

# U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE INFORMATION SERVICE FOR OFFICERS

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NAVAL WAR COLLEGE  
NEWPORT, R. I.

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## EDITOR'S NOTE

The four articles included in this issue are lectures presented before the Naval War College during a week devoted to *Strategy Studies*.

The purpose of these studies was to inquire into the elements and problems of strategy. In general terms, the coverage included the requirements of a sound strategy and the influence on strategy of political, ethical, ideological and military factors, with special attention devoted to the nature of sea power.

These lectures enhanced the value of the program and formed a background for seminar discussions.

The Naval War College is indebted to the lecturers who have generously devoted the time and effort to edit their lectures, and who have cheerfully given permission to publish them here for the benefit of the officers throughout the service in all parts of the world.

## INFLUENCES OF MILITARY ALLIANCES ON STRATEGY

A lecture delivered  
at the Naval War College  
on 19 March 1952

by  
*Major George Fielding Eliot*

Admiral Conolly, Admiral Hewitt, Gentlemen:

I want to thank the President for the very kind introduction. He points out that I have been a commentator, analyst, and so on — one of those fellows whose daily prayer is supposed to be, "Oh Lord, give me this day my daily opinion and forgive me for the one I had yesterday." I will try, gentlemen, to avoid opinion as far as I can do so in presenting the subject of "Military Alliances," and will try to rely as far as possible on expositions from the facts and lessons from the past.

The creation of a military alliance presupposes a common purpose among two or more countries which no one of the Allies is strong enough to accomplish alone. That purpose may be defensive or offensive. There have been many alliances which were formed for sheer conquest and the subsequent division of the spoils over which the Allies usually fell out. In this discussion I will try to confine myself to the consideration of *defensive* alliances in which two or more states come together to defend themselves against a common peril. That is the type of alliance in which we are now engaged and in which, historically, our interest is stronger than in the offensive type.

Such a defensive alliance, unfortunately, is the only practical form even now of collective security. The Covenant of the League of Nations and the Charter of the United Nations are

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expressions of the conscience of civilized humanity, a realization of the need for some form of collective security reaching out towards the ideal of a world of peace and justice under law. But neither the League nor the United Nations have so far succeeded in creating military institutions capable of enforcing such a rule of law. Military power remains a monopoly of national, not international, authority. It can be exercised in international combination only when two or more nations are impelled by a common purpose or a common danger to contract an alliance to that end. In the presence of aggressive and expanding power in centralized hands, the law-abiding state — if too weak to defend itself alone — cannot rely upon duly constituted officers of justice. It can rely only upon which might be called the *posse comitatus* of the international community, just as our own ancestors in the Old West were unable to rely on courts and sheriffs which did not yet exist but had to form committees of vigilance to deal with outlaws in those days.

It is in reluctant recognition of this fact that the United States today, faced by the threat of expanding Soviet power has entered into a series of military alliances with other nations likewise threatened by Soviet aggression. This is the first time in our history that we have become a member of a military alliance while not actually at war and some of us are inclined to be unhappy about it. We use words such as "entangle" and "involve," and seek to place artificial limitations on the extent of our military commitments as though we could define by Congressional resolution the precise degree of danger to which we shall in the future be exposed. Yet the primal instinct of self-preservation overrules our fears of departing from the comfortable precepts of less perilous days.

In fact, there is nothing startlingly new about the existing situation. It follows a pattern deeply woven into the history of

the past 250 years. Four times in those two and one-half centuries the liberties of a great part of mankind have been threatened by the concentrated power and expanding ambition of authoritarian states: by the France of Louis XIV, by the France of Napoleon, by Hohenzollern Germany and by the combination of Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan. In each case the threat was abated; in each case this result was brought about by a military alliance of the threatened state; in each case the aggressor might well have succeeded in his design if the threatened states had opposed him singly, if they had not succeeded in achieving some degree, however imperfect, of unity of purpose and of effort. In the last two instances we ourselves became partners in the victorious alliance and our intervention on both occasions decided the outcome of the struggle.

Now once more we face a determined bid for world domination. Here, as Kipling puts it "is nothing new or aught unproven," save that this time we Americans are the leaders, indeed the very architects of the alliance which the Soviet threat has drawn together. Instead of beginning as mere spectators and later being "drawn into a foreign war," as we like to tell ourselves was the case in 1917 and 1941, we now find ourselves compelled to take the initiative, to marshal the forces of resistance and to provide the bulk of the money and weapons which give the new alliance its power. We are thus cast in the role hitherto chiefly occupied by Britain. Instead of allowing ourselves to be disturbed by vague misgivings that there is something un-American about what we are doing, we might well give some study to the history of past alliances, especially from the British viewpoint.

We have made a good beginning. The alliance of which we are the leader has drawn together well in advance of the actual impact of full-scale war. We have not lost three or four of our



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Allies piece meal before making up our minds to resist. We have not indulged our God-given democratic right of hoping for the best while failing to prepare for the worst, right up to the moment when the storm burst in all its fury. In the light of past experience we have indeed been astonishingly forehanded. In consequence, we have some reason to hope that this time our alliance may have a chance of gaining its ends without a major war.

The common purpose of the Allied powers has been defined by President Truman in very simple words: "to stop Communist aggression and achieve peace." It follows that the alliance must be sufficiently strong and well-knit: (1) to stop or contain minor aggressive attempts of the enemy, as in Korea; (2) to present so formidable an aspect that the risk of doing anything that might lead to a major war will seem unacceptable to the enemy; (3) if a major war, nevertheless, does occur by mischance or by hostile designs — to win it. The alliance may have to have considerable staying power, as the conditions of readiness required to accomplish missions (1) and (2) may have to be maintained for a long time.

These are objectives which neither the United States nor any other Western power can accomplish alone. Their accomplishment depends upon an alliance which possesses sufficient combined power to achieve them. So much that is precious to all free men and women depends indeed on making this alliance strong and keeping it strong that it seems well worthwhile to examine what the record of experience teaches about the defensive alliances of the past; the reasons for their successes and their failures; the obstacles that had to be overcome; the influence upon Allied unity of the domestic politics, and the diverging interests of the member states; of political, personal, and military considerations and of public opinion.

It is somewhat surprising that the extensive military literature of the past 250 years contains no study of military alliances, as such, or of even the narrower and purely military problems of the conduct of coalition warfare. There is a wealth of historical material; the record is there, and it is copiously annotated, but there is no searching analysis of the military alliance as an instrument of defense against the exorbitant power of an aggressive state. One might well have expected such a book to have come from a British pen because of Britain's vast experience as the organizer and leader of military alliances, but there is little to be found save a few articles in military journals and Sir Frederick Maurice's excellent "Lessons of Allied Cooperation," which is confined to the experience of World War I. Most of the great writers on strategy, British or Continental, virtually ignore the subject of the workings of alliances save for a few pungent paragraphs in Clausewitz—which one could wish had been expanded into a chapter.

American interest in the subject of alliances is comparatively recent, not to say reluctant. Indeed, generations of Americans have been taught that the very word, "alliance," is one of evil connotation. This, too, is surprising in view of the historical fact that this country gained its independence by means of a successful military alliance. Yet, to this very day, statesmen of the isolationist persuasion repeat with great relish the famous quotation from Washington's Farewell Address: "It is our true policy to steer clear of permanent alliances with any portion of the foreign world." This seems to them, to be conclusive. They rarely place emphasis on the word "permanent" nor invite attention to the fact that no alliance between sovereign states, by its very nature, can ever be permanent. Still less do they bring to the attention of their listeners that in the succeeding paragraph of the famous address Washington goes on to say, "Taking care

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always to keep ourselves, by suitable establishments, on a respectable defensive posture, we may safely trust to temporary alliances for extraordinary emergencies." It would seem not only reasonable to expect this fuller quotation, but also a comparison of Washington's words with his actions under the burden of responsibility when he actively sought for and obtained an alliance for his country with France, then a monarchy of decidedly reactionary tendency; and, having obtained that alliance, himself conducted the operations of the Allied forces by land and sea with a masterly address which was crowned by the decisive victory at Yorktown.

Surely the legacy of guidance which the Father of his Country left to succeeding generations of Americans deserves to be assessed not only in the light of his words, but of his deeds. Nevertheless, the prejudice against alliances had become so ingrown by 1917 that when in that year we found ourselves compelled to join the alliance against Hohenzollern Germany, President Wilson was at some pains to see to it that we were not officially described as an "allied power," but as an "associated power." The reaction from that war, of course, was "never again." A whole generation of Americans was nurtured on the wistful belief that somehow we had been sucked in by the machinations of foreigners, and that the road to peace was to be found by means of legislative insulation against these evil contacts.

During the years 1919-1939, it is hard to imagine any subject in which Americans would have been less interested than the subject of "military alliances." Today, one hears frequently enough that World War II would never have happened if we had joined the League of Nations after World War I. Considering the somewhat sterile record of the League, one may wonder. But it is certain that if at the first hint of Japanese aggression in Manchuria in 1931, or in 1933 when Hitler marched into the Rhineland, we

had contracted a hard-and-fast military alliance with the British and the French and implemented it with Washington's "suitable establishments," it is extremely unlikely that World War II would ever have taken place. Nothing, however, could have been farther from the political realities of the times.

Our present attitude towards alliances marks, considered against this background, a very notable advance towards realism. With all that we now have at stake, the present seems a suitable time for a thoughtful reflection on the record of the great alliances of the past which have arisen as a result of the threat of concentrated and exorbitant power in the hands of a state bent on aggression. We shall not find in that record any suggestion that a military alliance is an ideally efficient instrument for waging war. It is an improvisation and it has all the faults of improvisations. A single government, capable of making the best possible disposition of all its resources under the direction of an established military and political system, has obvious advantages over a coalition of governments which must either handle their pooled resources by some form of agreement (which frequently falls down in the execution), or must set up super-agencies for the purpose in which the lines of authority and responsibility are very difficult to define.

Unity of purpose, as we shall see, is essential to success—but to translate unity of purpose into unity of action has proven no easy task. Nor is unity of purpose as simply established as might be thought at first glance. Sovereign states enter alliances out of self-interest and remain in them only so long as that interest is served by so remaining. In a defensive alliance, unity of purpose at the outset is often no more than a desire to survive. This overrides the divergences of interest as to other matters which may exist among the Allies, but these divergences continue to hamper a full cooperation and are likely to grow more troublesome as military success abates the original anxiety.

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We find strange bed-fellows in all the alliances of the past 250 years. We find free nations as allies of the most reactionary of authoritarian states in the face of a common danger. Again and again we find the common cause imperiled by incredible blindness, selfishness, and even outright treachery on the part not only of dynastic despots but of democratic politicians. Yet we also find that free peoples have usually provided the staying power of the allowance in adversity. We find, also, that allied success has a direct relationship to the degree of common understanding and agreement which has been established beforehand. Unity of command in a given theater of operations has been a factor of inestimable importance. It has been rarely attained on a 100% basis. Unity of political direction at the highest level is of even greater importance — but, alas, of even greater rarity.

Some voices are raised to ask whether it would not be better, in view of all these pitfalls and uncertainties about alliances, to abandon that idea and substitute an organized world government — or, at least, a federal union of free states with military establishments and agencies responsible to a federal authority, on the model with which Americans are so familiar. This might be so if time and the enemy permitted. But that is not the case. Just as our ancestors of the thirteen colonies had to fight and win the war of the American Revolution with an *ad hoc* organization and with the means at their immediate command so as to gain a breathing space in which to establish a more workable form of government, so today the nations of Western civilization must meet the perils by which they are beset with the best kind of organization that can be improvised in the time at their disposal.

We have, as a British diplomat remarked recently, two jobs to do: one, to lay, the foundation of our brave, new world, and the other to keep our throats from being cut in the meantime so that

we may live to enjoy it. The only means available to us for this second and essential task of survival is a military alliance. We cannot waste time wishing that this were not so; that we could find a more acceptable and efficient method. The old infantry drill regulations used to say (I never have understood why they cut this out in the later manual): "Any reasonable plan, even though defective in some particulars, if boldly and resolutely carried through is better than the hesitating search for the ideal." It is in this spirit that free men and women must now face a future charged with perils as great as those which their ancestors faced and overcame.

Perhaps some brief analysis of a few of these past accomplishments in collective security may throw light on present problems. I'd like to go now quite a long way back to the alliance against Louis XIV in the War of the Spanish Succession. You will find some very interesting parallels with conditions of the present day. The threat at that time, as you will remember, was a combination of the already very considerable military power of France (which was the strongest nation on the continent of Europe) with the whole of the Spanish Empire by union of the two crowns when Louis's grandson, Philip of Anjou, became the King of Spain. It was very strongly opposed by an alliance of England, Holland, the Empire, the German States and, after a while, the small Italian duchy of Savoy. These allies had various objectives. Indeed, it is doubtful whether the alliance would have come into existence at all if it had not been for the genius of the English King, William III, who was also a stadtholder and Captain General of Holland and long perceived the danger of the growing power of France. He had organized one alliance which had fought an inconclusive war to check Louis' attack on Holland and Germany at an earlier stage.

I think we may define the English objectives as, first of all.

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to prevent France from becoming the absolute ruler of the continent — the old “balance of power” principle which became later on so ingrained a factor in English policy — particularly to deny the French the occupation of the Low Countries — the extension of a strong continental power into that area having been always a British strategic objective; to prevent the French, by getting hold of Spain, from making the Mediterranean a French lake and checking British trade in that area; likewise, to prevent the French from getting hold of the whole of the resources of Spanish America and cutting off English trade in that direction, which was beginning to grow pretty fast. But, even, so, there were very different views in England as to how a war should be conducted and these views, as the war progressed, became a matter of partisan politics.

Let me read you what Winston Churchill, the present Prime Minister of England, has to say on the subject of the political views of war in the time of his great ancestor, the Duke of Marlborough.

“The Tories obstinately championed the policy that if we were drawn into a war, we should go as little to the continent, send as few troops, fight as close to the coast as possible, and endeavor to secure territory and traffic across the ocean. The Whigs, on the contrary, dwell upon the theory of the decisive theater and sought with the largest army that could be maintained to bring the war to an end by a thrust at the heart of France, the supreme military antagonist, arguing that thereafter all the rest would be added unto them. The Tories favored the popular ideas that the navy should be the stronger and the army stunted. As the reign of Anne continued, these opinions hardened themselves to a degree almost unbelievable in hard-and-fast party principles about the kind of strategy

and operations which should be adopted. The Tories were prone to judge every action not so much by whether it was successful as by whether it was in accordance with their party doctrines. Thus, taking a town near the coast was more to be applauded than taking one farther inland. Thus, an action at sea was preferable to one ashore. Marlborough's march to Blenheim was, therefore, the greatest violation of Tory principles which could be conceived. Even dazzling success could hardly redeem such a departure from the orthodox and conventional party method of waging war. Marlborough, throughout his campaigns, was bound — apart from military facts and the enemy — to consider the character of any operation by the effect it would have on Tory opinion in the House of Commons. Both parties could use powerful and capacious arguments in support of their dogma, and neither hesitated to turn the fortunes and accidents of the war to its special account. From this, again, it followed that not only were the victories in the field or afloat classified as "Whig" or "Tory" victories, but the officers concerned in specific operations became coloured by the party hue. Generals and admirals were encouraged to have strong party affiliations and each faction had its favorites whom it would praise and defend through thick and thin."

Does anything seem familiar to you about that, gentlemen? This is 250 years ago. I don't think human nature or politicians have changed very much.

So much for the British objectives in the War of the Spanish Succession. The Dutch objectives were much simpler. The Dutch had always thought first of a barrier of fortresses, plus inundations, against the French (at that time there was no German



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threat they had to worry about very much, Germany being too divided); and, secondly, freedom of trade wherever they wanted to go — which was the source of the wealth of their nation. They wanted to sit behind their dykes and trade — earthen dykes against the sea, the fortress dykes against the French.

The Empire had a number of troubles on its hands — the Empire at this time was pretty well falling apart. It had a Hungarian revolt; it was still worried about the Turks; it was also worried about the northern war which Charles XII of Sweden was waging against Poland and Russia. But the Emperor wanted to get his share of the Spanish heritage. Indeed, his maximum objective was that his son, Archduke Charles, should succeed to the whole business, but he was willing to make a decent trade (from his point of view). He wanted security against the French, of course, but he also wanted to extend the reign of Austria over additional Italian provinces, particularly Milan and Naples.

The German States, for the most part, wanted money for hiring out their soldiers and they wanted a little territory if they could get it — but they wanted both without risk. There is no instance during this war of the head of any German State having taken any serious risk one way or another and certainly no instance of any great loyalty on the part of the German States towards their nominal feudal chief, the Emperor.

The little Italian state of Savoy is interesting because it is perched on the passes of the Alps between France and Italy. Its policy was described at the time by the English envoy, Stanhope, as being one of selling their passes to either side at the highest possible price and then reselling them to the other side, as the fortunes of war changed. However, Duke Victor Amadeus of Savoy had a much clearer idea of what he was trying to do. When Stanhope's remark was repeated to him, he took no offense. He said,

“This is the policy which we have pursued in the past. It has been forced upon us. But my ambition is to make Savoy a country of self-defense so that it shall cease to be a road”. Incidentally, he achieved it.

The arrangements for political and military cooperation, as the alliance drew together, were urged along (as seems to be the habit of authoritarian states) by outrages on the part of Louis. These arrangements were rather tenuous. There was a treaty which fixed the contributions in men and ships of the respective members and in which all agreed not to make a separate peace. The empire never lived up to its commitments in men and ships and this was one of the excuses of the English government at a later date for breaking the agreement “not to make a separate peace”.

As between England-Holland, the association was secured by the fact that William III was King of England as well as stadtholder and Captain General of the United Provinces. Later, after William's death (and he died even before the war got under way), this was continued by the appointment of the English Commander-in-Chief, the Duke of Marlborough, as Deputy Captain General of Holland — the office of Captain General being left vacant. This, of course, was to keep Marlborough a little more under control of the emissaries of the States-General — the parliament of Holland — and he had these people with him in the field practically all the time with the right of veto on the use of Dutch troops in any operation they didn't approve of. Since the Dutch policy was that “no battle must be fought that can possibly be avoided”, this created certain difficulties for an enterprising commander of Marlborough's character.

As between the sea powers—that is, England and Holland—and the Empire, the only military link that proved at all effective

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was Marlborough's friendship with the greatest of the Imperial Generals, Prince Eugene. This proved extraordinarily effective at times but, unfortunately, only in a military sense — it never seemed to be able to translate itself into politics.

Now, all of these conditions and their effect on strategy are well illustrated by the campaign of 1706. The war then had been going on for five years. There had been four full campaigns. Marlborough's great victory at Blenheim, which destroyed the only serious offensive against the Empire that the French had so far undertaken, was two years old then — that was fought in 1704. Nothing had been accomplished in the main theater in Flanders in 1705, due to Dutch timidity and the failure of the imperial government and armies to give Marlborough any support. They were then distracted by the Hungarian revolt which was growing, which indeed was draining away most of the military resources of the empire. Under these conditions the German states were growing restive. The King of Prussia was obviously meditating black treachery — he was in correspondence with Louis XIV. Denmark, which had been a source of mercenary troops — very useful ones — had gotten herself into trouble with the truculent Charles XII of Sweden by grabbing off an island which she wasn't entitled to, so that Denmark was hesitant about furnishing her contingents.

But it was in Italy that all really seemed lost. At that time the situation in Italy was about as bad, from the Allied point of view, as it could be. There was no imperial force anywhere in Italy, except in the extreme northeast where a comparatively small force under a second-class general faced a strong French force under one of the best French Marshals, Vendome. In the northwest the Duke of Savoy had been punished for two years past by the French for what they called his "treachery" in deserting their cause and shifting to the allies. He picked the time, as he thought, quite well

after Blenheim — but it hadn't worked out. The French were all through the country; fortress after fortress had been taken and the Duke of Savoy who, himself, with a small imperial force had come to his assistance was about to be shut up in Turin — the siege of which was to be undertaken by one French Army of some 40,000 men under Marshall La Feuillade, while the other French Army under Vendome covered him against any attempt of the Imperialists to interfere. In between, the fortresses were chiefly in the hands of French garrisons.

What in prospect, then, was that in the Campaign of 1706 the whole of Italy would fall into the hands of the French. Thereafter, the French would have been able both to threaten the empire with an attack on Vienna from the south and, also, to concentrate their main force, without any anxiety about Italy, against Marlborough in Flanders.

Marlborough, the mainspring of the alliance, faced a terrible task. Fortunately, however, at this particular moment the means to deal with that task were placed in his hands by a series of what only be described as fortunate accidents. First of all, at home, where he had constantly to be anxious about his political support, things were going well. The Whigs, the war party, were in charge. The Queen, who was Tory in her sympathies, had not yet begun really to become annoyed with the Whigs. The war was well supported, so far as the British effort was concerned. Therefore, Marlborough had been able to raise the money for the payment of the Danish and German contingents. "England" (says Churchill) "was the milch cow of all and parliament was already voluble upon that pregnant point (that is rather familiar, too) — but the matter had been arranged for the time being.

Marlborough designed to stand on the defensive in Flanders

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and to move into Italy with 30,000 men to join Eugene, drive the French from Northern Italy, rescue Savoy, and prepare to invade France from the south by next year. The armies in those days went into winter quarters, so that was about all he could do in one year. In 1707 he hoped to invade France from the south. He had personal authority from the Queen to act independently of the Dutch, if necessary — a most extraordinary step to take in those days. But the French struck first — Vendome in Northeastern Italy, beat the Imperial armies at Calcinato and this seemed to seal the doom of Savoy — for it seems impossible that the Imperial forces could gather again in sufficient strength to march across Northern Italy to the relief of Turin. Meanwhile, the French Marshall Villars beat the Imperialists on the Rhine and seemed about to repeat the invasion of Bavaria, which the Battle of Blenheim had brought to an end.

All of this frightened the Dutch. They were particularly frightened at Marlborough's threat to leave them to their own devices, to make them stand on the defensive against the terrible French while he marched with the English and some of the German troops into Italy. So, in order to induce him to abandon the plan (which military conditions had since made less desirable, anyway,) they gave him a free hand for the first time. They gave him permission to despatch 10,000 of the troops in their pay — German troops — to Prince Eugene, anyway. This, under the new circumstances, was obviously the best thing to do. Marlborough immediately changed his plans, prepared to take the offensive in Flanders, while sending some German reinforcements to Eugene in Italy. He was further cheered up by the news of a considerable naval victory by Admiral Leake, who had successfully relieved Barcelona in Spain. This he knew would cause the French further serious anxiety in that area.

Marlborough was the one man who saw this war as a whole.

He could see that if the French had to use, let us say, 10,000 men in Italy — they couldn't have those 10,000 men in Flanders. It is doubtful that any other Allied statesman or soldier was ever able to see beyond the immediate concerns of his immediate country or theater of operations.

The result of Marlborough's free hand was the crushing defeat of the French at the Battle of Ramillies in May. Louis immediately reacted to this by recalling Vendome from Italy to take over the command of the remnants that were left after Ramillies and try to form some kind of a defensive zone to prevent Marlborough from invading France.

Eugene, in the meanwhile, had received the German reinforcements. Eugene advanced against Vendome's incapable successors, who could think of nothing better to do than to march along the north side of the Po as Eugene marched along the south side, headed for Turin. Eugene relieved Turin and inflicted a very serious defeat on the French army, before that city. The incapable French commanders who were left, marched out of Italy, across the Alps into France, instead of retiring eastward on the fortress which the French still held in northern Italy.

Thus, not by the means he originally designed but by brilliant improvisation, a change of plans that had been made possible to him, Marlborough had achieved not only the expulsion of the French from Italy — but he had also beaten them so badly in Flanders that it was doubtful if they could accomplish anything in the Campaign of 1707. This is where he stood at the end of the campaigning season of 1706, and you will admit that it was a masterly series of military combinations. Now, look how it was thrown away by the lack of any political direction in the Alliance.

The French were never in a worse spot throughout the war

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than they were at the opening of the Campaign of 1707 — and what happened? The battle of Ramillies had given the Dutch their barrier. It had resulted in the fall of most of the fortresses of Northern Belgium. They felt secure. Moreover, their traders were only too delighted to start reaping the rich reward of taking over the trade of these Belgian cities, where they succeeded in making themselves thoroughly hated during the next year — so that in 1708, the Belgians betrayed two of the principal fortresses to the French because they were sick and tired of the Dutch. The Dutch refused absolutely to give Marlborough the free hand in 1707 that he had in 1706. Oh, no! he might go somewhere and take chances. The Emperor, far from using the fall of Turin to clean up the French garrisons in Italy, weakly made a deal with the French and allowed 40,000 French troops to march out of Italy to join in operations in Flanders and Spain against the Emperor's allies. He, himself, turned happily to the conquest of Naples — if it could be called a conquest; all he had to do was to march in. At that time it was the whole of Southern Italy plus Sicily.

Savoy had what she wanted. She was well on her way to being a country, instead of a road. So Marlborough's plan, which called for an invasion of France from the north and a simultaneous invasion by the Imperialists and the Savoy troops from the south, with an attack on Toulon — supported by the British fleet — that plan just fell flat. Savoy wouldn't put any weight on the attack on Toulon. Even Prince Eugene, with all his influence at the Imperial Court, couldn't get enough Imperial troops for the siege which he commanded. Here, you come to a curious bit of Eugene's character. Eugene, as Churchill remarks, was a land animal. He never could believe in seaborne lines of communication — he was always looking at that road back there and the oxcarts and the horse wagons that were coming over it. That was what he understood.

So he discovered at Toulon he was going to be a long way from his base; he was going to be dependent on a very tenuous land line of communications. And, when it was pointed out to him that he had the British fleet, under the most capable British Admiral of the times—Sir Cloudesley Shovell—to take the place of these horse wagons and take it much more efficiently, he couldn't believe in it. He, therefore, was always fighting with one hand (psychologically) tied behind his back. The siege of Toulon was a failure.

As a result, the French were left pretty free in other directions. They inflicted a severe defeat on the Imperialists on the Rhine and they gained considerable successes in Spain. 1707, instead of being the year of victory, was a year of disaster for the Allies. None of them would do, save under Marlborough's immediate eye, anything for the common cause once the danger was removed from their own door.

I wonder how much we have learned in all the time that has past about these peculiarities of sovereign states. Certainly there is a lot to be gained from a study of what has happened before and human nature doesn't seem to have changed a great deal in the last 250 years.

In World War I, 200 years after the War of the Spanish Succession, this problem of political direction of an alliance hadn't yet been solved. The earliest attempts at unified command, even on the Western Front in France, were failures because the British and the French governments could never quite make up their minds what they wanted to do and it was held to be an insuperable difficulty that in the last analysis the British and the French commander-in-chiefs had a final responsibility to their respective governments. It was not until the crisis of 1917, with the Italian collapse at Caporetto and the knocking of the Russians out of the



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war, that under the pressure of disaster the Allies finally created an instrument for the political direction of the war — the Supreme War Council. Thereafter the subsequent appointment of Foch as Commander-in-Chief was greatly eased and he was able to perform almost a miracle of coordination, if not of unified command, in pulling the Allied war effort on the Western front together.

In World War II, we had the fortunate accident of a built-in political direction by the happy fact that Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill understood each other. They got along very well. Therefore, the Combined Chiefs of Staff was possible and the appointment of Allied Commanders-in-Chief in the various theaters of war was also possible. Of course, the Russians were never in on this deal, but considering our experience with the Russians later on — perhaps it is just as well. They might have been quite difficult to persuade if they took as long to decide on a military operation as they have to decide on a truce in Korea, it might have been quite troublesome.

But, we have to consider that neither in World War I nor World War II — though the nature of the threat in both cases was pretty obvious — would the threatened states do anything beforehand. They talked, they hesitated, they hoped — until the blow fell. The agencies that they created came to life only in the actual presence of danger, and sometimes after the danger was very, very far advanced.

This time we have done a little better. We are trying to build up the North Atlantic Alliance — the new Grand Alliance — and other military agreements in other parts of the world. We have given NATO political and military leadership — or at least tried to create organs for that purpose. We have appointed a Commander-in-Chief in General Eisenhower. We have now selected an ex-

tremely capable Secretary General in General Lord Ismay. Of course, we have better communications all over the world and better understanding of other people than was the case in Marlborough's time. And yet the fact that we are dealing with sovereign states remains, as indicated by all the hesitations and uncertainties. The effect of political internal dissensions in the Allied states remains, also.

Look at some of the things that are being said in our own election campaign not yet very far advanced, and think what will be said later. Look at the French. Look at the dissenting group in the Labor party in England. Look at the efforts of Mr. Schumacher to break up the adhesion of West Germany to the North Atlantic grouping. Comparing it to Marlborough's time, the gains are astonishing, but the factors of difficulty are still there. We learn — but we learn slowly. It is apparent now, as then, that the only hope of resisting aggression by a great centralized power is still by the united action of the threatened states, and that means as a practical matter by a military alliance — an imperfect instrument of war, but one which now, as in the past, can be brought to victory by genius and courage.

In conclusion, I've set down here a list of thoughts (I hesitate to call them principles — they rest on no better authority than my own research) which seem to me to have governed the political and military organization and leadership of military alliances. I will read them briefly: (1) alliances are the creatures of the self-interest of their members; (2) no state, unless constrained, will remain in an alliance when the interests which made it join no longer exist; (3) the strongest bond between Allies is the instinct of self-preservation against a common danger; (4) there are, however, always conflicting interests which threaten unity of action or at least create friction — these frictions increase as

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the original danger abates; (5) the essence of Allied leadership is to produce sufficient unity of purpose and action to accomplish the common objective, reconciling with this the conflict of lesser interests; (6) effective political leadership of an alliance is more important than military leadership and more difficult to establish; (7) if effective military leadership is created, but political leadership is lacking or intermittent — there will be a tendency for the military leadership to encroach upon political decisions; under the pressures of war, this becomes a certainty; (8) under the conditions of total war, no Allied political leadership can be effective which does not command the total resources of all the Allies; hence, which does not comprise an association of the highest responsible political authorities in all the Allied states.

To this I would only add that beyond these practical considerations, it seems to me of the highest importance that we should try to gain what the French General Requin has called, "the spirit of coalition". If that spirit takes hold of us, as it took hold of the common soldiers far more than of the politicians in Marlborough's day, the spirit of "all for one, and one for all" — the feeling that there is a common cause in which sacrifices of life and of national interests must be made: then to the degree that we attain that spirit — to that degree an alliance may expect to be successful.

Thank you, gentlemen !

**BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF LECTURER**

Major George Fielding Eliot was born in Brooklyn, New York, June 22, 1894. His family moved to Australia in 1902. He was educated partly in the United States and partly in Australia. He was graduated from Trinity College, University of Melbourne with a B. A. degree. His military background is as follows:

Australian Imperial Force, 1914-1918; Commissioned Second Lieutenant, rose to Acting Major — Infantry (Dardanelles Campaign, Egypt; Western Front; 1st Somme; Arras; Amiens; Passchendaele; Hindenburg Line, etc.).

Missouri National Guard; 2nd Lieutenant, Engineers, 1922.

Military Intelligence Reserve, U. S. Army, 1922-1930; Captain and Major. (Active Duty Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and Military Intelligence Division, War Department).

He is the author of several books, including: "The Ramparts We Watch"; A Study of the Problems of American National Defense, (Reynal & Hitchcock, 1938); "Bombs Bursting in Air"; The Influence of Air Power on International Relations, (Reynal & Hitchcock, 1939); "Hour of Triumph"; "The Means of Achieving Permanent Peace and World Security," (Reynal & Hitchcock, 1944); "The Strength We Need"; "A Military Program for America Pending Peace," (The Viking Press, October 1946); "Hate, Hope and High Explosives — A Report on the Middle East," (Bobbs Merrill, 1948); "If Russia Strikes," (Bobbs Merrill, 1949). He was the co-author (with Major R. Ernest Dupuy, USA) of "If War Comes," (MacMillan, 1937).

He was military correspondent and columnist, New York Herald Tribune Syndicate, September 1939-May 1947; columnist,

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New York Post Syndicate, May 1947-May 1949; and columnist, General Features Syndicate, January 1950-.

He was the author of many articles on military, political and international affairs for several magazines.

He lectured on the following platforms: Town Hall, Columbia University, New York; Foreign Policy Association, New York and Cleveland; as well as before many other audiences from coast to coast.

He was radio commentator for the Columbia Broadcasting System, 1939-1946 and the Mutual Broadcasting System, 1950-. His radio talks were as follows: America's Town Meeting of the Air; People's Platform; University of Chicago Round Table; Invitation to Learning; Information Please; Wake Up, America; America Forum, and others.

His associations and affiliations are as follows: American Association of the United Nations (Honorary Vice President), American Military History Foundation, Army Ordnance Association, Association of Radio News Analysts (President, 1943 and 1951), The Carnegie Endowment Committee on Atomic Energy, Council on Foreign Relations, Foreign Policy Association, Military Intelligence Reserve Society, National Press Association, Radio Correspondents Association, U. S. Infantry Association, and U. S. Naval Institute.

**THE PLACE OF THE ARMED FORCES IN THE  
MAKING OF NATIONAL STRATEGY**

A lecture delivered  
at the Naval War College  
on 18 March 1952  
by

*Mr. Joseph C. Harsch*

Admiral Conolly, Members of the Naval War College:

I approach this subject with some hesitation. I've done a great deal of thinking, myself, about what national strategy should be, but not until I received the invitation to address this group had I ever tried to think through the relationship to each other of the various elements involved in the making of national strategy. I hope, therefore, that what I say won't sound like the kindergarten course which you went through in the first week you were here.

I have prepared a sort of paper here — I'd much rather just stand up and talk to you, but I think that what I am trying to think into a subject as deep as this one I had better impose upon you the less easy formula of reading rather than talking extemporaneously. I don't think it will use up the whole time — and at the end of that I may, I hope, be a little more useful than I am in this first part of it. I was very interested by the fact that you invited me, a newspaper man, to express views on this subject. I am really not an expert in anything except the technique of gathering the news and presenting it to the public in the best perspective possible. I'm not an authority on national strategy or on the means best employed to achieve the purposes of national strategy. But you have asked me to talk to you on this subject — I am interested because I can not imagine Hannibal, Genghis Khan, Louis XIV,

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Napoleon, the Kaiser, Hitler, Stalin, or any of their generals, ever seeking the views of a newspaper man on the matter of this character. The fact that you do testifies to what is, I think, a healthy factor in the thinking of military leaders of my country. You do not obviously assume that the military point of view is, or should be, the sole determining factor in the formulation of national policy. You look around in the civilian body to see if you can find in that area some guidance in the forming of the bodies of doctrine which govern your thinking and planning. Whether you can obtain useful ideas from a newsman is something still to be determined. But the fact that you seek one out would in itself be documentation for the contention that American military thinking is not governed by what civilians sometimes describe loosely as "the military mind."

We have had recently in the news an example of what the civilian would be inclined to call "the working of the military mind on national strategy." A general of the United States Army kept a diary, in which he expressed some personal views. He had the misfortune to leave his diary unguarded in a German hotel room. It was stolen, as you know, photostated by Communists, and excerpts were then published in a book which purported to show that the United States is committed to a firm policy of making war upon Soviet Russia at the earliest convenient moment, and by sudden and unadvertised attack. He proposed that we strike a "Pearl Harbor blow" at Russia. He assumed that the war was inevitable — and the sooner, the better. The amount of damage done by that to American diplomatic and political position in the Alliance was equal or more than the damage done when an American magazine, published by civilians, purported to show how we would win the next war. I arrived in Europe shortly after the impact of that issue of COLLIER'S MAGAZINE on the European mind and it was shattering. I hasten to say, therefore, that it is not only a

general of the U. S. Army who has compromised the posture which we attempt to maintain before our alliance — the civilian has something to learn as well.

Now I recognize that from a strictly military point of view the long-term military interests of the United States might be best served by an early, sudden, and stealthy American blow at Russia. If you can assume that the United States possesses today the physical ability to strike Russia a crippling military blow which would nullify the military potential of Russia for years to come and leave the military potential of the United States and its allies unscathed, I could see some possible sense in such a course of action. However, it would seem to me as a civilian that there are dangers in such a course, even if a swift military success could be guaranteed. I would be interested to know if any of you think it could be guaranteed — I'd be quite comforted.

For one thing, it would immediately lose to the United States any claim to a position of moral leadership in the world. Second, it might destroy for all time the present disposition of the world to assume that we Americans are more interested in peace and peaceful pursuits than we are in military power. And this assumption is, I think, an important element in the fact that by and large those parts of the world not now ruled by Russia prefer to belong to a coalition led by us than to the part of the world dominated from Moscow. And if that assumption of a superior peaceableness on our part were destroyed, it is possible that our present friends might become our future enemies. By destroying Russia's military potential, in the manner proposed by General Grow, we might find that we had conjured into existence a coalition against us of all the countries we presently consider to be our friends. And such a coalition might, over the years, reduce us to the position of an embattled island living in the middle of the great ocean — severed from the land mass of Eurasia and Africa.



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I can think of other objections to the Grow system of planning national strategy. It overlooks the interests of an alliance. It shatters the best laid plans of the psychological warfare specialist. It treats as non-existent the question whether even a certain quick victory over Russia might cost us more in the end, even physically at home, than a long power struggle of indefinite duration. It ignores the possible effect upon our national thinking of an action contrary to our established ethical standards. It skims over the considerations which the economist and the specialist in physical resources would advance. In other words, in my opinion, it is not a balanced approach to the problem—but the approach of a specialist in one form of national action alone. So I, for one, would be unhappy to see our strategic planning in the hands only of the military specialists. I am happy to be able to say, as a Washington reporter, that it is not exclusively in such hands or dominated largely by them. There was no greater horror anywhere in Washington than at the top levels of the Pentagon when the Grow story broke.

But it is equally apparent to any Washington reporter that we have not yet succeeded in Washington in working out the most effective machinery for coordinating the thinking of the experts in all fields of national strategy. Matters are not as bad today as they were in late 1949, when diplomats and soldiers were not even on authorized speaking terms—except at the top levels. I'm serious about that. If you don't know about it, just let me underline a little bit.

Towards the end of the period when Louis Johnson was Secretary of Defense communication between the Defense Department and the State Department had to channel by his edict through his office. Subordinate officials were not allowed to speak to officials of the State Department unless the whole thing had been arranged

through the office of the Secretary of Defense. There was an open, angry battle for dominant control over strategy planning between the two departments. I have worked in Washington for 23 years as a journalist — and I have never seen an interdepartmental battle like that one. Anything went, and the infighting in the clinches was brutal.

Those times have passed, but the millenium has still to be achieved. In spite of all the elaborate machinery of the National Security Council, The Security Resources Board, and the various coordinating committees with the Atomic Energy Commission, etc., we have not worked out a perfect system under which all the different experts, operating on the vast problem of national strategy, make their contributions in perfect balance at the right times. Paranthetically, I must say with amusement about that famous Johnson-Acheson battle that at one time I was employed as an intermediary in an attempt to reestablish diplomatic relations between the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Office of the Secretary of State. I was successful, after a period of several weeks, in arranging an authorized luncheon between a gentleman representing General Bradley and a gentleman representing Mr. Acheson — but it took a long time and extremely delicate negotiations.

Somehow the views of the economist do not get worked into military planning today at the stage where the military are spared having to discover at some later date that their plans must be revised to accord with economic fact. I'm talking now about what I believe to be the present conditions, to the best of my knowledge, of the Washington correspondent. The politicians' interests can interfere with strategy making at the present time at the most unexpected times and with the most disturbing results. The Bureau of the Budget is capable of making arbitrary decisions which ig-

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nore all the careful studies of the military experts. The Pentagon is not free of the charge of swinging wide with the argument, "we know best."

Recently, a distinguished member of congress—after sitting through another appropriations hearing — declared with passionate sincerity, "I hate all Generals and Admirals. I've been listening to them for 25 years and I'm forced to conclude that they can not distinguish between \$5,000 and \$5,000,000." Many a Congressman felt confirmed in his suspicion of his military thinking when an official of the Air Force testified to recent occasions when differences between services were settled by flipping coins. All of which only proves that there continues to be a basis for distrust on all sides, and that the perfect machinery has not yet been achieved.

✓ Now, I am sure that we can all agree that the national interests of the United States would not be advanced if any single point of view involved in the making of national strategy were to get out of balance. History is cluttered with the wreckage of societies which failed to achieve balance in strategy making. Some states have disappeared because they gave the military point of view too little attention. Others, for a contrary reason. Sparta was too military a society to survive — it neglected other values and considerations. Napoleonic France bled herself to death by giving too little attention to non-military considerations. Hitler's Germany probably would have done better had the military been able to maintain its independence of the "instincts" of the head of the state.

✓ Balance is the important thing, obviously; and, of course, who is to say precisely what degree of influence should be accorded to each element in the equation. I would be horrified myself if any one were to tell me to go ahead and to try to work out a formula

assigning to soldier, politician, diplomat, economist, intelligence expert, propagandist and psychological expert, each his proper weight in the determination of national strategy. One major problem I think we must recognize in even attempting such a weighting of the various factors is that we have become a nation of experts to a degree never before known in history. Each is so expert in his own field and so preoccupied in it that he tends to see only his own field of interest.

Sometimes I fear that the tendency to overspecialization will be the cause of our ultimate downfall. We started out as a nation to specialize. We separated the executive from the legislative functions of government, thereby depriving ourselves of men like Winston Churchill, trained throughout their careers in both tasks. The British parliamentarian never forgets that at any moment he may become a cabinet officer. He must, and does, look at any given problem from both legislative and executive points of view. The British Parliamentary system also brings the country's best military brains into the legislative process through the device of elevation of top military leaders to the House of Lords. The military role in Britain is less defined than with us — but it is tied in more organically with the whole process of government. Sometimes I am tempted to think that we made a mistake when we adopted the Republican form of government, thus denying to ourselves a House of Lords to which we could elevate five star generals. Under our system General MacArthur must seek his revenge through political channels from outside the government. He is not automatically brought into the chambers of debate as he would have been in England. Think of how much it would have simplified that problem of the friction between the President, the Chief Executive, and his leading military commander if he could have resolved it not by dismissing him but by elevating him to the House of Lords under the title of Marquis of Bataan, Duke of

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Manila! It would have taken all the heat and the bitterness out of the issue and it also would have preserved the value of his thinking on the subject of the Far East in the making of national strategy. At the bottom level of legislative action, his thinking would have been brought into the process. As it is, our system does not permit that because it is so separating the Legislative from the Executive functions of government.

What are we going to do about all this? We have compartmented our legislators, our executives, our soldiers, our atomic energy experts, our economists. I have not a single criticism of the military which I wouldn't make with equal force with several other elements in our system of government that must be brought to bear upon any problem of this character. I have frequently found in my own experiences in Washington military men who are far more tolerant and broad-minded in their attitude toward the problem than were economists, politicians, scientists, experts of the Atomic Energy Commission, and things like that. But now we find the burden of world leadership on our shoulders. Without us there would not be a coalition strong enough to challenge the Russians. We must challenge them, and successfully, or we will ultimately find ourselves separated certainly from Eurasia and Africa and perhaps even from South America. Having compartmented our processes of government, we must find a way of fitting the compartments together at least well enough to permit us to outsmart the Russians sometime, somehow.

But, before we can even begin to accomplish this task, we must agree upon our national purposes. The founding fathers defined those purposes as, "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness." Many individual Americans have tried in many ways to further define these purposes. It would almost seem today that social security had become a major purpose in the minds of

many Americans. With others, the first conscious goal would be lower taxes. Still others think that our primary national goal should be the abolition of the rest of the world. Some put peace first — General Grow would not agree. Personally, I would be satisfied with the old formula of "life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness." In my opinion, those are the three things most of us want above all others — the three basic things. These other concepts that individuals have, called purposes, really represent the idea of the individual as to a way or means of achieving the basic objectives of "life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness." It was a very good formula. I don't think that the purposes of the human society have ever been more adequately defined. We want those things above all others. Everbody wants to live. Everybody wants as little interference in his normal life as possible and everybody also wants to have as good, as full, as rich a life with freedom to pursue money, a sports career, skill in weaving tapestry, if you like, or painting. The pursuit of happiness has many, many possible interpretations. To some people it means acquiring political power — to others it means getting a little acre patch where you can have a garden and some flowers. No two people would pursue happiness in the same way, but they all want to do it.

I would think that the best policies and strategies for us to pursue would be the ones which would most advance our chances of the enjoyment of those three things. Then you try to start to spell them out and what do they mean? That we prefer peace to war, but will fight if we must to protect our self-government and our opportunities to trade to advance our pursuit of happiness. We have a better chance for life if we have a minimum amount of war rather than a maximum, and a maximum amount of good police protection at home. We will have more individual liberty if we have a government of our own choosing than if we have one imposed upon us by foreigners. We will have a better chance

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to pursue happiness if we can live in a condition of economic prosperity—we certainly want economic prosperity. Therefore, I think that we can further specify our national purposes as including political independence, minimum war, and maximum freedom to trade with ourselves and with others — for there can be no prosperity without trade.

The armed services would not need to come into the picture of national strategy making at all if there were no other armed services in the world working for political leaders with ideas which might cut across the American desire to enjoy "life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness" for Americans. Unfortunately, there are other armed forces in the world and some of them work for men (I don't know that I should say unfortunately, because if there were no others some of you people would have to look for other jobs which might be less congenial for you than the ones you have)—however, there are other armed forces and they work for men, some of whom conceive their purposes to be in conflict with those of the United States. Therefore, we civilians need and require the thinking of the armed forces in planning the maximum possible achievement of our national purposes. Not only reason, but also history, tells us all this.

✓ American military force was needed to gain us our independence, to conquer our continental territory, to preserve our unity, and to protect the boundaries within which we do business, operate our factories and do our trading. We would not have the world's biggest market for our goods inside our own borders if our armed services had not won and held our frontiers. So, as long as there are armed forces in the world and as long as some of them are employed by persons with real or imagined conflicts of interests with us — we need and require the advice of our armed forces in planning our national strategy.

✓ The question is how this influence should be exerted and what weight should be accorded to it? It would seem to me that the first assertion in order is that the military role should not be dominant any more than the political or economic should be dominant. If the politician were given total freedom to shape national policy in terms of his political problems, the end of our society might be swift and terrible.

I frequently remember an episode in my early career in Washington, in the House of Representatives, when a member of Congress, held in considerable esteem by his colleagues, stood up on the floor of the House one day to explain his vote on a bill then nearing passage (nearing the final vote) and he defined the creed of the demagogue. He said the creed of the demagogue is, "to vote for every appropriation, and against every tax bill." Now, it doesn't take much imagination to understand why that would be the creed of the political demagogue. A vote for an appropriation bill is always popular with some one — a vote for a tax bill is always unpopular with a number of people. So, if the legislator were to be guided only by his political interests and instincts, he would vote for every appropriation bill and against every tax bill, and the country would soon go bankrupt.

Then, if only the economist had power and he tried to decide our problems according to economic interests alone, we might come out with some strange forms of military power. It might be economically sound to increase our armed services, as sort of a make-work program, at a time when we had no foreign policy need for expansion of our armed forces. There could conceivably also be times when it would be economically good business to cut our armed forces at a moment when foreign policy dangers were at their peak. You couldn't possibly trust to economic thinking alone the making of national strategy any more than you could



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entrust it to the politician alone. But disaster could come equally from giving the military sole control over our national policy.

We have a recent danger here in the conflict between military and economic interests in the North Atlantic Council. The best judgment of the military leaders of the Standing Group of NATO for a defense program, which under examination was plainly beyond the economic capacity of several member states—particularly of the French. It became necessary at Lisbon to cut the targets for the defense of Europe below the levels estimated as essential by the military planners in order to be sure of having a Europe worth defending. The issue between the so-called Three Wise Men of Lisbon and the Military Standing Committee is, I suppose, one of the classic examples of conflict between military and economic interests. There can be no doubt that the military men who drew up the plans for NATO drew them up on the soundest and the best military basis possible. They applied what they knew of Russia's capabilities to the geography of Europe and came up with a decision as to the amount of military force that would be necessary to provide security for the West. They came up with an answer, however, which was at variance with the economic capacity of the West and there had to be a reconciliation, and what a frightful job of reconciling that controversy! Because, if you urge on the side of military strength you might destroy the economic base of your whole enterprise, and certainly an economically insolvent West neither can be defended nor would be worth defending. Conversely, if you weaken the military in the interests of the economic factor, you might lose the whole thing, too. You have an irreconcilable difference there and all you can do is split the difference, really — which is what they had to do. You don't know whether you came out right or wrong.

More recently the President has taken upon himself the responsibility, for political and economic reasons, for cutting the

Air Force expansion program below the figures recommended by the four members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff unanimously. At about the same time, the Congress was overruling the same Joint Chiefs of Staff on the matter of Universal Military Training. Our system of checks and balances operates in this open fashion, rather than in the British fashion of a merging of the various considerations involved in national strategy at earlier stages in the process.

We have compartmented our society; we have compartmented our government. We have drawn up such distinctions between the economist, the soldier, the politician, the diplomat, etc., that it is a terribly difficult, mechanical problem to see how you can ever fit them together and give them their respective proper weights. To my way of thinking, an important long-range program for treating the problem would involve less specialization, less compartmentation, and the breeding of men more broadly grounded in points of view.

George Washington was a civilian, a soldier, a legislator, a merchant and an executive. He was typical of the leaders of his century. We do not go in for breeding that type of man any more. Henry L. Stimson is the last great American, I can think of off-hand, of that breed. Today, we do put our emphasis on specialists — and by so doing impose upon ourselves the necessity of working out complex formulae, under which the specialists will balance each other. Of course, it does not lie within your competence, or mine, to reverse this condition.

America, today, is a nation of specialists and what you really want to know today is the amount of influence which you, as military specialists, should properly have in the equation — and how much better you can exercise it. That I can not really tell you, except in the most general terms. I do know that if you reach for a degree of power which frightens the others, you will in the

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end reduce your own influence. I do know that every time you ask for more money than you can use (as sometimes you do), you weaken your case the next time you go to Congress. I do know that every time you over-advertise a new weapon, you reduce public confidence in your judgment. I do know that every time you overstress the danger of war, you reduce your ability to convince the public of the danger when it becomes real. I do know that every time you conceal your own uncertainty behind a bold front of "I know best," either in Congress or in inner government councils, you weaken your long-range influence in those places.

Personally, I would incline to think that too much emphasis is placed on machinery of coordination — and too little upon the caliber of men. Suppose that I had the capacity to work out the precise weight which should be accorded the armed services in the making of national strategy vis-a-vis the other elements involved. Suppose, also, that I could devise the perfect machinery for bringing your views into coordination with those of the diplomats, the politicians, the economists, the civilians, the merchants, the psychologists, the intelligence analysts and the industrialists. I still could not guarantee to you your right degree of influence if you send General Grows into those councils instead of General Marshalls or Admiral Shermans. But, on the other hand, if the armed forces came before the Congress and the people consisting of only Marshalls and Shermans, you would immediately enjoy an unfair advantage over the other agencies of government. No formula that you work out will work, because the effectiveness of any formula depends upon the caliber of the men involved in it. If you worked out the perfect formula given the precise men who are in these various positions of responsibility in Washington today and then you have a change, the weight that you have given — let's say the economist — is going to go up or down and get out of balance if the man you put in his place is stronger or weaker than his predecessor.

I don't think any one in his right mind can tell you precisely what is the role of the armed forces in the making of national strategy. We all know that you have a role — and an extremely important one. It has been recognized officially by act of Congress. Your voice is strong in every stage of the making of national policy. Conceivably at the moment it is a little too strong. Certainly it has gained so much strength in the past generation of American history that it has aroused resistance. There is, of course, a frightful problem inherent in the importance of military thinking in the making of national strategy. The world is so complex and the making of war is so complex, and it has such a bearing on every political and diplomatic decision, that in Washington today the military must be consulted about all kinds of things which don't seem to have direct bearing upon military planning. The result is that the military is in councils where the other elements of government were not accustomed to finding it. Military interests begin to have a bearing on such great political issues as the relationship between the Chief Executive and General MacArthur. The people on the Joint Chiefs of Staff and at the head of the three service departments in Washington have done their utmost, in my opinion, to preserve the old policy of "keeping out of politics." And yet, today, many leaders of our armed services are directly involved in domestic politics to a degree that we have not known in American history since the days of General McClellan and the Civil War.

How many of our military figures are involved currently? General Eisenhower is a candidate. General MacArthur is probably a candidate — he is not openly a candidate, but there doesn't seem to be much doubt he would be willing "if the lightning should strike," General Wedemeyer has been put up for political office. Admiral Denfeld came out for Taft the other day. The position a member of the military services takes in political matters has

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become new, has become important. It is a manifestation of the fact that it is not possible for any great issues of the day to be decided without consulting you. How you can play your role in the making of strategy without becoming involved in domestic politics is a very serious question. I don't know that it is possible.

When the Joint Chiefs of Staff supported the President's decision and dismissed General MacArthur, they acted upon their own military judgment and for military reasons. They did not desire to embarrass the Republican Party or support the Democratic Party — that was the least of their interests. Nevertheless, when they took a position on military ground involving an issue between the President of the United States and the Supreme Commander in the Far East, they did inevitably inject themselves into a domestic political equation. And, one inevitable result was Senator Taft, a leading contender for the Republican nomination, saying that he had lost confidence in the Joint Chiefs of Staff. A corollary of that was his subsequent statement that if he became President, he would consult General MacArthur. It was said in such a context that it seems fairly clear that if Taft did become President, the existing members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff would all have their resignations accepted at once and you would have a very substantial turnover in authority in the armed services. This is a terribly dangerous tendency because if it were not checked, if it progressed in the direction that it seems to be moving now, every one of you would have to take sides — you would have to be Democratic Admirals or Republican Admirals — and your chances for promotion would depend upon whether you picked the right party. And then your armed services would be torn not only between Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps — but between Republican Army, Navy, etc., *versus* Democratic Army, Navy, etc. You would have an eight-way split instead of a four-way split. That is very serious. It is terribly amusing and also deadly dangerous, too. Yet, I don't know how it is going to be avoided.

At the present moment the most influential, single man in Washington today, I believe, is General Omar Bradley. The President does not make a single decision with any remote national strategy implications without consulting General Bradley. It is terribly important that he consult him. And yet when you have that situation — when the President consults the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff more frequently on more issues of national policy than he consults probably any other one individual in government in Washington — the armed services are being drawn into politics. If the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were given more power than he has today (which at one time was advocated), my mind is incapable of encompassing the implications. You have in General Bradley today a military man with more direct influence than any military man, I suppose, has ever exercised in the history of our country.

In Lincoln's day, in the Civil War, he had the equivalent of a Chief of Staff. He had Scott at first and then old Halleck. Then, finally, he put his reliance primarily in Grant. I don't believe that any one of those men had the equivalent influence on the President that Bradley has today. Part of it is, of course, the difference in caliber between Lincoln and Truman. There you come again to my point that you can't take a sheet of paper and draw out a formula for giving the military its role, because a General Bradley is going to have far more influence over a Truman than he would have over a Lincoln. It is the personal, the human equation that counts there. If he were not a man — General Bradley — of very great restraint, the situation would be far more explosive than it already is. It is already so explosive, as I have said, that you have Taft coming out and making that statement that he had lost confidence, which of course is partly for political purposes. The prime motive behind a statement like that, during an election campaign, is to attract support. It was an invitation to a very large number of

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people in this country who had rather see MacArthur as President than any other one living individual—and there are quite a lot of them. Taft was bidding for the MacArthur vote when he did that. But there you are — you're in this thing.

At least your voice at the moment is so strong and so obvious that criticism of it has developed. I think that at the moment you are a trifle too conspicuous for your own good. I wouldn't know how to tell you to become less conspicuous, though. Adjustment can not be made by any formula or any tinkering with the machinery. The machinery itself isn't too bad — but it will function according to the balance, wisdom and restraint of the men who operate it, and in it. It would be easier for the military if someone from the outside could draw up a perfect table of organization. That would relieve you of the problem of breeding better and wiser soldiers, sailors and airmen. The machinery will work better, I think, as you of the armed services recognize that you are specialists; that you are only specialists, although extremely important ones; that an alliance perfected by diplomats might be worth many divisions and that, therefore, the diplomat should be considered; that the tax expert and the economist may have considerations equal and perhaps outweighing some of yours; and, finally, that the wiser you are as individuals, the more persuasively you will be able to present your point of view.

I think that my conclusion, if I have any, is that this problem like all problems cannot be solved suddenly by any one magic formula. We love in America to find a sovereign panacea. We've been hunting for Carter's Little Liver Pills and Lydia Pinkham's Compound and Indian Medicine. The amount of that stuff we buy every year, if you take the trouble to find out, is an extremely interesting commentary on that basic, unshakeable faith of the American that around the next corner of the shelf in the drugstore he is

going to find the remedy that is going to solve all his ills. What we haven't as a nation, yet adjusted ourselves to is the fact that more frequently we outlive problems than solve problems. I don't think there is any possible solution, any perfect solution to your problem of what weight you have in this matter of making national strategy and all the various and detailed phases of it, because it is not just a question of relationship between the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Congressional Appropriations Committee — that is the highest level of the issue. I don't suppose you face that problem very much when you are on the deck of your ship, on the bridge of your ship. But you certainly face it if you go into any of the many other activities which military officers go into now — military attaches and diplomatic missions attached to these mutual security administrations, missions overseas where you sit with people from the Treasury, from MSA, the State Department and all the rest and try to work out a sound strategy for American aid to Greece.

I can give you several horrid examples of things that you can avoid. I was on a tour of the Mutual Aid countries just a couple of months ago. I remember one place (I will not out of charity specify — I could give you examples where the story was the other way) where a group of us came in; we were a group of traveling editors and newspapermen. We faced the lineup of the American Mission there. It is frightening to go overseas and find out how many departments our Missions have now. As I recall there were 20 Americans facing us. One was the Ambassador, but that was only the beginning. Then there was the head of Mutual Security, head of ECA, Treasury, Agriculture — goodness gracious, I can't remember. I'm frightened by the number of people we have to send to each one of these overseas posts. At that particular place, the head of the Military Mission spent the entire time at his dis-



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posal showing his chart of organization and justifying each man on his staff — as though we were Congressional Appropriations Committees. We didn't care, we didn't give a hoot how many people he had on his staff and what each one was doing in his office every day. We were interested in knowing the results he was achieving — how many divisions was he being able to mobilize in that particular country and how good were they? He just wasn't bright enough to know what he should be doing there — he had other jobs more important than distending his table of organization to some visiting editors. That is one horrible example not by any means typical, as you well know. I'm not drawing up an indictment of the military — I'm just pointing out one or two places of things you know as well as I do you could avoid.

I had an experience with a military attache in another place once, which was even worse than the previous one. He was a military attache sent to one of the countries of Southeastern Europe. When he arrived, presumably having been thoroughly briefed in both the Pentagon and the State Department, they gave him a little further briefing. They were talking at one point about the problems of Austria. In the briefing the word "Trizonia" was mentioned. "Trizonia, what is Trizonia? Is that just south of Albania?" he asked. He didn't know that Trizonia was just a way of defining the three zones of the Western Allied Occupation in Germany. He thought it was a country. There were three things that he didn't know and that was the first one. The other two were even worse, but I can't remember them—it was fabulous. The Ambassador had to ask him to be taken back to Washington right away. Those are things to avoid in — what are we talking about? We're talking about public relations. In so far as you improve your public relations by avoiding that kind of unfortunate thing, you will exercise your role in the making of strategy more effectively. You will

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do that when you have more men with the kind of background of experience that you are acquiring right here.

Really what I'm trying to tell you is that the Naval War College is a good thing, and there ought to be more of it I believe. Thank you!

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## **BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF LECTURER**

Mr. Joseph C. Harsch was born in Toledo, Ohio, May 25, 1905.

He was educated at Williams College, Williamstown, Massachusetts, where he received a B.A. degree in 1927. He also holds an honorary M.A. degree from Williams. He attended Corpus Christi College, Cambridge University, England, where he received a B.A. degree in 1929.

After graduating from Cambridge he began his newspaper career by joining *The Christian Science Monitor* in 1929. He has written consistently for *The Monitor* ever since.

As a foreign correspondent, he was in Berlin from 1939 until January, 1941, when he returned to the States. He had also served as a *Monitor* correspondent in London, Paris and Rome. His experiences in Germany were recorded in a book entitled, "Pattern of Conquest," published by Doubleday in the summer of 1941.

In addition to his *Monitor* writing, he served briefly at the beginning of the war as Assistant Director of the Intergovernmental Committee on Political Refugees. He covered the Louisiana maneuvers and was in Honolulu at the time of the Pearl Harbor attack, after which he went to the South Pacific, New Zealand, Australia and Java.

Returning to the United States from the Pacific theatre, he began broadcasting as a news commentator for the Columbia Broadcasting System, in addition to *Monitor* writing, (1943 until the spring of 1949).

In 1945 he returned to Europe as a war correspondent and was in Europe again in 1947 and 1949. His observations on Eastern Europe are incorporated in a book entitled, "The Curtain Isn't Iron," Doubleday, May, 1950.

He is an occasional broadcaster for the British Broadcasting Corporation.

From August 1949-August 1951, he was Chief of the Washington News Bureau of *The Christian Science Monitor*. Currently, he is special correspondent for *The Christian Science Monitor*.

Beginning April 1, 1951, three times weekly, Mr. Harsch presents news analysis "Meaning of the News" over Liberty Broadcasting System.

## POLITICAL FACTORS IN THE FORMULATION OF STRATEGY

A lecture delivered  
at the Naval War College  
on 20 March 1952  
by

*Dr. Harold D. Lasswell*

Gentlemen:

I am going to take the liberty of analyzing the topic with which I am dealing in a manner that may be a little more comprehensive than perhaps was originally intended by those who planned this lecture. It will be necessary to give rather extended consideration to the term "political," since the word is ordinarily used in many different ways. Over the term "strategy" it is not necessary for me to tarry. I assume that we use the word as a convenient way of talking about a basic pattern for employing instruments of power. It is assumed that these power instruments are utilized for the purpose of maximizing the degree to which the fundamental values of the body politic are realized. Hence, any strategy includes objectives and courses of action under various contingencies. I suppose it is obvious that a strategy of sea power relates this instrument to all other instruments of total strategy; or, to express it another way, to total policy.

For many purposes it is convenient to classify the instruments of power according to the *distinctive* characteristics of the *means* employed. Let us begin by saying that strategy uses *arms, goods, deals, and words*. Perhaps you think these are undignified ways of talking about the four major divisions into which strategy is often separated: *military* strategy, *economic* strategy, *diplo-matic* strategy, and *ideological* strategy.

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It is also useful for some purposes to classify strategy according to the *distinctive effect* which a given instrument is capable of achieving in times of active crisis. From this perspective we may speak of *destruction* (or protection from destruction) as the distinctive effect of military strategy; of *scarcity* (or abundance) as the effect of economic strategy; of the *disunity of leaders* (or unity) as the distinctive result of diplomatic strategy; and of *disunity of masses* (or unity) as the distinguishing effect of ideological strategy.

Suppose we make a small table of these terms for ready reference purposes:

<u>Strategy</u>	<u>Distinctive Means</u>	<u>Distinctive Effects</u>
Military	Arms	Destruction (protection)
Economic	Goods	Scarcity (abundance)
Diplomatic	Deals	Disunity of leaders (unity)
Ideological	Words	Disunity of masses (unity)

There is no general agreement on the terms appearing in this table, although the categories are quite well known. It is not important to insist upon the labels, if we understand one another.

I believe it is evident that the first two (arms and goods) are alike in putting the emphasis upon *capabilities*, and that the last two (the agreements made or negotiated among leaders, and the words addressed to large audiences) put the emphasis upon *intentions*. However, no instrument is limited to its distinctive effect. It invariably has effects of every kind, in varying degree; in war and in peace. Furthermore, all the organizations which are primarily specialized upon any one of the means must make use of all means in varying degree. Obvious as this may appear to be,

it is nevertheless worth repeating, since it is of the utmost importance to catch hold of the *contextual principle*.

Another fundamental principle, besides wholeness (*contextuality*) is the *principle of maximization* of all values sought by total policy. This basic postulate of strategy is continually being revived in new words; and the revival, by renewal of emphasis, often accomplishes a useful purpose. To choose a recent example: The principle of maximization is often the point of the modern slogan, "psychological warfare." What is being stressed is the importance of achieving effects as economically as possible—by measures short of total war, for instance; and by the timing of all actions with the psychological state of the opponent always in mind. Hence, it turns out that the general principle of maximization — which is a fundamental principle of *all* strategy — is being reaffirmed in different terms. The slogan "political warfare" often performs precisely the same function by stressing what can be done to gain the ends of policy by diplomatic arrangement (with those in authority, or disaffected leaders, for example). Such considerations make a difference wherever strategy is conducted on behalf of goal values which do not include war itself as a positive value.

In the available time I propose to limit the scope of the present analysis by taking the "political" factor in the formulation of strategy to mean: first, considering the intentions of leaders and masses; second, considering the potential impact of any instrument of policy upon these intentions. In terms of our table, I'm concentrating upon disuniting (or uniting) leaders and masses; and I am considering the impact of each of the instruments of power, not only of diplomacy and ideology.

In fact, my discussion will be narrowed much further. Because of the fundamental importance of *relating the objectives of any special sphere of strategy to the goal values which are*

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*sought by the body politic* for whom the strategy is formulated, I shall devote most of my time to the problem of objectives.

The selection of objectives is enormously complicated in a democratic setup like ours by the ambiguity of the framework in which the strategist is compelled to operate. In this country there is always much ambiguity about long — and middle-range policies. Strictly speaking, no one is authorized to tie the hands of future generations of Americans. This applies to successive Congresses or Presidents. In addition to our formalities, our pattern of thinking includes the expectation on the part of our policy makers that national goals may be differently interpreted through time. Hence, no one arrogates to himself the last word on the goal values of the American people — and gets away with it.

Where does this leave the strategist who is responsible for any aspect of total American strategy? To say that it “leaves him up in the air” doesn’t help us very much. And even though this to some extent is true, the strategist need not be nearly as far up in the air as might appear from what I’ve just said. It is possible to obtain some guidance. First, there is a degree of consensus about the goal values of American life, and also about the translation of these values into institutional terms. And, second, it is possible to estimate the way in which policy objectives will be interpreted under various future contingencies. Both these operations are essential in estimating basic political factors in strategy.

Let us consider for a moment the ideal values of the American tradition. Each of us would express these basic goals in somewhat different words. But most of us would recognize that the words that I’m going to use are about equivalent to his own vocabulary preferences. The ideal preferences of the American tradition are for the realization of human dignity in theory and in



fact. These words mean that we favor the achievement of an American commonwealth in which values are shared on the basis of individual merit, rather than on the basis of the privileged status of a family group into which one happens to be born.

Let us spell this out more concretely in terms of a fundamental way of thinking about the social process. This notion of social process, by the way, is a handy intellectual gadget for examining a great many problems connected with strategy. A social process gets under way whenever human beings affect one another. Thus, we have a social process today on a global scale; we have it on a bi-polar, regional, national, and local scale. Whatever the social process is that we are undertaking to explore, it is convenient to talk about it in some such general terms as these: "*People pursuing values through institutions using resources.*" This term "values" refers to what people want; and the word "institution" means the patterns by which values are shaped and shared in concrete circumstances.

Let us apply this by making use of eight words to talk about the values in any social process that we want to describe. I'm going to use eight words for values:

*Power*, or decision making, a value that is shaped and shared through the institutions called government, political parties, pressure groups, and the like.

The *wealth* value is shaped and shared through the institutions specialized to production and consumption; more specifically, the corporations, trade unions, and so on.

Another value is *respect* which includes such activities as the giving of honors or of stigma. It includes the discriminations and the distinctions in a community.

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*Well-being* is the value of physical and psychological health. The institutions specialized to it provide medical care, seek to prevent accidents, and so on through a vast network of activity.

*Enlightenment* means access to facts and opinions upon the basis of which rational judgments can be made on important questions. The institutions are the agencies of civic instruction and public information.

A further value is *skill*, the maturing of latent talent into socially acceptable expression. Distinctive institutions are the organizations which concern themselves with levels of technical competence.

Another convenient value category is *affection*. Here we are talking about congenial personal relationships—family, friendship cliques, and so on.

Last in this list of eight is *rectitude*. We are talking about institutional patterns which specify standards of right and wrong and apply them.

Now let us look at the goal values of the American commonwealth in relationship to this statement about social process. Having the general ideal of realizing human dignity in theory and in fact, we are in favor of moving in the direction of a commonwealth in which all values are very generally participated in, as distinct from a community in which all values are concentrated in a relatively few hands. What this means is that in terms of power we endorse a decision-making process in which there is democratic participation, as distinct from despotic dictation by a few.

In terms of wealth, we think of rising standards of living throughout the community, as distinct from situations in which

the enjoyment of economic benefits is highly concentrated in very few hands.

In terms of human respect, we are against social castes.

In terms of well-being, we are in favor of high levels of physical and psychic health throughout the commonwealth.

So far as enlightenment is concerned, we are in favor of universal civic instruction and freedom of the press.

In terms of affection, we are in favor of human relationships in which there is opportunity for friendly and loyal human relationships to be maintained.

Then, in terms of rectitude, we want to attain a universal sense of individual responsibility for contributing to human dignity.

This is an over-simplified way of characterizing the sort of social process toward which we want to move, according to our ideal objectives.

Well, let's stand back from this. What are some of the implications for the development of strategies? One point is that our decision makers are multiple-valued, rather than single-valued; and, especially, they are not centered on power. If you compare the decision makers in top official and unofficial positions in the United States with those in Nazi Germany in its heyday, or within the Soviet Union at present, you'll be struck by the difference. Nazis and communists are intensely focussed on power.

For example: Very often American decision makers are emotionally upset when they listen to a situation being analyzed in

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strictly "power" terms. (I'm even referring to some specialists in the Armed Forces, as well as to decision makers who represent top civilian groups in the United States). There are frequent evidences of moral shock when an analysis is stringently carried through in power terms. The same attitude is reflected in a different way in a crop of embittered "baby Machiavellis" when people are trying to transform themselves into individuals who are hard-boiled about power.

You notice, also a strange zigzag in which persons who at one moment are insistent upon the consideration of many values besides power engage at the next moment in most ruthless power politics. This type of zigzag reaction expresses lack of ease in dealing with the power value, a lack of ease which comes from our "multi-valued" and "open" society.

This reaction also gives the United States a singular reputation for hypocrisy, thanks to the difficulties that arise in squaring many of our moralistic formulations with many of our power necessities. Now this reputation for hypocrisy was also a reputation which Victorian England enjoyed. To some extent, of course, it is the prerogative of all powerful units in the world to be regarded as hypocritical by those who are weaker, and in this sense we inherit England's position. The United States may have to get accustomed to being regarded as a nation of hypocrites.

A second implication of goal values for the choice of strategical objectives is this: we aim at national security by international law and organization rather than by world conquest or world empire.

A third point: We're not politically organized to plan and execute a so-called "preventive war." This is partly because the idea

is repugnant, and partly a result of our unwillingness to concentrate sufficient authority and control.

A fourth point: We desire to change the enemy's effective intentions by persuasion, if possible, rather by destroying his or our capabilities. This comes from our strong reliance on methods of bargaining and persuasion — bargaining in the sense of deals with leaders; persuasion in the handling of propaganda, advertising, and other mass-directed forms of communication.

Fifth in this particular list: we have little confidence in force as an instrument of policy save as a means of nullifying hostile force and of keeping the channels open for persuasion and for peaceful internal evolution.

Next, our fundamental goal values are of consequence when we undertake to formulate in advance the end results of the present crisis (end results to be obtained, be it remembered, by measures short of total or limited war, if possible).

What are the minimum objectives of basic American policy in the present crisis? I think we can be fairly definite about the minimum objectives. We want to bring into the effective control of the Soviet Union (and elsewhere) policy makers who accept inspection and control by the United Nations of arms, and agree to arms reduction and limitation.

What are our maximum objectives? Well, one hypothesis about our maximum objectives — not to be taken seriously, for I think it is highly improbable — is this: to impose detailed United States institutions on the Soviet world. That is to say, to reproduce as many of our specialized institutions concerned with each value as possible.

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It is of the greatest consequence for strategic thinking to arrive at workable estimates lying somewhere between the minimum I have specified (which is pretty clear) and the ceiling I have mentioned.

Next, in this list of implications, we prefer a minimum use of coercion against Allies and neutrals.

Next, I think there are as yet unrealized implications for the *positive* objectives to be sought during the next several years. It is notorious, isn't it, at least among analysts of American policy, that so far our policy formulations have been primarily negative. We have relied in public (and frequently in private) on formulating basic objectives in terms of hostility to somebody else — somebody's leadership, somebody's institutional details. Problem: do we have any positive objectives which can be made potentially clarifying and stimulating to our own people and to the world as a whole? I think the answer is "yes," and I would forecast, without stopping to develop the point, that in the years ahead we are likely to discover that we are the ones who are the most impatient with a non-industrialized world, and that we are the ones who most want to take the initiative and leadership in working closely with the leaders and peoples of all countries in order to develop world-wide industrialization; and that we propose to foster world-wide industrialization with a maximum of freedom and a minimum of sacrifice of the values connected with human dignity. To phrase it one way, we are for "industry and democracy" *versus* "industry and despotism." Our aim is to cooperate in realizing a commonwealth of free men in an industrial world. The purpose is to use modern science and technology in order to maximize the scope of human choice. I refer to this in passing to indicate the problems and solutions that appear when you explore the fundamental strategic objectives of this nation.

Note that in formulating strategy for a despotism the strategists are also in a quandry. People who suffer the ambiguities of popular government frequently forget the ambiguities of a dictatorial regime. This is not only because the dictators change their "line," if not their "spots," but because the dictators change their key personnel, so that you get a considerable readjustment by selective attrition. So at any given moment the official has the serious problem of deciding just how long a given perspective will be safe to play with. Hence, officials of despotisms become rather adroit in devising techniques for the evasion of responsibility, thus developing a kind of creeping paralysis in the formulation of middle and long-range programs.

Of course, in thinking about our objectives, political factors must be calculated that go beyond the influences at work in this country. We must take into account the power factors moulding the policies of present and potential allies.

There are special problems connected with the liberation and restoration of allies who are overrun.

There are thorny questions to be disposed of in adjusting our immediate and long-range objectives to programs of cooperation with regimes having little popular support. Here we meet the danger with which we have become well acquainted in recent times, of weakening the internal unity of the United States by close cooperation with regimes that have no basis of popular support. Also, there is the danger of weakening our appeal in the intermediate areas — and, ultimately, to peoples of the Soviet orbit — by upholding a ruling group with whom we can make excellent deals, but whose masses may be alienated in time of crisis by these arrangements.

Again, we must evaluate the helpfulness of regimes with a great deal of popular support but neutralist in orientation. Perhaps

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their neutralism comes from fear of internal disunity if their policies are more positive, perhaps through fear of being the theater of active warfare. In any case, the strategic problem is to estimate the policies open to us for increasing our mutual identification with common objectives. And, of course, we must evaluate the likelihood that the United States public will show patience and consideration toward other powers.

Turning now to another political problem involved in the formulation of strategy: *the scale and timing of preparations*. Let's assume that the strategist has arrived at an estimate of the magnitude of the enemy threat, and of the efforts needed to meet the threat. Assume further that a high level of continued mobilization presents novel problems that must be taken into account in strategy formulation. One must estimate the degree to which it is possible to maintain the conviction that the threat is as large as the strategist thinks it is. Unless such convictions are generally shared by leaders and led, all sorts of other attitudes will reassert themselves. One traditional attitude in this country is the suspicion that everybody is likely to exaggerate what he is interested in. After all, this is an advertising culture. It is a culture of Yankee traders. It is assumed that whenever any professional man tells you his services are needed, he is exaggerating, and making a self-serving declaration.

If the level of popular conviction is not high, it is necessary to avoid subjecting the standard of living to sharp reduction. Otherwise it will be impossible to maintain full cooperation through long periods. It will be necessary to count on achieving our objectives, not by cutting civilian requirements, but by diverting the annual increase of productivity into the defense program.

If support is not intense, we must also make sure that all important elements recognize that they have high and tangible stakes



in the production program. This applies to big and little business, investors, managerial groups, technical groups, farmers, and so on.

Then it is obvious that we must estimate the possibility of keeping inflation under control (particularly by tax measures) in order to diminish the likelihood of alienating the fixed and low income brackets.

We also have to estimate the degree to which it is possible to prevent black market operations, and the spread of administrative corruption. Obviously, we must consider the degree to which it is possible to mobilize an effective demand for efficient law enforcement.

Further, we must consider the likelihood that political police measures can be held to a minimum in the crisis. The traditional American attitude towards political police—toward the investigation of individual loyalty — is one of great hostility. The problem is to estimate whether these attitudes can be modified realistically without alienating the unity of the country.

Further, we have to consider to what extent it is possible to build up and sustain common unity of outlook, not only throughout the nation as a whole, but especially among young people and their families.

Strategy also calls for weighing the political factors affecting the scale of preparation by allies. I shall go no further with this phase of the analysis.

Rather, I shall mention another major element: *calculating the significance of political factors affecting the possible scale and timing of losses in active warfare.* This, I shall not have time to deal with.

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The formulation of strategy calls for the evaluation of political factors in connection with the *choice of instruments of warfare and the mode of their application*. I shall mention only a few ramifications of this extraordinarily important matter. Plainly, one has the task of estimating the role of specific bases under various conditions of political reliability. One has the problem of weapon balance. Weapon choice is not only a matter of engineering comparisons, but of weighing the chances of continued political support for various weapons. In some cases this means making concessions to the ease with which the support of certain industrial and territorial groups can be mobilized, and, as I heard some one remark, attention to the popular vogue of various weapons, even if this presents the problem of keeping up-to-date with popular education in the comic strips.

Connected with weapon choice and application is estimating the effect of appearing to play the role of the aggressor (and also of appearing to play a passive role).

Again, there is the problem of calculating the effect of introducing new and "inhuman" weapons, or of following suit. It is worth considering the possibility of developing and introducing new and humane weapons in order to avoid negative political effects. Some years ago the "paralysis weapon" was suggested as the ideal weapon for humanitarians. The idea was to treat large masses of the population the same way as the individual patient in the hospital when you put him under an anaesthetic.

We also have the task of estimating the usefulness of a weapon as a deterrent and as a builder of confidence. Historically, of course, this has been one of the many roles played by naval demonstrations.

Further, target selection for strategic operations calls for the consideration of political elements.

I turn now to another set of strategic calculations in which political factors cut an important figure: *the orientations and capabilities of the enemy*. I shall first mention the problem of estimating the weight assigned to political factors in the enemy's strategic thinking. What elements of his own population does he regard as liable or unreliable for various activities? What elements of other populations does he believe to be helpful under various circumstances? What are his expectations about our policy and that of other nations? (We note in this connection the chronic underestimation of the fighting potential of the United States by despotisms).

There is also the problem of the political responsiveness of the enemy to measures short of war, and to war itself. Here the greatest question is whether significant elements in the ruling elite can be brought to recognize, by procedures short of total war, that they have more to gain by cooperation than by non-cooperation with the rest of the world.

It is also necessary to assess the effect of internal cleavages, if they develop, upon the policy of an opponent. Will the development of antagonisms among the peoples of the Soviet world lead to even greater consolidation of garrison police states, or will it bring about a steady drift toward peaceful cooperation on the part of the top elite? We have in mind actual and potential cleavages separating Soviet cultures and nationalities, urban and rural populations, and the like.

Let me bring this analysis to a close. Political factors, I have said, enter into the formulation of partial or total strategy. Political considerations relate especially to the intentions of ourselves and others, and also to the impact of every instrument of power upon intentions. The aim of strategy is to maximize the reali-

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zation of the goal values of the body politic in a democratic commonwealth, and of the ruling few in a despotism. Political factors enter at least into the formulation of strategy in (1) the choice of objectives on the basis of our goal values and those of our present and potential allies; (2) the estimation of the possible scale and timing of preparations at home and on the part of allies; (3) the scale and timing of possible losses by our own forces and our allies; (4) the choice of war instruments and their mode of application; (5) the estimation of the political considerations that figure in the strategical thinking of the enemy; and (6) the weighing of the political responsiveness of the enemy to measures short of war and to war itself.

### **BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF LECTURER**

Dr. Lasswell was born in Illinois in 1902. He has degrees from the University of Chicago and was a graduate student at the Universities of London, Geneva, Paris, and Berlin. He has taught in the field of Political Science at the University of Chicago, Washington School of Psychiatry, Syracuse University, Western Reserve University, and the University of California. He has been a Professor of Law at Yale University since 1946.

Dr. Lasswell is a well known lecturer and authority on world politics. He has published numerous books on this subject, including: "Psychopathology and Politics," 1930; "World Politics and Personal Insecurity," 1935; "World Revolutionary Propaganda," 1939; "Politics Faces Economics," 1946; and "The Analysis of Political Behavior," 1948.

**CHARACTERISTICS OF A SOUND STRATEGY**

A lecture delivered  
at the Naval War College  
on 17 March 1952  
by  
*Dr. Bernard Brodie*

Admiral Conolly, Gentlemen:

The lecture title assigned to me is at once convenient and embarrassing — convenient, because it gives me a very wide latitude indeed; and embarrassing, because it implies on my part pretensions to oracular wisdom. I don't think I can describe the characteristics of a sound strategy except, perhaps, in the most general and abstract terms. I think I can, however, occasionally recognize an unsound strategy when I see one, as I believe I sometimes do. I shall, therefore, for the legitimate purpose of being specific rather than abstract, talk more about *unsound* strategies than about sound ones. In other words, I shall take a leaf from the revivalist preacher and point the way to the good life by preaching against sin.

The title of the seminar in which I am to participate this afternoon intrigues me even more — "Validity of the Principles of War in the Formulation of Strategy" — and since that subject is most intimately related to the one that I am to discuss this morning, I trust you will be indulgent enough to permit me now a few general observations on that subject.

Unfortunately, my views here, too, tend to be somewhat negative. My views may perhaps conflict with those current here, but that is all to the good in an academic institution, for argument is after all the stuff of learning. If we all thought alike we should all be infinitely wise or, more likely, very stupid.

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Now, if by Principles of War we mean that group of maxims or axioms which are usually presented in a list of 7 to 10 or more numbered items and which are supposed to be unchanging despite the most fantastic changes in everything else, then my feeling about them is not that they are wrong or useless but that we tend to be altogether too respectful of them. And if our respect becomes so extreme that we enshrine them as dogmas, as sometimes happens, then I think they become positively dangerous.

You have, no doubt, heard or will hear references to bad strategies of the past where the badness is summed up in terms of its being a violation of this or that Principle of War. I think it is equally true that one could point to the most egregious blunders of past actions (and I fear also of present planning) which have been committed in the name of this or that Principle of War and in so far as my samples may be safely drawn from past actions, I shall perhaps have occasion to refer to one or two.

The first thing that can be said about the so-called "principles of war," which I think were first formulated systematically by Jomini and developed later by subsequent writers, is that they are essentially common sense propositions. They have all the virtues of common sense propositions, which means, among other things, that it is generally useful to remain aware of them. But they also have the limitation of common sense propositions, including the limitation that occasionally a strict adherence to them will be extremely offensive to common sense.

Now let me give you an example of what I mean by common sense propositions. We will all agree, I think, that in the great majority of instances if you want to influence a man in a particular direction you don't insult him. You try to instill in him an attitude towards yourself of confidence and sympathy — and then you try

to persuade. That is common sense. But we also know that in many instances, and with assorted odd characters, that won't work. In some cases the best way to influence a man to action in the direction you desire is by insulting him. The latter procedure is usually more hazardous and is often prohibited by adverse differences in rank and the like, but, where possible, it is sometimes effective. Incidentally, this example is not as farfetched from the principles of war as one might think. I have seen lists which included, for example, the principle of cooperation — which is exactly what my example is about.

Now, because the principles of war are really common sense propositions, most of them apply equally to other pursuits in life — including some which at first glance seem to be pretty far removed from war. For instance, if a man wishes to win a fair and virtuous maiden and if he is not too well endowed with looks or money, it is necessary for him to clarify in his mind exactly what he wants of this girl — that is, the principle of the objective; and then to practice rigorously the principles of concentration of force, of the offensive, of economy of forces, and certainly of deception.

The same is true of a good number of other pursuits, like pursuit of higher income, of status, and the like; and even of disinterested objectives like pursuit of the national welfare or security. Now, one might argue that I am simply stretching some analogies, but I really don't know why war has a prior claim over these other pursuits to those principles which are common to all. Nor is it necessarily damning to the principles of war that they also apply to other pursuits. But it does begin to suggest (and this is the main thesis of my argument) that these principles are perhaps too abstract and too general to be very meaningful in themselves — too devoid of content to have any very specific application.

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To return to my analogy of the way of a man with a maid, he may know that he has to concentrate all his available resources on achieving his objective. In fact he is automatically driven to do so by a deep impulse of nature, but he needs deeper intuitions to tell him just how to apply those resources. He may take her to symphony concerts—when she is not that kind of a girl at all.

Now let me give you an example from an actual statement on principles of war — and I choose this one merely for convenience; it happened to be at hand — a recent list of ten principles of war adopted by the Canadian Chiefs of Staff Committee for the use and guidance of the Canadian Armed Forces. In reading this particular principle, which is No. 7 and called “Economy of Effort,” I am going to emphasize certain words which are not in fact italicized in the text:

“Economy of effort implies a *balanced* employment of forces and a *judicious* expenditure of all resources with the objective of achieving an *effective* concentration at the *decisive* time and place.”

Now I submit, gentlemen, that if we had the wisdom to know what a *balanced* force should properly be in the present day with all the new weapons and techniques that are crowding upon us; if we really knew what was meant by *judicious* expenditure of resources for the sake of achieving an *effective* concentration; and, if we knew what a *decisive* time and place was — how to recognize one and choose one — then, I should say people endowed with that wisdom would more or less intuitively know how to put those factors together in the way suggested here. Mind you, I’m not saying this particular idea is unimportant — one can point to instances in the past where it has been overlooked, to the sorrow of those who did so.



Take that business of balanced employment of forces. Admiral Doenitz, as you know, has, since becoming a captive of the Allies, written an essay on "The War at Sea" from the German point of view of World War II. He points out that the German submarines in the first year of the war were ten times as effective per day at sea as they were in the second year of the war. One therefore gathers (though he doesn't make this point) that if Germany had started the war with some 300 submarines instead of 60, they would have stood a very good chance of winning the war at sea, and therefore the whole war—and relatively early. Now, why didn't they have those 300 submarines? Well, one reason is that they were enamored of the idea of a balanced force and devoted a good deal of their naval resources (which had to be limited in view of their ground and air force needs) to surface vessels, including battleships. That gave them what according to a static conception was a balanced force. The trouble was that it was highly unbalanced for a war with Great Britain. This is only one example of where the word "balance" denotes no ready answer. The balance must always be thought of in terms of *strategic* needs against the particular prospective enemy.

What is balanced force in an atomic age? If you think that I am going to give you the answer, I'm sorry to disappoint you. It is certainly the great problem of our time.

Incidentally, the statement that I have read presents the principle of economy of force (which is here called the "economy of effort") in the classic sense. I will re-read that second clause:

"..... a judicious expenditure of all resources with the object of achieving an effective concentration at the decisive time and place."

Now notice that does not mean economizing on forces — it

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means utilizing all the forces one has. The significant thing about that is that certain recent military writers have altered the meaning of the phrase "economy of forces" without being aware that they have done so; that is, here we have the word "economy" in its 19th Century connotation, while more recent writers have used it in the 20th Century connotation, which means "to hold back; to economize." To me the significant thing about it is that where the thought can change while the phrase remains the same, maybe the formula was not too important in the first place.

I promised an example where a strict adherence to the principles of war resulted in a grave blunder. Since this is the Naval War College, I shall choose one from recent naval actions, and, with deep sorrow, from an American mistake. The memoirs of the Commander of the Third Fleet at Leyte Gulf tell us how he arrived at his main decision in the battle of October, 1944, which in terms of the ships engaged was not only the greatest naval battle of that war but of all time. He tells us that after the three enemy forces had been located, he drew up for himself three alternatives (I don't remember whether I am giving them in the proper order, but these were the alternatives): (1) he could keep his entire force concentrated off the mouth of San Bernadino Strait; (2) he could divide his forces, keeping one portion off San Bernadino Straight and sending the remaining portion north to counter Admiral Ozawa's fleet; and (3) he could send his entire force northward against Ozawa. He tells us he rejected the first of these alternatives (for reasons which I shall mention shortly), and then he rejected the second one because it conflicted with the principle of concentration of force. So he chose the third alternative and threw his entire force against Admiral Ozawa, 300 miles away to the north. That meant sending 90 ships against 16, those 16 being individually much inferior to their counterparts among our 90. As you know, two were hermaphrodite battleships, and of the four carriers three were jeeps, and so on.

We now know that Admiral Ozawa's mission was to lure the Third Fleet northward, but that he himself felt that his forces were not strong enough to serve that mission. And, logically he was right — but he did succeed.

The American commander finally did break with the principle of concentration of force. You remember after he had sent his force northward and when his six battleships were within 45 miles from his target force, he was finally induced to turn them around and send them south again and, after stopping to refuel his destroyers, he rushed on ahead with the faster IOWA and NEW JERSEY. The force that he was sending ahead at this time was inferior to that which he hoped to catch.

The purpose of the principle of concentration of force is to suggest that one should so allocate one's forces that one can hope to be superior to the enemy somewhere, preferably in the most important place, or at least minimize one's inferiority in the decisive place. I submit that the Commander of the Third Fleet had forces so overwhelmingly superior to those of the enemy that he could have divided his forces between San Bernardino Strait and the north and have remained overwhelmingly superior locally to each enemy force. And when you are overwhelmingly superior — how much more superior do you want to get?

So much for the principles of war which, to repeat, are useful as far as they go — but which simply don't go very far at all. The real military problems facing us today are problems for which the principles of war not only offer little or no guidance but in some instances are positively misleading. Nevertheless, I urge you to learn them — it will not take you very long.

Now I want to talk about another kind of axiom or maxim which differs from the Principle with a capital "P" in that it is less

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systematized and less hoary with tradition. It is also less likely to have the virtues of common sense about it. This I shall call the "slogan." The slogan may originate in experience or in fancy; it may enthrall a particular service or the whole profession of arms — but in any case it tends to become dogma and, therefore, to provide at the moment of its ascendancy the key to the basic decisions. Again to give a naval example, throughout the whole latter half of the 19th Century a very common axiom in manuals of tactics was, "The ram is the most formidable of all the weapons of the ship." How did that ever start?

Well, you remember the famous VIRGINIA or MERRIMAC of our own Civil War. The first day she came out at Hampton Roads she rammed and sank a Federal frigate—I believe it was the Congress — and that started it. Throughout the remainder of the Civil War numerous attempts were made at ramming — none of them succeeded.

Throughout the remainder of the 19th Century, in the rather numerous engagements that occurred, almost all of them were characterized by attempts of ramming and, so far as I know, only one succeeded — namely at the Battle of Lissa in 1866. Some warships were actually built as rams without armament — not many, to be sure, as it was an experimental venture — but certainly all battleships did carry a huge projection at the bow which was intended to be a ram and which always affected adversely the handling qualities of the ship. Even now there is floating in the East River in New York an old battleship, which has been converted to an armory, which has this huge ram bow. Here is a dogma which prevailed for half a century and which never had any real substance in fact.

Take the slogan by du Picq, prior to World War I: "He will win who has the resolution to advance" — the slogan which en-

couraged the school of the offensive a outrance in France, which cost the French so very dearly in the first weeks of World War I. That slogan might have better survived the battles of 1914 had not those battles inspired in Marshal Joffre a slogan even more terse and homely, "Fire kills!" Those two words, "fire kills" had more to do with determining Allied strategy in World War I than any number of volumes could have done.

To give you an instance from more recent times, let me return to my example of Leyte Gulf. Why did the American commander reject his first alternative? Because of the slogan — the slogan which was relatively new, but which had certainly become firmly fixed — "The enemy's main force is where his carriers are."

If you read that excellent little book of Professor van Woodward's called *The Battle for Leyte Gulf*, you get the feeling of tenseness within the fleet after the first two enemy detachments have been discovered — the one below Surigao Strait, the other in the Sibuyan Sea and subsequently in San Bernardino Strait. But the question asked was, "Where are the enemy's carriers? That is where his main force must be." I submit that was true for the preceding two years of the war, but at the time of Leyte Gulf it was no longer true, and I submit also that the intelligence was available to the fleet which should have indicated that it was no longer true. The remaining enemy carriers, the characteristics of which we well knew, were much too puny to be an effective force. We could not, of course, know that they weren't even carrying airplanes, but what we should have known was that the most planes they could have flown was far too small to be decisive in any sense of the word, even to be significant. We also at that time had plenty of reason to believe that what the Japanese naval air forces amounted to then were nothing like what they had amounted to in

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the first year of the war; it was not their first team, but something from away down deep in the barrel. In that battle the enemy's main force comprised in fact his battleships. That would have been clear except for the existence of the slogan.

The slogan is objectionable for the same reason that an undue deference to the principles of war is objectionable — it acts as a substitute for thinking, and any substitute for thinking is usually a bad substitute. Worse still, it introduces a rigidity of thought which is, after all, its purpose. This may prevent the realization of the absurdly obvious. This applies to all walks and professions of life and not simply to the military. The academicians, of which I have for a long time been one, certainly have their own slogans — so does the medical profession, and so on. The existence of prepossessions, of biases, and the like, are the chief reasons why the obvious is so often overlooked. But the military, I think, have to be specially careful, because a military service is a tightly-knit institution, closely bound up with the hierarchy of rank, the members of which generally share a common education, common traditions, and mutual life-long associations.

The slogan may represent a brilliant insight of the past, but as a rule only at its first utterance. When it becomes common currency, it is likely already to be counterfeit. I submit, therefore, that one of the first tests for a sound strategy is freedom from the dominance of slogans—I would offer that as the fifth freedom. This is a negative statement, but to my mind enormously important. If our strategic plans could be devised in relative freedom from the dominance of slogans that would be a great and refreshing advance.

What, then, should an intelligent strategy be based on? I should say first of all on the sound appreciation of existing realities, which will then enable us to make predictions which have real plann-

ing values — and that is easier said than done. It is a very big order. To arrange matters pertinent to strategic decisions, as Admiral Conolly just pointed out to you, covers a major portion of the entire field of human knowledge. If this field were really to be covered by those responsible for strategic decisions, the military profession would have to be far and away the most learned of all professions. Yet, other characteristics are desired in a commander — ability to lead, forthrightness, and ability to make decisions. Many characteristics and qualities demanded in a commander are in fact incompatible with the contemplative way of life.

Now this dilemma of scope is only partially and very unsatisfactorily served by specialization. Nevertheless, we are enforced to rely upon it to a very great extent. It is incumbent upon the military to be professional in their own field—in what is peculiarly their own field—which means what other disciplines have left to them in all those matters relating to war, even though it may require relative neglect of fields which are also quite closely related.

When I was at the National War College in 1946, I must confess I had some misgivings at the very great amount of time, relatively, which was being spent on what one might call the social sciences. I am myself a social scientist. It seemed to me that we were living in an age when there are such pressing problems of facing up to changing weapon and military techniques that this time could ill be afforded. And, yet, as Admiral Conolly suggested, our strategy is intimately bound up with our alliances, the NATO alliance above all, and certainly adjustment to existing realities requires that people responsible for military decisions know what they can expect of and what the political problems are in the NATO alliance.

But who is going to do the intensive study which the situation requires in matters concerning the proper utilization of new weapons,

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the changes in techniques indicated by those new weapons, the problem of proper targetting for strategic bombing, and the like? Who is going to straighten out the numerous grave problems which the social scientist as well as the physical scientist and the diplomatist are leaving exclusively to the military?

My feeling is that the handling of foreign affairs must, for better or for worse, be left primarily to our State Department (after all, our constitutional framework requires that that be done), and that the military have good answers to what are peculiarly military problems, and as you well know, those will not be easy.

As I said before, the problem is that more and more fields of knowledge are becoming more and more intimately related to strategic decisions. For example, we are becoming aware of the fact that the use of weapons in war can be manipulated to have greater or less psychological effect. I'm now talking about psychological warfare in the larger sense—not simply the use of words over the radio, but rather the use of fire power to maximize the psychological effects of that firepower on the enemy. This is obviously a requirement for military intelligence, for military analysis.

I've given you an example where the field of knowledge itself happens to be quite poorly developed. There is a vast universe of things we don't know about the psychological effects of weapons. Nevertheless, our first priority problem is not our deficiencies in knowledge (which we can leave to the researchers), but rather the intelligent, imaginative and comprehensive application of the knowledge we do have. What we need is a steady awareness of what we know and, more important perhaps, a steady awareness of what we do not know. Above all, we need that simple but rare and indispensable thing called "logical reasoning."



Now, what do I mean by logical reasoning? I shall be referring indirectly to staff studies which I have seen, upon which war plans were supposed to be built. I say that the first point about logical reasoning is that the premise should have some influence on the conclusions presumably derived from it. It is a commonplace in staff studies that assumptions are no sooner stated than they are forgotten.

Secondly, if we must say that we do not know whether a certain proposition is true—that does not mean that we know the opposite to be true. I refer here to some different schools of thought on strategic bombing. One of the things that we don't know about strategic bombing is whether it is politically and militarily desirable to maximize human casualties, to minimize them, or to choose targets which show indifference to casualties. We don't know that it is a bad thing to maximize casualties, but that is not the same as saying we know it to be a good thing to maximize casualties.

Thirdly, the wish may be a legitimate father to the thought, but he is an over-indulgent parent and his status of paternity must be kept constantly in mind. I am referring now to what I call the "gleam in the eye" strategy. I have seen studies of a hypothetical ground war in Europe which certainly deserve that description.

I would say, fourthly, first things come first. The winning of a war (and I would add of the subsequent peace) is more important than that some doctrine should be realized in practice, such as the doctrine of balanced force or the doctrine of strategic bombing, or whatever doctrine you like—good, bad, or indifferent.

Fifthly, I would suggest that if all one's assets are to be committed to a particular plan, I should expect that one would

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have a reasonable prognosis of the military and political consequences of executing that plan. That, I have found, is a most unreasonable expectation. I have seen studies which thought they were attempts at war plans, but which ended simply with putting bombs on targets.

Sixth, war is a very complex thing indeed and interpretations of past wars, upon which our planning for future wars have to be in some part based, is not easy. And I would say that any monistic interpretation, any interpretation which finds the answer in one particular thing, is likely to be wrong simply because it is monistic.

Finally, I humbly suggest that easily available knowledge which is relevant should be absorbed. It sometimes is. I noticed in glancing over your bibliography this morning there was an article by Air Marshal Sir Robert Saundby of the Royal Air Force. I happen to remember that article very well. That article was an answer to an article in the previous issue of the *Royal Air Force Quarterly*, in which a Wing Commander Whitworth had said that the success of strategic bombing depends very heavily on a shrewd selection of targets. And Saundby's reply in effect was: that's nonsense—what you have to do is pound the country first and after you have done a lot of pounding, then perhaps particular kinds of targets begin to emerge. Now, the answer Air Marshal Saundby made may prove in the end to be correct, but it will take colossal new weapons to prove him so. And he was not thinking about those possible new weapons when he wrote that article. I submit that all the experience of World War II, as written up in both the American and in the British strategic bombing surveys, proves him wrong. He has not done his home work.

Now, if our staff planners diligently follow the few precepts I have mentioned, we would have fewer of those studies which so

beautifully bear out the words of our great and good friend, Uncle Joe Stalin, and I quote:

“Paper will put up with anything that is written on it.”

Now, what are some of the touchstones for finding a plan wrong? How does a senior officer know that a study which is presented to him for his decision is right or wrong? Certainly one can not characterize the plan as wrong simply because one entertains a contrary opinion. The fact of the matter is that all too often the senior officer does not entertain the contrary opinion—the reason is that his staff has anticipated his opinion and perhaps subconsciously has adjusted to it.

Now I would say one touchstone is that if the assumptions are clearly unrealistic, or at least unstudied, we can suspect a poor foundation for the study. As I said before, the assumption should be more than a *pro forma* consideration.

Secondly, there may be many important assumptions which are implicit in the plan but which are not recognized as such by the authors. The authors will at first state their assumptions and then go on to reason from those assumptions, but the process of reasoning will introduce as facts what are in reality more assumptions, only they haven't been examined as critically as the stated assumptions.

Thirdly, there may be internal contradictions of a significant character in a plan or a study. Now, I agree with Emerson that “consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds,” but after all Emerson wasn't talking about war plans.

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Finally, factual data presented may be susceptible of being proven incorrect, and when that is done of course you know the study itself is suspect.

I see I am approaching the end of my time and I should like to talk briefly about two somewhat unrelated things, but both are related to this main topic. First, secrecy. Secrecy is a necessary evil, but not all the evils stemming from it are necessary. Notice that our war planning is the only important function of government—perhaps the most important function of government—which is carried on entirely without benefit of criticism from the outside, of criticism from the public. Now I grant you that much of the criticism from the public that is thrown at various governmental decisions and practices is malicious and ill informed. But, in the net, the criticism is an enormous contribution to good government. I think it is that which makes democratic government feasible and which in fact makes it, at least in my view, certainly the best form of government as well as the most tolerable.

With regard to war planning, on the other hand, it is a tight and closed organization which has cognizance of these things. Originality is at best a very rare thing under the sun. The people who might apply fresh ideas and insights are usually not aware of what is going on. In some instances the security is excessive—which means that a price is being paid for it which is unnecessary. But even where it is necessary (and I want to stress that I think it is in most instances essential) the planners ought to remain aware of the price they are paying and in so far as possible avail themselves of the insights and novel points of view of persons who would not ordinarily be drawn into the planning process.

I want, finally at the end, to say a few words about national objectives—particularly in view of the age in which we live. We are

living in an age in which atomic weapons already exist in substantial numbers, in which the numbers are steadily and rapidly growing, and which may at some future time include new and even more deadly weapons. If we look ahead only five years from now, we see a world in which war—if it comes—must mean a devastation (assuming that present principles are carried into practice) such as the world has never seen to any degree of approximation. As you all know, Clausewitz somewhat over a hundred years ago made a statement in his famous book which has since been very often quoted, namely: "War is a continuation of policy by other means." I confess that for a very long time I was convinced that that statement had no meaning. To me, modern war was so different, so much more violent than diplomacy, that I could not conceive of it in terms of its being a continuation of diplomacy. To a degree that is true, but I have now become convinced that what Clausewitz said has profound meaning. What he was saying by implication was that war should follow a planned procedure for the sake of securing certain political and social objectives. By implication, too, the procedures and the objectives should be rational and to some degree at least appropriate to each other.

Now, the political objectives of war can not be consonant with national suicide and there is no use talking about large-scale reciprocal use of atomic weapons (including those of the future) as being anything other than national suicide for both sides. I would ask, then, is it enough to say that our armed forces exist to prevent war if possible, and to win the war if it comes? In the future it will be difficult indeed to define what you mean by winning a war and in any case the winning of a war is not an end in itself, but a necessary means to an end. We also have to ask ourselves, "To win for what purpose?" And that will oblige us to ask, "To win how?"

Our national aims are a defense of the free world in order to

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enable it to remain free. Those objectives can be defended only by methods which include a readiness to wage war when the aggressor presents a military challenge. That proposition is well known and really provides the present basis for American foreign policy. But deterrents do not always deter. What, then? Are we obliged to commit ourselves to techniques of waging war which, if they provoke in the enemy (as they must) an equal and opposite reaction, will effectively destroy what they are designed to protect? Perhaps the chief problem of the future is to find some means of controlling events even after hostilities begin—not to let them get out of hand. The price of control, if it is possible to achieve it at all, must clearly include not only limitations in the means of waging war—but also limitations upon war objectives. Total victory, like total war, may well become an obsolete concept.

It seems to me that with these new mass destruction weapons, the science of war ceases to be such. Destruction becomes all too efficient, all too easy. But there is an enormous area for wisdom and science in determining what *not* to hit as well as what to hit: in determining what can be achieved by war, and in what way, other than by unloosing destruction on an unlimited basis.

Thank you very much!

## BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF LECTURER

Dr. Bernard Brodie is an American Naval and Military Historian. He was born in Chicago, Illinois, May 20, 1910, and educated at the University of Chicago. He obtained his Ph. B. degree in 1932 and a Ph. D. degree in 1940.

Meteorologist, U. S. Weather Bureau, 1928-37. Univ. Fellow in International Relations, University of Chicago, 1939-40. Carnegie Fellow, Inst. of Advanced Study, 1940-41. Instr., Dartmouth College, 1941-43. Lt., U. S. N. R., 1943-45. Technical Expert to American Delegation, U. N. C. I. O., San Francisco, April-June 1945. Research Assoc., Yale Inst. of International Studies, 1945-51. Assoc. Prof., Yale Univ., 1947-51. Prof. of International Relations, National War College, Washington, D. C., Aug-Dec. 1946. Consultant; Legislative Reference Service, Library of Congress, 1946 - ; State Department, 1945 - ; National War College, 1945 - ; Air War College, 1946 - . Senior Staff Member, The Rand Corporation, 1951 - .

Fellow: Soc. of American Historians; Naval Historical Foundation. Member: Amer. Political Science Assn. (Research Com.); Atomic Energy Com. of the Social Science Research Council. Author: *Sea Power in the Machine Age*, 1st ed. 1941, 2nd ed. 1943; *A Guide to Naval Strategy*, 1st ed. 1942, 2nd ed. 1943, 3rd ed. 1944, French ed. 1947; *The Absolute Weapon* (Editor and Co-author), 1946; *The Atomic Bomb and the Armed Services*, 1947.

## RECOMMENDED READING

## Current Books

The evaluation of books listed below include those recommended to resident students of the Naval War College. Officers in the fleet and elsewhere may find these of interest.

Many of these publications may be found in ship and station libraries. Some of the publications not available from these sources may be obtained from the Bureau of Naval Personnel Auxiliary Library Service, where a collection of books are available for loan to individual officers. Requests for the loan of these books should be made by the individual to the nearest branch or the Chief of Naval Personnel. (See Article C-9604, Bureau of Naval Personnel Manual, 1948).

- Title:** *Maoism: A Source Book.* 142 p.
- Author:** Steiner, H. Arthur. Los Angeles University of California at Los Angeles, 1952.
- Evaluation:** This is a translation of documents and directives that control the Communist Party of Red China, which is at the same time a noteworthy resume of the development of that party. In the foreword the author succinctly states a problem that will become more important in the future: "Whether 'Maoism' is an ideological phenomenon distinguishable from Marxism-Leninism (or Stalinism) may very properly and profitably be debated, as it doubtless will." In the pages that follow, the carefully selected sections from the translations of the speeches, directives, and polemics of Mao Tse-tung not only answer that question but also give the essence of the philosophy that guides present-day China, which show the various states in the development of the Chinese Communist Party from its early, weak efforts to domination of the greatest section of the human race. Running through the selections are brief commentaries and notes by the author that provide a thread of continuity and background for the material that follows.



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This is a book that merits careful study by all those who would understand this potentially important factor in world affairs. Of particular interest to military personnel are page 20, "Our Correct Strategic Direction," in which Mao outlines his basic concepts for the strategic direction of a war, and page 87, "We Carried Out a Correct Strategic Line," in which he outlines his ten tactical military principles which led to his overwhelming victory over the forces of Chiang Kai-shek. Both merit careful study by military personnel. Finally, on page 139, a hint as to his future attitude toward the United States is given in his "Our Country is Unified as Never Before."

- Title:** *Europe Between Democracy and Anarchy.* 291 p.  
**Author:** Hermans, F. A. Notre Dame, Indiana, University of Notre Dame, 1951.  
**Evaluation:** The author explains the inner workings of European democracy, country by country, both before and after the last world conflict. He points out how democracy, as practiced by continental European countries, differs from that practiced by Great Britain and the United States. He explains why democracy has failed in Europe in the past and why it is doomed to failure again unless the public is educated. The fault lies in the voting system used in the election of governments, a system that permits minor parties to wield power out of all proportion to their strength and thereby makes a strong government practically an impossibility. The remedy, as the author sees it, is a political Marshall Plan. The book is well worth reading and will be of great value to anyone interested in the political workings of our NATO allies.

- Title:** *The World's 30 Greatest Women Spies.* 318 p.  
**Author:** Singer, Kurt. N. Y., Wilfred Funk, 1951.  
**Evaluation:** A review of some of the more prominent women spy cases from Mata Hari to the Bentley and Coplon cases. The first third of the book is devoted to the atomic bomb spy incidents of the past few years and is not limited to women spies. It gives not only a good picture of the operations of these spies, but also tells the story of their uncovering. Although slightly dramatized, the book is interesting and easy to read. It should prove to be of interest to anyone

concerned with counter-intelligence and to those who wish to extend their knowledge of espionage and communist activities in this field.

**Title:** *The Peron Era.* 239 p.  
**Author:** Alexander, Robert J. N. Y., Columbia University Press, 1951.

**Evaluation:** Provides a thorough and comprehensive analysis of the Argentina of Peron, and of the Perons themselves. It gives in considerable detail the political background for Peron's ascendancy to the Presidency in 1946 on a foundation of popularity with rank and file of labor; how he exploited his popularity to consolidate control over the unions, suppressed the opposition of labor leaders, press, universities and other elements to weld his regime into a virtual dictatorship. Peron's political aims at home, his efforts to enhance his influence abroad, and his relations with the U. S. lead to the conclusion that the U. S. faces the danger of a Peron-led bloc of totalitarian military dictatorships among the nations to the South. A thorough treatise, using material from sources not available to the average writer. The great amount of factual detail found in this book makes it excellent for reference purposes.

**Title:** *My Ringside Seat in Moscow.* 307 p.  
**Author:** Nyardi, Nicholas. N. Y., Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1952.

**Evaluation:** Relates the experiences of Dr. Nyaradi, the last non-communist Minister of Finance in post-war Hungary, in negotiating with the Russians in Moscow during 1947 and 1948. Safe now in the United States, he relates many interesting and some revealing incidences. The book also contains his views on such subjects as the Voice of America, relations with Tito, and the Russian Army. As the personal views of a Central European democrat, the book provides interesting reading and adds to the general knowledge of the ways of the Soviet leaders.

**Title:** *Political Role of the General Assembly.* 190 p.  
**Author:** Haviland, H. Field. N. Y., Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1951.

**Evaluation:** The political role of the General Assembly of the United

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Nations is traced by the author from the background of the experience of the League of Nations through the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals, the United Nations Conference at San Francisco in 1945 and the developments within the General Assembly during the first five years of its existence. Reviewed and evaluated are many political and organizational problems including the curtailment of diplomatic relations between member states and the Franco regime of Spain, the rights of Indians in the Union of South Africa, the violation of human and political rights in Bulgaria, Hungary and Rumania, the disposition of the Italian colonies, the efforts to regulate armaments, the formation of the Interim Committee and the adoption of the Uniting for Peace Resolutions. Of particular value is the collection and review of the facts connected with the political issues described above and occurring in the years 1946-1951. Worthy of note, also, is the appendix which contains a chronological list of the resolutions adopted by the General Assembly during this five-year period pertaining to the specific situations discussed in the book.

- Title: *American Crisis Diplomacy.* 160 p.
- Author: Van Alstyne, Richard. Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1952.
- Evaluation: Mr. Van Alstyne gives the political and diplomatic background of major U. S. foreign policy decisions. After tying the fundamental shifts of power resulting from World War I to World War II, he shows how the frictions in the relations of U. S. with Britain, Russia, Vichy, France and China were engendered. Finally, the author binds together the complicated international problems that have arisen since 1945, showing the interrelationship of issues in Western Europe, the Eastern Mediterranean, Middle East, and the Far East. A well-written, thought-provoking book.
- Title: *David Beatty, Admiral of the Fleet.* 488 p.
- Author: Chalmers, Rear Adm. W. S. London, Hodder & Stoughton, 1951.
- Evaluation: This biography is based largely upon the letters, journals, and papers preserved by Admiral Beatty; additionally, the biographer, who served in HMS LION as an aide to Beatty during World War I, draws upon his personal experience

with the Admiral, and upon the first-hand experience of other reliable sources. The book is, therefore, authentic. It sets forth in one volume the life of Beatty, and concomitantly includes some interesting accounts of World War I naval engagements—especially Jutland—and the surrender of the German High Seas Fleet. There are numerous letters of Beatty to his wife which shed much light on the nature of the man. The book is written in a readable style, is well illustrated with pictures and diagrams, and contains several appendices of valuable historical material.

**Title:** *Mobilizing Resources for War.* 284 p.  
**Author:** Scitovsky, Tibor. N. Y., McGraw Hill Book Co., 1951.

**Evaluation:** The book is a proposal for the establishment of an economic program during mobilization. The first section indicates the points of stress in the U. S. economy and includes projections of the country's national income, employment level and war potential up to 1956. The second section is an analysis of World War II experience. In the third and last section, a new and somewhat unconventional program is proposed using expenditure rationing, forced savings, government control over consumer's budgets and rigorous controls over business financing. It is a well-written report on the subject, especially in its first two parts. The reader may differ with the author as to the political feasibility of some of the proposals in Part III.

**Title:** *The Marshall Story.* 344 p.  
**Author:** Payne, Robert. N. Y., Prentice-Hall, 1951.

**Evaluation:** In the Marshall Story, Robert Payne has tried to be objective in every approach in his analysis of the character, achievements, and failures of the great American about whom he writes, George C. Marshall. The author attempts to show why he thinks that Marshall was "a failure as Ambassador to China and an unimpressive Secretary of State except in the role of harbinger of the Marshall Plan; why he was magnificent as Secretary of Defense and the greatest Chief of Staff the country ever possessed." The book is a worthwhile reference volume for those who want to know more about Marshall the man and the many problems which he faced in his selfless loyalty to his country in a variety of fields of endeavor.

PERIODICALS

- Title: *What You Can Read in Russia.*  
Author: Gordey, Michel.  
Publication: HARPER'S, April, 1952, p. 77-84.  
Annotation: Deals with the publishing activities of the Soviet state, discusses the quantity and quality of the books published and tells how total and unlimited control of written thought is exercised by the ideological administration which decrees the political line, size of the printing and the distribution of every type of literature.
- Title: *Offensive Partisan Warfare.*  
Author: Metcalf, Lt. Col. George T.  
Publication: MILITARY REVIEW, April, 1952, p. 53-61.  
Annotation: Comments on the deficiency of training and understanding of the offensive capabilities and limitations of partisan warfare, using the situation in the Philippines during World War II to illustrate the growth and development of this type of warfare and discusses strategic and tactical employment of partisans.
- Title: *Spain: How Good an Ally?*  
Author: Brewer, Sam Pope.  
Publication: THE YALE REVIEW, Spring, 1952, p. 348-359.  
Annotation: An analysis of Spain's military, economic and political status to determine whether or not she would be an effective ally of the Western powers.
- Title: *Capacity and Location of Soviet Aircraft Plants.*  
Publication: AVIATION AGE, March, 1952. p. 6-17.  
Annotation: A report on the economic background and locations of units of the Russian aircraft industry which gives estimates of the number of plants in operation for the Red Air Force and the number of aircraft produced in 1951. (Map showing geographical distribution of Soviet aircraft production, p. 12-13).

- Title: *If I Were Mao Tse-tung.*  
 Author: Hunter, Edward.  
 Publication: AMERICAN MERCURY, April, 1952, p. 39-48.  
 Annotation: Proposes that an appraisal of the situation in Asia through the eyes of the Chinese Communist leader might help to determine where we stand and could give us a basis for planning. It presents a summary of the situation as it would appear to him if he actually were Mao Tse-tung.
- Title: *The China Lobby.*  
 Author: Wertebaker, Charles.  
 Publication: THE REPORTER, April 15, 1952, p. 4-24 and April 29, 1952, p. 5-24.  
 Annotation: A series of articles giving the historical background and a description of what the lobby actually is and does. (Insert gives a chronological list of events in U. S.-China relations from 1937-52).
- Title: *New Threat—Soviet Navy.*  
 Publication: U. S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, April 11, 1952, p. 37-39.  
 Annotation: Deals with the strength of Russian sea power, which is becoming a serious menace to the defense plans of the West.
- Title: *Text of Eisenhower's First Annual Report.*  
 Publication: THE NEW YORK TIMES, April 2, 1952, p. 14-15.  
 Annotation: Reprints the full text of General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower's first annual report as Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, in which he reviews progress and notes the needs of the Allied Powers in Europe.
- Title: *Scandinavia and Strategy in the Baltic.*  
 Author: Mehlem, Max.  
 Publication: SWISS REVIEW OF WORLD AFFAIRS, April 1952, p. 7-9. (Distributed by Univ. of Chicago Press \$5.00 per annum).

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Annotation: A discussion of the problems of Baltic strategy, especially as seen from Denmark and Sweden, in view of the strategic superiority the Soviet Union has been able to secure in this area since the end of World War II.

Title: *Guerrilla Warfare Under International Law.*

Author: Braun, Maj. R. L., U. S. M. C.

Publication: THE JAG JOURNAL, April, 1952, p. 3-9, 22-23.

Annotation: Discusses the status of guerrilla warfare prior to 1949 Geneva Conventions and explains the 1949 conventions that deal with the rights of irregular or guerrilla forces.

Title: *An American in Russia: 1850.*

Author: Kilpatrick, Carroll.

Publication: THE VIRGINIA QUARTERLY REVIEW, Spring, 1952, p. 183-190.

Annotation: Deals with State Department dispatches of Neill S. Brown, U. S. Minister to Russia 1850-1853, which contain information so pertinent to the Russia of today that George F. Kennan used one as his own several years ago, later reported that it was Brown's and recommended study of the other 1850 reports.

Title: *The Russian People.*

Author: Stevens, Vice Admiral Leslie C., U. S. N. (Ret.).

Publication: THE ATLANTIC, May, 1952, p. 27-33.

Annotation: An analysis of the traits and characteristics of the Russian people in an attempt to further our understanding of their actions.

Title: *Science and Scientists in Russia.*

Author: Rabinowitch, Eugene.

Publication: BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS, March, 1952, p. 74-78.

Annotation: Takes a more balanced and informed view of what Russian science has to offer industry and the military.

**Title:** *Russian Expansion and Exploration in the Pacific.*  
**Author:** Sokol, A. E.  
**Publication:** THE AMERICAN SLAVIC AND EAST EUROPEAN REVIEW, April, 1952, p. 85-105.

**Annotation:** Presents the known facts of Russian exploration, discovery and expansion in the Pacific region in order to provide a scale against which any Soviet claims in that region may be adjudged.

**Title:** *Reflections on the War in the Pacific.*  
**Author:** Wylie, Capt. J. C., Jr., U. S. N.  
**Publication:** UNITED STATES NAVAL INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS, April, 1952, p. 351-361.

**Annotation:** The author, a member of the Naval War College staff, examines seven incidents of the war which can be the subject of reasonable differences of opinion with respect to one element or another of the strategy involved and which can be usefully studied for reference to some future situation.

**Title:** *United States Submarines in the Blockade of Japan in the 1939-1945 War.*  
**Author:** Goldingham, Maj. C. S.  
**Publication:** JOURNAL OF THE ROYAL UNITED SERVICE INSTITUTION, February, 1952, p. 87-98.

**Annotation:** The first part of a study of the major part which U. S. submarines played in the blockade of Japan, prefaced by a brief review of Japan's economic position and military potential.

**Title:** *Tito and the Western Democracies.*  
**Author:** Fotitch, Constantin.  
**Publication:** JOURNAL OF CENTRAL EUROPEAN AFFAIRS, January, 1952, p. 353-371.

**Annotation:** Examines the various aspects of Western collaboration with Tito, concludes that this policy has been a failure, suggests that the Western nations reconsider Yugoslavia's situation



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and inaugurate a policy that would not support "a dictatorial and corrupt communist regime."

- Title: *Future Navy Air Role Shaped in Korea.*  
Author: Jessup, A. W.  
Publication: AVIATION WEEK, April 21, 1952, p. 18-30.  
Annotation: Reports that operations of Banshees off carriers in Korean waters proves the value of seaborne jet types and provides data upon which to evaluate the U. S. Navy's arguments for the development of strong naval air striking forces.
- Title: *Why Eisenhower's Forces Stopped at the Elbe.*  
Author: Pogue, Forrest C.  
Publication: WORLD POLITICS, April, 1952, p. 356-368.  
Annotation: Examines the military steps that led to the decisions that governed Eisenhower's action, in order to show that the evidence points to the fact that the Supreme Commander sought a purely military solution to the problem.
- Title: *Syria: A Lesson in Geopolitics.*  
Author: Roucek, Joseph S.  
Publication: CURRENT HISTORY, April, 1952, p. 221-226.  
Annotation: Briefly surveys Syria's historical background and discusses current problems in view of her strategic importance as a link to three continents.