

## BOOK REVIEWS

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### A VERY OLD KIND OF WAR

Ledeen, Michael A. *The War against the Terror Masters*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 2002. 262pp. \$24.95

Some twenty years ago, en route to a Gulf deployment, this reviewer and other watchstanders received various briefings on how to defend against Harpoons and other U.S. weapons sold to the newly hostile Iranians. This occasioned more than a little angry puzzlement at how we found ourselves in such a situation, but we had no uncertainty about who the foe was.

Today, the United States once again faces conflict in the wider Mideast region, including the Gulf. Again we have foes that use our own tools against us (e.g., airliners as cruise missiles). However, unlike then, today we arguably face a fundamental confusion about who the enemy is and what this war is about. This makes it extraordinarily difficult to know what to plan and execute against or to know the overall campaign context for individual combat operations. Ultimately, such confusion is a formula for failure in this war.

In *The War against the Terror Masters*, Mike Ledeen, noted political analyst, Middle East scholar, and frequent contributor to the *Wall Street Journal* and other media outlets, presents a compelling picture of what the threat actually is, how it developed, and how the United

States can and must defeat it. He avers that this war is not a “global war on terrorism” at all but is specifically about Islamic, not generic, terrorism—motivated and underwritten by militant Islamic fundamentalism and abetted by many regional regimes. However, many in the West are most reluctant to frame the conflict this way, for fear of being accused of “engaging in a war against Islam.” Ledeen’s account thus is quite “politically incorrect,” but as one European leader recently (and encouragingly) noted, “to solve a problem, you must start by giving it a proper name.”

President Bush, in his earliest “post-9/11” speeches to the nation, emphasized that the United States must wage war against the terrorists and *the countries that support or harbor them*, recognizing immediately that major terrorist organizations would be crippled absent state support. However, in the ensuing year this crucial distinction was largely honored in the breach. With the notable exception of Afghanistan, the emphasis has almost exclusively been on fighting terrorists, not their state facilitators. Much of the senior leadership of the Department of State, the CIA, and the U.S. military, as well as most European

elites, consider terrorists primarily as criminals and therefore urge a legal paradigm, or crime-fighting approach, perhaps with selective military assistance, rather than actual warfighting. The consequence arguably has been a dangerously lethargic campaign of which the ultimate objectives remain vague and uncertain.

The conventional wisdom is that the United States is engaged in a totally new kind of war against clandestine organizations rather than nation-states. Ledeen argues compellingly that this is at best partially true. Rather, “our prime enemies are the terror masters—the rulers of the countries that sponsor terrorism, and the leaders and soldiers of the terrorist organizations themselves.” Moreover, “the main part of the war—the campaign against the terror masters who rule countries hostile to us—is a very old kind of war . . . a revolutionary war, right out of the eighteenth century, the very kind of war that gave us our national identity.”

Ledeen starts by asking “why it happened,” and recounts how the (Islamic) terror network developed, from the start of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) to today’s al-Qa’ida, including “an analysis of the importance of Islamic fundamentalism within the terror network, as well as the crucial roles of several Middle Eastern regimes.” He argues that the al-Qa’ida and other Islamic terrorist groups have a fanatical desire to destroy the West, based on “a deep-seated Muslim rage and buttressed by a powerful Muslim doctrine. Without the rage and the doctrine—the ideology of the terror masters—there might be Islamic terrorists (there have been for centuries) but there would not be the global Islamic

terrorist network, resting on an Islamic fundamentalist mass movement.”

Ledeen then poses the equally important question, “Why weren’t we properly prepared?” He notes the woeful record of U.S. policy making and intelligence vis-à-vis terrorism and the Middle East since the late 1970s, when American policy makers failed to understand the epochal nature of Ayatollah Khomeini’s triumph in Iran. The 1980s and 1990s saw a long, compounding litany of disasters and missed opportunities. Some were due to bureaucratic dysfunctionality and poor communications among various organizations, while others were results of deliberate, ideologically based castration of agencies like the FBI and CIA throughout much of the 1990s, when *weltfremd* policy decisions left the “CIA as a cross between the Post Office and the Department of Agriculture,” in the words of one senior CIA official. However, many mistakes stemmed from a fundamental misunderstanding of “human nature and the true nature of human history”—in essence, for a variety of reasons, U.S. policy makers consistently fooled themselves about the reality of the threat. Progress is being made to correct some of the egregious flaws, but again, the pace is slow.

Lastly, Ledeen asks “How will we win?” He notes that if the key terror masters are in fact the rulers of their countries, the United States must defeat those regimes in some meaningful sense if it is to prevail. Noting these regimes’ fragility, he suggests bringing them down will help the United States “show the Muslims that they have been led astray by the terror masters, that they should look within themselves for the source of

their centuries-long failure, and that the best hope for them lies in cooperation with the civilized world and in greater freedom for all their people.” This can be characterized as a “revolutionary war against the tyrants,” one “entirely in keeping with our own national tradition of fighting tyranny.”

*The War against the Terror Masters* is a book that U.S. military leaders should read as a matter of urgency in order to understand the deadly threat that confronts the United States and its armed forces. The confusion about whether the United States is fighting terrorists or a much more formidable phenomenon, militant Islamic fundamentalism, is exacting a heavy toll. Though the cost has been paid largely in terms of international political support through late 2002, arguably America has been very lucky that it has not been reckoned in lives and destruction from another large-scale atrocity. It is little wonder that Mike Ledeen for months has ended his newspaper columns with “Faster please,” and more recently, “Faster please. What are you waiting for? Another September 11th?”

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Hoffman, Frank G. *Homeland Security: A Competitive Strategies Approach*. Washington, D.C.: Center for Defense Information, 2002. 67pp. (no price given)

O’Hanlon, Michael E., et al. *Protecting the American Homeland: A Preliminary Analysis*. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2002. 188pp. \$17.95

Since the events of 11 September 2001, a multitude of homeland defensive plans have been discussed at every level of

government and the military, centering on the restructuring of existing organizations or increased financing. Each plan focuses on a single phase or group believed to be essential to the safety of our nation. These two books for review take different approaches. *Homeland Security: A Competitive Strategies Approach*, by Frank G. Hoffman, stays out of the tactical and operational level of the “war” and focuses on the strategic level and the planning cycle. *Protecting the American Homeland: A Preliminary Analysis*, by Michael E. O’Hanlon, Peter R. Orszag, Ivo H. Daalder, I. M. Destler, David L. Gunter, Robert E. Litan, and James B. Steinberg, analyzes the problems of national security, determines the progress of current programs, and designs an agenda for future endeavors.

*Homeland Security* offers a process to enhance U.S. capabilities through a simple “course of action” analysis based on comparisons of known and perceived threats with strategies used by policy makers in recent history. The authors envision three possible categories of attacks against the United States. The first is a missile attack, from intercontinental ballistic missiles or cruise missiles; the second is covert attack or catastrophic terrorism, involving an array of weapons of mass destruction smuggled into the United States; finally, they consider a cyber attack designed to destroy the U.S. information infrastructure. Each method is considered in terms of known and projected capabilities of national and transnational players, and of the four classic strategies of nonproliferation, deterrence, counterproliferation, and preemption. Each “style” has been filtered through these four perspectives to discern strengths and weaknesses.

U.S. vulnerabilities are extensive. It will not be easy to protect the American people. The current approach of organizational restructuring to counter or prevent an attack, and the current assumption that the U.S. military can defend against an assault, may not meet the future need. Hoffman proposes a “serious policy debate” to consider the threat and risks and how to create an environment that will prevent an attack or at least make it very difficult for one to achieve the desired results. Hoffman provides valuable insights into the various strategies of homeland security that could be undertaken by the United States, making it clear that no single plan will suffice. Hoffman also discusses consequence management; if an attack is successful, a plan must be in place to mitigate its results.

*Protecting the American Homeland* argues that much could be achieved to improve homeland security at a cost that could be absorbed by both the federal government and the private sector. Working under the assumption that our large, open society provides little protection against terrorism, O’Hanlon’s team presents a scheme to complicate terrorists’ actions and therefore force them to engage less lucrative targets (“displacement”) or to continue to plan for a difficult attack in ways that offer an opportunity for U.S. authorities to prevent the attack. The authors argue that first identifying U.S. weaknesses and vulnerabilities will make it possible to correct them or at least lessen the effects of attacks we cannot prevent.

O’Hanlon and his coauthors describe a four-tier approach. Securing U.S. borders is the initial step. They consider it possible only if air defense systems are expanded, a cruise missile defense

system is created, and the Coast Guard and the U.S. Customs Service is extended, so as to improve security at sea, in ports, and over roads and rails. The second step entails preventive measures within U.S. borders to eliminate or reduce the possibility of an attack. This can be achieved by increasing FBI and state and local law-enforcement staffs; improving data collection, analysis, and dissemination; and providing incentives to the private sector by way of insurance and tax incentives to increase security and tracking of employees, production, and the storage and shipment of hazardous materials. The third measure would protect obvious targets. Once again, the concept of displacement is discussed—redirecting terrorist activities from a disastrous plan to one that is considerably less damaging. By concentrating on the protection of targets upon which attacks could be catastrophic—such as nuclear and chemical facilities, large buildings or arenas, national symbols, or critical parts of the national infrastructure—it may be possible to reduce the risk to essential interests. The fourth step deals with consequence management, or the mitigation of the effects of a terrorist act. Effective preparation of first responders is essential here. This preparation can be handled through training for the responders, added capacity to enable the health system to deal with the event, communications and information for the coordination of the relief efforts, and research and development in vaccines and detection equipment.

The remainder of the book deals with the principles for implementing and financing the organizational challenges of homeland security. The book proposes a balance between regulatory and

insurance measures that would pass the cost to users and producers vice the population as a whole. Such measures would have to, as noted, provide incentives (reduced insurance rates) to improve security. Organizationally, the United States could either attempt the “lead agency” approach (a single entity with responsibility for security of the homeland) or the “interagency” approach, an entity that coordinates the many agencies responsible for various segments of the security problem. The authors believe that the Bush administration is on the right track with the interagency method.

*Homeland Security* is an excellent introduction to strategic approaches to the threats that face this nation. It provides a backdrop for further research into homeland defense. *Protecting the American Homeland* is a logical, flowing, step-by-step analysis to defining policy issues involving the development of a comprehensive protection plan. Both books are useful and thoughtful analyses of homeland security issues.

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Peters, Ralph. *Beyond Terror: Strategy in a Changing World*. Mechanicsburg, Penna.: Stackpole, 2002. 353pp. \$22.95

In *Beyond Terror*, author, historian, and pragmatist Ralph Peters has assembled a collection of his own essays that puts the “post-9/11” world in perspective in terms of the U.S. reaction to the attacks and the historical context in which those attacks occurred.

A retired Army lieutenant colonel and former intelligence officer, Peters has

been engaged in every major U.S. theater, focusing the better part of his professional life on assessing the threats to U.S. national security. *Beyond Terror* offers a clear, unfettered, down-to-earth perspective of the world, as it is, not as the media “spinmeisters” or the “intellectual elite” would have one believe. His is a refreshing and invigorating view of what has made America the singular global force that it is today and what will allow it to maintain that stature in the long-term. He unabashedly believes that this country’s effort to protect its borders and global interests is a righteous one, and he offers some insightful and common sense prescriptions for how the United States should proceed. Peters tempers the enthusiasm for quick fixes to terrorist threats and endeavors to steel the American public for a long, protracted effort that will require every facet of American power and will: “Like crime, terrorism will never be completely eliminated.” What is needed, Peters argues, if the effect of terrorism on the American way of life is to be reduced, is not hand-wringing but an understanding of the terrorists’ intentions and motives, and of their ever more complex tools and planning processes.

The collection of essays presented in this work is arranged in two “theme sets.” In the first, Peters establishes the American reality in a hostile world from a historical perspective. In essence, the United States presently finds itself dealing with the colossal failures of the European colonial era, particularly with respect to the Islamic world, in which Western social, political, and economic ideals failed to take root and now take the terrorists’ blame for the failure and decay of their societies at large. In the context of these failing

cultures, Peters categorizes the emergence of two types of terrorists: the practical terrorist (or freedom fighter) whose actions reflect the yearning for social and political change, and the apocalyptic terrorist, who is “possessed and governed by a devilish vision . . . whose true goal is simply the punishment of others, in the largest possible numbers . . . as an offering to the bloodthirsty and vengeful God that they have created for themselves.” Unlike for the practical terrorist, “No change in the world order will ever content the apocalyptic terrorist, since his actual discontents are internal to himself.” Describing the latter as an unalterable menace to whom destruction and violence are not means to an end but ends in themselves, Peters suggests timely precepts (twenty-five to be exact) for the application of American power in the war on terror. The one that stands out as the key to long-term success is, “Do not be afraid to be powerful.” The rest flow logically from it and provide a viable framework in which U.S. national security policy should be executed in the “new world paradigm.” To strengthen the American sense of purpose, and more interestingly, provide an insight into the real character of American power, Peters describes the unique aspects of American social and cultural norms that will allow it to continue to be the preemptive global power: the ability of our society to break from “historical norms,” to adapt and be responsive to changing dynamics, and the ability to compromise and yet assume a sense of responsibility for who and what we are.

The second series of essays deals primarily with recommendations for a “blueprint” for future warfare in the campaign against

terror. It debunks social myths closely held by past U.S. presidential administrations. Peters attacks the present line of force planning by pointing out that the United States is well suited to fight the old Soviet threat, which never materialized: “We have the most powerful military in history, but its power is designed to defeat conventional threats. When the enemy does not ‘fight fair’ and deploy tanks, ships, and aircraft, we find ourselves punching thin air. We have prepared to fight machines. But the enemy is belief.” He then exquisitely describes the warfare challenge of the future with respect to the “human terrain of urban operations” in the context of three city “types”: hierarchical (synonymous to a typical U.S. city); multicultural (in contrast to “the fantasies of Liberal Arts Faculties,” in these cities “contending systems of custom and belief [are] often aggravated by ethnic divisions struggling for dominance”—these “cockpits of struggle” are representative of future combat challenges for U.S. ground forces); and tribal (the most “difficult urban environment for peacekeeping operations; ethnic conflicts in this environment can be the most intractable and merciless.”)

Against this backdrop, Peters argues the shallowness in the use of U.S. military power in the past administration and then emphatically debunks the “casualty myth” that wove its way into the political thought and leadership of the last administration. He is outraged that an “elitist” administration could have so underestimated the will of the American people to commit blood and treasure in worthy causes that its attempts to steer into harm’s way merely put the ship of state hopelessly “in irons.” The subsequent “low risk” approaches

(casualty avoidance via air “delivery” of military power) taken to “punish” violators of human rights and international law, Peters declares, merely emboldened lawless rogues to perpetrate more aggressive acts of human carnage and suffering.

*Beyond Terror* is a must-read for those who desire to get at the heart of the issues at hand without being hamstrung by political biases or organizational loyalties. The opinions of Peters will serve as a superb starting point for more detailed discussions on U.S. national security strategy and the direction that the war on terror should take in the future.

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Buckley, Roger. *The United States in the Asia-Pacific since 1945*. New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2002. 258pp. \$23

Even as the world remains focused on the war on terror, Roger Buckley’s examination of U.S. policy in the Asia-Pacific since 1945 reminds us of the danger of ignoring Asia. Although this area has been crisscrossed in the post-Cold War period by such formal and informal regional organizations as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), Buckley cautions that “any future Asia without America is widely seen to be a recipe for possible chaos,” since “Washington alone possesses the political and military strengths to deter aggression and thereby provide the essential foundations

for nation-building, economic advancement and regional building.”

This book recounts the wars and America’s postwar difficulties after World War II, Korea, Vietnam, and the Cold War. Washington’s challenges are far from over, and Buckley’s list of contemporary difficulties includes “two Koreas, two Chinas, nuclear and conventional weaponry on a massive scale and the absence of a Russo-Japanese peace treaty.” He argues the United States must prepare to resolve such problems through cooperative partnerships that will rely less on bilateral and vertical relations and more on a variety of Asian nations accepting a greater share of the responsibility; simultaneously, the United States must retain a combination of “regional muscle,” the “political will to readily deploy” forces, and the “necessary weapon systems and Pacific Rim basing facilities” to act effectively as “insurance against aggression” and “reassurance to its allies.”

According to Buckley, by far the most dangerous Asian problem is the potential threat posed by the People’s Republic of China. Whether intentionally or not, this book’s focus on wars and their aftermaths suggests that a conflict between China and America is in the offing. In particular, Beijing sees Washington as wielding arbitrary and excessive force in a way that undermines a more equitable distribution of power. Although some have predicted the evolution of a cooperative Sino-U.S.-Japanese triad, China’s chagrin at the extent of U.S. power, and its anti-hegemonic stance, will make it even more likely that the region will see a “distancing of Beijing from an already long-established U.S.-Japan partnership.” Assuming this happens, “the

entire region will be increasingly involved in dealing with a more ambitious and yet dissatisfied Communist state, since China still recalls the humiliations of the nineteenth century when it was 'sliced' like a melon among rival imperialists and still shares disputed land and sea borders with many countries." America's potential problems with China have been exacerbated in recent years by the disappearance of the European powers from Southeast Asia, Hong Kong, and Macao, and the precipitous decline of Russia in Northeast Asia, making China the only "possible contender for the American laurels."

Buckley, a Hong Kong-born, British-educated, and Japan-based scholar, is generally friendly to the United States and supportive of its East Asian policies. However, he has his fair share of criticism for U.S. policy makers, in particular Franklin Roosevelt's "casualness" in his dickering with Stalin at Yalta, Harry Truman's huge military reductions immediately prior to the Korean War, and Lyndon Johnson's and Richard Nixon's "humiliating" defeat in Vietnam. In the near term, Buckley warns, in addition to remaining the bulwark of Asia Washington must initiate wider regional interdependence among East Asian countries. Asian nations, instead of focusing on the United States as the Holy Grail for everything from democracy to human rights to capitalism, might do better to look at "British, European and Anglo-Pacific approaches to such issues" in order to spread their cultural horizons. To the extent that "globalization is frequently equated with Americanization," Buckley warns, the Asia-Pacific region may one day resent such influence as an unwelcome American intrusion.

This book went to press immediately before "9/11" and the war on terror. As a result, Buckley underestimates Japan's potential naval contribution to any multinational military effort, suggesting instead that "Japan appears most unlikely to deploy its so-called self-defense forces for anything much beyond the rescue of its own citizens in emergency situations abroad." Buckley's emphasis on the close interaction and interdependence of U.S. security and economic policies throughout the Asia-Pacific region are, however, as relevant now as ever. Buckley concludes by warning that Americans must energetically face up to the myriad of risks—chief among them the growing threat from China—associated with being the dominant Asia-Pacific power.

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Knox, MacGregor and Williamson Murray, eds.  
*The Dynamics of Military Revolution, 1300–2050*.  
New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2001. 203pp.  
\$28

The editors of this slim volume of essays have wide ambitions. In 194 pages of text, they seek to define the nature of military revolutions; describe the tripartite sources of the concept in the still-controversial work of historian Michael Roberts on seventeenth-century European land warfare, Soviet military theory, and studies by Andrew W. Marshall's Office of Net Assessment; and critique contemporary developments in American ground and air warfare. Furthermore, to support their arguments, Knox and Murray present case studies from seven centuries of

armed conflict in the West. Between their introductory essay on the concept of a revolution in military affairs (RMA) and their concluding analysis of the shortcomings of the “American RMA,” Knox and Murray place eight chapters on historical examples of military revolutions. There is one essay each by Knox and Murray (on the French Revolutionary army and the German blitzkrieg, respectively). The others are by equally prominent military historians: Clifford J. Rogers on fourteenth-century military developments under England’s Edward III; John A. Lynn on Louis XIV’s army; Mark Grimsley on the U.S. Civil War; Dennis E. Showalter on the mid-nineteenth-century Prussian army; Holger H. Herwig on changes in naval warfare, 1885–1914, exemplified by the British and Germans; and Jonathan B. A. Bailey on the creation of modern warfare in World War I. The accuracy, comprehensiveness, and thoughtfulness of every essay are outstanding—a rare achievement in an anthology. The editors deserve commendation.

Each part of this volume is excellent, yet Knox and Murray have set themselves such a daunting goal—to integrate coherently arguments based on episodes of Western military history with contemporary defense policy analysis—that they fall somewhat short. While all the essays are fine offerings, Rogers’s essay fits awkwardly alongside case studies of RMAs from the time of Louis XIV to the present, and Herwig’s accentuates the absence of other essays on the transformations of naval warfare in the age of sail and after 1918. Historical examples drawn almost exclusively from British, French, German, and American military history suggest a

certain cultural bias; the selection neglects significant contributions over the past four and a half centuries to transforming western military theory and practice by the Dutch, Danes, Swedes, Spanish, Italians, Poles, and Russians. Since the editors stress the Soviet contribution to the RMA concept, their failure to include a Red Army case study seems egregious. The origins of the book in papers delivered at a small conference at Quantico in 1996 help explain its limitations. Nonetheless, a work of such ambitious intellectual scope would have benefited from double or even triple the number of chapters, with a greater geographical and topical inclusiveness.

Paradoxically, this reviewer’s disappointment arises from the great contributions this book does make to understanding RMAs and redirecting present American efforts to achieve one. As all the authors emphasize, and as Knox and Murray reiterate in their conclusion, military revolutions are not actually based on technology. In fact, an RMA can occur without major technological innovation at all, as in late-eighteenth-century France. Instead, a military revolution is a reshaping of military institutions to solve strategic and political challenges. Adopting new weapons and equipment alone, without institutional reconfiguration, produces armies such as the British and French fielded against the Wehrmacht in May 1940. The editors present convincing arguments that the U.S. military has adopted new technologies without interservice integration or, far more important, without attempts to relate weapons systems, doctrine, force structure, and training to the strategic problems facing the nation. In mitigation,

Knox and Murray admit that achieving an RMA in the absence of an identifiable foe as the focus of strategy presents enormous difficulties. Be that as it may, they warn, the obstacle the United States presents to the ambitions of entities outside the Western alliance could make it the object of someone else's RMA. Perhaps that is the greatest warning to arise from the coincidental appearance of this book following 11 September 2001. *The Dynamics of Military Revolution* raises critical questions about how the United States might reshape its military to counter strategies based on asymmetrical warfare. Beyond the valuable contribution the book makes to military history, one hopes this volume will also help shape the national security debate currently in progress.

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Gilbert, Marc Jason, ed. *Why the North Won the Vietnam War*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002. 254pp. \$69.95

Since the fall of Saigon in the spring of 1975, Americans have sought to understand how their government could have lost the Vietnam War. Given the enormous gap in resources between the United States and the Vietnamese revolutionaries, it is difficult for even scholars of the war to explain why this nation's mighty military machine failed to defeat its enemy's forces. Many who have written about the war have focused on the alleged mistakes of American civilian and military leaders, arguing that more enlightened policies, such as fewer restrictions on military

operations or more emphasis on pacification, would have turned the tide in South Vietnam. The purpose of the eight essays in this volume is to place American policies in a broader context—or, as Gilbert writes, to recognize that “the outcome of that war was determined less at MACV [Military Assistance Command, Vietnam] and Washington than by the persistence of the enemy on the battlefield and in political cultures of the Saigon regime, the National Liberation Front, and its partners in Hanoi.”

The most original essays in this volume, by William J. Duiker, George C. Herring, and Robert K. Brigham, pursue aspects of this theme. Duiker traces the efforts of the government in Hanoi “to manipulate the international and diplomatic environment to its own advantage” and its complicated relations with China and the Soviet Union, allies whose aid was vital to the North Vietnamese war effort. Herring emphasizes the international dimensions of America's defeat, noting how the inability of the Lyndon Johnson administration to gain support from European allies undermined the U.S. war effort. Brigham challenges the traditional distinction between northerners and southerners, arguing that it is misleading to divide “the struggle along geographical lines that have no cultural or historical precedent.” Northerners, he argues, did not make all of the key decisions in the war; rather, southerners came to dominate party councils in Hanoi and were able to convince their northern comrades to pursue a more aggressive strategy in the South.

The other five essays focus, with varying degrees of success, more on the American side of the war. In a forcefully argued

essay, Jeffrey Record points out that those who emphasize the failures of civilian policy makers in Washington ignore both the achievements of Vietnamese revolutionaries and “the defective professional U.S. military performance in Vietnam *within* the political limitations imposed on the use of force.” If politicians were stabbing the military in the back, “the military also was shooting itself in the foot.” He concludes that it is unlikely that the United States could have done more than increase the price of an enemy victory. John Prados analyzes the uses of intelligence by both sides, emphasizing the difficulties of the Americans and South Vietnamese in collecting accurate information, and the extent of North Vietnamese and Vietcong penetration of the Saigon government and army. Gilbert challenges the views of Harry Summers, Jr., and William E. Colby, both of whom, he believes, fail to understand that America in Vietnam was betrayed “by its own collective limited vision of the nature of the war and the requirements of victory.” Andrew Rotter examines the respective economic cultures of America and North Vietnam that shaped each side’s response to the war, while Marilyn Young explores the impact of the American peace movement, suggesting that whatever its effect on the length of the conflict, widespread protests “increased the price to the government of continued prosecution of the war.”

In a thoughtful reflection on these essays, Lloyd Gardner writes that “the reality of Vietnam was as elusive to American policymakers as the enemy forces were to the men they sent to this hall of mirrors. They saw only their own reflections, multiplied over and over.” Like policy makers at the time,

many historians have also been in a hall of mirrors, preoccupied with the American side of the struggle. It is the great strength of this volume that, at least in part, it suggests the insights that can be gained by moving beyond the American perspective.

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Peattie, Mark R. *Sunburst: The Rise of Japanese Naval Air Power, 1909–1941*. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2002. 392pp. \$36.95

This work compellingly describes how Japanese naval aviation, both land and carrier based—like that of its principal adversary in the Pacific War, the United States—grew to maturity through trial and error. Its maturation period extended from the earliest days of powered flight through the bloody crucible of war with China. The story of U.S. naval aviation during this time is a familiar one, but that of the Japanese is less so, due to the formidable barrier posed by language. As more scholars equip themselves with the tools necessary to mine riches from the sources and publications of a former enemy, however, the other side of the story is becoming known. One such diligent student of Japanese naval history is Mark R. Peattie, familiar as the coauthor (with David C. Evans) of the highly praised *Kaigun: Tactics and Technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1887–1941* (Naval Institute Press, 1997). Holder of a doctorate in modern Japanese history from Princeton University and author, coauthor, or editor of seven other works, Peattie brings unique qualifications to the daunting task.

*Sunburst's* meat lies in seven chapters that discuss the early development of Japanese naval aviation (1909–21), Japanese naval aircraft and the tactics developed for their employment (1920–36), the design and construction of Japanese aircraft carriers and formulation of doctrine for their employment (1920–41), the Japanese aircraft industry and the design and construction of aircraft (1937–41), and Japanese naval aviation, both land and carrier based during the undeclared war with China (1937–41). Paralleling the wartime experience is a chapter on the development of Japanese naval air power in projecting the empire's power as it prepared for the Pacific conflict. The final chapter, "Descending the Flame," begins with the attack on Pearl Harbor and with the destruction, at sea and under way, of the British battleship HMS *Prince of Wales* and battle cruiser HMS *Repulse*. It ends with the battle of the Philippine Sea in June 1944, after which "the Japanese Navy never again launched a significant effort to contest the hegemony of the skies over the Pacific."

Augmenting the text are nine appendices: biographical sketches of those mentioned in the text; a glossary of naval aviation terms; the generic organization of Japanese naval aviation; naval aviation ships (carriers, seaplane carriers, and the like); naval air bases and air groups; principal naval aircraft; aircraft designation systems; principal engines; and a description of the "turning-in" maneuver. A common thread found in the graphics that appears throughout the text is the superb work of Jon Parschall, who renders tactical maneuvers, ordnance, aircraft, and ships with equal facility.

*Sunburst*, which Peattie affectionately dedicates to his former coauthor,

concludes that the "catastrophic collapse" of Japanese naval air power lay in the Imperial Navy's failure "to anticipate the kind of air combat it would be obliged to wage," its failure "to make the right kinds of decisions" to cope with the realities of a "new kind of air war," and, importantly, "the inability of Japanese industry and technology to support Japanese naval aviation against the emerging numerical and qualitative superiority of American air power." In that connection, this reviewer was particularly pleased with how Peattie disposes of the most common of persistent Midway myths, that the battle resulted in the catastrophic loss of aircrew. While heavy, the loss of pilots and observers by no means equaled the loss of the "trained maintenance personnel," invaluable to maintain modern naval aircraft, who went down with their ships. "Similarly," he contends, "the loss of skilled ground crews, often abandoned to their fates when the navy evacuated remaining aircrews from islands under siege, substantially weakened the land-based air groups."

"In the end," Peattie concludes, "the Japanese naval air service was outproduced, outorganized, outmanned, and outfought." Yet in the ashes of defeat, however, "the precision, skill, and . . . technical mastery" with which the Japanese crafted the Zero fighter "gave wings to the phoenix of postwar Japanese technology." Students of the Pacific War will find *Sunburst* (based on an impressive array of Japanese sources, including the official war history volumes and a variety of book or article-length studies) invaluable for its insights on an important subject.

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Dunmore, Spencer. *Lost Subs: From the Hunley to the Kursk, the Greatest Submarines Ever Lost—and Found*. Cambridge, Mass.: Da Capo, 2002. 176pp. \$35

Service in the Confederate submarine CSS *Hunley* was not for the faint of heart—on its first two sea trials, it sank with a loss of nearly all hands. With a fresh and stalwart crew, *Hunley* crept from Charleston on the night of 17 February 1864 and sank the USS *Housatonic* with a contact torpedo. However, in the ensuing confusion and gunfire, *Hunley* was lost.

For over one hundred years *Hunley* lay undisturbed in the mud and silt of Charleston's harbor, until August 2000, when it was raised with an elaborate cat's cradle of slings, braces, and foam pads. CSS *Hunley* is now undergoing an archaeological examination that is yielding a treasure trove of artifacts as well as insights into the technology of its time.

Spencer Dunmore's work, a handsomely produced coffee-table book, has more substance than one might initially expect. Dunmore's accounts of the loss and recovery of the CSS *Hunley*, USS *Squalus*, HMS *Thetis*, and the Russian *Kursk*, and the losses of the USS *Thresher* and USS *Scorpion*, are interesting and contain notable new material.

Like aircraft, submarines are inherently safe but very unforgiving of human and mechanical failures. *Squalus* (1939), *Thetis* (1939), and *Thresher* (1963) each was lost when its hull was breached and seawater flooded in. The main air-induction valve stuck open when *Squalus* submerged, a torpedo-tube outer door was inadvertently opened on

*Thetis*, and a seawater inlet pipe apparently failed catastrophically on *Thresher*.

Torpedoes can be as lethal to the submarine that carries them as to the enemy. In the years since the loss of *Scorpion* in 1968, its wreckage has been photographed several times by deep-sea reconnaissance vehicles. These photographs (many of which have been released and are in Dunmore's book), the troubled history of the batteries used by the submarine's Mark 37 torpedoes, and engineering analysis suggest that a spontaneous and violent initiation of a torpedo battery led to a warhead detonation and hull rupture.

The Russian submarine *Kursk* appears to have suffered a similar fate in the Barents Sea in 2000. Western acoustic detection systems picked up two massive explosions that correlated with *Kursk's* position. Naval engineers cited by Dunmore build a good case for the theory that the first of these explosions came from the hydrogen peroxide that was carried in *Kursk's* torpedoes and that the second resulted from the detonation of the torpedo's warhead.

The most fascinating and yet disappointing aspect of Dunmore's book is his descriptions of crew rescues and salvage—fascinating because these operations are high among underwater engineering feats, disappointing because Dunmore treats them shallowly.

When *Squalus* sank off Portsmouth, New Hampshire, the Navy had just placed into service a diving bell for submarine rescue. Winching itself down a half-inch wire fastened to the forward hatch of the *Squalus* 243 feet below, the bell ultimately rescued thirty-three of the fifty-five men aboard. The following summer, *Squalus* was raised with a

complex system of cradles and supporting pontoons. With each lift, it was moved into shallower water, grounded, then lifted again. It reached Portsmouth Harbor in September 1939. The technical details of its salvage are one of the truly great stories of deep-sea salvage operations.

*Kursk* was raised in the fall of 2001 and carried back to Roslyakovo Shipyard. Raising the sub was no mean feat of underwater engineering—it weighed twenty-four thousand tons underwater and lay in 350 feet of water. Unfortunately, Dunmore gives but four pages to this accomplishment. Happily, two of them are devoted to excellent drawings of the techniques by which the damaged bow was removed, lift points attached to the hull, and the submarine drawn up into a specially prepared floating dry dock. One could well spend a serious amount of time studying these drawings alone.

As a comprehensive treatment of submarine loss and recovery, *Lost Subs* is uneven and technically superficial. However, its treatment of the *Scorpion* and *Kursk* disasters and the rich collection of underwater and salvage photographs will please the generalist and fill niches for the naval scholar.

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Stiehm, Judith Hicks. *The U.S. Army War College: Military Education in a Democracy*. Temple Univ. Press, 2002. 200pp. \$69.50

This is an in-depth and insightful examination of the U.S. Army War College, one of the nation's six senior service colleges. Stiehm offers a comprehensive

book that reviews the history of the college, provides a typical class profile, offers a look at the faculty and the curriculum, and describes what a typical "Carlisle year" is like for the students. While analyzing the administration, Stiehm offers recommendations for improving the institution's ability to produce quality graduates. Stiehm believes that after following her prescription for improvements, the graduates would be better able to fight and win the nation's wars and would be better prepared to provide sound, thoughtful advice to senior decision makers on matters of national security and the application of military force in the pursuit of national objectives.

Stiehm is uniquely qualified to write this book. She attended the Army War College as a student-participant observer during the first semester of academic year 1996–97, with the class of 1997. Stiehm was fully integrated into the seminar experience of the war college and shared both the academic and social experiences of her classmates. She also served as a visiting professor at the U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute and at the Army's Strategic Studies Institute, both located at Carlisle Barracks.

Stiehm's critical examination of the Army War College is valuable for the insightful information she shares, which is otherwise not available to the general reader, but more importantly should prove valuable to the Department of Defense policy makers and decision makers responsible for the establishment and maintenance of defense institutions. The complex and multidimensional nature of the global war on terrorism has caused the United States to think about warfare in a new way. Stiehm's work challenges those in

power to review the administration, curricula, and faculty of the Army War College with an eye toward ensuring that the institution is able to address contemporary issues effectively and is positioned to adapt and change.

Stiehm organizes her conclusions and recommendations around the three thematic issues of “training and education,” “civil-military relations,” and “war and peace.” The first deals with the basic function of the institution. Carlisle’s mission statement is focused on the preparation and education of selected military, civilian, and international leaders. Is the mission of Carlisle to train or to educate? The differences are not subtle. Stiehm argues that the nature and composition of the faculty, design of the curriculum, and manner of course presentation all lead one to conclude that Carlisle is a training institution, not optimized for education, and that if the mission of Carlisle is in fact education, significant changes are required.

The second deals with the most basic constitutional issue of civilian control of the military. Stiehm concludes that the Army War College does not adequately prepare future senior leaders for the complications of realpolitik. She posits that there is an erosion of civilian control of the military and that this erosion is partially the result of the failure by the senior service colleges to ensure that graduates appreciate the unique position of the military, as it relates to government officials elected by the citizenry.

The third issue deals with the notion that we preserve the peace by preparing for war. Stiehm concludes that the Army War College may be spending too much time preparing for the wrong war

and is unresponsive to today’s security environment. She argues that the college could become a powerful change agent for military strategy, structure, and procurement, if certain of her recommendations were adopted. Among her recommendations are increased hiring of civilian Ph.D.s rather than retired military officers with doctorates, who, according to Stiehm, are of limited utility; increased independent research by the faculty; redesign of the curriculum to create “discomfort” (that is, to cause students to think outside of their comfort zones); and offer master’s degrees to only a limited number of students.

Stiehm provides much grist for the intellectual mill and does the Army War College a service by creating a framework for professional dialogue and offering recommendations for future improvements.

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de Montbrial, Thierry and Jean Klein, eds. *Dictionnaire de Stratégie*. Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 2000. 604pp. \$130.92

At a moment when American and French perceptions of security threats and appropriate policy responses in the Middle East are in apparent collision, it is well to be reminded how little Americans in the defense intellectual community know of their French counterparts. Yet as this volume shows, strategic studies in France are not only alive and well but well informed, intellectually sophisticated, and surprisingly free of anti-American animus.

Thierry de Montbrial, director of the prestigious French Institute of

International Relations (IFRI), and Jean Klein, a professor at the Sorbonne, have assembled a wide-ranging collection of articles emphasizing the historical and theoretical dimensions of strategy, though without neglecting such current topics as terrorism, the Yugoslav crisis, NATO, or the revolution in military affairs. There are substantial pieces on various national schools of strategic theorizing, beginning with the ancient Greeks, Romans, and Chinese, and ending with the Soviets and the “Anglo-Saxons.” Carl von Clausewitz is given due deference throughout, but the book also broadly acknowledges the reality of “culture” in shaping strategic rationality. There is a good general article on “strategic culture,” as well as useful separate essays on Chinese and Asiatic strategic culture by Valérie Niquet, author of a treatise on Chinese strategy (*Les fondements de la stratégie chinoise*, Paris, 1997) that ought to be more widely known on this side of the Atlantic.

Great commanders (even Napoleon) are given short shrift by the editors except as contributors to the development of the art of war, but there are individual articles on strategic thinkers both minor and major. From the Anglo-Saxon world, Alfred Thayer Mahan, Julian Corbett, J. F. C. Fuller, T. E. Lawrence, Liddell Hart, Bernard Brodie, and Herbert Rosinski make up what is perhaps not an obvious selection. (Particularly interesting is the appreciation of Rosinski, a German refugee who, while on the faculty of the Naval War College, produced notable

yet today almost completely neglected works on the historical development of strategy and on naval strategy.) From the French tradition, there are the standard figures—Antoine Henri Jomini, Ardant du Picq, Ferdinand Foch, Charles de Gaulle, Raymond Aron, Raoul Castex (the foremost French naval theorist), André Beaufre, Pierre Gallois, and others; there are also obscure yet interesting names, like Paul-Gédéon Joly de Maizeroy (1719–80), who apparently introduced the term “strategy” in reference to the higher component of the art of war, and the contemporary strategist Lucien Poirier.

Montbrial’s own substantial essay on the theory of strategy deserves particular attention. Montbrial distinguishes his own view from that of certain of the other contributors, defining strategy in a broad sense to encompass aspects that transcend the art of war as such. He is well versed in game theory and the American business strategy literature, yet, unusually, reserves a place for “glory” in the strategic calculus. Of the other contributors, mention should also be made of Hervé Coutau-Bégarie, author of a *Traité de stratégie* (Paris, 1999) as well as a number of works on naval history and strategy, and François Géré, who has produced studies of American strategy and military policy and of psychological warfare. It is to be hoped that this material will not forever remain untranslated.

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