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THE BALANCE OF POWER IN THEORY AND PRACTICE

A lecture delivered
at the Naval War College
on 17 September 1958 by

Professor Arnold Wolfers

As late as the outbreak of World War II, any suggestion that the United States was — or should be — concerning itself with the world balance of power was distastefully received by the American people, many of whom considered the suggestion almost cynical. The term was linked in people's minds with those features of the old European state system that seemed most objectionable: the struggle for power, the division of the world into hostile blocks, the unending series of wars. Today, on the contrary, there are constant references in the press or in official statements to the American policy objective of preserving or restoring the world balance of power or to the dangers of Soviet threats to this balance in some parts of the world. Far from being a subject of purely theoretical interest, then, the concept of the balance of power has come to be intimately related to matters of immediate practical importance to the United States and its allies.

For an inquiry into the manner in which the balance of power concept can serve to elucidate the current problems of American policy or even guide American decision-makers, it is necessary first to examine the age-old debate among theorists on the meaning of the term as well as the debate on the international phenomena to which the term can be usefully applied. As happens frequently, much confusion arises from the fact that the "balance of power" means different things to different people. There is agreement only that, when used in the discussion of international relations, the term refers somehow to the distribution of power among nations. But in some instances, it is used as synonymous

with the general distribution of power. In other instances, it is intended to imply the superiority of one country over another — a surplus of power on one side comparable to the balance on the credit side of a bookkeeping account. Finally, and more frequently, balance is taken to mean equilibrium, as when the scales are even on an instrument for weighing.

In order to cut the semantic knot from the start, I shall choose, arbitrarily perhaps, the last meaning and shall speak of the balance of power as implying an equilibrium or a distribution of power between two opponents in which neither side has attained a position of superiority or supremacy. Such a definition points to the opposite of hegemony or domination. To make such a distinction between balanced and unbalanced power does not suggest that there is any sure way of measuring and comparing the relative power of nations and, thus, of deciding how great the unbalance or how close the balance is. Even the extent of a nation's military power, which is only part of its over-all power, can only be tested in war, but such a test means that the balance of power process has failed in its purpose of preserving the peace. However, it makes sense to speak of an existing balance of power — or of a fair approximation of such a balance — whenever there are indications that two opposing nations, or blocs of nations, are being deterred from putting their opponents' total power to the test. In peacetime, one can speak of a balance of "mutual deterrence" which today, when nuclear power is involved, has been called a "balance of terror." It presupposes that according to their respective estimates the other side possesses not less than equal power.

With this definition of the balance of power in mind, one can inquire into theories on the chances or merits of an equilibrium of power among adversaries and on the process by which such equilibrium is established, preserved or upset. I shall distinguish and discuss four theories — three of long standing, one of recent vintage — and inquire into their significance for contemporary foreign policy. One theory regards the balance of power

as the ideal distribution of power; a second considers it the automatic outcome of developments inherent in the multistate system; to a third, the balance of power represents a goal of foreign policy which some policy-makers find useful to pursue; according to a fourth theory of mid-twentieth century origin, it has become an obsolete notion, which can be misleading to anyone concerned with contemporary international affairs.

Very few people in this country can be persuaded, I presume, to take seriously the kind of glorification of balanced power among adversaries that often found expression in earlier centuries. While the idea of "checks and balances," intimately associated with the American Constitution, is still considered a valuable device in domestic affairs, equilibrium on the world stage arouses grave misgivings because it implies today the continued coexistence of a free world and a communist world, with each side holding the other in check. Such a concept could hardly be more remote from our ideals of the kind of world in which we would wish to live. At best, then, a balance of power between the two main opponents of today's world may be the least objectionable or evil distribution of power presently attainable.

Even if it were not for the Cold War, many people in the West would refuse to consider international equilibrium as the ideal distribution of power. Strong current predilections run in the direction of what is called "collective security." This theory assumes that the peace of the world depends not on having the power of all nations balanced and checked by the power of others, but, on the contrary, on making overwhelming power available to those who are ready to oppose potential aggressor nations or to punish actual aggressors. By the rules of collective security, the peace-loving nations of the world cannot have too much power since they can be expected never to abuse their superior power position. The stronger they are, collectively, the better their chances of deterring or, if necessary, of punishing potential violators of the peace. On this premise, the ideal situation is one in which the

“defenders of the peace and law of the world community” enjoy unchallengeable hegemony.

Without being able to do justice, here, to the arguments in favor and against collective security which fill the pages of a long series of articles and books, I cannot refrain from pointing to some recent events that have cast doubts on the ideal of hegemony for the “peace-loving nations.”

In World War II the Soviet Union, an ally of the West in its struggle against the “aggressor nations” of the Axis coalition, became labelled as one of the “peace-loving” nations. It was therefore assumed that there was no need for concern about the postwar distribution of power between the Soviet Union and its Western Allies. In fact, President Roosevelt was incensed when Churchill raised the old bogie of the balance of power to warn against a strategy that would place Vienna under the control of the Soviet Union. Moreover, implicit in the Allied demand for unconditional surrender was the desire that Germany and Japan should be impotent after their defeat, in spite of the fact that the complete elimination of their power was bound to have an unbalancing effect in Eurasia. In its efforts to prevent a no longer “peace-loving” Soviet Union from dominating the entire “world island” of Eurasia, the United States has since discovered how costly and dangerous indifference to the distribution of power can prove.

The Suez crisis of 1956 struck another and more serious blow at the notion that some nations can be classified as falling regularly into the category of peace-loving countries and, therefore, can be assumed to need no external checks and balances. Two of the chief pillars of the United Nations collective security system, Britain and France, and democratic Israel turned up on the side of aggression. Now, of all the great powers that have existed in this century, the United States alone has escaped condemnation as an aggressor if one discounts repeated Soviet efforts to label American policies as aggressive. There may be some validity, then,

to the proposition that, from the point of view of preserving the peace — though not necessarily from the point of view of promoting justice — a balance of power that places restraint on every nation is more advantageous in the long run than the hegemony even of those deemed peace-loving at a given time.

It has been said that equilibrium was never really regarded as an ideal, even by those statesmen who have been its foremost verbal champions. The British, in particular, have been accused of hypocrisy for advocating the balance of power as a universally beneficial principle, when they have derived unique benefits from its observance. It is pointed out that Britain was seeking an equilibrium between her continental rivals, not between herself and her potential enemies. Britain could then assume the role of the “balancer” with all the advantages of that position.

But preference for equilibrium need not be a mere rationalization of national interest. In fact, it is deeply rooted in what today would be called conservative thought. Characteristic of such thought, which found its classical expression in the writings of Machiavelli and Hobbes, is a pessimistic view of human nature. It sustains Lord Acton’s expectation that “power corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely.” Men with a conservative bent of mind need find nothing shocking, therefore, in the suggestion that all nations, including their own, should be restrained by counter power. They will thereby be spared many temptations as well as being prevented from abusing their power.

The suggestion that all nations need the restraint of the balance of power does not mean that the same amount of power is required to deter an aggressive would-be empire builder or megalomaniac dictator from initiating violence as is required to prevent a satisfied nation, especially a democratic nation that operates under strong internal restraints, from seeking to cash in on the weaknesses of others. In any “balance of deterrence,” different estimates of the power distribution and variations in the willingness to take risks have to be taken into account. A fanatical government bent

on conquest will tend to overestimate its own power and underestimate that of its "decadent" opponents. Nobody could seriously praise a balance of power, therefore, except on the assumption that it is of a kind that promises to place effective restraints even on the least self-restrained of the parties.

It is the all-round potential restraining effect of the balance that turns conquerors — the Napoleons and Hitlers — into its most violent critics, making them strange bedfellows of the idealistic exponents of collective security who share their hostility towards the concept of the balance of power. The Nazis were vociferous in their accusation that Britain espoused the "ideal" of a balance of power merely in order to hold down potential continental rivals who challenged her predominance. Quite generally, countries in revolt against the *status quo* are opposed to balanced power as barring the way to change. Equilibrium tends to prevent "revision" by means of force, which is usually the only means through which major changes can be brought about.

For the exponents of the second theory of balance of power, the controversy between those who contend that the balance of power is a good thing and those who condemn it makes no sense. They say that equilibrium of power is not a matter of choice; instead, it tends to result from a competition for power among nations that is inherent in the multistate system. In this view, a mechanism is at work, similar to the "invisible hand" operating in a market economy that tends to produce an equilibrium between supply and demand. Theorists have construed a model of a multistate system, in which equilibrium automatically results without the assistance of deliberate choice in favor of equilibrium by the actors. While today such a model is not regarded as more than an abstract initial working hypothesis, the conditions existing in the 19th century gave it the character of a rather striking portrait of reality. After the end of Napoleon's Continental hegemony,

world power came to be distributed among five or six major European nations. All of them were jealous of their relative power positions, all keenly aware of any change in the distribution of power, and all eager to prevent any one of the others from stepping into the shoes of Napoleonic France. Therefore, in order to render impossible or to defeat any incipient hegemony, two or more powers could be counted upon to line up almost intuitively against any ascending power that threatened to become their superior. In their game of power politics, they were united by their common interest in not allowing the balance to be tipped against them. Competition for allies and competition in armaments were the chief instruments of a balancing process in which the realities of European power politics came close to resembling an automatic balancing system.

However, even in that period, the flaws in the expectation that an equilibrium of mutual deterrence would actually come about without deliberate and intelligent efforts on the part of governments were only too visible. Again and again, a country which believed it had attained a position of superiority struck out against its rivals, or another country which feared an increasingly adverse balance initiated war before the balance had tilted too far against it. In such instances, war was the instrument by which break-down of equilibrium was overcome or prevented, a method of adjustment hardly comparable with the relatively smooth-working price mechanism of the market economy. Innumerable historical cases could be cited to show the extent to which the success of the balancing process depended on the choices made by statesmen of the countries involved. British statesmen were faced with a momentous choice when, prior to the outbreak of war in 1914, they had to decide whether or not to give full British backing to France and Russia as a means of deterring the Central Powers. There was no automatism in operation to prevent them from making the wrong choice. Similarly, when three years later Germany had hegemony almost within her grasp, there was nothing automatic about the decision of the United States to enter on the side of the hard-pressed Allies; in fact, by resuming unrestricted submarine warfare early in 1917,

Germany was largely responsible for speeding up a decision that might have been reached too late to right the balance of power.

While it makes little sense, then, to use the term "automatic" in a literal way, as if human choices and errors have no effect upon the process of establishing or upsetting a state of equilibrium, there is nevertheless a significant element of truth in the theory of "automatism," and one that is valid even today. If it is correct to assume that any government in its senses will be deeply concerned with the relative power position of hostile countries, one is justified in concluding that efforts, to keep in step with such opponents in the competition for power, or even to outdo them, will almost certainly be forthcoming. If almost all nations react in this way, a tendency towards equilibrium follows as a consequence — it comes into play if both sides aim at equilibrium, but it also operates if the more aggressive side strives for superiority, thereby provoking his opponent to match his moves. In the latter case, which is the most frequent, it makes some sense to say that there are forces at work behind the backs of the human actors that seem to push them in the direction of balanced power irrespective of their preferences.

It is also worth noting, particularly in the light of recent events, how nations seem to be drawn into the balancing process almost without conscious choice or deliberation. The policy of the United States since World War II offers a particularly striking illustration. Despite its long-established policy of resisting all pressures and temptations toward involvement in the peace-time balancing of power, the United States reversed its traditional stand without hesitation when in 1946 no other country was in a position to contain the ascending Soviet Empire and to restrain it with at least equal counterpower.

One could point to other countries that have reluctantly become concerned about the world balance of power in recent years. Yugoslavia, for instance, although strongly committed by the ideology of her regime to remain on the Soviet side, has repeatedly given

signs of appreciating the security she enjoys through the existence of Western counterpower. Fearing Soviet predominance, she has sided with the West on several occasions, and conceivably might throw her military weight on the side of the camp whose ideology she rejects. Here again one can speak of an almost irresistible pull toward equilibrium.

However, there are other instances in which the "automatic" reaction fails to materialize. Some weak countries seek safety by getting on the band wagon of an ascending power in the hope that they might somehow escape complete subjugation once their powerful "friend" has gained supremacy. We can also point to countries which are so absorbed with their internal affairs or which ignore considerations of national power that we must regard as purely accidental the effects their policies may exert on the distribution of power, whether helping to preserve or upset the balance. With due respect, then, for anything the "invisible hand" may do to induce a trend towards power equilibrium, it may generally be concluded that more insight can be expected from a theory that places the emphasis on the effects of human intentions and actions.

The question is whether, as a matter of expediency, nations, under certain circumstances, do or should make power equilibrium rather than power superiority the target of their efforts. If equilibrium is, in fact, their objective, they must assume that it is a practical policy which can serve the best interests of their country. Frequently, one would suppose, the intention will be to achieve superiority until the competitive race proves it to be unattainable. Then equilibrium — or stalemate as it is often called today — may become the accepted goal. Both sides, in fact, may come to realize that a superiority is leading nowhere except to exhaustion, and agree, tacitly at least, to settle for the less ambitious and less costly goal of balanced power. Such a realization has been the rationale of most attempts to bring about disarmament through agreement, although the success of such attempts has been quite exceptional.

Frequently, as indicated earlier, when governments make the balance of power their aim, what they desire to bring about is a balance between the power of other nations that will place their country in the enviable position of a "balancer." Countries too weak to become active balancers are usually hopeful that an equilibrium will be established between their stronger neighbors, but they can do little to promote it. Up to 1914, the United States was one of the passive beneficiaries of the balance of power which Britain did so much to maintain on the Continent. Today, the United States stands out as the country that can do most to keep other nations, especially those within the free world, in a state of equilibrium. Not a few American moves have been directed towards this goal. The United States is interested in the maintenance of the peace between its many non-Communist friends and allies. It acts true to the traditions of the state system, therefore, when seeking, for instance, to keep Israel and its Arab neighbors in a condition approximating balanced power.

The connection continually drawn here between equilibrium and the preservation of peace is significant. It points to the fact that even at a time when collective security exerts much appeal, mutual deterrence through balanced power is still regarded, in some circumstances at least, as the safest practical device for the preservation of peace. This is particularly true in cases in which neither of two rivals can be trusted to want peace more than what it may hope to achieve by resorting to force. If, from the point of view of peace, it is desirable that both rivals be held in check, it is an advantage to third powers to have the rivals check each other by their own means and efforts.

No country faced with grave external danger, as is the United States today, would willingly forego superiority of power over its opponent if it were attainable at acceptable costs. Unquestionably, a sigh of relief would go up if a technical breakthrough in the arms race were suddenly to give this country military supremacy. Equilibrium, however carefully estimated and

maintained, can give nothing like the security that would flow from undoubted supremacy. Nevertheless, with most of its allies, the United States can afford to resign itself to a policy of mere equilibrium if supremacy or a marked degree of superiority over its opponent proves to be an unattainable goal. It is possible for the United States and other like-minded countries, if they are rightly classified as *status quo* powers, to adopt a policy of equilibrium with its minimum power requirements.

Status quo powers are those states which seek to preserve the established order or which have renounced the use of force as a method of changing that order. Presumably, therefore, they can achieve their objective of deterring or stopping their opponent only if they possess defensive counterpower no less than equal to the power of their opponent. Success does not require superiority of power.

Although the United States may be thoroughly dissatisfied with a world order in which some countries suffer under partition, bondage as satellites, or despotism, it nevertheless qualifies as a *status quo* power because it has renounced the use of force as a means of remedying the iniquities of the *status quo*. Therefore, acceptance of power equilibrium as the goal of American policy does not mean that the United States has sacrificed its defensive objective, but only that it has forfeited the greater security that *status quo* powers can obtain from a position of superior power.

The other category of nations — the so-called “revisionist” countries, those bent on changing the *status quo*, if necessary by force — are in a less favorable position. They can resign themselves to a policy of balanced power only in despair, since they are well aware that only with rare exceptions can the established order be seriously modified without the threat or use of a force so preponderant that it will overcome the resistance of the opposing side. Thus, for these states to give up pursuit of superior power in favor of balanced power means, in effect, their renunciation of

their ultimate national goal: a substantial change in the existing world order. Therefore, if it is correct to assume that the Soviet Union and Red China fall into the category of revisionist countries, it can be concluded that their power goal will be superiority rather than balanced power.

There are many Americans who deplore the acquiescence of their country in the policies of a *status quo* power. But their demands for a more offensive policy, one that would seek — by the use of force if necessary — to break Soviet resistance to unfavorable changes, must nevertheless face the practical question whether American superiority of power of the kind required for such a policy could be brought within practical reach.

Even the preservation or establishment of mere equilibrium is far from being an easy task. Democratic states suffer from severe handicaps in their competition with a totalitarian regime that can spend an exceedingly high proportion of its national product on armaments and mobilize impressive economic and ideological power for external purposes. Most of the governments of the non-Communist world, the United States included, find it difficult politically in contrast to the Soviets to maintain even their present inadequate military budgets and their present expenditure for foreign aid. Moreover, public opinion in the United States and throughout the West in general is content with a *status quo* policy which can be adequately served by balanced power between the East and the West. It is quite unlikely, therefore, that the additional sacrifices necessary to achieve a level of superiority *vis-a-vis* the Soviets would be found palatable. Fortunately, a quest for mere equilibrium may offer some advantages that will partly compensate for the failure, serious even for *status quo* powers, to attain the kind of security that only a safe margin of superiority can offer.

If a country is able to give convincing evidence of seeking only equilibrium, it will not usually be suspected of aggressive intentions, since it is obvious that the attainment of its relatively

modest power goal can give it defensive capabilities at best. Its attitude, therefore, will tend to appeal to all friends and allies that belong in the category of *status quo* powers, though it will disappoint its "revisionist" friends. There is a chance, too, that the more modest power goal will have some effect on the behavior of the opposing side — in this case on the Soviet Union. If the Soviets feel secure from threats of external aggression and, at the same time, are suffering from the heavy burden of the arms race, they too may resign themselves, temporarily at least, to the continuation of the *status quo* and to the maintenance of a mere balance of power. Although we do not want to make too much of a virtue of necessity, the acceptance by the United States of the balance of power as the avowed goal of policy may have certain other advantages. Such a policy will remove unfounded public expectations of future superiority and eliminate temptations to conduct policy as if the United States could soon expect to impose its will on an inferior opponent.

This suggestion — that the United States might do well to make a reasonable balance of power between East and West a target of its foreign policy and the standard by which to measure its efforts in the power field — runs counter to the last of the theories mentioned earlier. The whole notion of a balancing of power policy, according to the exponents of this theory, has been rendered obsolete by the emergence of new forces that have radically changed the conditions of international politics. While, in former times, the balance may have been a condition both of peace and of the continued independence of many nations, it has ceased, they say, to be a practiced goal today, because of the impact of a number of new factors with which statesmen did not formerly have to contend.

One of these factors, strongly emphasized at the close of World War II, was the rise of the United States to a leading position in world politics. Many argued that the newcomer was little fitted for the task of playing the balancing game. Was it possible

to expect that a country so little accustomed to, or inclined towards, power calculations in foreign affairs would be able to switch sides from former friends to former enemies if such a move were necessary for the restoration of the world balance of power? Would the United States agree to "entangling" itself in alliances? The record of American policies since World War II has laid these misgivings to rest and has thoroughly disproved the alleged inaptitude of the United States in the matter of the balancing of power process. With a speed that came as a shock even to many Europeans supposedly reared in the traditions of the power game, America's enemies of World War II became her military allies, and soon the United States was to emerge as the center of a peace-time alliance system of unprecedented breadth. Statesmen in Washington became quickly aware of the need for establishing and maintaining a balance between the power of the East and the West. Concepts such as containment and deterrence, which soon became the catchwords of the day, pointed to equilibrium as a minimum American objective. Therefore, it may be suggested that, rather than confirming the theory of obsolescence, this first factor demonstrates the continuing primacy of balancing-of-power considerations.

A second new factor, the so-called "bipolarity" of the post-war world, was thought to be of even greater consequence. After all, the so-called balance of power system of the 19th century rested on the simultaneous existence of five or six major powers. Now only two were left, while the remaining lesser powers were able to throw so little into the scales against a potential ascending state that their influence could be discounted. Here, too, however, experience in the era of the two superpowers has merely added weight to the contention that whenever there is more than one sovereign power in the world, the balancing process will begin to operate. Even had it been true that all significant power was to remain vested in the USA and the USSR, as it was at the close of World War II, their competition in armaments and in economic development could have led to a balance of power between them which might have been maintained by their efforts alone. But the

condition of the extreme bipolarity of 1945 has been steadily on the decline as other centers of not inconsiderable power have arisen or reasserted themselves in many parts of the world. As the situation stands today, these lesser powers could, if they wanted, throw their weight to one side or another and significantly affect the distribution of power between the two main opposing camps. Moreover, regional balancing of power is under way among some of the lesser countries: for instance, between the Arab countries and Israel, or between Pakistan and India. Neither bipolarity nor the rise of new states, then, has resulted in the disappearance of traditional policies of power. On the contrary, one of the striking characteristics of the present situation is the manner in which some of the new states, which one might have expected would be preoccupied with their thorny internal problems, have come to throw their weight around in the world balancing process, sometimes, as in the case of Yugoslavia, for the obvious purpose of preventing one of the superpowers from becoming too mighty in a particular area.

A third novelty which has rightly attracted attention is the ideological note that has been introduced into the world's major power struggle. Some observers predicted that ideological affinities and antagonisms would become so strong that nations would become unwilling, whatever the requirements of the balancing process, to leave the camp of their ideological preference. If this had occurred, the distribution of power in the world would have been at the mercy of ideological competition. Ideological appeals have, undoubtedly, affected the orientation of some countries toward East or West, but in such cases one cannot necessarily say that efforts to establish a balance of power have ceased. Indeed, whenever ideological power has shown a tendency to gain the upper hand over other forms of power, competition between East and West does not disappear but is transferred to the field of ideology, propaganda and subversion. We can see evidence of this competition on all sides today, and we may well conclude that the United States will be unable to balance Soviet power if it fails

to remain or establish itself as an ideological alternative no less attractive than the Soviet Union.

Ideology has not, however, come to reign supreme. There have been instances of recent date to show that the "blood" of military power considerations can still run thicker than the "water" of ideological sympathy. As mentioned earlier, Communist Yugoslavia lined up with the West when it felt threatened by Soviet military superiority, and countries with no Communist bias like Nasser's Egypt have taken full advantage of opportunities to swing toward the Soviet side when, for reasons of national interest, they wished to weaken or restrain the Western camp. If ideology interferes with the relatively smooth functioning of the traditional balancing process, it is most likely to do so by blinding ideologically fanatical leaders and elites to threats emanating from the camp of their ideological preference. When statesmen jeopardize national security interests in this way, one can speak of a kind of "ideological stickiness" which may lead to alignments that run counter to the requirements of equilibrium.

Finally, there is the new factor of nuclear weapons. The question has been raised whether the conditions of the nuclear age, with its weapons of unprecedented destructiveness and its revolutionary developments in weapons technology, does not defeat all efforts at rational power calculation and comparison. If it does, governments would be unable to establish any particular world power distribution or to know even approximately whether equilibrium exists at any given time. Thus, it would be hopeless to attempt to rely on the balance of power for the security of their countries or for the preservation of peace.

No one can deny that the art of estimating power — one's own and that of an adversary — which has been the source of many tragic errors even in prenuclear days, has been immensely complicated by the introduction of even new and untried instruments of war. Yet, despite this new element of uncertainty, there

has probably never been a time in which more efforts have been exerted towards estimating comparative military power, strategic nuclear striking power included. All the talk of a stalemate on the strategic plane would be meaningless if these estimates had become a matter of sheer guesswork. It must be remembered, in this connection, that in time of peace it is the balance of mutual deterrence that is important, and deterrence rests not on the *actual* relative strengths of the two sides — which only war can reveal — but on what governments *believe to be* the existing distribution of power. In fact, the more both sides overestimate the relative power position of their opponent, the more likely it is that they will be deterred from using their power. Since the chief danger has always been an underestimation of enemy strength and determination, the advent of nuclear weapons has had the effect of buttressing the deterrent value of the balancing process. Even a megalomaniac will not easily discount enemy nuclear retaliatory power, provided it is creditable to him that his opponent will use that power to counter his moves. If credible, the threat of retaliation with less than equal nuclear force may suffice for deterrence provided the lesser force is enough to cause unacceptably great damage. The problem, today, therefore, is not so much equality of nuclear power, but the difficulty of creating equilibrium on other levels, so that one is ready to meet various types of attack and can convince an opponent that his attacks will actually be met.

It is particularly difficult and costly for the United States to balance the Soviet Union today precisely because a “balance of terror” on the level of strategic nuclear force is not enough to assure what might be called an “overall equilibrium” involving all levels of power competition. The respective strategic nuclear capabilities of the United States and the Soviet Union have a marked tendency to neutralize each other, which means that they drop out of the scales as a positive balancing factor. The balance then depends on power relationships all the way down the ladder from somewhere below massive retaliatory power to the respective capacities for

limited war, for conventional war, for subversion and for ideological or economic appeal. On these less elevated rungs of the ladder, the Soviet bloc appears to be superior at this time. One may conclude, then, that the nuclear factor, while unable to end the balancing of power process or to rob it of its former functions, merely adds to the difficulties of manipulating the process in such a way that a reasonable degree of equilibrium can be attained, preserved and ascertained.

One last remark about the alleged obsolescence of the balance of power and balancing process is necessary. Those who accept the obsolescence theory must have asked themselves what alternative course is open to nations in the present era. An organization like the United Nations, despite its provisions for collective security, cannot put the balancing process to rest because it leaves all coercive power in the hands of its members. There can be only one alternative — the elimination of all military power from the control of individual nations, which, if it occurred, would obviously relieve governments of the need to concern themselves with the world distribution of power among nations. With the monopoly of military power by a single world authority, and only with such a monopoly, international power politics itself — and with it the whole balancing of power process — would disappear. Nations, even if embroiled in conflict with one another, would have no more reason to worry about the power position of other nations than a Rhode Island or an Oklahoma about the power of larger and potentially more powerful neighboring States of the Union. Unfortunately for those who would like to see such a world authority established, it must be said that there is not the slightest chance of its establishment in the foreseeable future. Can anyone imagine the United States or the Soviet Union, for that matter, subordinating themselves voluntarily to an authority over which their chief opponent might come to exercise supreme control? If they did, they would make themselves as impotent as is any State in the Union compared to the Federal Government. If ever the two superpowers had enough confidence in each other not to mind

being ruled by a world authority which was controlled by the other, there would be no need for such a world authority anymore! Under such ideal conditions of mutual confidence, the two together could, and probably would, rule supreme in the world, but one must add that their chances of preserving their mutual confidence and of agreeing on the use of their power would be greater if they preserved a high degree of equilibrium between themselves. Rather than to make a world authority more practical today than it was in earlier periods, ideological conflict, concentration of power in the hands of two antagonistic superpowers, and the introduction of nuclear weapons have deepened the gulf between groups of nations and made world unity more remote. Under these circumstances the balance of power, while far from ideal, suggests itself as an acceptable and practical substitute for the supremacy in the world that the United States with all its potential power cannot presently hope to attain for itself.

BIOGRAPHIC SKETCH

Professor Arnold Wolfers

Professor Arnold Wolfers was born in Switzerland. He received his Doctor of Law degree in Zurich in 1917, after which he practiced law in Switzerland until 1919. In 1924, he received his Doctor of Philosophy degree in Giessen.

After holding positions as Assistant Professor of Economics at the University of Berlin and as Director of the Institute of Politics in Berlin, he came to this country to teach at Yale University. He was Master of Pierson College and Professor of International Relations there from 1935 to 1949. He then became the Sterling Professor of International Relations at that institution, and served in that capacity until 1957. At present, he is the Director of the Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research at Johns Hopkins University.

Professor Wolfers was a special adviser and lecturer at the school of Military Government at Charlottesville, Virginia, from 1942 to 1944; he was a member of the resident faculty at the National War College during 1946; and he served as Director of Graduate Studies, International Relations Program, at Yale during Academic Year 1954-1955. During the war years he was expert consultant in the Office of the Provost Marshal General in Washington, D. C., and also consultant in the Office of Strategic Services. From 1953 until 1956, he served as President of the World Peace Foundation, and since that time has been a member of the Executive Council at the Graduate Institute of International Studies in Geneva.

Professor Wolfers is the author of several books and articles on law, economics and international relations, including *Britain and France Between Two Wars*, and is coeditor (with L. Martin) of *The Anglo-American Tradition in Foreign Affairs*.

REGIONAL ASSOCIATIONS

A lecture delivered
at the Naval War College
on 16 September 1958 by

Professor Edgar S. Furniss, Jr.

Captain Touart, Gentlemen:

It is indeed a pleasure to be back at the War College. I deem it quite a privilege to be invited to talk again, having inflicted one talk upon the War College last December.

I have a text for today, and I will begin by quoting it. It so happens that it comes from the lecture which I gave here last December:

But I question whether bipolarity really describes the international environment or whether action, on the basis of presumed bipolarity, in all instances increases national and international security. It seems to me that not only in the rise of neutral states but in such instances as Hungary, Suez, and the Near East, that bipolarity — as an operating premise — did not work.

Any discussion of regional associations ought to begin with this very basic problem: What is a "regional association," and what is a "regional arrangement?"

Professor Norman Padelford wrote an article on *Regional Organizations and the United Nations* in which he had to begin with a definition, and here it is:

Broadly speaking, a regional arrangement in the sphere of international politics may be described as an association of states, based upon location in a given

geographic area, for the safeguarding or promotion of the participants. The terms of this type of association are fixed by a treaty or other agreement.

Ordinarily, the idea of a regional association embraces cooperation between more than two states or political entities and is not localized to the extent of dealing solely with one narrowly confined situation or question . . .

On the other hand, it does not usually extend to associations of states that are proximately global in their situation . . .

Regional arrangements may take a variety of forms ranging from an agreement that certain rules or principles shall apply in the relations among a group of states to the creation of an alliance or the erection of an elaborate organization with permanent institutions or organs.

I quote this definition not only because it is long, but because Padelford had great trouble with it. Notice the ambiguous words in this quotation — he says 'broadly speaking'; 'fixed by a treaty or other agreement'; 'ordinarily, the idea'; 'on the other hand, it does not usually extend.' The problem, therefore, is that the term "regional associations," or in other words what we are talking about today, is practically impossible to define in geographic, political, economic, social, or numerical terms.

One of the reasons why international lawyers and professors of international organization also find this subject difficult to define is because the United Nations does not come up with any definition which is officially accepted. Article 52 of the Charter, for example says:

Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for

dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action, provided that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations.

This, in old-fashioned logical terms, is a fine example of a circular definition when it says that nothing in the Charter shall preclude regional arrangements from existing, and that regional arrangements shall exist whenever they are consistent with the Charter and when their activities are appropriate.

A conclusion on this subject of "definition" which I think is important: if a region is everything that people say it is, therefore a regional arrangement is anything declared by its members to be consistent with the United Nations' Charter. All Western associations — the Inter-American System, NATO, and so forth — therefore contain this formal vow in their preambles, or in one of the Articles, saying that this association is consistent with the purposes and so on of the United Nations. This means it is so because they say that it is so, and it also means that there is no necessary hierarchy between the United Nations and a regional association; there is no set principle of which is first and which is second (as I shall proceed to point out).

Regional associations, then, are related to bipolarity (which I mentioned in quoting from the last talk I gave here in December) in that bipolarity (the opposition of the United States and the Soviet Union, perceived so soon after World War II) caused a retreat from the United Nations' system which, in terms of organization, took the form of regional associations. This escape hatch had been written into the Charter at the insistence of the Latin American delegates to the San Francisco Conference in the form of Article 51, saying:

Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense

if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations . . .

Article 51 was then used by Western countries to develop and coordinate their collective strength against the Soviet Union when it was clear that the Soviet Union would not permit the United Nations to become truly a World Security Organization.

What I am saying is that there is a fundamental difference between the Organization of American States, which predated the Charter of the United Nations, and other regional associations coming after the (San Francisco) Charter. The difference is that the Organization of American States is a *collective* security system. By that, I mean that it has institutional procedures, including the use of force, for the settlement of *internal* disputes; that is, disputes between members of the regional associations. However, because of the bipolar world that followed World War II, other regional associations are military alliances which are externalized; that is, their purpose is not to settle disputes among their members but, as I said, to develop collective strength against an external enemy — whether it is the Soviet Union, Communist China, International Communism, or all three.

In order to make the point (as I did in the lecture last December) that bipolarity no longer characterizes the international environment, let me ask what is “bipolarity?” One of the best characterizations of it appears in the first edition of a book by Professor Hans Morgenthau called *Politics Among Nations*. In addition to being an excellent book, because it is well organized and coherently presented, it excellently illustrates the bipolar world in which he wrote. Here is what he says:

For the two giants which today determine the course of world affairs only one policy seems to be left, that is, to increase their own strength and that of their satellites. All the players that count have

taken sides, and in the foreseeable future no switch from one side to the other is likely to take place, nor, if it were to take place, would it be likely to reverse the existing balance of power. Since the issues everywhere boil down to retreat from, or advance into, areas which both sides regard as of vital interest to themselves, positions must be held, and the give and take of compromise becomes a weakness which neither side is able to afford.

Later on, he also says:

Imbued with the crusading spirit of the new moral force of nationalistic universalism and both tempted and frightened by the potentialities of total war, two superpowers, the centers of two gigantic power blocs, face each other in inflexible opposition. They cannot retreat without giving up what they consider vital to them. They cannot advance without risking combat. Persuasion, then, is tantamount to trickery, compromise means treason, and the threat of force spells war.

Well, this was the bipolar world. I am submitting (for you to argue with me about) that it no longer characterizes the world of 1958, or that it characterizes it only in part. Therefore, one of the major difficulties with regional associations is that they were developed for, and as a result of, the bipolar world; that they are everywhere having difficulty in adjusting to a world that is not that simple, and perhaps more dangerous.

There are, to be even more specific, a number of other reasons why regional associations fail, and I would like to give a little bit of attention to each.

One reason why regional associations fail is that some of them are not inclusive enough. Key participants are left out. In fact, there is a tendency in regional associations, because of the

bipolar world that they were developed to serve, for countries left out to become the key countries just because they were left out. Because these countries were not taken into the regional associations, they are the ones on which the Eastern enemy focuses.

This is not the case in one illustration, however. If you look at the Organization of American States, it is quite obvious that the famous "empty chair" in the Pan American Union which has been reserved for Canada, and still remains vacant, makes no sense in terms of regional organizations although it does make sense in terms of other factors. So here is a key member in any Western Hemisphere system which is left out.

Take some other examples. There is the famous South East Asia Treaty Organization, which does not cover a region at all. There is the Baghdad Pact, which, as we are all now well aware, left out some of the key countries in the Near East. In fact, one might argue that it left out the Near East itself. Even NATO was for a long time without West Germany, and it still has to get along without Sweden and without Spain. Although it is supposed to cover Algeria, it leaves out the two countries on either side of Algeria. So one problem, then, of regional organizations is that they have not been successful because they cannot be inclusive enough.

Another failing of regional associations is that they are not exclusive enough. The drive to accomplish what Morgenthau said had already been accomplished — namely, having every country choose up sides and be drawn in as a satellite to one or another of the great superpowers — has led to something which has been characterized as "Pactitis," or nominal regionalism, with only nominal members.

To take an illustration from another so-called "organization," the Arab League. Yemen and Libya are in the Arab League so far as nominal members, although the time may come when they become "actual" members.

A third failing of regional systems is the internal opposition between countries in the system and the inability of the system to settle those differences because, as I pointed out, it was not set up for that purpose. As time has progressed, some of these differences have become rather acute. The fact that the organization is externalized makes it difficult — if not impossible — to settle internal differences which sap the strength of the organization.

Take the example of the Arab League. The sole reason for its existence is, of course, the destruction of Israel. It was split wide-open by Iraq joining the Baghdad Pact and by the conflict between Iraq and the resurgent Egyptian Nationalism led by Nasser. This conflict may well be on the way towards solution, or it may not; but if it is, the solution is hardly favorable to Iraq.

NATO also has its problems in Iceland and in Cyprus — internal disputes which are certainly considered behind the scenes of the organization, but without institutional procedures and compulsions for their settlement.

Regionalism also has run into difficulty because it is supposed to set up a system for military defense against Communism, but has failed to settle such military questions as, for example: How to find local defense sufficient in strength to resist determined attacks?

For example, in the South East Asia Treaty Organization the purpose of the regional system is not to create a defense line and announce it to the world, but to serve the purpose of creating self-contained and self-sufficient regional defense. In the connotation of Soviet presumed attack, this has proved to be relatively impossible. It involved such related issues (which I do not have time to treat here) as that of deterrence versus local strength — the danger of the former and the futility of the latter — military questions which perhaps are impossible to resolve.

Another military question closely related to this that causes difficulty for regional organizations is: How to meet local attack without the conflict degenerating into a general war? This fear of progressive deterioration of any armed conflict, however it starts and whoever is responsible, is sometimes greater than the fear of attack itself. As a consequence, such States as India and Burma become positively neutralistic and determined to remain outside associations.

Another question which regionalism has to confront is the opposite of the one which I have just been discussing: Regionalism is military defense, but what does the region do when military issues are not relevant?

Problems other than military problems inside the alliance make the defense structure precarious, as, for example, the situation in Iceland or the situation in France. Internal subversion, not external attack, may knock a State out of the regional organization altogether, as we found in the case of Iraq. Here are examples where the crucial questions are not military defense against military attack but are nonetheless disrupters of the alliance pattern.

Finally, under this general heading there is a question which regional organizations have difficulty in answering: Co-ordinate responsibilities versus exclusive control, or, to put the question simpler, who is in charge here? This, as you know, is a question for Western alliances. Maybe it is an increasing question for the Eastern alliances, also — particularly in the Sino-Soviet relationships. So far as the West is concerned, we are dedicated to what may politely be called a “political fiction”; that is, an equality of commitment among all the members of our Western alliances and equal responsibility in discharging this commitment — not equal power, but equal responsibility, or at least a hierarchy of responsibility.

To other States, as key members of these alliance structures, we have to make concessions to this “political fiction.” But, ob-

viously, this cannot go all the way, as has been shown time and time again within the political structure of NATO itself. Where noises are made in Western Europe to make NATO a really tight-knit political organization, based upon some kind of presumed hierarchy of responsibility, what comes out of Washington is usually a lot of silence. Sometimes the Secretary of State is frank enough to say (as he did before one NATO meeting) that there are some questions which we will not submit — and have no intention of submitting — to NATO, however it is organized. This is a clear indication of the limit to the concessions which we can make to this “political fiction.”

On the other hand, for the other countries in the alliance the concessions are never enough because of the residue of power which is left uncontrolled. In their relationship to the United States, then (with a few exceptions), what these countries desire is precisely what we cannot give them: namely, co-ordinate responsibility and an ability to determine what the United States will do and will not do.

To take one example of this: the National Assembly in France, after the 1957 NATO Council meeting, was debating the question of U. S. missile bases on French soil. There, as is usual in the French National Assembly (or perhaps in any political assembly), there was a lot of irrelevant and hysterical political demagoguery. Foreign Minister Pineau quickly put a stop to this, however, when he got up and declared that the question of whether there should be missile bases in France was a false one. He said he found it extremely significant that some members of the opposition felt insecure, not when the Soviet Union was powerful enough to shoot directly at France, but when France was secure enough to shoot directly at the Soviet Union. He also said that the real question is not concerning putting missile bases in France, but is: “Who is going to control those bases and who is going to control the use of the weapons that are put on the bases?” Regard-

ing this question the Foreign Minister said that France intends to reserve and maintain its position.

Let me shift now to another regional organization, the Organization of American States. This is a collective security arrangement which includes the possibility of the use of force against internal disputes. Yet, Latin American countries are scared to death to invoke the use of force against internal disputes within the Hemisphere because most of the force has to come in one way or another from the United States. They do not want to invoke the military assistance of the United States because that constitutes "intervention," and they are much more scared of intervention than of internal disputes. The proof of this is that immediately after the war the issue was fought out directly when Uruguay, which was afraid of Argentina, proposed the principle of "collective intervention" when there were disputes within the Hemisphere. This meant intervention by military force on a collective basis. Not only did the Pan American Union, at the insistence of almost every other Latin American State in the Hemisphere, throw this proposal out but it also went on to reiterate and, in fact, to strengthen — at an almost absurd length — the contrary principle of "nonintervention" in the internal affairs of the State for any reason whatsoever.

There are difficulties, fallacies and faults in any system, including regional organizations. What makes the faults crucial, however, is the declining belief in the threat of an imminent Soviet attack (whether rightly or wrongly) within Europe. I call your attention to a brief dispatch from Washington in *The New York Times* of September 13, beginning:

Secretary of State Dulles said today some countries are 'growing a little bit tired' in the East-West struggle at a time when the Communist bloc is putting on new pressure.

The reason why they are 'growing a little bit tired' is not just the passage of time. It is their belief that the questions involving East and West are now essentially not military.

Bipolarity, then (to return to the point with which I began), really does not describe the international situation. There have been the neutralist, formerly-dependent countries in the Near East, in the Far East, and in Africa which have not only risen to statehood but to prominence in the international scheme of things. This throws in complications which are not settled by saying, as Morgenthau says, 'all the players that count have taken sides,' or by saying that if one shifted from one side to the other it would not matter very much anyway.

The failure of regional systems to adapt themselves to the international environment as it has changed since 1948 is revealed in a dramatic return to the United Nations' system from which regional organization was a retreat. I cite two instances here.

One is Suez, which was a failure for both NATO and the Arab League — a different type of failure for each of them, but a failure for both nevertheless. It was a failure of internal settlement on the part of NATO in the disputes between Britain and France, on one hand, and the United States on the other. It was a failure on the part of the Arab League in coping with its external enemy that created the situation — namely, Israel. In this situation what was left was what the United States immediately did — namely, to return to the United Nations' system. As you know, the United Nations was called upon to form an international police force to remove the contestants from the area. Many countries never got over the shock of seeing the United States and the Soviet Union voting together and working together in the United Nations to bring this solution about. This is dramatic evidence of the limitations of the bipolar concept. But the same basic problem remains in the Near East, perhaps in an exaggerated form, of settlement on a realistic basis.

The second illustration of the return or flight back to the U. N. is the situation in Lebanon and Jordan, which, of course, is a failure of the Baghdad Pact because it did not cover the real issue. The United Nations was used as a forum for the return of the Arab League to the supposed noninterference basis, or non-interference of one member in the internal affairs of another. The Secretary General was supposed to supervise and gain acceptance for the removal of foreign troops from the area — again a rather significant parallel to the Suez case because here, also, Western troops were involved.

Both of these reversals represent a crashing defeat for Western diplomacy, which may be catastrophic. The Suez case illustrated fundamental divisions within the West — moral and ideological bankruptcy of two governments within the Western system. The latter move, however much we want to justify it as necessary in the circumstances, by that very token indicates the bankruptcy of previous policies adopted within that area.

These crises, then — together with the present Formosan crisis — suggest, to me at least, the urgent need to re-examine what the basic units which are involved in international politics can and cannot do. Of course these units are the nation, the United Nations, and the regional organization.

Just because some countries returned helter-skelter, pell-mell to the United Nations in two recent crises does not mean that the United Nations is so effective, either, at settling conflicts between East and West. It is still just about as impotent in the bipolar world as it was back in 1946, when Western countries developed regional organs to protect themselves from this impotence of the U. N. Although the Indians did render assistance to the development of the Korean truce, this may represent an exception.

The United Nations is passing out of control of the United States and the West with the rise of the uncommitted states. As our Western friends — particularly the French — point out, ap-

peasement of these uncommitted states in the U. N. is ineffective because of the rise of Nationalism, which gave birth to them, and because of the anti-Colonialist and anti-Western orientation which caused that Nationalism. Hence, one of the reasons why the U. N. is ineffective is because these States have something positive, selfish and nationalistic that they want to do, aside from making the United Nations' system work: they want to continue to put pressure on the West, on the Colonial Powers.

On the other hand, the nation — as a unit — is obviously just as unable as it was to win security for itself against its potential or its actual enemies. Added to the limits of the capabilities which we all recognized after World War II, there has become the equally well-recognized danger of the military technique in use — or, in fact, in nonuse.

Walter Millis, in *Arms and Men*, concludes by saying:

By 1956 there appeared to be almost no way in which the deployment of military force — which means men armed with murderous weapons, whether Roman short swords or high-powered artillery or hydrogen bombs, for the slaughter of other men — could be brought rationally to bear upon the decision of any of the political, economic, emotional or philosophical issues by which men still remain divided. This is the great and unresolved dilemma of our age.

Hence, the problem which all statecraft must be involved in — of assessing the ingredients of national power and coordinating them in a consistent expression of national policy — is more difficult than ever because the nation, as a unit, cannot withdraw into isolation. On the other hand, complete commitment is likely to wind up in equally complete destruction.

I am supposed to be talking about “regional systems,” so let me return to them in the light of the difficulties which the U. N. and the nation — as units in the international environment — con-

front. What I am suggesting here is that regional systems likewise need to be re-examined, and that their re-examination points to the following procedures which might be used.

In the first place, I think that there has been for a long time an obvious need to promote interdependence within the areas — primarily economic interdependence, but also social interdependence and diplomatic interdependence. Multilateral diplomacy is a useful adjunct to bilateral diplomacy and even a useful substitute for it, as the procedures within NATO have at times demonstrated.

Another need for change within these regional associations is, as I have been repeating again and again, local settlement of local differences. This is what regional systems were supposed to do; this is their role as envisaged by the United Nations. It was envisaged because it was recognized that there is a need to take the burden off the U. N.; that the U. N. could not and should not get involved in every dispute between every country everywhere in the world. Regional associations should use regional instruments to prevent local disputes from becoming international issues and from threatening the peace of the world. These institutional relationships should also be used to prevent disputes from arising in the first place. (We obviously do not know how many disputes might have arisen between countries in NATO had it not been for the development of multilateral diplomacy and political association between the countries involved).

A third use for regional associations (and I hope that I am building these uses one on the other and sort of outward) is as steps toward international consensus. All agree — Eastern countries, Western countries, and the in-between world — all agree that Nationalism is a disease — an atavistic disease. The leaders produced by Nationalism in the in-between world recognize that they are riding a tiger, and that they may wind up inside. President Nasser has revealed this quite frankly in some interviews to Western correspondents, and President Bourguiba of Tunisia has revealed it even more frankly.

Well, what can one do about it? Some countries which are still dependent want to skip the national sovereignty stage altogether, such as countries in Africa now joined with France. They envisage a regional system with France on the basis of their local autonomy as a way of creating interdependence — not national independence, but interdependence of peoples. Other countries are anxious to pass beyond the stage of Nationalism, such as European countries, to a stage where there is so close a dependence between them that one can no longer separate out the independent ingredients of national policy. Others want to do it on a sort of *ad hoc* basis — which represents the in-between world — in order to try gradually to get beyond this stage. These are steps, then, toward an international consensus or agreement on something other than the differences and the disputes which mark international relations.

There is still a place (and this is another assistance which regionalism can recognize and can perform) for regional organizations to provide a balance of imperfect and ephemeral security between the East and West. If bipolarity is not sufficient to describe international environment, it still describes an unfortunately large part of it. Let me see if I can add a little bit to what regional organizations can do, aside from building up military power.

Each of these bipolar giants fears an attack from the others if it were left alone and without allies. The pathological fear of the Soviets, and the determination that they showed in the case of the Hungarian revolt to use any and all means, regardless of the impact upon other people, to hold on to their satellites in Eastern Europe is a symptom of this pathological fear. I submit that it is quite clear also that Americans are afraid of being alone in an unfriendly world. Collective systems or regional systems provide some sense of security, a sense of “togetherness.”

But there is more to it than that. There is a value in association — each assumes the mitigating influence of the allies on the leader of the bloc, or the reverse. By that I mean that within a regional system — built up, to be sure, to advance military power

against an external enemy — each one of the countries may soften or mitigate the action of the leader of the bloc in given situations, and each one recognizes that this may well operate. One of the things that both Eastern and Western leaders are certainly afraid of is the accidental or the unforeseen in a situation where the accidental or the unforeseen may provoke totally destructive war. What regional systems do is to develop some kind of order or institutional process for the prevention of the accidental or the unforeseen. This is certainly a contribution not to be minimized.

Take an example of that. The French asked the American Government to intervene by airpower to rescue Dienbienphu. Apparently, from what we read in the public press, the American Government or a majority within the American executive were in favor of doing just that. As far as the East was concerned, this was an unforeseen — and, therefore, a highly-to-be-feared and opposed — development. Our allies, for better or for worse, provided in this case a mitigating influence on the leader of the bloc. It may also be true (although we do not have very much evidence here) that the same can be said of the Eastern bloc. As the Communist Chinese appear to become *the* Eastern country most willing to take risks in the international system, it may be that the Soviet Union exerts a restraining influence on the Chinese, and the other way around. We also have believed in times past that Poland, in the Warsaw Pact or in its bilateral relationship to the Soviet Union, likewise exerted a mitigating influence upon Soviet behavior.

It is likewise true — or it ought to be true — that the leader of the bloc can prevent irresponsible action in the part of one of its dependencies or one of its co-ordinate states within a security system. This is the role which the United States could not perform in the Suez crisis.

Regional systems are supposed to (and may ultimately) contribute to the preparation of some kind of settlement of issues between East and West. After all, this was the purpose of Western associations: to prepare the way for some kind of satisfactory

settlement with the Soviet Union on issues which divided the world. By that I do not mean appeasement, and I do not mean surrender. I mean recognition, implicitly, by both sides that each is not going to be able to destroy the other; that each has to live with the other, because living with the other is preferable to the only alternative that can be seen.

Regional organizations, then, may have a place — and a very large place — in preparing for this kind of tentative reaching out towards solution of particular issues.

Again to return to the case of NATO. It has become very well established in approaches between East and West that on the Western side the approach has first been co-ordinated within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization; if it had not been, there would have been all hell to pay. For example, take the disarmament talks in London. When it appeared that Mr. Stassen was getting a little bit too close a little too frequently with his Soviet counterpart, the Secretary of State intervened — with the overt and enthusiastic approval of the French — to remind Mr. Stassen that there was a common Western position on the issues of disarmament which divided the East and West.

So that one may look optimistically on regional associations, despite the difficulties which they have encountered. They may perform a useful purpose in the kinds of questions which *are* relevant to the international environment twelve or thirteen years after the formation of the United Nations' Charter.

Thank you!

BIOGRAPHIC SKETCH

Professor Edgar S. Furniss, Jr.

Professor Furniss received his A. B. degree from Yale University in 1940. He was a Social Science Resident Council Fellow there in 1946 and 1947, and received his Ph.D. degree from the same institution the following year.

He was appointed Assistant Professor of Political Science at Princeton University in 1947, serving in that capacity until 1955, when he became Associate Professor — a position which he currently holds.

Professor Furniss is the co-author of *American Foreign Policy*.

RECOMMENDED READING

The evaluation of books listed below include those recommended to resident students of the Naval War College. Officers in the fleet and elsewhere may find them of interest.

The inclusion of a book or article in this list does not necessarily constitute an endorsement by the Naval War College of the facts, opinions or concepts contained therein. They are indicated only on the basis of interesting, timely, and possibly useful reading matter.

Many of these publications may be found in ship and station libraries. Books on the list which are not available from these sources may be obtained from one of the Navy's Auxiliary Library Service Collections. These collections of books are available for loan. Requests from individual officers to borrow books from an Auxiliary Library Service Collection should be addressed to the nearest of the following special loan collections:

Chief of Naval Personnel, (G14) Department of the Navy Washington 25, D. C.	Commandant ELEVENTH Naval District (Code 154) 937 North Harbor Drive San Diego, California
Commandant FOURTEENTH Naval District (Code 141) Navy No. 128 Fleet Post Office San Francisco, California	Commander Naval Forces, Marianas Nimitz Hill Library, Box 48 Fleet Post Office San Francisco, California

U. S. Naval Station Library
Attn: Auxiliary Service Collection
Building C-9
U. S. Naval Base
Norfolk 11, Virginia

Title: *The Russian Revolution.* 301 p.

Author: Moorehead, Alan. New York, Harper, 1958.

Evaluation: Written in a clear, orderly manner, this story on the nature of the Bolshevik rise to power in Russia holds the reader's interest from beginning to end. The main emphasis is oriented towards the individuals involved, and their relationship to each other, in the origin and growth of the Communist Party. From a setting showing the conditions in Russia under the Czars of the late nineteenth century, this book briefly describes the effects of the important events in Russian history, such as the assassination of Alexander II, the Revolution of 1905, and the First World War, and their consequences — which led to a weak central government. Under such conditions, the assumption of power by the professional revolutionaries was politically easy; but only by terrorism and violence could they maintain their grasp. The author contends that the Germans played an important role in bringing Lenin and the Bolsheviks to power, and makes it clear that the revolution itself was not quite the uncorrupted epic the Communists have made it out to be. By the time the Bolsheviks had essentially completed their seizure of control by the brutal breaking-up of the Russian Constituent Assembly, the wheel had almost turned the full cycle from Nicholas to Lenin, from autocracy back to autocracy. The Bolsheviks had now betrayed, or were about to betray, nearly every political slogan that had brought them to power. They had promised freedom to the individual and, instead, had censored the press, forbidden strikes, and set up a secret police. Also, they had cried for a freely elected Constituent Assembly —and now they had abolished it by force. The author's stated purpose was to make available to the general reader a book with a dispassionate and objective description of a great political upheaval. A discerning reader must inevitably reach the conclusion that the present-day techniques of the Communist leaders differ little in pattern from those of the Bolshevik leaders forty years ago.

Title: *The Silent Victory.* 206 p.

Author: Grinnell-Milne, Duncan. London, The Bodley Head, 1958.

Evaluation: *The Silent Victory* is the story of Germany's preparations to invade England in the summer of 1940 and the deterrents to this mission. Mr. Duncan Grinnell-Milne has documented his book with extracts from many authori-

tative sources — including Hitler's two directives for invasion preparations, which are quoted in full. The theme of the book is that the Royal Navy was the dominant deterrent factor which prevented the invasion attempt. Apparently many other authors have argued that the British Fighter Command played the dominant role. Mr. Grinnell-Milne goes into great detail and often excessive repetition to disprove this theory, and to plead his case for the role of the Royal Navy and the importance of control of the seas.

- Title:** *The Soviet Cultural Scene, 1956-1957.* 300 p.
- Authors:** Laqueur, Walter Z., and Lichtheim, George, eds. New York, Praeger, 1958.
- Evaluation:** A compilation of essays selected from the monthly review, *Soviet Survey*, a periodical that has been published by the Congress for Cultural Freedom since 1956. The essays deal with many aspects of cultural life in the Soviet Union and the Communist Bloc nations. Written during, and designed to cover, the period of the now famous "Thaw" subsequent to the report to the XXth Party Congress, the book represents a substantial contribution to studies of Soviet motivations and Soviet concepts of government control. The book utilizes exclusively Soviet and East European sources of material, and provides considerable insight into the struggle being waged behind the Iron Curtain effectively to control a vast network of countries. The highlights of the book are contained in the last four chapters (27 through 30). In reading these chapters, we are further enlightened on the crises of Stalinism, the Polish uprising, and the Hungarian revolt.

- Title:** *The Great Arms Race.* 116 p.
- Author:** Baldwin, Hanson W. New York, Praeger, 1958.
- Evaluation:** The author presents a thorough analysis of the comparative military power of the United States and the Soviet Union, primarily from the weapons systems aspect and, to some extent, the application of those systems. He concludes with a discussion of the future position of the United States in relation to Russia in the great arms race.

PERIODICALS

- Title:** *What is Indirect Aggression?*

- Author: Barraclough, Geoffrey.
- Publication: THE LISTENER, September 18, 1958, p. 403-405.
- Annotation: Discusses the dilemma of the policy of indirect aggression, how to define it, and the dangers of misapplication in using it as a cause for intervention or war.
- Title: *Nuclear Testing and The Problem of Peace.*
- Author: Kissinger, Henry A.
- Publication: FOREIGN AFFAIRS, October, 1958, p. 1-18.
- Annotation: Appraises the advisability of the ban on nuclear testing.
- Title: *Limited Defense Is Not Enough.*
- Author: Jackson, B. L., Colonel, United States Army.
- Publication: MILITARY REVIEW, October, 1958, p. 55-58.
- Annotation: The author suggests that "All Out Defense" has the best chance of deterring aggression: it provides for a graduated application of force, but is based on all-out — not graduated — deterrence.
- Title: *Sino-Soviet Relations and the Summit.*
- Author: Ritvo, Herbert.
- Publication: PROBLEMS OF COMMUNISM, September-October, 1958, p. 47-49.
- Annotation: The author refutes the theory that Mao called the plays in the Soviet strategy regarding the "summit meeting" on the Middle East; instead, he supports the idea that the Chinese have parroted the Moscow line on every phase of Khrushchev's maneuvers.
- Title: *Marxism and Early Indonesian Islamic Nationalism.*
- Author: von der Mehden, Fred R.
- Publication: POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY, September, 1958, p. 335-351.
- Annotation: Uses the Indonesian situation as an example of the influence of Marxism on Moslem areas in which it can exploit colonial people's hatred of imperialism and capitalism

and their capacity to synthesize Islamic beliefs with Marxist elements.

- Title:** *Communism and Nationalism in Latin America.*
- Author:** Alba, Victor.
- Publication:** PROBLEMS OF COMMUNISM, September-October, 1958, p. 24-31.
- Annotation:** Examines the Communists' encouragement of a new type of negative nationalism in Latin American countries and its exploitation for their own political purposes.
- Title:** *Formosa's Future.*
- Author:** Lindsay, Michael.
- Publication:** THE NEW REPUBLIC, October 6, 1958, p. 8-11.
- Annotation:** Presents the background of Formosa and analyzes the present political feeling and causes for Red China's Quemoy action at this time — discussing two main difficulties in negotiating a withdrawal from Quemoy and Matsu.
- Title:** *The Soviet "Drang nach Süden."*
- Author:** Dallin, David J.
- Publication:** PROBLEMS OF COMMUNISM, September-October, 1958, p. 50-52.
- Annotation:** Traces the history of the Russian aim to bring the Middle East under U. S. S. R. control.
- Title:** *Freedom of the Sea.*
- Author:** Dean, Arthur H.
- Publication:** FOREIGN AFFAIRS, October, 1958, p. 83-94.
- Annotation:** Discusses the complex and controversial issues considered at the Conference on the Law of the Sea, held at Geneva from February 24 to April 28, 1958, under U. N. auspices, and the resolutions agreed upon.
- Title:** *Norwegian Defense Problems: The Role of the Navy.*
- Author:** Araldsen, O. P.; Captain, Royal Norwegian Navy.

- Publication:** U. S. NAVAL INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS, October, 1958, p. 38-47.
- Annotation:** Discusses Norway's strategic importance to NATO structure and the problems faced by the country in effectively fulfilling its responsibilities in NATO defense from the naval point of view.
- Title:** *Military Fuel Demand to Hit New Peak.*
- Publication:** THE OIL AND GAS JOURNAL, October 6, 1958, p. 103-106.
- Annotation:** Forecasts military needs in petroleum and how the needs will change in future years.
- Title:** *Stand-By Police Force.*
- Author:** Frye, William R.
- Publication:** THE NATION, September 27, 1958, p. 164-166.
- Annotation:** Discusses the problems of setting up, preparing and financing a modest U. N. stand-by peace force, composed of manpower from within member states' own forces, for the purpose of representing the moral authority of the United Nations.
- Title:** *Defense: The Converging Decisions.*
- Author:** Murphy, Charles J. V.
- Publication:** FORTUNE, October, 1958, p. 118-120, 227-231.
- Annotation:** Discusses the disagreement on defense policy within Congress and within the Pentagon: limited war vs. general-war capability; the goals of each service; the weapons planned or in process to bridge the possible gap between Russian and U. S. missiles; and in what ratio the defense budget is to be apportioned.
- Title:** *We're Losing the Antarctic.*
- Author:** Cromley, Ray.
- Publication:** THE AMERICAN MERCURY, November, 1958, p. 5-11.
- Annotation:** Explores the United States' delay in taking claim to Antarctica, and reports action being taken by other countries.
- Title:** *Formosa Through China's Eyes.*
- Author:** Fairbank, John K.
- Publication:** THE NEW REPUBLIC, October 13, 1958, p. 9-10.

- Annotation:** Attempts to present the Formosa problem as seen through Chinese Nationalist eyes in the light of past Chinese history and culture.
- Title:** *Indonesia and the Commonwealth in South-East Asia: A Re-Appraisal.*
- Author:** Cowan, C. D.
- Publication:** INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, October, 1958, p. 454-468.
- Annotation:** A review of the entire problem of the unity of Indonesia from the standpoint of its history and postwar development; considers application of this situation to other Commonwealth countries in South-East Asia.
- Title:** *The Case for Seaplane Airlift.*
- Author:** Welling, William B.
- Publication:** NATIONAL DEFENSE TRANSPORTATION JOURNAL, September-October, 1958, p. 46-51.
- Annotation:** A timely article on airlift, offering military opinions and detailing the Martin Company's contention in the "Sea-Mistress" concept.
- Title:** *The Human Factor in Space Travel.*
- Publication:** AIR UNIVERSITY QUARTERLY REVIEW, Summer, 1958.
- Annotation:** Entire issue is devoted to a study of "The Human Factor in Space Travel," with eleven articles by different writers (five of whom are doctors) featuring various aspects of "the human factor."
- Title:** *The Reorganization Act of 1958*
- Author:** Burke, Arleigh , Admiral, United States Navy.
- Publication:** JAG JOURNAL, October, 1958, p. 3-4.
- Annotation:** The Chief of Naval Operations interprets the Defense Reorganization Act and the changes effected thereby
- Title:** *Challenge to Peace in the Far East.*
- Author:** Dulles, John Foster.
- Publication:** THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN, October 13, 1958, p. 561-566.
- Annotation:** An address on economic relations between the United States and Asian countries and on various facets of the China problem.