

## BOOK REVIEWS

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### THE ARABS AND MILITARY EFFECTIVENESS

Pollack, Kenneth M. *The Threatening Storm: The United States and Iraq—The Crisis, the Strategy, and the Prospects after Saddam*. New York: Random House, 2002. 528pp. \$25.95

Pollack, Kenneth M. *Arabs at War: Military Effectiveness, 1948–1991*. Lincoln: Univ. of Nebraska Press, 2002. 698pp. \$49.95

The U.S. engagement in the Middle East has dramatically escalated due to the recent war in Iraq. These two books provide valuable historical background as well as cogent national security policy analysis that commands attention from military and other national security leaders.

Kenneth Pollack, a highly regarded Middle East analyst, is a senior fellow for Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution and director of research for the institution's Saban Center for Middle East Policy. Pollack is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations (sponsor of both books), a former CIA analyst, and a former National Security Council staff member. He has been a frequent commentator on the television news and a regular contributor to newspaper op-ed pages, and he has been published in such prominent journals as *Foreign Affairs* and *International Security*. Pollack has considerable expertise in Middle Eastern affairs and skillfully brings it to bear. Both books are well written

and easily accessible to a general audience, and they provide strong analysis. *The Threatening Storm* also contains several soundly supported policy recommendations.

The books came out in autumn 2002, contributing constructively to the debate leading up to the recent war with Iraq. Superficially, it might appear that *The Threatening Storm* is outdated, given the fulfillment of Pollack's recommendation for war. Similarly, the immediate operational value of *Arabs at War* may also seem overtaken by events. However, even though their value was greater prior to the war, discounting their continuing value would be a mistake.

*The Threatening Storm* is an important policy examination that also incorporates a good, concise overview of Iraq and its earlier relationship with the United States. The book's centerpiece is Pollack's comprehensive and compelling case for war against Saddam-led Iraq as the best of available policy alternatives. However, he provides more than just an argument for war.

Confident the United States would quickly win a war with Iraq at an acceptable cost, Pollack emphasizes that winning the war would not be enough and therefore provides an outline for American diplomatic, economic, informational, and military efforts to support successful postconflict reconstruction. The war has been won with fewer forces than Pollack and many others would have preferred, but the number of forces sufficient to win the war might not be enough to secure the peace. Hence, Pollack's postconflict analysis found in chapter 12 ("Rebuilding Iraq") remains useful. Additionally, in chapter 10 Pollack provides an interesting look into American military operations, particularly regarding airpower in the first Gulf War, Kosovo, and Afghanistan.

*Arabs at War* is an excellent work of military history. Pollack discusses the military performance of six Arab countries—Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Libya, Saudi Arabia, and Syria—from 1948 to 1991. Although the record is heavily weighted with episodes from the Arab-Israeli wars, there are numerous other conflicts that support the analysis of Arab military effectiveness.

Pollack's definition of military effectiveness "refers to the ability of soldiers and officers to perform on the battlefield, to accomplish military missions, and to execute the strategies devised by their political-military leaders. If strategy is the military means by which political ends are pursued, military effectiveness refers to the skills that are employed." Pollack explores nine possible explanations for a remarkable record of Arab military *ineffectiveness* since World War II: cowardice, lack of morale, training, unit cohesion,

generalship, tactical leadership, information management, technical skills and weapons handling, and logistics and maintenance. He concludes that "four areas of military effectiveness stand out as consistent and crippling problems for Arab forces: poor tactical leadership, poor information management, poor weapons handling, and poor maintenance." Secondary problems such as poor generalship, training, and morale were recurring but not constant. Even when Arabs did well in these secondary areas, there was little increased effectiveness. Pollack observes that cowardice, weak unit cohesion, and bad logistics have not been significant problems for Arab militaries—Arab units and individual soldiers generally have fought hard, but not well.

The book concentrates primarily on Arab armies in conventional war, particularly ground warfare. Although use of air forces is addressed in many of the conflicts, their limited role and their frequent early failure and exit leave little to discuss. Pollack's assessment of Arab air force performance largely reinforces his general point about the limitations of Arab personnel in handling modern weaponry. Use of naval forces (limited when they exist at all) is inconsequential for the conflict chosen. With the exception of a brief treatment of Libyan-U.S. skirmishes from 1981 to 1989, naval operations play no significant role in Pollack's analysis.

*Arabs at War* more accurately could be titled "Six Arab States at Conventional War." Although Pollack is on solid ground asserting that these six states comprise the lion's share of conventional Arab military experience since World War II, there is little about Arab military effectiveness in unconventional

war, which places an important limit on the current value of Pollack's analysis. What it leaves out is the numerous irregular forces of the Arab world, who have proven troublesome to foes and who are often more effective in achieving political aims. However, a hint of such analysis shows itself in Pollack's description of Arab conventional military forces as they faced unconventional foes—such as Jordan against the PLO during the “Black September” fighting; Syria against the PLO and Lebanese guerillas; Iraq in numerous clashes with Kurds; and Libya against various forces in Chad. Additional examples of unconventional Arab military actions in Algeria, Afghanistan, Morocco, Lebanon, and Palestine-Israel might profitably be considered to form a more comprehensive view of Arab military effectiveness.

This work has a *Rashomon*-like feel that results from reading about military actions one state at a time, even though several belligerents participated in the same wars, sometimes even fighting each other. Pollack's approach maintains a discrete analysis of national military efforts but creates a disjointed presentation of some events. Readers who are familiar with these conflicts from other sources will have an easier time keeping events in context. The book's focus is on the effective use of instruments of war, particularly ground forces, and provides readers with little about the interplay of policy and strategy. Coalition dynamics also do not figure prominently in Pollack's discussion, although there are hints that in Arab military collaboration the coalition whole was often worth less than the sum of the parts.

*Arabs at War* and *The Threatening Storm* are excellent works of history and analysis. *Arabs at War* is a valuable work of military history for military professionals and historians. *The Threatening Storm*, its main argument now dated, still serves as a useful history of U.S.-Iraq relations leading up to the war and remains a valuable guide to the challenges of postwar reconstruction.

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Chasdi, Richard J. *Tapestry of Terror: A Portrait of Middle East Terrorism, 1994–1999*. Lanham, Md.: Lexington, 2002. 507pp. \$80

This is a book only a statistician could love. This reviewer is not a statistician. Chasdi, a visiting assistant professor of international relations at the College of Wooster, presents a quantitative analysis of the terrorist phenomena in four regions of the Middle East: Algeria, Egypt, Turkey, and Palestine and Israel. Purportedly Chasdi attempts to examine the antecedent events and conditions in the four subject nation-states with an eye toward understanding why terrorism occurs at the systems or operational level as well as at the state and subnational-actor levels. He hopes that in doing so he will give counterterrorism planners and policy makers data to help them better craft counterterrorism policy in the future. If this sounds complex, it is. Chasdi's complicated quantitative analysis coupled with his turgid and at times unfathomable prose makes the effort even more difficult.

*Tapestry of Terror* is the second of a projected trilogy studying the root causes of

Middle Eastern terrorism. In his first volume, *Serenade of Suffering*, Chasdi examines terrorism in the context of the contemporary Israeli-Palestinian-Arab conflict. He throws a wider net in his second work by examining conditions in countries as diverse as Turkey and Algeria, as well as the more widely studied Israeli, Palestinian, and Egyptian varieties of terrorism. Because comparatively less has been written about terrorism in Algeria and Turkey, these two sections are uniquely interesting. In the section relating to Algeria, Chasdi devotes considerable time to the Islamic Salvation Front, the Armed Islamic Group (GIA), and some relatively obscure splinter groups of the GIA. Unfortunately, Chasdi's examination of them falls short. Much of his analysis does not really address the basic questions of who these groups are or what constitutes their ideologies, their political, social, and religious goals, and how they differ from each other. Rather, Chasdi devotes most of his effort to studying the current state of the scholarship on different Algerian terrorist movements. This approach, historiographical in practice, is unhelpful, because it presumes that the reader is familiar with the differing views of the various scholars he is discussing. Last time I looked, not too many policy makers were steeped in the nuance of Algerian terrorist historiography.

The section devoted to the study of Turkish terror covers such well known groups as the Kurdistan Worker's Party and some not so familiar organizations, like the Greater Eastern Islamic Raiders

and the Anatolian Federal Islamic State. While the information presented on these obscure organizations is interesting and frankly better presented than in the Algerian case, Chasdi once again falls victim to his fascination with the internecine disputes and discussions among scholars. Many times the more immediate questions of who and what these organizations represent are simply not presented in sufficient detail.

Another problem plaguing this book is Chasdi's basic quantitative approach to the issue of identifying the root causes of terrorism and then using data to predict terrorist incidents. While using quantitative methods to study terrorism has been vetted and is useful in certain instances, Chasdi's devotion to the methodology almost approaches the religious. With the text littered with such terms as "Pearson chi square values" and "Yates continuity corrections," Chasdi is for not the casual reader but one who is well versed in statistical research analysis methods. This, of course, harkens back to the original purpose of the book, to assist policy makers in understanding the causality behind Middle Eastern terrorism. Unfortunately, Chasdi has crafted a work so complex and arcane that one must question the real utility of his work to those who shape policy. While the efforts of his scholarship are impressive, one cannot help wondering if the only real audience for Chasdi's *Tapestry of Terror* is Chasdi himself.

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Lennon, Alexander T. J., ed. *What Does the World Want from America?: International Perspectives on U.S. Foreign Policy*. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2002. 209pp. \$22.95

This volume is a collection of sixteen articles originally published in the *Washington Quarterly* in 2001 and 2002. It is part of the *Washington Quarterly* reader series, in which domestic and international perspectives are applied to a topic. Twelve of the articles were solicited from academics around the world. The editor of this book, Alexander T. J. Lennon, is the editor in chief of the *Washington Quarterly*. He offers no explanation of how the twelve were chosen, other than to say that each author is “preeminent” and has spent some time in the United States. The authors were asked to describe their idealized vision of U.S. foreign and national security policy in the future, emphasizing the role they would like the United States to play in their particular regions. The remaining four articles are the reactions of American scholars to those collective visions.

The *Washington Quarterly* typically runs accessible, jargon-free, mainstream articles, and those in this collection are no exception. They are well written and get to the point quickly.

It is a useful exercise for Americans to learn the views of non-American experts on foreign policy. Predictably, many of these academics from other countries emphasize that the United States could do more to understand (and sympathize with) the perspectives and cultures of other countries. Otherwise, the foreign authors tend toward a sanguine view of America as the world’s only true superpower. This could reflect

the timing of the articles and their geographic locations.

It is important to note that all twelve articles were published before “9/11” and the war on terrorism. If writing today, perhaps their opinions would be different.

The four articles by American scholars were written after “9/11” and when the war with Iraq was inevitable. Their analyses are both more current and out of alignment with the others. For understandable reasons, they reach beyond the range of their colleagues by paying considerable attention to post-11 September priorities and the fears that accompany them. Having said this, however, they do agree that the United States should be alert to the potential downside of power and compensate by being more politically and culturally sensitive. The Americans also advocate a balance between multilateralism and unilateralism, conceding that drawing this balance is more of an art than a science. Their articles imply that on this point the Americans arrived at their conclusion independently of the views of their foreign counterparts. They appear to be swayed more by the practical aspects of the war on terror and the risk of imperial overreach than by the opening twelve articles.

Christopher Layne suggests that the United States avoid overreaching by “shifting” the burden of maintaining stability to others on the assumption that in some regions U.S. interests are less intense than those of other major powers. He argues, for example, that Japan, China, and India have greater interests in Persian Gulf oil than does the United States and should therefore be responsible for stability in the region. The other American authors, however,

tend more toward sharing the burden with international organizations and other countries rather than totally relinquishing responsibility.

One theme addressed by the Americans is anti-Americanism in the Arab world, the cultural divide between the Arabs and the West. Unfortunately, none of the authors who wrote on the Middle East is an Arab. One is an Iranian, who observes that today the average Iranian has (or perhaps did in the summer of 2001) a “far more positive” view of the United States than the average Arab, and the other is an Israeli. They appear to be unusual choices to represent the region at this juncture in time.

Readers who hoped to learn more about Arab views of American foreign policy should look elsewhere.

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Lindberg, Michael, and Daniel Todd. *Brown-, Green- and Blue-Water Fleets: The Influence of Geography on Naval Warfare, 1861 to the Present*. Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2001. 242pp. \$64.95

Given the subject, this book appropriately covers a lot of territory. It is more than a treatise on geography; Lindberg and Todd have managed to incorporate fairly substantial discussions on naval strategy, tactics, history, force structure, and ship construction. The central theme is that historical concepts of “distance” remain central to modern naval operations, leading to the hypothesis that “the navies with the longest reach—those with the greatest geographical power-projection capability—are in possession of not just the most

sophisticated fleets but the most elaborate infrastructures to boot.” In developing that idea, the authors provide a useful compendium of intellectual rigor to support the strategic prescriptions not only of the U.S. Navy’s *Forward . . . from the Sea* but also of navies of all sizes, worldwide.

The authors progress from an introduction to the concept of time-distance as related to the maritime environment, comparing land versus sea warfare, to exploring historical case studies of naval warfare on the high seas, the littorals, and riverine warfare, before concluding with some thoughts on the influence of geography on navies. The theoretical background chapter is a generally solid overview of the works of Alfred Thayer Mahan and Julian Corbett, but it also discusses the often-overlooked Sir Halford Mackinder. The historical examples comprise several such obvious scenarios as Gallipoli and Okinawa, as well as many lesser-known ones—for example, the Russo-Japanese War and the Falklands campaign. Riverine warfare was especially interesting, with the arrival of the review copy in time to read the section on the Mesopotamia campaign of the First World War just in advance of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. Although necessarily slight, these case studies are far from shallow, drawing out the larger themes in often-novel ways.

In and of themselves, with a few exceptions, the authors’ observations and discussions are hardly profound. However, the judicious combination and interplay of geography, history, and strategy lead to many quite compelling derivations. Prospective readers be warned, however: This is a dense book with tightly spaced pages and is definitely not for the novice. There is a

presumed familiarity with much of the subject matter that makes this work a more appropriate developmental read for the interested professional—for whom it is a must.

If there is a weakness to the book, it is that the terms “brown-,” “green-,” and “blue-water” are not properly associated with their respective naval equivalents of “inland waterways,” “coastal defense,” and “power-projection” fleets until the last quarter of the book, and even then the distinguishing features are not defined but implied. To complicate matters, there is the earlier fleeting introduction of an additional “marginal seas” naval warfare environment that is never again mentioned. The distinctions are important, especially when the authors conclude that the physical configuration of these various environments—their geography—will continue to present challenges to navies and naval operations. Optimistically, they also conclude that far from rendering navies obsolete in the modern battle space, technological improvements and force structure developments derived from a sound understanding of geographical considerations will ensure their continued relevance.

A greater disappointment for a book on geography is the selection of maps. They are barely adequate even for the basic overview they are intended to provide—a number of important place names mentioned cannot be found. More to the point, especially considering the key factor of “distance,” the choice of the common Mercator projection, with all its inherent north-south distortions, is unfortunate. In many cases the scale is not given, and in the littorals the bottom depth contours are

not identified. Conic projections could have illustrated many points far more effectively.

That said, this book deserves to be read by naval professionals. Its conclusion that geography will continue to have much the same influence it always has had on navies would be startling only if it were otherwise. However, in arriving at that conclusion, Lindberg and Todd provide many useful reminders that navies do not exist just to impact one another but are part of a larger spatial context of global dimensions.

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Karatnycky, Adrian, A. Motyl, and A. Schnetzer, eds. *Nations in Transit 2001–2002: Civil Society, Democracy and Markets in East Central Europe and the Newly Independent States*. Somerset, N.J.: Transaction, 2002. 445pp. \$39.95

*Nations in Transit 2001–2002* is a comprehensive fact book that examines the trends of liberalization in East Central Europe and the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union. The editors claim the book is unique, as the “only . . . comparative study of post-Communist political and economic transition in Central and Eastern Europe and Eurasia.” This sixth edition covers the period from November 2000 through December 2001; however, the reader will frequently find information from the 1990s.

The book covers twenty-seven nations, attempting to assess each by its level of democratization, rule of law, and economic liberalization. Each of these broad categories contains elements that

provide a structure for the analysis of each nation; this analysis is conducted by one principal author, who in many cases is a native of the country in question.

The political process element in the democratization category has an explanation of the major political parties, their leadership, political agendas, and majorities in the government. Democratization also discusses civil society, focusing primarily on the functioning of nongovernmental organizations. Independent media are also covered, containing information on names, affiliation, content, and audience. This element also includes data on Internet accessibility. The final elements in the democratization category are governance and public administration. These cover the executive-branch workings of the nation, including information on political parties, national and sub-national governments, and elections.

The rule-of-law category has two elements. The first is a constitutional, legislative, and judicial framework that details constitutional and judicial issues, to include the court system and human rights. The second is corruption, addressing both the amount of corruption and initiatives to correct this problem. Economic liberalization and social indicators are the last category, which includes economic issues, both domestic and international, tax reform, and employment issues.

The book does have one potential flaw. The authors and editors have included a rating system grading each element on a scale of one to seven, with one being the maximum score. The grades of each

element are averaged and recorded to two decimal places to obtain a rating for the category. The movement of each nation along the scales is then tracked, and nations are compared with one another. In the description of this rating methodology, the reader may believe that there is a scientific basis for this scheme. In carefully reading the text, however, one finds that this basis is not fully explained. In fact, lacking any specific information, the conclusion one reaches is that this scale is subjective in nature, which detracts from the editors' claim of a comparative assessment of these nations. If there is no true objective measure, providing an example of a nation that rates a one in a particular element might mean more. That way, the reader has some basis to understand more clearly what a rating of 4.25 in, for example, independent media means.

Overall, this single weakness does not diminish the worth of *Nations in Transit 2001–2002*. The great value of this book is that it provides extensive knowledge and current, as well as historical, data on a variety of political, social, and economic issues in East Central Europe and the former Soviet Union. Even with all this data, the text is easy to read. This is accomplished with the incorporation of information from the 1990s, which provides a critical strength of this work; the reader need not be an expert on East Central Europe or the newly independent states to use it.

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Grimsley, Mark, and Clifford J. Rogers, eds. *Civilians in the Path of War*. Lincoln: Univ. of Nebraska Press, 2002. 280pp. \$50

This edited volume of essays provides an important set of historical case studies about noncombatant victims of war. From ancient Greece to the French Revolution, to strategic bombings of urban centers in World War II and the Gulf War, these articles address not the ethical or moral dimensions of war but rather the military calculus in planning violence against enemies that could also endanger or kill civilians. This collection gives historical perspective to the concept of collateral damage.

In their introduction the editors state, “This book is about occasions in which soldiers and governments have deliberately attacked the helpless.” The authors provide specific, highly detailed examples, removed from the lens of morality and judgement, of the “whys” of strategic interventions. It is difficult, however, not to document the uncertainty that accompanies military decision making, as author Conrad Crane describes in his article, “Contrary to Our National Ideals.” In spite of the important strategic use of American airpower to exact a toll on cities during World War II, he explains how American public opinion shifted against such ruthless bombings. The concept of “surgical strikes” by airpower was a concept conceived in part to assuage public opinion that rejected the indiscriminate use of force to destroy noncombatants.

Nine essays, originally commissioned as part of a 1993 conference on military history, reveal a central ambivalence by the authors about the impact of

military imposed violence on civilians. These historical cases try to balance what generals depict as a military necessity for bombings or invasions against the realities of on-the-ground conditions, which reveal large numbers of civilians getting in harm’s way. What is frequently developed in the name of military necessity is often immoral in practice. Certainly, this is the conclusion of Holger Herwig in his “The Immorality of Expediency,” which takes on German military planning and the exclusion of civilians from such discussions on the eve of World War I. Williamson Murray’s “Not Enough Collateral Damage: Moral Ambiguities in the Gulf War,” extols the use of American airpower to seek “surgical strikes” to minimize the loss of life on the ground but also points out that such an approach does not always produce decisive military victory. He recalls that even in Vietnam, with General Curtis LeMay’s “bomb them back into the Stone Age” approach, such bombing did not persuade the North Vietnamese not to pursue their military course.

While all the essays provide a strong historical overview of how noncombatants have fared in the course of warfare, it is difficult to understand how such a published volume could omit important lessons from the post–Cold War, given the gap of nine years between the commissioning of papers and publications. There is no essay about the genocide in Rwanda, where research shows that a military force positioned in early April 1994 could have averted tremendous loss of life. Moreover, in such intrastate conflicts as Chechnya, where the Russian military has turned on not only rebel guerilla groups but also the civilian population, the nature of these

new wars has also changed the rules about who is a combatant. Even more recent is the case of Kosovo, where Serbian military commanders deliberately targeted civilians as a means of staving off NATO air strikes. It has been precisely the importance of noncombatants as victims in the post-Cold War era that has been the central feature of internal conflicts and has distinguished these recent intrastate wars. Yet no essay in this volume brings the historical cases up to the present.

This anthology is useful for historians looking backward for examples or precedents. However, the book will not work for everyday classroom teaching without supplementation, because the case studies omit some of the more current examples, as mentioned above. Finally, the editors should have added a final essay about the Geneva Conventions and other public humanitarian law. The rules of modern warfare and the centrality of protecting civilians cannot be divorced from the planning of any intervention. As the United States enters a new era of strategic doctrine and preemption, it is especially important that writing about war include not only the details of decision making but also the implications that such acts have on civilians who might be caught in the middle.

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Friedman, Norman. *The Fifty Year War: Conflict and Strategy in the Cold War*. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2000. 597pp. \$39.95

Winkler, David F. *Cold War at Sea: High-Seas Confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union*. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2000. 263pp. \$45

Although the Cold War ended more than a decade ago, its impact continues to haunt the international community to this day. These two excellent works from the Naval Institute Press will greatly enhance our understanding of this uncertain period.

Norman Friedman's *Fifty Year War* is a broad look at the conflict between East and West. Friedman contends that the Cold War actually began in Spain in 1937, "when Stalin tried to hijack the ongoing civil war." This divide between the Soviet Union and the West would not come to an end until 1991. Friedman poses several questions: "Should or did the West understand events in the Soviet Union? Did the West in fact defeat the Soviet Union, or did the Soviet Union defeat itself? Was the Cold War, then, about communism versus capitalism or was it about old-fashioned Russian imperialism, cloaked in a largely irrelevant ideology?"

Friedman contends that the Cold War was in fact a "real war" fought in slow motion. It was also a war lost by the Soviet Union for sociopolitical, economic, and ideological reasons. In the end, Friedman sees Mikhail Gorbachev as responsible for its collapse, because he "never understood that his state was built on terror, not on any kind of popular support."

While making these arguments, Friedman also includes some very scary Cold War near misses, including a 1960 mistake by the new U.S. radar at Thule that interpreted the moon as a Soviet missile attack. Also intriguing is

Friedman's critical analysis of President John Kennedy's Cold War leadership.

With *The Fifty Year War* Friedman presents a new, provocative survey of the Cold War from a joint force perspective while keeping both sides of the Iron Curtain in mind. He again demonstrates why he is considered a leading commentator on international security issues.

Unlike Friedman in his broad landscape of Cold War history, David Winkler paints a much smaller aspect of the Cold War canvas. This is a fine work that details the long road to mutual respect, safety, and communication on the high seas between the U.S. and Soviet navies.

Utilizing previously classified official documents, other archival material, and personal interviews with senior participants from both sides, Winkler traces the history of confrontations between U.S. and Soviet naval forces—confrontations that often proved fatal. Eventually, these Cold War incidents demanded a solution lest the next such occurrence escalate into outright war. The solution was found in 1972, in the historic pact, known as the Incidents at Sea Agreement (INCSEA).

INCSEA provided a direct navy-to-navy channel of communication that would help to limit and avoid future occurrences. How necessary was INCSEA? Winkler's first chapter, "Playing with the Bear," clearly reveals how "hot" the Cold War actually was, unbeknownst to many at the time. During the Truman and Eisenhower administrations alone, over one hundred Soviet and U.S. airmen were killed in air-to-air contacts.

Throughout 1971–72, studies and negotiations took place that led to the signing of the INCSEA agreement by then Secretary of the Navy John Warner and

Admiral Sergei Gorshkov of the Soviet navy. Winkler skillfully illustrates how the successful negotiations were rooted in mutual respect and professionalism. This mutual understanding and respect, along with the signing of INCSEA, would do much to end naval harassment between the Cold War superpowers.

As Winkler points out, INCSEA truly "is one of the positive legacies of the Cold War." One should note that although *Cold War at Sea* represents first-class scholarship, the Cold War specialist is more likely to enjoy it than the armchair sailor. Nevertheless, with its superb chronology of Cold War naval incidents and excellent notes, this work will make a welcome addition to any serious Cold War library.

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Vyborny, Lee, and Don Davis. *Dark Waters: An Insider's Account of the NR-1, the Cold War's Undercover Nuclear Sub*. New York: New American Library, 2003. 243pp. \$24.95

Although ultimately worthwhile and entertaining, *Dark Waters* suffers from the strange paradox of inadequately describing underwater events that ought to be gripping while simultaneously portraying mundane and ordinary events in a marvelously compelling manner. Lee Vyborny was a new-construction plank-owner and member of the first commissioning crew of the U.S. Navy's small nuclear-powered submarine *NR-1*. Don Davis has written or coauthored eleven books.

Overall, the book well rewards its readers, but unevenly. An example of its bumpiness comes early in the prologue

when the authors state that in World War II “about half the U.S. submarines and the men who served in them were lost,” which, of course, is untrue. Although fifty-two U.S. submarines and over 3,500 of their heroic crewmembers were lost, this number represents a fifth (not half) of the submarines the United States sent to sea during that war.

Further problems arise when the book briefly describes the path that took Vyborny from being an ordinary high school graduate to becoming a crewmember of *NR-1*—the Navy’s smallest and most mysterious nuclear-powered submarine. The authors certainly do not devote excessive space to this part of the tale, but their telling of Vyborny’s early story is just a bit too self-conscious and self-effacing, lacking the easy confidence and pride that characterizes much of the rest of the book. Another criticism arises from an early passage in which Vyborny relates a 1964 deployment he made as a junior enlisted sailor on the nuclear-powered submarine *USS Sargo* to the Sea of Japan. Intended, one presumes, to rival the swashbuckling tales told in Sontag and Drew’s *Blind Man’s Bluff*, the story of the grounding, jam-dive casualty, and operational exploits of the *USS Sargo* simply are not conveyed in a manner compelling or even believable to those with their own submarine experience. One reads them wondering if they are true. For instance, the authors state that *Sargo* passed ten feet directly underneath a newly launched Echo II Soviet submarine to “determine if she was powered by standard diesel engines, or a nuclear reactor.” It is curious to think the U.S. Navy would use this method to ascertain the mode of propulsion of a

ship class that had already been in service for at least two years.

But these criticisms pale in comparison to Vyborny’s success in relating how he and eleven other immensely dedicated men who made up the first *NR-1* crew worked in the physically demanding environment of the Electric Boat shipyard to oversee the construction of the small submarine. This is the section in which the book truly shines, as readers get a rare firsthand glimpse of how a crew, believing with justified conviction that they are elite, come together to become shipmates and expert operators of a complex, expensive, amazing machine. Vyborny and Davis’s work is again excellent when it tells some of the Admiral Hyman Rickover anecdotes that Vyborny witnessed during Rickover’s reign over all the Navy’s nuclear-powered vessels. The authors balance perfectly Rickover’s bizarre idiosyncrasies against his awesome effectiveness and offset the fear he engendered against the respect he earned, neutralizing his routinely acidic abrasiveness with his child-like wonder at the sights of the deep visible from *NR-1*’s small windows. Also masterful is the authors’ depiction of the routine when operating *NR-1*, the sacrifices inherent in living for weeks in a small enclosed space, eating preprocessed food for days on end, standing miserable surface watches, and all the other mundane aspects of extended life underwater in close proximity to a nuclear reactor. These portions of the book are indeed well told and will resonate with those who have gone to sea.

As good as their depictions of the ordinary are, Vyborny and David convey the dangers of *NR-1*’s unusual and exceptional missions and experiences in a less forceful and riveting manner. Perhaps readers have become overexposed

to and jaded by these kinds of exploits, or perhaps *Dark Waters* pulled some of *NR-1*'s punches due to classification considerations. Regardless, the action sections, though worth reading, are not up to the high standards of the rest of the book. Still, Vyborny's insider account of how *NR-1*'s first crews built and operated their ship fully pays back the reader's investment. *Dark Waters* should be on every submariner's bookshelf, even if it tells its extraordinary tale a bit unevenly.

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Bateman, Robert L. *No Gun Ri: A Military History of the Korean War Incident*. Mechanicsburg, Penna.: Stackpole, 2002. 288pp. \$22.95

On 11 January 2001, Secretary of Defense William Cohen announced that in June 1950, U.S. soldiers "killed or injured an unconfirmed number of Korean refugees . . . in the vicinity of No Gun Ri." This announcement preceded the release of an investigation convened in response to an Associated Press article that documented the massacre of hundreds of Korean civilians by U.S. soldiers under orders. The article eventually earned a Pulitzer Prize for the Associated Press and thrust the story to front-page news.

For nearly fifty years, the No Gun Ri incident languished in the backwaters of military history. Despite understandable Korean interest, few American researchers delved into this difficult period until early 1999, when AP correspondents Charles Hanley and Martha Mendoza uncovered a "smoking gun," a confessed U.S. Army massacre

participant, and broke the story to a readership anxious to hear about U.S. wartime atrocities.

The truth is not so simple, however. According to Bateman, the AP was working with inconsistent or incorrect information and knew their version was questionable before the article was published. Concurrent with the Army's investigation into the incident, Bateman (an experienced infantry officer himself) examined what transpired at No Gun Ri and tried to resolve the discrepancies between what he knew of 7th Cavalry history, the soldiers who were there, and the details of the AP story. From his investigation and his subsequent writings, Bateman has captured important aspects of the military reality of that time, the frustrations associated with presenting unimpeachable history about a fifty-year-old event, and the dangers of a free press run amok.

Bateman's treatise is divided into two major sections: first, a soldier's review of the tactical situation at the end of July 1950 and the military record of the events at No Gun Ri; and second, a less relevant examination of the Associated Press's publication of the original story.

The military analysis is generally solid and clearly backed by an infantry soldier's appreciation for the life-and-death challenges that faced young men of the 7th Cavalry in the early days of the war. Bateman relies on U.S. primary sources, extensive interviews, and reconnaissance photographs to debunk many "facts" reported by the AP and a group of former Korean refugees who are now parties to a four-hundred-million-dollar lawsuit against the U.S. government. Unfortunately, Bateman also draws a number of conclusions

(e.g., that communist sympathizers fired at U.S. soldiers from inside a group of civilian refugees) that are supported only by circumstantial evidence. Interestingly, he chose not to refer to Korean primary sources, citing translation challenges and tainted testimony, and used only sources available on this side of the Pacific.

In the second half of the book, Bateman takes issue with the investigative work at the Associated Press and discusses at length his inability to convince the AP of the inconsistencies in its story. While interesting in a voyeuristic sort of way, Bateman's harsh spotlight on the AP does little to further explain what happened at No Gun Ri. Americans, unfortunately, have become inured to journalistic excesses and biased reporting. Not much is added to the story by belaboring the point. Also, Bateman's additional cursory discussions of the current sad state of military-media affairs are out of place in a work of serious military history.

Woven throughout both the AP story and Bateman's book is the strange case of Ed Daily—the “smoking gun.” Purportedly an Army officer who was present at No Gun Ri, Daily told his story to Handy and Mendoza and became an instant media sensation. After the story was published, Daily was interviewed by Tom Brokaw, made appearances at veterans' gatherings, and had his picture flashed around the world. He was a fraud. Daily had never been an Army officer. He made his living by fabricating an honorable military career. In February 2002, Daily was fined four

hundred thousand dollars by a federal court for fraudulent combat-related medical claims, and he admitted publicly for the first time that he had never been at No Gun Ri.

Ed Daily's deception and Bateman's conflicting evidence seriously undermine the credibility of the AP story but do not alter one fundamental fact—in the midst of a chaotic tactical withdrawal at the beginning of the Korean conflict, an unspecified number of civilians were fired upon and wounded or killed by U.S. soldiers near a railroad overpass at No Gun Ri. Any serious student of general military history, or Korean military history in particular, will not be surprised to learn that an incident like this occurred. The exact number of casualties is subject to debate but is likely far less than reported by the AP.

In the final analysis, there are four versions of the story: those of the Korean litigants, the Associated Press, the U.S. Army, and Bob Bateman. It is unlikely that we will ever know which of them is correct. Time, fog, fading memories, inadequate Army record keeping, and inflated egos have combined to make this event difficult to understand with confidence and clarity. Yet the event, however it occurred, reaffirms how challenging it is to lead troops in the field under fire, and it underscores the difficult task of combat identification during times of extraordinary stress.

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Mills, Randy K., and Roxanne Mills. *Unexpected Journey: A Marine Corps Reserve Company in the Korean War*. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2000. 271pp. \$32.95

For authors unschooled in Marine Corps history and newly self-taught in the history of the Korean War, Randy and Roxanne Mills do an acceptable job in following the Reserve Marines of Company C, 16th Infantry Battalion, to Korea and back, from 1950 to 1951. The strength of their homage to their neighbor-veterans of southwestern Indiana is their sympathetic, sensitive reconstruction of personal combat experiences in Korea and the general trauma of sudden wartime service. Its weakness is their handling of contextual and organizational issues. The authors sometimes seem as mystified as their veterans did when they went off to war in 1950.

When Company C formed in 1947, its officers and noncommissioned officers were World War II veterans without troops. They recruited obvious candidates such as Boy Scouts, high school athletes, younger brothers of Marines, and adventurous farm boys. The Millses capture the bucolic, Currier and Ives character of 1950 Indiana (I was there as a teenager visiting my grandparents); the recruits might well have been the Indiana volunteers of 1861. The authors do not press the point, but the reinstatement of the draft in 1948 proved a mighty weapon for recruiters—join the U.S. Marine Corps and escape the Army. It was an empty threat, however, although the recruits didn't know it; virtually no one was drafted into the shrinking Army between 1948 and 1950. It appears that the excitement of field training, company athletics, and a

little spending money sufficed as a lure, and the requirements were minimal: drill usually on Monday nights and two weeks annual training duty (“summer camp”). There was no initial active duty training requirement, no boot camp. Company C, not aggressively officered, coasted through its limited training from 1948 through 1950.

No doubt there was tension between regular Army and reservists at the troop level, as the Millses note, but the Marine Corps wanted fresh reservists with no prior experience for its twenty-one infantry battalions, nineteen other combat and combat support battalions, and a mix of independent companies. The 1950 drill-pay reservists numbered almost forty thousand units, a small percentage of the nearly 129,000 Marine reservists, but the best source of unbloodied infantry replacements for a short-handed active duty force. The authors are vague on mobilization demographics, providing a roster of eight officers and 202 enlisted men at the station of initial assignment, Camp Pendleton but no statistics on delays and physical disqualifications.

The Millses are unclear about how Company C fared in its readiness triage at Camp Pendleton as the company disintegrated in three days into a pool of replacements. Reservists and half the drill-pay reserves were judged combat ready by virtue of prior active duty (more than ninety days) or two years of Marine training that included at least one summer camp and no less than thirty-six drills (with two camps). Another 30 percent were judged combat ready after two to four weeks of intensive field training and weapons instruction. Twenty percent went to boot camp and became “real” Marines the

old-fashioned way. The problem with the deployable 65 percent was their rank (too much) and lack of thorough weapons training. Other problems were little more than irritations born by all Marines, which was interpreted as prejudice by the reservists.

After the readiness triage, the book becomes a mishmash of personal Korean War experiences—especially combat in the frozen crucible of the Chosin Reservoir campaign—and operational history. The authors recount the personal experiences well but bungle the general history in several details (none fatal)—for example, *Major* Courtney Whitney was not FECOM G-2.

Their Indiana Marines have tales to tell, but the stories will not move non-deployable readers. They are nevertheless the true ordeals of real people.

There is good coverage of the veterans of Company C that includes forty-three interviews, several with wives. However, apart from the interviews, the Millses use predictable secondary sources, sometimes without much real understanding. (This reviewer served twenty-seven years in the U.S. Marine Corps Reserve, nine as a commander and staff officer in two infantry battalions, commanding 3d Battalion, 25th Marines, from 1980 to 1981.)

On balance, *Unexpected Journey* gives the 1950 Marine Corps reserve mobilization a human face and an emotional dimension. As a tribute to Company C, this book succeeds and deserves inclusion in the personal literature on the Korean War.

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Beach, Edward L., Sr., with Edward L. Beach, Jr. *From Annapolis to Scapa Flow: The Autobiography of Edward L. Beach, Sr.* Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2003. 344pp. \$34.95

This charming and insightful memoir is among the most vivid and enjoyable portraits of the late nineteenth and early twentieth-century Navy ever written. Originally drafted in the 1930s following Captain Beach's retirement, it is the story of the fascinating career of an officer who began at sea by learning to handle sail as a midshipman in 1888 and ended by commanding a seventeen-thousand-ton steel battleship at Scapa Flow during the Great War. Full of equal parts delightful sea stories, harrowing maritime adventures, and thoughtful diplomatic insights, this is indeed a sailor's story. The volume was edited with loving care by the author's son, the late Captain Edward L. Beach, Jr., who was known for his famous work *Run Silent, Run Deep* (Naval Institute Press, Classics of Naval Literature series) and a dozen other histories and novels. Beach the younger inserts many wry and sometimes poignant asides that help to set in context his father's story.

And what a story! Beginning in the late 1880s, Beach senior served alongside Civil War veterans as he learned his trade in wooden sailing ships. He saw firsthand the naval renaissance of the late nineteenth century, powered by the intellectual energy of Alfred Thayer Mahan and Stephen B. Luce, and the political dynamics of Theodore Roosevelt. Beach began his commissioned service as an engineer and served as such until the merger of the engineering and line communities (amidst much

controversy) in 1897. He met and interacted with every significant naval figure of his time; among the most celebrated were a future commandant of the Marine Corps, John A. Lejeune, his Annapolis roommate, and a young assistant secretary of the Navy, Franklin Delano Roosevelt.

Beach's career included command of a repair ship, cruisers, and the battleship USS *New York*, which served as the flagship of the American Battle Squadron of the British Grand Fleet during World War I. Beach also commanded two major shore installations—the torpedo production facility at Newport, Rhode Island, and the Naval Shipyard at Mare Island, California. There are two episodes in his thirty-eight-year career that are particularly worth noting—the battle of Manila Bay, in which Beach served as engineer below decks in the cruiser USS *Baltimore*, and the destruction of the cruiser USS *Memphis* in the harbor of Santo Domingo in 1916 while under his command. (This story is brilliantly told in his son's gripping classic, *The Wreck of the Memphis*, in the Naval Institute Press, Classics of Naval Literature series.)

What is most striking about this superb memoir are the similarities to our own time. Even as the United States debates the transformation of its military today into an information-based force, the parallels are obvious in Beach's writing at the turn of the twentieth century: "The whole Navy of this period was enthusiastically interested in the fast-developing technology of warships and the sea. We developed smokeless powder from Russia, 'built up' guns from France and England, rapid fire and machine guns of our own invention, hardened armor plant, higher grade steel, the automobile torpedo, and the

submarine. There were many other inventions and developments of naval engines and weapons, all of which we worked on eagerly." Similarly, today, we are actively seeking to develop entirely new concepts of operating warships at sea, and many of the challenges are the same.

Likewise, the political tenor of Beach's time was similar to that which the United States faces today—a chaotic world with frequent requirements to apply naval power at the edges of the developed world. Beach was repeatedly thrust into diplomatic and military exchanges and, as many U.S. Navy captains do today, found himself developing U.S. policy at a great distance from Washington, D.C.

After retiring from the Navy in 1922, Captain Beach settled into an academic life, teaching history at Stanford University, entering complete retirement in the early 1940s. He described this in typical nautical terms, "And so I have finished my story. Lately, I have come under the domination of a most despotic admiral [his wife], who always makes me wear an overcoat when I go out for a walk, and even insists on my wearing a cap in the house, so I won't catch cold in my bald head. Our two sons are respectively in the Navy and Army, and so is our daughter, who has become a 'Navy Wave,' thereby ranking about even with her two older Lieutenant brothers. The only people left to obey my orders are a collie dog, who takes walks with me every day and thinks I'm wonderful; and a ridiculous cat, who is very insubordinate."

Beach lived to see the tragedy of Pearl Harbor but maintained faith in his Navy's ultimate victory until his death in 1943.

There is a comfortable fit to the feeling and tone of this autobiography. The camaraderie of the wardroom, the constant moving back and forth from sea to shore, the hard work and great rewards of command at sea, and the friendly naval gossip are so recognizable that he could be talking about the Navy of today. Indeed, the real charm of this book is in its candid yet loving portrait of one of the truly abiding institutions of the U.S. Navy. Captain Edward L. Beach, Sr., with the nicest of assists from his accomplished officer-author son, has given us not only his own story but a warm insider's view of our beloved Navy as well. This is a volume that deserves a spot in any serious Navy library.

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Crawford, Michael J., et al., ed. *The Naval War of 1812: A Documentary History*. Vol. 3. Washington, D.C.: Naval Historical Center (GPO), 2002. 874pp. \$70

During the War of 1812, the United States attempted to invade Canada three times in separate campaigns and failed on each occasion. Inept leadership, militia and service differences, and lost tactical opportunities marred translation of strategic aims into a workable operational plan. Vastly outnumbered by American troops on the land frontier along the Great Lakes and the St. Lawrence River, the British and Canadians remained on the defensive until events in Europe released regular reinforcements and ships of the Royal Navy. In 1814, Great Britain applied seapower against the United States and took the offensive. The resulting stalemate

eventually brought the two adversaries to the peace table to sign the Treaty of Ghent, whereby British North America's territorial integrity was preserved for the later confederation of Canada into a nation. This documentary collection, the third volume of a projected series of four to be published by the Naval Historical Center on the naval side of the war, concentrates on the Chesapeake Bay, Great Lakes, and Pacific theaters from 1814 to 1815. The selection of documents, like the two preceding volumes, deals comprehensively with events and persons behind the main battles and campaigns on both sides, as well as with such matters as recruitment, logistics, shipbuilding, and social relations from a wider perspective.

Almost half the book is devoted to the British blockade of the Chesapeake Bay and American defense against the mounting amphibious incursions of General Robert Ross and Admiral Alexander Cochrane into the American heartland. Once the resolve of General William Winder and his sundry troops crumbled at the battle of Bladensburg, Washington was left wide open. The occupying British burned the White House and other public buildings (allegedly in retaliation for burning the provincial legislature at York [present-day Toronto] by American sailors in April the previous year). The documents highlight the flexibility accorded the British to choose when and where to attack from the sea, as well as the significant naval contribution in stiffening American defenses.

The British likewise demonstrated the possibilities of concerted military and naval action on the internal waters of Lake Huron, Lake Ontario, and Lake

Champlain, the high point being Commodore Sir James Yeo's amphibious raid on the American transfer point at Oswego, and the low point definitely being General George Prevost's retreat from Plattsburg. On the opposing side, Commodore Isaac Chauncey's support of American armies on the Niagara frontier took second place to a growing ship-building race between the American and British naval commanders. The American land campaign was irretrievably impaired, the hoped-for decisive battle to determine naval ascendancy on Lake Ontario never materialized before peace came, and the republic's finances were left in tatters. The documents are carefully chosen to show the consequences of confused operational-level decision making and of the failure to pursue joint operations in an effective manner.

If Chauncey inclined toward caution on the Great Lakes, Captain David Porter's decision to abandon a successful commerce-destruction cruise in favor of seeking out superior British naval forces in decisive combat off the Chilean coast was rash and impulsive. American hopes for challenging the British in the Pacific ended with the frigate *Essex*'s submission to British firepower. In spite of the defeat, Porter returned home to a hero's welcome, while the officers and sailors whom he left behind faced numerous hardships and another year in British captivity. Inclusion of this small episode in the collection presents a reminder that personal considerations of fame and glory are no replacement for sound strategy.

Porter spent the rest of his life trying to justify his actions.

The collection makes accessible many primary documents used in classical works by Alfred T. Mahan and Theodore Roosevelt, as well as recent monographs by Anthony Pitch, Robert Malcomson, and Barry Gough. For anyone who has struggled to decipher handwriting in the originals, availability of typed and organized documents is a major benefit. Introductory essays to the chapters and subchapters are informative and balanced, while extensive footnotes give more details on people and sources. The index, perhaps the book's most valuable feature, allows readers to identify specific matters of interest within the documents quickly and efficiently. The end of each chapter shows the location and source from which individual documents were drawn, with microfilm numbers provided for Washington-area repositories, but no corresponding microfilm numbers appear for Record Group 8 in Ottawa. This discrepancy, though minor, detracts from the book's usefulness in tracking down originals for the sake of comparison, accuracy, and provenance.

This documentary collection, of which the first volume was published in 1978, will become a standard reference source in most libraries and undoubtedly stimulate awareness and scholarship about this forgotten war on both sides of the international border.

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