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GEOGRAPHY AND STRATEGY: THEIR INTER-RELATIONSHIP

A lecture delivered
at the Naval War College
on 17 September 1957 by
Professor Saul B. Cohen

The topic of my discussion today is *Geography and Strategy: Their Interrelationship*. Let me say at the outset that this is one of those topics that suffers as much in its being oversold as in its being undersold. The oversellers have a rigid, almost deterministic approach. They proclaim that geography determines strategy because it dictates state policies.

The Nature of Geography

In actuality, geography does not determine strategy. Indeed, geography, *per se*, does not even influence or condition strategy. What is the case is that man's *knowledge* of geography and the ideas that he derives from this knowledge influence and condition strategy.

This may sound like hairsplitting to some of you, but I submit that the difference is one of concept not of semantics, and hope to demonstrate this during the course of the lecture.

Why have analysts taken the approach that "geography conditions or influences strategy?" Perhaps the answer lies in the fact that all too many who have written on this theme have only a hazy idea of what geography is. No less an authority than the late Professor Nicholas Spykman at times fell into the trap of assuming that geography meant the factors of size, shape, location, typography and climate, and nothing more. He therefore was guilty of stating, "Because the geographic characteristics of states are relatively unchanging and unchangeable, the

geographic demands of these states will remain the same for centuries.”¹ Others, too numerous to mention, really talk only about topography when they discuss geography; that is, they only concern themselves with descriptions of slopes. Harold and Margaret Sprout, themselves primarily political scientists, state the problem frankly in a recent monograph. I quote: “Political scientists who specialize in international relations do not seem to be acquainted in the main with the methodical literature of geographic science. They are much more likely, in our judgment, to have derived their ideas about geography from the writings of Spykman, Wright, and other non-geographers.”²

If we know what geography is not, then we must proceed to ask ourselves what it is. Only if we are clear as to the substance and methods of this discipline can we successfully relate it to strategy. A simplified definition is that *geography is the study of man in reciprocal relation to the stage that is this earth of ours*. The essence of its methodology is to map, analyze and interpret the areal significance of this interrelationship — to show how and why man-earth relationships differ from place to place on the earth’s surface.

A surveyor tells us that Canada has 3,846,000 square miles. A geographer tells us that 80% of Canada is climatically unsuited to mass settlement; that, in reality, the Canada that can support a settled people on a vast scale is 750,000 square miles in area.

It is important to know the “wheres” and “whys” of physical elements like climate, soils, vegetation and rock structure (especially as it relates to mineral distribution). But geography does not stop with the physical environment. It maps and analyzes cultural differences as related to this physical environment. During the Middle East’s Khamsin periods (the hot, dusty, desert-

¹Spykman, N. “Geography and Foreign Policy,” *American Political Science Review*, Feb., 1938.

²Sprout, Harold and Margaret, *Man-Milieu Relationship Hypothesis in the Context of International Politics*, Center of International Studies, Princeton University, 1956, p. 37.

born winds), human energy and productivity decreases. Knowing that humid coastal areas are even more adversely affected by such winds than higher plateaus helps us understand people's actions during that period.

Differences among peoples within a country may have developed, or become accentuated, because of isolation imposed by the terrain. Thus, the Basques developed a separate language and way of life from the people of the Spanish Meseta because of the isolating effects of the Pyrenees. The Kurds, in northern Iraq, are a mountaineering grazing people, who differ racially, linguistically and culturally from the Arabs of Mesopotamia. They constitute a separatist element in modern Iraq. Often, such differences make it difficult for a state to achieve strong, centralized control.

These and other examples can be cited, but the essence can be summed up thus: people and their activities differ from place to place. Often, although certainly not always, these differences can be explained in cause-effect terms that stem from the study of geographic relationships. In examining the cause-effect relationships between the earth and man, many have been tempted to overinflate the influences of the environment in this relationship. Perhaps some of you are acquainted with an old story designed to point up man's relative insignificance in relation to nature. As the story goes, were it possible to pack all mankind into a box, as with sardines, such a box would be small enough to fit into the Grand Canyon. And the story heightens man's insignificance by suggesting that if the box could teeter on a knife's edge at the lip of the canyon, the wagging of a dog's tail could push the box and all mankind with it into oblivion.

Now this story tries to illustrate the role of physical geography in relation to man — but in a distorted manner. Certainly we will agree that geography is not simply a recognition of the existence of that deep chasm on the earth's surface that we call

the Grand Canyon. Were we to state that the Grand Canyon is a feature of the broken Colorado Plateau that has been cut by weathering and stream erosion to a depth of 6,000 feet and a width of 5 to 15 miles, that resistant limestone and sandstone strata cause steep cliffs on each side of the Canyon, that above the inner gorge are softer formations — mainly shale — that form a gently sloping platform, that the river itself is a V-shaped notch cut into ancient crystalline rocks, we would not be dealing with geography but rather with physiography (land-form analysis).

The geography of the Grand Canyon involves relating the physiography to tourism, to the directions that various trails can take, to the stream drop of seven feet per mile, the rapids, the potential for water power and the conditions of navigation. Geography therefore involves earth-man interrelationships.

But to use the size of the Grand Canyon to express nature's dwarfing of man is not particularly well taken. Man can dam the Colorado and fill the Canyon with water, if he is so disposed. He can, with nuclear energy, blast new holes of equal magnitude or fill present ones. He can bridge the Canyon, or fly over it. If he desires, and is willing to pay the price, man *can* move mountains. I say this not because we are likely to move many mountains, but to point out that nature only overpowers us with its immensity when we do not want to go through or over it. Obviously man's sights, desires and capabilities differ from place to place over the earth's surface. What we can think of and are capable of carrying out in the United States is far different from human aspirations and capabilities in Mozambique, and part of what we are is a product of our physical environment. When, therefore, we consider man and his activities in relation to his environment, we have to take into account his specific view of the environment from his specific framework of thought and activities. But, let us not make the mistake of underestimating man as an active agent in relation to nature.

The Nature of Political Geography

Turning to the specific relationship between geography and national strategy, we must first explore that branch of geography that is known as Political Geography and that is defined as “the *Comparative Strategy of Space, Resources, and Men.*” Political Geography seeks out the relationships between the physical and the cultural environment, on the one hand, and differentiated political space on the other. From these relationships Political Geography offers a basis for national strategy in times of both peace and war, because national strategy’s concern is to make the best use of all of a nation’s resources to realize national policy. To utilize concepts derived from Political Geography, the strategist draws upon the following kinds of information :

1. The physical environment, such as landforms (including coastal configuration), climate, weather, soils, vegetation, water bodies, accessways.
2. The transportation and communication of goods, men and ideas — most fittingly termed “circulation.”
3. Economic resources, employed and potential, and the stage of technology at which these resources are being employed.
4. Population — its distribution and characteristics, including sectional and national psychology.
5. The body politic — its apparatus, characteristics, ideals and goals. This may be treated on various levels, from the national state to an administrative component of that state, such as a province, or to a regional grouping of national states and other political bodies.
6. Space, including location, shape and boundaries, as they affect internal character and external relations of political bodies.

The Power Inventory

Not all of these factors need be taken into account in weighing specific problems of geography-strategy interrelations. Indeed, much of our analysis work suffers from an overabundance of data — from an attempt to collect all possible features of the physical and cultural environment only to founder for lack of a common index base. The crux of the problem is to search out the elements that are germane and can be fruitfully applied.

For example, we have become increasingly concerned with space and numbers in assessing the relative strength of nations and blocs. China and India especially loom important on the power scene to those analysts who feel that the weight of their populations may tip the balance of world power. The geographer has to concern himself with space and numbers — but not as the statistician does. Instead, we try to search out meaningful relationships. Sheer numbers are translated into population densities. These densities are expressed in terms of arable land (which, in turn, reflects climate, soil, slope, etc.). The numbers are expressed in terms of urbanized population — a good index for reflecting technology. The raw material base can be expressed by such a factor as steel production.

The following tables suggest how the power inventory can be used in manageable terms. Table I draws together the basic data and the index base. Table II shows that there is no single answer to the power base, but rather a series of answers that depend for their selection upon the intelligence and experience of the analyst (for which no electronic computer can substitute).

What this method cannot quantify is the ideological strength, policies and goals of the political units. It can only provide the framework from which to study these aspects.

TABLE I
AN INVENTORY OF NATIONAL POWER

	Total Area in Square Miles	Pop. Density Square Miles Arable Land	Total Population	Urban Population	Per Cent of Urban to Total Pop.	Arable Land in Square Miles	Steel Production in Tons*
U. S.	2,977,128	240	170 mil.	114 mil.	67%	700,000	88 mil.
U. S. S. R.	8,954,400	235	210 "	86 "	41%	900,000	45 "
CHINA	3,490,301	1,900	630 "	75 "	12%	330,000	5.6***
INDIA	1,138,814	740	390 "	65 "	17%	520,000	6 ***
BRAZIL	3,288,050	800	60 "	22 "	37%	75,000	1.3"
CANADA	3,854,144	110	16 "	10 "	62%	145,000	3.2"
WESTERN EUROPE	1,219,300	980	280 "	165 "	60%	285,000	71 "

SAME DATA TRANSLATED INTO INDEX TERMS

U. S.	2.7	8	10.6	11.4	5.6	9.3	68
U. S. S. R.	8.1	8	13.1	8.6	3.4	12	34
CHINA	3.2	1	39.4	7.5	1	4.4	4.3
INDIA	1	2.6	24.4	6.5	1.4	6.9	4.6
BRAZIL	3	2.4	3.8	2.2	3.1	1	1
CANADA	3.5	17.3	1	1	5.2	1.9	2.5
WESTERN EUROPE	1.1	1.9	15	16.5	5	3.8	55

*1954 statistics were used because they seem to best reflect national steel production ratios for the foreseeable future. U. S. production in 1955 was 115 mil. tons (1957 capacity is rated at 133 mil. tons), and Western European steel production for 1955 was 80 million tons.

**achievable target.

TABLE II

	Average Composite Index	Average Index, Excluding Total Population	Average Index Excluding Total Pop. and Urban Population	Average Index for Total Area, Arable Land, Urban Pop.
U. S.	16.5	17.5	18.7	7.8
U. S. S. R.	12.5	12.4	13.1	9.5
CHINA	8.7	3.6	2.8	5
INDIA	6.8	3.8	3.3	4.8
BRAZIL	2.4	2.1	2.1	2.1
CANADA	4.6	5.4	6.1	2.1
WESTERN EUROPE	14	13.9	13.3	7.1

Framework of Analysis

Basic to all geopolitical analyses are two distinctive features — methods and tools. The methods used are comparative; they mark off and analyze differences between political units of space in the light of the physical and cultural environment. The tools are maps and other vehicles for representing the distribution of the elements under consideration. Without the map, there can be no geography, because it is the map — either visual or in our mind's eye — that enables us to apperceive the differences that exist from place to place on the earth's surface.

There are four levels on which to treat geography and strategy: global, regional, national and local. While they cannot be completely separated from one another, global and regional views, with their emphasis on large-scale spatial groupings or associations, generally emphasize different types of geographical data than views concerned with specific national states or portions of those states. I will limit this discussion to geography as it relates to global strategy and to some of the major geopolitical patterns that have been derived from various views of the earth.

The starting point for all geopolitical views is *space*. Space is the expression of the distribution of the total gamut of the physical and cultural features of the environment and their interrelationship. Thus, spatial relations are a geographer's simplified approach to an understanding of earth-man political interrelationships. But views of the significance of space differ, because each analyst works within two environmental frameworks: the environment as he thinks it is, and the environment as it actually is. Sprout has used the terms "apperceived environment" and "operational environment" to distinguish between the two.³ This takes us back to the point made at the beginning of the hour — that man's knowledge of geography and the ideas and concepts that flow from this knowledge are what condition strategy.

³Sprout, Harold and Margaret, *Ibid.*

Admiral Arleigh Burke has mentioned that Navy planners had, several years ago, predicted the current lines of development of the Soviet Navy.⁴ This is an example of how American analysts were able to project themselves into the geopolitical environment of Soviet naval planners and to view the world from their standpoint. It is also probably true that the apperceived and the operational environments of Soviet planners were almost alike, for the better the data and the more rational the use of this data, the more these environments are likely to coincide. From a Soviet point of view, as well as from our view of their view, aircraft carriers are unrealistic. But if we were to try to predict the lines of development of, let us say, the Egyptian Navy, we might not be able to anticipate the fact that for prestige purposes they might aspire to a carrier despite the complete illogic of the situation. This example is, of course, an extreme case of illogic, but I hope that it demonstrates the point.

Geopolitical Views of the Earth

Global views of the earth first take stock of the patterns of arrangement of lands and waters. One view is that Eurasia and Africa constitute 66% of the earth's total land area and include 85% of the earth's population. Encircling this huge landmass are open seas that are three times as vast as all of the land combined. Here, then, is a distinct view of what we can call "World Island." Its focus is the center of the earth's largest landmass. Another view is of the Northern Hemisphere — i.e., Eurasia, North Africa, and North and Central America. This embraces 80% of the earth's land area and 85% of its people. The focus for this global view is the air and ocean space that links North America with Eurasia. There are other global views, such as the one that centers on the Atlantic, and views the adjoining Americas, Europe and Africa as the key landmasses of the earth.

From these differing views of the earth's spatial patterns have evolved differing strategic views. One is that control of the

⁴Burke, Arleigh A., "Problems Confronting the Navy Today," Lecture to the Naval War College, September 9, 1957.

heart of Eurasia could mean world domination. Another is that control of those peninsular lands which rim Asia, like Western Europe, the Middle East, South and East Asia could mean world domination. Another is that control of the Polar World by one power could spell world control. Still another is that a two-or three-Great Power World can achieve geopolitical balance.

Regardless of the various viewpoints, this much is clear: strategists ascribe varying degrees of importance to various parts of the earth, so that political and military actions are greatly influenced by their geographical views.

This also applies on the national, or even local, level. Certain countries or portions of countries differ from one another physically and culturally. It is strategically significant to know these differences, whether we refer to pass routes, factory distributions, internal religious rivalries, or economic differences from place to place. Knowing the geography of an area in detail is a prerequisite to applying a sound strategy towards it, in war or in peace.

Because the ideas that various people hold about geography differ, their views on geography's influence upon strategy are bound to differ. This does not mean that there are absolutely no common or universal views of the geopolitical environment. When we place the emphasis upon physiographic or climatic patterns, or upon the distribution of land and seas, we start with essentially the same framework. But as we relate these elements to the distribution and circulation of men, goods and ideas, we come up with appraisals that are unique products of their framers. In this sense, there is no single answer — there is no *one* geopolitical view of the world.

Let us now turn to some of the more important appraisals of earth geopolitical patterns — appraisals that have influenced the minds of those who have guided the destinies of states for the past three-quarters of a century.

Mahan — Unity of the Seas

Alfred T. Mahan, the second President of this War College and one of the first to relate his views on geography to global strategy, sketched out certain geopolitical patterns in a career of lectures and writings that commenced 71 years ago. His global view emphasized the unity of the sea as a means of controlling the sea from key land bases. He recognized: (1) the significance of Russia's dominant location in Central Asia; (2) the advantages and disadvantages of its landlocked position; (3) the instability of the zone between the thirty and forty degree parallels in Asia — an instability which, at that time, made this area a crush zone between Britain and Russia; and (4) the significance of Panama and Suez as marking the southern limit of most active commerce and politics. This last view, of course, did not recognize the possibility of shipping becoming too large for these canals.

What is especially important is that Mahan spoke not of sea power as such, but of sea-transported power. In this view, unified control of the landbase (from either land or air) is essential to a unified control of the sea. Mahan's views of the world, as well as those of so many who followed him, was Eurasian-centered.

Mackinder and Land Power

Next, we turn to the views of Sir Halford J. Mackinder — that most remarkable Englishman whose geographic writings and lectures over the span of half a century led to the establishment of modern geography as a university field in Britain. He is perhaps best known for the influence of his writings upon German geographers and German geopoliticians.

Mackinder was trained in biology, history, and law, as well as in topography, strategy and geography. This will explain his interest in historical analogies, as well as in the ecological studies that led him to geography and, finally, to diplomacy. Some measure of his philosophy can be discerned from the following quota-

tion, "Man and not nature initiates but nature in large measure controls. My concern is with the general physical control, rather than the causes of universal history."⁵

Seldom have one man's theories been as exposed to critical examination as have Mackinder's over the past decade — this, after nearly four decades of passive or uncritical acceptance. But, after all is said and done, most strategists continue to view the world as suggested by Mackinder. The American Foreign Policy of Containment of the Postwar Era, with its overseas alliances peripheral to the Eurasian landmass, continues to view the world as seen by Mackinder.

His theory, first postulated in 1904, was that the inner area of Eurasia is the pivot region of world politics. He warned that rule of the heart of the world's greatest landmass could become the basis for world domination. This view of the earth was not essentially different from that of Mahan (although it was sketched out in far greater geographic detail), but the interpretation differed significantly. Mackinder warned that it was entirely possible for the landpower that gained control of the pivot area (be it Russia, Germany or even China) to outflank the maritime world.

What many critics have failed to note, as they have expounded on Mackinder's theories, is that his views of the world kept changing. As a geographer, Mackinder was more aware than most of his critics that man's use of the physical environment constantly changes, and even the environment itself changes, albeit on a minute scale and at a slower pace.

I am going to show you three maps that will demonstrate how and why Mackinder changed his views of the world. In Map 1, the pivot area, as defined in 1904, was that part of Eastern Europe and Northern Asia characterized by polar or interior drainage.

⁵Mackinder, H. J., "The Geographical Pivot of History," *Geographical Journal*, Vol. 23, 1904, pp. 442.

In Map 2, the Heartland, as defined in 1919, included all of Central and Eastern Europe, and the Tibetan and Mongolian upland courses of the great rivers of India and China.⁶ This map took into account advances in land transportation, population increases and industrialization. Because of these advances, Mackinder felt that the Baltic and Black Sea areas were strategically part of the Heartland. These western lands were part of the Eurasian Lowland Plain, and lay within the winter snowline.

In 1943, at the age of 83, Mackinder published an article which reexamined the Heartland.⁷ In the article he discarded his 1919 dictum, which had been: "Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland. Who rules the Heartland commands the World Island. Who rules the World Island commands the World."


Unfortunately, Mackinder drew no map to accompany his article. I have therefore prepared a map which cartographically expresses what Mackinder wrote. First, Lenaland (the Central Siberian Tableland) is detached from the Heartland. Thus, Heartland now consisted largely of the cleared forest and steppe portions of Eurasia.

More important, Mackinder's concept of the map of the world has changed. He now spoke of a North Atlantic geopolitical unit as being as significant as the Heartland — its transpolar counterpart. He also referred to monsoonal Asia and the South Atlantic Basin as important geopolitical units of the future.

The changing yardsticks that Mackinder used in drawing the boundaries for Heartland indicate that the original concept of the pivot area of the world had changed from that of an area of movement (i.e., as a region of mobility for land forces) to one of a "power citadel," based upon people, resources and interior lines. The three maps — which reflect his changing views of the earth — and the composite one indicate that he was well aware of technological developments, including airpower.

⁶Mackinder, H. J. *Democratic Ideals and Reality*, Holt & Co., New York, 1942.


⁷Mackinder, H. J. "The Round World and the Winning of the Peace," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 21, No. 4, July, 1943.



MACKINDER'S THEORY - 1904

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
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
MACKINDER'S THEORY 1943



- | | | | |
|---|---------------------|---|----------------------------------|
|  | HEARTLAND |  | GIRDLE OF DESERTS AND WILDERNESS |
|  | MIDLAND OCEAN BASIN |  | GREAT OCEAN DRAINAGE |

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It is futile to debate the merits of Mackinder's views today unless we take into account the changes which he himself made during his lifetime. There are, of course, certain weaknesses that the Heartland theory exhibits. One is that its centrality is not necessarily an advantage, because of the concentration of targets in the event of air attack from peripheral lands. Another fact, unforeseen up to World War II's end, is that the Soviet Union is today far better equipped to control Eastern Europe's tidal lands than is Germany. Thus, we might rephrase the dictum to state that who rules the European and West Siberian portions of the U. S. S. R. commands the rest of Eastern Europe.

What happens if we accept Mackinder's general thesis and apply it to the crucial problem of Germany? Both the United States and the Soviet Union claim to favor German reunification. However, their inability to reach a workable agreement may be conditioned by the geopolitical situation sketched by Mackinder.

The present boundary between the German Federal Republic and East Germany follows the lower reaches of the Elbe, and then swings westward to include the Harz Mountains and the Thuringian Forest. It divides a seaward-oriented manufacturing state from a landward-oriented industrial state, in which agriculture plays a relatively stronger role. Mackinder's 1943 western Heartland boundary did not attempt to follow a sharp line, but was simply indicated as a border zone running through Central Europe. The present boundary between East and West Germany generally coincides with this.

The Iron Curtain has made a Rimland State of West Germany as thoroughly as it has made a Heartland State of East Germany. If Germany succeeds in reuniting, what will the consequences be? A reunited, but neutralized, Germany would constitute the broadest and most utilized portion of the Heartland-Rimland frontier zone. It would be the only part of the boundary that does not have a barrier nature. It could remain neutral only through its own desires and efforts. A reunited Germany that

became thoroughly oriented towards the Heartland power would make the independence of the European Rimland untenable. Were such a Germany to throw in its lot with the Rimland world, the existence of this landward extension would be a permanent bone of contention, although not necessarily crucial to the survival ability of Heartland. The maintenance of political stability, from the viewpoint suggested by Mackinder, would therefore call for either the status quo or a thoroughly neutralized, united Germany.

Spykman and Interior Sea Lines

Nicholas Spykman had the same global view as did Mackinder, but rejected the land-power doctrine to say, "Who controls the Rimland rules Eurasia; who rules Eurasia controls the destinies of the world."⁸ To Spykman, the Rimland, or the peninsular lands of World Island, was the key to the struggle for the world. In the past, the fragmentation of the Western European portion of Rimland, and the power of the United Kingdom and the United States, made unitary control of the Rimland impossible. Spykman feared that one power, such as Germany, might seize control of European Rimland and then sweep onto the other portions through various combinations of conquests and alliances, using ship superiority and command of a network of naval and air bases around Eurasia. Certainly there is still much to be said in favor of the sea lanes surrounding Eurasia as being interior lines of communication as far as the movement of goods are concerned. Also, aircraft carriers have given a mobility in the use of aircraft to ocean basin powers that fixed land air bases lack.

The inadequacy of Spykman's doctrine is today most clearly apparent from the fact that no Rimland power appears to be capable of organizing all of the Rimland. A United Western Europe would have to depend upon complete control of the Mediterranean, North Africa, Africa south of the Sahara, and Australia to exert its strategic dominance upon the remainder of the Rimland,

⁸Spykman, N. *The Geography of the Peace*, Harcourt, Brace & Co., New York, 1944.

and could succeed only if Heartland were not to intervene. Today's realities are that the Outer Crescent, or continental islands like the America's, Africa south of the Sahara, and Australia, and the large islands off the Eurasian shore — like the United Kingdom and Japan — are in competition with the Heartland for the lands and the minds of Rimland peoples. Complete control of Rimland by either side would mean world domination. A Rimland divided or neutralized means a world more nearly in power balance. But it is important to note that rule of the Heartland does not automatically mean command of World Island, nor is it true that rule of Rimland without the combination of the Outer Crescent commands Eurasia.

Geopolitical views of the world condition man's thinking in military-strategic terms. This applies not only to those who formulate grand strategy, but to the general public that must accept it and carry it out. The American Postwar Policy of Containment rests upon the views of the world that were first presented by Mackinder and Spykman. But the importance of interior lines of land communication, even between parts of the Rimland, looms greater today than in Spykman's considerations. Thus, the China landbase was able to sustain North Korea and Northern Vietnam, in spite of the control of the seas and the air by off-shore powers. Communist development of networks of rails and modern highways in South China and North Vietnam, as the sinews of politic-economic penetration have put Laos and Northern Thailand in more critical positions.


The development of railroads in Sinkiang, Mongolia and Tibet by the Chinese is an interesting example of a Rimland power penetrating parts of what Mackinder included in his 1919 Heartland. Indeed, he warned of a Chinese-dominated pivot area in his very first article. One might suggest that, in the long run, Sinkiang will be more easily controlled from the Heartland (Russian Turkestan) than from North China by means of the railroad now being built from Lake Balkash to Lanchow, but

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THE WORLD ACCORDING TO SPYKMAN

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this is not the case for Tibet. China's great space, and its influence on both Tibet and Vietnam, foreshadow the use of land connections to threaten India as well as Southeastern Asia. While China strengthens its position in Southern Tibet, the Tarim Desert, the Karakoram Mountains, the Kun Lun Mountains and the Tibet Basin, are a formidable barrier to competition from her northern Heartland ally. The remainder of the Rimland is less susceptible to landbased conquest from adjoining Rimland areas, but, of course, more susceptible to Heartland's pressures.

The Air Age

The impact of the air age upon geopolitical thought has produced a variety of views. In 1944, Renner suggested that the war plane had united the Heartland of Eurasia with a second and somewhat smaller Heartland in Anglo-America, across Arctic ice fields, to form a new, expanded Heartland within the Northern Hemisphere. A major attribute of this new pivotal area would be the mutual vulnerability of its Eurasian and its Anglo-American portions across the Arctic. Such a pivotal area would not only be a great Heartland in the power sense of the word — it would also afford the advantages of interior air, sea and land routes against most of the rest of the world. Within such a Heartland, the polar world, as the arena of movement, might well be the key to Heartland — and, therefore, world control.

Another opinion, that of de Seversky, takes a unitary global view, rejecting geopolitical units.⁹ Such a theory seems to reject concepts of Heartland, Rimland, and World Island, and preaches that long-range intercontinental bombers and guided missiles make overseas bases undesirable and unnecessary. This is the school of air isolationism, presupposing that a power which has the necessary economic resources, or control of those resources, can dominate the world — regardless of its location. But, if, as is the case today, several parts of the world may become

⁹de Seversky, A. *Air Power: Key to Survival*, Simon and Schuster, New York, 1950.

equally capable of mustering such resources, then the comparative advantage of strategic spatial units reemerges.

There is the widespread opinion that the development of nuclear weapons by both the United States and the U. S. S. R. is the great deterrent to all-out global warfare. Under such circumstances local wars or subversion reemerge as the weapons for world dominance and Heartland and Rimland regain significance as concepts of strategic space. Military aircraft and routes are highly variable in this long-distance air age. They can conquer space and time. But air bases are not variable — or, on sea, are variable in a limited time-distance sense only. A string of bases on American soil and around the periphery of the Soviet Union gives a spatial advantage over counterpart Soviet bases. And even in the guided missile age, where location may be of little significance in an offensive sense, the ability to scatter bases and launching sites on both land and sea will be a prime locational advantage for Western counterattacks.

Today's logistical goals are to conquer space by shortening supply lines. Building up peripheral bases to a point where they can be indefinitely maintained through stockpiles or local production has been our goal in Japan and the United Kingdom. Improving ports and roads, and building pipelines, has been our program in Spain. Keeping control of overseas supply centers, although the actual places may vary through time, is at present necessary. Thus, for example, whether Cyprus, Suez, North Africa, Southern Italy, or the Mediterranean Sea is the most advisable locus for a marshaling base is less important than the fact that *somewhere* in a key area, or overlooking the area, there is need for a foothold for enforcing such doctrine as the American Doctrine for the Middle East. In the future, although time may not be gained by a dispersal of overseas land or sea bases, the spatial advantages so gained will be of vital importance to our ability to retaliate to Soviet counterdefensive measures and thus appear basic to the doctrine of deterrence.

Circulation and Geopolitics

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization reflects another geopolitical concept. Here, military alliance stems from the unity of the North Atlantic, and its associated sea arms. Command of the air and sea entrances to the Arctic — through Spitzbergen and Greenland, and, to a lesser extent, Iceland — is vital. Control of the Mediterranean preserves sea unity and furnishes a protective screen to North Africa. But, an ocean basin cannot be divided arbitrarily by latitudinal lines for strategic purposes, and the South Atlantic should not be neglected in the broad geopolitical sense. The voices that are now being raised in favor of broadening the North Atlantic Alliance into an overall Atlantic Alliance are pressing for a more perfect geopolitical unit in this respect.

The German geopoliticians presented us with a suggested organization of the earth along Pan-Regional lines. They divided the earth into three units: (1) Pan-America, to be headed by the United States; (2) Pan-Eurafrica, to be headed by Germany (and to include the British Isles and the U. S. S. R.); and (3) Pan-Asia, to be headed by Japan. The Pan-Regions were organized along north-south lines to provide for complementary products and peoples. The need for vast, contiguous space as a prerequisite for power, and for self-sufficient economies, was their rationale.


The inadequacies of the Pan-Regional concept, in both the political and strategic sense, have been pointed out by many. But it would be well to remember that the Pan-Eurafrican concept may be closer to realization today than it ever was in the past. Western Europe is now far more dependent upon Africa south of the Sahara as a complementary subtropical and tropical world than it was before World War Two. It obtains 43% of its tropical imports from this region. And, in the current efforts to unite Europe's economy — first, through the six-nation common market organization — the Common Market Investment Fund will contribute development capital to African colonial areas. If a broader

Free Trade Europe were to emerge, then Commonwealth, Portuguese and Spanish African spheres might be added to those of France, Belgium and Italy.




In the geopolitical views that are current, the major emphasis is placed upon the distribution of the earth's land and sea features. The unity of the waters of the globe are usually taken for granted. Only the Pan-Regional theory challenged this to any substantial degree.

I feel that we have tended to oversimplify the picture. Not all lands which lie along the sea — and which we call maritime lands — are truly seaward-oriented. This may be due to an inhospitable coast, to a lack of a basis for overland trade, or to a variety of political and historical factors. To illustrate this, I have prepared a map based upon the ratio of imports to national income. This is a generalized picture of the dependence of certain nations upon imports. The map reflects a variety of factors, such as continentality, underdevelopment or absence of resources for manufacturing, colonialism and alliances. This is a map of the earth as seen by an individual — the strategic implications that it contains are therefore the product of a specific *approach* to geography, not a product of geography itself. If we look at the world as seen on this map, we note that certain parts of the so-called maritime world are far more dependent upon sea lanes than other parts. What we see is a group of four trade-oriented "islands," which we have called *Interior Seas and Africa*. A second grouping is trade-oriented, but to a lesser extent. This, we have called *Peripheral Ocean*. Lastly, we have the self-contained countries, mostly *Circumpolar* within the Northern Hemisphere. The economic and strategic interests of these groupings vary, but the trade "islands," above all, must be free to trade with one another and with the rest of the world. The global nature of the American commitment is readily apparent from this map. As long as our important allies are so heavily dependent upon overseas trade, we will have to help them maintain their sea contacts.

GEOPOLITICS AND TRADE



IMPORTS AS A PERCENT OF NATIONAL INCOME

- | | | | |
|---|--------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|
|  | 1% TO 10% | SELF-CONTAINED COUNTRIES | -CIRCUM-POLAR LAND |
|  | 11% TO 24% | INTERMEDIATE COUNTRIES | -PERIPHERAL OCEAN |
|  | 25% AND OVER | TRADE DEPENDENT COUNTRIES | -INTERIOR SEAS AND AFRICA |

F.L.M.

Another feature of this map is to suggest that the classical ideas about land-oriented and sea-oriented countries need re-examination. Redefining these ideas cannot fail to have geopolitical implications.

As an example, we can reconsider the term Rimland in the light of this map. Rimland, as defined by Spykman and uncritically accepted by the first proponents of the Containment Doctrine, refers to the sea-oriented portions of Eurasia. These are taken to be the four peninsular bulges of the landmass. In many respects, East and South Asia appear to have much more in common with the pivot lands of Interior Asia than with the maritime world. Yet, because of the barrier of mountains and deserts that separate East and South Asia from Interior Siberia, we tend to classify them as sea-oriented Rimlands.

Perhaps a reexamination of the Rimland concept will help us to understand more clearly the role that the so-called "gray areas" have to play, as we consider American strategy. I might add, parenthetically, that the symbolism of the color that has been selected to describe this area from Iran to Korea escapes me. Call it "green" for its characteristic vegetational color, "non-white" for skin pigment, "pink" for politics — but why "gray?"

A containment policy that views the world through the "Heartland-Rimland" looking glass draws us into grave strategic errors, for all parts of the Eurasian littoral are not of equal strategic significance to the West. We must, in our global approach, distinguish between those parts of the world that: (1) warrant American support and direct American intervention, even at the risk of total war; (2) those parts that warrant direct American intervention with the maximum risk of a limited nuclear war; (3) those parts that should be indirectly supported; and (4) those parts that should fend for themselves militarily. Only if we do this can we form alliances that will carry out the objectives of our strategy, rather than dictate our strategy.

In the first category are the American Caribbean, Western Europe, Australia and the Japanese Islands. In the second category are key parts of Africa and the Middle East — Soviet control of which would make Europe's position wholly untenable — and Brazil, without whose support the Caribbean is endangered. Broadly speaking, these two categories include the Atlantic Basin and lands overlooking the open Pacific.

Setting up the third category recognizes that some areas, especially those committed to the Free World Ideology with the will and capacity to help themselves, should be supported, but not at the risk of direct American involvement. When, for example, we decided to abstain from intervention in Indo-China, were we not admitting that a good deal of Southeast Asia was not strategically crucial to the survival of the Western World?

Finally, there are those countries which should be left to fend for themselves in a strategic sense. Neither Mainland East nor South Asia appears to be part of the maritime-oriented world. We have neither the manpower, equipment nor the money to assure that these areas remain part of the ring of containment around the Soviet Union. Our position will be best served if these areas can be helped to live and prosper as neutrals, being aided economically and encouraged to develop free institutions. We should not, however, allow ourselves to become involved in their military defense, for our strategic position will not be crucially undermined if they should turn to Moscow. Implicit in these observations is the fact that geographic areas need not be treated as strategic "wholes." In this respect, it is unsound to issue blanket invitations to countries of certain areas to enter defense pacts, because of the possibility of our becoming committed to countries whose defense is not strategically vital to American survival.

These views are some of the results that we obtain from relating our knowledge of geography to strategy. Since geography, in its broadest sense, is constantly changing, we dare not

rely upon concepts of the past, but must be continuously on the alert to examine the changing geographic scene, and to interpret the impact of this change in the formulation of strategy.

In addition to the readings cited in the footnotes, the following are suggested as supplementary readings. The first two are especially recommended for their clear and broad coverage of the lecture topic:

- Jones, S. B. "Views of the Political World,"
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The Changing World,
World Book Co., 1956, pp. 432-450.

BIOGRAPHIC SKETCH

Professor Saul B. Cohen

Professor Saul B. Cohen received his A.B., A.M., and Ph.D. degrees in Geography from Harvard University, where he specialized in Political Geography. He also did graduate work at Columbia University.

He joined the faculty of Boston University in 1952, where he is currently Associate Professor of Geography (on leave). In 1955, he was visiting lecturer of Political Geography at Yale University, and in 1956 was a visiting lecturer in Geography at Wellesley College. He is acting as Academic Consultant in International Relations (Geography) at the Naval War College during Academic Year 1957-58.

Major fields of interest, besides Political Geography, are the Geography of Europe and the Middle East and Economic Geography. He has done specialized research and writings in Marketing Geography, and is a locational consultant to various business firms. Articles and contributions have appeared in *The Geographical Review*, *The Professional Geographer*, *Middle Eastern Affairs*, *Bulletin of the International Oceanographic Institute*, and *Military Review*.

DIPLOMATIC ASPECTS OF UNBALANCED MILITARY FORCES

A lecture delivered
at the Naval War College
on 24 October 1957 by
Professor Gordon B. Turner

Gentlemen:

There has been a great deal of talk, and many words have been written, in recent years about the need for balanced military forces. Those of us who have entered the lists in behalf of the balanced military establishment have generally argued the cause on military grounds — that is, that we must be able to fight several different kinds of wars —or, we have argued that the military establishment must be able to implement the foreign policy of the United States without considering, except in a very general way, just what the implications of this are. This morning I want to take up this latter aspect, and perhaps even break a little new ground, in the belief that there are as many valid diplomatic reasons as there are military ones for insisting on the balanced defense establishment. Of course, the two aspects — the military and the diplomatic — cannot be divorced, and I have no intention of arguing the case this morning without some consideration of the military factor, too.

There is no question that force of some kind is an indispensable tool of international politics today, although Americans have come to this conclusion only with great reluctance. I remember back in the 1930's, when I was in college, we used to take great glee in lampooning the military, in pestering the poor ROTC students, and in organizing ourselves into the Veterans of Future Wars, little dreaming that one day we were to become veterans ourselves. Those days are over. We have all come to the conclusion that weakness is an open invitation to Soviet aggression. We

remember not many years ago at an international conference, when it was suggested that Papal consent to some diplomatic move be sought, that Marshal Stalin cynically asked: "How many divisions has the Pope?" And ever since that day the leaders of the Soviet Union have made it crystal-clear that negotiation through strength is the only way to assure negotiations at all.

The question remains: What kinds of strength? No single force will be sufficient in international statecraft, because the basic problem in developing foreign policy is finding the means rather than in choosing the ends we wish to pursue. The greater is the variety of means, the more objectives it will be possible to secure and the easier it will be to shift objectives as world affairs require. The sources of power are manifold. Indeed, they include all the elements of national strength, material and moral, but the issue before us this morning is restricted to military forces, and the proposition is that these should always be in balance.

The meaning of the term "balanced forces" is unhappily a tricky one. It cannot be reduced to any simple equation such as X plus Y plus Z, or army plus navy plus air force, equals national security. Not only must many factors be introduced to make up the balance, but the balance itself must be maintained in relation to a whole complex of variables, all of which shift with changes in the international situation, thereby causing reappraisals to be made of the factors which constitute the balance. There is one thing, then, that we can be sure of: a balanced force does not mean equal appropriations for each of the military services. If circumstances reduce the importance of any arm of the military establishment, appropriations for that arm must be cold-bloodedly reduced in proportion. If balance does not mean equal expenditures, what does it mean? Well, for one thing, it implies a balance between missions and means, between the tasks which must be performed and the ability to perform them.

In this sense the concept of balanced forces is perfectly familiar to the naval officer; it is much like the traditional con-

cept of the "balanced fleet." It is the basis on which the Navy argued its case in the unification controversy immediately after World War II. As long as the Navy, the argument went, has the mission to seize, maintain, and exploit control of the seas, it must be given all the forces, ground, sea and air, necessary to execute the multiple missions entailed in national defense. It also means that the forces should be no greater than are necessary, for in terms of the nation's economy it may be as disastrous to exceed the balance as it is to undercut it.

Balance in this sense seems to boil down to a question of utility. On the level of naval operating forces, we might ask this question in relation to utility. Should Admiral Halsey have sent ninety ships against sixteen at Leyte Gulf, when there were other tasks which could have been profitably performed by the excess among the ninety? This is more correctly a question of marginal utility, and I want to quote one definition of balanced forces based upon this concept. "A balanced force can be defined as one in which the marginal utilities, tactically and strategically considered, of the last increments to each of the existing components are approximately equalized." How do you like that definition? I'm not sure I do. I can't quite see the utility of marginal utility expressed in those terms, but at least you will admit that it would be quite a sight to watch generals and admirals sitting around discussing their common problems in terms like marginal utility, diminishing returns, or opportunity costs. Don't disparage it, though. With electronic computers around, anything is possible.

Seriously, however, the real issue in this business of balance *is* utility. Perhaps you will remember a few years ago when the dispute over the utility of the supercarrier was raging that Air Force spokesmen were arguing that the carrier was vulnerable, and the Navy was replying that in the last three years of World War II no large carrier was lost. My only reply to this is: so what? Of course carriers can be sunk; indeed, any weapon or

weapons carrier can be destroyed. The real issue is not their vulnerability but only how useful they are in relation to their vulnerability and their cost. If the carrier can perform a critical mission, and nothing else can, and if it can accomplish that mission before it is sunk, then its utility is virtually limitless — and it must be considered as an indispensable component in the military balance. Conversely, if we can be sure that ten carriers or 100 bombers can perform all the tasks set for them, the eleventh carrier and the 101st bomber are unnecessary. We have reached and passed the point of diminishing returns if we build them, and the balance will be disturbed.

Naturally, in figuring the numbers and types of forces which will be required to perform given missions, the enemy's capabilities must be taken into account, but for the military man this is such an obvious point that I pass it by without comment except to get on the record that in defining the meaning of balanced forces we are concerned not only with the relation between our own means and missions, but with the balance in terms of enemy means as well.

Moreover, and here we get into the diplomatic aspects, we must consider balance in relation to the circumstances which exist in international politics and in relation to such predictions as can be made about the future course of world affairs. What I am getting at here is that a force which is well-balanced with respect to one set of circumstances may be completely out of balance with respect to another. It may be able to perform its *military* mission creditably but be entirely unable to achieve equally important political objectives in foreign affairs. It may be well-designed to fight a war, but wholly unsuited to prevent one. And it is well to realize that military policies today are being designed as much toward nonmilitary ends as toward martial ones. Moreover, and this is the most difficult feat of all in maintaining the balance, we must not only be able to meet the conditions of today but build our forces to ensure that they will be in balance with

the needs of tomorrow. I am not talking here about the rapid technological advances which require adjustments, but about the international climate of opinion — the changing attitudes and objectives of our allies, our enemies and the neutrals. The United States is, I think, coming to the conclusion that there is no single or standard pattern of forces, nor any inevitable path which will lead us unerringly to national security. The choice which we must make among the various instruments of force available to us is dependent upon particular times, places and events of today and of the future.

Let me illustrate how changing circumstances in the international arena compel changes in our military forces in order to maintain the balance. During the nineteenth century, there existed among the great states of Europe a sort of rough balance of power — a condition at least so close to a balance that England, with her naval superiority, was always able to act as the make-weight in the balance by throwing her support to the weaker side. This enviable position permitted England to reduce her armies virtually to the vanishing point, for she could be sure that whichever group of powers she decided to support would have ample ground forces of their own, and all she needed to provide was ships and money. During all those years it can be said that Great Britain had balanced forces in terms of the power situation of the European world and in terms of the international objectives she sought to secure. Likewise, during this period, the United States found it unnecessary to keep large forces because she was virtually certain that the existence of so close a balance of power in Europe would deter any one of those nations from undertaking military adventures against her.

Today, there is no balance of power in the old nineteenth-century sense of the term. There are only two great powers — with no third force powerful enough to restore the balance should it get out of line, or to tip the scales for one side or the other should war come. I suppose we could say that nuclear power has

taken the place of British sea power in helping to preserve the peace. But the point is that under circumstances approximating bipolarity, each of the two great powers finds it necessary to have all the major components of military strength in and of themselves. If they have less, they will have unbalanced military forces to their ultimate sorrow. This is so because none of the lesser powers can contribute enough of land or air or sea power to make an appreciable difference. And if we do depend on allies for some vital component of balanced military power we become dependent upon them to an unpalatable degree. We can only follow our own policies when we can be sure that they will always agree with us.

One more example of changing circumstances creating imbalance in military forces begins with our adoption of the containment policy ten years ago. The original policy was predicated on the belief that sporadic efforts to counteract Soviet policy would fail. All indications pointed to the fact that Communist policy was extremely flexible, that the Soviets would retreat or advance as circumstances dictated, and that the only way to prevent the victory of Communism was to develop a long-range American policy and stick to it. Threats and bluff would not long succeed. Economic, political and military forces were set in motion to create situations of strength from which, it was hoped, negotiations would become possible on terms that we could accept.

For the first three years we merely sought verbal support from the rest of the free world for this general objective. But after 1950 we began to insist on cooperative action for the specific purpose of countering Soviet expansion wherever and whenever it might occur. We could not force cooperation from others, but as long as the Communists were relying on military force to expand, we could expect — and did receive — some support for an objective on which all agreed.

In 1953, however, both American policy and world circumstances underwent a change. The Russians developed the big

bomb; the new administration in Washington began seriously to retrench while talking about a shift from containment to liberation, and our allies and the neutrals began to balk at following our lead. Here was a new situation which called for an alteration in American military policy if objectives and means were to be kept in balance.

The original containment policy was geared primarily to react to Soviet moves. Wherever they moved forward, we had to apply counterforce if they were to be stopped. This policy required a variety of alternatives — including economic, diplomatic and flexible military force — and it was expensive. The decision to cut military expenditures brought immediate protest on the ground that military means were being reduced without a corresponding reduction in the missions to be performed, and that this was creating unbalanced military forces. The administration denied this charge, arguing that the new family of tactical atomic weapons would leave the military forces as strong as ever. Nevertheless, immediate steps were taken to reduce missions in an attempt to restore the balance. It was announced that henceforth, instead of trying to meet Communist aggression wherever it occurred, the United States would rely on its great retaliatory capacity to strike back wherever it chose to do so. In this way the numbers and types of objectives which our military forces might be called on to achieve were to be substantially reduced. It was apparently believed that by reducing the numbers and types of missions, along with the reduction which was taking place in the number and types of arms, the balance was being maintained. But, as a matter of cold fact, it was not.

A balance would exist only if the United States could really choose its points and means of attack in accord with what our newly restricted military forces could accomplish. But the United States could not then, and cannot now, act unilaterally in any way that it chooses. Only in a truly bipolar world could the United States make all the decisions for the free world, and

the condition of bipolarity is a myth. There *is* a rough division between the free and the slave, but there are many uncommitted states all of whom are sovereign nations, and in our camp there are a host of sovereign states. To none of these can we dictate. All have their own interests and aspirations, each has its own way of life, and none are in complete agreement with us on the policy of massive retaliation.

Our announcement that we expect to retaliate massively when and where we choose, when combined with our growing reliance on nuclear weapons and the rising Soviet capacity in this field, has produced the conviction among the other nations of the world that any conflict between the two great powers is bound to be a nuclear one, and they dread it. Not only are the uncommitted states beginning to resist our policies but the states associated with us are beginning to waver in their support. If it is to our interest to have allies and exert influence on the uncommitted nations (and United States foreign policy *is* based on this assumption), then surely we must pay some attention to their sincere convictions. They are supremely convinced, as are some Americans, that a foreign policy of liberation and a military policy of reduced forces are contradictory. They are convinced that reliance on nuclear weapons will lead to nuclear war, and they do not like the idea of leaving it to us to retaliate where and when and how we choose.

In other words, we do not live in a bipolar world, so that while our military forces may be balanced as to means and military missions, they are definitely *not* balanced as to our alliance policy or our obligations to the free world. This rigidity is in sharp contrast to the new flexibility of the post-Stalin regime. The Soviet Union, by reducing the fear of military aggression, has gained much more freedom of maneuver — the diplomatic freedom to exploit the lengthening lines of cleavage in the free world. Our military forces, being more rigid than they formerly were, are out of balance with this new flexibility of the Soviets.

They can be brought into balance only by adapting them to a new situation in which bipolarity is vanishing, in which the United States is losing influence and the rest of the non-Communist world is growing restive under our lead.

Moreover, with the development of Russian nuclear capability and the possibility of stalemate in a strategic air war, there is a growing conviction that such forces will never be used. At the Geneva Conference the powers that possess the bomb virtually pledged they would not use it and, with both sides knowing the consequences of its employment, there's an odds-on chance it will never be used.

The implications of this situation for the military balance are simply enormous. If the nuclear strategic air forces are not going to be used, their weight in the balance is sharply reduced. If they are not going to be employed except against thermonuclear attack, they cannot be counted on to prevent small wars, and their deterrent weight is similarly reduced. A military force or a military weapon which will probably not be used cannot count for much, if anything, in the military balance. Admittedly, the big bomb must be included in our weapons system because its absence would be an open invitation for the enemy to attack, but if it is not going to be used, what have we left to fight with? Tactical nuclear weapons? Perhaps, but many nations are beginning to protest their use, also. Conventional weapons? Guerrilla units? Paramilitary forces? Airborne troops? Yes, much more likely, but how many of them do we have in comparison to the enemy? Do we have enough to support either containment or liberation? Do we have enough to fulfill our commitments around the world? If we reckon the military balance in terms of the forces that we are *sure* to use, we must admit that a critical state of imbalance exists.

Our nuclear forces constitute our great offensive capability in war. If they are not to be employed, or even if there is a possibility that they won't be used, what can we count on? Where is

our offensive power? Insofar as they are deterrents, they will be useful for defense — but it is to be noted that balanced forces mean, among other things, a balance of offense and defense.

Finally, there is one other meaning of the term “balanced force” which should be considered. This is what we might call balanced coalition forces, or the need to balance *our* forces with those of our allies. This nation has entered into outright military alliances for the protection of almost all of the areas of the world which are directly threatened by Communist aggression. The one characteristic that all of the areas and nations have in common is their inability to defend themselves. Some of them — such as Britain and the major Western European states — can make substantial contributions to their own defense, and by joining NATO they have enhanced the defensibility of that region. Other nations with which we have defense arrangements can contribute far less to the common effort. Some are valuable merely for their geographic location; others are expected to provide indigenous ground forces which will be supported by the air and sea forces, and perhaps the ground troops of the United States, in what are hoped will be limited or local wars.

Now the question I would like to raise is this: If the United States continues to reduce its conventional forces and comes to rely solely upon its tactical nuclear forces for these small wars, of what use are these alliances for mutual defense? Can it be said that we have balanced coalition forces? In some cases, yes. If, for example, in the defense of Taiwan, we supply nuclear air and sea forces for *offshore* defense, and the Chinese Nationalists provide conventional ground forces for the island's defense, this may be a happy military solution. But what about the case where we and our allies are to fight side by side on the mainland of Southeast Asia or the Middle East? Is it possible for two nations to fight side by side with one armed conventionally and the other atomically? I would seriously doubt it. Certainly not, unless there were a good deal more interunit training than has been done to

date. I would suggest that if we are going to land ground troops to fight in other countries, we will either have to forego the use of our tactical atomic weapons or forego the indigenous ground forces of our allies.

I don't know whether these problems have been thought through in this country, but I am pretty sure that our allies, our enemies and the neutrals have thought about them. And if so, what must their reaction be? Of course I don't know for sure, but there might be several. They might say: "The United States is going to defend us in such a way that we cannot use our own forces, so why waste money in preparations for self-defense?" They might say: "The United States can only fight a nuclear war in our defense; we don't want our country devastated, so we will not call for aid." And if they don't call for military assistance, of what use is the Eisenhower Doctrine? Finally, their reaction might be this: "It will take the United States thirty days to get any troop units to us. Meanwhile, we shall fight a delaying action across our country, and when the Americans arrive to liberate us, they will destroy us in the process. We must, therefore, insist that the United States have enough conventional forces to drive the enemy from our land before they start using nuclear weapons. Otherwise, they will not be living up to the obligation they have assumed to help us defend ourselves." If coalition forces are to be considered balanced forces, they must be able to fight side by side and they must take into account the needs and the interests of all the partners.

Now I have suggested several meanings for the term "balanced forces," or several ways in which the balance must be judged. One is a balance of military means and military missions. Another is balance in terms of enemy capabilities. There must also be a balance between the means and obligations of national security; that is, between power and international commitments. Consideration must be given to future circumstances as well as to those now prevailing throughout the world. It must, above all,

be remembered that balanced forces include only those forces which can and will be used. There must be a balance between offense and defense. And, finally, there is a matter of correlating one's own needs and those of one's allies, being sure that the forces of the coalition can work together.

Having discussed the meaning of balanced forces, let's see if we can pick up some more ideas by analyzing the *need* for them. We might begin with the statement — which, through repetition, has become a cliché — that military policy and foreign policy must be in balance. Cliché or not, the statement remains incontestably true. And, because foreign policies must be flexible, it follows that military policies must be, too. The fact of the matter is that the United States in its foreign policy has made so many commitments for defense around the world in time and space and depth that they cannot possibly be fulfilled without balanced military forces. We are committed to the defense of Europe all the way from Norway around the perimeter to Turkey. We are committed to the defense of various Asiatic nations, stretching from Korea and Japan to Pakistan. And we have promised military assistance, if it is requested, to any nation of the Middle East. If we are to prevent aggression against these nations, we must make it clear to their enemies and ours that we have forces appropriate to their defense and that we intend to use them.

We did not have naval forces in the Pacific in the 1930's sufficient to compel the Japanese to negotiate our differences, and they attacked. We placed South Korea outside our defense perimeter in the late 1940's — the Russians were thus convinced that we would not defend it, and they instigated an attack. Conversely, because the Russians thought we would fight if they closed the air corridor to Berlin, they left it open and eventually withdrew their blockade. There is no reason to believe that the Soviets will not in the future, as in the past, press forward wherever they think we cannot or will not live up to our commitments.

The Korean War is an excellent example of the need for balance between military and foreign policy, because in that conflict we succeeded when the balance was intact and failed when it got out of kilter. The initial objective of our foreign policy and the policy of the United Nations was to drive the North Koreans back to their own territory to prove that aggression would not pay and would be punished. That objective was achieved because we built up the military forces to do the job. We shattered the North Korean armies and reached the 38th parallel. Then, the objective was raised. Instead of being content with what we had accomplished, we demanded a unified, democratic and independent Korea, which could only be achieved by driving north to the Yalu and risking war with a major power. This was an error, because we did not have the conventional forces or the will to use the nuclear forces necessary to achieve the objective. Our military forces, deprived of the chance to employ the strongest weapons in their arsenal, were unable to execute their mission; they were unable to fulfill the demands which foreign policy placed upon them. Having been deprived of adequate conventional weapons in the pre-Korean years, and being forbidden to use their atomic strength when the need arose, military and foreign policy had lost their balance.

This lesson has definite application for us today. If strategic nuclear weapons could not be used in Korea, either because the government would not permit it or because the targets were unremunerative, the same might well apply to tactical atomic weapons in the future. In the first place, our allies might not permit us to use them in their lands. In the second place, weapons of this kind don't have universal usefulness. They can be employed only in special situations.

You would know more about this than I do, but I would suppose that the Sixth Fleet — as presently constituted — and a reinforced Marine Battalion Landing Team are not entirely adequate for the types of jobs they are most likely to have in the

Middle East. And if you dispute this, I'll back off (I'm no military expert) and talk instead about the Middle East Command, which I understand consists of one seaplane tender without planes and, from time to time, three or four destroyers. Admittedly, this so-called "Command" is not intended to fight, but simply show the flag. But I ask you: Is a stripped seaplane tender a show of force or a show of weakness? Where there is no military strength, a display of the flag has a negative rather than positive diplomatic value. Our commitments in the Middle East have burgeoned tremendously since the announcement of the Eisenhower Doctrine — it has pushed our diplomatic frontier right up to the southern boundary of Russia, and has promised to support that diplomatic front with military might. And, yet, our military force is being reduced and restricted to an extent that it cannot fulfill that promise. It's all very well to talk about the need for economy and the resultant requirement to cut the fat, but let's not kid ourselves that there is that much fat in our military establishment. The grave fact of the matter is that by increasing the commitments of our foreign policy, while decreasing the means to implement that policy, we are magnifying the imbalance. We are magnifying the chance of war.

Another reason why we need balanced forces is to ensure that military policy does not come to dominate foreign policy. Reliance on the strategic bombing component has impelled us to seek bases all over the world from which our bombers can be launched in time of war. This necessity has brought about the strange spectacle of our employing all of the diplomatic, political, and economic instruments at our command in order to implement a military policy — the policy of securing military bases. These bases are essential because of our reliance on air power, but to get the bases we have had to antagonize our allies and the uncommitted nations. We have entered into diplomatic negotiations with Fascist Spain to the discomfort and anger of some of our democratic friends. We have given military aid to Pakistan, which has infuriated the Indians; and in other states we have given political support to

reactionary regimes, which has angered their people and made them prime targets for Communist propaganda. I am not suggesting that we can do without such bases; precisely the opposite. We cannot do without them because of the unbalanced structure of our military establishment; because we do not have sufficient offshore carrier bases; because we do not have sufficient airlift capacity for mobile landing teams.

We need balanced forces, next, because different purposes require different means. This is a particularly important point at a time when we are involved in such a variety of alliances. Consider for a moment the difference of purpose among the NATO nations and the variety of means necessary to implement those purposes.

Initially, there was a common fear of immediate Soviet attack and a common determination to resist it by creating divisions in readiness for such an event. It soon became evident, however, that Soviet invasion was not imminent, and with this realization came a divergence of views on just what the purposes of NATO should be. For most of the European nations one purpose was to create situations of strength from which successful negotiations with the Soviet Union could be conducted. Germany wanted Western strength to ensure negotiations on reunification, and she also wanted the defense line run across her eastern frontier so that West Germany would not become the battleground. France appeared to look upon NATO as the best solution to the defense of France and French North Africa. She always insists that North Africa is NATO's southern flank, and that it and France must be defended. Britain, if the recent White Paper means anything, looks upon NATO solely as a deterrent rather than as a means to victory in war, for Britain has admitted that she cannot escape destruction in a nuclear assault. The United States initially viewed NATO as a means of instilling confidence in the Western Europeans that they could defend themselves. More recently, we took the lead in extending NATO to include the defense of nations

far from the North Atlantic. We made it an integral part of our policy of containment of ringing Russia around as tightly as possible, and of taking advantage of any fissure which might appear in the armor of the Soviet Empire.

These differing purposes, together with the demand to reduce the burden of so many forces in being, brought the military stretch-out system into effect, and with the decline of ground forces came a corresponding increase in emphasis on air power. There were good and sufficient reasons for increasing the air arm of NATO because it had been the weakest component until that time. But in view of the incapacity of most of the NATO nations to create effective air units of their own, and particularly because the United States alone possessed nuclear strategic capabilities, it soon fell to SAC to assume the primary burden of implementing the new program. At first, our European partners apparently did not see the implications of this new situation, but as NATO began to depend more and more heavily on SAC to be both the deterrent and the offensive component of the alliance, the Western Europeans awoke to the fact that they were relying for the achievement of their objectives on a force over which they exercised no control, and which many believed was incapable of achieving their particular purposes.

European spokesmen began to note America's growing dependence on the very-long-range bomber, and began to express anxiety about what they felt to be our intention to fight a withdrawing action across Europe. Europeans did not want withdrawal and later liberation. They wanted their countries defended, and could not see SAC as the instrument of such defense. Strategic air power might fulfill the deterrent objective, but it could not defend West Germany's zonal border; it could not hold French North Africa or any other territory, and its unleashing would probably bring the big bombs hurtling down on Western Europe's cities.

In the search for more balanced forces to execute all the various objectives of the coalition, NATO finally turned to nuclear

weapons with tactical capacities. Such weapons, it is expected, will give new strength to ground and naval forces and thus increase the balance and flexibility of NATO as a whole. Rightly or wrongly, it is now believed that if these weapons are supplied to all the NATO partners, the major purpose of all of them can be achieved. They will permit a reduction in the number of divisions, thus freeing manpower for duties outside NATO. They will make a truly credible deterrent because they will offset the enemy's superior manpower, and they may induce the Soviets to negotiate because they cannot achieve their aims by military action. If deterrence, defense and negotiations can be taken as the primary purposes of the NATO partners, atomically-equipped land, sea and air forces come closer to achieving these goals than air power alone. If they are not fully balanced, through their lack of conventional capability, they are perhaps as close to that balance as the finances and politics of Europe permit.

Military forces can be said to be in balance if they have no critical weakness, so that another reason for insisting on balance is to see that no such weakness exists. To demonstrate this point, we might go back to disarmament discussions of the 1920's and '30's. During the series of conferences which were held in those years it was apparent that all of the democracies at least sincerely desired to cut defense expenditures, and all drew up proposals to end that. Yet, most of these sessions never got off the ground. They all stumbled over an immovable obstacle: the doctrine of minimum needs. Each nation was willing to cut those forces not vital to its military security, but each had certain vital needs which it refused to leave unfulfilled. England wanted all countries to reduce their armies, and was willing to cut hers even if the others did not. A large army was not vital to her; she needed only a few professional units to scatter through the empire. England wanted all the naval powers to reduce their submarine fleets and was willing to cut hers unilaterally, because submarines could do her little good and a great deal of damage. But England did have certain minimum needs for the defense of the empire

and the British Isles in air and naval surface forces, and she would listen to no proposals which did not leave her superior in those categories.

France demanded an army larger than Germany's. To the statement that this was unfair, she invariably replied: "Our army must be big enough to beat Germany quickly if we are attacked, because Germany's industrial potential is bigger than ours — and in a long war she can outproduce us in the materiel of war. To open a Franco-German War with equal armies would spell defeat for France; superiority in this field is vital to us." And so it went with all the nations, and so it goes today.

When the United States had a monopoly of the atomic bomb, the Soviet Union had a critical military weakness. She could not defend against it nor could she retaliate, and we were able to enforce our containment policy from Greece to Korea with a minimum military force. The Soviets have now filled that gap in their military structure, and the question is whether their superiority in manpower, in submarines, in guerrilla action and in secret warfare have produced any vital weaknesses in our armor. If they have, it is obvious we do not have balanced military forces because we are vulnerable militarily.

Less obvious, however, is the fact that if we do not have truly balanced military forces, we are vulnerable diplomatically. It is quite possible that a nation may not have any critical military weakness, but that it still lacks the ability to deter the enemy in the diplomatic realm. The Communists' capacity for guerrilla action, for small conventional wars and paramilitary action pose no direct or critical or immediate threat to the United States or its military establishment. Yet, these capacities permit a form of blackmail against some of our allies which leaves us in bad shape at the bargaining table. The greater our military ability is to check all kinds of Communist moves, the greater is our capacity to compel them to come to the bargaining table to achieve

their aims. The greater our military capacity to keep them uncertain as to our intentions, the less confident their diplomats will be. Just as lack of any critical weakness in the defense of Taiwan has prevented an attack upon that island, so the flexibility of a balanced United States fleet in the Far Pacific gave pause to the Red Chinese in their bid to take over the offshore islands. When Congress gave the President advance endorsement to use any means he saw fit to hold or relinquish Matsu and Quemoy, the Reds sheered off because they knew we had diverse means at our disposal. An uncertainty was created in their minds by the very diversity of means that we had available to employ.

If our purpose is to prevent Communist expansion in any part of the world, then at any point where it can expand there is a critical weakness. Our task is therefore a twofold one. First, we must be able to bring power quickly to bear at whatever point is struck. Second, that power must be appropriate to the type of action necessary. A slow build-up will do little good, for if the enemy has achieved his objective before we are ready to strike back, he can present us with a *fait accompli* in the armistice tent and thus compel us to employ greater force than would have been necessary earlier in order to make him willing to negotiate. The more rapidly our power can be brought to bear to make him see the futility of continued action, the quicker he can be brought to the bargaining table. Since the essential prerequisite for successful negotiation is mutual advantage to both parties, it is plain that we must make it immediately and vividly clear, by the presence of appropriate military force, that continued military action is to his disadvantage and that the relinquishment of his original objective is advantageous.

And, since he must believe that he can be seriously hurt by the force we have at hand, that force must be capable of inflicting serious damage. If it is too small, it will not disturb him; if it is too large or too expensive or too dangerous to world peace, he may disbelieve our willingness to employ it. This is why flexible

forces, forces designed for multiple kinds of missions, are essential to escape having a critical weakness. To command respect at the bargaining table, the enemy must believe we have the ability and the will to force him to curb his appetite. He knows that no single weapons system or military strategy is suited to every type of war or to all areas of the world. If, by truly balanced forces we can convince him that no type of military action can be to his advantage, we can keep him operating in the diplomatic field — and, in the nuclear age, this should be a primary goal of military policy. Today, and for years to come, it will be just as important for military forces to prevent wars as to win them. In short, we need balanced forces to prevent wars as well as to fight them.

I do not mean, of course, that we should be constantly and loudly threatening the use of force or boasting that we have compelled our enemies to back down by the threat of military action. This can only make us appear militaristic, and lower our prestige in the eyes of the world rather than raise it. What is required instead of a meat ax are forces so balanced, so ready to meet any situation, that we no longer have to boast about our power and threaten others with it in order to compel them to follow more peaceful ways. Where an unbalanced force has to be brought right into the conference room and pounded as a bludgeon on the table, balanced forces can be kept in the background, silently and effectively influencing the minds of the negotiators without arousing the fears and hatred of the rest of the world. In short, if military power is to be a true servant of diplomacy instead of its master, if the diplomats are to be reduced and not enhanced, military force must be a last resort, an infrequent threat, so powerful and versatile as to make itself a persistent factor in the conscience of the diplomats but never so blunt and so crude as to be threatened openly. Brinkmanship is not statesmanship; it is an act of desperation brought about by reliance upon an unbalanced military force. We have learned that we must negotiate through strength, but if we fail to understand

that this means balanced strength, the lesson will have been learned in vain.

We must remember also that the United States is no longer, if it ever was, a free agent in the world. We have an incredible number of obligations inside the United Nations and out, and this means that we must negotiate not only with the enemy but with a host of allies as well. Balanced forces are just as necessary for dealing with friends as with enemies — not because we want to impress our friends with our military power and make them do our will, but because we want to do precisely the opposite; that is, be prepared to do their will if necessary. No defensive coalition is worth its administrative headaches unless it can help its members achieve the security they seek. I have already indicated how the purposes of the various NATO partners differ, how some of our allies dread and fear our reliance on nuclear power, and how they see no way of escaping destruction if we intend to fight atomic wars across their countries. Unless we can convince them that we have the means to help them survive — that is, maintain their security in terms that are meaningful to them — we may find, when the chips are down, that they will appease the enemy rather than die.

It is not beyond the realm of reason — indeed, I should say it is eminently reasonable — if in launching an attack the Communists promise not to use any kind of nuclear weapons if we do not, that our allies might refuse to let us use our bases in their lands for nuclear attack. Nations have almost always been more interested in their own local defense than they have been in the defense of the whole. If this has been true in the past, when no nuclear destruction was possible, is it not reasonable to expect our allies to face similar temptations in the future? If allies are necessary to us, we must have balanced forces to win their consent to our foreign policies. They must be convinced that we have the will and ability to help them defend themselves, or our alliances will be in danger of breaking up. As a matter of fact,

our preoccupation with nuclear power has already placed us in danger of isolation. The major uncommitted Asian and Middle Eastern nations have long opposed our foreign policies in their areas, and even some of our allies have been concerned at policies of ours which could only be implemented by nuclear power.

Unbalanced military forces, then, have brought about an unfriendly or uneasy climate of world opinion which the Soviet Union is exploiting for all it is worth. This unease and suspicion has resulted in part from fear of destruction, but also in part because our unbalanced forces have prevented us from framing policies flexible enough to take account of the wishes of the less powerful nations of the free world. To reestablish frank and friendly relations, we must be in a position to pay deference to the sovereignty of other nations, to permit at least the appearance of choice in their foreign policies so that they can maintain the prestige necessary to the government of any free nation. This will make it easier for them to give consent to our policies.

The more flexible our military forces are, the more flexible our foreign policies can be — and these, combined, will gain the degree of acquiescence from the nations of the free world that we need for containment and global and local defense. Only in a completely bipolar world could we confine our negotiations and diplomatic pressures to the enemy. In that kind of a world it would be our choice alone what kind of forces we wished to build, but as long as we have firm commitments to defend our friends, they must share in the choice of how they are to be defended. If we do not allow them that choice, they may break away and seek freedom of maneuver with the Communists which they cannot get with us. Both to satisfy and support our allies we need balanced military forces. Because we cannot control sovereign nations, whether they are friends or enemies or neutrals, we must have every possible ability to exert pressure upon them. And in a world of power politics, balanced military forces constitute the most effective instrument of pressure.

In summary, then, I would suggest that balanced military forces are needed for the following minimum reasons: to ensure that military policies are flexible enough to implement a wide range of foreign policies, and that the former never dominate the latter; to ensure that our freedom of diplomatic and strategic maneuver is as great as the multiple contingencies of diplomacy and strategy require. Balanced forces are needed because different purposes require different means, because different geographic areas require varied types of military force, and because military power must have no critical weakness. They are required in order to deter the enemy both militarily and politically and to induce uncertainty in his mind, and because military policy must be aimed as much at preventing wars as winning them. They are necessary because, today, the maxim "negotiation through strength" means nothing unless it is balanced strength. Balanced forces are necessary in order to support and to satisfy allies, to gain consent of neutrals, and to give the appearance of consent to the policies of sovereign nations. They are needed to avoid isolation, to exert pressure where we cannot control, to create a viable and friendly climate of opinion, and to ensure that as the major power of the free world we are its leader, not its dictator. These, gentlemen, it seems to me, are good and sufficient reasons for taking a new look at the degree of balance in our military forces.

BIOGRAPHIC SKETCH

Professor Gordon B. Turner

Professor Turner received his A.B., A.M., and Ph.D. degrees from Princeton University. During World War II, he served in the United States Army. Following the war, he was a research assistant at Princeton University on a Marine Corps History Project. From 1950 to 1952, he was an instructor in History at Princeton University and was also a research assistant on an Organizational Behavior Project there. During 1952-53, he was Director of a Military History Project. Since 1952, he has been Assistant Professor of History at Princeton.

He was on leave from Princeton University to act as Consultant for International Relations and Social Sciences at the Naval War College during the first term of Academic Year 1956-1957, and during the present academic year is occupying the Ernest J. King Chair of Maritime History at the College.

Professor Turner is the editor of *A History of Military Affairs in Western Society Since the Eighteenth Century*.

RECOMMENDED READING

The evaluation of books listed below include those recommended to resident students of the Naval War College. Officers in the fleet and elsewhere may find them of interest.

The listing herein should not be construed as an endorsement by the Naval War College; they are indicated only on the basis of interesting, timely, and possibly useful reading matter.

Many of these publications may be found in ship and station libraries. Books on the list which are not available from these sources may be obtained from one of the Navy's Auxiliary Library Services Collections. These collections of books available for loan to individual officers are maintained in the Bureau of Naval Personnel; Headquarters ELEVENTH, FOURTEENTH, FIFTEENTH Naval Districts; and Commander Naval Forces, Marianas, Guam. Requests for the loan of these books should be made by the individual to the nearest Auxiliary Library Service Collection (See Article C9604, Bureau of Naval Personnel Manual, 1948).

- Title:** *Principles of Political Geography.* 723 p.
- Authors:** Weigert, Hans W., and Others. New York, Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1957.
- Evaluation:** Although a textbook, as the authors point out, it is not an ordinary one. Among the reasons for this, as the reader will discover, is the fact that it is very readable. Its most outstanding feature is its topical approach to the subject of political geography. Only in Part 3 does it adopt the regional approach to the better known elements of geography as related to their impact on mankind and *vice versa*. Although not treated in detail, it is here, perhaps, that students will find it most helpful as a secondary source of material for comparisons of the economic, psychological, and geographical powers of specific global areas. Important as this is, it is meaningless without an understanding of the salient factors of political geography. This is more than adequately

covered in Parts 1 and 2 of the book. Part 1 is concerned with the "Spatial Factor of Political Geography." This part begins with a description of the meaning and scope of political geography, which is carefully differentiated from the pseudo-philosophy of "geo-politics." Size, shape, boundaries, core areas, and location are all considered together with their impacts on strategy and power politics. Part 2 is titled "The Human and Cultural Factor in Political Geography." In this part, as in the previous one, the approach is functional: Population growth and pressure, migrations, languages, religious affiliations and other cultural factors are considered in relation to their impact on world politics and the potential for power.

Title: *Guided Weapons.* 255 p.

Author: Burgess, Eric. New York, The Macmillan Co., 1957.

Evaluation: The purpose of the book is stated by the author to be: (1) "to encourage more students and newly qualified men to start thinking actively about guided weapons and their problems," and (2) "to enable appreciation by an intelligent layman (public) of why protection of his cities beneath missile screens has not been achieved with his taxes." To achieve this purpose the author has discussed strategy, weapons systems, missile and component parts from research requirements through tests in all phases to performance characteristics. He has compared the missiles of a number of different countries in tabular format.

Title: *The Soviet System of Government.* 256 p.

Author: Hazard, John N. Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1957.

Evaluation: This first in a new series of comparative political studies sponsored by the University of Chicago attempts to portray the Soviet political framework by comparing its various features with our own political system. As the author notes, the Soviet system, on paper, contains many democratic features: a parliament, a system of civil rights, courts, judges, elections, etc. However, as set forth in considerable detail throughout the book, in each case, where the paper guarantee might threaten monopoly control by the tiny oligarchy, a nullifying countervail has been provided. Mr. Hazard demonstrates that considerable changes are occurring in the internal balance of forces within the Soviet Union. He notes particularly the rise

of the technical and managerial classes and the growing weight of the army within the ranks of the Communist Party. He does not, however, believe that this shift in relative political weight bodes any real threat to the continuance of the Soviet system.

- Title:** *A Guide to Diplomatic Practice*. 510 p.
- Author:** Satow, Ernest. New York, Longmans Green, 1957.
- Evaluation:** This volume is so well known in diplomatic circles that it is always referred to as "Satow" rather than by its full title. It is an indispensable reference work in the field of international relations, written originally by a distinguished official of the British Foreign Office. First published in 1917, Satow has undergone various revisions which take into account the latest influences. This book gives both historical and current material on all aspects of diplomatic practice and procedure, dealing with such questions as precedence, maritime honors, diplomatic immunities, rights and privileges, diplomatic conduct and countless other questions which arise daily in the lives of diplomats and which require precise answers.

- Title:** *Seven Roads to Moscow*. 334 p.
- Author:** Jackson, W. G. F. London, Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1957.
- Evaluation:** *Seven Roads to Moscow* describes in detail the seven major military expeditions into Russia. The book is well organized, easy to read, and very concise. Beginning in the year 300 A.D., the Vikings, followed by the Huns, Tartars, Poles, Swedes, French and Germans, set forth in turn to conquer Russia. The outcome of these expeditions has been carefully detailed, and the author has devoted considerable time to describing the obstacles that ultimately led to the defeat of six of the seven invaders. The specific aims of the early invaders have been lost in history. However, the Swedish, French and German leaders had the same military aim: to destroy the Russian armies. This aim, and the political and economic objectives were not obtained. The Vikings followed the River Road, elicited the cooperation of the peoples of the area invaded, and rendered a constructive service to those people — the only conquerors to do so. No recent invader has had the capability of occupying sufficient Russian territory to control the political and economic power of Russia, which is not concentrated but is widespread over the farthest reaches of her lands. The author

aptly points out that without a lasting political solution, military victory is a mirage.

- Title: *Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin.* 692. p
- Author: Feis, Herbert. Princeton, N. J., Princeton University Press, 1957.
- Evaluation: A very comprehensive history of the wartime relations between Great Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union. The period covered extends from 1940 until World War II ended in 1945. The book is well-documented by the author from a wide range of published and unpublished sources. The narrative is carefully divided into war phases which, although the diplomatic climaxes are emphasized, follow the military phases. Throughout, the author connects the relating diplomacy and strategy to each other against the background of circumstances. Thus, he enables the reader to appreciate the many factors and facets involved in the numerous decisions which were made by these men. This work presents a compilation of pertinent developments which occurred; the position each of the governments assumed toward each development; and the resulting demands, counterdemands and concessions made to further each country's national interests.

- Title: *The Atlantic.* 479 p.
- Author: Outhwaite, Leonard. New York, Coward-McCann, Inc., 1957.
- Evaluation: *The Atlantic* is a combination of history and oceanography. It deals primarily with the characteristics of the Atlantic Ocean and the effects of these characteristics on the history of Western civilization. It includes wind, weather, and currents, discovery and new lands, types of ships, communications across the ocean, war on the Atlantic, flying the Atlantic, and its commercial aspects in regard to fishing, shipping and obtaining mineral wealth from its waters. The work appears to be a compilation of the highlights of many, many books written about special aspects of the Atlantic Ocean. It weaves together in very readable form a story of the relationship between the characteristics and behavior of this ocean and the history of Western civilization. Mr. Outhwaite compresses a great deal of information into slightly over 450 pages, but still manages to include many interesting details about such things as packets and clipper ships and whaling and slave trading. He leaves you with the

impression that the Atlantic Ocean was the cradle of civilization, and will continue to be the major factor in Western man's destiny.

PERIODICALS

- Title:** *International Law and High Altitude Flights.*
Author: Cheng, Bin.
Publication: INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW QUARTERLY, July, 1957, p. 487-505.
Annotation: Discusses the current legal status of flight and territorial jurisdiction and then proceeds to the new problems engendered by high altitude flights, pilotless flights, and satellites. The latter problems are heightened by some materially differing views on the opposite sides of the Iron Curtain.
- Title:** *Combat Support for Amphibious Operations.*
Author: Itschner, Maj. Gen. E. C.
Publication: ARMY INFORMATION DIGEST, October, 1957, p 2-13.
Annotation: Explains the organization and functions of a newly activated organization, the Engineer Amphibious Support Command, designed for combat support of the Army's amphibious operations.
- Title:** *Anti-Missile for U. S. in 3 Years.*
Authors: Schweitz, Robert, and Wuriu, Thomas.
Publication: ARMY-NAVY-AIR FORCE REGISTER, September 7, 1957, p. 1-2.
Annotation: Doctor Dornberger, one of the world's top missile and rocket experts, states in an interview that we can perfect an ICBM defense weapon in three years.
- Title:** *Increasing the Effectiveness of Inter-American Economic Cooperation.*
Author: Anderson, Robert B.
Publication: THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN, September 16, 1957, p. 463-469.
Annotation: The Secretary of the Treasury speaks of the common objectives of the Americas and the ways these can be implemented through economic developments.

- Title:** *How Military Planning Looks to a Member of the Joint Chiefs.*
- Author:** Burke, Arleigh, Admiral, U. S. N.
- Publication:** U. S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, August 30, 1957, p. 101-102.
- Annotation:** Admiral Burke explains how basic military policies are decided by the Joint Chiefs within the framework of national policy.
- Title:** *Russia Shows Her Teeth on the Seas.*
- Publication:** U. S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, September 20, 1957, p. 91.
- Annotation:** Briefly reports how Russia and the United States are making a show of naval might.
- Title:** *Dulles Charts A New Way to Stop the Communists.*
- Author:** Dulles, John Foster.
- Publication:** U. S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, September 27, p. 104-110.
- Annotation:** A new concept of atomic defense is disclosed by the Secretary of State. This is the text of an article written for the October, 1957 issue of *Foreign Affairs* magazine.
- Title:** *Should Red China be Admitted to the U. N.?*
- Author:** Feis, Herbert.
- Publication:** THE NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE, September 29, 1957, p. 22, 70-71.
- Annotation:** A noted author on Chinese affairs presents the cases for and against the admission of Red China to the United Nations.
- Title:** *Five Months in London.*
- Author:** Spingarn, Jerome H.
- Publication:** BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS, September, 1957, p. 257-261.
- Annotation:** A report on the London disarmament talks, reviewing the various proposals and the positions of the East and the West on major issues.