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From the Editors

The editors of /luce.nt/ are pleased to bring you the Summer 2014 issue of the Naval War College's student run journal. As editors of a student run journal, we are exceptionally proud that we can provide our readers with a much broader range of material than other defense journals.

In this issue, two of our essays provide personal narratives from American Warfighters. Lieutenant Commander Robert Crosby's essay "Only in America," chronicles his journey from extreme poverty in the small town of Hot Coffee, Mississippi to becoming an officer in the United States Navy. He describes his journey from serving as an enlisted Sailor to becoming a member of the officer corps.

Repeat contributor (and /luce.nt/ editor) Colonel Donald Brown provides a raw and unflinching view into the day-to-day life of an infantry officer in the "long hard slog" that was service in Iraq. Appropriately titled "Trash," he recounts his experience with two very different victims of war on the streets of Bagdad.

In "Mentorship: A Critical Component of Life-Long Learning," Major Joseph reflects on the importance of mentorship in developing some of our greatest military leaders.

International contributors in this issue provide their unique insights into defense issues. Lieutenant Commander Lukasz Boguszewski of the Polish Navy provides rare insights into one of the hottest foreign policy issues of today in "Energy Security: Russia's energy relationship with the Baltic States." Captain Muhammad Shuaib of the Pakistan Navy gives readers an insightful perspective of the future of US- Pakistani relations.

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Military leaders from Pakistan, Afghanistan and the U.S.

PAK - U.S. Relations Post U.S. / ISAF Forces Draw Down from Afghanistan

Captain Muhammad Shuaib
Pakistan Navy

Henry John's words, a century and half old, still guide state-to-state relations. Undeniably, Pakistan-U.S. relations have been transactional with each criticizing the other for not fulfilling the requirements of the transactions. Such feelings are not likely to fade in the immediate future. In the long term it will depend on peace and stability in Afghanistan, particularly after the U.S. draw down. The prevailing situation between Pakistan and the U.S. points towards a challenging future.

The Past: The Beginning of Pakistan – U.S. Relations

Post WW-II, the U.S. emerged as one of the stronger global powers. The U.S. strategic interests were containment of the then USSR and communism. Promotion of capitalism and democracy were the main objectives. To counter Soviet threats, the U.S. promoted and formed global alliances. Proxy wars and struggle for influence through alliances and partnerships were key features of the cold war period. In the post-cold war era the U.S. interests focused on global peace and stability, avoidance of the spread nuclear weapons and Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD), capitalism and free trade. The 9/11 attacks led the U.S. to spearhead the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) with active engagement commencing in Afghanistan. Over a decade of war, the U.S. forces draw down from Afghanistan is planned later this

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year. Currently, the U.S. policy makers are focusing on South Asia and the Pacific. This could be the starting point of pursuance of competing interests between the U.S. and China.

Since Pakistan's independence in 1947, territorial integrity, political and economic stability have been the main concerns. Pakistan's security concerns have always been India centric. With unresolved Kashmir issues and a checkered history, these concerns have not subsided. The Indian nuclear programme introduced another dimension to Pakistani security calculus. Consequently, Pakistan pursued its own programme to address the imbalance. Pakistan interests in Afghanistan, discussed later, were earlier termed to be aimed at gaining strategic depth. Pakistan saw support to Afghan mujahedeen as a check to the Soviet spread of communism and the so called Soviet effort to reach warm waters. Beside traditional security concerns, the current Pakistan internal law and order situation has added another dimension to country's security issues and outlook. Pakistan was created based on religious ideology. The identity debate regarding the country being a religious or a liberal democratic state is not yet fully settled. The separation of mosque and state remains a central question. The religious parties have so far have not been voted into power; however, they wield significant power. The fundamentalist groups are a threat to the government's stability at every turn. The Kashmir issue has also been central to the rise of such tendencies. These factors make the situation unique to western democracies. The freedom of speech on religious issues is a sensitive topic and even mere words such as "Crusade" or "Enduring Justice" evokes negative reactions.

Post-independence, the Pakistani leadership approached the relationship with the U.S. with high expectations and hopes but with few institutional arrangements to study the U.S. decision-making process to achieve this goal. The civilian leadership earlier on had lost control over the security issues due to lack of experience and constant domestic political wrangling. The U.S. sees Pakistan's military to be more influential, and over the course of Pakistan history had no apprehension about working with military rulers.¹ This has been the feature of Pakistan-U.S. relations. Most Pakistani allege that the U.S. pursuance of its strategic interests has overshadowed Pakistan's concerns. They also do not believe in the sincerity of the U.S. assertion that the civilian leadership in Pakistan needs to have oversight of the military. The limits and bounds of the relations have not been properly spelled out. For example, the leasing of an airbase in Peshawar and the stationing of drones on Pakistani soil have been kept secret. The Pakistani leadership even keeps their routine dealings with the U.S. secret.² This dependence of Pakistani leadership on the U.S. goodwill makes them vulnerable. The U.S. policy makers on their part often use this power to their advantage.

The Present: Current Pakistan – U.S. Relations

Due to the on-off nature of relations with the U.S., there is a strong perception in Pakistan that the U.S. can embrace anyone when needed and discard him when its interests dictate. The U.S. government seems to be aware of this perception and would like to remain engaged. In the immediate time frame, it would serve the U.S. to have a peaceful and less expensive withdrawal from Afghanistan. In the long term, it would enhance the U.S. reputation as a reliable ally. However, if Afghanistan emerges in turmoil, the situation would change. It would be hard for the U.S. to accept that the reasons for an unsuccessful outcome could be other than Pakistani support to select Afghan groups. History and international politics are generally supportive of such trend.

Pakistan's joining of cold war SEATO³ and CENTO⁴ alliances, provision of an air base to the U.S.⁵, support to the Afghan freedom fighters⁶ to resist USSR in Afghanistan and alliance against Global War on Terror (GWOT) as result of the tragic event of 9/11 are the highs points of the relations. However, the on-off relations have not been smooth and huge trust deficit exists between the two states.

Presently, U.S.-Pakistan relations are marred by a number of concerns marking the lows in the relationship. Pakistan's adoption of a pro-U.S./Western policy was aimed at alleviating its India centric security concerns and to seek economic assistance.⁷ Ceding of East Pakistan,⁸ Pakistan nuclear weapons⁹ and proliferation concerns, Pakistan's alleged support to select Afghan groups and drone attacks are the major low points filled with crises such as the Osama Bin Laden (OBL) raid, the Salala and Raymond Davis incidents, and the NATO supply line closure and sanctions¹⁰ imposition among many others.

Pakistan cannot expect to benefit from a trust marred relationship with the sole super power. Pakistan's prevailing domestic difficulties call for prudence. Pakistan is unlikely to get any huge aid favours like in the past, but it still needs to have good relations with the U.S. The U.S. tax payer may not be willing to do so in the future partly because of the mistrust and misspending of aid and partly due to domestic pressure.

Pakistan faces difficult internal law and order and economic situations. It would take some time to improve. The past and current Pakistani governments are unlikely to subscribe to the idea that their actions and policies had contributed to it. It can be expected that each new government would keep blaming the past government and external forces to include following pro-U.S. policies and sanctions.¹¹

Many consider Pakistan's strategic approach towards achievement of its goals to be flawed. It is generally believed that the military and military security concerns guide the national agenda. Links with select Taliban groups and networks do not lend credibility to the plausible deniability argument. At the same time the U.S. strategy also has been fluctuating over the years. Grouping Afghanistan and adjacent Pakistani tribal areas into a single "Af-Pak" strategy, back and forth with Pakistan, an early announcement of withdrawal from Afghanistan, a surge, and continuous tolerance of corruption in Afghanistan have not helped advance the U.S. cause.

Interestingly, the three highs discussed earlier in U.S.-Pakistan relations have been centered on Afghanistan.¹² The source of recent mistrust is also largely due to situation in Afghanistan. Pakistan has the longest border and close religious links with Afghanistan. Afghan Pashtoons consider themselves as the core of Afghanistan and almost two-third of the Pashtoons live in Pakistan. Pakistan desires a situation in Afghanistan which respects the boundary between the two countries. Pakistan subscribes to a power sharing and proportionate representation mechanism between the Pashtoons and the non-Pashtoon populations of Afghanistan. With the rise of the Pakistani Taliban creating insurgency like situation in the northern part of Pakistan, Pakistan supports a bilateral agreement between the U.S. and Afghanistan. Some analysts in Pakistan also believe that the present Afghan government and army is not likely to be a stabilizing force for long, especially after the U.S. draw down. They base their argument on the economic (finances to support the existing military and other infrastructure) and prevailing political situation. The victorious presidential candidate's skills and accommodation of Taliban would largely determine the scale and scope of possible resistance and political stability. It is believed that the ethnic fault lines would be predominantly exploited by various groups challenging the government of Afghanistan. Some analysts in Pakistan believe that Pakistan needs strong allies in Afghanistan to counter other regional players influence in Afghanistan.

The Pakistani ISI has shot to fame in the U.S. in recent years, mostly for the wrong reasons. The CIA has been at the center of conspiracy rumors among Pakistanis since assassination of the country's first PM,¹³ allegedly for the refusal to provide an air base to the U.S. President Zia's death is also shrouded in mystery. Bhutto, who was hanged by Zia, alleged before the Court that he was being punished for pursuing the nuclear programme. The U.S. killing of Pakistani Taliban leaders, who were willing to enter into negotiations with Pakistani authorities, has also not gone well with the Pakistanis

including the current civilian government. The Raymond Davis, Dr Shakil Afridi, and Osama Bin Laden (OBL) episodes and U.S. assertion that the “Haqqani Network is a veritable arm of Pakistan Inter-Services Intelligence Agency”¹⁴ are issues that run tangentially to the publically announced claims of intelligence/ information sharing or ally on GWOT. The rebirth of a long-term partnership between the two countries has not evolved as the former Secretary Powell had hoped for.

U.S. drone attacks have become a contentious issue. Pakistan considers them counterproductive, against its sovereignty, and against international laws. The killing of innocent civilians also raises human rights issues. The U.S asserts that actually the terrorist groups operating with impunity in Pakistan’s tribal areas are violating the sovereignty of Pakistan. With regard to OBL, the majority of Pakistanis do not resent his killing. However, the conduct of the operation has cast the civilian government and military leadership in an awkward position. Complacency or ignorance both reflect on the military negatively. Pakistan’s inability to detect the incoming raid has raised question about the competence of the armed forces.¹⁵ The killing of twenty-four military personnel on the Pak-Afghan border¹⁶ along with above factors is fuelling high anti-U.S. sentiments.

Some U.S. policy makers believe that Pakistan is following a policy to keep the U.S engaged in Afghanistan. It is suggested that it makes Pakistan relevant and helps the country’s economy. They are also not happy with Pakistan’s shady handling of assistance. Pakistan, having lost over forty-thousand civilian / military personnel and significant economic losses, complains of non-acknowledgement of its sacrifices by the U.S. Pakistan support to select Taliban networks is also a contentious issue. U.S authorities have repeatedly accused Pakistan of duplicity. Pakistan is accused of undermining its neighbour’s security by turning a blind eye to select terrorist groups. To U.S authorities, it seems inconceivable that OBL could have lived that long without support from the inside. Some of the leaked documents portray Pakistan as being an untrustworthy ally. Former U.S. Defense Secretary Gates suggested in his recent book that doing business with Pakistan was not to his liking but he had to defend the country as part of the U.S policy. The U.S. administration believes that till the time it remains involved in Afghanistan it would need Pakistan. This makes the working extremely complex.

Regional Relationships

Pakistan –U.S. relations are also greatly affected by the two countries relations with other regional and extra regional countries. Pakistan was a prime channel for the U.S. efforts to reconcile with China.¹⁷ Pakistan places great emphasis on its relations with China. The Sino-U.S. competition is likely to intensify in future. Occasionally, the nuclear cooperation between the two countries has raised eyebrows in the U.S. citing violation of the Nuclear Supply Group guidelines. Pakistan has also been accused of providing China access to U.S. technologies¹⁸. China may want Pakistan to play a balancing role against India. China supports a political settlement in Afghanistan instead of a religious group victory. At present, U.S and Chinese interests have not taken a sharp competing nature as far as Pakistan is concerned.

With unresolved Kashmir issues and a history of wars, Pakistan and India have always approached each other with suspicion. India considers Pakistan to be harbouring terrorism across the border, particularly in the Indian held Kashmir. Pakistan alleges that India is supporting anti-Pakistan elements. On this count, U.S silence on the large number of Indian consulates in Afghanistan is also seen with suspicion by the Pakistanis. As unrealistic and strange as it may sound, the U.S-India strategic partnership is seen as a challenge to Pakistan’s relations with the U.S. Not much hope can be attached on normalization of relations between India and Pakistan, at least in the near future. The Indian-Afghan strategic agreement indicates the Afghan tilts towards India. India, mindful of its capacity and Pakistani

concerns, is avoiding active military presence in Afghanistan; however, it has linked Iran's Chah Bahr port to Afghanistan to reduce Afghanistan's dependence on Pakistan. Pakistan does not see the heavy Indian presence in Afghanistan favourably.

U.S. policy makers also have concerns over the Pakistani nuclear programme. They believe that Pakistan's weapons stockpile is growing, has a history of conflicts with India, a presence of extremist elements, and a trans-terrorist network. However, Pakistanis feel uneasy with these concerns. The U.S. nuclear cooperation agreement with India is considered preferential in favour of India. Similar apprehensions are voiced against Israel as well. In this backdrop, the U.S. presence in Afghanistan is also seen as a threat to the country's strategic assets.

Pakistan and Iranian bi-lateral relations are affected by their relations with other regional and international players. Post USSR withdrawal from Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran supported the Taliban and Northern Alliance respectively. Iran promotes the Shia sect; however, Pakistan sees this unfavourably, partly because it affects the religious sects' harmony in Pakistan and partly because of its good relations with Saudi Arabia. Pakistan supports Iran's nuclear programme for peaceful and energy purpose only. However, Iran puts Pakistan in the U.S camp and thus limits cooperation. Iran also has cordial relations with India. The U.S. sanctions also affect Pakistan-Iran cooperation. Pakistan has shown an inability to undertake its part of the Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline as the international financial organizations under U.S. pressure are not likely to fund the project.¹⁹

Saudi Arabian policy towards Afghanistan has been shaped by its relations with Pakistan, the U.S., Iran, and promotion of Sunnis. Saudi Arabia provided substantial funding to Afghan Mujahedeen during their resistance. Since then, it has cultivated good relations with few of the Afghan groups. It also wishes to counter Iranian influence in Afghanistan. Riyadh's interests lie in a broad based Afghan government where the pro-Iran groups are not over represented. Al-Qaida leadership and the majority of its activist come from the Arabian Peninsula and have known anti-Kingdom views; therefore, it seems that Saudi interests are to keep the group isolated in the Pakistan/ Afghan region.

The Future: A Way Forward

The most important factor in future Pakistan-U.S. relations is probably the misunderstood mutual strategic interests. Pakistan security concerns have always been India centric whereas the U.S. necessarily does not share that perception. The U.S. concerns about Pakistan's nuclear programme add another dimension to the divergence. Pakistan desires a stable and pro-Pakistani, mostly Pashtoon, dominated government in Afghanistan. A large Indian presence in Afghanistan also raises concerns in Pakistan. The U.S. desires a terrorist haven free, pro-U.S., and democratic Afghanistan. Pakistan, owing to its geography, status among Muslim countries, population and proximity to the Middle East consider [believe] that the U.S. needs Pakistan. However, U.S. policy makers do not share this perception. Represented on a Venn diagram, the common area between the strategic interests of the two countries is likely to be much smaller than what each country propagates. Neither country's strategic calculus can be changed easily; therefore, an honest, transparent, and realistic review would help in bridging the trust deficit.

Equally applicable to every other nation, the future of U.S.-Pakistan relations lies in greater understanding of each other at political and economic levels. A re-evaluation and redefinition of relations based on pragmatism, realities and transparency is needed. The review should also consider how the erratic go-no go (some terming it as burden of history) can be addressed. The on and off interaction indicate that the minimum requirement would be long term engagement.

Diplomatic relations between the two countries should be based on realistic understanding and accommodation of each other's strategic interests. The U.S. should not force Pakistan to change its strategic calculus whereas Pakistan has to recognize the global interests of the U.S. Pakistan needs to realistically re-assess its strategic interests in Afghanistan and preferential treatment of various groups. Pakistan also needs to advance its relations with the U.S., divorced from Indian centrality. The incompatibilities need to be identified and the commonalities, even if limited, be used for long term relations.

Reconciliation and adjustment in Afghanistan is what U.S., Pakistan and the world at large need. Having said this, future U.S. and Pakistan relations need to be based on issues of mutual interest, free of Afghanistan related factors. U.S. leadership places demands on and exact actions from a country which they do not trust; however, their Pakistani counterparts want economic benefits while dealing with the U.S. and publically capitalize on anti-U.S. sentiments. The U.S. drone attacks may be a tactical success but many agree that it is a strategic error. Respect for Pakistan's sovereignty should serve as the starting point.

¹ *General Ayub Khan did the first military takeover in 1958 and the last one was by General Pervez Musharraf in 1999 who remained in power until 2007. The U.S worked smoothly with all four Pakistan military rulers namely Ayub Khan, Yahya Khan, Zia Ul Haq and Musharraf*

² *Documents from WikiLeaks reveals the Pakistan's PM hypocrisy on drone strikes where in public he opposed it but in private communicated to the U.S. authorities that he is not bothered as far as right targets were selected, however he would protest in the national assembly which would be for the public consumption.*

³ *The Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, or Manila Pact, was signed on 8 September 1954 in Manila. Australia, France, New Zealand, Pakistan Philippines, Thailand, UK and the U.S were member of the organization.*

⁴ *The Central Treaty Organization was formed in 1955. Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, Turkey and UK were its members. The U.S joined the military committee of the alliance in 1958. It was dissolved in 1979.*

⁵ *Peshawar Air Station (Badaber) was a CIA – USAF listening post from 1958 until January 7, 1970, when the facility was formally closed. The air base used for spying on the USSR became a source of international and domestic controversy when a U.S spy plane was shot down by the Soviet Union threatening Pakistan of serious consequences.*

⁶ *Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates also funded the Mujahidden during the resistance.*

⁷ *Pakistan and U.S relations are sixty-seven years old as U.S established diplomatic ties with Pakistan barely two months after its independence in 1947.*

⁸ *Now Bangladesh*

⁹ *Pakistan maintain that its nuclear programme is a response to what it called 'nuclear threat and blackmailing' by India. Pakistani PM Bhutto, the architect of Pakistan nuclear programme, said that, 'We (Pakistanis) should develop nuclear weapons even if we have to eat grass.'*

¹⁰ *The sanctions were further tightened when India and Pakistan detonated nuclear weapons in 1998. Further sanctions were imposed on Pakistan due the 1999 military takeover Sanctions imposed under U.S. National Endowment for Democracy bill of 1983.*

¹¹ *The U.S is the biggest aid donor of Pakistan, yet more than seventy percent of Pakistanis do not look favourably towards the U.S. Similarly the U.S public places Pakistan among the five least favourite countries.*

¹² *Cold war alliance, support to mujahedeen post USSR invasion of Afghanistan and the GWOT.*

¹³ *An Afghan national assassinated PM Liaquat Ali Khan in 1951.*

¹⁴ *US Admiral Mike Mullen*

¹⁵ *Recently former U.S. ambassador to Pakistan Camron Munter has expressed such feelings in an interview to CFR radio interview.*

¹⁶ *On November 26, 2011, Twenty-four (24) Pakistani soldiers including two officers were killed in an aerial attack on Pakistani positions on Pak-Afghan border.*

¹⁷ *From Henry Kissinger memoir White House Years.*

¹⁸ *Sometimes reference is made by U.S mainstream media citing provision of parts of missiles fired by U.S against OBL in Afghanistan falling on Pakistani soil and access to helicopter parts that had met accident during the OBL operation.*

¹⁹ *Pakistan Finance Minister interview to local media persons on 17 Jan 2014.*



Tallinn, Estonia's Capital City (Photo courtesy of flickr)

Russia's Energy Relationship with the Baltic States

Lieutenant Commander Lucasz Boguszewski
Polish Navy

Launched in 1988, Estonia's process of separation from the Soviet Union provided a clear signal to all republics to perform a similar motion. On December 26, 1991, the world witnessed the breakdown of the superpower, the Soviet Union, into 15 smaller states. The reasons for the collapse of the 70-year power may be seen in the deepening economic and political crisis, the geopolitical situation, the role of the United States with Ronald Reagan as President, and the pervasive tendencies to gain sovereignty over the Eastern Bloc countries.

Undoubtedly, the loss of Russia's influence in the new sovereign, democratic, and independent countries such as Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and Poland has made it necessary to change the energy policy. Key in the newly defined Russian foreign policy regarding the Baltic Republics was bilateral relations and an unwillingness to participate in any group projects not led by Russia.¹ In addition to Moscow's desire to play a key and asymmetric role in international agreements, the Baltic countries showed particular distancing and distrust of any announcement of cooperation in the field of energy. As transit states for raw material, these countries dealt with Moscow's political moodiness by developing

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various sophisticated policies. The geographical location has strategic importance; however, Russia has an opportunity to bypass its reliance on this proximity.

Officially for Russia, the Baltic region is not an area of unique treatment² concerning foreign policy. Nevertheless, Russia's hegemonic approach to all kinds of unions, as well as the republics belonging to the Western European unions and organizations (UE, NATO, W4+, BALTRON), will motivate nations to act in an isolated way with Moscow. Moreover, remnants of the past Soviet infrastructure in these countries reflect traditional thinking. Russia is a key exporter of energy resources to western Europe. Industrial Germany is especially dependent on regular and uninterrupted supplies of gas and oil, and they expect it at a predictable price. In 2011, the situation was further complicated as Moscow launched a shared strategic pipeline. This pipeline, called the Nord Stream, allows for the constant transport of oil from Russian Vyborg to German Greifswald on the bottom of the Baltic Sea. For 11 billion Euro³ Russia bought independence in the exporting of oil to Europe and Germany and avoided unwanted cooperation. If this occurs, are the Baltic States somehow limited in the context of Moscow energy export strategy? Are Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, and Poland still of value for Moscow in the context of energy supply or is the Kremlin's support policy necessary for the Baltics?

To provide an effective policy, the states should use either diplomacy, military or, economic measures. Used to project military power over the years of the Cold War, Russia had to redefine its policy towards the economy. It must be admitted that the Kremlin successfully uses "energy cut-off policy" (oil and gas) in the cases of discordance. This occurred in Lithuania, Ukraine, and Georgia. The deterrence policy is also applied. After the beginning of the Ukrainian crisis, both in 2009 and 2014, Moscow used a policy of intimidation to achieve their strategy goals. The two Russian monopolies, Gazprom and Transneft, are the hydrocarbon muscle of the Kremlin and supply Europe with 5.9 mbd of oil and 132 bcm of natural gas by pipelines built by Russia. They also comprise one third of the annual total consumption in the area.⁴ What is more, dependence on Russian gas for the Baltic States is almost 100%. Russia ranks first place in the production of gas in the world and second in the extraction of oil (behind Saudi Arabia). Its potential economic power has evolved from a communist country geared to military solutions in just 20 years.

Could small countries such as Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and Poland have a chance to challenge the power based on their full dependence? Well, they do. They have two instruments to conduct the fight. While Russia also has access to the Baltic Sea via St. Petersburg and Kaliningrad, these locations unfortunately (fortunately for Europe) are by some historical reasons abandoned in the term of infrastructure. Furthermore, Kaliningrad Oblast is an exclave surrounded by Lithuania and Poland. Seeking solutions such as the construction of the Nord Stream pipeline obviously provides an advantage and represents a weapon for the Baltic countries. However, the cost is high and is the subject of a dispute with Finland and Sweden as well as the subject of the cooling of bilateral relations between Germany and the USA.

The subject of the Northern Pipeline was creatively resolved with Finland. Russia exerted pressure on Finland mainly by keeping high export duties on Russian wood since 2007, making them a potential reduction of the Helsinki agreement on German-Russian investments off the coast of Finland.⁵ This is another example of the application of economics to apply pressure and achieve Russian goals. Another major Russian infrastructure energy project associated with its strategies to the Baltic Sea is the construction of the Baltic Pipeline System BTS-2, connecting Unecha in Brianski region with a port terminal in Ust-Luga in the Gulf of Finland. The purpose of investment is to create a new pathway transport of oil by sea. This would enable the reduction of the value of existing transit routes in the form of the Druzhba oil pipeline leading through Poland to Germany. Additionally, it might allow them to

close its branches, which create separate routes using the Russian port of Primorsk, the Ukrainian ports of Odessa and Pivdenniy, Latvian Ventspils, and the Polish Naftoport in Gdansk. The strategic sense of building BTS -2 is the elimination of the effects of Russia's infrastructural collapse of the USSR. Those led to the loss of political control over the ports used in Poland and Latvia. According to the plans of the Russian route BTS- 2, in the first year of the operation, the transfer will be 30 million tons of crude oil, and after graduating from the investment, the transfer will be up to 50 million tons annually(6). Russia will significantly reduce its dependence on the transit of gas through Belarus, Poland, Ukraine and the Baltic States. An additional gain of the Kremlin from the implementation of the BTS- 2 will be a strong blow to the project of oil transit route Baku-Supsa-Odessa-Brody-Plock-Gdansk which is beyond the control of Moscow.

As in the case of these port terminals, the disintegration of the Soviet Union also led to the loss of the Kremlin's political control over the oil refineries in post-Soviet Central Europe. Efforts by Russia to purchase these systems resulted in competition between Polish and Russian investors for refinery Mazeikiu in Lithuania. The takeover of the Lithuanian refinery by Polish oil company "PKN Orlen" prompted Gazprom to employ a very aggressive strategy in the region.⁶

December 2009 brought another disorder influencing stability in the region. For safety reasons, Lithuania closed a second reactor at Ignalina nuclear power plant. From 2009 to 2010, electricity production decreased from 15.32 TWh to 5.7 TWh. At the same time, imports in the nation's energy grew from 4% to 56%(8). Russia used the occasion on 25 August 2009 to decide to build two nuclear power plants. The first is to be built jointly with Belarus in Ostrowiec near Grodno. The second power plant would fill the gap for Kaliningrad and is planned near Nieman. The latter is estimated at 5 billion euro, and its power would be 2x1150 MW. Russia is estimated to complete the project by 2018. Although the construction of such plants would fill a gap in Eastern Europe and would allow Moscow to enter the German market, which decided to close the nuclear power plants after the plant accident in Fukushima. However, it seems to be impossible to complete these projects. President Vladimir Putin in Sochi on May 20 called a council of the Russian power sector to revise plans to establish a Baltic Nuclear Power Plant near the town Nieman. Technically, the change would have to rely on the study of the possibility of building a small (40 MW) and medium reactors (640 MW) of power. Therefore, the Russian media reported that the construction of this plant had been temporarily frozen. The reason for this is most likely the failure of previous attempts to either obtain international financing and lack of contracts with foreign customers for the supply of electricity generated in the future power plant.⁷

Consequently there are two possible options for action in the matter of construction: either isolate energy for Kaliningrad or connect it to the European network. Interestingly Moscow is expected to decide on the first option: use existing power plants in Kaliningrad and resignation in the construction of a nuclear one and energy exports. Once again, it turned out that Lithuania (a theoretical future main importer) is not going to give up the project to build a power plant. Likewise, Poland has a similar view of the EU regulation on a common strategy and trade between members of the union. On July 18, 2012 in Minsk during a working visit, Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev signed a contract for the construction of the Belarusian nuclear power plant. This was preceded by a multi-year negotiation that failed to resolve fundamental issues such as divisions of profits, shares in the construction, and distribution of export.

The Belarusian authorities are hoping that the emergence of a nuclear power plant will reduce the import of Russian gas to supply the domestic energy consumption. In addition, Minsk assumed that, with this investment, it would be possible to export a surplus of electricity to the EU, including Poland. Considering the fact that Russia is the only lender and nuclear fuel supplier and exporter of gas to

Belarus, it seems improbable that Moscow will continue this project⁸, especially since the Kaliningrad project has been halted. The second issue is that plans for the construction of nuclear power plants in Kaliningrad and Belarus are competitive with Polish-Baltic proposals to build two new power units in the Polish Zarnowiec and Lithuanian Visaginas.⁹

Russian projects are also designed to prevent the inclusion of the Baltic States into the EU electric grid of ENTSO-E (European Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity) and to keep them controlled by the so-called Moscow BRELL circle (Belarus, Russia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania). This is a subtle high stakes game. On one hand, Russia benefits from selling nuclear fuel for future reactors, and on the other, Russia benefits from controlling electrical market due to its monopolist position in this area.

The Baltic nations—Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia as well as Poland—are dependent on energy from Russia. At the same time, they all strive for an extensive strategy of diversification. This article asserts clearly that although each country has similar actions and interests, they are not consistent and coordinated. Every country pursues an isolated policy evidenced by the construction of LNG terminals, power plant construction plans, or policies to introduce the third EU energy package. Clearly marked diverging interests of Russia and the Baltic countries highlights the lack of capacity of unified action, which could contribute to the strengthening of a dominant part of Gazprom.

As long as all the players continue to focus on regional projects that are less expensive, but with limited strategic value, there will be no chance of weakening the role of the Kremlin. There are at least three possible solutions. First is the consolidation of energy security policies and complete the nuclear power plant project in Lithuania. Second is the construction of a common international LNG terminal that connects to Finland and Sweden, instead of three local terminals. The third solution is to introduce, as soon as possible, the Third UE Energy Package, which will enable the Baltic's to join the network and significantly cut off supplies from Russia. This third option, after seizing Crimea, seems to be most likely to be introduced in the EU. It turns out the Baltics are active players and not just accidently market participants in the energy game. Is it also obvious that each side wants others to provide strong policy and maintain businesses. Because of this interrelationship, the possible Moscow moves are much more limited than it is thought.

¹ Przemysław Żurawski vel Grajewski, "Strategy of the Russia Federation", Natolin's Analysis, http://www.natolin.edu.pl/pdf/analizy/Natolin_Analiza_4_2011.pdf.

² J. Czaputowicz, "Teorie stosunków międzynarodowych. Krytyka i systematyzacja", Warsaw 2007.

³ A. Łakoma, "Rosyjski gaz płynie do Europy przez Bałtyk", Rzeczpospolita, accessed September 06, 2011, <http://www.rp.pl/artykul/712987.html?print=tak>.

⁴ G. Luft, A. Korin, "Energy Security Challenge for the 21st Century", 2009.

⁵ "Rosyjskie drewno bardziej dostępne", Rzeczpospolita 278(8789), accessed November 29, 2010, <http://www.ekonomia.rp.pl/artykul/570804.html>.

⁶ Polish Press Agency "Litwa chce blokować negocjacje Rosji z UE", accessed May 13, 2008, <http://www.wprost.pl/ar/129681/UE-Litwa-blokuje-negocjacje-z-Rosja/>.

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Mentorship: A Critical Component of Life-Long Learning

**Major Joseph Byerly
United States Army**

While many members of the military understand the importance of “who you know” in the context of career progression, many don’t think about it in the context of intellectual development. Mentors can significantly impact mentees’ effectiveness as life-long learners. They can inspire. They can intellectually challenge. They can shape professional study habits. General (ret) David Petraeus, reflecting on the role his mentor played in his self-development, commented that “General Galvin both encouraged me to get out of my intellectual comfort zone by going to grad school vice another infantry assignment, and he also suggested a number of books over the years – some that were classics in history or our profession, some that caught his eye at the time. He was a life-long student and encouraged me to be the same.”¹

History is ripe with examples of mentors who shaped the study habits and assisted their mentees along the way. Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831), author of *On War*, is known as one of the greatest military theorists, but his rise to intellectual immortality was not an individual effort. Gerhard

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Johann David von Scharnhorst (1755-1813) played an instrumental role in developing Clausewitz' theory of war from the time Carl entered the Berlin Institute up to Scharnhorst's untimely death in 1813. On reflection about her husband's time at the Institute, Marie von Clausewitz wrote, "At first it was very difficult for him to follow the lectures because he lacked the necessary prerequisite knowledge. He was near despair, and might have given up on the troublesome undertaking if Scharnhorst had not taken notice of him early and encouraged him with such characteristic kindness and empathy."² During their time together at the Berlin Institute the relationship between the two men grew from teacher and pupil to mentor and mentee. In a biography on Clausewitz, titled *Clausewitz and the State*, Peter Paret examined the influence Scharnhorst had on his mentee and writes, "Scharnhorst's conviction that the study of history must lay at the center of any advanced study of war confirmed Clausewitz's tentative attitudes on military theory and on the role of education, and guided them further."³ It was the mentorship of Scharnhorst that aided a struggling military student to become the top student of his class at the Berlin Institute in 1804.⁴

Another great example of the role mentorship plays in self-study can be found during the interwar years in the United States Army. Most military professionals know who George S. Patton, Jr. and Dwight D. Eisenhower were; but few recognize the name Fox Conner, a man that was instrumental in the lives of the two famous military figures. During a chance encounter on a train ride in the fall of 1913, Captain Fox Conner met a young Lieutenant Patton and the two immediately found a common interest in history, literature, and knowledge in general.⁵ The two remained in contact for years, and while visiting Patton at Fort Meade in 1919, Conner met Patton's neighbor, Dwight Eisenhower. As Conner and Eisenhower got to know each other, Conner became impressed with Eisenhower and invited him to serve as his executive officer in Panama.⁶ After Eisenhower joined him in Panama, Conner realized that the young officer wasn't prone to personal study, and began offering him books from his library. In addition to providing books, Connor also engaged him in discourse about the topics in which he read, thereby helping Eisenhower gain a deeper understanding of the subject matter. Eisenhower later claimed that his discussions with Conner were "a sort of graduate school in military affairs and the humanities, leavened by the comments and discourses of a man who was experienced in his knowledge of men and their conduct."⁷ If not for Conner's mentorship, Eisenhower may not have been intellectually prepared for the future roles he would play in world history.

While many view life-long learning as an individual endeavor, military professionals should follow the example of Petreaus, Clausewitz, and Eisenhower and connect with those who offer the potential of a mentor/mentee relationship. Additionally, like Galvin, Scharnhorst, and Conner, senior leaders should seek subordinates who possess a spark for the military profession and strive to mentor them so that the spark becomes a flame, transforming them into life-long learners.

¹ Interview with General(ret) David Petreaus on March 26, 2014.

² Charles White, *The Enlightened Soldier: Scharnhorst and the Militarische Gesellschaft in Berlin 1801-1805*, (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1989), 101.

³ Peter Paret, *Clausewitz and the State*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976), 71.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 76.

⁵ Edward Cox, *Grey Eminence: Fox Conner and the Art of Mentorship*. (manuscript., The Institute of Land Warfare, 2010), http://www.ausa.org/publications/ilw/Documents/LWP_78W_Fox_Conner.pdf.

⁶ Diana Bodner, "The Relationship Between Fox Conner and Dwight Eisenhower." (master\., The U.S. Army War College, 2002).

⁷ Mark Bender, *Watershed at Leavenworth: Dwight D. Eisenhower and the Command and General Staff School*. (manuscript., Combat Studies Institute, 1990).



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ONLY IN AMERICA

MY JOURNEY: HOT COFFEE-SCRAMBLED EGGS- NUCLEAR SUBMARINES

Lieutenant Commander Robert Crosby

United States Navy

I was born in a small town called Hot Coffee, Mississippi. My father had five children by five different women; some of these children were older than my mother. My father, a hustler, was abusive. My mother would escape my father's abuse by visiting my grandparents' house to do laundry. One day, she decided to stay permanently. My mother, who had only an eighth grade education, was now alone with three children. Still, she knew it was more important to protect her children than to stay in an abusive relationship.

After living with my grandparents for a while, my mother was offered a place to stay with my aunt in the Mississippi Delta, the poorest district in the poorest state in America. It was during this time that my mother remarried. WJ, my step father, provided a source of financial stability for us. Soon after, my other two siblings were born. WJ now had a wife and five children to care for on a salary of \$150/week. We were extremely poor. We did not own a car. I wore my sister's shoes to school, and WJ walked five miles to work every day. Because we were so poor, I was often bullied at school. Unfortunately, my parents' relationship began to sour as domestic violence again reared its ugly head. My life consisted of a continual cycle of physically protecting my mother on the weekends and enduring bullying during the school week. Food was scarce at times because we depended, almost solely, on government assistance to eat.

Being on the honor roll at school was my only source of comfort and enjoyment. This made me feel important, as my report card became a source of pride for my mother, aunts, cousins, and sisters. I was in 7th grade when my grandfather became ill, and my family moved from the Mississippi Delta back to Hot Coffee. This move happened at a critical point in my life. I was beginning to get into trouble by hanging around the wrong crowd in the Mississippi Delta. Most of my friends and relatives, who I viewed to be role models in the Mississippi Delta, would later be sent to prison for drugs or murder. I am certain that if we had not moved back to Hot Coffee, this would have been my destiny as well. Though I later found Hot Coffee to be boring in comparison to my life in the Delta, at this juncture, I was glad to be moving. This move essentially saved my life.

After the Mississippi Delta, life back in Hot Coffee wasn't much easier. It was during this time

that I met one of the most important leadership figures in my adolescent life. Uncle J C Fairley, who we affectionately refer to as Uncle J, was sixty-five years old and possessed a fourth grade education. Uncle J was my community's employer, banker, protector, spiritual advisor, and unequivocal leader. He was an entrepreneur and displayed compassion by hiring me to work in his watermelon field.

Uncle J and I drove two hours to New Orleans, LA to sell the watermelons. Once in New Orleans, Uncle J had a two-pronged operation. We parked the one-ton truck at a busy intersection and sliced open a display watermelon. This enticed many people to stop and buy them. We then drove the pickup truck through the residential areas of New Orleans, and as my uncle would honk the horn, my cousins and I would be on the back of the truck screaming at the top of our lungs in our southern Mississippi dialect, "WE GOT YO MISSISSIPPI WAATAMELOONS! RED TO DA RHYME!" Folks would come to the truck and ask, "How much dose watermelons?" and I would say, "Two dollas apiece," and they would say, "Nooo . . . too high" and I would reply, "Tell you wat, I'll give you two for fo dollas," and they would say, "We'll take 'em!"

I prided myself on being Uncle J's best salesman and his favorite yeller in getting prospective customers out of the house. Uncle J frequently motivated me by saying, "Boy, you know you can holla!" and "Keep bringing them out of the house, Bob!" I learned so much from Uncle J as he often taught about standards of conduct in a raised tone and in his wonderful, southern Mississippi dialect: "White folk'll help you if ya wuk hard!" and "You may as well like'em (white folk) cuz ya godda wuk for 'em." I will never forget when he said, "Boy, if you go to jail for fightin, I'll gitchu out cause I fought! If you go for jail for drankin, I'll gitchu out cause I drank! But if you go to jail for stealin' or messing wit dat dope, you gon rot there!"

I didn't realize it at the time, but Uncle J was shaping my work ethic, teaching the value of relationships, and explaining a zero tolerance policy for stealing and illegal drug use. His experience base was formed while growing up under the Jim Crow laws of the South but his declarations set a precedent in my heart.

In the fall of my senior year of high school, I received a phone call from my girlfriend, informing me that I was going to be a father. I was only seventeen and the thought of raising a child was overwhelming. After a bit, I told my Spanish teacher, Mrs. Mayfield, and she asked her husband, the city Alderman, if I could work in their yard after school to help with the baby's expense. They took the time to develop a relationship with me and allowed me the opportunity to work for \$3.35/hr (min. wage) to support my son. Mrs. Mayfield understood my immediate family issues and included me as part of their extended family. The Mayfield's were considered affluent, their children were educated, and they taught me responsibility, character, and the importance of education. I am still very close to this family today.

When my son, Robert Rashad Crosby, was born, I was determined to be a good father and a good provider, so I enlisted in the Navy in January of my senior year in high school. The first time I left Mississippi was when I left for Boot Camp in San Diego, CA. My recruiter had informed me that if I performed well, I could be promoted to E-2 when I left boot camp. I focused on this promise. Upon arrival, the Company Commanders gathered the hundred or so recruits and instructed each of us to sound off. Most of the recruits were shy and timid when called upon, but when it was my turn, I inhaled a healthy dose of God's fresh air and shouted at the top of my lungs, in my full southern Mississippi dialect: "My name is Robert Crosby! Fo-two-seven- xx-xxxx! I'm from Hot Coffee, Mississippi! Favorite food is pinto beans and cornbread, Sur!"

After my “sounding off” an eerie silence came over the group. The Company Commanders called me to the front and after quietly inquiring to ensure that I was in the right branch of service (Navy versus Marines) they gave me a spot promotion to Recruit Chief Petty Officer. They were compassionate leaders and I earned E-2 out of Boot Camp. I was very excited about becoming a Navy cook.

I reported to the USS Thorn in the winter of 1994 and was immediately assigned to the general mess to cook for a crew of about 350 people. I was very motivated. I even memorized the entire crews’ first names so I could greet them by name as they came through my chow line. My chief noticed my initiative and persuaded me to go to the wardroom to cook for the officers. My shipmates sneered at that position and stated, “Rob, you are going to be a slave up there!” My buddies understood that in addition to cooking, the wardroom cook made the officers’ beds, vacuumed their staterooms, washed their clothes, and cleaned their toilets. I forced myself to love it because I viewed it as my only alternative and I wanted to be a squared away sailor. Also, I truly believed that the officers could not make good decisions if their stomachs were empty and if their accommodations were not properly maintained. In my mind, I was contributing to the mission of the ship by keeping them comfortable and well fed.

One day, while vacuuming my Captain’s stateroom closet, I saw his Service Dress Blues. After peeking out of the entrance to ensure no one was around, I tried on his jacket and cover. They both fit perfectly. I stared in the mirror for a couple of minutes and thought, “Maybe I can be a Naval officer?” I quickly replaced the uniform to its original position. A few days later, in the ship’s library, I found a book entitled *Nimitz*. Reading about how Admiral Chester Nimitz, a poor boy from Fredrick, Texas, overcame challenges early in his career was very inspirational and gave me hope. I fell in love with this book. One day while reading, one of my shipmates snatched the book from me, looked at the cover with Admiral Nimitz’s white face on the front, and said, “N(word) who do you think you are? You are a cook like us!” I laughed, but inside I felt like the little kid back in the Mississippi Delta all over again. The teasing by my shipmates intensified. I was labeled a kiss up and an “Uncle Tom.” The isolation was horrible but my mind was freed in the evenings, as I would get lost in the book. Imagining that I was Admiral Nimitz became motivation for me to become an officer so I could lead my own ship someday.

I had begun to seriously consider becoming an officer, so I visited my Command Career Counselor and informed him of my aspirations. He told me about the Broadened Opportunity for Officer Selection and Training (BOOST) program, which was a college preparatory program designed to enable enlisted personnel to receive a commission in the Navy. I had to cross a major hurdle to get into the program, scoring a high qualifying mark on the SAT. Given my sparse academic background this would be challenging.

I prepared for the SAT between standing watches and during breaks from feeding and taking care of the officers on my ship. Ensign Floyd, the only African-American officer on my ship, noticed my efforts and committed himself to assisting me. Daily, after standing his watch, he would meet with me in the wardroom to go over the basics of algebra. Despite sometimes falling asleep in the middle of teaching a concept, he was committed to helping me achieve that passing score to get into the BOOST program.

In spite of all of our hard work, my SAT scores did not qualify me for BOOST program. Still, I submitted my application and I was selected as an alternate, and later upgraded to a selectee. Upon acceptance to the program, I was introduced to calculus, trigonometry, and physics. These concepts were very foreign to me, but if selectees did not successfully graduate from the BOOST program, they would return to the fleet in their previous field. For me, going back to cooking and cleaning was not an

option. I studied continuously and graduated with distinction.

After graduating from BOOST, the Navy awarded me a Navy Reserve Officer Training Corps (NROTC) scholarship. I decided to choose a major that I could relate to cooking, so I chose chemical engineering. I related cooking to chemical engineering because I thought the subjects shared the same foundations such as maintaining an optimal pressure and temperature for a certain product, and regulating temperature and pressure at a microscopic level to yield a better product. I enjoyed my professors at Hampton University as they went out of their way to help me achieve. I graduated Magna Cum Laude from Hampton University with a Bachelor of Science in Chemical Engineering.

After graduation, I was commissioned as an Ensign in the Navy. Once I passed the nuclear admissions test in Washington DC, the interviewing four-star Admiral stated, "Trade your spatulas in for some Nuclear Reactor Plant Manuals. Welcome to the Club!" The next stage was to complete Admiral Rickover's personally designed, academically rigorous, Nuclear Power School. Nothing at this point prepared me for the sheer volume of information I was required to understand and to be tested on weekly. I struggled. Several instructors worked outside their normal working hours to help me grasp concepts such as Reactor Theory and Radiological Controls. Eventually, I graduated from the school and was awarded the Director's Personal Excellence Award, an award given for maintaining a positive attitude and for logging the most study hours ever at the institution--almost 3000 hours over a six-month period. My family from Hot Coffee attended graduation and my mother and father cried audibly as I accepted the award. While hugging my mother as she continued to cry, she whispered in my ear in her warm and southern way, "I can't believe a person as smart as you came from an uneducated woman like me. Praise the Lord!" It was one of the proudest moments in my life.

After finishing the Nuclear Power School training curriculum, I reported to my very first submarine. In the submarine community, training and education never cease. Within the first days of reporting, I was given a qualification card for Engineering Officer of the Watch (EOOW). I did well in grasping concepts on paper, but the practical applications of supervising and giving orders, especially in a casualty scenario, were very challenging for me.

My immediate supervisor, the Engineering Officer, noticed that during the weekly Saturday night pizza celebrations among the officers in the wardroom, I was routinely absent. He would later walk through the engine room and find me behind a turbine generator practicing giving oral commands to members of the engineering spaces. From that point, he practiced with me daily until I achieved proficiency and qualified as EOOW. Additionally, my commanding officer took the time to ensure that I grasped certain concepts to qualify as Officer of the Deck. I would not be a submarine officer today, if it were not for the direct leadership of these two individuals.

After finishing my tour on the USS HAMPTON (SSN 767), the Navy sent me to the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) to pursue an MBA in financial management. After graduation from NPS, I received orders to report to the ballistic missile submarine, USS RHODE ISLAND (SSBN 740), as the Weapons Officer. I was in charge of all of the ballistic missiles on board. After reporting, I soon developed too much of a "Gung Ho" attitude that adversely affected other members of the crew. Instead of publicly reprimanding me, the Commanding Officer and Executive Officer privately counseled me on the importance of understanding human relations and how my actions, albeit motivating, were contrary to the command climate on the submarine. The power of their example inspires me today.

After leaving USS Rhode Island, I reported to Congressman Robert Brady's office as the Military Legislative Fellow. The Congressman's nomination numbers were extremely low and he was concerned

about the apparent lack of interest students displayed for the service academies. The Congressman's district is comprised of a large underserved community; therefore, I saw an opportunity to make a difference in the lives of the children of the First District of Pennsylvania. I went to the district several times and spoke to many schools about my background and how the military afforded opportunities for me. The following year, 100 percent of the Congressman's nominations were filled - a first in Congressman Brady's 16 years in office. This would not have happened without the work place flexibility, which allowed me to share my story with youths of similar backgrounds.

Where I'm from, it's not uncommon for teen parents to live a life of which they are not proud. I'd like to believe that a major contributor to why so many people went beyond the call of duty and reached out to help me is because they may have seen in me a bit of "A&W," attitude and work ethic. A child cannot choose their parents, their birthplace, academic ability, or social environment in which they are reared, but they can choose to have a good attitude and strong work ethic. Even as an adolescent, I had the ability to see the glimmer of hope in any situation and the ability to focus on doing my absolute best in any endeavor, whether it was achieving the honor roll in middle school or working on Capitol Hill. As I consider the future, I will look for A&W in my colleagues and subordinates so I can positively contribute to their lives as so many have contributed to mine. This life has been an amazing journey, my destination is uncertain, but I am enjoying this wonderful ride. My journey continues.



Photo courtesy of the author

Trash

**Colonel Donald Brown
United States Army**

There isn't any moral to this story, but it's true. Tim O'Brien taught me that. There aren't any hidden messages or subtle points I'm trying to make with imagery or symbolism. This is a story about trash, and about a boy, and an Iraqi dog, and how I spent some of my time in Baghdad in 2007. It's a story about some of the things I think about when I take out my trash or play with my dogs or my boys or when I think about Iraq.

Trash took up lots of my time in Iraq. Let me explain. In the early-middle part of the war while I was in Baghdad on my second deployment, our leadership was desperate for positive metrics. We were in the "long hard slog," to quote Donald Rumsfeld. Problem was, no one above the rank of Colonel knew what that really meant. Our most senior leaders hadn't figured out the type of enemy we were really fighting or how we should fight him. If they had, word had not gotten out.

As it turned out, we had quite a few different enemies, and each required a different strategy, but more on that later. In an attempt to wrap their heads around something that they could measure (and thus use to both show progress to the President and Congress) and harass subordinate units about,

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we toiled at fixing SWEaT (Sewers Water Electricity and Trash.) The logic was, if I remember correctly, that if the Iraqis had electricity, they'd stay inside in the A/C and watch TV instead of fight Americans. Water is self-explanatory. I guess trash worked its way in, either because of IEDs or our western distaste for trash in the street. Sewers were there for our western sensibility as well or maybe just because WEaT would have been dumb.

Down on the ground we were fighting both counter-terror and counterinsurgency fights, and in our spare time we filled in colored bubble charts (on Power Point of course) on how much electricity a neighborhood got that week, if there was trash on the street, or if the city water had run that day. We learned it was easier, and safer, to call most areas "amber" (not good, not bad) and only take the Generals to the rich neighborhoods when they came down to visit. Those neighborhoods all had generators so the lights worked. They had generators because the electricity hadn't worked when Saddam was in power either. They didn't have trash because they were rich and paid someone to haul it a few streets over. You get the picture.

Trash piles were also where the enemy could hide IEDs. Once the war really got going the enemy was often more sophisticated than that, but we still had to be careful. There were still some big bombs hidden in the trash and the random dead dog or donkey we had to pass on our way to work might explode. Unless someone was a newbie or a Rear Echelon Mother F... (REMF), we wouldn't fall for those most of the time.

Don't get me wrong. I did more than track trash, but no field grade officer who spent time in Baghdad during the war could escape talking about trash at some point. I had lots of positive experiences in Iraq despite my requirement to track trash. I spent almost three years of my life there and most of that time was spent working with some great people, American and Iraqi, and doing things other than shooting or fighting or filling in bubble charts about trash.

In fact, fighting a counterinsurgency, at least in Iraq, was more about thinking, talking, drinking tea, and eating in order to build relationships than anything else. Imagine trying to run for Prom King at a new school, only the other Prom King candidates have guns and bombs they can use from time to time if it suits them, and they know the other kids better than you. In this instance, you can easily see how it helps to open your wallet, and it pays to make as many friends as you can really fast. Of course, you still have to fill in Power Point bubble charts about trash as you go.

This tour was also when the sectarian violence was bad. Americans have a hard time conceptualizing what "sectarian violence" means. One way to describe the level of hatred the Shia and Sunni descended into in 2007 is to describe the bodies we'd find. When we were out checking on sewage or trash, or going to meetings, we'd often find bodies dumped on the street and next to the trash piles.

I remember finding this kid one day. I'd guess that he was probably thirteen or fourteen because he wasn't shaving yet. We'd been on a routine patrol with the TAC, and we just happened to be some of the first Americans who drove by his body. Typically, when we found bodies we'd check them out, gather some data, take some pictures for our reports, and then have the Iraqi police pick them up and haul them away.

The boy was probably from a Sunni family, and he'd been kidnapped by the Shia militia, most likely Jaish al-Mahdi (aka JAM, aka the Mahdi Army, aka the guys with Iranian backing.) That was what typically happened in our area (given the demographics.) He'd been badly beaten up like a lot of them were. The bottoms of his feet were bruised, his ribs were bruised, and probably broken (from being

hung from the ceiling and beaten), and he had black eyes. He'd been shot in the forehead with a pistol, which was also a JAM trademark (by shooting their victims in the face JAM militiamen could ensure their victims saw it coming.) The worst part was his hands, and this is how you know what kind of degenerates we were dealing with. His hands had been drilled through with a power drill and bolted together, as if in the prayer position. Locals told us that the Shia would sometimes do this and call the victim's parents. They wanted the parents to hear the screams, and then taunt them over their son's unanswered prayers for help. The bodies would be dumped in the trash as a final insult.

Some days or weeks before or after we found the boy with his hands bolted together, we were on a combined clearing operation. The Army, in its wisdom, in addition to measuring SWEaT, had decided that the strategy of "Clear, Hold, Build" literally meant CLEAR every building in Baghdad. That meant we were also engaged in the daily drudgery of literally sending soldiers (U.S. or Iraqi) into every building in Baghdad. Dozens of units were doing this every day. It gave us a chance to talk to people about sewage, water, electricity, trash, or bodies while we searched their houses. Those are the orders we had, issued by the higher headquarters we had, and that's fodder for another story or two.

I was a Squadron Operations Officer then, and I spent my days with the Tactical Command Post (TAC) roaming Baghdad with my boss. What this really meant is that I spent hours walking in the middle of masses of Iraqi soldiers, tracking our progress, coordinating between groups of American Soldiers who were herding cats and reacting to the infrequent discovery of a cache, an IED, or a short gunfight. I'd also take notes about sewage, water, electricity, and trash (sometimes) or harass our troop commanders about the same. I'm not going to lie—95% of the time it was just hot, miserable, and boring work in heavy body armor. Some days I'd just make up colors for the SWEaT chart based on what I vaguely remembered from the search or what the last guy had reported. Most of my charts were just emailed off into the matrix, and I never heard back about them.

We were close to one of the big slaughter house and butcher districts on this particular day. We'd walked through there a few times before. It was gross. I mean gross, in every way you can imagine. The trash here was piles of animal parts and the sewage was mostly coagulating pools of sheep blood. The dogs and flies loved it. No one else did. I think I marked those bubble charts as red (red means "bad" or "poor").

The Iraqis had herds of sheep penned in old buildings next to the slaughter house. The slaughter house was open air and fairly brutal. No OSHA or PETA in Iraq. The next sheep in line got to watch his buddy in front of him being turned into chunks of mutton with a carving knife.

On an unrelated side note, the next time you think your job sucks, imagine being the guy who squeezes the crap out of recently slaughtered sheep intestines, washes the empty intestine out, and then hangs them up to dry. All day, in Middle East heat, that's your job. Strip the contents of sheep intestines into a big bucket by hand, and then repeat. Think about that. Guess your job doesn't sound that bad now?

I was walking with my normal posse of radio operators and security personnel. We were surrounded by Iraqi soldiers half stepping through clearing operations, which they despised, believed was a waste of time, and over which I was attempting to exert some measure of control for my boss.

I don't know why I noticed the dog, but I did. It wasn't necessarily the dog itself I saw first. I saw its eye. I don't know how to explain how I saw it, other than to tell you it was the phenomenon of eye to eye contact. I realized that I'd made eye contact with something alive in the trash pile. I had to look twice. It was a small dog, probably a puppy, but impossible to tell for sure. It was partially buried in the

trash but in a manner as if it had been pressed into wet clay on its side. One side of the dog, in perfect profile, was exposed from the trash. At first it didn't seem possible that the animal was alive. All I saw was bone structure covered by skin. The dog couldn't move, not even its nose or rib cage moved when it breathed. All that moved was its eye. That single black eye locked onto mine and followed my every move. It didn't look away or blink.

I've got a soft spot for dogs. This dog's circumstances were kind of shitty. I could tell the dog knew, that I knew, it was alive. I knelt for a closer look. All that moved was the eye, the rest of the dog was paralyzed, pitiful, and buried in an Iraqi trash heap. I knew it needed my help. I could see that it wanted me to end its misery. Don't ask me how, I could just tell as we looked into each other's eyes. I told it that I'd take care of it. I think the dog realized that I was going to end its misery, and I could see a sense of relief in its little black eye.

Normally I'd have shot it, but I was surrounded by jumpy Iraqis and U.S. soldiers worried about snipers. A random shot would have started pandemonium. We'd take cover, and the Iraqis would initiate a "death blossom." There was a good chance they'd shoot one of us when they did it. I thought about cutting its throat, but I believed that might put it in more pain before it died. I was going to crush its skull with my boot, but honestly, I felt a little barbaric contemplating that. I also didn't want my interpreter to think I was a savage: stomping an injured dog to death isn't very touchy feely. Remember, we were there to win hearts and minds, I think.

I found a concrete block on the sidewalk. "Sorry buddy," I said, "I don't know how you ended up in this world of shit but I can see you need some help." I swear it looked relieved. I crushed its little skull with the block, and then arranged the block to cover it in the hopes that the other dogs wouldn't eat it. I don't know why I thought that. I guess my western brain just thought a dead dog should get buried.

After that I moved up to the next building and we kept clearing. Shit happens in life, in war, or in war stories, and you keep on moving. They don't roll the credits after ninety minutes, and you don't get to go home. You do have to go fill out some Power Point slides after the operation though.

Years later, I thought about this story as I wrote it all down. There still isn't a moral (if you were wondering.) It's just a real story and a few thoughts about trash and a confused war effort and human depravity and a random dog down on its luck and a young Infantry Major. Stuff just happens sometimes, and we are there to see it. Then you move on. I don't remember a single thing about that unremarkable day or mission other than the dog I found, killed, and wrote about in my journal that night. I can still remember everything about the look in that poor pup's eye just before I killed it, and then left it in the trash where I found it.

About the Contributors

Colonel Donald Brown is an Army Infantry officer who most recently commanded an Infantry Battalion in northern Iraq and then served as the U.S. Army Human Resources Command Infantry Branch Chief. He is currently a student in the College of Naval Warfare at the U.S. Naval War College.

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