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HISTORICAL AND CULTURAL BACKGROUND OF THE U. S. S. R.

A lecture delivered
at the Naval War College
on 26 October 1956 by
Professor Hans Kohn

Admiral Robbins, Gentlemen:

I was asked a few minutes ago whether I would discuss the most recent news from Poland and Hungary, and I answered that I should be glad to do that during the Question Period. But during my talk this morning I shall feel on safer grounds not to discuss anything which is happening there today. I shall discuss things which happened hundreds of years ago, and, therefore, the radio cannot bring any denial of what I say during the lecture itself.

Let me say, however, that events in Poland and Hungary bear out what the Captain chairing this meeting has just told you about history as a background of all contemporary events. These revolts against Moscow's rule were not an accident. They are not revolts against Communism; they are not only revolts against economic poverty, without which a Communist regime is unthinkable; and they are not only revolts against the loss of liberty — again, without which a Communist regime is unthinkable. They are also revolts against Moscow's control — revolts deeply ingrained in the history of Poland and Hungary, much more so than in the history of Czechoslovakia or Bulgaria. It is no accident that the people of Poznan or of Budapest were the first to rise against Moscow's control. The history of the feelings of the people in Poland and Hungary during the last one hundred years show that these two nations had, as they themselves claimed, the conviction of forming a bulwark of Western Christianity — the *antemurale Christianitatis* against the East — or, against Moscow and against Russia. This historical conviction has influenced their actions.

When I came here, I tried to get a copy of a famous book from the Library, a book which I wished to recommend to all those who desire to study the United States. Gentlemen, it is as important for Americans to know more about the United States as it is to know more about Russia. The book was written by a non-American, and yet there are many answers in it to questions being asked today from deep-reaching analysts. It is a book by a Frenchman by the name of Alexis de Tocqueville, entitled *Democracy in America.* I wished to read you a passage from this book, which shows the prophetic and unusual insight of this French aristocrat into the political-historical process. I cannot read it to you because there are only excerpts in the Library, and they do not contain the passage. But let me reconstruct it out of my memory.

The book was written in 1832, or more than 125 years ago. In that book de Tocqueville said that there were only two nations on earth then which were still growing; that all other nations seemed to have reached their maximum and were moving ahead slowly, if at all. He said that these nations grew up unobserved on the outskirts, so to speak, of history and of civilization, but yet each of these two nations was destined in a not distant future to control half of the globe. He said that these two nations were Russia and the United States. Both started from opposite points of view, with the Russians relying on centralized autocracy while the Americans relied on individual liberty, but in spite of the difference in their starting points and in their methods and ways of progress, each of them seemed marked out by Providence to sway the destinies of half the globe.

Mind, that book was written in 1832, when Russia was great but still semi-barbaric. Nicholas I then ruled in Russia, keeping Russia almost as strictly separated from Europe as did Stalin during his reign. The United States was still a very small, struggling country in the vastness of an unexplored and unopened Continent. Yet, I would call that political foresight on the part of de Tocqueville when he predicted something that was to happen

a century later. We shall come back to de Tocqueville and his prediction later on.

We will now turn to the Russians. We know, of course, that the Russians are Slavs and Christians. They are Slav-speaking peoples like the Poles and also Christians as the Europeans in general are. Yet, by history Russia was separated through most of its history from the rest of Europe by something which was broader than the Atlantic Ocean; by something spiritual, by the volition of free decisions on the part of the Russians and by the accidents of history. If we wish to understand Russia today, we have to recall to our minds that Russia throughout most of its history was not a part of Europe. It would, however, be a mistake to regard Russia as a part of Asia. Russia was *sui generis*: of its own unique kind, neither European nor Asian. That made it possible for Russia, whenever she decided to do so, to turn to Europe or to turn to Asia so as to be part of one or part of the other.

Russia itself, or the Slav-speaking Christian peoples which later became Russia, originated in what might be called today Western Russia: in the western part of Russia, along the rivers leading from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea, along cities like Novgorod in the north and Kiev in the south. But this Russia still was near Europe, although it received its Christianity not from Rome but from Constantinople. Yet, this western Russian state was soon conquered and overrun by the Mongols. Kiev, its capital, was destroyed in 1240. For almost three hundred years Russia remained under Mongol domination, separated from Europe, no longer the Eastern march of Europe against Asia but a Western march of Asia against Europe.

Gentlemen, it would be most unjust if I did not add that it was an accident which saved Europe from this fate. You have probably heard so much recently of Imperialism and of Colonialism. It appears that some propagandists say that Imperialism

is a kind of Western disease, a statement which naturally is historic nonsense. The great empire-builders, except for the last three hundred years, were Asian nations. From the time of the Persian Empire until the Turkish siege of Vienna in 1683 — not so long ago — Europe trembled before Asian conquerers. Although it is my deep conviction that immense blissful results came to India or Ceylon by the transformation that they underwent through the vitalizing effect of British rule and Western civilization, no similar good came to other races by the domination of the Mongols. Yet, Europe was threatened by them after they had conquered Russia; the Mongols were marching into Germany. They were then facing the knighthood and the chivalry of the West in what is today Silesia. They would have overrun it, too, but for an accident. They suddenly left! Today, we know why they left: the great Khan had died in far-off Mongolia and the commanding officers hurried back to be there when they appointed a new Khan, or a new ruler. This was an accident which saved Europe from the barbarization by the Mongols which Russia underwent.

Looking at Russia, we should recall that we could have been in a similar situation. For three hundred years — and three hundred decisive years — Russia was cut off from Europe and was part of the Mongol Empire. When Russia arose and revolted it was no longer under the rule of Kiev, which had been destroyed; Russia's center was no longer on its Western border. Kiev is on the Dnieper River, and the Dnieper flows into the Black Sea and down through the Straits into the Mediterranean to the seats of ancient civilization. But it was from Moscow that the new Russia arose. Moscow is northeast of Kiev. It had been then recently settled by Russian peasants, or by Russian pioneers if you like, and was primeval land until then. Again, Moscow is on a river, the Moskva; in fact, Moscow got its name from the Moskva River. We speak of a period of history when the course of rivers was determining much of history, of trade, of civilization. The Moskva flows into the Oka, and the Oka flows into the Volga at a place formerly called Nizhni Novgorod but now called Gorki, because

Gorki, the famous Russian Socialist writer, was born in Nizhni Novgorod; the Volga flows, as you all know, into the Caspian Sea, and the Caspian Sea flows nowhere for it is an inland lake in Asia. The roads from Kiev still led to Constantinople, to Greece, and to the Mediterranean, but the roads from Moscow led nowhere but to the Asian Steppes.

So in Moscow the new Russia arose at the very same time that a new Europe was born, when the Renaissance and the Reformation laid in Europe the seeds of liberty and individualism. Russia was then under great rulers in Moscow who ruled from the the Kremlin. The Kremlin is not a European palace, but a fortified compound, an imitation of the Sacred Cities in which Asian despots lived and ruled, something like the Forbidden City in Peking, very close in spirit to this traditionalist Asian theocratic autocracy. There arose in the Kremlin great authorities, of which I shall name only two: Ivan III, and his grandson and second successor, Ivan IV, or Ivan the Terrible, as he was called in history. It was these strong princes who forged the new Russia. I cannot compare them to Khruschev because as a historian I know too little of Khruschev yet. But they were certainly alike Stalin, because living under Stalin was like living under the Moscow and the Kremlin of Ivan the Terrible.

The last speech which Khruschev made — the famous Secret Report to the Twentieth Communist Party Congress in February of this year — depicted Stalin as a second Ivan the Terrible, before whom everybody trembled who approached him. One never knew when one left the face of Ivan or of Stalin whether one would go from there to one's home or to prison and death — death under torture from Ivan or Stalin. These great princes, Ivan III and Ivan IV, who were the contemporaries of the Renaissance and of the Reformation, and who were the contemporaries of the birth of liberty in Europe, destroyed completely the remnants of what had been liberty in Russia.

Ivan IV, or Ivan the Terrible, in a certain way made himself (as did Stalin) an omnipotent autocrat who was unequalled anywhere else. He did it by one means: namely, by making everybody equal in Russia. Mind, there was no equality in Europe at the time of the Renaissance and the Reformation. But this lack of equality saved liberty because it meant that every class and every group had its own rights and privileges, which nobody dared — or should dare — to break down; it meant that each class had its own sphere, within which it could move freely. But Ivan abolished the rights of the aristocracy in Russia, the rights of the *boyars*, or what might be called "the ruling class," and he made them equal with everybody else. He made everybody equal in being nobody before the Tsar, the ruler, with a complete equality in rightlessness. He created this equality of abject subjects, mere worms before the autocrat, and Stalin restored this form of "equality." During the reign of Stalin, as you know from Khruschev's speech, Khruschev or Molotov had exactly as few rights before Stalin as did any other man in the Soviet Union. This autocracy before which all are equal and before which everybody is nobody, except for *one* autocrat, is one of the great contributions of Ivan IV to the Russian tradition.

Why did he do this? He did it not only because he was probably a complex and yet barbaric personality, which he undoubtedly was; he did it not only because he was half-mad, which he probably was. He did it because he believed that only a strictly centralized state could undertake those conquests which would bring about the grandeur of Moscow.

It was under Ivan the Terrible that Russia began to expand to the Baltic Sea and into Siberia, that two-fold expansion to the west and to the east which has continued until today. You should not forget that the first nation to knock at the doors of China was not the British in 1840. The Russians knocked at the doors of China during the 17th century and forced China into treaty arrangements with Russia. The Russians reached the Pacific Ocean

long before the Anglo-Americans did — in the 17th century. And you know that they expanded even beyond that point a little later down the American Pacific Coast into Oregon. This was one of the contributions of Ivan.

There was a second contribution by Ivan to the formation of Russia, one that is equally important. To understand this, let me say a few words briefly. In 1453, Constantinople, the Sacred City of Eastern Christianity, fell to the Turks. That does not mean very much to us today, but five hundred years ago it made a tremendous impression. Constantinople, the city consecrated by the Roman Emperor Constantine I in 333 as the new capital of the universal Christian Roman Empire, was from then on the real Rome, the second Rome, the new Rome. It was the center of the Mediterranean world; it was the sacred seat of ancient and venerable Orthodox Christianity. Yet, in 1453 it fell into the hands of the enemy whom the Christians regarded as the infidel. The crescent went up in place of the cross over the holiest church of Christendom, and at this spectacle an immense terror went through the Christian Orthodox World.

Now the question was: Who would be the legitimate successor to Constantine, the Roman Emperor? The answer given in Russia was very simple: there was only one mighty Orthodox Prince left. From the Russian point of view the Western Church was unorthodox, was heretic, was not truly Christian. The only truly Orthodox and Christian Prince was the Prince of Moscow. He was just rising in power by breaking the Mongol yoke and taking all the Russian lands. From that moment on, Moscow regarded itself, as the official word went, as the third Rome. The proud word went forth that there would be no fourth Rome; that the third Rome would remain the center of a world order and a world faith. The Russians were convinced that they, the guardians of the true faith, had to preserve it from contamination — contamination not by the infidels, but by the heretics, by the not entirely Christian Western Christians. They were convinced that

Moscow would once guide the world towards salvation, towards peace, towards a realization of their faith. This conviction has deeply remained in the hearts of many Russians. The West was regarded by Orthodox Moscow as something unorthodox, something to be saved by Moscow from perdition.

The next great break in Russian history came under Peter the Great. Peter the Great, who ruled, as you know, from 1689 until 1725, decided that he must modernize Russia, primarily by means of more modern armaments in order to make it equal to or stronger than the West. Peter the Great, as Aleksandr Pushkin the great Russian poet tells in a famous Russian poem, "broke a window into the wall which separated, like a Chinese wall, Russia from Europe." He transferred, as a symbolic gesture, the capital of Russia from Moscow and from the Kremlin to St. Petersburg. He built this new city by imperial order. This was land which had not had any Russian or Asian tradition. It was land on the Baltic Sea, where the Neva flows into the Finnish Gulf; where the winds were from the West, from Europe — from Germany, from Holland, from Denmark, and from England — a city which did not turn towards Asia, as did Moscow, but which turned towards Europe. The Russian government no longer resided in the Kremlin — that medieval monstrous building — but in the Winter Palace, which was built by Italian architects according to the most recent taste at that time.

From Peter on, and especially with his great successor, Catherine II — a woman of great mind, a German princess who reigned until the end of the 18th century — then through her grandson, Aleksandr I, who, as you know, defeated Napoleon in 1812-1813 and who was the leading man in the Council of Vienna and settled the first Napoleonic Europe, this window was slowly widened. Then through it there came what might be called "Western ideas."

I do not know whether you remember the years before 1945, when Hitler was defeated on the snowfields of Russia. At that

time there were some people in this country who did not know Russian history or Russia, but who were just good-hearted people and believed that the Russians were our ally, as Britain was. In fact you found people in high command who were more distrustful of the so-called "British Empire machinations" than of the future plans of the Soviet Union. Good-hearted Americans praised Stalin and the Bolshevik regime because, supposedly, it enabled the Russian people to defeat Hitler. What nonsense! Hitler was defeated, but not by Stalin. We have it today even from Khruschev's own speech that it was not by the Bolshevik leadership that Hitler was defeated. Do not forget that on the snowfields of Russia Napoleon was defeated, too, and probably (although I am not an expert in this) he was a greater general than Hitler. He was defeated, and nobody said: "Look at what a great man Aleksandr is! He has defeated Napoleon!" Nobody said, "How wonderful the Russian regime is! They have defeated Napoleon!"

In both cases it was not the regime which defeated Hitler and Napoleon. It was the expanse of Russia; it was the vastness of the country; it was the unprecedented early and hard winter; it was the stamina of the Russian people then (and also recently). The Tsarist and the Bolshevik regimes are both bad regimes, but let us say that the Bolshevik regime is even worse as far as human liberty is concerned than the Tsarist regime in modern times was.

In the 19th century, through this window that had been broken in the wall (of which I formerly spoke), there came Western ideas. Gentlemen, you have to remember one thing: Russia was the first non-Western society that was Westernized. What has been happening during the last decades in China, in India, in the Middle East, was first attempted in Russia. In a certain way the Asians are right if they think there is a certain similarity between their situation and the situation of the Russians a short while ago. Russia was the first non-Western society to be Westernized. This Westernization aroused in the educated Russians who were a very small minority, the demand for the Western

way of life: for individual liberty, for rights, for civilized ways of life. It led to a struggle between the autocracy and the educated classes, a struggle which started in December, 1825, at that time the first uprising, an uprising led by officers of the guard regiments of St. Petersburg. From then until March, 1917, there was a revolutionary movement in Russia which demanded one thing: to make Russia a European State, a State like France, like Britain, like Sweden or Denmark — a civilized, free State.

But the Russian intelligentsia, these Russian intellectuals and this Westernized class which first came from the high aristocracy — and later on from the newly-rising middle classes — labored under two drawbacks. One, and a very important one, was national pride. In some of these intellectuals there arose the old feeling that they had nothing, or very little, to learn from the West. We call them (and, in fact, they call themselves) Slavophiles — lovers of the Slavic or Russian way of life, of the old way of life. Their conviction was that the West was in reality disintegrating, decadent; that the West was threatened by lack of faith, by lack of fervor, by skepticism, by class and racial struggles. They believed that Russia was the Rock of Faith, ordered and orderly. The Slavophiles maintained that although Russia might be backward in outward civilization, it was very much richer than the West in the spiritual life.

Some of this feeling was repeated later in their own way by Asians, by Indians, who, again, over-compensated their inferiority by so-called "spiritual superiority," very much as the Russians did in the 19th century. The Slavophiles maintained that while Europe was doomed, Russia would be the Rock of Salvation by its spiritual life.

There was one difficulty in what I would call "civilizing" Russia's political life: this was the deep-seated nationalist pride and arrogance which you find again strong in the Asian countries. But many Russians did not share this view. Many of them were

willing to learn from the West — and to learn well — so well that in everything, including political ideas, they became an integral part of the West.

But the second hindrance was that the Russian masses did not care for Western constitutions and liberty. Do not forget that the Russian masses had been serfs until 1861 — very recently, as history goes. Constitutional rights meant very little to them. So it came about that when, during March, 1917, in the midst of the First World War, a revolution broke out in Russia, the masses — just as the Chinese masses in 1949 — did not care for liberty in that sense either. Maybe they care more for it today than they did a few years ago, after the experience of Mao's regime, but I do not know. But I would say that the revolt in 1917 was against the corrupt and inefficient government of the Tsar, for the government, both backward and inefficient, was unable to lead the nation successfully through the difficulties of war.

The Tsar himself, at the moment Nicholas II, was a weakling and was ruled by his wife. His wife, as you all know, was ruled by a very intelligent but not otherwise understanding kind of "miracle worker" named Rasputin. You see that these things are not so unique. What is happening in Holland today, where the Queen seems to be under the influence of a similar "miracle worker," is like the incident connected with Rasputin, again, for the very same reason as in the case of the Tsar. The son of the Tsar, the young ex-tsarevitch named Alexis, was suffering from an incurable disease of the blood, from that bleeding called "hemophilia." Nobody could cure him. Then this Russian Siberian peasant, Rasputin, came. He no doubt healed him to a certain extent. What his powers were we do not know, but that Rasputin had powers there is no doubt whatsoever. You must understand that naturally the child's mother was elated when Rasputin performed this miracle, so he became a man whose word was law in the court. This did not make for an efficient government there, I can assure you.

So the patriotic educated Russians saw Russia defeated in the war — defeated because of an inefficient and corrupt administration. For patriotic reasons they arose to reform Russia and to make Russia more Western, to make it something like Britain or France. It was a hope in March, 1917, but it did not succeed!

I was then in Russia. Within two weeks all of the Tsarist Police State was abolished and Russia was as free a country as is the United States. The United States is an old English country, prepared by five hundred to six hundred years' growth of liberty. But remember that Russia was completely unprepared, except in the small upper and middle class groups. The peasants did not care for constitutional liberty. There was only one thing for them to do: to make an end of the war; to go back to their farms and to have more farmlands.

But, secondly, there was the German General Staff. The German General Staff has always been too cunning for its own good. It was willing to use any method to destroy the Second Front in Russia and to throw all of its forces against the West. It sent Lenin into Russia, knowing very well who Lenin was, expecting him to undermine the democratic regime in Russia. Lenin, a genius in organization, in propaganda, and ruthless in his purpose, succeeded.

In November, 1917, as a result of the chaos, as a result of the experience, as a result of the war which went on, Lenin seized power in Russia and ended the brief dream of Russian liberty and of Russia being a part of Europe. Mind, it was in many ways a symbolic gesture that he transferred the capital from Petrograd (now Leningrad) back to the Kremlin in Moscow, back to those mediaeval palaces, where, with the spectral ghost of Ivan, it was as secluded and shut off as it was later under Stalin.

Lenin's rise to power ended the period of Russia as a part of Europe. Consciously, Lenin turned Russia away from Europe

and toward Asia. From the very beginning, he believed in the closest alliance between the Russian-Leninist Revolution, or what I would class as the anti-democratic counterrevolution of Lenin, and the Asian nationalist leadership, above all in China. He hoped to get an alliance with Turkey, but he was disappointed there. So there remained as his hope the future closest alliance between the East and Russia against the West.

Two hundred years ago the *rapprochement* of Europe and Russia had started with Peter the Great, and this hopeful development ended in November of 1917. Russia became again completely *sui generis*, or of its own kind, away from Europe and un-European. Mind, what the Polish and Hungarian workers rebel against today is not Socialism. They have no liking for Capitalism, with which they are not acquainted; they have no liking for America; they have no liking for things which this country could offer them. They hate Asian Moscow. They do not wish to become Capitalistic; neither do they wish to return to the bad governments which they had in Hungary under Admiral Horthy and in Poland under Colonel Joseph Beck. Do not make any mistake about that! But they wish to belong to Europe, and not to Moscow.

But I do not wish to conclude upon that note but to conclude upon another note. In 1918, what de Tocqueville had foreseen happened for the first time. The United States had then entered World War I, and in my opinion rightly, not to make the world safe for democracy but to make democracy safe in the world. In case of a German victory, woe to democracy and woe to Western ideas!

When America entered the war, Woodrow Wilson was President — I can think back to 1918 for I am so old as to remember it very well. In 1918, the world was weary of war; it was tired and fatigued to a degree which we cannot understand today. You must understand that World War I came as an immense shock to Western mankind, while World War II was expected by most people and did not shock us. If World War III should come (which I do not think will happen), it will not shock us for we are prepared

for it. But World War I shook my generation to a degree which the present generation cannot understand. In 1913, we did not expect a great war; we were mentally not prepared for a great earthquake.

So in 1918 we all looked for a new world to emerge and for a new message to come forth. In 1918, for the first time in history, this new message came from two new sources; one came out of Washington, and Woodrow Wilson was the spokesman; the other came out of Moscow, and Lenin was the spokesman. Each one started from opposite points of view, with opposite methods — but each promised peace and a better order.

For a short while it seemed that this bipolarization of the world, of which de Tocqueville spoke in 1832, would happen in 1919. But, as you know, it did not happen. It did not happen because the American people voluntarily withdrew into isolationism and the Russians had no other choice but to also withdraw into isolationism, for they were much too weak at that time to do otherwise. The Europeans and ourselves, unfortunately, were misguided by the fact and believed that the European Powers were still strong and that Russia was to remain weak behind the *cordon sanitairs.*

Gentlemen, in 1945, to our great astonishment, and I think to the astonishment of the Russians also, we and the Russians met at the Elbe; we met at the border of Manchuria. Unexpectedly, circling the globe, de Tocqueville's vision had come true! In a way which Americans did not expect and did not wish to happen, America — by history, by geography and by economy — had become the foremost power of what might be called "the Western World." This was something unexpected except by de Tocqueville and a few other individuals. Russia regarded herself as the great counterplayer, as the great adversary, antagonist of, and future victor over, the Western World. Moscow hopes for the support of the Asian and Arab rising nations, and it must be our main concern to win these nations, especially the Arabs, to feel nearer to

the West than to Moscow. Then, by Western unity and by friendship with the Arabs and the Asians, we will defeat Moscow's plans. These plans are there not because Lenin or Stalin willed it so, but because there is something in Russian history which drives them in that direction.

But there have also been strong opposite trends in Russian history. It is not true that Lenin was necessarily the outcome of Russian history. If there had not been a World War I, or if the German General Staff had not been as super-clever as it was, Lenin would not have come to power. Today, Russia might be a part of Europe. There is nothing inevitable in history; there are no inescapable laws of historical development. There is still the hope — not today and not tomorrow, but in the not too far distant future — that the great Russian people, with their immense stamina, will turn again to become a part of the Western World. Mind, there is a brief century or less that Russia was practically part of Europe. From 1825 until 1917, this *rapprochement* brought about a most productive cross-fertilization. An astonishing Russian literature arose from Pushkin to Dostoevsky to Chekhov which much enriched us in the West. And Russia received from the West the seeds of civilized liberty under law, the freedom of creative expression. All this was destroyed, for the time being, by Lenin. There may be again in the future a fortunate encounter between Russia and the West.

BIOGRAPHIC SKETCH

Professor Hans Kohn

Professor Hans Kohn was born in 1891 in Prague, Czechoslovakia. During World War I, he served in the Austrian Army and became a prisoner-of-war in Russia, where he lived for five years in Turkestan and in Siberia, witnessing the Russian revolutions and civil war. After his return, he lived from 1921 to 1931 in Paris, London, and Jerusalem, studying the history of nationalism, especially in the Middle East, and modern history.

In 1931, he came to the United States through the Institute of International Education in New York to lecture in American colleges on the Near East. He became professor of modern history at Smith College in 1934, occupying the Syndenham Clark Parsons Chair in history from 1941 to 1949. For two years he taught government at Harvard and at Radcliffe. In 1949, he became professor of history at City College of New York.

Professor Kohn has taught in the summer sessions of Harvard University, the University of California, the University of Colorado, Yale University, and the University of Minnesota. He was a Guggenheim Fellow in 1940, and a member of the Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton in 1948 and 1955. He is an editorial advisor of the *Encyclopedia Britannica.*

Among his books are three basic studies on nationalism in the Middle East: *A History of Nationalism in the East* (1929); *Nationalism and Imperialism in the Hither East* (1932); and *Western Civilization in the Near East* (1936). More recently, three books were published by Macmillan: *The Idea of Nationalism* (1944), now in its fifth printing and in Spanish, German and Italian translations; *Prophets and Peoples, Studies in 19th Century Nationalism* (1946); and *The Twentieth Century, A Midway Account of the Western World* (1949). His latest books, *Panslavism, Its History and Ideology* and *The Mind of Modern Russia* try to explain Russian policy. A new book, *Nationalism and Liberty,* was published in September, 1956.

PUBLIC RELATIONS IN THE NAVY

A lecture delivered
at the Naval War College
on 5 February 1957 by
Rear Admiral Edmund B. Taylor, U.S.N.

It is a signal honor for any officer to be asked to address students of the Naval War College and, to some extent, a frightening one. Seldom does any officer have to face such an "unsnowable" group. Any speaker who does attempt to overwhelm you with oratory finds himself in an extremely uncomfortable position during the Question Period.

I regard it as significant that the Chief of Information is here today. It is a striking example of the increasing awareness of the need for a more articulate Navy which can present the accomplishments and capabilities of this Navy of ours, not only to the civilian public but to our own Navy public.

Public Relations is so broad in scope that it would be impossible for me to delve into all the varied facets of the subject, even when applied specifically to the Navy. Therefore, I should like to touch briefly upon five areas which can be conveniently examined this morning. First, I should like to present a short resume' of the history of Navy Public Relations; second, some of the concepts which govern our operations; third, the objectives we are striving to achieve; fourth, what your responsibiilty in public relations will be; and, finally, a few suggestions for you to mull over prior to or just after you get your next command.

The Navy is a real neophyte in this public relations profession. We really have been in the full-time business only since World War II, when Secretary Knox established the Office of Public Relations. Prior to this, relations with information media and with the public were handled by hastily contrived organizations which were established for a particular period or for a particular

purpose. When that period or purpose had been served, public relations endeavors were usually left to fend for themselves. A case in point was our World War I experience. The public relations organization established by Secretary Daniels was allowed to die after hostilities ended.

During the early days of the present office, a great deal of effort went into acquainting the Navy with just what Navy Public Relations was and where it fitted into the scheme of things.

The Navy was really "The Silent Service" in those days. Such comments as "The public KNOWS what the Navy has done and can do; let's not pat ourselves on the back" were frequently heard. The skid of the Navy in public recognition after World War II is ample proof of the fallacy of that kind of statement.

Public relations in the Navy has probably had more ups and downs than any other branch. When the Navy enjoyed good relations, public relations effort was considered a waste. When the Navy got in trouble, public relations was derelict for letting it get into trouble. It was an outstanding case of "damned if you do and damned if you don't.

I am happy to say that the attitude toward public relations in the Navy has passed through a metamorphosis to the point where we feel we are really on the way to becoming an accepted part of the Navy Structure.

The foundation of our recent efforts was laid in 1954, when the Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of Naval Operations approved the issuance of a series of public information objectives applicable to then entire Navy. In the three-year period since their issuance, public relations has followed a course which, while not always leading through safe waters, has, nevertheless, been a defined course. With the continuing understanding and support of Secretary Thomas and the dynamic leadership of Admiral Burke, we are making steady progress and receiving increasing support from the Navy.

As to our second point, no discussion of public relations can proceed very far before you are forced into a statement of principles or concepts. These must be established in order to set forth the ethics which will govern our operations.

Right now I would like to establish the difference between public relations and publicity.

Too many of our people are still of the opinion that publicity is synonymous with public relations. Nothing could be further from the truth. Publicity is about 10% of public relations. Because a story appears in a magazine, newspaper, or similar medium, or a TV show about the Navy receives favorable attention, does not necesarily mean that the Navy enjoys good public relations.

Publicity is a tool of public relations. It provides channels for accomplishing a specific public relations project. The field of public relations itself is much greater than the channels through which we publicize projects. (Annual Global Strategy Discussions is an outstanding example).

Whether the services enjoy good public relations is contingent on how people regard the military. The attitude of your neighbors and friends toward your service; the success or failure of the services to obtain sufficient appropriations to operate and carry out the missions assigned; the number of recruits we enlist; the rate of reenlistments; attrition in our officer ranks; the support we receive in cities and towns throughout the country — all these things, plus a good many more, are the yardsticks that must be used to measure the public relations climate toward the Navy, the Army, the Marine Corps, the Air Force. The same is equally applicable to the other executive agencies of the Government.

I should like to digress for just a moment to touch upon a subject that has presented itself to some of our public information officers.

There is nothing quite so important or so significant as our own opinion. This is quite natural. The older we get the more important these attitudes become. In the military, we give an order and know that it will be carried out. When it isn't carried out somebody gets told about it, and told in very concise understandable terms.

As a result, when we make a speech we assume that because WE made it, that speech automatically takes precedence over the rise and fall of governments, the activities of movie stars, the condition of the market, or any other minor item you chance to see in the papers. Unfortunately, some of the unenlightened people who edit the various media fail to recognize this fact. We have had isolated occasions where a senior officer, because a speech or appearance he made was not on the front page or in the news at all, was apt to criticize his PIO.

I shall take advantage of my position today to advise you that because *you* make a speech does not necessarily mean that every medium is going to give full coverage to that speech. If its news, they'll cover it. If it isn't — they won't. If you accept this concept in the beginning, you'll save your blood pressure and decrease the number of ulcers your PIO probably already has.

The basic concept of Navy Public Relations is based on truth. We can not deal in propaganda, half-truths, or evasion. As does every organization experiencing growing pains, some of the people in the Navy have, in the past, attempted to fence with media representatives or have attempted to present the Navy wreathed in a halo on every occasion. The results of such tactics have ranged from embarrassing to near disastrous.

We must deal in facts and treat the media and our neighbors fairly. By so doing we cannot go far afield, nor can we be criticized for our efforts.

Do not get the impression from the foregoing that public relations is a passive operation. In this era, such a notion is tantamount to extinction.

Reasonable competition is not only encouraged, it is essential. This is true not only in civilian enterprise but within the Defense Department and within each service. Without such competition, any organization must become stagnant. The world situation which confronts our country today does not permit such stagnation.

The capabilities, the accomplishments, the activities of the Navy — and of the other services — must be presented to the country so that they may evaluate what they are getting for their money. The days of getting something for nothing have not yet arrived, and I doubt that such a condition will ever exist in our lifetime.

In the past, perhaps time was available for a more leisurely appraisal of the activities of the Navy. Such time is not available today. People are too busy keeping up with the accelerated age in which we live to focus their attention on expenditure of funds for defense. That's one of the jobs they delegate to their elected representatives.

But do not let this delude you into thinking they are not interested. Just let one unsavory project in Government come to the surface and watch how quickly the reaction comes!

Thus, it becomes mandatory to present to the public the facts of the Navy's part in perpetuating what has been tagged as "The American Way of Life." No amount of icing, or bumbling attempts to "hush things up" can long withstand the pressure of public inquisitiveness.

A word now about adequate public relations planning.

All of us have spent most of our service careers "planning" things, from military operations to household moves. The need

for following this procedure in the execution of public relations projects has become obligatory. No more can you set up an open house and, the day before, issue a release to the local paper. Too many side issues are involved. The public relations aspects are far too complex for such bizarre treatment.

An additional problem encountered in public relations planning which is not common to other prearranged events is the lack of a standard format. No matter how many previous projects have been conducted or how successful they were, there is no guarantee that the next one will come off the same way.

Too many extraneous and sometimes apparently unrelated factors have a way of throwing a big wrench in the project. A great many potential trouble spots can be avoided, however, by a thoughtful and planned approach. Common sense should dictate just how far in advance you should start planning. If you have an annual open house which is THE big public relations project for the year, start a year ahead of time.

No man is now alive who can give you all the things you should consider when you start your public relations planning, but there are some things that are common to every public relations endeavor.

Consider, first: "What do you hope to gain from the project?" "What will be your object?" "Do you desire to show off new equipment?" "Do you hope to gain new recruits?" "Are you trying to show what a good neighbor your command is?" "Is your program to be aimed at the civilian community, at the dependents, or at the servicemen themselves?"

These items constitute fundamental approaches which must be considered before you even begin to contemplate the mechanics of how you are going to conduct the project.

Let us assume you are appealing to a civilian group and have determined what message you want to get across. The next

step is to make absolutely sure that everybody, and every department participating, has the same understanding.

The premise that public relations is an "all hands' job" has been repeated time and time again, but it is just as applicable today as it was in the beginning. Arrange staff conferences to explain the project. Have a presentation prepared, if necessary, to define what each department's responsibilities will be. Over-information is far better than lack of information.

Do not hesitate to ask for expert help from outside your immediate command if you feel any qualms about the project at all. Once the thing comes off, it's no good trying to retrieve the bobble. We have almost half a hundred Reserve Public Relations Companies throughout the country which are made up of experts of sorts and degrees. Call on them for help if you need it. A call to the nearest District PIO will give you names and addresses — if he is not able to handle it himself.

As a rule of the thumb the more people that know about the project in its initial stages, the more pitfalls can be avoided. A word of caution here, though. Be sure your original objective is not sidetracked for a pet scheme of some division or branch. Information about the project should be in the form of an explanation of what's going to happen, not a request for each division or branch to plan the overall program.

Place the responsibility for this planning in your Public Information Officer, if you have a full-time man. If you don't, go to the next nearest competent source. He may be a Reserve Officer experienced in the field, or an Enlisted Journalist. The main thing is: get EXPERT advice. We have found the Regular Line Officers are tremendous assets for accomplishing public relations jobs which involve an understanding of Navy Organization. They are generally, at their weakest, public relationswise when they step out of that role.

I should like to make another aside here. Don't be prejudiced by the age of your PIO or Journalist. Within strictly Naval channels rank must be and is recognized because of the inherent experience attached to that rank. The more senior the rank, the more knowledge of things Navy. This does not necessarily hold true in the case of public relations.

A majority of our full-time PIO's are well trained in public relations techniques and have, as well, a good grasp of how the Navy operates. Therefore, when you require public relations advice, don't disregard such advice because it comes from a Junior Officer or Enlisted Journalist.

During the recent evacuations in Egypt, the entire public relations aspects were handled by a Commander. Officers in charge of the actual evacuation were senior to him, and, in some cases, very senior. The success of the public relations story on that evacuation must in large measure be attributed to Admiral Brown's confidence in that Commander.

A few moments ago, I mentioned that a series of public information objectives had been issued to the Navy in 1954. I'd like to dwell on those objectives in a little more detail.

These objectives are seven in number, and I should like to mention them:

Public Understanding of Seapower

Public Understanding of the Navy's Role Today

Public Understanding of the Navy's Future Role

Encouragement for Career Service

A Vigorous Reserve

Need for a Modernized Fleet

Awareness of Growing Soviet Naval Strength

As you will note, these objectives are general in their phrasing. That was done intentionally in order for them to be applicable to all parts of the Navy, regardless of geographical location. These objectives are the keystones upon which our public relations programs should be built. They provide the course that must be followed if there is to be an accrual of effort by Naval Commands.

Too much of our public relations effort is still being disseminated on one-shot deals that lack direction. The strength of the overall public relations program is derived from the cumulative effects of many small programs that are carried on by all parts of the Navy.

It does very little good if one command has a good public relations project that has no aim or goal. The effect of the program is lost immediately upon completion. If programs all over the Navy are tied into a series of objectives which are common to all, the end result has more lasting power.

Your public must receive a "message" as a result of your public relations efforts. It is not enough for them to leave your command saying, "Weren't they nice people?" Or, "Did you ever see such a clean ship?" There must be some connection between the "niceness" of the people or the "cleanliness" of the ship with the job the Navy is trying to do.

How you get this message across can be done in a variety of ways. Let's take an open house at a Naval Air Station, for example. If you have a big — and I mean really BIG — sign hanging over the gate saying "NAVY AIRPOWER CAN REACH ANY LAND TARGET IN THE WORLD," they may remember that. If you have the same phrase placed at strategic places over the station, there is more than an even chance they will also remember that. Thus, you give your visitors something to think about, something to talk about, something they will automatically

recall whenever they are discussing their visit to your ship or station.

Another example concerns speeches. Most of you have already come to grips with this chore of speech-making. If you haven't, you've been lucky so far. Believe me, it won't last! The point I should like to make here is that, whenever practical, you should hang your speech on one of these objectives. You don't have to repeat it verbatim, but get some point across which is closely akin to one of the objectives.

If you magnify this example by the number of officers in this room, and consider that each one makes a speech before a different civic organization, you see how this accumulation of effort begins to pay off. Everyone is talking about similar concepts. The words and approach may be different, but the goals are the same.

To amplify these objectives a bit further, let me say that no public relations program can be a good one unless there is a theme or message upon which, or around which, all public relations efforts revolve. The use of themes which support the objectives are especially useful to point up local aspects of the objectives. They act as tie-in "gimmicks" which illustrate how the local station fits into the job the Navy is trying to accomplish.

So far, my remarks have dealt with some general items which concern what public relations can do for you. Now, I'd like to touch on your responsibility toward public relations.

The success or failure of any public relations program does not rest with the Chief of Information, your PIO, or your Executive Officer. That responsibility is exclusively the burden of the Commanding Officer. It's an obligation that cannot be delegated. And, in the Navy, it's a function of command which has been spelled out as a responsibility of command by the Secretary of the Navy. But no amount of command assignment or pleas from seniors can do

the job if you don't believe in it. Oh, yes, you can pay lip service to directives and do your duty so you will not be accused of sidestepping your responsibility. But, unless you exercise your initiative and get the word out to your people that you really believe in public relations — very little will actually happen.

We all recognize the effect that personalized directions have. If your immediate boss tells you to do something, his work gets done right now. If the directions come from far away, the tendency is to say, "That's nice. I'll have to do something about that some day."

Your subordinates have the same attitude. If you pass a public relations suggestion or paper along "for information," that's just what it is going to get. If you interpret that paper in local terms and indicate you want something done, then something will be done. But it can't be done from Washington. You've got to give public relations *your* support before anything happens.

The final subject which I should like to cover concerns a few things in which I think you will be interested because they concern some practical suggestions you may wish to investigate when you get your next command.

First of all, have a frank discussion with your PIO. Find out what the climate is in the nearby community toward your command. If you are lucky enough to get a ship, find out what the men aboard think of the ship. What's more important, try to find out what their families think of the ship and the Navy. Once you have this information, you can take solid public relation steps.

If you feel you cannot place your utmost confidence in your PIO, appoint another one. If he is a full-time man — a 1650, public relations specialist — drop me a note and I'll see if we can't get someone in whom you can place your confidence.

Next, see that the PIO is cut in early on anything which may have a public relations aspect. This means he should be in-

cluded in almost all staff conferences. In this connection — if you run into a messy situation that appears to be getting messier, please let the nearest District PIO know as soon as possible, or let my shop know. So many times we could have avoided unpleasant problems if we had just known about them in time to have taken some corrective action.

The PIO should also have direct and immediate access to you at all times. Time is an essential ingredient in public relations, and if you have the PIO beating his way up through the normal chain of command you'll find yourself in the thick of a large hassel before he gets to you. And be sure that everyone in the chain of command knows the PIO can see you at all times. This doesn't mean that the PIO will bypass everyone. In the normal course of events he cuts everybody in, but there are time when this procedure just doesn't work.

If you get command of a shore station, consider the establishment of an advisory board, so to speak, made up of yourself and your Exec and representatives of the local community. Have regular meetings. Cut them in on what your command plans to do in the ensuing months that may effect them. You don't have to breach security in doing this, either.

One advantage of this type of group is the easing of unpleasant decisions which have to be made. It is much more palatable to the local community if these decisions are announced by a joint group rather than unilaterally by the Navy.

Check in with the local civic organizations. Join at least one. These groups are powerful influences in forming opinion in the community and, in addition, you'll derive a great deal of pleasure out of the associations you form.

Make a sustained effort to cultivate the acquaintance of the local media. These people are very important to you. They may not be Hanson Baldwins or George Fielding Eliots, but they are

the ones that get the news to the local people and from their stories may come the coverage by the big news syndicates. Have the publisher of the local paper and the manager of the local radio station for lunch, or invite them to the club on suitable occasions. Then when something unpleasant comes up you'll find they give sympathetic treatment to the event rather than purely surface investigation.

Finally, when you embark on a purely public relations program — as opposed to publicity — don't look around for measurable results right away. Public relations is perhaps the most difficult thing in the world to measure. Tangible expressions are sometimes not evident immediately, and perhaps they may never be apparent.

I should like to briefly touch upon the organization of public information in the Department of Defense and where my office fits into this organization. The Office of Public Information, Department of Defense, comes under the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative and Public Affairs. Major policy concerning the conduct of service public information activity originates from this office. These policies are sent to the individual service secretaries, who reissue them in the proper format — either a SecNav Instruction of Notice.

Most of the policies affecting more than one service are discussed by the Public Information Coordinating Council, which is made up of all Chiefs of Information and representatives of the Department of Defense.

You may be interested to note that news releases *in Washington* are not made by the individual services. The only approved releasing channel is the Office of Public Information, Department of Defense. We write up the release and then send it to the Office of Public Information, Department of Defense, for distribution to major news media representatives who have their offices in the Pentagon.

Navy public information is conducted by the Chief of Information on behalf of the Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of Naval Operations. Therefore, I work in a dual capacity as the executive agent of public information policy for the Secretary and carry this policy out under the Chief of Naval Operations.

The overall guide for Navy public information is the *Public Information Manual,* which was first issued as an enclosure to SECNAV INSTRUCTION 5720.7 in 1953. This manual should be your bible on any item concerning public information operations. It covers a wide variety of subjects, from accreditation of news media to the staging of air shows. It may save you embarrassment and save us time if you get a working knowledge of this Manual. However, my office, in addition to its other functions, is a service agency for the entire Navy and is ready and willing to offer advice and assistance when possible in solving your public relations/public information problems.

Now a word about public information coordination between services and agencies of the Government overseas.

The closest cooperation is required and is enjoyed between the services based overseas. There is mutual support and a great deal of *rapport* between their operations, and this must be the case in order to provide as united a front as possible to foreign publics. That the coordination is working is obvious, and we assume it will continue.

Another agency that is very interested in service public information abroad is the United States Information Agency. They bear the primary responsibility of portraying America to the country in which they operate. They have the experienced personnel and know-how of the local scene and should be consulted as soon as possible when no Navy public information officer is readily available.

In this short period — short to me, at least — I have tried to give you some background on the early development of Navy

public relations and the increasing acceptance this field is experiencing in the Navy.

As long as you stick to the concepts of truth and adequate advance planning and utilize your public relations advisers properly, you can't go far afield.

The objectives have been tried and found to be stable and good for the foreseeable future. So long as you use them intelligently and bend local efforts toward their achievement, we believe that your command will benefit — and so will the Navy.

The entire progression or recession of public relations is the responsibility of the individual. No set of directives or suggestions can ever replace the commanding officer's opinion toward public relations.

I have tried to give you a very few suggestions on some public relations programs or steps that you can use if you so desire.

In closing, I should like to again emphasize that if this Navy of ours is to endure and advance in the form that we anticipate, it will be a direct result of the support we receive from the people of this country. If we don't convince them that the Navy is an essential ingredient for sustaining the freedom that has been won over the past 150 years or so — it will be our fault, not theirs.

BIOGRAPHIC SKETCH

Rear Admiral Edmund B. Taylor, U.S.N.

Admiral Taylor was graduated from the United States Naval Academy in 1925. During the early period of his career, he had sea duty in the Battleships U.S.S. NEW YORK, U.S.S. TEXAS and U.S.S. WYOMING and the Destroyers U.S.S. HATFIELD, U.S.S. LEARY and U.S.S. PERRY, interspersed with assignments to the Naval Academy as Assistant Football Coach and Assistant Lacrosse Coach and as an instructor in Ordnance and Gunnery.

Duty as Aide and Flag Lieutenant on the Staff of Commander Destroyers, Battle Force, and in the Officer Personnel Division of the Bureau of Navigation. Navy Department, preceded his World War II service in command of the U.S.S. DUNCAN. That vessel, under his command, rescued survivors of the U.S.S. WASP and was later lost from severe damage received while launching a successful torpedo attack against the Japanese Cruiser FURATAKA.

After serving as Commanding Officer of the U.S.S. BENNETT, Admiral Taylor served successively as Commander of Destroyer Division 90 and Destroyer Squadron 45 in the South and Central Pacific areas. During the last eight months of the war, he served as Aide to Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal. In May, 1946, he returned to the Naval Academy as Head of the Department of Physical Training and Director of Athletics. In July, 1948, he became Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, and during 1950 he was in command of the U.S.S. SALEM.

Since that time he has again served in the Navy Department; first, in the Bureau of Naval Personnel; and, later, as Assistant to the Under Secretary of the Navy. In late 1952, he returned to a sea command as a Destroyer Flotilla Commander in the Atlantic Fleet. Admiral Taylor served one and a half years as Commander, United States Naval Base, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Since 1955, he has been the Navy's Chief of Information.

RECOMMENDED READING

The evaluation of books listed below include those recommended to resident students of the Naval War College. Officers in the fleet and elsewhere may find them of interest.

The listing herein should not be construed as an endorsement by the Naval War College; they are indicated only on the basis of interesting, timely, and possibly useful reading matter.

Many of these publications may be found in ship and station libraries. Books on the list which are not available from these sources may be obtained from one of the Navy's Auxiliary Library Services Collections. These collections of books available for loan to individual officers are maintained in the Bureau of Naval Personel; Headquarters ELEVENTH, FOURTEENTH, FIFTEENTH Naval Districts: and Commander Naval Forces, Marianas, Guam. Requests for the loan of these books should be made by the individual to the nearest Auxiliary Library Service Collection (See Article C9604, Bureau of Naval Personnel Manual, 1948).

Title: *The Red Army.* 460 p.

Author: Liddell Hart, B. H., ed. New York, Harcourt, Brace, 1956.

Evaluation: This is one of those books written by multiple contributors, each dealing with his own particular specialty, and an editor trying to tie the whole thing together. There is, consequently, an unevenness as to pace, quality of writing and continuity. This is inevitable because of the subject. Any factual account of the Army of the U.S.S.R. must be made up of bits and scraps of pertinent information, to be fitted like a jig-saw puzzle into a single framework. The U.S.S.R. has consistently enjoyed a not inconsiderable reputation for secretiveness about the various aspects of its military machine. In spite of these difficulties, however, the editor of *The Red Army* — the well-known military analyst, Captain Liddell Hart — has succeeded in his purpose. He has provided a reliable account and a comprehensive picture of the Soviet Army in all its facets. The chapter on "Geography and Strategy," for example,

is noteworthy. The factors of geography are constant factors, despite quantum advances made in weapons systems. Thus, regardless of the existence or non-existence of thermonuclear weapons, should one be of a mind to take foot in hand and invade Russia, there are certain unyielding facts of geo-strategy that must be faced. The converse of the matter is equally a matter of concern to the Russians, should those worthies contemplate an adventure in the West, say, or in the Middle East.

Title: *Disarmament and Security.* 1,035 p.

Author: U. S. Congress. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. Washington, U. S. Government Printing Office, 1956

Evaluation: A very complete collection of important security documents on the control and reduction of armaments. There are 239 documents included in this collection, in full text or excerpt, and they are divided into three main parts: (1) Disarmament — Historical Background (1919-1945); (2) Problems of Disarmament and Security; and (3) Related Action in the United States Congress. This collection contains many documents on the interrelationship of disarmament, security, and peaceful settlement; the international control of weapons of mass destruction; the complex and crucial issues of inspection control and phasing in a disarmament system; control of arms, ammunition, and strategic materials; and problems of disarmament and security from the standpoint of strategic areas. There is appended to the collection a selected bibliography of supplementary official documentation, as well as books and articles on aspects of disarmament from non-official sources.

Title: *Soviet Total War.* 2 Vols.

Author: U. S. Congress. House Committee on Un-American Activities. Washington, U. S. Government Printing Office, 1956.

Evaluation: In the face of periodic tendencies to discount the severity of the communist threat to the free world, the House Committee on Un-American Activities has assembled here a symposium of more than 120 contributors which points up the deceits and subterfuges, and *unchanging goals* of communism. Articles by experts in various fields — government, military, business, and labor leaders, political scientists and writers — each dealing with some phase

of the psychological, political, economic, sociological and military strategies of international communism.

Title: *Grand Strategy*. Vol. VI. 422 p.

Author: Ehrman, John. London, H. M. Stationery Office, 1956.

Evaluation: This is a volume in the official British series, *History of the Second World War*. It covers the evolution and conduct of grand strategy for the final months of the war, October 1944 to August 1945, at the highest level. It presents the British point of view in great detail and, for this reason, its chief value is as a reference work, giving long quotations from hitherto unpublished documents that bear on the evolution of grand strategy. The final chapter contains a good explanation of the British committee system at work.

Title: *Collective Defence in Southeast Asia: The Manila Treaty and its implications*. 179 p.

Author: Royal Institute of International Affairs. London, 1956.

Evaluation: A report on the historical and political background of events leading up to, and reasons behind, the creation of SEATO. Written primarily from a British point of view as the "old hand" in Southeast Asia, as compared with the "neophyte American" treatment of Southeast Asian countries, it is an interesting and informative report which puts the United States in the role of "latter-day enlightened colonialists who are learning" — however slow and expensive the process may be. Accurate comparative similarities are drawn between the SEATO Treaty and its counterparts, ANZUS (1954) and the Philippine-United States arrangement of 1951. A wealth of nineteenth and twentieth century historical data concerning Southeast Asian politics and affiliations is contained in the report. A concise appraisal of the developments leading up to, and the actual happenings of, the Indo-Chinese events of the 1950's are well covered. Added as appendices, in their official language, are the eight relevant treaties and armistice agreements affecting this vital area.

Title: *Problems in International Relations*. 330 p.

Authors: Gyorgy, Andrew and Gibbs, Hubert, eds.

Evaluation: The editors have adapted the case study treatment to twenty-five contemporary problems in the field of inter-

national relations. No effort has been made to make the treatment definitive; rather, the authors have presented their material in such a way as to facilitate further detailed study by both graduate and undergraduate students. Each case begins with a brief introduction, followed by a series of problems suggested for further analysis. The body of the case is then presented by an author qualified in the particular field. A suggested bibliography for the initiation of further study terminates each case.

PERIODICALS

Title: *Personal Report from Navy Air Secretary Norton.*

Publication: MISSILES AND ROCKETS, January, 1957, p. 43-46.

Annotation: An interview with the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Air, in which he discusses the Navy's missile program.

Title: *The First Year of Deterrence.*

Author: Rabinowitch, Eugene.

Publication: BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS, January, 1957, p. 2-8.

Annotation: Contends that England and France abandoned the Egyptian invasion because of the Soviet threat and discusses the lessons of this demonstration of the power of air-atomic deterrence.

Title: *America's Troubled Canal.*

Publication: FORTUNE, February, 1957, p. 129-132, 160, 162, 167 and 168.

Annotation: Details United States problems with the Panama Canal in regard to sovereignty, needed improvements to keep up with peacetime traffic, and defense against nuclear weapons in wartime.

Title: *World Strategy and Suez.*

Author: Nicholl, A. D., Rear Admiral, Royal Navy.

Publication: THE NAVY, January, 1957, p. 2-4

Annotation: Attributes Soviet activity in the Middle East to the Communist aim of world domination, and shows how united action of the Western nations has blocked the advance of communism in various parts of the world since World War II.