organizational framework. General MacArthur acted both as a multinational (Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command) and a joint (Commander-in-Chief, Far East Command) commander. MacArthur's dual role resulted in tense issues in coalition dynamics, including Great Britain's concerns about the possible use of atomic weapons.

This new structure, along with the unusual nature of the mission, also resulted in one of the most serious civil-military crises in American history: the Truman-MacArthur dispute. The conflict between President Harry S. Truman and General MacArthur illuminates ongoing issues in present-day operations, including friction and disagreement between the White House and the theater commander on objectives, strategy, and the proper employment of multinational forces. By examining the adverse strategic consequences that can result from a breakdown in the relationship between the statesman and military leadership, this case study offers an opportunity to scrutinize the roles, authorities, responsibilities, and functions of the President, the Congress, the Secretary of

Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the combatant commanders as well as the relationships among these actors.

Following MacArthur's removal, General Matthew Ridgway took command of the U.N. forces. The contrast between Ridgway and MacArthur as theater commanders is telling in that Ridgway concentrated on the operational problem of evicting Chinese forces from South Korea. Coming from the Pentagon, Ridgway showed that he understood the administration's goals and undertook operations to achieve them. Although he stabilized the conflict, he failed to achieve decisive effects due to the massive Chinese military presence and significant Soviet material aid. The result was a stalemate that prevailed from mid-1951 until the armistice in 1953. Likewise, fears of escalation—specifically that the Soviet Union would launch operations in Europe—called into question the utility of nuclear weapons at the operational level of war.

Having forced the enemy back across the 38<sup>th</sup> parallel, Ridgway opened truce talks but could not secure a quick peace. Disagreement soon broke out among United States commanders over whether offensive operations had been halted prematurely. With U.N. forces bogged down and American casualties mounting, Stalin demanded that his coalition partners maintain their intransigent positions in negotiations and prolong the fighting. General Mark Clark, one of Ridgway's successors, considered escalating the war, including attacks on mainland China and the possible use of nuclear weapons to kick-start the stalled negotiations. However, escalation proved unnecessary. Negotiations yielded results after the death of Stalin.

Now, more than sixty years since the armistice, United States troops remain in South Korea, committed to its defense against a renewed communist onslaught. What was supposed to be a limited intervention to repel communist aggression and restore order turned into more than a half-century of tension with the communist rulers of North Korea, a regime with which a peace treaty has yet to be signed and that is developing nuclear weapons along with long-range delivery systems. While the presence of United States forces has contributed to the stability of the war's settlement, it has complicated relations with South Korea, especially with that country's transition to full democracy, and it has at the same time provided a target for North Korea's vitriol. This case illustrates the unintended long-term consequences of intervention in regional conflicts, showing that international security might require a considerable and lengthy commitment of military power.

## **B. Essay and Discussion Questions:**

1. Were the United States and China drawn into a war neither power wanted because of their alliances?
2. Did the United States make a strategic mistake in going to war in Korea, a region of minor importance in the larger Cold War?

3. Evaluate the operational risks and rewards of Operation CHROMITE.
4. In the Melian Dialogue, the Athenians argue that “the strong do as they can and the weak suffer what they must.” To what extent is the Korean War consistent with this view of international relations?
5. Which theorist—Sun Tzu, Mao, or Clausewitz—best explains the outcome of the Korean War?
6. Did the Communists commit a strategic blunder by pressing their offensive in late 1950?
7. Did the U.N. forces commit a strategic blunder by not continuing their advance in the spring of 1951?
8. How do Clausewitz’s concepts of the culminating point of attack and culminating point of victory (Book 7, Chapters 5 and 22 of *On War*) help explain the course of the Korean War?
9. In examining the relationships between civilian and military decision-makers, which was more harmful to the American conduct of the war in Korea—a failure of the military to comprehend the political objective or a failure of civilian leaders to comprehend what actually can and cannot be achieved by force?
10. Korea was the first major war fought after the advent of nuclear weapons. What role did nuclear weapons play in determining the choices that were made at the operational level of war?
11. During the 1951-1953 war termination phase of the Korean War, three strategic challenges needed to be addressed by both belligerents: how far to go militarily before making peace; what to demand in the armistice or peace talks; and how to convince or compel the enemy to accept as many of their terms as possible. Did the Americans or the Chinese do a better job overcoming these three challenges?
12. How effectively did U.S. leaders apply and integrate joint and multinational capabilities during the Korean War?
13. How effectively did the United States work with coalition partners during the Korean War?
14. How effectively did the United States use information as an instrument of national power during the Korean War?
15. Could the U.N. forces have extracted more strategic effects out of their sea and air power advantages?

16. How well did MacArthur manage the fog, friction, uncertainty, and chaos of war?

17. How well did military and civilian leaders in the United States manage risk during the Korean War?

18. Why did the United States accept a stalemate in Korea after achieving its basic political objectives five years earlier in the Second World War when operating on a much larger scale?

### C. Readings:

1. "X" [George F. Kennan]. "The Sources of Soviet Conduct." *Foreign Affairs* 65, no. 4 (spring 1987). Pages 852-868  
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/20043098>

[In this article, originally published anonymously in July 1947, George Kennan, a high-ranking State Department official, argued that the United States needed to follow a strategy to contain the expansion of the Soviet Union. This article played a critical role in shaping the strategic views of American decision-makers during the Cold War.]

2. "The Truman Doctrine," March 12, 1947. (Selected Readings)

[Truman's speech before a joint session of Congress was a landmark articulation of American policy goals in the Cold War.]

3. NSC-68: United States Objectives and Programs for National Security, April 7, 1950. Sections I-IV, IX, Conclusions, Recommendations. (Selected Readings)

[This report of an ad hoc interdepartmental committee under the leadership of State Department official Paul Nitze painted a stark picture of the emerging superpower conflict and forcefully recommended a major buildup of military and other resources to confront the communist threat. It is often seen as a blueprint for United States strategy during the Cold War.]

4. Stueck, William. *Rethinking the Korean War: A New Diplomatic and Strategic History*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002. Pages 11-239.

[Stueck provides an overview of the origins of the Korean War, foreign intervention on the peninsula, war termination, and the war's effect on Cold War alliances and U.S.-Korean relations.]

5. Osgood, Robert. *Limited War: The Challenge to American Strategy*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957. Pages 163-193. (Selected Readings)

[Osgood's chapter on the Korean War analyzes the Truman administration's rationale for intervening in the conflict and addresses some of the problems that waging a limited war posed for the United States and its Clausewitzian triangle.]

6. "North Korean Offensive, July 1-September 15." In *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950*. Vol. 7: *Korea*. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1976. Pages 393-395, 449-461, 502-510, 600-603, 712-721, 781-782. (Selected Readings)

[These documents illuminate the pre-Inchon debate within the American government over whether the U.S. political objective in the Korean War should be limited, or unlimited.]

7. Schnabel, James F. *Policy and Direction: The First Year*. Washington: Center of Military History, 1992. Pages 139-172, 182-183. (Selected Readings)

[The first selection details the planning and execution of Operation CHROMITE. Pages 182-183 contain the instructions from the Joint Chiefs to General MacArthur for his advance into North Korea in the fall of 1950.]

8. Hunt, Michael H. "Beijing and the Korean Crisis, June 1950-June 1951." *Political Science Quarterly* 107, no. 3 (autumn 1992). Pages 453-478.  
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/2152440>

[Hunt addresses Chinese communist policy and strategy and contrasts how Mao and Truman handled their respective military commanders.]

9. Zhang, Shuguang. "Command, Control, and the PLA's Offensive Campaigns in Korea." In *Chinese Warfighting: The PLA Experience since 1949*, edited by Mark Ryan, David Finkelstein, and Michael McDevitt. Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 2003. Pages 91-122. (Selected Readings)

[Drawing on a variety of Chinese primary sources, including telegrams exchanged between Mao Tse-tung and his military commander Peng Dehuai, Zhang examines the Chinese military's offensive campaigns during the Korean War, devoting particular attention to command and control issues.]

10. Brodie, Bernard. *War and Politics*. New York: Macmillan, 1973. Pages 57-112. (Selected Readings) (Due to copyright restrictions, please do not print this article.)

[Brodie analyzes the major American policy and strategy choices in the Korean War. He is especially provocative on what he sees as a missed opportunity for war termination in mid-1951.]

11. Clodfelter, Mark. *The Limits of Air Power*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2006. Pages 12-26.

[Clodfelter's analysis of air operations in Korea highlights the challenges that U.N. commanders faced in using air strikes to inflict sufficient operational and strategic costs on the Chinese to force them to accept peace terms.]

12. "Testimony of General Douglas MacArthur and of Secretary of Defense George Marshall." In *Korea: Cold War and Limited War*, edited by Allen Guttman. Lexington: D. C. Heath and Co., 1972. Pages 26-52. (Selected Readings)

[In this reading, we see the explanation General MacArthur offered for his actions in the conflict with Truman and the administration's rationale for his relief.]

13. Gaddis, John Lewis. *The Long Peace: Inquiries into the History of the Cold War*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1987. Pages 104-129. (Selected Readings)

[Gaddis, a former member of the Strategy Department and now a professor at Yale University, explores the development of American nuclear strategy and the deliberate non-use of these weapons from the end of the Second World War to the end of the Korean War. This reading will help students think about how United States policy and strategy may be constrained if the other side has a small WMD capability at its disposal.]

14. Crane, Conrad C. "To Avert Impending Disaster: American Plans to Use Atomic Weapons during the Korean War." *Journal of Strategic Studies* 23, no. 2 (June 2000). Pages 72-88.

<http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/01402390008437791?needAccess=true>

[Crane examines the views of senior American leaders about the operational utility of nuclear weapons during the Korean War.]

15. "Memorandum of the Substance of Discussion at a Department of State-Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting, March 27, 1953." In *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954*. Vol. 15, part 1: *Korea*. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1984. Pages 817-818. (Selected Readings)

[This is a brief summary of an interagency meeting called during the war to discuss operational and strategic courses of action involving the use of nuclear weapons.]

16. Baer, George W. *One Hundred Years of Sea Power: The U.S. Navy, 1890-1990*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993. Pages 314-331.

[Baer examines the role of the United States Navy in the Korean War, as well as the overall maritime strategic environment in which the conflict occurred.]

17. Handel, Michael I. *Masters of War: Classical Strategic Thought*. London: Cass, 2001. Pages 165-213.

[In these chapters, Handel explores the contradictions between the concept of continuity and Clausewitz's idea about the culminating point of victory. Handel also explores war termination and how belligerents convert military success into a peace settlement. Specific issues that dominate this process include the questions of what to ask for and how to maintain the peace.]

**D. Learning Outcomes:** The case study on the Korean War supports the OPMEP by applying the theories, themes, and frameworks developed throughout the course to a major regional war in which the United States served as a leader of a coalition against a determined ideological adversary. This case study supports:

- CJCS Joint Learning Areas and Objectives 1a, 1b, 1d, 2c, 3a, 3b, 3c, 3d, 3e, 3f, 3g, 4b, 4e, 4f, 4g, 4h, 6a, 6b, 6c, 6e, and 6f. Emphasis will be placed on the following topics, enabling students to:
  - Comprehend the capabilities and limitations of U.S. military forces in the Korean War (1a).
  - Comprehend the relationships between and interactions among the President, the President's principal civilian and military advisors, combatant commanders, and service component commanders (1b).
  - Comprehend the meaning and limitations of strategic guidance as articulated through historical documents (1d).
  - Understand the challenges of joint force employment in a volatile, uncertain, and ambiguous security environment (2c and 3a).
  - Comprehend how command relationships affect the development of various theater policies, strategies, and plans as well as the employment of military force (3b and 4g).
  - Comprehend the theory and principles that guide relationships among the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war (3c and 3d).
  - Comprehend the relationships among all elements of national power as well as the importance multinational cooperation and building partnership capacity (3e).
  - Comprehend a plan for employment of joint forces and analyze it critically at the operational level of war (3f and 4b).
  - Comprehend the relationships among national objectives, military objectives, and conflict termination (3g).
  - Comprehend the roles that geography, geopolitics, society, culture, socio-economic conditions, and allied partners play in shaping the planning and execution of the full range of military operations (4f).
  - Comprehend the role of the profession of arms through the exploration of the challenges of leadership and civil-military relations in the first historical case of limited war in the nuclear era (6a and 6c).
  - Comprehend the necessity of critical thinking and decision-making by real world, operational level leaders (6b).
  - Analyze the importance of adaptation and innovation on military planning and operations (6f).

## **IX. INSURGENCY, COUNTERINSURGENCY, CONVENTIONAL, AND INTERAGENCY OPERATIONS—THE VIETNAM WAR, 1965-1975**

**A. General:** Few historical cases loom as large in American memory as the Vietnam War, and few are as heavily laden with myth and emotion. This case is designed to give students an opportunity to reexamine the puzzle of Vietnam. It traces the evolution of the United States' theories of victory from the beginning of major troop escalation in 1965 through the collapse of South Vietnam in 1975. In the process, it sheds light on the utility of air and ground operations and the perennial challenges of allied and interagency cooperation.

From 1950-1975, the United States' political aims in Vietnam were largely fixed. The United States sought to maintain an independent, non-communist South Vietnam in the face of aggression by a communist coalition. To do so, the United States employed multiple instruments and varying strategies. Major involvement began in 1950 with financial and advisory support to the French in the First Indochina War (1945-1954). In the aftermath of French withdrawal, the United States expanded its advisory role as it sought to develop the capabilities of the nascent Republic of Vietnam (RVN) and its armed forces. The impending collapse of the RVN in 1964 prompted the United States to introduce large numbers of ground combat units and launch a large-scale air offensive against North Vietnam, Operation ROLLING THUNDER.

During the peak of the United States' involvement in Vietnam, ground strategy focused on attrition and the big unit war. To this end, United States leaders pushed American troop levels from 20,000 in 1965 to 550,000 in 1968. In the wake of the Tet Offensive of 1968, the United States began to shift its focus from the big unit war to an Accelerated Pacification Campaign to secure the population of South Vietnam. The election of Richard Nixon ushered in a new set of strategies that combined vertical and horizontal escalation with a desire to reduce troop commitments. Nixon endorsed new forays into the Communist sanctuaries in Laos and Cambodia. At the same time, he began to withdraw United States troops, seeking to transfer responsibility for the ground war to the RVN's military forces in a process known as Vietnamization.

The first major test of Vietnamization came with the Easter Offensive of 1972. In that offensive, the RVN military, supported by American air power, managed to repel a massive conventional invasion by the North. The defeat of the Easter Offensive, a more aggressive employment of air power in Operations LINEBACKER I and II, and calculated concessions by the United States at the bargaining table all contributed in varying degrees to a negotiated settlement in 1973.

The resulting 1973 Paris Peace Accords proved fragile, however, as the North sought to capitalize on the perceived weakness of the South Vietnamese regime and the uncertain and waning commitment of the United States. The Vietnam War ended in 1975 as a second conventional invasion by North Vietnam, this time unopposed by American air power, toppled the Republic of Vietnam in a matter of weeks.

This case highlights several enduring themes and dilemmas of limited war. In the realm of assessment and reassessment, United States civilian and military decision-makers engaged in a deliberate effort to understand the nature of the war and the major players involved—their enemies, their allies, and themselves. While these efforts to assess the strengths and weaknesses of the opposing military, social, and political systems may have been invalid or incomplete, the readings underscore the difficulty of the task and the degree of effort invested. At various critical junctures after 1965, United States leaders had opportunities to reassess the problem and the strategic options. Whether they took full advantage of these opportunities, and whether a clearer understanding of the problem and the actors would have improved American strategy, remains open to debate.

On the ground, the United States pursued a variety of distinct theories of victory. While the Krepinevich reading highlights the tension between the attrition strategy of 1965-1968 and rival ideas about counterinsurgency, this understates the degree of variation in U.S. strategy. Beginning in the early 1960s, the CIA, working in conjunction with Army Special Forces and the RVN military, launched a series of unconventional warfare and pacification programs. These initiatives would continue in various forms throughout the remainder of the conflict. Before 1965 and after 1969, the United States focused primarily on its efforts to train, advise, and assist the South Vietnamese armed forces in their efforts to pacify the South and resist conventional attacks. Whether in major combat operations, pacification, unconventional warfare, or foreign internal defense, the question is simple: why did the United States have such difficulty translating its operational and tactical achievements into political results?

In the air, Operation ROLLING THUNDER (1965-1968) highlighted the influence of the civilian leadership upon operations, command relationships in theater, the effectiveness of joint and service doctrine in an unfamiliar environment, and the limits of what air power could contribute to victory in this particular war. Throughout ROLLING THUNDER, President Lyndon Johnson and his senior advisers wanted to ensure that the campaign did not alienate domestic or international opinion or lead to expansion and escalation of the war. He and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara insisted upon limiting the targets that could be struck, a practice which some officers felt severely diminished the campaign's effectiveness. Meanwhile, the lack of clear lines of authority among the various participants in ROLLING THUNDER made the campaign much more difficult to run. Perhaps most important of all, Clodfelter's book argues that North Vietnam did not contain enough targets to make a World War II-type strategic bombing campaign effective. Here, we must ask which of these factors contributed the most to the strategic failure of air operations to translate battlefield effects into achievement of national political objectives.

Operations LINEBACKER I, from May through October 1972, and LINEBACKER II, which lasted about one week during December 1972, present a different range of issues. In April 1972, the North Vietnamese launched a major conventional attack upon South Vietnam, and LINEBACKER I, executed with few if any political restraints, undoubtedly helped halt that attack, both because of improved technology (the use of "smart" bombs) and the changed nature of the enemy threat.

LINEBACKER II, an all-out air operation featuring hundreds of B-52 sorties over Hanoi and Haiphong, was designed to bring the North back to sign the agreement it had agreed to in October 1972. While the Communists did sign the Paris Peace Accords, LINEBACKER II's contribution to the termination of this war remains controversial.

This case also examines the challenges of allied cooperation. As the readings illustrate, the relationship between the Americans and their South Vietnamese allies was far from ideal. The United States was consistently frustrated by what it saw as Vietnamese corruption, tepid commitment, political machinations, and dependence. The Vietnamese government and military resented the American tendency to dominate and dictate during the period of peak involvement, while they were equally dumbfounded by America's late-war decisions to unload all responsibilities in the name of Vietnamization. The unhappy marriage between the United States and the RVN raises more general questions about the appropriate relationship between patrons and clients in limited wars.

In addition, the Vietnam War showcases the enduring problems of interagency operations in limited war and counterinsurgency. From 1950 through 1975, a series of American ambassadors, CIA station chiefs, and senior military commanders played critical roles in the prosecution of the war. The imperative of interagency cooperation did not always trump bureaucratic and strategic disagreements. Robert Komer, the architect of the late-war CORDS program (Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support), highlights a series of obstacles to interagency cooperation and execution. Komer's account, and more recent American experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan, raises questions about the sources of interagency friction, the degree to which these can be overcome, and the level of cooperation necessary to achieve success on the strategic level.

This case also sheds light on the conduct and consequences of withdrawal from Vietnam. Experts continue to disagree about the relative success or failure of Vietnamization, their arguments resting heavily on interpretations of the Accelerated Pacification Campaign, the Easter Offensive of 1972, and the collapse of the RVN in 1975. The United States' decisions to persevere and escalate in Vietnam often rested on concerns about the consequences of withdrawal. In the minds of many hawks, withdrawal from Vietnam would lead to the collapse of neighboring regimes (the domino theory) and would damage the credibility of American commitments worldwide. Opponents of the war argued that the cost of involvement exceeded the value of holding the line, and that withdrawal was unlikely to damage United States credibility or precipitate a regional collapse. The subsequent course of events in Indochina supports elements of both arguments. The fall of Laos and the nightmarish civil wars of Cambodia would appear to support the hawks' fears of regional collapse. By contrast, Thailand's successful resistance and the emergence of a regional rivalry between China and Vietnam would appear to support more dovish arguments.

The most important questions that emerge from Vietnam revolve around causation and learning. What best explains the Communists' victory in South Vietnam—

the strategic errors of the United States, the weaknesses of the RVN, or the efficacy of communist strategy? And what lessons, prescriptive or proscriptive, might contemporary leaders draw from the multi-decade struggle in Indochina?

## **B. Essay and Discussion Questions:**

1. How might U.S. Army doctrine of the 1960s have been modified to improve pacification efforts in South Vietnam? Could such modifications have been sufficient to make pacification effective in the broadest sense?

2. How and why did senior civilian leaders attempt to control ROLLING THUNDER, and did doing so further their political objectives?

3. How did joint planning, command relationships, and overlapping command authority affect the use of air power during the Vietnam War?

4. What best explains the failure of ROLLING THUNDER to have a decisive effect in the Vietnam War?

5. How important were sanctuaries and safe havens to the outcome of the Vietnam War?

6. Were the most important security problems within South Vietnam susceptible to the application of United States military power?

7. In light of how the Paris Peace Accords were reached in 1972-1973, what effect did LINEBACKER I and LINEBACKER II have on the outcome of the war?

8. Assess the contributions of interagency organizations to the effectiveness of the Accelerated Pacification Campaign.

9. What is the appropriate division of labor between external sponsors and client states in the prosecution of counterinsurgency?

10. What would an effective counter to the enemy's dau tranh strategy have required?

11. How well did American leaders assess the effectiveness of their military strategy and adapt based on interaction with the enemy?

12. Was the Communist victory in Vietnam due more to the inherent weaknesses of the Saigon regime, strategic mistakes made by the United States, or the brilliance of North Vietnamese strategy?

13. Did the United States armed forces discover elements of a strategy that, if combined, might have secured American objectives at an acceptable cost?

14. To what extent did the doctrinal outlook of the American armed services about how to fight wars inhibit the strategic effectiveness of the United States during the Vietnam War?

15. The United States fought a successful limited regional war in Korea. Why, when faced with an ostensibly similar strategic situation, did the United States fail to achieve its objectives in Vietnam, despite a greater effort in both magnitude and duration?

16. Was Vietnamization a success? What does this case tell us about problems of withdrawal and the challenges of shifting the burden to client states?

17. Why did the Paris Peace Accords of 1973 fail to cement the United States' gains in Vietnam?

18. In Korea, United States advisers trained the Korean army to defeat a domestic insurgency before 1950, only to see South Korea nearly overrun in a conventional invasion. Early in Vietnam, United States advisers trained the RVN military to resist a conventional invasion, turning later to a focus on pacification and internal war. The RVN ultimately fell under the blows of two subsequent conventional invasions. What do these two cases tell us about the appropriate focus of American advisory efforts in embattled client states?

19. Two prominent scholars have argued that “the system worked” in Vietnam in the sense that the United States consistently did the minimum necessary not to lose and the maximum that was possible given domestic and international constraints. Do you agree?

20. Krepinevich argues that the United States lost in Vietnam because it applied the “Army concept” of conventional operations to an insurgency. The fact remains that the RVN fell to conventional invasion in 1975 and not to a popular uprising or insurgency. Does the nature of the endgame invalidate Krepinevich's argument?

21. How significant was operational surprise (e.g., the 1968 Tet Offensive, the 1972 Easter Offensive, the 1975 Offensive) to the outcome of the Vietnam War?

### **C. Readings:**

1. Clodfelter, Mark. *The Limits of Air Power*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2006. Pages 73-210.

[Clodfelter discusses doctrine, broader civilian concerns, operational problems, and the strategic effects of ROLLING THUNDER and LINEBACKER I and II.]

2. Krepinevich, Andrew F. *The Army and Vietnam*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986. Pages 131-275.

[Krepinevich shows how the U.S. Army began fighting the war by attempting to apply conventional doctrine in Vietnam.]

3. Bergerud, Eric. *The Dynamics of Defeat: The Vietnam War in Hau Nghia Province*. Boulder: Westview Press, 1991. Pages 223-308.

[Focusing on one key province, Bergerud discusses the overall effects of the United States and Communist strategies during the period of the Accelerated Pacification Campaign.]

4. Komer, Robert. *Bureaucracy Does Its Thing: Institutional Constraints on U.S.-GVN Performance in Vietnam*. Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 1972. Pages 1-11, 37-44, 64-69, 106-117, 151-162. (Selected Readings)

[Komer, who headed the CORDS program in Vietnam, examines the bureaucratic obstacles that inhibited effective interagency participation.]

5. Pike, Douglas. *PAVN: People's Army of Vietnam*. Novato: Presidio Press, 1986. Pages 213-252. (Selected Readings)

[This critical chapter focuses on dau tranh, or struggle, the essence of Viet Cong political and military strategy.]

6. Willbanks, James. *Abandoning Vietnam: How America Left and South Vietnam Lost Its War*. Lawrence: University of Kansas, 2004. Pages 122-162. (Selected Readings)

[Willbanks examines the Easter Offensive of 1972, providing insights on South Vietnamese and North Vietnamese strategies, the role of U.S. air power, and the mixed results of Vietnamization.]

7. Hosmer, Stephen, ed. *The Fall of South Vietnam: Statements by Civilian and Military Leaders*. Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 1978. Pages v-xviii, 5-131. <http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/reports/2005/R2208.pdf>

[This study, based on extensive postwar interviews with South Vietnamese leaders, helps us see the war through the eyes of our allies. In doing so, it raises important questions about the appropriate relationship between the United States and partner nations. These interviews also help explain the 1975 collapse of the RVN and the general strengths and weaknesses of the Vietnamese regime.]

8. Paris Peace Accords, January 17, 1973. (Selected Readings)

[This is the text of the Paris Peace Accords signed in 1973. This reading offers an opportunity to ask to what extent the terms of the peace contributed to its fragility.]

9. Baer, George W. *One Hundred Years of Sea Power: The U.S. Navy, 1890-1990*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994. Pages 384-393.

[Baer discusses the United States Navy's role during the Vietnam War, including its riverine campaign.]

**D. Learning Outcomes:** The Vietnam War case study supports the OPMEP by applying the theories, themes, and frameworks developed throughout the course to assess how the United States and its allies should cope with a regional, limited war across the spectrum of politico-military operations ranging from counterinsurgency to conventional military engagements. This case study supports:

- CJCS Joint Learning Areas and Objectives 1a, 1b, 1c, 2b, 2c, 3c, 3d, 3e, 3g, 4a, 4e, 4f, 6a, 6b, 6c, 6d, 6e, and 6f. Emphasis will be placed on the following topics, enabling students to:
  - Comprehend the capabilities and limitations of U.S. military forces (1a).
  - Comprehend the relationships between and interactions among the President, the President's principal civilian and military advisors, combatant commanders, and service component commanders (1b).
  - Comprehend how the United States military is organized to plan, execute, sustain, and train for joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational operations (1c).
  - Comprehend the interrelationship between Service doctrine and joint doctrine (2b).
  - Undertake critical analysis of problems in the volatile, uncertain, and complex environment of the Vietnam War and apply such concepts to the current environment (2c).
  - Comprehend the interrelationships among the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war (3c).
  - Comprehend how theory and principles of war pertain to the strategic and operational levels of war (3d).
  - Comprehend the relationships among all elements of national power as well as the importance of multinational cooperation and building partnership capacity (3e).
  - Comprehend the relationships among national security objectives, military objectives, and conflict termination (3g).
  - Comprehend the roles that geography, geopolitics, society, culture, socio-economic conditions, and allied partners play in shaping the planning and execution of the full range of military operations (4f).

- Comprehend the role of the profession of arms through an historical exploration of the challenges of leadership and civil-military relations in a case involving counterinsurgency operations and resulting in the withdrawal of U.S. forces (6a and 6c).
- Comprehend the necessity of critical thinking and decision-making by real world, operational level leaders (6b).
- Analyze the importance of adaptation and innovation on military planning and operations (6f).

## **X. JOINT AND COALITION OPERATIONS IN A MAJOR REGIONAL WAR— THE STRUGGLE AGAINST SADDAM HUSSEIN’S IRAQ, 1990-1998**

**A. General:** Saddam Hussein’s regime posed a serious strategic challenge to the United States and Iraq’s neighbors. Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 triggered a major regional war that involved a huge commitment of American and coalition forces to roll back Saddam Hussein’s aggression. Though the coalition attained overwhelming operational success in DESERT STORM, successful war termination proved elusive. Examining the 1990-1998 period in-depth affords students a strong platform for critical comparative study with past cases as the Strategy and War Course becomes more cumulative. As in the Russo-Japanese War, the victors in this limited war confronted the difficult task of deciding how to translate military success into political outcomes. Unlike the settlement of the Russo-Japanese War, which proved highly unpopular with the Japanese public but was tolerable to the Russians, the settlement to the 1991 Gulf War was more ambiguous.

The case also affords an opportunity to apply Clausewitzian strategic analysis to a volatile, uncertain, complex, and often ambiguous contemporary environment, and to test whether the disciplines of thought built throughout the course can withstand the fog and passion of recent events. Planning, waging, and ending wars fought for limited aims pose complex strategic challenges. Although the principles for success appear simple— isolating the adversary, seizing the initiative, and imposing sufficient costs to convince the enemy to relinquish the political objectives at stake—constructing a durable peace can be complicated. Even when leaders appear to have solved key operational dilemmas and have the critical thinking and decision-making skills to anticipate and adapt to surprise and uncertainty, they may still face obstacles to strategic success. These include complex relationships among national security objectives, coalition objectives, military objectives, conflict termination, and post-conflict transitions. Military commanders may bristle at civilian orders to halt an ongoing campaign when the enemy is on the run, or political leaders may fail to provide clear and precise guidance. Domestic groups may further constrain operational flexibility. Coalition partners may disagree about what to demand in return for peace. And, while unlimited wars leave the enemy powerless, limited wars leave the enemy in place, creating the possibility of enduring hostility, mistrust, and mutual misperceptions. The losing side may find solace in Clausewitz’s dictum that defeat is but a temporary setback. The loser might not accept defeat; the winner might not recognize victory.

Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990 came at a time of unusual geostrategic advantage for the United States. The end of the Cold War meant that abundant United States forces were available for regional operations. Intense competition with Moscow during the late Cold War, moreover, had prompted technological adaptation and innovations that some dubbed a revolution in military affairs. Most importantly, the decaying Soviet Union was unlikely to intervene militarily on behalf of its Iraqi client, which was still recovering from a brutal eight-year war with Iran.

Despite these advantages, joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational issues complicated U.S. operations. First, the Bush administration feared that domestic opposition would undermine its strategy if the war went badly and coalition forces suffered heavy casualties. Iraq's large stockpile of chemical and biological weapons contributed to these fears, creating new requirements for force protection. Second, while recent congressional legislation had emphasized the importance of joint planning and operations, inter-service rivalries remained an obstacle to a truly unified effort. Specifically, old rivalries were exacerbated by suggestions that advances in precision technology could allow air power alone to win the war. Third, the coalition against Iraq was a disparate group of states with varying capabilities and interests. Not all multinational partners were equally enthusiastic about the mission or about the prospect of fighting under foreign command. Coalition management required some way of assuaging the political concerns of key regional partners, which threatened the efficiency of operations. Coalition concerns also constrained the United States from expanding its objectives at the end of the war. Finally, the war was a test of civil-military relations, which had been badly damaged in the Vietnam era. While the Bush administration promised to avoid micro-managing the military campaign, it frequently intervened to reinforce the primacy of policy.

Critical decisions about war termination reflected military judgments, coalition concerns, and domestic politics, illustrating the complex interrelationships among the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war. President Bush's decision to halt the ground offensive after 100 hours, possibly prompted by concerns about media coverage of Iraqi forces retreating under heavy air attack, was also influenced by miscommunication regarding the actual military situation on the ground and the remaining strength of Iraq's Republican Guard forces. General Norman Schwarzkopf's emphasis on a quick coalition withdrawal from Iraqi territory made it difficult to ensure Iraqi compliance with the cease-fire terms. Surviving Iraqi forces crushed major uprisings against Saddam Hussein with the assistance of helicopter flights that were permitted under the cease-fire agreement. Despite the fact that Iraq came under international sanctions and an intrusive U.N. WMD (Weapons of Mass Destruction) inspection regime, United States leaders feared that Saddam Hussein would remain intractable and ruthless. The initial sense of triumph dissipated over time.

The Bush administration worked hard to assemble the coalition that fought in DESERT STORM, but international solidarity was difficult to sustain in the postwar years. In this period, inspectors sought to destroy Iraq's remaining unconventional weapons programs, and economic sanctions prevented efforts to rebuild Iraq's conventional military. As the decade wore on and the cost of containment rose, some coalition members argued that Iraq no longer presented a serious regional or international threat, and they began debating ways to relax sanctions. Yet at the same time, Saddam Hussein managed to consolidate power while intimidating and obstructing U.N. inspectors.

Because Saddam Hussein never eliminated the doubts about his WMD programs or aspirations, frustrating inspectors and keeping up his belligerent rhetoric, many

officials in the United States concluded that lasting stability was impossible as long as he remained in power. By December 1998, the U.N. Security Council concluded that the inspections regime had reached an impasse. Inspectors were withdrawn, paving the way for Operation DESERT FOX. Assessing the period as a whole, some argue that DESERT FOX marked the effective end of the post-Gulf War period, with no-fly zones remaining usefully in place while Security Council members debated escalating or abandoning their policy goals. Others argue that continued containment was viable, or that the United States had already succeeded but did not realize it. Students should ponder such questions while extracting insights relevant to today's equally complex, dynamic international environment.

### **B. Essay and Discussion Questions:**

1. How effectively did Saddam Hussein frustrate his enemy's strategy from 1990-1998?
2. How effectively did American political and military leaders work together from August 1990 to March 1991 to formulate a strategy that not only matched the stated political objectives but was also sensitive to the other political considerations of policy-makers?
3. Drawing upon the experiences of United States operations in Iraq from 1990-1998, the War for American Independence, and the Second World War in Europe, what are the strengths and limitations of multinational coalitions?
4. Evaluate United States and Iraqi efforts to use the multinational arena, especially in the areas of coalition building and strategic communication, from 1990-1998.
5. Michael Gordon and Bernard Trainor maintain that "the air campaign had all but won the war" by the time the ground invasion began (*The Generals' War*, page 331). Do you agree?
6. How well did United States air power serve as an instrument of policy from 1990-1998?
7. Clausewitz forces strategists to grapple with the relationship between the principle of continuity and the culminating point of victory. How well did United States leaders navigate this relationship?
8. How well did Generals Powell and Schwarzkopf manage the fog, friction, and uncertainty of war?
9. Did the United States-led coalition achieve a quick, decisive victory in DESERT STORM?

10. In the war termination phase of a conflict, three key strategic questions need to be addressed: a) how far to go militarily before making peace; b) what to demand in the armistice or peace talks; and c) who will enforce the peace and how. How well did the United States handle these questions at the end of DESERT STORM?

11. Did the United States create “security and stability” in the Arabian Gulf region from 1991-1998?

12. Did NSD-54 articulate a viable policy-strategy match?

13. Did President Clinton’s 1998 speech articulate a viable policy-strategy match?

14. Between 1990 and 1998, which state was more strategically effective in its use of intelligence, surprise, and deception, the United States or Iraq?

15. What enduring lessons about war termination, if any, can be learned by comparing this war to other cases covered in the course?

16. How well did the United States manage WMD challenges in its plans and operations from 1990-1998?

17. What “moral forces” were at play in this war? In what respect, if any, did they have an impact on the war’s outcome?

18. The 1990-1991 Gulf War has been dubbed by some as “The Generals’ War.” To what extent did United States civil-military relations and intra-military relationships allow warfighters to operate effectively through trust, empowerment, and understanding in the period covered by this case?

19. Some might argue that despite the enactment of the Goldwater-Nichols Act in 1986, inter-service rivalries continue to impede the United States military’s ability to apply joint warfighting principles and concepts to joint operations. Do you agree?

### **C. Readings:**

1. Baram, Amatzia. “The Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait: Decision-Making in Baghdad.” In *Iraq’s Road to War*, edited by Amatzia Baram and Barry Rubin. New York: St. Martin’s, 1993. Pages 5-10, 15-26. (Selected Readings)

[This reading explores Saddam Hussein’s rationale for attacking Kuwait, his strategic options, and the Iraqi perspective on events leading up to Operation DESERT STORM.]

2. Gordon, Michael R. and Bernard E. Trainor. *The Generals' War: The Inside Story of the Conflict in the Gulf*. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1995. Pages 31-53, 75-202, 227-248, 267-288, 309-331, 400-461.

[This reading provides an opportunity to assess a variety of crucial issues. It is provocative in its treatment of civil-military relations and the national command structure, inter-service cooperation and rivalry in war planning and execution, the various strategic alternatives open to decision-makers, the strengths and limitations of the high-tech revolution in military affairs pioneered by the American armed forces, the limits of intelligence in piercing the fog of war, the formation of joint doctrine and planning after the Goldwater-Nichols Act, and issues relating to war termination.]

3. Bush, George and Brent Scowcroft. *A World Transformed*. New York: Knopf, 1998. Pages 380-415, 424-492.

[President Bush and his National Security Advisor, Brent Scowcroft, wrote an account of foreign policy decision-making during their time in office, relying in part on a diary kept by President Bush. The authors provide insights into high-level decision-making during wartime which are especially important for understanding American policy aims in the war, the politics of coalition building, the press of domestic political considerations on the making of strategy, the crafting of a coordinated information campaign, and the President's role as Commander-in-Chief.]

4. Woods, Kevin M. "Iraqi Perspectives Project Phase II: Um Al-Ma'arik (The Mother of All Battles): Operational and Strategic Insights from an Iraqi Perspective." Vol. 1. Alexandria: Institute for Defense Analyses, May 2008. Pages 167-225, 280-337, 385-391. (Selected Readings)

[This study is part of the Iraqi Perspectives Project, a Department of Defense-sponsored effort to enhance critical strategic analysis by considering the adversary's point of view, made possible by primary source material captured from Iraqi government archives after 2003. The first selection explores Iraqi strategies for defending Kuwait, compensating for United States and coalition strengths, exploiting the utility of WMD and terrorist options, and conducting a net assessment of the coalition and its likely strategies. The second selection picks up a detailed narrative of the last phase of DESERT STORM from the Iraqi point of view, carrying the discussion through cease-fire talks at Safwan and into the immediate aftermath and uprisings. The third selection sets the stage for the Iraqi perspective moving into 1991 and later.]

5. Byman, Daniel, Kenneth Pollack, and Matthew Waxman. "Coercing Saddam Hussein: Lessons from the Past." *Survival* 40, no. 3 (autumn 1998). Pages 127-152.  
<http://www18.georgetown.edu/data/people/dlb32/publication-31954.pdf>

[This article explores the interaction between Iraq and the United States in the 1991-1998 period, using the framework of coercion and counter-coercion to cover key events. The authors also conduct a center of gravity analysis to propose a campaign design for future

coercive efforts. The article was published shortly before the DESERT FOX campaign and is also useful in recapturing a perspective from this era.]

6. Conversino, Mark. "Operation DESERT FOX: Effectiveness with Unintended Effects." *Air & Space Power Journal—Chronicles Online*, July 13, 2005. (Selected Readings)

[Conversino undertakes a campaign analysis of Operation DESERT FOX. The article examines the campaign in light of the potential promises and limitations of air power writ large, as well as in terms of a policy-strategy match for the campaign. In addition, it provides a net assessment of the viability of continued containment and the strength of the coalition towards the end of the period covered by this case, providing a foundation for debate with the Lopez and Cortright selection below.]

7. Lopez, George A. and David Cortright. "Containing Iraq: Sanctions Worked." *Foreign Affairs* 83, no. 4 (July/August 2004). Pages 90-103.  
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/20034049>

[Lopez and Cortright argue that despite much criticism, the international sanctions put in place after Operation DESERT STORM successfully eroded Iraq's conventional military power and WMD arsenal. Their argument evaluates the war termination decisions of 1991 and speaks to the broad issue of threat assessment against a defeated but still confrontational enemy. It also provides a useful foundation for debate in tandem with readings 5 and 6 above.]

8. Cohen, Eliot. *Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime*. New York: Anchor Books, 2002. Pages 184-207.

[Cohen, a former professor in the Strategy Department and later Counselor to the Department of State under Secretary Condoleezza Rice, examines the tension between the "unequal dialogue" civil-military model he proposes and the record of United States civil-military relations after Vietnam. Cohen is provocative in using Clausewitz to critique the making of strategy as a "routine method" and in castigating war college curricula that teach politics as a substitute for strategy.]

9. Posen, Barry R. "U.S. Security Policy in a Nuclear-Armed World, or What If Iraq Had Nuclear Weapons?" In *The Coming Crisis: Nuclear Proliferation, U.S. Interests, and World Order*, edited by Victor A. Utgoff. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2000. Pages 157-190. (Selected Readings)

[What if Saddam Hussein had possessed nuclear weapons in 1990-1991? Posen explores this counterfactual question as a way of thinking about the nature of a conflict involving the United States and an enemy armed with nuclear weapons.]

10. "Confronting Iraq: Primary Source Documents." (Selected Readings)

[This compendium of primary source documents provides essential support for the critical strategic analysis required in this case study. Two of the documents cover presidential speeches which attempt to articulate a policy-strategy match at two very different periods in the U.S. confrontation with Saddam Hussein's Iraq. The first is President Bush's address to Congress in September 1990 in the wake of Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait. The second is President Clinton's address to the American people on the eve of Operation DESERT FOX. Two other documents provide an internal companion to these presidential speeches. NSD-54 is the now-declassified statement of U.S. war aims and supporting goals, and should be evaluated both as strategic guidance and in comparison with the more public articulation of U.S. purposes in the 1990 public speech mentioned above. The final document is a selection from the Iraq Survey Group Report, a comprehensive post-2003 attempt to establish a non-partisan body of evidence to account for Saddam Hussein's motives and efforts regarding WMD.]

**D. Learning Outcomes:** This case study supports the OPMEP by applying the theories, themes, and frameworks developed throughout the course to assess how the United States and its coalition partners coped with the planning, execution, and termination of a regional, limited war in a near-contemporary setting. As the first post-Goldwater-Nichols case, this module provides a rich array of learning outcomes. This case study supports:

- CJCS Joint Learning Areas and Objectives 1a, 1b, 1d, 2c, 3a, 3b, 3c, 3d, 3e, 3f, 3g, 4f, 4g, 4h, 6a, 6b, 6c, 6d, 6e, and 6f. Emphasis will be placed on the following topics, enabling students to:
  - Comprehend the capabilities and limitations of U.S. military forces (1a).
  - Comprehend the relationships between and interactions among the President, the President's principal civilian and military advisors, combatant commanders, and service component commanders (1b).
  - Comprehend strategic guidance contained in official historical documents, particularly critical analysis of NSD-54 serves as a centerpiece to this case study (1d).
  - Undertake critical analysis of problems in a volatile, uncertain, and complex environment and apply such concepts (2c).
  - Comprehend the security environment within which Joint Forces are created, employed, and sustained in support of JFCs and component commanders (3a).
  - Comprehend joint force command relationships (3b).
  - Comprehend the interrelationships among the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war as well as the theory and principles that guide them (3c and 3d).
  - Comprehend the relationships among all elements of national power and the importance of comprehensive approaches, the whole of government response, and multinational cooperation (3e).
  - Analyze a plan critically for employment of joint and multinational forces at the operational level of war (3f).

- Comprehend the relationships among national security objectives, military objectives, and conflict termination (3g).
- Comprehend the roles that geography, geopolitics, society, culture, socio-economic conditions, and allied partners play in shaping the planning and execution of the full range of military operations (4f).
- Comprehend the role and perspective of the Combatant Commander and staff in developing various theater policies, strategies, and plans (4g).
- Comprehend the requirements across the joint force, Services, inter-organizational partners, and the host nation in the planning and execution of joint operations across the range of military operations (4h).
- Comprehend the role of the profession of arms through the historical exploration of the ethical challenges of leadership and civil-military relations (6a and 6c).
- Comprehend critical thinking and decision-making skills needed to anticipate and recognize change, lead transitions, and adapt to surprise and uncertainty (6b).
- Analyze the application of Mission Command in a Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental and Multinational (JIIM) environment (6d).
- Analyze the importance of adaptation and innovation on military planning and operations (6f).

## **XI. COUNTERTERRORISM, THEATER STRATEGIES, AND INTERAGENCY OPERATIONS IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT—THE WAR AGAINST AL QAEDA AND ASSOCIATED MOVEMENTS IN AFGHANISTAN AND IRAQ**

**A. General:** This case marks the firm transition from “closed” historical cases used to hone habits of critical thinking and strategic analysis to “open” and unfinished contemporary cases chosen precisely because policy-makers and strategic planners do not have the luxury of hindsight and must grapple with the fact that key data may be missing or evolving. Such a transition is necessary since strategy made in the real world is always contemporary and must always cope with uncertainty and fragmentary evidence. Indeed, this evolving dynamic is at the heart of two primary interrelated challenges in the war against al Qaeda and Associated Movements (AQAM): grappling with Sun Tzu’s dictum to know yourself and know your enemy and the role of interaction, adaptation, and reassessment.

To address the first challenge—know yourself and know your enemy—both U.S. and AQAM documents are included among the readings. More than one third of the readings in this case are dedicated to either close textual analyses of primary sources or actual speeches and letters from al Qaeda leaders. The readings invite students to consider the enemy using the adversary’s own words. From documents that reflect the strategic logic of al Qaeda’s early attacks (including the 1998 United States Embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania), to the 9/11 plot, to debates within AQAM in the wake of major United States counteractions, and finally to a wealth of recently released raw material recovered from Usama Bin Laden’s safe house (including his reflections on the challenge posed by the Arab Spring for al Qaeda’s future), the readings provide a comprehensive sampling of AQAM strategic thought. To address the challenge of knowing yourself—a challenge which previous case studies have shown can be just as difficult as knowing the enemy—the readings also include U.S. policy documents on the use of force and evolving American goals.

The second challenge is to consider the role of interaction, adaptation, and reassessment—a course theme. The readings examine the strategic effects for al Qaeda of operations in Iraq and U.S. efforts to stem the complex Iraqi insurgency between 2006 and 2009. This focus is particularly important for strategists who must adapt to the changing nature of the war by anticipating and responding to surprise and uncertainty at both the strategic and operational levels. For example, the primary source readings on AQAM in Iraq and Afghanistan suggest deep strategic friction over where to concentrate forces and conduct future operations. Moreover, the readings suggest that these strategic and operational choices may have negative long-term implications for a post-Bin Laden al Qaeda.

From the U.S. perspective, there is a deep strategic debate over the roles of the Surge, creation of the Sons of Iraq, al Qaeda’s strategic blunders, and the role of Shia militias in quelling the violence in Iraq between 2006 and 2009. Each competing explanation has long-term consequences for how to deal with the challenge from armed groups in Iraq and elsewhere. These in turn challenge us to consider the role of military

force among the many instruments of U.S. national power, and specifically, the limitations of military means to achieve broad, ambitious political objectives. Primary documents provide U.S. policy statements on the use of force in the war against al Qaeda and strategic perspectives from senior American leaders, including General David Petraeus, President Bush, and President Obama, as they each cast their vision for the near and long-term future of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The Afghanistan readings show how another armed group—the Taliban—has demonstrated resilience and strategic adaptation over a protracted conflict. The depth of reading on Afghanistan’s cultural and political terrain will also enable students to debate which of the perceived elements of success in Iraq, especially between 2006 and 2011, could be applied to U.S. strategy in Afghanistan. The geopolitics of the region together with cultural and social factors also influence war termination considerations and post-conflict reconstruction plans. At the same time, the readings and lectures discuss how the resilience and adaptation of the Taliban have complicated U.S. relations with Afghanistan’s government and other international partners.

Students should find ready use for the variety of conceptual frameworks previously discussed and utilized in this course, and they should also question which frameworks may be a poor fit for this complex, multi-front war. Although the war began for the United States with the 9/11 attacks by al Qaeda, multiple armed groups have since formed or become involved in this conflict. The readings and lectures provide the background to understand the old and new ethnic and religious fault lines in Iraq and Afghanistan and the challenge that new armed groups pose for regional stability. The effects armed groups have on stability can be assessed through the Taliban’s adaptations in Afghanistan, the rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) in Iraq and Syria, and armed groups across trans-Sahel and North Africa.

## **B. Essay and Discussion Questions:**

1. How does AQAM differ from other armed groups engaged in irregular warfare that you have studied in this course, and do those differences suggest successful strategies for the United States and its allies to win the war against AQAM?
2. How coherent and effective have the strategies and operations of al Qaeda and its allies been since they openly declared war on the United States?
3. Sun Tzu advised that the best way to win is to attack the enemy’s strategy. How, and to what extent, does that insight apply to the war between AQAM and the American-led alliance?
4. Sun Tzu advised that the second best way to win is to attack the enemy’s alliances. How, and to what extent, does that insight apply to the war against AQAM?

5. How well did American policy-makers and military planners respond to the surprise attacks of 9/11, and how well have they adapted policy and strategy to the changing nature of the war against AQAM?
6. A successful counterinsurgency strategy requires acquiring a solid understanding of the local cultures and society, or “cultural terrain.” How coherently and effectively have U.S. efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq (between 2003 and 2011) utilized and shaped the relevant cultural terrains?
7. What should be the appropriate strategic and operational level relationship between counterinsurgency and counterterrorism efforts in the war against AQAM?
8. In the period 2006-2011, were the gains made in Iraq by U.S. and Iraqi forces due more to the Surge or to AQAM’s self-defeating behavior?
9. Based on examples from this case and previous counterinsurgency cases in this course, are there key strategic and operational principles that produce success in counterinsurgency operations? If so, which principles are most important and why? If not, why not?
10. How well has al Qaeda, as a non-state organization, compensated for its weaknesses and exploited its strengths in its war with the United States?
11. In the Peloponnesian War case study, we considered the wisdom of the Sicilian Expedition for the Athenians. To what extent was opening and contesting the theater in Iraq similar to that ancient expedition?
12. Why has the United States had difficulty terminating the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq?
13. What does the American experience in Afghanistan and Iraq suggest about the importance and the difficulty of interagency operations for achieving strategic goals when fighting armed groups?
14. Looking at this case and the others covered in the course, are information operations and strategic communication more important in wars against insurgents and terrorists than in other kinds of wars?
15. Does Clausewitz, Sun Tzu, or Mao provide better guidance for strategic reassessment and operational adaptation in the Afghan theater?
16. What strategic lessons from the course apply to war termination in the Afghan theater?
17. “The United States and its allies are not defeating al Qaeda and its Associated Movements so much as AQAM is defeating itself.” Do you agree?

18. “The future of a successful war against AQAM will look much more like the pre-9/11 world than the major theater efforts of the last decade.” Do you agree?

### C. Readings:

1. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States. *The 9/11 Commission Report*. Pages 55-70, 108-119, 145-156. (Selected Readings)

[This document provides background on the emergence of al Qaeda as a threat to the United States, the phenomenon of “terrorist entrepreneurs,” and the “planes operation” as an inaugural strategic move.]

2. *In the Eyes of Your Enemy: An Al-Qaeda Compendium*. Strategy Department, U.S. Naval War College, September 2009. Two Speeches: Usama Bin Ladin “Strategy of Attrition,” and Ayman Zawahiri, “Realities of the Conflict,” Two Letters: “Zarqawi to al-Qaeda,” and “Zawahiri to Zarqawi,” and Two Statements: al Qaeda Central “Statement Disavowing ISIL,” and Ayman Zawahiri “General Guidelines for Jihad.” (Selected Readings)

[These speeches and letters represent some of the most important strategic communications efforts and internal debates by al Qaeda’s senior leadership. They are part of a larger volume of translated primary source documents, compiled by Professors Scott Douglas and Heidi Lane, as well as other colleagues from the Strategy Department. The selections allow students to engage with AQAM’s ideological view of the world, peculiar version of history, its image of the United States, as well as its political objectives, strategies, information operations, internal divisions, and debates.]

3. Robinson, Linda. *Tell Me How This Ends: General David Petraeus and the Search for a Way Out of Iraq*. New York: Public Affairs, 2008. Pages 141-180, 251-344.

[Selections from this book set the framework for the key issues that are still being debated about United States strategy in Iraq: how did the very pessimistic American political view of progress in Iraq shape United States strategy in 2006; what was the Surge and what role did it play in reducing violence in Iraq; how important were the Sons of Iraq in reducing violence in Iraq; to what extent did al Qaeda’s strategic and operational mistakes help United States strategy; and what role did Shia militias play in quelling the violence?]

4. Shadid, Anthony. *Night Draws Near: Iraq’s People in the Shadow of America’s War*. 1st Picador ed. New York: Picador, 2006. Pages 186-231, 418-465.

[Covering the period leading up to the Surge, this award-winning book by non-embedded American journalist Anthony Shadid provides perspective, through multiple interviews,

on how Iraqis felt they were the target population of multiple armed groups that were trying to intimidate, recruit, and win them over. Assigned chapters offer three insights that are of crucial importance for understanding the sectarian tensions in Iraq, effects of which can still be seen vis-à-vis the regional crisis surrounding ISIL. First, the book outlines the historical origins of the sectarian divide in the Muslim world. Second, it identifies the ways in which the breakdown of the Saddam Hussein regime led to the rise of religious actors including the Shia clergy. Third, Shadid implies that while the Sunni-Shia tensions existed in Iraq for a long time, the outbreak of full-blown sectarian violence was still not pre-ordained as of late-2004.]

5. Harmony Project. "Cracks in the Foundation: Leadership Schisms in Al Qaeda 1989-2006." West Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center, September 2007. Pages 1-23. (Selected Readings)

[This analysis by a research group at the United States Military Academy uses primary sources and captured documents to provide insight into al Qaeda's senior leadership, its strategic decision-making, and the seams and gaps between strategic and operational leaders in Iraq.]

6. Byman, Daniel. "Understanding the Islamic State—A Review Essay." *International Security* 40, no. 4 (2016). Pages 127-165.  
[http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/ISEC\\_r\\_00235](http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/ISEC_r_00235)

[This recent article offers one of the most comprehensive analyses of ISIL currently in print. Synthesizing five recently published books on the group, this reading provides a solid background on ISIL that facilitates informed discussion about the strategic interaction between ISIL, AQAM, a multitude of regional actors in the Middle East, and the U.S. and its allies. In particular, Byman argues that while ISIL's ideology shapes whom the group sees as an adversary and its state-building efforts, the group should not be seen as a purely fanatical organization. This article also highlights how ISIL instrumentally exploits its ideology for many of its pragmatic decisions and strategies.]

7. "United States Policy and Strategy Perspectives: Government Documents Bundle." (Selected Readings)

[This collection of primary source material contains documents that bridge across this case. The first document is General David Petraeus's report to Congress on progress in Iraq after the Surge. The next two documents detail the evolution in policy for the use of force in counterterrorism operations, from the 2001 Joint Congressional Resolution, to the more narrowly defined 2013 policy standards. The final two documents include speeches that set out United States presidential policy-strategy matches for Iraq, Afghanistan, and AQAM, namely President Bush's November 6, 2005 speech to the National Endowment for Democracy and President Obama's speech at West Point, May 28, 2014.]

8. Barfield, Thomas. *Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010. Pages 255-336. (Selected Readings)

[This serves as the foundational reading for understanding Afghanistan as a strategic environment in the war against AQAM. Barfield's cultural, linguistic, and historical expertise on Afghanistan, which he developed long before the country became a focus of the "Global War on Terror," provides a concise, overarching history of the country's political evolution since the rise of the Taliban.]

9. Malkasian, Carter. *War Comes to Garmser: Thirty Years of Conflict on the Afghan Frontier*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2013. Pages xv-xxiv, 71-157.

[Modeling his book after a famous Vietnam era book *War Comes to Long An*, Malkasian, who spent two years in southern Helmand Province, chronicles the interaction, adaptation, and reassessment of United States, Afghan, and Taliban forces. This book focuses on an area at the heart of the Taliban's influence—Garmser—and examines why Taliban influence rapidly diminished and then resurged despite intense U.S. and Afghan counterinsurgency efforts.]

10. Giustozzi, Antonio. *CIWAG Case Study on Irregular Warfare and Armed Groups in Afghanistan*. Naval War College, 2011. Pages 14-42. (Selected Readings)

[Giustozzi's case study, provided by the Naval War College's Center for Irregular Warfare and Armed Groups, focuses on how the Taliban adapted its strategy against Afghan and coalition forces. This analysis, which picks up the Taliban side of the story presented in the Malkasian reading, covers the period 2009-2011 and adds a red team perspective to the discussion on Afghanistan.]

11. Harmony Program. "Letters from Abbottabad: Bin Ladin Sidelined?" West Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center, May 2012. Pages 4-53. (Selected Readings)

[This reading is a close analysis of primary source material captured during the raid that killed Osama bin Laden in 2011. It addresses a number of topics, including bin Laden's leadership role, the evolution of the wider AQAM coalition, his view of the Arab Spring, and his thoughts for the future direction of the war.]

12. Cronin, Audrey Kurth. "'The War on Terrorism': What Does It Mean to Win?" *Journal of Strategic Studies* 37, no. 2 (2014). Pages 174-197.  
<http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/01402390.2013.850423?needAccess=true>

[Audrey Kurth Cronin's article uses many of the frameworks from the Strategy and War Course to discuss how to define victory in the "War on Terrorism." This article raises a number of different scenarios for ending the war and discusses the challenges of war termination.]

**D. Learning Outcomes:** This case study supports the OPMEP by applying the theories, themes, and frameworks developed throughout the course to assess how the United States and its coalition partners have planned, executed, and sought to terminate regional wars, counterinsurgent wars, and a global counterterrorist war in the twenty-first century. It considers how best to knit outcomes in different theaters into the larger global struggle against AQAM. As the second post-Goldwater-Nichols case, it provides an excellent platform for an analysis of institutional and operational change as well as material for a critique of remaining areas of deficiency. This case study supports:

- CJCS Joint Learning Areas and Objectives 1a, 1b, 1c, 1d, 2c, 3a, 3b, 3c, 3d, 3e, 3f, 3g, 4f, 4g, 4h, 6a, 6b, 6c, 6d, 6e, and 6f. Emphasis will be placed on the following topics, enabling students to:
  - Comprehend the capabilities and limitations of U.S. military forces (1a).
  - Comprehend the strategic guidance contained in official U.S. documents (1d).
  - Apply solutions to operational problems in a volatile, uncertain, complex, or ambiguous environment using critical thinking (2c).
  - Comprehend the considerations for employing joint and multinational forces at the operational level of war, particularly in irregular warfare settings, and understand how theory and principles pertain to this level of war (3c and 3d).
  - Comprehend the relationships among all elements of national power and the importance of comprehensive approaches, the whole of government response, multinational cooperation, and building partnership capacity in support of security interests (3e).
  - Analyze a plan critically for employment of joint and multinational forces at the operational level of war (3f).
  - Comprehend the relationships among national security objectives, military objectives, conflict termination, and post-conflict transition to enabling civil authorities (3g).
  - Comprehend the roles that geography, geopolitics, society, culture, socio-economic conditions, and allied partners play in shaping the planning and execution of the full range of military operations (4f).
  - Comprehend the role and perspective of the Combatant Commander and staff in developing various theater policies, strategies, and plans (4g).
  - Comprehend the role of the profession of arms in the contemporary environment including the exploration of the ethical challenges faced by leaders (6a and 6c).
  - Comprehend critical thinking and decision-making skills needed to anticipate and recognize change, lead transitions, and adapt to surprise and uncertainty (6b).
  - Analyze the importance of adaptation and innovation on military planning and operations (6f).

## **XII. RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT: SEA POWER AND MARITIME STRATEGY—WAR IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY**

**A. General:** Alfred Thayer Mahan published an article entitled “Retrospect and Prospect” in 1902. At the time, the United States was prosecuting its first major overseas counterinsurgency campaign, in the Philippine Islands. As the title of his article suggests, Mahan gazed back across the nineteenth century to identify trends he could project forward into the twentieth century—gleaning insights into then-present contingencies such as the Philippine War while catching sight of the future. By connecting past, present, and future, he foreshadowed the forward-looking nature of the Strategy and War Course in general and of this final case study in particular.

Even as Mahan’s effort to draw upon the experience of the past should inspire us as we peer ahead into the future, the limits of his foresight remind us of the limits of our own. Like Mahan, we cannot predict the future with certainty. Indeed, the future is not foreordained. It depends on the strategic choices that we and others make, on the interaction between clashing wills, and on the play of chance and contingency that Clausewitz and Thucydides emphasize in their classic works on war. It will also depend on how human wills interact in new parts of the commons, notably cyberspace. The best we can do is to become as nimble as possible, preparing our intellects for different alternative futures and anticipating the impact of complex, dynamic, ambiguous, and dangerous environments when planning and understanding operations.

What might the future global security environment look like? *A Cooperative Strategy for 21<sup>st</sup> Century Seapower* foresees turbulence in the coming years. This latest U.S. Maritime Strategy anticipates a major shift in the global balance of power toward the Indo-Asia-Pacific region, an area of growing geostrategic importance to the United States. Framers of the strategy acknowledge that a Chinese naval presence in the Pacific and Indian oceans will likely be a permanent feature of Asian politics. At the same time, other traditional and irregular threats, ranging from Russian aggression to terrorism in the Middle East and Africa, continue to demand policy attention. The proliferation of weaponry that could impede the access of U.S. maritime forces to the global commons is another worrisome trend.

An uncongenial strategic environment thus awaits the seagoing services. The maritime future could resemble the period between 1890 and 1945, when multiple naval powers, motivated by major conflicts of interest, grappled with one another for strategic advantage. China, like Japan in the last century, boasts the potential to mature into a great naval rival of the United States in the Pacific. But unlike the Imperial Japanese Navy, the People’s Liberation Army Navy has demonstrated a penchant for radically asymmetric operations and tactics to defeat the United States.

Those who perceive a looming threat point to the unexpected and rapid buildup of Chinese sea power since the Taiwan Strait crisis of 1995-1996. They also highlight how technological change is enhancing access-denial capabilities. China has increasingly availed itself of smarter mines, stealthier submarines, more sophisticated sensors, and—

above all in importance—an ever more threatening array of missiles. Some analysts say that cruise and ballistic missiles will exert even greater influence on maritime conflicts in the twenty-first century than aviation did on World War II.

A country need not be a great naval power to turn technological change to its own maritime advantage in ways that might challenge the United States and disrupt the international economy. Consider Iran. It has been hostile to the United States since 1979 in ways that China has not. Uncertainties surrounding Iran's nuclear ambitions continue to complicate the geometry of deterrence in the region. Bordering on a chokepoint of globalization—the Strait of Hormuz—and combining missiles and mines with fast patrol boats and irregular forces under a radically asymmetric operational concept, Iran may be able to cause major strategic problems for the United States and its allies in the Arabian Gulf.

The armed forces of the United States must have leaders with sufficient critical skills to lead joint and combined forces in this environment, as well as to execute national strategies and policies. In preparing for seminars in this final week of the course, students should consider the various ways in which United States and partner maritime forces can help prevent war along the rimlands of Eurasia, including Asia, Europe, and the Middle East. They should also consider the ways American and allied maritime forces can help win a war. There are many potential maritime theaters of conflict in the twenty-first century, including the Arctic Ocean, Baltic Sea, Black Sea, Eastern Mediterranean, Arabian Gulf, Indian Ocean, and Western Pacific. The readings in this case bring into focus several of the most demanding contingencies involving China, Iran, and Russia.

In approaching these scenarios, we should bear in mind the process for analyzing policy, strategy, and operations as laid out at the beginning of the syllabus. How will United States policies integrate and leverage military and non-military capabilities to advance national interests and achieve national objectives? As a starting point, we should ponder the differences in policy that might bring the United States and its allies into violent conflict with potential adversaries. We should also try to anticipate the strategic concepts that opponents may adopt to achieve their policies, helping us assess their operational capabilities in relation to our own. And, an important theme of the Strategy and War Course is to assess the ability to derive strategic advantage from forging coalitions. Finally, we must consider the different roles of each instrument of national power and the relationships between them when employed against our adversaries.

In thinking about how the United States might wage war in the maritime domain, students should bridge back to the course's sea power theories and to case studies in which naval power loomed large. Indeed, the assigned readings offer an opportunity to revisit Corbett's idea of active defense, the prewar net assessments by Athens and Sparta, the Anglo-German rivalry preceding World War I, and Imperial Japan's interwar innovations. Through the lens of the past, students should consider the warfighting missions of navies, including: securing command of the sea (or at least local sea control) through naval engagements; denying a superior opponent command of the sea to frustrate

its operational aims or gain time; projecting power from the sea (or maritime bases) onto land using ground and air forces; and waging economic and logistics warfare by interdicting enemy sea lines of communication. Going forward, we need to assess how new technologies may affect these missions and their prospects for success. Gaming out scenarios involving China, Iran, and Russia must take account of operational interactions across multiple domains, including space and cyberspace, helping us forecast how a conflict might unfold through different phases and how the United States and its allies might terminate the fighting on favorable political terms.

From the beginning of a conflict to its end, political and military leaders will need to keep firmly in mind the two overarching concepts of strategy that stand out in Clausewitz's work from two centuries ago, namely rationality and interaction. Can the courses of action that policy-makers and military leaders develop and then execute deliver the desired political objectives at a cost and risk commensurate with the value of the object? The answers to questions of rationality rest on how adversaries and other audiences react militarily and politically to one's own courses of action. In dealing with China, Iran, Russia, and other potential adversaries that cannot match the full array of American military capabilities, American strategic and operational leaders must be prepared for radical forms of asymmetric interaction—some of which may be inspired by concepts broached by Sun Tzu more than two millennia ago. Applying strategic theory to operational practice is never easy, as Clausewitz warned. Nonetheless, sound theory and past experience provide the starting point for leaders in their search for a secure future.

## **B. Topics for Discussion:**

1. To what extent, and under what conditions, do the principal strategic concepts of Mahan and Corbett remain relevant?
2. Thucydides described and examined an asymmetric conflict involving a democratic sea power fighting against an authoritarian land power. The United States today, long accustomed to seeing itself as the world's leading democracy, faces strategic challenges from authoritarian Eurasian land powers, including China, Iran, and Russia. What lessons from Thucydides would provide strategic guidance to American political and military decision-makers?
3. Should the United States worry more about irregular threats, either from non-state actors or from states supporting them, or about conventional challenges from peer or near-peer competitors? How can the United States balance the risk between these two fundamental strategic challenges?
4. How would Sun Tzu advise prospective adversaries to defeat the United States without fighting? What counterstrategies are available to the United States?

5. How might an adversary attempt to disrupt the relationships of the United States with its coalition partners? How can the United States best preserve those partnerships in peace and war?
6. Will technological change alter the strategic logic or operational grammar of war in the coming decades?
7. What Strategy and War case studies are most relevant for understanding future conflicts in Asia, Europe, or the Middle East? What scenarios can you envision for potential conflicts involving China, Russia, or Iran?
8. “Sea powers find it difficult to fight for unlimited aims because that objective typically requires operations on the ground of the adversary’s homeland.” How is this insight into the relationship between aims and strategy relevant for American decision-makers when designing strategies and anticipating strategic outcomes in a possible conflict with China, Russia, or Iran?
9. What are the principal elements of the Air-Sea Battle concept (renamed the Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver in the Global Commons (JAM-GC) in 2015)? What strategic problems and risks would American political leaders and operational commanders experience in executing it? What strategic effects might be derived from executing the Air-Sea Battle concept?
10. What strategic guidance would Clausewitz, Sun Tzu, Thucydides, Mahan, and Corbett offer about the Air-Sea Battle concept?
11. What role can ground forces play in support of the Air-Sea Battle concept?
12. What strategic effects might be derived from a strategy of “offshore control” in a conflict with China? What strategic problems would American political leaders and operational commanders experience in executing it?
13. How likely is major warfare at sea between nuclear-armed powers to deliver strategic rewards that justify the risk of escalation?
14. What are the lessons offered by the Tanker War of the 1980s for a future conflict with Iran in the Arabian Gulf? What lessons do you think Iranian strategic and operational leaders have drawn from that experience?
15. What are Iran’s prospects of success in any future attempt to cut access to sources of energy in the Arabian Gulf region?
16. What counterstrategies can be employed against Russia’s mixed use of military and non-military means on its periphery?

17. What guidance can the strategic theorists examined in the Strategy and War Course offer for understanding conflict in the cyber domain? For example, what do offense and defense mean in the cyber domain? Is one dominant over the other?

18. How might operations in the cyber domain be combined with actions in other domains to achieve decisive strategic effects?

19. To what extent did the strategic leaders examined in this course employ mission command in executing their operations? What are the strengths of mission command in carrying out operations? What are its weaknesses?

20. The concept of mission command was developed to guide the conduct of warfare on land between conventional armies. How applicable is the concept for operations in other domains, such as maritime, aerospace, cyber, nuclear, and irregular warfare?

### **C. Readings:**

1. Mahan, Alfred Thayer. *Retrospect and Prospect: Studies in International Relations, Naval and Political*. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1902. Pages 3-35. (Selected Readings)

[This essay by Mahan looks to the past in order to look to the future. It provides the inspiration for this case study.]

2. Fuller, William C. "What Is a Military Lesson?" In *Strategic Logic and Political Rationality: Essays in Honor of Michael I. Handel*, edited by Bradford A. Lee and Karl F. Walling. London: Frank Cass, 2003. Pages 38-59. (Selected Readings)

[Fuller, a Professor Emeritus and former Chair of the Strategy Department at the Naval War College, analyzes the intellectual impediments to learning lessons from past wars. Drawing upon wars covered in the Strategy and War Course, Fuller examines fallacies, analytical pitfalls, and ingrained preferences that have led military organizations to draw the wrong lessons.]

3. Corbett, Julian S. *Some Principles of Maritime Strategy*. London: Longman, Green, 1911. Reprint, Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1988. Pages 209-232.

[Corbett demonstrates how a weaker naval power can adopt a strategically defensive posture to keep command of the sea in dispute. Employing historical examples studied in our course, he assesses how active defense at sea can deny the enemy fleet's objectives. His analysis holds lessons for how inferior adversaries today could frustrate the plans of superior U.S. and allied naval forces.]

4. Evans, David C. and Mark R. Peattie. *Kaigun: Strategy, Tactics, and Technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1887-1941*. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1997. Pages 238-298.

[Evans and Peattie chronicle the Imperial Japanese Navy's doctrinal and technological developments that sought to outrange the enemy fleet's firepower. They show how these tactical innovations during the 1930s influenced Japanese naval strategy. Japan's interwar experience parallels the emergence of anti-access and area-denial challenges in recent years.]

5. Turner, Stansfield. "The Naval Balance: Not Just a Numbers Game." *Foreign Affairs* 55, no. 2 (January 1977). Pages 339-354. (Selected Readings)

[Admiral Turner furnishes a trenchant analysis of the naval balance between the United States and the Soviet Union. Turner's analysis of the Soviet missile threat is particularly instructive in light of China's anti-access challenge today. Moreover, the security environment of the 1970s, which featured post-Vietnam retrenchment and stiffening competition at sea, offers insights into predicaments currently facing the United States.]

6. Maurer, John H. "A Rising Power and the Coming of a Great War." *Orbis: A Journal of World Affairs* 58, no. 4 (autumn 2014). Pages 500-520. (Selected Readings)

[This article examines the ominous parallels between the Anglo-German struggle for mastery in Europe of a hundred years ago and the dangers now troubling Asia's great powers. Antagonistic nationalisms, technological innovations, arms races, and strategic competition mark present-day Asia as they did Europe's past. Will today's competition for power in Asia have a better ending?]

7. Strassler, Robert B., ed. *The Landmark Thucydides*. New York: Free Press, 1996. Book I.80-85 (pages 45-47) and Book I.140-144 (pages 80-85).

[As China turns seaward, it is worth recalling the speeches of Archidamus and Pericles, which illustrate the classic problems arising from struggles between land and sea powers while highlighting the utility and limits of navies in wartime. The speeches also highlight the analytical value of net assessment both past and present.]

8. Posen, Barry R. "Command of the Commons: The Military Foundation of U.S. Hegemony." *International Security* 28, no. 1 (summer 2003). Pages 5-46.  
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/4137574>

[Posen argues that superiority at sea, in the air, and in space forms the military foundation of American dominance of the international strategic environment. He discusses the nature of that superiority as well as challenges to it.]

9. Friedberg, Aaron L. *Beyond Air-Sea Battle: The Debate Over U.S. Military Strategy in Asia*. London: International Institute of Strategic Studies, Adelphi Paper 444, 2014. Pages 73-149.

[Friedberg offers an appraisal of American strategy toward the rising power of China. His analysis holds up even though the Department of Defense renamed the concept in 2015.]

10. Crist, David B. *Gulf of Conflict: A History of U.S.-Iranian Confrontations at Sea*. Washington: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, June 2009. Pages 1-32. (Selected Readings)

[Crist examines the operational interaction between United States and Iranian forces in the Tanker War as it reached its final stage in 1987-1988. He also discusses the lessons that Iran seems to have learned from its failure in that conflict and the improvements that it has made in its maritime capabilities since then.]

11. Haghshenass, Fariborz. *Iran's Asymmetric Naval Warfare*. Washington: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, September 2008. Pages 4-24.  
<http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/PolicyFocus87.pdf>

[This reading addresses whether Iran can effectively interdict shipping in the Arabian Gulf. Haghshenass surveys Iranian geography, maritime history, and naval weaponry before positing several scenarios for conflict between Iranian and Western forces. He highlights how Iranian commanders rely on the human factor to offset disadvantages in the material dimension of naval warfare.]

12. O'Rourke, Ronald. *Iran's Threat to the Strait of Hormuz*. Washington: Congressional Research Service, January 23, 2012. Pages 1-23. (Selected Readings)

[This report appraises Iran's capacity to close or impede transit through the Strait of Hormuz.]

13. Finch, Ray. *Vladimir Putin and the Russian Military*. Fort Leavenworth: Foreign Military Studies Office, May 2015. Pages 1-15. (Selected Readings)

[This short monograph examines the sources of Russia's muscular foreign policy, aggression, and military modernization in recent years. Finch highlights the non-military instruments of Russian power and the ideological underpinnings of Russian assertiveness.]

14. Goldman, Emily O. and John Arquilla, eds. *Cyber Analogies*. Technical Report: NPS-DA-14-001. Pages 26-32, 46-63, 76-89, 96-107. (Selected Readings)

[This collection of essays draws upon history to glean strategic guidance for understanding the future of warfare. By utilizing case studies and strategic theorists

already examined in the Strategy and War Course, these essays provide analytical frameworks for understanding the challenge of gaining command of a contested cyber commons.]

15. *A Cooperative Strategy for 21<sup>st</sup> Century Seapower*. Pages 1-37. (Selected Readings)

[Originally published in 2007, the revised 2015 edition of the maritime strategy adjusts to changes in the international security environment over the past decade. The document discusses American geostrategic priorities in light of the rebalance to Asia and introduces the concept of all-domain access, namely the capacity of the sea services to operate effectively in contested areas.]

16. Richardson, Admiral John M. *A Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority*. Version 1.0., January 2016. (Selected Readings)

[In *A Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority*, Admiral Richardson, the Chief of Naval Operations, outlines the courses of action the U.S. Navy must take to realize the objectives presented in *A Cooperative Strategy for 21<sup>st</sup> Century Seapower*.]

17. *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations: Joint Force 2020*. (Selected Readings)

[Issued in 2012, this guidance from General Dempsey challenges the armed services to follow “an approach called *globally integrated operations*.” Ten primary missions are identified for the armed forces. General Dempsey also highlights: “Mission command is the most appropriate command philosophy for the increasingly uncertain future environment because it empowers individuals to exercise judgment in how they carry out their assigned tasks.”]

**D. Learning Outcomes:** This case study supports the OPMEP by applying the theories, themes, and frameworks developed throughout the course to the future application of maritime power across the full range of conventional and unconventional operations and on the spectrum, from peace to war to peace. This case study supports:

- CJCS Joint Learning Areas and Objectives 1a, 1d, 2c, 3c, 3d, 3e, 3g, 4e, 4f, 4g, 5a, 5b, 5c, 6a, 6b, 6c, 6d, 6e, and 6f. Emphasis will be placed on the following topics, enabling students to:
  - Comprehend the capabilities and limitations of United States military forces—particularly naval forces—against adversaries the United States may face in the 21st century (1a).
  - Comprehend the strategic guidance contained in official U.S. documents including *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower* and *Capstone Concept for Joint operations: Joint Force 2020* (1d).

- Apply solutions to operational problems in a volatile, uncertain, complex, or ambiguous environment using critical thinking, operational art, and current joint doctrine (2c).
  - Examine the relationships among the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war as well as the application of strategic theory to the operational level of war (3c and 3d).
  - Comprehend the relationships among all elements of national power and the importance of comprehensive approaches, the whole of government response, multinational cooperation, and building partnership capacity in support of security interests (3e).
  - Comprehend the relationships among national security objectives, military objectives, and conflict termination, (3g).
  - Comprehend the integration of IO and cyberspace operations with other lines of operations at the operational level of war (4e).
  - Comprehend the roles that geography, geopolitics, society, culture, socio-economic conditions, and allied partners play in shaping the planning and execution of the full range of military operations (4f).
  - Comprehend the role and perspective of the Combatant Commander and staff in developing various theater policies, strategies, and plans (4g).
  - Comprehend the effects of networks and cyberspace on the ability to conduct Joint Operational Command and Control (5c).
  - Comprehend the role of the profession of arms in the contemporary environment including the exploration of the ethical challenges faced by leaders (6a and 6c).
  - Comprehend critical thinking and decision-making skills needed to anticipate and recognize change, lead transitions, and adapt to surprise and uncertainty (6b).
  - Examine the concept of mission command for the execution of operations in pursuit of national objectives (5b and 6d).
  - Analyze the importance of adaptation and innovation on military planning and operations (6f).
- Additional objectives including Naval Professional Military Education. The students will:
    - Understand the classic works on sea power and maritime strategy.
    - Comprehend operational warfare at sea—past, present, and future.
    - Comprehend the theory and practice of applying sea power to achieve strategic effects across a range of military operations.
    - Comprehend how naval power must be integrated with other instruments of national power.

## **STUDENT SURVEY**

**At the end of the Strategy and War Course, each student will be required to return a completed electronic survey. Student comments are carefully evaluated and thoroughly considered. Constructive, thoughtful criticism by students has been an invaluable tool in revision of the curriculum. The Strategy and War Course as it exists today is the product of change stimulated by student opinion.**

**Mark your responses to the numbered questions in this annex as progress in the course. This allows you to record your thoughts while they are fresh in your mind. You can transfer your responses from this paper critique to the electronic version.**

**Following each numbered question is space for comments. Please note that not all questions are numbered; those that are not numbered ask for comments only. Specific feedback is particularly valuable on any area marked as less than “Satisfactory.”**

**At the end of the course complete your electronic survey. The faculty will not have access to these surveys until all grades have formally been submitted.**

### **END OF COURSE CRITIQUE – CNC&S 2016-2017**

**Please mark your responses on the pages of this annex. Instructions on how to complete the critique electronically are provided in Section 13 “Course Critique” on page 19 of your syllabus. Student passwords allowing you to gain access to the critique will be provided the first week of classes.**

## **COURSE QUESTIONS**

*Please indicate whether you agree with the following statements using a scale where 7 indicates that you “strongly agree” and 1 indicates that you “strongly disagree”. Please also provide feedback as appropriate in the spaces for narrative comments.*

1. This course is likely to enhance my professional development.

- 7 – STRONGLY AGREE
- 6 – AGREE
- 5 – SOMEWHAT AGREE
- 4 – NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE
- 3 – SOMEWHAT DISAGREE
- 2 – DISAGREE
- 1 – STRONGLY DISAGREE

Comments:

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2. This course challenged me to think critically.

- 7 – STRONGLY AGREE
- 6 – AGREE
- 5 – SOMEWHAT AGREE
- 4 – NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE
- 3 – SOMEWHAT DISAGREE
- 2 – DISAGREE
- 1 – STRONGLY DISAGREE

Comments:

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3. The workload for this course was appropriately challenging.

- 7 – STRONGLY AGREE
- 6 – AGREE
- 5 – SOMEWHAT AGREE
- 4 – NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE
- 3 – SOMEWHAT DISAGREE
- 2 – DISAGREE
- 1 – STRONGLY DISAGREE

Comments:

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4. The following contributed to achieving the stated objectives of this course:

a) Seminar Discussions

- 7 – STRONGLY AGREE
- 6 – AGREE
- 5 – SOMEWHAT AGREE
- 4 – NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE
- 3 – SOMEWHAT DISAGREE
- 2 – DISAGREE
- 1 – STRONGLY DISAGREE

b) Readings

- 7 – STRONGLY AGREE
- 6 – AGREE
- 5 – SOMEWHAT AGREE
- 4 – NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE
- 3 – SOMEWHAT DISAGREE
- 2 – DISAGREE
- 1 – STRONGLY DISAGREE

c) Lectures

- 7 – STRONGLY AGREE
- 6 – AGREE
- 5 – SOMEWHAT AGREE
- 4 – NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE
- 3 – SOMEWHAT DISAGREE
- 2 – DISAGREE
- 1 – STRONGLY DISAGREE

d) Writing Assignments

- 7 – STRONGLY AGREE
- 6 – AGREE
- 5 – SOMEWHAT AGREE
- 4 – NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE
- 3 – SOMEWHAT DISAGREE
- 2 – DISAGREE
- 1 – STRONGLY DISAGREE

Comments:

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5. Seminar discussions, readings, lectures and writing assignments mutually reinforced my understanding of the themes of this course.

- 7 – STRONGLY AGREE
- 6 – AGREE
- 5 – SOMEWHAT AGREE
- 4 – NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE
- 3 – SOMEWHAT DISAGREE
- 2 – DISAGREE
- 1 – STRONGLY DISAGREE

Comments:

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6. I was a diligent student in this course.

- 7 – STRONGLY AGREE
- 6 – AGREE
- 5 – SOMEWHAT AGREE
- 4 – NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE
- 3 – SOMEWHAT DISAGREE
- 2 – DISAGREE
- 1 – STRONGLY DISAGREE

Comments:

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## **FACULTY QUESTIONS**

*Please indicate whether you agree with the following statements using a scale where 7 indicates that you “strongly agree” and 1 indicates that you “strongly disagree”. Please also provide feedback as appropriate in the spaces for narrative comments.*

1. My teaching team for this course was effective overall.

- 7 – STRONGLY AGREE
- 6 – AGREE
- 5 – SOMEWHAT AGREE
- 4 – NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE
- 3 – SOMEWHAT DISAGREE
- 2 – DISAGREE
- 1 – STRONGLY DISAGREE

Comments:

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2. Please respond to the following statements regarding each member of your teaching:

Professor #1: Professor's Name \_\_\_\_\_

a) This professor was effective overall.

- 7 – STRONGLY AGREE
- 6 – AGREE
- 5 – SOMEWHAT AGREE
- 4 – NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE
- 3 – SOMEWHAT DISAGREE
- 2 – DISAGREE
- 1 – STRONGLY DISAGREE

b) This professor was effective at presenting course material.

- 7 – STRONGLY AGREE
- 6 – AGREE

- 5 – SOMEWHAT AGREE
- 4 – NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE
- 3 – SOMEWHAT DISAGREE
- 2 – DISAGREE
- 1 – STRONGLY DISAGREE

c) This professor was effective at guiding seminar discussion.

- 7 – STRONGLY AGREE
- 6 – AGREE
- 5 – SOMEWHAT AGREE
- 4 – NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE
- 3 – SOMEWHAT DISAGREE
- 2 – DISAGREE
- 1 – STRONGLY DISAGREE

d) This professor was effective at providing verbal and/or written feedback.

- 7 – STRONGLY AGREE
- 6 – AGREE
- 5 – SOMEWHAT AGREE
- 4 – NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE
- 3 – SOMEWHAT DISAGREE
- 2 – DISAGREE
- 1 – STRONGLY DISAGREE

Comments:

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Professor #2: Professor's Name \_\_\_\_\_

e) This professor was effective overall.

- 7 – STRONGLY AGREE
- 6 – AGREE
- 5 – SOMEWHAT AGREE
- 4 – NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE
- 3 – SOMEWHAT DISAGREE
- 2 – DISAGREE
- 1 – STRONGLY DISAGREE

f) This professor was effective at presenting course material.

- 7 – STRONGLY AGREE
- 6 – AGREE
- 5 – SOMEWHAT AGREE
- 4 – NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE
- 3 – SOMEWHAT DISAGREE
- 2 – DISAGREE
- 1 – STRONGLY DISAGREE

g) This professor was effective at guiding seminar discussion.

- 7 – STRONGLY AGREE
- 6 – AGREE
- 5 – SOMEWHAT AGREE
- 4 – NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE
- 3 – SOMEWHAT DISAGREE
- 2 – DISAGREE
- 1 – STRONGLY DISAGREE

h) This professor was effective at providing verbal and/or written feedback.

- 7 – STRONGLY AGREE
- 6 – AGREE
- 5 – SOMEWHAT AGREE
- 4 – NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE
- 3 – SOMEWHAT DISAGREE
- 2 – DISAGREE
- 1 – STRONGLY DISAGREE

Comments:

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Professor #3 (if needed): Professor's Name: \_\_\_\_\_

i) This professor was effective overall.

- 7 – STRONGLY AGREE
- 6 – AGREE
- 5 – SOMEWHAT AGREE
- 4 – NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE
- 3 – SOMEWHAT DISAGREE
- 2 – DISAGREE
- 1 – STRONGLY DISAGREE

j) This professor was effective at presenting course material.

- 7 – STRONGLY AGREE
- 6 – AGREE
- 5 – SOMEWHAT AGREE
- 4 – NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE
- 3 – SOMEWHAT DISAGREE
- 2 – DISAGREE
- 1 – STRONGLY DISAGREE

k) This professor was effective at guiding seminar discussion.

- 7 – STRONGLY AGREE
- 6 – AGREE
- 5 – SOMEWHAT AGREE
- 4 – NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE
- 3 – SOMEWHAT DISAGREE
- 2 – DISAGREE
- 1 – STRONGLY DISAGREE

l) This professor was effective at providing verbal and/or written feedback.

- 7 – STRONGLY AGREE
- 6 – AGREE
- 5 – SOMEWHAT AGREE
- 4 – NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE
- 3 – SOMEWHAT DISAGREE
- 2 – DISAGREE
- 1 – STRONGLY DISAGREE

Comments:

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**CASE STUDIES:** Evaluate each case study as a unit. Feel free to discuss particular readings, lectures, or seminar topics that illustrated course themes or contributed to your overall understanding of the Strategy and War Course regarding lectures, comments on presentation of material, and the overall cohesiveness of the lectures, readings, and seminars.

**CASE STUDY: MASTERS OF WAR: CLAUSEWITZ, SUN TZU, AND MAO**

**Lectures:** Evaluate the contribution of the lectures to your understanding of the case study. Comment on how clearly the material was presented and the overall quality of the lectures.

1. PROF Hoyt "Clausewitz"

HIGH LOW

7 6 5 4 3 2 1

Comments:

2. PROF Wilson "Sun Tzu"

HIGH LOW

7 6 5 4 3 2 1

Comments:

3. PROF Yoshihara "Mao Tse-tung"

HIGH LOW

7 6 5 4 3 2 1

Comments:

4. PROF Dew "Strategy, Ethics and War"

HIGH LOW

7 6 5 4 3 2 1

Comments:

**CASE STUDY: MASTERS OF WAR: CLAUSEWITZ, SUN TZU, AND MAO**

**(Continued)**

**Readings: Provide comments on the readings and their contribution to the case. Identify specific readings that particularly added to your understanding, or readings which you believe require faculty attention.**

**Seminar: Provide comments on how well seminar discussion contributed to your overall understanding of the case. Identify any particular discussion subjects that helped in your understanding.**

**General Comments:**



**CASE STUDY: DEMOCRACY, LEADERSHIP, AND STRATEGY IN A PROTRACTED WAR-THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR**

**(Continued)**

**Readings: Provide comments on the readings and their contribution to the case. Identify specific readings which particularly added to your understanding, or readings which you believe require faculty attention.**

**Essays: If you wrote an essay for this case, identify the question and assess its contribution to the case and course at large. Assess whether the readings support the essay.**

**Seminar: Provide comments on how well seminar discussion contributed to your overall understanding of the case. Identify any particular discussion subjects that helped in your understanding.**

**General Comments:**

**CASE STUDY: SEA POWER, JOINT AND COMBINED OPERATIONS, AND IRREGULAR WARFARE—THE WAR FOR AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE**

**Lectures: Evaluate the contribution of the lectures to your understanding of the case study. Comment on how clearly the material was presented and the overall quality of the lectures.**

**9. PROF Satterfield “The American War for Independence: A Strategic Overview”**

	<u>HIGH</u>						<u>LOW</u>
7	6	5	4	3	2	1	

**Comments:**

**10. PROF Holmes “Sea Power: Alfred Thayer Mahan”**

	<u>HIGH</u>						<u>LOW</u>
7	6	5	4	3	2	1	

**Comments:**

**11. PROF Genest “The Rise of the American Liberation Organization”**

	<u>HIGH</u>						<u>LOW</u>
7	6	5	4	3	2	1	

**Comments:**

**12. PROF Pavković “Irregular Warfare”**

	<u>HIGH</u>						<u>LOW</u>
7	6	5	4	3	2	1	

**Comments:**

**CASE STUDY: SEA POWER, JOINT AND COMBINED OPERATIONS, AND  
IRREGULAR WARFARE— THE WAR FOR AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE**

**(Continued)**

**Readings: Provide comments on the readings and their contribution to the case. Identify specific readings that particularly added to your understanding, or readings which you believe require faculty attention.**

**Essays: If you wrote an essay for this case, identify the question and assess its contribution to the case and course at large. Assess whether the readings support the essay.**

**Seminar: Provide comments on how well seminar discussion contributed to your overall understanding of the case. Identify any particular discussion subjects that helped in your understanding.**

**General Comments:**

**CASE STUDY: MARITIME STRATEGY, JOINT OPERATIONS, AND WAR TERMINATION IN A LIMITED REGIONAL CONFLICT—THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR**

Evaluate the contribution of the lectures to your understanding of the case study. Comment on how clearly the material was presented and the overall quality of the lectures.

13. PROF Paine “Japanese Strategy”

HIGH LOW

7            6            5            4            3            2            1

Comments:

14. PROF Stone “Russian Strategy”

HIGH LOW

7            6            5            4            3            2            1

Comments:

15. PROF McCranie “Corbett and Maritime Strategy”

HIGH LOW

7            6            5            4            3            2            1

Comments:

16. PROF Holmes “Successful War Termination in a Regional War”

HIGH LOW

7            6            5            4            3            2            1

Comments:

**CASE STUDY: MARITIME STRATEGY, JOINT OPERATIONS, AND WAR TERMINATION IN A LIMITED REGIONAL CONFLICT—THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR**

**(Continued)**

**Readings:** Provide comments on the readings and their contribution to the case. Identify specific readings that particularly added to your understanding, or readings that you believe require faculty attention.

**Essays:** If you wrote an essay for this case, identify the question and assess its contribution to the case and course at large. Assess whether the readings support the essay.

**Seminar:** Provide comments on how well seminar discussion contributed to your overall understanding of the case. Identify any particular discussion subjects that helped in your understanding.

**General Comments:**

**CASE STUDY: PREWAR PLANNING, WARTIME REALITIES,  
REASSESSMENT, AND ADAPTATION—THE FIRST WORLD WAR**

Evaluate the contribution of the lectures to your understanding of the case study. Comment on how clearly the material was presented and the overall quality of the lectures.

17. Prof Maurer “Pre-War Planning and Opening Moves”

HIGH LOW

7            6            5            4            3            2            1

Comments:

18. PROF Murray “Adaptation and Innovation”

HIGH LOW

7            6            5            4            3            2            1

Comments:

19. PROF McCranie “The War at Sea”

HIGH LOW

7            6            5            4            3            2            1

Comments:

20. PROF Holmes “Strategy for Ending the War”

HIGH LOW

7            6            5            4            3            2            1

Comments:

**CASE STUDY: PREWAR PLANNING, WARTIME REALITIES,  
REASSESSMENT, AND ADAPTATION—THE FIRST WORLD WAR**

**(Continued)**

**Readings:** Provide comments on the readings and their contribution to the case. Identify specific readings that particularly added to your understanding, or readings which you believe require faculty attention.

**Essays:** If you wrote an essay for this case, identify the question and assess its contribution to the case and course at large. Assess whether the readings support the essay.

**Seminar:** Provide comments on how well seminar discussion contributed to your overall understanding of the case. Identify any particular discussion subjects that helped in your understanding.

**General Comments:**

**CASE STUDY: WAGING TOTAL WAR: INTERDEPENDENCE OF SEA, AIR, AND GROUND OPERATIONS—THE SECOND WORLD WAR IN EUROPE**

**Lectures: Evaluate the contribution of the lectures to your understanding of the case study. Comment on how clearly the material was presented and the overall quality of the lectures.**

**21. PROF Toprani “German Aims and Strategy”**

**HIGH 6 5 4 3 2 1 LOW**

**Comments:**

**22. PROF McCranie “Victory at Sea: The Battle of the Atlantic”**

**HIGH 6 5 4 3 2 1 LOW**

**Comments:**

**23. PROF Haun “Victory through Air Power?”**

**HIGH 6 5 4 3 2 1 LOW**

**Comments:**

**24. PROF Satterfield “Rumbling to Victory: From Normandy to Berlin”**

**HIGH 6 5 4 3 2 1 LOW**

**Comments:**

**CASE STUDY: WAGING TOTAL WAR: INTERDEPENDENCE OF SEA, AIR,  
AND GROUND OPERATIONS—THE SECOND WORLD WAR IN EUROPE**

**(Continued)**

**Readings:** Provide comments on the readings and their contribution to the case. Identify specific readings that particularly added to your understanding, or readings which you believe require faculty attention.

**Essays:** If you wrote an essay for this case, identify the question and assess its contribution to the case and course at large. Assess whether the readings support the essay.

**Seminar:** Provide comments on how well seminar discussion contributed to your overall understanding of the case. Identify any particular discussion subjects that helped in your understanding.

**General Comments:**

**CASE STUDY: VICTORY AT SEA: MILITARY TRANSFORMATION,  
THEATER COMMAND, AND JOINT OPERATIONS  
IN A MAJOR MARITIME WAR—WORLD WAR II IN THE PACIFIC**

**Lectures: Evaluate the contribution of the lectures to your understanding of the case study. Comment on how clearly the material was presented and the overall quality of the lectures.**

**25. PROF Sarantakes “Overview of Allied Strategy and Operations”**

	<u><b>HIGH</b></u>						<u><b>LOW</b></u>
<b>7</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>1</b>	

**Comments:**

**26. PROF Paine “Overview of Japanese Strategy and Operations”**

	<u><b>HIGH</b></u>						<u><b>LOW</b></u>
<b>7</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>1</b>	

**Comments:**

**27. PROF Jackson “Cumulative Operations and Strategic Effects”**

	<u><b>HIGH</b></u>						<u><b>LOW</b></u>
<b>7</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>1</b>	

**Comments:**

**28. PROF Dennis “War Termination at the Dawn of the Nuclear Age”**

	<u><b>HIGH</b></u>						<u><b>LOW</b></u>
<b>7</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>1</b>	

**Comments:**

**CASE STUDY: VICTORY AT SEA: MILITARY TRANSFORMATION,  
THEATER COMMAND, AND JOINT OPERATIONS  
IN A MAJOR MARITIME WAR—WORLD WAR II IN THE PACIFIC**

**(Continued)**

**Readings: Provide comments on the readings and their contribution to the case. Identify specific readings that particularly added to your understanding, or readings which you believe require faculty attention.**

**Essays: If you wrote an essay for this case, identify the question and assess its contribution to the case and course at large. Assess whether the readings support the essay.**

**Seminar: Provide comments on how well seminar discussion contributed to your overall understanding of the case. Identify any particular discussion subjects that helped in your understanding.**

**General Comments:**

**CASE STUDY: CLASH OF IDEOLOGIES: FIGHTING AND TERMINATING A MAJOR REGIONAL WAR—THE KOREAN WAR, 1950-1953**

**Lectures: Evaluate the contribution of the lectures to your understanding of the case study. Comment on how clearly the material was presented and the overall quality of the lectures.**

**29. PROF Moss “Origins of Cold War”**

**HIGH 6 5 4 3 2 1 LOW**

**Comments:**

**30. PROF Jackson “Strategic and Operational Overview”**

**HIGH 6 5 4 3 2 1 LOW**

**Comments:**

**31. PROF Paine “China as an Adversary”**

**HIGH 6 5 4 3 2 1 LOW**

**Comments:**

**32. PROF Genest “War Termination”**

**HIGH 6 5 4 3 2 1 LOW**

**Comments:**

**CASE STUDY: CLASH OF IDEOLOGIES: FIGHTING AND TERMINATING A MAJOR REGIONAL WAR—THE KOREAN WAR, 1950-1953**

**(Continued)**

**Readings: Provide comments on the readings and their contribution to the case. Identify specific readings which particularly added to your understanding, or readings which you believe require faculty attention.**

**Essays: If you wrote an essay for this case, identify the question and assess its contribution to the case and course at large. Assess whether the readings support the essay.**

**Seminar: Provide comments on how well seminar discussion contributed to your overall understanding of the case. Identify any particular discussion subjects that helped in your understanding.**

**General Comments:**

**CASE STUDY: INSURGENCY, COUNTERINSURGENCY, CONVENTIONAL,  
AND INTERAGENCY OPERATIONS—THE VIETNAM WAR, 1965-1975**

**Lectures: Evaluate the contribution of the lectures to your understanding of the case study. Comment on how clearly the material was presented and the overall quality of the lectures.**

**33. PROF Garofano “Overview; The United States and Vietnam”**

	<u>HIGH</u>						<u>LOW</u>
7	6	5	4	3	2	1	

**Comments:**

**34. PROF Hazelton “Counterinsurgency”**

	<u>HIGH</u>						<u>LOW</u>
7	6	5	4	3	2	1	

**Comments:**

**35. PROF Paine “The Red Side of the Vietnam War”**

	<u>HIGH</u>						<u>LOW</u>
7	6	5	4	3	2	1	

**Comments:**

**36. PROF Jackson “Withdrawal from Vietnam: Conduct and Consequences”**

	<u>HIGH</u>						<u>LOW</u>
7	6	5	4	3	2	1	

**Comments:**

**CASE STUDY: INSURGENCY, COUNTERINSURGENCY, CONVENTIONAL,  
AND INTERAGENCY OPERATIONS—THE VIETNAM WAR, 1965-1975**

**(Continued)**

**Readings: Provide comments on the readings and their contribution to the case. Identify specific readings which particularly added to your understanding, or readings which you believe require faculty attention.**

**Essays: If you wrote an essay for this case, identify the question and assess its contribution to the case and course at large. Assess whether the readings support the essay.**

**Seminar: Provide comments on how well seminar discussion contributed to your overall understanding of the case. Identify any particular discussion subjects that helped in your understanding.**

**General Comments:**

**CASE STUDY: JOINT AND COALITION OPERATIONS IN A MAJOR REGIONAL WAR—THE STRUGGLE AGAINST SADDAM HUSSEIN’S IRAQ, 1990-1998**

**Lectures: Evaluate the contribution of the lectures to your understanding of the case study. Comment on how clearly the material was presented and the overall quality of the lectures.**

**37. PROF Lane “The Rise and Fall of Saddam Hussein”**

	<u>HIGH</u>						<u>LOW</u>
7	6	5	4	3	2	1	

**Comments:**

**38. PROF Hoyt “Coalitions in the Gulf War”**

	<u>HIGH</u>						<u>LOW</u>
7	6	5	4	3	2	1	

**Comments:**

**39. PROF Schultz “Instruments of Modern War”**

	<u>HIGH</u>						<u>LOW</u>
7	6	5	4	3	2	1	

**Comments:**

**40. PROF Douglas “War Termination, Interaction, and Coercive War”**

	<u>HIGH</u>						<u>LOW</u>
7	6	5	4	3	2	1	

**Comments:**

**JOINT AND COALITION OPERATIONS IN A MAJOR REGIONAL WAR—  
THE STRUGGLE AGAINST SADDAM HUSSEIN’S IRAQ, 1990-1998**

**(Continued)**

**Readings: Provide comments on the readings and their contribution to the case. Identify specific readings which particularly added to your understanding, or readings which you believe require faculty attention.**

**Essays: If you wrote an essay for this case, identify the question and assess its contribution to the case and course at large. Assess whether the readings support the essay.**

**Seminar: Provide comments on how well seminar discussion contributed to your overall understanding of the case. Identify any particular discussion subjects that helped in your understanding.**

**General Comments:**

**CASE STUDY: COUNTERTERRORISM, THEATER STRATEGIES, AND INTERAGENCY OPERATIONS IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT—THE WAR AGAINST AL QAEDA AND ASSOCIATED MOVEMENTS IN AFGHANISTAN AND IRAQ**

**Lectures: Evaluate the contribution of the lectures to your understanding of the case study. Comment on how clearly the material was presented and the overall quality of the lectures.**

**41. PROF Dew “Strategic Overview”**

**HIGH**

**LOW**

**7 6 5 4 3 2 1**

**Comments:**

**42. PROF Genest “Afghanistan: Time for Strategic Triage”**

**HIGH**

**LOW**

**7 6 5 4 3 2 1**

**Comments:**

**43. PROF Douglas “The GWOT in Iraq”**

**HIGH**

**LOW**

**7 6 5 4 3 2 1**

**Comments:**

**44. PROF Kadercan “Interaction in Iraq and Syria”**

**HIGH**

**LOW**

**7 6 5 4 3 2 1**

**Comments:**

**CASE STUDY: COUNTERTERRORISM, THEATER STRATEGIES, AND INTERAGENCY OPERATIONS IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT—THE WAR AGAINST AL QAEDA AND ASSOCIATED MOVEMENTS IN AFGHANISTAN AND IRAQ**

(Continued)

**Readings:** Provide comments on the readings and their contribution to the case. Identify specific readings which particularly added to your understanding, or readings which you believe require faculty attention.

**Essays:** If you wrote an essay for this case, identify the question and assess its contribution to the case and course at large. Assess whether the readings support the essay.

**Seminar:** Provide comments on how well seminar discussion contributed to your overall understanding of the case. Identify any particular discussion subjects that helped in your understanding.

**General Comments:**

**CASE STUDY: RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT: SEA POWER AND MARITIME STRATEGY—WAR IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY**

**Lectures:** Evaluate the contribution of the lectures to your understanding of the case study. Comment on how clearly the material was presented and the overall quality of the lectures.

45. PROF Maurer “Retrospect and Prospect”

HIGH

LOW

7                    6                    5                    4                    3                    2                    1

Comments:

46. PROF Yoshihara “Chinese Strategy and Operational Concepts”

HIGH

LOW

7                    6                    5                    4                    3                    2                    1

Comments:

**Readings:** Provide comments on the readings and their contribution to the case. Identify specific readings that particularly added to your understanding, or readings which you believe require faculty attention.

**Seminar:** Provide comments on how well seminar discussion contributed to your overall understanding of the case. Identify any particular discussion subjects that helped in your understanding.

**General Comments:**