



U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE

# **The Report on the U.S. Naval War College Workshop on Somali Piracy**

*Fresh Thinking for an Old Threat*

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## KEY INSIGHTS

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- Piracy has emerged from a complex political, economic and cultural milieu. No single response will solve the problem.
- Regional capacity-building and collective maritime action are required to contend with the challenge of piracy so long as pirates enjoy sustained sanctuary in Somalia. Proposals to stop piracy by “fixing” Somalia, however, beg the question – it is doubtful the international community has the capability or will to transform Somalia quickly into a stable and viable state.
- Major maritime powers should rapidly expand coastal and littoral security assistance to the regional states, including training and provision of patrol craft and eventually corvettes, in order to shift responsibility for maintaining rule of law at sea to the regional powers.
- The civil shipping industry will have to take a greater role in protecting merchant vessels, including provision of armed security in appropriate circumstances.

**O**n April 7 and 8, the International Law Department of the Center for Naval Warfare Studies at the U.S. Naval War College conducted a Counter-piracy Workshop comprised of 50 legal and policy experts from across the globe. The Workshop was designed to take a fresh look at the threat of maritime piracy off the Horn of Africa, assess the tremendous progress in international law and diplomacy that has transpired to address the problem, and to take a measure of the way forward. By collecting many of the world’s top experts to consider the threat of maritime piracy, and by providing a forum to discuss the issue in a frank and open dialogue, the Workshop revisited some conventional thinking and

explored new approaches. The participants brought significant diversity and depth of expertise. Many are involved in day-to-day decision-making on counter-piracy operations, policy and international law in Europe, Asia and the United States. This point was underscored on the second day of the Workshop, when a number of attendees joined a U.S. Government interagency phone conference to plan a course of action for dealing with the overnight hijacking and ensuing hostage stand-off involving the *M/V Maersk Alabama*. The Workshop was conducted in the Naval War College’s Decision Support Center, a state-of-the-art briefing center which can anonymously tabulate participants’ responses to issues under consideration, creating a non-attribution record of the proceedings.


## I. THE THREAT

The Workshop opened with a prominent irregular maritime warfare expert who provided a threat assessment for the group. The threat assessment concluded that although Somalia is a failed state, it is not a failed society. Central government has collapsed but other forms of authority remain. Some forms of authority are local, restricted to individual towns and villages. Other forms of authority derive from clan or sub-clan positions, and elders are often able to exercise their authority using traditional means. Power also flows from political figures who exercise authority through negotiation or patronage of largely self-interested supporters or allies. Finally, militias and Islamic courts exercise considerable influence in Somali society. Clan organization is a context rather than a determinant of piracy.

On November 21, 2008, the UN released a report by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on piracy off the coast of Somalia based on meetings held in Nairobi, Kenya.<sup>1</sup> The Nairobi Report suggests that piracy off the coast of Somalia is driven by the volatile security and political situation inside the country, rampant poverty and other factors. Using the Nairobi Report as a point of departure, the NWC Workshop considered the leading contributors to maritime piracy in East Africa. The causal factors contained in the Nairobi Report were considered as potential drivers of Somali piracy. The Workshop participants independently scored the drivers of Somali piracy according to the level of perceived importance. The data are presented in Figure 1, which displays the results of the exercise. A score of 100 represents a factor of very high importance, whereas a score of 1 signifies a factor of very low importance.



<sup>1</sup> Workshop Commissioned by the Special Representative of the Secretary General of the UN to Somalia, Nairobi, Kenya, Nov. 10–21, 2008, *Piracy off the Somali Coast: Final Report: Assessment and Recommendations* (prepared by Ambassador Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah).



**Figure 1: Drivers of Somali Piracy**

The aggregated scores show that the average of the participants was highest in relation to the volatile security and political situation in Somalia and lowest in regard to environmental hardship. The scores were sorted into quintiles and are reproduced in Figure 1.

In addition to considering the list of drivers contained in the UN’s Nairobi Report, several NWC Workshop experts suggested additional factors that were important in fostering permissive conditions in which piracy can flourish. First, the availability of pirate sanctuary ashore provides a safe haven from which pirates operate with apparent impunity. Second, the opportunity to conduct piracy is presented by the geographic location of the nation of Somalia and close proximity of the major piracy hubs of Haradhere and Eyl, which are situated along the international shipping route from the Suez Canal. Third, the availability of legions of destitute, young men combines with numerous unpaid or underpaid complicit and corrupt officials to populate the piracy enterprise. Finally, the low level of risk associated with piracy, and the prospect of high rewards,

continues to draw Somalis into the illicit business. The risk-reward calculus is favorable to piracy and has to be changed.

A number of nations have facilitated payment of ransoms in order to obtain the release of their nationals and ships held by Somali pirates. Some states, including Denmark, have released captured pirates unpunished due to legal and diplomatic confusion or difficulty with detaining and prosecuting the perpetrators in criminal court. The Nairobi study suggests that these practices have encouraged piracy. Although the wider international community has universally condemned piracy activity off the coast of Somalia, the Nairobi Report indicates that the same nations have been tolerant of piracy by either sanctioning the crime or facilitating payment of ransoms. In some cases, nations appear to have deployed warships to the area without authority to take robust action to arrest or detain pirates or use force to disrupt attacks. The NWC Workshop experts were asked to characterize whether they agreed with the description of the response by the international community contained in the Nairobi Report. Many of the NWC experts—30 of

34 – either agreed or strongly agreed with the Nairobi Report’s characterization that the international community has either sanctioned or tolerated maritime piracy off the coast of Somalia, and the responses provided by the experts are contained in Figure 2.

system, with no single nation bearing the burden. Consequently, organizing a response to thwart piracy represents a classic collective action problem. The need to shift the outcome of this equation is obvious, but the means to do so are more debatable. This conclusion gives rise to the division of responsibility among regional states,

The Nairobi Report also suggested that the wider international community has universally condemned piracy activity off the coast of Somalia, but then has generally been tolerant by either sanctioning or facilitating payment of ransoms or deploying warships to the area without authority to take robust action (arrest and detain, use of force).	1 Strongly Disagree	2 Disagree	3 Neutral	4 Agree	5 Strongly Agree
What is your level of agreement with this characterization of the response of the international community? (Number of experts responding under each column.)	1	3	0	18	12

Figure 2: Condemning International Piracy

The NWC Workshop received a detailed brief on the political, social and economic motivations of Somali pirates. Pirates are exploiting the vacuum created by anarchy in Somalia. The lack of rule of law inside the nation spills offshore. Somali pirates are driven by the goal of pecuniary gain. Moreover, the crime of maritime piracy has some amount of acceptance in a society whose values have been distorted by conflict and violence. Piracy in the offshore areas of Somalia is perpetrated by organized criminal gangs who benefit from political protection, so solutions will have to account for the wider political context inside the country. The rational risk-reward calculus of the pirate gangs has to be changed by ensuring piracy is less rewarding while at the same time infusing piracy with greater risk. So far there has been a high tolerance for piracy because costs are diffuse throughout the international



distant states and the private sector. The NWC experts provided individual assessments of the likely impact of Somali piracy on international trade from Europe to Asia over the next five years. Figure 3 provides the data on the anticipated risk of Somali piracy on the Europe-Asia trade route.

In Figure 3, the experts individually characterized the likely impact of Somali piracy

The impact of Somali piracy is likely to be severe on Europe to Asia maritime trade through the Suez Canal, Strait of Bab el Mandeb, and the Gulf of Aden over the next five years.	<b>1</b> <b>Strongly Disagree</b>	<b>2</b> <b>Disagree</b>	<b>3</b> <b>Neutral</b>	<b>4</b> <b>Agree</b>	<b>5</b> <b>Strongly Agree</b>
Number of experts responding in each column.	<b>1</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>3</b>

Figure 3: Anticipated Impact of Somali Piracy on Europe-to-Asia Trade

on Europe-to-Asia maritime trade through the Suez Canal and the Gulf of Aden. In considering whether the impact is likely to be severe, 13 experts either strongly disagreed or disagreed, while 20 were in agreement or strong agreement. On this question it is safe to say there was a lack of consensus on the severity of the impact of Somali piracy along the critical trade route connecting Europe and Asia.

The Workshop also considered the anticipated impact of Somali piracy on global shipping over the next five years, and the results of that question are contained in Figure 4.

Regarding the impact of Somali piracy on global shipping over the next five years, the results displayed in Figure 4 were even more circumspect than those in Figure 3. A greater number of experts—16—either disagreed or strongly disagreed with the proposition that the likely impact of Somali piracy on global shipping will be “severe.” Seven participants registered a “neutral” response, and no expert was in strong agreement with the statement.

Similarly, the Workshop experts were not in agreement on the number of piracy attacks anticipated to occur in the region in

2012. In 2008, more than 100 vessels were attacked and more than 40 were hijacked successfully in waters off the Horn of Africa. When asked, “By 2012, how many vessels do you expect to be successfully hijacked in the region?,” the estimates among the experts ranged from a low of 2 or 3 per year to a high of 450 attacks per year, with most responses in the 50 to 250 range.

There was, however, quite strong agreement that in order for Somali piracy to be successfully addressed, the rule of law has to be restored in Puntland. Puntland is the region of Somalia that serves as the primary staging area for most piracy emanating from the country. Thirty-three out of 34 experts agreed or strongly agreed that restoration of the rule of law in Somalia was essential for curbing piracy. The actual numbers in response to the question appear in Figure 5, and indicate that only one expert disagreed with the statement that “In order to curb piracy in the offshore region, it is necessary for law and order to be restored in Puntland and the coastal areas of Somalia.”

Question 5 poses a broader challenge—if it is necessary to restore law and order in Somalia, how can that goal be achieved? There is an absence of international

The impact of Somali piracy is likely to be severe on global shipping trade over the next five years.	<b>1</b> <b>Strongly Disagree</b>	<b>2</b> <b>Disagree</b>	<b>3</b> <b>Neutral</b>	<b>4</b> <b>Agree</b>	<b>5</b> <b>Strongly Agree</b>
Number of experts responding in each column.	<b>2</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>0</b>

Figure 4: Anticipated Impact of Somali Piracy on Global Shipping Trade

In order to curb piracy in the offshore region, it is necessary for law and order to be restored in Puntland and the coastal areas of Somalia.	1 Strongly Disagree	2 Disagree	3 Neutral	4 Agree	5 Strongly Agree
Number of experts responding in each column.	0	1	0	10	23

Figure 5: Necessity of Restoring Law and Order in Somalia

consensus on how to engineer the stabilization and reconstruction of Somalia, with some analysts so discouraged that they are doubtful the country can be stabilized any time soon. The elusive quest for crafting a “Somalia policy” has persisted since the collapse of the country in 1991. Although neither the United States nor other nations have successfully implemented a coherent approach for revitalizing the country, the issue of piracy has attracted greater public attention toward the plight of Somalia. On April 23, 2009, thirty nations participated in a UN meeting in Brussels and developed a \$250 million plan to rebuild stability in the fractured state. Strengthening regional maritime security in order to reduce piracy was among the top concerns at the conference. The international community has a chance to turn adversity into opportunity and perhaps try to bring some measure of law and order to the country. Most NWC Workshop experts agreed that restoring order in Puntland was essential to curb piracy, and it remains to be seen whether the donors’ conference will make a positive and marked difference.

## II. REGIONAL RESPONSES

During the past five years, a large group of Asian states have come together to cooperate in order to counter piracy in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore and throughout

Southeast Asia. Many observers credit these efforts with reducing the incidence of piracy throughout the Asia-Pacific, and these efforts have knit the nations together in a regional counter-piracy community. Asian counter-piracy cooperation has emerged from three mutually supporting initiatives. First, under the leadership of Japan in 2004, sixteen nations signed the “Regional Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery” (ReCAAP).<sup>2</sup> ReCAAP is the first treaty dedicated solely to combating piracy. The treaty established an organization that operates an advanced information fusion and sharing center in Singapore. The Information Sharing Centre (ISC) helps individual nations take action to avoid piracy attacks, and to respond more effectively to piracy when it occurs. Second, beginning in 2005, more than twenty-five states that regularly use the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, including the large trading nations of China, Japan, the United States and Korea, began meeting with the littoral states of Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore to develop a combined framework for improving maritime safety in the Straits.<sup>3</sup> The meetings were sponsored by the International Maritime Organization, the UN specialized agency for maritime matters and shipping regulation located in London. After several years, the user nations and littoral states signed the “Co-operative Mechanism,” an agreement that enables user states to help littoral states develop maritime security capacity for

<sup>2</sup> The sixteen countries were the People’s Republic of Bangladesh, Brunei Darussalam, the Kingdom of Cambodia, the People’s Republic of China, the Republic of India, the Republic of Indonesia, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Malaysia, the Union of Myanmar, the Republic of the Philippines, the Republic of Singapore, the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, the Kingdom of Thailand, the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam.

<sup>3</sup> Kuala Lumpur Meeting on the Straits of Malacca and Singapore: Enhancing Safety, Security, and Environmental Protection, Sept. 18–20, 2006, *Kuala Lumpur Statement on Enhancement on Safety, Security and Environmental Protection in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore*, IMO Doc. KUL 1/4 (Sept. 20, 2006), available at [http://www.imo.org/includes/blastDataOnly.asp/data\\_id%3D15677/kualalumpurstatement.pdf](http://www.imo.org/includes/blastDataOnly.asp/data_id%3D15677/kualalumpurstatement.pdf).

better management of the straits.<sup>4</sup> Third, the three littoral states along the Straits of Malacca and Singapore also began coordinating surface and air patrols throughout the straits in order to improve security in the area. Recently Thailand has joined the efforts. The NWC Workshop experts considered whether these three East Asian initiatives could be transplanted successfully to East Africa. Although the benefits of doing so were potentially significant, the responses represented in Figure 6 indicate

but even they face a startling lack of governance, security and bureaucratic capacity. The region is not economically dynamic, like East Asia. Consequently, the area suffers from a low tax base, low penetration of technology and difficulty in integrating citizenry from different backgrounds.

Similarly, nearly all of the discussants disagreed or strongly disagreed that no modifications would be required even if the “Asian” model of fighting piracy could

The responses to piracy in Asia are a model that can be transplanted to the Horn of Africa.	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>
	<b>Strongly Disagree</b>	<b>Disagree</b>	<b>Neutral</b>	<b>Agree</b>	<b>Strongly Agree</b>
Number of experts responding in each column.	<b>4</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>1</b>

Figure 6: Transplanting the “Asian” Counter-piracy Model to East Africa

There are no key differences between countering piracy in the Horn of Africa and countering piracy in Southeast Asia.	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>
	<b>Strongly Disagree</b>	<b>Disagree</b>	<b>Neutral</b>	<b>Agree</b>	<b>Strongly Agree</b>
Number of experts responding in each column.	<b>17</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>

Figure 7: Key Differences between the Horn of Africa and Southeast Asia

that the experts were quite divided on the feasibility of transplanting the “Asian” model of counter-piracy cooperation and international institutions to the Horn of Africa. Thirteen experts disagreed or strongly disagreed that the Asian initiatives were a suitable model for East Africa.

Figure 7 shows that the experts were nearly unanimous, however, in rejecting the notion that no key differences exist between piracy off the coast of Somalia and piracy in Southeast Asia. Somalia is a “failed state,” embroiled in crime, ethnic and tribal conflict, endemic corruption and a suffering from a woeful lack of effective governance, predictability and the rule of law. The social fabric and governance of the country are in disrepair. The neighboring nations of East Africa are comparatively more functional,

be transplanted to Africa. Clearly, if East Asian approaches and institutions are to be adopted in East Africa, they will have to be tailored to meet local conditions. The results in Figure 8 nearly perfectly replicate those in Figure 7, and only one expert suggested that no modification would be needed for transplanting the “Asian model” to the Horn of Africa.

### III. DIPLOMATIC RESPONSES

Given that it is unlikely that quick progress can be made in changing the fundamental conditions that are abetting piracy, the immediate focus must be on containing it and taking cost-effective measures to reduce or manage the risk. The international

<sup>4</sup> The Singapore meeting also recognized the contributions of the straits states in the development of Malacca Strait security initiatives.

No modifications of the approaches in Asia would be needed for countering piracy in the Horn of Africa.	<b>1</b> <b>Strongly Disagree</b>	<b>2</b> <b>Disagree</b>	<b>3</b> <b>Neutral</b>	<b>4</b> <b>Agree</b>	<b>5</b> <b>Strongly Agree</b>
Number of experts responding in each column.	<b>18</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0</b>

Figure 8: No Modification of Asian Approaches Needed for Somalia

*In the 90 days from November 2008 through January 2009, a greater number of positive developments occurred in international counter-piracy law and diplomacy than had unfolded in the previous 90 years.*

community already has achieved significant diplomatic success in countering piracy.

The recent efforts include development of the previously mentioned UN study – the Nairobi Report – plus two UN Security Council resolutions under chapter VII of the UN charter (authorizing states to take “all necessary measures”), two bilateral agreements between the United States and the United Kingdom, on the one hand, and Kenya, on the other, to facilitate transfer of detained pirates from warships to courts in Mombasa, creation of a UN

Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (“Contact Group”) and a regional nonbinding counter-piracy agreement, the Djibouti Code of Conduct. With a view toward building on this progress, the experts were asked to consider how much responsibility various global actors had for addressing the problem of piracy off the coast of Somalia. Among the choices were regional states, the shipping industry and flag states, or the nations with the largest number of registered vessels at risk from piracy attack. The aggregated scores are presented in Figure 9, with a score of 1 indicating a low responsibility and a score of 100 indicating a high responsibility.

Interestingly, in Figure 9 the average score among the Workshop experts for placing responsibility with regional states, the shipping industry and flag states was fairly similar, ranging from an average of 60 to 65.





Figure 9: Responsibility for Countering Piracy in the Horn of Africa



**Figure 10: Importance of International Organizations**

The Workshop experts also were asked to score the importance of various international institutions in countering maritime piracy off the Horn of Africa. The experts each assigned a value to the relative importance of the particular international institution for addressing the problem of piracy off the coast of Somalia. Figure 10 illustrates the scores.

A value of 1 means that the institution has no importance, whereas a score of 100 means that the institution is of critical importance. Figure 10 displays that the average scores of importance for counter-piracy of the United Nations Security Council topped the list at 78. Second, with an average score of 68, was the International Maritime Organization. The European Union was scored third.

The Workshop also considered the question of whether the diplomatic efforts

underway were well integrated with the naval efforts to suppress piracy. Figure 11 indicates that there was not widespread agreement among the experts on whether diplomatic efforts were well integrated with operational naval activities, with two or more participants selecting each of the five possible responses.

In addition to responding to these questions, the experts were able to provide recommendations on other diplomatic initiatives that might offer some promise. It was noted that the Djibouti Code of Conduct was a nonbinding instrument, and that the Arab and African states that negotiated the agreement should make it a binding treaty. Furthermore, states from outside the area should be encouraged to provide maritime security capacity assistance in the form of training, communications, small boats and security infrastructure to the nations of the Horn of Africa. Just as

Diplomatic efforts and naval efforts are well integrated.	<b>1</b> <b>Strongly Disagree</b>	<b>2</b> <b>Disagree</b>	<b>3</b> <b>Neutral</b>	<b>4</b> <b>Agree</b>	<b>5</b> <b>Strongly Agree</b>
Number of experts responding in each column.	<b>2</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>4</b>

**Figure 11: Integrating Diplomatic and Naval Efforts**

Japan provided leadership in construction of a regional counter-piracy center in Singapore, one or more nations should assist the regional states in the construction and operation of a regional maritime security coordination center.

The UN Security Council should consider additional authorization for naval forces operating in the area to seize the accoutrements of piracy, such as high horsepower outboard motors mounted on the stern of Somali skiffs. One method of enabling this strategy would be for the UN Security Council to declare a specifically tailored maritime exclusion zone adjacent to the Somalia coastline, forbidding the use of large outboard motors throughout Somalia's

implement a counter-piracy "rewards for justice" program that helps to identify and apprehend the leading offenders.

## IV. OPERATIONAL COORDINATION

Somalia has the longest coastline in Africa and there are over 2 million square miles of water at risk of piracy, complicating naval strategy. The experts were divided on whether the world's naval forces were effective in addressing piracy in the Horn of Africa. Not one expert strongly agreed that the world's naval forces are effectively addressing the issue of maritime piracy off the coast of Somalia (Figure 12).

The world's naval forces are effectively addressing the issue of maritime piracy off the coast of Somalia.	1 Strongly Disagree	2 Disagree	3 Neutral	4 Agree	5 Strongly Agree
Number of experts responding in each column.	3	13	4	10	0

Figure 12: World's Naval Forces Effectively Addressing Piracy

exclusive economic zone. Fishermen and other civil traffic have little justification for high-powered outboard motors, which propel the small and fast pirate skiffs, enabling them to overtake large merchant vessels. By banning the use of such high horsepower engines, the international community can reduce the availability of the means of pirate attack. Such engines should be subject to seizure and destruction on sight by the international naval forces operating in the area.

The Contact Group should adopt a means of decoupling the Somali piracy gangs from the tribal and social structure of the country through targeted aid and increased support to alternative centers of authority inside the country. The donors' conference is a first step toward realizing this approach. Furthermore, the international community, possibly working through INTERPOL, should

Moreover, it is unlikely that the deployment of large numbers of warships from distant states into the area is sustainable. Many of the nations that have sent warships are unaccustomed to operating far from home waters and without logistical support in unfamiliar regions. Furthermore, it is not clear that such a large area can realistically be patrolled, even by a large multinational force. It would take more than 60 warships to provide an effective presence throughout just a single narrow vessel transit corridor. Until other more effective approaches are developed and begin to show progress, however, there is no immediate substitute for operational patrols by major maritime powers. In fact, Figure 13 indicates that a majority of Workshop experts—18 out of 22—either agreed or strongly agreed that out-of-area naval forces should be doing even more to counter piracy.

The out-of-area naval forces should be doing more in countering piracy.	1 Strongly Disagree	2 Disagree	3 Neutral	4 Agree	5 Strongly Agree
Number of experts responding in each column.	2	2	8	16	2

Figure 13: Out-of-area Naval Forces Should Be Doing More



The Workshop experts narrated additional operational options that might be implemented, and these include the use of:

- **Deception.** “Q-ships” – warships disguised as civil merchant shipping.
- **Land strike.** The use of armed force against safe havens and logistics activities on the shore. Land strikes against identified pirate staging areas would be difficult to conduct and likely ignite anti-western reaction and inflame Muslim passion—making the cure worse than the disease.
- **Blockade.** Monitor the entrance and egress of shipping into and out of Somalia in order to cut pirates off from their bases on land.
- **Embargo.** Prevent the introduction, by land, sea or air, of weapons, communications devices and other equipment destined for use by pirate gangs.
- **Tailored Exclusion Zone.** Use naval forces to prevent the use of certain items or devices, such as high horsepower outboard motors, in designated areas, such as Somalia’s exclusive economic zone.
- **Unmanned Systems.** Greater use of unmanned systems for detection and monitoring of piracy activity may reduce

warship requirements and serve as a force multiplier for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance.

- **Smaller Warships.** Employment of smaller warships, such as patrol craft and corvettes, should be embraced over the long term, making the task of combating piracy more efficient. Maritime powers should develop simultaneously regional coastal maritime security capacity, complementing or eventually replacing the foreign presence.
- **Regional Coordination.** In the near term, there is a need to identify a single contact point for vessels facing an immediate threat, such as UK Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) Dubai. Over the long term, creation of a regional maritime security coordination center to fuse intelligence and share information is essential to shift responsibility toward regional states. This presents an opportunity for regional states dependent on the safety of freedom of navigation in the Horn of Africa—specifically Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states—to provide funding and training for such a center.
- **Somali Coast Guard.** Development of a Somali coastal force is a necessary, but long-term, proposition.





## V. FOCUS ON SOMALIA

Regional and maritime action is required to contend with the challenge so long as pirates enjoy sustained sanctuary in Somalia. The last time the international community took military action to change the situation in Somalia, it did not go well.

- **Governance.** It is unclear whether a stronger central government or stronger clan system would yield greater stability and governance. The dichotomy implicates all of the promise – and difficulty – experienced in Iraq and Afghanistan.
- **Somali Development.** Providing greater development assistance to Somali clan elders who may have some influence in reducing piracy.
- **Piracy Financing.** Explore the potential for disrupting the piracy financing and ransom system through coordinated banking security.

## VI. INDUSTRY & SHIPPING SECURITY

The international civil shipping industry will have to take additional steps to ensure the safety of merchant shipping in the area of greatest risk. Merchant ships should continue to broaden their defensive responses, to include passive measures such as barbed wire around the lifelines, and consider employment of organic or contract vessel security on board some ships, such as dredgers and barges or those carrying sensitive cargo.

Counter-piracy approaches by the private sector appear to align well with the threat assessment we heard this morning.	1 Strongly Disagree	2 Disagree	3 Neutral	4 Agree	5 Strongly Agree
Number of experts responding in each column.	0	3	9	16	4

Figure 14: Private Sector Approaches

## VII. THE U.S. GOVERNMENT

In considering the U.S. interagency process, the experts had mixed views on whether the disparate departments and agencies were working together successfully to address Somali piracy, with more experts characterizing the level of success as neutral or successful.

Finally, the majority of experts believed that the interagency community was working well to counter piracy.

The finding in Figure 16 is particularly encouraging since the experts also rejected the idea that there were no impediments that had to be overcome in order to facilitate interagency cooperation.

## VIII. CONCLUSION

The depth of discussion and variety and originality of the discourse, conducted in a non-attribution environment, were productive. The seizure of the *Maersk Alabama*, in particular, has elicited numerous commentators who suggest meaningless prescriptions, such as “time to get tough,” or “we have to change the risk-reward calculus” of the pirates. Ultimately, everyone agrees that the best solution is for a restoration of law and order to develop within the country of Somalia, but neither the international community nor the United States has been able to devise such an outcome. The much harder questions lie behind those slogans, and require patiently thinking through specific alternative courses of action based on an accurate picture of the causes and motivators of Somali piracy. Furthermore, the Workshop illustrated that no single solution will solve the problem of Somali piracy. If there is the desire to find progress in adversity, the rampant

Within the US government, the interagency community is working together successfully to counter piracy.	<b>1</b> <b>Strongly Disagree</b>	<b>2</b> <b>Disagree</b>	<b>3</b> <b>Neutral</b>	<b>4</b> <b>Agree</b>	<b>5</b> <b>Strongly Agree</b>
Number of experts responding in each column.	<b>1</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>0</b>

Figure 15: The Success of the U.S. Interagency Process

Within the US government, the interagency community is working together well to counter piracy.	<b>1</b> <b>Strongly Disagree</b>	<b>2</b> <b>Disagree</b>	<b>3</b> <b>Neutral</b>	<b>4</b> <b>Agree</b>	<b>5</b> <b>Strongly Agree</b>
Number of experts responding in each column.	<b>0</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>0</b>

Figure 16: The Interagency Community Works Well

There are no impediments to US government efforts to achieve interagency cooperation.	<b>1</b> <b>Strongly Disagree</b>	<b>2</b> <b>Disagree</b>	<b>3</b> <b>Neutral</b>	<b>4</b> <b>Agree</b>	<b>5</b> <b>Strongly Agree</b>
Number of experts responding in each column.	<b>3</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>

Figure 17: Interagency Impediments

piracy off the coast of Somalia, stretching from the seizure of the very large crude carrier *Sirius Star* in November 2008 to the capture of the *Maersk Alabama* in April 2009, has focused world attention on an often ignored corner of the globe. One of the most promising courses of action is to build the rule of law and capacity for governance and the maintenance of security throughout the region. All of the regional states, and Somalia in particular, would benefit from increased security assistance and, just as importantly, development of long-lasting governance, economic and security partnerships with neighbors, friends and allies. Operationally, the threat of piracy has presented the first—and by any measure successful—test of the concept of a spontaneous Global Maritime Partnership (GMP) and a validation of the Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower.<sup>5</sup> The follow-through, moving from coordination among the larger out-of-area naval forces and toward regional efforts and local capacity-building, requires commitment, generous resources and political will in East Africa and throughout the globe.

## PARTICIPANTS AND CREDITS

The Workshop was comprised of participants from South and East Asia, Europe and the United States. The participants represented a variety of eclectic professional experiences, including international law attorneys, advisers in the areas of oceans policy, irregular maritime warfare and maritime piracy from several continents, representatives of the international civil shipping industry and maritime piracy and naval experts from academic and policy research institutions. A list of the workshop participants, an agenda for the workshop and selected briefs presented may be found on the Internet website of the International Law Department, Naval War College, at <http://www.usnwc.edu/cnws/ild/ild.aspx>.

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<sup>5</sup> James Kraska and Brian Wilson, *The Co-operative Strategy and the Pirates of the Gulf of Aden*, THE RUSI JOURNAL 74–81 (April 2009).

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