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FOREWORD

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
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CURRENT SOVIET MILITARY STRATEGY

A lecture delivered
at the Naval War College
on 22 September 1965

by

Professor Richard F. Staar

Earlier this year the former chief of staff of the Soviet Armed Forces, Marshal Vasili Sokolovskii, made the following statement at a news conference which was held on 17 February 1965. I quote: "The Soviet Union is armed with intercontinental and global missiles whose nuclear warheads are equal to 100 million tons of TNT." This announcement was amplified by the current Soviet defense minister, Marshal Rodyon Malinovskii, who is cited by the official organ of the Soviet armed forces, *Krasnaya Zvezda*, as having boasted that these Russian ICBMs, with their 100-megaton warheads, "will sweep from the face of the earth all industrial and administrative-political centers of the United States." About the same time that these words appeared in print at Moscow, a leading American intellectual wrote here in the United States that he had found great hope for peace during a visit to Russia when he saw hanging in the old country estate of Tolstoi a picture of William Lloyd Garrison inscribed, "Liberty for each, for all, and forever." Gentlemen! When the cobwebs of a deserted manor house, dating back to pre-1917 Russia, excite otherwise useful minds of our day, I submit that we should face with increased anxiety the greatest seduction of our time.

I would like to discuss in my introduction the evolution of Soviet military doctrine in three phases since the end of World War II. I will speak very briefly of the first and second phases and then concentrate on the current phase. Initially, between 1945 and 1953 while Stalin was still alive, a struggle by conservative tendencies in USSR strategic thought was apparent against the process of growth required by the military revolution. This period, if we read

Soviet writings published during these years, was dominated by Stalin's concepts of the five permanently operating military factors to achieve victory: a stable rear, high morale, divisions adequate in quantity and quality, good weapons, and skillful command. Obviously, this is not something that Stalin himself had thought up; these were basic principles of warfare. Any Soviet author writing in the field had to give lip service to them, quoted them, and apparently was intimidated from introducing any innovation.

On 5 March 1953, Stalin died and that was the end of the first postwar phase in Soviet military doctrine. The second phase lasted roughly from 1954 to 1958, and here we note a liberation of Soviet military thought from Stalinist dogmatism and the beginning of strategic planning for the nuclear age. The greatest momentum in this modernization process was achieved, while Marshal Georgi Zhukov held the office of defense minister between the years 1955 and 1957.

The noteworthy aspect about this period is that it was initiated apparently by the military and not the political leadership. Secondly, no major revision actually occurred in doctrine, but rather what one witnessed was an adaptation of nuclear weapons and jet aviation to traditional World War II concepts of warfare. Finally, this period was also characterized by an unusually high expenditure of funds for the training of skilled personnel, for military hardware, and for research and development.

I would like to tell you a story which may not be true, but it makes a good story, about Marshal Zhukov. He had helped Khrushchev maintain his position and indeed eliminate the anti-Party group in June 1957, from the Presidium of the Communist Party. A few months later, in October, Khrushchev thought that this man perhaps might be infected with Bonapartism and that he represented a potential threat. Hence, Zhukov was sent on a goodwill mission to Eastern Europe. He went to various capitals and finally arrived in Belgrade. Now, from Belgrade Zhukov took a plane back to Moscow. He sent a radio message to indicate when he would land. But when his plane landed, there was nobody at the airport to meet him. He thought that perhaps the radio message had not been received. No band, no marshals, no members of the Presidium. He stepped off the plane, wearing his resplendent uniform. These Soviet officers just have to be endowed with double-barreled chests to wear the medals that hang from both sides of their jackets.

Carrying his baton, Zhukov walked off the airplane. A civilian stepped up toward him and handed him a copy of *Pravda*. Zhukov thought, "What is this? Doesn't he understand that I am a Marshal of the Soviet Union and Minister of Defense?" You know, they have seven stars for rank in the Soviet Union: one star for a Major General, two stars for a Lieutenant General, three stars for a Colonel General, and four stars for a General of the Army. Finally, of course, they have no more place for these small stars on their epaulets, so they make big stars. The Marshal of type forces, of course, has a big star. Then comes a Chief Marshal of type forces (armor, aviation, etc.) who has an intermediate star. Finally, a Marshal of the Soviet Union has the biggest star.

So this man Zhukov walks down from the airplane in all of his regalia, takes the newspaper, and looks at it. Soviet papers, if you have noticed, usually run only four pages and are very simple to read. Zhukov ran through pages one, two, and three. At the bottom of page four he noticed a brief item, saying that he had resigned his position as minister of defense. Nobody heard of Zhukov for a number of years, but finally he emerged, not taking the salute but standing on the podium in Moscow, during the 20th anniversary parade of the victory over Germany this past May of 1965.

During that second period, the fundamental strategic concept had remained unchanged. Soviet armed forces were to represent an effective combination of all services capable of conducting both total war and the limited variety. That concept was upset by Khrushchev himself by means of a shift in the concentration of USSR military power in favor of strategic missile forces. This third phase, a new doctrinal revision, opened with the secret debate held at a plenary session of the Central Committee of the Communist Party. We know that this debate took place. Since it was secret, obviously we do not have a transcript of it. But later on Khrushchev made a public speech before the Supreme Soviet in January 1960, in which he indicated what had happened. Apparently, during the secret debate a compromise had been reached between the professional military leadership and Khrushchev. The military wanted to maintain a large standing army (they were concentrating on substantial theater forces), whereas Khrushchev desired to retrench by reducing the armed forces by one third and relying to a greater extent on missile deterrence as well as counterdeterrence. What is meant by counterdeterrence, of course, is the countering and neutralizing of the American use of deterrence to meet indirect Soviet challenges.

Regarding conventional forces, Khrushchev stated in his speech to the Supreme Soviet in January 1960, and I quote: "Military aviation has been almost completely replaced by missiles." Then, about the navy: "Surface ships can no longer play the role that they played in the past." In this same address, Khrushchev expressed confidence that the USSR would achieve a decisive technological breakthrough. He did not say in what way, but this was the gist of his idea. One of the chief motives for retrenchment involved the cost of this mammoth standing army, while also adding to offensive and defensive weapons systems. In other words, the Soviets did not have the resources to allocate for both the strategic missile forces and maintain a large standing army.

The strategic missile forces apparently number about 200,000 men, according to a West German magazine, *Soldat und Technik*. The Institute for Strategic Studies in London, which is probably the best unclassified source, indicates 130,000 as the strength. At any rate, I think that the relevant point here is that the "New Look" trend in Moscow precipitated an extended debate among senior officers which has resulted in a more penetrating analysis regarding the nature of modern warfare.

One should note that there existed strong conservative tendencies throughout the military hierarchy. This conservative inclination brought about the release of two senior officers. These individuals had never openly or publicly announced their support for Khrushchev's new policy. One was Marshal Sokolovskii, whom I quoted above. This man, chief of staff for many years, was relieved in April of 1960. The other person was Marshal Ivan S. Konev, commanding officer of the Warsaw Pact Forces or the East European alliance system. He was replaced in July of 1960 by Marshal Andrei Grechko. Both of these individuals had been first deputy ministers of defense. In other words, they ranked as Number Two and Number Three in the military hierarchy, just below the defense minister. I think it is noteworthy that both of these individuals were the last hold-overs from the Zhukov military administration. In other words, they had been in power in these respective positions while Zhukov was minister of defense.

Since that time, eleven of the fourteen key positions in the Soviet hierarchy have been held by members of the so-called Stalingrad clique. What was the Stalingrad clique? This comprised a group of generals and marshals who had fought on southern fronts during World War II. Many of them participated in the Battle

of Stalingrad. For example, Malinovskii himself who is defense minister belongs to this clique. It is interesting to note that Malinovskii, between 1945 and 1955, directed Soviet forces in the Far East. It was his headquarters in Siberia, we know today, which planned the invasion by North Korea against South Korea. The first deputy minister and commanding officer for the Warsaw Treaty forces, Marshal Andrei Grechko, is a member of the Stalingrad clique. The chief of staff, Marshal Zakharov, was with the 64th army at Stalingrad. He is also a member of that clique.

It should be mentioned that the man who replaced Khrushchev last October, Leonid Brezhnev, had the military rank of colonel. He was actually a political commissar with the 18th army in the Caucasus, so he also fought in the south. All of these individuals are members of the Stalingrad clique. They had much more in common with one another (after all, they were fighting) than with the men who were back at supreme headquarters in Moscow or elsewhere far behind the front—the people who were making the decisions for the entire war. We know that differences existed, and we know that a compromise was reached. However, this compromise did not last very long, primarily because certain developments took place within the Soviet domestic arena, and there were fluctuations in the level of international tension. So let us now consider how Khrushchev's new military policy came to be modified.

Khrushchev had announced a cut of 1.2 million men. He said that the Soviet armed forces at that time numbered 3.6 million, and they would be reduced to some 2.4 million. This process was to take place over a two-year period, presumably during 1960 and 1961, so that by early 1962 the reduction would be completed. International developments and domestic problems changed this policy. First came the crash of the U-2 near Sverdlovsk, right in the middle of the Soviet Union on 1 May 1960. This afforded the military an opportunity to request reconsideration by Khrushchev and the other Party leaders of their avowed policy. Then, there arose the internal problem of integrating these thousands of officers who were being released. Obviously, if a man is a field grade officer, he does not want to drive a tractor in the Virgin Lands. He would rather do something that his background had prepared him for, and it has not prepared him for driving a tractor. So this created a problem.

Then, in the summer of 1961, came the serious political-military confrontation in Berlin where American tanks moved right up against Check-Point Charlie and Soviet tanks came up from the other side of the iron curtain. This series of demonstrations by both sides raised the level of international tension. In July of 1961, the Soviet Union suspended further reduction in its armed forces. Next, it held in uniform additional men who were due for routine discharge. Thirdly, a sizable number of reserves was called up. Finally, overt defense expenditures jumped by almost fifty per cent, to be specific 44.9%, from 9.2 to 13.4 billion rubles. These were overt expenditures. This is not what the USSR actually spends. It has something called the ministry for medium machine building industry, which is the atomic energy program. The Soviets have six different ministries that actually work for defense. So the best available calculations are that the Soviet Union spends not twelve or thirteen billion, but somewhere in the neighborhood of thirty billion dollars each year. The United States spends fifty billion, or in that neighborhood. But actually, thirty billion dollars in the Soviet Union is proportionally more than fifty billion dollars in the United States. Why? Because the American gross national product is more than double that of the USSR, so really the latter is spending at the rate of about sixty billion dollars per year on defense.

The Soviets also broke the three-year informal moratorium on testing nuclear weapons in September 1961. This was climaxed, as you will recall, by the 57-megaton monster H-bomb explosion. All of these moves were clearly favored by the military, but the decisions were made by the political leadership as measures to meet Soviet deterrence policy. At the most recent 22nd Communist Party Congress (there is supposed to be another one in the spring of 1966), defense minister Malinovskii justified the retention of a large standing army by accusing the United States of building up conventional forces and preparing for local wars.

In view of the high priority and alleged superiority of strategic missiles claimed by Khrushchev, observers in the West considered that the USSR probably would press for political advantage. The groundwork for such moves had been laid through clever propaganda projecting the image of a missile gap from which the United States was likely to suffer through the mid-1960s. In fact, America has always been superior to the Soviets in this respect and today has at least a 3½ to 1 superiority just in ICBMs and Polaris missiles not counting SAC bombers which are capable of delivering a nuclear payload. (TABLE 1) Soviet military leaders apparently

TABLE I

U.S. STILL WAY OUT FRONT IN THE MISSILE RACE

In the past year virtually no over-all change in America's 3½-to-1 strategic lead over Russia. While Soviets added to ICBM force, U.S. kept pace with heavy additions to its atomic-submarine fleet.

	U.S.	U.S.S.R.
Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles	854	270
Submarine-Borne Missiles	544	120
Total	1,398	390

Source: Adopted from "The Military Balance, 1965-66" by the Institute for Strategic Studies, London.

800 MINUTEMAN I ICBM'S. Instant-firing solid-fueled missiles, able to reach Russia from these bases: 200 at Warren AFB near Cheyenne, Wyo. 150 at Malmstrom AFB near Great Falls, Mont. 150 at Minot AFB in North Dakota. 150 at Whiteman AFB near Knob Noster, Mo. 150 at Ellsworth AFB near Rapid City, S.D. Coming: 200 Minuteman II's at Grand Forks AFB in North Dakota and at Malmstrom. Eventually, entire force of 1,000 will be the "second generation" Minuteman II with range of more than 9,000 miles.

54 TITAN II ICBM'S. Fast-firing liquid-fueled missiles, in position at these bases: 18 at McConnell AFB near Wichita, Kans. 18 at Little Rock AFB in Arkansas. 18 at Davis-Monthan AFB near Tucson, Ariz. Removed: 180 Atlas and Titan I missiles, now obsolescent.

544 POLARIS MISSILES. 16 aboard each of 34 nuclear-powered submarines. Half are on patrol at any one time well within range of Russia's most vital targets. Planned: 112 more Polaris missiles aboard 7 submarines. Eventually, all will be refitted with superaccurate, more-powerful Poseidon missiles.

Source: U.S. Department of Defense.

had always realized their inferiority and became concerned about the growing United States missile superiority. They did not, of course, believe Khrushchev who once had said in a speech that missiles were coming off the assembly line like sausages. This was not happening, because missile production is a very sophisticated problem.

The situation also must have coincided with Khrushchev's great frustration. I can just conjure up an image of him in his office at the Kremlin, down on his hauds and knees chewing on the rug, because he could not achieve any political payoff, despite the increase in Soviet military power by a factor of approximately four. Khrushchev could not achieve any political payoff, despite the artificially created tension and various ultimata that were being handed to the United States regarding Berlin. Hence, it was decided to offset the real missile gap, that is Soviet inferiority, by a daring placement of ICBMs in Cuba.

Nobody knows precisely with whom this idea originated and, naturally, no one has come forward since it proved to be a fiasco in order to claim post facto credit for the idea. But there is a twenty-nine-point, forty-page indictment of Khrushchev (I have not seen it, but am sure our intelligence organizations have the document) released to all Soviet agitation and propaganda personnel. The latter then went to the Primary Party Organizations, the lowest ranking units, with the official explanation why Khrushchev had been thrown out. Reportedly, of the twenty-nine points one indicted Khrushchev for putting the missiles into Cuba initially and a second for taking them out.

Successful implementation of this Cuban project would have complicated, if not degraded completely, the defense of North America. The prospects of such a dramatic and sudden improvement in the Soviet military strategic posture vis-à-vis the United States by means of a so-called quick fix, would have given the USSR immense prestige. Even more important, by reducing Western confidence and cohesiveness, Moscow would have attained increased leverage in particular for a new confrontation over Berlin. It would have been also most satisfying to Khrushchev himself, if he could emulate the United States by placing a base close to our borders which paralleled American missile bases around the periphery of the Soviet Union. Suffice to say that while Khrushchev cut his diplomatic losses fairly effectively (he claimed that the missiles had only been in there to protect Cuba, and after we promised not to invade Cuba he took them out), he had certainly

not met either the political or military aims which led to the Cuban missile gambit. This may have, indeed, played a part in Khrushchev's ouster almost exactly two years later.

Let me now briefly go into Soviet writings on war. Everything that I am giving you comes from unclassified sources. It is interesting to note that it was not until 4 April 1962, that *Krasnaya Zvezda*, the Soviet daily newspaper put out by the defense ministry began to use for the first time the term "military revolution." This was done by publishing a letter from a certain Lieutenant E. Martynov, who had asked the editors to explain the concept. Gentlemen, this was nine years after the first H-bomb, five years after the first Soviet ICBM and *sputnik*. The mere fact that nobody asked this junior officer where he had slept away all of these years indicates to me at least that the question may have been inspired. In other words, perhaps the lieutenant never existed. This is a favorite technique of the Soviets when they want to launch some kind of an enlightenment campaign. Ever since April 1962, a series of articles has appeared in the USSR armed forces press by prominent military leaders and specialists. They all are published under the same heading: "The Revolution in Military Affairs, Its Significance and Consequences."

These are all didactic materials and intended for instructional purposes among officers, generals, and admirals. As a recent illustration, on 15 January 1965, a Rear Admiral F. Sizov, stated in an article which appeared in *Krasnaya Zvezda*: "A new world war will definitely become the last decisive clash between two contradictory social systems—capitalism and socialism [what he means by socialism is communism]. Such a war will be conducted with unheard of ferocity according to the principle of *Kto Kogo* [who will bury whom]:" In other words, a war to the finish.

Although these writings do say that war is no longer inevitable, they also indicate that it can break out in five different ways: The first situation envisages a surprise attack by the United States against the USSR, when we see that our sources of raw materials are disappearing within an expanding world communist camp. Then, America strikes at the Soviet Union as an act of desperation. To quote the former chief of staff, Marshal Sokolovskii who incidentally, even though he was relieved, has been holding press conferences and writing articles. In *Krasnaya Zvezda* for 28 August 1964, he states: "The aggressive imperialist bloc of NATO is holding, on an alert basis, large numbers of ground troops and tactical aviation which are equipped with nuclear weapons. These units are being

prepared to launch military operations with the use of such weapons." And probably if these people dream, this is the nightmare that wakes them up in a cold sweat.

TABLE 2		
COMPARATIVE STRATEGIC STRENGTH, 1965		
CATEGORY	NATO	WARSAW PACT
MISSILE AND AIR POWER:		
ICBMs	854	270
Navy Missiles	544	120
IRBMs & MRBMs	----	750
Heavy Bombers	630	200
Medium Bombers	580	1,400
SEAPOWER:		
Carriers	37	----
Cruisers	33	20
Escorts	593	130
Submarines:		
Conventional	181	443
Nuclear	54	30
LAND POWER:		
On active duty	3,121,000	3,145,000

It would appear that Khrushchev himself had come very close to accepting the principle of mutual deterrence. However, even he stopped short of complete agreement on this point because of the second way in which war might break out: by accident or miscalculation through human or mechanical error that involve two dangers, according to Soviet writers. An irresponsible leader might come to power in a country that possesses both nuclear weapons and delivery systems. A misreading of intelligence or a faulty warning system or even a temporarily deranged pilot on air patrol could precipitate a nuclear exchange. If we look

at some of the movies that have appeared recently, such as "Doctor Strangelove" or "Seven Days in May," I sometimes wonder where these scripts are written: in Hollywood or in Moscow.

A third way in which war might break out, according to the Soviets, is where a limited or a civil war escalates into a global conflict after intervention by a nuclear power. For example, the Arab states backed by the USSR attack Israel, and Israel is supported perhaps by France. A civil war in Iraq or perhaps even the war in Vietnam today, with volunteers comprising regular armed forces coming in from the outside. And, of course, most recently the Pakistan-Indian conflict which according to the news apparently has ended in a cease-fire. Most of these sites mentioned in the foregoing remain outside of the NATO, CENTO, SEATO, or the Warsaw Pact areas. In other words, they are not covered by any one of the various alliance systems.

Not all causes of war are beyond Moscow's control. There are two other conditions or circumstances under which war might break out, where Moscow itself would control the circumstances. One might involve a preemptive strike by the USSR against the United States or against an ally of the United States. A discussion of a preemptive strike we find in Soviet literature as far back as 1955 to 1957; in other words, ten years ago. Major General N.A. Talenskii, and General of the Army, P.A. Kurochkin, were writing during this period. Of course, that was the time when strategic bombers could have been detected in time enough to launch a preemptive strike. These two authors claimed this would not really consist of preemptive war, because the Soviet strike would depend upon accurate intelligence of an imminent attack against the USSR. Ten years later, just the other day, this same man Kurochkin, who is now commandant of the M.V. Frunze Military Academy in Moscow complains, and I quote: "Ever more frequently one hears [American] voices about the right of the United States first to launch a nuclear strike against the USSR." So now, the Soviets are claiming that perhaps we are the ones contemplating this right. They do not cite any literature on this, and there are no footnotes given, so I do not know who the alleged American source may be.

Now that ICBMs are operational and in significant quantities, with a warning of only four minutes if launched from Western Europe and twenty minutes at the most from North America, I think the situation has not radically changed because of the development of space satellites. These detect and warn against operational

launching, and this would appear to make a Soviet preemptive strike even more applicable in the future.

Finally, the fifth set of conditions envisages a war precipitated by a call from an ally on the USSR to honor an alliance obligation. Here, the key provision of the Sino-Soviet treaty of 14 February 1950 is such that an attack by Japan or an ally of Japan (meaning the United States) against Red China would trigger the alliance. If hostilities were to involve the United States, let us say in the Formosa Straits, Peking might demand a Soviet nuclear strike at American bases in the Pacific or even against the West Coast. Then Moscow would be faced with a decision in favor of a preventive war or would refuse to uphold its defense treaty. Although the former appears unlikely, in other words a preemptive blow appears unlikely, it cannot be precluded now that Khrushchev is out of office. Nobody really knows what the future may hold. Peking may have come to the conclusion that the Soviet guarantee is virtually useless. *Izvestiya*, the official Soviet government newspaper, not so long ago quoted the Red Chinese foreign minister, Marshal Chen Yi, as having cast doubt on the 1950 treaty in these words: "For us [Red China], the Soviet defense has no value." He also described the Chinese People's Republic as a nonaligned country. *Izvestiya* went on to comment and stated: "In effect, Chen Yi no longer considers China a part of the world socialist camp." Even more recently, *Radio Belgrade* on 7 April 1965 quoted Premier Chou En-lai as saying that "In a regional, limited war China will ask nobody for help, not even the [communist] Bloc."

The same theoretical situation prevails with regard to Eastern Europe, with the Warsaw Treaty which was signed on 15 May 1955. At the seventh session of its political consultative committee on 19-20 January 1965, NATO was warned against arming West Germany with nuclear weapons. A cartoon in *Krasnaya Zvezda* of 14 September 1965 declares, "In one of the cities in the Federal Republic of [West] Germany, there operates a special military school where enlisted men and officers of the *Bundeswehr* [West German armed forces] are being prepared to conduct warfare with the use of atomic, bacteriological, and chemical weapons." A similar one appears almost daily. The source in parentheses states: "from newspapers." They never give the exact source. The instructor is shown with an Iron Cross decoration, and the enlisted men and officers with the Nazi swastikas.

In the statement mentioned above, the Soviets warn that if West Germany were given access to nuclear weapons, then the Warsaw Pact would take some kind of action. This warning was reinforced by joint USSR-East German maneuvers, held this past 5-11 April 1965, which temporarily closed the expressway between West Germany and Berlin and also harassed certain air corridors into West Berlin. That was followed up by summer amphibious maneuvers that took place off the coast of Bulgaria along the Black Sea. In recent photographs of Soviet troops, men are shown wearing protective masks apparently in anticipation of bacteriological or gas or perhaps even nuclear warfare. A picture from a July 1965 issue of *Krasnaya Zvezda*, depicts an amphibious operation with men equipped with gas masks. These men incidentally were Soviet Marines. I will comment on that later.

What kind of a war then do Soviet military writers foresee? Again, we have to piece this together from various types of information. They envisage an exchange of nuclear strikes which may not annihilate either side. Military operations would then continue on land, sea, and in the air, possibly over an extended period of time until the adversary had been destroyed and his territory occupied. They call this a "protracted war."

The other possibility is a conflict of the *Blitzkrieg* type or lightning warfare. Soviet writers use this term which the Nazis introduced during World War II, although such a war would be of much shorter duration than the military campaigns of that war. If we are to believe a recent authoritative statement (and I say authoritative because it appeared as an unsigned article in *Krasnaya Zvezda* for 28 July 1965, with the notation: "Materials for Lectures and Seminars," i.e., for dissemination), ICBMs are no longer considered decisive. I quote: "Realistically evaluating the high military capability of [USSR] Strategic Missile Forces, Soviet military doctrine considers that victory over the aggressor can be attained only as a result of combined operations by all types of armed forces, all kinds of weapons being used in connection with their military possibilities [and] in close cooperation."

My comment is that this statement probably reflects the influence regained by the senior ground force officers as a result of Khrushchev's fall. Similar statements will probably be unlikely once his successor reestablishes firm Party control in the Soviet Union. We should note here that current Soviet military doctrine on nuclear war envisages the destruction not only of military objectives but also of industrial and political targets. In other


words, everything that feeds the military machine. Again I quote Marshal Sokolovskii from the article cited above who says: "Much discussion in the West has been heard about a so-called controlled nuclear war, about firing nuclear weapons only at military targets and the armed forces. This concept of a controlled [and he puts this word in quotes] 'nuclear war' represents a demagogic hypocrisy on the part of the militaristic circles of imperialism." In other words, they are going to hit everything.

The Soviet armed forces have been reorganized to conform to this concept of unlimited war. I have prepared a chart showing the individuals who are in charge of these various components within the Soviet armed forces. (CHART 1) You have Malinovskii up here. Joint Policy and Control is in the hands of Zakharov, the chief of staff. A.A. Epishev is only a colonel general but heads the Main Political Administration and, although he holds military rank is really a political commissar. Moskalenko runs the Chief Inspectorate. Bagramyan is Chief Directorate of the Rear. Here are the commands of the important force components: Ground Forces under Chuikov; Air Forces under Vershinin; Air Defense under Sudets; Navy under Fleet Admiral Gorshkov; and the Missile Forces under Krylov. All of these people are marshals, except for Gorshkov.

The small dots indicate full members of the Central Committee. One of them, Sudets, is only a candidate member of the Central Committee. Let me comment briefly also on Andrei Grechko, whose name I have already mentioned. He is in charge of the Warsaw Pact armed forces. He is also Commanding Officer of the groups of USSR forces stationed abroad—in East Germany, twenty divisions; in Poland (northern group of Soviet forces), two divisions; and in Hungary (southern group of Soviet forces), four divisions. So here abroad, outside of the USSR proper, you have twenty-six Soviet divisions under Grechko, who ranks Number Two in the military hierarchy, ahead of chief of staff Zakharov who is Number Three.

As far as Soviet troops are concerned, the ground forces obviously have the largest manpower. I have already shown you a table comparing NATO with Warsaw Pact forces. Probably something like two thirds of the 3.3 million total of Soviet troops alone today is in the ground forces. The latter are organized into 160 divisions, ten of these being airborne. The others are mostly either armored or motorized rifle units. They probably dispose of about 30,000 first-line tanks. Soviet troops have been trained under simulated conditions of nuclear warfare. This is why these

CHART I
USSR DEFENSE MINISTRY, 1965



gas masks appear in photographs. The USSR is placing more reliance on smaller autonomous units and, of course, it also possesses tactical missiles with ranges of anywhere from 10 to 450 miles. Any attack that may take place against Western Europe would be launched by these troops, i.e., the twenty-six divisions that are located outside the Soviet Union proper.

As far as the Air Force is concerned, the USSR has about 20,000 aircraft. They are grouped into different types. You have Front Aviation, and this would involve tactical air support. I would assume that about half of the available aircraft or 10,000 remain in this category. Then you have Fighter Aviation, which is under the Air Defense command. There is also Long-Range Aviation. Finally, you have aircraft which transport airborne troops, the ten divisions mentioned above. The thing to remember here again is that these air units would be under control of the ground commander. They would not be under Vershinin in combat but instead under Chuikov in the case of tactical air support. The commander of airborne troops would have direct control over aircraft for the transportation of his paratroopers.

The Navy under Fleet Admiral Giorshkov comprises four main fleets: Black, Baltic, White and Bering seas, and the Pacific Ocean. The surface units include something like twenty-five cruisers, 165 destroyers, 275 frigates, and about 1800 smaller vessels. The most important, obviously, is the Soviet submarine fleet. This totals about 450 units, 300 of these subs having been built since 1949, so they are relatively modern. About three fourths are ocean-going types, twenty-five of them nuclear-powered submarines. The source here is *Jane's Fighting Ships* (1963-1964). Then, finally, there is a Naval Air Arm, with about 4,000 aircraft, half of them being jets, and 1,000 light jet-bombers, as well as somewhere between 800 and 900 seaplanes.

TABLE 3	
THE SOVIET ARMED FORCES	
BRANCH	NUMBER
Army	2,200,000
Navy	460,000
Air Force	510,000
Security Troops	270,000
Total	3,440,000

Source: Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Communist Bloc and the Western Alliances: the Military Balance, 1964-1965* (London: November 1964).

I did mention but would like to talk briefly about Air Defense under Sudets. This is an organization which has not received too much publicity. Called literally, "Antiair and Antimissile Defense of the Country," it has received coequal status with the other branches of the armed forces and remains under the chief marshal of aviation. *PVO-Strany*, the abbreviation used in Russian, disposes of antiaircraft artillery, ground-to-air missiles, fighter interceptors, and even certain elements of the civil defense organization. The Soviets claimed this past March that they have anti-ICBM complexes around various cities. They were not specific as to which cities, but the claim appeared in *Krasnaya Zvezda*.

PVO-Strany is intended to carry on independently and to lessen the effects of nuclear strikes against the USSR. This objective is supported by the current seven-year plan, which ends on 31 December 1965, and which allocates forty per cent of all investments to such areas as the Urals, Siberia, the Soviet Far East, Kazakhstan, and Central Asia, that is, territories which would be relatively less damaged than European Russia in a nuclear war.

It remains essential, of course, that the bulk of the Soviet armed forces somehow survive and escape annihilation regardless of the destruction sustained by the civilian population centers. Here, I think it is worthwhile noting in an AP despatch from Moscow on 16 March 1965, which quoted Marshal Chuikov, the

man who commands Soviet ground forces as saying that the USSR was just then organizing a nationwide civil defense especially geared to cope with a nuclear attack. In other words, civilian population centers have a relatively low priority.

During phase one of a global conflict, a dispersal would probably take place into three major escape areas. An attempt might be made in the first place to occupy the NATO bridgehead of Western Europe, meaning of course, West Germany, France, Italy, Spain, and Portugal. Here again, the communist parties of France and Italy are relatively strong. They could give the support needed in terms of feeding and housing Soviet troops, because they would take over the civil administration. Also, the USSR presumably considers that the United States might be a little hesitant to attack Western Europe with nuclear weapons. So this would be a good place for dispersal and survival. This is one good reason also why the Soviets would be frustrated if the plan which was proposed recently by the Inspector General of the West German armed forces, General Heinz Trettner, were accepted by NATO. This, if you recall, involved a plan to establish a nuclear belt along West German borders with Czechoslovakia and East Germany.

A second major area for dispersal might be the Middle East. This would represent a logical place for troops now located in Turkestan and the Trans-Caucasus military districts. These men could be moved into Afghanistan, where the Soviets are now building roads and giving substantial foreign aid in the form of loans to that country. Up to twenty divisions probably could "settle" in the more fertile parts of the Middle East and establish viable military camps there.

And then, thirdly, I would assume that plans probably exist to disperse Soviet forces into the Far East, where remote areas can be selected which are removed from any potential targets for nuclear bombardment. Here, possibly deployment into Outer Mongolia is being considered, i. e., the so-called Mongolian People's Republic which is definitely under USSR influence and, in effect, remains a Soviet satellite. As a matter of fact, it is even a member of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, the East European economic organization. That is phase number one.

Phase two has many unknown factors. For example, what will be the extent of destruction in the USSR compared with the United

States and American bases overseas? The accuracy of the prediction by the Soviets which claims that both sides will continue warfare after phase one is important. Then also whether both sides or only one and which one would have any resources left for continued use in the production of nuclear weapons cannot be foreseen at present.

Current Soviet military doctrine foresees the firing of most, if not all, ICBMs in its first strike. This is a violation, as we all know, of one principle of war; economy of force. If neither side were capable of mounting any further nuclear strikes, then what will be the relationship in conventional forces? In the table on comparative strategic strength in 1965 between NATO and the Warsaw Pact (meaning the Soviet Union and all of Eastern Europe) you will notice that we have almost a thousand ICBMs compared with fewer than 300 for the USSR. In Navy missiles, again we are far ahead of the latter. IRBMs and MRBMs represent the only category where the Soviets dominate. They also have more medium bombers than we do. But again, these can be used only against Western Europe and not against the United States.

In terms of sea power, the Communist Bloc has no carriers as you know. There was a rumor in the *Foreign Report*, published by *The Economist of London* of 1 July 1965, that the Soviets are thinking of building a carrier. On the other hand, when they talk about American carriers, they always downgrade them. They are defined as "sitting ducks." But I think, the Soviet leaders are realizing the tremendous potentiality of carriers for amphibious warfare. In cruisers, escorts, and submarines they have many more than we do, although in nuclear ones we dominate. In terms of ground troops, the relationship is about equal, i.e., just over three million each.

I mentioned that the Soviets are trying to build an amphibious capability. Last July, for the first time, the USSR revealed that it was reestablishing a Marine Corps. The Soviets did have a Marine Corps in the past which they call "Sea Infantry." They had 500,000 men in the Marine Corps during World War II, but this was infantry which fought on the land. They fought as you recall in the defense of Moscow, Leningrad, and conducted only limited amphibious operations. As of July 1964, the USSR has reestablished a Marine Corps. Photographs have depicted some of these Marines. First of all, they are the only troops who wear berets. In a picture which appeared in *Krasnaya Zvezda* on 16 September 1964, they wore black uniforms, sailor-type shirts, and combat boots. In other words, the beret and the combat boots certainly

are meant to show that this is an elite force. When one reads descriptions of Soviet Marines, they are always considered to be the toughest and are called "black death."

What is the USSR's intended use of these Marines? Again, I quote from *Foreign Report* which I think has been relatively accurate in the past. It states that the Soviets are building the nucleus for a strategic bridgehead in Africa; namely, an air base at a place called Tamala in the northern bush country of Ghana. It will have an 11,000-foot runway. Well, there are no airplanes in Africa today that require such a long runway. The project will take some four years to complete and something like twenty million dollars. The USSR is putting its own labor and equipment into the construction. If this report is true, perhaps it may explain why the Soviet Union is rebuilding a Marine Corps, i.e., to establish amphibious bases in Africa and other areas.

The foregoing reconstruction of possible Soviet military strategy is based on open sources, as mentioned. It shows one thing, I think, namely that the USSR High Command is well advanced in its study of the kind of war that may have to be fought in the future. I think that there is a very practical danger to the USSR (and they realize this) from American bases overseas. The Soviets are making an attempt to reduce the number of these bases. Marshal Andrei Grechko, who was identified previously as the Commanding Officer of the Warsaw Pact forces, stated that United States strategic bases will increase tenfold in number by 1967 in comparison with 1961, according to *Krasnaya Zvezda*, 27 December 1963. It is not really important whether this is true. What remains significant is that the elimination of these bases represents a fundamental element in Soviet political, as well as military, strategy. I would like to run through some of these proposals very briefly.

The Soviet Union sponsored initially, and somehow this has proliferated, the idea of nuclear-free zones. It started with the Adam Rapacki Plan by the communist minister of foreign affairs in Poland to denuclearize Central Europe. Then came the East German "Sea of Peace" plan in the Baltic. The USSR suggested the same thing for the Balkans and the Adriatic. Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana suggested an atom-free zone for Africa. Finally and most recently, of course, came the ten-nation resolution in the UN about Latin America.

Another aspect of this is the so-called Pugwash conferences. The fourteenth was held in Venice, Italy in April 1965. What happened here involved Soviet writers, soldiers, and diplomats who met with their counterparts from the West. The former were unanimous and "sincere" in their support of Soviet proposals for universal disarmament. The net result, if we did disarm, would be to paralyze American power through the elimination of armed forces and general staff, as well as their replacement by so-called militias. The term militia is used to mean a domestic police force. The effect would be simply that communist militias in the Soviet Union and the East European countries would rush to the assistance of any armed uprising or even attempted subversion by a communist party in Western Europe. Of course, there would be no United States forces available either on the continent of Europe or any ICBMs to strike back at the USSR.

Let me briefly mention the relationship between strategy and politics in a very few minutes. Chart II shows the probable military policy-making team in the Soviet Union as of 1965.

CHART II		
PROBABLE MILITARY POLICY-MAKING TEAM, 1965		
NAME		POSITION
	(AGE)	
1. Brezhnev	(58)	1st Secretary, CPSU
2. Podgorny	(61)	Unofficial 2nd Secretary
3. Shelepin	(46)	Deputy Premier
4. Kosygin	(60)	Premier
5. Mikoyan	(69)	Chairman, Supreme Soviet
6. Malinovskii		Defense Minister
7. Semichastny		KGB Chief (Secret Police)
8. Gromyko		Foreign Minister
9. Smirnov		Deputy Premier (Defense Indus.)
10. Novikov		Chairman, Supreme Sovnarkhoz

You will notice Brezhnev. He is fifty-eight. Podgorny, the Number Two man in the Party, who is in charge of cadres and organization, is sixty-one. Shelepin is forty-six and a man who bears watching. He is the former head of the KGB (secret police) and before that

headed the youth movement. Khrushchev put him in charge of the secret police to give it a good image. This man is currently a member of the Secretariat and of the Presidium, and he was, until recently, a deputy premier in the government and also in charge of the now apparently defunct Party-State Control Committee. Number Three man is Kosygin, the premier, and he is sixty years old. Mikoyan is sixty-nine. These five men are on the Presidium. They are the ones who make the decisions, because of their positions on the policy-making organ. If they need military advice, they call in Malinovskii; foreign policy advice, Gromyko; information on the defense industry, Smirnov; and finally, the economy in general, Novikov.

These are the men then who make the decisions, and you will notice that the military are not really represented in the top five. The military hierarchy in the USSR traditionally has accepted the famous Clausewitz dictum that strategy is subordinate to politics. Several years ago, however, Major General Talenskii, whom I have mentioned, described military strategy as "an active aid to policy, at times exerting decisive influence on its development, which phenomenon manifests itself in our times." Even more recently, the current chief of staff, Marshal Zakharov wrote, and I quote: "In a scholarly atmosphere research workers cannot be tolerated who try to lend weight to their superficial and primitive judgments by making reference sometimes even to somebody [Khrushchev?] who had no direct connection with military strategy." This was a recent article, appearing in *Krasnaya Zvezda* on 4 February 1965.

These people are trying to stake out some influence in the making of military strategy. The above remark probably reflects the ascendancy of the military to a certain extent following Khrushchev's ouster, and it is an ascendancy which certainly will last while the top political leaders are jockeying for power.

In a second edition of the 503-page book *Voennaya Strategiya* (*Military Strategy*) which was edited by fifteen top officers, the editor in chief being Marshal Sokolovskii, fewer than five pages discuss the relationship between the military and the politicians. Here is what is said, and I quote: "The essence of war as an extension of politics does not depend upon changes in technology or armaments." In other words, the relationship remains the same. Nevertheless, prolonged and repeated crises in the Soviet Union could lead to an enhanced role for the military. This was the case in June 1957, when Khrushchev sought Zhukov's support against the majority of the Party Presidium. And it seems true to a lesser

extent today. Finally, it remains arguable whether or not further development in this direction (the ascendancy by the military) would increase the chances of war. Certainly, if one looks back at the history of both Nazi Germany and Stalinist Russia, it was the Party leaders rather than the professional soldiers who conceived of and implemented the really disastrous policies.

BIOGRAPHIC SKETCH

Dr. Richard F. Staar (Ph.D., University of Michigan) is Professor of Political Science, Emory University. As an authority on the governments, politics and the International relations of the Soviet Bloc, Dr. Staar has visited in 18 European countries on both sides of the Iron curtain. A professor since leaving government service in 1954 where he served with the CIA and Department of State as an intelligence research specialist, Dr. Staar speaks and reads seven foreign languages including Russian. He has lectured in both France and West Germany, and has been recording tapes for the Voice of America since 1957. In the 1963-1964 academic year, Dr. Staar occupied the Chester W. Nimitz Chair of Social and Political Philosophy at the Naval War College while on leave of absence from Emory University. He is a contributor to many professional journals and is author of *Communist Party Leadership: a Study in Elite Stability*, and *Poland, 1944-1962: the Sovietization of a Captive People*. Dr. Staar holds a commission of Major in the United States Marine Corps Reserve.

THE ECONOMY OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

A lecture delivered
at the Naval War College
on 28 September 1965

by

Mr. Harry Schwartz

When one talks about the economy of Communist China, one is immediately faced with a paradox. While it is possible to talk about the economy of Communist China as a homogeneous entity much the same as the economy of the United States, Great Britain, or France, we should actually consider that the economy of Communist China is, in fact, two economies. It is this concept of two economies that I should like to dwell on in this lecture.

One economy, which you might call the "major" economy (I call it *major* simply because it embraces most of the population of the country), is the economy of a very poor and underdeveloped country. It includes that great mass of Chinese peasants tilling the soil in a rather primitive fashion. They have few tractors or other farm machines. Most of the motive power in Chinese agriculture is provided by animals—oxen, water buffaloes, and the like—and by human beings. It is an agriculture which is, in the main, as primitive and as backward as any in the world. It is an agriculture in which land is very densely populated; where you have people trying to make a living by the extensive cultivation of two or three acres per person. It is, in short, the classical agriculture of China that has changed little from five hundred or two thousand years ago.

The "minor" economy—*minor* in terms of the total country and population—is the economy with which you would be more concerned. It is what we might call "islands" of modern industrial technology and modern industrial scientific production. These islands, in the aggregate, do not amount to much by such normal

measuring sticks as gross national product, production of steel, and the like. The Chinese have not published any industrial production statistics since the year 1960. However, the general impression, which can't be too far wrong, is that they may be producing somewhere in the neighborhood of ten to fourteen million tons of steel annually.

The United States now produces well over a hundred million tons of steel; the Soviet Union produces almost a hundred million tons of steel; and Japan, West Germany, Great Britain, and France all produce more than do the Chinese. If we use steel as a rough indicator, the Chinese industrial economy isn't very great. However, we live in a world where some of these "islands," if they can get the backing of the state and the required allocation of resources, can produce some very major achievements. What I am thinking about, of course, is that one of these islands of modern industry and technology in the Chinese economy has, to date, produced at least two atomic bombs. Presumably there are others which have not been exploded. So you have this curious dichotomy in China: a country which is, overall, one of the most backward, most poverty-stricken in the world; and yet which has been able to become the fifth nuclear power. It is the only country in the underdeveloped world to have nuclear weapons.

However, the poverty of the country is a drag on the Chinese economy. Its leaders have been trying to overcome this. Much of the history of the Chinese economy over the past fifteen years has been concerned with efforts to accelerate economic growth and industrialization. It should be borne in mind that the present situation in Communist China is one which, from the point of view of the dreams of the leaders, is highly disappointing. The leaders of Communist China, as of a decade ago, had hoped that their country would now be much further along on the road to industrialization.

When you think of Chinese industrialization, it is important to remember that Communist China started from a much smaller industrial base than the Russians. We tend to use the term "underdeveloped" rather loosely; we think of Russia in, say 1913, as having been underdeveloped, and of China as having been underdeveloped in the last years of nationalist rule. While this is true it is misleading, because Russia in 1913 produced roughly four million tons of steel; it had one of the longest railroads in the world, the Trans-Siberian Railroad; and it had a long tradition of science and technology. In the 19th century,

the Russians contributed significantly to science and technology. For example, Meudeleev discovered the periodic table of elements. Pavlov, the discoverer of conditioned reflex, was also one of the discoverers of non-Euclidean geometry. Thus Russia, in the 19th century, already had a very thriving, if small, tradition of accomplishment in science and technology, along with its application to modern industrial production. This base did not exist in China, and what I am trying to suggest is, that in some very important respects, China, in 1950, was very far behind the Russia of 1913. One indicator of this is the fact that China in 1950 had a steel production of less than one million tons, which is less than one quarter of what the Russians enjoyed in 1913.

When the Chinese Communists took over in 1949 and 1950, they attempted to impose upon China an economic system which was, in large measure, simply a duplicate of the Soviet system. I understand that Professor Berliner of Brandeis University described the Soviet economic system to you, so I shall not dwell on that in any great detail. Essentially, the Chinese People's Republic had nationalized all significant industry by 1956. They had eliminated individual peasant farming and had created a system of collective farms; they had introduced a system of governmental economic planning under the State Planning Commission—one which operated in very much the same way as the Soviet system operates. It is a system that attempts to account for the major resources available, and then allocates those resources to the primary needs of the nation as determined by the political leadership of the country. Thus, the Chinese, with due regard to the differences in the size and the backwardness of the country, had imitated the Russian pattern up to 1956.

There was, however, at least one major difference in that, during the first years of the 1950s, the Chinese received rather substantial aid from the Russians. Much of this aid was in the form of technical assistance, rather than purely monetary assistance. The Russians did give the Chinese a 300-million-dollar loan at the beginning of 1950 and additional loans in 1954, but the monetary amount wasn't very great. However, the Russians did send thousands of their Soviet advisers to Red China—engineers, architects, chemists, and skilled workers of all kinds. They helped the Chinese draw up plans and build modern plants in a wide variety of areas. The Russians also educated and trained thousands of Chinese in Soviet universities, laboratories, and factories. Similarly, the Russians supplied the

machinery required for the new Chinese factories. There were several hundred modern factories involved in this very substantial injection of industrial technology into China from the Soviet Union.

A major difference arose between the Soviet and the Chinese economic patterns of development in 1957-1958. The cause seems to have been the feeling on the part of the Chinese leadership that continued dependence upon technological aid from the Soviet Union, was simply too slow a process. The impatience of the Chinese Communists resulted in what they called "the great leap forward." The great-leap-forward period, which was nominally supposed to be the three-year period from 1958 to 1960, was an attempt to move ahead extremely rapidly within a very short period. Those of us who have studied Soviet economic history believe that the idea for the "great leap forward" in China came from the Soviet experience of the early 1930s, when the Russians did make a very great leap forward. Since the Chinese started at a lower level than did the Russians, they had a more difficult task. This difference in starting points obviously had something to do with the final outcome.

The "great leap forward" had two aspects—one in industry and one in agriculture. In industry, there was adopted the policy called "walking on two legs." This has a poetic ring, and one of the charming things about working in China is their rather poetic language. We talk about "free speech"; the Chinese talk about "letting a hundred flowers bloom." We use a rather prosaic language, but it is quite exciting to see the Chinese perspective—such as their walking-on-two-legs industrial policy. "Walking on two legs" was essentially an attempt to push industrialization ahead, not just in one way, but in two ways. One leg was the old and usual manner of building cities and modern plants, taking time to instruct and train the workers, to get machinery and so on. This was simply a continuation of what had been done in the early or mid-1930s.

The other leg was an attempt to mobilize the huge labor power of China. You must remember that by general estimates, which may be off by 50 to 100 million people, China now has around 700 million people. While China has always been short of capital, it does have an enormous manpower reserve. This other industrial leg was the formal policy of having people, all through China, use rather primitive techniques to produce goods needed in a modern society.

The key element was the backyard iron and steel furnace. There was a period in 1958 and 1959 when just about every apartment house in every major Chinese city, and every house in every Chinese farm village, had to have a small blast furnace somewhere in the backyard to make iron and steel, using local raw materials. They used this technique in many ways: to create small furnaces for copper, small factories for manufactured goods, and so on.

These installations were primitive and inefficient by standards of modern technology. Nevertheless, the idea was that there would be so many of them, that in the aggregate they would make a major contribution to the industrialization of the country. You can see the immense effort that was involved when, in 1958, it was claimed that there existed about 700 thousand of these backyard furnaces, and that they produced over 5 million tons of steel. This was the official claim which sounds very impressive. However, there were certain elements that the Chinese had not taken into account. One was that the production of these backyard furnaces and analogous installations were of such poor quality, that most of it was ineffective. As a matter of fact, there were some economists who estimated that the value of this production was negative on the basis that the cost of the raw materials and the labor inputs were greater than the value of the output.

This effort to substitute the low-paid labor of millions of Chinese for the missing capital simply failed, and failed dismally. Moreover, there was a further negative consequence. The Chinese leaders assumed that they had a large reservoir of unemployed manpower. What they hadn't realized was that this unemployed labor was only seasonally unemployed. At the height of the agricultural season, many of these people were needed in the fields. However, when they should have been in the fields, they had to tend their furnaces and were thus not available for farming. This failure to consider seasonally employed agricultural workers had serious consequences in the agricultural sector of the Chinese economy.

With the great change of 1958, and the agricultural revolution of the great-leap-forward period, "people's communes" were created. In American terms, how shall we define *people's commune*? As an oversimplified example, a people's commune would be as though you took all the people in every American county, and combined all these people into one governmental and economic organization. Remember that before the communes,

there had been collective farms in China. There were hundreds of thousands of these collective farms on the Soviet model. However, under the new program, these collective farms were abolished and amalgamated into the people's communes. The theory was that with the people's communes, a number of advantages would result. Private property would be abolished, and the labor of all of the people within a commune would be available for whatever work was needed. As an example, one day a couple of thousand of workers could be marched off to till the fields, and that was all that was required. The next day, they could be marched off somewhere else to help build a dam or canal, or whatever work was required. It was really a Chinese adaptation of Trotsky's idea of labor armies. As a matter of fact, the roots of this idea could go even further. If you have read the Communist Manifesto of Marx and Engels, you would find that one of their notions was that agriculture, after a triumph of the communists, would be handled by huge labor armies. The communes were apparently an attempt to effectuate that concept.

A second function of the communes was military, and this has remained to the present day. The concept was that everyone of adult or semiadult age would get military training. The commune, therefore, became a unit for militia training where hundreds of millions of people received training in the elements of guerrilla warfare. Moreover, it was thought that the people's communes would provide a faster approach to the theoretical communist state. In this connection, communes resulted in the destruction of family ties and traditions. In some cases whole families were simply wiped out. The population was resettled into dormitories. Men were settled in male dormitories and the women in female dormitories; husbands and wives were permitted to meet once or twice a month if they were good production workers. I suppose this was a way of providing some incentive to the workers.

As part of the idea of moving toward communism, payment was by a rationing system. Normally people were not paid money. If they did receive money, it was very little. Meals were provided without cost, as were haircuts once a month and one suit of clothes. It was a little like being in the Navy. The idea was to get rid of private property, to make everybody available for work wherever the need existed, and to abolish inequality.

At first, the Chinese leaders thought that this was the greatest discovery of all times. In the fall of 1958, they began printing very "snooty" articles which enraged the Russians. These writings

suggested that the communes were highly successful because they were using such revolutionary methods in production and agriculture, and that China was obviously only a couple of years away from perfect communism. Of course, when the Chinese began to make such claims, it was an implicit rebuke to the Russians. These claims, in effect, said, "There are those slow-pokey Russian Communists. They have been in charge of their country for 41 years, and are not even talking about when they will have perfect communism. We Chinese Communists have been in charge for less than a decade, and already we can see the advance of perfect communism around the corner." The difficulty was that the communism the Chinese were dreaming of in 1958 just didn't seem to come.

To make a long story short, the Chinese Communist government simply blundered into a very embarrassing situation when they announced such fabulous agricultural production results. The figures do not matter now, but they came pretty close to claiming that in 1958 alone, they had doubled the production of grain. People like myself looked at these claims and wondered what they meant. We were flabbergasted in that the claims made no sense whatever; and yet, it seemed inconceivable that a modern government would make such fantastic claims without having some real basis. I recall a certain agency in Washington which issued a forecast, based on projections of these results, indicating that China would be a great economic power by 1962-63. If you projected the kind of progress the Chinese Communists were claiming in 1958-59, their progress was really very frightening.

What happened was very simple. The people's communes did not do much in the way of improving actual production. Under terrific pressure from above to obtain good results, the managers of those communes felt there was one thing that they could do: make up good statistics. The output of the communes was, above all, a crop of glowing statistics in production. For a while, everyone was eating and gorging themselves on the assumption that they had a tremendous amount of food. Before long, food supplies were exhausted. An investigation was hurriedly conducted, and it was embarrassing for Premier Chou En-lai to have to announce that the original production figures had to be corrected—like cutting them nearly 75 percent.

As with industrial progress, the impatience of the Chinese Communists had betrayed them. Those who carried out this

agricultural revolution knew very little about the peculiarities of Chinese agriculture or local conditions. The great wealth of wisdom that existed on how to till the land under the intense population demands of China was ignored and wasted. As a result, agricultural production deteriorated. Much of the work of the communes was actually disastrous. For example, irrigation canals were built in such a way that much of the land became waterlogged and excessively polluted by salt. The whole program was a genuine debacle.

The Chinese, while never admitting defeat, hurriedly backed away on certain agricultural policies. They have kept the people's communes, but there has been a trend back to the old collective farm system. They are now called "agricultural brigades," and there is even a smaller farming unit called "the production team." The whole role of the communes has, therefore, been cut back sharply, and all of the folderol of reaching perfect communism has been dropped. The peasant is now allowed to have a little garden of his own. He can keep a couple of chickens, and maybe a pig, if he is really wealthy. Payment to workers is now unequal; families are reunited; and things are more nearly "normal."

It wasn't enough that the Chinese were set back in 1958 and 1959 by the failure of both of these aspects of the "great leap forward." They received another blow in 1960 when the entire struggle between the Chinese and the Russians came to the fore. In the summer of 1960, the Soviet government ordered all of its technicians, some 1300 to 1400 of them, to come home. Most of them took their blueprints with them. This meant that the Chinese were often left with half-completed factories, or with factories whose structures were completed but with machinery still in the process of being installed. Before the Chinese really knew what had happened, the Soviet technicians were gone and had taken their blueprints with them.

Natural disasters also appear to have had an effect during this period. The net impact of all of these setbacks was that the Chinese economy went into a distinct nose dive. The magnitude of its depression can be indicated by the fact that the Chinese Communists officially claimed that they produced 18 million tons of steel in 1960. Western estimates are that in 1962, they may have produced only 7 million. As I indicated earlier, I thought that the 1965 figure was probably in the 10 to 14 million ton range.

What do I mean when I say that the Chinese economy went into a terrific nose dive? China apparently had extremely bad

harvests for several years. Their leaders claim that these bad harvests were primarily the result of the worst weather Communist China had ever experienced. Every area that could have a flood was flooded; every year that could have a drought had the worse drought in a hundred years. Even though the weather may have been bad, there are some of us who think that God wasn't out to wage meteorological warfare against the Chinese. The blunders of the people's commune movement had come home to roost and these errors had much to do with their predicament. Whatever the causes, it is quite clear that food production in Communist China went down.

We know from once-secret documents that are now available, that there were periods in 1960 and 1962 when the leaders of Communist China were afraid of revolution because they didn't trust their own army. The army was, after all, composed of peasant youngsters, many of whom must have received letters from their folks and friends at home telling of the starving conditions.

Thus, the combination of the Russian pull-out and the agricultural catastrophe forced the Chinese Communist leadership into a tremendous campaign of retrenchment. The entire order of priorities for economic development was completely revamped. During the 1950s, the order of priorities had been primarily the same as the Russians—heavy industry first. This was supposed to make China a modern, industrial, technical, and military power. The Chinese also wanted to have their own nuclear weapons, their own Polaris-carrying submarines, their own ICBMs, and so on. After all, these were the status symbols of the modern world.

In the early 1960s, the push for heavy-industry-first was temporarily abandoned with top priority being given to agriculture. When I say that top priority was given to agriculture, they really had no alternative when they couldn't feed the swollen population of their industrial cities. Moreover, as a result of not being able to feed their population adequately, many of their workers, particularly the coal miners, were so weak that they just couldn't mine enough coal, which meant that their productivity went way down. The result was that several million people were shipped out of the cities to the farm areas where they were told to find some way to feed themselves. A great many of China's factories, which had either been built with Russian help or inherited from the nationalist regime, were either closed down or only worked at a quarter or a

half of their capacity. Almost all of the resources of the country were focused on the desperate job of trying to get enough food to feed the people. It was during this period that the Chinese began buying large quantities of grain from abroad—a practice which they have continued every year since 1961, up to and including 1965.

It is now clear that during this process of retrenchment, there must have been at least one area of military effort which the Chinese kept going—the nuclear one. This nuclear effort is one which was begun no later than 1957. We know that in October 1957, the Soviet Union and China entered into a secret treaty in which the Soviet Union pledged itself: (a) to transfer nuclear weapons to China, and (b) to help the Chinese develop their own nuclear weapons industry. Unfortunately, for the Chinese, the Russians reneged on that treaty in June 1959. We knew nothing about it at the time. However, in this period of almost two years, the Russians must have given the Chinese a good start in nuclear technology. The Chinese continued their nuclear development even while they were being hit by the economic catastrophes of the early 1960s. As you know, the day after Khrushchev was deposed in Moscow last year, the Chinese exploded their first atomic bomb.

We have in China today a country which has apparently (I stress the word *apparently* because the Chinese are still not releasing any statistics) recovered, at least partially, from the catastrophes of the early 1960s. Food production has apparently improved. Visitors to China report that in cities like Shanghai, Canton, and Peking, there seems to be more food; rations are more nearly fulfilled (unlike the earlier period when people couldn't even get what they were supposed to get); and that things generally seem better. The Chinese also claim they have used this period of retrenchment to improve the quality of their industrial production, and to extend very sharply the range of industrial products they can produce. This is evident when the Chinese participate in an industrial fair in which they show off some fairly large machine tools and other complex items of machinery with the boast that they were made in China. They argue that they are now far less dependent upon foreign industrial and technological aid than they were a few years ago. In other words, this has been a period of initial retreat and then regroupment of forces. The general impression the Chinese give is that they may be very close to a new attempt at moving forward industrially.

It is rather interesting that the Chinese have recently admitted some 150 foreign correspondents into China on very short notice. There were no Americans included, but these correspondents have already been provided one story of note. A former Chinese Nationalist official, a Vice-President who defected to the communists several months ago, gave a press conference in which he said that the United States had asked him to overthrow Chiang Kai-shek in 1955. This is certainly too minor a story to justify the unprecedented admission of 150 foreign correspondents. However, we did know that on October 1st, the Chinese Communists would be celebrating their sixteenth anniversary. It may be that the foreign correspondents were desired in Peking for this celebration in order to announce a new five-year plan, or some other new ambitious plan aimed at once more starting the Chinese economic advance. Be that as it may, Communist China has some glaring weaknesses at the moment.

Now what are the weaknesses of the People's Republic of China? Look at it from the military point of view. One of their weaknesses is clearly that much of their military equipment, such as planes, tanks, and more complex weapons, is Russian in origin, and the Russians for some time have not been supplying them with spare parts. In any case, this equipment is now rather obsolete. Then again, military technology is changing rather rapidly, and the planes they received in 1957 or 1958 may not be the most desirable equipment with which to wage a present-day war.

Another weakness is in the area of oil. The Chinese were able to fight in Korea because the Russians supplied the oil—a good deal of oil. Since then, the Chinese claim to have increased their oil production quite substantially. Their last published figure was about 5 million metric tons of oil in 1960. They have claimed vaguely that they have been increasing their oil production in the years following. In fact, a year or two ago, the claim was made that China was now "basically self-sufficient in petroleum." This may be true for the kind of primitive economy China has today, but China would be unable to fight a modern war, using mass flights of planes, with their present petroleum facilities.

Russian-supplied petroleum products would somewhat alleviate the seriousness of Chinese fuel demands. However, continuation of the Soviet-Chinese rift places the supply of Russian oil in questionable perspective. The fact that the Chinese can't properly count on the Russians to supply them with very much oil would seem to suggest real limitations in the use of air and sea power in the event

of a war with the United States. Their emphasis seems to be that if they get into a war with us, it will finally be decided on the ground in a guerrilla-type action. The Chinese seem to envision a South Vietnam-type war, but expanded a hundredfold to the dimensions of Communist China. Some of the people I know in the Army don't particularly like to fight under the conditions in South Vietnam. I can assume they would like even less to fight under similar conditions in China. I hardly blame them.

Let me conclude that the Chinese economy, by the usual indicators, by the usual status symbols of a major power, is really a joke. Even with nuclear power, it's quite clear that if the Chinese dare to use nuclear weapons in anger or in war, they are simply asking for their own destruction. I don't believe it is classified to say that the United States can very easily destroy China several times over with the stockpile of United States' nuclear weapons. I do not think that the Chinese really intend to use their nuclear weapons for military purposes. The nuclear weapon is primarily important in their minds as a status symbol—as a sign to underdeveloped countries that China should be regarded as a leader of the underdeveloped countries. After all, the People's Republic of China is the only such country that has a nuclear weapon.

What I am really trying to say is that for certain kinds of warfare, it is China which is the paper tiger rather than the United States. If you are talking about air or sea warfare, China is a joke. On the other hand, partisan warfare is the kind of war that the Chinese Nationalists and Communists alike fought against the Japanese in the early 1930s. This is the kind of war which the Chinese seem to be preparing for under the assumption they may be attacked by the United States. At least, that is what the Chinese Communists say. However, looking ahead, I see no reason why China should not in time become a major industrial, technological, and military power. The Chinese, once they have recovered from the catastrophe of what was the "great flop backwards" rather than the "great leap forward," should be able to move ahead. I think they have learned a lesson, and after the debacle of the late 1950s and early 1960s, they will be more cautious. Given time, there is no reason why the Chinese can't make hydrogen bombs; why they can't make ICBMs; why there can't be a Chinese equivalent of SAMOS or Sputniks orbiting the earth and taking pictures; etcetera.

In terms of modern military technology, I don't see China as a problem today. I do think, however, that the generation of my children, which will have to worry about China twenty years from now, really has something to think about. For both the United States and the Soviet Union, I would suppose that one of the great strategic problems to be faced is: Should the United States and the Soviet Union, either alone or together, permit Communist China to become a modern military and industrial power? Or should they take measures in the near future to interdict the growth of that power? That is a question beyond my competence, and perhaps your competence.

BIOGRAPHIC SKETCH

Mr. Harry Schwartz (Ph.D., Columbia University) is presently employed by *The New York Times* as a specialist on Soviet Affairs. He has served in numerous governmental agencies, including the State Department, as an economist. During World War II, Mr. Schwartz served in the U.S. Army and also with the Office of Strategic Services. Prior to his present assignment with *The New York Times*, he was Professor of Economics, Syracuse University. In addition to numerous articles in newspapers and magazines dealing with the political and economic life of the Soviet Bloc, Mr. Schwartz is also the author of *Russia's Soviet Economy* and *The Red Phoenix*.

NEW DIMENSIONS IN EXTENSION

DID YOU KNOW THAT . . . the Naval War College Correspondence Course in Counterinsurgency provides an insight to understanding the threat of communism and why we must take our stand in Vietnam? The president of a college in New York, a Naval Reserve officer, recently had this to say concerning this correspondence course.

Forced study in concentrated fashion of some of the most important ideas and techniques of communism has served as a foundation for interpreting much current news which would be otherwise unintelligible. As an unexpected side effect, I believe I am gaining some insight into characteristic tactics of student activists of the kind who operated in the University of California at Berkeley, and who are all too likely to appear on other college campuses. As a new College President, I have more than passing interest in understanding, anticipating, and countering activities and techniques and tactics of this kind.

DID YOU KNOW THAT . . . a Professor of History at a university in Illinois, a Naval Reserve aviator, had this to say about the Naval War College Correspondence Course, International Relations?

The systematic study required for answering the questions has clarified and sharpened my previous knowledge and will be of professional benefit in my teaching.

DID YOU KNOW THAT . . . just as the Naval War College was the first service college in this country, so also was the first correspondence course for officer advanced professional education instituted by the Naval War College? A correspondence course in Strategy and Tactics was started in 1914 by Lieutenant William S. Pye, who as Vice Admiral later became President of the Naval War College.

Although continuously updated, and recently subdivided into several shorter course segments to facilitate student utilization, the same educational philosophy used then has been carefully preserved in the current War College correspondence courses in the field of strategy and tactics. A description of courses offered and the procedure for enrollment can be found in the current BUPERS Instruction 1500.49A, the Naval War College Brochure of Courses, and this issue of the *Review*.

DID YOU KNOW THAT . . . CDR Charles M. Itte, USN has recently completed the Correspondence Course of Naval Command and Staff and has been awarded a diploma for this achievement? This package plan consists of the following four courses (or their equivalent): National and International Security Organization, Military Planning, Naval Operations, and Command Logistics. Completion of these four courses closely parallels a command and staff level of education.

CORRESPONDENCE SCHOOL

COURSE DESCRIPTIONS

The aim of this School is to provide the educational benefits of the War College to those officers currently unable to attend the resident Schools. To this end, all correspondence courses are continually reviewed and updated to keep them in consonance with the resident courses.

These courses are available to all officers of the United States military services and the Coast Guard of the grade of Navy Lieutenant (or equivalent) and above in active service, or in the inactive reserve. Additionally, courses are also available to selected government employees of the grade of GS-10 (or equivalent) and above. The waiver of rank or grade requirement may be granted for qualified individuals in lower grades. Applications from active duty officers should be by letter via Commanding Officer or the enrollment card provided in this issue. Applications from inactive duty officers should be by letter via Commandant Naval District or command maintaining record. Listed below are courses currently available. Reserve Officer retirement and promotion points are indicated.

NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ORGANIZATION, NWC 14. 2 Installments—18 Points.

A study of the National Security Council; the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Office of the Secretary of Defense; Headquarters of the Military Departments; Unified, Joint, and Combined Organizations; International Security Organizations; and Foreign Aid Programs.

COMMAND LOGISTICS, NWC 15 . 3 Installments—27 Points.

A study of basic logistic considerations, logistic elements and functions; interrelationships of strategy, tactics, and the basic elements and functions of logistics; the impact of future developments and trends of warfare upon the field of logistics; and the impact of future developments in the field of logistics upon the concept of warfare from the command viewpoint.

INTERNATIONAL LAW, NWC 16. 6 Installments—54 Points.

This course is designed to provide the student with the means to gain an understanding of principles of international law having to do with the organization of the world community, with emphasis on areas of naval interest and with specific application of these principles to the Naval Officer's profession.

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, NWC 17. 6 Installments—54 Points.

This course is designed to provide the student with the means to gain an understanding of the fundamental elements and basic principles of international relations and the relationship of these elements and principles to the formulation of national strategy.

MILITARY PLANNING, NWC 18. 2 Installments—18 Points.

A study of the systematic techniques of logical analysis as applied to military planning using a problem situation; and an introduction to staff organization, functions, staff studies and planning directives.

NAVAL OPERATIONS, NWC 19. 2 Installments—18 Points.

A course comprising a study of the characteristics of four major weapons systems and considerations for their employment: submarine, antisubmarine, attack carrier, and amphibious forces. The student need select and complete only two of the four installments; however, a combination of the submarine and anti-submarine installments may not be selected.

STRATEGIC PLANNING, NWC 20. 4 Installments—36 Points.

A National Security Council level study of national objectives, interests, and policies, and their relation to national strategy; Soviet interests, objectives, and likely courses of action; strategic planning at the level of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and strategic considerations at a Unified/Specified Command level.

COUNTERINSURGENCY, NWC 21. 4 Installments—36 Points.

To provide a means for the student to prepare himself for positions of responsibility which involve the planning and conduct of counterinsurgency programs and to acquire an understanding of the possible contributions of all governmental departments and the need to integrate their available capabilities into effective programs to attain our national objectives.



Recognition of successful completion of individual courses is afforded by the award of a certificate and issuance of a letter of completion. Notification of successful course completion is forwarded to the Chief of Naval Personnel, or other appropriate authority, for inclusion in the student's selection jacket.

In addition, the President of the Naval War College will award a special diploma to those officers who successfully complete a "Package Plan" of correspondence courses. This nonresident program of studies closely parallels those offered at the Naval War College's resident courses of Naval Command and Staff and Naval Warfare, and is organized accordingly:

The Correspondence Course of Naval Command and Staff. The special diploma awarded for graduation from this course indicates successful completion of the following four correspondence courses: National and International Security Organization, Military Planning, Naval Operations, and Command Logistics.

The Correspondence Course of Naval Warfare. The special diploma awarded for graduation from this course indicates successful completion of eight correspondence courses, the above-listed four courses required for the Correspondence Course of Naval Command and Staff, plus the following: Counterinsurgency, Strategic Planning, International Relations, and International Law.

FOUR CHARACTERISTICS OF THE U.S. ARMY

by

Colonel William F. Long, Jr., USA, Army Adviser
School of Naval Command and Staff
Naval War College

The United States Army is more than the organization, deployments and capabilities which currently capture our interest. It is the tradition of all wars past, a reflection of the historical character of our country and the concepts and philosophies of the current generation of Army leaders. It is true that when all the lines are written and all the words are spoken, it is the ability of the Army to fight on the ground and to ultimately exercise control over people that counts. However, the ideas and ideals that molded and continue to guide the molding of the modern U.S. Army are very much a part of the moral fibre and combat readiness of the source of American land power.

In this respect there are at least four major characteristics of the U.S. Army which merit delineation and development. These are the four "M's": Militia Tradition, Mobilization Miracles, Man-Minded, and Maritime Influence.

1. **Militia Tradition.** The first characteristic of the U.S. Army is that it reflects the militia tradition which has pervaded the concepts and management of the U.S. Army from its inception—and before. The colonial tradition, which initially relied almost exclusively upon the citizen as a military man, gave rise to the present concepts of civilian control. In our folklore, the rifleman occupies a primary place. The realities of our early history required the use of arms, and the organization of civilian life placed emphasis upon the responsibilities and the right of the citizen to bear arms. There was also the tendency for civilian leaders to continue exercising their community control in militia formations. Although it has long since been discovered that professional military qualifications and civilian community leadership is an

inexact equation, the proposition that leaders must have the willing support and confidence of the men in the ranks continues to condition our concepts of discipline and leadership.

One aspect of the militia tradition which has been particularly troublesome is the "fight and come home" ideas based on the concept that civilians become soldiers long enough to fight and win the battle, then return to carry on the civilian pursuits which were interrupted by war. This has continued to be a powerful psychological influence even in modern times when the military and political situations are damaged by it.

The militia tradition also reflects a fundamental American persuasion that professional armies are dangerous. This is because in the formative years of our country the citizens observed the peacetime use of the professional armies to coerce and overawe the people, and there are even constitutional provisions to protect the citizen from the Army. The right of the citizen to bear arms reflects this desire to retain civilian ability to control a professional Army even to the extent of exerting force against it, if necessary. The requirement for Congress to appropriate money annually for the Army also reflects the inherent desire of the people to keep the Army under absolute control.

However, in spite of these basic traditional psychological concepts, there is a strong thread of Yankee practicality running through the militia tradition which will accept a fairly large peacetime Army in the present cold war situation—but it still operates to confine the U.S. Army to a position and size which is certainly no more than commensurate with the absolute threat as discerned by the people and their elected leaders.

II. Mobilization Miracles. Operating inside the restriction of the militia tradition, the U.S. Army has always been called on to perform expansion miracles when a war situation which requires large armies confronts the U.S. The history of the U.S. Army has long since established the pattern of a small peacetime Army which must cope with initial combat situations and attempt to prevent military disasters, while at the same time providing a cadre upon which to build a conscription Army.

The equation:

Cadre + conscription, + education and training, = a fighting Army is by now a stylized and proven approach. This equation

puts a heavy peacetime and wartime burden upon the Army education and training structure. This accounts for the continuing, overriding Army emphasis upon professional education and training, and the development of techniques which can be applied to effectively communicate skills and attitudes to an enormous influx of civilian soldiers. For example, the small pre-World War II Army managed the production of combat forces in excess of 8 million in a period of about 4 years. Winston Churchill had something to say concerning this effort:

I greatly admired the manner in which the American Army was formed. I think it was a prodigy of organization, of improvisation. There have been many occasions when a powerful state has wished to raise great armies, and with money and time, and discipline and loyalty, that can be accomplished. Nevertheless, the rate at which the small American Army of only a few hundred thousand men, not long before the war, created the mighty force of millions of soldiers, is a wonder of military history . . . I saw the creation of this mighty force—this mighty Army—victorious in every theater against the enemy in so short a time and from such a very small parent stock. This is an achievement which the soldiers of every other country will always study with admiration and envy.

But that is not the whole story, nor even the greatest part of the story. To create large armies is one thing; to lead them and to handle them is another. It remains to me a mystery as yet unexplained how the very small staffs which the United States kept during the years of peace were able not only to build up the armies and the Air Force units, but also to find the leaders and vast staffs capable of handling enormous masses and of moving them faster and further than masses have ever been moved in war before . . .

III. Man-Minded. Nowhere does the U.S. Army reflect national character to a greater degree than it does in the development of attitudes and techniques aimed at the conservation of our most precious asset—men. The conviction that the life of our citizens is precious is reflected in the continuous, restless search for better techniques in substituting firepower for manpower. This attitude is emphasized and reemphasized and is repeated at every level of Army command and in all levels of military education and training.

This same mind-set accounts for the continued quest for increased mobility, because mobility is a means of economizing on force and thereby requires fewer personnel assets at the expense of money and machines.

There is also the conviction that the high morale resulting from being man-minded is worth the cost. The U.S. Army spends more effort and money in providing medical services, recreational activities, and morale and character-building programs than any other Army in the world. Although frequently misunderstood in the sense of attempting to make combat comfortable in the creature sense, Army leaders understand that taking care of our men is one of the surest ways to reap the irreplaceable rewards of high morale in combat.

IV. Maritime Influence. The U.S. Army staff and student presence at the Naval War College serves as a reminder that the U.S. Army also reflects the influence of the maritime character of the U.S. Having long since disposed of continental threats in North America, the initial ties of our people to the sea have been reinforced throughout our history. Occupying an insular position in the world, U.S. strategy continually reflects the maritime, commercial characteristics of our people. There is no requirement for a large Army to defend the shores of the U.S. against foreign invasion so long as our lines of naval and air defense remain intact. Further, the application of U.S. ground forces in foreign theaters requires the requisite sea and air lines of communication and is limited as much by the ability of the Navy and Air Force to transport and supply the Army as it is by purely Army considerations.

Summary. Taken altogether these characteristics have tended to limit the size of the U.S. Army, particularly in peacetime, and to establish U.S. Army attitudes in such basic areas as leadership, discipline, tactics and training. Operating inside these characteristics it should be a matter of national, as well as Army, pride that the citizen soldier of the U.S. has frequently been molded into formations which have successfully met and defeated the finest professional armies in the world. The U.S. Army confidently anticipates retaining this ability now and in the future.

BIOGRAPHIC SKETCH

Colonel William F. Long, Jr., USA (M.A., George Washington University) was Chief, Ground Operations and Operations Analysis Sections, J-3, Headquarters, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, until his recent assignment to the Naval War College as Army Adviser to the School of Naval Command and Staff. He served in Korea as Battalion and Regimental S-3 in 1950-51. Other assignments have been Battalion Commander and Regimental S-3 with the 12th Infantry Regiment, 4th Infantry Division in Germany, and on the staff of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel, Headquarters, Department of the Army. Colonel Long is a graduate of the Army Command and General Staff College, the Armed Forces Staff College, and the Naval War College.

PROFESSIONAL READING

The evaluations of recent books listed in this section have been prepared for the use of resident students. Officers in the fleet and elsewhere may find these books of interest in their professional reading.

The inclusion of a book in this section does not necessarily constitute an endorsement by the Naval War College of the facts, opinions or concepts contained therein.

Many of these publications may be found in ship and station libraries. Certain of the books on the list which are not available from these sources may be available from one of the Navy's Auxiliary Library Service Collections. These collections of books are obtainable on loan. Requests from individual officers to borrow books from an Auxiliary Library Service Collection should be addressed to the nearest of the following special loan collections.

Chief of Naval Personnel (G14)
Department of the Navy
Washington, D.C. 20370

Commanding Officer
U.S. Naval Station
Library (ALSC), Bldg. C-9
Norfolk, Virginia 23511

Commanding Officer
U.S. Naval Station
Library (ALSC)
San Diego, California 92136

Commanding Officer
U.S. Naval Station (Pearl Harbor)
Library (ALSC) Box 20
San Francisco, California 96610

Commanding Officer
U.S. Naval Station (Guam)
Library (ALSC) Box 174
San Francisco, California 96680

BOOKS

Asprey, Robert B. *At Belleau Wood*. New York: Putnam, 1965.
375 p.

In the spring of 1918, after almost three years of French stalemate and a succession of futile, costly offensives with diminishing returns, the tired and vastly depleted Allied armies stood totally on the defensive along a battlefield from the channel coast to the Swiss border. The French and British armies were momentarily beaten. The German high command had initiated an offensive to win or lose the war on the western front. (An armistice had already been negotiated with Russia.) By late May it appeared that the brilliantly conceived, German coordinated assault tactic would overwhelm the British and French armies; the Germans again stood on the Marne, the French continued to fall back, and Paris was in mortal danger. Enter the Americans.

At Belleau Wood is the story of a series of actions, culminating at Belleau Wood, which formed the first prolonged test of American arms in World War I and answered questions the world was asking: Will the Americans fight? If they fight, will they win? The author relates how, as the press focused world attention on the battle for Belleau Wood, the Marines gave the foot-by-foot, yard-by-yard, wounding, killing answer.

In telling his story, the author documents not only the events of battle, but the conflict of personalities and resulting division of Allied command along the front. His treatment of some of the commanders is rather harsh, but he reasons that "battle rarely leaves professional reputations unchanged."

Some readers will find only another Marine "glory story" by the contributing editor of *Marine Corps Gazette*. Others will find thought-provoking discussions of leadership and troop morale. This book is recommended as an outstanding documentation and analysis of a battle that is regarded by many military historians as a tremendous psychological victory and turning point for the Allies in World War I.

H.R. CODY
Commander, U.S. Navy

Beals, Carleton. *War within a War*. Philadelphia: Chilton, 1965. 177 p.

This small book deals with the variety and impact of disaffected, dissident anti-Confederacy elements in the South during the Civil War which, taken together, created a subversive second war in the rear. The author, grandson of Carry Nation, and familiar of Latin-American peoples, revolutionaries, and presidents, is reputed to be one of the most socially conscious observers and belligerently crusading writers of the American twentieth century. His past penchant for sympathy with people and antipathy for government extends into this work. His declared purpose is to glorify the forgotten people of the South, who variously resisted the "Southern oligarchy" because of love for the Union, hatred of slavery, or belief that it was a "rich man's war, poor man's fight." The style is easy, the insights are penetrating, and the scholarship is accurate in fact but is influenced by an underlying major theme, i.e., that the slavery system was already disintegrating, and that "It is, perhaps, one of the tragedies of history that Northern conquest halted, or at least distorted, an inevitable social process." This, of course, links his work forward into the civil rights arena. Other themes are the ironic hoisting of the South on its own petard of states' rights which precluded unity of action, and the eventual need for slave manpower to fight for the South—essentially a free man's function. The book is organized to facilitate familiarization with sources of disaffection by geographic area and major sociopolitical strata. For the uninitiated who are jaded with American Civil War books dedicated to explaining red and blue arrows on campaign maps and glorifying (or vilifying) generals, this book will be a welcome social primer for back-drop purposes. It is, also, instructive in the broad area of the sociological aspects of revolutionary and counterrevolutionary war. In this context, military students of counterinsurgency may find implicit lessons to ponder for present-day application.

W.F. LONG, Jr.
Colonel, U.S. Army

Eccles, Henry E. *Military Concepts and Philosophy*. New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1965. 339 p.

Rear Admiral Eccles observes that military concepts have been complicated and confused by the technological acceleration and the growth of a vast bureaucracy. In the midst of this growth, civilian control of military affairs has not only been reaffirmed at

the highest level of command and policy, but has moved into many details of operation and administration. It has become difficult to draw a sharp line between military and civilian activity and between military and civilian concepts. The author evolves a comprehensive theory of modern conflict within a group of interrelated concepts. The most important considerations are those of conflict, strategy, logistics, tactics and weapons, command, decision, and organization. Additional concepts are developed for morale and leadership, which the author notes are the intertwined intangibles that more than any other element constitute the ultimate weapon in human conflicts. Throughout the work thoughts on the problems of command and ideas about power and force are interwoven with the concepts of strategy, logistics, and management. It is Admiral Eccles' contention that there is no longer a real distinction between war and peace. Victory in the absolute sense in a clash between major powers is no longer possible. The purpose of current conflict is to attain political objectives, and the military commander must be prepared at all times to use appropriate military combat forces effectively as directed by political authority. At times the political authority will impose irksome and seemingly arbitrary restrictions on the military commander's weapons and create problems for those in actual command. The military commander, who makes life and death decisions, must maintain the morale and combat élan while operating under these restraints of political considerations. To this political-military consideration must be added the political-economic consideration of the budget that introduces the business management aspects of the problem. This has led some to the fallacious conclusion that management and command are synonymous.

High military command must be a blend of civilian and military professionals. The author states that unless we can establish mutually appreciated military concepts and a mutually understood ideal concept of commands, the differences and the ill-matched sharing of authority can result in confusion, frustration, great waste, national disaster, and even the destruction of our civilization. The author's naval career includes submarines and later destroyer and battleship commands. Since World War II, Admiral Eccles has been closely associated with logistics and military education and research. He uses this uniquely qualifying experience to take a giant step in countering the politico-military imbroglio with this outstanding book, which is highly recommended

reading for all professional officers and should be of special interest in the high circles of the government.

P.F. CUNNINGHAM
Captain, U.S. Navy

Harrington, Michael. *The Accidental Century*. New York: Macmillan, 1965. 322 p.

Michael Harrington argues here for a modern socialism in the United States to oppose what he sees as a great hypocrisy and fundamental failure of present capitalism to meet the "real" challenges which dehumanize most people while enriching a new elite. He believes that affluence and modern technology make democratic socialism more relevant than ever before, and indeed make it the only way to maintain focus of human values and to control our fate, rather than to be helpless instruments of it. He believes that things have actually worked out in America so that a substantial and growing portion of the population is poorly educated and unequipped to deal with modern technological development, and that a few well-educated people who understand and control the new machinery constitute a technological elite. Unfortunately, Harrington seriously muddies the waters of his stimulating arguments and theses with wide-ranging quotations from others which leave an impression that he is trying to show how clever and learned he is instead of concentrating attention on serious problems. He also comes dangerously close to a "devil theory" of society which suggests that all the present beneficiaries of the system want only to feather their own nests and no one but Harrington sees through them. "America has for some time been engaged in the wrong argument," he arrogantly proclaims.

Yet Harrington deals with significant questions: "education" too often fails to prepare people for the lives they actually lead, and it does not get anywhere near the investment of money and people it should have; middle-class and luxury housing steadily improves while masses of people live in slums and poverty; contemporary real-estate developments isolate an elite in homogeneous golden ghettos while the poor are condemned to urban slums; corporate planning and advertising direct consumption and do not respond to people's demands; traditional individualism has largely become a farce; government, business, and military bureaucracies manipulate information and destroy the true "market place of ideas"; competition no longer actually

exists. Collectivism has become the fact, and individualism a myth. Harrington is still decent enough (or immature enough?) to be shocked that people say one thing and often do another. He also appears to believe that ordinary people possess a great intellectual and moral potential which "the system" perverts and destroys; his socialist system will liberate this great reservoir of largely untapped talent. People are enslaved by an outdated form of economic and social organization; their inadequacies are socially caused and not inherent. The book is recommended as stimulating and serious, but made unduly difficult and confusing by extensive quotation. It illuminates real problems and difficulties, but its prescription is difficult to accept.

R.A. RUPEN

Consultant, International Relations

Schwartz, Harry. *The Soviet Economy since Stalin*. Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1965. 256 p.

This is a report of the ins and outs, the ups and downs of the Soviet economy since 1953 when Stalin died. In addition, there is a brief review of the Stalin era, which the author claims still haunts the Soviet economy and Soviet society. *The Soviet Economy since Stalin* is the Soviet story of promising far more than could be achieved, and objectively describes the Russians' plans, their accomplishments, and their disappointments. Mr. Schwartz tells of the key economic issues that probably helped determine the timing of Khrushchev's fall, and attempts to identify his successors' intentions in the area of economic policy. In all, this is a gem of a little book, written by and in the style of a *New York Times* staffer.

F.A. BALDWIN

Captain, U.S. Navy

Sulzberger, Cyrus L. *Unfinished Revolution*. New York: Atheneum, 1965. 304 p.

This book is a pithy introduction to current problems of American foreign policy. Mr. Sulzberger, writing as a journalist and not as a historian, has produced an excellent, if somewhat oversimplified, survey of the current world. He begins by briefly outlining three major revolutions which have begun since World War I: the Revolution of Technical Means, the Revolution of

communism, and the Revolution of Self-Determination. Mr. Sulzberger is mainly concerned with the third revolution which, he maintains, was proposed by Woodrow Wilson and backed by the power and prestige of the United States. Mr. Wilson's proposals "became fissionable after World War II" because they were joined to the methods of Lenin and the techniques of communications symbolized by Marconi. The United States has experienced difficulties in coping with the Revolution of Self-Determination, the *Unfinished Revolution*; here Mr. Sulzberger has assembled his compendium of conclusions and advice relative to these difficulties, area by area. He outlines problems facing the United States in Latin America and analyzes the validity of the Alliance for Progress; he characterizes American policy toward Africa as being "compounded of faith, hope, and charity"; he documents the inescapable involvement of the United States in the Near East; he criticizes United States Asian policy as the result of zealous pactomania and warns against indulging too heavily in a policy of "Asia first." The book also examines the role of American economic aid in dealing with problems of the third world. *Unfinished Revolution* makes interesting reading and is highly recommended for those interested in problems of foreign affairs and counterinsurgency.

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