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PRINTER'S CORRECTION
TO
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Page 13 line 6 - Change "World War II" to "World War I"

Page 13 line 9 - Change "Siberia" to "Serbia"

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THE THEORY AND PRINCIPLES OF WAR

A lecture delivered
at the Naval War College
to the Junior Reserve Officers' Course
8 May 1961

by

Colonel Edward M. Flanagan, Jr., U.S. Army

When I realized the full scope of the topic I was assigned to discuss this morning, I must admit that I felt baffled and perplexed, for the subject is a very weighty one. Learned writers have worn out many quills and typewriter ribbons seeking its philosophy, its wellsprings, and its fiber.

But to get to the heart of the matter, I'll just read you the scope of this lecture. It is: "The nature and theory of war, consideration of the inter-relationship of the military and the nonmilitary factors in the development of strategic concepts, a brief review of classic concepts of strategy, and the contribution they have made to modern strategic concepts." I think you can understand my initial feeling of trepidation after contemplating that scope. For a discussion of the nature and theory of war is fraught with many complexities and difficulties because one can weave into it such academic disciplines as philosophy, science, technology, sociology, morality, geography, history, economics, and politics, not to mention the various other arts and sciences which go to make up just the military side of war itself.

You must wonder why you should have this as a kickoff lecture for your two-week course here at the Naval War College. First of all, one of the reasons is to get you off the decks of your former DD's and CVA's

and to think on a different plane, on the national and the international level. Another reason is that because we are unmistakably at war today, a discussion of war is a very timely subject. A third reason is that wars have been in all our backgrounds ever since we were teen-agers. A fourth is that, while your vocations are not in a military line, you must have strong avocations in that field, else you would not be here today. Therefore, it seems appropriate to talk about war.

The most important point to be made here is that you are a blend of the civilian and the military, which in this day and age is a mix of transcendent importance for the conduct of warfare. I hope to prove this point unequivocally before the end of this 50 minutes. I might add, perhaps impertinently, that while war may be too important to be left to the generals, so, too, today's peace—cold war—neither war nor peace—is too important to exclude the generals and the admirals. So much for why you should listen.

Before I get into the main subject, I would like to make a few other general comments. First, I am going to mention authors and books from which I got some of my material; I think you might do well to remember some of these books and at least to flip through them while you are here. Second, I am going to cover a very broad field, and I am not going to offer you any solutions, generally speaking. I am only going to point out the problems. This is in keeping with Admiral Colestock's rejoinder to forget your civilian pursuits and to think in a different context while you are here at the course. Third, I certainly encourage you in any free moment that you have, and I know they are relatively few and far between, to go to our libraries and browse around. At Sims Library there is a special shelf of books which has been set aside especially for you. A few of the books I used in preparing this lecture are included. One of the most

valuable items in the library is the *War College Review*. This is a monthly publication which contains the more important lectures given here at the War College and some of the outstanding term papers and theses written by the students, both in the Command and Staff and Naval Warfare Courses.

When you get back to your homes, you might do well to read up on some of the fields which may be opened up to you here at the Naval War College. In this connection, your local drugstores and paperback bookstores have many important and worthwhile books in very inexpensive editions. Among them are: *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy* by Henry A. Kissinger; *What We Must Know About Communism* by Harry A. and Bonaro W. Overstreet; *The Dynamics of Soviet Society* by Walt W. Rostow; *American Diplomacy* by George F. Kennan; *Democracy in America* by Alexis de Tocqueville; *The Public Philosophy* by Walter Lippmann; *Arms and Men* by Walter Millis; *The American Presidency* by Clinton L. Rossiter; and *A Documentary History of the United States* by Richard D. Heffner, all extremely fine books for your libraries. These books cover a broad field too, and, using them as a basis, you can expand outward, continually increasing your breadth of vision and scope of intelligence. Another book, not in paperback, but which is a formidable study of the United States, is *The United States in the World Arena* by Walt W. Rostow. This is a classic, I feel, in the broad study of United States foreign policy. So much for my introductory remarks.

Here are the broad topics which I am going to discuss in the main part of my lecture. They are, first, the history of war; second, the various types of war; third, some of the causes of war; fourth, the nature of war itself; fifth, some of the principles of war; and finally, the formulation of a national strategy.

In order to simplify a discussion of the vast history of warfare, I should like to classify wars into three categories: primitive, historic, and modern. The divisions between these classifications are based upon man's various inventions in the fields of weapons and communications. The primitive gave way to the historic when (a) the horse was introduced to the battlefield and (b) when the peoples of the various nations fighting the wars had learned to write. The historic gave way to the modern when gunpowder and printing were invented and introduced to the conduct of war. To give you a finite date, the Hyksos of Palestine used the horse and chariot when they conquered the Egyptians in 1750 B.C. This date would mark the transition from primitive to the historic.

Another way of classifying wars, and which I will develop in more detail, is by breaking the history of war into three periods: the ancient, the medieval, and the modern. Ancient warfare lasted to about 500 A.D.; the medieval phase lasted from 500 to 1500 A.D.; the modern period has been from 1500 A.D. to the present. I will discuss these three periods in historical sequence.

Lynn Montross in *War through the Ages* subdivides the first part of the ancient wars into general categories. First were the wars of the Asiatics fighting on the great plains prior to the ascendancy of the Greeks. Then came the "gymnastic warfare" of the Greeks. By this he means, for example, the Battle of Marathon in 480 B.C. The Greeks were opposed at the Battle of Marathon by a superior force of Persians who were equipped with missiles, light cavalry, heavier arms, and a greater number of men. Miltiades, leader of the Greeks, inferior in strength and equipment, had to use tactics and ingenuity to beat the Persians. Miltiades backed his flanks on two parallel streams, put his rear up a slope, and made his flanks stronger than his center. The Persians succeeded in driving in the Greek center, but at a

given signal, the flank units swung inward and attacked the Persians in their flanks. The extremely athletic and physically fit Greeks were able to surround the Persians, limit their maneuver space and defeat them decisively. This was the first illustration in war of the tactical double envelopment. It also illustrates the "gymnastic warfare" of the Greeks.

Along about this same time occurred the Battle of Salamis, the first great naval battle in history. Again the Greeks were faced by a superior Persian force, this time at sea, and again the Greeks had to resort to clever tactics and a ruse to win. The Greeks enticed the Persians into rather limited waters, limited the Persian maneuverability and defeated them piecemeal. The Persians lost 200 ships to 30 by the Greeks. These battles were in the ancient period. These are the glorious days of Philip; of Alexander, the first great military genius; of Hannibal; of the Romans in the days of the Roman legions; and of Caesar who was a great leader, but incidentally no great shakes as a strategist. He got himself out of many tough situations by sheer luck which, I suppose, one could also call flashes of brilliance. As I proceed with this discussion, I would like you to try to relate some of the principles I may mention, some of the tactics and techniques employed, to modern-day warfare.

The next phase in the over-all history of warfare is the medieval period. This has been called the Dark Ages of War. But because it developed the mounted ironclad knight, it also introduced the cavalry cycle of warfare. During this period wars were very limited. The cavalry became ascendant and, in the Battle of Hastings in 1066, the mobility and the flexibility of the cavalry proved its worth. The infantry at this time was very ill-armed. The medieval period is also the time of the great Crusades, when propaganda was used effectively for the first time to arouse whole

nations to go out and do battle against the infidels. It was also the period of Genghis Khan, the sadistic, all-conquering Mongol military genius. He was the first man to use subversion, spies, and psychological warfare on a large scale to conquer and keep whole peoples subdued and subservient.

In the 13th century, and still in the medieval period, we come to the era of fortified castles and the counterweapon, siege artillery. Also, along about this time the British developed the longbow, and it proved its efficiency in the Battle of Crecy in 1346 where it permitted the British to defeat the French. At Poitiers in 1356, the longbow-equipped English again defeated the French. This time, however, light cavalry also played a major role in the victory. In the 14th century, gunpowder was introduced to battle, and for the first time it reduced a siege to a relatively short period. In 1453 Constantinople fell after only 55 days of attack. The days of the invulnerable fortified strong points were thus numbered.

After the medieval period came the modern era of warfare. It is subdivided into four phases: the religious wars, the 18th century limited wars, the revolutionary and civil wars, and the world wars.

The Religious Wars were fought from 1500 to 1648. The terminal date for this period was the end of the bloody Thirty Years' War. During the religious wars, Gustavus Adolphus sallied forth from Sweden with some revolutionary new and highly efficacious ideas on how to run an army. For example, he kept the supplies with his army, proved that he could win with a relatively small army if it was well trained, well supplied and disciplined.

Next in the modern era are the 18th century limited wars. This was the period of armed diplomacy. It lasted from 1648 to 1793, the beginning of the French Revolution. This is the heyday of Frederick

the Great Wars were limited during this epoch because, by this time, Europe had gotten thoroughly sick of warfare. Armies had become permanent parts of their nations' environment, economy, and strength and, very importantly, were loyal to their sovereigns. At about this time, uniforms were introduced by Louis XIV. Armies, after the model and example of Gustavus Adolphus, were well-supplied and disciplined. After 1700 the musket and the bayonet became the principal arms of the infantrymen. Armies were relatively small, and wars (I think this is an important point) were fought for limited objectives because governments did not want to overthrow other governments; they merely wanted to obtain concessions. Therefore, there was a limitation on political objectives for which wars were waged.

This was also the period of Clive of India, when he carved out great empires for the British; of colonial wars in America; of Montcalm versus Wolfe at Quebec; and of the supremely sanitary and militarily competent Lord Amherst, who literally cleaned up the armies and converted them into smooth, well-trained fighting machines.

Next is the Revolutionary and Civil War phase, ushered in by the French Revolution in 1793 and closed out by the start of World War I. During this period, the strategy and tactics of warfare underwent a revolution. The wide and credible authority of governments now made it possible for them to raise and equip mass conscripted armies, to regiment civil populations, and to levy and collect high taxes. Thus totality was introduced to warfare during this period. On the conduct of warfare itself, Napoleon introduced great mobility not only on the battlefield, but also between battles. Thus, by unencumbering his troops from heavy personal loads, he was able to move great distances rapidly, a capability which permitted him strategic surprise on more than one occasion. He also found that light mobile artillery on the battlefield was a great killer. He introduced and used it efficiently.

After Napoleon's downfall there was a 99-year period prior to World War I. During this period there were massed armies, but there were no prolonged wars except the Civil War in America. Europe was stable because there was a balance of power among the great nations. Our own Civil War was probably the first industrial one. It was a war in which the South fought to the last gasp; it was a war of annihilation. It was called industrial because, for one thing, each infantryman got a good rifle with a range of 600 yards, a factor which made the infantryman quite deadly on defense. There were no more volleys at commands, no more massed infantry in close formation, and relatively few cavalry charges. It was industrial also because the railroads were put to efficient use to move the troops strategically and to supply them logistically. Later on in this period Von Moltke introduced a command and staff system. This was necessary because troops were now widely scattered and dispersed. Therefore, command had to be decentralized, and the smaller unit commanders had to have the power of decision. These principles Von Moltke recognized in his command system. He also established staffs for commanders who now had more and more functions to perform and needed assistants to plan and supervise the execution of plans.

The next major period is that of the World Wars. World War I introduced a period of fantastic casualties and trench warfare where, at one point, 2 million men opposed 2 other million men across pulverized stretches of no man's land. World War II, of course, emphasized the machine on and above the battlefield and on, above, and below the seas. Strength came from machines and from industry which could turn them out at prodigious rates. It was our first truly global war. So much for the history of warfare.

The next major topic is the types of warfare through the ages. First of all, they might be described as either limited or absolute. A limited war

might be one in which one nation wanted to gain reparation for a real or imagined injury to it. This would be a limited war for a limited objective. But absolute war, on the other hand, is one in which one nation demands unconditional surrender from the other. Of course, World War II is a perfect example of an absolute type of war. Clausewitz had something to say on this particular subject. He said that there was a tendency of all wars, however limited their original aim, to become absolute if the belligerents are equal. This is certainly food for thought in today's international environment.

There is another way of classifying wars: international, imperial and civil. An international war is a war between states in the same community. Perhaps the Hundred Years' War and some of the European continental wars are examples of international wars. The imperial wars are between different kinds of states. Perhaps the conquests of Genghis Khan might be classed under imperial wars. Civil wars are waged between units within one country. From 1480 until World War II there were some 278 of these three types of wars: 135 were international, 65 were imperial, and 78 were civil. There is a great variety in the magnitude of wars: One might involve two very small countries fighting over a small chunk of real estate on their borders and lasting only a few months, to another involving millions of troops from many nations fighting doggedly for years. The Thirty Years' War, the Seven Years' War, the Napoleonic Wars, and World Wars I and II, are in this latter category. In modern times wars lasted about four years, but as these wars have decreased in length, they have increased in severity. They have been continuous wars fought day and night through all seasons. This is a relatively recent development from the time, say, of the Thirty Years' War, which was broken up by the various seasons of the years and daylight and darkness.

Wars can be discussed from a number of other points of view. For example, from the standpoint of intentional violence, one might discuss crimes and police actions; from the standpoint of solving conflicts, then you introduce negotiations, mediations, arbitrations, and the like; and from the viewpoint of intergroup relationships, you then can talk about alliances, ententes, understandings, etc.

Quincy Wright wrote a monumental work called *A Study of War*. He goes into the philosophy of war in great detail. This might logically lead next into a discussion of my next main topic: causes of war. One might say that war is a last resort for the settlement of disputes between organized groups, but most people have different ideas on what causes war. In every history book there is a different set of causes for any given conflict. There have been many learned philosophical discussions on the subject. Is man just naturally belligerent and is this what causes war? Perhaps so. Thus the field is broadened and diverse, and I can only hope to summarize the various causes of war.

One grouping of the causes of war might be the quest for land, wealth, power, and security. For example, the Japanese in World War II, with their Greater Southeast Asia Co-prosperity Sphere, and the Germans, with their Lebensraum, might have been looking for land. The ancients fought many wars simply for wealth, not for land, and they did it with hired armies. They fought to determine which king would collect taxes and who would plunder whom. Certainly Genghis Khan was an example of this type of warrior. During the Middle Ages wars were also fought for wealth as opposed to land-grabbing. In the power category of causes of war, we have the example of the European wars in which nations fought for power and influence. Leaders also found that wars united their own people at home and strengthened their governments if they were successful in wars abroad. Napoleon,

Hitler, and Mussolini capitalized on this facet of war for power. They found that the more effective they were in warfare—the more effective they were in their conquests—the greater was their power at home; the more united were their people. Certainly this is one of the reasons for the rantings of Castro against the United States: he needs some scapegoat to cover up what's going on internally.

A fourth cause of war is security. Some might say that the fear of war is a cause of war. I would like to emulate one of our professors from last year who used to quote Thucydides to cover almost any circumstance. Thucydides said: "In arriving at this decision and resolving to go to war, the Lacedaemonians were influenced, not so much by the speeches of their allies, as by the fear of the Athenians and their increased power." Thus fear of war can be considered to be a cause of war. For example, a country might fear attack from her neighbor. Therefore, she might keep on a wartime footing huge armies and navies for her defense, but then, at a propitious moment when her fear got the better of her, decide to strike the first blow, or to strike a weaker nation.

It is important in a discussion of this type also to differentiate between reasons and causes of war. Reasons are generally very lofty and idealistic; causes, on the other hand, are the realistic bases for which nations go to war. Take the War of 1812 for example. The reason publicized was the impressment of our seamen by the British, yet the real cause of the war was our desire to expand. Most wars have several causes. The United States entered World War I, for example, because of the invasion of Belgium, because of our economic and cultural ties with England and France, because we were afraid of a depression, because of the sinking of the Lusitania, and because we thought the Germans were wrong. Parenthetically, I might say that I probably have mixed up causes and reasons; the point, however, is that there is normally more than one cause for a nation's going to war.

Quincy Wright analyzes six major wars, and in his analysis he gives a different set of causes of war. First, he considers the Moslem conquests, which, he says, were caused by the desire to spread religion. Thus, Islam carried on wars of conquest in the 7th century to spread their religion throughout the world.

Secondly, he analyzes the Crusades which, he feels, were caused by a religious zeal on the part of the Crusaders, and the populations which supported them, to avenge the indignities to the holy places by the infidels. He claims also that the Crusades resulted from the political ambition of the Popes to unify Christendom, by princes to gain territory and prestige, by the Italian towns to re-establish their trade routes, and by the ideology of the just war.

Thirdly, he analyzes the Hundred Years' War. He claims that insipient national enthusiasm drove the British to invade France. In the later stages Joan of Arc aroused the nationalism of the French and caused them to defeat and throw out the English, but he also avers that the political ambitions of the various leaders, the need to unite the countries at home to prevent rebellion and to add to the domain were also causes of the Hundred Years' War.

Fourthly, he considers the Thirty Years' War which started out as a religious war between the various camps in Europe: the Catholic camp on the one hand and the Protestant camp on the other. This war had its basis in an idealism. It started out as a religious war and ended as a war for territorial sovereignty with the rise of new leaders with disciplined armies in France, Sweden and Russia.

Fifthly, he analyzed the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars. Extravagance in France and heavy taxation finally caused the masses to revolt against the rulers. The rights of the common man became the religion of democratic nationalism. Napoleon fought

his wars for conquest, for international prestige, and for internal solidarity. Others, of course, fought to defend against Napoleon and to defend against the revolutionary idea of the rights of man which were spreading outward from France.

Finally, Quincy Wright considered World War II. This developed from nationalistic movements in the Balkans, and the allies fought to defend small nationalities such as Siberia and Belgium. The primary causes of this war were political. Austria desired to preserve itself in face of the Yugoslav propaganda, Russia fought to save its declining prestige, France hoped to recover Alsace-Lorraine, and the Germans and British fought for fear of unbalancing the power in Europe.

To sum up all of these causes and reasons for war which I have been mentioning, one might conclude that men and masses are moved to war (1) over enthusiasm for ideals; and (2) to escape from unsatisfactory conditions. This covers a lot of territory, but I feel that those two drives cause men and masses to wage or at least to accept war. Governments and organized factions start war (a) because a war is either necessary or convenient to enhance their foreign policy, to expand or maintain what they have, or to reorganize the community of nations; or (b) because incidents have occurred which the governments feel violated laws and impaired their rights. So much for the causes of war.

My next major topic is the nature of present-day wars. We have all heard a great deal of talk about cold, limited and general wars. There are various other gradations of warfare even today, and these are all points along a spectrum. The parts of this spectrum are differentiated by the scope of the political objectives at stake, by the dimensions of the conflict, and by the geographic arena. These are all limitations of one sort or another on warfare; you can think up many other kinds of limitations on war.

Starting at the left of the spectrum with cold war, it is clear that cold war may be peace one time and war another, depending upon the vantage point from which you are viewing the passing scene. Certainly, if you are a Laotian, the cold war today is fairly hot. Looking at it from an objective historian's viewpoint, peace has been interrupted some twenty times since World War II. Thus it is really a game of semantics to classify the period since World War II as real peace.

Looking at the spectrum in more detail—looking at the various ways of waging the cold war—one might progress from the left side of the spectrum at diplomacy, then move on to propaganda, subversion, show of force, blockade, guerrilla warfare, and limited non-nuclear warfare—all warfare methods in the cold war phase. Mr. Churchill once said that the cold war is all "mischief short of war."

Next I would like to discuss for a moment the so-called guerrilla or special warfare. Special warfare, as we know it in the Army, is made up of two components—unconventional warfare and psychological warfare. You may remember that the French Maquis were extremely effective during World War II as a type of guerrilla force. General Eisenhower credits them with giving him the equivalent of 15 divisions. Men and units like Castro and his 26 July Movement, Mahailovich and his Chetniks in Yugoslavia, the North Vietnamese in Indo-China, were all effective against superior conventional forces. The Indo-China War, for example, cost the French more than their Marshall Aid for four years. Their officer casualties per year were greater than the graduating classes of St. Cyr.

The guerrilla war going on between the French and the Algerians is causing the French to tie up a 500,000-man army. Back in the colonial days one of the greatest guerrilla warfare leaders was Major Rogers, who led his Rangers all over New York and New

England harassing the French and Indians. These are examples of guerrilla warriors.

Psychological warfare, on the other hand, was waged by such men as Genghis Khan whose noisemakers terrified and immobilized the opposition; Hitler and his screaming dive bombers and siren-screeching tanks put terror into the minds of his enemies. One of the classic gimmicks of psychological warfare was the Trojan horse which the Greeks rolled up to the gates of Troy as a peace offering. This is psychological warfare.

In the Army today we have both of these components. There are three Special Forces or Groups which make up our special warfare units. The 10th Special Forces Group is in Germany, the 7th at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and the 77th in Okinawa. These Special Warfare Groups are made up of teams of 10 or 11 men each. The men on these teams are experts in communications, demolitions, first aid and weapons. The aid men are so expert, for example, that they can take out anything from a splinter to an appendix. The men are trained for the country to which they might go; they learn some of the language, the customs, the history, and the geography. But these men are not themselves guerrilla fighters. Rather, it is their mission to go into a target country there to organize indigenous guerrilla forces. One of these teams of 10-11 men can organize a 1500-man force. Psychological warfare units are various types of loudspeaker units which are used for short-range broadcasting across the front line. But there are also long-range radio broadcasting units which can broadcast deep into enemy territory. So much for special warfare. I would like to get back now to the spectrum.

Next is limited war. A war may be limited by weapons, by geography, or by political considerations. The American Revolution was limited to obtaining our independence, not to conquering Britain. The War of

1812 did not have as its objective the subjugation of England. The Spanish-American War was limited simply to freeing Cuba. Korea, of course, was a prime example of a limited war, where we couldn't bomb across the Yalu, where we didn't use atomic weapons, and where the area around the 38th parallel became sacrosanct. The most uniquely limited battles in the history of warfare probably were the actions around Quemoy and Matsu where the Chinese fired only every other day.

Next on the spectrum moving to the right is a limited atomic war. Consider the possibility. I am not saying it is possible; I am just mentioning such a war so that you'll think about it. Some people think we might have a limited atomic war. We certainly could get one started; there's no question about that. But how are you going to stop it and still keep it a limited atomic war? Perhaps if the war initially had a limited political objective, and that objective were achieved, then one side might be willing to negotiate a truce or a settlement. But it seems clear that, for the next few years at least, a limited atomic war implies that the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. are fighting one another. Is either one of these adversaries going to be willing to lose even a limited political objective? On the other hand, the two protagonists might see the folly of such a war, realize that no good would come of it, and negotiate a truce.

Next on the spectrum is the general non-atomic war, something like World War II. Does this seem like a possible type of war in this day and age? There's no question that in this type of war—general non-atomic—the two adversaries are very definitely the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., or we wouldn't be calling it a general war. Is either the United States or Russia going to lose such a war and quit before unleashing some, or all, of her nuclear weapons? Is this a possibility? A general war implies that national survival is at stake. Are we going to surrender that with an intact stockpile of nukes? A lot of people hark back to

World War II and say that that was really a limited war because the Germans, who had a gas capability, didn't use it. I suspect that if the Germans thought that they could have gained an advantage by using gas they would have done so. I don't think the parallel exists here between gas and atomic weapons.

Next is total war, and there can be little question about its definition. Again our national survival is at stake; the nation is completely mobilized far more so even than during World War II.

I have categorized these types of wars into cold, limited, and general, and you note that the cold war goes all the way from diplomacy up through limited non-atomic war. Limited war starts back here some place around the blockade and goes up to general non-atomic war, because actually a general non-atomic war is in reality a limited war. General war picks up general non-atomic and goes through total war. This may give you some idea of the spectrum of warfare. Of course, there are other types of wars—the preventive war and pre-emptive war—but certainly these two are morally repugnant to us. What would we do if we had unmistakable evidence that Russian bombers and missiles were in the countdown stage and there was no question about the fact that the buttons were going to be pushed? Worse still, what if we knew that they were on the way? What is the United States going to do in such a situation? As I said earlier, I have no solution. Now that we have analyzed the history of warfare, the various types, the various causes, and the nature of war, my next main topic is the principles of war.

Some people scoff at the principles of war and attempt to punch holes in their logic and applicability. But as I go through them and explain them rather briefly, I would like you to determine for yourselves whether they do or do not apply today. I must admit that I have taken these right out of the Army field manual, but I must also add that while the Army uses

one set of words and the Navy uses another set, they all mean the same thing. See for yourselves if they are pertinent, not only on the battlefield or on the sea, but to the nation in the development and execution of its national strategy. (For you memory gimmick experts, the initials of the principles form the acronym MOSSCOMES.)

The first principle is the principle of *mass*. This means that a commander concentrates his forces at a given point, so that at that particular point, the point of decision, he has a greater combat superiority than does his enemy. He does not necessarily have a greater number of troops overall, but at the point of decision he has a greater preponderance of force. At the battle of Leuctra in 371 B.C., when the Thebans fought the Spartans, the Thebans overwhelmed a larger number of Spartans by massing at the point of decision.

The principle of *objective* means that a force has a specific and very definite objective which it must accomplish. It also has intermediate objectives which, if accomplished, will lead to the accomplishment of the final objective. All units in a force have objectives which, taken together, keep the battle organized and on the track and eventually lead to the force's victory.

The principle of *security* means that our forces have taken the measures necessary to prevent surprise, to avoid annoyance, to preserve freedom of action and to deny to the enemy information of our forces. Certainly the Japanese at Pearl Harbor meticulously followed this principle.

The principle of *surprise* is a corollary to this. The principle of surprise, of course, holds that if we do keep our plans from the enemy, if he has no idea of what our intentions are or of what we are going to do, we can achieve a greater victory than

without it. We may achieve a victory out of all proportion to the power employed. This may also be applicable on the national level in the cold war.

The principle of *command* means unity of command. It means that all the forces, regardless of service, which are put together to accomplish one common goal, are under the command of one single commander with requisite authority. Pearl Harbor is an example of the failure in organization for command.

The principle of the *offensive* means that only offensive action achieves decisive results. It permits the commander to exploit the initiative and impose his will on the enemy.

The principle of *maneuver* is the positioning of forces to place the enemy at a relative disadvantage. A commander takes advantage of weaknesses in the enemy to outmaneuver him. He takes advantage of the ability of his own forces to maneuver, to cut down his own casualties, and to inflict greater casualties and greater losses on the enemy. Maneuver alters the relative combat power of military forces.

The principle of *economy of force* is the corollary to the principle of mass. It means that at points other than the point of decision a commander has only the minimum essential means. To devote means to unnecessary secondary efforts, or to employ excessive means on required secondary efforts, is to violate the principles of both mass and objective. The mass must be in the critical area. On the national plane economy of force means that we have only the minimum force necessary to do the job. In translating this into more conventional every-day terms, how much overkill do we really need? How much SAC do we really need? How many Polaris submarines? How many Army divisions?

Simplicity, the final principle of war, is the keynote of military operations. It means that plans are kept as simple as possible because battle is extremely complex anyway, and the simpler the plans the easier it is to carry them out. Are these principles applicable also on the national and international level?

Hanson Baldwin has another set of principles which he says should dominate our strategic concept. His are first, military policy must support a finite and obtainable military goal. Second, the pace of the technological revolution demands top priority and generous funding for research and development in all weapons. (By this he means that the Army's Nike Zeus, for example, should be given top priority as far as Research and Development is concerned; but because it is so expensive it does not necessarily mean that it should get a great deal of money for production until the system is either proved or disproved.) Third, the fortress America concept cannot support the nation's political and economic policies in the years ahead. Fourth, and a corollary to that one, military strategy must have as one of its primary purposes, the security of the home base. Fifth, we must be invulnerable to surprise attack. (Polaris is a way that we can achieve this invulnerability to surprise attack. This is a key requirement to the successful nuclear deterrent of the future.) Sixth and last, flexibility and rapid reaction to an entire spectrum of challenges is essential. And I think he thereby eliminates our massive retaliation strategy as our only strategy. We must be able to cover the entire spectrum of war possibilities.

Now I would like to turn from the subject of war and discuss, finally, national strategy and its formulation. The Naval Warfare Course spends the better part of about 4-5 months on this particular subject; I would like to condense it down to the remaining time I have this morning. Naturally this is impossible, but I would like you to have just an inkling of what it is all about.

There are many definitions and a tremendous amount has been written on the subject of national strategy, military strategy, or strategy in general, but since we are all connected with the military, let me give you the JCS definition of strategy. The JCS dictionary says "Strategy is the art and science of developing and using the political, economic, psychological, and military forces of a nation, during peace and war, to afford the maximum support to national policies, in order to increase the probabilities and favorable consequences of victory and to lessen the chances of defeat." Note in that definition the emphasis on all parts of the national power—not simply military power. You can derive from this one observation that strategy is truly a complex affair.

How do our national planners go about developing a national strategy? In the next two weeks you are going to hear something about the Estimate of the Situation. Maybe a planner can develop a plan by making an estimate of the situation. He can determine the mission, the situation, the possible courses of action, and can analyze the opposing courses of action. Then he can compare his own courses of action as to advantages and disadvantages and then can test them for suitability, feasibility, and acceptability. Is it suitable? Will it do the job? Is it feasible? Can it do the job? And is it acceptable? Can we take the losses it might entail?

Take the situation in Laos, for example. A planner knows what our mission is there. The United States wants to save Laos from being overrun by the communists. He knows what the situation is. The Pathet Lao have overrun approximately half of it. He has some broad courses of action. The United States can send in our own forces to beat back the Pathet Lao; the United States can increase military aid to Laos; or it can do nothing. There are various other possible lines of action within that spectrum, but for purposes of this broad and brief discussion, we'll limit

ourselves to those three. Now we must analyze the opposing courses of action. If we go in with our own forces, what will the North Vietnamese do? What will the Chinese do? Or what will the Russians do? If we step up military aid, what will the communists do? If we do nothing, will Laos go down the drain? Then we can compare our own courses of action. If we do go in there in force, is this really the place where we want to make the stand? Is this where we are going to draw the line on the ground and say, "You are not going to come across here. This is as far as you are going to go"? If we increase our military aid, is this going to accomplish our mission? Is the aid going to dwindle as it goes forward to where it is needed most—the front line troops? Where is it going to do the most good? Or, if we do nothing, what's going to happen then? Then we test the one course of action which we think is best for suitability, feasibility, and acceptability. This might be one way of developing a strategy, but I would like to point out that Laos is only one small part of the overall national problem. A national strategy, however, is a continuing guide by which the country hopes to achieve its national interest and a world based on justice as we know it.

I would like to present another framework on which a national strategy might be hung. Military strategy, again according to the JCS dictionary, is "the art and science of employing the armed forces of a nation to secure the objectives of national policy by the application of force, or the threat of force." National strategy, on the other hand, is an all-encompassing strategy and includes what we plan to do in all situations, including the military. You know that the U.S.S.R. certainly has a national goal for world order; their goal is the world-wide spread of communism. We, too, must have a national goal of world order, and a strategy by which we plan to implement it. What our goal purports to be is pretty hard to isolate. Do we wish to spread democracy throughout the world? Are we again seeking to make the world safe for

democracy? Can the jungle dwellers of New Guinea really handle democracy, one of the most sophisticated types of political philosophy ever evolved? If not, what? What is good for emerging nations? I don't know. This is another of the problems I told you I would mention. Thus, we must have, first of all, a goal. Next I will mention some of the other ingredients which go to make up a national strategy.

First of all, are our national interests. By this I mean "what should be." One might say that these are the enduring aspirations of a nation for its security and well-being as determined by its culture and by its principles. These are the national interests. I am also going to mention goals again—goals of world order and goals of national order. Some of the other ingredients are forces and trends which are at work in the world today. These include the population explosion, technological breakthroughs, emerging nationalisms, communism, the high standard of living in the United States, the abject poverty in other parts of the world, the alliance systems, the search for freedom, and perhaps the declining virility of the American people.

National objectives, concrete statements of the ends or conditions sought by national action, are another of the ingredients which go to make up a national strategy. Another is national power which "is the capability of a nation to adopt and implement national policies which will favorably influence trends and events toward achievement of national objectives selected to promote national interests. National power is the sum total of all our tangible and intangible sources of strength, including the political, military, socio-psychological, and economic elements." Another element is a national strategic concept which is a broad statement of our problems as a whole and a broad course of action to be followed. Still another is our national policies which link power to objectives—how to convert power in furtherance of our objectives.

Now I am going to try to put all these ingredients together to show how they go to make up a national strategy.

First of all, let's consider that the time period for our strategy is the next 10-15 years. If the United States were to follow an ideal course from now, directed through the next 10-15 years, and were operating in all areas at 100% efficiency, her path would follow a straight line headed directly at our national goal of world domestic order. This goal of world and domestic order is shaped by our national interests. From where do we derive our national interests? We get them from the Declaration of Independence; we get them from various comments, speeches, utterances of our leaders; out of various books written by learned, patriotic men. These things make up how the United States feels about problems and how we want life to be lived. Our national interests may be idealistic, but they cannot be selfish.

In reality, however, the course which the United States follows is not a straight line, following the 100% efficiency abscissa. Rather the path fluctuates up and down. What makes it fluctuate? The various forces and trends at work in the world cause it to fluctuate. Communism, for example, butts head-on against the path we want to take to achieve the national goal of world order we want. Advances in technology may assist us sometimes and may thwart us at others. (I suppose you might say that getting Gagarin into orbit before Mr. Shepard left the pad is technology working against us; this might be far-fetched, but it might be one example.) Other forces and trends, just a few among many, which vary our straight-line path are: emerging nationalism; the population explosion (working for us in some places and against us in others); mutual hostility of nations; underdeveloped economies; anti-militarism; materialism; isolationism; and affinity for disarmament.

To develop a national strategy the planner must next analyze all these forces and trends which are at work. He must determine which aid and which work against our national interests. Then he must determine how to increase the advantageous forces and trends and how to decrease the effects of the disadvantageous one. He determines objectives on country and regional bases.

To accomplish objectives we must apply power. We apply power against communism, for example. We determine what we can do to help the emerging nations. We apply power—it is not military necessarily; it is not economic power necessarily. It can be psychological. It can be the various parts of our power that go to make up the national power.

Then, in determining how we should apply power, we develop policies. We will apply so much power in a certain area. We will do it in such a way. Policy (which includes the quantity of power) plus objective equals our program for that one particular area. And these programs, taken as a whole, represent a national strategy, "a plan for the integrated development and employment of our national power over a period of time to achieve our national objectives." Naturally, the sum total of power expended must be costed and added up to see if the United States can afford it. It may be that tax increases, controls of various sorts may be necessary. And if these violate our national interests, within which the whole strategy is formulated, then the planners must go back and revise objectives and policies.

This is one way of formulating a national strategy. The national goal of world order and domestic order is shaped by our national interests. Forces and trends are analyzed and objectives developed. Power is allocated via our policies. We put policies and objectives together and we finally come up with a program.

Since World War II, we have had a strategy of filling vacuums and a strategy of collective security. Such a strategy has worked well and to our advantage in Europe—this side of the Iron Curtain. In Europe, we drew a line on the ground. It may not have been the line we wanted, but there is a clear-cut boundary between East and West. And there hasn't been too much communism oozing out from underneath the Iron Curtain since it has been established. True, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Rumania, Bulgaria, and others have been lost. But since then, we have maintained the status quo. But things are certainly not like that in Southeast Asia; there is no line on the ground. South Vietnam and Laos are in difficulty. It's clear that if they go, all of Southeast Asia is going to go. It may slide all the way to Australia. Clearly, we haven't drawn the line in Asia as we have in Europe.

But all has not been black since World War II. We have been successful in some places. I think we kept Italy and France from going communistic. The European continent is certainly stable. West Germany has recovered beyond all expectation and belief; we have helped England; we helped save Greece; we took a strong stand in Iran and forced the Russians to withdraw their forces shortly after World War II.

On the minus side of the ledger, we must admit to some disasters and losses. China is one; Korea has not been united, and South Korea is still in trouble; guerrilla warfare continues in Algeria; the Middle East is unstable; communism has moved into Cuba, and the whole of former Indo-China is up for grabs.

All I can hope to give you in such a hasty run-down is the overall framework of a national strategy. In your spare time, after you get home, you can read to fill in the various gaps. Many volumes have been written on various phases of this national strategic appraisal. For example, the threat we face is covered very well in *Protracted Conflict* by

Strausz-Hupé et al. The overall view, in one of the best books I can recommend to you, is covered in W.W. Rostow's monumental *The U.S. in the World Arena*. While you are here you might want to take a brief look at Lieutenant Dorsey's *A Concept of National Strategy*, which is in the September 1959 *Naval War College Review*. Another book which I think discusses the Korean War from a very refreshing viewpoint is *Korea and the Fall of MacArthur* by a man named Trumbull.

In summing up my remarks of the past 50 minutes, I must say, first of all, that it is extremely difficult to sum it up. I do hope that I made you think about our national strategy, and that I have planted a few desires to do a little outside reading on this subject. I hope that I have shown you the need for a purposeful, well-thought-out U.S. national strategy. I hope I have clearly indicated, above all, the close intermingling these days of the civilian and the military in the formulation of national strategy.

As long ago as 1513, Machiavelli said, "Success in war is determined by the political advantages gained, not victorious battles." Therefore, one might conclude that we lost World War II. I might also suggest that the principles I have mentioned are still valid.

Finally, I would like to quote a rather gloomy forecast by George Kennan. This is one man's opinion on whether or not we need a national strategy, whether or not we need a national purpose. He said, "If you ask me as a historian, whether a country in a state this country is in today, with no highly developed sense of national purpose, with the overwhelming accent of life on personal comfort and amusement, with a dearth of public services and a surfeit of privately sold gadgetry, with a chaotic transportation system, with its great Metropolitan areas being gradually disintegrated by the headlong switch to motor transportation, with an educational system where

quality has been extensively sacrificed to quantity, and with insufficient social discipline even to keep its major industries functioning without grievous interruptions—if you ask me whether such a country has, over the long run, a good chance of competing with a purposeful, serious, and disciplined society such as that of the Soviet Union, I must say the answer is No."

Have we as a nation really lost the fiber which made the old industrialists, entrepreneurs and frontiersmen resolute, brave, competitive, and ambitious? Are we so nationally satisfied that we merely want to be left alone to enjoy our standard of living and our material wealth? Have we lost the old American urge to expand and grow? Are we willing to concede and compromise our principles? Do we really need a national strategy?

At the beginning I told you that I was not going to offer any solutions. I hope at least that I have posed the problems.

BIOGRAPHIC SKETCH

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THE LEGACY OF GEOPOLITICS

Research paper written by Dr. John K. Linn, Jr.
Naval Warfare Class of 1961

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INTRODUCTION

Geopolitics was unknown to most people in the United States prior to World War II. Since then, however, it is well remembered as a system of scientific-like thought which the Nazis in Germany developed in support of their dream of world conquest. In fact, we in America began to use the term ourselves and even now continue to use it to a considerable extent. It is of interest, therefore, to consider what, of all this business of geopolitics that was so ballyhooed by the Germans before and during World War II, remains to us today as something really valid that we, too, can properly use in carrying out our national strategy.

A casual encounter with the subject of geopolitics gives rise to certain impressions. For instance, many of the profound-sounding utterances of geopolitics appear to be little more than truisms, things that a grade-school child should be able to tell you. Many a pronouncement of geopolitics is made without any demonstration of the reasons leading to it; it smacks of sweeping generalization. It appears to be a fairly simple matter to attach a geopolitical explanation to almost any fact or phenomenon in history or current affairs. One becomes quite struck at times by a certain mystical aura assumed by geopolitics, as if it were some sort of oracular institution presided over by high priests of its own.

Impressions like these and further reflections lead to some more serious questions. Is a separate system of geopolitics really appropriate, or could not all the explanations offered by geopolitics be just as cogently presented in the frames of reference of the other more established scientific disciplines from which geopolitics has been hybridized? Does geopolitics gain or lose meaning with the seeming reduction in size of the world and its approach to unity, where the situations of relationship between

nations and groups of nations become straitened by world organizations, lack of expansion frontiers, nuclear stalemates, etc.? Do events and circumstances of earlier times serve as valid analogies for the present time? Must not the study of the essentially two-dimensional concerns of geopolitics, such as the question of the relative values of land versus sea power, political boundaries, and economic self-sufficiency, give way to a consideration of such three-dimensional matters as are manifested in developments with respect to air power, ballistic missiles and outer space devices?

Again, how scientifically sound are the views of Mackinder and his followers regarding the "heartland" as the seat of control of the "world island" and ultimately of the world? Do these views receive any sort of confirmation in the present situation of the Soviet Union or the Sino-Soviet Bloc, or are we being misled by fears and imaginings in our minds? Finally, what is the proper relationship between geopolitics and strategy, and where do "war geopolitics" and "geostrategy" fit into the picture?

This study is prompted by a number of questions like the foregoing, but the main question with which it deals is: Does geopolitics have a positive value that is not already possessed by the older established disciplines of geography and political science, or would it be better if we omitted it from respectable discussion as being merely a hybrid pseudo-science and a source of too much confusion? We cannot here elaborate in detail the whole content of geopolitics or the history of its development, which can be readily found in various references. We shall, however, attempt to assess geopolitics for what it essentially is and to this end must go to some extent into the historical context of the rise of geopolitics.

An effort will be made, incidentally, to discriminate among different existing meanings and

interpretations of the term "geopolitics" and fix on a general meaning which can be consistently used in any consideration of the merits of the subject for further pursuance. It is, moreover, hoped that this study will point the way to the consideration of a proper role for geopolitics, or something analogous to geopolitics, in support of national strategy, with particular regard to the place it might take in conditioning our leaders and the public for the proper determination and execution of said strategy.

THE LEGACY OF GEOPOLITICS

CHAPTER I

SUMMARY HISTORY

There is no question but that the main impetus to the rise of geopolitics as a subject of wide study and discussion was provided by the movement which came into being in Germany after World War I, centered around the activities of the famous retired-army-officer-turned-professor, Maj. Gen./Dr. Karl Haushofer (1869-1946). The question rather is: would geopolitics be anything more than a little-known oddity of scholarly interest fostered by Rudolph Kjellén (1864-1922), the Swedish political scientist who first devised the term, had not the Germans, led by Haushofer, taken over the concept and adapted it to their use?

We need to go back farther than Kjellén, however, to understand how the ideas of the state embodied in geopolitics came into being. Even in ancient times we can trace attempts by philosophers (Aristotle, Lucretius), geographers (Strabo) and other writers to account for the influence which geographic factors such as climate, soil, food and topography play on men and nations. Following the Middle Ages, with the rise of the modern national state and the revival of interest in science and the humanities, we find further attempts to relate natural environment and political power, initially in the same vein as the classical writers.

It is in the nineteenth century that we find the specific source of the theory of the state as an organic being which has seemed so fundamental to geopolitics. During that century we note in geography, as in other fields, an extensive search and inquiry into facts, and the development of scientific explanations

of these facts based on careful and thorough analysis. The outcome of these investigations was a determination of the main effects of man's geographic environment on his culture and civilization, with the further result that geography advanced from a descriptive accounting for the environment alone to a formulation of principles governing the relationships between the environment and the enviroined—between geography and humanity.

Friedrich Ratzel (1844-1904) was the last of a series of nineteenth century scholars who evolved the school of thinking in which geography and human society are treated together under one heading. He gave this school of thought, or this branch of science, which compounds the sciences of geography, anthropology, and political science, the name of anthropogeography. Inevitably he, like certain of his precursors in this field, touched on matters that were later to become identified also as matters of geopolitics. He dealt, for instance, with the conditioning effects of the oceans, pointing out the importance of a maritime orientation in the development of human civilization and culture in the various continental lands of the world. Though not original with Ratzel, the matter of space (*Raum*) received thoroughgoing treatment at his hands as being essential to the existence of peoples and as playing a significant role in world politics. In his conception, the world was an organic unity, and not only man, but the state, was a part of this organic whole; the state was a living organism tied down to a land area which both served to mark its identification and to condition its character (form of government, type of society, etc.). According to Ratzel, moreover, there is a constant struggle for existence on the part of states in the face of the natural conditions attending their lands; there is also a continuous conflict among states resulting in the overcoming of smaller states with lesser advantages by larger and more resourceful states.

With this cursory review it can be seen that much of the groundwork of geopolitics was worked out for the Germans of Haushofer's school ahead of time by geographers whose primary interest was in finding a naturalistic explanation of the phenomena of human geography. It is of interest to note that Admiral Alfred T. Mahan (1840-1914) had a similarly deterministic approach in his findings concerning the maritime orientation of the politically predominant nations of the world. A close parallel may be observed in two treatments of the Mediterranean Sea as an important factor in world history—those by Mahan and Miss Ellen C. Semple (1863-1932), an American student of Ratzel's. Ratzel himself gave considerable attention to Mahan's work, but differed in concluding that continental land power would ultimately prove stronger than sea power.

In the early part of the twentieth century the tempo of the evolution of a school of geopolitics was quickened by the work of Kjell n. He was but one of many scientists then absorbed in the study and discussion of the views of the earlier proponents of geographical determinism. He was also but one of many engaged in theorizing about the nature of the state. He, like Ratzel, conceived of the state as a living creature or natural organism. According to Kjell n, however, the state possessed not only vital organs (frontiers, a capital, arterial lines of communication), but also the faculties of intellect and morality. Thus, where he departed from the anthropogeographic school was in his pointing out that the influence of the natural physical environment of geography does not fully account for the nature of the state. The state must be regarded as being capable of pursuing its own ends and purposes along the lines of certain "inexorable laws of progress." In the system of politics formulated by Kjell n, the term "geopolitics" was intended to cover only those aspects of the state related to its natural environment: location (topopolitics), form (morphopolitics), and region,

area and physical features (physiopolitics). To cover the other more intellectual and moral aspects, he made up four more correlative terms—ecopolitics, demopolitics, sociopolitics and cratopolitics (treating of the national economy, the people, the society and the government, respectively). This system permitted him to combine with the thinking derived from the anthropogeographic school the thinking that had been separately developed relative to economics, sociology and political science. The Germans of Haushofer's school later appropriated the term "geopolitics" but gave it a broader application and ignored the other four terms.

Prior to the rise of geopolitics, the English geographer, Sir Halford J. Mackinder (1861-1947), had already expounded an interpretation of the struggle between continental and maritime nations for the domination of the world. His conclusions gave warning that a nation in the geographical position which the Soviet Union occupies today has, by virtue of this position, the potentiality of ruling the world. That the Germans acknowledged the correctness of his views is attested by Haushofer's long advocacy of a Russo-German military alliance to assure ultimate German ascendancy in the Eurasian continent.

It should not be overlooked that when the German school of geopolitics was established, there had been a century-long build-up of a sense of imperial destiny. The beginnings can be detected, for example, in the *Addresses to the German People* published in 1808 by Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762-1814), noted educator and nationalist:

Thus are you of all modern peoples the one in whom the seed of human perfection most unmistakably lies, and to whom the lead in its development is committed. If you perish in this your essential nature, then there perishes together with you every hope

of the whole human race for salvation from the depth of its miseries.

Fichte's pronouncements became the bible of Prussian chauvinism and the sacred book of German foreign policy. Subsequently the philosopher Hegel continued and enlarged the concept of the totalitarian state. Nietzsche taught "a gross egotism, worship of one's own individual thought, a lifelong crusade to deify the superman who shall rule the earth—and the concept of leadership (Führerprinzip)." Treitschke glorified the Prussian state and canonized war as "an institution ordained of God." These and others provided stimulation to the German sense of destiny during a period in which Germany achieved victory over France and unification (1871) and attained status as a strong world power under the guidance of Bismarck and Kaiser Wilhelm II up to World War I. The century-long idea of a *Mitteleuropa* (the Danube area) under German domination, first advocated in 1841 by Friedrich List (1789-1846), played no small part in conditioning German national feeling for support of the Nazi strategy.

Haushofer became established as an honorary professor of political geography at the University of Munich in 1919. He drew around him associates and followers who shared his views of geopolitics, and with them he founded in 1924 a journal, the *Zeitschrift für Geopolitik*, which over the years came to embody a great portion of the literature developed on the subject. Many books and articles in other journals were also published. Haushofer himself was the leading figure in the research effort and published a considerable portion of the writings in his own name. Eventually practically all of the geographic facilities of Germany came under the sway of the geopoliticians and great numbers of field workers were pressed into the service of sending back data to be incorporated in the research carried on in many centers in Germany. The subject of geopolitics became

greatly ramified. Geopolitics was given a military application and the term "Wehrgeopolitik," probably best rendered as "geostrategy," was assigned to this extension of the term. Attempts were also made to apply geopolitical techniques to such sciences as psychology, medicine, and jurisprudence, with a resultant portmanteau labeling of these synthesized "geo-sciences" as "geopsychology," "geomedicine and "geojurisprudence."

The fundamental ideas embodied in the geopolitics of Haushofer's school, according to one analysis, are all concerned with space (*Raum*) and are five in number:

1. Autarky, the ideal of national self-containment in the economic sense.
2. Lebensraum, the right of a nation to ample room for its population.
3. Panregions, parts of the earth to which a nation stakes particular claims for domination with a view to the exercise of an autarky not feasible within the nation's own borders.
4. The land power vs. sea power issue, with the conviction that the former, centered in the heart of the "world island" of Eurasia and Africa, will eventually prevail over the latter.
5. Frontiers as a temporary halt of a nation in its march toward world domination and as a factor which may serve as an excuse for renewing expansionist wars.

These ideas and the associated theories, programs for action, and propaganda found in the voluminous writings of the German geopoliticians, are generally

"drawn from several natural and social sciences, ranging from geology to psychology . . . They form a recurrent *leitmotiv* in these prolix and repetitious writings. When stripped of the ambiguities with which they are generally surrounded, they are seen to be presented in different versions, often mutually contradictory. All this is the antithesis of the spirit and method of science which the geopoliticians look upon as their guiding star, for natural science sets as its goal impartial search, accurate observation, lucid generalization, and precise formulation. Two of the five [ideas enumerated above] are applications of geographic theory, two others are proposals for world organization, and the fifth is a facilitating device."

The Nazis found in geopolitics a school of thought in sympathy with their political aims and seized upon it as a tool to further their aims in several ways. Geopolitics proved useful as a mode of justifying political action by the Nazis in the eyes of the intelligentsia and of the public at large within Germany and also in winning support, active or tacit, among many persons outside of Germany. It was built up as the basis of a powerful propaganda directed, first against the nearest neighbors of Germany on whom the Nazis had designs for annexation or conquest, then, when events reached the showdown stage, against the powers which became opposed to Germany. As a research effort geopolitics unquestionably provided much useful data concerning the geographical, and therewith the economic, political, and social—not to mention military—situations of the other countries with which Germany was confronted in her growth and expansion.

The contribution which geopolitics made in its proper sphere of suggestions or recommendations as to national strategy and policy are generally on the order of those ideas traceable to geopolitics which can be found in Hitler's *Mein Kampf*, mostly in Chapter XIV. This book, first published in 1924, contains

reflections of an association which Haushofer had with Hitler through Rudolf Hess, one-time aide-de-camp of Haushofer's in World War I, who arranged for Haushofer to meet Hitler in 1923, later to visit him in prison. There is, however, no evidence of actual collaboration or direct participation by Haushofer in the writing of this document. Similarly, it would be difficult to prove any positive connection between ideas published in the *Zeitschrift für Geopolitik* and other works by the geopoliticians and the activities of the German nation under Nazi leadership, despite remarkable correspondences in many details. Haushofer praised the conclusion in August, 1939 of the non-aggression pact between Germany and the Soviet Union which he had advocated for years on geopolitical grounds, but it is debatable whether his advocacy of the agreement was a strong factor leading to its conclusion. Certainly his views did not count for much when Hitler broke this agreement in June, 1941.

In other countries during World War II we hear relatively little of geopolitics as such, even though some of those countries played key roles in the system of thought developed by the Germans of Haushofer's school. Italy functioned as the Axis partner in the center of Europe, with an orientation to the Mediterranean Sea, but in German eyes she appeared the weak sister of the alliance, ultimately to be cast aside or subjugated when Germany's main aims of world domination were fulfilled. Despite this disparagement of Italy, there was an Italian school of geopolitics of sorts. That is to say, a monthly journal was published entitled: *Geopolitica*, beginning in 1939, which imitated the *Zeitschrift für Geopolitik* and included reprints and translations therefrom. It had official sanction from Mussolini and there was, as manifested in it, a certain amount of original Italian activity concerned with geopolitical matters, mostly confined to the Mediterranean area.

Japan was of more particular interest to the Germans because of her position at the Eastern extreme of the Eurasian continent and the possibility of her establishing a new order of things in East and Southeast Asia parallel to that which Germany aimed to establish in Europe and Africa. Haushofer had a personal interest in Japan as a result of his pre-World War I sojourn there. He admired the Japanese and found in their history illustrations of the principles of geopolitics which he believed Germany should follow. As early as 1924 he wrote a book entitled *Die Geopolitik des Pazifischen Ozeans* in which he championed the cause of Japan in the "spatial rivalry" for a Pacific region and predicted that Japan would probably win in this rivalry. He also introduced the idea of wars being started without formal declarations and being made "deadly, sharp and short" through the maximum use of the element of surprise. Later studies by members of his geopolitical school, notably one Klaus Mehnert between 1937 and 1940, gave attention to Hawaii and Pearl Harbor in a way that most interestingly anticipated the Japanese attack of December 7, 1941. The Japanese took an avid interest in geopolitics. The extensive use of German geopolitical writings and the slavish adoption of the German geopolitical terminology and concepts revealed in the Japanese press were typical of the close imitation by the Japanese of the Germans on scientific and military matters prior to and during World War II. The Japanese propaganda theme that it was necessary for Japan to expand her territory in order to accommodate her increasing population, with its obvious resemblance to the German doctrine of *Lebensraum*, illustrates this copying of ideas.

That the matter of geopolitics was studied to a considerable extent in the Soviet Union before and during World War II is indicated by the existence of extensive Soviet literature on the subject, of which the German geopoliticians took note. There is, unfortunately, little readily accessible evidence as

to the specific views which the Soviets may have had of the German geopolitical movement, or as to the particular trends which were manifested in the Soviet development of the subject in that period.

CHAPTER II

CARRY-OVERS

The impact of the geopolitics of Haushofer's school on geographical activities in the United States in World War II was commensurate with the effect obtained by the early successes of Nazi Germany in the war. As Americans became aware of geopolitics and the important part it played in the Nazi propaganda, they could hardly help but wonder if there was something in this geopolitics that gave the Germans a kind of superior insight into the relationships among the various nations. Respect for German scientific achievements of the past made them wary of dismissing this question lightly. But it was difficult to grasp the essence of the German geopolitics; its pronouncements were so often couched in confused, obscure, ambiguous language (very likely on purpose).

Close study revealed that the Germans with their geopolitics were indeed far ahead of other countries in an understanding of the bearing which geography has on world politics and war strategy, as well as in a detailed knowledge of the specific geography of various countries of the world, with particular reference to their economic and military potentialities. American military intelligence had previously been well aware of the importance of geography for military operations and for estimates of the capacity of various countries for supporting an extended war effort. But at the outbreak of World War II the United States found it had much catching up to do in acquiring and assembling the vast quantities of pertinent data. In short order it set about to do just that, with new comprehensive surveys of all the strategic areas of the world and original compilations of targeting information on enemy-held territories. The German geopoliticians must undoubtedly be counted a factor which led to the full-scale pursuit of this type of

research, which began in World War II and is still continuing apace on an enormous scale.

We are probably indebted to the German geopoliticians to some extent for specific techniques found to be characteristically used by them in their geopolitical work. The Germans made much use of special-purpose maps and charts, with peculiar devices designed to point up the features which the maps and charts were intended to display. The maps and charts were often reductions to simpler form of more comprehensive versions. Devices such as heavy lines, shading, cross-hatching, arrows, wedges, clamps, pincers and circles were used with striking effect to mark matters of emphasis and to represent geographic advance, penetration, encirclement, infiltration, alliances, and other movements and relationships of geopolitical forces. These and other similar techniques, of course, form a familiar part of the graphic display and visual aid techniques commonly used now throughout the United States, with additional embellishments of color, lighting and the use of special materials and forms. The use of these paraphernalia would undoubtedly have come about anyway, but the geopoliticians, as among the first users, must surely have given some impetus to it by demonstrating its effectiveness for educational and propaganda purposes.

The German geopoliticians have imparted some new terminology to our language. The best known word, given currency by Ratzel's disciples, then made into a slogan by the geopoliticians, is "Lebensraum," which has become fully established as an English word. "Geopolitics" is another word in the English language which, as noted in Chapter I above, we can similarly trace to its source through the German geopoliticians. Other words in English, as listed in Merriam-Webster's *New International Dictionary*, likewise owing their currency to the importance which the German geopoliticians attached to them, include: "geostrategy," "heartland," and "world island," the latter two having

been original with Mackinder. Some words previously established in the English language have come to have special connotations due to their association with geopolitics, e.g. "global" and "pivot."

Beyond such mere words, the German geopoliticians have undoubtedly transmitted to the minds of peoples in many parts of the world a way of thinking which reinforces nationalism among these peoples. Instead of just the Germans, the Italians and the Japanese, now it is any number of nations—some of them newly formed or recently made independent—that have, in studying their own situation in relation to the rest of the world, become conscious of their geographical limitations in terms of space and economic resources. Accordingly, where Germany and her Axis partners left off at the end of World War II, others have carried on. The representation of the need for more territory and access to sources of materials may be couched in different terms from those which Nazi and Fascist propaganda made so odious in the recent period of World War II. Nevertheless, the real struggle continues, intensified in the form of protestations against the unequal relationships connoted by colonialism and capitalism, with consequent demands for equality of opportunity and privilege. The present threat of communism is all the more potent for its having appropriated these themes as propaganda means for the advancing of its own cause.

In the scientific aspect, the German geopolitical movement served to awaken us forcibly to a realization of the importance of geography in relation to world politics. Regardless of how geographers of the old school resisted before World War II any idea of putting geography to use for state expansionist purposes, now there has come about a general acceptance of some purpose of geography other than the assemblage of facts for the mere sake of knowledge and enlightenment. World War II saw something of a flurry of activity in the United States in response to the stimulus

provided by the Germans. Efforts were made to inform people in the government and the public at large of the facts concerning the development and significance of the German geopolitical movement. Naturally enough there were also efforts to parallel what the Germans were doing, especially in the most constructive aspect of the geopolitical movement—research. The word "geopolitics" came into vogue overnight. Courses in "geopolitics" have at various times since then been conducted at a number of leading academic institutions. The War Department produced in 1944 a three-volume manual along geopolitical lines entitled: *Geographical Foundations of National Power*, and used it as the basic textbook for geographical studies in the Army Specialized Training Program. The Military Intelligence Division, G-2, of the War Department established an element in its organization bearing the designation of "Geopolitical Group." While the thoughts of many were thus occupied with applying geopolitical principles to the interpretation of events and the formulation of strategy in connection with the prosecution of the war, the thoughts of a few were turned toward the application of these principles to the designing of an international structure to be put into effect upon the conclusion of the war. A well-known effort along this line was the work of Nicholas J. Spykman represented in his *Geography of the Peace*, published in 1944. He advocated regional groupings, each under the direction of a dominant power, with a judicious apportionment of natural resources among the regions to provide a mutually compensatory balance.

In the period since World War II the German school of geopolitics has continued to have an effect on geographical studies and related pursuits. The particular geopolitics of Haushofer's school has been largely repudiated and discredited because of its prostitution of science for propaganda purposes. It committed many errors which in any objective review and analysis are readily apparent; it could only have thrived as it did on the nationalistic fervor which

Nazism stirred up in the German people. Attempts have continued, nevertheless, to identify and extract sound elements in the geopolitical system of thought, and further to develop approaches to the study of geography with its political and other sociological implications in a comprehensive and completely justifiable scientific system.

CHAPTER III

CHARACTERISTICS AND DEFINITIONS

In Chapters I and II we have traced the origin and rise of the German school of geopolitics and noted some evidences of its continuing effect in the post-World War II period. In the present chapter we shall review geopolitics in the various aspects it has presented to date in order to arrive at a determination of what it is in essence. Before discussing definitions it is well that we note some circumstantial and characterizing features.

First of all, we should not overlook the fact that geopolitics as a subject of study is peculiar to our times. The particular German school of geopolitics which flourished under the Nazis could only have had being in a time and setting in which a strong national state, professing a need for direct access to resources and markets outside its borders, was denied such access by surrounding states with crystallized forms of government in a static framework of international relations. There is an underlying principle here which can be associated with any brand of geopolitics, regardless of whether it is linked to one nation's aggressiveness or to plans for peaceful international co-operation. For there now is universal consciousness of the fact that each state forms a definite component of the world's structure, with an extension of territory, a limitation in boundaries, certain economic assets and deficiencies, and certain relationships with other states—all peculiar to that particular state.

It should be noted here that geopolitics has in the past exhibited an almost chameleon-like ability to vary itself in accordance with circumstances. For instance, Mackinder's views on the heartland underwent considerable modification from the time they were

first formulated in 1904 to the end of World War I (1919) and to the middle of World War II (1943). Weigert ably points out the variations in the relationships among Great Britain, Germany and Russia as among the conditioners of Mackinder's views at these various times and implies that the pronouncements of geopolitics are prone to be colored by current political considerations. One could likewise cite instances of variations in Haushofer's statements concerning, for example, the United States and sea power, which betray the influence that current political situations had on his thinking.

The fact that geopolitics is a synthesis of the two academic disciplines of geography and political science is a matter of interest. For geopolitics is not, as usually understood, the same thing as political geography, although it is, to be sure, a synthesis of essentially the same two disciplines, but of a different order. While political geography is primarily a geographical survey of the various forms of political organization in the light of all the factors affecting such organization, geopolitics has the main object of determining appropriate political action in the light of geographical factors. Naturally there is much overlapping of interest, but the emphasis is clearly distinct in each case. Some of the words originally invented in the same framework as "geopolitics," namely "topopolitics," "ecopolitics," etc., and the additional words introduced by Haushofer's school, notably "geopsychology," "geomedicine," and "geojurisprudence," give one pause; but there is inherently no lexicological reason why "geopolitics" cannot be a permanently acceptable word with a distinct meaning of its own. The questionableness of the term lies rather in the uncertainty of its definition and application.

An interesting question is this: Does geopolitics constitute a science? Kjellén, who coined the term, defined it as "the science which conceives the

state as a geographic organism or as a phenomenon in space." We need not, however, dwell on the merits of this particular definition. As we have noted, the term "geopolitics" has undergone a modification of meaning and application since Kjell n's time, and while his imputation of a scientific character to geopolitics might conceivably have proven justifiable in other circumstances, the question to be resolved now is whether the geopolitics that resulted from the efforts of Haushofer and his disciples was a science. Haushofer called geopolitics "the new national 'science of the state' (*nationale Staatswissenschaft*)" and spoke of "scientific geopolitics." His followers also called it "*Wissenschaft und Kunst*"—a science and an art. In the *Zeitschrift-f r Geopolitik* in 1928, the editors stated: "Geopolitics is the science of the earth relationships of political processes," but in the same statement went on to declare that geopolitics also partakes of the character of "an art, namely, the art of guiding practical politics." The consensus of scholars is that the German brand of geopolitics does not deserve to be classed as a science. Many scholars hold the term "geopolitics" in distinct opprobrium, because of its contamination by the German movement.

An interesting and valuable comparison between geopolitics and other ways of viewing relationships between human units and their geographical environment is to be found in a recondite study by Harold and Margaret Sprout: *Man-Milieu Relationship Hypotheses in the Context of International Politics*. Classifying geopolitics under the headings of environmental determinism and mild environmentalism, the author cites other approaches as being environmental possibilism, environmental probabilism and cognitive behaviorism.

a. Possibilism has found historical expression in a school which arose in France in the early part of this century in reaction against the deterministic school developing in Germany. The possibilists argued that within a given set of environmental factors man

had many choices of action. He even had the capability of modifying his environment, as demonstrated in modern technology. Man was not inevitably driven by conditions of his environment to prescribed courses of action. There were limitations, of course, within which his capabilities were practically confined. Analysis of capabilities, e.g. war or industrial, involves reasoning along possibilist lines.

b. Probabilism is explanation or prediction, by means of a generalized model, of the average, or typical, person's reaction to a given milieu. It normally reasons from general assumptions as to how decision-makers operating in a given physical and social milieu are likely to act and react. It often incorporates the view that international politics is a struggle for power and that foreign-policy decision-makers give highest priority to maximizing power. It tends to oversimplify the objectives of statecraft and frequently assumes that the analyst's own state seeks only security, whereas most of its adversaries are aggressive.

c. Cognitive behaviorism, influenced by Gestalt psychology, emphasizes the subjective aspect of man's apperception of his environment. Curiously, one statement of Mackinder epitomizes this approach: "The influence of geographical conditions upon human activities throughout history has depended . . . not merely on the realities as we now know them to be and to have been, but in even greater degree on what men imagined in regard to them."

The authors conclude their study with a consideration of the possibilities of integrating the foregoing hypotheses within the framework of a more general theory of explanation or of prediction. Explanation theory, as an approach to the problem of man-milieu relationships, combines features of possibilism, probabilism and cognitive behaviorism—all of the alternative hypotheses to those to which

geopolitics is subordinated. Explanation in terms of environmental determinism and environmentalism, however, is too vague and abstract to be of value, because it divorces the idea of the state from the human persons who take and execute decisions in the name of the state. Prediction theory depends even more than explanation on assumptions and less on definitely established factors; consequently the hypothesis of environmental determinism and its watered-down version, mild environmentalism, with their claims of certainty and inevitability, are simply incompatible.

Definitions of the term "geopolitics" show considerable variation. One definition makes it synonymous with political geography, but this is not what is generally understood to be the connotation of the term. An obvious, but not very useful, definition is the one that makes it the particular German school of geographical studies which was headed by Haushofer. Generalizing therefrom, however, it would be possible to call it a system of studies which purports to find considerations in geographical facts indicating courses of action which a state should take. This is, in fact, how Europeans generally regard geopolitics. Some political geographers have found good use for the term as a simple substitute for "applied political geography," in which a serious effort is made to study the natural environments of political states as universally applicable conditions and to derive impartial conclusions relative to policies to be worked out for these states by their governments or external organizations. Most people understand geopolitics merely to refer rather generally to national policy (either national security or foreign policy-wise) as affected by the natural environment and in relation to the rest of the world. Where the Germans differed from this was in using geopolitics as a means to promote the interests of their particular government, claiming that the natural environment determines the behavior of a state, as a form of living being or organism.

If we are to consider using geopolitics for our own purposes, we will probably have to be satisfied with the interpretation generally given to it, as indicated above, which merely recognizes that geographic factors have an effect on national policy, but which falls short of the deterministic view that a nation is compelled to act the way it does because of its environment. Whether geopolitics in these terms will ever become established as a science appears doubtful on the face of things.

CHAPTER IV

ANALYSIS AND CRITIQUE

With the review in the foregoing chapter of the distinguishing features and identity of geopolitics, we are now in a position to consider what there is to geopolitics in the way of real and lasting value. We have seen that there is much that is all wrong about geopolitics. Yet there have been various scholars of high standing who found in geopolitics, even as evolved by the Germans during the Nazi regime, a new basis for the serious study of political states in relation to each other against the background of the geography of the world.

Before we begin to talk of geopolitics in any sort of favorable light, we need to clear away all the undesirable features with which it early became entangled. It would certainly be well to make a clean break with the whole idea which Kjellén, borrowing from Ratzel and other forerunners, wrote into his concept of the state and which Haushofer and his school eagerly took over, namely that of the state as a living organism. Not that comparing a nation with a living being or person is necessarily wrong. Lincoln at Gettysburg spoke of a new nation conceived, brought forth (by our fathers!) and dedicated, like a baby. Near the end of the Civil War, at his second presidential inaugural, Lincoln exhorted his countrymen to "bind up the nation's wounds." Franklin Roosevelt's address at his third presidential inaugural contained a curious treatment of a nation as a human being.

A nation, like a person, has a body—a body that must be fed and clothed and housed, invigorated and rested, in a manner that measures up to the objectives of our time. A nation, like a person, has a mind—a mind that must be kept informed and alert,

that must know itself, that understands the hopes and the needs of its neighbors—all the other nations that live within the narrowing circle of the world. And a nation, like a person, has something deeper . . . the spirit—the faith of America.

But these and other cases of likening a nation to an individual usually have a rhetorical purpose and need not be interpreted literally. In the geopolitical context, however, beginning with Kjellén, the concept of the state as a living organism lends itself forthwith to the philosophy of the totalitarian state. The related notion that nations are born, have a youth, become senile and finally die, similarly plays into the hands of ambitious dictators who attempt to extend their power at the expense of the established order.

All the other main features of the German brand of geopolitics, as noted in Chapter I above, likewise come in for a measure of condemnation. The argument for *Lebensraum*, which is linked with this organismic concept, can be shown to be a false one, as far as reasoning from population statistics is concerned. For, in fact, the acquisition of additional lands has never resulted in more than a meager reduction in the population of the supposedly overpopulated homeland. Much the same sort of judgment can be made of the principle of autarky for a nation and of the related principle of extended economic dominion over a wide region to ensure self-sufficiency in the "large-expanse economy" (*Grossraumwirtschaft*). As Strausz-Hupé says, "Germany and Japan could have obtained by universally accepted trading methods the raw materials and markets that *Grossraumwirtschaft* was intended to assure, and Germany had done a tidy business in the era of free trade preceding World War I."

On the matter of the argument over continental power as against sea power, the geopoliticians under Haushofer made grave miscalculations. They overlooked

the decided advantage of mobility possessed by Great Britain, not to mention the United States, in the form of sea power.

As for the idea that frontiers are mere resting points in a vigorous nation's expansion, although the Germans went to lengths to write a new system of international law to justify German aggression on the principle of *Lebensraum*, there is little likelihood that the world at large will in the foreseeable future tolerate such disregard for established boundaries. Since technology has made it possible for many people to achieve or to hope for betterment of their situation within their geographical confines, the *Raum* idea is obsolescent, though by no means obsolete.

In general, the criticism may be made of the geopolitics of the German school—and perhaps this is a danger inherent in any geopolitics—that too much emphasis was placed on natural factors, not enough on the importance of the human element, as between one section of the world and another. Haushofer did recognize variations in the human factor, but in practice he did not make sufficient allowance for it in his calculations. These and other mistakes greatly compounded the total error in the appraisal of the world situation made by the German geopoliticians.

The German school of geopolitics then can be summed up as a movement which served to lend support to the Nazi aggression scheme. It was a clever business. It helped mobilize popular thought in favor of the Nazi policies and tended to confuse those who were opposed. With ponderous pronouncements and catchy slogans, it gained among the Germans something of the power of a cult, if not a religion. But like many clever cults and false religions of the past, its cleverness was not enough to give it permanence and its falseness led to its inevitable doom.

What, then, remains to be salvaged and regarded as of lasting value from this fallen edifice? Even during World War II, the term "geopolitics" gained acceptability among many in the United States who recognized a certain validity in it insofar as it pointed up new factors in the study of international relations. Hitherto, the study of geography had been little more than a seeking of assorted facts concerning the various lands of the world *per se*. There had been little effort to relate these facts to the political facts of international relations. A few scholars, who were aware of the work of the Germans, though not in sympathy with its German nationalistic aims, did pioneer even before World War I in setting forth observations on the effects of geographical factors on international political affairs. These early efforts, carried out in sound, scholarly fashion, formed an impressive contribution to the sciences of geography and political science or their synthesis, political geography, and became the core of such a movement of geopolitics as there grew to be in the United States during the war. Because of their particular approach they can be classed as "geopolitical" in the sense with which we are concerned; but it is significant that they were produced essentially as contributions by geographers to geography or by political scientists to political science. With the flurry of wartime excitement relative to geopolitics in the German style now past and with the passage of ample time to reflect, it has been possible to throw much of the earlier geopolitical achievement into proper perspective as properly a part of one or another of the older established fields of study. What is good in geopolitics thus turns out to be little more than a part of one or more of these older disciplines.

Now let us turn to a consideration of some of the particular doctrines that have been classed under the heading of geopolitics other than those unworthy ones which have been condemned along with the German school

of geopolitics which fostered them. Principal among such doctrines which we should consider are those associated with the name of Mackinder. As noted in Chapter III above, Mackinder's heartland theory was not a firmly fixed one by any means, but was in fact influenced by varying political considerations. The effect it had was greatly amplified by the importance attached to it by the German geopoliticians, which it may be pointed out was in turn affected by political considerations. A most thoroughgoing critique of Mackinder's theory has been undertaken in Weigert et al., *Principles of Political Geography*. Here it is concluded that since the time of Mackinder's writings, in view of developments in communications capabilities not only on the Eurasian land mass but across the one-time Arctic barrier, the idea of an inner world island with its heartland and an isolated outer crescent including the North American continent is an oversimplification and an obsolescence. "As a glimpse of the globe or any world map not inspired by Mercator makes clear, the two 'mainlands' almost merge in their northern expanses. It is here that the land power and the land-based air power of the North American nations and of the U.S.S.R. are now maneuvering for positions in anticipation of a possible major conflict."

The conclusions of the earlier writers on the sea power-versus-land power issue have undergone a thorough review, too. In general, the criticism against them is that they are further instances of oversimplification. As we have noted in Chapter I above, Mahan and Ratzel both found in sea power a highly significant factor in history. Mahan, on the other hand, argued that historical evidence pointed to the necessity of strong sea power in support of imperial purposes. Ratzel, on the other hand, saw indications of the gradual demise of sea power with its ultimate overthrow by land power. Mackinder took this European view and incorporated it in his warnings of the potential advantage which might be realized by a power controlling the heartland.

Spykman took issue with Mackinder in his interpretation of the position of the lands surrounding the heartland. Mackinder called them "marginal lands" and believed that they were doomed to be completely dominated by the power in the heartland. Spykman, however, relabeled them "rimlands" and pointed out that historically Great Britain and Russia have usually opposed each other with a number of other members of these rimlands allied with them on one side or the other, or else they have joined in an alliance with each other in opposition to a rimland power, e.g. France or Germany, which tried to gain control over the whole continent. The marginal lands or rimlands form a power element in their own right, with their power partaking of both the forms of sea power and land power. "Emphasis on the land power-sea power conflict meant even before the advent of air power a gross oversimplification, as it is the accessibility to both sea and land and the power deriving from it which gives the marginal regions growing importance. In the second half of the twentieth century, the impact of air power makes a new appraisal of the marginal lands mandatory, in their relationship to the heartland as well as to other areas."

The prevailing view which scholars hold of Mackinder today is summed up in the following statement:

H.J. Mackinder presented nearly half a century ago a thesis of world power analysis and prognosis which for better or worse has become the most famous contribution of modern geography to man's view of his political world. Mackinder's interest and purpose, it may be noted, were primarily political and practical and it is not surprising therefore that his hypothesis is much less firmly grounded than, for example, his more academic and geographic analysis of the foundation of Britain's sea power in the relationship of Great Britain to "The British Seas."

Thus, as we have seen, the central views of those who have been most highly regarded or who have achieved the greatest notoriety in the geopolitical movement are largely ignored or discredited today. The few sound scholars willing to wear the label of "geopolitician" have envisioned something slightly different from what, looking at the matter carefully, we now understand to be geopolitics. Most others in their place would today consider their activity to be a part of the functions, perhaps a bit extended, of geography or of political geography proper. "Geopolitics" is a convenient handle—more convenient, especially in its adjectival form, than, say, "political geography" and "politico-geographical"—but it has been made fairly worthless as a term having a precise significance. The following statement is a sample of the current attitude toward geopolitics of many in the academic field:

The analysis of national power represents a distinct area of convergence, not only of geography and political science, but also of economics, anthropology, and psychology. It would seem well to identify this area of joint interest with a clear and simple name, such as "power analysis" rather than to obscure it by the all-embracing term, geopolitics, the origin of which is steeped in error, exaggeration, and intellectual poison.

But while we may conclude that geopolitics in the form in which it was identified and known in its heyday under the Nazis is now, to all intents and purposes, dead, it would be wrong to ignore one element of the movement which is still with us and very much alive today: this is the aspect of its being a basis for nationalistic propaganda. It made full use of homespun metaphors and vivid symbols which could be readily comprehended by the average citizen. It played upon the feelings of dissatisfaction and the desire

for a better lot latent in every individual. All the time that it represented itself as a serious scholarly effort it was in reality a somewhat disguised propaganda mechanism. The main real justification that German geopolitics had for itself was the fact that it supported the Nazi government's purposes of national aggression. Remove the earmarks of the German organization and you have in this brand of geopolitics a straightforward propagandea effort of a type not unfamiliar in the world today.

It is not without interest to compare the German geopolitical movement with the world communist movement centered in the U.S.S.R. Gyorgy in 1944 observed:

Geographical materialism [referring to the German geopolitical movement] is a twentieth-century "spatial" version of earlier, Marxist methods. The interpretation remains the same, only instead of explaining political and historical phenomena in terms of economics, geopolitics considers them in terms of space. History, according to this conception, consists of endless fights among states for political and spatial survival, while states themselves are predetermined and measured by only two standards, power and territory. Following in the footsteps of Marxist economic determinism, geographical materialism completely ignores all social, human, and cultural values.

The element of conflict is also present in both ideological systems, the emphasis alone showing the divergences. Followers of Marx speak of a class struggle, whereas the Haushoferites attempt to describe a conflict of youthful, dynamic, and strong versus aged, static, or weakened nations. The feeling of an impending catastrophe fatal to the present-day structure of society is

equally shared by both schools. For the Marxists this catastrophe heralds the coming victory of the proletarian revolution and the formation of a giant proletarian state. Geopolitics interprets the catastrophe as a world-wide struggle among space-swallowing and space-resisting states, leading eventually to a redivision of the earth among the few triumphant proletarianized giant states. Capitalist society and an integrated, more or less normalized family of nations of pre-World War I vintage are, in either case, definitely predestined to come to an end.

Interesting comparisons have also been drawn between the geopolitics of the German school and the creed of Manifest Destiny which flourished in the period 1830-1860 and continued to have an influence down to the end of the nineteenth century. Mahan's stimulation of American interest in sea power may be said to have resulted in an extension of the Manifest Destiny "geopolitics," which had previously been mainly continental, into an overseas frame of reference.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

It is ironic that we continue to hear so much of geopolitics today, seeing that its validity has been denied by leading figures in the scholastic world. Geopolitics is not dying out. It evidently comes naturally to many government officials, lecturers and writers dealing with national strategy to make sweeping references to the subject of geopolitics, with casual allusions to the world island and the heartland and the issue of sea power versus land power. Even scholars go along with the tide. What does this mean?

Perhaps the explanation is to be found partly along the line that we need a simple theory to guide us. For even though we may realize that a highly simplified explanation of things is apt to overlook many important points in this complex world, yet it is human nature for us to welcome a theory that reduces matters to a simple set of issues with us on one side and our enemy on the other. The communists, like the Nazis, have simplified matters along the lines of haves-versus-have-nots, capitalists-versus-workers, and the like. It may well be that, where we encounter difficulties in competing with the communists with respect to their economic materialism, we find ourselves in a more comfortable position with respect to something like the geographic materialism represented in geopolitics, without the trappings of the German school. This might help to explain why it is fashionable, in comparing the relative power postures of the United States and the Soviet Union in the world today, to adduce the terminology and concepts of geopolitics. Since Nazi Germany was able to make things simple for its people this way, perhaps we are fortunate in that, by adopting the same general principle, with a substitution of countries and areas, we have gotten a ready-made clarification of our present situation in the simplest terms.

Whether or not the foregoing rationalization explains why geopolitics stays with us, the important fact is that it is still here. This is not necessarily a bad or wrong thing. We do need to beware of the danger that we might place too much stock in such a simple explanation of matters. Our knowledge of the experience of the German geopolitics and our own relatively sane attitude, however, should guard us from making miscalculations of the magnitude of those which the Germans made. In any case, we do need something—and it is entirely possible that geopolitics, in a suitable form, could be that something—to give us a lucid and compelling justification of our position in the world, comparable to the way it helped the Germans.

The specific content of the geopolitical doctrines which we use must be different. We do not care about Lebensraum. We are not concerned with autarky for any region except the world-wide one consisting of all the Free World—in other words, uninhibited trade and mutual assistance on a global scale. Talk of frontiers can be only in terms of the iron curtain, bamboo curtain or any other type of barrier between the Free World and the communist bloc. There will still be the sea power-land power issue, complicated, however, by the growing importance of air power and space technology. Above all, we must assiduously avoid the highly deterministic view that the state is a living organism which must respond involuntarily to the forces exerted upon it by its environment.

An acceptable body of geopolitical-type doctrine for us would begin with a recognition of the conditioning effects of geographical environment on a political state. It would further acknowledge the importance of the fact first emphasized by Mackinder that the world has become in modern times a closed system. It would then proceed to consider how the needs of the peoples of the world can be most appropriately met by judicious allocation of the real

estate and means of livelihood available in the world. A most essential consideration today is that it also must take into account the aid which technology can provide in improving the lot of peoples everywhere.

Strausz-Hupé in 1942 stated:

But if our reading of history does not deceive us there is another alternative [to the system of power spheres which arose after the eclipse of the League of Nations or a system of approximately symmetrical regional areas each dominated by a great power]. Modern technology is subtly changing the pattern of expansionism as we have known it. According to Ratzel, space is a power which would prove superior to all other powers; the Mackinders and Haushofers, notwithstanding considerable difference of opinion, have substantially accepted his dogma, and the history of the past appears to reflect the ascendancy of the regional super-state. Modern technology, however, is revolutionizing our concepts of space, and the very exigencies of modern technology, with its demands on the economic resources of the *whole* globe, bid fair to drive men's thoughts about the world's political organization into yet untried channels.

He went on to point out one such channel as being the "obliteration of tariff barriers," in which is implicit "the mutual acceptance of the idea of the world's economy being truly one." He referred to "an increasing sense of the real mission of the United States in this age to put an end to the era of rampant expansionism and to clear the decks for an order which will be universally beneficent and universally secure." He considered that the United States should use "its great size, space deepness, and resources, its possession of all the geographical prerequisites of land,

air and sea power" to exercise "beneficent leadership" in establishing a new and universal order.

CHAPTER VI

SUMMARY

In the Introduction to this paper we set out to examine geopolitics with certain questions in mind. We have examined the subject and in the course of doing so found answers or indications of answers to these questions. The main question with which the paper was concerned was whether geopolitics has validity as an independent subject of research in the academic sense, and the answer we have arrived at is No.

We have seen that many of the geopolitical concepts which have been most highly publicized, including the well-known ones of Mackinder, are scientifically unsupportable; for the most part they have owed their origin and continued existence to political considerations. The basic motivation of geopolitics is political, not scientific, and insofar as it seeks to put a deterministic interpretation on the effect of geography on man, through the attribution of an organic nature to the state, or the like, it lends itself to totalitarian and aggressive purposes.

Geopolitics persists in our time as the caption of a point of view which seems to make clear our relationship to the rest of the world. Its simplicity has much appeal for us, as it has had for others. If we avoid the worst errors into which the German geopoliticians fell, it may be that geopolitics will over the years prove to have a positive value for us as well.

We might make good use of a modified geopolitics-type doctrine which recognizes that geographical factors do have an effect on human society, that the ecumene of the world is finite, and that steps can be taken to redress imbalances in natural resources

between one part of the world and another to the mutual benefit of all concerned.

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RECOMMENDED READING

The evaluation of books listed below include those recommended to resident students of the Naval War College. Officers in the fleet and elsewhere may find them of interest.

The inclusion of a book or article in this list does not necessarily constitute an endorsement by the Naval War College of the facts, opinions or concepts contained therein. They are indicated only on the basis of interesting, timely, and possibly useful reading matter.

Many of these publications may be found in ship and station libraries. Certain of the books on the list which are not available from these sources may be available from one of the Navy's Auxiliary Library Service Collections. These collections of books are obtainable on loan. Requests from individual officers to borrow books from an Auxiliary Library Service Collection should be addressed to the nearest of the following special loan collections:

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Marianas
Nimitz Hill Library, Box 17
Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

U.S. Naval Station Library
Attn: Auxiliary Service Collection
Building C-9
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BOOKS

Dale, Ernest and Urwick, Lyndall F. *Staff in Organization*. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1960. 241 p.

The ever-increasing size and complexity of modern business have brought about the need for larger organizational management staffs to cope with the many details and facets of modern management; likewise, this trend has generated the rise of specialists in many fields. Problems of coordination, then, assume first-rank status in dealing with this many-headed monster. Here is the gist of the problem for top executives and here is the core of the great increase in health deterioration caused by executive "overwork." Excellent bibliographical references on organization are included in the book's appendices. Over-all, this work is most interesting reading and should provide some excellent guide signs to military officers concerned with staff or command problems.

Miller, Wright W. *Russians as People*. New York: Dutton, 1961. 202 p.

Russians as People is a refreshingly different account of Russia; it is a social rather than a political study. Calling on twenty-six years of visits and residence, Mr. Miller provides an exceptionally fine analysis of the Russian character as it manifests itself daily in all aspects of Soviet society. His study is summarized in his observation that the Russian people are formed partly by communism and partly by the inescapable geography and history, manners, morals, tastes, and traditions to which they are born. The highly significant sense of community among Russians which antedates communism by many centuries is given a large measure of credit for the success of communism. However, in spite of other changes taking place in Russia, "there is not the slightest sign that the nonrepresentative system of government in Russia is likely to modify its fundamental nature."

Porter, Charles O. and Alexander, Robert J. *The Struggle for Democracy in Latin America*. New York: Macmillan, 1961. 215 p.

In view of the increased awareness of Latin-American problems occasioned primarily by the Castro regime in Cuba and the concern for improvement in relations between the United States and its southern neighbors voiced by the new administration, this is a most timely book. It is a convenient résumé of the background of the Latin-American nations, as it traces their political histories from initial independence to the present. The book is recommended as a current political reference for Latin America.

Cleveland, Harlan, et al. *The Overseas Americans*. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1960. 316 p.

The Overseas Americans is an interesting and readable book resulting from extensive research and critical analysis at the Maxwell Graduate School of Citizenship and Public Affairs of Syracuse University. It concerns the elements needed for successful performance by our overseas representatives.

Mohammed Rezā Shāh, Shah of Iran. *Mission for My Country*. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1961. 336 p.

The Shah of Iran has written a fascinating book about his country. It is recommended for those whose duties require thorough understanding of matters pertaining to the Middle East.

McGovern, William M. *Strategic Intelligence and the Shape of Tomorrow*. Chicago: Regnery, 1961. 191 p.

Dr. McGovern has compiled, in a concise and perhaps somewhat oversimplified book, the essentials of strategic intelligence and the effect of strategic intelligence on the future course of United States policy.