

BOOK REVIEWS

THE RELEVANCE OF HISTORY TO CURRENT MILITARY CHALLENGES

Tangredi, Sam J. *Anti-Access Warfare: Countering A2/AD Strategies*. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2013. 320pp. \$47.95

Longtime and well-known analyst of maritime affairs Dr. Sam Tangredi, a retired U.S. Navy captain, has written a timely, informative, and useful book. First, he provides historical context to contemporary antiaccess/area-denial (A2/AD) strategies. By reinterpreting well-known historical episodes (the efforts of Greek city-states to resist Persia in the fifth century BC) from an antiaccess perspective, he confirms once again what historians and strategists have long known—the relevance of history to current military challenges. Second, Tangredi details the recent history of thinking about antiaccess strategies and ways to defeat them. He cleverly describes a narrative in which the wars with Iraq, technological developments dating to the 1970s, and strategic thinking inside the U.S. Navy and Air Force, the Pentagon's Office of Net Assessment, and private think tanks like the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments all combined to shape the approaches of the United States (such as Air-Sea Battle) to a host of challenges to American power-projection capabilities.

Tangredi also explores the complexity of the interaction of antiaccess strategies with counter-antiaccess strategies, in six case studies. Three represent successful instances of a weaker defending force denying access to a larger force, and three examples are given where entrance into a critical region was achieved. To add even further depth to his analysis, Tangredi examines contemporary or potential future scenarios in which the United States, with or without allied support, might be denied access in East Asia, South Asia, Northeast Asia, and Central Asia. While insiders and experts might quibble with the details of Tangredi's specific judgments, all will find insights into the general problem of countering antiaccess strategies and the specific challenges posed by known foes and geographical conditions.

If I had to take issue with this book, it would be to ask for even more, especially at the level of strategy or, perhaps better, grand strategy. Tangredi presumes, like many naval officers, scholars, and analysts contributing to current debates

over sea power, that access and its handmaiden forward presence are the essentials of American defense strategy. The logic underlying this assumption is seductive in its simplicity: the United States needs access to allow it to use force at times and places of its choosing in the service of its national interests. Yet rarely does Tangredi ask whether the assumed national interests are worth the enormous financial, technological (in terms of opportunities forgone), and even human cost of countering A2/AD strategies, given the challenges of geography, the growing capabilities of potential adversaries, and the evolving nature of modern warfare.

After all, what specific national objectives are at stake in, for example, the Taiwan Strait scenario that could not be achieved by other means? Moreover, the author gives insufficient attention to the downside of forward presence and, especially, to the potential negative consequences of executing counter-A2/AD strategies. Some downsides can, of course, be intuited from the historical case studies included in chapters 3 and 4. However, to stress this weakness, serious as it is for the state of maritime and naval strategy in general, would be unfair to Sam Tangredi, because it would ask him to write a book that he chose not to write. He chose to explain and analyze antiaccess warfare in both contemporary and historical contexts, and he has done an excellent job of it. I highly recommend that the readers of this journal find room for *Anti-Access Warfare* on their bookshelves.

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Mulqueen, Michael, Deborah Sanders, and Ian Speller, eds. *Small Navies: Strategy and Policy for Small Navies in War and Peace*. Burlington, Vt.: Ashgate, 2014. 247pp. \$39.95

Small Navies is a selection of essays presented at the Small Navies Conference held in October 2012 at the National University of Ireland, Maynooth, cosponsored by the Corbett Centre for Maritime Policy Studies, King's College London, and the Centre for Applied Research in Security Innovation, Liverpool Hope University. The first three essays examine existing classifications of what constitutes a small navy. Chapters 4 and 5 reflect on the conditions that inspire innovation within small navies. The remaining eight essays analyze the small navies of several states and discuss their characteristics and employment, the relationships between strategy and naval force structure, and the particular challenges they face.

The first theme in the collection is the question of what constitutes a small navy. Several definitions are proposed; the traditional quantitative methods of comparing and measuring navies are discussed, as well as movements beyond such historical measurements of naval power as tonnage, hulls, and capital ships.

Eric Grove, Geoffrey Till, and Basil Germond review navy hierarchical classification criteria proposed by analysts during the past three decades. They consider naval warfare principles and common naval functions and missions. Till's essay evaluates the differences and similarities between large and small navies, arguing that "small navies are simply big navies in miniature." He considers

functions common to all navies, the impact of cooperation among navies of all sizes, and the common pressure placed on navies to align resources with operations and mission execution. Germond's essay compares classification criteria and argues that twenty-first-century navies should be classified by their "order of effect" vice their "order of battle."

This book as a whole does not propose its own definition generally accepted by the authors. It is instead a thoughtful examination of the conditions in the twenty-first-century security environment that challenge preexisting classifications while broadly observing that the size of a navy is an insufficient basis of classification.

Building a small navy is a national choice. Essays in this work examine the conditions of the strategic environment that cause states to build them, finding that because of the effects of globalization, technology, and economics, navies are valuable to states for a variety of reasons.

Several essays discuss the necessity for small navies to provide perceived or actual returns on national investment in naval force structure. Absent a nationally valued return, small navies face an existential threat, which may explain the observation that many small navies have made the practical decision to build constabulary and coastal-defense forces. Such navies focus on maritime missions that promote national-security and economic interests through operations in territorial seas and exclusive economic zones.

Small Navies is a thoughtful collection of concepts and ideas now present in naval force planning. This book assesses the range of strategic and domestic

influences facing states and navies engaged in maritime force-structure decision making. Today, naval shipbuilding costs are on the rise, potential adversaries have access to technology that complicates the threat to maritime forces, and states struggle to dedicate more than a few percentage points of gross domestic product to defense. These trends portend that a growing number of states will possess the capacity to build only small navies.

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Moten, Matthew. *Presidents & Their Generals: An American History of Command in War*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 2014. 443pp. \$39.95

The author delivers a chronological review of how the relationship between the president and senior Army leaders has evolved over the life of the Republic. The book is part history, tracing the evolution of U.S. civil-military relations from an uncertain beginning to a level of increasing professionalism, to the current state, which the author finds excessively partisan. It also belongs on any shelf devoted to government policy, since it presents a convincing argument that Samuel Huntington's concept of operational control is as artificial a construct as the frictionless plane described in most physics textbooks. Moten is not the first author to suggest this. For example, Mackubin Owens, of the Naval War College, has long held that the U.S. political-military relationship is more akin to a contract that has been periodically renegotiated. However, Moten takes this a step farther by

arguing that the civil-military contract is under constant negotiation and that the reality of governance makes it inevitable that senior generals and political leaders will be (and should be) involved in each other's spheres of endeavor. This partnership is often an uneasy one and is always marked by tension, but when it works the country profits immeasurably.

Moten argues convincingly that this key relationship works best when both partners are competent practitioners of their respective arts, when each respects the other's roles and abilities, and when each is willing to engage in frank, even adversarial discourse to gain the best possible understanding and strategy. He argues there are times when military leaders should offer advice that requires political understanding and times when a president should intervene in military affairs. The relationship is not an equal partnership; the civil partner must take precedence over the military. The pairings of U. S. Grant and Abraham Lincoln and of George C. Marshall and Franklin D. Roosevelt are regarded as the best the nation has seen.

Although civil-military relations also evolve during times of peace, Moten confines his examination to wartime leaders, arguing that it is during conflict that these relationships can do the most good or harm to the nation and put the maximum strain on the participants. He also all but exclusively confines his work to the relationships between presidents and generals. *Presidents & Their Generals* does not suffer as a result.

Moten is on his most solid ground when he discusses historical relations up to the end of the Cold War. His observations are logical, his analysis solid, and his tone temperate. Much of this work may

be unfamiliar and therefore even more welcome to readers whose knowledge of civil-military relations only connects the dots represented by the presidencies and wars of George Washington, Abe Lincoln, FDR, and Lyndon B. Johnson.

Presidents & Their Generals also does justice to some of the warmer moments of the Cold War, such as the Bay of Pigs and the long involvement in Vietnam. As with Moten's discussion of earlier conflicts, there is no lack of willingness to find fault and identify weaknesses. For example, his dispassionate accounting and analysis of Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara strikes just the right note.

Unfortunately that note sounds increasingly sour as Moten turns his attention to post-Cold War civil-military relations. His criticisms come across as increasingly personal, and his assertions appear not to be well supported. The choice of adjectives and other descriptions becomes increasingly pejorative. This tendency reaches a crescendo when Moten describes Operations ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM, which he clearly views as among the nation's worst failures of the civil-military partnership. He is scathing in his descriptions of General Tommy Franks, Vice President Richard Cheney, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, and others. This is not to say that he does not present a case, but he should, as much as possible, maintain objectivity and limit inflammatory writing.

The book concludes, rather hurriedly, with a series of recommendations to strengthen the strategic partnership. If anything, this chapter is much too short. However, taken in its entirety, *Presidents & Their Generals* is a worthy

addition to the genre and deserves serious consideration not only by scholars but also by general readers.

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Lemnitzer, Jan Martin. *Power, Law, and the End of Privateering*. Basingstoke, U.K.: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014. 254pp. \$95

Jan Martin Lemnitzer has made a very important contribution to international history in this study of the 1856 Declaration of Paris and its immediate aftermath. Having begun his research as a graduate student at the University of Heidelberg, Lemnitzer completed it as a PhD thesis in the Department of International History at the London School of Economics in 2010. With a highly structured approach and a persuasively presented argument, Lemnitzer has made excellent use of primary-source materials from Austria, Britain, France, Germany, and the United States. He has brought to light much new and detailed material, which he complements with broad-gauged and valuable insight.

Most importantly, Lemnitzer places his story in the context of the complex balance required to create and maintain international law in matters of warfare. On the one hand, this is a balance between law and power; on the other, between great powers and smaller states. Lemnitzer demonstrates that the 1856 Declaration of Paris was the event that clearly established the manner in which modern international law is created. Likening it to a global opinion poll among national governments, he shows how the congress of nations at Paris after the Crimean War

created instantaneous international law through what has since become common under the modern rubric of “multilateral law-making treaties.”

Historians are often puzzled about why the United States never signed the declaration, and they have asserted a variety of explanations. Through his careful research, Lemnitzer unveils the fascinating story of how Britain and the world’s leading powers focused the declaration’s ban on privateering directly on American policy. For most countries at that time, privateering was a largely forgotten weapon. But Britain and the United States had the largest merchant shipping fleets in the world, and there was a danger of war between the two. Since America had a small and weak navy, its merchant ships, which could easily be converted to privateers, were collectively its main strategic weapon. Since they could effectively attack Britain’s network of global trade, statesmen in London had a major strategic interest in eliminating that threat, which could crush British control over global trade.

Lemnitzer follows the development from the experience of the Crimean War and shows how that first major conflict involving steam-powered warships raised a range of questions about the future course of warfare at sea. The idea that privateering should be banned first arose in 1853. While for some it was an advance, the banning by the civilized world of an ancient barbaric practice, for others it was a clear-eyed way to prevent smaller nations from causing major damage. Lemnitzer shows that the declaration was a deliberate attempt to isolate the United States diplomatically and force it to accept the abolition of privateering to suit British strategic ends.

America actively attempted to thwart these developments, creating a major diplomatic campaign for the permanent establishment of neutral trading rights in wartime without restriction on privateering. Secretary of State William Marcy proposed, in what was soon dubbed the “Marcy amendment,” that the United States would accept the abolition of privateering only if it was linked to the complete immunity of merchant shipping in wartime, regardless of flag. Through the initiative of the business community in the city-state of Bremen, this diplomatic initiative nearly isolated Britain. During the American Civil War, as the Confederacy issued letters of marque, the United States offered to join the declaration, only to withdraw its offer when it became apparent that France and Britain would not attack Southern privateers.

The participants in the Austro-Prussian War of 1866 nearly created a precedent in practice for Marcy’s suggestion. The subsequent Franco-Prussian War in 1870–71 involved a global French war on German trade that even led French warships into American waters in search of their prey. Germans saw the French blockade as illegal in terms of the declaration. At first Prussia invoked Marcy’s principle, but when Otto von Bismarck saw what he termed French violations of the declaration he responded in a way based on his belief that the violation of international law justified unrestricted attacks on French trade. Convinced that when a neutral state is wronged it has the unqualified right of reprisal, Bismarck established a singular interpretation of international law, which it would use again in its policy of unrestricted submarine warfare of the First World War.

In conclusion, Lemnitzer comments ruefully that “it is the enforcement dilemma that constantly reminds us that for all our progress, our present international community centered on the [United Nations] is a thin veneer, masking the fact that the basic fabric that holds our rapidly globalizing world together is a cloth made in the late nineteenth century.”

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Rickards, James. *The Death of Money: The Coming Collapse of the International Monetary System*. New York: Penguin, 2014. 356pp. \$28.95

Admiral Michael Mullen, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, stated in a 21 January 2014 speech that the national debt is the biggest threat to national security. James Rickards underscores that view in this sequel to his earlier *Currency Wars: The Making of the Next Global Crisis* (reprinted 2012). Rickards, a consultant to both the Defense Department and the Central Intelligence Agency, addresses a range of other national-security issues in the financial realm. Among them are currency inflation and deflation, cyber attacks, and financial manipulations by terrorist groups and other adversaries.

Terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda and Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL; also called ISIS) have become adept at “insider” trading and other schemes to enrich themselves at the expense of Western nations. As the author notes, such activity was present well before 9/11, but lacking expertise in financial operations, the CIA failed to spot it as an indication of a

possible attack. Fortunately, the author argues, this deficiency has been partly corrected with the acquisition of expertise in “market intelligence,” the ability to analyze “big data” in stock exchange trading for unusual activity.

The author discusses at length Chinese financial and cyber capabilities and vulnerabilities. Cyber attack and financial/currency manipulation have become Chinese specialties, as manifested in recent attacks on the U.S. Postal Service. At the same time, the Chinese economy has become shaky as a result of poor investments, exemplified by the construction of numerous huge buildings with no prospect of occupation and by capital flight. The latter results from the placement by financial elite of their capital gains in safe havens, mainly the United States.

On the other side of the world, Germany, under the leadership of Angela Merkel, has become the dominant player in the European Union, through its powerful position in the EU central bank. According to the author, however, the strengthened euro is threatened by the weakened U.S. dollar, through the export of inflation. Rickards discusses how the U.S. Federal Reserve’s “printing” of money to support the national deficit has led to such export and the dangers it poses for the world economy. The weakening of the dollar, until now the world’s “reserve currency,” has led to demands that it be replaced by “special drawing rights” (SDRs) on the International Monetary Fund (IMF), a creation of the post-World War II Bretton Woods agreements.

Rickards discusses how uncertainties inherent in fiat currencies (the U.S. dollar, the Chinese yuan, the EU euro,

IMF SDRs, etc.) have led to proposals for return to the pre-1914 gold standard. The possibility, even likelihood, of the adoption of that currency standard has resulted in buildups of national gold reserves, especially by the Chinese. Rickards closes with an analysis of a maelstrom that may very well result if the present currency and financial threats are not resolved.

Like its predecessor, this work will be of interest to military officers because of its analyses and predictions of economic stress and the associated effects on national defense.

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Krepinevich, Andrew, and Barry Watts. *The Last Warrior: Andrew Marshall and the Shaping of Modern American Defense Strategy*. New York: Basic Books, 2014. 336pp. \$29.99

I remember the first time that I heard the name of Andrew Marshall. Here was a man, I was told, who in his early nineties, a man of the “greatest generation,” was still working away in a small office in the Pentagon. He had worked for every president since Richard Nixon and every Secretary of Defense since James Schlesinger. I was both curious and awed. Who has the grit to last so long in our bureaucracy? I could only imagine the level of intellectual power it would take to remain trusted and valued not only for a few years but *decades*. With Marshall’s upcoming retirement in early 2015, it is only fitting that someone write a biography of this great civil servant, an assessment of his forty-plus years of public service and of the impact of his

office—the Office of Net Assessment—on senior government decision makers. Enter Andrew Krepinevich and Barry Watts’s excellent biography.

Krepinevich and Watts are no strangers to Marshall. They were a part of what is fondly called “St. Andrew’s Prep,” the some ninety or so people who over the years have worked for Marshall. Many of them have gone on to have impacts elsewhere in government or in the private sector, identifying and discussing national-security issues with the same rigor and intellectual chops that their boss in the Office of Net Assessment brought to the job.

Krepinevich and Watts handle his story with objectivity, aiming to show his “intellectual contributions to US defense strategy.” Thus the story begins with a young Andrew Marshall, an autodidact, reading widely and voraciously in Detroit. He goes on to the University of Chicago, earning a master’s in economics. He then considers earning a PhD in statistics but instead decides, in the 1950s, to work for the then-fledgling RAND Corporation. Marshall there meets some influential people who would change his life and would help propel him into the perch he has held from 1973 to today.

It is a credit to the authors that they can craft a thorough biography about a man whose work is largely classified. In fact, only one of his assessments has ever been written at the unclassified level. But his intellectual fingerprint has been so prevalent that there is plenty to discuss. The authors go into great detail about how Marshall developed the idea of net assessment, arguing that he looked further out than others, identifying issues that might challenge American

decision makers in the future. He was so prescient that the discussions many of us are having today about China’s rise were presaged by what Marshall and his office were thinking about as early as the late 1980s and into the 1990s.

Marshall left it to his subordinates to best figure out for themselves what net assessments were; he balanced intellectual guidance with demanding thoroughness. In a building where egos loom large and people posture for influence, Marshall remained out of the limelight, quietly but diligently working to identify the right questions, the ones that needed to be explored.

Marshall’s exit will leave a hole. But this excellent biography and the men and women he mentored are testaments to his impact and a reminder that we have much to do to remain competitive in the future.

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Linn, Brian McAllister. *The U.S. Army and Counterinsurgency in the Philippine War, 1899–1902*. Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina Press, 2000. 258pp. \$36.97 (paperback)

Brian McAllister Linn, professor of history and liberal arts at Texas A&M University, addresses here the war between the United States and the fledgling Philippine Republic, detailing the prolonged guerrilla struggle that followed. First published in 1989 and reprinted in 2000, Linn’s book presents the struggle between the U.S. Army and guerrillas on the island of Luzon as a series of regionalized conflicts. Eschewing a conventional campaign history,

the author argues that circumstances of culture, ethnicity, religion, and terrain made the challenges in each region unique. The book demonstrates that the Army defeated the insurgency because commanders focused their efforts on the idiosyncrasies of each district, rather than following a campaign plan handed down from headquarters in Manila. While this flexible and decentralized approach may not have been intentional, Linn argues that it succeeded because it allowed commanders the latitude to implement measures responsive to each local situation. This regionalized view demonstrates the value of what modern practitioners refer to as “mission command,” and that is what makes this work relevant for readers today.

The book is organized into six chapters—an introduction, four regional case studies, and a short conclusion. The first chapter is a sweeping synopsis of the conventional war in the Philippines and a brief but excellent introduction to the geography of the islands, the Spanish colonization of Luzon, and the nascent Filipino reformist and nationalist movements that led to open revolt against Spain in 1896.

In the following chapters Linn describes counterinsurgency operations in four numbered districts. Using several examples in each of the districts, he skillfully supports his claim that the insurgency varied widely from one area to the next. For instance, in the Fourth District, the Department of Northern Luzon, the Army exploited cultural rifts in the provinces by playing antirevolutionary elements of the population against the guerrillas, who themselves eroded what local support they enjoyed by heavy-handed terrorism

against the populace. In contrast to guerrilla campaigns in the other districts, the insurgents in the Fourth District suffered from poor leadership and slipshod organization. The Army rapidly gained the support of the local elite, and pacification soon followed.

Linn describes the counterinsurgency in the remaining districts. Wildly different circumstances prevailed in each. In his description of the Army’s responses Linn supports the validity of his claim that the U.S. Army eventually pacified the archipelago by making campaign decisions at the right level and on the basis of local circumstances, rather than by forcing a centralized, top-down approach.

Linn makes a well-organized argument in support of his regionalized thesis, but his effort is not without some shortcomings. First, his case studies apply only to the island of Luzon. Details of American efforts elsewhere in the archipelago would have broadened understanding of the war. Second, Linn only makes cursory mention of the logistical challenges presented by the terrain and the disjointedness of the theaters of operation. A brief but comprehensive look at the logistics in each of the case studies would have been appropriate, especially a discussion of how logistical problems affected areas differently. Finally, the text includes several photographs, but the six maps are lacking in topographic detail that would have visually reinforced the remoteness and disparate nature of the four districts.

In each district, the Army prevailed because commanders implemented plans that suited the unique circumstances of the insurgency in their respective districts or provinces. This decentralized approach avoided strict adherence

to doctrine that did not suit situations on the ground and saw the employment of effective, sophisticated, counterinsurgency measures that reflected the local state of affairs. Although not achieved without controversy, the victory in the Philippines represents the most successful counterinsurgency campaign in U.S. military history. Though it details a war fought over a century ago, the book holds valuable lessons for today. It provides not only a historical framework for understanding counterinsurgency but also a glimpse into the complexities

that have confronted the U.S. military over the last thirteen years and points to the wisdom of a decentralized command structure for such cases. Linn leaves the reader with a reminder that even when the strategic objective is President William McKinley's "benevolent assimilation," or the winning of George Orwell's "hearts and minds," nonmilitary efforts toward achieving it will not work without victory over the insurgents responsible for the instability.

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