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**THE SIGNIFICANCE OF SEAPOWER TO  
THE UNITED STATES**

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Naval Warfare Class of '59

## INTRODUCTION

Geography, it has been said does not argue — it simply is. But physical geography has a different meaning for, and a different effect upon, different peoples at different times. Politico-geographical realities of yesterday may be myths today and, unless the changing relationships of territory and people are re-examined and re-evaluated constantly, national strategies and objectives may become based upon myth rather than fact.

In the last century the creed of American Manifest Destiny apparently was absorbed and readily accepted by the American public generally, and by many persons in positions of power. The new American Republic was to expand over the entire North American Continent, and in fulfillment of that destiny she would become a great and powerful nation! Through the writings of the naval historian, Alfred Thayer Mahan, expansion beyond the seas was added to the credo of Manifest Destiny, for Mahan pointed to the sea as the road to national greatness and to sea power as the means.

Mahan was a spokesman for his times. He brought political and geographic realities of his day sharply into focus. He lifted the doctrine of American Manifest Destiny out of its continental context and gave it new horizons beyond the seas. He accurately defined sea power, demonstrated its significance to the Nation, and reduced its principles to a clearly stated set of rules of naval strategy — all in terms of the politics, economics, and technology of his day.

But political goals, economic relationships and technology change. Strategic concepts have to keep pace if the Nation's strategy is to succeed — if, indeed, there is to be a national strategy at all!

What, then, is the significance of the sea, and of sea power, to the United States in its international relations today?

In order to arrive at an answer to this question, we shall analyze in this paper both the continental and maritime concepts

of power politics, and then present a brief interpretation of United States Navy, Army, and Air Force strategic doctrines in the context of the foregoing analysis. Finally, we shall synthesize from these bits and pieces a sound national strategic concept, stated in the form of broad strategic principles having current applicability to the specific politico-geographical realities which face the United States today.

# THE SIGNIFICANCE OF SEA POWER TO THE UNITED STATES

## I. THE CONTINENT — BASE OF POWER

*A Geographic Concept.* An examination of the significance of sea power today may well begin with a brief exploration of its counterpart — the continental power concept — which assigns overwhelming natural advantages to broadly based land power by virtue of its domination of the sea power bases which must be located on the periphery of the land.

To proceed directly to the heart of the matter, the thesis is advanced by advocates of the continental power doctrine that the real ultimate threat to the world's liberty lies in the probability that the great continental land mass of Europe, Asia, and Africa some day will fall under the domination of a single aggressive nation which then will possess the base upon which to establish invincible world political power.<sup>1</sup> This conclusion is not based so much upon an appraisal of the relative military and economic potentialities of the continental land base as upon an interpretation of world history in terms of world geography.

The geographer sees three-fourths of the face of the globe covered by a single body of water, and from this simple observation he derives the concept of the unity of the sea as a fundamental geographic reality. Of that one-fourth of the earth's surface which is land, two-thirds occurs as a single great island lying in the one world ocean. All other land surfaces appear as mere insular satellites of the great continent, or world island, of Europe, Asia, and Africa.

Examining the world continent more closely, the geographer perceives that its northern coast is almost inaccessible from the ocean because of its proximity to polar ice, and that therefore the great rivers which flow through Siberia to this northern coast are not part of the world-wide ocean and river navigation system.

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<sup>1</sup>Halford J. Mackinder, *Democratic Ideals and Reality*, p. 70.

These rivers thus have not served, as have other coastal waterways, as access routes for penetration from the ocean into the interior of the continent. Contiguous with the basins of these northward flowing Siberian rivers, which comprise the Arctic drainage, is an even larger area which drains into salt lakes and seas having no outlet at all to the world ocean. These land-locked basins of inward drainage, referred to geographically as "continental" basins, when taken together with the Arctic drainage, form a single large region in the north and center of the world continent which is not accessible by navigation from the ocean. From this fact the concept of a *geographic heartland* within the great continent is derived.<sup>1</sup> And since the Baltic and Black Seas can be closed (and historically have been) by the exercise of military land power, a *strategic heartland* can be described as consisting of the geographic heartland plus the Baltic and Black Seas with their respective drainages.

It is in this setting that the concept of the heartland as the ultimate power base for world domination first was derived, through an interpretation of the history of conflict between peoples whom the geographer can classify either as insular, peninsular, or continental.

*Islands, Peninsulars, and the Heartland.* It is a matter of record that the island of Crete, pre-Greek center of Aegean civilization and sea power, eventually fell prey to a tribe based upon that mainland peninsular which later was to become Greece. The half-barbaric Macedonians, in their turn, based as they were in the root of the Greek Peninsular, were able to conquer the Greek sea base and then march around the Eastern Mediterranean to Egypt, to make that body of water a "closed sea" by depriving both Greeks and Phonicians of their sea bases.

From their peninsular position the Romans similarly made a "closed sea" of the Western Mediterranean when, after the conquest of Carthage in the Third Punic War, all shores of the Western Mediterranean were controlled by Roman land

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<sup>1</sup>Nicholas John Spykman, *The Geography of the Peace*, pp. 35-36.



power. Later, when unified Roman power had supplanted that of the Macedonians on the shores of the Eastern Mediterranean as well, the entire Mediterranean was maintained as a "closed sea," and for some 500 years Rome controlled that sea by holding the coasts. No battle fleet was needed for, deprived of bases, no sea power rose to challenge the land power of the Roman Empire on the Mediterranean.

The foregoing bit of ancient history seems to hint at a geopolitical principle — broadly based land power is capable of dominating the insular and peripheral bases upon which sea power depends; hence, land power is intrinsically stronger than sea power.<sup>1</sup>

A subsequent historic cycle occurred in a larger geographic arena. The land power of Rome eventually waned, and the seas she once had controlled from their shores were no longer "closed." The opening of the Mediterranean, after some five centuries of Roman domination, took place as a vast Mohammedan empire pushed out from the inland capitals of Cairo, Damascus, and Baghdad. Islamic tribes seized the provinces south of the Mediterranean, one by one, and gained footholds in Spain and Sicily. While Christendom remained contained in the European peninsula, the Mohammedans spread their domination and influence northward to the Continental heartland, eastward into northern India, southward to the African coasts south of the Sahara, and west to Gibraltar and Spain.

In spite of the European Crusaders' sorties against it, this Islamic bid for world empire was not thwarted by any power or combination of powers based upon the periphery of the continent. Its ultimate downfall remained to be brought about by Turkish (Tartar) land power projected from the steppes of the Eurasian heartland!

After the break-up of the Roman Empire, which had held sway not only over the Mediterranean but over the European peninsular and Britain, and the English Channel as well, fierce Norsemen were able to raid the Atlantic coasts from the North Sea to Gibraltar. Christendom thus was compacted into the Euro-

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<sup>1</sup>Halford J. Mackinder, *Democratic Ideals and Reality*, pp. 34-39.

pean peninsular of the world continent, contained between Islam to the south and the pagan Norsemen from the north, and hammered by barbaric Tartar hordes from the Eurasian heartland.

Geographically, there is an unmistakable similarity between peninsular Greece and insular Crete, on the one hand, and peninsular Europe with its offlying insular Britain on the other. But ancient Mediterranean history did not quite repeat itself in Europe.

Crete had been overcome by land power projected from a united power base on the larger Greek peninsular. The Macedonian position, in the broad root of the Greek peninsula, had enabled the Macedonians to conquer Greece. Rome both conquered Carthage and took over the Macedonian conquests on the eastern shore of the Mediterranean, thus closing the entire Mediterranean by unifying control of its shores. But with the decline of the Roman Empire, *competing nation states* grew up within the confines of the European peninsula, which therefore did not develop into a *united* power base. Moreover, all the competing states of Europe, so the interpretation goes, were vulnerable to the potentially superior land power based upon that broad root of the European peninsula which is the continental heartland. These circumstances, rather than any inherent strength of insular position, enabled the power balance to pass to the offlying island base — Britain.

The British Isles were conquered and held by Rome when Rome held sway over the European peninsula. It was only because the break-up of the Roman Empire resulted in the fragmentation of the European peninsula into several rival powers (each open to attack from the land behind, even as Athens and Sparta once had been open to invasion by Macedonians from the continental frontier) that Britain faced no united peninsula power base and thus became able to establish an island-based power which, by the end of the Napoleonic Wars, had enveloped and contained the peninsula.

In the middle of the nineteenth century there began the current series of attempts by Teuton and Slav to rule East Europe and the continental heartland, and thereby to establish a base

combining both geographic position and man power requisite to the domination of all of the great continent and, ultimately, the world. While Europe was embroiled in her wars, Britain enjoyed domination over the sea without serious challenge, and employed her sea power to contain whatever continental power threatened to extend its empire to the peripheral lands and combine an effective sea base with the heartland. But if the historic analogies described above are as good as the obvious geographic one, and if the conclusions drawn therefrom are indeed sound, then the European peninsula remains vulnerable to this day to the more broadly based power of the heartland; and the offlying islands remain vulnerable to a unified power having access to the entire European peninsula.<sup>1</sup>

*Barriers and Gateways to Conquest.* While East Asia has felt the same pressures from land power based on the heartland as has Europe, the results have been quite different and the difference is readily explained on the basis of geography. The greatest single continuous lowland on the face of the earth extends from the north, center, and west portions of the heartland to the Volga basin of Europe, and is contiguous with the European Plain. This great lowland has provided invaders with a broad gateway from Siberia into Europe, through the gap between the Ural Mountains and the Caspian Sea. China, India, and Southeast Asia, on the other hand, instead of being joined to the heartland by the greatest continuous lowland on earth, are separated from the heartland by the most massive uplands on the globe.<sup>2</sup> Thus when, in the course of history, mobile Tartar hordes have fallen upon the agricultural peoples of the Asian periphery, just as they have descended upon Europe, they have come by narrow and difficult routes. Although their invasions have succeeded, the invaders and their new empires have not long maintained political ties with the heartland base. In interpreting history in terms of the continental power concept, great significance is attached to barriers and gateways to conquest — to the intimate physical merging of the heartland with the peripheral lands of Europe and the Middle East, and to the separation of the heartland from the marginal lands of Africa and

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<sup>1</sup>William E. Livezey, *Mahan on Sea Power*, p. 288.

<sup>2</sup>Nicholas John Spykman, *The Geography of the Peace*, p. 37.

the southern and eastern coasts of Asia by such strong natural frontiers as the Sahara Desert, the Tibetan Heights and the arid Mongolian Upland.

*The Western Hemisphere.* In order to see clearly the significance to the Western Hemisphere of the world continent and heartland concept, it is necessary to view geography in still broader perspective than we have yet attempted. The world continent, in such broader view of the entire globe, appears as a gigantic promontory extending southward from the inaccessible Arctic to the Cape of Good Hope, around which sea lines of communication between East and West must pass unless the Mediterranean and Suez remain open by sufferance of any land power dominant on the great continent. Beside this mighty promontory the Americas assume the proportions of an island base lying off a peninsula — perhaps two rather large islands connected by a narrow isthmus and surrounded by lesser isles, but an insular base, nonetheless, comparable to the island of Crete lying off the Greek promontory and to the British Isles lying off the peninsula of Europe.

By virtue of this geographic analogy, and in light of the foregoing interpretation of insular, peninsular, and continental history, the continental power concept becomes a clear and ominous warning to America. The heartland of the world continent strategically dominates the marginal lands, so the dogma goes. A single unified land power based upon a promontory strategically dominates offlying islands, and can close the intervening waters to sea power merely by exerting this domination to control both shores. Hence, consolidated land power based upon the great world promontory occupies a strategically dominant position vis-a-vis the insular New World, and by extending its control to the American shores of the Atlantic and Pacific could close the entire world ocean to any rival sea power, even as the Romans closed the Mediterranean by exercising effective control over its shores.

Neither the Tartar hordes, which descended from the heartland upon Europe and Asia in the past, nor the Islamic Empire which once bid for world domination were backed by enough man-

power in the home base to make their conquests stick. Today in the continental heartland base there are hundreds of millions of people to threaten all the marginal lands of Asia and Europe — enough so that, once united, they easily could control the continent and reduce the offlying Americas to insular satellites.

*An Appreciation of the Concept.* This continental concept of power — the heartland thesis of world domination — deserves our critical scrutiny. Its basic tenets have some obvious validity, and do indeed throw interpretive light upon a good many historic events. But in extracting from this geographical interpretation of history a set of timeless principles underlying power relationships between nations — in reducing these principles to a form of dogma — and in extrapolating trends in order to forecast future developments in the world political arena, we are on much less firm ground.

Geographically, the great world promontory of Europe, Asia, and Africa set in a single great world ocean is indeed a reality. Geographically, the heartland consisting of combined Arctic and continental drainages is just as real. Strategically, the concept of a continental heartland not accessible to sea power may be less valid. Certainly it is safe to say that the national strategic heartland should have been considerably altered by developments in aircraft and modern integrated systems of transportation on land, to say nothing of the advent of missiles. Access to the geographic heartland is less and less denied by its detachment from the ocean and river navigation system. The strategic heartland concept might prove to be a good deal more transitory than its purely geographic counterpart, perhaps possessing greater validity in interpreting an era which is passing than it will have as a key to future events.<sup>1</sup>

Furthermore, the same historic events in the same geographic setting could be used to argue that past attempts to es-

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<sup>1</sup>Hans W. Weigert, Henry Brodie, Edward W. Doherty, John R. Fernstrom, Eric Fischer and Dudley Kirk, *Principles of Political Geography*, pp. 209-215.

establish world domination from inland power bases have had little more than fleeting success! Historically, conquests of marginal lands from the heartland base actually have not been made to stick, either in Europe or in Asia. Deep penetrations of the marginal lands have occurred, but ultimately they have been contained and detached from the heartland base, and the invaders absorbed or transformed into a peripheral political entity.

Islands have been conquered from nearby peninsular bases, but Britain successfully contained the European peninsular, and it is largely speculation to say that this was possible *only* because the peninsular was occupied by several rival nations all of whom were vulnerable to pressure from East Europe. Even when Napoleon effectively united Western Europe — by conquering Belgium and Switzerland, surrounding himself with satellite kingdoms in Spain, Italy and Holland, and making an alliance with Germany — insular Britain still held the line Portsmouth-Plymouth-Gibraltar-Malta and was able to contain this concentration of power in the European peninsula and eventually see to Napoleon's downfall.

Seas have been closed by land power in control of their shores, but there is a remarkable resemblance between the closed Mediterranean of the Romans and the British-controlled Indian Ocean which, after the Napoleonic Wars, was dominated not by land power on its shores but by *naval power* linking the home base with a *colonial* army stationed in Northwest India!

Perhaps it was, after all, just an ironic twist of fate which resulted in the wholly unlikely alliance between maritime powers and Russia in World Wars I and II, and which thwarted the German ambition to dominate the heartland from East Europe and thence extend domination over the entire continent. But such are the vicissitudes of human history.<sup>1</sup> Whether or not Germany *should have been successful*, on the basis of geopolitical theory, the fact is that the overwhelming advantage which is supposed to accrue to land power rooted in the heartland of the great world continent has yet to be proved. Specifically, history to date leaves some doubt

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<sup>1</sup>Nicholas John Spykman, *The Geography of the Peace*, p. 43.

as to the strategically dominant position of the heartland vis-a-vis the entire maritime periphery when these coastal lands are supported by sea power which enjoys bases both upon them and upon offlying islands. Rather than "who rules the heartland commands the world island," might it not be that who rules the periphery of the world island can contain and dominate the power of the heartland? This thought invites an examination of an alternate concept of world power, based upon control of the sea rather than control of the land.

## II. SEA POWER — BASIS OF EMPIRE

*An Opposing Doctrine.* Set against that concept which identifies the Eurasian heartland as the inevitable geographic pivot of world power is the doctrine that true and abiding national greatness rests upon sea power — that national power and wealth ultimately are associated with dependence upon, command of, and exploitation of the sea. This philosophy was crystallized and widely propagated in the writings of Alfred Thayer Mahan between 1890 and 1914.

To the advocate of the sea power doctrine, the history of international conflict is largely a narrative of contests between nations to secure, each to its own people, a lion's share of the strength and prosperity which flow from commerce on the sea. Viewed in this light, many of the same historical incidents which have been cited to support the land power concept can be recounted to tell a somewhat different story.<sup>1</sup> For instance, although when once in control, Rome was able to maintain the Mediterranean as a closed sea by controlling its shores, it was first necessary that she emerge victorious on the sea itself, as a prelude to the final defeat of Carthage in the Punic Wars, by which she wrested control of the western shores. And even then, in the following civil war which finally united Roman West with Roman East, and really sealed the Mediterranean, it was the sea fight of Actium which was decisive.

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<sup>1</sup>James A. Field, Jr., "Origins of Maritime Strategy and the Development of Sea Power," *Naval War College Review*, Vol. VII, No. 7, March 1955, pp. 2-6.

Surely it is true that Islam's bid for world empire finally was crushed by the land power of the Eurasian heartland, but even before this its sea power in the Mediterranean had been countered from Venice and Genoa, and its exploitation of the sea to the eastward had been denied by Portuguese sea power rampant in the Indian Ocean.

Such incidents as those cited above, however, pale to virtual insignificance in support of the sea power thesis when compared to the history of the British Empire.<sup>1</sup> Based upon tiny, insular Britain, founded and maintained solely by the purposeful exercise of supremacy on the sea, this Empire in its history provides the preceptor and expositor of the sea power doctrine with concrete examples of the principles, techniques, and benefits of command of the sea. Speculation as to what *might* have happened, had Europe not been occupied by numerous competing nation states, is counted a weak argument against the events of history as they actually transpired. British sea power did in fact surround and contain the entire Eurasian continent, and Britain was able to wield the balance of power among nations and control the course of events in her favor on the mainland. In the face of British sea power, the world island has been an isolated battleground rather than a bastion of strength. The peaceful transfer of supremacy on the sea from Britain to the United States is regarded as the relinquishing of a priceless heritage by a tired and aging parent to a maturing offspring.

*Transcending Concept.* The term "sea power" itself does a disservice to the concept by improperly describing the thesis. "Sea Power" is all too easily relegated in the mind to the status of merely one of a triumverate — "sea power," "land power," and "air power" — all too easily related directly to navies, as "land power" is associated with armies and "air power" with air forces. In this narrow sense, the term "naval power" would be more appropriate, although even "naval power" is still too broad

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<sup>1</sup>Captain John D. Hayes, "Peripheral Strategy — Mahan's Doctrine Today," *United States Naval Institute Proceedings*, Vol. 79, No. 11, November 1953, p. 1185.



a term to describe fully the military element of sea power if land and air forces are excluded in the context. The use of air forces as component parts of naval forces has become of paramount importance in modern naval operations, and the use of landing forces to seize and hold naval bases and to project naval power against a littoral is as old as sea warfare itself.

In its true meaning the term "sea power" is a transcending one, encompassing the algebraic total of all the strengths and weaknesses — geographical, political, economic, cultural, military — of a maritime nation. Mahan referred to "sea power in the broad sense, which includes not only the military strength afloat, that rules the sea or any part of it by force of arms, but also the peaceful commerce and shipping from which alone a military fleet naturally and healthfully springs, and on which it securely rests."<sup>1</sup> Sea power is "at once an abstract conception and a concrete fact." As an abstract conception it describes the power "personality" which automatically accrues to any maritime nation simply by virtue of its being a maritime nation. As a concrete fact it expresses the degree to which a maritime nation has realized its national power potential, and the vigor with which it applies its national power in the international political arena.

*Basic Factors.* Several factors were seen by Mahan to influence both a nation's dependence upon and her opportunities to exploit the sea. In Mahan's day, geographical position with respect to other nations and trade routes was of prime importance. The weather and terrain, including the nature of the seaboard, affected both the need and ability to establish intercourse with the outside world, as did the extent of the national territory and length of the coastline. The number of people, and the per cent who "followed the sea" in their normal pursuits, were a strong element of sea power, as was the aptitude of the people for commercial enterprise and for planting successful colonies. Finally, the character of the government, its institutions, and domestic and foreign poli-

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<sup>1</sup>Captain A. T. Mahan, U.S.N., *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History*, p. 28.

cies, could operate to stimulate or throttle activities which contribute to the development of sea power.

The doctrine of sea power, as it had evolved and was crystallized some seventy years ago, was widely accepted in the United States, Britain, Germany, and Japan, and has exerted profound influence upon the destinies of these nations in the intervening years. Its wide acceptance, however, is not real proof of its validity.

According to the tenets of this doctrine, sea-borne commerce — with its exchange of finished products for raw materials — makes a nation great. Command of the sea is a prerequisite. A close relation between sea-borne military power and economic health thus is established. The effectiveness of navies is dependent upon far-flung systems of bases, which concurrently may serve as sources of raw materials and as markets. Thus the requirements of the Navy and national economic ambitions coincide, to produce a compelling national interest in the acquisition of overseas territories. Mahan's sea power doctrine and the philosophy of economic imperialism were virtually synonymous in this respect.

The due sense and control of the sea is but one link in the chain of exchange by which wealth accumulates; but it is the central link, which lays under contribution other nations for the benefit of the one holding it, and which, history seems to assert, most surely of all gathers to itself riches.<sup>1</sup>

*Imperialistic Origins.* Sea power doctrine evolved in an age of dynamic power politics, competitive navalism, and rampant imperialism. Mahan's studies of the history of the rise of the British Empire during the years of mercantilistic imperialism offered substantiation of his views that national power, national security, and national prosperity depend upon foreign commerce which in turn demands merchant shipping, colonial markets, overseas bases, and naval protection. His sea power concept thus was basically a philosophy of empire. He viewed the retention of overseas markets

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<sup>1</sup>Captain A. T. Mahan, U. S. N., *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History*, pp. 225-226.

as resting upon the political and military power of a nation, rather than upon success in economic competition entered into freely by manufacturers and merchants. The underlying economic philosophy of the day, reflecting historic mercantalism rather than modern capitalism, held that national prosperity and power required an accumulation of precious metals through a favorable balance of trade. From this requirement stemmed the need to increase the value of exports and decrease the value of imports; the need for a merchant marine, to limit the profit from shipping to a nation's own citizens rather than sharing this source of income with others; the need to establish overseas colonies whose trade could be so supervised and regulated as to provide the mother country with inexpensive essential raw materials and with profitable outlets for the surplus capacity of her industrial plant. This economic philosophy, perhaps more than anything else basic to the sea power concept of an earlier day, is outmoded by today's capitalistic finance system wherein profit must accrue to the buyer as well as to the seller in the international market, and wherein other great nations with their own excess production capacity and purchasing power have replaced colonies as the best potential customers.<sup>1</sup>

*Related Theories.* Two other theories became almost inextricably enmeshed in the very warp of sea power doctrine during its evolution and subsequent interpretation. One is the principle of concentration of naval force, which in its applied form becomes the principle of battle-fleet supremacy. The other is the controlling influence of naval operations over land campaigns.<sup>2</sup> These notions, like the imperialistic philosophy of international economics in these days of revolutionary nationalism, have an archaic tone which cannot help but bring into question the timeliness of the whole sea power doctrine and its applicability to conditions as they really exist today.

The principle of concentration of naval power to achieve battle-fleet supremacy involves more than the mere tactical concentration of capital ships to produce decisive results in battle. It

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<sup>1</sup>Frederick H. Hartmann, *The Relations of Nations*, pp. 128-136

<sup>2</sup>William E. Livezey, *Mahan on Sea Power*, pp. 38 and 47.

also encompasses the concentration of national resources, even before hostilities begin, to provide the capital ships needed to command the seas. It warns against squandering potential naval strength on other less essential instruments, whose operations can in no way be decisive in a contest for sea supremacy. This principle certainly proved valid for Britain in World War I, and, with the aircraft carrier replacing the battleship as the capital ship of the fleet, it again proved its worth for the United States in her naval operations against Japan in World War II.<sup>1</sup> But with recent developments in submarine capabilities, in land-based air forces, and in missiles, it becomes fair and indeed prudent to question whether concentration either of resources or of tactical units to achieve battle-fleet supremacy is any longer an effective strategy for gaining command of the sea.

As to the controlling influence of naval operations over land campaigns, this theory too can be substantiated by historical example. But, once again, it is dangerous to assume an immutable principle as applicable to conditions of the future as it has been to events of the past. It is pertinent now to question whether technological developments may make interdiction of critical sea areas possible without recourse to *conventional naval* operations, thus greatly reducing the influence of operations *at sea* upon land campaigns. It is even pertinent to question whether modern weaponry can place the decisive issue, in a general war between continental and maritime nations, completely outside the spheres of both conventional land campaigns and naval operations!

### III. SUMMARY ANALYSIS OF OPPOSING THESES

*Strengths and Weaknesses.* Thus far we have dealt with the continental concept of national power and with traditional sea power doctrine as separate and conflicting philosophies of power politics. Nonetheless, they have a number of common virtues and common faults. Each has found substantiation in scholarly historical analysis, and each focuses attention upon the close relationship

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<sup>1</sup>William E. Livezey, *Mahan on Sea Power*, pp. 38 and 47.

of historical geography and political geography. This important contribution should not be overlooked in any critique of either the continental or sea power philosophy, for a sound evaluation of politico-geographical factors is impossible without an appreciation of historical factors and events. Whether or not history repeats itself, geography repeatedly influences the destinies of nations as history unfolds. Both continental and sea power philosophies provide useful insight into the manner in which this influence is exerted.

Both philosophies, however, originally were related to the realities of a particular point in time and their validity was manifest in particular politico-geographical frames of reference. Often their disciples have been led astray by an unwillingness to recognize the factors of time and change which erode any concept in the fluctuating realm of political geography. Furthermore, both these concepts of national power politics stem from the school of "geopolitical" thought which goes beyond *objective* study of political and geographic factors and is an applied psuedo-science with an axe to grind! The geopolitical school of thought implies that geographical factors so completely determine the destiny of states that no room is left for courses which contradict the dictates of the geographical environment. From this it is but a small step to a philosophy which claims for itself the right to predict the course of political events, and thus dictate to statesmen and soldiers alike their strategic decision. Both concepts have used environmental factors for the justification of power-political and expansionist aims.

To present the foregoing criticism of the philosophies underlying both the doctrine of sea power and the continental concept of national power is not to say that the conclusions derived from geopolitical thinking necessarily are erroneous within the framework of any particular set of politico-geographical realities. It is to say that such conclusions should be accepted as immutable principles with utmost caution, and that their currency and validity should be re-evaluated constantly in the process of strategic decision-making. In the light of the hard realities of the world as it

exists today, the current validity of both the sea power and heartland theses is open to legitimate question.<sup>1</sup> Let us summarize the specific weaknesses which we now find in each.

*Validity of the Heartland Thesis.* The notion of a *strategic* heartland not accessible to sea power no longer is valid. Sea power, in its broad and true sense, is not confined to the limits of ocean and river surface navigation. Strategically, East Europe may be more accessible from Washington than was the Mediterranean at the beginning of the century.

The strategically dominant position of the heartland vis-a-vis the maritime periphery of the Eurasian land mass is not proved, historically, but rather is surmised from the fact that the heartland has served as a base for numerous successful but rather localized incursions in the direction of the seacoast.

The advantage of "interior lines" radiating out from the heartland could be illusory.<sup>2</sup> In a contest between continental land-based power and sea power, such "lines" represent a dispersal rather than a concentration of strength, whereas converging "lines" of maritime power directed toward the continent from the surrounding ocean represent a progressive concentration of force as they approach the heartland. The relative advantage, if any, inherent in such an array of opposing forces on a world-wide scale is not clearly established, and should be regarded more as a function of current technology, weaponry, and strategic initiative than as a fixed strategic factor.

There is little common ground on which to dispute the contention that if a single great nation should achieve domination over the entire world continent of Europe, Asia, and Africa, that nation would then have the best geographic position combined with the greatest manpower pool and wealthiest resource base that ever has been in the hands of a potential world conquerer. It is the *second* proposition of the Mackinder thesis — "Who rules the

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<sup>1</sup>Ernst B. Haas and Allen S. Whiting, *Dynamics of International Relations*, p. 84.

<sup>2</sup>Nicholas John Spykman, *The Geography of the Peace*, p. 40.

Heartland commands the World-Island"<sup>1</sup> — whose validity is belied both by historic and current results of the impinging of sea power and continental power upon the periphery of Eurasia!

*Validity of Sea Power Philosophy.* Sea power doctrine, as it so often has been presented in the past, has its soft spots too. It is not inevitable that sea power will have the last word in its rivalry with continental land power. A national posture closely tied to a policy of imperialism, and the exploitation of colonial markets and resources, clearly is incompatible with the international political realities of today,<sup>2</sup> even though the utility of bases and the requirement for markets and materials remain undiminished.<sup>3</sup>

Command of the sea by battle-fleet supremacy also is an outmoded concept. The time has arrived when command of the sea is no longer the exclusive province of battle fleets, nor even of navies. To deny sea lines of communication to the enemy, and to exploit them to its own advantage, a nation now must control the air and space above the sea and the water below the surface as well as the surface of the sea itself. Because of the speed, range and destructiveness of modern aircraft and missiles, and because of the ability of the submarine to avoid detection, reliance cannot be placed upon interception of these vehicles over or under the surface of the sea. Command of the sea requires control of the shores, or the denial of these shores to the enemy, as well as supremacy on the sea itself. To "close" a sea area by controlling its shores and thus denying an enemy bases thereon, makes command of that sea area easier to establish and more effective as well. Sea power, in its true sense, always has transcended pure naval power. But now, even the military component of sea power must consist of a team of land, air, and naval forces whose task of first priority is to command the sea — that is, to deny to the enemy in time of war, and to exploit in the national interest at

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<sup>1</sup>Halford J. Mackinder, *Democratic Ideals and Reality*, p. 150.

<sup>2</sup>Dean Acheson, *Power and Diplomacy*, pp. 116-118.

<sup>3</sup>Edgar S. Furniss, Jr., and Richard C. Snyder, *An Introduction to American Foreign Policy*, pp. 128-130.

all times, the sea including the waters below its surface and the air and space above.

With the foregoing description of the military component of sea power in mind, we might look again at another questionable tenet of traditional sea power doctrine: the controlling influence of naval operations upon land campaigns. When command of the sea rests upon supremacy above, on, and below the surface, and upon control of the far shore of the sea as well, it seems axiomatic that the exercise of this degree of command of the sea *will* continue to exert a controlling influence upon land campaigns, at least in land areas contiguous to the sea, whether the assumption that pure naval operations alone could continue to exert such influence upon land campaigns is valid or not

So far we have examined, rather sketchily to be sure, the heartland thesis and the traditional doctrine of sea power. Comparing the two, we have probed some of the apparent weaknesses of each. We have seen that the doctrine of sea power must be updated if it is to have meaning and validity for the United States in the latter half of the twentieth century. Now we should turn our attention to some strategic philosophies enjoying current advocacy in the United States today.

#### IV. CURRENT UNITED STATES STRATEGIC DOCTRINE

*Development.* Strategy aims at developing and utilizing material and human resources so as to maximize a nation's total effectiveness in the pursuit of its own national interests, in its dealing with other nations.

In the United States, the Army, the Naval Services, and the Air Force all have developed bodies of strategic doctrine. Each Service has tended to develop its own somewhat independently of the others, for the National Security Council and the Joint Chiefs of Staff are, after all, relatively recent phenomena. Each Service has taken a somewhat parochial approach, tending always to assign greatest import to those strategic tasks which it can perform best or to which it can contribute the most. This has



had the one distinct advantage, at least, that no military task — land, sea, or air — is likely to have been overlooked. Let us be somewhat pragmatic, then, and test the current validity and applicability of modern sea power doctrine by laying alongside it the strategic doctrines advocated by the several Military Services.

*Air Force Doctrine.* Advocates of Air Force doctrine contend that technological developments have added a third dimension to military conflict and that military operations on the surface of the land or sea cannot succeed in a hostile aerial environment. On this basis, proponents of air power argue that the primary protective shield available to the United States is supremacy in the air around and above the approaches to the United States, for without control of the air no hostile nation could conceive of a naval or military invasion. The security of the nation is seen to rest upon the state of its air power relative to that of other nations.<sup>1</sup>

Air forces are seen as much more than defensive instruments, however, for only through the air can the United States strike directly at a nation in possession of the Eurasian heartland and surrounded by a cordon of buffer states. Air Force doctrine thus inexorably leads to concentration on long-range strategic air capability, and a "counter-force" strategy designed to deter rival nations from taking hostile action against the United States and to project United States military strength across the sea if war should occur. The need for bases overseas is inherent in the doctrine, both to improve the effectiveness of air striking power and to achieve dispersal as passive protection against surprise attack.

*Army Doctrine.* The basic proposition advanced by Army strategic doctrine is that only military land forces can seize and hold territory. Air and sea forces can protect friendly territory by interdiction, and can inflict damage upon enemy-held territory, but neither can win a decisive victory over land power. Particularly

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<sup>1</sup>Colonel Jerry D. Page and Colonel Royal H. Roussel, "What is Air Power," *Air University Quarterly Review*, Vol. VIII, No. 1, Summer, 1955, p. 7.

in limited war, the deployment of land forces can be opposed effectively only by other land forces. The very existence of long-range strategic air capability on both sides increases the probability that the balance of military power ultimately will be determined by the effectiveness of other military forces, whether unlimited strategic air strikes on the respective homeland occur or not.

Army strategic doctrine does not advance as the only possible strategic objective those enemy military forces stationed in the Eurasian heartland. On the contrary, likely physical objectives are seen to lie in localities on the periphery, where indigenous forces are unable to defend successfully by themselves, but where they can put up enough of a defense so that the interposition of United States ground forces need not come too late to be decisive. Thus Army doctrine emphasizes powerful, highly mobile ground formations, supported by adequate air and sea lift in being, as an essential instrument of national policy in peacetime and as the most likely *ultima ratio* in war. Required military task forces will include elements of all Services, but the Army's contribution will be paramount.<sup>1</sup>

*Naval Doctrine.* The foundation of naval strategic doctrine lies in the assertion that in neither time of peace nor of war can the United States live in and of herself, but that she is dependent economically and militarily upon maritime transportation for which the protection of sea lines of communication is a prerequisite. Close ties with friendly maritime nations throughout the world is considered essential. United States national strategy must be a maritime strategy. Naval defense, to prevent invasion, and a naval counteroffensive capability to strike an enemy's home bases are imperative. A formidable fleet is a strong deterrent to war. It also is insurance against disruption of essential maritime commerce.

The Navy assigns itself the primary strategic mission of gaining and maintaining command of the sea.<sup>2</sup> It has four es-

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<sup>1</sup>"Mission for the Army: The Winning of World War III," *Army Combat Forces Journal*, Vol. VI, No. 7, February 1955.

<sup>2</sup>*Naval Orientation*, NavPers 16138-C, 1955, p. 13.

sential tasks to perform. *First*, it must maintain the security of important materials entering or being exported from the United States. *Secondly*, in time of war, it must assure the safe transport of ground forces to theaters of operation overseas. *Thirdly*, it must maintain sea communications among friendly and allied nations. And, *fourthly*, it must be prepared to contribute directly to the destruction or defeat of enemy forces within range of naval power projected from the sea.

According to naval doctrine the main role of the Navy, stated in its simplest terms, has been and still is to control the sea — to be able to use those ocean areas needed by the United States and her allies, and to deny to the enemy those ocean areas of critical importance to him.<sup>1</sup>

*Collation.* As might be expected, the several Service strategic doctrines have much in common. They may seem somewhat parochial, to be sure, but each represents a distillate of the results of serious study, by dedicated officers, of the capabilities, limitations, and missions of separate Services, all of which are charged with the security of the United States as their supreme responsibility. None of these doctrines, at least as stated in the foregoing paragraphs, presents a complete and balanced national military strategic concept. Each, through its own emphasis, calls attention to a facet of over-all strategy which is not fully developed in the others. Yet, there is a thread of consistency and continuity running through them all.

Not one of the Service doctrines questions the need to prevent hostile use of the approaches to the United States, whether above, on, or under the surrounding ocean. All agree on the need for maintaining close ties with friendly maritime nations on the periphery of the Eurasian mainland, whether for bases, or to sustain commerce, or to deny these peripheral lands to a hostile power.

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<sup>1</sup>Admiral Robert B. Carney, "Role of the Navy in a Future War," *Naval War College Review*, Vol. VI, No. 10, June 1954, p. 5.

All Service doctrines agree on the need for a posture of strength as a deterrent to war. Although the emphasis may vary as to means, all agree that there is a requirement for being able to project United States power beyond the sea — through the air above the sea, from the surface or from below the surface of the sea, or by ground forces transported safely across and landed from the sea.

Thus the strategic concept which emerges does not deny, but rather substantiates entirely, the applicability of a modern sea power doctrine to the strategy of the United States today! Friendly nations have long since supplanted colonies as markets, suppliers of imports, and bases from which United States military strength can be supported overseas. Battle fleets alone no longer can command the sea, when technological developments have made the space above the surface and the waters below it as much a part of the sea as the surface itself. Speeds attainable above the sea, and the detection problems encountered below its surface, are making command of the sea more and more dependent upon controlling the far shore and upon denying any hostile power the bases from which to challenge supremacy on the sea. In light of these developments, that which each Service can do best, as reflected in its own strategic doctrine, becomes a major contribution to the military element of the sea power of the United States.

Command of the sea may no longer be exclusively a Navy task. Perhaps it really never was. But sea power still depends upon command of the sea, and the exercise of dominant sea power in its most modern and highly developed form is implicit in the strategic doctrine of each Military Service. Indeed, this is the thread of continuity which binds together and provides a basic compatibility to these superficially conflicting dogmas.

## V. PRINCIPLES OF MODERN MARITIME STRATEGY

*Maritime Coalition.* Politically, the dominant sea power normally attracts into its orbit virtually all the maritime nations not in direct conflict with it — both allies and friendly neutrals whose maritime interests are subject to the dominant sea power.

The United States is, and for the foreseeable future must continue to be, the dominant maritime nation of the world. This is a novel peacetime situation, historically. Until recently, the United States was content to pursue her foreign policies against an accepted background of British domination of the sea<sup>1</sup> — a domination at once dictated by the interests and made possible by the resources of the far-flung British colonial empire. Now a prostrate victor of two world wars, Britain is deprived simultaneously of much of her incentive as well as the resources required to maintain her dominant position among maritime world powers.

Opposition to expansionist ambitions of the current occupants of the Eurasian heartland must be built around a coalition base of maritime resources.<sup>2</sup> Any deterioration in United States domination of the sea will cause a deterioration in her influence and in the maritime power alignment.

In the face of modern political nationalism throughout the world, the fostering of interdependence and economic internationalism among maritime powers is highly desirable. This is indeed power doctrine of an earlier day was based!

*Command of the Sea and Marginal Utility.* Nations depending upon the use of the sea for their economy and security must insure to themselves that measure of control of the sea which is commensurate with their need. Complete control of the sea is a rarely attained ideal in times of conflict,<sup>3</sup> as surreptitious use of localized sea areas is possible even by nations vastly inferior in total sea power. With modern developments in aircraft, submarines, and missiles, this limited use of sea areas by inferior maritime powers will become of greater and greater significance.

Control must be maintained over areas dictated by the strategic concept that generates the requirement, and over areas wide enough to prevent projection of enemy military forces from areas

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<sup>1</sup>George F. Kennan, *American Diplomacy, 1900-1950*, pp. 4-5.

<sup>2</sup>William W. Kaufmann, ed., *Military Policy and National Security*, Chapter 6, "Coalitions and Alliances," by Roger Hilsman, pp. 162-193.  
a far cry from the philosophy of imperialism upon which the sea

<sup>3</sup>Admiral Robert B. Carney, "The Principles of Sea Power," *United States Naval Institute Proceedings*, Vol. LXXIX, No. 8, August 1953, p. 823.

in which firm control is not maintained by friendly forces. But it must be recognized by the strategist that combined naval, air, and land forces, from a geographically advantageous position, can achieve control of local areas for an inferior sea power, or exact a great price from the dominant sea power which chooses to challenge in these restricted areas. A dominant sea power must concentrate a great force, and accept severe losses, to wrest local sea control in areas where the opposing forces enjoy great natural advantages. This is no less true in limited war than in global war, and the significance may be much greater in limited war when the entire issue may be decided precisely in the localized area chosen for its advantages by the inferior maritime power.

These practical "facts of life" bear heavily upon the applicability of the principle of concentration of military force to achieve command of the sea in any specific situation or locality. Practicable control of the sea is limited to that degree of control required by over-all strategy. The concept of *marginal utility* must be always a guiding principle in strategic planning for control of the sea.<sup>1</sup>

*The Strategic Objective.* Strategic objectives are, of course, dictated by national aspirations. Sea power, as far as the United States is concerned, is a means to an end. Likewise, domination of the entire Eurasian continent by land power based in the heartland is a means to an end — world domination.

In its present phase the contest between continental and maritime powers is not a direct conflict over command of the sea, but is rather a contest for control of the periphery of Eurasia. Just as the means of gaining control of the peripheral lands by a heartland nation is land power, so the means of retaining control of these vital territories by maritime nations is sea power.

If the periphery of the continent is controlled by maritime nations, the heartland is encircled and contained — perhaps even dominated. What is not so obvious is that if this same Eurasian periphery should fall under the control of the heartland, the pres-

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<sup>1</sup>Bernard Brodie, "Strategy as a Science," *World Politics*, Vol. I, No. 4 July 1949.

ent great world sea power base — the United States — then would be encircled, contained, and probably dominated by a continental power which itself could be a great maritime power as well.<sup>1</sup> We are used to thinking in terms of plane surfaces, but such thinking is not applicable to global strategy. It may seem strange that the line inscribed by the periphery of the world island can encircle the lands on either side of it, but while such an assertion may not be absolutely accurate from the standpoint of geometry it is nevertheless quite true as a strategic principle. The seas which wash the Eurasian coasts bound the Americas. Dominant Eurasian sea power in the East could close the Pacific, just as dominant sea power based on the shores of Europe could deny the Atlantic to nations of the Western Hemisphere.

The strategic key to world domination is not the Eurasian heartland, nor is it sea power based upon a mighty offshore island. The key is possession or control of the Eurasian periphery, in conjunction with either of the other two.<sup>2</sup> Captain B. H. Liddell Hart has observed that "the true aim is not so much to seek battle as to seek strategic situation so advantageous that if it does not of itself produce the decision, its continuation by a battle is sure to achieve this."<sup>3</sup> In the contest between heartland and maritime powers, the side which establishes undisputed control of the maritime periphery of the continent will have achieved this aim.

The physical objective of United States strategy is clearly discernable. It is the maritime periphery of the Eurasian continent. The most fundamental national interests of the United States depend for their attainment upon the control of these peripheral lands by friendly maritime nations.

*Significance.* Recognition of the true nature of United States strategy, of its objective, and of its fundamental principles and

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<sup>1</sup>Nicholas John Spykman, *America's Strategy in World Politics*, pp. 194-195.

<sup>2</sup>Hans W. Weigert, Henry Brodie, Edward W. Doherty, John R. Fernstrom, Eric Fischer, and Dudley Kirk, *Principles of Political Geography*, p. 227.

<sup>3</sup>B. H. Liddell Hart, *Strategy, The Indirect Approach*, p. 339.

requirements can do much to insure the success of that strategy. Not only a maritime strategy but any strategy can be pursued most effectively when it does not have to compete with rival strategic concepts for available national resources — material, technological, manpower. Indeed, Mahan warned that even in his day of relatively inexpensive instruments of national power no nation could afford to support contending strategic philosophies when “the contents of the National purse are distributed, instead of being concentrated upon a leading conception, adopted after due deliberation, and maintained with conviction.”<sup>1</sup>

Sea power can be a mere abstract conception. For the United States it also can be a unified guiding strategic doctrine, focusing attention and effort on the most rewarding means of pursuing national interests and achieving national goals. But when sea power is equated with the size of the Navy (or, worse yet, with the relative size of a single component of the fleet), when continental strategy becomes linked with the capabilities of the United States Army, and when strategic bombing or massive retaliation delivered by air forces is assigned the stature of a third strategic concept and proposed as a possible substitute for the other two, then indeed is the true meaning of sea power lost and the Nation saddled with competing and ineffectual fragments of strategic philosophy which it can ill afford!

The sea power concept of national security is a great deal more than the mere product of an exercise in abstract thinking. Its practical utility can be demonstrated by reference to a recent specific case in which its implications either were not understood or were overlooked entirely. Victory in World War II brought the United States to a commanding position in world affairs. Within five years thereafter China had been lost and, with it, a large segment of the key physical objective of maritime strategy. As an alternative to this loss, continental strategy offered an unacceptable land war waged on the Chinese mainland. Strategic bombing of the Chinese, whose domination by an unfriendly regime the United States sought to prevent, offered no solution to the

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<sup>1</sup>Captain A. T. Mahan, *Interest of America in Sea Power*, p. 175.



problem. A mighty deep-water Navy had no means of defeating the Chinese Communists or of taking their territory.

The China coast went by default, and the whole power alignment of maritime nations deteriorated markedly, because strategic decisions had to be made without benefit of a comprehensive strategic doctrine. No Service doctrine focused attention upon the strategic significance of the China coast by permitting its identification as an important segment of the real physical objective of national strategy. No single Service doctrine provided an acceptable concept for retaining control of the China coast. In the absence of any doctrine providing either the reason or the means to hold it, an important position on the periphery of the continent was abandoned without a contest.

The Chinese coastland need not have been lost. An appreciation of the principles of maritime strategy as set forth in the foregoing paragraphs, including a recognition of the true physical objective of such a strategy, would have dictated that the Chinese seacoast should not have been relinquished. At the same time it would have showed the way in which it might have been held.

The real issue was not whether Nationalist China could defeat the Communists, and reunify the Nation, with or without United States intervention. Yet, it was precisely upon a negative determination as to this issue that a momentous strategic decision regarding China was made.<sup>1</sup>

The pertinent question — the real issue — was whether the free coalition of maritime nations should, and whether they could, retain control of the China coast. Since control of all of China was not essential to the United States' interests, no "all or nothing" choice need have been made. Major rivers and ports could have been held by relatively limited land, sea, and air forces supported from across the sea — in other words, by sea power. Friendly sea power could have been maintained on the coast of China indefinitely, sustaining a friendly maritime nation extending from

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<sup>1</sup>Dean Acheson, "American Policy Toward China," *Department of State Publication* 4255, p. 48.

Shanghai to Canton with its capital on Formosa. The effort would have been a mere fraction of that soon to be required to restore the balance in Korea, and certainly no greater than the continuing effort which "neutralization" of the Formosa Straits has demanded ever since.

The loss of the China seacoast came about by strategic decision, not by defeat or any real threat at that time from superior land power. Such are the costly mistakes which result from failure to appreciate the significance of sea power to the United States, failure to understand its principles and to be guided by them in the formulation of strategic doctrine, and failure to apply these principles in making strategic decisions.

## VI. SUMMARY

Of the various politico-geographical theories that have developed out of studies of history, international politics, and geography, those which undertake to assess the relative national power which is inherent in maritime and continental positions, respectively, have been among the most intriguing. From them have grown conflicting doctrines explaining, justifying, and predicting events in international power politics upon the basis of geographic environment, especially upon the factors of location and space. Serious and critical analysis of these doctrines clearly shows that, while they are of value in providing an insight into the interplay of geographical and political factors, they include speculations and assumptions which are not borne out by objective research. Particularly dangerous to the strategist is the element of environmental determinism inherent in such geopolitical manifestoes as American Manifest Destiny, the Heartland Theory of World Domination, or the Ultimate Ascendancy of Sea Power Over Land Power. Time and technology continuously reshape the tools and the environment of power politics. The strategist who accepts any concept of environmental determinism, which cannot be demonstrated in a relatively stable environment, comes perilously close to the fatal error of assuming the very point at issue between his nation and her antagonists.

The several strategic doctrines developed by the Military Services of the United States reflect a high degree of parochialism, and are superficially conflicting. Basically, however, they are complementary rather than conflicting, each highlighting the contribution to overall strategy which a single Service is most capable of making. Taken either individually or collectively, they are inadequate to the task of national strategy in that they focus attention on bits and pieces of an overall strategic concept rather than upon the whole.

The security and well-being of the United States, as is the case with any maritime nation, depend upon the exercise of a degree of control over her lines of communication and the avenues of approach to her borders. These critical lines of communication, and avenues of approach, are to be found above, below, and on the surface of the sea. The degree of control required is not absolute, but varies as to time and locality. It is that degree of control consistent with the fundamental national interest — that which will permit the use by the United States and her allies of critical sea areas, and deny to an enemy the use of those areas critical to him.

Because complete control of all the sea will be an unattainable ideal even in a conflict with an inferior maritime power, the allocation of available resources for the task of controlling the sea at specified times and places is a function of greatest strategic importance. The probable utility of any additional increment of sea control always must be weighed against the utility which the additional increment of resource or effort would have if it were applied to another essential strategic task or toward attainment of another national objective. This principle applies to the allocation of available means at all stages — from decisions concerning the peacetime national budget to decisions concerning the deployment of available military forces in being in time of conflict.

The most serious threat to exercise by the United States of that degree of control of the sea requisite to the pursuit of her national interests lies in the possibility that a nation or coal-

tion, broadly based in the Eurasian Continent, will seize control of the maritime periphery of the World Continent and become dominant on the sea as well as on the Continent. The primary politico-geographic objective of United States national strategy thus is clearly defined — it is the control, by the United States or friendly maritime nations, of the entire maritime periphery of the Eurasian land mass, in order to assure to the United States and her allies the economic, political, and military bases from which the requisite control of the sea can be achieved, and to deny to any heartland power the geographic positions upon which the construction of such sea power bases could be accomplished.

The effective and prudent use of United States' dominant sea power is the only way of preserving the foundations upon which that very sea power rests. History teaches that once sea power is lost by a maritime nation, it is seldom regained. Carefully cultivated and wisely used, sea power in its broadest sense can be the self-sustaining means by which the United States may achieve its national goals of security and prosperity in a relatively orderly world.

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This paper was prepared as a part of the Naval Warfare Curriculum while LCOL McInteer was a student in the class of '59.

## **A CONCEPT OF NATIONAL STRATEGY**

Research paper written by Lieutenant L. Dorsey, U. S. Navy  
Command and Staff Class of '59



## INTRODUCTION

The American prospect for the future is not reassuring. Today's children, members of a generation who will one day ask, "What did you do about it?" face a long range prospect which is far from reassuring. The thought occurs that America should take some positive steps today beyond those already being taken. Americans are confused on what needs to be done to stabilize world affairs. Just what could be done? No one is sure. To many people it is hard enough to manage one's own life today let alone to set a course for the nation.

Americans have little previous experience in reorienting international relationships, in *determining* world power or *status quo*. Seemingly, America began completely free of outside influence. But for a long while the British stabilized world power relationships so that America was free to grow relatively untroubled by *major* foreign difficulties. But British power is no longer determining the *status quo* which Americans, unconsciously, found so comfortable. The *status quo* is being determined now, more and more, by the Communists.

Most Americans find this difficult to admit and mention the containment policy. Today there *is* a military containment or stalemate (which may not last) but a number of other Communist functions are not being contained within the Iron/Bamboo curtain; no amount of wishful thinking will make the fact otherwise. The Communists in fact have complete freedom for global action in many fields. They use this freedom to cause counter-actions favorable to their designs; thus, every move they make receives a counter move according to the containment policy of the non-Communists. By carefully preselecting global activities, the Communists hope to gain increasing control of determination of the world *status quo*. They "cause" or "trigger" Western actions since the Western philosophy is not to *initiate* but to *react*. This is very agreeable with the Communists. They are confident that when they complete adjustment of the *pattern* and sequence of

American national reflexes, they will have irrevocably attained control of America and the world.

Americans generally do not see these facts, hence the emphasis on military containment to the exclusion of many other types of containment. The static allied military containment is not altering the increasingly Communist determined dynamic *status quo* although it is indeed preventing a Communist military victory.

Will the Americans eventually desire to do more than contain, militarily, the Communists? They are accustomed to the British *status quo* and have no heritage in such astute practices (when given the opportunity to determine *status quo* at the time of Woodrow Wilson, they fled in horror). Will Americans remain satisfied with the increasingly Communist complexioned world affairs? They may not be discerning enough to alter a patchwork containment policy. And even if they sense their inadequate grip on world affairs they may not have the inclination for the harsh measures required. Benjamin Franklin's wise saw, "A fat kitchen makes a lean will", applies today to America, the world's richest nation, land of the most creature comforts per capita.

Serious steps (in addition to military) *can* be taken to reverse the global trend of an increasingly Communist determined *status quo*. Whether or not they *will* be taken by Americans (in time enough to make a difference) is the big question.

If the steps are to be taken, Americans must change, their leaders must change, and all Americans at home and abroad must vigorously act in accordance with a highly developed, highly sophisticated overall strategy. *The people, their leaders, and their strategy must be mutually identifiable.*

What should the American strategy be? That is the subject of this paper. Some introductory remarks will be made in addition to those just made. The remainder of the paper is devoted to the task of identifying a new strategy with Americans and with world affairs.

As will be seen, a strategy highly developed in its most modern sense will be the best answer for coordination of human affairs. But for years to come, this best of answers, this master plan, will at most provide only partial answers. The many seething conflicts of the age are only partially understood by the best minds of the age. Remedial actions may partially succeed; they may simultaneously produce vast unexpected events in turn partially understood and in turn partially manageable. This is the lesson of all recorded history, this is history's bequest to the present and to the future.

One can not turn ruefully from this lesson in man's inability to control events fully. Neither can one naively specify *the* strategy which *must* be followed. Great and complex problems afford more than one feasible solution; there would be elements common to all solutions, however. One should define the nation's goal while using the many lessons offered by history of civilization.

Some would complain that it is pointless to confuse present day problems with "dead" histories, centuries old. Yet, if one seeks to form an astute strategy (astuteness is needed here if nowhere else), one can not but see the folly of such a narrow view of the present. A view which does not look into the past, can not comprehend the present, and much less look into the future. Such a view can never come to grips with a forward looking Marxism; it can only content itself with its deftness in regaining its balance after each Marxist thrust. Such a view is present day "containment policy" and must be corrected. Such a view is a natural development of the "American Experiment" which began with cutting of all ties with Europe, and the "tainted" past.

A concept of national strategy must be acquired and implemented which gives unity of purpose to both domestic and foreign affairs. This strategy must make the nation strong through systematic concentration and application of talents and resources to the well springs of danger. There must be a sharing of contemporary responsibilities among Americans and by America among nations.

The problem of conceiving such a strategy lies in gaining a *true* perspective of the past, present and future. Having acquired this perspective, a new idea of strategy's role must be employed — more comprehensive than ever before. Pragmatic interpretations of Clausewitz's traditionally one-dimensional strategic concepts can be discarded. It was Douhet who said, "Victory smiles upon those who anticipate the changes in the character of war, not upon those who wait to adapt themselves after the changes occur". (30:218)

It will be seen that strategy has been both partially applied and misapplied; errors continue that do grave damage today. It will further be seen how America today is having difficulty in interpreting contemporary events as well as influencing them. Finally, the dangers facing America today are numerous; without applying a more comprehensive strategy, national survival is gravely endangered.

# A CONCEPT OF NATIONAL STRATEGY

## CHAPTER I

### PAST AND PRESENT STRATEGY

*How Strategy Began.* In the past four centuries of Western civilization, wars were fought according to the overall guidelines of a strategy. Strategy came to be regarded as the fundamental prerequisite to successful military actions. Complex operations tended to be successful if executed with an overall plan. Complete military and naval operations examined in national political context revealed rules applicable to the future. In 1513, Machiavelli advised in his book, *The Prince*, that success in war was determined by the political advantages gained, not victorious battles. (30:51)

Gradually, a body of strategies began to accumulate. This collection of interpretations was continually studied and variations were utilized. An example is the Nazi Blitzkrieg strategy. It developed after intensive study of Frederick the Great's "blitzkrieg" wars, Napoleonic Wars, American Civil War operations, then current writings of Liddell-Hart, Charles De Gaulle and others. Technological innovations were also integrated with older concepts.

Strategies, then, were an evolution of military concepts of political significance. Strategies almost invariably sought political advantage by *violent* or military force. The goal thus tended to be a static, finite situation. A recent example of this static goal is the combined strategy of the World War II allies: unconditional surrender of the enemy.

Nations became involved in wars from a variety of causes. These causes sometimes were the result of warlike actions of other nations. Some nations fought wars as a final consequence of their inattention, inaction, or even ineptness toward the sequence of international events. Strategies at first were modest even for the nations initiating a war. But as time passed, as nations evolved, strategies became more complex. Larger numbers of men, greater mobility, and larger quantities of material were the requirements

of later strategies. Nevertheless, nations pushed into a war were hard pressed to develop a sound counter strategy. In the Napoleonic Wars, for example, some nations were simply overwhelmed by a strategy they could not counter. Others, such as Russia in 1812, improvised a unique strategy which was effective.

When the medieval social structure disintegrated, the military organization of the Middle Ages declined. Monarchies or National States then formed. Social relations between these new entities also materialized. These relations in part consisted of wars. For example, Richelieu's France had a foreign policy of territorial aggrandizement. Military strategies were needed to implement the French policy. Richelieu's policies provided the impetus for the buildup of the military. And some years later under Louis XIV a great strategist developed, Vauban, the greatest master of siege warfare of all time. Thus, military "foreign socio-cultural relations" nurtured a buildup of military forces according, in this case, to the great Vauban's strategic role of fortresses.

There was never an effective system for preventing war. Police systems did evolve within nations for curbing domestic violence. But if a nation were to continue to exist, its first step had to be military power accretion. This was possible in either a transient military power coalition or in an independent development of national military power. In either case, there was the need for the strategist. He created the framework in which successful military action could be possible.

There were exceptions to this. Geographically isolated nations were sometimes isolated militarily. For such nations, defense was not necessarily the first consideration. Foreign relations tended to have non-military overtones — tariff regulations and the like. For such nations, operations for extended periods without a foreign policy was possible. Such nations hence did not have a military strategy of consequence since wars were only a distant consideration.

The United States was such a nation. Prior to entry into World War I, a U. S. naval strategy was conceived in spite of the

fact war was not politically considered. The strategy turned out to be extremely useless; in 1917, an entirely new naval strategy had to be hastily conceived and executed. (20:452) Valuable time was lost. The U. S. Army was considerably strengthened in the years preceding World War I, but this was not due to existence of a national military strategy.

*Clauswitz Interprets Strategy.* In the Napoleonic era war and underlying strategy changed. No longer did strategy fashion war for dynastic claims of *limited scope*. War now became a great violence upsetting the territorial *and social* order of all Europe. National survival, national philosophies were now in the scope of war. Single battles (rather than long campaigns) were of strategic finality now.

To Clauswitz who interpreted this new development, war was the supreme act of *violent force*; he did not define the supreme act of non-violent force. He went to great lengths, however, to reveal the nature of the violent force. Violent force was only one method. Clauswitz emphasized, of conducting relationships between nations or among social, cultural, and political entities. The basic principle of strategy was to locate the enemy "center of gravity" against which force would be applied. Application of violent or military force should, according to Clauswitz, not be subordinated to political considerations. But he returned again and again to his more fundamental thesis that war is merely a continuation of state policy by other means.

For the violent military force aspect of foreign relations, Clauswitz laid down many profound (but often ambiguous) truths. His teachings among those of others were widely applied in the development of total war strategies in the 20th century.

Clauswitz alluded to *non-violent* means of overcoming enemy "centers of gravity". But he left many questions unanswered in this respect. The foremost of which was how to formulate and apply a grand strategy which properly integrated not only violent (military) foreign relations *but all the other non-violent methods as well*.

Marx and Engels gravitated toward attaining these answers. Unfortunately, the answers are too tenuously interwoven with Communist ideology. Accordingly the answers have escaped understanding or application by non-Communists. Sorokin, a sociology professor, at Harvard came far closer to these answers in 1937, but his works have passed almost unnoticed until the past few years. His works, enormous in scope, are a frame of immensely significant inquiries into culture and society. His inquiries are much closer to the truth than those of Marx, Engels, Spengler, Toynbee, and Pareto. Sorokin points at the centers of gravity of world socio-cultural systems and examines their susceptibility to modification through the ages by both violent *and non-violent* force.

*Popular Interpretations of Clausewitz.* Today strategy is still regarded as Clausewitz seemingly saw it: the framework for military action. Matters of strategy are regarded as almost exclusively a military affair. American politicians today tend to gratefully avoid strategy tasks in deference to military expertise as is evidenced by increasing military preoccupation with this area. (4:42 and 18: ix, 368, 468) Ignorant default to military expertise is the basis for an unbalanced national strategy. The results are plain: highly intellectual progress in war potential, non-intellectual stone-age progress toward peace. The effect of this default in the long run *could* be the equivalent of the substitution of gasoline for water in fire hoses.

A very important thing is lacking in Clausewitz writings and generally lacking in strategy concepts expressed since Clausewitz. Great bloodshed has been the result of overlooking this. The factor is that the ultimate *strength* of a state is not *military* potential (although this is highly important); the ultimate strength is the health, the progressive stability or *dynamic equilibrium* of a well integrated socio-cultural structure. This puts in fuller perspective Clausewitz's strategic degrees of violent force in state relations. Military strength is indispensable to any strategy. But overemphasis or underemphasis on it are serious errors.

For instance, when military paralysis set in on the Western Front in 1917, need was keenly felt for a new look at strategy and



its place in a nation's affairs. Military events of 1917 were one long rending catastrophe. Bad military strategy and political deference to "military expertise" made calamity follow calamity. Nations in their agony earnestly began to seek a way out. Military strategy, the conventional one-dimensional interpretation of Clausewitz, left the bitter failure of a muddy stalemate.

Two schools of strategic thought arose. One school was that the war had to be fought on the Western Front against the main concentration of German strength. It would be fought by throwing vast numbers of men and equipment against a fully prepared enemy and counting heads afterward to compute the victor of the battle. The other school considered it hopeless to attack the enemy where he was strongest *and* recommended consideration, at least, of other ways of outflanking, or dismembering, or blockading, *or otherwise demoralizing and defeating him.* (37:25-26)

The war of course ended as it began — according to the first school. However, political rules were set for a coordinated Allied direction of the military operations in the remainder of the war. For the French, British, and American political coordinators, *enemy centers of gravity* were still military, however. Here, pragmatic interpretation of Clausewitz's advice is obvious. Such a reading of Clausewitz has always found the centers of gravity to be military. The pragmatic reading of Clausewitz thus is superficial in that it hands over to the military expertise the job of outlining a strategy for exerting international force. Such a course as taken in World War I and World War II by the Allies still leaves unquestioned, unanswered, the problem "*of otherwise defeating or demoralizing the enemy.*"

The non-Communist nations have not answered this question yet. This is in spite of the fact that the Soviets *have* found an answer and are successfully applying it. But before them, Hitler did well similarly before he went to war. The answer is of course that a strategy must now be background for *all* of a nation's affairs. It must lose its purely military color. Strategy, not violent force, must be the ultimate core of *any national policy determination in either internal or external affairs.*

*Present Strategy — A Second Look.* Liddell-Hart notes that a great many people today say that the horror of nuclear weapons have now made war impossible. These people therefore say that since war is impossible, strategy (or the need for strategy) is cancelled out. (10:147)

This statement shows clearly the pragmatic interpretation of strategy; the one-dimensional (purely military) application or meaning is still very much embraced today.

The statement reveals, also, a callous disregard for the bloodier pages of history. It is as well a surrender to the tense emotionalism so much in vogue in some circles today. The fact is that atomic weapons would have made a number of historic battles far less horrible. Take only the 1917 Ypres campaign of World War I, for instance. The 450,000 Allied casualties (and additionally, a comparable number of German casualties) of the summer and autumn of 1917 were made far more horrible by "conventional" weapons — explosives, gas, and drowning in mud, etc. *Each* of the many artillery barrages themselves amounted to several multi-kiloton atomic bombs. Would not one or more megaton bombs have been more mercifully swift? Would not the casualty numbers have been nearly the same? Would not the permanent "conventional" wounds approximate the non-fatal permanent effects of nuclear radiation?

Liddell Hart derides as ill-founded and misleading the idea that the atomic bomb cancels out strategy. Quite the opposite to being cancelled out today, atomic weapons are "stimulating and accelerating" an adoption of non-violent methods of interstate force which are the essence of modern strategy. Warfare and interstate relations *because of the atomic bomb* therefore are being endowed with intelligent properties that raise them above the brute application of violent force.

On the surface this would seem encouraging (it would appear that war — violent forces — will tend to become less useful). Not so! As France fell by surprise violent force one spring week

in 1940, an unwary America could for instance fall quickly by non-violent force if the Soviet strategy is successful.

The atomic deterrent today to direct military aggression is really causing a deeper strategic subtlety on the part of aggressive Communism. Thus, at the very time when America is thrust into the limelight of world leadership, strategy of the aggressors is not using violent military force in the conventional way. And the deterrence to aggression by America tends to be strategically oriented to the centuries-old method of violent (or military) force. Yet, American strategy *seems* new because of the many spectacular breakthroughs in military technology. However, regardless of all of the radically new military hardware — missiles, nuclear submarines, etc. — the American concept of deterrence is shackled to inapplicable features of the past: abnormal dependence on military (violent) force. Political default to the military, not military parochialism, is the cause of this.

In the one-dimensional interpretation of Clausewitz, America does have a strategy today — military deterrence. This is hardly strategy in the modern sense because it is designed to cope only with situations that occurred years ago but possibly not again — direct and large scale military aggression. In the modern sense, America does not have a strategy, merely some loosely connected ideas — called positions or policies. Today there exists no mechanism which is comprehensively protecting American resources from international non-violent force. Nor is there a comprehensive channeling of American resources into non-violent “force-legions” against modern aggressors. This is not to say for instance that a need does not continue for the Continental Air Defense Command or the Strategic Air Command, nor that they are not more fully employable also as non-violent forces under a more comprehensive strategy which makes balanced use of all national resources.

The past has indeed left the present a harmful legacy. The unimaginative, one-dimensional concept is still very much in vogue today. Military preparedness must of course be such that a sudden materialization of a hot war (fought with history’s most powerful

weapons) would not cause a consequent American defeat. Yet the hot war need never be fought. The cold war may be the source of all strategic victories dreamed of by a century of Communism.

But the cold war can not be won by navies, armies and air forces. If this can not soon be realized, if America's trust is placed in the wrong weapons and an inapplicable strategy, America will lose the war of ideas. If this happens, ruin of "the West" will be swift, complete, and irrevocable. (27:164)

One statement of Clausewitz seems as a ghostly voice of approval of Communist cold war strategy. The same statement sounds as a derisive, macabre critique of America's present quasi-strategy: "OFTEN ALL HANGS ON THE SILKEN THREAD OF IMAGINATION." (26:111) The great irony is that this statement is made by one whose writings have been so frequently studied, yet so often misinterpreted and misapplied through lack of imagination!

Does it require a great deal of imagination or mental effort to apply the words of General Sun Tzu Wu written in 500 BC? "The supreme excellence consists of breaking the enemy's resistance without fighting." (30:216) Is it impossible to find the present day strategic implications to America of the advice of Flavius Vegetius? He wrote the following during the twilight years of the Roman Empire, a century before its final end:

It is better to overcome the enemy by imposing upon him famine, surprise, or terror *than general (military) actions*, for in the latter instance fortune has often a greater share than valor. (30:217)

## CHAPTER II DILEMMA IN STRATEGY

*The Essential Element of Tragedy.* In Shakespeare's plays, a flaw in character is the cause of the tragic ending. In the American democracy, a flaw in the system of government seems to prevent the giant steps needed, awaited, by the world. One crisis after another mounts and crashes against America. And America braces

against the blows, hoping, wrongly believing they must end. The flaw in the American system, like a flaw in character prevents the strategic rising up without which only final catastrophe can result. The flaw generates a tragic sequence of events which if left unchecked will culminate in national and international disaster.

*The Mackinder Flaw.* America's founding fathers created a governmental system which seemed close to perfection. But at its inception, a tiny, unnoticed inner flaw existed. Technological progress and the recent explosion of world events have reduced the size of the earth causing this tiny flaw to become more noticeable. In 1919, Sir Halford Mackinder pointed out the flaw:

Democracy implies rule by consent of the average citizen who does not view things from the hilltops, for he must work in the fertile plains. (15:24)

In the placid development of the great nation, geographic isolation kept America away from the main stream of world events. National survival was solved from an equation of mainly domestic factors. The scope of the domestic factors was not such that government influence was always needed or decisive. Thomas Jefferson argued to limit the scope of government.

But when national survival began to be considered in terms of a number of important and volatile international factors, government influence became more critical. Now, the government's action is in demand not only for national survival but for survival of a great many more nations besides. The government must act not only now and then but quickly, sensitively, constantly, and *consistently*.

The changing times which have dwarfed the globe have expressed the need for government to ascend to higher plateaus of action. The separation from the "average" citizen's plateau of action and that of his government increased. The Mackinder flaw became much more noticeable, thereby. Requirements for fast government action were met with citizen consternation and delays in approval.

In addition, the government found itself dealing with many complex socio-cultural elements, structures, and forces seemingly very dissimilar to the American configuration. The government found itself attempting to stabilize a number of these dynamic relationships concurrent with the American structure. Yet sociologists are in disagreement that histories yield any discernable patterns of performance, and therefore, that future socio-cultural performance patterns are neither predictable nor capable of pre-determination.

This emphasizes the Mackinder flaw. The American has only a superficial understanding of his own dynamic socio-cultural milieu. He tends to see others only in his own terms of reference. His political leaders are usually recently from the "average citizen" ranks. He is poorly prepared to take either fast or forehanded actions on the higher governmental level. It almost seems to be asking too much that such actions taken by our government departments be timely and correct *and in addition* consistent with similar types of other departmental actions *and simultaneously approved by the citizens*. Yet these things must occur!

*A Trans-Physical (Metaphysical) Enigma.* In complex issues, analogies are helpful. Analogies are used in teaching physics, chemistry, electronics, mechanics, and other *physical* sciences. The following analogy is used to illuminate the existence of a complex trans-physical enigma.

America is in a dilemma in trying to move its culture and social structure (including other satellite free world national structures) toward a "reasonable", dynamic equilibrium. The structure is not entirely understood; neither is the goal. The directors appear like the blind men in the classic poem *The Blind Men and the Elephant*.

It was six men of Indostan  
To learning much inclined,  
Who went to see the elephant  
(Though all of them were blind),  
That each of them by observation  
Might satisfy his mind.

The first approached the elephant,  
And, happening to fall  
Against his broad and sturdy side,  
At once began to bawl,  
"God bless me! but the elephant  
Is very like a wall!"

The second feeling of the tusk  
Cried: "Ho! what have we here  
So very round and smooth and sharp?  
To me 'tis mighty clear  
This wonder of an elephant  
Is very like a spear!"

The sixth no sooner had begun  
About the beast to grope,  
Than, seizing on the swinging tail  
That fell within his scope,  
"I see," quoth he, "the elephant  
Is very like a rope!"

And so these men of Indostan  
Disputed loud and long,  
Each in his own opinion  
Exceeding stiff and strong,  
Though each was partly in the right,  
And all were in the wrong!

So, oft in theologic wars  
The disputants, I ween,  
Rail on in utter ignorance  
Of what each other mean,  
And prate about an elephant  
Not one of them has seen! (18:8)

Many believe they understand the structure but really understand aspects "within their scope." Without a concept of the complete structure, the directors have difficulty in setting the elephant in motion in the right direction. The difficulty is further compounded when they suspect that the beast is ailing in some bodily members. They do not comprehend the extent of the ailments. Nor are they certain if they can be healed.

This is not all. This elephant is confronted by another predatory beast (Communism). Although the blind men have only

a compartmentalized concept of the menace, some fear it since a few realize their lives depend on making their sick elephant well and either overcoming the menace or cowing it into submission.

Besides the Soviet threat there are also other vague elements fast developing into structures which may threaten the sick elephant (such as nascent nationalism in Africa, Asia and the Middle East). Their bodies have not yet reached a definite shape and even when they do, the "blind men" will continue to have difficulty in perceiving their structures.

It is plain, then, that the blind men must agree without delay on what it is they are up against if they are to save themselves and their beast.

*Some Deny The Problem.* This view is not shared by many Americans today. It would seem too serious, too hysterical, too perplexing, and certainly too unreal. Yet, the blindness does exist:

Some (U. S. Governmental) officials who help to spend about \$40 billion a year on defense have never systematically studied the global strategy of the Communists and apparently feel, as each succeeding crisis subsides, that the prospects for national security are improving. (3:428)

Some do *sense* that something is wrong. A few years ago thoughtful writers of American domestic and world affairs began to describe an "uneasiness" in their views. Today this word is used or implied constantly. Nationally syndicated columnists noted for conservative attitudes now use it frequently. The *Rockefeller Reports* use it now. And many other reputable authors, speakers and writers use it too. They all have become uneasy and express their anxiety from specific situations which they describe — military posture, diplomacy, economic strategy, domestic economy, civil defense, general Soviet progress, domestic educational progress, American advertising, etc. They present many increasingly sobering points with which there can not be wide factual disagreements. The disagreement comes as to what should be done. But as with the blind men, *only those aspects of the problem within the scope*



*of the individual* are of importance to him. No *overall* relationship *can be agreed on* beyond the immediate scope. Without conception of an ultimate relationship, no *overall* strategic remedy *can be agreed on* or adopted. Everything is piecemeal. And, everyone becomes more "uneasy." If anything, more fragmentation rather than unity of concepts occur as the individual issues enlarge without resolution. The elephant becomes more of a riddle than ever!

The "Mackinder flaw" creates these conditions. Too many work too long "on the fertile plain." Those few who come to the hilltops from these plains stay too briefly there and while there see events more in terms of the plains.

Kissinger sees this condition as a difficulty in attitude — a psychological difficulty. In discussing the criticisms heaped not long ago on former Treasury and Defense Secretaries Humphrey and Wilson he states:

They may know in their heads *but can not accept* in their hearts that the society which they helped to build could disappear as did Rome, or Carthage, or Byzantium which probably seemed as eternal to their citizens. (13:426-427)

Professor Rostow addressed the Naval War College in a similar vein:

There are serious, dedicated, and able Americans *who do not believe* that it matters greatly to us whether, for example, India succeeds or fails relative to China in its next 5 year plan, and who could hold that the only meaningful touchstone for American policy in India is whether the responsible men in New Delhi are prepared to join us in military alliance. Similar men believe that our only job in the Middle East is, somehow, to assure the continuity of the eastern oil supply and to keep Soviet military power out of the area. There is a widely held view that our job in national security is simply and solely to put ourselves in a position where overt Communist military strength, in the form of atomic weapons can not be rationally used against the Free World.  
(25:36-37)

Kissinger and Rostow refer to views that are certainly not "from the hilltops." Louis Halle sums it up in an outspoken way, by saying that the President can lead not in the direction he conceives as best. Rather it is the direction in which the "fertile plains views" (domestic forces) persist or force the President. (11)

*The View From The Plains.* The view from the plains is in control. What is it really? The answer is deeply disturbing. American (and the Western powers) mistake the world in which they live and act. As a result of this misjudgment, the people of the fertile plains sometimes have no desire to act at all. If it were not for the meddlesome Communists, they say, the world would roll merrily on its way in some easy, self-regulated manner. The crises can not be seen from the plains. World violence, catastrophe, deepening socio-cultural revolutions are sweeping in at hurricane force. Communism seldom is successful in creating these conditions, but it enlarges them whenever possible. Once the crises come, Communism provides the convenient mold for capturing, shaping, and stabilizing, in its own image. (35:57)

The aggregate organism of present day civilized society and culture, according to Sorokin, seems to have not a number of local or superficial ailments, but to be undergoing one of the deepest crises of its many centuries of life. The crisis is far greater than the ordinary (infinitely deeper than most people recognize), its depth is unfathomable, its end is not yet in sight. (31: xiii Vol I and 532 Vol III)

The "plains-people" seem content to live in an increasingly Soviet crystallized *status quo*. They let their government take steps only as determined by the onslaught of events, yet some events are accomplished past the point of counter action.

The tragedy of this flaw, if not overcome, will soon have a predictable ending. Actions on a national level which are schizoid (as on a personal level), logically culminate in disaster. The action could become realistic. But unrealistic views cannot cause realistic actions. Thus the flaw in the system produces the dilemma in strategy, and the tragedy in events.

There has been argument for sometime that there exists a political vacuum in action on world events. Some say that since this vacuum exists, military expertise must be (and is being) relied on to develop America's plan of action amid the global hurricane building up. Others contend that not only is the military expertise not calling the tune to the nation's strategy but that diplomacy backed by military force is accomplishing the national interests.

*Patchwork Policy v.s. Strategy — The Dilemma.* These intense arguments continue. Yet both sides are superficial and miss the main point. American strategy today consists mainly of a patchwork of military and territorial positions (policies), political response to the aggressive non-violent forces of Communism. The superficiality of such strategy seems too plain for comment. Yet, on it are staked most of the hopes and plans of the non-Communist world! For one thing, such a strategy is seemingly a modern concept. Really it is a small improvement over an isolationist policy — a non-strategy! And as such it is mistaken for soundness and well balance when it is greatly out of balance: rich in some territorial political and military factors, poor in other qualities. It is a "fill-the-breach" technique.

Under the increasing Soviet *status quo*, much wider ranges of non-Communist response may soon become urgently required. It may be that such response will not be possible from a one-dimensional territorial and military reflexive orientation. Only a narrow band of the total Soviet strategy spectrum has been used thus far. (32:13-38)

An increasingly Soviet determined *status quo* throughout the entire socio-cultural spectrum develops as the Soviet becomes more proficient in relating more and more world forces to its strategic ideology. Thus far, cold war battles have been confined to a narrow range of the spectrum. As more complete application is reached by the Soviets, non-Communist responses will become more difficult by reason of being outside non-Communist strategic terms of reference. The consequence could be an increasingly schizoid type of reaction and increasingly ineffectual responses.

The strategic dilemma exists today because vision is lacking, enlightened guidance is not always present because of the Mackinder flaw. One has only to look back over the past few years to confirm this. Errors committed since World War II because of this lack may be setting the final, fateful course in Western Civilization's long and gaudy history.

*A Strategic Failure in Education.* Three important post World War II books give eloquent testimony to this lack of vision.

Thirteen precious years ago, Professor Bailey completed the third edition of his famous *A Diplomatic History of the American People*. He fully recognized the Mackinder flaw when he uttered this sober warning in 1946:

The (Hiroshima) atomic bomb is but the primitive proto-type of the push button weapons of a potential World War III. It is no longer One World but One Room. We must dispose of the maniacs and learn to live with the others.

The tragedy of modern man is that while he is clever enough to blow up the world, he has thus far not been clever enough to live in peace with his neighbors. The physical sciences have developed with frightening speed, while the social sciences in some respects are back in the days of Noah's Ark. If this gap is not substantially closed the finish of everything can soon be expected.

If the American people, through their Congress, insist — indifferent, ignorant, or mislead — upon (various) impediments to world recovery, they will have their way — with consequent disaster.

A tremendous job in public education needs to be done . . . Proper education is a relatively cheap form of international life insurance.

Upon every citizen in our democracy rests a solemn obligation to inform himself, so that he may shape American foreign policy — *his foreign policy* — along constructive, far sighted, lines. (2:869-871)

However, six years later in 1952, General Willoughby concluded his documentary book, *Shanghai Conspiracy: The Sorge Spy Ring*, with a stinging warning "unless (Americans) learn the art of international self-defense, we will have the suicide of Western civilization on our conscience." General Willoughby saw the mortal dangers arising from naive tolerance of Communist penetrations, thefts of atomic secrets, political dupes and perverted liberalism. (36:315)

Ten years after World War II ended, Edwin O'Connor in his Atlantic prize novel of 1955, *The Last Hurrah*, put his finger on the heart of this dilemma with a question:

He sometimes wondered . . . whether they, who seemed to have overcome so many of the old passionate prejudices of their ancestors, had not also overcome some of their old passionate virtues? In these neutral, tolerant times, do Americans feel deeply about anything? (21:106)

It would seem, then, that the greatest single factor to overcome the Mackinder flaw would be a good means of informing, educating, the people. According to a good many reports — for example, the Rockefeller Report on Education (34) — education has some considerable defects today. The one big chance, then, since World War II, the really important means toward international "self protection", toward a basis for a sound strategy has been lost in the post World War II years.

It remains for future events to spell out whether or not the strategic dilemmas that this creates will eventually be fatal to America. Years ago Kipling said in his poem, *The Route of the White Hussars*:

It was not in the open fight  
We threw away the sword,  
But in the lonely watching  
In the darkness by the ford. (30:110)

Were the post World War II years (those years of intellectual darkness for America) a time when "the sword" was thrown away?

## CHAPTER III

### AMERICAN ASPIRATIONS

*The Golden Door.* National aspirations are important to strategy. Seemingly, nothing could be harder than to give a brief, yet concrete summary of the great heterogeneity of American motivations, hopes and desires. Seemingly, the sources are numberless and indistinct; the merging pattern of these aspirations is almost mystical. The inscription on the Statue of Liberty sums this up:

. . . Give me your tired, your poor, your huddled masses . . . Send these homeless, tempest-tossed to me, I lift my lamp beside the golden door!

Ostensibly, America is a great "melting pot" of peoples, ideas and ideals. Only the best is sublimated and saved. The greatest American strength seems to be this healthy refinement of diverse ideals for the common good.

This condition has resulted in the development of vast national wealth, of prosperity, of well being and comfort without historic parallel. National aspirations are strongly for a continuation of these fine conditions. This is considered to be the primary obligation of everyone, most of all, the government electorate. Prosperity has only lately reached the present high level. Wars, depressions, droughts and other hardships have long been endured. Now, at long last, when wealth and comfort are available to so many, nothing must be permitted to interfere.

At first glance, the "comfort cult" seems almost natural and logical. Actually, it is being carried to proportions which exclude other important concepts.

*Comfort Strategy.* In 1953, a leading advertising researcher warned that Americans would *have to learn to live a third better* if they were to keep pace with growing production and permit the United States economy to hit a four hundred billion dollar gross national product in 1958 (actually it shot past this mark in 1956). To help Americans learn to live better by consuming more of the national product per capita, *Tide* solicited assistance from

a number of "leading" sociologists. Professor Allen of the University of Virginia, for one, responded. He mapped out a systematic program by which more people could achieve greater addiction to comfort. He stressed that his scheme would require (among other things) the concerted effort of the major social institutions — particularly educational, recreational, and religious. In mapping out the "grand design", the basic assumption was accepted without question that achieving the one third goal is worth any manipulating that might be necessary to achieve it.

The comfort cult, then, is carrying everyone along by a process that is becoming an end in itself and which threatens to overwhelm everyone. Producer, businessman, and consumer are all caught up in a whirl which is becoming so much the substance of American life that it is difficult to get outside long enough to look at it, let alone to see where it is leading. (22:260-264) (17:12-14, 19, 21, 31, 299-300)

Comfort, once possessed, tends to attract an excessive attention to the exclusion of other things. Also, comfort excites in its possessors a certain amount of avarice, fear and obstinacy when they are faced with the prospect of its loss. This may be the background for the accusation made by Hans Morgenthau that "our defense policy has been deflected from a bold, decisive course by the spectre of an unbalanced budget, our foreign policy has been paralyzed by a fear of the unknown . . . all of which is caused by Russia a nation having less than one half the national product of the U. S. A." (19:11-16)

Americans on the whole are aware of there being some trouble with the Communists. But after all, they say, "Every problem has its solution, let the electorate solve this one and quickly, too." Americans know that the lack of military power among the allies and lack of allied unity were contributing causes of both World Wars I and II. They insist that these mistakes be avoided this time; then they settle back to enjoy unprecedented domestic comfort. They are of course aware of rising tides of nationalism in the world today also. But somehow, they mistakenly see this

as an effect of the meddling Communists. They feel that neither Communism nor Nationalism would be a problem to anyone in the U. S. A. if only the bureaucrats in Washington would cut the red tape and solve the whole thing. If the present set of politicians can't get the thing straightened out, why then, some "better people" should be given the jobs next election. Americans probably feel that more than "enough" money is being provided; the basic philosophy in giving this money is "Every problem has its price." (6:112) The politicians are therefore being allowed to do everything "within reason." Everything, that is, except disturb the comfortable domestic tranquility. But, some say that even if the politicians make a complete mess of things, there is always war at the eleventh hour to "solve the problem." This has always worked in the past. This is Clausewitz speaking in ambiguous terms again — that war is the "ultimate" force. The whole idea is outmoded!

*The Unwise Goal.* It goes without saying that the present national aspirations which make a cult of uniformity and comfort are pathetically naive and tragic. Comfort has come as a quest but remains as master. The great grass roots heterogeneity — once the great American strength — has been dissolved and fused into a uniform desire for comfort. Frankly, many do not want to be told (or will not readily believe) that prosperity, comfort, et. al. should *not* be considered as foremost. For anyone to say that Communism and Nationalism are rising hurricanes today, against which our nation is in grave peril, seems just a little unreal and radical. No elected Federal Government Representative who grasps the danger of Communism (many apparently don't) wants to be the one to tell the Americans, for example, that an all-out Cold War should be launched at the expense of prosperity, for the time being at least.

One is reminded here of the similarity of American actions to the classic reaction of some medical patients when told they have cancer. In place of courageously seeking out competent physicians and surgeons, they retreat to "quack" doctors. They pay staggering



sums for fake, "painless" cures, a prolongation of comfort. They waste critical time in this; when a cure is hopeless, when the pain becomes unbearable, when death is near, they realize their error. By then it is too late. Of course, the threat of Communism may be more complex than cancer. Yet the selection of political representatives who are only mirrors of empty hopes will not bring the painless sure cure (the existence of which the patient seems certain).

Americans are not insensitive to the sufferings of other peoples of the world. Therefore, a moderate amount of government assistance to underdeveloped nations is considered. Pains are taken to avoid letting these nations become Soviet targets for military aggression. After all, it was military aggression which brought on World Wars I and II. Aggression and war are to be avoided. Thus, assistance takes the frequent form of military material, training, and treaties. This is linked with economic aid. The military aid often is not large and might not be decisive. The economic aid is even more modest when compared to the poverty and hunger existing. The hope, however, is that nations will emulate the American system and attain comparable levels of comfort and prosperity. The comfort cult tends to be self propagating.

Yet the system of foreign aid and alliance is not always producing the power developments hoped for. Some nations have less of an idea of the Communist danger than Americans. They even are suspicious of American aid, as is the case in some countries bordering the Indian Ocean.

*Character Evaluation — A Key To The Future.* It is not difficult to see that all is not well with the U. S. A. today. Some would say otherwise. But then this denial is an element characteristic of tragedy. History fairly brims over with examples of proud nations slowly sinking into catastrophe and oblivion amid the denials. Today there are many people who hotly deny that the future can be seen soon enough to do anything about it. They forget that nations do not disappear mysteriously overnight.

In 1938, the German biographer, Emile Ludwig, exiled by Hitler, wrote:

The man who regards raw materials as more important than a people's philosophy, or believes that figures decide history and not feelings, is liable to be surprised . . . Philosophers, and only philosophers, have accurately forecast developments . . . From Plato and Cicero to Nietzsche. We have a modern example in Norman Angell who in 1912 foretold all that happened later . . . Statesmen who have no philosophers to advise them are lost. Today, if the Americans and English would study the German Character, they might yet ward off the war . . . (14:451)

Today, doesn't the answer to the immediate future lie in the character of the Americans and the Communists? Have Americans bothered to study the Communist character sufficiently to foretell the outcome of the present course of events? There are many parallels.

The question is raised that perhaps events have already passed the turning point. Perhaps the fall of China will be regarded in later generations as the decisive victory of the Cold War. The next few years could indeed be the last years of American greatness.

*The Broken Ideal.* The cult of comfortable uniformity has replaced a great ideal. The present must be enjoyed; this is the American ideal today. What was it in the beginning?

Once it was a trust in the future, a preparation for posterity. John Adams called it "the best opportunity and the greatest trust . . . that Providence ever committed to so small a number since the transgression of the first pair." Americans believed themselves the inheritors of all previous civilizations, yet also the founders of a wholly new one . . . Turgot, called it the "hope of the world." Lewis saw in the aspiration, "an epitome of all societies . . . more universal than the Roman Empire . . .", destined to lead not just Europe but mankind into the first truly cosmic age of peace. (33:283)

What happened to take American eyes from the stars? Well, in many ways American ideals consisted of vague, loosely connected principles never formally related nor stated. Twentieth century events have shattered some of these principles. Comprehensiveness is now lacking more than ever from American ideals and hopes. The American ideal seems shaky to many who retreat to material comfort, togetherness, security, uniformity, etc. As stresses are applied to American ideals, implicit contradictions become explicit. Seeming unity of aspirations and ideals break down or become fragmented. Schizoid actions thereby result in nations (as in individuals) under stress which lack true unity in basic beliefs. The comfort cult today is one such schizoid reaction. Explicit contradictions are acknowledged because current pressures expose a lack of specific comprehensiveness in aspirations. Actions and realities get mutually "out of phase."

Communist principles on the other hand are completely formulated and ostensibly provide cohesive standards for judging all things (morals, religion, art, literature, history, science, politics, economics, etc.). The complex of Communist theories impress any one by their coherence and completeness regardless of their falsity, of whether or not they are true. Anyone can be impervious to Communism who possesses a complex of larger and richer answers, an equally coherent body of doctrine to which they are already attached prior to "exposure" to Communism. (12:274-275) But when Communists militarily defeat their opponents, the defeated ask "Why?". They question their own principles naturally, in defeat. German and Japanese prisoners of the Communists in World War II and American prisoners of the Korean War, puzzled and homesick, had the desire to accept any positive teaching presented. Americans, puzzled today by Communist Cold War victories, want to fall back on their own principles for sustenance; but at this they strike more confusion; traditional American goals are obscured. The future is now feared. Yet building-for-prosperity was *once* the central theme of American Ideals! Building for the future, making history, is by paradox the central thought of Communism today.

*Uncohesive Ideology.* Important beliefs have been removed from the ideology of the so-called American Experiment; "Comprehensiveness", (as seemingly offered in Communism), is lacking. The failure of President Wilson's efforts for a "just and holy peace" to make the world "safe for democracy" was the first stunning blow dealt to the stellar American belief in a unique destiny. A second similar chance to secure peace was lost in 1945 in default to Communist treachery.

Another cherished, typically American idea, (that mankind is making steady progress) similarly was splintered by events. The worse-than-medieval-methods of Lenin, Stalin, and Hitler in consolidating German and Soviet power were viewed by Americans with horror in the 20's and 30's. The 1945 scenes of death at Buchenwald proved with nauseating vastness a fallacy in another American ideal. The 15 million Chinese slaughtered in 1951 re-emphasized this fallacy.

Even the existence of a moral universe is doubted. This fundamental belief was written about by Melville as being a perpetual scene of battle by man — good against evil. Some writers say that the muscles of the American belief have now become weak; they cite a chief justice of the U. S. Supreme Court who recently declared that "there are no absolutes", that "all concepts are relative." (33:287) These writers believe that if Americans lose faith in a moral universe (society founded on moral absolutes), the whole American experiment would be at an end, that the disregard today of such *fundamental* absolutes as *right* and *wrong* would signal disaster. (5:69-73) These writers remember that a similar destruction of moral absolutes a hundred years ago by people such as Marx, Turgenev, and Proudholm historically set the stage for the events of 1917 in Russia.

If the Mackinder flaw of democracies is not to prove fatal, there must be an awakening of Americans to realities. It may not yet be too late. Resolute action has been known to change many a foreboding situation. A properly aroused American public is indispensable to resolute action.

*Confidence Confers Success.* The Communists feel confident of success because they realize certainty is conferred just as much by a philosophy as by fact. By stern imposition of purpose to world events, they have been richly successful. They were told by Marx that national ferments would occur, (this was a highly accurate prediction, although Marx erred as to the cause being economic) and they provide a mold for capturing the molten product.

There is no reason why America can not bring itself certainty of victory. A richer, more comprehensive, philosophy than Communism is available to Americans if they would but formulate it and apply it. The present idea of merely recovering balance after each Communist thrust is little more than craven intellectual surrender. It permits them, not the U. S. A., to confer certainty to world events according to a particular purpose. Thus, the more adequate (comprehensive) one's definitions for reality and the more apt one's program for changing it, the less complex does the scene of action appear; the converse is true, also.

There may be yet time to reverse the pattern even though it is difficult for a nation to escape habits of a lifetime. It might be possible, however, if the people really understood that failure to do so would make their defeat (in their lifetime) a virtual certainty. At least the attempt should be made.

*Americans Must Aspire to Greatness.* What then is the national interest? To what should the people aspire, mainly, if not to prosperity and a comfortable security of uniformity?

Should more power be given to the government to work more freely? Probably not; Augustus tried this 2000 years ago and only arrested momentarily the decline of the Roman Empire. Possibly it is the course already being taken today. However, more governmental power for Augustus did not reverse the lethargy, the inertia of Rome.

More than anything else, a reawakening of patriotic altruism is needed from the people. The government which has distributed so many blessings and comforts to the people is in grave

trouble. Disaster is imminent, sacrifices should be commensurate to the extent of the danger. The inner health of the nation's social order must be restored. The nation's integrity and ability to cope with its own problems, cultural strength and attractiveness, the promise of its own ideals and achievements (10:143) must be greatly increased and strengthened. None of this can be legislated. Concerted action by many people could make a great deal of difference (people closely aware of world realities today as well as historic national failures). Americans must possess a comprehensive set of ideals easily communicated to others without inspiring suspicion. These ideals should not be vague, general principles but specific, meaningful concepts worthy of attracting nations. In countering global Communism care should be taken not to appear to "infiltrate" other nations so that American motives become suspect. The American position should not attract comments of the following type made recently by a nation in South Asia.

Initial American overtures were regarded with suspicion, but by a judicious combination of joint economic and military aid, by pandering to the local jealousies and rivalries and by closing its eyes to the real motives that prompt the recipients to accept military aid — which is far from coincident with American interests — the U. S. A. has succeeded in obtaining wide military concessions by a series of separate treaties. (7:135)

If founded on fact, can such an American position be sound? Will it attract a community of nations to rally to its cause? Can such a criticism be identified with American aspirations today?

*Great Maxims Are Needed Today.* It can be seen that present aspirations of Americans have a number of features which uncorrected can bring great harm to everyone. It is axiomatic that people usually get what they *really* want. Action should therefore be taken to literally save Americans from themselves. The first step is to arouse interest in wholesome American goals. In the development of a strategy great consideration should be given to the most important of all resources — the aspirations of

a free people. In a democracy, no good strategy can be conceived, can endure unless it is truly for the good of the people and the people realize the fact.

It might be possible to conceive a complete American strategy without detailed public criticism. Yet, public understanding would be needed to place it into effect. Public identification with national aspirations is essential.

Today, issues are very complex. In an editorial, a Mr. Alexander noted:

The ruthlessness of the enemy, the fecklessness of the . . . Administration, the multiplicity of our military problems, the complexity of the inflationary peril, the degeneracy of our people, especially our youth, and the admitted perplexity of our few remaining statesmen.

Then he said,

The Congress is too sparse in its talents and too diffuse in its purposes. The job to be done while not beyond our nation's strength, is too big for anything except a grand and heroic effort. (1:4, Sect I)

Simplicity is important to national aspirations, the strategy must be devised and be presented to the people in the most understandable of terms. In the year 1908, Admiral Mahan quoted Sir John Seeley on this score:

Public understanding is necessarily guided by a few large, plain simple ideas. When great interests are plain, and great maxims of government unmistakable, public opinion may be able to judge securely even in questions of vast magnitude. (16:viii)

## CHAPTER IV

### IDEAL NATIONAL STRATEGY

*Examples of Cohesive Universes.* Within each human heart is the dream for a better tomorrow. Yet Americans are faced with the loathsome prospect of Communist domination.. Piecemeal military, diplomatic, and economic concepts are not containing

the danger. The nation needs a cohesive strategy which points the way to a better tomorrow despite all dangers. Every American needs to end each day with the knowledge that he personally has done his share according to the national aim. (Remember the NRA and "We do our part" during the depression?)

Consider for a moment the solar system and the stellar or celestial universe beyond. One notes here a classic dynamic equilibrium explained for the first time by Copernicus in the year 1543. Precise, well ordered movements continue with timeless regularity.

Consider the universe of the atom (first explained by Mendeljeff in 1871). All matter, even one's self is composed of complex, well-ordered, atoms in dynamic (and static) equilibrium. Electricity is produced and used, nuclear fission takes place, chemical combustion occurs. In every case, the sub-microscopic "building blocks" of the atomic universe rearrange with infinite accuracy according to pre-ordained relationships.

Knowledge of the celestial and atomic universes (the material world) was slow in accumulating. The bulk of it was gathered in "break-throughs" in the past 600 years. As this knowledge was accepted many old errors were discarded. The world was no longer thought flat; the misguided practice of alchemy ceased entirely. People for a while, however, were burned at the stake or guillotined for accepting or propagating the new knowledge.

Consider now the universe of man, the sociological universe. Here one finds very little absolute knowledge in existence today. Few break-throughs have occurred since Aristotle's time. Sociological and cultural elements exist but few can agree on their nature nor how they can be channelled. Man works with these elements attempting to crystallize a dynamically stable relationship to create a "golden peace." Man fails continually in these efforts without an absolute knowledge of the elements and forces with which he works. His efforts in this are very much like his earlier efforts at alchemy — inept.

*The Knowledge Needed.* The significance is plain. Man has mastered, to a high degree, his material (physical) world. He



still understands little of his sociological (trans-physical) universe. His material progress (Industrial Revolutions, Population Revolution, Nuclear Weapons, etc.) are all the results of dazzling material progress. Yet the implications on man's sociological universe are only dimly perceived, if at all. For instance, weaponry has progressed at such a rate that the situation is now comparable to placing a revolver in the hands of a monkey. He may unwittingly destroy himself or others. The material progress therefore produces great cracks in the social structure, the depth and degree of which can not be, have not been, fathomed.

Absolute knowledge on the sociological universe will slowly accumulate as it did on the atomic universe. If man can avoid a final lunge to catastrophe, enough knowledge may be accumulated within the next century or two to permit a highly stable (dynamic equilibrium not a Soviet static equilibrium) global socio-cultural structure to crystallize. Progress is already being made by the Soviets at an accelerating rate toward a stable global prison. Paradoxically, the Communist religion is materialism but one of their greatest sources of power may be in the trans-physical science of the sociological universe (metaphysics).

However, without the requisite knowledge, formulation of a strategy will continue an inexact art, not a science. Lack of such knowledge is a distinct handicap in efforts to formulate a well balanced national strategy. Lack of this knowledge explains why current strategy treatises dimly visualize the factors other than military, economic and political which must be integrated into a national strategy. For that matter, it is difficult to integrate properly even the military, economic, and political factors. Lack of sociological knowledge also explains the improper political deference to military expertise in national strategy matters. Explained also is the pragmatic, predominantly military, interpretation of Clausewitz writings which dwelt on strategy for international relations (war being only one among many such relations). Generally, strategy becomes a highly ambivalent term when taken out of context from the socio-cultural structure in which it is intertwined.

These things are not generally understood. Strategy may once have had a purely military structure, but no longer. Any student of strategy must humbly accept the underlying uncertainty of strategy. Then he will not accept such shallow explanations as "inter-service-rivalry" or "military parochialism" as major causes for there being no fully integrated national strategy today in the U. S. A.

It is all very well to say (as many do today) that the nation that does not heed history's lessons is doomed to repeat them. It is another thing, entirely, to create a strategy which countenances history's lessons. Few government officials can agree on what the lessons are for the nation today.

The nation, the world, can not stand still until some distant date when national strategy is more than a medieval art. Nor should governments any longer consider strategy a military matter. The results of World Wars I and II *should* have settled this for most people.

*Strategy Must Be Based on Truth.* All things have a beginning. Thus it is with a strategy formulation. The most important principle must be the advice of Polonius to his son, to thine own self be true and thou canst not then be false to any man (nation). This nation must turn back again to the fulfillment of ideals on which it was founded. (24:4-6) It must sort these out, update them, and rededicate itself to their fulfillment: a preparation for posterity. American ideals once seemed as the hope of the world; the cult of comfort is not the hope of the world no matter how many would like this to be.

But ideas and ideals, regardless of how excellently conceived or how noble, will not alone lift a nation on to the proper path. Nor will they, alone, move a nation to its goal. They are important, however.

But what more is needed? Can a nation legislate itself to security? Sometimes, yes. But not today for America.

What then of reorganization of the government? Will this work? Will dismemberment of the present system pave the way for a healthier Federal system? No, this will only waste valuable time. A reverse of the Parkinson Law trend (progressive organizational elephantiasis) would be healthful to the Federal Government, however.

The fact is that ideas, legislation, and reorganization tend more toward partial solutions or tend to direct a nation toward a goal of static equilibrium. Static equilibrium even if attainable, is of little use in a fast changing world. The static goal was attained at the end of World War II — military victory — and was of little lasting importance.

The nation needs to acquire a firm basis for continued stable existence in the future ages to come. Not only must such a relationship exist with Communism but with nascent nationalism the world over.

*Metaphysical Forces Need Be Applied.* Co-existence with Communism is not likely to be ever dynamically stable since the situation is one of continual gain, overt or covert, by the Communists. Stability can only be achieved by *active* measures other than reflexive containment on the part of this nation against the Communists. Such measures must continue throughout the coming generations of protracted conflict. Consistent acts must occur against the Communists which will also nibble away power — *physical or trans-physical* — from them.

Meanwhile, other world structures in formation can not be excluded from the global dynamically stable structure. For many years, Communism was such a structure in formative, hardening states. Yet little care was given toward bringing it into a dynamically stable relationship. Now, at the eleventh hour, such attempts are almost too late and promise little. Of course, domestic troubles for many nations and rising Naziism made many nations too preoccupied to consider Communism adequately. The same mistake must not be made with Communism today — it should not

monopolize all attention and material concern at the expense of African nationalism for instance.

*Overcome National Ignorance.* By now, several things are plain. One is the need for enlightened people who can compensate the "Mackinder flaw" in democracies. The people should see the need for a lessening of the frenzied striving for personal success which is spelled out in terms of a materialistic, seemingly comfortable and secure anonymity. They should rather see the need for an increase in development of comprehensive national ideals compatible with American Allies. Enlightenment is necessary since as Pope Pius once said in a worldwide broadcast, ignorance is man's *greatest* enemy. But the enlightenment of the people in national affairs can only go so far. Beyond this there must be a greater *trust* in government leaders. A more enlightened people would elect officials more worthy of this trust. The government is in a position to enlighten the people without, of course, propagandizing them. A central feature of the enlightenment must be a realization of the nature of the threats against the U. S. A.

*Career Government Needed For National Strategy Preparation.* The government, to best fulfill the interests of the people, can not be "turned out" with regularity by the voters. They must be a body of career government officials who keep a steady hand on the helm despite the changing world and domestic scene. This does not propose rigidity of purpose, rather it proposes a dynamic stability.

Within the government structure there must be a reduction of the vast numbers of minor "policy makers." Unintegrated policy is often worse by far than no national policy.

A properly conceived strategy could provide the framework for most Federal action. But to prepare such a strategy would be a hard job. The trend has been to turn it over to military expertise. The military, as well as in other governmental departments, operate according to their own peculiar systems of orientation. It is gravely wrong for the military to be given a large share of the task of national strategy formulation.

The national strategy must not be a total mobilization of national resources only for violent acts of war. Total national resources must be used in time of peace. Peaceful resources can be more powerful than wartime resources. War permits destruction but peaceful resources permit an increase in national power.

*Strategy, Doctrine and Implementation.* The strategy must be an integration of national policies. Thus at the highest level, strategy would be formed. The governmental departments would implement this strategy *by preparation of departmental doctrine.* Thus, national strategy could countenance such a thing as Communism. The departments of State, Defense, and Treasury, Health, Education and Welfare, etc. would devise separate departmental doctrines which would be in accord with the strategy. All being in accord with the same thing, the departmental doctrines *would be in accord with each other.*

The formation of strategy and its implementation just described would not result in a huge monolithic state. Rather, it would tend to reduce governmental size relative to that of today. Elimination of large numbers of "minor policy makers" would be a reduction in itself. The clarification of departmental actions would cause some reduction in confusion and consequently in governmental employees.

The strategy would not be a static thing. It would, with adequate non-delayed horizontal and vertical communications, achieve a condition of dynamic stability within the American system as well as in American foreign relations. Dynamic stability would enable a cohesive, healthy and victorious evolvement of the American system and the world system.

*Toward Political Expertise.* One notes with particular interest the recommendations of Mr. Barnett in ORBIS. He visualizes the need for a fourth service — a non-military service. He visualizes this political service as being headed by an Assistant Secretary for non-military Defense — of cabinet rank. There would also be a joint congressional committee on Cold War Strategy. The service itself would contain career service people expert in use of propaganda and

psychological warfare. There would be a *West Point of Political Warfare*. The whole idea is predicated on the belief that conflict by communications, psychological combat, subversion, and political warfare require as much professional competence as commanding an aircraft carrier or an infantry division. (3:432)

Barnett sees in America, vast resources which could, if properly directed, be used for non-military combat: universities, professional and technical societies, trade associations, corporations with overseas investments, labor unions, newspapermen, private foundations, international legal organizations, and nationality groups. (3:431)

Barnett seems to recognize several things. One, that military conflict (according to Clausewitz) is but a part of the larger political picture. He probably recognizes that the great destructiveness of weapons as Liddell Hart points out is making strategy become more obtuse and political. And most of all, he probably realizes as Brodie said, that politicians today are not equipped for, and spend hardly any time in, thoughts or acts of strategy.

Barnett's article represents significant thought in the right direction. Already the Herlog-Judd Bill is in Congress proposing the "Non-Military West Point."

But even if the "Non-Military West Point" were approved today it would take years before its graduates reach experience levels comparable to the infantry division commander or the aircraft carrier captain. The Soviet's have been graduating personnel from their many irregular warfare institutions for years. James Burnham acidly observes U. S. naivete compared to Soviet experience in political warfare. He says the aim of the latter is to defeat their enemies; for the U. S. the aim is to be loved. (6:189)

Thus, the Barnett proposal and the Herlog-Judd Bill are steps in the right direction. They may not be too late. In any event, there seems to be a growing recognition of the prime role of the non-military in today's strategy formulation and execution. This would reverse the trend of wrongful deference to military

expertise. There are *so many* avenues of non-military relations with the world that purely military strategy is not the answer.

Until man acquires a more sophisticated view of his socio-cultural universe it is unlikely that he can do much better than speedily accept the Barnett proposals on the Herlog-Judd Bill. Meantime, serious efforts should be undertaken to acquire a better knowledge of the non-materialistic, socio-cultural universe. Acquisition of this knowledge now seems possible.

It is first of all fair to say that necessity has given to strategy a completely wide scope role in national affairs. National survival may be decided quickly as in the past by military means; strong strategy and military wherewithall is required. But national survival may now be decided *by means other than war. The nation that can, without war, bring about the most effective mobilization of the total range of its resources (human as well as physical) stands the best chance of cold war victory.* Here one can see the new role of strategy. Here also is found the decrease of usefulness of national policy determination as now understood.

*Basis For An Ultimate Ideal Strategy.* Strategy once was the military development of national policy. Now, the strategy must develop first. No longer can there be a patchwork of national policies from which strategic positions are developed. Now the broad strategy must be developed from phased estimates at the highest national level. Afterwards, and concurrently, there must be a coordinated implementation in each government Department concerned. Departmental Doctrine must be formed from which operations will occur. From this must come the swift, consistent, and effective action required from the government *as an entity* on both the domestic and the international scene.

Lack of public understanding has caused considerable difficulty to the support of a program of strategic development of the type required. Urgent nationwide measures in education are needed in which the people are made more aware of their world and can elect political representatives more and more responsive to the national need during these dangerous times.

One, however, finds that these tasks seem difficult in the extreme today as well as in the immediately foreseeable future. The new role for strategy would seem highly difficult for the same reasons that some claim sociology to be an impossible riddle. "Can anybody," says Professor Geyl, "embrace with his mind the records of human activities in many countries and in many ages? Doing so, can he derive from that immense chaos conclusions which would be evident to every other human intellect as would a proposition of Euclid?" Geyl says, "No." (9:155) He concludes that all "large syntheses of history are vitiated by an insufficient appreciation of the infinite complexity of the many-sidedness of the irreducible variety of the life of all of mankind in all its aspects." (9:162)

Although Professor Geyl may be one of the greatest living historians, he probably is unaware that his denial of sociology is *per se* a denial of the new role that strategy can and must play. Strategy must now reflect a comprehensive understanding of history and must go one step beyond understanding. From this understanding of the past must come comprehension of the present, a prerequisite of a strategy to shape future trends, future sociological events.

Strategy must orient non-violent social as well as violent military forces. This is a fact of life. Today, it is clear that the cold war consists of a focusing of the entire repertoire of social forces as weapons and weapons systems. (23:45)

In the coming decades it will be necessary to prove Geyl wrong, to develop the understanding and the ideal national strategy.

Until serious effort begins to take place to acquire more information in the socio-cultural field there are a few men who have variously contributed through the ages: Aristotle, St. Augustine, Bousset, Condorcet, Hegel, Marx, Buckle, Wells, Spengler, Toynbee, Pareto, and Sorokin. Of these, some (such as Marx) are noted for their misuse of facts and logic. People such as Marx have done more harm than good for sociological students, especially



by such total falsehoods as a claim of scientific basis for fraudulent opinions. Yet all of these names have made contributions to the technique of historic synthesis. Sorokin's works are of particular interest as perhaps being the most factual, the most highly documented, and the most comprehensive in scope — vital prelude to the important large scale pure and applied socio-cultural research which must occur as a preliminary to large scope strategy development.

Large scale data processing is the most important help that can be gotten for accurate socio-cultural interpretations. When Professor Geyl of Holland denied with such ease the possibility of accurate interpretation, he probably was unaware of the possibilities of data processing to vastly complex socio-cultural problems. He was also undoubtedly unaware of almost fantastic work being accomplished lately in electronic data processing.

Charles Babbage, in the early 1800's, formulated a number of the important concepts essential to alpha-numeric data processing. The next step, development of punched "IBM type" cards did not take place until about twenty years ago; this was the first practical development of Babbage's ideas. Then, at Harvard University, came the Mark I Automatic Calculator in the year 1939. The year 1943 saw the development of the ENIAC in which electronic data processing began. (29:245) Today, the UNIVAC exists and more advanced transistorized, miniaturized models are rapidly developing.

Success in data processing equipment has spurred a very important development. A highly organized, serious effort is being undertaken to *organize all recorded knowledge for its effective use* (the key task said to be impossible by Professor Geyl). Top national leadership among industrial management, operations research, equipment designers, scientists, lawyers, government administrators, librarians, documentalists, publishers, and educators have made a start toward solving this problem. It is here that results can be readily collated and applied for national strategy development. It is not likely that the full scope, the importance

of this project is understood by its directors; only brief mention is made in Mr. Shera's book of the applicability of the project results to the *military* strategist in the realm of decision making. (29:449-450) Yet note here that the outmoded, "one-dimensional view" of strategy is applied military strategy!

## CHAPTER V

### SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

*Summary.* America today has the reins of free world leadership. And yet many dangers of vast proportion beset America. A remorseless, confident Communism is but one of these dangers today; it may turn out to be the only one of consequence if America is overcome. America therefore needs a highly developed plan, a strategy, total and complete in nature and scope. It must provide the means for dealing effectively with the realities of the hour or of the age. But Americans and their leaders must change if they are to grasp the realities of the hour or of the age. Only by understanding the danger can counter-plans be prepared which are realistic in nature. Only by understanding the danger can it be overcome and the strategic initiative be seized.

How should Americans change? The following statement was made in 1937 but it is much more important today:

The most urgent need of our time is the man who can control himself and his lusts, who is compassionate to all his fellow men, who can see and seek for the eternal values of culture and society, and who deeply feels his unique responsibility in this universe. (31: Vol. III, 538)

Each American, should change somewhat in this direction, then. More personal victories, then, are needed to prevent a general Communist victory. Remember, it was once said that General Washington's greatest victory was over himself . . .

How should American leaders change? Benjamin Franklin's observation (in a negative sense) *is* still applicable in the Atomic

**Age.** This need for increased responsibility in leadership is becoming more and more the need of free men everywhere.

Few in public affairs act from a mere view of their country, whatever they may pretend . . . Fewer still in public affairs act for the good of mankind.  
(8:105)

*Conclusion.* America, in a position to wield world leadership, should attempt a truly "all-out, heroic effort" at effecting events, at overcoming dangers and saving itself. Public opinion should be mobilized as well as all other human and material resources. It still may not be too late; therefore, every effort should be applied. With public opinion fully mobilized, the best possible national strategy must be placed in effect. Meantime, every effort should be made to acquire more basic socio-cultural information for the enlightenment of strategy. Man must strive to crystallize a stable socio-cultural universe in a form other than the loathsome stability of a "well-regulated" Communist global prison.

In the generations to come, more competent strategies will cause military force to achieve a more balanced, less dominant, relationship with the other non-violent socio-cultural forces. This will be possible after acquisition of a fund of knowledge on the socio-cultural universe. As the fund increases fraudulent socio-cultural concepts such as Marxism (Communism) will be discarded just as alchemy was discarded when knowledge of the atomic universe accumulated, just as the Witch Doctors give way to the Medical profession.

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## BIOGRAPHIC SKETCH

LT Dorsey graduated from the Naval Academy in the class of '48 and commenced his commissioned service as an Ensign in USS TOPEKA. Subsequently he served in USS KEARSARGE, USS NORFOLK and USS H. J. THOMAS. For duty ashore he served on the staff of CINCPAC-CINCPACFLT and in the Training Division of the Bureau of Naval Personnel.

Since commissioning he has also attended Gunnery Officers' Ordnance School, Washington, D. C.; Fleet ASW, CIC and Air Control Schools at San Diego, California; and Joint Maritime Warfare Course (Junior), Halifax, N. S., Canada.

This paper was prepared as a part of the Command and Staff Curriculum while LT Dorsey was a student in the class of '59.

## RECOMMENDED READING

The evaluation of books listed below include those recommended to resident students of the Naval War College. Officers in the fleet and elsewhere may find them of interest.

The inclusion of a book or article in this list does not necessarily constitute an endorsement by the Naval War College of the facts, opinions or concepts contained therein. They are indicated only on the basis of interesting, timely, and possibly useful reading matter.

Many of these publications may be found in ship and station libraries. Certain of the books on the list which are not available from these sources may be available from one of the Navy's Auxiliary Library Service Collections. These collections of books are obtainable on loan. Requests from individual officers to borrow books from an Auxiliary Library Service Collection should be addressed to the nearest of the following special loan collections:

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U. S. Naval Station Library  
Attn: Auxiliary Service Collection  
Building C-9  
U. S. Naval Base  
Norfolk 11, Virginia



## BOOKS

Loney, Glenn M. *Briefing in Conference Techniques*. New York, McGraw-Hill, 1959. 194 p.

This book is excellent for study, reference and guidance, incorporating in one volume the important elements of speech preparation and delivery, including fundamentals governing audio-visual aids. The individual without previous training will find it particularly helpful when faced with the problem of lecturing or briefing.

Moscow, Alvin. *Collision Course*. New York, Putnam, 1959. 309 p.

This book is written by an Associated Press reporter who covered the four months of court hearings in connection with the controversial collision at sea of the Andrea Doria and the Stockholm, and later interviewed the officers and crews of both ships, the passengers, the personnel engaged in the rescue and salvage work, and the lawyers and officials of both steamship lines. This definitive account is an excellent study of modern travel on the commercial sea routes of the Atlantic and gives argumentative support to the need for revision of the International Rules of the Road for present-day radar equipped ships. The tale is cleverly developed by switching the commentary from bridge to bridge as the ships close for their tragic meeting. This is a book of great interest to all seafaring men.

Schneider, Ronald M. *Communism in Guatemala, 1944-1954*. New York, Praeger, 1959. 350 p.

Lenin's "Communist Principle of Insurrection" states "Success at the point of overthrow depends upon the revolutionaries being able to endow their minority group with the effective strength of a majority." Dr. Schneider's carefully documented case study of the ten-year rise to power of Communism in Guatemala serves to prove that Lenin's precepts are still valid and are still being applied by practicing Communists. This book offers a detailed history of the means by which less than four thousand Communists in a nation of three million

persons manage to disunify, disorganize and demoralize the numerical majority to the point where no single group was able to withstand the Communist onslaught. Anyone who holds the opinion that a half million Communists within the Latin-American population of a hundred and seventy million is insignificant, or that this unified and purposeful group will be deterred by the proximity of the United States, the strength of Roman Catholicism, a political importance of the armies, or the stubborn individualism of Latin Americans will be re-educated by Dr. Schneider's book, which offers a startling revelation of the threat which world Communism poses on our southern flank. The book is documented from official government papers and is excellent background reading on Communist operations in the Latin American nations with emphasis on the continuing threat posed by this activity.

## PERIODICALS

Baar, James. "Red Threat from Antarctica." *Missiles and Rockets*, June 1, 1959, p. 15-16.

Discusses possibility of Russia's launching ICBM's from subs in Antarctic waters and also from bases in that region.

"Global Defense" *The General Electric Defense Quarterly*.  
April-June 1959.

An issue comprising the following articles: "The United Nations: Soviet Strategy and the Strategy of Freedom," by Henry Cabot Lodge; "An American Businessman Looks at Global Defense," by Frank Pace, Jr.; "Economic Defense," by W. Rogers Herod; "Integration for Global Defense: Role of the Defense Department," by John N. Irwin II; "West Germany's Role in Free World Defense," by Franz Josef Strauss; "France and World Security," by Pierre Lucien Jean Guillaumat; and "U. S. Industry and Global Defense," by Richard P. Coke.

"Ballistic Missiles: Birthplace of the 1968 Logistics System?"

*Armed Forces Management*, June, 1959, p. 22-26.

An article on the ballistic missiles logistic program.

Baritz, Joseph J. "Soviet Military Theory and Modern Warfare."

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p. 12-20.

Examines Soviet theories on the waging of future war, the ways in which it might begin, and the ways in which it might be fought.

Barnett, Frank R. "The Fourth Dimension in Defense."

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A most interesting article that examines the seriousness and scope of the Communist threat to our freedom.

Beavers, Lt. Roy L., Jr., USN. "Seapower and Geopolitics in the Missile Age." *U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings*. June, 1959,

p. 40-46.

Develops the two theses that (1) a marriage of seapower and missiles, strategic as well as tactical, will provide the U. S. with the best system of military force in the missile age, and (2) to realize this sea-based missile potential, command of the sea becomes the essential military objective in geopolitical power-relationships throughout the world.

Bowles, Chester. "The Challenge in Free Asia." *The New Leader*, May 25, 1959, p. 3-5.

Proposes an Asian Monroe Doctrine as the most promising approach to the future of South Asia; "without . . . initiative from local leaders, no amount of American aid can rescue the situation."

Burnham, James. "The Third World War." *National Review*, July 4, 1959, p. 176.

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Carrison, Capt. Daniel J., USN. "The Role of the Navy in Cold War." *U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, June 1959, p. 57-63.

Discusses three general areas in which the Navy can contribute to the prosecution of the cold war: capabilities helping to keep the cold war cold; orthodox preventive measures; and measures short of war.

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Fulbright, J. W. "Our Responsibilities in World Affairs." *Vital Speeches of the Day*, June 15, 1959, p. 527-532.

The Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee talks on the two main issues of foreign policy that we face — nationalism and the demand for improved living conditions, charges that we overemphasized the short-term tactical problems at the expense of long-range important questions, and concludes with a discussion of the role of the Senate in the field of foreign affairs.

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An assessment of the actual evidence as to the size and type of the much-publicized reduction of the Soviet armed forces and the real reasons behind it.

Gunther, Dr. Hans Karl. "Victory Without War?" *Military Review*, June 1959, p. 102-108.

An excellent article discussing the dangers for free countries inherently contained in world disarmament.

Hanna, Paul L. "America in the Middle East." *Middle Eastern Affairs*, May, 1959, p. 178-190.

A survey of the background of American policy in the Middle East, its objectives, the difficulties of carrying it out, and an evaluation of it.

Kissinger, Henry A. "The Search for Stability." *Foreign Affairs*, July, 1959, p. 537-560.

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Lippmann, Walter. "The Problem of Berlin." *The New Republic*, June 1, 1959, p. 9-10.

Mr. Lippmann recommends the negotiation with the Russians of a new charter or statute for West Berlin, stating that a general German settlement is not now practical politics.

"Moving Europe Closer to Unity." *Business Week*, June 6, 1959, p. 104-109.

Provides a view of progress made in the movement toward economic integration in Europe, considers the economic and political problems still facing the six nations, as well as the problems of growth and moves still to come.

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Presents interesting facts on the use of biological and chemical warfare, stressing effectiveness and humane aspects.

Scores the policy of official silence regarding this valuable type of weapon, pointing out that it leaves the public unprepared, and it infests the military establishment so that budgets for this warfare are short-changed.

"Ten Years NATO." *The Fifteen Nations*, Number 9/10, June 1959.

A special issue on the aims and achievements of NATO and the Soviet in policy, economics, leadership, science, defense and world influence. Includes such articles as: "Ten Years of Soviet Foreign Policy," "Communist Concepts of the Principles of War," "The Soviet Military Concept: War Is Inevitable," "The Strength of Soviet Sea Power," "NATO's Naval Forces," and many other interesting discussions on Soviet armed and nuclear forces, the Soviet threat and the cold war.