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**NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
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TITOISM AND THE COLD WAR

A lecture delivered
at the Naval War College
on 27 April 1959 by
Professor Andrew Gyorgy

Good Morning, Gentlemen:

This discussion on *Titoism and the Cold War* is the last lecture that I am scheduled to give for Naval Warfare. Therefore, I will express my great regret that there is no encore to this performance.

Well, to get to the point, I would like to start out by paraphrasing Mark Twain's wonderful remarks (which many of you have heard): "The millionaire's money is doubly tainted, 'tain't yours and 'tain't mine." It occurred to me, in getting a general theme for Tito's loyalty, that it is doubly tainted: 'tain't Russia's, and 'tain't ours. So I think this is highly applicable to the situation that we are faced with in discussing it.

I would like to start out by a defensive footnote. Very little emphasis will be placed in this lecture (although in the Question Period I would be most happy to go into details on it) on the internal structure of domestic, political and economic developments, because I was given the title (and quite rightly, to fit into your present problem) of *Titoism and the Cold War* with, of course, very strong and obvious emphasis on the foreign and external posture of this "ism" and of the Yugoslav picture in general.

I would like to suggest a couple of books, however, for your further information. Professor Fred Warner Neal of Claremont College, California, has just come out with an excellent book on *Titoism in Action* (1958), which is particularly strong and well-rounded, on the economic and political structure of developments that I cannot touch on. On an earlier level, very rich in excellent biographical data and well known to many of you, is the one time Brigadier General Fitzroy Maclean's excellent book, *The Heretic*,

which is really the best single biography of this elusive character that we are trying to discuss this morning. I would like to recommend both of these as truly pertinent and central to a discussion of this nature.

I am really delighted to have the chance to talk about Titoism in particular because in 1951, to about 400 students and faculty of the Johns Hopkins University, I had to talk about Titoism or *Tito between East and West*. In going over some of these lecture notes (not that I am using them here again), I feel that basically — especially in view of the last few months when quite a turnabout has occurred with which many of you are familiar — in many ways our relations with Tito and also Tito's specific relations with the Soviet Union and the Communist Bloc are described in almost a completely 360° circle. Again we are today standing, roughly speaking, where we stood in 1951 and 1952, in appraising this country and its peculiar political behavior in many ways. Therefore, the problem is really to more or less bring the story up-to-date. Of course, a major problem is to fit the climactic date of Stalin's death in March of 1953 into this picture, which, of course, must be done, because it changed a great deal in a short-run perspective in Yugoslav-American and Soviet-Yugoslav relations.

By way of a brief introduction, I would still like to point out (as you know) that Yugoslavia has played — and will continue to play — the role of a continual ferment in the broader European scene, a distinctly nonstabilizing force on the geographic periphery, but only geographically the periphery, because politically it is close to the center or heartland of world politics at any time.

Since June 28, 1948 — a tremendously important date which we must mention frequently and with emphasis — that is the expulsion of Tito from the Cominform and also the acknowledgment of the rift between Stalin and Tito — Yugoslavia and this energetic and peripatetic dictator have kept the Communist world in a continuous state of ideological confusion. Frequently this ideological confusion has also embraced the Congress of the United States, when discussing an aid program for Yugoslavia. All the

way through, since 1944, in fact, the Yugoslav version of what is broadly and may be somewhat inaccurately labeled as "national communism" insisted on a considerable degree — or I would say a maximum degree — of internal independence, while it was willing to grant only a very minimum of what we might call a "leadership edge" to the Soviet Union in the realm of foreign affairs.

On balance, I would say it is pretty obvious to all of us that Tito is alive — very much alive — while Stalin has been physically dead since March, 1953 and ideologically and intellectually, let us say, more or less extinct since February, 1956 (the 21st Party Congress). Tito won this battle quite obviously like the little boy who ran to try and separate a rather bitter fight and proudly yelled back at the other little boy, "Remember one thing — I hit you back first!"

On the other hand, I would also say that not only is this a great biological and political triumph for the dictator, but it also is a tremendously important fact in suggesting that it has been the greatest single failure of Soviet foreign policy to date. Now I know there will be questions on this, so let me quickly qualify it. I did not include here a detailed discussion or any kind of an analysis of the China record of the Soviet Union, because that record is too incomplete to give us a full picture. But the Yugoslav state and the handling of Tito has been the greatest single failure of Soviet foreign policy in the last fifteen years — and I will stand on this rather broad and aggressive statement.

I think it is also clear to you that of all the centrifugal forces and effects of Titoism, the most momentous has been the Yugoslav insistence (and this insistence, by the way, came up very recently and repeatedly in connection with the 21st Party Congress) that its relations with the Soviet Union serve as a construction model, both for what in academic terms we would call "intramural" and "extracurricular" relations among all the Communist Bloc nations. This is a fairly important blow to the Soviet insistence that they are the permanent center of World Communism. By steadily irradiating this particular influence — particularly in the

very somber world of the Eastern European satellite region — the Yugoslavs have been the strongest on-the-spot element of the political pressures for change that has been released by Stalin's death in 1953, and then by Mr. Khrushchev's rather poorly-timed denunciation of the late dictator in February, 1956.

Before getting to my seven-point outline, I would like to say a few words very briefly upon the theory of "deviation," which has produced Titoism, to give you at least a broader context in which you can place the Cold War and the Yugoslav role in it.

I think it is perfectly clear to us at this point that in Communist countries everything that goes wrong is a result of "sabotage" of the enemy. In fact, the search for an enemy is a built-in and truly permanent feature of most Communist societies. The continuous search for an enemy is an essential ingredient in that permanently maintained revolutionary and fighting character of a conflict-minded society run by "conflict managers," to quote the words we all enjoyed so recently.

In the beginning of the dictators' rule — Tito, Stalin, Lenin, Moa — of course the former ruling class was the obvious tiger. They must go; they must be liquidated; they must disappear; they were earmarked for total genocide. Then, however, after they obviously ran out of the ruling class, came the rich peasants. I certainly do not have to tell you, for you know that in China this has been repeated in the earlier phenomenon of what is so politely labeled as "de-Kulakization" (a charming phrase). This "de-Kulakization," which is the wholesale massacre of the rich and successful peasant group, was more recently carried out in Communist China, and Tito's Yugoslavia went through all the stages. Then came the certain scattered democratic sources of resistance: trade union leaders (if any are still alive) or social democratic leaders who have not cooperated; in other words, a Right-Wing Socialist type who has not cooperated with the Communist ruler. At one point or another a new type of traitor must be generated by this permanent and ever-present search for the continual enemy.

This is, in my opinion, where Tito appears as a particularly important phenomenon. He is the arch or prototype of the Deviationists. The term is a very simple one: *De viare*, two Latin words meaning, "Get off the road, or stray off the road." Anybody who strays off the road in the midst of this continuous changing of signals is under the cloud of being a Deviationist. To "deviate" implies turning into unknown and uncharted regions, beyond the rigid and narrow confines of a Communist system, that we have described to you so often and which you have found in your reading.

The doctrine of Communism refuses to recognize any shades in this Deviationism. The point I want to make very strongly here is this: there are only *black* and *white* conceptions of loyalty; there are no *gray* zones or shadings in this loyalty. A Communist either follows the line 100%, or he slips into the enemy camp. A 99% loyalty is not loyalty any longer, but is 1% heresy. This is a problem, of course, that bothers the doctors, too, when a young lady suggests that she came for advice because she is "slightly pregnant." There is no such thing as a slight degree of heresy. It is either 0 or a 100% proposition, and a 1% deviation from the road puts them inevitably and permanently into the other camp.

The point I want to make here, therefore, is that all Deviationists are total and permanent Deviationists (from the Soviet Communist point of view). There are only *quantitative* differences and variations between minor and major challenges of this system. In terms of quality, or as a *qualitative* distinction, they are all alike from the viewpoint of a Stalin or a Khrushchev. Once a Deviationist, always a Deviationist! Please keep this in mind when we begin to formulate an American foreign policy towards Tito.

Straying from the line is a symbol of hostility to the International Communist Organization, to an ironclad system; therefore, by definition, this cannot be tolerated. The most fundamental of all these challenges, of course, has been Tito's brand of National Communism. It has challenged the Soviet Union in its by far most sensitive area of doctrine and practice: namely, the permanent assumption of a papal infallibility (if I may put it that way in

Communist terms). The center of the World Revolution forever — permanently and in an unchallengeable manner — is the Soviet Union, as the base for that Revolution. Therefore, it is superior in status to that non-Communist World, and the rest of the State within that Communist World must automatically assume a satellite status.

You can realize, therefore, that a Tito-type challenge — or, to a lesser extent, a Polish-Gomulka-type challenge — challenges both the world revolutionary leaders of the Soviet Union, on the one hand, as well as the present structure of Soviet society and thinking — which is based on the permanent assumption that these are the cradle of World Communism. Tito's challenge therefore not only hits them at that extremely sensitive spot, but this man, with his exuberance and aggressiveness (that I will comment on a little later) has also publicized it. In fact, he has publicized it very effectively. His public relations have been excellent from the very first day of his challenging Stalin and the Soviet system. His, therefore, has been a power struggle between two political belief structures, so to speak, which are similar in detail and orientation, but which — that is, at least as of April 27, 1959 — seem to be completely incapable of coexistence, or even of some kind of a minimum agreement.

I would say, in going on now in my general outline, that Tito's movement has threatened both the ideological and the organizational fronts of Soviet and World Communist power. Therefore, it has another very important possibility that should be added here. This, like an infection in the human body, has tremendous possibilities of further spreading in the Communist body politic (and that is what a primary infection on the Yugoslav-dominated periphery may well become) and produce secondary and tertiary infections throughout the body politic of the Communist World.

There is another point I would like to make before leaving the theory of "deviation": Titoism, of course, is only one aspect of this multifaceted process and the political scope of dissidence, so to speak, is not only broad, but also very flexible. A hundred

flowers bloom in the back yard of political deviationism in the Communist World, and these flowers produce some very interesting fruit.

One day we find that a Trotskyite is accused, and "Trotskyism" is stressed as a major source of ideological sin. The next day the slogan of "Cosmopolitanism" is being launched, which has been played up in the anti-Semitic drives and efforts in Eastern Europe in particular. There is a flexibility here — a broad scope — that is most interesting in watching the total operation.

The frankest single statement that has been made along these lines came in December, 1951 from the (then) Czech Prime Minister, who later became President of Czechoslovakia and who died a couple of years ago, when he said — while he went on arresting the Secretary General of his own Communist Party:—"We shall not tolerate (and please note the order and force that is mentioned) any foreign influence in our affairs, whether from Washington, or London, or Rome, or Jerusalem." This is a very interesting further possibility. Belgrade was not mentioned at that point because Titoism was already well-established as the world's capital within heresy, so to speak.

Another point which should be mentioned, deviation is never complete unless there is an external aspect to it. Every time that Tito is being denounced it is a discussion centered on the shadows of Tito's regime and "the American Secret Services" (whatever that may be in that particular case). Therefore, there is a double-pincer-type suggestion here; it is both the external dynamic of this movement plus a very complicated, round-about, foreign, Western, U. S. type agitation which, all together, produce this classic prototype of deviation.

I shall now closely follow, gentlemen, a seven-point outline which I have divided into two very simple parts. I would like to talk first about in my opinion (and please feel free to challenge this at all points — which, undoubtedly, you will) four points on the *internal* proposition or features of Titoism and then (what is probably more important to us today) the three most important

external characteristics. I would like to add here that these are my own thoughts which I have developed after mature and (occasionally) sober reflection.

The first point I would like to make is that the most important single point — in other words, there is a major qualitative difference between the internal side and the other three — is a brief re-examination of what is probably the number one puzzle in the political world of today, the combination of Nationalism and Communism. It was my pleasure to talk to you about this briefly last November, so I will not repeat those remarks but, rather, would like to pick it up where we left off then.

There are two major possibilities in the combination and the possible cross-fertilization of Communism and Nationalism on the political scene today: they are either in open conflict or they seem to reinforce each other in the form of thoroughly harmonious — or, at any rate, in a closely interrelated — manner to produce some sort of a peculiar local product all of their own.

The former proposition raises a number of challenging questions in case of an open conflict. Which of the two will be more permanent, more pervasive, more deep-seated? Which one is likely to outlast the other? (I know several of you in personal discussions with me raised this type of question, and I think it is a very important one). Which has the more significant long-term appeal to the masses of mankind? Which of the two has the more profound impact in terms of the sweep of human history?

I shall hide behind the cloak of a great authority here — the Chinese philosopher, Lin Yutang, in a brilliant book on Communism entitled *The Secret Name* (which many of you have read by now) has this to say (a very brief quote, but a very pertinent one, I believe):

Nationalism as a human trait and human habit is deep-seated and universal. The last world war was not fought on an ideological basis, but was fought on a nationalistic basis across ideological frontiers, capitalistic countries fighting hand in hand with a

Communist country to destroy a common enemy. (And here is the central point). Of the two — ideological loyalty and national loyalty — the latter is a far stronger and far more vital force.

I think we should all concur with this excellent generalization.

Studying, therefore, the evidence of history, one must implicitly agree that Nationalism is bound to prevail in the long-run over the short-run impact of such ideological forces as National Socialism (more or less defunct) or, particularly, as Communism. I take here a very optimistic stand, therefore, to show that of tyrannical mass murder, Hitler-type genocide, or Soviet-staged bloodbath (which was simply the rule of the day and that was reinforced for a short time by brutal naked external pressures), Nationalism certainly proved that in the final round it will emerge with at least a partial (if not total) conquest.

If you apply this to such situations as Yugoslavia or China, I would say that Nationalism will restore itself and will arise, like the old Phoenix type of phenomenon, "from the ashes of destruction and despair," while the ideology of the hour or the "ism" of the moment will generally be incapable of reviving itself and will disappear — unless, as the five violent partitions of Poland, for example, have proven — combined with bloody suppressions or situations in other parts of the world, there are temporarily such pressures that Nationalism cannot vindicate itself. Therefore, you see, when an internationally motivated and organized ideology like Communism runs into a conflict with a localized force of Nationalism, I would say that the problem is a tremendous one.

Very briefly, the question that was raised by a British writer recently (I think he phrased it very well): "Is there a safe passageway between the Scylla of Nationalism and the Charybdis of Communism as you navigate a very treacherous strait here?" Well, there is a possibility, of course (and Tito has tried it) "If you can't destroy them, join them!" He has joined the Communist world to the extent of deriving enough power to be still alive and going strong today.

Indeed, there are a few limited case studies in which N+C (Nationalism plus Communism) can reinforce, reinvigorate and strengthen itself. And there are really only two — well, I will put it this way, only two and a half case studies at the most which we could consult. To come specifically to my point now. Of course, the most important one is Yugoslavia. But the most of Poland has given us an interesting insight in a modified, localized form of National Communism in which the vicious circle worked interestingly and one force sort of helped to reinforce the other. And I must say that eventually they probably will be able to put Communist China into this very limited category of case studies of National Communism — but this would be difficult and premature, to say the least.

I would like to move on here and suggest therefore, to combine points one and two of my internal outline here, that I would put it this way: the most fundamental common denominator of all such belief systems generally labeled as National Communism is a peculiar combination of two forces (and that is the essence of Titoism, in my modest opinion) — a negative force and a positive force, but the two must be present and act to sort of reinforce each other. The negative force I would now describe as a social process against International Communism, a very important ingredient. The positive ingredient is a vigorous assertion of national unity and independence, which will then lead us to a consideration of what we mean by “elbow room” for internal action.

But let me say this about number one — this is a formula for autonomy: “I rule myself; I shall go it alone.” This is a very strong attitude, and it is as strong in Eastern Europe as it is in Communist China and other parts of the world. I would like to add a brief comment here: namely, that therefore the dates and the subject of the Soviet-Yugoslav or Soviet-Polish disputes are unimportant by themselves. I think what is important, and what should matter to you and to me, is that there *was* such a dispute, or the incident itself; namely, that it was possible to challenge the infallibility of a central organization and survive.

I would like to define my second point. By "elbow room" in internal affairs, I mean that a certain amount of leeway — in effect, an almost 100% leeway — is demanded by the national Communist leader in this type of situation. Of course the percentage figure would be higher for Tito, lower for Gomulka, and different for the Chinese, but we are talking about the same general point. By "elbow room," we mean here that the Yugoslav ruler — or any other ruler — must be able to reconcile certain dangerous forces and manipulate them simultaneously. The first point is the well-proven Nationalism of his own people, which says: "Don't tamper with me, because I will determine things in my own way. I am not going to take any dictation from the outside world." Point number two (a very important one — and this is where Professor Neal gives us wonderful insight) is the highly unpalatable overtones of International Communism that must be sold at home, whereupon the leader finds himself in a dilemma.

I want to pick out two phenomena which can create a terrific domestic problem of selling. It is a very nasty salesmanship-type job that we are talking about: namely, the forced and aggressive land collectivization and the forced industrialization. Either one or the other will cause a dictator to run into serious trouble unless he redefines it for local consumption and for his own people. Tito has done this very shrewdly when, for example, abandoning (or practically abandoning) the land collectivization program. Other dictators have tried to sell this problem in other ways. And, finally, I think this "elbow room" proposition is a general objection to the continuously subservient relationship to the Soviet Union that they are talking about; it is the objection to be subservient in culture, in national tradition, history and language.

Let me move on and ask you, then, the related question: How can this "elbow room" or "leeway" in political affairs be used internally by a national Communist regime? After a lot of soul-searching (this is not an easy problem), I would describe Tito's Yugoslavia (and many of you have had recent experiences there

of dealing with them) as undoubtedly a tight police dictatorship — as it is in Poland and, of course, much more so in China.

Tito came to power the hard way, and he is not going to relinquish this hard-won and very sweet center of power. In effect, as you all know, he has put on an immense amount of weight — both physically and ideologically — and is today a far different type of character than the lean, ascetic young revolutionary leader who led his excited followers to victory. Mr. Djilas' very great disappointment in seeing this fat, bloated imperial ruler, as compared to the ambitious young Comintern agent of the thirties and early forties, has led to the imprisonment of the latter (which I will cover in a minute).

So on the one hand they will never give up the idea, "We fought hard for power and we are not going to hand it over to you or anyone else on a silver platter." On the other hand (which would be the other end of the spectrum), neither is Tito's Yugoslavia (as so nicely described in Soviet propaganda) a Balkan-Turkish province of slaves. It is obviously not that, either. It stands somewhere (and I hope this is not too striking a statement) between the Soviet system of the totalitarian government and western forms of capitalist democracy — but much, much closer to the former.

It is a curious black and white picture (I'm trying to define the third point as to what sort of a view we should have of this elusive country), with peculiar combinations and zones of overlapping which one would not expect. Let me cite you just two examples here.

One example is elections and the role of parliament. Well, to put it very briefly and distinctly Eastern style, their parliament is of no importance whatsoever. Elections, however, while they have no really vigorous political importance, are held. Tito is quite content with only 96% of the total votes, which is a little better than Hitler and Stalin. In fact, I think I may have mentioned to you last fall that the recent Bulgarian election results were

104.2% of the total votes. The rest were undoubtedly in opposition. So Tito has been satisfied with 96% of the eligible votes.

I would like to quote to you a very brief description of the recent election:

In all but six of the 301 districts, a single candidate was in the field. While his seat was contested, voters had a choice of personalities, but never of program.

I think that is a neat way of putting it — “a choice of personalities but never of program.” Every one of the 307 men and women nominated had the endorsement of the Socialist Alliance of the Working People — namely, the Communist-led popular front which has the control over Yugoslavia. Any parallel between today's Yugoslav elections and parliamentary balloting in Western countries would be misleading. The voter was called upon to register “approval and support” of the government by marking the name or number of his designated candidate.

On the other hand, in a recent report from the *Christian Science Monitor* (and I think a very excellent one), a very non-Communist style of doubt which is a threat in an area that the Soviet Union — or any of its satellites and Red China — would never even dream of pointing up, let alone freely and frankly admitting, is Yugoslavia's own assessment of its unemployment problem. Let me quote very briefly:

Unemployment, although on a small scale, is beginning to trouble government officials in Yugoslavia. Unlike other Communist countries, Yugoslavia freely admits that fairly large-scale unemployment exists. The latest statistics published indicate . . . But by April, 1958 about 100,000 were unemployed out of a total potential labor force of 8 million.

The number is probably much smaller than that but, anyway, 100,000 were unemployed. Then it talked about the seriousness of the problem, such as “Let's do something about it,” et cetera. I do not have to tell you that you would never find anything

even remotely resembling this type of statement from the Soviet Union or any other Communist country.

Another factor to add to this black and white picture here is the very vigorous and important activity of the so-called "Workers' Councils." I cannot go into the ramifications of this, but just mention to you briefly that this is the result of three important economic and political reforms that were carried out in 1953, 1955 and 1957. You may also remember the date of 1957 because that was the date when they launched a very vigorous and ambitious Five-Year Plan. It remains to be seen whether they will be able to accomplish all the fantastically ambitious economic goals. At any rate, there is a lively and active Workers' Council organization which you might almost describe as a self-management of certain industries by self-selected and self-appointed workers' groups. I will just say briefly that one of the central demands in the Hungarian revolt was precisely the establishment of such workers' groups, which was quickly liquidated a week after that revolution was over. Mr. Gomulka now has to worry about the Workers' Councils which are operating freely and effectively in Yugoslavia. This is something to remember.

On the other hand, I am trying to balance this by suggesting to you that the tightness of the police and security matters is not as relaxed today as it was, say, three years ago, when things were generally better in the Central European scene. The Djilas case must be mentioned at least in passing. Let me suggest that a short article in *The New Leader* is worth three years in prison; that an autobiographical, as well as angry, statement against the regime is worth seven years in prison. This does not exactly call for freedom or a great expression of civil rights. The Djilas case (and now he sits without pen and paper in a small river . . .) was indeed a test case for freedom of speech and, as such, was flunked by the Peoples' Government.

In effect, I would say that Tito has reassured his subjects that the citizen has the inalienable right to keep his mouth shut. Silent criticism, on the other hand, is greatly encouraged — not

only tolerated, but encouraged. It is only the vocal, highly publicized, or articulate form of criticism that is discouraged — and under rather drastic circumstances, as you can see. In fact, I would like, by way of a footnote, to add that a much more interesting but less-known case was that of Mr. Dedijer, who wrote the only authorized biography of Tito, very adulatory and going all-out, of course. Then he changed his mind about something or other and went to Stockholm, where he gave a couple of rather angry lectures at the University of Stockholm, as well as a press conference attended by 300 Western correspondents, openly criticizing his boss. Well, he was called back, he did go back, and he has been silenced although I didn't see any evidence of a formal prison sentence. Well, this is a kind of openly unpleasant (to him) and extremely unpalatable criticism which has not been tolerated.

This leads me briefly to the fourth point, which I call "certain cultural freedoms." I hope you don't get the idea it is the Balkan-Turkish province that the Russians are always screaming about, for it is not. The situation is very mixed and, I think, quite interesting. Of all the possible reports that I could give you here is that of a friend of mine. He has just been over there, has come back (and, by the way, came back from Rumania, through Bulgaria, to Yugoslavia — therefore reversing the usual tourist trip — he was on a professional trip, anyway) and had this to say in his recently printed report:

One leaves Bulgaria with a sense of the need and importance of cultural and educational exchange (we have since resumed our state of recognition with Bulgaria). On entering Yugoslavia, there is the feeling (superficial, though it may be) of returning to the West. (Now this man is not crazy — he is a very able and penetrating historian). The first thing noted was President Eisenhower on the front page of the daily *Politika*. Here one finds no perceptible restrictions on travel or contacts (this is absolutely true). There are other differences.

Then he goes on to mention the minority picture. And I would like to add briefly that of the seven major federal provincial republics,

the minority treatment of each of these has improved greatly in the last few years and, generally speaking, under Tito, compared to the earliest loyalist dictatorship which should not be painted all white just because this guy today is a Communist.

There is vigorous research and educational progress in the higher institutions of Yugoslavia and, in effect, quite a resurgence of Serbian-Croatian-Slovinian and other cultures since 1950 in particular. Again, I must add a footnote. Of course, everybody who dissented was purged rather ruthlessly but, then, those who survived the purges were given a lot more freedom than anywhere else, including even Poland and certainly the Soviet Union.

This latitude of freedom of action can be illustrated in many ways. For example, the WHO (the World Health Organization) had a Yugoslav president just a few years ago who did a very effective job. And I want to mention to you the fact that at our recent international congress (this is the IPSA, the International Political Science Association) meeting in Rome a couple of months ago, the next president of the IPSA elected is a professor of political science and law from the University of Belgrade. Therefore, you can see that in terms of international exchange, culture, and relationships, the Yugoslav role is far different from the Soviet or the Czech role. Travel is free and there are few defectors from Tito's Yugoslavia today, although an occasional tennis player or two gets a great deal of publicity — but this is not a serious proposition. Westerners are not shadowed; they are not interfered with. And there is a fairly relaxed atmosphere about things today, as we gather from our Embassy officials in Belgrade and other places.

Let me move on quickly to the external characteristics. I will summarize these in three major points, and I hope that you will pick them up like that. (Before everyone else is asleep, or before total disaster, I hope that I can conclude).

I feel very strongly about the first phase. I don't think you can abbreviate it very much further. I think the core of the Yugoslav attitude in the cold war (which is our main topic) is Neutralism, despite the occasional protests by Yugoslav leaders that there is

no such thing as "neutrality" or "neutralism." In effect, as recently as March 2, 1958, Tito said this to the editor of the *New York Times*, Mr. Sulzberger, who wrote a very interesting series of columns about this type of discussion:

In fact, there can be no neutral nation. It is impossible for any country to be neutral. That doesn't mean one must belong to a power bloc. Abstract neutrality does not exist. Yet, one can cooperate with everyone.

Now, what does he mean by "abstract neutrality does not exist?" Well, since he said that abstract neutrality does not exist, maybe we ought to talk in terms of "concrete Neutralism," or a concretely neutral behavior on his part. I know at this point there are a couple of outstanding Marine colonels who have raised some specific questions like: "What do you mean by playing around with these words? And where the hell are we going from here?" (This is known as "commotion in the halls).

I would like to tender a semantically happier solution to you because Tito, himself, in one of the high points of his career so far (there are undoubtedly others coming), in December, 1954, speaking to a very formal session of the Parliament of India, and introduced personally by Prime Minister Nehru, defined his attitude and those of his colleagues on the broader international scene as a "state of active coexistence." Now this is what he said:

In contradistinction to the policy of bluff and the division of the world along ideological lines we, for our part, see a real possibility in the coexistence of nations and states with differing systems. Such coexistence is moreover not only a practical possibility, but is essential if we want to avoid war.

So he calls this "active coexistence." Now, I would define this a little differently and say that what he really has in mind is a third-force type of solution or approach to big problems, in which at least two countries, but occasionally a third, which I mentioned as the self-appointed (that is a very important part of it), or the self-styled and self-appointed leaders are such a third

force in world operations. This is a Tito-Nehru-Nasser combination (in that order of importance — that is, looking at it from Tito's perspective, of course) which would be a sort of third force (you are all familiar with that phrase) or a third-bloc type of arrangement, which would therefore, particularly today, play a very important role in any summit meeting (I will come back briefly to this point), or any below-the-summit meeting, as three important leaders throwing their weight around obviously to the detriment of either side. In effect, in that equation I have there the MBC (that would reflect the possibility of talking about 'minimum bloc cooperation, and I think this is a fairly important ingredient in the Tito formula) or the minimum bloc cooperation on either side and with either aspect.

We can also describe this attitude as "qualified Neutralism," and Professor Neal has an excellent remark when he says:

In the years between 1948 and 1955, Yugoslavia could perhaps be called 'neutral,' but neutral for the West and against the Soviet Union. By 1956, her neutrality was not against the West but was somewhat for the U. S. S. R.

Now you see how people are trying to get the general idea.

Before moving on to the next problem, I would like to suggest this: that Tito maintains an ideological posture which is generally in step with the Communist World and is generally out-of-step with the Capitalist World, but he is not hostile to the latter group. This is about all we can say on this very peculiar and qualified proposition of Neutralism.

I would like to add two footnotes by remarks and then conclude in the next few minutes. These are that Yugoslav Neutralism cannot be understood unless we qualify their relations with: (a) the Soviet Union, and (b) the United States. I think there is no question or doubt in your minds, or in theirs, that the depth of Tito's hatred towards Stalin and — after a brief glow of conciliation — the impact of the hangover that followed in Soviet-Yugoslav relations is sincere and frank. I think this factor by

itself must influence the Western position. There is a lengthy history of mutual vituperation and vilification between the two sides.

There is only one interesting distinction between the two — for they fight each other verbally all of the time, or have with the exception of one year — the technique of denunciation varies a little bit. Tito seldom denounces individual Soviet leaders, or, rather, when he denounces them he doesn't go beyond a denunciation of that person as an international Communist, while the Soviet denunciation of Yugoslavia always calls for a revolution in Yugoslavia, which I would like to describe as a most peculiar technique of going around the leader in a foreign country, reaching over the heads of the government, asking the people to rebel against their own government. This is the technique of manipulated revolutionary overthrow in the other country, which is a terrific insult if you look at it from the point of view of that country's leadership. There has never been an open call to the Russian people to revolt or throw over Khrushchev's or Stalin's regime. More recently Tito, of course, has denounced Stalin for putting to death 100 Yugoslav leaders in Russian exile.

I would like to say a few words about what I call the "ambiguous relationship" with the Free World. I would like to stress to you (this is the other side of the point) the importance of the term "ambiguity," redefining it here as giving a little to the West here and there, but taking a great deal in aid and encouragement, for example. This is a peculiar combination of three elements, in my opinion: a great deal of impertinence, a spirit of greatly aggressive and exuberant attitude, plus a tremendous economic dependence upon the West. If you add up these three, you will find that this has been a most peculiar relationship between Yugoslavia and ourselves. Tito likes to denounce us freely and frequently, as you must have noticed. One of the most impertinent denunciations, while going ahead and receiving hundreds of millions of dollars of economic aid, was in March, 1958, when he said in Marx-Engels Square in Belgrade, "The West is sabotaging and

evading a summit meeting." The next day the Yugoslav news agency released it, but deleted the word "sabotaging" and put in "undermining." So they felt that the leader himself went a little too far in the terms. And he used that most interesting statement that "we do not push ourselves (this is hardly true), but we believe that if countries not belonging to blocs were represented at a summit meeting they could make constructive proposals."

In my final summary, I would like to stress three brief points on either side for your future thinking and discussion. I would like to answer very briefly two types of questions, which I hope seem to be justified. What is this man after? What are we after in our relations with his country?

Tito is after three closely related goals, or objectives.

The first goal is sheer survival. I think this is perfectly clear because the Soviet satellites — even without the Soviet Union and without considering unconventional weapons — could throw about 800,000 troops into a ring that is practically complete around him except for a weak and insignificant Greece. At any rate, he therefore has faced for years — and is facing — a real peril of sheer survival. I would like to add, however, that recently he felt that apparently he is less threatened. In 1957, our Military Aid Program was terminated by that statement and since then we have given them only economic aid.

This leads me to my second point, from Tito's view: ambitious economic goals. He is completely dependent on the West, not only on the United States, but Great Britain, France, and Italy have played an important role here. Our aid-to-Tito program is now ten years old, in fact almost to this date, for it was ten years ago (in the spring of 1949) that our (then) Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, very skillfully manipulated the aid program through a more or less reluctant Senate, or Congress in general. This program during its first eight years was military and economic, in this order of importance. In 1957, he said in a very cryptic statement that he now felt no longer threatened and therefore would accept only economic aid from that moment on.

The third point that I'm after is that he would like at least a passive backing of U. S. prestige. What is he after? He is after some sort of a recognition, or a passive acceptance of his role as a junior partner on our side. But he makes it awfully hard, both with his flaw in talking and the flow of talk. It has been most discouraging. He talks a lot. There are great verbal slips in his remarks, sort of like a Communist version of Senator Hubert Humphrey in many ways. And each time he makes a major slip — for example, in saying that the President of the United States sabotages his attempts to be in on the next summit meeting — Congress goes into one of these reappraisal, delay and doubt acts, and there is a great deal of soul-searching as to whether we should or should not support this man because he has really reached the point of impertinence and arrogance, and we really should not take any more!

Now, what do we want of Tito? I shall summarize, again, under three very brief headings.

First of all, we want businesslike agreements with him, with certain strings attached. And I think that the only major string I would care to stress here is that we will support him as long as he is the enemy of the Soviet leaders; that is, our fundamental assumption is that whoever is Khrushchev's enemy, or was Stalin's enemy, is by that definition alone at least a tactical ally, if not a friend, of ours — but only as long as he maintains that posture.

The second point is that we want him (and on this we have been more successful than on the first point) to stay away from enlarging local conflicts into regional crises. This, looking at the Balkan scene, is not an unjustified proposition. We don't want him to make big crises out of little crises but, on the other hand, we would like him to participate in agreements and settlements such as the one about Trieste in 1954 without "raising Cain" and enlarging the stage for truly major conflict.

And, finally, I think we also would like (I will put it very modestly — "would like") a relatively decent behavior by the Yugo-

slav delegation in the United Nations. This we have not been able to accomplish, although we have gotten along fairly well in many directions. At best, I think we can define this "relatively decent behavior" as saying that they have abstained on Korea and Hungary — and apparently that is about as far as they will go in the near future.

Now let me, after monopolizing your attention for so long, conclude by suggesting that we must take this man extremely seriously.

An American visitor remarked to a newly-made Yugoslav friend in Belgrade the other day, "You seem to laugh a lot about Tito around here."

"We always have," the friend replied ruefully, "that is the trouble!"

I think he is a very able, clever, shrewd, ruthless and (occasionally) brilliant man. If you don't believe it, please go and ask him and he will inform you of these facts in a seemingly endless manner.

Thank you very much!

BIOGRAPHIC SKETCH

Professor Andrew Gyorgy

Professor Gyorgy received his A.B. and J.D. degrees from the Law School, University of Budapest and his M.A. and Ph.D. degrees from the University of California.

He studied law and politics at the Sorbonne University in Paris in 1936-37 and the following two years he studied at the University of California on a Rockefeller Foundation Fellowship. From 1941 to 1942, he was a lecturer in the Department of Political Science at the University of California at Los Angeles.

During World War II, Professor Gyorgy was an instructor in the Army Specialized Training Program at the University of California and later an instructor in the Academic Department at The Infantry School, Fort Benning, Georgia.

After serving as assistant professor of government at University of New Hampshire (1945-46), he was assistant professor of political science at Yale University until 1950. During 1950, he was a visiting associate professor of political science at Johns Hopkins University. During 1951-52, Professor Gyorgy was a research associate at Yale University and the following two years he was research associate at the Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Since 1952, he has been professor of government at Boston University.

Professor Gyorgy is the author of *Geopolitics, the New German Science* and *Governments of Danubian Europe* and is the editor of *Soviet Satellites, Studies in the Politics of Eastern Europe*, and *Problems in International Relations*. Professor Gyorgy took leave from Boston University to act as Consultant for International Relations and Social Sciences at the Naval War College during the first term of the academic year 1956-57. He occupied the Chester W. Nimitz Chair of Social and Political Philosophy during the academic year 1958-59.

THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

A lecture delivered
at the Naval War College
on 21 October 1958 by
Professor John Brown Mason

Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen:

It is a great pleasure to come back to these halls and buildings. Of course, since I left these shores, as it were, I have been thinking a great deal of the work that we did here last year. Then I looked over the schedule for the present year, and I found out that the students and staff of this year are exposed to as many lectures as last year. I could not but help thinking of the high school girl who wrote an English theme in which she said: "In the United States, people are killed by elocution."

I have a number of friends here from last year, but most of you do not know me. Perhaps I may, therefore, answer two questions right now which you already have on your mind: Why does that man have an English name and a German accent?

Perhaps I might tell you of an experience which I had a number of years ago, when I was teaching at Fresno State College in Fresno, California. I was at the house of one of my colleagues, a philosophy professor.

I noticed how his old mother, a lady up in her seventies, watched me very carefully all evening. She finally said to me: "I was not born in this country, either." (It developed that she had been born in England).

I told her that I had been born in Germany but, as it happened, my parents were native-born Americans; and that, as it again happened, they were English, Scotch and French by descent, rather than German.

She looked at me, and it was obvious that the whole thing puzzled her. Then, suddenly, a flash of enlightenment came over her face, and she said: "Oh, your birth was an accident!"

Gentlemen, there is a story abroad that there are a good many Americans, including military officers, who have less of a liking for some of our wartime allies than for the Germans, whom they fought twice. Of course we talk about it — and there is some truth in it: We have a feeling that the plumbing is better in Germany; that the beer is colder and that there is more of it there than in some other places in Europe. After all, if anything, we were weaned on beer rather than on ale or wine.

Of course this story about the way a number of Americans feel when they are over there is matched in some respects by the story of how some of those people feel about us. After our men had been in Great Britain, France, Germany, and so on, year after year, a good many people in those countries seemed to feel like the Englishman, who said, "There are three things wrong with Americans in Europe: one is that Americans are overpaid; another is that Americans are oversexed; and the third is that Americans are over here."

There are, therefore, difficulties of adjustment on both sides, and the reasonable thing for intelligent adults is to try to figure out calmly what our relationships are to the various nations involved. It is my job this morning to specialize on the subject of *The Federal Republic of Germany*: to see what Germany looks like in American eyes; and to try to understand Germans, and our relationship with them, which is not always simple.

When we talk about Germany, we can talk about two Germanys — East and West — and in many ways they are quite different from each other nowadays. However, what I would like to do this morning is to talk about *four* different Germanys, of which the last one is a composite, for it seems to me that as the world and the people of the world look at Germany, they see it in four different perspectives.

First, there is the Germany that is feared, from a military point of view. It is feared, believe it or not, by Soviet Russia even with all of her power today; it is definitely feared by the Czechs

and by the Poles. Let us remember that it is also feared by many people in the Netherlands, in Norway, and in France, as well as elsewhere. That is *one* Germany.

Then there is a second Germany: the Germany which is despised, the Germany of National Socialism — because of its atrocities against the Jews, against foreign people under occupation, and against those of her own people who did not agree with the Nazis. We should remember that the Nazis murdered not only Communists, and Jews, but also Protestants and Catholics (including some 4,000 priests in Poland). They not only killed Czech university students, but German university students and professors. They also hanged some of their own outstanding admirals and generals for opposition to the regime. People (Germans and others) who loved one kind of Germany were the ones who felt strongest about and against this Hitler Germany.

There is a third Germany: the Germany which is beloved, respected, admired, and often imitated. There is the Germany of music and poetry; there is the Germany of universities. Our American graduate school is copied from the German university, and the seminars in which you are engaged during so much of your time were taken over from the German professors and students. The one innovation along that line seems to be that Americans are sending officers to school to work in seminars, and that (at least as of half a year ago) the Germans had not gotten around to doing the same thing. The Germany, of course, that is respected and admired, is also leading in the field of science. It has also been a leader in the field of public administration for the last 150 years — and in some ways for 200 years. Germany was the first country to institute a civil service — and, regardless of all the jokes we make about the civil service, we admit that its concepts and principles are very fine. The Germans have long had a very efficient administration. They have had very, very few scandals of corruption and, except under the Nazis, they *always* have had honest elections.

You remember the struggle which took place during the early days of the "New Deal," when an American system of Social

Security was introduced. Well, the Germans led the world in Social Security, when they started it back in the 1880's. They also had a marvelous system of health insurance, one which is still unequaled here.

When I was a youngster of eighteen or nineteen, in Berlin in 1923, I worked as a stenographer. It was a time of extreme inflation. I made the equivalent of two American dollars per week, and paid a ten per cent income tax on that tiny salary (the government took it out of my pay before I ever saw it) so there was not much left to live on. Another ten percent went to various forms of social insurance and health insurance. When I was sick, however, I did not have to worry about medical care (operations and hospitals), for it was all taken care of, just as though I had been in the American Navy. And that gives you a wonderful feeling at those times when sickness hits you.

The fourth Germany, on which I would like to concentrate, is a composite of the other three (the Germany that is feared, the Germany that is despised, and the Germany that is beloved and admired). It is the Germany which often confuses us; it baffles us because we do not quite know what to expect; and the reason why we do not quite know what to expect is that Germany's history has been something of a checkerboard.

If we go back only a few years — we remember the Germany of 1945. Defeated, she had surrendered unconditionally. She was destroyed for the most part; most cities and many villages were in ruins; people were hungry, even starving, and were out of work. But within some ten years, people were in jobs, and were producing at least 50 per cent more than they did in 1938 (which had been the best previous year in their economic life). They improved their standard of living until at the present time it is at least equal to that of any country in Europe, and better in several ways.

We have become accustomed to talking of this as the "German economic miracle." It is due to two factors: one was the currency reform which we imposed, and the American eco-

conomic aid through the Marshall Plan; the second was the German habit of hard work. (I had a fellow student years ago who was very anti-German; he claimed that it was the Germans who had invented work).

Aside from the "German economic miracle," I think there is something of an "Allied miracle" which has taken place in our relationship with the Germans. When I was working in Germany for the State Department, back in 1950, we were interested not only in de-Nazification, but also in demilitarization. But our policy changed soon. Today our complaint is not that the Germans are militaristic, or that the Germany Army is too large. On the contrary, it is that it is not large enough and that we would like to see it expanded. A few years ago, we were sorry when German youths were not particularly happy to serve in the Army. Apparently there has been a change for the better, from our point of view, in the last few years, and we are glad.

Today, when American officers go to Germany, they salute German officers of higher rank. They stand at attention when the German national anthem is played and when the German flag is shown on official occasions. General Field Marshal Montgomery, who accepted the surrender of a large part of the German Army in 1945, was paraded by the German Army in honor of his departure from NATO. In turn, the English Army of Occupation removed a 15-ton monument from Luneburg which had been erected in memory of the surrender of the German Army. They shipped it to Sandhurst, England, in the correct belief that there were fewer Germans in Sandhurst than in Luneburg.

So our relations with the former enemy have changed a great deal — so much so, in fact, that they are hardly believable if one sits down and reflects on them. The only thing that makes them believable is this: so many things have been happening in recent years that could not have happened in the past, that nowadays nothing seems impossible.

The future is interesting to speculate upon, but difficult to anticipate. I would like to invite you for a moment to try to figure

out with me "why the Germans are that way," in an attempt to understand them.

A good many people in this country (and elsewhere) speak of Germans as "typical Germans." Of course, there is no such thing as "typical Germans" — certainly there is not *one* type of German to the exclusion of other types. There may be half a dozen or a dozen different typical Germans who are all recognizable as Germans, but who are different from each other, just as there may be a dozen typical Americans who are different from each other, but who are all very American in some way.

The Germans used to be militaristic; in fact, there was more militarism in Germany than in any other country in Europe. But that has changed to such an extent that, as I mentioned a moment ago, we had difficulty some years ago to induce them to reestablish their army.

Why did the Germans change? I do not have the answer. I only know, from history, that the Swedes, the Swiss, and the Danes were at one time as war-minded as any nation in Europe, until they were decisively beaten. Then they changed, and have been different ever since. Whether that analogy fits the German situation, I simply do not know.

There has been a great deal of political instability in German history, and there are a number of reasons for that. The Germans were not united as a nation until 1871, while the English were united some 900 years ago and the French some 400 or 500 years ago. Both the Italians and the Germans were late. Only about 150 years ago there was no "Germany", and there were 300 different political entities — kingdoms, duchies, principalities, free cities, and so forth — in the territory which is now called Germany. For a long time it seemed impossible to the Germans ever to get to a point where they would be united — where they would be one nation.

Part of the reason for this disunity was geographic. In the north, there are the plains; there, the situation is simple. In the

center and south of Germany, however, there are mountains. So, long ago, means of communications in large parts of Germany were very difficult between one principality or Kingdom and another. For that reason most of these 300 entities grew up by themselves, in great cultural diversity (which was something very beautiful), and in political disunity. They had a very difficult time getting together.

As outsiders, we should remember that the German national anthem, *Deutschland Uber Alles* ("Germany Above All"), in its original meaning did not mean Germany above the rest of the world (later on, it was abused); it rather meant (and the words are very clear) a unified Germany above all those principalities and kingdoms which made German unity impossible. It was the song of liberals and of German revolutionary students who wanted to unite the country over the opposition, the independent princes, kings, and so on. For reasons of their own, the only way in which the Germans succeeded in doing this was by Bismarck whipping up the nationalist sentiment of the disunited Germans in the various independent states against a foreign nation (an old trick) — against the French. His policy of "blood and iron" was not a policy of conquest; it was a blood and iron policy for bringing about German unity.

In the case of Great Britain, unity was also brought about by war. It was, however, war waged by Norman the Conqueror against the English — a case of subduing them and imposing national unity from above and from the outside.

In the case of Germany, national unity was imposed by the head of the Prussian Government by means of a war against a foreign power. Those historical developments left a mark on the German character. You will notice, when talking with Germans, that they hold national unity very dear. They worry much more about it than do the English or the French (who, as a matter of fact, do not worry about it at all — and do not have to).

Another worthwhile thing to remember about the Germans is that Germany is located in the center of Europe. One reason

they became militaristic in the course of history was that they had practically no natural defense against outsiders.

The British had no reason to have a large standing army, since a foreign enemy had to cross the Channel before he could hope to conquer England, and no one ever succeeded in this after 1066. Not having a need for a standing army, they had no occasion or temptation to develop militarism. If they developed anything, it was at times a very strong feeling of what one might call "navalism." Not having a strong army, the Kings of England were not able to use military force to suppress their own people when they demanded greater political freedom. Therefore, the English people found it much easier to gain democratic government at an early date than did the Germans.

The Prussian Kings found it easy to play around with their army, which they said they needed to protect the country against foreign invasions. They used it not only for invasions of other countries, but also for holding down their own people. That was one reason for German militarism.

Being located in the center of Europe, Germany has always been the subject of two major influences: one coming from the West, and the other from the East. From the West, there were the influences of Roman law and of Christianity; later on, there came the warm winds of Constitutionalism from France, Great Britain, and the United States. From the East, the influence was all along the lines of autocracy and absolutism. The German areas in the East originally (some 1,500 years ago) were Slavic, but some 800 or 900 years ago the Germans pushed out most of the Slavs, and the whole area became something like a colonial settlement. Life in these areas furthered autocracy and the absolutism of local rulers. In the West, however — especially in the southwest, and in northern port cities like Hamburg and Bremen which faced the ocean and had contacts with the West — there were very early democratic developments.

The tragedy of democracy in Germany was that its growth was so uneven: it became highly developed in what is now Wurt-

temberg, in Hamburg, Bremen, and a city like Frankfurt; it remained far behind in the central and eastern parts of Germany. Therefore, the whole domestic political situation was rather mixed up.

This development was in part a struggle for the German mind and the German soul. As Goethe expressed it (not necessarily speaking of the political situation): "Alas, there are two souls in my breast." You can well say that about the Germans, for there was a struggle between the democratic and autocratic souls, minds, and ways of thinking. For that reason, Germany, politically, became a mixed civilization: half East and half West. There are remnants, of course, of the older autocratic thinking even today.

The important question, however, is this: Which one of these ways of life is going to prevail? That question is very important because we should realize that Germany is second in Europe in size of population (Soviet Russia being first); second in area; and second in economic production. It is also strategically located and it is one of the leaders of the world in the fields of science, industry, and management. It makes a great deal of difference to the United States and to the Free World in general whether Germany is on one side of the Iron Curtain or the other.

What is the present outlook? This outlook, of course, is dominated by the personality of Chancellor Konrad Adenauer.

German domestic politics have developed in the direction of a two-party system, which is a very wholesome contrast to the days of the Weimar Republic, when there were as many as twelve, twenty, or even twenty-four different parties, representing all kinds of interest groups. There were not only the Conservative, Liberal, Socialist and Communist Parties, but parties for the middle class, for landlords, for people who were not landlords but who rented houses, and two which were based on a religious foundation.

I recall that in The Free City of Danzig (which, of course, was very German) there was a party for the herringfishers who had come to the conclusion that none of the other parties was

taking care of their economic interests. Then, of course, being Germans, they split their political party; then there were two parties for herringfishers, one on the left and one on the right. Under Germany's system of proportional representation it was easy to start and maintain a new party. It encouraged a multiplicity of parties and, with it, there was unstable government. Sometimes the parties would support the government, at other times they would not.

At present, the CDU (Christian Democratic Union) is so strong that it has an absolute majority in parliament. It is wise enough to take some smaller parties into the coalition in order to widen its base, and certainly the government has been stable since it was established in 1949. This is partly because of a constitutional provision (which the people who do not like it call a "constitutional trick"). Under the new German Constitution, the Bonn Constitution, Parliament cannot overthrow the government by a vote of lack of confidence unless it agrees on a successor to the Chancellor. It is much easier to vote against Adenauer than to agree on whom to put in after he is defeated (which has never been possible). Therefore, even when the CDU did not have a majority, Adenauer was safe.

Under the Weimar Republic, in the later years, it was possible for the Nazis and the Communists to vote against the government and to throw it out by a combined effort. But, of course, it was not possible for them to agree on a successor government. Therefore, there was instability, turmoil, sometimes a near political chaos, and certainly a lot of public dissatisfaction with the regime.

The domestic, political situation in Germany today also looks more promising in other ways. Under the Weimar Republic, the feuding between the parties was much worse than it is today, and there was much more bitterness. In those days, Germans were fighting over the national flag: whether it should be black, white and red, or black, red and gold. There is no trouble about that now. Then, Germany had a very large Communist Party. Around

1930 there were 6 million votes cast for the Communists and 100 Communists elected to Parliament (about one-fourth of its membership total. Today, the Communist Party in Germany is illegal. But that is not why it is weak. It is weak because the Germans of today just do not take to Communism (and I will come back to that in a moment).

Another great difference between the Bonn Republic and the Weimar Republic is that now there are not 6 or 7 million Nazi voters, as there were in those days. In the beginning of the Adenauer regime, a pro-Nazi Party was declared illegal by the German Constitutional Court. It would have been possible for the surviving Hitlerites to start some other party without a program that was too openly Nazi, but they have not succeeded in doing that. You might say that they infiltrated one of the smaller parties, but not very much. It is really amazing that when people are absolutely free and can choose their own parties, they do not vote the Communist ticket, as they did to such a large extent in France and also in Italy. Neither do the Germans vote for any Nazi or pro-Nazi ticket, and this is a very encouraging situation.

Another encouraging situation is the fact that Germany has been able to absorb some 10 million refugees: Germans who were expelled by Poland, Czechoslovakia, Roumania, Hungary, and so on, and dumped into Germany at the end of the war. Most of them (except the old people and sick people) now have jobs, and their assimilation into Germany (where most of them had never lived before) has succeeded to such an extent that the Refugee Party, which at one time was quite prominent and rather threatening, has dwindled to minor size. As the people settled down to jobs, intermarried with the local people, and became satisfied and happy, they were not attracted to the Refugee Party. They went back to their old political convictions along Socialist or CDU lines, or whatever. That is a very, very good situation.

The trade union situation in Germany is, on the whole, very favorable to the government. There have been few strikes, only some for higher wages. Labor has been disciplined — disciplined

in the sense of not having any corrupt practices such as the Teamsters' Union, let us say, in this country. They have some good labor leaders there who have been very cooperative in putting Germany back on her economic feet.

What of the relations between Germany and the United States? Well, they have changed a great deal. Perhaps the first major change came with the Berlin Airlift. The Russians threatened to starve Berlin — they not only threatened, but tried to. We put on an enormous airlift, carrying food, medicines, and even coal for the hospitals — everything that was needed to support a population of 2 million people. These supplies were carried to Berlin by air for almost a year. The Germans appreciated it very much that we stood by them. This means, in effect, that they also have faith in what we are going to do in the future. We have said in so many words (and Dulles repeated it the other day) that if the Russians acted against West Berlin it would mean war between the United States and Soviet Russia.

There was also the currency reform, which was American-imposed and very beneficial to Germany. There was the exchange program, the *Amerikahauser* (Information Centers) in Germany. There was a very strong and growing German interest in American authors. The number of translations of works by O'Neill, Thornton Wilder, and a dozen other American playwrights and novelists is simply amazing. There are many German critics who claim that there is much more good writing done in the United States than in Germany.

We still wonder whether, in spite of these favorable relations between Germany and the United States, there are not possibilities of a change.

What about the neutralist sentiment in Germany about which we hear so much? Well, there has been a neutralist sentiment. In some years it has been greater than in others. There are some Germans who think that the Western Powers are really putting Soviet Russia on the defensive; that Russia sees herself surrounded; that she is afraid of her national security — and

justifiably so. Then there are Germans who want to be bridgebuilders: they want to bridge the gap between the East and the West; they think Germany should form a link. There are also a few foolish people who would like to see Germany as a balancer. In these days, when the Soviet Union is so enormously powerful, no matter how strong Germany is, she simply is not strong enough to serve as a balancer between the Soviet Union, on one side, and the United States on the other. It would take more than one country the size of Germany to serve as a balancer.

I am now going to offer my personal interpretation as to Germany's future in regard to neutralism. Even if the Socialists would come into power, I think that the Germans will stay in NATO. The Socialists talk about getting out of NATO; they talk about getting out of NATO in order that (as they believe) reunification between the two parts of Germany might become easier (I am going to come back to that in a moment).

I think this will not happen. If Germany were to leave NATO, she would be without friends — and she now has friends in many places for the first time in almost a generation. She has friends in Europe, and friends overseas. If she left NATO, she would be dependent upon her own small army, and nobody to fall back upon to help her. Outside of NATO, I think she would have no future as a power.

Why cannot the East and West of Germany manage to get together? Well the eastern part of Germany — with a population of some 17 million as against 52 million in the West, is Soviet-dominated and Soviet-controlled. It is governed by the Socialist Unity Party, which is Communist and Moscow-controlled. The East German Government has no desire to merge with Western Germany on democratic terms, for if it did the 17 million people in the East would be swallowed up by the 52 million in the West — especially, since the 17 million in the East are by no means all Communists (perhaps no more than 20 per cent). For that reason the East Germans in control do not want to unite with the West Germans on democratic terms.

They do, however, want to unite with them on their own terms, and therefore they say there should be a Confederation (that is, a loose union); that Eastern Germany, with one-third of the population, should have equal say with Western Germany. This equal say, they argue, should mean that the so-called "Socialist accomplishments" (which we call "Communist accomplishments") should be preserved. In effect, this means: "We will unite with the West, provided we can go on keeping a communist house, as we see fit, and with no interference from you. In addition, having a half say in the government of the loosely united Germany, you in the West cannot stay in NATO; you cannot be friends with the Americans; you cannot make decisions along democratic lines. One-half of this German Confederation is ours — and certainly we will not budge!"

Being strictly disciplined, and knowing exactly what they want, if the East Germans had one-half of the say, the West Germans would have less than one-half. This is because, being democratic, they are not strictly disciplined; they are not told by one party or by one man what to do; they are free to disagree among themselves and to disunite. Therefore, in some ways they are more weak in making immediate decisions. For that reason, I do not think there will be a unification of Germany for a long, long time.

Now a few other things.

I think we can depend upon Western Germany to continue being anti-Communist. They are anti-Communist not only by conviction in the sense of being anti-Marxist, but they are anti-Communist in the sense of being anti-Russian because of what they suffered under the Soviet occupation and what the German prisoners-of-war went through in Russia. All of their election results indicate that when they are free they vote not for the Communist or Nazi Parties, but for the democratic parties.

I think there will be no war in the near future over the question of reunification, which the French used to be afraid of, and there are two reasons for this. First, the Germans, in my

conviction, do not care that much about reunification, and they do not want to risk war. They talk and act very differently from the way they did in 1919 and 1920. Then, they had lost territories in the West and in the East, and they talked constantly about "Germany's bleeding borders." They talk about this very little today. As a matter of fact, the East Germans often complain (and I think correctly) that the West Germans are not as interested in the East Germans as they should be.

Certainly I think there will not be reunification of Germany in our time — this is only a personal opinion, but I do not see any basis of compromise for the two Germanys on which they could get together. I do not see why Russia should agree to a unification, unless it be on Russia's terms. If it is on Russia's terms, then West Germany will not agree. If it is on West German terms, then there is no reason in the world why the Russians should agree because it would merely weaken their security rather than keep it at the present strength.

I think that, on the whole, the Germans will continue a very strong pro-American policy. They will also be more and more interested in a stronger Europe which does not have to depend altogether on the United States. Personally, I can see nothing wrong with that. The stronger Western Europe is, the better for us.

In the United States it is sometimes said that the future actions of Germany — whether she will join the East or remain with the West — is the \$64,000 question. In this connection, I think we should remember that the future, and Germany's actions in the future, do not depend entirely on her.

There is another \$64,000 question, and that is in the minds of the Germans. Their big question is this: What is the United States going to do? Is the United States going to continue its interest not only on a military basis, but also on a political basis — and, especially, on an economic basis? Is American foreign policy going to be wise enough to avoid unnecessary conflicts in other parts of the world outside of Europe?

I think that the Germans, as well as other Europeans, want to stay on our side, for reasons of their own national safety, just as we would like to have them on our side. But they do not seem to be anxious (quite naturally) to risk being blown up for reasons of mistakes in our foreign policy. Therefore, they are watching us at least as anxiously as we are observing them. It will be up to us to pursue a policy which is good not only for the United States, but good for the rest of the Free World. This is not always simple. I think, however, that by the end of your year in delightful Newport you will have even more appreciation of the possibilities and the difficulties than you now have. And a deeper appreciation of the complexities of a situation — or a country and people — leads to better judgment and calmer reasoning.

BIOGRAPHIC SKETCH

Professor John Brown Mason

Professor Mason was born in Germany in 1904. He received his A.B. degree from Butler University in 1926, his A.M. degree from the University of Wisconsin (where he was a Scholar in History and Carnegie Fellow in International Law) in 1927, and his Ph.D. degree from there in 1929.

He remained at the University of Wisconsin as an instructor in political science for one year, following which he served as an assistant professor of political science and history at the University of Arkansas from 1930 to 1931. During the period from 1934 to 1936, Professor Mason was Head of the Department of Social Science and Chairman of the Faculty at the Colorado Women's College in addition to lecturing at the University of Denver. The following year he was Forum Leader of the United States Public Forums in Orange County, California, and in Seattle, Washington.

During the war years, Professor Mason was with the Special War Problems Division of the United States Department of State (1944) and Chief of the Training Division in the Foreign Economic Administration (1944-1946). He was also a member of the Patterson Historical Mission to Germany from the United States War Department (G-2) during the summer of 1945 and a member of the Hoover Food Mission to Europe the following Spring.

He has been associated with various educational institutions, including the University of Illinois, Stanford University, and Oberlin College where he was a Professor of Political Science from 1946 to 1950.

Professor Mason took leave from his position as Professor of Government at Georgetown University to occupy the Chester W. Nimitz Chair of Social and Political Philosophy at the Naval War College during the 1957-1958 academic year.

He is the author of *Hitler's First Foes; A Study in Religion and Politics*, *The Danzig Dilemma, A Study in Peacemaking by Compromise*, and co-author of *Foreign Governments and Constitutions and Constitutional Developments Since World War II*.

RECOMMENDED READING

The evaluation of books listed below include those recommended to resident students of the Naval War College. Officers in the fleet and elsewhere may find them of interest.

The inclusion of a book or article in this list does not necessarily constitute an endorsement by the Naval War College of the facts, opinions or concepts contained therein. They are indicated only on the basis of interesting, timely, and possibly useful reading matter.

Many of these publications may be found in ship and station libraries. Certain of the books on the list which are not available from these sources may be available from one of the Navy's Auxiliary Library Service Collections. These collections of books are obtainable on loan. Requests from individual officers to borrow books from an Auxiliary Library Service Collection should be addressed to the nearest of the following special loan collections:

Chief of Naval Personnel,
(G14)
Department of the Navy
Washington 25, D. C.

Commandant ELEVENTH Naval
District (Code 154)
937 North Harbor Drive
San Diego, California

Commandant FOURTEENTH
Naval District (Code 141)
Navy No. 128
Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

Commander Naval Forces,
Marianas
Nimitz Hill Library, Box 17
Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

U. S. Naval Station Library
Attn: Auxiliary Service Collection
Building C-9
U. S. Naval Base
Norfolk 11, Virginia

BOOKS

Larson, Arthur. *What We Are For*. New York, Harper, 1959. 173.

Using strong, forceful language that is easy to read, but deeply convincing, Mr. Larson offers new counsel to all Americans regarding the projection of the image of the United States to the rest of the world. He points out that although America has been traditionally a revolutionary country and that we have reached only a precarious midpoint in the most radical, political-economic experiment in centuries, the author shows that the average American and many foreigners feel that we are now against change. In presenting his views on what he terms "Enterprise Democracy," he points out that the areas in which the Soviets have had their greatest successes are in the very areas in which they have to the greatest degree abandoned their own principles and copied ours.

Auphan, Paul & Mordal, Jacques. *The French Navy in World War II*. Annapolis Md., United States Naval Institute, 1959. 413 p.

Both authors of this book were employed at the top level in the Vichy regime of World War II. As might be expected, they have developed a strong defense of that part of the navy which remained under the German occupation and devoted its efforts to preserving what it could of the French Navy and its installations, while at the same time being determined that its ships should not fall into German hands. It tends to be critical of De Gaulle and the Free French Navy and he frankly discusses the deep schisms that have developed between the groups who chose different methods for serving France. Recognizing this background we receive from the book an excellent insight into the spirit of tradition of the French Navy and the code of honor which its officers have traditionally observed.

Kinkead, E. *In Every War But One*. New York, Norton & Co., 1959. 211 p.

This book is a shocking report of the behavior of American and other allied prisoners of war in the Chinese Communist prisoners of war camps in the Korean War and the methods employed by the Communists and their so-called brainwashing of these prisoners.

Amrine, Michael. *The Great Decision*. New York, Putnam, 1959. 251. p.

This book is a well-told story of the world's greatest surprise — the dropping of the first atomic bomb,, and of the arguments, discussions, and decisions which took place prior to this surprise. The arguments for and against the use of atomic weapons expressed here are still as valid as when they were first advanced and are likewise as unsettled.

Goodspeed, Stephen S. *The Nature and Function of International Organization*. New York, Oxford University Press, 1959. 676 p.

With exceptional perceptivity and clarity the author succinctly covers man's efforts to build international organizations with major emphasis devoted to the League of Nations and to the United Nations. Although scores of books have been written on international organization, this is an exceptionally objective and penetrating work which should prove especially enlightening to the layman, and because of its masterful execution valuable to the scholar as well.

McGovern, William & Collier, David. *Radicals and Conservatives*. Chicago, Henry Regnery Co., 1957. 174 p.

This book is a short, clear, highly readable statement of the basic philosophy of liberalism with a comparison of the routes, attitudes and differences of its radical and conservative wings. Its central thesis is that a democratic system and a free economy can best be preserved by a government somewhat to the right of center which, by restraint of excess

in either extreme of individualism or democracy will maintain a balanced freedom in the attainment of the common good.

Strausz-Hupe, R. ; Kintner, W. R. ; Dougherty, J. E. ; and Cottrell, A. J. *Protracted Conflict*. New York, Harper & Brothers, 1959. 203 p.

This book presents excellent insight into Communist global strategy in a readily understood fashion — including the premise that conflict is a much more normal state of affairs than is peace. Operational methods as well as immediate and long-range objectives are discussed along with the need of this country to develop a conflict-minded attitude and a determination never to lose the initiative. Additionally, the book shows how our diverse actions and attitudes, our conventionalized thinking, our naivete and legalistic preconceptions assist rather than impede the Communist strategy — directed by a conflict-minded group of professional revolutionaries. Besides its terrifying lessons, this book contains valuable considerations including a stimulus to seek and reward those officials who are “conflict-conscious” and who can and do support taking the initiative in strategy and tactics in the cold war.

PERIODICALS

Baar, James. “ARPA Seeks ‘Blue Sky’ Defense Against Russian Missiles.” *Missiles and Rockets*, July 13, 1959, p. 16-17.

Tells of Project *Defender* — the search for something better than *Zeus* as a defense against Soviet ICBM’s.

Baldwin, Hanson W. “Our Fighting Men Have Gone Soft.” *The Saturday Evening Post*, August 8, 1959, p. 13-15, 82-84.

Mr. Baldwin blames the inequities of the draft, civilian meddling and physical pampering for the undermining of our combat capabilities.

Baldwin, Hanson W. "U. S. Strategy. The Prospects of Tomorrow." *Army*, August, 1959, p. 32-37.

An interesting and well-written article, discussing our vacillating policies and strategies, summing up the lessons of recent history and totaling these in what the author terms a 1959 balance sheet. Considering assets and liabilities on both the U. S. and Soviet sides, he points up the respective sizes of ground forces and nuclear weapons, touches on the nuclear missile race and the coming stalemate of terror. This the writer uses to emphasize our need for alliances, and summarizes his thoughts in the final two sections, "The Key to Future Security" and "Man is the Measure."

Barber, Hollis W. "United States Alliances East of Suez." *U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, July, 1959, p. 66-76.

An analysis of the character and effectiveness of our alliances with countries of the Middle and Far East.

"The Communist World 1958-59." *The British Survey*, June, 1959.

A survey of the Communist world today — Khrushchev's position, the criminal law reform, the problem of youth, educational reform, culture, economic development and planning, and the status of economic and political integration among the various members of the Soviet bloc.

Eliot, George Fielding. "Bolt from the Blue." *U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, July, 1959, p. 22-33.

Emphasizes that mobility is the only security for our striking force against surprise attack.

Garthoff, Raymond L. "Soviet Strategy: Flexibility, Firepower, Follow-up." *Army*, August, 1959, p. 38-43.

In this excellent short article, Dr. Garthoff traces changes in Soviet strategy since the death of Stalin in 1953. He discusses a "preemptive strike or attack," and paints the Soviet image of future war.

"Guided Missile Encyclopedia — 1959." *Missiles and Rockets*, July 20, 1959, p. 137-176.

A listing of U. S. Army, Navy, Air Force and several foreign nations' missile inventories, including specifications. A worthwhile reference for any missile research project.

Hart, Parker T. "How the Free World Can Meet the Communist Challenge." *The Department of State Bulletin*, July, 13, 1959, p. 51-54.

Marks five means by which the free world can meet the Communist challenge.

Murphy, Charles J. V. "U. S. Sea Power: 'The New Mix.'" *Fortune*, August, 1959, p. 76-83, 180-187.

The Navy's aim is for a broader role in the nation's defense, with carriers to wage limited war and Polaris-armed submarines geared to the needs of nuclear warfare.

"A New 'Great White Fleet.'" *Life*, July 27, 1959, p. 17-25.

NWC graduate Cdr. Frank Manson, USN, explains his idea of a new White Fleet composed of a hospital ship, carrier, destroyer escort capable of supplying emergency power, cargo vessel, floating technical school and supply vessel to bring aid to stricken areas in remote sections of the world.

"Tomorrow's Strategy." *The Economist*, August 8, 1959, p. 347-348.

Considers the possible change in American military policy with potential consequences for American strategy.

Whiting, Dr. Kenneth R. "The Past and Present of Soviet Military Doctrine." *Air University Quarterly Review*, Spring, 1959, p. 38-60.

Examines the permanent factors and historical development of Soviet military doctrine, and that doctrine as it stands today.