

BOOK REVIEWS

STRATEGY AS A BATTLEGROUND

The Direction of War: Contemporary Strategy in Historical Perspective, by Hew Strachan. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2013. 322 pages. \$66.70 (paperback \$26.99; Kindle \$17.20).

About halfway through his account of the direction of war, the distinguished Oxford military historian Hew Strachan makes a seemingly minor point about Bernard Brodie, one of the pioneers of limited-war theory during the Cold War. “Brodie had studied Socratic philosophy and had been trained as a historian. These were in some sense the traditional disciplines of strategic thought,” but in the early nuclear age they “were now in retreat” (p. 187). Some might doubt that a Socratic approach combined with historical inquiry is a foundation of strategic thought, or at least of Brodie’s, but in truth Strachan thereby described his own approach to strategic theory and practice as well as anyone possibly could. Strachan, however, is not in retreat. He has taken the initiative and is very much on the offensive—against just about everyone’s sacred cow.

Following Clausewitz directly and perhaps Socrates’s greatest student, Plato, indirectly, Strachan has a dialectical approach to thinking about strategy, which is fundamentally a conversation, the sort any war college could only welcome. It occurs at many levels, and often the

interlocutors speak at cross-purposes. Most fundamentally it is a conversation between theory and practice, one insisting on clarity and therefore abstraction, the other on concrete experience.

As the conversation develops, Strachan brings in new interlocutors. Virtually all the great and many minor strategic theorists and practitioners of the modern era have something to say in this dialogue: Clausewitz, of course, but also Jomini, Mahan, Corbett, Douhet, Billy Mitchell, Brodie, Herman Kahn, Mao Zedong; Generals Powell, Clark, Petraeus, and McChrystal; Admirals Morgan and Mullen; and many, many others. While they converse with each other, all also are engaged in a conversation with practice, i.e., what works and what does not.

That conversation is rooted in a deeper one about the relation of the past (continuity and change) to the present and the foreseeable future (contingency), meaning Strachan harnesses his vast understanding of the past to help us think about the future direction of strategy and war. His dialogue is always about at least these three big questions: What is strategy?

Who should direct it? And where and how should it be made (p. 215)?

Those looking for a clear answer to the first question are likely to be disappointed. Strachan observes that Clausewitz's "*On War* contains many references to the need for principles and system, but never delivers them in a way designed to be learnt by the parrots of military crammers and spoon-fed examinees" (p. 203). Neither does Strachan. Like Socrates, he is an interrogator. He asks what other people, such as the British prime minister and the American president and their military and other subordinates, mean by *policy*, *grand strategy*, *military strategy*, and *operations*. Like Socrates again, he is pretty sure either they do not know or their views are one-sided, if not misguided, and at best limited in utility to a particular moment in time. He frustrates his readers as much as Socrates does in Plato's dialogues because he never quite defines strategy himself. It exists somewhere between war's political purpose and operations that purport to achieve it (p. 220).

As a middle ground between political purpose and military action, strategy also becomes a battleground between those who make policy and those who design and execute operations to achieve it. Strachan's focus is often on the disappearance of strategy in this conflict. Sometimes it is subsumed by policy, which is what he insists happened during the Cold War, when the purpose of strategy was to ensure that major-power, i.e., nuclear, war did not occur, so the use of violence to achieve political objectives among major powers against each other became unthinkable. This also happened after the Cold War, when strategy as a means to achieve political purposes was nearly extinct (with many,

in Europe especially, welcoming its demise), and operations came to occupy the middle ground. This was especially true in the United States, though in such a narrow way that Strachan ascribes fleeting successes in Afghanistan and Iraq after 9/11 and 2003 to the triumph, i.e., failure, of merely operational thinking. So, in many ways his book becomes a discussion of civil-military relations, with a powerful critique of the pioneer of the field, Samuel Huntington.

Like Socrates, Strachan is willing to question taboos. He argues that, in both England and the United States, the danger of a military leader on a white horse coming to power at the expense of freedom was vastly exaggerated. Liberal principles had taken such deep root in the people that a military coup d'état was simply inconceivable. What private in the U.S. or British military would obey an order from a general to arrest the president or prime minister? So Huntington's principle of strict separation between the roles of statesmen and generals was not merely unnecessary but in many ways counterproductive. "The principal purpose of effective civil-military relations is national security: its output is strategy. Democracies tend to forget that" (p. 76). Following Clausewitz, whom he uses to criticize rather than support Huntington, Strachan insists that war is interactive, the realm of chance, friction, contingency, and unexpected actions from the adversary. And war has its own grammar, often leading to escalation. War, in other words, has its own nature, which politics defies at its own risk. A good Clausewitzian might, indeed must, try to impose the political logic of war on all this, but once the dogs of war are unleashed, they tend to make havoc—that is, they follow their own

direction. As often as not, then, policy and strategy are directed by war; they do not direct it. Responding to that reality requires a dialogue between soldiers and politicians—not the subordination of one element to the other, but rather their “harmonization” (p. 78). For any kind of rationality to be imposed, politics must therefore listen to strategy, which must listen to war, both in its enduring nature and in its changing character. All this suggests a far more prominent role in the conversation for generals and admirals than current norms, often violated in practice, tend to permit.

As a student of the American founders and the American political tradition, this reviewer is not sure Strachan is right to challenge the Anglo-American taboos as much as he does. As a professor of strategy, however, I am certain Strachan has captured something vital for understanding the direction of any war. It arises from Clausewitz’s discussion of war as more than a true chameleon changing its colors from war to war. War does have a nature. It is embodied especially in Clausewitz’s trinity: the relation among reason, passion, and creativity that exists in any war. But that relation changes from war to war. Sometimes one element is more important than another, which gives an entirely different direction to a conflict than the one preceding or succeeding it. Sometimes the elements quarrel among themselves. Each attempts to give direction to war, and the changing historical direction of war is very much the result of the conversation among the parts and the interaction of their whole with others. No wonder, then, that Strachan does not give us the clear and final answers we crave. War will not allow them; neither will he. We therefore will have to figure the answers

out for ourselves. A fine way to start is by reading this subtle and erudite book.

KARL WALLING



Authority, Ascendancy, and Supremacy: China, Russia, and the United States’ Pursuit of Relevancy and Power, by Gregory O. Hall. New York: Routledge, 2015. 188 pages. \$145 (paperback \$42.95).

Gregory O. Hall, a professor of political science at Morehouse College, has taken an acknowledged fact of contemporary international relations—the dominance of the United States, Russia, and China within the international system—and developed a compelling academic model supporting this.

Hall argues that the Tripolar Conflict, Cooperation, and Competition (TC3) Framework model reflects the reality of the international system since at least the early 2000s. From Central Asia to the Middle East and Northeast Asia, Hall demonstrates that the United States, China, and Russia are locked in a complex web of interrelationships that increasingly determines the outcome of pressing regional, and even global, issues. As the traditional economic and military advantages of the United States decline relative to those of some rising powers, the international system will be even more defined by the interactions of these three dominant global powers.

Hall cogently traces the gradual transition of the global system following the “unipolar” moment that emerged after the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s. While the United States remains first among equals in numerous metrics of national power, the comparative diminution of its own influence and the rise of other power centers

have led to an international environment in which regional problems must be resolved in conjunction with the other critical global actors—namely, Russia and China. Hall contrasts previous examples of American unilateral action—from military intervention in the Balkans in the late 1990s to the 2003 invasion of Iraq—with more recent examples of U.S. foreign policy being constrained by Russian or Chinese concerns. Whether it is Russian support for the al-Assad regime in Syria, China's sustainment of the Kim dynasty in North Korea, or both Moscow and Beijing's attempts to constrain possible U.S. military action against Iran's nuclear program, Hall marshals the full panoply of regional issues to demonstrate the relevance of his framework.

For the national security community, Hall's work represents an important translation of international relations theory to the realm of practical policy making. His "strategic triangle" between the United States, Russia, and China is an accepted fact of international politics with which leaders around the world have grappled for at least the last decade. On almost any security issue of note, whether traditional or nontraditional, the acquiescence of at least two of the three major powers is essential for any action. Whether it is Russia and China constraining U.S. options in Middle East hot spots such as Syria or Iran, or the United States and China increasing their influence in traditionally Russian-dominated Central Asia, the triangular relationship plays out on nearly every conceivable regional security question. While the popular literature continues to debate a "post-American world" and other slogans, a "strategic triangle" has long been the reality for Russian, Chinese, and U.S. decision makers.

While Hall is particularly adept at translating the academic literature into a compelling narrative that fits the global political reality, he is less sure footed in properly contextualizing the limits of American power. Although it is clear that global power is more diffuse than in the years directly following the Soviet Union's collapse, and American power is certainly more constrained on a variety of regional issues, Washington still maintains an unparalleled ability to act militarily when and where it chooses even in the face of strong objections from Moscow and Beijing. The 2011 intervention in Libya demonstrates that, while Russian and Chinese concerns were certainly considered in ways unheard of during the 1990s and early 2000s, Washington still ultimately exercises a tremendous degree of discretion in the use of force and remains able to apply its overwhelming military advantage in a variety of contingencies despite deep misgivings in Moscow and Beijing. As Professor Hall rightly notes, the continued economic and military advances of less developed nations such as Turkey, Brazil, Iran, and South Africa will inject new forces and issues into the international agenda. Nontraditional security issues such as water scarcity and environmental degradation, while certainly not replacing the traditional primacy of inter-state competition and conflict, will likely act as a supplement to those dynamics. As the global system seeks to adjust to these actors and issues, the predominance of the United States, China, and Russia in the international system and the reality of cooperation and competition between these powers will continue to define the twenty-first-century international order.

ALEXANDER B. GRAY



The Battle of Lake Champlain: A "Brilliant and Extraordinary Victory," by John H. Schroeder. Norman: Univ. of Oklahoma Press, 2015. 184 pages. \$26.95.

War in the Chesapeake: The British Campaigns to Control the Bay, 1813–14, by Charles Neimeyer. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2015. 256 pages. \$44.95.

In 1814, the United States faced a crisis of a magnitude not experienced since the Revolution and not to be exceeded until the Civil War. Congress declared war against the British Empire in 1812 to stop the impressment of sailors on American ships, to maintain the rights of neutral trade, and to stop perceived British support for Native Americans then violently opposing western settlement. Congress and the Madison administration expected a quick victory by ending British control over Canada. After all, Britain was locked in existential struggle with Napoleonic France and could send little assistance to its forces in North America. However, the British in Canada managed to turn back multiple American invasions. Even the stunning naval victory on Lake Erie in 1813 resulted only in local superiority. The key cities of Montreal and Quebec remained firmly in British hands.

With the abdication of Napoleon in 1814, Britain deployed large land and naval forces to North America. Britain's goals were to retaliate for American depredations in Canada, permanently eliminate American military power on the Great Lakes and Lake Champlain, establish a neutral Indian territory north of the Ohio River, and seize New Orleans. The American treasury was almost empty, the Atlantic coast was under close blockade, American naval

power on the Atlantic was all but neutralized, and politically the nation was bitterly divided over continuing the war.

Two new books reexamine this period of national crisis. First, John H. Schroeder retells the dramatic story of turning back a powerful British invasion intended to clear Lake Champlain of an American military presence. Lake Champlain makes up a large segment of the traditional invasion corridor linking Montreal to New York City. In September 1814, ten thousand British soldiers, many of them veterans of Wellington's victories in Spain, marched into New York State heading toward the American base at Plattsburgh. A strong Royal Navy squadron accompanied this formidable army. Defending Plattsburgh were a few thousand regulars and militiamen under Brigadier General Alexander Macomb. Master Commandant Thomas Macdonough commanded the naval squadron on the lake. Macomb and Macdonough were determined to defend Plattsburgh, and they prepared an integrated defense. Macomb stationed most of his soldiers in three earthen fortifications across the narrow peninsula formed by the Saranac River and Plattsburgh Bay. Macdonough deployed his four major war vessels anchored in line across the bay. This arrangement exploited American advantages—yet there would be no escape for either force if the British attacks were successful.

Sir George Prevost, governor general of British North America, directed a less-well-coordinated offensive. He urged Captain George Downie to attack Macdonough's squadron. However, Prevost delayed the accompanying land assault to await the results of the fight on the water. Downie intended to lead a column of warships to pierce

the American line, but the wind and currents in the bay refused to cooperate. Instead, the four British warships came into close range of their opposites and anchored to begin a cannonade. Barely fifteen minutes into the fight, an American ball slammed into a British gun, dismounting it—and crushing Downie. The next ranking officer on the flagship could not locate the signal book to inform Captain Daniel Pring that Pring was now in command. As a result, each British skipper fought his own battle.

Schroeder recounts the well-known story of Macdonough's use of anchors and cables to rotate his big vessels to bring the maximum number of guns into action. Eventually, superior American gunnery prevailed, and one British vessel after another struck its colors. When Prevost learned that the Americans had shattered his naval force, he called off the land attack and led his frustrated troops back to Montreal.

While Schroeder adds little that is new to the oft-told battle narrative of this improbable victory, his notable contribution is the detailed analysis of how British defeat on this inland body of water affected the peace negotiations. The British ministry offered command in North America to the Duke of Wellington. The Iron Duke carefully spelled out the requirements for military success. In his analysis, Britain could not win a decisive victory until it controlled the water. Only this would yield the operational and tactical mobility to take advantage of the troop surge. Failing to control key lakes and rivers, Wellington opined, the government would be best served by ending the war as rapidly as possible. The ministry received the news of the failures at Plattsburgh and Baltimore in rapid

succession and sent new instructions to its negotiators in Ghent. Britain dropped its objectionable demands, and a treaty was signed on Christmas Eve.

The defense of Baltimore is the final chapter in Charles Neimeyer's excellent narrative of the campaign in Chesapeake Bay. As early as the spring of 1813, a formidable Royal Navy force under Sir George Cockburn entered the bay with the purpose of shutting down American commerce and persuading Madison to withdraw regulars from the fight in Canada to defend the cities, villages, and plantations along the hundreds of miles of coast and along rivers that empty into the bay. The Royal Navy raided with impunity. Captains ordered crews to torch villages, seize food and tobacco, and evacuate thousands of escaped slaves, sending them to freedom in British colonies. Yet Madison refused to redeploy his regulars from the northern campaigns, even after the burning of Washington.

Neimeyer relates this tale lucidly, weaving events and policy change with insightful analysis. The Americans responded to British raids with Commodore Joshua Barney's famed flotilla of gunboats. While Barney was ultimately forced to destroy his squadron to avoid capture, he and his flotillamen and accompanying Marines were the only bright spot in what was otherwise a debacle at Bladensburg, Maryland.

Neither author tells a new story, yet both Schroeder and Neimeyer provide a fresh look fortified with penetrating analysis. Their works are well-balanced, speaking perceptively to national policy, strategy, diplomacy, and joint operations from both sides. These are scholarly works written for a popular readership and are at the top of their genre.



The Ashgate Research Companion to Military Ethics, ed. James Turner Johnson and Eric D. Patterson. Farnham, Surrey, U.K., and Burlington, Vt.: Ashgate, 2015. 464 pages. \$149.95.

The editors and twenty-nine other contributors have produced an impressive collection of essays on military ethics, *not* “ethics and the military.” Thus, one will find nothing about false reporting, fraternization, abusive command climates, limitations on gifts, gays in the military, women in combat, contractor oversight, civil-military relations, hazing, rape, drug or alcohol abuse, suicide by service members, marital violence, postretirement employment restrictions, interservice rivalries, or headquarters politics (careerism).

The first of four parts addresses why a nation morally may use force. Pacifism of any variety is not considered; the Christian-based ideas of just war serve as the fundamental approach. Chapter 1 explains *jus ad bellum* (the state’s right to go to war) as seen by the approach’s classic founders from antiquity through Aquinas (Gregory M. Reichberg). Chapter 2 looks at very recent bases for the use of force (*jus ad vim*), including the “responsibility to protect” weakening the Westphalian idea of sovereign inviolability (Daniel R. Brunstetter). Chapters 3 and 4 examine current international law (Davis Brown) and the military’s role in decisions to use force (Martin L. Cook). The part’s final four chapters focus on “special problems” in resorting to force: preemption (Mary Manjikian), asymmetric warfare and terrorism (Keith Pavlischek), intervention in “failed states” and genocides (Luke Glanville), and weapons of mass destruction (Darrell Cole).

Half the book’s pages are devoted to part 2’s “Right Conduct in the Use of Military Force” (*jus in bello*). Chapters 9–12 discuss the ground of limitations on violence: from the just war tradition (J. Daryl Charles), from a Kantian perspective (Brian Orend), from several contemporary doctrines of human rights (Robert E. Williams, Jr.), and from international humanitarian law (Howard M. Hensel). Chapters 13 (Amos N. Guiora) and 14 (Pauletta Otis) address terrorism; chapters 15–18 explore the problems arising from targeting dual-use facilities (Paul Robinson), employing autonomous unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) (James L. Cook), pursuing “targeted killing” of specific individuals (Laurie R. Blank), and conducting cyber warfare (George R. Lucas, Jr.). Chapters 19–21 explain recent academic debates about the moral equality of combatants (Henrik Syse), how to classify and treat prisoners and detainees (John Sawicki), and what—if anything—remains forbidden even to those with just cause whose enemies are fighting without restraint (David Whetham). Chapter 22 studies military ethics in peacekeeping operations (Bard Maeland); chapter 23 reviews the immense problems associated with justifying and enforcing noncombatant immunity (James Turner Johnson); and chapter 24 discusses the enigmatic topic of “proportionality” in contemporary armed conflict (Paul Gilbert).

Part 3 offers reflections on the recently developed topic of postconflict justice, *jus post bellum*. Chapters 25–28 consider who must take control at war’s end (Eric D. Patterson), how to fight with a future peace in mind (Timothy J. Demy), war crimes trials (Carla L. Reyes), and eventual reconciliation as an ethical military goal (Nigel Biggar).

Part 4 is a valuable addendum giving academic, primarily historical, reviews of military ethics in the Islamic (John Kelsay), Chinese (Ping-cheung Lo), and Indian (Torkel Brekke) traditions.

The editors provide summary introductions to all four parts, and they asked the authors to begin each chapter with an abstract and to close with a conclusion section preceding a list of references. All three features are helpful.

Aptly titled a “research companion,” this is a cutting-edge effort by many leading students of military ethics. I learned major things from every author; and while I especially admire certain chapters, other experts are likely to applaud different contributions most, depending on their own backgrounds. However, all the chapters are aimed at advanced scholars or the highest level of decision makers.

Finally, two critical remarks underscore scholarly responsibilities. The word *guerrilla* is spelled with a single *r* more than a score of times—even quoted materials repeatedly are mangled—in an otherwise laudable chapter by the volume’s expert on unconventional warfare. Second, an author asserts that the Gulf of Tonkin incident was merely a matter of erroneous U.S. Navy reporting. While the Navy now judges that the night “battle” of 4 August 1964 never took place, no one doubts that the 2 August day engagement of USS *Maddox* (DD 731) and three North Vietnamese P-4 torpedo boats happened. (There were eyewitnesses and photographs; a Vietnamese 12.7 mm machine-gun round lodged in *Maddox*’s superstructure; and in 1984 General Vo Nguyen Giap told former Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara the attack was deliberate.) The lesson for all of us is that, in

professional ethics, theories are interesting but *facts matter*, usually decisively.

THOMAS GRASSEY



Waging War, Planning Peace: U.S. Noncombat Operations and Major Wars, by Aaron Rapport. Ithaca, N.Y., and London: Cornell Univ. Press, 2015. 266 pages. \$79.95.

Innovative, provocative, and compelling, Aaron Rapport’s *Waging War, Planning Peace* offers a distinct perspective on U.S. failures in postwar stability and reconstruction operations since 1941. The disconnect between waging war and planning peace is the subject of this intriguing study that applies theories of national security policy to four historical case studies. A lecturer at the Department of Politics and International Studies at the University of Cambridge, Rapport examines how the ambitious state-building aims of U.S. presidents and senior advisers were consistently undermined by meager planning.

Rapport invokes “construal level theory” to explain postconflict reconstruction failures following World War II and Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, arguing that the Roosevelt and Bush administrations projected confidence and visionary objectives for peace after the war without providing the necessary organizational support. In turn, failures following the Korean and Vietnam Wars are attributed to administrations that did not articulate end-state agendas and instead concentrated on immediate operational and military gains. The flaw common to the actors in all four historical studies is that kinetic aspects of the war were prioritized at the expense of postwar planning.

The construal level theory consists of several key components. The more distant our goals, the greater we construe the long time horizon abstractly. The more immediate our goals, the greater we construe the short-term horizon in detail. Consequently, the *desirability* of distant goals can overshadow their *feasibility*. National leaders who formulate lofty goals for the distant future support *transformative* objectives, while those who focus on the particulars of combat operations tend to be preoccupied with a *maintenance* outlook that is far more cautious about future estimations. Proponents of desirability and transformative strategies for peace display deductive reasoning based on preexisting concepts, whereas advocates of feasibility and maintenance approaches demonstrate *inductive* thinking sensitive to context-specific information. Undergirding these processes in strategic assessments, the construal level theory presupposes the dynamic of communication fluency. In other words, civilian and military leaders' predispositions toward either desirability or feasibility will determine the flow of information and whether the incoming data are accepted or rejected.

Rapport suggests that the semantics of "postwar" be reformulated. The semantics of "post" makes reconstruction endeavors more of an afterthought, and the "post" verbiage buys into a sequential scheme of arranging operations instead of a fluid model of cooperative interaction. From this descriptive analysis, he offers a prescriptive remedy to the problem: instead of sequencing or paralleling phases of the total operation, he suggests overlapping the coordination of waging war and planning peace so as to harmonize stabilization considerations with

kinetic aims. To that end, greater joint agency collaboration between military and civilian leaders—both desirability visionaries and feasibility organizers—must take place for abstract ends and concrete means to synergize in the range of military operations. By bringing the *why* of desirability and the *how* of feasibility together through interagency cooperation, U.S. presidents and their senior advisers will be better equipped to win the peace, and not simply the war, through a continuum of joint operational planning.

Overall, Rapport's use of construal level theory for understanding the gap between *jus in bello* and *jus post bellum* is persuasive. Readers must decide whether this particular theory assumes too great a role in explaining the lack of correlation between war fighting and state building and, in the process, minimizes the cultural, political, and economic factors that frame the context and motivate the power brokers of a given historical period. For scholars and students, policy makers, and warfighters, Rapport's interdisciplinary work in history, international policy, and psychology is a fascinating study worth the time and money to read and heed.

EDWARD ERWIN



Outsourcing Security: Private Military Contractors and U.S. Foreign Policy, by Bruce E. Stanley. Lincoln, Neb.: Potomac Books, 2015. 238 pages. \$25 (paperback).

Bruce Stanley, a retired Army officer and professor at the United States Army's School of Advanced Military Studies, has written a detailed and well-documented

volume on the recent use of private military contractors by the United States Department of Defense and their utility. He has done this by taking a scholarly, microeconomic approach to assessing how and under what conditions the military has most recently employed private military contractors within the context of overall U.S. foreign policy.

While Stanley begins with a clear, easily understandable introductory discussion of what private military contractors are, how they differ from mercenaries, and why they are valuable to the U.S. military today, he later delves into the microeconomic model's concept of supply and demand as it relates to private military contractors within theaters of operation. He provides all the economic, mathematical, and statistical modeling and analysis that a postgraduate student might desire. However, readers who have a "diminishing marginal utility" for the nuances of academic economics may safely bypass the in-depth mathematical discussions and proceed to his qualitative discussion of this subject.

Stanley's book looks at four recent U.S. military engagements, each of which saw the use of private military contractors: DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM (1990–91), Bosnia (1995), U.S. operations in Afghanistan (2001 to very nearly the present), and U.S. operations throughout the Iraq war (2003–12). He examines the similarities between these engagements, the existing demand for the contractors' services, and how the various contracted providers were able to supply those services for the Department of Defense.

Stanley maintains a balance in his examination of the use of contractors in the performance of our military's mission. He does not delve into the oft-heard

complaints from many in uniform that contractors are solely in the business to make money. Frankly, all business entrepreneurs are in business to make a profit; it is a crucial part of the very fabric of America. Profit is the entrepreneur's reward for assuming risk within the marketplace. Indeed, the protection of capitalism is among the fundamental reasons our armed forces exist. This suggests a tolerant view of those engaged in business in general; and private military contractors in particular share substantial risk to life and limb to support our armed forces. Since the end of the Cold War, the Department of Defense has successively and significantly reduced the numbers of active-duty personnel. While the numbers of soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines have fallen, the mission requirements of our armed services have not diminished. As a result, in an effort to use our uniformed service members in the business of actual combat tasks, the Department of Defense and its subordinate military departments and combatant commands have resorted to using contractors to provide the many logistical and other supporting service tasks necessary to support their combat operations.

Stanley's study includes the sobering numbers of civilian military contractors wounded and killed in these various theaters. Over certain periods, the casualty numbers experienced by some private military contractors closely mirrored those experienced by soldiers. His book provides a deeper understanding of the very real risks these companies and their employees have faced in the support of our deployed service members.

The United States has successfully conducted recent and current military operations to support our foreign policy.

Readers should note that doing so requires us to maintain both a sufficient number of uniformed armed forces personnel and a treasury sufficient to fund both military operations involving soldiers conducting extended combat operations anywhere in the world and the significant expense of hiring private military contractors to perform the support services necessary to enable them. This economic model, while currently feasible and tenable for the United States as a wealthy nation, may not work for another nation with more-constrained resources. In the future, while the “demand” may be there and the “supply” of contractors may still exist, if a nation does not have the financial resources to pay for those contracted services, this model might not work.

Outsourcing Security is a valuable read for military and civilian defense professionals. Stanley applies a thoughtful analysis to what many may have thought they understood, and his work brings both depth and academic merit to the topic.

NEAL H. BRALLEY



Success and Failure in Limited War: Information & Strategy in the Korean, Vietnam, Persian Gulf & Iraq Wars, by Spencer D. Bakich. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 2014. 344 pages. \$35 (paperback).

This groundbreaking treatise by Dr. Spencer Bakich, visiting lecturer in political science at the University of Richmond, endeavors to explain America’s mixed success with limited war since 1950 by way of a new theoretical approach to analyzing policy-strategy formulation and execution at

the highest levels of government. For the purposes of his theory, Bakich characterizes limited wars as those fought at a high level of intensity for limited aims but whose outcomes “are of a considerable consequence for the states involved and for the broader international system.” Furthermore, restraint is necessary to avoid escalation—a tendency of limited wars. Not surprisingly, Bakich focuses his analysis on four preeminent case studies from the “American century”: the Korean War; the Vietnam War; the Persian Gulf War (Operation DESERT STORM); and the Iraq war (Operation IRAQI FREEDOM).

The book’s first two chapters are largely theoretical. Bakich points out how established approaches such as “rationalistic strategic choice theory” and the “foreign policy decision making (FPDM) school” cannot fully explain how information influences strategy, or its outcome, in war. He argues that organizational theory does not capture the true nature of relationships between strategic leaders and national security organizations. As Bakich writes, “A gap remains in our understanding of the sources of strategic success in [limited] war.”

To bridge this gap, Bakich confidently posits his “information institutions” approach. Simply put, it is the pattern of information flow between those at the apex of power and their national security organizations that predisposes states to success or failure in limited war. The information institutions approach suggests that top decision makers served by an information-rich and densely networked national security apparatus should have a better grasp of the strategic environment and experience greater military-diplomatic coordination in planning and execution, significantly

enhancing the effectiveness of their limited-war strategies. Bakich carefully explains the methodology used to test his theory and introduces two direct competitors: organizational culture theory and democratic civil-military relations theory. Key propositions on strategic performance are also tabulated to test each of the three theories against the empirical data (the four case studies).

In the next four chapters, Bakich convincingly demonstrates how only the information institutions approach correctly predicts (or explains) both the military and diplomatic strategic outcomes in all four limited-war cases, with the competing theories falling short in one way or another. For example, in the Persian Gulf War, defeating the Iraqi army without fracturing the international coalition defined strategic success for the United States. The information institutions approach alone correctly anticipates military and diplomatic success in the Persian Gulf War. Organizational culture theory expects both military and diplomatic failure (given the extant organizational culture characterized by a military-dominant conception of war and a Jominian norm of civil-military relations), whereas democratic civil-military relations theory forecasts military success but diplomatic failure (given divergent military and diplomatic strategic preferences). The book's final chapter nicely encapsulates the results of the aforementioned analyses and their significance for theory and policy. One finishes the book persuaded that the information institutions approach offers a more satisfactory explanation for America's mixed military and diplomatic results in limited war than do the alternatives.

Interestingly, Bakich's emphasis on institutional as opposed to organizational relationships in ascertaining the pertinent information flows reveals the often-disproportionate influence of key individuals in the decision-making process. In the Korean War, MacArthur's near stranglehold on strategic intelligence available to top policy makers was abetted by John Allison (in charge of the Department of State's Office of Northeast Asian Affairs) arguing for American intervention north of the thirty-eighth parallel, against the advice of State's own Policy Planning Staff—with disastrous results. In the Persian Gulf War, President George H. W. Bush's personal, "hands-on" approach to information gathering, down to the analyst and desk-officer level, was tempered by National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft's and his deputy Robert Gates's deft management of the interagency process. These and other anecdotes will keep the reader engaged and enthusiastic about the book.

With over eight hundred endnotes gleaned from more than four hundred authoritative sources, this is first and foremost a scholarly work. Those in the international relations community seeking to understand the puzzle of America's recent strategic performance in limited wars will find this information institutions approach a worthy adjunct to the more established theories. Those who read purely for pleasure will enjoy the four case studies, each offering a unique take on the various policies and strategies crafted and the decisions made at the highest levels of government. In short, the book has much to offer, to the serious reader and dilettante alike.

DERRILL T. GOLDIZEN



Fu-go: The Curious History of Japan's Balloon Bomb Attack on America, by Ross Coen. Lincoln: Univ. of Nebraska Press, 2014. 296 pages. \$28.95.

The world recently commemorated the seventieth anniversary of the surrender of Japanese forces at the end of the Second World War. Even seven decades later, however, little-known stories of various military operations are being published that provide insight into ways the Pacific War was fought using remarkable technology and ingenuity. This is very much the case with Ross Coen's fascinating book, which provides a detailed discussion of the use of the first unmanned intercontinental weapon: the *fu-go* balloon. These attacks were, at the time, the longest-range attacks ever conducted in the history of warfare.

In his carefully researched and richly documented book, Coen weaves the story of an improbable project that succeeded in launching upward of nine thousand gas-filled balloons from the Japanese home island of Honshu to attack the North American coast in late 1944 and early 1945. At least six hundred of these balloons are known to have actually made it to the United States and Canada, carrying antipersonnel and incendiary bombs. The intentions were to kill individuals; set forest fires in the heavily timbered Pacific Northwest; and demonstrate that Japan could attack the American mainland, thus creating panic and anxiety.

Once this bizarre form of attack was recognized by U.S. military forces, strict censorship was exercised on press and other media outlets, which were forbidden to publish any information about the silent attacks against which there was little defense. This lack of

public awareness led directly to the only combat deaths to occur in the continental United States during the entire war. On 5 May 1945, a group of hikers came across a crashed *fu-go* balloon near Bly, Oregon, and in the process of trying to determine what the device was they caused it to explode, killing twenty-six-year-old Elsie Mitchell and five children.

The *fu-go* balloons were cleverly designed to make the transpacific crossing by using an automatic altitude-control device to drop sandbag ballast at intervals as the hydrogen-filled balloons rose and settled owing to the solar heating of the gas envelope. The balloons flew as high as thirty thousand feet to capture the prevailing easterly jet stream, carrying them across the Pacific in as little as three days. A *fu-go* measured approximately thirty-three feet in diameter, was constructed from laminated *washi* paper, and was supported by nineteen thousand cubic feet of hydrogen.

The censorship that resulted in the Oregon deaths also had a more positive effect by denying the Japanese any knowledge about whether the balloons were successfully crossing the ocean. Facing increasingly destructive raids on the home islands that made the manufacturing and launching of the balloons more difficult, and with no indication that the attacks were succeeding, the program was abandoned in April 1945. (The last balloon recovered in North America during the war was found near Indian Springs, Nevada, which is near current-day Creech Air Force Base, the home of the Predator/Reaper drone program.) Balloon remnants have been found as far east as Michigan, and as recently as October 2014, when a balloon was detonated by Canadian bomb-disposal personnel in British Columbia.

Today's headlines are filled with discussions questioning the ethics of launching unmanned weapons (drones) against targets when nearby innocent civilians might be killed or injured by an attack. It is interesting to reflect on the ethical ramifications of launching thousands of unmanned weapons (the *fu-go* balloons) against an entire continent, with no ability to predict within thousands of miles where the weapons would strike or who would be injured or killed. Such attacks today would certainly violate the law of armed conflict, but they must be judged within the context of warfare in the last century.

I strongly recommend this book to those with an interest in the technology of warfare, and to those who may have heard of the balloon bomb attacks and thought them to be almost-mythical events.

JOHN E. JACKSON



Reconstructing a Shattered Egyptian Army: War Minister Gen. Mohamed Fawzi's Memoirs, 1967–1971, ed. Youssef H. Aboul-Enein. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2014. 320 pages. \$10.94.

Few states in modern times have seen their military beaten as badly as Egypt did in 1967—and have that military survive. Even fewer, perhaps no others, have then deliberately rebuilt that defeated force to a point at which a mere five years later it could again offer battle and, arguably, produce victory. How the Egyptians accomplished this has been something of an incomplete and little-known story up to now. This is mainly due to a lack of translated articles and writings penned by senior Egyptian

leaders. Youssef H. Aboul-Enein has, with this volume, begun to fill in some of the major gaps in the account.

Aboul-Enein's book is actually a collection of articles initially published in *Infantry* magazine. Each of the original accounts was written by General Mohamed Fawzi, the man handpicked by Nasser to build the defeated and demoralized Egyptian forces into a professional, combined-arms military that could retake and hold occupied Egyptian territory. Fawzi served as war minister for both Nasser and Sadat and was the master architect of the stunningly successful creation of professionalism in the Egyptian armed forces. His voice, despite whatever biases and personal axes to grind he may bring to the table, deserves to be heard, and Aboul-Enein's translation gives Fawzi that opportunity.

Fawzi's challenge was massive. The pre-Fawzi army was much more involved with state security than with power projection or war fighting. As the 1967 war had revealed, the Egyptian armed forces, even with Soviet equipment, were woefully inferior technologically to Israeli forces. The Egyptian army was riddled with low morale and displayed an apparently well-deserved inferiority complex. Its soldiery was, for the most part, uneducated and poorly trained. The Egyptian high command was overcentralized, overpoliticized, and, as events had proved, unable to exercise anything like the command and control required in modern combat. The end of the war both left Israel with strategic depth and turned the Suez Canal into a natural defensive barrier that was further fortified with a series of formidable defensive positions.

Fawzi admits to having certain unusual advantages in accomplishing his

mission. Nasser was willing to give his new war minister as close to a blank check as could be imagined. Nothing was more important than securing a victory and expunging the shame of 1967. Furthermore, the Soviet Union became a guaranteed supplier of military hardware, not only making up the quantitative Egyptian losses but substantially improving equipment quality as well. Fawzi makes the point that the Soviets were less motivated by a common ideology in this effort than by the need to prove that their equipment was at least on a par with that of the United States, and to maintain their geopolitical position in the region. Fawzi also confirms that the Soviet presence on the ground was extensive, that Soviet forces not only advised but performed certain military duties as well.

Fawzi brought new capabilities to Egypt and improved others. Surface-launched ship-to-ship missiles, modern surface-to-air missile batteries, new armor and aircraft all entered the Egyptian inventory. Fawzi understood, however, that new hardware would not be enough. Military-school attendance was increased, and the military's intellectual capabilities expanded. But beyond that, he explains, the three-year "war of attrition" that Egypt waged against Israel (1967–70) was a deliberate effort to blood the Egyptian army, test new tactics, and deploy new forces. Over this period, Fawzi argues, the Israeli forces came to embrace a defensive mind-set, while the Egyptian army became imbued with the spirit of the offensive. Although most books claim Israel won the war of attrition, Fawzi claims this was not the case. According to Fawzi, not only did Israeli jets increasingly avoid Egyptian airspace, but Egyptian

soldiers underwent quantum improvements as well—and these improvements were the real war aims of this period. It is also clear that whatever strategic deterrent the Israeli leaders thought they might have against the Egyptians did not work when it came to preventing at least a limited war. As the Egyptian army began to believe in itself, Fawzi and his officers crafted plans for what would become one of the most successful set-piece battles of the twentieth century: the 1973 crossing of the Suez Canal and the breaching of the Bar-Lev line.

Reproducing the *Infantry* articles, complete with their original and somewhat repetitive forewords, gives the book something of a choppy feel. It is also clear that this work is a synopsis of Fawzi's memoirs, not a complete translation. Some readers will be left with a desire to know more. Not surprisingly, the focus of the book tends to be at the strategic level. Readers who want more tactical details will have to find them elsewhere. Unfortunately for our understanding of Egyptian perspectives of how the war was waged, Fawzi was relieved of his duties two years before the war began and was arrested for conspiring to overthrow Sadat, so this critical element is sadly lacking. However, these shortcomings pale when compared with the value inherent in this work.

RICHARD J. NORTON



Tarnished: Toxic Leadership in the U.S. Military, by George E. Reed. Lincoln, Neb.: Potomac Books, 2015. 216 pages. \$26.50.

Although the term "toxic leadership" has recently come into vogue, the U.S. military is no stranger to the phenomenon.

Any current or former member of the armed forces can usually provide a firsthand account of a leader he or she believes was toxic. So even when a very healthy dose of skepticism regarding anecdotal reporting is applied, it is surprising that senior military leaders have not paid more specific attention to evaluating to what degree toxic leadership has affected their services' personnel and their performance, and to determining what to do about it.

George Reed, who carries very respectable credentials as both a former Army officer with twenty-seven years of experience and a civilian scholar, has at least begun to examine toxic leadership in the U.S. military seriously. For those interested in understanding this type of leadership, *Tarnished* is an excellent starting point. However, as Reed is laudably quick to point out, more work—much more work—is required.

The study of leadership is as fraught as it is vital. There is not even a universally accepted definition of the term. The field abounds with conflicting theories, mountains of individual case studies, and an ever-increasing number of blandly self-assured “how-to” books of questionable utility. *Tarnished* is a welcome change of pace.

Reed begins by defining toxic leadership as “demotivational behavior that negatively impacts unit morale and climate.” Reed then explores how toxic leaders behave and why; in many cases, their seniors in the chain of command may fail to recognize these behaviors and even reward these leaders. This, not surprisingly, is in marked contrast to the perspectives of toxic leaders' subordinates and the deep and lasting negative impact that results from working for such a leader. Loss of productivity,

decreased communication of necessary information to senior leaders, and rampant dissatisfaction with not only the leader but the service are just some of the consequences Reed documents. But as serious and at times tragic as these results can be, they pale in comparison to the loss of combat effectiveness such units could experience and the potential cumulative impact of toxic leadership on the profession of arms.

Reed makes a convincing case that a toxic leader's behavior likely stems from feelings of inferiority, which, when combined with narcissism, creates a potentially disastrous mix. The manner in which toxic leadership often involves ethical breaches is also examined.

Among the useful ideas presented in *Tarnished* is that toxic leadership is best viewed along a spectrum. At one end are found true psychopaths, whose numbers in the military are likely to be few. At the other end of the scale are individuals with behaviors that may actually be correctable, or at least mitigated.

Part of this book's allure is Reed's healthy understanding of reality. He notes that losing control in the moment or having a bad day does not make a leader toxic. *Tarnished* does offer suggestions for those sentenced to work with toxic leaders, but Reed has the candor to admit that these suggestions may not work. This is a refreshing change from books that suggest that “speaking truth to power” will result in a happy ending, or those that, having identified a problem, offer no solution.

This is not to suggest that *Tarnished* is without flaws. In discussing specific cases, there is a tendency to identify toxic leaders as “a Navy captain,” or “a visiting field officer.” If these cases are in the public domain, then providing

actual identities would be better. Although it is ostensibly devoted to military leadership, civilian cases do at times move into the narrative. There is also a surprising lack of historical cases. Were Admiral King, General Patton, and General LeMay toxic leaders?

Does the answer matter? One of the more difficult questions involving toxic leaders is, Do results ever trump their behavior? *Tarnished* claims, quite reasonably, that how leadership is delivered can be as important as what it delivers, or even more important. But is that always true? Another question that will leave most readers wanting more is whether, and to what degree, the culture of the U.S. military and the nature of the profession of arms rewards (some would say demands) attributes from leaders that, if not toxic, may seem very similar. However, when all is said and done, *Tarnished* is a most welcome addition to the discipline of leadership. It belongs in the handful of books that should be on the shelves of both scholars and practitioners of leadership.

RICHARD J. NORTON



The China Dream: Great Power Thinking & Strategic Posture in the Post-American Era, by Liu Mingfu. New York: CN Times, 2015. 288 pages. \$24.99.

This 2015 publication of the English translation of *The China Dream*, originally published in Chinese in 2010, merits reading by a wider Western audience wishing to understand a clear exposition of a conservative, hawkish view of China's approach to international relations. The author, Liu Mingfu, is a retired People's Liberation Army colonel.

The book does not necessarily represent the mainstream view of the Chinese general public or the official Chinese government position, but it does ring more true to the spirit of Chinese president Xi Jinping's current thinking than it did to former Chinese president Hu Jintao's approach when the book was released in Chinese over five years ago. The fact that the foreword for the book was written by Liu Yazhou, a princeling political commissar of the National Defense University, gives the work gravity within the Chinese defense community.

Henry Kissinger spent four paragraphs in *On China* (2011) summarizing Liu's views regarding China's grand goal to become number one in the world, thereby restoring its historic glory. According to Liu, this is to be done through cultivating "martial spirit," not through "peaceful rise." The inherent conflict in U.S.-Chinese relations is portrayed as a "marathon contest" or "duel of the century," as if world politics is a sporting event between a champion and a major contender for the global championship. Kissinger follows his discussion of the Liu triumphalist view of the national destiny debate with a much longer analysis of State Councilor Dai Bingguo's more moderate reaffirmation of the peaceful rise strategy.

Liu begins the first chapter by paying homage, Chinese fashion, to his ancestors, laying out his interpretation of the visions of Sun Yat-sen, Mao Zedong, and Deng Xiaoping for turning China into the world's leading nation. Getting to the crux of his argument in the second chapter, "The Fight for the Century," Liu clearly blocks out the results of five centuries of global political competition. Citing George Modelski's hegemonic stability theory that there is an approximate

one-hundred-year life cycle for global hegemony, Liu names the champions: Portugal in the sixteenth century, Holland in the seventeenth century, Britain in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and America in the twentieth century. Maybe China had a fleeting world championship title in the fifteenth century—not through colonial conquest, but through tributary recognition of the center of world power. Liu's argument is that China is back—to claim the champion's title in the twenty-first century.

The rest of the book elaborates how China can become the world champion by drawing on lessons from former and current champions, especially the United States. For instance, Liu notes that American strategy included an internal strengthening phase of isolationism under President Washington, a century of regional consolidation under the Monroe Doctrine, and world power generation under FDR's globalism. He also likes America's "cheap rise": in other words, coming late to both world wars, but concluding those wars with the victor's share of the spoils. Comparing China to America, Liu notes that China underwent domestic consolidation under Mao and Deng, and has its eye on being king of Asia, with the ultimate goal of being king of the world.

The first champion's goal, toward achievement of which China is well on the way, is to become the wealthiest nation—because all world champions have been the wealthiest nation. All world champions have also been the strongest military power—hence the focus on martial spirit. In terms of strategy, Liu prefers Sun Tzu to Clausewitz, pointing out that China will seek to win without fighting. In what may seem like a non sequitur to Americans and many

others, Liu continually repeats the theme that "the first nonhegemonic champion nation in history will appear, and that nation is China." However, he also refers on multiple occasions to China as king, and the difference between kingly thinking and hegemonic thinking is ironically opaque. Liu refers to the United States as "one country, two systems," meaning democracy at home and hegemony abroad. Since Liu prefers to see China exercise democracy abroad and hegemony at home, we could also refer to China as "one country, two systems," but with practices inverted from those of the United States of his characterization.

For those who like the sporting analogy, the book is an entertaining read and an enticement to place one's bets on the grand sporting event of world politics. On a more sober note, Liu's world view rings more true to current Chinese policies than to those of five years ago. President Xi Jinping gave his "China Dream" speech in November 2012, apparently somewhat influenced by Liu Mingfu's book of the same title published two years earlier. Thus, the recent translation is food for thought that should be chewed on by a wider Western audience now that it is available.

GRANT RHODE



Logistics in the Falklands War, by Kenneth L. Privratsky. Barnsley, U.K.: Pen & Sword, 2015. 248 pages. \$34.95.

Major General Kenneth Privratsky, USA (Ret.), highlights the importance of the integration of combat operations and logistics in this book about the Falklands War of 1982. *Logistics in the*

Falklands War is the result of years of research, begun when Privratsky was at the Army's Command and General Staff College in the mid-1980s and continued while a fellow at Stanford's Hoover Institution. Most of all, the author wants the reader to "appreciate the extent of the efforts behind the victory" rather than simply present a logistical view of lessons learned.

The book begins by examining British and Argentine claims on the Falkland Islands before walking through the sequence of Argentina's invasion threat and subsequent invasion; Britain's mobilization and deployment; combat operations; and the aftermath of the conflict. He highlights the key role of industry during the rapid mobilization. Commercial ships were quickly modified for the war. For example, the cruise ship *Uganda* was converted to a hospital ship in only sixty-five hours once it reached the shipyard. This included modifying its interior spaces for a clinic, surgical facilities, and labs; installing a helicopter deck; adding equipment to produce fresh water; and applying Red Cross markings. In total, fifty-four ships were taken up from trade, outnumbering the number of warships involved. Privratsky aptly describes the outload as rushed and gives readers a sense of being on the docks during the unchoreographed flurry of activity. Many converted commercial ships were designed only for pier-side off-loading; however, once in theater, supplies and equipment had to be transferred to vessels capable of shallow-water operations. Off-loading difficulties and concerns over Argentine air strikes sent *Queen Elizabeth 2* home with "seventy percent of 5 Brigade's 81 mm mortar and 105 mm gun ammunition . . . buried in lower decks."

Privratsky argues convincingly that logistics was the center of gravity of the campaign. The movement of ammunition, supplies, and equipment—whether by shallow water-capable ships, helicopters, or backpacks—dictated the pace of the ground war. The author's thorough research, including interviews, leads to a comprehensive description of the combat operations and movement of supplies and equipment from the amphibious landing zone on the west shore of East Falkland on D-Day, 21 May 1982, to the surrender on 14 June 1982, at Port Stanley, the capital on the east shore of East Falkland. The British, with their firm resolve and their jointly trained and professional military forces, tirelessly got the right supplies to the right place. His vivid description of the harsh conditions on the Falkland Islands reinforces the importance of the integration of combat operations and logistics. Nevertheless, although that integration was successful, "[b]y the time the Argentines surrendered in Stanley, some [British] artillery batteries were on their last rounds."

In many ways, Britain embarked on a "come as you are, bring what you can" affair to reclaim the Falkland Islands from Argentina. The remote islands' formidable terrain and inhospitable climate—along with the hostile Argentine military forces—exacerbated the difficulty of moving supplies and equipment, which directly impeded combat operations. As Privratsky writes, "Wars sometimes occur at times and in places least expected." And a lack of bullets, beans, and fuel can cause unplanned pauses to a campaign plan or, worse yet, leave troops alone and exposed.

Privratsky firmly believes that effective combat operations are enabled by integrating combat and logistics units and

conducting realistic training. Privratsky's insights could also apply to humanitarian affairs operations, especially if a natural disaster has destroyed piers or off-loading equipment, or occurred in a remote location without prepositioned stores. Military operational planners and military history enthusiasts should add this book to their professional library.

CYNTHIA K. SEXTON



The East Asian War, 1592–1598: International Relations, Violence, and Memory, ed. James B. Lewis. London: Routledge, 2015. 418 pages. \$178.

The Japanese invasion of Korea, known in the West as the Imjin War, has been largely overlooked by Western scholars. While Stephen Hawley's *The Imjin War* and Kenneth Swopes's *A Dragon's Head and a Serpent's Tail* are excellent works, those wishing for a more thorough treatment of some of the issues leading to the war and a more succinct history of the war itself have had to rely on Korean- or Japanese-language sources. However, James B. Lewis's *The East Asian War, 1592–1598: International Relations, Violence, and Memory* now fills the void, offering a variety of perspectives on this seminal conflict among Korea, China, and Japan.

Lewis has assembled an impressive list of international scholars representing a variety of academic specialties. This book is far more than a simple military or political history of one of Asia's largest conflicts prior to the twentieth century. It is divided into three parts, the first an examination of the international and domestic background to the conflict. Japanese and Korean scholars assess the issues that led to a deterioration

of relations between Korea and Japan. Economic issues, including trade disputes, predominate in this section, and set the stage for a review of the war itself, which is the subject of the next part of the book, simply entitled "War."

The nine chapters that compose the section on the Imjin War present the reader with a wealth of information previously unavailable to an English-language audience. These chapters rely almost exclusively on either primary-source material in Japanese and Korean or secondary sources from scholars in Korea, Japan, and China who have provided their own accounts and interpretations of this conflict. Each of the belligerents gets a thorough review, covering political, military, cultural, and social forces that shaped the six-year-long tragedy that has come to be known as the Imjin War. From a military perspective, readers will find plenty of groundbreaking information on the naval aspects of this war, which featured the largest maritime expedition in history up to that time. The valiant resistance put up by the Korean navy against the invading Japanese is worth a separate book in itself.

The third and final part of this book should not be overlooked. Examining the "impact and memory" of the Imjin War, these five final chapters provide the reader with a review of the ways in which this conflict helped shape attitudes among China, Korea, and Japan over the ensuing centuries. Whether through literature, art, or fashion, this conflict left a lasting impact that Western audiences would have had a difficult time discerning prior to the publication of this book.

There is a comprehensive glossary and index at the end of the book; however, the term "glossary" is a bit misleading,

as this section is a traditional index, albeit an inclusive and very useful one. The references are all listed at the end of each chapter, and readers will be impressed with the breadth of sources used to put this book together. In light of the many challenges facing East Asia in the twenty-first century, Lewis's book should be read by anyone interested in some of the antecedents to the political and cultural tensions that exist in that volatile part of the world. Both general readers and scholars alike will find something of interest in this impressive work. It is highly recommended.

JEFFREY SHAW



The U.S. Naval Institute on Naval Cooperation, ed. Sam J. Tangredi. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2015. 224 pages. \$21.95 (paperback).

Naval Cooperation is an anthology of essays on the employment of maritime forces in security cooperation and partnership missions, taken from the U.S. Naval Institute's periodical *Proceedings*. The Naval Institute Wheel Book series represents an analogy to the practice of a naval officer keeping a pocket-size notebook, or "wheel book," that served as a ready reference of accrued and evolving knowledge and experience. This book places maritime force partnership and cooperation in a strategic context by evaluating the relationships among maritime partnership, operations, and strategy. This approach facilitates examination of the relationships among strategy, strategic objectives, and global maritime partnership, moving the reader to consider not only the relationship of partnership to strategy but the intended outcome of partnership activities.

One of the interesting elements of this collection is the variety of experiences and perspectives its authors represent: U.S. and international chiefs of service; flag officers who commanded fleets; maritime theorists; and senior and junior naval officers from U.S. and international navies. The articles reflect these contributors' personal experiences in cooperation operations ranging from counter-piracy patrols off the coast of Africa to disaster-relief missions in Asia, multilateral exercises such as Rim of the Pacific exercises (i.e., RIMPAC), and military-to-military maritime training events. Each article receives an editor's introduction to both its topic and author. These introductions are especially helpful in contextualizing the different periods in which the articles were written and the relevant cooperation and participation issues.

Geoffrey Till's 2005 piece "Navies and the New World Order" is notable for its assessment of trends within the contemporary security environment affecting the international maritime system. Till argues that the sea is transforming from a domain of peer-to-peer naval competition to one that requires collective action in defense of the established norms and rules of the international maritime system. This will require partnership and cooperation among navies to guarantee maritime security in support of the global economy, while protecting an international system of transportation at sea from the constant threat of criminals, terrorists, and pirates, and to project power ashore in support of stability.

Admiral Michael Mullen's "1,000-ship navy" concept, the Global Maritime Partnership (GMP), and the 2007 maritime strategy "A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower" (as well

as Secretary of the Navy Ray Mabus's 2015 revision of the same) then provide the thematic foundation for the book's articles on cooperation and partnership.

This anthology initiates a discussion of which types of missions and tasks are included in GMP. Collectively, they can be developed into a naval cooperation operations framework or operating concept, as described in the U.S. maritime strategy. GMP missions can be conceptualized across a scale of complexity from combat operations at sea, through maritime operations in support of combat operations ashore and freedom-of-the-seas operations that include naval operations to secure seaborne commerce and trade, to training activities such as multinational or bilateral exercises and military-to-military engagement.

In a 2014 article, Admiral Jonathan Greenert and Rear Admiral James Foggo consider the employment of a "Global Network of Navies" in the execution of GMP. Their concept does not focus on the specific number of ships engaged in maritime partnership activities during a specific period, but rather concentrates on the collective effect of a flexible network of partners engaged in cooperative operations and independent national and naval tasking in the maritime environment.

Other contributors argue that GMP can be used to accomplish common naval tasks among navies, thereby conserving resources by replacing one state's maritime forces with international naval forces. For example, in an article originally published in 2013, Rear Admiral Michael Smith, USN, argues that U.S. naval planners should include allied and partner navy contributions in operational plans. The opposing view envisions GMP as an employment that diverts forces

and resources from national military commitments and operations into missions that build partnership capacity.

Naval Cooperation brings the "wheel book" analogy to life. It inspires reflection on previous arguments and observations regarding maritime partnership and cooperation by providing a collection of ideas from the past. This collection enables a comparative or trend analysis of the objectives and impact of U.S. maritime strategy over time. This edition stimulates further evaluation of the effectiveness of partnership and cooperation activities and their progress toward those objectives. This book will stimulate a reader's thoughts on the opportunities and challenges of global maritime partnership and cooperation among international navies.

SEAN SULLIVAN



Fields of Blood: Religion and the History of Violence, by Karen Armstrong. New York: Knopf, 2014. 512 pages. \$30.

Karen Armstrong's *Fields of Blood* may be an unconventional choice for traditional military historians; it is more a work of comparative religion than a work of military history, and attention to military matters of strategy, operations, or tactics is thin. Nevertheless, for historians interested in the causes of wars, the social and cultural history of war, or the relationship between religion and violence more broadly, Armstrong delivers an important addition to a growing interdisciplinary literature.

Armstrong, though not an academic, is well known for her sweeping, expansive works on comparative religion, with a

particular emphasis on the Abrahamic traditions. Known for books such as *A History of God* (1993) and *A Case for God* (2009) as well as *Islam: A Short History* (2000) and *Muhammad: A Prophet for Our Time* (2006), Armstrong has staked her claim with religious apologists. In *Fields of Blood*, Armstrong takes on Western secularist critics who argue that religion is a fundamental source of violence in the modern world (and was in the premodern world as well).

Instead, Armstrong argues, our modern conception of “religion” is inadequate for understanding the intimate relationship between the sacred and the secular that existed before the early modern period and the development of the secular state. Armstrong instead sees the origins of systemic, structural violence as inherent in the development of agrarian civilizations, which she explores in chapters on Eurasia, the Indus valley, China, and Mesopotamia. Armstrong contends that emerging religious systems served both to explain and to rationalize, and in some cases to reject, the violence endemic to the maintenance of empire.

In the second part of the book, Armstrong explores the development of Christianity and Islam and concludes with a long chapter on the traditions of crusade and jihad. Armstrong rejects an essentialist version of either Christianity or Islam that would mandate violence, and instead places both into a more nuanced political context.

In the final part of the book, which covers the ground most familiar to the average reader, Armstrong details the development of the modern Western idea of “religion” as being personal and private; the advent of Lockean political philosophy that advocated the separation of church and state; and the rise of

the liberal, secular nation-state. The last several chapters are devoted to understanding religious backlash against this trend of secularization. Even here, Armstrong rejects the premise that “fundamentalism” is inherently violent, writing, “Only a tiny proportion of fundamentalists commit acts of terror; most are simply trying to live a devout life in a world that seems increasingly hostile to faith” (p. 303). In this last part of the book, Armstrong also seeks to make sense of terrorism and “global jihad.” Unsurprisingly, Armstrong places culpability for both at the feet of colonialism, modernity, and political struggle, and suggests that “religion” may motivate actors on nearly any side of a given conflict. She writes, “Identical religious beliefs and practices have inspired diametrically opposed courses of action” (p. 393).

Fields of Blood is a survey; certainly scholars of any region and era will find details with which to quibble, and they may believe that one important event or another is treated too cursorily. Yet as an introduction to the complex historical relationships between the world’s major religious traditions and violence, it serves its purpose quite well. And given the recent attention to religious extremism and the rise of Daesh (also known as ISIS, ISIL, or the Islamic State), Armstrong’s work should be taken seriously by any who wish to understand the complex interplay among religion, politics, economics, and violence. Although Armstrong rejects the view that religion is inherently violent, this work takes an important step toward understanding religion as simply epiphenomenal to political violence.

JACQUELINE E. WHITT

OUR REVIEWERS

Rich Barbuto is professor of history and has served as the deputy director of the Department of Military History at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, since 2004. A 1971 graduate of the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, he served for twenty-three years as an armor officer, with tours of duty in Germany, Korea, and Canada. He authored *Niagara 1814: America Invades Canada*, and *Long Range Guns, Close Quarter Combat*, as well as a chapter in *Daily Lives of Civilians in Wartime Early America*.

Neal H. Bralley, Colonel, USA (Ret.), is the Supervisory Assistant Professor, Department of Logistics and Resource Operations at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, the Army University, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He is a 1997 Naval War College graduate.

Edward Erwin serves as command chaplain of Naval Air Station Sigonella, Sicily. He holds a PhD in theology and ethics from Duke University.

Derrill Goldizen is an associate professor of joint maritime operations at the Naval War College. He is a retired Air Force officer with experience supporting Army ground and aviation operations and Air Force intelligence operations. He has taught at the graduate level in two disciplines, space physics and joint military operations.

Thomas Grasse is a retired Navy Reserve captain. A graduate of Villanova University, he received a PhD in philosophy from the University of Chicago. He served on the faculty of the Naval War College and is a former editor of the *Naval War College Review*.

Alexander B. Gray is currently senior adviser to a member of the U.S. House of Representatives' Committee on the Armed Services. The views expressed here are his alone.

John E. Jackson, Captain, USN (Ret.), has done extensive research in the areas of lighter-than-air flight and unmanned aircraft. His latest book is *U.S. Naval Institute on Naval Innovation*, published by Naval Institute Press in November 2015. He has flown five different commercial airships and wrote the chapter on Navy airships entitled "Ships in the Sky" in the book *One Hundred Years of U.S. Navy Air Power*, published in 2010 on the occasion of the centennial of Navy aviation.

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