



U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Est. 1881
NEWPORT, RHODE ISLAND

Joint Professional Military Education Phase II Senior Level Course

College of Naval Warfare and Naval Command College

STRATEGY AND POLICY

February 2016–June 2016



S & P

STRATEGY AND POLICY
DEPARTMENT

**STRATEGY AND POLICY DEPARTMENT
NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport, Rhode Island**

FOREWORD

This pamphlet contains the syllabus for the Strategy and Policy Course for the College of Naval Warfare and Naval Command College, February–June 2016. The syllabus provides both an overview and lesson-by-lesson, detailed description to assist students in their reading and preparation for seminar. Administrative information is also included.

SUBMITTED



MICHAEL F. PAVKOVIĆ
Chair
Department of Strategy and Policy

APPROVED



PHIL HAUN
Dean of Academic Affairs

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	PAGE
FOREWORD	1
TABLE OF CONTENTS.....	2
COURSE OBJECTIVES AND CONTENT.....	4
STUDENT OUTCOMES	7
COURSE THEMES.....	8
MATCHING STRATEGY AND POLICY — THE PROCESS.....	9
1. The Interrelationship of Policy, Strategy and Operations.....	9
2. The Decision for War.....	7
3. Intelligence, Assessment, and Plans	10
4. The Instruments of National Power	12
5. Interaction, Adaptation, and Reassessment	13
6. War Termination.....	14
7. Winning the Peace and Preparing for War	15
MATCHING STRATEGY AND POLICY — THE ENVIRONMENT.....	16
8. The International Dimension of Strategy.....	16
9. The Economic and Material Dimensions of Strategy.....	16
10. The Institutional Dimension of Strategy.....	17
11. The Cultural and Social Dimensions of Strategy.....	18
COURSE PROCESS AND STANDARDS.....	20
1. Methodology.....	20
2. Seminar Assignments.....	20
3. Presentations	20
4. Readings.....	20
5. Course Requirement.....	20
6. Seminar Essays	20
7. Final Examination.....	21
8. Pretutorials and Tutorials.....	22
9. Seminar Preparation and Contribution.....	22
10. Grade Appeals.....	24
11. Academic Honor Code.....	24
12. Student Survey	25
13. Online Resources	26
STRATEGY AND POLICY DEPARTMENT FACULTY	27
CASE STUDIES	
I. On Strategy: Clausewitz, Sun Tzu, and the Development of Contemporary Strategic Thought.....	43

II.	The Peloponnesian War: Democracy, Leadership, and Strategy, in a Long War.....	50
III.	Commanding the Maritime Commons: Great Britain’s Grand Strategy in the Wars of American Independence and Napoleon	59
IV.	Profiles in Strategic Leadership—Bismarck and Lincoln, and their Generals	67
V.	Sea Power and Rising Peer Competitors in an Age of Globalization: The Origins, Conduct, and Consequences of the First World War.....	76
VI.	Losing Global Leadership: Confronting Conventional, Irregular, Catastrophic, and Disruptive Security Challenges—Great Britain Between the Two World Wars	84
VII.	Geopolitical Retrospect and Ideological Prospect—The Influence of Geography and Ideology on Security and Strategy.....	92
VIII.	The Rise of the Superpowers—The United States and the Soviet Union in World War II and the Early Cold War	98
IX.	The Rise of Communist China—The Chinese Civil War, the Korean War, and Maoist Strategy	108
X.	Irregular Warfare and Protracted Conflicts—The Wars of Southeast Asia.....	117
XI.	The Decline and Fall of the Soviet Superpower—Alliances, Economics, and Nuclear Competition in Ending the Cold War, 1969-1991.....	127
XII.	Security and Stability in the Gulf, 1979-2003—Unconventional Challenges, Limited War, Containment, and Regime Change	136
XIII.	The War on Al Qaeda—Asymmetric, Multi-Front, Coalition Conflict	145
XIV.	Retrospect and Prospect—Sea Power and Grand Strategy in the Twenty-First Century	154
STUDENT SURVEY		164
CALENDAR		202
PRESENTATION		206

STRATEGY AND POLICY COURSE DESCRIPTION

Course Objectives and Content

The Strategy and Policy course is designed to teach students to think strategically and analytically in preparation for positions of strategic leadership. The course sharpens students' ability to assess a variety of situations and compare alternative courses of action to achieve overall national political purposes. Students will be asked to think in a disciplined, critical, and original manner about the international environment and a range of potential strategies involving joint, interagency, and multinational partners.

Strategy has been viewed traditionally as the relationship between war's purpose and the means to achieve this political end. Strategy provides a theory of victory that explains how a state can translate the employment of the specific means of military operations into the achievement of overall national objectives. In addition, the Strategy and Policy Course focuses on long-term competitions in war and peace, and therefore considers non-military elements of state power and the use of "soft power" in international affairs. In the words of British strategist Sir Basil Liddell Hart:

...fighting power is but one of the instruments of grand strategy—which should take account of and apply the power of financial pressure, of diplomatic pressure, of commercial pressure, and not least of ethical pressure...[F]urther, while the horizon of strategy is bounded by the war, grand strategy looks beyond the war to the subsequent peace.¹

The role of a War College, however, is to emphasize the systematic study of war and military affairs in both war and peacetime, which do not receive similar emphasis in civilian academe. This course, therefore, takes a more traditional view of grand strategy than that currently found in academic debates, emphasizing the role and importance of military power for war-fighting, coercion, and deterrence.

Strategy is about interaction, as adversaries seek to frustrate the best-laid plans in war, overturn the peace imposed upon them, or reshape the international environment to their advantage. A good strategic leader must anticipate the dynamics of interaction in a contest against determined foes. A skillful enemy that employs asymmetric strategies or an adversary from an unfamiliar culture may prove especially difficult to defeat. The interaction among adversaries and allies greatly complicates strategy and constitutes a theme running through the course's diverse case studies.

The case studies listed in the syllabus are distinctive in several respects. First, the course examines the strategic dynamics of long wars. Such wars often entail protracted periods of intense fighting that produce truces and peace settlements, interwar and prewar eras, as well as cold war conflicts and crises leading to war. This dynamic provides an opportunity to consider

¹ B.H. Liddell Hart, *Strategy* Second Revised Edition (London: Faber & Faber Ltd., 1967), page 322.

the long-term effectiveness of all instruments of national power. Second, the case studies and leading strategic thinkers featured in the readings examine diverse types of wars, encompassing a variety of operations and different keys to success. Success in one kind of war may be followed by failure in another. An important aspect of strategic leadership is the ability to adapt to different types of wars and threats. Third, this course analyzes the strategic success and failure of great and regional powers, and non-state actors over long periods of time. It contrasts maritime powers with land powers, exploring the different strategies open to them, and examines the resiliency of different kinds of political systems. Last but not least, the case studies include status quo and revisionist states, and established and emerging powers.

The Strategy and Policy Course examines wars of various types, sizes, and combinations. Three basic types of war stand out in our syllabus: big (and protracted) wars fought for high stakes by the most powerful states of the international system, utilizing coalitions and engaging in multiple theaters; regional wars fought within a single theater (or two contiguous theaters), typically of shorter duration than big wars; and insurgencies fought within a country, against a failing, emerging, or well established state, by a non-state movement that seeks to secede from or overturn the existing political system. Almost every historical case study of this course incorporates at least two of these basic types of war, and some case studies include all three types.

This course also reveals that new cases of each basic type of war differ in significant respects from previous cases. There is a fundamental nature to war and to its basic types that is virtually unchanging over time, but there are other characteristics that do change radically. A syllabus that takes students from the ancient Greeks to the twenty-first century allows them to see how and why some characteristics of war change from era to era. Vice Admiral Stansfield Turner, then President of the Naval War College, emphasized the importance of in-depth examinations of historical case studies for a course on strategy in his famous convocation speech:

Studying historical examples should enable us to view current issues and trends through a broader perspective of the basic elements of strategy. Approaching today's problems through a study of the past is one way to ensure that we do not become trapped within the limits of our own experience.²

The Strategy and Policy Course adopts an interdisciplinary approach by drawing on the disciplines of history, political science, international relations, and economics. It integrates these academic perspectives with critical military factors from the Profession of Arms, such as doctrine, weaponry, training, technology, and logistics. The resulting synthesis provides a coherent framework of analysis to assess complex strategic problems and formulate strategies to address them.

The course combines the key strengths of a graduate education in the liberal arts and a professional school program of study. As in graduate liberal arts education, students attend small seminars after having the opportunity to read outstanding books and articles as well as hear

² Vice Admiral Stansfield Turner, "Challenge: A New Approach to Professional Education," *Naval War College Review* Volume 25, no. 2 (Nov-Dec 1972), page 4.

presentations delivered by members of the faculty and outside scholars, expert in the field. These lectures include new material and insights to supplement the readings, and are not simply a recitation of existing reading requirements. In seminar, students contribute to vigorous discussion about enduring questions on war and peace, developing the ability to undertake critical inquiry and make sound judgments. As in business and law schools, students study real-world case studies and problem solving. In addition, students test their ideas in tutorials with their professors in preparation for writing essays.

The readings consist of two core components: strategic theory and historical perspectives. The work of major strategic thinkers—such as Carl von Clausewitz, Sun Tzu, Thucydides, Alfred Thayer Mahan, Sir Julian Corbett, and Mao Tse-tung—provides an analytical foundation, while the case studies furnish the materials to construct an analytical framework to understand the interrelationship of policy and strategy. The current Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral John M. Richardson, has recently emphasized the importance of the study of these masters of war: “The nature of war has always been, and will remain, a violent human contest between thinking and adapting adversaries for political gain. Given this fundamental truth, the lessons of the masters—Thucydides, Clausewitz, Sun Tzu, Mao, Corbett, and, yes, Mahan—still apply.”³

The case studies allow students to evaluate and discuss the ways in which strategic leaders in the real world have successfully (or unsuccessfully) grappled with the challenges associated with the use of force and other instruments of power to attain national objectives. This course develops the analytical skills to deal more effectively with current problems in policy and strategy, and those that might emerge in the future.³

The Strategy and Policy Course addresses Senior Level Learning Areas for Professional Military Education established by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, additional areas of emphasis put forward in the United States Navy’s guidance on professional military education, the intent articulated by the President of the Naval War College for the development of an elite senior-level course, and the strategic challenges highlighted by the Department of Defense. The views of policy practitioners and leading teachers of strategy, as well as feedback from College graduates, shape the course content, as does the collective experience and judgment of the Naval War College faculty. Admiral Stansfield Turner advised:

If you attempt to make this a prep school for your next duty assignment, you will have missed the purpose of being here. If we trained you for a particular assignment or type of duty, the value of this college would be short-lived. We want to educate you to be capable of doing well in a multitude of future duties....Your objective here should be to improve your reasoning, logic, and analysis.⁴

At a time when the country and global community face daunting security challenges, the need for levelheaded and farsighted strategic analysis is of the utmost importance. The goal of the Strategy and Policy Course is to educate joint warfighters to become strategically minded and

³ Admiral John Richardson, *A Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority*, Version 1, January 2016.

⁴ Vice Admiral Stansfield Turner, “Challenge: A New Approach to Professional Education,” *Naval War College Review* Volume 25, no. 2 (Nov-Dec 1972), page 6.

skilled at critical analysis. The education received at the College is meant to be of lasting value for someone serving in the Profession of Arms and as a national security professional.

Student Outcomes

The Naval War College Senior-level Professional Military Education Outcomes applicable to this course are listed below. These outcomes, developed in synchronization with Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) Objectives, represent the Naval War College's expectations for those who successfully complete the Strategy and Policy Course.

Skilled in Strategic Decision-Making Involving Maritime, Joint, Interagency, and Multinational Warfighting

- Aware of maritime, joint, interagency, and multinational operations along with their strategic effects
- Skilled in applying sea power to achieve strategic effects across a wide range of conflicts
- Capable of integrating naval/military capabilities with other instruments of national power
- Understand challenges in accomplishing interagency and multinational coordination
- Enhanced awareness of American grand strategy from the founding of the Republic to the present day

Prepared for Positions of Strategic Leadership

- Able to think strategically about all types of wars and strategic actors
- Skilled in evaluating alternative strategic courses of action
- Enhanced cultural awareness of key regions to include an understanding of the dynamics of the international strategic environment and geostrategic relationships
- Skilled in persuasive leadership by practicing the craft of writing clearly and speaking articulately about operations, grand strategy, and policy
- Understand the importance of strategic communication and reaching multiple audiences

Capable of Critical Thought

- Empowered with analytical frameworks to support policy and strategy decision-making
- Master the meaning of a wide range of classical and contemporary strategic concepts
- Aware of critical thinking and decision-making by real-world, strategic leaders
- Competent in strategic-level problem solving, creative thinking, and risk management

Effective Maritime Spokespersons

- Understand classic works on sea power and maritime strategy
- Steeped in the maritime dimensions of warfare
- Understand warfare at sea—past, present, and future
- Conversant in a full range of naval capabilities
- Skilled in applying naval perspective through use of analytical frameworks
- Aware of naval operations and their strategic effects

Course Themes

The Strategy Department has developed eleven interrelated themes for use in the Strategy and Policy Course. These themes are neither a checklist of prescriptions nor a set of “school solutions,” for the conduct of war can never be reduced to a formula. Rather, they are sets of questions designed to provoke thought, discussion, and evaluation of alternative strategic courses of action. They will be used throughout the course because they can contribute to understanding the reasons for strategic effectiveness in contemporary war. The themes cannot provide the answers. Nonetheless, they are of critical importance as points of departure for analysis of and deliberation on key choices in strategy and policy decision-making. These themes thus provide a starting point for undertaking a critical analysis, assessing the match between alternative policy objectives and strategic courses of action.

We have divided these themes for the Strategy and Policy Course into two broad categories: those dealing with the process of formulating and executing strategies that support national policies; and those concerning the environment in which that process takes place.

STRATEGY AND POLICY COURSE THEMES

MATCHING STRATEGY AND POLICY THE PROCESS

- 1. THE INTERRELATIONSHIP OF POLICY, STRATEGY, AND OPERATIONS**
- 2. THE DECISION FOR WAR**
- 3. INTELLIGENCE, ASSESSMENT, AND PLANS**
- 4. THE INSTRUMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER**
- 5. INTERACTION, ADAPTATION, AND REASSESSMENT**
- 6. WAR TERMINATION**
- 7. WINNING THE PEACE AND PREPARING FOR WAR**

MATCHING STRATEGY AND POLICY THE ENVIRONMENT

- 8. THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION OF STRATEGY**
- 9. THE ECONOMIC AND MATERIAL DIMENSIONS OF STRATEGY**
- 10. THE INSTITUTIONAL DIMENSION OF STRATEGY**
- 11. THE CULTURAL AND SOCIAL DIMENSIONS OF STRATEGY**

MATCHING STRATEGY AND POLICY THE PROCESS

1. THE INTERRELATIONSHIP OF POLICY, STRATEGY, AND OPERATIONS

What were the most important political interests and objectives of the antagonists? Did these interests and objectives emerge from a sound understanding of geopolitics and geostrategy? To what extent were objectives driven by a threat to the homeland? Were these interests shaped by culture, ideology and/or religion? If so, how? Were these interests and objectives clearly articulated and understood? If a country or a belligerent possessed coherent long-term political objectives, as well as medium-term and short-term ones, were these sets of objectives compatible or in conflict? If the objectives were pursued by peaceful means, what instruments of national power did the country choose to employ? Were the correct instruments selected? If not, how might a country have performed better?

Were the problems that gave rise to the war susceptible to military resolution? If leaders decided to employ armed force in pursuit of their political objectives, did they also plan to use instruments of power other than military ones in support of their strategy? Were these plans appropriate? If war was chosen, did the military component of strategy tend to “crowd out” non-military components or considerations? What value did each participant in the conflict place on its political objectives? Were the costs and risks of the war anticipated? How did political and military leaders propose to manage these risks? Were the risks commensurate with the benefits and rewards to be achieved?

What strategic guidance did the political leadership provide to the military? What was the quality of that guidance? Did the strategic guidance place restraints on how force could be used? Were those restraints so stringent as to reduce the chance of operational success? Was the policy so amorphous that it was difficult to match a strategy to it? What military strategies did the belligerents adopt? Did the strategies strike an appropriate balance between defense and offense? To what extent did these strategies support their respective policies? At any point in the war did strategy drive policy? What assumptions did statesmen and military leaders make about the linkage between the achievement of military objectives and the achievement of political objectives? Did the political and military leaders think carefully in advance about how the other side would respond militarily and politically? What was the quality of the strategic leadership of the belligerents in the transition from peace to war, in the waging of war, and in the transition from war back to peace? Was the outcome of the war more the product of sound strategy and superior leadership on the part of the victors or more the result of self-defeating courses of action by the losing side?

2. THE DECISION FOR WAR

What were the causes of the war? Can a distinction be usefully drawn between the underlying causes of the conflict and the proximate cause of the opening of hostilities? Did war

develop because of the long-term rise of a major new power? Could the outbreak of the war have been averted by more skillful diplomacy? Was any attempt made to appease or engage a potential enemy, and if so, were the results productive or counterproductive? Did the existence of weapons of mass destruction influence the outbreak of war? If the war broke out despite an effort by one side to deter the other, why did deterrence fail? Were superior deterrent strategies available? In an effort to promote deterrence, did one side forward deploy some of its forces? If so, did the deterrent forces become vulnerable to preemptive attack? Was there something about the politics, culture, religion, or society of a belligerent that made him impossible or difficult to deter?

Given the political objectives sought, was the choice to go war a rational one? Was it based on an accurate appreciation of a state's (or non-state actor's) own capabilities, military potential, and vulnerabilities as well as those of its enemy? What role, if any, did military leaders play in the decision for war? Did they attempt to push the political leaders into the war? Did they attempt to restrain the political leaders from going to war? Or did they offer the political leadership a balanced analysis of the available strategic options? How did the nature of the political objectives shape the decision to go to war? What role, if any, did a vision of an ideal international order play in the decision to go to war? Did cultural, social, or religious considerations influence the decision to go to war? Did geopolitical concepts or geostrategic calculations influence the decision? Was the war conducted in self-defense? Was control over a disputed territory central to the decision for war? Was it undertaken to protect an ally or coalition partner? Was it waged to uphold a preexisting balance of power? Was it waged to overturn a preexisting balance of power? Was the war preemptive? If so, how accurate was the information about imminent enemy military action? Was the war preventive? If so, were the forecasts made about the growth in enemy capabilities reasonable and justifiable? Was the outbreak of the war optimally timed from the standpoint of the belligerent that initiated it? To what extent did careful predictions about the likely behavior of coalition partners and neutral states factor into the decision to go to war? If the war began with a surprise attack, what impact did that attack have? If another party intervened in an ongoing conflict, why did it do so? Was that intervention decisive in determining the war's outcome?

If the choice to go to war was in some measure irrational, then why? Did ideology skew decision-making? Religious beliefs? Unrealistic ambition? Status anxiety? False perceptions of threats? Erroneous historical analogies? Misconceptions about geopolitics or geostrategy? Did cultural arrogance promote either overconfidence or an underestimation of the enemy? Were there peaceful strategies that were potentially as promising or more promising than military ones that were nonetheless dismissed or overlooked? Did a third party or parties "drag" major powers into a war that none of them wanted? Did one power miscalculate how another power would respond to an aggressive or threatening action? Did the war start "by accident"?

3. INTELLIGENCE, ASSESSMENT, AND PLANS

How reliable and complete was the intelligence collected concerning the interests, intentions, capabilities and will of a country's rivals and potential enemies? What was the relative contribution of human sources and technology to the process of intelligence collection?

Did superiority in intelligence collection technology actually produce superior intelligence? Were there features of a belligerent's own political system, culture, or society that facilitated or inhibited the collection of intelligence against it, and if so, how? Were there characteristics of a belligerent's political system, bureaucracy, society, or culture that made it more difficult accurately to interpret or use the intelligence it collected? If a belligerent suffered a surprise attack, why was he taken by surprise?

Once war broke out, how successful were each belligerent's efforts to deny the enemy information about his own capabilities and intentions? As the war unfolded, how well in the event did each belligerent know both himself and his enemy? Were plans for the war based on an objective net assessment of friendly and enemy strengths and weaknesses? How well did each belligerent understand the culture, society, values, religious practices, political system, military traditions, and military potential of its enemy? How was that understanding reflected in the plans for the war? Was account taken of non-rational or unpredictable behavior on the part of the enemy? Was account taken of the possibility of the enemy's employment of asymmetric warfare or, if they existed, weapons of mass destruction? To what extent did civilian and military leaders correctly predict the nature of the war upon which they were embarking? Did they anticipate that the nature of the war might change over time? Did any leader stand out for his mastery of the art of assessment?

Did a country have a formal planning process designed to translate national policy into executable military strategies? If so, how effective was it? How responsive was it to changes in the international or domestic political environments? To what extent did the planners think about larger strategic issues, not just about operational concerns? Did the planners have to take account of two or more fronts or theaters? If so, how did they establish geostrategic priorities among those fronts or theaters? Were theater plans consistent with national strategies and geostrategic priorities? If the realization of national policy required the application of non-military instruments of power in addition to military force, was there any interagency mechanism for coordinating that application with the use of military power? What was the impact of interagency coordination on the development of strategic plans? Did coordination require fundamental changes in the quality and/or quantity of the planned use of military force? If allies were included in the planning process, how did their participation modify the war plans? Was a serious effort made to study the "lessons" of previous wars, and if so how did it affect planning for war at the levels of both grand strategy and theater strategy?

To what extent did plans bear the imprint of service doctrines and/or reflect accepted principles of war? Did plans correctly identify the enemy's strategic center or centers of gravity? His critical vulnerabilities? Were strategic plans informed by a sound grasp of the relationships among political ends and military and non-military means? If weapons of mass destruction existed, how did their existence influence the plans of those belligerents who had them and those who did not? To what extent did plans rely upon deception, surprise, information operations and/or psychological operations? To what extent were plans for information operations well integrated with plans for other military operations? What were the principal strategic effects planners sought to achieve? Did planning make adequate allowances for the inevitable fog, friction, chance and uncertainty of war? Did planners envision the possibility of a quick decisive victory? If so, was their vision realistic? If a war of attrition was likely, did planners anticipate

the different stages through which such a war might pass and the full range of operations that might be necessary? Did the initial plans consider how and when the war would be terminated, and what the requirements of the anticipated postwar settlement would be? Did any strategic leader distinguish himself for his brilliance, intuition, and/or imagination as a planner?

4. THE INSTRUMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER

How robust and well balanced were the diplomatic, informational, military and economic components of a belligerent's power? Did a belligerent's political and military leaders understand the strategic capabilities, effects and limitations of the different forms of national power at their disposal? Did the leaders take into account the political, financial, social and logistical constraints on the employment of the available instruments of national power? How well were diplomacy, economic initiatives and information operations coordinated, synchronized and de-conflicted with military operations?

How well did diplomacy support military power? How well did military power support diplomacy? What contribution did diplomats make to the understanding of other cultures, societies, and political systems? Did diplomats demonstrate an ability to think strategically? Did a country's diplomatic service develop an institutional point of view? If so, did that point of view help or hinder the state's attempt to match its grand strategy to its policy? Did diplomats act effectively to prevent the escalation of a war? To negotiate a timely and advantageous settlement to a war? To what extent did a country's diplomatic success depend on its actual relative power? To what extent did that success depend on the perception of its power?

How well did a belligerent utilize its economic resources in support of its political aims? Did it seek to influence other parties by means of subventions, foreign aid, loans, direct investment, or trade treaties? Did it attempt to deter or coerce its enemies by means of denial of aid, selective embargoes, partial or total suspension in trade relations, or blockades? If one belligerent engaged in economic warfare against another, how accurate were the assumptions he made about the effects of his economic campaign on the public health, standard of living, and/or will power of his enemy? What roles did the naval and/or air instruments play in the execution of such economic warfare? Did a belligerent have an information strategy? Did leaders develop a plan of strategic communication to reach multiple audiences? Was it developed through an interagency process? How flexible, imaginative and comprehensive was it? If a belligerent tried to improve its image abroad, how did it attempt to do so and with what success? Were the informational and/or propaganda campaigns of a belligerent aimed at the correct audiences? Were those campaigns based on a sound understanding of the culture, society, religion(s), values, traditions and language(s) of the targeted audience? If a belligerent was interested in promoting its own ideology abroad, how did it attempt to do so and with what results? If a belligerent was interested in countering what it deemed to be a noxious ideology abroad, what means did it employ? To what extent did it succeed? How well did political and military leaders engage in strategic communication with their domestic audience? How persuasive were the justifications they offered for the war? To what extent did political and military leaders manage to convince the domestic audience that their strategies would produce the desired results?

Did the military leadership understand how to integrate the different forms of military power for maximal national strategic and theater strategic effectiveness? Were plans that called for the use of different forms of military power informed by a common set of assumptions about how the use of force would translate into the achievement of the political objectives? If one side in a conflict was conspicuously more “joint” than the other, how important was this superior “jointness” to the outcome of the war? What limitations prevented a belligerent from attaining an optimal integration of its land, naval, and air operations during the war? Did any leaders stand out for their success in transcending those limitations? If army officers played a dominant role in the formulation of strategy, did they understand how the naval and air instruments could be used most effectively? Did naval commanders understand the circumstances under which it made strategic sense for them to risk their fleets? Was there a new domain of warfare in which a belligerent was able to operate to good strategic effect? Did strategists exploit opportunities created by technological innovation? Did any belligerent successfully translate asymmetries of technology into a strategic advantage? Was there a revolution in military affairs (RMA) prior to or during the war, and if so, did its operational consequences produce lasting strategic results? Did a belligerent make effective use of unconventional forms of military power and/or engage in irregular warfare?

5. INTERACTION, ADAPTATION, AND REASSESSMENT

How accurately were the consequences of interaction with the opponent predicted and anticipated by the parties to a peacetime conflict or by the belligerents in an open war? What effects did interaction with the opponent or enemy have on the nature (and the perception of the nature) of the conflict or war? Did the existence of weapons of mass destruction influence that interaction? At the outset of war, was the initial strategy implemented as planned, or were the pre-war strategic plans disrupted by unexpected enemy action? Was the interaction among the belligerents asymmetric, and if so, in what sense and with what consequences? Was one side able to make its adversary fight on its own preferred terms? If not, how well did strategists and commanders adapt to what the enemy did? How skillfully did a belligerent accommodate himself to the fog, friction and uncertainty of war? If the war became an attritional conflict, how successful were the belligerents in devising ways and means for intensifying the effects of attrition upon their opponents? Was the side that began on the defensive able to make a successful transition to the offensive? Did any strategic leader stand out as an adaptive improviser?

If a belligerent chose to open or contest a new theater of war, did this signify the adoption of a new policy objective or a new strategy, or was it merely an extension of a preexisting strategy? Was it a response to failure or stalemate in the original theater? Or was it an effort to seize a previously unanticipated opportunity created by the evolution of the war? Did it involve fighting the enemy in a different location or fighting an entirely new enemy? If the latter, what were the strategic consequences of fighting an additional enemy? Did it make strategic sense to open or contest the new theater? Was the new theater opened at the correct time? Did the social, cultural, religious, political, geostrategic and topographical environment of the theater promote military success, and if so, did that success have strategic “spillover” effects in the larger war? What role did maritime power play in opening or contesting the theater and supporting

operations there? If opening or contesting a new theater involved risking the fleet, how well did naval commanders manage that risk?

If the initial strategy proved to be successful, did that strategic success drive changes, whether wise or ill advised, in the political objectives? Alternatively, if the initial strategy proved to be unsuccessful or too costly, was there an opportune reassessment of either or both political objectives and strategy? If an additional state or other parties intervened on behalf of one side in the conflict, did this force the opposing side to rethink its policy and/or strategy and, if so, how? If there were any changes or adjustments in policy and/or strategy during the war, were these based on a rational and timely reexamination of the relationship between the political objective and the means available, both military and non-military?

6. WAR TERMINATION

How and why did the war come to an end? Did the war end due to the collapse of one of the belligerents? As a result of the capitulation of one of the sides? By means of negotiated settlement? If negotiations began before the end of hostilities, how well did each side's military operations support its diplomacy? Did the war end because of the unambiguous material or psychological destruction or defeat of one belligerent by the other? To what extent was the end of the war due to the exhaustion of the belligerents? Did one of the belligerents sue for peace after rationally concluding that the costs of continuing to fight outweighed the value of any political object that might be gained? Did that rational calculation occur only after a change of leadership on the losing side? Had the losing side earlier squandered realistic opportunities for a successful or partially successful end to the war? If a belligerent was committed to overthrowing its enemy's political regime, did that commitment translate into a longer war and heavier casualties? Did the end of the war come as a surprise? If so, did that surprise catch the victor unprepared to manage the process of war termination to his best advantage?

Did the winning side carefully consider how far to go militarily at the end of the war? In an attempt to maintain military pressure on its adversary, did it overstep the culminating point of victory? Or did the winning side stop too short to give the political settlement of the war a good chance to endure? Did the winning side carefully consider what specific demands to make on the enemy in fulfillment of its general political objectives? If the winning side chose to go further militarily in pursuit of greater political demands, what actual leverage did it acquire over the enemy? Did the long-term benefits of going further outweigh the short-term costs? If a leading power on the winning side put forward political demands that were opposed by its allies, what leverage, if any, did it exert on those allies to gain their acquiescence?

Was there a truce? If so, did military leaders negotiate the terms of the truce? In doing so, did they have, and heed, strategic guidance from their political leaders? Did the terms of the truce crucially shape the postwar settlement? To what extent did the postwar settlement satisfy the political objectives of the winning state or coalition? To what extent was the losing side or coalition reconciled to its political and military losses? Did the concluding operations of the war leave the victor in a strong position to enforce the peace? Had the victor planned adequately for the transition from war to peace? If the victorious belligerents had achieved the unlimited aim of

overthrowing the enemy regime, were they ready to carry out an occupation of the defeated country? If the victorious belligerents had pursued a more limited aim and had left the enemy regime in place, were they ready to execute, if necessary, a postwar policy of containment of the defeated country? Did the victors make appropriate deployments for postwar stability operations? Did they understand the cultural, religious, social and geopolitical contexts in which such operations would take place?

7. WINNING THE PEACE AND PREPARING FOR WAR

To what extent did the stability or instability of the settlement of the war stem from the nature of the settlement itself? Was the underlying conflict that had given rise to the war definitely resolved by the war? What were the implications, if any, of the “nature of the war” for the durability of the settlement? In the aftermath of a civil war, did a stable new political order emerge, or was there a recurrence of state failure? How did the outcome of an interstate war affect the geostrategic position of the victors in relation to the vanquished? Did a victorious power emerge from the war substantially stronger in relative and absolute terms? If so, did it attempt to exploit that strength to reshape the international order in a fundamental way? What ideological and/or geopolitical concepts informed the reshaped international order? Did the members of the winning coalition maintain the collective will to enforce the peace? Did the victorious coalition survive for long in the postwar era? Did old allies become new threats? If so, why? Did postwar occupations of defeated countries turn old enemies into new friends or allies? If so, how? Did the victorious powers “downsize” their military forces to such an extent that they undercut their ability to continue to secure the postwar international order and prevent the outbreak of a new war?

What were the major “lessons” of the war? What did the victorious side think that they were? What did the losing side consider them to be? How were the “lessons” of the previous war absorbed into the policies of winning, losing, and neutral powers? How were the “lessons” of the previous war absorbed into the military thought and doctrine of winning, losing, and neutral powers? Did strategic leaders presume the next war would be similar to the last one? Or did they strive to create conditions that would make the next war utterly dissimilar to the previous one? What impact did the previous war have on the character and tempo of military-technological progress and on the development of operational art? Was such progress seen as likely to favor the offense or the defense in the next war?

At what point did it become apparent that a postwar era had given way to a prewar era? Were there countries that should have recognized that transition earlier? Were there crises that portended the next war? If so, how well did status quo powers manage those crises? Did preoccupation with stabilizing the settlement of the last war distract attention from the next war that loomed? Were preparations for the next war hampered by bad memories, feelings of guilt, or long-term material costs from the last war? Did anticipation of mass destruction to the homeland in the next war affect preparations for it? Were preparations for the next war driven by a sense of injustice or a desire for revenge? How ready were a country’s government, society, and military establishment when a new war broke out? Were they ready for different types of war and a broad range of military operations?

MATCHING STRATEGY AND POLICY THE ENVIRONMENT

8. THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION OF STRATEGY

Did political and military leaders seize opportunities to isolate their adversaries from potential allies? If so, how successful were those efforts and why? Did the belligerents manage to create multinational coalitions? If so, what common interests and/or policies unified the coalition partners? Did coalition partners agree on who the primary enemy was? Did coalition partners generally agree about the strategy to be pursued in the war? If not, why not? What were the capabilities and limitations of the instruments of power that each partner brought to the coalition? Was there effective strategic coordination and burden sharing within a coalition, and what were the consequences if not? How freely did information, intelligence, and material resources pass among the members of a coalition? How important was coalition cohesion to the outcome of the war? Did that cohesion have ideological, cultural or geopolitical underpinnings? What contribution did intra-coalition diplomacy make to coalitional cohesion?

Did the strategies of the coalition have the effect of solidifying it or splitting it apart? Did strategies have the effect of strengthening an opposing coalition or weakening it? To what extent did allies act to support, restrain, or control one another? If a coalition disintegrated during the war, was this chiefly the result of internal stress, external pressure, or a combination of both? If coalition partners were culturally diverse, did cultural or religious differences contribute to internal stress? Did coalition dynamics help or hinder efforts to match strategy to policy? How did the action or inaction of allies contribute to strategic success or failure? What impact did coalition dynamics have on the process of war termination? If the winning coalition did not fall apart soon after the end of the war, what accounted for its post-war vitality?

How did the outcome of the war change the international system? Were there concerted efforts to reform those aspects of the international system that were thought to have caused the war? Were new international organizations and/or other transnational arrangements established in order to secure the peace? Did the war result in changes in the international distribution of both hard and “soft” power that had not been anticipated? What were the implications of the outcome of the war for the belligerents’ political stability, social structure, economic viability, ability to attract allies, and future military potential? Did the war stimulate non-state actors to rise up against existing states or empires? Did the war produce geopolitical change in the distribution of power among different regions? What were the implications of the outcome of the war for domestic and regional economies? For the world economic system as a whole? Did post-war economic instability breed new sources of political instability in the international environment?

9. THE ECONOMIC AND MATERIAL DIMENSIONS OF STRATEGY

What sort of economic system did the country possess? Was it predominantly agricultural, mercantile, industrial, or post-industrial? To what extent did the government direct

or control economic activity, and with what results? Did the defense industrial base (where one existed) do a good job of producing the weapons and developing the military technology that the country needed? Was a belligerent able to benefit militarily from ongoing or recent waves of technological innovation in the industrial, transportation, or communications sectors of the civilian economy? Was the economic system as a whole sufficiently dynamic, productive, and broad-based to support the country's strategic efforts to preserve or enhance its position in the international arena? Did a country's strategic efforts have the "feedback" effect of strengthening or weakening the country's economy? Did a gap open over time between strategic commitments and economic/fiscal resources available to support those commitments? If so, what were the ultimate consequences of that gap for the country's security? In wartime, how effectively did each belligerent mobilize the economic resources at its disposal? Did governments make wise decisions about how to allocate resources, including manpower, among different uses? Was there an effective interagency process for making such allocation decisions? How did a belligerent's financial strength, natural resources, manufacturing plant, scientific expertise, and technological prowess affect its ability to wage war? Were belligerents able to maneuver creatively but prudently around financial constraints? What were the implications of a belligerent's system of public finance for its staying power in a protracted war? Which of the belligerents had superior logistical systems for moving manpower and materiel to the theaters of war and sustaining forces there? How vulnerable were those systems to enemy interdiction? What role did shipping play in the logistical systems? Was the outcome of the war due more to material superiority or superior strategy?

If a belligerent adopted a strategy of economic warfare, how appropriate was this strategy and how well was it integrated with other strategies? How vulnerable were the belligerents to attack by strategies of economic warfare? How economically self-sufficient were they? How important were communications by sea to the functioning of a belligerent's economy? If air power was available, did the structure of a country's industrial sector and the location of its key productive assets make that belligerent especially vulnerable to strategic bombing? How adept were the belligerents at working around the effects of attacks on their material capability to wage war?

10. THE INSTITUTIONAL DIMENSION OF STRATEGY

Who were the main institutional players in the development of strategy? What were their roles, relationships, and functions? By what processes did they develop, integrate, and apply ends, ways, and means? How did theater commanders fit into the overall chain of command? How were the military forces of each belligerent organized? How well did that system of organization facilitate planning, executing and training for joint and combined warfare? Did a regular interagency process exist to coordinate the employment of military power with the use of other instruments of national power in pursuit of a belligerent's political objectives? If so, how effective was that process? How might that process have been improved? How freely was information shared among military and civilian agencies?

If there was rivalry among the military services, how did this affect the design and execution of strategy? Did such rivalries impede the presentation of a coherent military point of

view on strategy to the civilian leadership? Were the relations among military and political leaders functional or dysfunctional? If dysfunctional, why was this so and what were the consequences? Did problems in the chain of command, the interagency process, or the institutional structure of governmental authority contribute to excessive friction in civil-military relations? If there was intense competition within the governmental elite or among the participants in the interagency process, did this obscure the military leaders' understanding of the political objectives of the war? How did any lack of clarity or constancy in the political aim affect the wartime civil-military relationship? If the political leaders demanded of the military instrument something that it could not effectively deliver, or if they imposed overly stringent political restraints on the use of force, how did the military leadership respond? If military leaders proposed operations that promised to be militarily effective but entailed significant political risk, what was the reaction of the civil leadership? How attuned were military leaders to the need to assess and manage risk? How did the personalities of the key military and civilian leaders affect the civil-military relationship and the making of policy and strategy? Did any leader manifest conspicuous ability in managing civil-military relations and making sound tradeoffs between political and military considerations?

Did the transition from war to peace, or from one form of war to another, lead to any major institutional changes in the organization of a country's national security system? How well did new national-security institutions or a reformed interagency process perform in the next war? Were new institutions and old institutions able to work together effectively in both wartime and peacetime? Did institutional changes affect how the political and military leadership either divided their respective tasks or shared responsibility for strategy?

11. THE CULTURAL AND SOCIAL DIMENSIONS OF STRATEGY

How did a belligerent's culture, society, ideology and religion affect the formulation of policies and strategies? Did a belligerent's culture, ideology and social structure affect the quality of the policy/strategy match? Did a belligerent possess a discernable "strategic culture" or "way of war" and, if so, did this allow its adversary to predict and exploit its behavior?

If the war was an ideological struggle either in whole or part, how did the character of military action affect its course and outcome? Did non-military action or factors have a greater impact on how the struggle turned out? If the war involved a struggle for mass political allegiance, did culture, values, social structure, or religion give either belligerent a clear advantage? Did information operations and/or strategic communication have the effect of either reinforcing or negating any such advantage? If a conflict pitted different ethnic or religious groups against each other, how did the mobilization of ethnic and/or religious passions affect the conduct and outcome of the war? Was the war marked by heavy resort to terrorism? Was it possible for external powers to resolve the conflict by military or diplomatic intervention? If so, how? If not, why not?

Was the embodiment of Clausewitzian triangle—the relationship among government, people and the military—able to withstand the shock of battlefield reverses, catastrophic damage to the homeland, or the strain of protracted war? If not, why not? If the war was protracted, how

successful was the victorious side in weakening its adversary's society from within? Did information operations play a significant role in any such weakening? Did a belligerent's military strategy deliver sufficient "incremental dividends"—periodic successes or tokens of success—to maintain support for the war? Or did the strategy have the effect of diminishing domestic support for the war? Did belligerents attempt to mobilize and manage public opinion, and if so, with what success? Did the existence of communications media outside governmental control make it difficult for political leaders to manage public opinion at home and influence attitudes abroad? Did the "passions of the people" make it difficult for political and military leaders to maintain the proper relationship between policy and strategy?

Course Process and Standards

- 1. Methodology.** Each case study will be examined in-depth through a combination of faculty presentations, readings, tutorials, student essays, and seminars.
- 2. Seminar Assignments.** Each student has been assigned to a seminar for the duration of the course. Each of these seminars will be led by a faculty team composed of a military officer and a civilian academic.
- 3. Presentations.** Students will attend faculty presentations relating to each case study. These presentations enhance knowledge of the case study, provide insight into difficult strategic problems, and stimulate discussion and learning in seminar. At the conclusion of each presentation, the speaker will address questions about the presentation from the audience. This question and answer period is considered an integral part of the presentation. Students are encouraged to avail themselves of this opportunity so that others in the audience may benefit from the question and the speaker's response.
- 4. Readings.** Before seminar, students are expected to have read the books and articles assigned for that week's topic, as well as the student essays prepared for that week. These readings are the only assigned texts for the course. They are the only readings required for seminar preparation, for the writing of essays, and for the taking of the final examination. Books must be returned to the Publication Issue Room immediately upon completing the requirements for the course.
- 5. Course Requirements.** In addition to attending presentations, completing the assigned readings, and contributing actively in seminar discussions, students will write three essays: two seminar essays and one final examination. In computing the final grade, the following percentages will be used:

Essays—25 percent for each of two essays

Final Examination—25 percent

Seminar Preparation and Contribution—25 percent

A final course grade of B- or above is required for an award of a master's degree. Grading will be in accordance with Chapter III, Section 7 of the 2013 U.S. Naval War College *Faculty Handbook*.

- 6. Seminar Essays.** Each student will submit two essays of no more than ten double-spaced typewritten pages (Times New Roman, 12-point font) on questions listed in the syllabus. For matters relating to the format for documentation and bibliography, students should consult *A Writer's Reference*, pages 369-440 (MLA format). The seminar moderators will assign students their two essay questions at the beginning of the term. In the preparation of essays, students will find all of the information required to answer the question in the readings assigned for each case study. Students shall not consult any reading outside of those provided without procuring written permission from their moderators.

Students will submit a copy of the completed essay to each moderator no later than 0830 on the day before the seminar meets. In addition, the student will distribute a copy of the essay to each member of the seminar, as the papers are a part of the assigned readings for the week. Students must read the essays prepared by their seminar colleagues before the seminar meets.

The essay offers an opportunity to undertake a strategic analysis on issues where the information available is substantial. A good essay is an analytical “think piece” in which the author presents a thesis supported by arguments based on the information available in the assigned reading. A good essay will demonstrate five elements: it answers the question asked; it has a thesis; it marshals evidence to support that thesis; it considers, explicitly or implicitly, counterarguments to or weaknesses in the thesis and supporting evidence; and it does the above in a clear and well-organized fashion.

These five elements serve as the foundation for a grading rubric that articulates the expectations for the essay, sets base criteria for grading, serves to clarify the standards for a quality performance, and guides feedback about progress toward those standards. The ability to compose a succinct thesis, to marshal the evidence to prove it, and to address the most important counterarguments to that thesis are, taken together, the hallmark of analytical thinking that allows students to communicate ideas with clarity and precision.

7. Final Examination. Students will take a final examination at the end of the term. This examination will cover the work of the entire course.

All written work in the Strategy and Policy Course will be graded according to the following standards:

A+ (97-100): Offers a genuinely new understanding of the subject. Thesis is definitive and exceptionally well-supported, while counterarguments are addressed completely. Essay indicates brilliance.

A (94-96): Work of superior quality that demonstrates a high degree of original, critical thought. Thesis is clearly articulated and focused, evidence is significant, consideration of arguments and counterargument is comprehensive, and essay is very well-written.

A- (90-93): A well-written, insightful essay that is above the average expected of graduate work. Thesis is clearly defined, evidence is relevant and purposeful, arguments and counterargument are presented effectively.

B+ (87-89): A well-executed essay that meets all five standards of a seminar essay as outlined above. A solid effort in which a thesis is articulated, the treatment of supporting evidence and counterargument has strong points, and the answer is well-presented and well-constructed.

B (84-86): An essay that is a successful consideration of the topic and demonstrates average graduate performance. Thesis is stated and supported, counterarguments considered, and the essay is clear and organized.

B- (80-83): Slightly below the average graduate-level performance. Thesis is presented, but the evidence does not fully support it. The analysis and counterarguments are not fully developed and the essay may have structural flaws.

C+ (77-79): Below graduate-level performance. The essay is generally missing one or more of the elements described above. The thesis may be vague or unclear, evidence may be inadequate, analysis may be incomplete, and the treatment of the counterargument may be deficient.

C (74-76): The essay fails to meet the standards of graduate work. While it might express an opinion, it makes inadequate use of evidence, has little coherent structure, is critically unclear, or lacks the quality of insight deemed sufficient to explore the issue at hand adequately.

C- (70-73): Attempts to address the question and approaches a responsible opinion, but conspicuously fails to meet the standards of graduate-level work in several areas. The thesis may be poorly stated with minimal evidence or support and counterarguments may not be considered. Construction and development flaws further detract from the readability of the essay.

D (56-69): Essay lacks evidence of graduate-level understanding and critical thinking. It fails to address the assigned question or present a coherent thesis and lacks evidence of effort or understanding of the subject matter.

F (0-55): Fails conspicuously to meet graduate-level standards. The essay has no thesis; suffers from significant flaws in respect to structure, grammar, and logic, and displays an apparent lack of effort to achieve the course requirements. Gross errors in construction and development detract from the readability of the essay, or it may display evidence of plagiarism or misrepresentation.

8. Pretutorials and Tutorials. These conferences will normally be with the students who are preparing essays, but may be used for any other consultation desired by either the students or the faculty moderators. A pretutorial is required for every essay. It is meant to assure that the student understands the essay question. A required tutorial session will follow, in which the thesis of the essay will be discussed. Students who are writing essays should schedule a tutorial session with their moderators no earlier than one week before the date on which the essay is due. All students are encouraged to take advantage of these individual tutorials with their moderators as an aid in the preparation of their seminar essays.

9. Seminar Preparation and Contribution. Student contribution to seminar discussion is an essential part of this course. It is vital that students prepare for seminar. Each member of the seminar is expected to contribute to the discussion and to help the group as a whole understand the critical strategic and operational problems examined by the case study as well as the course themes and objectives.

The goal in assigning a classroom contribution grade is not to measure the number of times students have spoken, but how well they have understood the subject matter, enriched discussion, and contributed to their seminar colleagues' learning. This caliber of commitment entails that each student come prepared to take part in discussion by absorbing the readings, listening attentively to presentations, and thinking critically about both. The seminar is a team effort. Not to contribute or to say very little in seminar undercuts the learning experience for everyone in the seminar. Preparation and contribution will enhance the quality of the seminar. Additionally, it will facilitate the students' ability to demonstrate that they are able to comprehend and synthesize the course material and communicate their thoughts with clarity and precision.

Seminar preparation and contribution will be graded at the end of the term according to the following standards:

A+ (97-100): Contributions indicate brilliance through a wholly new understanding of the topic. Demonstrates exceptional preparation for each session as reflected in the quality of contributions to discussions. Strikes an outstanding balance of "listening" and "contributing."

A (94-96): Contribution is always of superior quality. Unfailingly thinks through the issue at hand before comment. Arrives prepared for every seminar, and contributions are highlighted by insightful thought, understanding, and contains some original interpretations of complex concepts.

A- (90-93): Fully engaged in seminar discussions and commands the respect of colleagues through the insightful quality of contributions and ability to listen to and analyze the comments of others. Above the average expected of a graduate student.

B+ (87-89): A positive contributor to seminar meetings who joins in most discussions and whose contributions reflect understanding of the material. Occasionally contributes original and well-developed insights.

B (84-86): Average graduate-level contribution. Involvement in discussions reflects adequate preparation for seminar with the occasional contribution of original and insightful thought, but may not adequately consider others' contributions.

B- (80-83): Contributes, but sometimes speaks out without having thought through the issue well enough to marshal logical supporting evidence, address counterarguments, or present a structurally sound position. Minimally acceptable graduate-level preparation for seminar.

C+ (77-79): Sometimes contributes voluntarily, though more frequently needs to be encouraged to participate in discussions. Content to allow others to take the lead. Minimal preparation for seminar reflected in arguments lacking the support, structure, or clarity to merit graduate credit.

C (74-76): Contribution is marginal. Occasionally attempts to put forward a plausible opinion, but the inadequate use of evidence, incoherent logic structure, and critically unclear quality of insight is insufficient to adequately examine the issue at hand. Usually content to let others form the seminar discussions.

C- (70-73): Lack of contribution to seminar discussions reflects substandard preparation for sessions. Unable to articulate a responsible opinion. Sometimes displays a negative attitude.

D (56-69): Rarely prepared or engaged. Contributions are uncommon and reflect below minimum acceptable understanding of course material. Engages in frequent fact-free conversation.

F (0-55): Student demonstrates unacceptable preparation and fails to contribute in any substantive manner. May be extremely disruptive or uncooperative and completely unprepared for seminar.

10. Grade Appeals. A request for a review of a grade on written work (weekly essays or final examination) may be made to the Department Executive Assistant no later than one week after the grade has been received. The Executive Assistant will then appoint two faculty members other than the original graders for an independent review. Anonymity will be maintained throughout. The second team of graders will not know the student's identity, the seminar from which the essay came, or its original grade. They will both grade the paper independently as though it were submitted for the first time, providing full comments, criticisms, and a new grade. The new grade will replace the old one. The student may request an additional review of the work in question, whereupon the Department Chair will review the appeal and either affirm the grade assigned on appeal or assign another grade (higher or lower), which then replaces any previous grade assigned. In exceptional circumstances, the student may make a further appeal to the Dean of Academics, whose decision in the matter will normally be final.

11. Academic Honor Code. Plagiarism, cheating, and misrepresentation of work will not be tolerated at the Naval War College. The Naval War College diligently enforces a strict academic code requiring authors to properly credit the source of materials directly cited to any written work submitted in fulfillment of diploma/degree requirements. Simply put: plagiarism is prohibited. Likewise, this academic code (defined in Chapter III, Section 6 of the 2013 U.S. Naval War College *Faculty Handbook*) prohibits cheating, and the misrepresentation of a paper as an author's original thought. Plagiarism, cheating, and misrepresentation are inconsistent with the professional standards required of all military personnel and government employees. Furthermore, in the case of U.S. military officers, such conduct clearly violates the "Exemplary Conduct Standards" delineated in Title 10, U.S. Code, Sections 3583 (U.S. Army), 5947 (U.S. Naval Service), and 8583 (U.S. Air Force).

Plagiarism is the use of someone else's work without giving proper credit to the author or creator of the work. It is passing off another's words, ideas, analysis, or other products as one's own. Whether intentional or unintentional, plagiarism is a serious violation of academic

integrity and will be treated as such by the College. Plagiarism includes but is not limited to the following actions:

- a. The verbatim use of others' words without both quotation marks (or block quotation) and citation.
- b. The paraphrasing of others' words or ideas without citation.
- c. Any use of others' work (other than facts that are widely accepted as common knowledge) found in books, journals, newspapers, websites, interviews, government documents, course materials, lecture notes, films, and so forth without giving credit.

Authors are expected to give full credit in their written submissions when utilizing another's words or ideas. While extensive utilization, with proper attribution, is not prohibited by this code, a substantially borrowed but attributed paper may lack the originality expected of graduate-level work. Submission of such a paper may merit a low or failing grade, but is not plagiarism.

Cheating is defined as giving, receiving, or using of unauthorized aid in support of one's own efforts, or the efforts of another student. (Note: NWC Reference Librarians are an authorized source of aid in the preparation of class assignments but not on exams.) Cheating includes but is not limited to the following actions:

- a. Gaining unauthorized access to exams.
- b. Assisting or receiving assistance from other students or other individuals in the preparation of written assignments or during tests (unless specifically permitted).
- c. Utilizing unauthorized materials (notes, texts, crib sheets, and the like, in paper or electronic form) during tests.

Misrepresentation is defined as reusing a single paper for more than one purpose without permission or acknowledgement. Misrepresentation includes but is not limited to the following actions:

- a. Submitting a single paper or substantially the same paper for more than one course at the NWC without permission of the instructors.
- b. Submitting a paper or substantially the same paper previously prepared for some other purpose outside the NWC without acknowledging that it is an earlier work.

12. Student Survey. Student feedback is vital to the future development of the Strategy and War Course. Your responses are treated anonymously and student information that is requested (seminar number, graduation date, and service) is used only to create standardized reports. The survey is designed to provide case study feedback on a weekly basis and overall feedback at course completion. You are highly encouraged to contribute your responses throughout the course rather than complete the entire survey in one sitting at the end of the course.

During the first week of the course, seminar leaders will distribute randomly generated passwords to each student in their seminars. Use this password throughout the course and do not share it with others. A paper copy of the survey is included in the syllabus to provide a

convenient place to record your draft feedback on lectures and seminars. You will still need to enter your responses electronically for the survey to be valid. All students should complete their course surveys prior to the final exam. Thank you in advance for your time and effort in completing this important assessment of the Strategy and Policy Course.

13. Online Resources. The main repository of online resources for the Strategy and Policy Course is Blackboard. On Blackboard, students can access the most current versions of the syllabus, course calendar, presentation schedule, and selected readings. Moreover, lecture handouts and presentation audio files will be posted on Blackboard along with other supplemental information including material specific to individual seminars. Lecture presentation audio files will be posted to Blackboard twenty-four hours after the lectures are delivered. Interested students may also request a copy of these audio files from the NWC classified library. (Students are requested to furnish blank CD/DVD media in order for the library to meet this request.)

The Strategy and Policy Department site on the War College web page also contains the course syllabus and course calendar. The information on this site may not be as current as the information on Blackboard, but will be of use to the general public and alumni. To access this site go to <http://www.usnwc.edu>, click on Departments on the right side of the page, and click on Strategy and Policy under Departments.

There are two types of readings assigned in this course that are only available on-line:

- 1) Documents noted as “Selected Readings” are available electronically through Blackboard;
- 2) Readings that are noted with web links in the syllabus are not available through Blackboard and must be downloaded from the internet. Compliance with copyright restrictions requires these linked readings be downloaded individually and in some cases the student must download the document while physically at the Naval War College and connected to the school’s network.

Please refer any questions to Christine Mello (Strategy and Policy Department Academic Coordinator), mellocc@usnwc.edu; 401-841-2188; Strategy and Policy Department, Office H-333.

STRATEGY AND POLICY DEPARTMENT FACULTY

Professor Michael F. Pavković currently serves as Chair of the Strategy and Policy Department and the Vice Admiral William Ledyard Rodgers Professor in Naval History at the College. He received his B.A. in History and Classics from the Pennsylvania State University and his Ph.D. in History from the University of Hawai‘i at Mānoa. Before joining the Naval War College, he served as an Associate Professor of history at Hawai‘i Pacific University, where he also coordinated the programs in Diplomacy and Military Studies. He has presented papers at national and international conferences and has also published a number of articles, book chapters, and reviews on topics relating to ancient, early modern, and Napoleonic military history. He is co-author of *What is Military History?* (Polity Press, 2nd edition, 2013). He is currently completing a book on sea power in the ancient world. He has held summer fellowships at West Point in Military History and at Harvard University’s Dumbarton Oaks Center for Byzantine Studies.

Captain Christopher P. Ramsden, U.S. Navy, the Executive Assistant of the Strategy and Policy Department, is a native of Windham, NH and holds a Bachelor of Science degree in Physics from Norwich University, a Master’s of Science degree in National Resource Management from the Industrial College of the Armed Forces at the National Defense University and is a graduate of the Defense Acquisition University’s Senior Acquisition Course. Since 1989, CAPT Ramsden has flown over 3,000 hours in the P-3C Orion on operational tours that include Commodore of Patrol and Reconnaissance Wing TWO (CPRW-2) in Kaneohe Bay, HI command of Patrol Squadron EIGHT (VP-8) in Brunswick, ME and overseas as Officer in Charge of Task Force 57 Forward. Additional sea duty assignments include Patrol Squadron TWENTY-SIX (VP-26), USS JOHN C. STENNIS (CVN-74) and Patrol Squadron FIVE (VP-5). Ashore, duty assignments include Patrol Wings Atlantic/Task Force 84, Patrol Squadron THIRTY (VP-30) and the Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance Weapons Tactics Unit. Additionally, he served as Assistant Program Manager for Training Systems (APMTS) for the new P-8A Poseidon at Naval Air Systems Command, PMA-205/290 in Patuxent River, MD. His most recent shore assignment was as Deputy Director for Battlespace Awareness (BA) and BA Functional Capability Board (FCB) Lead for the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC), managing DoD requirements and resources for the Joint Staff, J2 at the Pentagon.

Commander Thomas C. Baldwin, U. S. Navy, graduated from the U. S. Naval Academy in 1992 with a B. S. in Oceanography and holds a M. A. in Diplomacy from Norwich University and a M. A. in National Security and Strategic Studies from the U. S. Naval War College. As a Naval Aviator, CDR Baldwin has logged over 2,500 hours flying the SH-60B and MH-60R. Operational flying tours include Helicopter Antisubmarine Squadron Light FIVE ONE (HSL-51) and Helicopter Anti-submarine Squadron Light FOUR NINE (HSL-49). CDR Baldwin also served as a Catapult and Arresting Gear Officer in USS CARL VINSON (CVN 70) and commanded Helicopter Maritime Strike Squadron FOUR ONE (HSM-41). Staff tours include Flag Aide to Commander, Navy Region Southeast; Special Assistant for Congressional Matters to Commander, Navy Personnel Command; and Knowledge and Resource Manager, International Military Staff, NATO Headquarters, Brussels, Belgium.

Colonel Bob Cassidy, U.S. Army, Colonel Bob Cassidy, Ph.D., U.S. Army, a native of New England, received his doctorate in international security studies from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. He has master's degrees in international relations and security studies from Boston University, the Fletcher School, the École de Guerre, and the U.S. Naval War College. Colonel Cassidy has served in Iraq, Afghanistan, the Persian Gulf, and Grenada. He most recently served as a special assistant to the senior operational commander in Afghanistan during 2013-2014. He is the author of a number of articles and three books on irregular war and strategy. His books are *War, Will, and Warlords*, *Counterinsurgency and the Global War on Terror*, and *Peacekeeping in the Abyss*.

Professor Michael Aaron Dennis received his doctorate in the history of science and technology from the Johns Hopkins University in 1991. After postdoctoral fellowships at the Smithsonian Institution's National Air and Space Museum, as well as the Science Studies Program at the University of California, San Diego, he served as an Assistant Professor in Cornell University's Department of Science and Technology Studies as well as a member of the Peace Studies Program. After his time at Cornell, he worked as an adjunct at several universities in the metropolitan Washington, DC area, including Georgetown University's Security Studies and Science, Technology and International Affairs Programs; he also taught courses on technology and national security in George Mason University's BioDefense Program. His research and writing focus on the intersection of science, technology and the military with a special emphasis on World War II and the Cold War. He is currently completing a book manuscript on this topic, entitled, *A change of state: Technical Practice, Political Culture and the Making of Early Cold America*. His 2013 article, "Tacit knowledge as a factor in the proliferation of WMD: The example of nuclear weapons," won a prize from the Editorial Board of *Studies in Intelligence*, the journal in which it appeared.

Professor Andrea J. Dew holds a B.A. (Hons.) in History from Southampton University in the United Kingdom, and an M.A.L.D. and Ph.D. in International Relations from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University. In addition, she also lived in Japan for eight years where she studied advanced Japanese at the Kyoto Japanese Language School. Professor Dew has served as a Research Fellow at the Belfer Center for Science in International Affairs at Harvard University, and Senior Counter-Terrorism Fellow at the Jebson Center for Counter Terrorism Studies at the Fletcher School. She is the co-author of a book on armed groups, entitled *Insurgents, Terrorists, and Militias: The Warriors of Contemporary Combat* (Columbia University Press, 2009). Her most recent publications include "Exploiting Seams and Closing Gaps: Lessons from Mumbai and Beyond," *Journal of Strategic Studies*, and a co-edited book entitled: *Deep Currents, Rising Tides: The Indian Ocean and International Security* (Georgetown University Press, 2013). Dr. Dew is the Co-Director of the Center on Irregular Warfare and Armed Groups (CIWAG) at the US Naval War College.

Professor Frank "Scott" Douglas earned his Ph.D. from Columbia University's Political Science Department, where he focused on the use of air power for compellence in Bosnia and Kosovo and on developing strategies to coerce authoritarian regimes. Since coming to the Naval War College in 2004, he has also focused on building a strategic appreciation of the GWOT and is currently working on a manuscript

entitled *Killing an Idea: A Strategic History of the War Against Al Qaeda*. Professor Douglas is also a direct commission Naval Reserve Intelligence Officer, who served from 2009-2010 with a special operations task force in support of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. In addition, he served as a civilian academic advisor to Regional Command South West (RC(SW)) in Afghanistan during the AY 2011-12 Winter trimester. Dr. Douglas also holds an M.A. from Johns Hopkins University, School of Advanced International Studies, where he concentrated in Strategic Studies, and a B.S.F.S. degree from Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service. Additionally, he earned a regional studies certificate in East and Central Europe from Columbia's Harriman Institute and received a Foreign Language Area Studies Fellowship for Serbo-Croatian. Aside from his scholarly work, he has served as an election observer in Bosnia and as the director of a volunteer English teaching program in the Czech Republic from 1993-1995. As a reservist, he has also had the opportunity to support the CNO's Strategic Studies Group for seven years, to serve as a liaison to the Republic of Korea Navy during *Ulchi Freedom Guardian '12*, and serves currently as the CO of a Naval Special Warfare Intelligence support unit.

Professor John Garofano served as Dean of Academics from July 2009 to July 2015. Previously he taught in the National Security Affairs (2003-07) and Strategy and Policy (2007-09) Departments, with a focus on international relations theory, military intervention, civil-military relations, and the Korean and Vietnam wars. He held the CAPT Jerome Levy Chair in Economic Geography from 2006 to 2010, introducing lecture series on economics and running international conferences on the subject, the latest resulting in *The Indian Ocean: Rising Tide or Coming Conflict?*, co-edited with Dr. Andrea Dew published by Georgetown University Press in 2013. Dr. Garofano's research interests include military intervention, Asian security, and the making of U.S. foreign policy. Publications include *The Intervention Debate: Towards a Posture of Principled Judgment* (Strategic Studies Institute: 2002), *Clinton's Foreign Policy: A Documentary Record* (Kluwer: 2003), and articles in *International Security*, *Asian Survey*, *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, *Orbis* and the *Naval War College Review*. In 2011 Dr. Garofano deployed to Helmand Province, Afghanistan, to support the First Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF) in areas related to assessment and red-teaming. He has received Meritorious and Superior Civilian Service Awards from the Department of the Army and the Department of the Navy, and is the recipient of fellowships from the MacArthur Foundation, the Smith-Richardson Foundation, the Olin Institute, and numerous other research and travel grants. Prior to joining the War College Dean Garofano was a Senior Fellow at the Kennedy School of Government. He has taught at the U.S. Army War College, the Five Colleges of Western Massachusetts, and the University of Southern California. Dr. Garofano received the Ph.D. and M.A. in Government from Cornell University, an M.A. in Security Studies from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (Bologna/ Washington), and the B.A. in History from Bates College.

Professor Marc A. Genest is the Forrest Sherman Professor of Public Diplomacy in the Strategy and Policy Department and is Co-Director of the Center on Irregular Warfare and Armed Groups (CIWAG) at the Naval War College. He is also the Area Study Coordinator for the Insurgency and Terrorism electives program. In 2011, Professor

Genest served as a civilian advisor at Division Headquarters for Regional Command – South in Kandahar, Afghanistan, where he assessed the division’s information operations campaign. In 2009, Dr. Genest received the Commander’s Award for Civilian Service from the Department of the Army for outstanding service as a Special Advisor to the Commander of Task Force Mountain Warrior while stationed in Regional Command – East in Afghanistan. Dr. Genest earned his Ph.D. from Georgetown University in International Politics. Before coming to the Naval War College, Professor Genest taught at Georgetown University, the U.S. Air War College, and the University of Rhode Island. While at the University of Rhode Island, Professor Genest received the University’s Teaching Excellence Award. He also serves as a political commentator for local, national, and international radio news and television stations, as well as for Rhode Island and national print media. In addition, Dr. Genest worked on Capitol Hill for Senator John Chafee and Representative Claudine Schneider. Dr. Genest has received fellowships and grants from numerous organizations, including the United States Institute of Peace, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the Harry S. Truman Foundation, the Foundation for the Defense of Democracy, Smith-Richardson Foundation, and the Bradley Foundation. Professor Genest’s books include: *Negotiating in the Public Eye: The Impact of the Press on the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force Negotiations*; *Conflict and Cooperation: Evolving Theories of International Relations*; and *Stand! Contending Issues in World Politics*. He has also written articles dealing with international relations theory, strategic communication, American foreign policy and public opinion.

Professor Gregory S. Groth is the U.S. Department of State Faculty Advisor to the U.S. Naval War College and a 2015 graduate of the Naval War College. He has served in the U.S. Foreign Service for eighteen years as an Economic Officer, most recently as the Political/Economic Section Chief at the U.S. Mission to the Rome-based U.N. Food and Agriculture Organizations (2011 to 2014). Mr. Groth served as the Economic and Commercial Section Chief in Haiti from 2008 until 2011, including before and after the January 2010 earthquake. He has worked extensively in West and Central Africa, including three years as the Economic and Commercial Section Chief in Kinshasa, DRC (2005 - 2008) and the State Department’s Regional Refugee Coordinator for West Africa in the aftermath of the Liberian Civil War (2003 – 2005). Mr. Groth served earlier tours in Haiti, Hungary and Washington, D.C. Before joining the Foreign Service, Mr. Groth worked in the non-governmental organization field in West Africa (Senegal, Mali) and was a Peace Corps Volunteer fish culture extension agent in then-Zaire from 1979 to 1982. He holds a B.A. in Biology, Middlebury College, and an M.S. in International Agricultural Development from California Polytechnic State University. Mr. Groth speaks French, Haitian Kreyol and has working knowledge of German, Hungarian and Tshiluba, an African Bantu tongue.

Professor Phil Haun is the Naval War College’s Dean of Academics. Prior to joining the faculty in January 2016 he served as the Professor of Aerospace Studies at Yale University. Previously he served as the Senior Air Force Advisor at the Naval War College and taught in Strategy and Policy. He served for 29 years as an active duty U.S. Air Force officer and A-10 pilot with combat tours in Iraq, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan. He commanded an operational A-10 squadron, his military education includes a National Security Fellowship at the

JFK School of Government and he is a graduate of the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, USAF Command and Staff College, and USAF Weapons School. He holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from MIT, an MA in Economics from Vanderbilt, and an AB in Engineering Studies from Harvard. He is a research affiliate with MIT's Security Studies Program. His latest book with Stanford University Press is *Coercion, Survival & War: Why Weak States Resist the United States* (2015).

Professor Jacqueline L. Hazelton is a scholar of international relations. Her research interests include international security, compellence, asymmetric conflict, military intervention, counterinsurgency and insurgency, terrorism and counterterrorism, the uses of military power, and U.S. foreign and military policy. She received her Ph.D. from the Brandeis University Politics Department. She holds an MA in International Relations from the University of Chicago, an MA in English Language and Literature from Chicago, and a BA in English, also from Chicago. Hazelton previously taught at the University of Rochester and spent two years as a research fellow at the Belfer Center, Harvard Kennedy School. Before returning to academia, Hazelton was an Associated Press journalist whose posts included New York, Washington, and Tokyo.

Professor James Holmes is a Phi Beta Kappa graduate of Vanderbilt University and earned graduate degrees at Salve Regina University, Providence College, and the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. He graduated from the Naval War College in 1994, earning the Naval War College Foundation Award, signifying the top graduate in his class. Before joining the Naval War College faculty, he served on the faculty of the University of Georgia School of Public and International Affairs, and as a research associate at the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Cambridge, MA. A former U.S. Navy surface warfare officer, he served in the engineering and weapons departments on board USS WISCONSIN (BB-64), directed an engineering course at the Surface Warfare Officers School Command, and taught Strategy and Policy at the Naval War College, College of Distance Education. His books include *Theodore Roosevelt and World Order: Police Power in International Relations*, *Chinese Naval Strategy in the 21st Century: The Turn to Mahan* (co-author), *Indian Naval Strategy in the 21st Century* (co-author), *Red Star over the Pacific: China's Rise and the Challenge to U.S. Maritime Strategy* (co-author), and *Strategy in the Second Nuclear Age: Power, Ambition, and the Ultimate Weapon* (co-editor).

Captain Carol Hottenrott, U.S. Navy, is a 1987 graduate of the University of Pennsylvania with a B.A. and M.A. in Political Science/International Relations. She also holds an M.Phil. degree from The George Washington University. Captain Hottenrott has served extensively in the Pacific and Central Command Areas of Responsibility and her recent operational sea tours supported both OPERATIONS IRAQI FREEDOM and ENDURING FREEDOM. She commanded Destroyer Squadron NINE which embarked in USS ABRAHAM LINCOLN (CVN 72), Commander Task Group IRAQI MARITIME based on the Al Basrah oil terminal, USS HOWARD (DDG 83), and USS PELICAN (MHC 53). Shore tours included joint duty as a Senior Operations Officer at the National Military Command Center in the Pentagon; Congressional liaison in the Appropriations Matters Office for the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Financial Management and

Comptroller; and Director, Maritime Warfighting/Department Head curriculum at the Surface Warfare Officers School (SWOS). Prior to reporting to the Naval War College, Captain Hottenrott served as the Deputy Director, Defense Plans Division at the U.S. Mission to NATO in Brussels, Belgium.

Professor Timothy D. Hoyt is the John Nicholas Brown Chair for Counterterrorism Studies. Dr. Hoyt earned his undergraduate degrees from Swarthmore College, and his Ph.D. in International Relations and Strategic Studies from The Johns Hopkins University's Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies. Before joining the Naval War College's Strategy and Policy Department, he taught at Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service. He has testified before subcommittees of the House Committee on International Relations regarding terrorism in South and Southwest Asia, and is regularly involved in discussions on security issues in those regions with the U.S. and other governments. Dr. Hoyt's recent publications include studies on the war on terrorism in South Asia, the limits of military force in the global war on terrorism, the impact of culture on military doctrine and strategy, military innovation and warfare in the developing world, U.S.-Pakistan relations, and the impact of nuclear weapons on recent crises in South Asia. Dr. Hoyt served previously as Co-Chairman of the Indian Ocean Regional Studies Group at the Naval War College. He is the author of *Military Industries and Regional Defense Policy: India, Iraq and Israel*, and over 40 articles and chapters on international security and military affairs. He is currently working on a book on the strategy of the Irish Republican Army from 1913-2005, projects examining U.S. relations with India and Pakistan, studies on arms control and arms racing during and after the Cold War, and analyses of irregular warfare and terrorism in the 20th century.

Professor Colin F. Jackson studied at the University of Pennsylvania's Wharton School (M.B.A., Finance), Johns Hopkins' School of Advanced International Studies (M.A., International Economics and Strategic Studies), Princeton University's Woodrow Wilson School (B.A., Public and International Affairs), and completed his doctoral work in Political Science at MIT (Ph.D., Political Science—Security Studies). Professor Jackson's current research includes work on civil wars and insurgency, economics and strategy, public and private sector risk management, organizational learning, and intelligence operations. In 2011, Professor Jackson deployed as a mobilized Army reservist to Afghanistan where he served as the Executive Officer for Policy Planning for the Deputy Chief of Staff of Operations, International Security Assistance Force Afghanistan. Prior to entering academia, Professor Jackson worked for several years in the corporate sector in financial trading, telecommunications, transportation markets, and power development. He also served four years on active duty with the United States Army in Germany as an armor and cavalry officer. Professor Jackson continues to serve as a military intelligence officer in the U.S. Army Reserve.

Captain Vincent R. Johnson, U. S. Navy, graduated from the U. S. Naval Academy in 1993 with a B. S. in Physics and holds a M. A. in National Security and Strategic Studies from the U. S. Naval War College. As a Naval Aviator, CAPT Johnson has logged over 3000 hours flying the SH-60B, EA-6B and EA-18G. Operational flying tours include Helicopter Anti-submarine Squadron Light FOUR FOUR (HSL-44), Electronic Attack

Squadron ONE FOUR ONE (VAQ-141) and command of Electronic Attack Squadron ONE THREE FIVE (VAQ-135), The World Famous Black Ravens. During command, CAPT Johnson transitioned the Ravens from the EA-6B Prowler to the EA-18G Growler. He has deployed in support of DESERT FOX, ALLIED FORCE, IRAQI FREEDOM and ENDURING FREEDOM. Staff tours include Action Officer on the Joint Staff, Directorate of C4I (J-6) and most recently as Flag Air Operations and Plans Officer for Commander, Carrier Strike Group ELEVEN onboard USS NIMITZ where he additionally served as liaison to U. S. Naval Forces Central Command (NAVCENT).

Professor Burak Kadercan is an Assistant Professor of Strategy and Policy. He holds a Ph.D. and M.A. in political science from the University of Chicago and a B.A. in politics and international relations from Bogazici University in Istanbul, Turkey. Dr. Kadercan specializes in the intersection of international relations theory, international security, military-diplomatic history, and political geography. Prior to joining the Naval War College, he was Lecturer in International Relations at the University of Reading (United Kingdom) and Assistant Professor in International Relations and the Programme Coordinator for MA in International Security at Institut Barcelona d'Estudis Internacionals (IBEI). In addition to Reading and IBEI, he has taught classes on the relationship between war and state-formation, privatization of military power, research methods, international security, diplomatic history, foreign policy, and nations and nationalism at the University of Chicago, University of Richmond, and Bogazici University. He is currently working on three projects. The first project scrutinizes the relationship between territory and interstate conflict, with an emphasis on nationalism's place in the said relationship. The second explores the conceptualization of empires in IR theory and historiography with a special focus on the case of the Ottoman Empire. The third project, in turn, examines the association between civil-military relations and the production as well as diffusion of military power. Dr. Kadercan's scholarly contributions have appeared in outlets such as International Security, Review of International Studies, and International Studies Review.

Commander Timothy P. Kollmer, U.S. Navy, is a 1991 graduate of Stony Brook University with a B.E. in Electrical Engineering. He holds an M.A. in National Security and Strategic Studies from the U.S. Naval War College. A submariner, he has served as Commanding Officer of Naval Submarine Support Center, New London and completed operational tours on USS WYOMING (SSBN-742), USS MARYLAND (SSBN 738) and USS SCRANTON (SSN 756). He has deployed to the Mediterranean Sea, the Northern Atlantic Ocean and the Arabian Gulf. Shore assignments include tours at Nuclear Power Training Units in Ballston Spa, New York and Charleston, South Carolina and on the staffs of Commander Submarine Development Squadron TWELVE and Commander, Submarine Squadron TWO.

Commander Robert A. Krivacs, U.S. Navy, is a 1991 graduate of the United States Naval Academy with a B.S. in Economics. He holds an M.A. in National Security and Strategic Studies from the Naval War College. Designated a Naval Aviator in 1993, his operational experience includes Western Pacific, Indian Ocean, and Persian Gulf deployments while forward deployed in Guam with Helicopter Combat Support

Squadron FIVE as well as Helicopter Combat Support Squadron ELEVEN. He served as Air Boss on USS DULUTH while stationed off of Aden, Yemen following the bombing of and in support of USS COLE. His staff tours include being a Fleet Replacement Squadron Instructor in Helicopter Combat Support Squadron THREE, a Placement Officer in the Bureau of Naval Personnel (BUPERS), and deputy director of PERS-44 in BUPERS. In 2007, he served as 4th Stryker Brigade Combat Team, 2nd Infantry Division (4/2 SBCT) Electronic Warfare Officer in Iraq. Responsible for 4/2 SBCT electronic counter-IED efforts and electronic attack, he supported and patrolled with the 38th Engineering Company, 4th Battalion, 9th Infantry Regiment, 2nd Battalion, 12th Field Artillery Regiment, 2nd Squadron, 1st Cavalry Regiment, 2nd Battalion, 23rd Infantry Regiment and 1st Battalion, 38th Infantry Regiment operating out of Camp TAJI, north of Baghdad and Forward Operating Base WARHORSE in the Diyala Province.

Professor Heidi E. Lane is Associate Professor of Strategy and Policy and Director of the Greater Middle East Research Study Group. She has conducted extensive field research in the Middle East, including as research affiliate with the Truman Institute for the Advancement of Peace at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and as a U.S. Fulbright scholar in Syria. She was a research fellow with the International Security Program at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University from 2010-2012. She is currently a senior associate at the Center for Irregular Warfare and Armed Groups (CIWAG) at the Naval War College. Her areas of specialization are ethnic and religious nationalism, insurgency and terrorism, and de-radicalization. She is currently completing research on a book manuscript about the effects of counterterrorism programs on state liberalization in the Middle East. She also taught as a visiting instructor in Department of Government, Claremont-McKenna College before joining the US Naval War College in 2003. Dr. Lane holds a M.A and Ph.D. in Islamic Studies from the Center for Near Eastern Studies, University of California, Los Angeles and a B.A. from the University of Chicago. She is trained in Arabic, Hebrew, and Persian.

Lieutenant Colonel Nathan Maker, USMC, is a Marine artillery officer and native of New England who graduated from the University of Connecticut in 1993 with a B.A. in History, earning his commission through the Marine Platoon Leaders Class Program. His tactical and fire support experience includes over eleven years with the 11th Marines, 1st Marine Division and 14th Marines, 4th Marine Division, including the 1st Marine Division's invasion of Iraq in March, 2003. Lieutenant Colonel Maker recently completed a three year tour at U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM), where he served in the Joint Operations Directorate, Plans Division, executing the duties of Joint Fires Element Branch Chief; a multi-service and multi-discipline organization responsible for designing and operationalizing theater-strategic and operational lethal and non-lethal targeting strategies for the USCENTCOM commander in support of crisis action and deliberate planning efforts. He holds a M.A. in National Security and Strategic Studies from the U.S. Naval War College and a M.A. in U.S. History from American Military University. His personal decorations include the Defense Meritorious Service Medal, Meritorious Service Medal (three awards), Navy and Marine Corps Commendation Medals (two awards), Joint Service Achievement Medal, Navy and Marine Corps Achievement Medal (two awards), and the Combat Action Ribbon.

Captain Ralph J. Marro, MSC, U.S. Navy, enlisted in the U.S. Navy in 1984. After graduating from boot camp, he attended “A” and “C” schools and served as a hospital corpsman (pharmacy technician) at Naval Hospital, Newport, in Newport, RI from 1985-1988. After separating from the Navy to complete his academic studies, he obtained B.S. and M.S. degrees in radiological health physics from the University of Massachusetts-Lowell and has served as a commissioned officer since 1995. After completing initial Officer Indoctrination School and Radiation Health Officer (RHO) training, he was assigned to the Naval Dosimetry Center in Bethesda, MD from 1995-1997. From 1997-1999, he served as the Medical Department Division Officer and RHO on board the submarine tender, USS EMORY S. LAND (AS 39). From 1999-2002, he served as Assistant Director, Radiation Health Division at Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard & IMF, Pearl Harbor, HI. From 2002-2005, he served as the Radiation Safety Officer at Naval Medical Center, Portsmouth, in Portsmouth, VA. From 2005-2008, he served as Deputy Program Manager for the Nuclear Test Personnel Review Program at Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), in Alexandria, VA. From 2008-2010, he served as the Director, Radiation Health Division, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard, in Kittery, ME. He then attended the Naval War College in Newport, RI, and was awarded a M.A. degree in National Security and Strategic Studies and Joint Professional Military Education Phase II credit. Before reporting as the Director of Source Operations at Armed Forces Radiobiology Research Institute (AFRRI), in Bethesda, MD, he deployed to U.S. Pacific Command to provide radiological support as part of Operation Tomodachi.

Professor John H. Maurer is the Alfred Thayer Mahan Professor of Sea Power and Grand Strategy and served as the Chair of the Strategy and Policy Department. He is a graduate of Yale University and holds an M.A.L.D. and Ph.D. in International Relations from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University. He is the author or editor of books examining the outbreak of the First World War, military interventions in the developing world, naval rivalries and arms control between the two world wars, and a study about Winston Churchill’s views on British foreign policy and grand strategy. He also serves as a senior research fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, on the Editorial Board of *Orbis: A Journal of World Affairs*, the Academic Board of Advisers of the Churchill Centre, and Associate Editor of *Diplomacy and Statecraft*. He served on the Secretary of the Navy’s advisory committee on naval history. In recognition for his service and contribution to professional military education, he has received both the U.S. Navy’s Meritorious Civilian Service Award and Superior Civilian Service Award. At the Naval War College, he teaches a special advanced class on sea power and grand strategy, and a popular elective course on Winston Churchill as a statesman, strategist, politician, soldier, and war leader.

Professor Kevin D. McCranie received a B.A. in History and Political Science from Florida Southern College, and an M.A. and Ph.D. in History from Florida State University. Before joining the faculty of the Naval War College, he taught history at Brewton-Parker College in Mount Vernon, Georgia. In 2001, he held a fellowship at the West Point Summer Seminar in Military History. Specializing in warfare at sea, navies, sea power, and joint operations during the “Age of Sail,” he is the author of *Admiral Lord*

Keith and the Naval War against Napoleon (University Press of Florida, 2006), as well as *Utmost Gallantry: The U.S. and Royal Navies at Sea in the War of 1812* (Naval Institute Press, 2011). His articles have appeared in *Naval History*, *The Journal of Military History*, and *The Northern Mariner*.

Colonel Michael J. Mooney, USMC, enlisted in the Marine Corps as an infantryman in July 1985, and received his commission from the U.S. Naval Academy in 1992 (B.S in History) He holds an M.A in Leadership from the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, an M.A. in National Security and Strategic Studies from the U.S. Naval War College., and is a graduate of the George C. Marshall Center Program on Terrorism and Security Studies (PTSS). During two tours at 2d Reconnaissance Battalion he commanded a reconnaissance platoon and two reconnaissance companies, as well as serving as the Battalion Intelligence Officer and the Battalion Operations Officer. From Feb 2008-Jan 2011, he commanded 1st Reconnaissance Battalion, completing combat deployments to Iraq (OIF 08.2) and Afghanistan (OEF 10.1). Other assignments include service with the USMC Coalition and Special Warfare Division, the 2d Marine Regiment (RCT-2) during OIF 1, and as a Company Officer/Leadership Instructor at the U.S. Naval Academy. He additionally co-teaches the Intro/Advanced Special Operations elective classes at NWC, serves as a Senior Associate with the Center on Irregular Warfare and Armed Groups (CIWAG) as well as an adjunct professor with the Marshall Center's PTSS course. Outside of the Marine Corps, Col Mooney has served in several SOF units, completing multiple overseas deployments. His most recent assignment was as the J-35 Future Operations Division Chief at the Joint Special Operations Command, Ft Bragg, NC.

Professor Richard A. Moss earned a B.A. from the University of California Santa Barbara and an M.Phil and Ph.D. in History from the George Washington University. He specializes in U.S.-Soviet relations during the Cold War and is an expert on the Nixon presidential recordings. Dr. Moss previously served as a government and contract military capabilities analyst with the U.S. Department of Defense, and as an historian with the U.S. Department of State. His manuscript, *Nixon's Back Channel to Moscow: Confidential Diplomacy and Detente*, is under contract with the University Press of Kentucky for publication in 2016.

Colonel Paul R. Murphy, U. S. Air Force, is the Alan Sheppard Professor of Air & Space Warfare and Senior Air Force Advisor to the President of the Naval War College. A graduate of the Boston Latin School, with a B.A. in Computer Science from Northeastern University. He has a M.A. from Embry Riddle Aeronautical University, an M.A. in Logistics & Mobility from the AF Institute of Technology, and M.As in National Security Studies from both the College of Naval Command & Staff (Distinguished Graduate), and the Air War College (Academic Distinction). Additionally, Col Murphy attended Joint Forces Staff College (McArthur Foundation Award), and is a graduate of the USAF Advanced Study of Air Mobility (ASAM) course. A command pilot with over 3,300 flying hours, he has held several key staff billets at Headquarters Air Force (A8PM the air mobility & special-ops programs portfolio & Chair of the Global Mobility Panel), USSTRATCOM J3/4 and Air Mobility Command (Chief of Programming, Force

Structure & Installations). Prior to the Naval War College, Col Murphy commanded the 305th Air Mobility Wing (KC-10 & C-17s) at Joint-Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst, was Vice Commander of the 380th Air Expeditionary Wing (KC-10, U-2, RQ-4, AWACS), Southwest Asia, and Deputy Group Commander of the 55th Operations Group (RJ-135, WC-135, COBRA BALL, COMBAT SENT, E-4/NAOC) Offutt AFB, NE. He is also a graduate of, and later commanded, the USAF's KC-135 Weapons Instructor Course, Fairchild AFB WA. He has a plethora of contingency, humanitarian relief, combat, combat support, special operations, and nuclear alert experience stretching from DESERT STORM through current operations in Iraq, the Horn of Africa and Afghanistan.

Professor Nicholas Murray received his B.A. Hons. in War Studies from King's College, University of London. He holds a M.St. in European History and a D.Phil. in Modern History from the University of Oxford. He is also a Fellow of the Royal Historical Society. Prior to joining the Naval War College, he served as associate professor of military history at the US Army Command and General Staff College. While there, in addition to his faculty and teaching duties, he served as coordinator for the master's degree program in history, completely revamping the program during his tenure. Additionally, he assisted with the establishment of the Art of War Scholar's program. For the above he received the Department of the Army Commander's Award for Civilian Service, and for his teaching he was named Civilian Educator of the Year for History in 2013. For his continued work in these areas, in December of 2014 he was awarded the Department of the Army Superior Civilian Service Award. He is the author of *The Rocky Road to the Great War: the evolution of trench warfare to 1914*. He has also written articles on fortification and the evolution of warfare in the 19th and early 20th centuries, and he is currently editing two books. His recent focus has been on professional military education (PME) on which he has published several articles and op-eds. Based upon his research into PME he was asked to assist the Undersecretary of Defense (P&R) with advice on the revision of PME, and with the establishment of a program for improving the teaching of strategy to the services.

Commander Michael O'Hara, U.S. Navy is a Permanent Military Professor in the Department of Strategy and Policy and National Security Fellow at Brown University's Watson Institute of International and Public Affairs. He holds an M.Phil from Columbia University, where he is completing his Ph.D. in Political Science (International Relations and Comparative Politics). He is a 1995 graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy and the 2010 honor graduate of the Naval War College (highest distinction). His operational experience includes carrier-jet aviation (S-3B Viking NFO) and naval intelligence with flying and staff deployments in three aircraft carriers and in Kabul, Afghanistan. He is currently writing a dissertation examining five decades of Freedom of Navigation operations. His research interests include coercion, diplomatic communication and signaling, and decision-making.

Professor Sarah C. M. Paine is the William S. Sims Professor of History and Grand Strategy. She earned a B.A. in Latin American Studies at Harvard, an M.I.A. at Columbia's School for International Affairs, an M.A. in Russian at Middlebury, and a Ph.D. in history at Columbia. She has studied in year-long language programs twice in

Taiwan and once in Japan. She wrote *Imperial Rivals: China, Russia, and Their Disputed Frontier* (M. E. Sharpe, 1996) Jelavich prize, *The Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895* (Cambridge, 2003), and *The Wars for Asia, 1911-1949* (Cambridge, 2012) PROSE award and Leopold Prize, and edited *Nation Building, State Building, and Economic Development* (M.E. Sharpe, 2010); and co-wrote with Bruce A. Elleman *Modern China: Continuity and Change 1644 to the Present* (Prentice Hall, 2010) and co-edited *Naval Blockades and Seapower, Naval Coalition Warfare, and Naval Power and Expeditionary Warfare* (Routledge, 2006-11), and *Commerce Raiding and Navies and Soft Power* (NWC Press, 2013-2015). She has received year-long grants twice from the Fulbright Program (Taiwan, Japan) and IREX (Taiwan, Soviet Union), and one year each from the Committee for Scholarly Communication (China); Hokkaido University (Japan); and the National Library of Australia, a Chiang Ching-kuo Foundation fellowship, and an Earhart Foundation grant (Australia); and a Hoover Institution National Fellowship (Stanford).

Commander Michael J. Riordan, U.S. Navy, graduated with distinction from the U.S. Naval Academy (B.S., History Honors, 1994) and the U.S. Naval War College (M.A., National Security & Strategic Studies, 2006). He holds a Master's Degree in International Public Policy from the Johns Hopkins University Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, a Legislative Certificate from Georgetown University, and subspecialties in National Security Studies, Education, and Strategy. He is a graduate of the National Defense University's Joint Forces Staff College. A Surface Warfare, Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD), and Joint officer, CDR Riordan has deployed to the Persian Gulf, led EOD operations in Kosovo in 1999 as part of the initial Kosovo Stabilization Force (KFOR), deployed in support of Special Operations Command Europe (SOCEUR) contingency missions, and directed EOD operations across U.S. Southern Command. He has served as a Defense Sensitive Support officer meeting national intelligence community requirements; as an associate fellow on the CNO Strategic Studies Group (CNO SSG); and was the first naval officer assigned to the Joint IED Defeat Task Force in support of combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Previously, CDR Riordan served as Director of Congressional Affairs at U.S. European Command and senior Congressional advisor to the Commander, U.S. European Command and Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR) following a Defense Legislative Fellowship in the office of Senator Edward M. Kennedy (D-MA), Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee's Subcommittee on Sea Power.

Professor Nicholas Evan Sarantakes earned a B.A. from the University of Texas. He has a M.A. from the University of Kentucky, and holds a Ph.D. from the University of Southern California. All three degrees are in history. His first two books looked at the battle and occupation of Okinawa: *Keystone: The American Occupation of Okinawa and U.S.-Japanese Relations* (2000), which was followed by *Seven Stars: The Okinawa Battle Diaries of Simon Bolivar Buckner, Jr. and Joseph Stilwell* (2004). His next book looked at coalition warfare: *Allies Against the Rising Sun: The United States, the British Nations, and the Defeat of Imperial Japan* (2009). His fourth book, *Dropping the Torch: Jimmy Carter, the Olympic Boycott, and the Cold War* (2010), is a diplomatic history of the 1980 Olympic boycott. His most recent book is *Making Patton: A Classic War Film's Epic Journey to the Silver Screen* (2012). He is currently writing a book on the battle of

Manila, and another on the home front in World War II. He has written a number of articles that have been appeared in journals and publications such as *Diplomatic History*, *English Historical Review*, *The Journal of Military History*, *Joint Forces Quarterly*, and ESPN.com. He is a Fellow of the Royal Historical Society and has received five writing awards. He previously taught at Texas A&M University—Commerce, the Air War College, the University of Southern Mississippi, and the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. He is a book review editor for *Presidential Studies Quarterly*.

Professor George Satterfield holds a Ph.D. in history from the University of Illinois. Before joining the Naval War College, he served as an assistant professor at Morrisville State College, and as an associate professor at Hawaii Pacific University, where he taught courses in history. Dr. Satterfield is the author of *Princes, Posts, and Partisans: The Army of Louis XIV and Partisan Warfare in the Netherlands, 1673-1678*. This book received a distinguished book award from the Society for Military History. Dr. Satterfield is also the author of articles on several topics in military history, including irregular warfare and revolutions in military affairs.

Professor Tim Schultz is the Naval War College's Associate Dean of Academic Affairs for Electives and Research. He joined the Strategy and Policy Department in 2012 as an Air Force colonel and became the Associate Dean in 2014 after retiring from active duty. Prior to joining the Newport faculty he served as the Dean of the U.S. Air Force's School of Advanced Air and Space Studies from 2009-2012 at Maxwell AFB, Alabama. Tim earned his Ph.D. in the History of Science and Technology from Duke University in 2007. His research interests include the transformative role of automation in warfare and the impact of technological change on institutions, society, and military strategy. He is a 1988 graduate of the U.S. Air Force Academy and studied at Colorado State University, Fort Collins (M.S. in Cellular Biology), the Air Command and Staff College (M.A. in Military Operational Art and Science), and the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies (M.A. in Airpower Art and Science). He spent much of his military career in the high-altitude reconnaissance community as a U-2 pilot enjoying the view over interesting regions of the globe.

Commander John Michael Sheehan, U. S. Navy, is a Naval Aviator commissioned through Aviation Officer Candidate School in May 1989. Commander Sheehan holds degrees from the United States Naval Postgraduate School (Ph.D. in Security Studies), George Mason University (M.A. in American History), Columbia College (M.B.A.), United States Naval War College (M.A. in National Security and Strategic Studies), and San Jose State University (B.S. in Aeronautics). An attack pilot, Commander Sheehan served in VA-115 at NAF Atsugi, Japan and aboard USS Independence (CV-62). In 1995, he joined VA-196 for the final Intruder deployment, serving as a Forward Air Controller/Airborne. He transitioned to the EA-6B, and served two tours with VAQ-141 as Prowler Tactics Instructor and Night Vision Goggles Instructor. He has logged over 3,500 flight hours and 750 arrested landings on 9 aircraft carriers. Ashore, CDR Sheehan served on the Joint Staff in J-5 Strategy as the lead for Security Cooperation and Global Posture Realignment. He subsequently served as engagement lead for South and East Africa at United States Naval Forces Africa in Naples, Italy. In 2010, he was selected as a doctoral candidate in Security Studies at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School. After

earning his doctorate, he joined the faculty of the United States Naval War College in October 2013.

Professor David R. Stone received his B.A. in history and mathematics from Wabash College and his Ph.D in history from Yale University. He has taught at Hamilton College and at Kansas State University, where he served as Director of the Institute for Military History. He has also been a fellow at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences at Stanford University. His first book *Hammer and Rifle: The Militarization of the Soviet Union, 1926-1933* (2000) won the Shulman Prize of the Association for Slavic, East European, and Eurasian Studies and the Best First Book Prize of the Historical Society. He has also published *A Military History of Russia: From Ivan the Terrible to the War in Chechnya* (2006), and *The Russian Army in the Great War: The Eastern Front, 1914-1917* (2015). He edited *The Soviet Union at War, 1941-1945* (2010). He is the author of several dozen articles and book chapters on Russian / Soviet military history and foreign policy.

Lieutenant Colonel Paul Theriot, U.S. Air Force, is a Military Professor in the Strategy and Policy Department. He holds a Masters in Aeronautical Science from Embry-Riddle University, is a 1998 graduate of the U.S. Air Force Academy and a 2011 graduate of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. He is a graduated C-17 Squadron Commander and his operational experience includes a deployed command tour, an Air Mobility Liaison Officer deployment to Bagram AB, Afghanistan and multiple flying deployments with C-17 flying squadrons since 2000. His staff experience includes two years serving on the Air Staff in the Operations Plans and Requirements directorate at the Pentagon, Washington, DC.

Professor Anand Toprani is a specialist in energy geopolitics and great power relations. He earned an A.B. in History from Cornell University, an M.Phil. in Modern European History from University College, Oxford, and a Ph.D. in History from Georgetown University. He was also the recipient of the Smith Richardson Predoctoral Fellowship in International Security Studies from Yale University and the Ernest May Fellowship in History & Policy from Harvard University. Dr. Toprani previously served as an historian with the U.S. Department of State and as a strategic analyst at U.S. Central Command. His academic work has appeared or been accepted for publication in scholarly journals such as *Diplomatic History*, the *Journal of Strategic Studies*, and the *Journal of Military History*, and he is currently preparing a manuscript on oil and grand strategy for publication.

Professor Michael F. Van Vleck, a 1981 graduate of the United States Merchant Marine Academy, Kings Point, New York. He holds a B.S. in Marine Transportation and a M.A. in National Security and Strategic Studies from the Naval War College. He has completed the Defense Leadership and Management Program (DLAMP) and Advanced JPME program at Joint Forces Staff College. He holds a USCG Master's license and is a retired Captain, US Navy Reserve. He has 27 years of commercial maritime and Military Sealift Command experience afloat and ashore. Prior to his assignment at the Naval War College, he was assigned as Military Sealift Command Pacific/Naval Fleet Auxiliary

Force, West Deputy Director, later restructured as Deputy Commander, Commander Sealift Logistics. Professor Van Vleck reported to the Naval War College in 2005 to lead, manage, and field the Online Professional Military Education continuum for junior officers and enlisted sailors. He is a member of the College of Distance Education Strategy and Policy faculty.

Lieutenant Colonel Noah Villanueva, U.S. Army, is a 1994 ROTC graduate from Campbell University where he earned a B.S. in Biology. He holds a Master's of Education degree with a specialization in Human Resources from the University of Louisville and a Ph.D. in Business Organization and Management with a specialization in Human Resource Management from Capella University. He is a resident graduate of the Army's Intermediate Level Education course. His most recent assignment was as the Division Chief for the Field Artillery MOS, Directorate of Training and Doctrine, Fires Center of Excellence. He has served on four deployments- twice in Bosnia as a Fire Direction Officer and Fire Support Officer with 3ID and twice to Iraq as an Operations Officer and Fire Support Officer with 1ID and 3ID, respectively. Currently, he is pursuing an MBA with a specialization in Information Technology Management from American Military University.

Professor Andrew R. Wilson is the Naval War College's Philip A. Crowl Professor of Comparative Strategy. He received a B.A. in East Asian Studies from the University of California Santa Barbara, and earned his Ph.D. in History and East Asian Languages from Harvard University. Before joining the War College faculty in 1998, he taught Chinese history at Harvard and at Wellesley College. Professor Wilson has lectured on Chinese history, Asian military affairs, the classics of strategic theory, Chinese military modernization, and Sun Tzu's *The Art of War* at numerous military colleges and civilian universities in the United States and around the world. The author of a number of articles on Chinese military history, Chinese sea power, and Sun Tzu's *The Art of War*, his books include *Ambition and Identity: Chinese Merchant-Elites in Colonial Manila, 1885-1916*; *The Chinese in the Caribbean*; *China's Future Nuclear Submarine Force*; and the forthcoming *The Acme of Skill: Strategic Theory from Antiquity to the Information Age*. Professor Wilson is also featured on *The Great Courses* with lecture series including *The Art of War*; *Masters of War: History's Greatest Strategic Thinkers*; and the upcoming *Daily Life in Imperial China*.

Commander Christopher S. Wiseman, U.S. Navy, is a 1991 graduate of Princeton University, with an A.B. in politics, and he holds an M.A. in National Security and Strategic Studies from the Naval War College, where he graduated with distinction. Designated as a Naval Flight Officer in 1992, his operational experience includes tours flying F-14Bs and F-14Ds, and recent cross training in the F/A-18F, participating in operations in Bosnia (DENY FLIGHT), Iraq (SOUTHERN WATCH) and Afghanistan (ENDURING FREEDOM). His shore staff assignments include tours at Fighter Wing Atlantic and the International Military Staff at NATO Headquarters in Brussels, Belgium, and student tours at the Naval Fighter Weapons School (TOP GUN) and the Naval War College. He most recently served as the Operations Officer at Carrier Air Wing SEVENTEEN on board USS CARL VINSON (CVN-70), including participation in

Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE (Haiti).

Professor Toshi Yoshihara holds the John A. van Beuren Chair of Asia-Pacific Studies and is an affiliate member of the China Maritime Studies Institute at the Naval War College. Before joining the College faculty, he was a visiting professor in the Strategy Department at the Air War College. Dr. Yoshihara has also served as an analyst at the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, RAND, and the American Enterprise Institute. He holds a Ph.D. from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, an M.A. from the School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, and a B.S.F.S. from the School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University. He is co-author of *Red Star over the Pacific: China's Rise and the Challenge to U.S. Maritime Strategy* (Naval Institute Press, 2010), *Indian Naval Strategy in the Twenty-first Century* (Routledge, 2009), and *Chinese Naval Strategy in the 21st Century: The Turn to Mahan* (Routledge, 2008). He is also co-editor of *Strategy in the Second Nuclear Age: Power, Ambition, and the Ultimate Weapon* (Georgetown University Press, 2012) and *Asia Looks Seaward: Power and Maritime Strategy* (Praeger, 2008).

I. ON STRATEGY—CLAUSEWITZ, SUN TZU, AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF CONTEMPORARY STRATEGIC THOUGHT

A. General: One of the primary goals of a Joint Professional Military Education lies in the desire to “develop strategic leaders who can think critically.”⁵ Effective critical thinking requires a disciplined habit of thought, which can be developed by first-hand experience and studying widely accepted texts and theorists. This week of study commences with Carl von Clausewitz’s *On War* and Sun Tzu’s *The Art of War* both of which are valuable far beyond the simple fact they have withstood the “test of time.” These texts provide future military and civilian leaders with common frames of reference and useful concepts to foster the integration of all instruments of national power in the pursuit of national ends. These sometimes-complementary, sometimes-conflicting works will not provide standardized answers. Instead, they will spark thought, foster debate, and underwrite the creativity needed for true critical strategic analysis.

Mastery will not be achieved in a single week’s study. Instead, this module lays the first cornerstone in a foundation which will be augmented by others (e.g. Thucydides, Mao, Mahan, Corbett) and tested by application through a wide range of case studies drawn from across the range of military operations in the weeks to come. However it is fitting to begin with these two authors in depth. Though written long ago, both Clausewitz’s *On War* and Sun Tzu’s *The Art of War* were primarily concerned with the intellectual development of military officers, whom they identified as vital to national security. Both expected their students to use their minds critically and creatively—as does the Naval War College. Clausewitz was systematic in his approach, whereas Sun Tzu was suggestive, and the two came from very different cultures.

Clausewitz’s description and analysis of the essential characteristics of war have never been surpassed. In his memoirs, Colin Powell recalled the profound impact that studying *On War* had on his intellectual development:

...Clausewitz was an awakening for me. His *On War*, written 106 years before I was born, was like a beam of light from the past, still illuminating present-day military quandaries.⁶

Wars at all times and in all places feature a dynamic environment of uncertainty and chance, of violence and intellect, of physical forces and moral forces, of passions and politics. Clausewitz sees “fog” and “friction” as fundamental conditions permeating war. Recent analysts have suggested that technology may dispel these conditions—conclusions students are encouraged to consider and debate. Indeed, Sun Tzu suggests that a smart commander will try to increase the fog and friction on the enemy side. Clausewitz portrays war as a violent but purposeful clash of interacting wills, while Sun Tzu usefully adds the view of war as a contest over information.

Although neither Clausewitz nor Sun Tzu claims to provide formulas for proper practice, they each offer prescriptive concepts. Both stress the importance of making assessments before taking action. Sun Tzu’s famous injunction to know the enemy and know oneself lives on in our

⁵ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Officer Professional Military Education Policy,” May 29, 2015. Page E-E-1.

⁶ Colin Powell and Joseph E. Persico, *My American Journey* (New York: Ballantine, 2003 paperback edition), p. 207.

contemporary concept of “net assessment.” Clausewitz’s maxim of concentrating forces against the enemy’s “center of gravity” is still at the heart of joint U.S. military doctrine and planning processes, as is his concept of the culminating point of victory. Sun Tzu’s list of strategic options that can be pursued in both war and peace is timeless, and his emphasis on advantageous positioning, superior speed, and surprise, foreshadows many aspects of what we now call “maneuver warfare”—an important element of modern approaches to warfare, not least in the U.S. Marine Corps. The ancient Chinese text also stands as a forerunner of certain aspects of contemporary information operations, especially the use of deception. Indeed, *The Art of War* treats information superiority as a key determinant of strategic success. Clausewitz, for his part, was skeptical that intelligence and deception could deliver what Sun Tzu promised.

The most important prescriptive point in these two texts is that war must serve a rational political purpose. Both *On War* and *The Art of War* stress the need to match strategy to policy, as does our first course theme. The same is true for official documents such as the *National Security Strategy of the United States* and the *National Military Strategy of the United States*. Military (and non-military) instruments must be used in ways calculated to achieve specified political objectives. Moreover, both Clausewitz and Sun Tzu emphasize that the cost of waging war must be rationally accounted for as well. Clausewitz counsels his readers that as costs in blood, treasure, and time come to exceed the “value of the object,” the use of force must be reassessed, even renounced. Sun Tzu cautions against allowing the costs of protraction in a war to undermine the social and economic stability of one’s nation. But keeping war rational is never easy, and Clausewitz and Sun Tzu are well aware that irrationality abounds in war. Chance, complexity, human passions, and factors beyond human control all make rational calculation very difficult. The enemy may act or react in quite unpredictable ways. In a warning worth the close attention of contemporary theorists, Clausewitz highlights how difficult it is to anticipate the effects that the actions of one side will have on the other.

It is at this point that the crucial issue of strategic leadership looms large in both *On War* and *The Art of War*, as it does in this course. Strategic leaders must master interaction with the enemy if they are to succeed in achieving policy aims within rational constraints in a dynamic security environment. Much of the detailed analysis by Clausewitz and many of the aphorisms attributed to Sun Tzu concern the characteristics and activities of strategic leadership necessary to handle the problems of rationality and interaction. Clausewitz, who experienced first-hand the effectiveness of Napoleon’s leadership, struggles with how best to educate military officers to obtain “military genius.” This “genius” that Clausewitz believes combines character, experience, and intuition. Sun Tzu stresses the importance of calculation, creativity, and flexibility. What they say can be tested against the actions of the strategic leaders profiled in our historical case studies and considered in relation to contemporary models of leadership. Students should bear in mind that what makes for superior operational leadership may not make for superior strategic leadership (and vice versa), but there can be little doubt that a thorough appreciation of both is essential to the profession of arms.

Two categories of strategists are in evidence in *On War* and *The Art of War*: political leaders and military commanders. Under the rubric of “civil-military relations” we will consider the interactions of these two sets of leaders throughout this course as well as the impact on command and control. Clausewitz and Sun Tzu provide much material for debate about the

proper roles of political and military leaders. Both agree that political leaders must determine the overall policy objectives that strategy (military and non-military) must support in any war. At the same time, the dynamics of interaction, and the other pressures faced by military commanders give rise to civil-military tensions regarding the best ways and means to employ force against the enemy. Students should carefully consider the different approaches to resolving those tensions that Clausewitz and Sun Tzu offer. Civil-military tension does not necessarily vanish in peacetime: military leaders must still provide sound strategic advice on the utility and limitations of military force to policymakers in order to promote national interests and objectives. The value is also clear in wartime: it is doubtful mission command can ever be fully realized without a keen grasp of the dynamics of civil-military relations, its requirements and its pitfalls.

A hallmark of the Strategy and Policy Course is its coverage of the many different types of war and the wide range of conflicts across the range of military operations that it covers. Here, too, our classics of theory are advantageous points of departure. Clausewitz, in a famous passage, stresses the importance for both political and military leaders of understanding the nature of the war that they face. He also makes a distinction between wars of limited and unlimited political objectives that can serve as a good first step in understanding how one war may differ from another. This course adds other variables to the analysis of different types of war. For instance, Clausewitz points out how the character of warfare may change, sometimes quite dramatically, from one era to the next. Indeed, we can detect in *On War* and in *The Art of War* the imprint of transformations of war in the respective eras in which they were composed, and of the very different cultural and geostrategic contexts in which the authors wrote. The Strategy and Policy Course, covering as it does many eras of warfare from the ancient world to the twenty-first century, allows students to gain a well-rounded understanding of how and why such transformations have occurred in the past and the present. As we approach the end of the course, where we deal with the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the rise of transnational jihadist networks, Sun Tzu offers a range of operational choices that can be adapted to various strategic problems posed by regional nuclear powers and agile non-state actors. As a wise man once counseled, if one wants to find new ideas, start by looking in old books.

Those with new ideas often criticize, either explicitly or implicitly, Clausewitz and Sun Tzu. One set of critics has argued that the classical theorists are of little help with regard to irregular warfare involving non-state actors. It is noteworthy, however, that the first and foremost theorist and practitioner of warfare by non-state actors, Mao Tse-tung, drew substantially from both Clausewitz and Sun Tzu (as we shall see later in Case VIII). There is also evidence that the would-be strategic thinkers of Al Qaeda and its affiliates have studied *On War* and *The Art of War*.

Another set of critics, who advocate greater reliance on “soft power,” may implicitly look askance at classical strategic theory because it encourages leaders to think too much about military instruments and too little about non-military instruments of national power. In fact, neither Clausewitz nor Sun Tzu denies the importance of non-military courses of action. For Clausewitz, after all, war is the “continuation of policy” with the “addition” of military means. For Sun Tzu, the ideal is to win without fighting. One need not resort to violence to execute the two strategic options most highly recommended in *The Art of War*—thwarting the enemies’

strategy and disrupting their alliances. The Strategy and Policy Course examines cases of long-term competition between great powers. These competitions encourage students to analyze the interplay of strategic concepts and policy instruments and the importance of strategic thinking in both war and peace. Sir Basil Liddell Hart, himself a noted authority on strategy, extrapolated from both Clausewitz and Sun Tzu to posit a theory of “grand strategy”—the use of all tools of power to achieve political objectives in war or peace. The short passage offered in Reading 3 is one of the first efforts to broaden the study of military strategy to encompass long-term competitions, protracted wars, and peacetime threats.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s guidance on Joint Professional Military Education emphasizes the importance of understanding how joint, interagency, and multinational partners use diplomatic, informational, military, and economic instruments of power in a multidimensional effort to achieve strategic success. There is not much well-developed theory, classical or contemporary, to ease our way into these broad areas of inquiry. For sea power and maritime strategy, we will explore the influential theoretical (and historical) writings of Alfred Thayer Mahan and Sir Julian Corbett. For air power, we will examine how theories concerning the strategic effects of air operations have played out in wars since 1940. Beyond some partial insights from Corbett, we will have to supply our own exposition of how joint and combined military operations can make a decisive strategic difference in various types of wars. International relations scholars have offered a host of theories of coercion using military and non-military instruments, but there is no consensus on how civilian agencies and military services successfully coordinate and wield diplomatic, informational, and economic influence. Again, we will have to proceed largely on our own. This course is a long intellectual journey into the various domains and dimensions of contemporary strategy. The classical theorists, however, enable students to improve their ability to “apply key strategic concepts, critical thinking and analytical frameworks to formulate and execute strategy.”⁷

B Discussion Questions:

1. Clausewitz emphasizes the primacy of politics in waging war. “Policy,” he states, “will permeate all military operations.” At the same time, he notes that “the political aim is not a tyrant,” that political considerations do not determine “the posting of guards,” and that “policy will not extend its influence to operational details.” How can we reconcile the first statement with the last three?
2. Does Clausewitz’s view of the proper relationship between war and politics differ from that offered in *The Art of War*?
3. The authors of *The Art of War* and *On War* agree that, although war can be studied systematically, strategic leadership is an art, not a science. What are the implications of this proposition for the study of strategy and policy?

⁷ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Officer Professional Military Education Policy,” May 29, 2015. Page E-E-1, Learning Area 1.

4. Among Clausewitz's most important concepts are "the culminating point of victory," "the center of gravity," and "the need to be strong at the decisive point." How useful are such concepts for political and military leaders? Are they as valuable on the strategic level as they are on the operational level?

5. Evaluate the role of intelligence in *The Art of War* and *On War*. Which view is more relevant today?

6. Clausewitz emphasizes the need to understand the importance of three interrelated aspects of war: reason, passion, and the play of chance and creativity. What is the role of each in war, and how do they interact?

7. *The Art of War* says that "to subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill," while Clausewitz states that very limited and defensive objectives might be secured by the mere deployment of force. Are these two statements contradictory or complementary?

8. In Chapter 1 of Book 1 of *On War*, Clausewitz makes a distinction between war in theory—which tends to escalate until all the available forces are used—and war in reality or in practice. How do the two types of war differ from each other? Why are most wars waged with less than total effort?

9. Clausewitz, on page 69 of *On War*, recognizes two kinds of war, involving a limited or unlimited objective. How do they differ from each other?

10. Some have suggested that technological advances may soon lift the "fog of war" completely, thus invalidating certain of Clausewitz's most important insights. Do you agree?

11. Which theorist do you regard as more relevant to current conflicts, Clausewitz or Sun Tzu?

12. Contemporary writers on strategy emphasize the growth of violence by non-state actors since 1945, suggesting that such conflicts cannot be evaluated by reference to Clausewitz's trinity. Do you agree?

13. One of the preferred strategies presented in *The Art of War* is to disrupt an enemy's alliances, and Clausewitz argues that an ally can sometimes be the enemy's center of gravity. How, and to what extent, do these insights relate to twenty-first century conflicts?

14. What is Clausewitz's definition of "military genius"? How does it differ from the vision of strategic leadership in *The Art of War*?

15. Both *On War* and *The Art of War* were written in response to revolutionary changes in the nature of warfare. Which text is the better guide for political and military leaders attempting to anticipate and manage changes in warfare during the periods of peace between major wars?

16. Do *On War* and *The Art of War* provide much guidance for using information as an instrument of national power?

17. On page 131, Clausewitz states “we clearly see that the activities characteristic of war may be split into two main categories: *those that are merely preparation for war, and war proper.*” Does this mean that strategic principles cannot be applied to peacetime? Would Sun Tzu agree?

18. What is “grand strategy”? Does Liddell Hart’s definition reflect the thinking of Clausewitz? Of Sun Tzu? Of both? How useful are Clausewitz and Sun Tzu for thinking about *grand strategy*? Why?

19. Sun Tzu argues that attacking an enemy’s strategy and disrupting an enemy’s alliances are the two preferred means of winning conflicts. Can this analysis be applied to an enemy “grand strategy”? Can these techniques be used in peacetime as well as in war?

C. Readings:

1. Clausewitz, Carl von. *On War*. Michael Howard and Peter Paret, eds. and trans. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976. Author’s Preface, Comment and Notes; Book 1; Book 2, Chapters 1-3, 5, 6; Book 3; Book 4, Chapter 11; Book 5, Chapter 3; Book 6, Chapters 1, 5, 6, 26, 27; Book 7, Chapters 2-5, 22; Book 8.

[This translation of *On War*, undertaken by the noted historians Michael Howard and Peter Paret, with a commentary by the famous strategic analyst Bernard Brodie, was much heralded when it appeared in 1976, in the immediate aftermath of the United States’ involvement in the Vietnam War. It remains the most widely read English-language version of Clausewitz’s famous work.]

2. Sun Tzu. *The Art of War*. Samuel B. Griffith, trans. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980. Pages 63-149.

[Samuel B. Griffith’s experience in the United States Marine Corps, as well as his deep knowledge of Asian languages and cultures, make his translation of this important text both scholarly and approachable for the professional soldier.]

3. Liddell Hart, Sir B.H. *Strategy* (second revised edition). New York: Meridian, 1991. Pages 319-323, 353-360. (Selected Readings)

[Sir Basil Liddell Hart, one of the most prolific British writers on strategic affairs in the 20th century, introduces a concept of “grand strategy”—the pursuit of national objectives in war and peacetime, using all tools of state policy including coalitions. This passage also supplies an important definition of “victory,” and a discussion of the sometimes transitory nature of that condition.]

4. Stavridis, James G. "Read, Think, Write: Keys to 21st Century Security Leadership," *Joint Forces Quarterly*, Issue 63, (October 2011). Pages 110-112.

<http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jfq/jfq-63.pdf>

[In this 2011 National Defense University convocation address, Admiral James Stavridis, USN, the 2007 recipient of the Naval War College Distinguished Graduate Leadership Award, reflects on the value of professional military education for his professional development and successful leadership in an ever-changing security environment.]

D. Learning Outcomes: The "On Strategy" module raises the most fundamental and enduring problems of strategy and policy, underwriting Joint Professional Military Education Phase II's core goal of producing "strategic leaders who can think critically." This case study supports:

- CJCS Joint Learning Areas and Objectives (JPME II) 1a, 1b, 1c, 2a, 2f, 4b, 4c, and 5a. Emphasis will be placed on the following topics, enabling students to:
 - Apply key strategic concepts, critical thinking and analytical frameworks to formulate and execute strategy (1a).
 - Analyze the integration of all instruments of national power in complex, dynamic and ambiguous environments to attain objectives at the national and theater-strategic levels (1b).
 - Evaluate historical and/or contemporary security environments and applications of strategies across the range of military operations (1c).
 - Evaluate the principles of joint operations, joint military doctrine, joint functions (command and control, intelligence, fires, movement and maneuver, protection and sustainment), and emerging concepts across the range of military operations (2a).
 - Evaluate key classical, contemporary and emerging concepts, including IO and cyber space operations, doctrine and traditional/irregular approaches to war (2f).
 - Analyze the factors of Mission Command, including policy-strategy matches and civil-military relations, as they relate to mission objectives, forces and capabilities that support the selection of a command and control option (4b).
 - Analyze the opportunities and challenges affecting command and control across the range of military operations (4c).
 - Evaluate the skills, character attributes and behaviors needed to lead in a dynamic joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational strategic environment (5a).

II. THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR—DEMOCRACY, LEADERSHIP, AND STRATEGY IN A LONG WAR

A. General: Thucydides serves as the perfect guide and an indispensable companion to the foundation begun last week in applying key strategic concepts, critical thinking and analytic frameworks to formulate and execute strategy. The Strategy and Policy syllabus lies at the intersection of history, political science, and military operations. Thucydides, an Athenian general during the Peloponnesian War, is known as the father of both “scientific” history and “political realism” (also known as [realpolitik]). In 1972, VADM Turner looked no further than Thucydides for the cornerstone of the curriculum at the heart of his revolution. “We will start with Thucydides’ *History of the Peloponnesian War*,” VADM Turner said to the Naval War College faculty and students at their convocation. “What could be more related to today than a war in which a democratic nation sent an expedition overseas to fight on foreign soil and then found that there was little support for this at home? Or a war in which a sea power was in opposition to a nation that was basically a land power? Are there not lessons still to be learned here?”⁸ RADM Howe could have asked those same questions at this year’s convocation as VADM Turner did to those studying Strategy and Policy during the Vietnam War.

Although the ancient Greeks would be baffled by concepts and acronyms like the “Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental and Multinational (JIIM) environment”, a critical study of their complex experience can help us navigate the strategic environments of today, and analyze strategy and the employment of all instruments of national power to achieve strategic objectives. In this conflict, the Delian League, controlled by a sea power, democratic Athens, fought the Peloponnesian League, led by the militaristic land power, Sparta. The contest between the two sides resulted in a war lasting twenty-seven years. The prominent Athenian historian Thucydides provided an account of this struggle. He meant for his history to be “a possession for all time,” and that has indeed turned out to be the case. By understanding this one conflict, you may understand the persistent problems of strategy and policy more thoroughly and deeply than if you read an entire library. Whether the issue is the nature of strategic leadership, homeland security, the disruptive effects on society and politics of a biological catastrophe, the decision to mount joint and combined operations, the cultivation of domestic and international support in a long war, the confrontation of an enemy with asymmetric capabilities, sea control, the assessment of an enemy from a radically different culture, the impact of foreign intervention in an ongoing war, the use of revolution to undermine a government or alliances, the constraints and opportunities supplied by geopolitical position, the ethical conundrums inherent in the use of violence to achieve political ends, or the unique problems, strengths, and weaknesses of democracies at war, Thucydides supplies archetypes, or models, of the recurring problems of strategy, with his readers usually left to judge how well the particular leaders of his time were able to solve them.

In this first case study, it is useful to consider how Thucydides differs from Clausewitz and Sun Tzu. Whereas they introduced us to essential elements of strategic theory, Thucydides supplied a school of hard knocks. The lessons of experience invite us today to understand how a great democracy, much like our own in some respects, lost a war to a bitter rival and its free way of life as a result. The stakes are high in this case study. If we cannot understand the strategic

⁸ Vice Admiral Stansfield Turner, “Challenge: A New Approach to Professional Education,” *Naval War College Review* Volume 25, no. 2 (Nov-Dec 1972), page 4.

strengths and weaknesses of ancient Athenian democracy, perhaps we will not understand our own democracy, thus condemning ourselves to follow in the footsteps of Athens. Learning from its example may be the prerequisite for thinking clearly about the strategic problems and advantages of democracy in our own age. To be sure, the differences between Athenian “pure democracy” and modern “liberal, representative democracy” are as glaring as the similarities are intriguing, and the differences are cultural as well as institutional. The great Athenian leader, Pericles, advocated retreating behind the long walls of Athens before a land assault by Sparta and its allies. Yet he also encouraged his people to seek immortal fame, perhaps the most coveted goal among Greeks since the age of Homer, with Athens earning its unique glory by dominating the sea and ruling over more Greek cities than any Greek city before it. Whereas both Clausewitz and Sun Tzu encouraged rational calculations about the interests of the state, Thucydides revealed the extent to which passion always threatens to escape rational control in time of war, with fatal consequences for both policy and strategy. Indeed, during his accounts of the plague in Athens, the civil war in Corcyra, the witch hunt for religious heretics in Athens, and the revolution and counter-revolution in Athens, Thucydides sometimes seems to be leading his readers on a journey to Hades, that is, to strategic madness. Democratic institutions and civilization itself proved extraordinarily fragile in the face of the passions unleashed and encouraged during this war. Terrorist attacks on diplomats; atrocities, like the mass murder of school children; even genocide, sometimes merely proposed as in the case of Mytilene, but sometimes actually carried out, as at Plataea, Scione, and Melos—fill the pages of Thucydides’ account and make one wonder whether war can ever be a rational tool of statecraft. He forces an examination of the ethical dimension of strategy and war, and the ethical consequences for the citizenry, the state, and the armed forces.

Thucydides also goes beyond Clausewitz and Sun Tzu by emphasizing the extent to which one cannot understand either strategy or policy without looking at the politics that shape them. So although Thucydides takes pains to describe unfolding battles, he also compels us to look at political speeches and debates, with different leaders (Archidamus, Pericles, Cleon, Demosthenes, Brasidas, Nicias, Alcibiades, etc.) competing for the power to set policy, frame strategy, and execute operations as commanders in far-flung theaters. The goals of the belligerents and the strategies they choose to achieve them are not self-evident at any stage of this war. Indeed, the leaders of different cities in Thucydides’ account often lie or reveal only part of what they have in mind. As we peer through Thucydides’ “fog of politics,” we are forced to come to terms with the limits of our understanding of war; chance, friction, and uncertainty make every strategic decision a gamble, while the personal interests and ambitions of political and military leaders often undermine the interests of the state. Hence, strategy is most emphatically a continuation of politics in this war, with military commands often divided to reflect the balance of political factions at home. Relations between political and military authorities frequently proved decisive in the success or failure of different campaigns, especially under the Spartan commander, Brasidas, and the Athenian commanders, Alcibiades and Nicias. This panoply of leaders provides an excellent foundation to evaluate the execution of “Mission Command” and the prerequisites for effective strategic leadership.

The origins of this great war appear to lie in something trivial: a dispute between two Greek cities, Corcyra and Corinth, over control of Corcyra’s colony, Epidamnus. The dispute eventually drew Athens, Sparta, and their allies into what for the ancient Greeks might have been

considered a world war. Yet as Thucydides' account unfolds, he makes a case that the truest cause of the war lay in something deeper: Sparta's fear of the growing power of Athens. The efforts of Sparta's allies (Corinth especially) to persuade Sparta to attempt to overthrow the Athenian empire before it dominated the rest of Greece, and the refusal of the Athenian political and military leader, Pericles, to cave in to demands from the Peloponnesian League force us to think carefully about what each side meant to achieve (policy) and how it meant to succeed (strategy). Which side was trying to preserve the status quo? Which was trying to overturn it? Is it possible that each side was trying to preserve a different understanding of the status quo? Were their ends limited, unlimited, or some mix of both? What gave either side hope of success?

Simple answers to these questions are hard to come by, but it helps to think about the likely nature of the war, which Thucydides predicted would be like no other in ancient Greece. Not only would it be an asymmetric struggle between a land power and a sea power, it would also be a conflict between two coalitions with different strengths and weaknesses. The coalitions would be led by two cities with radically different characteristics. Sparta was a militarized regime in which an elite group of citizens, who were soldiers from age six to sixty, brutally dominated the majority of the population, the Helots, whom the Spartans had enslaved several hundred years previously. Yet Sparta also had a complex constitutional system of government with multiple checks and balances, making Sparta the most admired city in Greece for its political stability and seeming moderation. Fearing slave revolts, Spartans rarely ventured far from home or stayed away too long. The Athenians, by contrast, were energetic, innovative, and adventurous. They consistently tested the limits of the humanly possible and sailed almost anywhere in the ancient Greek world where their ships could carry them. Their democratic system of government and way of life made them the freest people in Greece at home, though abroad even Pericles admitted that Athens ruled its allies like a tyrant by demanding tribute at the point of a sword. In contrast, Sparta did not demand tribute from its allies, who followed it more voluntarily. Trade and tribute from its allies made Athens extraordinarily wealthy, but the Athenians depended on supplies and revenue from abroad. Sparta, living off the labor of its slaves, was virtually self-sufficient. If Sparta's regime sometimes made it too cautious, Athens' regime perhaps made it too bold. Thucydides forces us to assess the nature of this war not merely in terms of the military capabilities, plans, and objectives, but also in light of all the relevant material, diplomatic, cultural, geopolitical, institutional, and social dimensions of strategy.

Traditionally, Greek warfare consisted of the hoplites (heavy armored infantry) from two opposing cities massing against each other to fight for some contested piece of ground. Wars might be won in one battle fought on single day. Sparta excelled in this type of warfare given its military's high level of training. However, the Spartans were unprepared materially and intellectually for the long walls that enabled Athens to feed itself by sea and withstand a lengthy siege of the city. Predictably, as the conflict unfolded, Athens, the sea power, found it difficult to bring its military strengths to bear against Sparta, the land power, and vice versa, thus producing a protracted stalemate. As much as anything, frustration with the stalemate fueled the angry, vengeful passions that led the war to escalate and pushed each side to violate the traditional ethical standards of ancient Greece, even when doing so was not necessarily in their strategic interest. Yet success for either side depended on finding a way to make strategy a rational means to political ends. Hope of decisive victory appeared to depend as much on

compensating for strategic weaknesses through other means of national power (diplomacy, intelligence, and economic aid), as on gaining leverage through its traditional strengths on land or sea. So Thucydides reveals each side reassessing its initial policies and strategies. The Athenians, for example, opened a new theater at Pylos in the Peloponnese to inspire a revolt of the Helot slaves against the Spartans. Sparta's ally, Corinth, used revolution to knock Athens' ally, Corcyra, out of the war; and Sparta uncharacteristically took the initiative to "liberate" Athens' allies in a daring land campaign in the distant theater of Thrace.

This case study examines the essential qualities of strategic leadership introduced in the previous case. The strengths and weaknesses of Pericles' initial strategy, including his remarkable ability to communicate with the Athenian people, as well as the leadership qualities of the Spartan king Archidamus, must be evaluated against the successes and failures of their successors. In particular, the skill of the Spartan commander, Brasidas, in combined operations and the ingenuity of the Athenian commander, Demosthenes, in joint and unconventional operations, supply models for thinking about how theater commanders can use such operations for strategic effect. The Athenian general, Cleon, may have showed poor judgment in demanding too much from enemies on the verge of surrender. The daring (some say reckless) Athenian commander, Alcibiades, personified the energetic, innovative spirit of Athens as a commander and advisor, as well as when his playboy lifestyle so offended the Athenians that they tried him in absentia and sentenced him to death. Nicias' caution (some say indecision and superstition) in Sicily lost the opportunity for Athens to exploit its potential gains and avoid disaster. Still, much credit belongs to the Spartan theater commander, Gylippus, for exploiting Athenian mistakes in Sicily to tie Athens down in a two-front war. The ultimate model of strategic adaptation may be the Spartan admiral, Lysander, who found a way to finally defeat Athens after twenty-seven years of war. To explore the strengths and weaknesses of these diverse strategic leaders, we have included in the readings some biographical sketches from the ancient historian, Plutarch, who discusses their personalities and accomplishments in greater detail than Thucydides.

Given the length and costs of this war, not merely to Athens and Sparta, but to all of Greece, it is reasonable to ask whether each side should have reassessed its political goals enough to make a lasting peace. Thucydides mentions several occasions when one or both sides tried to negotiate a lasting peace: Athens during the plague that killed as much as a third of its people; Sparta after its defeats at Pylos and Sphacteria; both Athens and Sparta, after Sparta's victory at Amphipolis. Whether these efforts were unfruitful because one side or the other demanded too much politically or failed to go far enough militarily is a matter of dispute. Could the Peace of Nicias, which Thucydides considered nothing more than an unstable truce, have produced a lasting peace in Greece or was it doomed to failure because it had not addressed the underlying causes of the war and lacked effective enforcement mechanisms? Since the largest land battle of the war, at Mantinea in 418 B.C., occurred during the Peace of Nicias, one must question whether the Athenians would have done better by committing everything to aid their principal ally on land, Argos, to defeat the Spartan army decisively, or to have labored to fix the peace before it broke down completely. Ironically, the climax of Thucydides' account, the famous Sicilian expedition, was set in motion while Athens was still technically at peace with Sparta, thus making it possible for some to assume the Athenians would not have to fight on two fronts if it went to war in Sicily.

Thucydides' account of the Athenian expedition to Sicily reads like a novel, or perhaps more accurately, a Greek tragedy. It shifts back and forth between the home front in Athens and the field in Sicily, which compels us to inquire how events inside Athens shaped the planning and execution of the campaign, and vice versa. Indeed, all course themes are relevant for understanding this campaign. Despite its overwhelming material advantages, Athens found itself bogged down in a protracted siege of a walled city, exactly the worst strategic option, from a Sun Tzuian point of view, unless there is no other alternative. Whether the resulting quagmire and ultimate loss of the cream of the Athenian army and navy was because of unclear political goals, inadequate strategy, poor assessment, or poor execution of an otherwise sound strategy is always a matter of vigorous debate. Do not forget, however, to think about Athens' failure to acquire significant allies in Sicily, friction and chance, Athenian distraction with scandals on the home front, Athens' lack of cavalry in Sicily, and poor relations between theater commanders and the Athenian people. A Clausewitzian critical analysis of the expedition might also consider failures to make timely reassessments, and failures to exploit Athenian command of the sea. Not to be forgotten are the skill of Spartan leaders, Corinthian and Sicilian reinforcements to Syracuse, technological innovation, the toughness and adaptability of Syracuse (a democracy almost as large as Athens), bad luck, shifting morale, and just about anything else that can go wrong when a theater commander (Nicias) loses the initiative. Nonetheless, the Athenians proved remarkably resilient in adversity, and perhaps more moderate strategically when the chips were down than when the fortunes of war were in their favor. They recovered enough from defeat in Sicily to continue the war for almost another decade, though they could not afford to lose a major naval battle, lest they lose command of the sea and control of the sea lines of communications necessary to feed their people. With a coup d'état at home, revolt among their allies, and intervention by Persia on the side of Sparta and its allies, however, there is no doubt that the Sicilian expedition had weakened Athens substantially.

The debacle at the Battle of Aegospotami in 405 resulted in Athens' surrender the following year. Whether Sparta and its allies could have defeated Athens without the Persian intervention that enabled them to overthrow Athens at sea is another disputed question, but many suggest it was not Sparta that defeated Athens in this war. Athens' greatest defeat prior to its surrender occurred in Sicily. Some say that if Athens had not overextended itself, or if its relations between its generals and people had not distorted the proper match between strategy and policy in Sicily and elsewhere, then perhaps Athens might have won the war, or failing that, have avoided catastrophic defeat. Others respond that it was not the faults of Athenian democracy, whatever they were, but poor generalship that was most responsible for Athenian defeat.

In 404 B.C. Sparta had achieved her political and military objectives and was thus the hegemonic power of the Greek world. Her success, however, was to be short-lived. By the middle of the 390s, it was Sparta who found herself fighting a two-front war—the first a naval war in the eastern Aegean against Persia (with active Athenian assistance) second a land war in Greece against a coalition including both former adversaries, Argos and Athens, and allies (Corinth and Thebes). This was the first in a series of wars which engaged Sparta for nearly 33 years. While the Spartans won a series of marginal land victories in the first decade of the war, the constant internecine warfare exhausted Sparta, along with other Greek states. In 371 B.C. at

the Battle of Leuctra, Sparta was defeated. This precipitated the end of Spartan hegemony and the rise of Thebes as a dominant power.

While Clausewitz and Sun Tzu advise against protraction from a military and monetary point of view, Thucydides speaks to the cost of a long war on a democracy. One cannot ignore the increase in cruelty and loss of humanity in the actions of the Athenians as the war protracted. Protraction does not just dishearten soldiers and cause an erosion of public support—it tends to corrode the bonds of democratic societies. We will see this start to occur several times in the course. President Lincoln warned against this possibility during his first inaugural address and pleaded for an end to the U.S. Civil War in his second inaugural address after his country's citizens failed to be touched by the "better angels of [their] nature." Democracies can fight long wars, contrary to conventional wisdom. This case raises the questions concerning the social price democracies pay to fight such wars and the effect on their relative power vis-à-vis other rivals and their ability to prepare for the next challenge. Thucydides' account of the strategic failure of this great democracy supplies us an opportunity to look ourselves in the mirror. Thucydides does not flatter his readers. He shows us both human nature and the character of democracy, warts and all. Certainly in that respect, he is in harmony with Clausewitz and Sun Tzu. Self-knowledge is the foundation of any effective policy and strategy. He provides a panoramic view of interacting political, geographic, social, cultural and religious factors and their roles in shaping the desired outcomes of policies, strategies and campaigns.

B. Essay and Discussion Questions:

1. How well-aligned were the policies and strategies of Sparta and its allies during the Archidamian War (431-421 B.C.)?
2. During the plague, the Athenians came to blame Pericles for a policy that led to war and a strategy that seemed incapable of winning it, but Thucydides seemed to think that Athens' major mistake was to abandon the political goals and strategy of Pericles (see Book II, paragraph 65). Who is right, Thucydides or the critics of Pericles?
3. Which leader did a better job of net assessment prior to the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War, Pericles or Archidamus?
4. How well did the sea power, Athens, compensate for its weaknesses and exploit its strengths in fighting against the land power, Sparta?
5. How well did the land power, Sparta, compensate for its weaknesses and exploit its strengths in fighting against the maritime power, Athens?
6. Which side was more successful at using revolts as a tool of policy, Athens or Sparta and its allies?
7. Which theater commander was most skilled at using joint and combined operations to produce significant strategic effects, Demosthenes, Brasidas, or Lysander?

8. Was the Sicilian Expedition a good idea badly executed, or just a bad idea?
9. In light of the Athenian joint campaign at Pylos, the Spartan combined campaign in Thrace, and the campaigns of both Sparta and Athens in Sicily, explain the risks and rewards of opening a new theater in an on-going conflict.
10. Which strategic leader in this war came closest to fitting Clausewitz's definition of a military genius?
11. Which leader in this war came closest to Sun Tzu's ideal of a general?
12. Athens sued for peace unsuccessfully in 430 B.C., as did Sparta in 425 B.C., and even the Peace of Nicias broke down almost immediately. Explain the reasons for these failures and the problems they reveal about the process of war termination.
13. "Sparta and Athens were dragged into a war neither wanted because of alliances which caused both powers to act against their interests and inclinations." Explain why you agree or disagree with this statement.
14. In light of the campaign of Brasidas in Thrace and the many quarrels among Athenian military and political leaders, in what ways did problems in civil-military relations have an impact on strategic effectiveness in this war?
15. "Sparta and its allies did not defeat Athens so much as Athens defeated itself." Explain why you agree or disagree.
16. What does the experience of Athens reveal about the sorts of problems democracies are likely to face in fighting a long war against a determined, ideologically hostile adversary?
17. How strategically effective were the strikes made by both sides on the Athenian and Spartan homelands in determining the war's outcome?

C. Readings:

1. Strassler, Robert B., ed. *The Landmark Thucydides*. New York: The Free Press, 1996. Books 1-8, pages 3-483; Epilogue, pages 549-554.

[Thucydides covers all eleven of our course themes in his account of this war, but compels his readers to think through the problems of strategy and policy on their own.]

Key Passages:

Book I - pages 3-85. (Especially the speeches).

- Book II - Outbreak of the War, pages 89-107.
- Pericles' Funeral Oration, the Plague, and the Policy of Pericles, pages 110-128.
- Book III - Revolt of Mytilene, pages 159-167.
- The Mytilenian Debate, pages 175-184.
- Civil War in Corcyra, pages 194-201.
- Book IV - Athens' success at Pylos, pages 223-246.
- Brasidas in Thrace, pages 266-272.
- Brasidas captures Amphipolis, pages 279-285.
- Book V - The Battle of Amphipolis, and the Peace of Nicias, pages 305-316.
- The Alliance between Athens and Argos, and the Battle of Mantinea, pages 327-350.
- The Melian Dialogue, pages 350-357.
- Book VI - Launching of the Sicilian Expedition, pages 361-379.
- Book VII - Athenian disaster, pages 427-478.
- Book VIII - Reaction to Athenian defeat in Sicily, pages 481-483.
- Epilogue - The end of the war, pages 549-554.

2. Plutarch. *The Rise and Fall of Athens: Nine Greek Lives*. Ian Scott-Kilvert, trans. New York and London: Penguin, 1960. Pages 79-108, 252-318.

[Plutarch's famous biographies of Themistocles, Alcibiades, and Lysander highlight the nature of strategic leadership; the transformation of Athens into a sea power; the impact of democratic politics on strategy, policy, and civil-military relations; and debates within Sparta over how to terminate the war with Athens effectively.]

3. Kagan, Donald. *On the Origins of War and the Preservation of Peace*. New York: Doubleday, 1995. Pages 15-79.

[The well-known historian Donald Kagan provides an account that is helpful for understanding the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War.]

4. Strassler, Robert B., ed. *The Landmark Xenophon's Hellenica*. New York: Pantheon, 2009. Book I.1-II.2, pages 3-52; Appendix O, pages 438-444, 476-479, 481-484, and 488-493.

[Xenophon was an Athenian aristocrat, soldier, and philosopher. His *Hellenica*, or "History of Greeks," carries on Thucydides' narrative of the war to its conclusion. Also included are fragments by Diodorus Siculus which cover the key naval battles of Arginousai and Aegospotami, the Battle of Leuctra, the Theban invasion of the Peloponnesus, and the establishment of an independent Messenian state.]

5. Mahan, Alfred Thayer. *Naval Strategy Compared and Contrasted with the Principles and Practice of Military Operations on Land*. Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1915. Pages 222-230.

http://books.google.com/books?id=yB1CAAAAIAAJ&printsec=frontcover&dq=Mahan+Naval+Strategy&hl=en&ei=kLyNTuveN4nr0gHwsr1F&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=2&ved=0CDIQ6AEwAQ#v=onepage&q&f=false

[In this selection from a published series of lectures, Alfred Thayer Mahan evaluates the Athenian plans for a campaign against Sicily and provides some insightful analysis on how the campaign might have been better executed.]

D. Learning Outcomes: Some things never change, or so Thucydides seemed to think, arguing that the sorts of questions arising from the conflict between the Athenian empire and the Peloponnesian League would arise in time of both war and peace, so long as human nature remains the same. This case study supports:

- CJCS Joint Learning Areas and Objectives (JPME II) 1a, 1b, 1c, 2b, 2c, 5a, 5b, 5e, and 5g. Emphasis will be placed on the following topics, enabling students to:
 - Apply key strategic concepts, critical thinking and analytical frameworks to formulating and executing strategy (1a).
 - Analyze the integration of all instruments of national power in complex, dynamic and ambiguous environments to attain objectives at the national and theater-strategic levels (1b).
 - Evaluate historical and/or contemporary security environments and applications of strategies across the range of military operations (1c).
 - Evaluate how theater strategies, campaigns and major operations achieve national strategic goals across the range of military operations (2b).
 - Apply an analytical framework that addresses the factors politics, geography, society, culture and religion play in shaping the desired outcomes of policies, strategies and campaigns (2c).
 - Evaluate the skills, character attributes and behaviors needed to lead in a dynamic joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational strategic environment (5a).
 - Evaluate critical strategic thinking, decision-making and communication by strategic leaders (5b).
 - Evaluate historical and contemporary applications of the elements of mission command by strategic-level leaders in pursuit of national objectives (5e).
 - Evaluate how strategic leaders establish and sustain an ethical climate among joint and combined forces, and develop/preserve public trust with their domestic citizenry (5g).

III. COMMANDING THE MARITIME COMMONS—GREAT BRITAIN’S GRAND STRATEGY IN THE WARS OF AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE AND NAPOLEON

A. General: New frameworks and concepts, introduced for the examination of the long-term rivalry between Britain and France, augment the analytical foundations of the Strategy and Policy Course. Students focus on such key underpinnings of national power as naval and joint warfare, diplomacy, and economics. Winning naval mastery and the strategic effects a country derives from exercising command of the maritime commons provide the overarching framework. Critical thinking about the particular problems and opportunities in strategy and policy faced by maritime states is facilitated through the study of the innovative strategic thinkers, Alfred Thayer Mahan and Sir Julian Corbett, who extend the theory of war presented in Clausewitz and Sun Tzu to the maritime environment. Mahan and Corbett wrote what are arguably the two most important studies on maritime strategy: Mahan’s *The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783* and Corbett’s *Some Principles of Maritime Strategy*. Excerpts from both studies have been assigned as part of the readings for this case study to provide theoretical insights about how controlling the maritime domain contributes to winning wars and shaping the international environment. In addition to the maritime theorists, this case fosters critical thinking about the economic dimension of strategy, operational versus strategic leadership, and coalition warfare in a complex multinational environment.

Britain engaged in a long-term competition with France between the late 1680s and 1815. This competition yielded no fewer than seven major wars. An examination of the final series of wars—the War for American Independence (1775-1783), the Wars of the French Revolution (1793-1802), and the Napoleonic Wars (1803-1815)—offers insights into how Britain came to command the commons. In the War for American Independence, a police action grew into a regional rebellion and then into a major war, involving both conventional and counterinsurgency operations. Third-party intervention by France in 1778 following Britain’s defeat at Saratoga made the war global in scope. By contrast, the Wars of the French Revolution and Napoleon were great power struggles from the start. Napoleon destroyed a succession of great power coalitions until the last one marshaled the resources, cohesion, and leadership to finally defeat him. These wars cover a complex range of military operations, with some types of war evolving into others or multiple types coinciding to produce layered conflicts.

During this period, Great Britain developed and put to use a powerful seagoing, war-fighting expeditionary force in pursuit of national interests. Britain’s Royal Navy gave the state tremendous flexibility to manage emerging and persistent threats. Most duties performed by the British navy were far more mundane than major combat operations and involved the projection of land forces ashore, the protection of commerce, and interminable presence missions. Such operations demanded permanent deployments on a nearly global basis. As the fighting progressed, the barriers to entry faced by adversaries seeking to contest Britain’s naval mastery became very high and created conditions that allowed Britain to dominate the maritime environment for at least six decades following the Napoleonic Wars.

This case study explores the writings of Alfred Thayer Mahan and Julian S. Corbett. Mahan served as a professor and the second president of the Naval War College where he turned his lectures on strategy into a best-selling series of books. His first book, *The Influence of Sea*

Power upon History, 1660-1783, was widely heralded by his contemporaries as groundbreaking in its arguments about the effects of sea power while the second book in the series, *The Influence of Sea Power on the French Revolution and Empire, 1793-1812*, cemented his reputation. These books brought great fame both to their author and the Naval War College. Mahan wrote in an era of rapid technological and naval change as well as a transformation of the international environment, with the rise of new great powers challenging the status quo. Amid these rapid changes, Mahan believed that historical case studies provided the best way for contemporary political and naval leaders to discern key strategic concepts. Mahan maintained, "From time to time the superstructure of tactics has to be altered or wholly torn down; but the old foundations of strategy so far remain, as though laid upon a rock" (*Influence of Sea Power upon History*, p. 88).

Mahan also provided a high-level analysis of grand strategy, exploring the interrelationship between navies and what he saw as other critical factors of a nation's strength including geopolitics, society, the economy, and government institutions. In the process, he developed the concept of sea power—a combination of naval strength and various aspects of financial and economic power. Governments, for Mahan, could not create sea power out of thin air. Favorable social conditions, political and economic institutions, and geography were all critical elements in creating and sustaining sea power.

Mahan placed a particular emphasis on the aggressive deployment of the fleet. In *The Influence of Sea Power upon History*, he castigated British naval leaders during the War for American Independence for their failure to risk warships in battle. By adopting a more aggressive strategy during the Wars of the French Revolution and Napoleon, the British, Mahan argued, obtained better outcomes. The wars highlighted this week allow the analysis of a critical operational decision with enormous strategic importance: under what circumstances does it make strategic sense for a naval power to risk its main fleet to the hazards of battle? This necessitates asking the question: in what ways can naval power exert decisive influence on the outcomes of wars? For example, the Battle of Trafalgar, fought on October 21, 1805, has mythic status, but what strategic effects did Britain actually derive from Trafalgar?

Julian S. Corbett, the first joint theorist, sometimes complemented and sometimes offered a counterpoint to Mahan. His reputation as an outstanding naval historian prompted the Royal Navy's leadership to offer him an appointment as a lecturer on strategy in advanced professional education courses established for British naval officers. Corbett, who drew heavily upon Clausewitz's *On War*, developed a distinctive analysis of how maritime powers fight and win wars. He was a firm believer in the necessity of integrating diplomacy, economics, military, and naval power in pursuit of national security objectives. His emphasis, however, was on integrating the navy with the other instruments of national power. The key objective from which all other effects flowed was the need to obtain "command of the sea" which he defined as "nothing but the control of maritime communications, whether for commercial or military purposes. The object of naval warfare is the control of communications ... which are part of the life of the nation" (*Some Principles*, p. 94).

His work with the navy led Corbett to develop his own strategic theory, published in 1911 under the title of *Some Principles of Maritime Strategy*. He defined "maritime strategy" as

the integration of land and naval power to create what today would be referred to as joint effects. Corbett recognized that land and naval forces working in concert toward a single objective multiplied the strength of a maritime state, especially in limited wars and through peripheral operations. Power projection and joint warfighting, as emphasized by Corbett, gave Britain significant flexibility. Joint operations, however, were not ends in themselves; such operations had to be applied in the proper environment. For Corbett, a textbook example of the successful execution of a joint and combined strategy occurred in the Iberian Peninsula during the Napoleonic Wars under the leadership of the Duke of Wellington.

This case study explores a variety of instruments of national power, with particular emphasis on the interrelationship among the economic sources of strength (The Economic and Material Dimension of Strategy), the managerial skills of government organizations (The Institutional Dimension of Strategy), and strategic effectiveness in wartime. Britain's command of the maritime commons rested on the Royal Navy and Britain's financial power buttressed by maritime trade. Financial strength enabled Britain to maintain powerful armed forces and support coalition partners. Britain undertook an enormous mobilization effort against France during the Wars of the French Revolution and Napoleon. In the closing stages of the long-term competition with France, Britain pioneered the Industrial Revolution, becoming the world's leading manufacturing power. This combination of commerce, finance, and industry, along with naval prowess, made Britain a formidable adversary in wartime and, subsequently, a superpower throughout the nineteenth century. Yet even with overwhelming economic superiority, Britain lost the thirteen American colonies and took years to bring its economic and financial superiority to bear on Napoleon. This example should cause students to question how financial superiority translates into strategic success.

One key factor lies in the multinational dimension of the strategic environment. Britain faced daunting challenges in its wars against an expansionist French Revolutionary regime during the 1790s and later against Napoleon. The new political identities that emerged in France challenged the existing international system. French governments demonstrated an ability to mobilize considerable military power and transform warfare on land. Napoleon's exploits on the battlefield have made him among the most legendary of all ground commanders. His prowess made France seem unbeatable and came close to securing French hegemony over Europe. Yet, he failed to obtain his ultimate objective. Why did Napoleon's operational prowess not translate into strategic success?

The role of coalitions and the ability to prevent the formation of an enemy coalition were important in both the American War for Independence and the Wars of the French Revolution and Napoleon. To what extent did French assistance—arms, money, supplies, advisers, as well as French ground and naval forces—determine the outcome of the American War for Independence? Beginning in 1778, that war expanded into a global maritime war in which Britain fought a coalition of naval powers—France, Spain, and the Netherlands. How did this change the nature of the war for Britain and what effects did the expansion of the war have on Britain's ability to secure victory in America? The wars against the French Republic and Napoleon provide the opportunity to examine France's attempts at continental coalition building as well as a succession of anti-French coalitions spearheaded by Britain. As a maritime power, Britain lacked an army of sufficient size to defeat a great continental power like France, while

Napoleon lacked a navy able to defeat Britain. The protracted nature of the Anglo-French struggle allows students to consider the difficulties faced by land and sea powers in overcoming their asymmetric deficiencies and leveraging their asymmetric strengths. Coalitions provide one solution, but why did Britain face such difficulty in forming an effective coalition against France? Only in 1813 did a final coalition form that proved capable of defeating Napoleon. A comparison of the success in 1813 to previous failures might suggest key elements for effective coalition cohesion as well as the principal solvents most corrosive to coalition unity.

The statesmen who created the final coalition against Napoleonic France endeavored to transition from a wartime coalition to one that could in fact win the peace to attain national objectives far beyond simple battlefield victory. First at Paris and then more notably at Vienna, leaders planned a comprehensive postwar settlement. The victorious European Great Powers—Russia, Austria, Prussia, and Britain—created a system to manage the international order and eventually accepted France back into the European state system. However, each of the great powers had its own interests. Britain was particularly concerned about naval supremacy and refused involvement in continental entanglements as long as its security in the maritime domain was not threatened. Despite all states still considering their own self-interest, it was not until the 1850s that the European great powers would fight even a limited conflict (The Crimean War), and a major European-wide war occurred only in 1914, nearly a century after Napoleon’s final defeat at Waterloo.

B. Essay and Discussion Questions:

1. How well did Great Britain exploit its strengths and compensate for its weaknesses in its wars with France in 1778-1783, 1793-1802, and 1803-1815?
2. In the Peloponnesian War, the land power, Sparta, defeated the sea power, Athens. What differences can be found in this case to account for the opposite result in the wars between Britain and France?
3. Could Great Britain have crushed the rebellion in the American colonies?
4. Which better explains Britain’s failure in subduing the rebellion in the American colonies: poor decisions by British political leaders in London or French intervention?
5. Napoleon achieved remarkable successes during the period 1805-1807. Why was he not able to duplicate these successes in 1812-1815? Why did he fail to convert these into a lasting peace?
6. How strategically effective was the British navy in carrying out the missions assigned to it during the wars examined in this case study?
7. Did British leaders effectively balance risk versus reward when employing their fleet during the wars examined in this case study?

8. Was the Battle of Trafalgar decisive?
9. Did Napoleon ever win any decisive battles?
10. Several scholars, including Corbett, have argued that Great Britain's efforts in the Peninsula War (1807-1814) were an essential factor in Napoleon's final defeat in 1814. Do you agree?
11. In fighting France, which factor was most important for Britain, its military and naval instruments of war or its economic power?
12. How strategically important were operations in secondary theaters for determining the outcome of the wars examined in this case?
13. Which was more important for Napoleon's defeat: the Emperor's self-defeating actions or British strategic performance?
14. In light of the wars between Great Britain and France examined this week, what makes for a strategically effective coalition?
15. Which naval theorist better explains the outcome of the wars covered in this case, Alfred Thayer Mahan or Sir Julian Corbett?
16. Dominant maritime powers often try to shift the burden of ground fighting onto their coalition partners. What steps can a maritime power take to overcome problems of burden sharing and prevent a coalition from falling apart?
17. Why did Britain maintain most of its empire at the conclusion of the War for American Independence, while the end of the Peloponnesian War resulted in the destruction of the Athenian Empire?
18. Did the Thucydides' trinity of honor, fear, and self-interest make it impossible for the coalition of great powers that defeated Napoleon to survive long into post-1815 period?
19. The coalition that defeated Napoleon between 1813 and 1815 transitioned at the Congress of Vienna to an organization designed to rebuild and protect the international order. How effectively did strategic leaders overcome the challenges faced while transforming the coalition from its wartime to its peacetime role?

C. Readings:

1. Kennedy, Paul. *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000*. New York: Random House, 1987. Pages 73-100, 115-139.

[Yale historian Paul Kennedy describes the European balance of power in the eighteenth century emphasizing financial developments and geopolitical trends. In addition, he provides an overview of the period from the end of the Seven Years' War in 1763 until the downfall of Napoleon in 1815, focusing on Britain and France and their positions in the European state system.]

2. Allison, Robert J. *The American Revolution: A Concise History*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2011. Pages 1-73.

[Robert Allison provides an overview of the American War for Independence that contains significant insights into the course of the war from both British and American perspectives.]

3. Rothenberg, Gunther E. *The Napoleonic Wars*. New York: Collins, 2006. Pages 24-191.

[Gunther Rothenberg traces the history of the Wars of the French Revolution and Napoleon with particular emphasis on the military campaigns along with the roles of leadership, transformation, and irregular warfare.]

4. Kennedy, Paul M. *The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery*. Atlantic Heights: Ashfield Press, 1987. Pages 97-147.

[Paul Kennedy examines how Great Britain responded to threats faced in the maritime domain. Chapter 4 addresses the period from the Seven Years' War until the outbreak of the Wars of the French Revolution and Napoleon, while Chapter 5 provides insights into the operational and strategic roles of Britain's navy in the struggles against Revolutionary and Napoleonic France.]

5. Mahan, Alfred Thayer. *The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783*. New York: Dover paperback edition, 1987. Pages iii-vi, 1-89, 505-541.

[This classic study introduces Mahan's thesis about the importance of sea power. Specially, he defines and develops six elements of sea power and links these issues to principles of naval strategy. Mahan argues that technologies change but not the underlying, fundamental principles of strategy. The second section of this reading includes Mahan's analysis of the use of sea power during the War for American Independence.]

6. Mahan, Alfred Thayer. *The Influence of Sea Power upon the French Revolution and Empire 1793-1812*. Vol. 2. 9th Edition. Boston: Little, Brown, 1898. Pages 371-411. (Selected Readings)

[Mahan followed *The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783* with a two-volume study titled *The Influence of Sea Power upon the French Revolution and Empire*. Taken together, these three volumes told a single story detailing the significance, development, and effects of how a maritime state used sea power. This reading comprises an excerpt from the final chapter of the series and develops Mahan's argument about the effectiveness of sea powers in long-term competitions and the way sea powers in fact defeat continental land powers.]

7. Corbett, Julian S. *Some Principles of Maritime Strategy*. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press Edition, 1988. Pages 15-71, 326-345.

[Julian Corbett wrote *Some Principles of Maritime Strategy* before the First World War. Corbett admired and sought to build on Clausewitz's *On War*, adapting it to offer strategic guidance for maritime powers. In particular, he wanted to show the effects that a maritime power might generate from a "joint" strategy for the employment of its army and navy. The appendix provides a brief description of Corbett's overall concept of Maritime Strategy.]

8. O'Shaughnessy, Andrew Jackson. *The Men Who Lost America*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2013. Pages 4-14, 47-80.

[O'Shaughnessy describes Britain's defeat in the American War for Independence through a series of biographical sketches of key military, naval, and political leaders. The assigned chapters provide insights into British decision-making and the political leadership of Lord North as prime minister.]

9. French, David. *The British Way in Warfare, 1688-2000*. London: Unwin Hyman, 1990. Pages 88-118. (Selected Readings)

[This chapter focuses on Britain in the Napoleonic Wars to examine such issues as financial, material, and manpower constraints, to show the unique strengths and weaknesses of the British state at war, and particularly to explain how the Peninsular War contributed to the defeat of Napoleon.]

10. Kissinger, Henry. *Diplomacy*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994. Pages 78-102.

[Henry Kissinger provides a valuable assessment of the international order at the conclusion of the Napoleonic Wars by highlighting the events and personalities surrounding the Congress of Vienna and the Concert of Europe that emerged in the aftermath of the defeat of Napoleon. In this account, Kissinger assesses the role played by strategic leadership in shaping the international environment as Europe transitioned from decades of war to almost a century without a major European-wide war.]

D. Learning Outcomes: The case study on Commanding the Maritime Commons applies the theories, themes, and frameworks developed in the course to examine how they can be applied to all three types of wars discussed in the Strategy and Policy Course. Students will focus especially on the issues of preparing for and fighting a war at sea, joint and combined conventional operations, and the unique problems of insurgency and counterinsurgency. This case study supports:

- CJCS Joint Learning Areas and Objectives (JPME II) 1a, 1b, 1c, 2a, 2b, 2c, and 3d. Emphasis will be placed on the following topics, enabling students to:

- Apply key strategic concepts, critical thinking and analytical frameworks to formulate and execute strategy (1a).
- Analyze the integration of all instruments of national power in complex, dynamic and ambiguous environments to attain objectives at the national and theater-strategic levels (1b).
- Evaluate historical and/or contemporary security environments and applications of strategies across the range of military operations (1c).
- Evaluate the principles of joint operations, joint military doctrine, joint functions (command and control, intelligence, fires, movement and maneuver, protection and sustainment), and emerging concepts across the range of military operations (2a).
- Evaluate how theater strategies, campaigns and major operations achieve national strategic goals across the range of military operations (2b).
- Apply an analytical framework that addresses the factors politics, geography, society, culture and religion play in shaping the desired outcomes of policies, strategies and campaigns (2c).
- Value a joint perspective and appreciating the increased power available to commanders through joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational efforts (3d).

IV. PROFILES IN STRATEGIC LEADERSHIP—BISMARCK AND LINCOLN, AND THEIR GENERALS

A. General: This case expands the analytical foundation in the area of critical analysis applied to a controlled and deep study of strategic leadership and the Profession of Arms. Both Abraham Lincoln and Otto von Bismarck were masters of the conduct of strategy, from whom much can be learned; both sought to integrate the conduct of military operations into a larger grand strategy that employed economics, diplomacy, and information as instruments of power. Lincoln is celebrated for his soaring rhetoric that defined American aims and motivations not only in this war but for the future. Bismarck is known for his mastery of the arts of diplomacy and his shrewd assessments of the international strategic environment. One leader fought to preserve a nation-state and extend democracy; the other to create a nation-state and preserve the power of a monarchy. One leader fought for unlimited aims, seeking to overthrow the enemy government and transform its society; the other fought for limited aims, to gain legitimacy as a new and dynamic leader among the great powers of Europe. The successes of Lincoln and Bismarck as war leaders put both countries on the path to world leadership a generation later. Their legacies remain profound, providing outstanding profiles of leadership in war and peace.

War marked the emergence of the German Empire as a great power during the nineteenth century. The North German state of Prussia fought three wars—the Danish War of 1864, the Austro-Prussian War of 1866, and the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871—to forge a united Germany under its rule. Bismarck was the policy and strategy architect of these conflicts known as the Wars of German Unification. While serving as the Prussian Minister-President, Bismarck showed himself a master at managing the delicate policy-strategy relationship in regional wars fought for limited aims to make Prussia the dominant power in Germany. Bismarck understood that in order to defeat Prussia's rivals in war, he needed to calibrate objectives, to integrate military operations and diplomacy, and to balance the triangular relationship among the people, government, and army. Bismarck faced and took great risks in pursuing his strategy of unifying Germany under Prussian rule through limited war with its great power neighbors. There was always the danger of defeat on the battlefield, protracted war, or escalation to a wider, general European conflict. Bismarck sought to control the escalatory dangers of ever more ambitious war aims and great-power intervention against Prussia. The study of Bismarck provides timely insights into the making of policy and strategy by a country that sought to challenge the international status quo without provoking escalation to a wider, general war. To examine the strategic leadership of Bismarck, the writings of another famous leader, Henry Kissinger, provide a core text.

Lincoln became a master of policy and strategy in an exceedingly dynamic and uncertain security environment. The strategic situation confronting Lincoln required the mobilization of large armies and naval forces to overthrow the Confederacy. At the outset of the struggle to restore the Union, the interrelationship of the war's purpose, cost, and duration confounded the best strategic analyses. In Lincoln's second inaugural address, he stated:

Neither party expected for the war the magnitude or the duration which it has already attained. Neither anticipated that the cause of the conflict might cease with, or even before the conflict itself should cease. Each looked for an easier triumph, and a result less fundamental and astounding.

The majestic language of this oration should not obscure that Lincoln employed a rational calculus for strategic analysis that echoes Clausewitz.

Analysis of civil-military relations enables a broader conceptualization of effective command and control and a more perceptive evaluation of effective strategic leadership in the Profession of Arms. Both Bismarck and Lincoln had stormy relationships with the generals in charge of their countries' armies. The critical role played by civil-military relations in the making of strategy thus forms an integral part of this case study. Perhaps no case study in civil-military relations shines as bright a spotlight on the strategic consequences of the relationship between the statesman and the soldier. Strategic choices, for good or ill, result from the actions of decision makers and their staffs who bring differing bureaucratic backgrounds, strategic conceptions, and personalities to their deliberations.

Bismarck used war as a way to outmaneuver his domestic political enemies, who wanted to control government policies by asserting the power of the Prussian parliament, the Landtag, and the primacy of the rule of law. By defeating Denmark, Austria, and France on the battlefield, the Prussian army gave Bismarck the political leverage he needed to thwart internal opposition to the government. As Bismarck gained an ascendancy over the government's internal foes, he faced a stiff challenge to his authority on matters of war and peace from the Prussian military establishment. In particular, Bismarck needed to assert control over the Prussian general staff, headed by the skilled military leader Helmuth von Moltke. The disagreements between Bismarck and Moltke during the Wars of German Unification provide an invaluable opportunity to examine civil-military relations. These disagreements threatened to upset Bismarck's political calculations and impair Prussia's strategic effectiveness.

The story is often told of Lincoln's travails in finding a military high command willing to work with him to develop and execute a coherent strategy for overthrowing the Confederacy and breaking the will of the people of the South to fight. In the eastern theater of war, the Army of the Potomac was led by a succession of generals, whose offensives repeatedly failed to destroy the Confederate centers of gravity, represented by the South's main field army and its capital, which also served as its most important industrial center. The North's theater leadership in the East was not without talent. General George B. McClellan built the Army of the Potomac into a formidable fighting force. He devised the joint strategy of using the North's dominance of the maritime domain to attack Richmond from the sea. In addition, McClellan defeated a dangerous offensive launched by the audacious Confederate General Robert E. Lee in the autumn of 1862 at the hard-fought, bloody Battle of Antietam. Still, McClellan's disagreement with the administration about overall policy, his disrespect for Lincoln both as an individual and as the commander-in-chief, and his unwillingness to push offensives more aggressively into the South led to his dismissal from high command. Other theater commanders fared even worse, with General Ambrose Burnside and General Joseph Hooker suffering major defeats at the hands of Lee and his Army of Northern Virginia. General George Gordon Meade's victory at Gettysburg

at least ensured that the war would not be lost in the Eastern Theater, even if the Army of the Potomac proved unable to win it by offensive operations during the first three years of the war.

The emergence of Ulysses S. Grant, first as a general in the Western Theater and later as commander of the entire Union effort, gave Lincoln a military leader who saw the strategic contours of the war as he did. Grant was skilled at maneuver warfare. His offensives were meant to seize the strategic initiative and gain the war's objectives. The Union offensives of 1864 were designed to be a coordinated, multi-theater drive to end the war by taking advantage of the North's superiority in numbers and naval forces. This sound strategic blueprint, however, did not prove easy to execute. Defeating Lee's army and taking the South's capital of Richmond took almost a year of hard fighting and enormous casualties. Grant's offensive in the main theater of war in Virginia was complemented by the drive of General William Tecumseh Sherman into Georgia, with follow-on operations in the Carolinas. Sherman's offensive into the Confederate homeland did serious damage to the South's ability to wage war. These two offensives, Grant's drive into Virginia and Sherman's march through the South, broke the Confederacy's capacity to wage a conventional war.

This case also evaluates the impact of operations on societies waging war. Bismarck came to power in the midst of a deep constitutional crisis in Prussia. The Prussian Landtag would not agree to the government's plans for modernizing the army, but the victories of the Prussian army paved the way for Bismarck to settle the constitutional conflict that pitted the monarchy against the Landtag. Bismarck wrote a constitution for the newly united German state that strengthened the monarchy and insulated the army from the elected representatives of the people. In the Franco-Prussian War, the largest of the Wars of German Unification, Germany's victories on the battlefield led to a revolutionary upheaval in France, resulting in the capture and overthrow of the Emperor Napoleon III. The interrelationship among people, government, and army is a cardinal element of this case study.

A constitutional crisis, provoked by the election of 1860, also sparked the American Civil War. The fighting tested the relationship of the American people, government, and army. By late summer of 1864, the high casualty lists from Grant's offensive in Virginia, as well as the trench warfare on the main front outside of Richmond and Petersburg, seemed destined to result in Lincoln's defeat in the presidential election of 1864, with the people repudiating the government. Lincoln certainly feared defeat at the polls and even thought about what that would mean for the conduct of operations after the election. Pivotal victories in secondary theaters achieved by Sherman, General Philip Sheridan, and Admiral David Farragut helped Lincoln avoid electoral defeat. The North's ability to keep together the government, people, and army through this protracted and costly struggle holds important insights for studying leadership and grand strategy in a democracy during wartime. Conversely, the destructive march of Sherman's army through Georgia and the Carolinas delivered a shock to the South's triangle of people, government, and army.

Another component of this case study is an examination of transformation in warfare. Prussia's military leaders designed and built armed forces to fight short-duration, high-intensity conflicts. This case study assesses when a transformation in fighting forces might produce the capability to win quick decisive victories. Moltke endeavored to institutionalize military genius

in his development of a modern general staff, which proved a key ingredient in Prussia's ability to inflict major defeats in quick succession on its adversaries during the Wars of German Unification. Railways, the telegraph, rapid-fire rifles, and longer-range artillery were bringing about a transformation in command and control, the conduct of operations and the increasing lethality of the battlefield. The Prussian army capitalized on these developments to gain a military edge on its adversaries. Military historians and strategic analysts consider the transformation of the Prussian army during the mid-nineteenth century as one of the most important examples of a revolution in military affairs.

In the American Civil War, generals struggled with the problems posed by the increased lethality of weaponry and command and control of large conscript armies. Railways, telegraphs, and more lethal weapons contributed not to quick battlefield victories, but to stalemate and heavy casualty lists. Determined soldiers, fighting from prepared defensive positions, could inflict horrendous losses on the attacker. The battles of Fredericksburg, Gettysburg, and Cold Harbor bear horrible witness to the stubborn reality that even the bravest of soldiers could not prevail against the firepower of well-armed and entrenched defenders. New technologies appeared to significantly favor the defense, but as Clausewitz notes the offense—with its positive aim—is often necessary to achieve political objectives. Even one of the most renowned field commanders of the war, Lee, saw his two major offensives into Northern territory thrown back with heavy losses. The North's victory depended on offensives to defeat Confederate armies in the field and break the morale of the South's people. This task required a huge mobilization effort, harnessing the industrial and demographic strengths of the North to create, deploy, and sustain large armies. Comparing the American Civil War with the Wars of German Unification provides insight into the impact of weaponry and technology on operations and strategy.

Both Bismarck and Lincoln showed considerable diplomatic skill. They sought to isolate their adversaries, preventing outside intervention that might tip the balance of power against them. For example, an intervention by Great Britain into the American Civil War or the Wars of German Unification might have proven decisive in upsetting the strategies of Bismarck and Lincoln. Both therefore sought to prevent British intervention on the side of Prussia's adversaries or the Confederacy. Potential triggers certainly existed. Britain's leaders were deeply concerned about the overall balance of power in Europe as well as for the security and independence of the small countries on the North Sea littoral—Belgium, the Netherlands, and Denmark. Bismarck in his aims and operations sought to reassure British leaders that Prussia's wars did not threaten these longstanding geostrategic interests. Meanwhile, Lincoln wanted to ensure that the North's actions in enforcing the blockade did not provoke Britain to support the Confederacy with armed intervention. The United States sought to show how its actions at sea were actually in harmony with Britain's interests as the world's leading sea power. The ability of Bismarck and Lincoln to assess the interests of other great powers and shape the international environment to their strategic advantage also played a critical role in their success as war leaders.

Winning the peace is another prominent theme in this case study. The Wars of German Unification established a Germany so powerful that it appeared poised to dominate the rest of Europe. Still, Germany's position in the center of Europe, surrounded by great power rivals, was strategically precarious. Bismarck sought to consolidate through careful diplomacy the gains that Prussia had won in the Wars of German Unification. For a period of nearly twenty years

after the Franco-Prussian War, while Bismarck still held the reins of power, Germany acted as a sated power on the international stage. Bismarck, the “iron and blood” leader, sought security by avoiding war. He protected Germany by creating a system of alliances designed to prevent the formation of a hostile coalition. The cardinal principle of his strategy for preserving the peace was to isolate France from great power allies. France, on its own, in Bismarck’s estimation, would not possess the strength to overturn the settlement of 1871. Diplomacy, rather than further wars, was the key for Bismarck in consolidating Germany’s gains within the European system. Yet Bismarck’s complex balancing act did not outlive his tenure in office. In 1892, just two years after the end of Bismarck’s public career, France and Russia entered into a security pact aimed at Germany.

Lincoln, his life cut short by an assassin, would not have the opportunity to play the role of peacemaker or carry out the effort of reconciliation, so beautifully stated in his second inaugural address:

With malice toward none, with charity for all, with firmness in the right as God gives us to see the right, let us strive on to finish the work we are in, to bind up the nation’s wounds, to care for him who shall have borne the battle and for his widow and his orphan, to do all which may achieve and cherish a just and lasting peace among ourselves and with all nations.

Historians and commentators have long debated how Reconstruction of the South might have taken a different turn if Lincoln had survived the assassin’s bullet. Would he have been as great a peacemaker as he was a war leader? History cannot answer that question. This case study nonetheless does provide an opportunity to examine the era of Reconstruction, an era marked by great controversy. The North needed to maintain an army in the South against those who wanted to prevent a thoroughgoing reconstruction of the South’s society and politics. An irregular warfare campaign and terrorism were employed to disrupt the agenda of Radical Republicans for transforming the South and securing the peace. While Lee’s surrender of the main Confederate army brought one phase of the conflict to a close, the struggle to determine the peace did not end at Appomattox. This case study also considers the consequences if Lee, instead of surrendering his force, had dispersed it and encouraged further fighting by employing the remnants of the Army of Northern Virginia to conduct irregular operations. The American Civil War provides many powerful lessons about the dangers of assuming that theater-strategic success will naturally achieve higher-level national objectives, in this instance equating the end of conventional operations with achieving a just and durable peace.

B. Essay and Discussion Questions:

1. Why did the North find itself bogged down in a protracted war of attrition during the American Civil War, whereas Prussia achieved quick victories in the Wars of German Unification?

2. Some strategic analysts argue that Bismarck's success was largely the product of his own skill. Others argue that the keys to his success were a permissive domestic and international environment, "cooperative" adversaries, and good luck. Which argument has the most validity?
3. What are the most important lessons about civil-military relations one might draw from the American and Prussian experiences in the wars examined in this case study?
4. Who better understood the proper relationship between political and military authorities during the Austro-Prussian and Franco-Prussian Wars, Bismarck or Moltke?
5. Did Lincoln ask more of his generals than they could reasonably have been expected to deliver in their operations?
6. Bismarck and Lincoln hold the reputation of being outstanding war leaders. Yet, they encountered difficult problems in working with their top military leaders. Why did military leaders find Bismarck and Lincoln so difficult to work with in the making of strategy and the execution of operations?
7. Assess the validity of the following statement. "Politics and strategy are radically and fundamentally things apart. Strategy begins where politics ends. All that soldiers ask is that once the policy is settled, strategy and command shall be regarded as something in a sphere apart from politics. . . . The line of demarcation must be drawn between politics and strategy, supply, and operations. Having found this line, all sides must abstain from trespassing."
8. The lethality of the weaponry employed during the American Civil War and the Wars of German Unification conferred important advantages to the defender on the battlefield. Yet, both wars were won by the side that resorted to the offensive in pursuit of its overarching political aims. Why did the defense not prove the stronger form of war in the conflicts examined in this case study?
9. Neither Lincoln's reelection in November 1864 nor the capture of Napoleon III in September 1870 brought an immediate end to the fighting. Instead, the American Civil War and the Franco-Prussian War continued, although the chances for success of both the Confederacy and France were low. Was it rational for the leaders of the Confederacy and France to continue fighting for as long as they did?
10. Did the North "win the peace" after the conclusion of the American Civil War?
11. What strategic effect did irregular warfare have in shaping the outcome of the American Civil War and the Franco-Prussian War?
12. A famous military historian has written: "Lee was not really a strategist, though he was a brilliant tactician and operational leader." Do you agree?
13. Sun Tzu presents a model of effective strategic leadership in *The Art of War*. Does President Lincoln represent this type of leader?

14. If you had served as a foreign correspondent for a newspaper covering the American Civil War, how would you have assessed the prospects of the two sides shortly after the First Battle of Bull Run?

15. If you had served as a foreign correspondent for a newspaper covering the Franco-Prussian War, how would you have assessed the prospects of the two sides at the onset of the conflict?

16. Both Grant and Moltke are lauded as great field commanders. How well did they manage the fog, friction, uncertainty, and chaos of war?

C. Readings:

1. McPherson, James M. *Tried by War: Abraham Lincoln as Commander in Chief*. New York: Penguin, 2008. Pages 1-270.

[James McPherson presents an important study on strategic leadership. In the crisis to preserve the Union, Lincoln needed to contend with the problems of a democracy fighting a total war for unlimited ends. Part of Lincoln's greatness was his ability to provide a convincing public rationale about the war's purpose and for the actions of the government in prosecuting it. Lincoln needed to find military leaders who could bring this desperate struggle to a conclusion. His understanding of the triangular relationship between political leadership, popular support, and military success contributed to the Union's eventual victory, and reflects an intuitive understanding of Clausewitz.]

2. Kissinger, Henry. *Diplomacy*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994. Pages 103-136.

[The famous statesman, Henry Kissinger, provides a valuable assessment of the German statesman Bismarck and the challenge posed by imperial Germany's foreign policy ambitions to the peace of Europe in the mid-nineteenth century. In this account, Kissinger assesses the role played by strategic leadership in shaping the international environment in both peace and war.]

3. Craig, Gordon A. *The Politics of the Prussian Army, 1640-1945*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1964. Pages 136-216.

[This landmark study on civil-military relations analyzes the relationship between soldier and statesman. The institution of the general staff, pioneered by Prussia during the nineteenth century, gave the Prussian army an important strategic advantage in planning for war and controlling operations once the fighting began. Prussia's operational successes during the Wars of German Unification owed much to the general staff's ability to generate a formidable pulse of military power at the outset of war by carrying out a rapid deployment of Prussian forces to the frontiers. It also owed much to the skill at maneuver warfare showed by its chief, Helmuth von

Moltke. This study highlights Bismarck's difficulty subordinating successful battlefield operations to policy during the Wars of German Unification.]

4. Badsey, Stephen. *The Franco-Prussian War, 1870-1871*. New York: Osprey, 2003. Pages 7-54, 59-76, 81-86.

[This concise history offers an overview of the operations that occurred during the Franco-Prussian War.]

5. Cohen, Eliot A. *Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime*. New York: Free Press, 2002. Pages 1-14, 15-51 (optional), and 173-224.

[Eliot Cohen, a former professor of the Strategy and Policy Department and later Counselor to the Department of State under Secretary Condoleezza Rice, has written a thought provoking study on civil-military relations. The chapters assigned provide an overview of the topic of civil-military relations, as well as an in-depth case study of Lincoln's wartime strategic leadership. This study can be profitably compared with reading number 3, Gordon Craig's examination of civil-military relations in Prussia.]

6. Murray, Williamson, and Jim Lacey, eds. *The Making of Peace: Rulers, States, and the Aftermath of War*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009. Pages 160-207.

[These two essays provide valuable background information and an assessment of the long-term problems in making peace after the wars for American and German unification.]

7. Holborn, Hajo. "The Prusso-German School: Moltke and the Rise of the General Staff" in *Makers of Modern Strategy*. Peter Paret, ed. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986. Pages 281-295.

[Helmuth von Moltke's strategic thought as well as the origins of the general staff system for planning and executing operations are examined in this thoughtful essay, written by a leading scholar of German history.]

8. President of the United States of America, First Inaugural Address, March 4, 1861; President of the United States of America, The Emancipation Proclamation, January 1, 1863; President of the United States of America, The Gettysburg Address, November 19, 1863; and President of the United States of America, Second Inaugural Address, March 4, 1865. (Selected Readings)

[In this collection of speeches, together with the Emancipation Proclamation, Lincoln sets out the war's underlying purpose, explaining the stakes for which the conflict was fought.]

9. Sutherland, Daniel E. "Guerilla Warfare, Democracy, and the Fate of the Confederacy," *The Journal of Southern History* 68, no. 2 (May 2002). Pages 259-292.

<http://www.jstor.org/stable/3069933>

[Daniel Sutherland argues that Southerners viewed guerilla warfare as an inherent strength that the Confederacy should exploit to achieve independence from the North. Yet as Sutherland also points out, the reaction of the North was unexpected and led to a strategic backlash. The Union adopted a "hard hand" to dealing with guerrillas and eventually took this approach to guide their "total war" strategy.]

10. Handel, Michael I. *Masters of War: Classical Strategic Thought*. London: Cass, 2001. Pages 255-272.

[Michael Handel, who served on the faculty of the Naval War College, argues in *Masters of War* that, despite some important differences in emphasis and substance, there is a universal strategic logic or unified strategic theory that transcends the wide gaps in time, culture, and historical experience of various nations. The assigned reading focuses on how the major strategic theorists understand and value the concept of military-strategic leadership.]

D. Learning Outcomes: This case is grounded in a deep focus on strategic leadership, the civil-military dialogue, and the Profession of Arms. This case study supports:

- CJCS Joint Learning Areas and Objectives (JPME II) 1a, 1b, 1c, 2b, 4c, 5a, 5b, 5c, and 5e. Emphasis will be placed on the following topics, enabling students to:
 - Apply key strategic concepts, critical thinking and analytical frameworks to formulate and execute strategy (1a).
 - Analyze the integration of all instruments of national power in complex, dynamic and ambiguous environments to attain objectives at the national and theater-strategic levels (1b).
 - Evaluate historical and/or contemporary security environments and applications of strategies across the range of military operations (1c).
 - Evaluate how theater strategies, campaigns and major operations achieve national strategic goals across the range of military operations (2b).
 - Analyze the opportunities and challenges affecting command and control created in the joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational environment across the range of military operations, to include leveraging networks and technology (4c).
 - Evaluate the skills, character attributes and behaviors needed to lead in a dynamic joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational strategic environment (5a).
 - Evaluate critical strategic thinking, decision-making and communication by strategic leaders (5b).
 - Evaluate how strategic leaders develop innovative organizations capable of operating in dynamic, complex and uncertain environments; anticipate change; and respond to surprise and uncertainty (5c).
 - Evaluate historic and contemporary applications of the elements of mission command by strategic-level leaders in pursuit of national objectives (5e).

V. SEA POWER AND RISING PEER COMPETITORS IN AN AGE OF GLOBALIZATION—THE ORIGINS, CONDUCT, AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE FIRST WORLD WAR

A. General: The potentially disruptive rise of new powers creates a challenging security environment, requiring the development and evaluation of innovative analytical frameworks. The rise of Germany and the United States transformed the international strategic landscape at the beginning of the twentieth century. In the aftermath of the Wars of German Unification and the American Civil War, examined in the previous case study, dynamic economic growth transformed both countries into leading industrial and technological powers. Their surging economic strength had immense strategic implications for Great Britain, which had grown accustomed to thinking of itself as the workshop of the world. The advent of new economic competitors called into question Britain's standing as a global superpower. Examining great-power grand strategies from a hundred years ago thus provides a lens for assessing the dynamic changes taking place in today's international environment. Do shifts in the balance of power between rising and status quo powers produce conflict, as Thucydides contended in his classic history? Or is it possible to manage major shifts without war?

The breakdown of the globalized international order of a hundred years ago amidst a catastrophic world war provides a warning for contemporary leaders and strategic analysts. The First World War resulted in horrendous loss of life as well as political and social upheaval. The German, Austro-Hungarian, Ottoman, and Russian empires collapsed, leaving power vacuums in Eastern Europe and the Middle East. These outcomes were not what the leaders who embarked on the war had foreseen or wanted, and reflect inadequate approaches to the problems of surprise and uncertainty.

The determined quest for victory in war, along with the difficulties confronting military and naval leaders who sought innovative tactics to overcome battlefield realities, presented leaders on all sides of this conflict with immense strategic problems. These strategic problems shed light on the difficulties involved in breaking a stalemated struggle against determined adversaries at an acceptable cost. And as we know all too well, the settlement of the "war to end all wars" supplied a number of grievances that helped to spark another great world war but a generation later.

The Instruments of National Power course theme provides one framework for understanding the grand strategies of the great powers. This case study allows for a comparative analysis of the interactions among technological innovations, the geopolitical environment, military strategy, political and economic mobilization, and new operational doctrines for waging war across domains. In particular, the workings of sea power—the contest to command the maritime commons and deny access to adversaries—played a major role in the strategies of the great powers.

The case study pays special attention to Germany's emergence as a peer competitor challenging Britain. Germany attempted to defeat a stronger maritime adversary through deterrence, access denial, and disruptive, asymmetric strategies, while girding itself for a decisive fleet action. It already fielded the best army in Europe, and now sought to acquire a

powerful navy to guard its access to foreign markets and raw materials. Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz, the state secretary for the navy, devised a strategic blueprint for building up Germany's naval power. The German navy undertook a transformation of its operational capabilities, remaking itself from a coastal defense force designed to operate in littoral waters into an instrument that could strike at great distances to interdict critical shipping lanes. Berlin set out to assemble a colonial empire in Africa and Asia of its own, along with a navy to defend it. German expansionism—both military and economic—and bellicosity threatened the existing balance of power and posed a direct threat to British security. In both Britain and Germany, strategists feuded with politicians over how to fund their enormous naval construction programs. Ultimately, Germany's political system proved less resilient than that of Britain. Intense domestic political differences between irreconcilable interest groups—the monarchy, the armed services, liberal and conservative political parties, Socialists and trade unionists—hindered the adoption of a sound fiscal policy that could sustain the naval arms race.

The Decision for War course theme provides an analytical framework for understanding Imperial Germany's strategic behavior, which is essential to any examination of the origins of the First World War. The Wars of German Unification gave rise to a power so strong that it possessed the potential to dominate the rest of Europe—the so-called “German Problem.” Germany grew even stronger after 1880 during the Second Industrial Revolution, becoming an economic powerhouse that benefited from a remarkable expansion of industry and foreign trade. Technological prowess in the steel, chemical, electrical, optics, pharmaceutical, and machine-tool industries spurred economic growth. Germany also became a leading trading state, developing links through commerce and immigration with markets around the world and building the world's second-largest shipping industry. Even though Germany derived substantial economic benefits from the existing, interdependent networks comprising the global economy, its leaders wanted to translate their country's increasing strength into enhanced international political influence and military security.

Germany thus stood at a strategic crossroads at the beginning of the twentieth century. Rising powers must choose whether to operate within the existing global order or to use their increasing power to modify or even overturn that order. Germany opted for the latter. Whereas Bismarck sought to limit his country's goals to avoid a general European-wide war, a later generation of German leaders sought larger policy aims. They hoped to transform Germany into a superpower while overthrowing the existing international order. In this drive for world power, Germany's rulers risked their country's considerable economic and technological achievements by bringing about a powerful coalition of adversaries intent on stopping the German bid for hegemony over Europe. This case study considers why the leaders of a thriving industrial, technological, and trading power—a power that stood to gain economically and politically from adopting the role of a peaceful international stakeholder—instead embraced strategies entailing enormous risks, high costs, and uncertain payoffs. As such it provides a particularly powerful but negative lesson in what the requirements for successful strategic leadership and the role of the Profession of Arms.

German strategic behavior in this era was rooted in deep internal disputes among political, military, and naval leaders. The decisions made by Germany's rulers during the First World War provide a cautionary tale about the adverse strategic consequences that can result

from a breakdown in the proper relationship between statesmen and soldiers, who rarely trusted or respected each other. In their quest for swift, decisive victories, German military leaders first flouted international law by violating Belgian neutrality and then introducing the use of chemical weapons in 1915. That same year, they adopted a disruptive strategy that employed submarines as a weapon of commerce destruction, striking at British and neutral merchant shipping. The German bid to win the war quickly at sea provoked the United States, and in turn the U.S. entry into the war in April 1917 altered the balance of power. The study of Imperial Germany thus shows that transformations in warfare cannot substitute for wisdom or prudence.

Imperial Germany's rise can be profitably contrasted with that of the United States. Thanks to the "free security" afforded by weak neighbors, the oceans, and the Royal Navy, the United States expanded across the North American continent by 1848. Even the bloodiest war in American history, the Civil War, did little to slow the U.S. ascent. By the late 1880s, a scant twenty years after the Civil War, the United States was rapidly becoming the world's leading industrial power. American elites' views of America's place in the world impelled them to press for a more powerful navy at a time when Britain's command of the maritime commons appeared to be on the wane. The United States took an active part in the naval armaments rivalries that were a hallmark of this era. As the world's leading industrial power, as well as a producer and exporter of oil, the United States possessed the economic and industrial wherewithal to build a navy second to none.

In addition to the naval buildup, the United States unexpectedly raised an immense conscript army in 1917-1918. About two million soldiers deployed to Europe, dramatically shifting the balance of forces on land against Germany. General Tasker Bliss, who had served as one of the first instructors at the Naval War College, played a key part in the ground war. Bliss presided over the buildup of American military power as the U.S. Army's chief of staff, and over its employment in Europe as the U.S. representative on the Supreme War Council. The United States, not Imperial Germany, ultimately proved to be Britain's most dangerous competitor. By the end of the war, its navy surpassed that of Britain and the torch of global financial leadership had already passed from London to New York, as the United States went from being the world's largest debtor in 1914 to the largest creditor a mere three years later. This American military and economic mobilization provided the basis for diplomatic leverage and leadership in the Allied coalition.

To what end was American power to be used? The United States had officially gone to war to protect neutral rights and freedom of the seas, but its objectives during the Paris Peace Conference proved more grandiose. President Woodrow Wilson, probably the most influential global statesman the United States has ever produced, introduced a new and enduring ideological dimension to American foreign policy. Whereas earlier generations of American statesmen followed the advice of Washington, Jefferson, and Adams, and turned their backs on the wider world, Wilson exhorted Americans to global leadership and to remake the world "safe for democracy." In his book *Diplomacy*, former Secretary of State and Harvard professor Henry Kissinger provides a unique perspective, as both practitioner and scholar, on the evolution of presidential leadership. Kissinger maintains:

During the Wilson Administration, America emerged as a key player in world affairs, proclaiming principles which, while reflecting the truisms of American thought, nonetheless marked a revolutionary departure for Old World diplomats. These principles held that peace depends on the spread of democracy, that states should be judged by the same ethical criteria as individuals, and that the national interest consists of adhering to a universal system of law.⁹

In Kissinger's view, then, the rise of the United States entailed not just growth in capabilities but also expansion of its ideological aims. Like Germany, the United States intended to recreate the international order under its leadership. The discussion of American grand strategy that took place during this era echoes in contemporary debates over the U.S. role in world affairs. The early twentieth century, when the United States emerged as a superpower, thus demands close study if we are to understand American purposes and grand strategy.

Some echoes of this case are also present in contemporary U.S.-China relations. U.S. leaders have called on China to become a "responsible stakeholder" in the liberal international order. Chinese leaders, conscious of the history of conflict between great powers and rising challengers, have tried to avoid using language reminiscent of Imperial Germany, although their complaints of U.S. "containment" echo German cries of "encirclement" before 1914. The last case study of the Strategy and Policy Course will discuss the U.S.-China relationship in detail, but students might benefit from considering how this case study is similar to or different from the current international system even at this intermediate stage in the course.

B. Essay and Discussion Questions:

1. Imperial Germany and the United States at the beginning of the twentieth century provide examples of emerging great powers at strategic crossroads. Why was Great Britain unable to manage the rising power of Germany yet relatively successful at dealing with the growing strength of the United States?
2. Did Thucydides' trinity of honor, fear, and self-interest make great-power conflict inevitable in the early twentieth century?
3. Both Sun Tzu and Thucydides maintained that successful strategic leadership and outcomes depend upon sound assessments. How would Sun Tzu and Thucydides evaluate the strategic assessments of British and German leaders in the period covered by this case study?
4. Why did Germany, which had made remarkable economic gains during the period of peace before 1914, go to war against Great Britain and eventually the United States?
5. Did Great Britain commit a major policy and strategy error by going to war against Germany in August 1914?

⁹ Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy* (New York; Simon and Schuster, 1994), p. 30.

6. Germany's naval buildup under Wilhelm II was the fundamental cause of the Anglo-German conflict. Do you agree with this assessment?
7. Were Mahan's strategic theories becoming irrelevant even as he developed them?
8. What was the influence of sea power on the outcome of the First World War?
9. Which country—Germany, Great Britain, or the United States—employed its navy to greatest strategic effect during the First World War?
10. Were British and German leaders too risk-averse in employing their main surface fleets during the First World War?
11. What strategic advantages did Great Britain derive from possessing the world's strongest navy and financial services sectors before 1914?
12. Why did Germany find itself bogged down in a protracted war of attrition during the First World War, in stark contrast to the quick Prussian victories in the Wars of German Unification?
13. How might European politicians and soldiers at the beginning of the twentieth century have benefited from a close study of the strategic lessons of the American Civil War?
14. Imperial Germany provides a glaring example of a breakdown in the proper relationship between political and military leaders in the making of policy and strategy. Why did this breakdown occur, and what were its strategic consequences?
15. Was the failure of the major powers to negotiate an early end to the fighting during the First World War irrational?
16. "Woodrow Wilson never had any realistic war aims, or the ability to execute them." Do you agree?
17. The naval buildup undertaken by the United States "was not a defensive reaction to foreign threats, which were practically nonexistent. It was instead the product of expanding ambitions." Do you concur with this judgment?
18. Which coalition was more strategically dysfunctional during the First World War—the Central Powers or the Allied and Associated Powers?
19. Leading maritime powers often try to shift the burden of ground fighting onto their coalition partners. What general conclusions can one draw from the efforts of Great Britain in this era to overcome problems of burden sharing and prevent a coalition from falling apart?

C. Readings:

1. Kennedy, Paul. *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000*. New York: Random House, 1987. Pages 194-274.

[Yale historian Paul Kennedy discusses the shifting power balances that shaped the international strategic environment in the era of the First World War. He examines how an earlier era of globalization unraveled, resulting in a catastrophic war that devastated the great powers, and set the stage for further conflicts.]

2. Stevenson, David. *Cataclysm: The First World War as Political Tragedy*. New York: Basic Books, 2004. Pages 3-122, 179-239, 247-261, and 379-430.

[London School of Economics Professor David Stevenson's work challenges the assumption that politicians lost control of events, and that the war, once it began, quickly became an unstoppable machine. The unprecedented lethality and carnage wrought by World War I tends to obscure and overshadow the political decision-making process and its influence on battlefield events. According to Stevenson, the disturbing reality is that the course of the war was the result of conscious choices—including the continued acceptance of astronomical casualties.]

3. Kissinger, Henry. *Diplomacy*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994. Pages 29-55.

[In Chapter 2 of *Diplomacy*, Kissinger examines the foreign-policy outlooks of Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson. Kissinger sees this era as a formative one for understanding the role of the United States in the international arena.]

4. Kennedy, Ross A. "Woodrow Wilson, World War I, and an American Conception of National Security," *Diplomatic History* 25, no. 1 (Winter 2001). Pages 1-31.
<http://search.proquest.com/docview/226071680?accountid=322>

[An analysis of how Woodrow Wilson defined US national security interests during World War I and how his ideas about national security influenced his policies are presented. As the war in Europe developed, Wilson began to perceive two external threats to America's well-being: balance-of-power politics and the power of Germany specifically.]

5. Kennedy, Paul M. *The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery*. Atlantic Heights: Ashfield Press, 1987. Pages 177-265.

[These chapters examine Great Britain's response to the growing threats it faced in the maritime domain at the beginning of the twentieth century. Chapter 7 examines geopolitics and grand strategy. Kennedy also appraises Britain's efforts to stay ahead of the challenge posed by the German naval buildup engineered by Tirpitz.]

6. Baer, George. *One Hundred Years of Sea Power: The U.S. Navy, 1890-1990*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994. Pages 9-82.

[Professor George Baer, former chair of the Strategy and Policy Department and the Emeritus Alfred Thayer Mahan Professor of Strategy and Policy, provides a richly detailed study of the United States Navy during the twentieth century. In these chapters, he examines the rise of the navy during the early part of the twentieth century and the American participation in the First World War. This study can be usefully compared with the previous reading about Britain's Royal Navy in the same era. In addition, this study complements the reading from Henry Kissinger about the foreign policy of the United States.]

7. Steffen, Dirk. "Document of Note: The Holtzendorff Memorandum of 22 December 1916 and Germany's Declaration of Unrestricted U-Boat Warfare," *The Journal of Military History* 68, no. 1 (January 2004). Pages 215-224.

<http://www.jstor.org/stable/3397253>

[In this strategic assessment, the chief of the German Admiralty Staff, Admiral Henning von Holtzendorff, argued for a submarine offensive to defeat Britain even if it meant provoking American intervention in the war against Germany. The decision of Germany's rulers to follow Holtzendorff's strategy proved a turning point in the First World War. Despite initial success at sinking merchant shipping, the submarine offensive failed to deliver a knockout blow that forced Britain out of the war. By bringing the United States into the fighting, furthermore, Germany contributed to its own defeat.]

8. Offer, Avner. *The First World War: An Agrarian Interpretation*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991. Chapter 24. (Selected Reading)

[Oxford professor Avner Offer provides an account of the flawed assessments and planning assumptions behind Germany's decision to embark on a disruptive, asymmetric strategy of unrestricted submarine warfare.]

9. Maurer, John H. "Fuel and the Battle Fleet: Coal, Oil, and American Naval Strategy, 1898-1925," *Naval War College Review* 34, no. 6 (November-December 1981). Pages 60-77.

<https://www.usnwc.edu/Publications/Naval-War-College-Review/ArchivedIssues/1980s/1981-November-December.aspx>

[Professor John Maurer of the NWC Strategy Department examines the interrelationship between fuel supplies and American naval strategy in the era of the First World War. As the world's leading oil producer and exporter, the United States improved its relative strategic position with regard to naval rivals.]

D. Learning Outcomes: This case study examines the behind-the-scenes and public diplomatic efforts, military plans, weapons programs, and economic policies employed by rising great powers to achieve their aim of reordering the international system. This case study supports:

- CJCS Joint Learning Areas and Objectives (JPME II) 1a, 1b, 1c, 2a, 2b, 2e, 3d, and 5a. Emphasis will be placed on the following topics, enabling students to:
 - Apply key strategic concepts, critical thinking and analytical frameworks to formulate and execute strategy (1a).
 - Analyze the integration of all instruments of national power in complex, dynamic and ambiguous environments to attain objectives at the national and theater-strategic levels (1b).
 - Evaluate historical and/or contemporary security environments and applications of strategies across the range of military operations (1c).
 - Evaluate the principles of joint operations, joint military doctrine, joint functions (command and control, intelligence, fires, movement and maneuver, protection and sustainment), and emerging concepts across the range of military operations (2a).
 - Evaluate how theater strategies, campaigns and major operations achieve national strategic goals across the range of military operations (2b).
 - Evaluate how strategic level plans anticipate and respond to surprise, uncertainty, and emerging conditions (2e).
 - Value a joint perspective and appreciating the increased power available to commanders through joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational efforts (3d).
 - Evaluate the skills, character attributes and behaviors needed to lead in a dynamic joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational strategic environment (5a).

VI. LOSING GLOBAL LEADERSHIP—CONFRONTING CONVENTIONAL, IRREGULAR, CATASTROPHIC, AND DISRUPTIVE SECURITY CHALLENGES BETWEEN THE TWO WORLD WARS

A. General: “Victory in the First World War brought the British Empire to its zenith: with the addition of the territories it had occupied in the Middle East and elsewhere, it had become larger than it—or any other empire—had ever been before.” (Fromkin, *A Peace to End All Peace*, p. 383) This expansion of the British Empire during and after the war presented Great Britain’s leaders with new international responsibilities, which exacerbated old strategic problems. Although British leaders held the view that the British Empire should remain “the greatest power in the world,” defending and policing an enlarged empire embroiled Britain in a series of conflicts throughout the world, even as it attempted to enforce the peace in Europe and shape the international environment in the face of rising great power challengers.

Meanwhile, at home Britain’s leaders were also conscious of the need to avoid imposing further heavy burdens on a war-weary people. Britain paid a fearful price in winning the First World War, with more than 700,000 Britons losing their lives. Additionally, the economic and domestic upheaval following the war spawned new social movements. The question facing British leaders was whether Britain could sustain its position of global leadership, and whether their country, after having sacrificed so much to win the war, would lose the peace—and its Empire—to a lethal combination of distant insurgencies and emerging conventional threats in Europe and Asia.

In the aftermath of the First World War, Britain faced the colossal task of controlling a vast area that stretched from the Horn of Africa and the Eastern Mediterranean, across the Middle East, to South Asia. The Ottoman Empire had dominated the Middle East for hundreds of years, but by the beginning of the twentieth century, it had become a failing state, known as the “sick man” to contemporary observers. With the collapse of the Ottoman Empire at the end of the First World War, a power vacuum emerged in the Middle East that Britain intended to fill. When British forces captured Baghdad in 1917, their commanding officer, General F. S. Maude, proclaimed: “Our armies do not come into your cities and lands as conquerors or enemies, but as liberators.” Britain’s attempt to impose a postwar settlement on the Middle East, however, led to clashes with local nationalist movements—most notably an uprising in Iraq during 1920. Maintaining the so-called *Pax Britannica*—Latin for “the British peace”—entailed that Britain embrace the burden of undertaking military campaigns throughout the Middle East and South Asia between the two world wars. The study of British counterinsurgency operations in this period enables an evaluation of contemporary security environments and the capabilities and limitations of armed services (including special operations forces) in the development and integration of military strategies in achieving national objectives.

This case study also examines the severe economic constraints on the making of policy and strategy and their repercussions for British grand strategy. Economic problems limited the strategic choices open to Britain’s decision makers. After a short-lived post-war boom, the British economy went into a deep economic slump, followed by sluggish economic growth throughout the 1920s. With the onset of the Great Depression at the end of the decade, Britain, like most of the world, suffered during the 1930s from the effects of the economic downturn.

The prevailing economic orthodoxy called for sharp cuts in military spending as a way of holding down government expenditures and balancing the budget. To rein in military spending, in the summer of 1919, the government issued a vision for defense planning that stated “the British empire will not be engaged in any great war during the next ten years.” This defense planning guidance—the so-called Ten Year Rule—indicated that Britain’s leaders did not consider another war against a peer competitor likely in the near future. This drive for economic savings in the armed services’ budgets forced Britain’s leaders to confront awkward policy and strategy tradeoffs while attempting to balance the instruments of national power to achieve strategic objectives. For example, the armed services needed money for force modernization even as British decision makers expected them to carry out extended policing operations and to maintain a strong forward presence.

The British experience between the two world wars also provides insight into the difficulties that military organizations face in carrying out successful innovation in peacetime. Pioneering efforts to transform Britain’s armed services began during the closing stages of the First World War. The British Army and Royal Air Force (RAF) assembled an effective combined arms team of tanks, infantry, artillery, and air support. Meanwhile, the Royal Navy developed the capability to launch air strikes from aircraft carriers against targets afloat and ashore. The new, independent RAF took steps to carry out long-range bombing and defend the homeland against aerial attack. Britain also began to use air power in innovative ways to help keep the costs of controlling its empire from outrunning available resources. For instance, the RAF played a leading part during campaigns in Aden, Afghanistan, Iraq, Palestine, and Somaliland. In the 1919 war with Afghanistan, the bombing of Kabul played a crucial role in encouraging the Afghans to negotiate.

Over the course of the interwar period, Britain lost some of the operational advantages that its armed forces derived from the wartime innovations in doctrine, weaponry, and force structure. German rearmament—in particular, the buildup of a powerful air force—constituted a growing menace to Britain’s homeland security. Air power degraded the strategic protection afforded by Britain’s oceanic moat, on which the strategies of Mahan and Corbett were premised. This increasing danger from the threat of catastrophic attacks on British soil posed an especially demanding security challenge. Homeland defense against aerial attack of cities—the pre-1945 forerunner of what we today call weapons of mass destruction/effects (WMD/E)—preoccupied policy makers and defense planners throughout this era. Britain even embarked on what amounted to a strategic defense initiative—the development of the first integrated air defense system, along with an extensive effort in civil defenses—to protect the homeland in case deterrence failed.

The consequences of this disruptive transformation of warfare almost brought about Britain’s defeat during the initial stages of the Second World War. The armed forces of Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan inflicted stunning early defeats on Britain and the other Western powers. A comparison of innovation in Britain and other countries between the two world wars helps explain why the British armed forces began to lag behind great-power rivals in some critical operational capabilities. This case study also emphasizes the role played by naval forces in meeting security challenges and the strategic effects of military transformation in the maritime domain. By examining the concept of transformation, the obstacles to carrying it out, and the

factors that promote it, we can deepen our understanding of the chain of events necessary to turn innovation into transformation, and the potential strategic rewards of doing so.

Beyond the challenges posed by insurgencies, global responsibilities, economic constraints, and military transformation, Britain was buffeted by a perfect storm in the international strategic environment of the 1930s: the gathering of simultaneous threats in Europe, the Mediterranean, the Middle East, and the Pacific. Extremist governments in Soviet Russia, Fascist Italy, Imperial Japan, and, above all, Nazi Germany threatened the outbreak of a new world war involving great power peer competitors. Britain's leaders employed a grand strategy that has come to be derided as "appeasement" to manage this increasingly dangerous international environment in an attempt to avoid war. This case study highlights the vexing problem in policy and strategy of determining when to negotiate to avoid war, and when to take a determined stand and fight. It also demonstrates the challenge great powers face in dealing with different political systems animated by radical ideological and cultural beliefs and expansionist motivations.

The inability of Britain's leaders to avoid another great war risked the very existence of the British Empire. By the summer of 1940, Britain fought alone against a coalition of enemies, facing the danger of imminent invasion, its homeland under attack from the air, and its sea lanes threatened. Despite this bleak strategic picture, Britain refused to negotiate with Nazi Germany and rallied instead to Prime Minister Winston Churchill's call for continued resistance. The art of communication, facilitated by an expanding global media, was an important weapon deployed by Britain in this critical moment in world history. Targeted at domestic public opinion, the enemy leadership, and international audiences, such efforts proved crucial not only in countering the effects of air attacks on the British homeland, but also in bolstering Britain's global strategic position during a period of grave crisis, and particularly in cultivating critically needed support from the United States. By choosing to fight on, Britain became the foundation of the Grand Alliance that would ultimately defeat Germany, Italy, and Japan during the Second World War. Thus, we have here an example of how, in a democracy, the determination of government, people, and armed forces can stave off defeat and point the way to ultimate victory.

B. Essay and Discussion Questions:

1. How effectively did Great Britain deal with the problems that it confronted in the Middle East between the two world wars?
2. Great Britain fought several insurgencies during the interwar period. What strategy and policy mistakes did British decision makers commit in fighting these conflicts?
3. How effectively did Great Britain integrate joint, interagency, and multinational capabilities to achieve its policy goals in the Middle East between the two world wars?
4. Great Britain's underlying source of strength for two centuries had been its financial staying power in war. In an effort to sustain this source of strength in the future, British leaders

constrained defense spending in the 1920s and 1930s. How effectively did Britain's leaders manage the risks they ran by following a policy of holding down defense spending?

5. Did British military planners in the interwar era draw appropriate "lessons" from the First World War?

6. How effective were the British armed services in transforming themselves between the two world wars?

7. How effectively did Great Britain respond to the challenges and threats to its maritime security that emerged between the world wars?

8. Did the rise of air power as an instrument of war present more of a strategic opportunity or a strategic threat to Great Britain in the period from 1919 to 1940?

9. British leaders feared above all that massive air attacks on the homeland would result in large numbers of civilian casualties and defeat in war. How effectively did Great Britain prepare for this growing threat to its security?

10. How did changes in the international strategic environment and in naval warfare undermine Great Britain's command of the maritime commons?

11. Were Alfred Thayer Mahan's views about sea power still relevant as strategic guidance for leaders in the era of the two world wars?

12. How effectively did Great Britain use intelligence and strategic communications as instruments of national power during this era?

13. Did British leaders have any viable alternative courses of action, other than appeasement, in managing the strategic challenges posed by the rise of Nazi Germany?

14. Did Great Britain commit a strategic error by going to war against Germany in September 1939?

15. Germany became bogged down in a protracted war of attrition when it attacked France in 1914. In 1940, however, German forces gained a rapid victory over France. What accounts for these different outcomes?

16. Why did Britain keep fighting after the defeat of France in 1940? Was that decision a rational choice in policy and strategy?

17. How well does Thucydides' trinity of "honor, fear, and self-interest" explain Britain's grand strategy during this era?

18. What strategy and policy lessons does Great Britain's experience in the Middle East in the era between the world wars hold for American decision makers at the beginning of the twenty-first century?

C. Readings:

1. Kennedy, Paul. *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000*. New York: Random House, 1987. Pages 275-343.

[Kennedy explores the relationship between a country's international position and its economic vitality. The assigned chapter examines the period between the two world wars, providing background information for understanding Britain's increasingly desperate economic and strategic predicament and the strategic tradeoffs that Britain faced.]

2. *The Making of Peace: Rulers, States, and the Aftermath of War*. Murray, Williamson, and Jim Lacey, eds. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009. Pages 209-264.

[These two essays provide background information and an assessment of the long-term problems in making peace after the First World War.]

3. Fromkin, David. *A Peace to End All Peace*. New York: Henry Holt, 1989. Pages 383-462, 493-539.

[The First World War ushered into being the modern Middle East. In this acclaimed study, David Fromkin presents a survey of Britain's strategic predicament in the Middle East and South Asia after the First World War. Britain faced a wide range of problems in trying to impose control on the region. Fromkin examines Britain's interests in the region, problems that it needed to overcome, and the efforts of British leaders to reconcile the two. Close study of the Middle East in this era provides insights into current-day problems in the region.]

4. Rayburn, Joel. "The Last Exit from Iraq," *Foreign Affairs* 85, no. 2 (March-April 2006). Pages 29-40.

<http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=mth&AN=19895475&site=ehost-live>

[This short article by a U.S. Army officer picks up where the account by Fromkin ends. Rayburn describes the political and security problems that confronted Great Britain in trying to bring stability to Iraq between the two world wars. British leaders faced an extraordinarily difficult task in their effort to establish a pro-British government that could effectively govern the people of Iraq. The upshot was that, early in the Second World War, Britain had to invade and reoccupy the country so that it did not become a base for Nazi operations in the Middle East.]

5. Liddell Hart, B. H. "Air and Empire: The History of Air Control," in *The British Way in Warfare*. London: Faber, 1932. Pages 139-161. (Selected Readings)

[The famous British strategic theorist and author B.H. Liddell Hart, writing in the early 1930s, offered a policy and strategy assessment of the deterrent value of air power for policing the British Empire. In particular, he examined the strategic effects of air power in the campaigns fought by British forces in Afghanistan, Iraq, Somaliland, Waziristan, and Yemen during the decade following the First World War. His justification offered for the use of air control, written close after the events by a leading strategic commentator, can be contrasted with that presented in the next reading by the historian Charles Townshend.]

6. Townshend, Charles. "Civilization and 'Frightfulness': Air Control in the Middle East between the Wars," in *Warfare, Diplomacy and Politics: Essays in Honour of A. J. P. Taylor*, Chris Wrigley, ed. London: Hamish Hamilton, 1986. (Selected Readings)

[This article explores British views about air power as an instrument for policing the empire. Britain pioneered the use of air power in a role that appeared to offer a cheaper way of controlling territory than large numbers of ground forces. This article also explores the limitations of air power as an instrument of imperial control, not least the moral issues raised by its use.]

7. *Military Innovation in the Interwar Period*. Murray, Williamson, and Allan R. Millett, eds. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. Pages 6-49, 96-143, 191-226, and 369-415.

[This major study, supported by the Department of Defense's Office of Net Assessment, examines how the armed forces of the major powers developed the doctrine, force structure, and weapons that they would employ during the Second World War. Studying military transformation from a comparative perspective provides insight into how the British armed services fell behind those of competitors between the wars.]

8. Kennedy, Paul. *The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery*. Atlantic Heights, New Jersey: The Ashfield Press edition, 1987. Pages 267-298.

[This insightful account examines the challenges Britain faced in maintaining its position of naval leadership between the two world wars. Kennedy demonstrates that as other countries built up their navies during the 1930s, the burden of providing for Britain's naval security grew increasingly heavy in this deteriorating international environment.]

9. Kissinger, Henry. *Diplomacy*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994. Pages 288-368.

[Henry Kissinger offers his assessment of the international system between the world wars and how the settlement that ended the First World War broke down when confronted by the violent extremism of Hitler's Germany and Stalin's Russia. In these chapters of *Diplomacy*, Kissinger once again emphasizes the role of strategic leaders in making decisions to initiate war.]

10. Kennedy, Paul M. "The Tradition of Appeasement in British Foreign Policy," *British Journal of International Studies*, vol. 2, no. 3 (October 1976). Pages 195-215.

http://www.jstor.org/stable/20096775?origin=JSTOR-pdf&seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents

[Britain's appeasement of Germany during the 1930s formed part of a longer tradition of accommodating rising great power challengers, in the view of Paul Kennedy. This important article provides a model and history of appeasement in Britain's grand strategy.]

11. Murray, Williamson. "Munich, 1938: The Military Confrontation." *The Journal of Strategic Studies*, vol. 2, no. 3 (December 1979). Pages 282-302. (Selected Readings)

[This study provides a net assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of the European great powers on the eve of the Second World War. An evaluation of the foreign policy of appeasement needs to take into account the balance of power and how it was changing during the 1930s. Murray's assessment of the military balance provides an opportunity to consider a counterfactual analysis about whether Britain and France would have been better off fighting in 1938 rather than a year later.]

12. Parker, R. A. C. *Struggle for Survival: The History of the Second World War*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989. Chapters 1-3.

NOTE: You may receive an edition of this book entitled *The Second World War: A Short History*.

[This history presents a lucid account of the major defeats suffered by Britain and its coalition partners during the initial campaigns of the Second World War. These defeats came about in part because of the inadequacy of Britain's prewar preparations. Despite these setbacks, Britain under the leadership of Winston Churchill refused to make peace, but continued to fight until a new coalition came into being to defeat Nazi Germany.]

D. Learning Outcomes: This case study examines the ends, ways, and means for employing the joint services to achieve strategic effects. It does so by applying the theories, themes, and frameworks developed throughout the course to examine the challenges that the U.S. Navy, the Department of Defense, and the nation will face in coming years. This case study supports:

- CJCS Joint Learning Areas and Objectives 1b, 1c, 1d, 1e, 2c, 2e, 3c, 4a, 5a, 5c, and 5d. Emphasis will be placed on the following topics, enabling students to:
 - Analyze the integration of all instruments of national power in complex, dynamic, and ambiguous environments to attain objectives at the national and theater-strategic levels (1b).
 - Evaluate historical and/or contemporary security environments and applications of strategies across the range of military operations (1c).

- Apply strategic security policies, strategies, and guidance used in developing plans across the range of military operations and domains to support national objectives (1d).
- Evaluate how the capabilities and limitations of the U.S. Force structure affect the development and implementation of security, defense and military strategies (1e).
- Apply an analytical framework that addresses the factors politics, geography, society, culture and religion play in shaping the desired outcomes of policies, strategies and campaigns (2c).
- Evaluate how strategic level plans anticipate and respond to surprise, uncertainty, and emerging conditions (2e).
- Evaluate the integration of joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational capabilities, including all Service and Special Operations Forces, in campaigns across the range of military operations in achieving strategic objectives (3c).
- Evaluate the strategic-level options available in the joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational environment (4a).
- Evaluate the skills, character attributes and behaviors needed to lead in a dynamic joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational strategic environment (5a).
- Evaluate how strategic leaders develop innovative organizations capable of operating in dynamic, complex and uncertain environments; anticipate change; and respond to surprise and uncertainty (5c).
- Evaluate how strategic leaders communicate a vision; challenge assumptions; and anticipate, plan, implement, and lead strategic change in complex joint or combined organizations (5d).

VII. GEOPOLITICAL RETROSPECT AND IDEOLOGICAL PROSPECT—THE INFLUENCE OF GEOGRAPHY AND IDEOLOGY ON SECURITY AND STRATEGY

A. General: The mid-point of the course offers the opportunity to bridge back to the previous case studies to analyze long-term competitions through the prism of geopolitics. It is also a turning point to the ideological preoccupations of the ensuing case studies. A combined geopolitical retrospect and ideological prospect permits a comparison of the relative importance of geography, perhaps the most tangible factor in war, versus ideas, perhaps the most intangible factor. Some say geography is destiny. Others believe ideas are decisive.

As part of a consideration of geopolitics, students can bridge back to examine the role of naval power in long-term competitions and the role of naval power in the rise and fall of great powers generally. Such a retrospective highlights the differences between continental and maritime powers. It opens a discussion about the strategic advantages and limitations conferred by geography and the theories of security appropriate for each archetype. Evidence for this discussion will be drawn from the rivalry between Athens and Sparta, and Britain's long-term rivalries with France, Germany, and the United States. The primary theorists of maritime versus continental power are Alfred Thayer Mahan and Sir Halford J. Mackinder respectively. Whereas Mahan argued that maritime commerce formed the basis for global power, Mackinder argued that the Eurasian continental heartland was the dominating geographic position.

Some countries were continental powers. Others were maritime powers. Still others were hybrids. Does geography alone determine whether a country can become a continental or a maritime power? Athens and Britain always remained maritime powers. Historically, Sparta, France, and Germany were continental powers, but at different times each tried to become a hybrid power, competitive in both domains. The United States alone made the permanent transformation from a continental to a maritime power. What are the differences in geography, resources, politics, and economics that account for these divergent outcomes? Can all countries become maritime powers or are there limiting factors? Reaching into the prospective future, can China become a maritime power in the full sense of the term?

Governments by intent or by default rely on a theory of security to guide foreign policy. Do continental and maritime powers typically follow fundamentally different theories of security? Likewise, in warfare, do they rely on a different set of instruments of national power? Pericles' theory of security entailed a defensive posture behind the city wall to await an enemy change of heart. His plan proved politically difficult to sustain in a democracy. The British gradually developed a "grand strategy" (a term they coined) over the course of the wars against revolutionary France. Their strategy depended as much on the diplomatic and economic instruments of national power as on the military. Bismarck had a theory of security based on divide and conquer, but his successors could not replicate his success and instead twice destroyed their homeland in world wars. American political scientists have coined the term, "global hegemon." Based on British experience, how does a country become and then remain the global hegemon? Why did, by contrast, Germany fail?

Over the long-term, maritime powers have been extraordinarily resilient, capable of mobilizing tremendous human and material resources, and of overcoming severe defeats. Why

was Athens' defeat at Sicily not decisive, whereas its defeat at Aegospotami was? What distinguishes operational, strategic, and Pyrrhic victories? Although France posed the greatest threat to the British Empire in the eighteenth century, two French political systems did not survive the competition. Louis XVI lost his head in the French Revolution and the catastrophe in Russia extinguished Napoleon's dreams for empire. Why did Britain weather its defeat during the American Revolution and repeated setbacks in the wars against revolutionary France, while France did not survive the defeats in Russia, Leipzig, and Waterloo? What explains Prussia's success during the wars of German unification versus Germany's failure in World War I? Although by economic indices, the United States had become a great power by the second-half of the nineteenth century, why did Britain not perceive it as a threat on a par with Germany? Which type of political system can best endure long-term competitions, democratic or authoritarian? Which one is more capable of adaptation and resource mobilization? What are the primary strategic advantages and disadvantages of each system?

In addition to geopolitics, this case study also examines the role of ideology in great-power competitions. Ideology is a set of ideas or beliefs that provide an overarching framework through which individuals, groups, and states interpret the world around them and determine appropriate action to attain their goals. Ideology has often dramatically influenced the course and conduct of international relations and global security. Much of human history can be viewed as a clash of ideologies including the sectarian wars that fractured Europe following the Reformation, the wars of nationalism inspired by the French Revolution (initially in France and later in the developing world), the two world wars, the Cold War, and contemporary conflicts involving religious extremists.

The previous cases allow a comparison of status quo, revisionist, and revolutionary powers, which often support divergent ideologies. Dominant powers tend to be status quo powers, which seek to maintain a global order fashioned to their liking. Revisionist powers often want to supplant the dominant power without necessarily replacing the international system. Revolutionary powers, however, intend both to supplant the dominant power and revolutionize the international system according to the precepts of a different ideology. The War for American Independence was fundamentally an ideological clash between republicanism and constitutional monarchism. Under republicanism, the people were sovereign; under constitutional monarchy, the monarch was the head of state but Parliament made and passed legislation. Revolutionary France then brought nationalism to bear. Land forces transformed from mercenary armies with indifferent morale to citizen armies motivated by nationalism. Carl von Clausewitz described these changes: "Suddenly war again became the business of the people.... [and the] juggernaut of war, based on the strength of the entire people, began its pulverizing course through Europe" (*On War*, p. 592). During World War I, President Woodrow Wilson drew up one of the most influential foreign policy statements in U.S. history, the Fourteen Points, which have been used to justify self-determination ever since. This document helped set the stage for many national-liberation movements in the twentieth century.

World War I brought into full bloom two formidable rivals of liberal democracy and capitalism: the ideologies of communism and fascism. Karl Marx, the preeminent theorist of communism, recommended an inversion of the social pyramid to put the workers in charge through state ownership of the means of production. Vladimir Lenin and Joseph Stalin

operationalized Marx's vision through five-year plans, the nationalization of industry, and the collectivization of agriculture. Like the communists, the fascists also favored state planning and a one-party state, but reviled both communism and liberalism and used xenophobic nationalism to build a mass party to seize power and ultimately to build an empire. Adolf Hitler's *Mein Kampf* (*My Struggle*) was the most widely read book by any fascist leader.

Although the Grand Alliance of World War II eliminated fascism, the Soviet victory allowed communism to spread globally. Lest we forget, at this time the United States also was a revolutionary power, which sought to replace imperialism with free trade and pressured its Western allies to decolonize. The ideological divide separating liberal democracy from communism defined the ensuing Cold War. An examination of the combined effects of geopolitics and ideology allows students to grasp how physical geography and abstract ideas together shape the way in which strategy is conceived and implemented.

B. Essay and Discussion Questions:

1. Based on the long-term rivalries between Athens and Sparta, and Britain and its rivals, what are the most important opportunities and constraints geography imposed on land powers?
2. Based on the long-term rivalries between Athens and Sparta, and Britain and its rivals, what are the most important opportunities and constraints geography imposed on sea powers?
3. Does geography have the same strategic significance in global, regional, and insurgent wars?
4. Under what strategic conditions does it make sense for a country to invest in a first-class navy?
5. The British naval historian, Andrew Lambert, has argued that dependence on seaborne imports is the defining characteristic of a sea power, whereas the wealth to buy and maintain a navy defines a naval power. Under this definition, both Athens and Britain were sea powers by necessity, whereas France, Germany, and the United States were naval powers by choice. Does this distinction have any important strategic implications?
6. Do land and sea powers rely on a different set of instruments of national power to achieve strategic success?
7. Karl Marx wrote that "men make history but not in conditions of their own choosing." What social, geopolitical, ideological or economic conditions are most likely to lead to conflict between major powers?
8. To what extent do ideological preconceptions about the nature of international politics shape the strategic decisions made by political and military leaders?

9. What role does ideology play in inducing conflict, ending conflict, and in creating a lasting peace?

10. What lessons could strategists have derived from the impact of nationalism during the wars of the French Revolution and Napoleonic and then applied to the spread of fascism and communism after World War I?

11. Michael Handel interpreted Clausewitz to define strength as the product of tangible means times the intangible will. Did the advent of fascism and communism tip the balance in favor of the intangible will?

12. In what ways would fascism distinguish the nature of World War II from World War I?

13. Why did the loss of the American Revolution fail to undermine Britain's position as a great power?

14. Could Germany, given its geopolitical position, have won World War I?

15. Could Britain have won World War I without making a large-scale commitment of ground troops on the Western Front?

16. Could Germany have supplanted British naval dominance?

17. What lessons should Japanese and U.S. strategists have derived, prior to the outbreak of World War II, from the conflict between the naval powers at the time of the American Revolution?

C. Readings:

1. Sprout, Margaret Tuttle. "Mahan: Evangelist of Sea Power," in Edward Mead Earle, ed. *Makers of Modern Strategy: Military Thought from Machiavelli to Hitler*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1944. Pages 415-445. (Selected Readings)

[Mahan made clear to Americans that they needed to shift from the outlook of a continental to a maritime power. Sprout provides an overview of his most important ideas culled from his numerous publications. She clarifies the origins, scope, and impact of his theory of sea power as of 1944.]

2. Mackinder, H. J. "The Geographic Pivot of History," *The Geographic Journal*, vol. 12, no. 4 (April 1904). Pages 431-437.

<http://www.jstor.org/stable/1775498>

[The mapping and conquest of the world foreclosed maritime expansion while the development of railways allowed continental integration. The assigned second-half of Mackinder's seminal article highlights the preeminent geographic position occupied by Russia, in the heartland or geographic pivot of the world. Mackinder argued that the days of the dominance of maritime over continental powers were over.]

3. Knutsen, Torbjorn L. "Halford J. Mackinder, Geopolitics, and the Heartland Thesis," *The International History Review*, vol. 36, no. 5, 2014. Pages 835-857.

<http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/07075332.2014.941904#abstract>

[Knutsen provides an overview of the evolution of Mackinder's ideas and their influence on Britain, Germany, the United States, Russia, and particularly Hitler's Germany. Mackinder emphasized internal lines of communication available to the power dominating the Eurasian heartland. Today, his ideas resonate in Putin's Russia.]

4. Gray, Colin S. *The Leverage of Sea Power: The Strategic Advantage of Navies in War*. New York: Free Press, 1992. Pages 31-91. (Selected Readings)

[The assigned chapters, "The Practice of Sea Power" and "The Practice of Land Power," lay out the different strategies available to maritime versus continental powers. Gray comes to these observations based on many of the case studies examined thus far in the Strategy & Policy Course.]

5. Marx, Karl. *The Communist Manifesto*, Friedrich Engels, ed. 1881.

http://avalon.law.yale.edu/subject_menus/mancont.asp

[The *Communist Manifesto* distills the core ideas of Marxism that so profoundly shaped the conflicts of the twentieth century, with a cascade of revolutions throughout the heartland and elsewhere.]

6. Stone, David R. "Marxists on War," *Encyclopedia of War*, vol. 3, Gordon Martel, ed. Chichester, UK: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012. Pages 1319-1325. (Selected Readings)

[Marxism profoundly influenced military thinking, initially in Russia but soon in China and eventually in Vietnam. Each developed highly effective methods of warfare that the West found extraordinarily difficult to counter.]

7. Hitler, Adolf. *Hitler's Second Book: The Unpublished Sequel to Mein Kampf*. Gerhad L. Weinberg, ed., Krista Smith, trans. New York: Enigma Books, 2006. Pages 15-27, 99-118, 240-244. (Selected Readings)

[The two chapters from Hitler's 1928 manuscript and his speech lay out his ideas concerning *Lebensraum* (living space) and underlying his program of territorial expansion and genocide. He emphasizes the primacy of: agriculture over industry, territorial extent over economic

productivity, and the military over all other instruments of national power. Students can contrast the bland expression of the ideas with the mayhem of their implementation.]

8. Paxton, Robert O. "The Five Stages of Fascism," *The Journal of Modern History*, vol. 70, no. 1 (March 1998). Pages 1-29.

<http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/10.1086/235001.pdf?acceptTC=true&jpdConfirm=true>

[Paxton defines fascism and distinguishes it from authoritarianism and Stalinism. He traces the five stages of its development and explains the differences among fascist countries in terms of unique national myths developed by each. By his definition, Chiang Kai-shek and Saddam Hussein were both fascists.]

D. Learning Outcomes: This case study examines the role of sea power in long-term competitions and, generally, in the rise and fall of great powers. Students will consider the differences between continental and maritime powers and the strategic advantages and limitations conferred by geography. Additionally, students will evaluate the theories of security appropriate for each domain. Finally, this case study allows students to consider the role of ideology in dominant and revisionist power competitions. This case study supports:

- CJCS Joint Learning Areas and Objectives (JPME II) 1a, 1b, 1c, 1d, 1e, 2c, and 4a. Emphasis will be placed on the following topics, enabling students to:
 - Apply key strategic concepts, critical thinking, and analytical frameworks to formulate and execute strategy (1a).
 - Analyze the integration of all instruments of national power in complex, dynamic, and ambiguous environments to attain objectives at the national and theater-strategic levels (1b).
 - Evaluate historical and/or contemporary security environments and applications of strategies across the range of military operations (1c).
 - Apply strategic security policies, strategies, and guidance used in developing plans across the range of military operations and domains to support national objectives (1d).
 - Evaluate how the capabilities and limitations of the U.S. Force structure affect the development and implementation of security, defense, and military strategies (1e).
 - Apply an analytical framework that addresses the factors politics, geography, society, culture, and religion play in shaping desired outcomes of policies, strategies, and campaigns (2c).
 - Evaluate the strategic-level options available in the joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational environment (4a).

VIII. THE RISE OF THE SUPERPOWERS—THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION IN WORLD WAR II AND THE EARLY COLD WAR

A. General: This case marks the transition from the construction of the conceptual and analytical foundations to the combined application of these strategic frameworks to interlocking case studies. For the United States and its allies, World War II was a struggle against the fascist variants of the new totalitarian forms of political organization that challenged capitalism's hegemony. The Cold War that followed then became a struggle against the communist variants. This and the next three cases are set in the Cold War. They trace the emergence of the United States and other major powers, the evolution of novel strategic concepts with the advent of the nuclear age, and the special challenges of waging regional wars in Korea and Vietnam nested within the overarching Cold War. The present case starts in 1940 with the fall of France, ushering in a period of profound strategic uncertainty. It ends in 1948 with the Berlin airlift, signaling definitively that World War II's Grand Alliance had shattered.

In 1941, Germany, the Soviet Union, Japan, and the United States each responded to growing uncertainty by radically changing their military strategies, with escalation by all. Under the 1939 Nazi-Soviet Pact (also known as the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact), Germany and Russia had cooperated to divide central Europe into spheres of influence. But in June of 1941, Hitler suddenly turned on Stalin to stake out his empire in the east, a policy called "Lebensraum" or "living space." By December, German troops were within visual range of Moscow. In Asia, Japan's major escalation in 1937 of its war in China triggered spiraling U.S. embargoes of war materiel. When Japan completed its invasion of French Indochina, in July of 1941, in order to cut the most important remaining supply route to China, the United States responded with a total oil embargo. Japan then reacted with plans to drive the Western powers out of Asia through a series of simultaneous attacks across the Pacific on 7-8 December. The German attack on Russia and the Japanese attacks across the Pacific formed new strategic alliances for Britain and China. In Europe, Britain gained Russia and the United States; while in Asia, China gained the United States and Britain.

The military fortunes of the Grand Alliance faltered for much of 1942. In a number of new theaters that Germany, Italy, and Japan had initially opened, the Americans, British, and Soviets began to operate more effectively, even before the United States fully mobilized its economy. Politically, the issue of when the United States and Britain should reopen the French theater put great strain on the cohesion of the Grand Alliance. This strain went unrelieved until the June 1944 invasion of France. By 1945—three years after its military nadir—the Grand Alliance achieved victory, engineering the complete defeat of Germany and Japan. The United States and the Soviet Union had thus far risen in power together, while Britain had fallen behind in relative terms by the end of the war.

State-funded technological change generated new means of waging war. After the first important use of tanks, aircraft, and submarines in World War I, armored warfare, strategic bombing, carrier-aviation strikes, and unrestricted submarine warfare became the main forms of military action in World War II. Germany and Japan made use of this new technology to achieve remarkable operational success from 1940 to 1942, but that early advantage did not last. By the end of World War II, the United States and its allies had exploited their material superiority and

scientific expertise to gain qualitative as well as quantitative advantages in all major weaponry, except for jet aircraft and missiles.

Yet in the aftermath of stunning success, the Grand Alliance broke down. A four-year pattern of cooperation in the rise of American and Soviet power ultimately turned into a four-decade pattern of conflict and competition. The Soviets threatened the hard-won security of the Western democracies by extending their sphere of influence throughout Eastern Europe and attempting to spread their ideology globally. Within two years of the war's end, despite the U.S. atomic monopoly and the enormous task of rebuilding, the Soviets transformed the political landscape of Eastern Europe into what would become known as the Soviet Bloc and were deeply involved in China, the subject of the next case study. George Kennan, in his famous 1947 "X" article, prescribed containment as the necessary U.S. response to Soviet expansionism. Containment as a theory and a key strategic concept became established in practice as the Marshall Plan, the American blueprint for the economic reconstruction of Europe. The Soviet Union then responded to the economic unification of the Western occupation zones in Germany with the 1948-1949 Berlin blockade.

Also of transformative importance for the future, the United States had developed the first nuclear capability and ended the war against Japan by dropping atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. However, as often happens after technological breakthroughs, the American nuclear monopoly proved to be short-lived. The conditions for a protracted Cold War arose not only from the ideological conflict between radically different forms of political organization, but also from the weapons of mass destruction developed by both sides. New modes of knowledge production promised a permanent technological revolution in munitions, which then required a concomitant growth in key strategic concepts to keep pace with the technological possibilities.

This case study has one of the shortest chronological spans of all the cases in the Strategy and Policy Course. What it lacks in length, it makes up for in complexity. The readings and lectures enable students to extract from this complexity five elements of significant strategic importance. First, students will delve deeply into social, cultural, and geopolitical factors to evaluate the mutual assessments made by the belligerents: Hitler's assessment of the Soviet Union and Stalin's assessment of Germany in 1941; the American assessment of Japan and Japan's assessment of the United States in 1941; Stalin's assessments of the United States and American assessments of the Soviet Union in the early Cold War. All merit close attention in this regard.

Second, how do strategic leaders evaluate and synthesize general strategic concepts, such as "Europe-first" (proposed in 1940-1941 by U.S. Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Harold Stark) or "containment" (proposed by Kennan in 1946-1947), and sustain them over the long-term to achieve national security ends? Leaders must manage the risks of specific threats and rewards of perceived opportunities at the theater-strategic level that may diverge from the overall concept in the short-term, as the United States did in the Pacific and in the Mediterranean in 1942-1943. Among the adversaries of the United States, German and Japanese opportunism in 1940-1941 and Stalin's opportunism in the early Cold War invite critical analysis.

Third, in an ongoing conflict, the decisions about when, where, and how to open up or contest new theaters are crucial to analyze how to use uncertainty to one's advantage by seizing the initiative. Strategic leaders must conceptualize how the new theater contributes to the achievement of the political objective of the war. Critical turning points in this case include: Hitler's decision to invade the Soviet Union; the Japanese Navy's decisions to strike eastward across the Pacific in 1941 and 1942; the Anglo-American decision to contest the Mediterranean in 1942, and to reopen the French theater in 1944; the Soviet attempt to expand its influence in Turkey and Iran in 1945-1946; and the Soviet decision to blockade Berlin in 1948.

A fourth topic is multinational coalitions as a central factor in a modern strategic environment. In World War II, the Grand Alliance united Western democracies and the Soviet totalitarian regime. The Axis regimes possessed greater ideological affinity and fewer conflicts of national interest. Students should consider why one alliance was more cohesive than the other during the conflict and why even the victorious alliance did not survive for long. In the Cold War, the United States made concerted use of non-military instruments of national power to create and maintain coalitions, as it had done in World War II. The Soviet Union employed a more heavy-handed strategy to establish a "bloc" of communist regimes located in the regions it had liberated from Nazi rule.

A final element of this case study concerns the integration of military and non-military instruments of national power. Among non-military instruments, the use of the American economy's productive capacity deserves special attention, as does the use of the nation's universities as seedbeds for critical weapons innovation. Among the case study's military instruments, two stand out as particularly important for their strategic effects: unrestricted submarine warfare in the Pacific theater, and the use of air power in its many roles in World War II. The combination of air power and atomic weapons contributed to the capitulation of Japan. From this point onward in the Strategy and Policy Course, nuclear weapons affect every case, including those in the twenty-first century. In short, this case begins to analyze and integrate the modern instruments of national power available since the second half of the twentieth century.

B. Essay and Discussion Questions:

1. General George Marshall wrote to General Dwight Eisenhower in March 1945: "Making war in a democracy is not a bed of roses." In World War II, what strategic advantages did the United States gain and what strategic disadvantages did it suffer from having a democratic political system?
2. What strategic advantages did Hitler and Stalin gain and what strategic disadvantages did they suffer from being dictators?
3. In World War II, who struck the better balance between short-term military considerations and longer-term political considerations – the United States or the Soviet Union?
4. Could the Axis have defeated the Grand Alliance in World War II? If so, how? If not, why not?

5. In global wars such as World War II and the Cold War, the decision to open or contest a new theater may prove to be of great strategic consequence. In the period from 1940 to 1948, identify one such decision that brought major, positive consequences and another that did not have positive consequences. Why were the strategic consequences different in the two cases?

6. In 1942-1945, did American military operations in or across the Pacific undercut the Europe-first geostrategic priority of the United States?

7. Leading maritime powers often try to shift the burden of ground fighting onto their coalition partners. What general conclusions can one draw from the efforts of the United States and Britain in World War II to overcome problems of burden sharing and prevent a coalition from falling apart?

8. The historian William O'Neill calls air power "the democratic delusion." Is that assessment justified by the evidence of World War II?

9. What difference did the existence of nuclear weapons make for the policy and strategy of the United States and its Communist adversaries from 1945 to 1948?

10. Evaluate how effectively American political and military leaders made the transition from fighting World War II to waging the Cold War.

11. In 1945 Stalin and most American strategic leaders expected a cooperative relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States to continue in the postwar era. Why was that expectation not fulfilled?

12. The British strategic thinker Basil Liddell Hart asserted that the purpose of war is to create "a better peace—even if only from your own point of view." Did the United States fulfill that purpose with World War II? If so, how? If not, how might it have done better in this regard?

13. As the Cold War emerged, who did the better job of assessing the other as an adversary—the United States or the Soviet Union?

14. What general conclusions can one judiciously draw from the 1940 to 1948 period about the elements that make for a strategically effective multinational coalition?

15. Does American strategic performance from 1940 to 1948 represent a good model for the integration of different instruments of national power?

16. More conspicuously than any other power studied in this course, the United States was able to emerge from a big war stronger in the material dimension of strategy than when it entered the war. How would you explain this American achievement in the era of World War II?

17. The Soviet Union seemed on the verge of extinction in 1941-1942. By the late 1940s it had emerged as a superpower. How would you explain that achievement?

18. Did the Soviet Union improve its long-term strategic position in the world from 1940 to 1948?

19. The United States entered into Cold War alliances with Japan and much of Germany. What best accounts for the realignment of the two main Axis powers after World War II—American policy and strategy, Soviet policy and strategy, or the Germans and Japanese themselves?

20. Despite major technological advances and institutional innovations in the collection of intelligence during World War II and the early Cold War, this period saw some of the most dramatic surprise attacks in strategic history. What best accounts for this discrepancy?

21. What lessons did British leaders apparently learn from prior experience fighting France in the Napoleonic Wars and Germany in World War I and then applied to fighting Hitler in World War II?

22. Analyze the difference in economic and popular mobilization in World War I and World War II. How did the differences affect each war's outcome and the subsequent peace?

23. Corbett glossed Francis Bacon's quote that "he that commands the sea is at great liberty and may take as much or as little of the war as he will." To what extent does British and U.S. strategy exemplify this approach?

C. Readings:

1. Weigley, Russell. *The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy*. New York: Macmillan, 1973. Pages 269-359, 363-398.

[Weigley's book is perhaps the best known military history of the United States ever published. The first two chapters assigned here provide an overview of the American role in World War II from the perspective of theater strategy. The next two chapters offer a critical examination of how well the American military services made the transition from World War II to the early Cold War.]

2. Fuller, William C. "The Great Fatherland War and Late Stalinism, 1941-1953," in *Russia: A History*. Gregory L. Freeze, ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997. Pages 319-346. (Selected Readings)

[Fuller, a former chairman of the Strategy and Policy Department, and distinguished historian of Russia, examines World War II from the Soviet perspective. Stalin's grand strategy to sit out an Anglo-German war failed miserably when Germany invaded the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941. The Red Army was locked in a horrific struggle, fighting against the bulk of the German

Army, with the Soviet Union suffering catastrophic casualties and economic devastation. At war's end, the triumphant Red Army had advanced deep into Europe with enormous implications for the post-war settlement.]

3. Zubok, Vladislav M. *A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2007. Pages 1-78.

[Zubok, who received his Ph.D. in the Soviet Union and then became a leading historian of the Cold War in the United States, provides an analysis, from Stalin's perspective, of the transition from World War II to the Cold War. His analysis includes a focus on the main issue in the emerging U.S.-Soviet competition: the fate of Germany. He makes use of Soviet primary sources that became available after the end of the Cold War.]

4. Gaddis, John Lewis. *We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1997. Pages 4-20, 26-62.

[Gaddis, a former member of the Strategy and Policy Department at the Naval War College and the preeminent American historian of the Cold War, provides the main treatment of the early Cold War for this case study. Published after the end of the Cold War, this reading reconsiders the 1940s in light of newly available information on Communist policy and strategy. Gaddis is especially strong, for both sides of the Cold War, on the role of ideology as well as security considerations in the development of policy and strategy; and on the formation of coalitions.]

5. Baer, George. *One Hundred Years of Sea Power: The U.S. Navy, 1890-1990*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1994. Pages 146-180.

[Baer, formerly Chairman of the Strategy and Policy Department at the Naval War College, examines the interplay between U.S. Navy strategic leaders and President Franklin Roosevelt on issues of policy, strategy, and naval operations in the American transition from peace to war in 1940-1941. Students should take special note of Professor Baer's analysis of the Plan Dog essay written in November 1940 by Admiral Harold Stark, Chief of Naval Operations.]

6. O'Neill, William. *A Democracy at War: America's Fight at Home and Abroad in World War II*. New York: The Free Press, 1993. Pages 10-14, 301-319. (Selected Readings)

[O'Neill is interested in the relationship between American democracy and American strategy. In the first brief excerpt, he shows how traditional balance-of-power considerations and geostrategic thinking should have had more influence on American policy and strategy in World War II, but did not have much appeal for Americans at the time. In the second longer selection, O'Neill argues that aversion to casualties in a democratic political system led Americans to put misguided hope in air power as a high-tech, low-cost way to victory in World War II. O'Neill concludes that strategic bombing was both inefficient and unethical.]

7. O'Brien, Phillips. "East versus West in the Defeat of Nazi Germany," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 23, no. 2 (June 2000). Pages 89-111.

<http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01402390008437792>

[Providing a new look at the elements of strategic success in a global war such as World War II, O'Brien reconsiders the traditional view that Soviet ground forces were largely responsible for the defeat of Nazi Germany. He plays up the importance of American Lend-Lease aid to the Red Army and, even more, the powerful effects of the Anglo-American strategic bombing of the German homeland. This article can be read as a counter-argument to O'Neill's thesis about strategic bombing in Reading 6.]

8. Wilson, Theodore A. et al. "Coalition: Strategy, Structure, and Statecraft," in *Allies at War: The Soviet, American, and British Experience, 1939-1945*, in David Reynolds, Warren F. Kimball, and A. O. Chubarian, eds. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994. Pages 79-104. (Selected Readings)

[In this book of essays about the Grand Alliance in World War II, Wilson's contribution stands out for its careful analysis of the complex mixture of conflict and cooperation among the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union. Wilson covers relations between political leaders, efforts by military leaders to achieve strategic and operational coordination, arrangements at the theater level for combined and joint warfare, and the important role played by intelligence and information operations in the defeat of Germany.]

9. Kershaw, Ian. *Hitler: 1936-1945: Nemesis*. New York: W. W. Norton, 2000. Pages 341-369, 381-389, 393-395, 397-419. (Selected Readings)

[These excerpts from the best English-language biography of Hitler focus on his decision to invade the Soviet Union in 1941. Kershaw highlights the importance of racial ideology and economic considerations and the interaction of the German dictator and his military leaders.]

10. Weinberg, Gerhard L. "Global Conflict: The Interaction between the European and Pacific Theaters of War in World War II" and "D-Day After Fifty Years: Assessments of Costs and Benefits," in *Germany, Hitler, and World War II: Essays in Modern German and World History*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995. Pages 205-216, 254-273. (Selected Readings)

[Weinberg, the most distinguished American historian of World War II, wrote these essays while preparing his monumental tome *A World at Arms: A Global History of World War II*. The first essay assigned shows how strategic developments in different theaters were interrelated in a way that made World War II a truly global conflict, and it highlights the deficiencies of the Axis as a coalition for fighting such a global war. The second essay focuses on the strategic problem that was most important for the cohesion of the Grand Alliance: whether and when the United States and Britain should open a new theater in France. Students should note how Weinberg relates the invasion of France in 1944 to the issue of war termination in the European theater.]

11. Paine, S. C. M. *The Wars for Asia, 1911-1949*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012. Pages 171-220.

[Professor Paine of the Strategy and Policy Department discusses how Japan, already overextended in China, opened new theaters in the Pacific and elsewhere in 1941-1942 then ultimately came to grief, deciding at last to surrender in August 1945 after the U.S. dropped atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the U.S.S.R. invaded Manchuria. In a war of many theaters, the China theater is often overlooked in accounts of World War II, but Paine stresses that, much as the Soviets dealt with the bulk of German ground forces, the Chinese tied down large numbers of Japanese troops that might otherwise have been deployed in the Pacific.]

12. Smith, Tony. "Democratizing Japan and Germany," in *America's Mission: The United States and the Worldwide Struggle for Democracy in the Twentieth Century*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994. Pages 146-176. (Selected Readings)

[This excerpt views the American military occupations of Japan and part of Germany after World War II as pivotal experiences in the longer-term American effort to spread forms of democratic government around the world. At first sight, the cultural terrain of Germany and Japan posed formidable obstacles for achievement of American political purposes. Smith highlights American actions that overcame these obstacles. He may understate the role played by the Germans and Japanese themselves—not to mention the looming Communist threat—in bringing about favorable outcomes in the context of the Cold War.]

13. Judt, Tony. *Postwar: A History of Europe Since 1945*. New York: The Penguin Press, 2005. Pages 86-99. (Selected Readings)

[In this highly acclaimed study of Europe since World War II, Judt, a British historian who taught at New York University, provides a judicious appraisal of the political and economic effects of the Marshall Plan in the late 1940s.]

14. "X" [George Kennan]. "The Sources of Soviet Conduct." *Foreign Affairs* 25, no. 3 (July 1947); reprinted in *Foreign Affairs* 65, no. 4 (Spring 1987). Pages 852-868.

<http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=414283&sid=1&Fmt=6&clientId=18762&RQT=309&VName=PQD>

[This article by a Foreign Service Officer educated as an expert on Russia had a remarkable impact on U.S. policy and strategy in the Cold War that was emerging by 1947. Kennan provided an insightful assessment of the Soviet Union, the key concept of "containment" for thwarting Soviet strategy, and a "theory of victory" for bringing about the mellowing or break-up of the Soviet system. Students should note why Kennan saw Stalin as different from Napoleon and Hitler.]

15. Mark Kramer. "Stalin, Soviet Policy, and the Establishment of a Communist Bloc in Eastern Europe, 1941-1949." *Imposing, Maintaining, and Tearing Open the Iron Curtain: The*

Cold War and East-Central Europe, 1945-1989. Mark Kramer and Vít Smetana, eds. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2014. Pages 3-28. (Selected Readings)

[Kramer is the editor of one of the most important Cold War series of books, relying on Eastern European archives, opened after the fall of the Soviet Union. His assigned chapter provides an overview of the Soviet imposition of Communist governments throughout Eastern Europe in the aftermath of World War II.]

16. Hans-Peter Schwarz. "The Division of Germany, 1945-1949." *The Cambridge History of the Cold War*, volume 1, *Origins*. Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad, eds. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010. Pages 133-153. (Selected Readings)

[Schwarz, a German expert on the early Cold War, covers the division of Germany into four occupation zones at the end of World War II, the consolidation of the Western zone, and the creation of two German states. Together, the Kramer and the Schwarz readings explain the territorial outcome of World War II in Europe.]

D. Learning Outcomes: The Rise of the Superpowers Case study applies the theoretical concepts, themes, and frameworks of the course to two different types of global coalition conflicts: World War II and the Cold War. It provides a critical examination of these unlimited global conflicts, with emphasis on the role of strategic leadership, civil-military relations, and profound technological change. This case study supports:

- CJCS Joint Learning Areas and Objectives (JPME II) 1a, 1b, 1c, 1e, 2b, 2c, 2e, 5a, and 5b. Emphasis will be placed on the following topics, enabling students to:
 - Apply key strategic concepts, critical thinking, and analytical frameworks to formulate and execute strategy (1a).
 - Analyze the integration of all instruments of national power in complex, dynamic, and ambiguous environments to attain objectives at the national and theater-strategic levels (1b).
 - Evaluate historical and/or contemporary security environments and applications of strategies across the range of military operations (1c).
 - Evaluate how the capabilities and limitations of U.S. Force structure affect the development and implementation of security, defense, and military strategies (1e).
 - Evaluate how theater strategies, campaigns, and major operations achieve national strategic goals across the range of military operations (2b).
 - Apply an analytical framework that addresses the factors politics, geography, society, culture, and religion play in shaping the desired outcomes of policies, strategies, and campaigns (2c).
 - Evaluate how strategic level plans anticipate and respond to surprise, uncertainty, and emerging conditions (2e).
 - Evaluate the skills, character attributes, and behaviors needed to lead in a dynamic joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational strategic environment (5a).

- Evaluate critical strategic thinking, decision-making, and communication by strategic leaders (5b).

IX. THE RISE OF COMMUNIST CHINA—THE CHINESE CIVIL WAR, THE KOREAN WAR, AND MAOIST STRATEGY

A. General: Tracing the rise of China from 1926 to 1953 and the U.S. reaction, particularly in the post-1945 period, complements and completes the themes and chronology of the previous case. War termination in Japan as in Germany transformed former enemies into stalwarts of a global order based on international laws and institutions. In Europe, an expanding group of Western allies cooperated to establish stable political, economic, and military institutions. This yielded economic recovery and an increasingly capable alliance wielding a wide range of instruments of national power. In Asia, the settlement did not produce regional stability; rather, right after the defeat of Japan, the long Chinese civil war reignited and after four years of bitter fighting produced a unified, communist, and viscerally anti-Western China. Less than a year after this communist victory, the Korean civil war escalated into a regional conflict and the first hot war of the emergent Cold War. In the process, China had transformed from a failed state into a rising power allied with the Soviet Union in pursuit of a communist world order. Mao Tse-tung's achievement of fighting the greatest Western powers to a stalemate in Korea crowned him as one of the most strategically effective leaders of the twentieth century. A close look at his theories adds vital components to any strategist's range of analytic frameworks.

After the fall of the Qing dynasty in 1911, China sank into a long civil war that did not end until the communist victory in 1949. This war began as a multilateral struggle among competing warlords with provincial followings. Much of the fighting even in the 1920s was conventional and devastated provincial economies. The Japanese intervention in 1931 brought destruction on an even greater scale, negating China's significant state building and economic development efforts. By 1945, the civil war had coalesced into a bilateral Nationalist Party-Communist Party fight under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Tse-tung, respectively. In the late 1940s, the Communists took control of the country from north to south in a series of huge conventional campaigns.

World War II left Soviet troops in occupation of North Korea and U.S. troops in possession of South Korea. Both occupying powers tried to establish institutions consonant with their political and international preferences. The Soviet Union repatriated Soviet-trained Korean forces under Kim Il-sung and established him as the leader of the North, while the United States withdrew its forces in 1948 immediately after elections brought American-educated, Syngman Rhee to power. Although Koreans shared a common desire for a unified Korea, they vehemently disagreed on their future political institutions. A civil war broke out in 1948 when the South announced its intention to hold elections, which the North boycotted and then secured Soviet and Chinese military assistance to overturn. The South suppressed this insurgency in 1948-1949. The North Korean attack, which followed on June 25, 1950, its rapid advance to the Pusan Perimeter by that summer, the U.N. amphibious assault on Inchon that fall, and the Chinese crossing of the Yalu that winter produced a war of rapid movement in the first year. Yet hostilities stalemated in the vicinity of the 38th parallel for the next two years despite mounting casualties.

Both the Chinese civil war and the Korean War occurred against the backdrop of an increasingly bitter Cold War. The Soviet imposition of communist governments throughout

Eastern Europe, the 1948 Berlin crisis, Soviet success in helping bring the Communists to power in China, and Soviet development of an atomic bomb ending the U.S. atomic monopoly created a crisis atmosphere. The economies of Western Europe remained fragile and communist parties remained popular and active, particularly in France and Italy. This cascade of bad news triggered a political crisis in the United States over responsibility for the “loss” of China, targeting American diplomats and Democrats, as well as a gathering witch hunt under the notorious Republican Senator Joseph McCarthy, targeting Communist sympathizers in the United States.

This case study introduces Mao Tse-tung, not only as one of the most influential strategic leaders of the twentieth century but also as a major theorist widely employed by U.S. enemies. Mao adapted the ideas of Soviet revolutionaries to an agrarian society beset by civil war and disintegrating governmental institutions. Revolutionaries have applied his theories of triangle building and protracted warfare across the globe. Students can compare these theories with Mao’s actual practice. The Communists overcame repeated setbacks: the breakdown of the Nationalist-Communist united front during the Northern Expedition in 1927, the series of Nationalists encirclement campaigns culminating in the Long March in 1934, and the Nationalist military offensives of 1946. Likewise, the Nationalists overcame repeated setbacks: the numerous warlord rebellions in the 1920s and 1930s, the Communists’ attempt to take over the Nationalists from within in the 1920s, and the Second Sino-Japanese War (1931-45). Did the Nationalist defeat progress according to Mao’s theories or according to other explanations?

Mao Tse-tung announced his victory in the Chinese civil war during the same week that the Soviet Union detonated its first atomic weapon. Truman’s announcement of this successful test shocked Soviet leaders who could not fathom an American scientific enterprise that could detect nuclear explosions at continental distances. President Truman decided to develop a thermonuclear capability before the Soviets did in order to continue the postwar down-sizing of conventional forces. Paul Nitze’s interagency committee responded to the end of the U.S. atomic monopoly by calling for major conventional and nuclear rearmament to bring American military capabilities in line with containment. Students can compare the period during and after the U.S. atomic monopoly to assess the impact of the development of atomic weapons on strategy.

The communist insurgency in China rapidly became entangled in the emerging Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union. Although the Soviets played both sides in China, their aid was an important factor in Mao Tse-tung’s triumph. The United States, wishing to keep China from becoming a theater in the Cold War, first tried to mediate between the Nationalists and the Communists in 1945-1946 and then declined to intervene militarily on a large- scale in 1947-1948 to save Chiang Kai-shek. In contrast, Democratic President Harry Truman chose to intervene in the Korean War, after he had lost the atomic monopoly, but not to intervene in the far more consequential Chinese civil war when he still retained that monopoly. The case affords an opportunity to consider under what political, military, diplomatic, and geographic circumstances the United States should intervene in a foreign civil war. It also explores the appropriate instruments of national power to use, ranging from troops, to military and economic aid to sanctions to institution building. Students can expand the analysis to examine the issue from the point of view of U.S. enemies. Joseph Stalin chose to open the

Korean theater in the global Cold War by providing North Korea with the necessary conventional military equipment, but he also arranged for proxies to do the ground fighting. Students can compare the operational and strategic consequences of his choices, as well as the complicated and shifting relationship between theater strategic success and national aims.

Conceptually, this case study also encompasses a very broad range of military operations. The Strategy and Policy course distinguishes among insurgent, regional, and global wars, which sometimes appear as nested wars. Students can examine the impact of nested wars on alliance systems and on civil-military relations. The Chinese civil war and the Korean War both began as insurgencies but then escalated into regional wars, which became theaters in global wars—World War II and the Cold War, respectively—that contested the nature of the international system. Alliances loomed large in these wars, but the allies often focused on different layers of the conflict, which produced tensions in the alliances. Those living in the theater focused on their unlimited objectives in the civil war, while the intervening powers emphasized either the regional or the global wars.

In fighting a regional war within the context of a global Cold War, both China and the United States experienced friction with allies. Mao's ally Stalin had supported North Korea's invasion of South Korea in June 1950 on the assumption that the United States would not intervene militarily. Having miscalculated once with regard to Korea, he did not want to risk further escalation, so his aid, although substantial, did not satisfy the Chinese. From Stalin's perspective, the two-year operational stalemate pinned down the United States in a secondary theater and drained American power. From the Chinese perspective, Stalin seemed content to fight to the last Chinese. U.S. Western allies, while fighting alongside American forces in Korea, tried to restrain any further deviation from a Europe-first geo-strategic priority and especially to prevent any escalation beyond the Korean theater. South Korean President Syngman Rhee's preoccupation with winning the civil war then set him against a settlement based on continued partition. To gain his acquiescence to the armistice of 1953, the United States made a security commitment to the Republic of Korea that has helped to preserve an uneasy peace between North Korea and South Korea ever since.

Framed in this manner, this module also allows students to employ Clausewitz's concepts of the culminating point of attack and the culminating point of victory as U.N. and Communists forces ranged the Korean Peninsula. Although Clausewitz did not develop these concepts in depth, students can treat the culminating point of attack as an operational concept and the culminating point of victory as a strategic concept to ask: are the culminating point of attack and victory always the same? Does one always precede the other? Alternatively, what is the optimal sequence for war termination?

Finally, Chinese and American strategic leaders had difficulty adapting among the different types of war. These difficulties produced significant civil-military tensions and intense command and control interactions. Mao and his generals, accustomed to waging an insurgency in their own country with significant local support and against relatively weak Nationalist forces, had to adapt to fighting a regional war on foreign soil against the much more capable forces of the United States and its allies. The new communist government was ill-prepared for the enormous logistical and economic challenges. Mao repeatedly pushed his theater commander

Peng Dehuai to continue to attack in late 1950 and early 1951, generating civil-military friction. On the other side, American political and military leaders, having presumed before 1950 that the next hot war would be World War III, struggled to adapt to a more limited regional war—an adaptation that General Douglas MacArthur found especially difficult to accept. Not wanting the Korean War to become a global nuclear war, American policymakers thwarted MacArthur's desire to make the Chinese mainland a new theater of operations. There ensued the most notorious crisis of civil-military relations in American history. The outcome of that crisis, and of the war, significantly affected U.S. strategy and policy in America's next major conflict—Vietnam—examined in the next case study.

B. Essay and Discussion Questions:

1. In what ways does Mao's theory of war resemble the theories of Clausewitz and Sun Tzu, and where does it add something genuinely new and important?
2. To what extent did actual Communist strategy in the Chinese civil war follow Mao's theoretical model of revolutionary insurgency?
3. Would the Chinese Communists have been able to achieve their revolutionary seizure of power in China in the absence of the Japanese military occupation of large parts of China in the 1930s and early 1940s and the Soviet occupation of Manchuria from August 1945 to May 1946?
4. The Chinese Communists experienced many "ups and downs" on their road to power in China from the 1920s to 1949. What enabled them to be so resilient after their major setbacks (1927, 1934-1935, November 1945-May 1946)?
5. Evaluate the relative advantages and disadvantages for the Communists and for the Kuomintang regime of opening a new theater in Manchuria in 1945-1946.
6. Did George C. Marshall's policy stances toward the Chinese civil war in 1945-1948 represent wise strategic judgment, both in the short-term and longer perspective?
7. Was there any realistic strategy by which the United States could have prevented the Communists from winning the Chinese civil war?
8. Evaluate the U.S. decision to intervene militarily in Korea but not in China. Did those decisions represent good policy and strategy?
9. Why were American political and military leaders twice caught by surprise in Korea in 1950?
10. Compare and evaluate the ways that Mao and Truman as political leaders interacted with their senior military commanders.

11. A critical issue of theater strategy concerns not going beyond what Clausewitz called the culminating point of attack and the culminating point of victory, yet overextension plagued the Nationalist regime in China, and both the United States and the People's Republic of China in Korea. Why did such overextension happen, and what lessons might we usefully learn from those episodes?

12. Two key issues of war termination are how far to go militarily and what to demand politically. Compare how well the United States and China handled those two issues in the Korean War.

13. Which outside power—the Soviet Union, China, or the United States—derived the greatest strategic advantage from the Korean War of 1950-1953?

14. Would a latter-day Sun Tzu judge that the United States effectively attacked the Sino-Soviet alliance at one or more points? If so, how did it do so? If not, how might it have best done so?

15. Did nuclear strategy play a significant, effective role in supporting American policy toward the People's Republic of China?

16. Which factor was most important in causing tensions between the United States and the People's Republic of China: differences in ideology, culture, domestic politics, or national-security interests?

17. Did the diplomatic policies of the People's Republic of China reflect Mao's strengths or his weaknesses as a strategic leader?

18. Like the United Kingdom from the 1790s to the 1810s, the United States faced a new ideological state with a dynamic leader. Why was the United Kingdom able to thwart and then defeat revolutionary France while the United States was unable to do so against China?

19. The United Kingdom in the early twentieth century and the United States at mid-century faced two recently unified rising powers in Germany and China. Why was neither English-speaking power able to manage the strategic environment and avoid direct military conflict?

20. When opening a new theater in an ongoing war, what circumstances have proven to be exceptionally rewarding?

C. Readings:

1. Paine, S.C.M. *The Wars for Asia, 1911-1949*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2012. Pages 49-76, 223-270.

[Professor Paine of the Strategy and Policy Department provides the bookends to the Chinese civil war. In Chapter 3, Paine details Chiang's rise and the near destruction of the Chinese Communist Party. In the process, she illustrates Chiang's nation building efforts amidst adverse strategic circumstances. In Chapter 8, she examines the resumption of the Chinese civil war, which the global war covered in the previous case study temporarily interrupted. Paine assesses the struggle between the Chinese Communists and the Nationalists while emphasizing the critical roles of the Soviet Union and the United States in this internal conflict.]

2. *Seeing Red: The Development of Maoist Thought on Insurgency*
(Selected Readings)

[These extracts from Mao's writings on insurgency were selected for this case study by Professor Bradford Lee, a former faculty in the Strategy and Policy Department, who has added an introductory comment about each of them.]

3. Chang, Jung and Jon Halliday. *Mao: The Unknown Story*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2005. Pages 282-292, 295-300. (Selected Readings)

[This account of the Chinese Communists' decision to open a new Manchurian theater in the Chinese civil war after the Soviet offensive against Japan in August 1945 provides valuable insights into relations between Mao and Stalin and between Mao and his senior military commanders.]

4. "NSC-68: A Report to the National Security Council," *Naval War College Review*, XXVII, (May-June 1975). Pages 51-108. (Selected Readings)

[NSC-68 was drafted in response to President Truman's request for advice regarding nuclear weapons policy subsequent to the likelihood that the Soviet Union had successfully tested an atomic weapon.]

5. Tanner, Harold M. "Guerrilla, Mobile, and Base Warfare in Communist Military Operations in Manchuria, 1945-1947," *Journal of Military History* 67, no. 4 (October 2003). Pages 1177-1222.

<http://www.jstor.org/stable/3396886>

[Tanner looks at the interface of strategy and operations in the Manchurian theater in 1945-1947. He is especially illuminating on the theme of "interaction, adaptation, and reassessment." Note there are differences in interpretation between this article and Reading 3.]

6. Levine, Steven I. "Mobilizing for War: Rural Revolution in Manchuria as an Instrument of War," in *Single Sparks: China's Rural Revolutions*, edited by Kathleen Hartford and Steven M. Goldstein. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1989. Pages 151-175. (Selected Readings)

[Whereas, in Reading 5, Tanner analyzes military operations in Manchuria, Levine focuses on political mobilization of the Manchurian rural population by the Chinese Communists. The author introduces key concepts such as “exchange relationship” and “local coercive balance” that are useful for understanding insurgencies beyond this case study.]

7. May, Ernest R. “1947-48: When Marshall Kept the U.S. Out of War in China,” *The Journal of Military History* 66, no. 4 (October 2002). Pages 1001-1010.

<http://www.jstor.org/stable/3093261>

[This lecture, by a renowned historian of international relations, highlights George C. Marshall’s decision to stop short of large-scale military intervention in the Chinese civil war in the late 1940s. The lecture ends with some speculation about what might have followed had the United States intervened.]

8. Chen, Jian. *Mao’s China and the Cold War*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001. Pages 1-16, 44-117.

[This path-breaking book provides a close look at the rise and fall of the Sino-Soviet alliance in the Cold War, and Mao’s policy and strategy in the Korean War of 1950-1953. Chen emphasizes the importance of culture, ideology, and domestic politics in Chinese decision-making.]

9. Stueck, William. *Rethinking the Korean War: A New Diplomatic and Strategic History*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002. Pages 87-181, 185-193.

[This book presents a lucid, analytical history of the Korean War primarily from an American perspective. It complements the Chinese perspective offered in Reading 8.]

10. Cohen, Eliot A. and John Gooch. *Military Misfortunes: The Anatomy of Failure in War*. New York: Random House, 1991. Pages 165-195.

[In late 1950, Chinese military intervention in the Korean War surprised the United States and resulted in the greatest operational setback ever suffered by American military forces. Cohen and Gooch wrote this analysis of that double debacle while they served on the Strategy and Policy Department faculty.]

11. Hunt, Michael. “Beijing and the Korean Crisis, June 1950-June 1951,” *Political Science Quarterly* 107, no. 3 (Fall 1992). Pages 465-475.

<http://www.jstor.org/stable/2152440>

[The assigned excerpt from this article highlights the differences in leadership style between Mao Tse-tung and President Harry Truman, especially in regard to how they interacted with military leaders.]

12. Jackson, Colin. "Lost Chance or Lost Horizon? Strategic Opportunity and Escalation Risk in the Korean War, April-July 1951," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 33, no. 2 (April 2010). Pages 255-289.

<http://tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/01402391003590499>

[Theater commanders have to be responsive to political developments back home even as they try to mater interaction with their adversaries in the war zone. Professor Jackson of the Strategy and Policy Department faculty evaluates how well General Matthew Ridgway handled this "two-level game" at a critical point in the Korean War.]

13. Gaddis, John Lewis. *The Long Peace: Inquiries into the History of the Cold War*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1987. Pages 115-129. (Selected Readings)

[Gaddis, a former Strategy and Policy Department faculty member and the preeminent American historian of the Cold War, provides a nuanced interpretation of thinking in the Truman and Eisenhower administrations about nuclear strategy in relation to China in the Korean War.]

14. Herken, Gregg. "A Most Deadly Illusion: The Atomic Secret and American Nuclear Weapons Policy, 1945-1950," *Pacific Historical Review* 49, no. 1 (February 1980). Pages 51-76.

<http://www.jstor.org/stable/3639304>

[Herken discusses the false assumptions and miscalculations associated with the Truman Administration's nuclear weapons policy and the reasons for the administration's surprise at the loss of American nuclear weapon hegemony in 1949. In addition, the essay describes how the consequences of this failed policy affected the Cold War.]

15. Brodie, Bernard. "Nuclear Weapons and Changing Strategic Outlooks," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 13, no. 12 (February 1957). Pages 56-61.

<https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0/#inbox/150626b744ab6590?projector=1>

[This article discusses the challenges regarding the policy-strategy match in the nuclear age.]

D. Learning Outcomes: The Rise of China case study completes the chronology and themes introduced in the previous case and supports the OPMEP by exploring Mao Tse-tung's theories of irregular warfare, U.S. considerations of intervention in a regional civil war, this period of rapid technological change, postwar demobilization, and nuclear development, and the emergence of Cold War strategy. This case study supports:

- CJCS Joint Learning Areas and Objectives (JPME II) 1a, 1b, 1c, 1e, 2b, 2c, 4c, 5a, 5b, and 5e. Emphasis will be placed on the following topics, enabling students to:

- Apply key strategic concepts, critical thinking, and analytical frameworks to formulate and execute strategy (1a).
- Analyze the integration of all instruments of national power in complex, dynamic, and ambiguous environments to attain objectives at the national and theater-strategic levels (1b).
- Evaluate historical and/or contemporary security environments and applications of strategies across the range of military operations (1c).
- Evaluate how the capabilities and limitations of the U.S. Force structure affect the development and implementation of security, defense, and military strategies (1e).
- Evaluate how theater strategies, campaigns, and major operations achieve national strategic goals across the range of military operations (2b).
- Apply an analytical framework that addresses the factors politics, geography, society, culture, and religion play in shaping desired outcomes of policies, strategies, and campaigns (2c).
- Analyze the opportunities and challenges affecting command and control created in the joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational environment across the range of military operations, to include networks and technology (4c).
- Evaluate the skills, character attributes, and behaviors needed to lead in a dynamic joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational strategic environment (5a).
- Evaluate critical strategic thinking, decision-making, and communication by strategic leaders (5b).
- Evaluate historic and contemporary applications of the elements of mission command by strategic-level leaders in pursuit of national objectives (5e).

X. IRREGULAR WARFARE AND PROTRACTED CONFLICTS—THE WARS OF SOUTHEAST ASIA

A. General: Southeast Asia was one of the most complex strategic environments the United States has ever faced. U.S. experience demonstrates the high cost of inadequate critical analysis applied to theater campaigning across such a wide range of military operations. To set the context, from 1945 to 1979 Southeast Asia was one of the most violent regions in the world. Although some of this warfare featured states fighting states, most took place within political systems. Every country in the region, except Singapore, was convulsed by internal wars, most more than once. There were violent uprisings against Western colonial systems (Vietnam and Indonesia); there were Communist insurgencies (Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaya, Burma, Thailand, Laos, and Cambodia); there was organized violence arising from ethnic and religious divisions (Malaya, Burma, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Laos); and there were coups and counter-coups (Thailand, Burma, South Vietnam, and Cambodia). In 1965, an attempted coup in Indonesia triggered a wave of violence in which several hundred thousand Communists and ethnic Chinese were killed. The Communist regime in Laos waged war on its ethnic minorities, while the Khmer Rouge regime in Cambodia slaughtered one-fifth of its own population. At the end of this era, in 1979, communist China invaded its erstwhile ally, communist Vietnam, in an effort to reassert its regional dominance.

It is important for strategic leaders to possess the historical, cultural, and geostrategic knowledge necessary to understand why—and to anticipate when—a region may become convulsed by violence. In the case of Southeast Asia from 1945 to 1975, a number of factors converged to generate massive and violent instability. Well before the twentieth century, Southeast Asia had been a meeting ground for conquerors, traders, missionaries, and migrants from other regions and other civilizations. As a result, by the twentieth century, the area south of China and east of India had become a remarkably complex mosaic of different civilizational influences, ethnic and tribal groups, languages, religions (especially Buddhism, Islam, and Roman Catholicism), cultural traditions (such as Confucianism), and political ideas. Before World War II, the whole region except Thailand was under Western colonial rule, though nationalist and Communist movements were beginning to manifest themselves with sporadic episodes of violence. The Japanese invasion and occupation of almost all of Southeast Asia in 1941-1942 accelerated political change in the region. It not only shattered Western colonial regimes and the aura of Western military invincibility, but also, as Japan headed for political defeat in 1945, opened up political opportunities for indigenous successor movements. After World War II, when the British, French, and Dutch tried to reassert their colonial authority (though not the United States in the Philippines), they encountered political resistance everywhere and violent insurgencies in some places. From 1946 to 1957, independent states emerged all over Southeast Asia.

Decolonization did not bring an end to violence, for nearly every new regime faced ideological or ethnic insurgencies—or a combination of both. Some of the Communist insurgencies, notably in Indochina, became enmeshed in the global Cold War. Thus what Americans refer to as the Vietnam War formed part of a set of nested wars at the local, regional, and global levels. In South Vietnam, a Communist insurgency triggered a regional war between the United States and North Vietnam over the fate of South Vietnam. These two wars then

became embedded in the Cold War as the United States sought to contain the expansion of Communism, even as the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China gave massive material support to North Vietnam.

This case focuses on thinking critically about insurgency and counterinsurgency in the Philippines, Malaya, and Indochina. To provide a comparative backdrop to our successes and failures in Vietnam, we shall consider how the cultural, geostrategic, and other features of that environment differed from those in Malaya and the Philippines. We shall compare the nature of the insurgents, the strengths and weaknesses of their strategies, and the availability of external support in the different cases. We shall also look for patterns of success and failure in the counterinsurgencies waged by: the British against the Malayan Communist Party and its Malayan Races Liberation Army; by the Filipino government (with American advisers and aid) against the Huks in the Philippines; by the French against the Viet Minh in Indochina; and by the United States and its South Vietnamese allies against the National Liberation Front/Viet Cong and North Vietnam. It is noteworthy that, after the immediate post-World War II era, only in Indochina did Communist insurgencies actually succeed in Southeast Asia. Thinking through why that was the case should help students assess the prospects for success or failure of external powers in insurgencies in the future.

Five complexities common to many insurgencies are worthy of special attention when building a suitable analytic framework: the role of politics, the attributes of effective leadership, the environmental constraints, the impact of third-party intervention, and the institutional dimension of strategy for an intervening outside power. First, while this course emphasizes how politics permeates all types of wars, insurgency and counterinsurgency entail extraordinary political complexity. The existence of insurgency itself suggests basic weaknesses in state institutions. This, in turn, suggests that insurgencies are a variety of civil war in which different groups compete for power to establish a more durable political hierarchy. This process usually involves some amount of brute force to destroy insurgent groups and coerce the population into obedience. At the same time, a lasting victory often requires some accommodation of public grievances and some effort to integrate former insurgents into the new political order. Absent these steps, the government faces renewed violence by disaffected losers in the last war, and its authority may prove tenuous. Moreover, different regions within the same conflict might be witness to very different local politics. Some areas might enjoy higher relative levels of political stability and lower levels of violence. An effective approach to counterinsurgency may require calibrating different levels of coercion, accommodation, and even tolerance of parallel political structures depending on local conditions. Obviously, achieving this calibration is a very demanding task.

Second, such complexity poses special problems for strategic leadership. Because most military and political leaders are not well-prepared to deal with insurgencies when they first encounter them, the ability to learn quickly and adapt; assess and reassess enemies and environments; combine different players and instruments cohesively; and communicate with different audiences persuasively are all at a premium. Performing these tasks well requires effective strategic leadership and civil-military integration. In the Philippines case, Ramon Magsaysay and his American adviser, Edward Lansdale of the U.S. Air Force provide this leadership and integration. In the Malayan case, Generals Sir Harold Briggs, Sir Gerald

Templer, and the Colonial Secretary Oliver Lyttelton meet these critical needs. Their predecessors often seem clumsy and brutal by contrast. On the other hand, students should consider whether later counterinsurgent leaders would have succeeded had not earlier leaders done the dirty work of attacking insurgent networks and coercing the civilian population into obedience. Examples of strategic leadership are considerably rarer on the counterinsurgent side of the Vietnam War. In the American case, few in key leadership positions, either in Washington or in the theater, seemed capable of providing a unifying vision of how to win the war. Though Ambassador Robert Komer, General Creighton Abrams, and CIA Officer William Colby believed that they had arrived at a winning formula of rural development and targeted counterinsurgent operations after the Tet Offensive, the lasting contribution of this campaign was undercut by the push to hand over security to the South Vietnamese. Certainly, U.S. leaders struggled to grasp the dynamics of Vietnamese politics, and to integrate that understanding with the larger Cold War struggle.

Third, even the best strategies and the best strategic leaders may not succeed in all circumstances. What works well in one environment may not work well in another. The mechanical translation of “lessons” from one war to another may, under different circumstances, be counterproductive. Strategists must pay close attention to the characteristics of any given environment to ensure that the strategies pursued genuinely correspond to the problem at hand.

Fourth, external sponsorship of insurgency can magnify the difficulty of counterinsurgency. North Vietnam enjoyed relatively easy road, rail, and maritime access to Soviet and Chinese military and economic aid. Separated by land and sea from the Communist powers to their north, the Malaysian and Philippine insurgents received almost no material aid from China or the Soviet Union. At the same time, American strategists had to balance competing Cold War demands at the global, theater, and local levels. The U.S. decision to contest Communist advances into Indochina forced civilian and military leaders to grapple simultaneously with four interlocking problems—the insurgency in South Vietnam, North Vietnamese sponsorship of the insurgents in the South, the existence of sanctuaries in Laos and Cambodia, and massive Soviet and Chinese support for North Vietnam. American courses of action that addressed one layer of war sometimes exacerbated problems in the other three layers of war.

Finally, these cases underscore the difficulty of coordinating allied, host nation, and interagency efforts in counterinsurgency. Allies seldom share in full the aims of their sponsors; the resulting friction and competition can impede or derail the progress of the combined campaign. Incomplete or failing institutions of the host nation can alternatively impede and impel direct involvement by the intervening power. In some instances this has buttressed weak client regimes; in other instances, aggressive involvement by the intervening power has inadvertently disrupted the political consolidation necessary to end the violence. Students should evaluate this tradeoff in the context of the three cases examined here and assess which of a range of problems proved most damaging to the American effort in Vietnam. Finally, even the integration of efforts from among various agencies of the intervening power or the host nation can prove elusive. Competing agendas can stymie progress and open vulnerabilities for the insurgent to exploit.

The aftermath of four decades of strife in Southeast Asia illuminates the full range of possible sequels to insurgency. In the Philippines and Malaya, the defeat of Communist insurgencies, combined with the accommodation and integration of the defeated groups, set the foundation for steady political and economic progress in the decades that followed. While the fall of South Vietnam triggered a series of smaller conflicts known collectively as the Third Indochina War, by the end of the 1980s Indochina as a whole had returned to a level of stability and prosperity not seen since the eve of the Second World War. Eventually, Vietnam itself followed the rest of the region down the path of economic integration into the global economy and rekindled a close relationship with the United States. As welcome as these later developments may be, the period of U.S.-led intervention created legacies that persist today. An education in the fields of strategy and leadership would be incomplete without a careful evaluation of the complex blend of traditional and irregular challenges that comprise the strategic landscape in this case.

B. Essay and Discussion Questions:

1. Which variable or variables were most significant in explaining why the Huk insurgency collapsed: Philippine government strategy; U.S. advisory support; insurgent errors; or environmental factors?
2. Why did the British succeed in suppressing the Communist insurgency in Malaya? Were any of these lessons transferable to Vietnam?
3. Was the implementation of the Briggs Plan decisive?
4. Who presents a more useful strategic analysis of the conflict in Malaya, Briggs or Lyttelton?
5. Given the information available to decision-makers at the time, what lessons should American decision-makers of the early 1960s have drawn from the Huk Rebellion, the Malayan Emergency, and French performance in Indochina?
6. Did it make strategic sense for the United States to extend the policy of containment to Vietnam and make it a major new military theater in the larger Cold War?
7. Why did the United States fail in Vietnam whereas it achieved its basic political objective in Korea in the previous decade?
8. Was the Communist victory in Vietnam due mostly to North Vietnamese strategy, the inherent weaknesses of the South Vietnamese government, or the strategic mistakes of the United States?
9. How effectively did the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong combine conventional, guerrilla, terrorist, and information operations?

10. Would better integration of, and coordination among, the instruments of national power have allowed the United States to win in Vietnam?
11. How important were civil-military relations in determining the success or failure of the American war effort in Vietnam?
12. Given the political restraints placed on his ground operations, General Westmoreland believed that there were no good alternatives to the strategy of attrition that he pursued from 1965 to 1968. Do you agree?
13. Could the United States have better used air power to win in Vietnam? If so, how? If not, why not?
14. Some have argued that the Tet offensive in 1968 was a major strategic mistake by the Communists that the United States and South Vietnam did not exploit effectively. Do you agree?
15. “It is hard to see how any administration coming to power in 1968 could have pushed harder against the basic trend of American public opinion, kept the war going longer, fought it better, or got an agreement fundamentally more favorable to Saigon than the one that emerged.” Do you agree?
16. Which theorist—Clausewitz, Sun Tzu, or Mao—provides the best insight into Communist victory and U.S. defeat in Vietnam?
17. What does the Southeast Asia experience suggest are the most important mistakes that incumbent governments and coalitions may make in countering an insurgency, and how can insurgents most effectively capitalize upon them?
18. What attributes of strategic leadership would you judge to be the most important in producing favorable outcomes in counterinsurgency?
19. How important was assistance from outside powers—China, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States—in determining the outcome of the conflicts examined in this case study?
20. “It wasn’t so much they [the military leadership] resented civilian oversight—they just didn’t feel we were competent to question it,” Secretary of Defense McNamara later said of the top U.S. military commanders in Vietnam. “And to a considerable degree, they were right. But they should have recognized, even if we weren’t experts in military operations, the questions we raised were fundamental. And they should have been willing to reexamine their actions in relation to those fundamental questions, and most of them were not.” Do you agree with this assessment of American strategic decision-making during the Vietnam War?
21. Were there alternative courses of action open to American decision-makers in 1965, other than escalation in the number of ground forces, that would have achieved U.S. goals in

South Vietnam and the region?

22. Under what circumstances can an intervening power reasonably expect to restore order in a shattered political system?

C. Readings:

1. Lomperis, Timothy J. *From People's War to People's Rule: Insurgency, Intervention, and the Lessons of Vietnam*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996. Pages 173-195 and 198-221.

[This reading provides general overviews of the Huk Rebellion in the Philippines (1948-1954) and the Malayan Emergency (1948-1960).]

2. Kerkvliet, Benedict J. *The Huk Rebellion: A Study in Peasant Revolt in the Philippines*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977. Pages 188-248. (Selected Readings)

[Kerkvliet offers an account of the Huk Rebellion from the peasant population's viewpoint. He gives insight into the origins of the rebellion and a number of potential explanations for its eventual decline.]

3. Valeriano, Colonel Napoleon D. and Lieutenant Charles T. R. Bohannon. *Counter guerrilla Operations: The Philippine Experience*. New York: Praeger, 1962. Pages 89-111. (Selected Readings)

[The authors, both leading participants in the Philippine government's campaign against the Huks, examine the causes of the rebellion and the nature of the challenges facing military and civilian leaders in counterinsurgency.]

4. Taruc, Luis. *He Who Rides the Tiger: The Story of an Asian Guerrilla Leader*. New York: Praeger, 1967. Pages 54-62. (Selected Readings)

[This excerpt from the memoirs of the surrendered Huk leader, Luis Taruc, describes the role of informer networks in amplifying the effectiveness of the Huk insurgents. He also provides important insights into the role of Communist ideology, popular grievances, and the escalatory dynamics of violence in rural Luzon.]

5. Bennett, Huw. "'A Very Salutory Effect': The Counter-Terror Strategy in the Early Malayan Emergency, June 1948 to December 1949," *The Journal of Strategic Studies* 32, no. 3 (June 2009). Pages 415-444.

<http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/01402390902928248>

[Bennett examines British counterinsurgency strategy in the opening year of the Malayan

Emergency. He argues that the “hearts and minds” narrative of British strategy in Malaya overlooks an early emphasis on the active intimidation of the Chinese populace.]

6. Briggs, General Sir Harold. “‘Federation plan for the elimination of the communist organization and armed forces in Malaya’ (the Briggs plan): report by COS for Cabinet Malaya Committee, 24 May 1950,” in *Malaya: The Communist Insurrection 1948-1953*, ed. A. J. Stockwell. *British Documents on the End of Empire*, Series B, Volume 3. Pages 216-221. (Selected Readings)

[This document is the official record of the famous Briggs Plan. Many participants and historians have pointed to this plan and its implementation as the key turning point in British strategy in Malaya. The Briggs Plan has served as a model for subsequent planners of counterinsurgency campaigns.]

7. Lyttelton, Oliver. “‘Malaya’: Cabinet memorandum by Mr. Lyttelton. Appendices I-XV, 21 Dec 1951,” in *Malaya: The Communist Insurrection 1948-1953*, ed. A. J. Stockwell. *British Documents on the End of Empire*, Series B, Volume 3. Pages 318-331, 344-350 (Appendix IX). (Selected Readings)

[In late 1951, two events—the assassination of the High Commissioner Hugh Gurney and the election of the Conservative Party in London—prompted a mid-war reassessment of British policy and strategy in Malaya. The incoming Colonial Secretary, Oliver Lyttelton, traveled to Malaya and spent a month assessing the nature of the conflict and the effectiveness of British strategy. This document summarized his conclusions and served as the policy foundation for General Templer’s subsequent campaign.]

8. Ramakrishna, Kumar. “‘Bribing the Reds to Give Up’: Rewards Policy in the Malayan Emergency,” *War in History* 9, no. 3 (July 2002). Pages 332-353.

<http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index=0&did=1082691751&SrchMode=3&sid=1&Fmt=6&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=1261145049&clientId=18762&aid=1>

[Ramakrishna recounts the history of British attempts to induce insurgent surrenders in Malaya. He highlights the interaction of financial incentives, propaganda, and military operations in explaining the relative effectiveness of surrender appeals. In so doing, he provides a sense of the dilemmas of war termination in an insurgency and how they may differ from those of interstate war.]

9. Trapnell, Thomas J. H., Major General (USA). “Debriefing of Major General Trapnell, Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) Indochina, 3 May 1954,” Department of Defense, *Pentagon Papers*, U.S. House of Representatives Edition, declassified September 20, 1970. Pages 406-420. (Selected Readings)

[General Trapnell, the outgoing U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group chief for Indochina, presents his views on the late stages of the French War in Indochina. Trapnell’s account offers

an early American assessment of the nature of irregular warfare with the Vietnamese Communists, his opinions on French performance, and his strategic recommendations.]

10. Lewy, Guenter. *America in Vietnam*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978. Pages 42-222.

[This book provides an even-handed overview of the period from 1965, when the Johnson Administration intervened militarily in Vietnam on a large scale, to 1975, when the Vietnamese Communists conquered South Vietnam. Lewy covers both high-level decision-making in Washington and the execution of theater strategy in South Vietnam.]

11. Herring, George C. "Cold Blood: LBJ's Conduct of Limited War in Vietnam." *The Harmon Memorial Lectures in Military History*. Lecture No. 33. Colorado Springs: U.S. Air Force Academy, 1990. Pages 1-24. (Selected Readings)

[Herring, a leading American historian of the Vietnam War, examines problems in the "Clausewitzian Triangle" of the United States from 1965 to 1968, first by showing how poorly the civil-military relationship between President Johnson and his military advisers functioned, and then by showing the inadequacy of Johnson's efforts to engage in strategic communications with the American people.]

12. Komer, R. W. *Bureaucracy Does Its Thing: Institutional Constraints on U.S.- GVN Performance in Vietnam*. Santa Monica: RAND, 1972. Pages 7-53, 60-126. (Selected Readings)

[In a think-tank report written before the Vietnam War ended, Komer, who from 1966 to 1968 had served first as a special assistant to President Johnson and then as Deputy to COMUSMACV for CORDS, drew on his experience to analyze major impediments to the effectiveness of counterinsurgency efforts in Vietnam. He is particularly insightful on problems with the government of South Vietnam (GVN) and on problems of institutional adaptation in the U.S. interagency process and U.S.-GVN multinational efforts at pacification.]

13. Pape, Robert A. *Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996. Pages 174-210.

[Robert Pape, formerly a faculty member in the School of Advanced Airpower Studies at Maxwell Air Force Base and now a professor of political science at the University of Chicago, provides a provocative analysis of the strategic value of American uses of the air instrument in the Vietnam War.]

14. Fall, Bernard B. *The Two Viet-Nams: A Political and Military Analysis*. Second Revised Edition. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1984. Pages 338-352. (Selected Readings)

[Fall, a French journalist with a profound knowledge of Indochina, wrote these pages during the Vietnam War, in which he lost his life. He highlights the ways in which the environment differed from the environment in Malaya, emphasizes the importance of political factors in

determining the outcome of insurgencies, and notes how short-sighted the United States was to ignore the French experience with counterinsurgency.]

15. Pike, Douglas. *Viet Cong: The Organization and Techniques of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam*. Cambridge, MA: M.I.T. Press, 1966. Pages 85-108, 119-132, 240-252. (Selected Readings)

[Pike, who was as knowledgeable as any American about Vietnamese Communism in the 1960s, examines in these three excerpts different elements of early Viet Cong insurgency strategy in South Vietnam. From the perspective of the twenty-first century, Pike's discussion of the Viet Cong's use of information operations and terrorist tactics for political purposes is of special interest. His extensive quotations from Communist documents give readers a good sense of Viet Cong strategic thought and of the extent to which it may have deviated from the Maoist model.]

16. Elliott, David W. P. "Hanoi's Strategy in the Second Indochina War," in *The Vietnam War: Vietnamese and American Perspectives*, eds. Jayne S. Werner and Luu Doan Huynh. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1993. Pages 66-92. (Selected Readings)

[Elliott, an area-studies specialist who has intensively studied the Vietnam War, presents a revisionist interpretation of Communist strategy based on Vietnamese-language sources. While acknowledging that the Viet Minh followed the Maoist model in the 1946 to 1954 war against France, he argues that American strategic leaders in the 1960s and American analysts subsequently were wrong to assume that the Vietnamese Communists continued to adhere to the Maoist model in the war against the United States. Instead, Elliott seeks to demonstrate (without referring to Sun Tzu) that North Vietnam attacked American strategies from the early 1960s to the early 1970s.]

17. Brigham, Robert K. *Guerrilla Diplomacy: The NLF's Foreign Relations and the Viet Nam War*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999. Pages 94-125. (Selected Readings)

[This excerpt from a study by an American historian looks at the final two phases (1970-1975) of the Vietnam War from the perspective of the Vietnamese Communist leadership (both in the National Liberation Front and in the North Vietnamese regime). The first chapter assigned shows how the Communists used the peace negotiations as a forum from which to launch information operations to undercut the Thieu government in Saigon and the Nixon administration in Washington. The second assigned chapter illuminates debates and decision-making in the Vietnamese Communist leadership about what strategy to follow in South Vietnam after the peace agreement of 1973.]

D. Learning Outcomes: The Wars of Southeast Asia case study provides an iconic, and perhaps unavoidably central, case study for exploring strategic concepts relevant to insurgency, counterinsurgency, interagency coordination, and great power diplomacy. This case study supports:

- CJCS Joint Learning Areas and Objectives (JPME II) 1a, 1b, 1c, 1e, 2b, 2c, 3c, 3d, 5a, and 5b. Emphasis will be placed on the following topics, enabling students to:
 - Apply key strategic concepts, critical thinking, and analytical frameworks to formulate and execute strategy (1a).
 - Analyze the integration of all instruments of national power in complex, dynamic, and ambiguous environments to attain objectives at the national and theater-strategic levels (1b).
 - Evaluate historical and/or contemporary security environments and applications of strategies across the range of military operations (1c).
 - Evaluate how the capabilities and limitations of U.S. Force structure affect the development and implementation of security, defense, and military strategies (1e).
 - Evaluate how theater strategies, campaigns, and major operations achieve national strategic goals across the range of military operations (2b).
 - Apply an analytical framework that addresses the factors politics, geography, society, culture, and religion play in shaping the desired outcomes of policies, strategies, and campaigns (2c).
 - Evaluate the integration of joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational capabilities, including all Service and Special Operations Forces, in campaigns across the range of military operations in achieving strategic objectives (3c).
 - Value a joint perspective and appreciate the increased power available to commanders through joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational efforts (3d).
 - Evaluate the skills, character attributes, and behaviors needed to lead in a dynamic joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational strategic environment (5a).
 - Evaluate critical strategic thinking, decision-making, and communication by strategic leaders (5b).

XI. THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE SOVIET SUPERPOWER—ALLIANCES, ECONOMICS, AND NUCLEAR COMPETITION IN ENDING THE COLD WAR, 1969-1991

A. General: The range of military operations covered in this case shifts to the convoluted and spectacular end of a completely different kind of conflict: the Cold War. The Cold War pitted two superpowers with vastly different ideologies against each other in a decades-long strategic competition. In that sense, it resembled other long-term competitions that we have studied in the Strategy and Policy Course, including those between Athens and Sparta, Great Britain and France, Great Britain and Germany, and the United States and Japan. The U.S.-Soviet competition produced clashes in the developing world and even occasional direct combat between Americans and Soviets, notably in the skies over Korea and elsewhere along the Soviet periphery. Yet, unlike previous competitions, the Cold War never escalated into war between the superpowers. War never broke out despite serious mutual fears and grievances, even though each side built large conventional and nuclear forces specifically to fight against the other. Moreover, the Cold War ended peacefully, in an historically unusual, great power implosion. What happened? This case study provides an opportunity to analyze this important question from the perspective of strategy and policy and to explore key strategic concepts such as deterrence, coercion, containment, alliance management, and long-term competitive strategies.

More specifically, the case allows us to apply the Strategy and Policy Course themes while evaluating the evolution of U.S. and Soviet strategic thought during the final phase of the Cold War. Although all of the course themes can tell us something about strategy in the Cold War, four overlapping issues relating to national security strategy stand out. The first is war termination. The U.S.-Soviet competition began during the prolonged effort to terminate World War II, when each side's efforts to achieve a postwar settlement favorable to itself intensified the superpower competition. Two decades later, policy-makers in Washington tried to use *détente* to take the "war" out of the Cold War. Supporters of *détente* argued that a reduction in superpower tensions was necessary to reduce the likelihood of a nuclear exchange. Critics argued that *détente* was based on fundamental misperceptions about the nature of the enemy and the rivalry, and that it replaced grand strategy with wishful thinking. Finally, we will explore the actual end of the Cold War from 1989-1991. Did U.S. actions accelerate the decline of the Soviet Union, or did Moscow collapse under its own weight? How did the United States deal with the imploding Soviet empire? What were some of the results?

A second issue concerns peacetime competition between powers with dissimilar ideologies and economic models. As in the Peloponnesian War, the struggle pitted a vibrant democracy dependent on trade and enterprise against a despotic autocracy with a command economy devoted to the maintenance of a large, standing military. The economic competition was central to the Cold War for several reasons. First, it was the tangible expression of the underlying ideological contest: each superpower claimed its model offered the best path to prosperity and social justice. Second, each power faced an ongoing "guns versus butter" tradeoff. The superpowers could maximize their readiness for war by investing in their military establishments, but only by diverting scarce resources from their civilian economies. Third, the advent of modern, industrial economies added a technological competition largely absent from the Peloponnesian War. The United States and Soviet Union vied to demonstrate their relative

superiority in innovation, particularly in the military realm. The final phase of the Cold War was a period of remarkable technological and political change.

The third issue concerns the strategic value of multinational alliances within a complex landscape. Each superpower forged alliances in an effort to extend its strategic reach and build defenses against the expansion of its adversary's political system. In Europe, these alliances took on such significance that the Cold War became as much a struggle between NATO and the Warsaw Pact as between Washington and Moscow. The alliances conferred political and military advantages on their superpower leaders, but often proved difficult and costly to manage. Each superpower had to carry an overwhelming share of the burden of defending its alliance, and—particularly in Eastern Europe—had to invest large sums of money subsidizing its allies' militaries and economies. The result was an internal struggle between each superpower and its allies over who should contribute how much to the common defense. Whatever benefits these alliances conferred, they also created knotty strategic dilemmas. For instance, officials in Washington sometimes wondered whether it was wise to promise to fight a major war in the event that Bonn or Brussels was threatened. Leading Western European powers often questioned whether the United States would come to their aid under such circumstances. Such doubts prompted some allies to seek major deterrent forces of their own, and to pursue independent foreign policies at times. Combined, joint, and interagency endeavors proved trying under such circumstances.

Fourth, the United States and Soviet Union adopted radically different approaches to building and managing their respective alliances. The Soviet Union imposed its will and its ideology on its Eastern European allies, holding its alliance together by the threat and use of force (as with Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968). Conversely, the United States built its alliances by mutual consent, responding with restraint to defections and challenges to its authority (as with France in 1966). NATO and the Warsaw Pact survived until the end of the Cold War, but other alliances—such as SEATO and the Soviet alliance with China—did not fare as well. The stories of the superpower alliances raise a number of fundamental strategic questions: Are alliances a net boon to geopolitical power, or are they a net drain on it? Under what circumstances should a superpower fight a war to defend an ally? Are carrots or sticks more effective at building and holding alliances together? How should a superpower deal with independent-minded allies? What determines whether an alliance will succeed or fail over the long run?

Finally, no study of the Cold War would be complete without analyzing how nuclear weapons affected strategic considerations in Washington and Moscow. In the aftermath of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, some observers argued that the advent of nuclear weapons constituted a strategic revolution because their vast destructive power was only useful for deterrence. Not everyone agreed, however. Others argued that nuclear weapons could serve a number of purposes in peacetime and war. The debate over the interrelationship among nuclear weapons, strategy, and policy spanned the Cold War and was never fully resolved. Evaluating the evolution of nuclear strategy offers the chance to understand this debate, and to pose a series of questions about a key strategic issue, namely how coercion works. The Cold War evaluation of coercion continues to frame current discussions concerning nuclear weapons. What does it take to deter a specific action? What does it take to compel an enemy to change its behavior? What

circumstances justify the risk of nuclear brinkmanship? If coercion involves a competition in risk-taking, how can one side prevail while controlling the risks of inadvertent escalation and nuclear war?

Another dimension of the nuclear competition concerns arms control. Arms control became a theater whereby each superpower sought to improve its strategic position relative to the other. In the United States and Western Europe, arms control provoked intense political debate. The end of the Cold War and its aftermath witnessed dramatic reductions to the superpowers' nuclear arsenals.

In addition to these fundamental questions, students should analyze the second-order political effects of nuclear competition. The United States began the Cold War holding a nuclear monopoly. Some policy-makers considered preventive military action against the Soviet Union to keep it that way. Although the Soviet Union tested its first nuclear device in 1949, Washington still enjoyed many years of superiority in numbers and technology. Nonetheless, fears that an emboldened Soviet Union might engage in conventional aggression under the cover of nuclear weapons impelled U.S. strategists to devise ways to make the U.S. extended deterrent more credible. European allies shied away from some of these options—giving rise to years of tension within NATO while complicating multinational strategic decision-making.

The Soviet Union achieved rough parity after a tremendous arms buildup in the late 1960s, and during the last two decades of the Cold War each side retained the ability to absorb a first strike and deliver a devastating counterattack. Efforts to deal with these changes in the nuclear balance strained civil-military relations, affected the conduct of operations in limited wars, and put pressure on alliance diplomacy and domestic politics. In short, peacetime strategic competition involving nuclear weapons displayed many of the dynamics we associate with open war. Students should apply insights from this case study as they think critically about a world where long-term strategic competition, alliances, nuclear weapons, and war termination have taken on new urgency.

B. Essay and Discussion Questions:

1. To what extent was the Cold War a “war” as defined by Clausewitz?
2. How well did American leaders follow Sun Tzu’s injunction to understand oneself and the enemy?
3. During the Cold War, how and with what effect did the United States follow Sun Tzu’s advice to attack the enemy’s strategy?
4. Sun Tzu advised sovereigns and generals to attack an enemy’s alliances. How did Soviet leaders attack the coalition arrayed against them, and why did they fail?
5. How did economic pressures influence each superpower’s strategy?

6. Why did détente fail to bring an end to the Cold War?
7. Which superpower benefited most from détente?
8. Did the advent of nuclear weapons constitute a revolution in military affairs?
9. Did the existence of nuclear weapons make the Cold War more or less dangerous?
10. Why did the superpowers build so many nuclear weapons? Did this constitute irrational strategic behavior?
11. What role did arms control play in the Soviet-American rivalry?
12. How did the military buildups undertaken by the superpowers during the period covered by this case study contribute to the Cold War's outcome?
13. What role did American domestic politics play in driving strategic reassessment and adaptation by the United States between 1969 and 1989?
14. Did the regional wars in Korea and Vietnam strengthen or weaken the United States in the Cold War?
15. Drawing upon the strategic theories of Mahan and Corbett, evaluate the maritime strategy developed by the U.S. Navy during the 1970s and 1980s.
16. What were the strengths and weaknesses of the maritime strategy advocated by the U.S. Navy during the late 1970s and 1980s? Did the weaknesses outweigh the strengths?
17. One commentator has called NSDD-75 "the strategic plan that won the Cold War." Is that description warranted?
18. Which factor was more important in explaining the collapse of the Soviet Union: American strategy, Soviet weakness, or Soviet blunders?
19. Few strategic leaders or analysts in the East or West foresaw the collapse of the Soviet Union. Why did the Cold War's outcome come as such a surprise to them?
20. Gorbachev did not come to power intending to preside over the Soviet Union's downfall. How did his actions contribute to the Soviet collapse?
21. Some policy commentators and historians argue that Reagan's success was largely the product of his own skill. Others argue that the keys to his success were a permissive domestic and international environment, "cooperative" adversaries, and good luck. Which argument is most valid?
22. What war termination lessons can be drawn from the final phase of the Cold War?

23. Basil Liddell Hart argued that “the object in war is to attain a better peace—even if only from your point of view. Hence it is essential to conduct war with constant regard to the peace you desire.” Did U.S. strategy during the Cold War achieve and maintain a better peace from the American point of view?

24. Did either superpower devise and execute anything that qualifies as a grand strategy over the twenty-year period covered by this case study?

C. Readings:

1. Gaddis, John Lewis. *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy during the Cold War*. Revised and expanded edition. New York: Oxford University Press, 2005. Pages 272-379.

[John Lewis Gaddis, the Yale historian and former faculty member in the Strategy and Policy Department, provides an overview of the evolution of American strategy and of the different approaches to containment taken by the Nixon, Ford, Carter, and Reagan administrations.]

2. Brands, Hal. *What Good Is Grand Strategy? Power and Purpose in American Statecraft from Harry S. Truman to George W. Bush*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2014. Pages 59-143.

[This study examines American grand strategy during the 1970s and 1980s. Brands defines grand strategy as “the conceptual framework that helps nations determine where they want to go and how they ought to get there; it is the *theory or logic that guides leaders seeking security in a complex and insecure world*” (page 3, emphasis in the original). He underscores the difficulties facing American leaders as they sought to formulate and execute a coherent strategy amid shifts in the domestic and international environments.]

3. Kissinger, Henry. *Diplomacy*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994. Pages 703-761.

[In this account, Kissinger answers critics by offering a spirited defense of the statecraft of the Nixon and Ford administrations, which pursued a grand strategy that included détente with the Soviet Union and an opening to Communist China. The actions of Nixon and Kissinger were and remain controversial. Kissinger gives considerable attention to the domestic political attacks aimed at them for their handling of foreign policy. In examining the interrelationship between the domestic and international environments, Kissinger offers insights into the making of foreign policy and the execution of strategy.]

4. Zubok, Vladislav M. *A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2008. Pages 192-335.

[Zubok offers an overview of Soviet strategy from the mid-1960s through the 1980s, giving special attention to the impact of leaders' personalities and priorities on policy and strategic decision-making. Students should compare the American views of the Cold War examined in the Gaddis and Brands readings to Soviet conceptions of alliance diplomacy, economic policy, and nuclear strategy.]

5. Freedman, Lawrence. "The First Two Generations of Nuclear Strategists," in Peter Paret, ed., *Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986. Pages 735-778.

[Freedman reviews how strategic thought about the uses and limits of nuclear weapons evolved during the Cold War.]

6. Wohlstetter, Albert. "The Delicate Balance of Terror," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 37, no. 2 (January 1959). Pages 211-234.

<http://eds.a.ebscohost.com/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?sid=8dc23f56-c269-4da0-8f79-caca0d2138e8%40sessionmgr4001&vid=3&hid=4103>

[This classic study examines the problems of surprise nuclear attack and the survival of a deterrent force in the face of an adversary that possesses long-range strike capabilities. Henry Kissinger has written: "Wohlstetter's article did for strategic analysis what Kennan's "X" article had achieved for political analysis" (*Diplomacy*, p. 715). Wohlstetter helped shape decisions about force structure, doctrine, and strategy during the Cold War, and remains relevant for understanding today's international strategic environment.]

7. Heuser, Beatrice. "Victory in a Nuclear War? A Comparison of NATO and WTO War Aims and Strategies," *Contemporary European History*, vol. 7, part 3 (November 1998). Pages 311-328. (Selected Readings)

[Heuser compares and contrasts the policies and strategies employed by NATO and the Warsaw Pact during the Cold War. In particular, she contrasts the development of nuclear strategy within the two alliances.]

8. Friedberg, Aaron L. *In the Shadow of the Garrison State: America's Anti-Statism and Its Cold War Grand Strategy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000. Chapter 3. (Selected Readings)

[Friedberg examines how the United States and the Soviet Union sought to manage the "guns versus butter" tradeoff while developing their defense postures in the Cold War, and explains why they arrived at very different answers.]

9. *National Security Decision Directive 32*, "U.S. National Security Strategy," May 20, 1982. (Selected Readings)

[NSDD-32 was the Reagan administration’s classified national security strategy. Notably, in 1986 the National Security Council staff conducted a review of the document with an eye toward revising it, but found that it remained fundamentally sound.]

10. *National Security Decision Directive 75*, “U.S. Relations with the U.S.S.R.,” January 17, 1983. (Selected Readings)

[NSDD-75 outlined U.S. strategy towards the Soviet Union in the last decade of the Cold War. The document offers a series of steps geared towards “Maximizing Restraining Leverage over Soviet Behaviors.” Students should consider what that phrase means, whether the steps described in NSDD-75 were necessary to achieve it, and whether the document offered a practical strategy-policy match.]

11. Gaidar, Yegor. “The Soviet Collapse: Grain and Oil,” American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research (April 2007).

http://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/20070419_Gaidar.pdf

[Gaidar provides an insider’s account and astute analysis of the relationship between economic policies and strategic outcomes. According to him, the Soviet collapse was in large part “a story about grain and oil” that began with flawed agricultural policies in the 1920s and ended with the collapse of oil prices in the 1980s.]

12. Aron, Leon. “Everything You Think You Know About the Collapse of the Soviet Union Is Wrong: And Why It Matters Today in a New Age of Revolution,” *Foreign Policy*, July/August 2011. Pages 1-11.

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/06/20/everything_you_think_you_know_about_the_collapse_of_the_soviet_union_is_wrong

[Aron offers an alternative explanation for the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. Unlike the previous article by Yegor Gaidar, who places great emphasis on economic factors, Aron argues that Gorbachev’s reforms unintentionally unleashed an ideological and cultural crisis that triggered the collapse of the Soviet Union.]

13. Huntington, Samuel P. “National Policy and the Transoceanic Navy,” *United States Naval Institute Proceedings*, vol. 80, no. 5 (May 1954). Pages 483-493.

<http://blog.usni.org/2009/03/09/from-our-archive-national-policy-and-the-transoceanic-navy-by-samuel-p-huntington>

[Huntington wrote this classic statement about the role that the United States Navy could play in the Cold War. He highlighted the importance to the Navy of developing and communicating a coherent strategy. He warned: “If a service does not possess a well-defined strategic concept, the public and political leaders will be confused as to the role of the service.” Those words remain as relevant today as they were when Huntington wrote them.]

14. Baer, George W. *One Hundred Years of Sea Power: The U.S. Navy, 1890-1990*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994. Pages 394-444.

[Baer examines the evolution of American naval strategy during the 1970s and 1980s.]

15. Hattendorf, John B., and Peter M. Swartz, eds. *U.S. Naval Strategy in the 1980s: Selected Documents*. Naval War College Newport Papers, no. 33. Newport: Naval War College Press, 2008. Pages 45-104.

<https://www.usnwc.edu/Publications/Naval-War-College-Press/-Newport-Papers/Documents/33-pdf.aspx>

[This compendium of documents presents the Navy's maritime strategy for waging a conventional global war against the Soviet Union.]

D. Learning Outcomes: The Decline and Fall of the Soviet Superpower case study uses the Strategy and Policy framework to explore a decades-long superpower confrontation, as well as crises and regional wars nested within that conflict. The Soviet Union and the United States had fundamentally different ideas about how to build and sustain the economic foundations of superpower status. Those differences explained much about the course and outcome of the conflict. The Cold War was also a story of dueling alliances, a theme that resonates with other cases but that takes on special importance here because of the presence of large nuclear arsenals on each side. This case study supports:

- CJCS Joint Learning Areas and Objectives (JPME II) 1a, 1b, 1d, 1e, 2c, 2f, 3c, 3d, 5a, and 5b. Emphasis will be placed on the following topics, enabling students to:
 - Apply key strategic concepts, critical thinking, and analytical frameworks to formulate and execute strategy (1a).
 - Analyze the integration of all instruments of national power in complex, dynamic, and ambiguous environments to attain objectives at the national and theater-strategic levels (1b).
 - Apply strategic security policies, strategies, and guidance used in developing plans across the range of military operations and domains to support national objectives (1d).
 - Evaluate how the capabilities and limitations of U.S. Force structure affect the development and implementation of security, defense, and military strategies (1e).
 - Apply an analytical framework that addresses the factors politics, geography, society, culture, and religion play in shaping the desired outcomes of policies, strategies, and campaigns (2c).
 - Evaluate key classical, contemporary, and emerging concepts, including IO and cyber space operations, doctrine, and traditional/irregular approaches to war (2f).
 - Evaluate the integration of joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational capabilities, including all Service and Special Operations Forces, in campaigns across the range of military operations in achieving strategic objectives (3c).

- Value a joint perspective and appreciate the increased power available to commanders through joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational efforts (3d).
- Evaluate the skills, character attributes, and behaviors needed to lead in a dynamic joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational strategic environment (5a).
- Evaluate critical strategic thinking, decision-making, and communication by strategic leaders (5b).

XII. SECURITY AND STABILITY IN THE GULF, 1979-2003—UNCONVENTIONAL CHALLENGES, LIMITED WAR, CONTAINMENT, AND REGIME CHANGE

A. General: The transition from the global Cold War to a succession of regional wars allows students to evaluate the differences and the difficulties of matching theater strategy to national policy during a period of remarkable change. Though many may be familiar with the U.S. policy concept of “security and stability” from the first Gulf War, this broadly-stated objective framed U.S. perspectives on the region for at least two decades prior to Operation DESERT STORM in January 1991. Moreover, a careful study of the evolution and re-articulation of this policy over nearly 25 years provides critical insight into the various strategies that the United States pursued in dealing with regional allies and rivals. Different definitions of security and stability called for different strategic solutions, from judicious restraint, diplomatic balancing, and demonstrative raids, to containment, large-scale limited war, and even regime change. The reading materials for this case and the lectures offer a comprehensive look at the often imperfect formulation and articulation of policy objectives made by U.S. and other actors in the context of an especially dynamic security environment.

Over the span of this mere quarter-century, inhabitants of the Middle East experienced the Islamic Revolution in Iran, the bloody Iran-Iraq War, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the sudden and unforeseen end of the Cold War (and its spillover effects for Soviet and non-Soviet client governments), the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, and the decisive intervention of the United States and the international community in the aftermath of 9/11 which removed Saddam Hussein and the Baathist regime. Although not all of these events are covered in equal depth in this case, their impact is both explicit and implicit in the environment of strategy-making. Indeed, the collective impact of these events solidified an ongoing quest for security and stability that remains present in current U.S. decision-making and informs the cases that follow in this course.

Five general discussion topics offer an analytic structure for looking at this period in a tumultuous region: the dialogue between strategy and grand strategy; the integration of all instruments of national power; the challenges of contemporary multi-national coalitions; civil-military relations and effective command and control; as well as the limitation of weapons of mass destruction through a regional containment policy aimed at a post-Cold War regime.

As a concept, strategy offers a theory of victory. It explains how a state can translate military operations into political objectives. Grand strategy, on the other hand, offers a broader theory of security by explaining how a state seeks to use diplomacy, soft power, international law, brute force, and coercion to secure its national interests in war or in peace. However, it is clear that these concepts do not always align perfectly. A state may implement an excellent strategy in the service of a fundamentally flawed grand strategy. Conversely, a state may forfeit a perfectly reasonable grand strategy through poor wartime decisions. This case explores the bridge between strategy and grand strategy through the lens of U.S. interaction in the Persian Gulf region since 1979 when the United States sought to implement a policy of “security and stability in the Persian Gulf.”¹⁰

¹⁰ United States. National Security Council. *National Security Directive-54*. Bush Administration. January 15, 1991.

This case study also offers the chance to ask what the phrase “using all instruments of national power” really means, not only for the United States, but for its international partners and rivals. The readings remind us that there have been dramatic shifts in political objectives toward the region and in the articulation of political objectives across a broad range of military operations. For example, the Iranian hostage crisis of 1979-1980 and the Iranian Revolution led the United States to “tilt” toward Baghdad in the early 1980s. U.S. leaders were confronted with a revolutionary ideology led by extreme political actors, state-sponsored terrorism, and multiple asymmetric challenges in both land and maritime domains. During the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988), the United States pursued a variety of diplomatic and military approaches to manage an anti-access problem and ensure the free flow of oil to international markets, while attempting to contain the bloodshed between Iraq and Iran. It also made extensive use of naval and special operations forces during the Tanker Wars (1988), which remains the largest surface action for the U.S. Navy since World War II. Finally, it confronted a host of problems while trying to create a new regional command to coordinate these actions. The effort to organize U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) under the pressures of regional dynamics resonates with similar institutional challenges today.

While U.S. interactions with Iran provide necessary context for this case, an equally important element for understanding the period centers on the escalating U.S. confrontations with Iraq from 1990 to 2003, culminating in the invasion of Iraq and the stirrings of an insurgency amidst the rubble of Saddam Hussein’s regime. The intense interaction between the United States and Iraq over this 13-year period allows students to examine the strengths and weaknesses of U.S. efforts to plan, wage, and terminate both a limited and an unlimited war within a larger grand strategy. Detailed readings on the U.S. planning efforts in 1990-91 and 2002-03 also allow students to compare civil-military relations during these two periods. The readings highlight the value and problems of coalition management in a variety of contexts, as well as the utility and limits of multilateral sanctions and international enforcement of war settlements. This case allows a close examination of strategy during a period of technological innovation, which provided the context for intense debates about the benefits of jointness and broad governmental approaches to traditional military problems. Altogether, these frameworks vividly illustrate the significant challenges that exist within the consolidated acronym of “Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational” (JIIM) environments.

Finally, this case takes a close look at the national security policy of “dual containment” of Iraq and Iran during the 1990s, and offers an excellent opportunity to analyze and evaluate U.S. policy and in order to suggest possible alternatives. The United States considered both Iran and Iraq as threats to regional security and stability. However, U.S. leaders undertook very different approaches to managing each adversary. Officials were particularly concerned with the spread of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, and they employed multilateral diplomacy, economic sanctions, military threats, and the use of force in order to forestall proliferation. Iraq was the main target of these efforts, and the decision to wage a war fought for unlimited aims in 2003 was based at least in part on the belief that Saddam Hussein would never willingly disarm. Post-war intelligence, however, revealed that Saddam’s calculations and efforts at concealment were strongly influenced by his net assessments of Iran. As a result, it is practically impossible to understand the results of the sanctions and inspections regime without considering Iraq’s regional concerns and to some degree, its own grand strategy. In sum, it is very difficult to

understand either Iraqi or Iranian grand strategy or U.S. responses to regional events during this timeframe without opening the aperture to consider the intersection of regional and foreign policies, ideological and cultural frames, energy security, other instruments of war, and the way in which these variables shaped the political and economic conditions of the region over a quarter of a century. These same factors permit a discussion assessing the strategic role of ethical considerations, as well as the interaction between domestic and coalition political landscapes.

As the first post-Goldwater-Nichols case, and one which continues to resonate in present-day circumstances, this case also begins the course's shift to a capstone critical analysis of areas of personal, rather than historical, familiarity. This case launches the beginning of a multi-part assessment of students' maturing abilities to understand the strategic context and adapt to uncertainty in their post-JPME assignments.

B. Essay and Discussion Questions:

1. Clausewitz asserts: "The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish by that test the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature." How effectively did U.S. leaders abide by Clausewitz's dictum in 1990 and in 2003?

2. Was the United States effective in achieving "security and stability in the Persian Gulf" from 1979 to 2003? Why or why not?

3. What strategic advice about alliances would Bismarck have offered to U.S. policymakers during the period of the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988)?

4. How well did the United States integrate all instruments of national power to cope with the challenge of terrorism and asymmetric force from Iran in this period?

5. How well did Iran and Iraq use outside powers in their confrontation with each other and in their pursuit of regional preeminence? Which country did a better job cultivating foreign states?

6. Would Iraqi possession of nuclear weapons during any period between the years 1990 and 2003 have fundamentally changed U.S. strategy in the region? If so, how and why? If not, why not?

7. Considering the U.S. experience in Iraq in 1990-1991, analyze the political and military conditions necessary to achieve a quick, decisive victory.

8. Was dual containment a viable strategy? Why or why not?

9. It is often argued that, in the contest with Saddam Hussein's Iraq, the United States won the war but lost the peace. Do you agree? Why or why not?

10. What key differences can be found between U.S. civil-military dialogues that took place in the Korean War and those that took place during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) in 2002-2003?

11. NSD-54, President Clinton's "DESERT FOX" speech, and President Bush's "OIF" speech all attempted to articulate policy. Which provided the best guidance for strategists?

12. Drawing on the experience of the United States in Iraq and in Vietnam, what are the key strategic differences between fighting a conflict during the Cold War and fighting one in the post-Cold War period?

13. How did the U.S. experience in coalition-building during the Cold War conflict in Vietnam differ from the process of coalition-building in the post-Cold War conflict in Iraq in 1990-91?

14. Sun Tzu says that knowing oneself and the enemy is the key to success. How well did the United States know Saddam Hussein's Iraq as an enemy, and how did that assessment affect coalition success or failure?

15. Was U.S. strategy in Iraq during the summer of 2003 consistent with its broader grand strategy in the Persian Gulf at the time? What course of action(s) might have been a viable alternative?

C. Readings:

1. Palmer, Michael A. *On Course to Desert Storm: The United States Navy and the Persian Gulf*. Washington, DC: Naval Historical Center, 1992. Pages 89-134. (Selected Readings)

[This reading details the debate about the appropriate U.S. policy aims for the region, and how best to pursue U.S. interests starting in 1979. It culminates with a discussion of the Tanker Wars and details U.S. efforts to use force to achieve policy goals.]

2. Pollack, Kenneth M. *The Persian Puzzle: The Conflict Between Iran and America*. New York: Random House, 2005. Pages 181-302, 343-369.

[In addition to providing a multi-faceted account of the Iran-Iraq war and U.S. intervention, this reading helps establish the strategic currents which still characterize Iranian foreign policy today. The second section details the effect of the U.S. "dual containment" policy in the 1990s and Iran's various asymmetric challenges to the United States. Finally, the third section covers U.S. interaction with Iran after 9/11 and ends with the revelations about Iran's clandestine nuclear program in 2002.]

3. Gordon, Michael R., and Bernard E. Trainor. *The Generals' War: The Inside Story of the Conflict in the Gulf*. Boston: Little, Brown, 1995. Pages 75-101, 123-158, 408-432, 438-461.

[This reading about Operation DESERT STORM in 1991 provides an opportunity to assess: civil-military relations and the national command structure; inter-service cooperation and rivalry in war planning and execution; the various strategic alternatives open to decision makers; the strengths and limitations of the touted high-tech Revolution of Military Affairs (RMA) pioneered by the American armed forces; the limits of intelligence in piercing the fog of war; the formation of joint doctrine and planning after the Goldwater-Nichols Act; and war termination.]

4. Bush, George and Brent Scowcroft. *A World Transformed*. New York: Knopf, 1998. Pages 450-492.

[President George Bush and his national security advisor, Brent Scowcroft, wrote an illuminating account of foreign policy decision-making during their time in office. Portions of their account rely on a revealing diary kept by President Bush. The sections of this book dealing with the execution of Operation DESERT STORM are especially good for understanding American policy aims in the war, the politics of coalition management, the influence of domestic political considerations on strategy, the crafting of a coordinated information campaign, the president's role as Commander-in-Chief, and the importance of society, culture, and religion in formulating strategy and policy.]

5. *National Security Directive-54* (January 15, 1991). (Selected Readings)

[This declassified document lays out the primary and secondary objectives of the United States in Operation DESERT STORM.]

6. Sick, Gary. "Rethinking Dual Containment," *Survival* 40, no. 1 (Spring 1998). Pages 5-32.

<http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/00396338.1998.9688522?&userIP=198.7.238.40&>

[Writing during the Clinton Administration, Sick assessed the logic of dual containment, which weakened both Iraq and Iran but eroded international support for the United States. He also examines the reasons for positive changes in Iran in the late 1990s.]

7. Clawson, Patrick. "The Continuing Logic of Dual Containment," *Survival* 40, no. 1 (Spring 1998). Pages 33-47.

<http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1093/survival/40.1.33?&userIP=198.7.238.40>

[Clawson responds to Gary Sick's critique, arguing that dual containment represented the most cost-effective means for achieving regime change in Iraq and political transformation in Iran.]

8. Woods, Kevin M. and Mark E. Stout. "Saddam's Perceptions and Misperceptions: The Case of 'Desert Storm'," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 33, no. 1 (February 2011). Pages 5-41.

<http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01402391003603433>

[This reading draws upon the wealth of captured documents and interviews with former-regime members that form the "Iraqi Perspectives Project." In particular, it provides a useful look at Saddam Hussein's "lessons learned" from the 1991 Gulf War to paint a more complete picture of the period between 1991 and 2003.]

9. Clinton, William Jefferson. "Address to the Nation," December 16, 1998. (Selected Readings)

[President Clinton delivered this speech on the opening night of the DESERT FOX bombing operations. It should be analyzed both as an act of strategic communication and an attempt to articulate a coherent policy-strategy match.]

10. Bush, George W. "Freedom and the Future," Speech at the annual dinner of the American Enterprise Institute, February 26, 2003. (Selected Readings)

[This speech, given shortly before the initiation of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, provides the President's vision of U.S. war aims in 2003.]

11. Gordon, Michael R. and Bernard E. Trainor. *Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq*. New York: Pantheon Books, 2006. Pages 38-54, 62-74.

[Gordon and Trainor's second book on U.S. military efforts in Iraq replicates the rich array of topics covered in *The General's War* and allows a comparison of such key issues as civil-military relations, war planning, and inter-service cooperation and rivalry. The selection covers the evolution of U.S. planning and decision-making leading to the start of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM.]

12. Woods, Kevin A., with Michael R. Pease, Mark E. Stout, Williamson Murray, and James G. Lacey. *Iraqi Perspectives Project: A View of Operation Iraqi Freedom from Saddam's Senior Leadership*. Washington, DC: Institute for Defense Analyses, 2006. Pages 123-150. (Selected Readings)

[This reading adds to the narrative of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM by analyzing the war from the Iraqi government's perspective. Based on interviews with leading survivors of the Baathist government, this is an invaluable look into the last days of Saddam's rule and the total collapse of Iraqi political and military organization. It is particularly useful for understanding how interaction played a central role in the campaign's outcome.]

13. Iraq Survey Group Report. "Regime Strategic Intent," Washington, D.C.: GPO, 2004. Pages 1, 5-26, 28-36, 41-68. (Selected Readings)

[These excerpts are drawn from the final report of the Iraq Survey Group, a comprehensive post-invasion, interagency effort to account for Iraqi WMD programs and the intelligence surrounding pre-war estimates. It is particularly useful for its clinical look at the state of residual capabilities, as well its conjecture about Saddam Hussein's strategic motives.]

14. Duffield, John S. "Oil and the Decision to Invade Iraq," in Jane K. Cramer and A. Trevor Thrall, eds. *Why Did the U.S. Invade Iraq* (London: Routledge Press, 2012.) Pages 145-163. (Selected Readings)

[The role of oil in the U.S. decision to attack Iraq in 2003 remains one of the most controversial topics in U.S. or even international politics. This reading offers a balanced assessment of how oil (or, more broadly, consideration of U.S. energy security) may have influenced U.S. strategy in the Gulf without necessarily having played a significant role in the decision to invade Iraq in 2003. Furthermore, it sketches out how the defense of U.S. energy security interests might have complemented Washington's objectives in the concurrent war against Al Qaeda.]

15. Painter, David S. "From the Nixon Doctrine to the Carter Doctrine: Iran and the Geopolitics of Oil in the 1970s," in Robert Lifset, ed. *American Energy Policy in the 1970s*. (University of Oklahoma Press, 2014) Pages 61-92. (Selected Readings)

[This reading illustrates how the United States came to develop the Carter Doctrine in 1979 which remains the basis of U.S. energy security policy in the Gulf to this day. Since the Second World War, the United States sought to guarantee access to Gulf oil *without* a massive military commitment to the region. Following Britain's withdrawal from "East of Suez" in 1971, the Nixon Administration hoped that the "twin pillars" of Iran and Saudi Arabia could reconcile and undertake the defense of the Gulf backed by U.S. arms. The failure of détente and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 seemed to prefigure a renewed communist drive into the Gulf, while the collapse of the Pahlavi dynasty in 1979 and its replacement by an anti-American clerical regime revealed that there were very limited options for the United States to take a direct role in the promotion of peace, stability, and freedom of commerce in the Gulf.]

16. Telhami, Shibley. "The Arab Dimension of Saddam Hussein's Calculations: What We Learned from Iraqi Records," in Jeffery Engel, ed. *Into the Desert: Reflections on the Gulf War*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2012. Pages 148-179. (Selected Readings)

[This article assesses Saddam Hussein's worldview before and after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990. It offers an important counterargument to prevalent analysis about the period: that Saddam Hussein's actions were driven by his misperception of Arab politics and public opinion, not by his misreading of American and international signals. The article draws on primary sources to explain the perceptions of regional states during the first Palestinian Uprising (*Intifada*) and their contribution to Saddam's misreading of the Arab polity. It concludes by considering the potential implications of the events of 1990-1991 to the Arab Spring.]

17. Haass, Richard N. "The Gulf War: Its Place in History," in Jeffery Engel, ed. *Into the Desert: Reflections on the Gulf War*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2012. Pages 57-83. (Selected Readings)

[The author, who took part in the formulation of U.S. policy during this period, argues that the 1991 Gulf War provided an important strategic and diplomatic opening for many of the intractable issues that still plague the region today. While this article is part counterfactual and part retrospective, it offers a thoughtful consideration of what could have been accomplished in the aftermath of the 1990-91 conflict. It also draws interesting analogies with other cases in the course.]

D. Learning Outcomes: This case study begins the transition to the capstone phase of the course by transitioning from historical to near present-day contexts. It also adopts a deep regional focus to allow students to apply the theories, themes, and frameworks examined throughout the course in order to assess how the United States and its coalition partners coped with an evolving set of challenges, from both Iraq and Iran to the core U.S. national security interest of “security and stability in the Persian Gulf.” This case study supports:

- CJCS Joint Learning Areas and Objectives (JPME II) 1a, 1b, 1c, 1e, 2a, 2b, 2c, 2e, 3c, 5a, 5b, 5c, and 5g. Emphasis will be placed on the following topics, enabling students to:
 - Apply key strategic concepts, critical thinking, and analytical frameworks to formulate and execute strategy (1a).
 - Analyze the integration of all instruments of national power in complex, dynamic, and ambiguous environments to attain objectives at the national and theater-strategic levels (1b).
 - Evaluate historical and/or contemporary security environments and applications of strategies across the range of military operations (1c).
 - Evaluate how the capabilities and limitations of the U.S. Force structure affect the development and implementation of security, defense, and military strategies (1e).
 - Evaluate the principles of joint operations, joint military doctrine, joint functions (command and control, intelligence, fires, movement and maneuver, protection and sustainment), and emerging concepts across the range of military operations (2a).
 - Evaluate how theater strategies, campaigns, and major operations achieve national strategic goals across the range of military operations (2b).
 - Apply an analytical framework that addresses the factors politics, geography, society, culture, and religion play in shaping the desired outcomes of policies, strategies, and campaigns (2c).
 - Evaluate how strategic level plans anticipate and respond to surprise, uncertainty, and emerging conditions (2e).
 - Evaluate the integration of joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational capabilities, including all Service and Special Operations Forces, in campaigns across the range of military operations in achieving strategic objectives (3c).
 - Evaluate the skills, character attributes, and behaviors needed to lead in a dynamic joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational strategic environment (5a).
 - Evaluate critical strategic thinking, decision-making, and communication by strategic leaders (5b).

- Evaluate historic and contemporary applications of the elements of mission command by strategic-level leaders in pursuit of national objectives (5e).
- Evaluate how strategic leaders establish and sustain an ethical climate among joint and combined forces, and develop/preserve public trust with their domestic citizenry (5g).

XIII. THE WAR ON AL QAEDA—ASYMMETRIC, MULTI-FRONT, COALITION CONFLICT

A. General: Strategy and Policy is not a history course. As noted at the outset, it is a course in critical strategic thinking, fostered by applied historical analysis. This week's case marks the firm transition from "closed" historical cases, used to hone habits of strategic analysis, to "open" and unfinished contemporary cases chosen precisely because hindsight is impossible and key data may be missing. Along with the contemporary case that precedes it and the prospective one to follow, this case study continues building the capstone phase of the course, creating both a test and transition since strategy made in the real world is, after all, always "contemporary" requiring practitioners to cope with a great deal of uncertainty and fragmentary evidence. It is best that this transition begins before graduation, with a classroom of colleagues testing newly-forged habits of thought. It is fitting that the topic should be such a complex and central one for the United States.

It would seem that each generation has its own defining conflict which shapes the national character, goals, and strategic thinking of all those involved. Today, for the student body of the Naval War College, that conflict is seen as the war that began on September 11, 2001, with Al Qaeda's attacks on the U.S. homeland known today as the "9/11 attacks." The immediate U.S. reaction to the 9/11 attacks took place in October 2001. Dubbed Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF), the United States sought to disrupt Al Qaeda's leadership and to destroy the organization and infrastructure it had built in safe areas provided by Taliban-run Afghanistan. Using a hybrid combination of U.S. Special Forces, CIA paramilitary forces, and air power, the U.S.-backed Northern Alliance quickly gained the upper hand over the enemy. By December of that year, Al Qaeda had mostly fled Afghanistan, seeking refuge in neighboring Pakistan where it sought to reconstitute and adapt in lesser-governed areas. The few resulting years of relative stability in Afghanistan allowed for the United Nations Security Council to establish the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to assist Afghan interim authorities secure their country. NATO became involved in OEF in August 2003, assuming leadership of ISAF later that year. Meanwhile, the Taliban sought to recover and adapt, readying themselves for a concerted push to regain power in later years.

Determined to be proactive in removing threats to the United States before they manifested themselves in more attacks against the U.S. homeland, the United States launched a preventative war against Iraq to remove Saddam Hussein from power and prevent the proliferation or use weapons of mass destruction reportedly in his arsenal. To that end, the United States commenced Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) in March 2003. Within three weeks, the U.S.-led ground invasion succeeded in removing Hussein from power. However, other actors soon moved into the resultant power vacuum to contest control. One of these actors was Abu Musab al Zarqawi, who built an organization that soon received Al Qaeda senior leadership's official imprimatur as "Al Qaeda in Iraq."

The result was a complex array of factional fighting which mixed elements of a vicious ethno-sectarian civil war with an anti-U.S. insurgency. Faced with mounting chaos by mid-2006, U.S. leadership decided to "surge" additional combat forces to Iraq to defeat the insurgency which, by then, consisted of significant Al Qaeda elements. Although the

effectiveness of this reassessment and adaptation is a subject of debate, the fact remains that, by 2009, violence within Iraq had indeed declined. By 2011, Iraq had conducted several internationally recognized elections which provided the foundation for President Obama to withdraw all U.S. forces from Iraq. Events which have unfolded since—namely, the rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, or ISIL (referred to in other venues as the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, or ISIS)—raise the question whether the withdrawal of U.S. forces was a wise decision in light of Clausewitz’s dictum that “the results of war are never final.” Further analysis explores whether external events like the “Arab Spring” and the collapse of Syria have overwhelmed the fragile gains of 2011. Either way, today limited U.S. forces are back in Iraq supporting the Iraqi government and army in their battle against ISIL under the name Operation INHERENT RESOLVE, while grappling with how to confront ISIL in Syria.

At the same time the 2011 drawdown within Iraq was occurring, the security situation in Afghanistan, which had become a secondary effort when OIF was launched, had similarly deteriorated. The gains of late 2001-2003 eroded over time as the Taliban waged a protracted insurgency against the nascent Afghan government and its allies, including the United States. By 2006, the Taliban had reestablished themselves as an insurgent power against a struggling Afghan government and army. As in Iraq, a U.S. reassessment of the situation resulted in a 2010 “surge” of combat forces to Afghanistan to regain the initiative from the enemy and ultimately enable the Afghans to defeat the Taliban and provide for their own national security. As we study this case, the final word on this conflict—and U.S. participation in it—remains undecided. Although NATO formally ended its involvement in December 2014, the fight between combined Afghan-U.S. forces and the Taliban continues today under the name Operation FREEDOM’S SENTINEL.

Understanding this conflict and forming well-grounded assessments about its future requires a deep appreciation of the “war of ideas,” and of the interaction and adaptation course theme. Al Qaeda leaders, such as Osama Bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri, and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, were united in their desire to attack and bleed the United States and its allies. But they differed substantially in their visions as to the best combination of ways and means to achieve those ends. Likewise, the United States and its allies, caught unaware by the scale and magnitude of the ever-changing Jihadist threat, have struggled to balance strategic and operational demands across multiple theaters of war. Within the American leadership, reassessments of U.S. policy and strategy by Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama, as well as military leaders such as General David Petraeus, seemingly gained the United States and its allies the advantage, even as the threat against them grew and splintered into multiple challenges across the Middle East and North Africa.

At the same time, this case also requires a deep commitment to net assessment in order to understand the core phenomena of terrorism, and to keep regional theaters in an appropriate context. In theory, terrorism involves the use or threat of violence against civilians to achieve a political objective. In practice, it can be used to support a variety of strategic goals. Since its formation in the 1990s, Al Qaeda has attempted to use spectacular violence in order to achieve expansive aims. It sought to eject U.S. and Western military forces from the Middle East and South Asia. It also sought to topple secular governments in the Muslim world and replace them with regimes adhering to its particular austere brand of religious rule. Key Al Qaeda leaders also

claim that the ultimate goal is the establishment of a supranational caliphate, which would radically reshape the international system. In response, the United States has vastly expanded the scope and intensity of its counterterrorism efforts, consolidated a hodgepodge of federal agencies into the Department of Homeland Security, and increased the scope and pace of intelligence and law enforcement operations. It has also waged two regional wars within the broader framework of the war on terrorism.

In some respects, this war appears different from other conflicts against non-state actors that we have studied in this course. Al Qaeda seems unique. Despite its relatively small size, and the fact that its views are deeply unpopular throughout the Muslim world, it has executed outsized attacks and generated an unusual amount of international attention. In addition, measuring progress against Al Qaeda is particularly difficult because of the basic disparities between the two main combatants: one a superpower nation-state with a huge defense bureaucracy and unparalleled military capabilities; the other a transnational terrorist group with minimal military capabilities and an elastic organizational structure. Indeed, the peculiarity of the conflict has led some analysts to conclude that traditional strategic theory is irrelevant for such a war. This week we investigate that claim. Is the war on Al Qaeda so different that it requires new thinking and a new lexicon, or do classic strategic concepts still apply?

Three topics help frame the debate. The first has to do with the nature of the enemy. How is Al Qaeda different from, or similar to, past non-state actors? And who, exactly, is the enemy? Some analysts focus on the descendants of the original Al Qaeda organization to argue that the United States should concentrate on this group. Others argue that the threat has morphed into something much broader in the period covered by this case, and should now be thought of as Al Qaeda and Associated Movements (AQAM). The emergence of the so-called “Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant” (ISIL) raises the specter of a separate, but ideologically related, enemy with even more complex terrain for the continued conflict. The nature of the enemy remains an open question. Terrorism scholars continue to debate whether it is more useful to think of Al Qaeda as a small organization mostly concentrated along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border or a sprawling transnational network of loosely affiliated movements with ambiguous ties to many other ideologically similar foes. Much depends on the answer. Strategic options for dealing with a small and territorially contained adversary are far different from options for dealing with a shifting constellation of far-flung groups all claiming to be part of the same ideological movement. Although the rise of ISIL and the most recent events of this conflict range beyond the boundaries of this case study, which is anchored around the death of Osama Bin Laden, a disciplined look at these questions provide a solid foundation for continued thought and discussion afterwards.

The second topic deals with the nature of the war. Over the last decade, the United States has waged both conventional campaigns and counterinsurgencies; it has stepped up assistance to others’ counterterrorism operations; it has changed its own procedures for domestic law enforcement; it has expanded the scope and character of intelligence collection; and it has launched a number of strategic communications efforts designed to win the so-called “war of ideas.” All of these disparate activities have fallen under the umbrella of the fight against Al Qaeda. So, is this conflict a war in the traditional sense? Should we mainly focus on the classic question of how to link military operations to achieve policy objectives? Or is it mostly a mix of

law enforcement, intelligence, foreign assistance, and strategic communications? Again, the answer to this question has important implications for strategy. If we view the conflict in military terms, we may be able to apply the tools developed in this course to tailor the use of force against the enemy's center of gravity. We might also have an easier time locating the culminating point of victory. On the other hand, many have argued that "militarizing" the conflict has distorted our approach.

The final topic has to do with war termination. Al Qaeda espouses grandiose goals, and the United States has unlimited objectives against it. As President Bush declared shortly after the September 11 attacks, "Our war on terror begins with Al Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped, and defeated." President Obama, for his part, has shown no desire to negotiate with Al Qaeda. The problem is that the amorphous nature of Al Qaeda will make it difficult to know when the enemy is actually destroyed. Extremists anywhere may claim that they are associated with Al Qaeda, whether or not they have any relationship to Al Qaeda leaders in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Alternatively, Al Qaeda may be succeeded by ISIL as an equally virulent ideological challenger, perhaps leaving the United States with one atrophying foe among many, but with a war that still wends on under newer terms. U.S. strategists then face a difficult choice: whether to expand the war to deal with upstart terrorists claiming the Al Qaeda mantle, or ignore them.

The death of Osama Bin Laden and the decisions to end U.S. efforts in Iraq and scale down operations in Afghanistan all offer chances to assess the state of the war on Al Qaeda. Classic strategic questions about the nature of the enemy, the nature of the war, and war termination are important in making this assessment. The readings this week are designed to provide a diverse foundation for these conversations by providing a wide range of primary source documents, as well as a global historical overview and a deep regional focus on Afghanistan and Pakistan.

B. Discussion Questions:

1. Clausewitz stresses that the primary task of statesmen and commanders is to understand the nature of the war in which they are engaging. What strategic implications derive from an assessment of the nature of this war and how it has changed over time?
2. Sun Tzu stresses the importance of understanding yourself and the enemy. Who has better fulfilled that prescription—America's strategic leaders or Al Qaeda's?
3. Have American strategic leaders either underrated or overrated the "value of the object" in the war against Al Qaeda?
4. Both Al Qaeda and American strategic leaders have articulated multiple layers of policy goals, some of them quite ambitious. What political outcomes can either side realistically or rationally achieve in their war against each other?

5. How does Al Qaeda differ from other armed groups engaged in irregular warfare that you have studied in this course? What are the implications of such differences for applying strategic lessons from past cases to the ongoing war?
6. How, why, and with what implications has Al Qaeda's strategy changed since the 9/11 attacks?
7. Which belligerent—the United States or Al Qaeda—has done a better job of mastering interaction, adaptation, and reassessment?
8. Has either the United States or Al Qaeda achieved significant strategic benefit from opening new theaters? Are the strategic logic and value of these moves substantially similar to, or different from, other instances studied in this course?
9. In some of the wars we have studied in this course, the winning side was victorious because it had a good strategy and executed it well. In other wars, the outcome was largely determined by the propensity of the losing side to defeat itself. In the war between the United States and Al Qaeda, which side has shown the most strategically significant propensity for self-defeating behavior? What insights, if any, would you draw from other cases covered in this course?
10. Sun Tzu advised that the best way to win a war is to attack the enemy's strategy. How, and to what extent, does that insight apply to the war between Al Qaeda and the U.S.-led alliance?
11. Sun Tzu advised that the second best way to win is to attack enemy alliances. How, and to what extent, does that insight apply to the war between Al Qaeda and the U.S.-led alliance?
12. Previous case studies highlight the importance of coalition cohesion for success in large, protracted wars. Both the United States and Al Qaeda have tried to piece together multinational coalitions and partnerships with sub-national actors. Which side has been more effective in building and sustaining coalitions and partnerships? What insights, if any, would you draw from other cases covered in this course?
13. Many have argued that the key to victory over Al Qaeda lies in the mobilization of Muslim opponents of jihadist terrorism. What U.S. policies and strategies are most likely to encourage such mobilization?
14. In the war against Al Qaeda, is it more helpful or harmful for U.S. strategic communication and diplomatic action to emphasize the transcendent value of democratic forms of government in the Muslim world?
15. Why has the U.S. had difficulty "winning the peace" in Afghanistan in a way that fully serves the overall political purposes of the larger war against Al Qaeda?

16. What is the strategic relationship between the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and the protection of the American homeland from a terrorist attack?

17. What mix of military and diplomatic action is most likely to produce either a favorable or acceptable outcome in the Afghanistan theater for the United States and its allies?

18. Assess the strategic significance of the Afghanistan-Pakistan region for the origins and outcome of the terror war.

19. Is deterrence possible against terrorist groups and other non-state actors?

20. It would appear that a key element in Al Qaeda's strategy is to attack the "people" leg of the United States' "Clausewitzian Triangle." Compared to previous cases studies, how does the execution of this strategy mirror or differ from other adversaries' attempts to achieve their aims through such indirect ways and means?

C. Readings:

1. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States. *The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States*. New York: W.W. Norton, 2004. Pages 47-70, 108-156, 187-214, 330-338.

<http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/report/911Report.pdf>

[The 9/11 Commission provides background on the emergence of Al Qaeda as a threat to the United States; the escalation and interaction leading up to 9/11; U.S. attempts to develop an agreed interagency policy-strategy match before 9/11; and early strategic planning by the Bush Administration to respond to the 9/11 attacks.]

2. Harmony Project. "Cracks in the Foundation: Leadership Schisms in Al-Qa'ida 1989-2006," West Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center, September 2007. Pages 1-24.

<https://www.ctc.usma.edu/v2/wp-content/uploads/2010/06/cracks-in-the-foundation-leadership-schisms.pdf>

[This analysis uses captured documents and other primary sources to provide insight into Al Qaeda's senior leadership, its strategic decision-making, and debates in the violent-jihadist movement over whether the primary enemy should be the United States ("the far enemy") or existing governments in the Muslim world ("the near enemy"). The author, Vahid Brown, highlights AQAM vulnerabilities that the United States and its allies should be able to exploit.]

3. Jones, Seth. *Hunting in the Shadows: The Pursuit of al Qa'ida since 9/11*. New York: W. W. Norton, 2013. Pages 63-107, 141-184, 225-283, 336-344, 414-444.

[The author, a RAND analyst with close affiliations to U.S. Special Operations Command, offers a broad historical overview of the war with Al Qaeda from a counter-network point of view. In

addition to describing the interaction and adaptation of a multi-theater global war, he uses the idea of Al Qaeda's "waves" to analyze success and failure, and to advance a particular recommendation for success in the future.]

4. Hoffman, Bruce and Fernando Reinares. *The Evolution of the Global Terrorist Threat: From 9/11 to Osama bin Laden's Death*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2015. Pages 3-28, 571-599. (Selected Readings)

[The two selections from this edited volume provide a deep and focused look at two key themes: the sweep of Al Qaeda efforts against the U.S. homeland after 9/11, and the attacks on Mumbai by a non-Al Qaeda entity. They complement and update the general history provided by reading #3 above.]

5. Harmony Program. *Letters from Abbottabad: Bin Ladin Sidelined?* West Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center, May 2012. Pages 1-52.

https://www.ctc.usma.edu/v2/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/CTC_LtrsFromAbottabad_WEB_v2.pdf

[This analysis of documents found at Osama Bin Laden's Abbottabad compound discuss his relationship with Al Qaeda's affiliates, the relationship of Al Qaeda to Iran and Pakistan, and Bin Laden's plans, including a strategic reassessment in light of Al Qaeda's declining popularity.]

6. Barfield, Thomas. *Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010. Pages 255-350. (Selected Readings)

[This selection portrays Afghanistan as a strategic environment for the war against AQAM. It provides a concise, overarching history of the country's political evolution since the rise of the Taliban. The last section offers Barfield's prognosis on what has or has not been achieved, and how best to move forward.]

7. Rashid, Ahmed. *Descent into Chaos: The United States and the Failure of Nation Building in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia*. New York: Viking Penguin, 2008. Pages 265-292, 349-373. (Selected Readings)

[Previous case studies suggest the importance of coalitions for achieving success in protracted, high-stakes, multi-theater wars. The United States' NATO allies were, by and large, more willing to commit themselves to the Afghan theater than to the Iraq theater. Pakistan was designated a "major non-NATO ally" by the United States in 2004. Rashid provides insight into these coalition dynamics in the fight against the Taliban and Al Qaeda.]

8. Ryan, Michael. *Decoding Al-Qaeda's Strategy: The Deep Battle Against America*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2013. Pages 51-82. (Selected Readings)

[This reading provides a focused look at Al Qaeda's ideology and the way it has been adapted as the conflict evolved.]

9. Douglas, Frank, and Heidi Lane, eds. *In the Eyes of Your Enemy: An Al-Qaeda Compendium*. Newport: U.S. Naval War College, 2009. (Selected Readings)

[This compilation of translated primary-source documents and U.S. presidential speeches offer insights into AQAM's strategic vision, ideology, version of history, and image of the United States. The focus is on actual pronouncements made by Osama Bin Laden and Ayman Zawahiri, which represent key strategic communications efforts by Al Qaeda's senior leadership. The compendium also includes letters exchanged between Zarqawi and Zawahiri, suggesting tensions between Al Qaeda's strategic leaders and AQAM theater commanders, as well as Al Qaeda's efforts to cope with the competing vision of ISIL. These documents are paired with a set of U.S. presidential speeches that represent competing efforts to frame and re-frame the war as it evolves.]

10. Hoffman, Bruce. "Al Qaeda's Uncertain Future," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 36, no.8 (July 2013). Pages 635-653.

<http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/1057610X.2013.802973>

[This article offers a broad assessment of Al Qaeda as a threat, notes the many premature assertions of the organization's "death," and analyzes its possible future trajectories.]

11. Talmadge, Caitlin. "Deterring a Nuclear 9/11," *Washington Quarterly* 30, no. 2 (Spring 2007). Pages 23-34.

http://www.ciaonet.org/olj/twq/spr2007/07spring_talmadge.pdf

[If non-state actors obtained nuclear weapons, could the U.S. deter their use? Talmadge addresses that sobering question.]

D. Learning Outcomes: This case study continues the capstone phase of the course, requiring students to apply the theories, themes, and frameworks examined throughout the term in order to assess how the United States and its coalition partners are coping with the complex challenges presented by transnational terrorism and associated insurgencies across multiple theaters. This case study supports:

- CJCS Joint Learning Areas and Objectives (JPME II) 1a, 1b, 1c, 2b, 2c, 2e, 3c, 5a, 5b, and 5e. Emphasis will be placed on the following topics, enabling students to:
 - Apply key strategic concepts, critical thinking, and analytical frameworks to formulate and execute strategy (1a).
 - Analyze the integration of all instruments of national power in complex, dynamic, and ambiguous environments to attain objectives at the national and theater-strategic levels (1b).
 - Evaluate historical and/or contemporary security environments and applications of strategies across the range of military operations (1c).

- Evaluate how theater strategies, campaigns, and major operations achieve national strategic goals across the range of military operations (2b).
- Apply an analytical framework that addresses the factors politics, geography, society, culture, and religion play in shaping the desired outcomes of policies, strategies, and campaigns (2c).
- Evaluate how strategic level plans anticipate and respond to surprise, uncertainty, and emerging conditions (2e).
- Evaluate the integration of joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational capabilities, including all Service and Special Operations Forces, in campaigns across the range of military operations in achieving strategic objectives (3c).
- Evaluate the skills, character attributes, and behaviors needed to lead in a dynamic joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational strategic environment (5a).
- Evaluate critical strategic thinking, decision-making and communication by strategic leaders (5b).
- Evaluate historic and contemporary applications of the elements of mission command by strategic-level leaders in pursuit of national objectives (5e).

XIV. RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT—SEA POWER AND GRAND STRATEGY IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

A. General: This case completes the capstone segment begun in the two previous weeks by transitioning fully from the historical cases to the uncertain present day. Alfred Thayer Mahan’s framework of “retrospect and prospect” provides the structure and encapsulates the logic of the Strategy and Policy Course, which began by “looking back to look forward” with the first case study on the Peloponnesian War. Mahan published a piece entitled “Retrospect and Prospect” in December 1901, spurred by the U.S. victory over Spain and the ensuing counterinsurgent operations in the Philippine Islands. As his title suggests, he looked back at the nineteenth century in order to identify trends that he could project forward into the twentieth century. Mahan saw the war in the Philippines as a part of a larger advance by the United States “toward wider influence” in the world. In trying to connect past, present, and future, he foreshadowed the nature of the Strategy and Policy Course in general and the forward-looking orientation of this final case study in particular.

Like Mahan, geostrategic thinkers have used the past as a guide to contemporary strategy at major inflection points in U.S. history. Walter Lippmann, a leading political commentator, produced a classic work on U.S. foreign policy in the middle of World War II. Even though the global struggle’s outcome was by no means certain, Lippman’s interpretation of the past offered a way forward for the United States in the postwar era. Indeed, his calls for a U.S. strategy of global engagement proved remarkably prescient. Writing as the United States entered the post-Cold War period, Henry Kissinger also employed his understanding of the European balance of power in the nineteenth century to forecast America’s role in international politics.

These assessments of American purpose and power in world affairs—spanning almost a century—remain as relevant today as they were in their own respective times. The selected readings in this module offer students an opportunity to compare past and current debates about the future world order and America’s place in it. They provide a useful starting point for thinking about American sea power and the transoceanic strategies that have underwritten the current U.S.-led international order.

As we look to the new century, these efforts to think in retrospect and prospect should inspire us, even as the limits of foresight remind us of the need for intellectual humility in the face of deep uncertainty. Like Mahan, Lippmann, and Kissinger, we face problems in predicting the future. Indeed, the future is not foreordained; it depends on strategic choices that we and others will make, as well as the play of chance and contingency that Clausewitz emphasized. The best that we can do in this course is to prepare our intellects for different possible futures, some of which practitioners and scholars have postulated in recent years.

A major school of thought posits that the global system and the maritime domain will follow the patterns of the past two decades over the next two decades. Globalization and interdependence will deter conflict while promoting cooperation among the great powers. In this future, the U.S. Navy will be able to co-opt emerging naval powers or at least deter them from initiating a major conflict at sea. Another view holds that the “rise of the rest” will unbalance the international system, stimulating cycles of competition. In this future, the first half of the

twenty-first century is more likely to resemble the period from the 1890s to the 1940s, when major conflicts of interest pitted multiple naval powers against one another.

Within this debate, China has emerged as a major test case. Some fear that China will become, like Japan in the last century, a great naval rival of the United States, but with the People's Liberation Army Navy operating in radically more asymmetric ways than the Imperial Japanese Navy did. Mounting evidence suggests that China, and perhaps other adversaries of the United States such as Iran, will be able to exploit technological change in the form of smarter mines, stealthier submarines, more sophisticated sensors, and a more threatening array of missiles. If so, U.S. command of the sea may be challenged in the coming decades, at least in some crucial regions. Of course, the United States still enjoys an extraordinary concentration of relative military capability, and some analysts predict that this gap will widen. The United States is not a passive actor. Strategy is fundamentally about interaction, and much depends on how U.S. leaders react to recent technological trends as well as how Chinese leaders assess the evolving regional and global balance.

There is also reason for concern that economic and budgetary problems, compounded by deep involvement in the Middle East, will constrain the development of American capabilities to deal with looming challenges in the maritime domain. If so, American relations with longstanding allies as well as new friends in Eurasia may come under great pressure in the future. International political alignments might shift in ways unfavorable to U.S. foreign policy and maritime strategy. Again, students should be careful to consider the view from, and options available to, Beijing. By some measures, China's domestic economic problems dwarf those of the United States, including grim rural poverty, a staggering real estate bubble, the presence of inefficient state enterprises, massive corruption, and a long-term demographic problem due to population control measures and an enormous aging population.

This case study provides students with an opportunity to assess the relative likelihood of gloomy or bright strategic futures. The key learning aids of the Strategy and Policy Course provide tools to make such an assessment. In our intellectual preparation for what lies ahead, we can work with classical theorists, course themes, and past cases to consider five important issues.

The first issue relates to forecasts of countries that aspire—and possess the capacity—to be major maritime powers in the coming decades. A useful point of departure here is to recall Thucydides' emphasis on honor, fear, and self-interest. How far might these three motivating impulses drive rising naval powers such as China and India? Aspiration is one thing, however, and achievement is quite another. Mahan's six "elements of sea power" offer useful measures for determining whether a country enjoys the prerequisites for sea power. To these Mahanian elements we might add such factors as economic growth, fiscal capacity, technological sophistication, multinational partnerships, and strategic leadership. These are basic conditions for success in the maritime domain. So far as China and India are concerned, our historical case studies illustrate the difficulties that traditional landward-oriented countries face as they turn seaward.

If multiple major naval powers rise in the next half-century, will such a phenomenon lead to violent maritime conflicts as in previous eras? To think about this second issue, one should

review the “Decision for War” course theme and relate it to the various historical cases that we have studied. Is the outbreak of war more likely in the future because of the long-term rise of a major new power? Or will geography, nuclear weapons, and economic interdependence dampen the pressures for such “power-transition” wars in the twenty-first century? Will China, in the tradition of Sun Tzu, seek to “win without fighting?” Might China miscalculate American responses to aggressive actions on its part, as many past adversaries of the United States have done? Or will the most likely maritime war not involve the United States and China—at least not initially, as with Corinth and Corcyra before the war between Athens and Sparta? What actions might the United States take to dissuade or deter others from resorting to the use of force?

If in the future there are maritime conflicts or crises, a third issue to consider is where the theaters of contestation might be. Possible areas of conflict loom all around the “rimlands” of Eurasia: the Arctic, the Baltic Sea, the Black Sea, the Persian Gulf, the Indian Ocean, and the Western Pacific. As with past maritime wars that we have studied, a future conflict might begin in one theater and spread to other theaters. In this case study, we focus in the first instance on the Western Pacific and then on the Indian Ocean, examining the possible linkages between these two vast bodies of water. Recent high-level policy pronouncements suggest that we may need to think about these two distinct maritime theaters as a single entity: the Indo-Asia Pacific.

A fourth issue that demands our attention is the international dimension of strategy (Course Theme 8). In the maritime domain in the twenty-first century, as in the past, alliances and other partnerships will be important for preserving peace and, if necessary, for waging war. The United States will try to sustain longstanding alliance relationships and create new alignments. China will no doubt try to use a mixture of military coercion and economic inducements to attack American alliances. Furthermore, the Chinese may decide that they can no longer entrust to the U.S. Navy the security of their sea lines of communications connecting China to distant energy sources. If so, they must carve out alliances and basing arrangements along the South Asian rimland to support a forward naval presence. We need to ponder the factors that may affect future alignments or realignments.

A fifth issue concerns the character of possible future warfare in the maritime domain. The cases of past maritime war in this course have featured three basic naval missions: securing command of the sea, or at least local sea control, by fleet engagements; projecting power from the sea (or maritime bases) onto land, with ground forces and air forces; and waging economic and logistics warfare by interdicting enemy sea lines of communication (SLOCs). We need to think about how, and to what extent, the development and diffusion of new technologies like long-range precision strike weapons, space systems, and computer networks may transform, make prohibitively costly, or even supersede the traditional missions in twenty-first-century maritime warfare.

Finally, this case study examines two other geopolitical challenges facing the U.S. and its allies. First, we take a brief look at the threat posed by the rise of the Islamic State and its potential impact on the Middle East and South Asia. Second, Russia’s aggression in the Ukraine and its recent military intervention in Syria have led many to question whether this marks the beginning of a new more dangerous era in U.S. relations with its former Cold War adversary.

Both of these critical challenges may reflect the declining influence of the United States as the Obama Administration seeks to reduce U.S. military operations in the Middle East and South Asia.

The readings and associated discussion questions for this “Retrospect and Prospect” case study may be seen as many pieces of a big puzzle. Putting the pieces together might reveal patterns that are unfolding over the long run. Those patterns will likely include the sorts of ups and downs for key strategic actors that we have seen in all our historical case studies. Evaluating such patterns requires students to synthesize across the full range of analytic tools developed in this course, and doing so may enable the United States and its friends to pursue viable strategies during the coming decades.

B. Essay and Discussion Questions:

1. Thucydides maintained that the real cause for the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War was the growth of Athenian power and the fear this induced in Sparta. Is his theory, about power transition as the underlying cause of war, relevant in the 21st century?
2. Great Britain’s attempts to manage the rise of Imperial Germany and the United States at the beginning of the twentieth century produced dramatically different outcomes. What lessons can be drawn from these two experiences in the context of China’s rise?
3. Which rising power, China or India, can best turn its strategic orientation from land to sea in the twenty-first century?
4. Is China overrated as a potential peer competitor of the United States?
5. Looking out to the next twenty years or so, how would Sun Tzu advise prospective adversaries to defeat the United States? What does victory mean for smaller and less capable military rivals? What counterstrategies are available to the United States?
6. Clausewitz distinguished between the nature and character of war in the early nineteenth century. Are changes in the nature and the character of war and in the relationship between them looming large in the maritime domain in the early twenty-first century?
7. More than a century ago, Mahan identified key elements or prerequisites for a country to become a great sea power. In the twenty-first century, what factors are most important for becoming or remaining a great sea power?
8. Can strategic concepts (beyond the prerequisites of sea power) propounded by Mahan more than a century ago still be of any utility to Chinese or Indian maritime strategists?
9. Are Corbettian peripheral operations to open a new theater likely to be of strategic value in any future maritime war?

10. One might argue that the intellect and temperament to manage risk are attributes that naval commanders in the twenty-first century must have in even greater measure than in the past. Do you agree? Why or why not?

11. Are precision-strike cruise and ballistic missiles likely to have a greater impact on conflict between maritime powers in the twenty-first century than airplanes and submarines did in the twentieth century?

12. Have the different domains of war—to include space and cyberspace—merged so closely that it no longer makes strategic sense to think in terms of a distinctive maritime domain?

13. Evaluate the “Air-Sea Battle” concept.

14. Could major warfare at sea between powers that possess nuclear weapons deliver strategic rewards for either side that outweigh the strategic risk of escalation?

15. Identify and evaluate China’s long-term options for ensuring its access to sources of energy in the Middle East and Africa.

16. Do formal security alliances and associated overseas bases still have strategic benefits that outweigh their strategic costs?

17. If economic globalization continues full steam ahead in the wake of the recent international economic crisis, is it likely to make major maritime conflict more likely or less likely in the future?

18. Have changes in the American economy been undermining the strategic position of the United States in the international arena?

19. A scholar of international relations maintains: “the United States is not exempt from the historical pattern of great-power decline. The country needs to adjust to the world of 2025 when China will be the number-one economy and spending more on defense than any other nation. Effective strategic retrenchment is about more than just cutting the defense budget; it also means redefining America’s interests and external ambitions. Hegemonic decline is never painless. As the twenty-first century’s second decade begins, history and multipolarity are staging a comeback. The central strategic preoccupation of the United States during the next two decades will be its own decline and China’s rise.” Discuss.

C. Readings:

1. Mahan, Alfred Thayer. *Retrospect and Prospect: Studies in International Relations, Naval and Political*. Boston: Little, Brown, 1902. Pages 3-35.

<http://archive.org/stream/retrospectprospe00maha#page/n7/mode/2up>

[This opening article from Mahan establishes a rationale for looking into the past in order to look ahead while examining the role of naval power in a globalized world.]

2. Lippmann, Walter. *U.S. Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic*. Little, Brown, 1943. Pages 3-46, 81-113. (Selected Readings)

[Lippmann provides a *tour d'horizon* of U.S. foreign policy from America's founding to the outbreak of World War II. In anticipation of the postwar order following the Allied victory, he reflects on the enduring lessons that the United States should learn from this history. His insights about striking the proper balance between commitments and resources are particularly valuable.]

3. Kissinger, Henry. *Diplomacy*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994. Pages 804-835.

[Writing in the opening years of the post-Cold War era, Kissinger counsels balance between idealism and pragmatism in U.S. foreign policy. He offers a historically and geopolitically rooted assessment of the major powers across Eurasia.]

4. Posen, Barry R. "Pull Back," *Foreign Affairs*, 92, no. 1 (January/February 2013). Pages 116-128.

<http://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/fora92&id=202&collection=journals&index=journals/fora>

[Posen contends that strategic trends since the end of the Cold War have made the U.S. strategy of liberal hegemony increasingly untenable. He advances a strategy of restraint as an alternative approach to foreign policy.]

5. Kagan, Robert. "Superpowers Don't Get to Retire," *New Republic*, May 26, 2014. Pages 1-31.

<http://www.newrepublic.com/article/117859/allure-normalcy-what-america-still-owes-world>

[Like Lippman, Kagan traces the origins of current American grand strategy to the lessons drawn from the interwar period. He argues that the United States should remain committed to the defense of the "liberal world order."]

6. Westad, Odd Arne. *Restless Empire: China and the World since 1750*. New York: Basic Books, 2012. Pages 365-469.

[These chapters illustrate China's complex engagement with the United States and the rest of Asia in the post-Mao era. Based on his reading of China's modern history, Westad offers some predictions about China's rise.]

7. Strassler, Robert. B., ed. *The Landmark Thucydides*. New York: Free Press, 1996. Book I.80-85 and Book I.140-144.

[As China turns seaward, it is worth recalling the speeches of Archidamus and Pericles, which illustrate the classic problems arising from struggles between land and sea powers while highlighting the utility and limits of navies in wartime.]

8. Kissinger, Henry. "Does History Repeat Itself?" *On China*. New York: Penguin Press, 2011. Pages 514-530. (Selected Readings)

[Kissinger looks back to the pre-World War I Anglo-German naval rivalry and the famous 1907 Crowe Memorandum to frame his forecast of Sino-U.S. relations in the 21st century. While Kissinger does not rule out a replay of history involving escalating strategic competition between Beijing and Washington, he contends that "co-evolution" is both a more likely and preferable outcome.]

9. Montgomery, Evan Braden. "Contested Primacy in the Western Pacific: China's Rise and the Future of U.S. Power Projection," *International Security* 38, no. 4 (Spring 2014). Pages 115-149.

http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/ISEC_a_00160

[This article explains how U.S. forward defense in the western Pacific is coming under increasing strain. The author identifies advantages that favor the local, regional power seeking to deter the intervention of a distant, global power.]

10. Schwartz, General Norton A. and Admiral Jonathan W. Greenert. "Air-Sea Battle," *American Interest*, February 20, 2012. Pages 1-12.

<http://www.the-american-interest.com/articles/2012/02/20/air-sea-battle/>

[The Chiefs of the U.S. Air Force and the U.S. Navy make a public case for the Air-Sea Battle concept.]

11. Kline, Jeffrey E. and Wayne P. Hughes Jr. "Between Peace and the Air-Sea Battle: A War at Sea Strategy," *Naval War College Review* 65, no. 4 (Autumn 2012). Pages 35-40.

<https://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/e3120d0c-8c62-4ab7-9342-805971ed84f4/Between-Peace-and-the-Air-Sea-Battle--A-War-at-Sea.aspx>

[This prize-winning essay from two Naval Postgraduate School faculty members puts the U.S. military's Air-Sea Battle concept in its larger context, explaining how Air-Sea Battle can deter, and recommending ways and means for attaining U.S. political ends in the Western Pacific.]

12. Prakash, Admiral Arun. "China's Maritime Challenge in the Indian Ocean," *Maritime Affairs* 7, no. 1 (Summer 2011). Pages 1-16. (Selected Readings)

[Admiral Prakash, former Chief of Naval Staff of the Indian Navy and Chairman of the Indian Chiefs of Staff Committee, offers a blunt assessment of China's rise and its impact on Sino-

Indian relations. He contends that both powers are destined to “compete for the same strategic space.” Indeed, the admiral discerns a Chinese energy strategy that would complete the “encirclement of India.”]

13. Menon, Admiral Raja and Rajiv Kumar. *The Long View from Delhi: To Define the Indian Grand Strategy for Foreign Policy*. New Delhi: Academic Foundation, 2010. Pages 20-26, 31-32, 130-142, 174-179. (Selected Readings)

[Inspired by the work of Andrew Marshall’s Office of Net Assessment in the Pentagon, a team of retired Indian military officers and diplomatic officials, along with academic economists and regional experts, conducted net assessments and assembled scenarios in order to guide Indian policymakers toward a long-term grand strategy for India. Note the key role played by assessments of the long-term strategic competition between the United States and China.]

14. Valeriano, Brandon and Ryan Maness. “Paper Tiger Putin,” *Foreign Affairs*, April 30, 2015. Pages 1-7.

<https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russia-fsu/2015-04-30/paper-tiger-putin>

[The authors argue that Russia’s recent military and diplomatic adventures have revealed its desperate weakness. Meanwhile, its shift toward covert warfare, cyber conflict, and coercive energy policy demonstrates the limitations it faces in coercing its neighbors.]

15. Stavridis, James. “NATO’s Circle of Ice and Fire,” *Foreign Policy*, August 31, 2015. Pages 1-9.

<http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/08/31/nato-circle-of-ice-and-fire-game-of-thrones-russia-turkey-arctic/>

[Admiral Stavridis (USN, ret.), Dean of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, and former Supreme Allied Commander, Europe and Commander of U.S. European Command, discusses the current challenges facing NATO and argues that it must expand its Partnership for Peace Program around the edges of the alliance.]

16. Kadercan, Burak, “3 Huge (and Dangerous) Myths About ISIS,” *The National Interest*, August 30, 2015. Pages 1-21.

<http://www.nationalinterest.org/feature/3-huge-dangereous-myths-about-isis-13740>

[The author, a Strategy and Policy Department faculty member, challenges three core assumptions that lie at the heart of most analysis about the objectives and strategy of ISIL (also referred to as ISIS). He argues that piecemeal defeats, lost chunks of territory, and halted expansion do not hurt the group as much as it is believed in the West.]

b17. Fromson, James & Steven Simon. "ISIS: The Dubious Paradise of Apocalypse Now," *Survival: Global Politics and Strategy*, 57, no. 3 (June-July 2015). Pages 7-56.

<http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2015.1046222>

[This article argues that ISIL's (also known as ISIS) four principal manifestations—as a guerrilla army, Sunni revanchist political movement, millenarian Islamist cult, and ruthless administrator of territory—suggest a strategy against it: containment. Those features which, in the near to medium-term, make ISIL impossible to destroy from without also appear to make its gradual decline from within nearly inevitable. As was the case during the Cold War, containment is more than mere passivity: complementary international missions to degrade ISIL from the air, and train and equip the group's local adversaries, are key to this aggressive form of containment.]

18. Obama, President Barack, "Remarks by President Obama to the Australian Parliament," Parliament House, Canberra, Australia, November 17, 2011. Pages 1-12.

<http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/11/17/remarks-president-obama-australian-parliament>

[President Barack Obama lays out the rationales for the pivot to Asia.]

D. Learning Outcomes: This case study on Sea Power and Grand Strategy in the 21st Century requires students to draw upon all the theories, key strategic concepts, and analytic frameworks developed throughout the course to examine the future employment of maritime power across the range of operations and along the spectrum from peace to war and back to peace again. This case study supports:

- CJCS Joint Learning Areas and Objectives (JPME II) 1a, 1b, 1c, 1e, 2c, 2f, 3c, and 5a. Emphasis will be placed on the following topics, enabling students to:
 - Apply key strategic concepts, critical thinking, and analytical frameworks to formulate and execute strategy (1a).
 - Analyze the integration of all instruments of national power in complex, dynamic, and ambiguous environments to attain objectives at the national and theater-strategic levels (1b).
 - Evaluate historical and/or contemporary security environments and applications of strategies across the range of military operations (1c).
 - Evaluate how the capabilities and limitations of the U.S. Force structure affect the development and implementation of security, defense, and military strategies (1e).
 - Apply an analytical framework that addresses the factors politics, geography, society, culture, and religion play in shaping the desired outcomes of policies, strategies, and campaigns (2c).
 - Evaluate key classical, contemporary and emerging concepts, including IO and cyber space operations, doctrine, and traditional/irregular approaches to war (2f).



UNITED STATES NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
686 CUSHING ROAD
NEWPORT, RI 02841-1207
WWW.USNWC.EDU

[HTTP://TWITTER.COM/NAVALWARCOLLEGE](http://twitter.com/NAVALWARCOLLEGE) 
& [FACEBOOK.COM](https://www.facebook.com/USNWC) 

- Evaluate the integration of joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational capabilities, including all Service and Special Operations Forces, in campaigns across the range of military operations in achieving strategic objectives (3c).
- Evaluate the skills, character attributes, and behaviors needed to lead in a dynamic joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multi-national strategic environment (5a).