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CONTENTS

LATIN AMERICA'S IMPORTANCE TO THE UNITED STATES	1
<i>Professor Lawrence O. Ealy</i>	
AFRICA, SOUTH OF THE SAHARA, 1958	29
<i>Professor Melville J. Herskovits</i>	
RECOMMENDED READING	47



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**NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
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LATIN AMERICA'S IMPORTANCE TO THE UNITED STATES

A lecture delivered
at the Naval War College
on 24 October 1958 by
Professor Lawrence O. Ealy

Gentlemen:

During the course of this lecture it will be necessary for me to use certain Hispanic-American expressions at times. I have tried to keep these to a minimum, and those who may be concerned about the spelling will find them duplicated on the blackboards to my right and left.

I think it would be well at the outset to call your attention to Latin America's position on the World Map before us. You will notice that, being in the Southern Hemisphere, it is remote from the portion of the Earth which has been regarded as the center of mankind's principal activities for the past several hundreds of years. The principally travelled trade routes of the world have bypassed Latin America. Human commerce was not known in any volume of significance to much of this area until the opening of the Panama Canal, shortly after the start of the present century.

Latin America was long a backward, underdeveloped, and economically dependent area — and largely she still is. Her economy is fundamentally based upon the production and export of raw materials and foodstuffs. These items have always been sold in foreign markets at prices over which the Latin Americans themselves have never been able to exercise much control.

There have been three main outside influences dominating Latin American economy since Columbian days. In colonial times the Iberian mother countries, Spain and Portugal, had a complete rule of mercantilistic monopoly. The Spanish Navy used the *flota* system to keep tight control over merchant shipping. I believe that this was the first employment of the convoy idea in the Atlantic Ocean. Ships were required to move in flotilla to designated

ports at either end of their voyage. Some of the most absurd restrictions were imposed in order to prevent the Latin American colonies from trading with the outside world.

For example, if a colonist in Buenos Aires (in the Rio de la Plata estuary) wanted to order some furniture from Old Spain he had to take shipment by way of a very tortuous route and process. It was brought across the Atlantic, through the Caribbean to Panama, unloaded and carried on mules across the Isthmus, and reshipped from Panama City down the west coast of South America. It would then be unloaded on the Peruvian coast, transported over the Andes to the headwaters of the Rio de la Plata, and thence down to the estuary. By the time our colonist got his furniture it was usually good for little but kindling wood. The reason for this was the prevention of trade between Spain's colonists in the River Plate region and foreign powers, particularly the pesky and dynamic British. To assure this the estuary was closed to all direct traffic from the Atlantic, even from Spain. The Spanish Navy kept a tight blockade across the river.

It is not much wonder that with the coming of the Napoleonic period, when the Latin American colonies were released from the tutelage and close supervision of the mother countries and had a taste of trading with the British, they soon discovered the change to be a delightful one. They found British goods to be not only better but infinitely cheaper! From about 1810 onward Britain dominated the economic picture in Latin America — so much so that it became British policy to prevent restoration of Spanish and Portuguese power in the hemisphere, for that would have meant a return to the old trade ways of exclusive mercantilism.

By 1825 Britain had over 100 million pounds invested in Latin America. In 1914 British investments were up to nearly 10 billions of dollars and accounted for considerably more than one quarter of all Latin America's foreign trade. (I now use "dollars" because I think this is more meaningful in 20th Century statistics). All of this trade empire was tied to British supremacy on the seas

and to the vast British Merchant Marine which carried these goods to all parts of the world.

The year 1914 of course saw the coming of World War I and Britain's preoccupation with that conflict. Her Navy and Merchant Marine were almost completely turned over to the business of supporting and supplying the mother country in its war effort. Latin America found herself cut adrift, much as she had been at the time of the Napoleonic Wars.

This time another great and booming industrial power was ready and willing to step into the breach — the United States. The North American Republic was coming to the fruition of its own industrial development at just about the turn of the century. But our output and quality of goods had never really been able to match that of the British prior to 1914, despite valiant efforts to win markets in the southern republics.

World War I forced Latin America to turn to us for her needs. She became used to buying and using American items. Even when the end of the war brought the British back as the favored seller a slow trend toward more trade with the United States continued. By 1929 this country had over 6 billions of dollars invested in Latin America. American industries and enterprises came to be very important there. To mention a few of these: the Grace Line dominated coastal commerce and later, through Panagra, was supreme in commercial aviation. After 1919, U. S. banking took first place throughout the hemisphere, something which could not have been dreamed of before 1914. The Chase Bank and the National City Bank of New York led this development. The American Fruit Company, and similar enterprises, had a virtual monopoly on the coffee, banana, and other fruit trades.

Only in Argentina did the British manage to hang on to their position. The Argentines continued to prefer to buy from the British because, for one thing, they harbored a deep-seated antipathy toward the United States, a factor which I want to discuss more fully in another phase of this talk. In the 1930's there was an effort to tie Argentina firmly to the sterling bloc, and she

was sometimes referred to as the "Sixth Dominion." The Ottawa Conference in the 1930's, with its corresponding Commonwealth Preferential Trade Arrangement, was expanded to take in Argentina as the sole non-Commonwealth member.

Then came World War II. In Britain the economy faced a tighter squeeze even than during World War I. The English investments in Latin America had to be liquidated in the mobilization to fight Hitler. Britain had over 1.5 billions of dollars in Argentine railways and rolling stock, for example. These had to be sacrificed for about 600 million dollars. By 1945, even in Argentina, the United States had become the number one foreign industrial, trading, and financial power in South and Central America and the Caribbean.

Since 1945 there has been some repenetration and some recovery by British enterprise. The French, the Germans, the Russians, and the Japanese have also captured some segments of trade held by us during the war. The United States remains, however, the overwhelmingly predominant factor in the trade and economy of this part of the world.

Everywhere the people are wearing and using U. S. clothing and textiles; they read North American literature; they travel through the United States; they send their children to school in the United States; they drive North American automobiles, fly in North American-built aircraft, drive over highways built by American equipment, technology, and materials; and seek ever more U. S. money and U. S. tourists to come to them. This is a profoundly complete change from the picture of half a century ago. Then we could have substituted the word "British" for "U. S." or "North American" in the foregoing description — or at least the word "European." The shadow of Uncle Sam looms large indeed over Latin America. In view of this the importance of Latin America to the United States can scarcely be overemphasized.

The term "Latin America" has Spanish-Portuguese (and some French) connotations, with obvious reference to the colonial background of the area. But this expression is somewhat misleading because the ethnic background of Latin America is really

quite varied. The Indian is still the basic "Latin American" when one views in perspective the whole Southern Hemisphere. Peru, Ecuador, and Bolivia have large elements of pure Inca blood in their population. Bolivia is more than 90% — that is, almost pure-blooded — an Indian republic to this day. I would estimate that 75% of the people in Mexico have at least a major strain of old Aztec in their veins. In Central America the Mayans (who had reached the epitome of civilization and progress in this hemisphere long before the coming of the white man) are the basic stock of much of the highland population. In Colombia and Venezuela there are many remnants of the Chibcha Confederation of peoples. Guaraní Indians still abound in the Plata Estuary. Paraguay is a nation of heavily Indian-descended people. In Chile, where white civilization is completely predominant, many thousands of descendants of the warlike Araucanians still survive unassimilated. Indeed, using this expression "white civilization" calls to mind the fact that only Argentina and Chile, and possibly Uruguay and Costa Rica, can be cited as being truly Caucasian cultures dominated beyond challenge by pure-blooded Europeans.

In addition to the Indians there are a great many Negroes in all of the Caribbean countries. Some of the islands are predominantly Negro. There are many other strains far removed from the Iberian conquistadores. In Chile, according to an estimate which seems authoritative, there are 750,000 Germans. Other Germans are to be found in Brazil, Argentina, and Panama. There are a great many Italians in Argentina — in fact, they make up 40% of the total population. There are a considerable number of Italians in Chile — the present President, Alessandri, being partly of Italian ancestry — and there are quite a few in Brazil as well. Orientals make up a significant part of the population in Brazil, Panama, and some of the Caribbean islands (notably Trinidad). One must also mention a considerable English and Irish strain running through much of the hemisphere. These people have tended to become Hispanicized. I think that some of you gentlemen are aware of this from having to come to know several of our foreign officers enrolled in this War College. The Chilean officer here has

anything but a Spanish-sounding name — Gibbons. And we have Commander Lockhart, from Argentina. The national hero, "El Libertador," of Chile was Bernardo O'Higgins. The last Viceroy of Mexico, who went over to the revolutionaries, was "O'Donoju" — just a Hispanicization of the Irish spelling.

There are four important racial groups in Latin America today: Creoles, Mestizos, Mulattos, and Zambos. These terms are not exclusive, for there are certain other names sometimes used in place of them, but they are most commonly used racial designations. "Creole," which is a much misused term in this country, means a pure Caucasian in Latin America. As you know, that is quite a different terminology than the common meaning of the word here. "Mestizo" is a mixture of Caucasian and Indian. "Mulatto" is a mixture of Caucasian and Negro. "Zambo" is a mixture of Negro and Indian. Then, of course, there are all sorts of variations, connotations, and combinations of these terms.

There is no race prejudice in Latin America which is very considerable or anywhere near the characteristic feelings in this country along these lines. Nevertheless there is a tendency in certain parts of Latin America to grade one according to his color. In other words, the lighter one is the higher in the social scale he is likely to be. There is a saying that one should try to "raise his color," which means to marry someone lighter than himself and thus assure a lighter color for his descendants.

To sum up the tenor of the last few remarks: I would say that the term "Latin America" is more meaningful if taken as a cultural and geographical expression. Because of the colonial isolation of Latin America, only the Iberian cultures had any real chance to develop there. And even this idea must not be carried too far, because these Spanish and Portuguese cultures were only superimposed in many places upon the existing Indian civilizations.

Speaking now of the early relations between Latin America and the United States: the American Revolution was an inspiration to them. Washington, Franklin, Jefferson, Tom Paine, and others were all much admired by the intellectuals of Spanish America. When the revolt against Ferdinand VII came, from 1810 to

1824, the writings and examples of the North American leaders were oftentimes quite important. But this influence was purely psychological. In a physical sense our contacts with Latin America were very meagre. One reason for this has already been mentioned — the British predominance in trade. It was very difficult for the United States to break in commercially — although we tried — because the old truth still prevailed that British goods were both better and cheaper.

Another factor to be mentioned at this point is the rejection of United States' style of Democracy by Simon Bolívar, San Martín, and the other leaders of the new republics (and in Brazil and Mexico, monarchies). Bolívar was wedded to the concept that the typical Latin American was not likely to conform to our way of democracy; that it would be meaningless to him because he had no tradition other than a completely authoritarian one. The idea of a republic meant a state somewhat like the old Venetian Republic; of a class born to rule, of *personalismo* and *Caudilloismo*. (*Caudillo* is the Spanish word for leader, corresponding to *Il Duce* or *Der Führer*). The tendency was to form political movements around individual personalities — “men on horseback” types — and this became very typical of the Spanish American political scene.

Brazil, Portuguese America, was an exception to this because, paradoxically, Brazil was a monarchy. There was not an opportunity for ambitious men to be constantly stirring up ferment in their rise to the top because the House of Braganza was popular and accepted. Until 1889, Brazil was a monarchy under a very liberal form in which parliamentary government developed very similar to that institution in Great Britain. The long period under a parliamentary monarchy gave Brazil a political stability which few of her neighbors enjoyed.

One of the first things to make much impact in our relations with Latin America was the Monroe Doctrine. Contrary to the impression which is given in some of our grade school textbooks, our Southern neighbors were not overjoyed by the Monroe Doctrine. It really didn't serve them, except in a negative sort of way. They

quite keenly realized that the Monroe Doctrine was a unilateral statement of policy by the United States directed against European ambitions in this hemisphere. They were also quick to note that at no place in the Doctrine did Uncle Sam abjure any thought of his own expansion in this hemisphere — an expansion which would probably be at Latin expense. They were quite upset by a remark attributed at the time to Secretary of State John Quincy Adams. Adams was reported to have said to the British Minister in Washington, "Keep what you have, but leave the rest of North America to us!" Newspaper reports and letters of the time report from Buenos Aires, Santiago, and other Latin cities that they took a very dim view indeed of the North American pronouncement. There was a tendency to move in quite the other direction — to cuddle up to Britain and to the protection of the British Navy, and to rejoice in the benefits of British trade.

We did not add to our reputation by our reaction to an effort to call an Inter-American Congress to meet at Panama in 1826, in an effort to hammer out a beginning at hemispheric cooperation. The invitation to us was batted about in congressional debate. A great many people made disparaging remarks about Latin America. Mr. Adams was quoted as speaking approvingly about an old thesis wafted around during the 18th Century "Enlightenment" called "the black legend" (*Leyenda Negra*). The general tenor of it was that everything evil, backward, reactionary, and hateful were to be found in oppressed Spain and Portugal, and in their American colonies. Due to prolonged debate, our delegates got such late starts that they could not arrive at Panama before the Congress had met and adjourned. So, to our eternal shame, we did not participate in this first attempt at an Inter-American movement.

During the 18th and 19th Centuries there was almost universal disapproval of human slavery in Spanish America. Simon Bolívar had written a famous letter while he was an exile in Jamaica, denouncing it as an abominable institution. By and large, Indian peoples who had known the whiplash of slavery under the Spanish warmed up to any antislavery philosophy. All through the

19th Century, and during much of the 20th, there was a slow growth of feeling in Latin America that the *Yanqui* presented some threat, always. They came to think of us as *El Coloso del Norte* (the Colossus of the North). They could feel apprehension about the future relationship of this Protestant, Anglo-Saxon power toward the weaker Latin military and political states to the South.

In spite of our intervention in Mexico at the time of the Maximilian affair, which saved that country from European domination, and despite our stand forcing the Spanish out of Santo Domingo at the same time (just after our Civil War), there was a growing image of *Imperialismo Yanqui* throughout Latin America. I might digress here a moment to assure you that in the eyes of a Latin American any citizen of the United States is a *Yanqui*. It does not matter whether you come from Mississippi, Georgia, or the State of Maine, you are still a *Yanqui*. This Latin American word simply does not have the same meaning as "Yankee." So don't ever try to argue or explain the matter down there. It will do you no good whatsoever!

Now let's see what some of the factors were which operated to create this feeling about us. First, there was the period of the Annexation of Texas and the Mexican War. Mexico had not acknowledged the independence of Texas and did not give up hope of getting it back until forced to recognize the Rio Grande boundary after the Mexican War. The loss of Texas, and the cessions following the Mexican War cost the Republic of Mexico over one half of its national territory.

Next, a series of filibusters in Central America and in Cuba beclouded our relations in the 1840's and 1850's. Gangster-like individuals seemed to operate with impunity to gather together a bunch of hoodlums and a store of weapons, and descend almost at will on some hapless Central American republic or the Spanish colony in Cuba. Our government not only did nothing to hamper these depredations but often our presidents and secretaries of state seemed to be providing encouragement. One such statement by a group of American diplomats, the Ostend Manifesto, aroused

the indignation of all Europe by its bald-faced proposal for the seizure of Cuba if Spain would not sell it.

Many of you have read of the incidents involving William Walker, the prize filibusterer of them all, who was twice bailed out from before Central American firing squads by our government. The third time proved to be the unfortunate "charm" for him for it came at a time when people in Washington had other things to consider. Walker was not aware that the Civil War was breaking out in this country when he launched his third expedition, and that we would be otherwise engaged than to pull his burning chestnuts out of the fire. So he stood against a wall in Honduras and took the fatal volley at long last (a very just comeuppance I cannot help but believe)!

The first Venezuelan crisis toward the end of the 19th Century, saw us use the Monroe Doctrine in a dispute between Britain and Venezuela over the boundary line between British Guiana and Venezuela. We used the Doctrine to force Britain to arbitrate the dispute. Latin America arose cheering when we did that, but cried out to high heaven when we made the arbitral award in favor of the British. We might better have not moved into this matter in the first place for the net effect which it had in our neighboring republics.

Then there was the Spanish-American War. Once again a large amount of Spanish-speaking territory was brought under the American flag. In addition to Porto Rico and Cuba, in this hemisphere, this included Guam and the Philippines in the Far Pacific. When the Philippine Rebellion ensued and General Arthur MacArthur was sent out and killed 40,000 Filipinos before they became convinced of the blessings which our rule would bring to them, Latin America looked on with grim aspect indeed.

The seizure of the Panama Canal Zone in 1903 truncated the Republic of Colombia. We openly intervened in a civil war on the isthmus, used our Marines to prevent Colombian troops from exercising the lawful authority of their government, and within less than ten days after the revolution had first broken out we

had recognized the new Republic of Panama and formulated with it the Hay-Bunau Varilla Treaty, giving us a perpetual grant of the Canal Zone. And who do you suppose "represented" Panama in negotiating this pact? A Frenchman who, with his associates, just happened to have a controlling interest in the defunct French Canal Company. This company, having failed in its canal building, was working every angle to get our government to pay them \$40,000,000 and take over their concession. Monsieur Bunau Varilla received "honorary Panamanian citizenship" to enable him to negotiate this fast one in Washington. He gave up this citizenship the week after the signing of the treaty!

Next we have the famous "Roosevelt Corollary" to the Monroe Doctrine. If many Latin Americans had taken a dim view of the Doctrine itself, this corollary to it really set them to gnashing their teeth. This action of President Theodore Roosevelt grew out of the second Venezuelan crisis in 1904, when there was a threat of British and German intervention there to collect some defaulted debts. The entire Latin American world had started querying the United States: "Now where is this Monroe Doctrine we have long heard about? Why are you permitting the Germans and British to threaten us with this intervention? Surely this is the sort of thing the Doctrine forbids."

President Roosevelt was put on a spot, of sorts. He felt called upon to answer: "Yes, it is true that the United States will protect this hemisphere against a foreign intervention. We prohibit such an intervention. But no second or third rate power is going to hide behind the Monroe Doctrine to welsh on its just obligations. We shall be the *"Policeman of the Western Hemisphere."* We shall be the sheriff who goes in and levies the attachment for the foreign creditor!"

Most Latin Americans were very quick to reply: "We had rather that the foreign creditor came in and took it directly, if you please. We cannot concede that the *Gringos* have anything to do with this matter."

Their protest was ineffectual, of course. For a quarter of a century the U. S. Marines moved about the Caribbean, along

with our other armed forces, as we bulldozed our way into as many as half a dozen countries at a time pursuing this "Big Stick" policy as the "Policeman of the Western Hemisphere."

The administration of President Taft contributed still another phase to this chapter in *Yanqui* imperialism — "Dollar Diplomacy." American capital was assured that it could "go in where an angel would fear to tread" because, unlike an angel, it could depend upon the U. S. Marines, Army, and Navy to follow it whenever its chestnuts needed to be pulled out of some fire of outraged Latin American nationalism. Dollar Diplomacy meant that where the Dollar might be the Flag would be, also. Latin American dictators hastened to make fine deals for themselves with "enterprising" American businessmen. Such partnerships paid handsome dividends and frequently enabled the *caudillos* to retain authoritarian powers — because if any trouble arose they could be sure that the U. S. military would be on the spot in a hurry to protect their "partner's" investment and, incidentally, the regime with which it was so intimately intertwined. The dictators always obtained huge loans and their American patrons took up their bonds — at enormous rates of interest. To pay the interest and to support the *Gringo* enterprise, the native labor would be worked at the whiplash on a starvation level. To Latin American intellectuals this situation was worse than loss of national dignity and sovereignty; it was a form of slavery.

Under Presidents Harding and Coolidge, Dollar Diplomacy seemed to reach its highest crescendo. Certainly the low-water mark of our reputation in Latin America came during the 1920's. At one time there were either American troops in occupation or regimes which were mere American puppets in a majority of the Caribbean nations.

When Sumner Wells was a delegate from the United States to the Inter-American Conference held in Santiago, Chile, in 1923, he was appalled at the feelings of hatred and animosity expressed towards his country. At the next Conference, held in Havana in 1928, President Coolidge was booed when he came in person to

address the meeting. I would say that this was a rather understandable occurrence in view of the fact that Mr. Coolidge had been quoted as saying that the United States would not be overly concerned with the feelings, and expressions, of "insignificant peoples" in shaping its course of conduct.

During all of these tortuous years about the only story to have any heartening feature was the slow development of the Pan-American movement. In 1889, we had taken the lead in sponsoring a Pan-American Conference in Washington which made an effort to pick up some of the loose ends left in Panama in 1826. After 1889, there were fairly regular meetings of the American states, usually coming at five-year intervals. Most of these earlier meetings were hampered by the hatred of the United States, to which we have just made reference. To prevent such incidents as the booing of Coolidge in Havana, the agenda was usually made up to exclude any controversial political subject. They would get together and talk about tourism, extradition of criminals, international postal services — anything but political matters.

The Pan-American movement began to take on some aspect of international amity with the inauguration of the Quaker President, Herbert Hoover, in 1929. He had celebrated his election by taking a long good will tour of Latin America, during which he successfully mediated the old Tacna-Arica dispute between Peru and Chile. Most Latin Americans were overjoyed in 1930 when Hoover's administration promulgated what is known as the Clark Memorandum. I shall not tax you with the details of this complicated state paper. Its effect was interpreted to be the abrogation of the Roosevelt Corollary — the United States was no longer going to play the role of Sheriff in the Western Hemisphere. President Hoover began to implement this new policy by withdrawing our troops from certain Caribbean areas.

Some Latin Americans were understandably skeptical of the apparent reformation of the Gringo Colossus. They kept their fingers crossed and said: "Well, this just cannot last!" When they awoke one morning in November, 1932 to read headlines saying "Roosevelt elected President of the United States," they

were quite sure that the end had come. They had vivid memories of Roosevelt the First, of his Corollary and of the seizure of the Panama. They recalled his remark about Colombians, made during the abortive negotiations for a Canal Zone at the time of the Hay-Herran Treaty, "dirty little Greasers." Roosevelt the Second seemed to waste little time in living up to the reputation of his family name. The 1934 intervention in Cuba, which saw President Machado taken aboard a cruiser to New York, seemed to many observers to be the most extreme action we had ever taken in our long history of interference into the affairs of Latin American states.

But F. D. R. had in his administration a close personal friend of Groton and Harvard days who had an *entré* to speak frankly with the President. This was Sumner Wells. Perhaps no North American has ever had the cause of Latin America more at heart or better understood that part of the world. Under-Secretary of State Wells influenced the very significant developments which now characterized the Roosevelt Administration's policies toward Latin America. In his inaugural address the new President had talked about a "Good Neighbor" policy, but it had not had any particular reference to Latin America. It had been meant for a statement of our relations with the world generally. Wells convinced F. D. R. that there could be no better place to apply the principle than in the portion of our own hemisphere where the hatred and bitterness toward the United States had reached such proportions.

At the Inter-American Conference in Montevideo in 1933 we had accepted a principle long urged by Latin American nations: absolute nonintervention by one American state in the affairs of any other. But we had made a reservation to our acceptance (and Latin Americans had said, cynically, "Of course *they* would make a vitiating reservation. They could not really accept it!") The reservation was that we should still be free to move in anywhere that treaty provisions gave us the right; i.e., the Platt Amendment in Cuba, etc. Some of these treaty concessions had literally been obtained at the point of a gun. So the Montevideo Conference did

not have too great an effect in raising our reputation among the southern neighbors.

But in 1936 the next Inter-American meeting at Buenos Aires saw President Roosevelt go in person to accept, without qualification, the Doctrine of Absolute Nonintervention for the Western Hemisphere. Even as he spoke we were at work implementing our new position. We renegotiated our canal treaty with Panama. The new Hull-Alfaro agreement removed any right of the United States to intervene in the Republic of Panama or to acquire any further Panamanian territory by unilateral action, as we had been authorized to do under the original Hay-Bunau Varilla Treaty. We abrogated the Platt Amendment, which had given us the right to virtually dictate the foreign policy of Cuba. We pulled our remaining forces of occupation out of Haiti and other Caribbean areas. Latin America now began to believe that we might mean what we were saying. The change had come none too soon, because the shadow of the Axis was now beginning to fall over the world.

The potential menace of Axis totalitarianism was in the minds of all American statesmen as the Eighth International Conference opened in Lima, Peru in 1938. This conclave issued the famous Declaration of Lima: "that an attack upon one American state would amount to and be regarded as an attack upon all twenty-one republics."

Hemispheric solidarity was put to the test almost immediately. After World War II broke out in September, 1939, a meeting of the Foreign Ministers in Panama agreed upon hemispheric neutrality and a mutual defense arrangement. At Havana in 1940, the twenty-one republics served notice on the Axis that we would not tolerate any attempt to take over the French and Dutch colonies in the New World. Finally, after Pearl Harbor brought one of the twenty-one into a state of war, the Rio de Janeiro Conference of 1942 saw all of the Latin American states but two range themselves alongside the United States by breaking diplomatic relations with the Axis. The two conspicuous exceptions, of course, were Argentina and Chile. Chile came along a few months later, after her presidential election, and you are all familiar with the

unhappy story of Argentine shenanigans during World War II. It must be noted, however, that even Argentina declared war just before the UN San Francisco Conference, so that for the record hemispheric solidarity was complete during that war.

Most Latin American contributions toward winning World War II came in furnishing bases and strategic materials to the United Nations. Two of the republics did contribute overseas forces, Brazil in Italy and Colombia in the Philippines. There were naval operations on the part of Brazil and Mexico which had significance in helping the Allies to deal with the Axis submarine threat in the South Atlantic and the Caribbean. The Western Hemisphere was never drawn together more closely than during World War II. The method of the Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor created a great feeling of sympathy for the United States throughout Latin America. President Roosevelt's popularity was tremendous throughout the hemisphere. I have a personal recollection of the observance of his birthday in 1942 in one Latin American country, where the tides of war had brought me as a member of the armed forces. The birthday balls and public tributes were very moving to a North American, even to a Republican whose feelings about Mr. Roosevelt had been something less than enthusiastic back home!

When the war seemed to be approaching its conclusion an Inter-American Conference was called at Chapultepec, having its eye on the forthcoming UN organization meeting set for San Francisco in April, 1945. The gathering at Chapultepec issued a very important statement of position and purpose which shows how far the Pan-American movement had come since the bitter days of the 1920's. The twenty-one republics declared that they wished to preserve their regional organization, come what may; that they would not agree to going into any world organization which would delimit the operation of the Inter-American System. The stand taken at Chapultepec is one of the main reasons why the United Nations Charter gave its blessing to regional organizations. On no other terms would the Latin American states have agreed to enter the United Nations.

Following the war in 1947 the Organization of American States was set up as a permanent peacetime agency. I have already made mention of this in a previous lecture to you, but I will just remind you of Articles 17 and 19 of the Charter of the OAS adopted at the Rio Conference in 1947. These articles set up the permanent body, the Organ of Consultation, which, in event of a crisis, can actually, by a two-thirds vote, commit the members of the OAS to specific actions short of military operations. In other words, it is interesting to point out that the United States could be committed against its will to go along with an economic blockade or boycott. It could be in the minority, and a two-thirds vote of the OAS could bind it to some very significant actions. Sometimes economic weapons are more than enough. There is no veto in the Organization of American States!

Latin American affection for the United States was at its peak in 1945. It has been falling away ever since. Latin America felt neglected in the days of the Truman Doctrine and our preoccupation with Europe and the Far East. The Marshall Plan sounded hollow to this part of the world which obtained so little benefit from it. When General Marshall went to Bogota as our Secretary of State to attend the sessions of the Inter-American Conference there in 1948, mobs tried to bring the situation of Latin America to his attention in a most forceful way. Rioting swept the city, there were hundreds of casualties, and most of the foreign diplomats, Marshall among them, had to take refuge in their respective embassies. So you see the reception which greeted Mr. Nixon in various places last year was not a new thing. General Marshall could have briefed him well.

The United States did promise aid after the 1948 conference. Things seemed to be looking up again. Some of the South American republics began to organize a sort of PWA type of government agency — a *corporación de fomento* (development corporation) — which had as its purpose the building of dams, the manufacture and distribution of electric power, and the establishment of industrial mills. Colombia, for example, began an impressive

construction of textile mills. Brazil planned to develop its coal and iron. But the money from Uncle Sam was simply not forthcoming.

From 1945 to 1957, the United States gave out over 62 billions of dollars in foreign aid. Latin America received less than one billion; 800 million, in fact. The 1958 Foreign Aid Bill appropriated 3 billions of dollars, and after all of the uproar over Nixon the share for Latin America is only 100 million. The twenty republics to the south of us have experienced the gravest sort of an economic crisis since World War II. They think that the United States, far from extending a helping hand to them, has aggravated their situation. This is the reason: Latin America for the most part has to import its capital equipment and its consumer goods. They can pay for these only by selling their own exports at a suitable price level. The United States has often put the squeeze on them. I will give you a few illustrations of this.

Copper. During the Korean War, we were buying copper like mad. The price went up to 55¢ per pound. Once the war was over, however, the bottom fell out and it is now 25¢ per pound. Yet, Chile gets 60% of its export income from copper. The current situation is a terrific problem for that nation, which is used to a high standard of living.

Coffee. The United States not only is the greatest consumer of coffee, but it is the middleman which carries much of this product to many parts of the world. A congressional investigation of coffee prices set off a consumers' strike against coffee in this country about six years ago, and the export of coffee from Brazil declined precipitately. Yet, coffee accounts for three-quarters of Brazil's foreign exchange. You can imagine that the McCarthy-style congressional investigating committees are rather unpopular in Latin America.

Nitrate and Tin. Changes in United States manufacturing methods have greatly reduced our purchases of these items, and the result has been a very adverse effect on the economies of both Chile and Bolivia.

Oil. It might surprise you to hear that there is any economic grievance in this field. But in Venezuela they say that we have been greedy, that we developed their fields too fast, that our technology has been too efficient and has run the supply ahead of world demand, and that they now have a glut of oil on their hands. They are very unhappy about this — so much so that they have accepted a recent invitation from Nasser to go to Cairo to sit in on a conference of the world's oil-holding states to see what can be done to control the flow of oil to world outlets. (I should think that the picture of a member of the OAS going to sit down in company with Nasser would be enough to jar the complacency of somebody in Washington!)

Lead and Zinc. Just a few years ago the United States cut our imports of lead and zinc by one third. The reason given was a desire to protect the domestic industries in these fields. But it would be hard to imagine a worse case of timing, however legitimate the reason. The step was taken by presidential order just on the very eve of a meeting of the OAS foreign ministers in Washington. Talk about public relations! Mr. Dulles was undercut by another branch of the Executive Department just at a time when he was trying to soothe troubled Latin American colleagues.

The Latin Americans complain that our government does little or nothing to encourage United States capital to invest in their area. In some of our other lectures here at the War College we have heard about investments being made by American corporations in other parts of the world: there is a new DuPont plant in Northern Ireland, for example. Latin America has cheap labor; it is rich in raw materials; and it has fairly well-developed transportation facilities. But our government has made virtually no effort to encourage capital investments in South America. When one looks at the ferment in Africa, and realizes the very uncertain future there of the white man, the question cannot help but arise as to the wisdom of the rubber plantations in West Africa laid out by American concerns. Especially when one recalls the expenditure of millions upon millions in the upper Amazon to create an

American rubber industry during World War II — all now reclaimed by the jungle, in spite of the fact that rubber was native to Brazil.

On the other hand we have never been loathe to welcome Latin American capital to the United States. The grandee class of Latin America, which holds most of the money, usually turns to the United States to do its banking. For example, there is more Chilean capital invested in the United States than there is at home. If the Latin countries could just lure an appreciable amount of their own money back again they would be quite happy. We could help them with little cost to our own economy by imposing taxes on foreign investments which might cause their owners to re-examine the value of giving their own countries the go-by.

Certain foreign policies of the United States have operated to shut Latin American trade out of markets on the other side of the world. The twenty sister republics have gone along with us in our attitudes toward trading behind the Iron Curtain. They say that this cooperation has cost them dearly. They have had the opportunity to trade with Red China, and they recognize that filling the needs of Red China might mean a great deal of profit to them. They point out, however, that they have been loyal to the United States' position on Red China, in and out of the UN, and they have raised no fuss about blockade of the China coast. They think we owe them something to help ease the economic loss which has come to them by taking this stand by our side. They are quick to point out that we have tried to compensate Japan for her loss of trade with China.

What Latin America desires above all is an economic partnership with the United States. She feels that she has asked in vain for aid and cooperation and received instead moves toward domination, reminiscent of the old days of imperialism. There is a feeling that we do not understand the new surge towards democracy in Latin America; that we do not comprehend that it is really a social and economic revolution to a greater degree than it is political. In this connection, I should like to urge upon you this thought: *caudilloism* and the cult of the man-on-horseback (*per-*

sonalismo) is not dead in Latin America. There is simply a shift to a new class of *caudillo*. The leader comes no longer from the old *patron* or grandee element. He rises from the masses. He inflames his own people with an awareness of their natural rights, with resentment for their longtime exploitation, and with a dream of sharing in the wealth of their country and in society and government so long closed to their kind. It would be well for us to get the true picture. Men who are full-blooded Indians, or Negroes, have been coming to places of leadership and power. We have had an example of this in Mexico since 1917, where the Party of the National Revolution has been continuously at work on a broad program of social and economic reforms.

The distate for "dictators," which we hear so much about, is actually a distaste for the old *patron* class of dictator. Peron is out, but his prototype is likely to continue for a long time to be very popular with the *descamisados* (the shirtless ones). The tradition of "government by bullet rather than ballot" is not gone. It simply has reference to a new type of beneficiary. The new leaders will come and go in much the same fashion as the old ones. We must not be shocked by violence in Latin American governmental change. We cannot judge their way of doing things by ours. As one great scholar, A. C. Wilgus, has put it, Latin America cherishes a "divine right of revolution" as much as we cherish the processes of an orderly elective democracy.

The dictators of the new era appear to be an improvement over their predecessors of *patron* days. The new Latin "democratic movement" which they lead means change for popular betterment in social and economic fields. It is vitally necessary that the American people and their leaders understand this. The Nixon affair, I think, was due to a widespread impression in Latin America that we are committed to uphold and restore the old privileged classes. The worst blowup came, as you know, in Caracas because the people of Venezuela saw in Mr. Nixon a symbol of the power which they thought had stood behind the ousted dictator, Perez Jimenez, in his heyday.

There are certain other tensions between the United States and her Latin neighbors which should be noted. First, there is the cultural impact of the North American radio, movies, books, periodicals, and tourists. There is a movement in Latin America known as *Hispanidad*, which tries to emphasize the Hispanic culture which ties so much of the area to Old Spain. The members of this cult profess to fear the corrupting Anglo-Saxon influence from North America. Just recently, at the International Film Festival in Mexico City, this feeling broke out and there was organized boeing of American personalities and American offerings.

Religion, unhappily, is another cause of tension between us. They still think of us as a fundamentally Protestant and Anglo-Saxon people. Some of our missionaries down there, who are usually from the vocal and dynamic fundamentalist sects, do not always behave in the most diplomatic way in their missionary activities. Many Latin Americans fail to understand how there could be anything but a sinister purpose in spending money for "missionary" work among a people who are already confirmed in their Christianity.

It seems that the racial question somehow gets into every lecture I give here at the War College, and it must be mentioned at least in passing in any discussion on the subject of Latin America. As I pointed out earlier there is some social discrimination based upon race in the area, but Latin America long ago broke down the barriers in the political and economic fields. Nixon was greeted by signs bearing the words "Little Rock," and there can be no doubt that this grievous question vexes our relations with Latin America as it does with so many other parts of the world.

We come now, inevitably, to another sure topic — Communism. Latin America does not see Communism quite as we do. This is sad, but it is true. For one thing it is not an important grass-roots movement in Latin America, nor does it attract many intellectuals. They were horrified by what happened to Trotsky, and any intellectual is likely to want to be free to "deviate." The Party does not have a significant membership in numbers except

in Brazil, Cuba, Argentina, Panama, and Chile, and it is not a real threat in any of these as a force with a chance to achieve political power. The Communists appreciate their position very well and try to influence events more subtly than in any overt and sure-to-be-beaten bid for office.

The struggle against World Communism is unreal to many Latin Americans. It is a far-away ideology, and Russia is far away. The Communists and their fellow travelers constantly exploit this latent feeling that there is no *real* menace, that the *Yanquis* are obviously just using the excuse of combatting Communism to cover up a renewal of their own imperialism in Latin America. Even the overthrow of the pro-Communist Arbenz regime in Guatemala was pictured far and wide throughout the Latin republics as a new move by the *Gringos* to impose their will on a small and helpless American state. It is sad to say this, but there can be no doubt that many, many people in Latin America believed this. Latin Americans indeed often find themselves thinking in terms of the Soviet Union and its power as a counterpoise to the *Gringo* Colossus. They demonstrate this in devious ways. In Argentina, for example, they used to take great delight in parades on national holidays and other state ceremonies in putting the Soviet Ambassador right at the head of the procession and the American Ambassador away back in the rear some place.

Latin Americans are tremendously impressed with the industrial growth of the U. S. S. R. Being a backward region themselves for the most part, they feel that the example of Russia's "Operation Bootstrap" is one which they could conceivably follow. They are well aware that industrial power is a *sine qua non* to political power and national security in this modern age. They think at times of playing the U. S. A. and the U. S. S. R. off against each other, and thus securing economic and technical assistance from both. They are not afraid of getting too far into the Soviet Bear's embrace because they realize that in any event they would still have the assurance of U. S. protection in case of any Russian attempt at military or political penetration.

The fact is that in Latin America there is still a pronounced, if sometimes latent, feeling against the United States which is accounted for by the history of their relations with us over most of the past century. This unhappy fact continues to be the principal tool in the hands of Communist agitators. You say: "Well, surely the Church must be a powerful counter-influence." But, here again, the fact that Latin America is Catholic is no adequate answer to this problem. There are mixed effects of the religious allegiance of this part of the world. The situation is not unlike that of another Catholic country, Italy. You will recall that the Communists have polled as much as 40% of the vote in that country despite its being the seat of the Papacy and a strong stand by the Church against Marxism. In Latin America, too, there is often a pronounced anticlericalism, in some sections even agnosticism. The Church itself is well aware of the nominal style Christianity of many of its communicants and is laying plans for a missionary movement in Latin America.

The U. S. S. R. leaves no opportunity untouched to wage psychological warfare. They talk about "neutralism," and warn the Latin Americans that military collaboration with the United States, such as granting us bases, is an invitation for nuclear attack upon their territory and population. The horrors of atomic warfare can be just as graphically described to people in this part of the world as in any other. This sort of agitation has already harvested some bitter fruit for us in the new Caribbean West Indian Commonwealth, where we have been "invited" to get out of our base in Trinidad.

To sum up the nature of Latin America's contemporary importance to the United States, I would say that it falls into economic, strategic, and psychological categories. There is a tremendous storehouse of vital raw materials there. Virtually every Latin American country has quantities of manganese — sometimes huge deposits. Bolivia turns out 15% of the world's tin and sizeable amounts of antimony and tungsten. Brazil has enormous deposits of monozite, which as you gentlemen know is another source of thorium, an alternate for uranium. There are several extensive

sources of iron ore and coal in South America, although not a high grade of coal. Brazil is the birthplace of the rubber industry. Chile turns out 75% of the world's iodine. Colombia has iron ore, oil, lead, copper, and mercury in great quantities. Ecuador has almost untapped stores of silver, iron, cotton, and lead. Paraguay has vast timber resources and also iron and copper. Peru is the largest producer in the world of vanadium, and also supplies much copper and some oil. Venezuela produces 2,500,000 barrels of oil per day and boasts one of the richest veins of iron ore in the Lake Maracaibo area.

Latin America is an important food producer, even for us. We have over a billion dollars invested in Cuban sugar. Argentina and Uruguay are among the world's largest suppliers of beef, wheat, and wool. Brazil and Colombia give us most of our coffee, and the Caribbean lands our bananas and a considerable amount of certain citrus fruits. Cotton, tobacco, rice, and indigo are other very important agricultural exports from the Caribbean area.

The industrial potential of Latin America is not to be overlooked. We have taken account of the great mineral resources waiting to be exploited. There is also a vast labor pool. It is estimated that the population of Latin America will surpass 500 million people by the year 2000. The birthrate in this part of the world is booming. It may very well match that in India and China before long. There are important water power resources, as well as the ingredients which I have already mentioned, for the development of atomic energy.

Strategically speaking, the Latin American nations represent, through OAS, our proudest alliance. We have been talking so much here at the War College about the concept of the "heartland" and, of course, have been using that term with reference to the Old World. But the Western Hemisphere can also be an important "heartland." Mankind is on the verge of achievements which would have seemed beyond credibility a few short years ago. In this hemisphere are base sites of vital importance to controlling the approaches to Outer Space, to supremacy of the West on the sea and in the air, and to protection of the South Polar

World. A friendly Latin America, plus a friendly Australia, can enable us to virtually interdict any enemy's approach to Antarctica. The transoceanic canal in Panama, and its twin, which may be built through Nicaragua or elsewhere in Central America, is vital to the expeditious movement of the Free World's shipping.

Psychologically, Latin America has, up till now, been ranged alongside us in the world struggle. She has given us complete support in the United Nations. To cite four examples of UN voting: the resolutions on the Hungarian Revolution; the question of seating Red China; the Western plan for disarmament in 1957; and the dispatch of the UN Emergency Force to Suez in 1956. The Latin American voting was 100% on these issues — twenty votes right down the line by our side. Can we possibly afford to lose such valuable support? Isn't it worth making every effort to maintain the solidarity of the Western Hemisphere? Could anything be more important than keeping the 500 million Latin Americans who are on our own doorstep on the closest terms of freindship and collaboration?

During this talk on the subject of Latin America's importance to the United States I have done the natural thing and formulated my thinking from the North American's point of view. This emphasizes the role of Latin America in hemispheric defense and as a part of the Western bloc in the Free World; it takes into account its situation as a storehouse of vital and strategic materials. But it would be well for us to look to the other side of the coin and try to appraise this matter as a literate citizen of Latin America might look at it. (And I should have said earlier that one of the impressive results of the new democratic movement in Latin America is that many, many more people are getting an education and are literate). Frequently, the North American's outlook seems materialistic and selfish to his Latin neighbor.

The Latin American does not relish a role of colonial dependency, economic subordination, or cultural tutelage. He seriously rejects any inferior position for himself and his country. He has long been devoted to the concept of the juridicial equality of states and the value of international organization. He demands

full recognition of his national and individual dignity. The Latin American wants to be the valued and respected partner of the North American. He does not need to be reminded of our "community of interests." What he is all too often afraid of is that it is *we* who will forget and need to be reminded. If we will take him in good faith into a *true* partnership, I am confident that we can count upon him through thick and thin, and that all of our twenty-one republics will succeed in keeping the Western Hemisphere a beacon of human freedom, security, and progress.

Gentlemen, I have tried, rushing along here, to deal with the whole hemisphere at our doorstep — to cover twenty nations in less than an hour. I realize that I have done it very inadequately, and my apologies to you. The assignment may very well have been an impossible task, but our curriculum schedule would not allow more time.

Thank you!

BIOGRAPHIC SKETCH

Professor Lawrence O. Ealy

Professor Ealy received his LL.B., M.A., and Ph.D. degrees from the University of Pennsylvania. He also attended Temple University, and is a 1941 graduate of the Navy Supply Corps School at the Harvard University Graduate School of Business Administration.

He holds the Ernest J. King Chair in Maritime History for the 1958-1959 academic year. He is on leave from Temple University where he holds the rank of Professor of History. He has also taught in the fields of History and Political Science at Rutgers University and at Beaver College.

Professor Ealy is a specialist in the Latin American area and is a recognized authority in Panamanian and Isthmanian affairs, particularly. His recent publications on this subject include *The Republic of Panama in World Affairs* (a book-length diplomatic history) and *The Development of An Anglo-American System of Law in the Panama Canal Zone* (an article in legal history). He also works in American Foreign Relations and Constitutional Law and History.

Professor Ealy has written four books and numerous articles for scholarly and professional journals. He is presently engaged in doing a diplomatic history of the American Civil War, which will be published in connection with the oncoming centennial observance of that conflict. In addition to his career in higher education, he is a member of the legal profession and has been admitted to the bar in both Ohio and Pennsylvania, as well as practicing before various Federal courts. He serves on the Board of the *American Journal of Legal History* (of which Chief Justice Warren is the Chairman), and is a member of many professional societies in his fields of interest.

During the period of the Second World War, Professor Ealy was in the Supply Corps and saw service in the Pacific, Atlantic, and European Theaters. He was Commanding Officer of the Naval Supply Depot at Argentia at the close of hostilities in the Atlantic, with additional duty as Force Supply Officer on the Staff of the Commander, North Atlantic Force (CTF 24). He is now a Commander (Retired) in the United States Naval Reserve.

Professor Ealy has been elected Provost of Hobart College, at Geneva, New York, and of its women's affiliate, William Smith College, and will assume his responsibilities at those institutions when he leaves the Naval War College in July.

AFRICA, SOUTH OF THE SAHARA, 1958

A lecture delivered
at the Naval War College
on 12 November 1958 by

Professor Melville J. Herskovits

Two and a half years ago, when I had the privilege of addressing the members of this class, the situation in Africa was so different than it is today that many of the things that were at that time envisaged as possibilities have come to pass, and many others not even discussed have taken place.

The most important thing that has happened, to my mind, is the change in the attitudes toward the future of the Continent found in Africa itself. If we roughly draw a line at the northern border of Portuguese territory, across Southern (and perhaps Northern) Rhodesia, and across to the northern border of Mozambique (Portuguese East Africa), we find that north of this area, without any exception, it is taken for granted that these territories will be African territories, politically controlled by Africans, and that this is going to happen soon. As a Minister of the Kenya Government recently remarked: "It is not a question of 'if,' it is a question of 'how' and 'when' we will transfer to a democratic situation, which will mean that control will be in African hands." South of the line I have drawn, the situation is different; in fact we can think of what is taking place there as a kind of "holding action." Europeans there have the hope, though it is not a very secure one, that they are there to stay, and various proposals and policies have been advanced to make it possible for them to continue to predominate as they have in the past.

A general principle which applies to Africa South of the Sahara, if not the whole of the Continent, is this: that the degree of tension in a given territory will be in direct proportion to the size of the permanent non-African population. The major problem is created by the presence of Europeans, as whites are called. Other aspects of the same problem arise where there are large Indian populations, as in Uganda, Kenya, Tanganyika and the Union, and to

a lesser extent in the Federation and in Ruanda-Urundi, the Belgian Trust Territory. But it is the Europeans who are the crux of the interracial situation.

What are some of the specific changes that have taken place since I spoke before this group two and a half years ago?

At that time, the *loi cadre*, which granted autonomy in their internal affairs to the various territories of French West and Equatorial Africa, was about to be implemented. Not only has this been implemented, but under the voting for the Community of the Fifth Republic any African territory could opt for independence; and Guinée, accepting the offer, has become an independent nation, to which, within the past week, we and Great Britain have extended recognition. This new country, however, is faced with certain difficult problems as concerns its internal administration. Unlike the British in West Africa, who have carefully prepared Ghanaians and Nigerians for running their country by bringing them into the foreign service, the postal service, and teaching them other administrative skills essential for governing a country, the French have not done this. So Guinée, cut off without a shilling — or, as I suppose I should say, without a franc — is having to make its own way.

Again, since I last spoke here, Ghana has become self-governing. The date of its independence, as you know, was March 6, 1957. A conference in London between the governments of the three regions of Nigeria and the British has just ended, and it has been announced that the date agreed upon for the independence of Nigeria is October 1, 1960. And the French have just announced that they will give up their Trusteeship for the Cameroons, also in 1960.

The Sudan had just become independent. It has since had a change of government, which has placed power in the hands of the military. Uganda is moving toward a state of independence, and if the various tribal groups in Uganda can agree, this will come about fairly soon. In Tanganyika the political pot is boiling, and it is possible that the United Nations Trusteeship, held by

the United Kingdom, will be terminated in a few years. 1960 will also see conversations in London concerning the revision of the Constitution of the Federation, with all its implications for European-African relations there.

The Belgians, who have been most reluctant to bring Africans into the political scene have, so to speak, put a toe in the political waters with their *statut de ville*, under which both Africans and Europeans, heretofore entirely voteless, have been permitted to vote for burgomasters who will function in the various sections of the three cities where this system has thus far been tried under a chief burgomaster named by the Governor General of the Congo. These elections were held last year; three more cities are soon going to be allowed to have this privilege. More important, however, is the fact that the recently established government is now holding conferences in Brussels to reconsider the whole structure of Belgian policy in Africa.

From what I have said, it is apparent that the outstanding developments of the moment lie in the political field. This is understandable, for the power structure, which is the key to the situation, is by its nature political. Africans who have had university training recognize this clearly. Thus, when I have indicated to such Africans that they must become members of the faculties of their own universities, because this is the only way in which they can assure the continuity of knowledge that is essential if their countries are to take their place in the world society, they have almost always pointed out that because there are so few of them, they are compelled to get into the political arena.

This is why so large a number of the Africans who have taken higher degrees in England, France, or the United States, have gravitated to politics. A case in point is a young man named Gikonyo Kiano, who took a Ph.D. in Political Science at the University of California about three years ago, and then was appointed as Lecturer on the Staff of Nairobi Technical College in Kenya. He was instrumental in breaking the color bar in university housing, he and his wife being the first non-Whites to live in the faculty section. He has, however, felt compelled to resign his

teaching post and run for election as representative of the Kikuyu, his own people, in the Legislative Council. And only last Thursday he, with Tom Mboya, the very brilliant young Luo who is the leader of the African group in the *Legco*, as it is called, organized a walkout during the Governor's speech, as another step toward breaking the Lenox-Boyd Constitution, which is held by the Africans not to give them the degree of representation they feel to be their due

I may give another example that shows how important the Africans have come to feel political action to be. In 1955, as I believe I mentioned in my previous talk to this class, I had the opportunity of talking with the leaders of the various African trade unions in Dakar. What struck me more than anything else was the fact that their interests lay essentially in economic questions; that is, they discussed how to get a better price for their peanut crops, or about ways and means to raise wages and obtain various fringe benefits for African workers. They sounded like labor leaders in an European country, or in the United States.

But in 1957, their interests seemed almost exclusively political. Why? Because under the new statute that had been promulgated, where a great deal of political power was being put into the hands of the Africans, they began to see that here was the place where they could obtain the things they wanted; things that without such power in their own hands they could not get.

With this background, let us consider one of the basic problems of present-day Africa which I was asked to discuss, since, as I was informed, it is in these areas your primary interests lie, the problem of race relations.

This has created situations which have importance not only for all the African continent, but for all the world. For in terms of winning the allegiances of the uncommitted peoples, the color question is one of the most pressing we must face at the present time. In this struggle our side is handicapped because it includes most of the colonial powers, as well as the United States, which itself has not at home done too well on this level. For us, therefore,

it is necessary to understand the resentments that the peoples of color all over the world hold against Europeans, and which provide the dynamics for the anticolonialist movement of the present. I am not assessing praise or blame against any position. I am analyzing a situation. What we must understand is that at the present time "colonialism" is for most of the world defined as something that a white man does to a man of color.

Shortly after the crisis in Suez, in talking to Africans about their attitudes toward this problem, I raised the matter of their attitudes toward the Russian action in Hungary. Their response was invariably the same: "That is different." Then I would ask: "But is not what the Russians are doing a kind of imperialism?" And their reaction would be, "This is a fight between Europeans. Imperialism and colonialism are things that white people do to people of color."

This is a fundamental fact in shaping international relations that cannot be lost sight of in phrasing our foreign policy in all its aspects. In Africa, it is supremely important, for even where the color question does not arise it is invariably present.

Let me sketch some of the background of this question.

It was only in relatively recent times that Africa came to be recognized as one of the oldest inhabited parts of the world. Within the last twenty-five years, however, the extreme south of the Continent has yielded certain prehuman forms called the Australopithecinae, which are now felt to have been very early forerunners of the human type. These were small animals, but apparently walked on their hind legs, and seemed to have used tools. Other parts of Africa show a long period during which prehistoric cultures were maintained. It is interesting to note that in East Africa stone tools have been found that date from periods that antedate the earliest stone ages of Europe by about 100,000 years.

Whatever the nature of the earliest inhabitants — and we are not entirely sure whether they were pygmoid, like the Pygmies of the Ituri Forest, or the Bushmen of South Africa, who certainly had a much broader distribution than they have at the

present time — other types are found as time goes on. Whether the Negroid was the earliest of these other forms, or developed at a later period, we do not know. But the written record of contact between Africa and the outside world goes back about 2,500 years, at least as far as the coastal areas are concerned. What we must understand is that there was a great deal of contact with the rest of the Old World long before the Europeans arrived. Voyages across the Indian Ocean were constantly undertaken along the east coast, so that during all this long period India, and perhaps even China, had relations with African peoples.

In fact, Africa was never really cut off from the world, as is popularly supposed. The reason we get the picture of "Darkest Africa," and assume that Africa was not "opened up" until the nineteenth century, is because we think of African contacts with other continents from the point of view of Europe, which means we think of it essentially in terms of approaches by sea on the Atlantic side. Yet caravans have gone across the Sahara from time immemorial, implementing trade between Sub-Saharan and North Africa and thus, indirectly, linking Africa South of the Sahara with Europe. The impulse for the Moorish attacks on Spain came from Mauritania, one of the fundamental reasons for this being their control of the trade in gold that in early days was transported across the Sahara to Europe from mines of Senegal, traditionally cited in the ancient kingdom called Ghana. In later times, there was trade in leather, slaves, and other commodities across the desert to the north.

What we always seem to think of first, when relations of Africa with the outside world is considered, is the influence of Egypt on Africa. Because of the swamp (sudd) area of the upper and middle Nile, however, this seems to have been minimal. The few Egyptian remains found in some of the archeological deposits in East Africa seem to have been traded around the Sudan rather than to have come due south. The influence of Egypt on Negroid Africa is certainly much slighter than we thought in earlier times and, conversely, the relations of the Sub-Saharan region with North Africa have been somewhat greater than we had recognized.

There is no need to repeat here the tale, with which I am sure all of you are familiar, of the initial European voyages of discovery down the coast of Africa that resulted in the circumnavigation of the Continent in the search of a route for India. These brought the Portuguese, and later other peoples, to the west coast very early in the sixteenth century. Yet this later contact of Africa with Europe, though, an important incident in the overall history of the Continent, was only the continuation of something that had been going on for a great deal of time.

If you will look at a relief map of the Continent, you will see at once why penetration of Africa from the sea was difficult. Except in West Africa, there is everywhere a coastal plain of varying degrees of narrowness, from which an escarpment rises to the interior plateau that ranges from 3,000 to 6,000 feet and more. There are almost very few harbors. Where the rivers did not have falls that impeded shipping, sand bars prevented ocean-going vessels from sailing inland as they did up the North American rivers.

Turning to the present situation as regards race relations, it is only in more recent times that racial problems have in certain parts of the Sub-Saharan Continent become acute. Kenya offers a good example, since the three-level pattern of race relations found in Eastern and Southern Africa was established there quite early. One reason for the British going into Kenya was to build a railroad to Uganda; since Uganda was the scene of early exploration and missionary activity it was felt that it needed communication with the sea. To build the railroad, there had to be technicians and a managerial group; these were brought from Europe and remained at the top. The descendants of the laborers brought from India comprised the second level and, finally, there were the Africans, who, though they came to participate in the new economy, remained in the lowest socio-economic stratum. This pattern has maintained itself in all the area to the present time. If one takes any index of status — whether it be the standard of living, social position, or opportunity — it will be found that the

European is highest, the Indian is next, and that the African is lowest in the scale.

Elsewhere, however, this pattern did not develop, perhaps because there were few residents of nonindigenous races. It did not develop in the Belgian Congo, except in the Lake Kivu region, where some Belgian planters have settled. In most of the Congo, however, development has been encouraged by giving agricultural and mineral concessions to large companies, so that the managerial group does not come to settle, but to work for a period and then return home to Belgium.

In West African territories under British control, Europeans have not been allowed to own land, which made it impossible for a class of white settlers to be established. Until very recent times, indeed, when pharmaceutical developments and medical research made it possible to cope with the indigenous disease, this area was avoided by Europeans, except for short tours, since it is the region classically known as the "white man's grave." Today, the European population is a fraction of one per cent. I do not mean that the Europeans do not keep to themselves, and do not on occasion have their own clubs — though even this is minimal in Ghana and Nigeria — but there is no official sanction for discrimination. The process of "Africanization" of the civil services, on all levels, giving Africans full access to primary, secondary, and higher education and placing them in managerial posts and in all kinds of business enterprises, goes on apace. The middle layer does exist in West Africa, however, where it is composed of Lebanese and Syrian merchants. They have come in since the turn of the century, and perform the same entrepreneurial function in West Africa that is performed by the Indians in the eastern and southern parts of the Continent.

In French Africa, racial tensions are likewise minor. I was present when the elections to the Assemblée Territoriale of French Equatorial Africa were held at Brazzaville, on March 30, 1957. The electoral lists were very interesting from the point of view of race relations. Candidates were selected by party caucuses in which Africans, being fully enfranchised, predominated in great majority.

Yet on each party list, among eight or ten nominees, there were the names of two or three Europeans which, obviously, had been put there by Africans.

This is important, as evidence of an attribute too often ignored in discussing contemporary Africa. I am convinced that where the African sees the road is clear for him to exercise political responsibility, and opportunity of participating in the government of his own country is accorded him, he is not anti-European. Africans in all parts of the Continent have, with various phrasings, said to me, "When we get free, we are going to have to have Europeans with us for a long time, for we are going to need technical assistance and advice of all kinds." This is quite in line with what Prime Minister Kwame Nkrumah said to me four or five years ago: "I cannot run a modern country by myself. I need advisors, but I want to make the policies." And as far as I can ascertain, that is the attitude of Africans everywhere. In other words, they are not anti-European; whether they will continue to maintain good relations with Europeans depends on how the Europeans behave. As I see it, the failure to recognize this is at the basis of the difficulties in human and interracial relations we find in being, or in the making, over all Eastern and Southern Africa.

The Portuguese territories present a special case. No political activity is allowed in what are now called the Portuguese Overseas Provinces — as you know, these are juridicially no longer "colonies," but have been declared integral parts of Portugal. On the economic level, Portuguese Guinéé, Mozambique and Angola represent the closest approximation existing in Africa today to classical colonialism, which is to use the resources and man power of a given overseas territory for the benefit of the Metropole. In those territories the African has less access to education than anywhere else on the Continent, and is subject to arbitrary controls of various kinds over all phases of his life, enforced by corporal punishment, forced labor, and other devices.

This is why, therefore, everything is calm in Portuguese territories. There is no political agitation or labor organization

there because of the rigid restraints that apply to the Africans. Hence, when I discuss significant recent developments in Africa, I exclude the Portuguese territories, since there we find no political, economic, or social developments of any kind, so far as the Africans are concerned. We understand this if we consider that even in the small concessions that are made to Africans in terms of permitting them to become *assimilados* (assimilated citizens), they must pass tests to achieve this, demonstrating a knowledge of Portuguese, being a Christian, sleeping in a bed, being monogamous, eating with a knife and fork, and the like. Moreover, the requirements have been raised in recent times because too many applicants were attaining the status of *assimilados*.

As I have indicated, racial tensions are most serious in East Africa, the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, and South Africa. Here various attempts have been made to solve this problem of interracial living: in East Africa, the formula most often called on is designated "multiracialism"; in the Federation, it is called "partnership"; and in the Union it is called *apartheid*, a term with which, I am sure, you are all familiar, and which is officially translated as "separate development." Realistically, all these formulae are essentially to be thought of as phrasings of the strategy exercised by a stratum of society that has a highly privileged position to continue their privileges in the face of a growing realization on the part of the underprivileged majority of their deprivations under the current system, with a concomitant drive to participate in the benefits the new order can bring them.

If one looks at eventualities in these parts of Africa objectively, if only in terms of the population masses involved, the disparities in numbers make the inevitabilities clear. Thus in the Union of South Africa, there are almost 10 million Africans, 1.5 million people of color, and a little more than 2.5 million Europeans. In Southern Rhodesia, there are about 230,000 Europeans as against 4 or 5 million Africans. Kenya has about 60,000 Europeans and 130,000 Indians, with between 5 or 6 million Africans.

As I have stated, the implications of this disparity in numbers are acknowledged by Europeans everywhere north of the line

I drew and, as I indicated at the outset of this discussion, as Europeans south of the line become frank in their conversations it soon becomes apparent that it is also recognized by them.

In the Congo, for example, the change in attitude on the part of Europeans is most striking. Four or five years ago, when talking to high government officials, to ordinary Belgian merchants, or to small entrepreneurs, they would speak of their future in Africa in terms of an indefinite period. Last year, however, they were saying: "Our children have no future here. We are going to be through!" When they would take the position that the African, in power, would necessarily be hostile to Europeans, and I would state that I did not get this impression in talking to Africans, they would reply: "Oh, you feel that way? Would you like to buy my newspaper? Would you care to buy my business? Would you like to come here to settle?" In Kenya, as I have stated, they are beginning to say: "Perhaps we can hold our position for a while." This is in contrast to Rhodesia and the Union, where Ministers of the Government can be heard to say: "This is a white man's country — and it is going to stay so!"

On the political side, the development of the various forms of African nationalism we encounter today is of major importance. In the early pictures of conquest and control, there was no place for such nationalism. But the paradox of colonialism arises from the fact that it has had certain benevolent facets, for in the long run there can be no such thing as a benevolent colonialism if the colonizing country wishes to retain its controls indefinitely. In realistic terms, the only efficient colonialism in Africa today is that of the Portuguese. But the moment a power speaks of its benevolent colonialism, its idealism, and begins to give its subjects access to its schooling and technology, then, sooner or later, the people are going to use the instruments that have been placed in their hands to obtain freedom of action. And this is precisely what has been happening all over Africa.

Obviously, a people cannot be taught literacy, and then have two wars for democracy, supported by such a statement as that of the Four Freedoms without taking them seriously. Members

of dependent societies cannot be employed in the military forces of the governing power without learning competences which they are later going to use. It is a very interesting fact, for example, that most of the leaders of the Mau-Mau revolt, or what is referred to in Kenya as the Emergency, had seen service in the British Army in Burma. Benevolent colonialism is thus a contradiction in terms, because it inevitably brings on its own downfall.

The Africans, who have an excellent base in their own culture for debate, for argumentation, for political maneuvering, have proved themselves superbly competent to employ European political tactics to achieve their ends, with recourse to a minimum of violence. Mau-Mau was a striking exception; this is one of the few times armed rebellion has occurred on any significant scale, at least in Sub-Saharan Africa, during European occupation. Nationalism has lodged primarily on the level of political action. By walking out of a Legislative Assembly, two constitutions in Nigeria were broken; as I have mentioned, in Kenya, Mboya is using a constitutional technique to break the present constitution. For the constitution requires there be one African Minister in the Cabinet, and no African will take a Ministry; and the obvious outcome must be more negotiation, with constitutional revision, under which the Africans will obtain more political power.

In British Africa, National Congresses are everywhere found, even in the Federation and the Union. In Nigeria, political parties, which have been developed more or less on a tribal basis, are, for the moment at least, coming together so as to obtain independence, though what is going to happen when they get it cannot be predicted. In Ghana, there is almost a monolithic party in control, though a parliamentary opposition also exists. In French territory, African political parties show certain tendencies that indicate they may follow the pattern of the Metropole. By and large, however, the dominant RDA (Rassemblement Démocratique Africain) and the smaller political groupings are all moving toward one objective: self-government.

In Belgian territory, where no participation in government was permitted anyone, African or European, there has been some

political development in the last three years. About that time, a professor at the Colonial University in Ghent, A. A. van Bilsen, published a paper in which he presented a thirty-year plan for the political development of the Congo, which would at the end of this time bring the Congo to independence. Congolese intellectuals picked this up, and a group called *Conscience Africaine*, in Leopoldville, issued a manifesto in which, while not disclaiming future association with Belgium, asserted that thirty years was too long to wait. Then another group, the *Abaco*, published another manifesto which, while agreeing that thirty years was much too long to wait for self-government, flatly stated that the Congo of the future was to be an African State, completely independent of any association with Belgium. When, in 1957, the *statut de ville* was promulgated, and the voting for burgomasters in three major cities I have mentioned was authorized, the Belgian authorities were surprised when, in Leopoldville, the candidates supported by the *Abaco* were elected by large majorities.

Nationalism in Southern and Eastern Africa is somewhat different. South Africa, of course, is independent. At any time it may opt to become a republic, and may even leave the Commonwealth. What we find there is white nationalism holding down the development of black nationalism, which, in terms of good dialectics, is a response to it. Even in the Union, however, the exponents of black nationalism do not talk in terms of violence. I have met many of the new young leaders of the African National Congress, and their thinking seems to be developing in this way: "Since we have no political power, and since our labor is needed, what we must do to get our rights is to exert our economic power by strikes, slow-downs, and other means of this kind." When one considers that it is today illegal for more than ten Africans to assemble, one can see the magnitude of the task these leaders have set for themselves. Yet the Africans are facing up to this, and the younger ones to whom I talked were very frank about the fact that in their determination to attain better conditions for the African they were responding to the currents of thought and action emanating from the more northerly parts of the Continent.

In the Federation, which is pressing for complete independence in 1960, the position of Britain as regards Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland is that Africans are not to be subjected to the control of the local Europeans unless there are guarantees as to their rights in the future. In the Federation as a whole, Europeans are saying: "Ghana has her independence, and Nigeria will soon have hers. Aren't we as competent to govern ourselves as the Africans?" Africans have certain political rights, in terms of what is called a "qualitative franchise." Under this system, the number of votes a man may cast varies with the amount of his income, his education, the type of house he lives in, and the like. However, when looked at in realistic terms, it is apparent that this system guarantees the continuation of European control.

There is another form of nationalism that manifests itself in Africa, and which should not be overlooked. This might be called "religious nationalism." A notable example is the Kitawala, which staged one of the minor revolts in the region of Luluabourg, in the Belgian Congo. "Tawa" is the Congolese pronunciation of "tower," while "ki" is the Bantu prefix that means "thing." So that Kitawala becomes the form for the watchtower movement. There are about 3,000 Belgian Africans who, because of their affiliation with it, are in exile, which means they must live in another part of the country from their own, under surveillance.

These religious movements have developed over all of Africa as reactions against foreign missionary control, and comprise what we technically speak of as "nativist churches." They are independent; they all accept polygamy; and they all have large components of aboriginal African belief and ritual — most of them, for example, include the worship of the ancestors as well as of God, and drums are sometimes used as an accompaniment to singing hymns. The total complex then comes to symbolize wider African control. I may say that this phenomenon is not restricted to Christian sects; the same thing happens with regard to Islam, there being a number of separatist Islamic sects which are a manifestation of this same deep-rooted tendency in African culture

toward fragmentation that has a political significance which would be fascinating to explore, did our time permit.

If I may summarize certain wider aspects of the African political situation as I see it, I would say that while elsewhere the present forms of anticolonialism are something that stress the conflict between white and colored worlds, in Sub-Saharan Africa the acutely bitter quality that it takes on in, let us say, North Africa, is not present.

By and large, relations between Europeans and Africans have not been bad. Certainly the feeling of Africans about the United States is heartening, and sometimes favorable to a point of being romantic. The Cairo Conference was important, but the coming Accra Conference of nationalist leaders will be even more so. I have the feeling that as soon as there is a number of independent Sub-Saharan African States, the influence of the Moslem North will lessen considerably, for Africa, in actuality, is a geographical fiction, with Northern Africa pointing to the Near and Middle East far more than to the territories south of the Sahara.

My feeling about this arises from various conversations I had in centers of French West Africa, where Moslem influence is strongest. At Bamako, in the French Sudan, for example, I talked to one of the important Moslem leaders. Nasser, to him, was only another Nationalist, who could not even feed his own people. "Why should we follow Nasser?" was his comment. In the Sudan, my impression was that the Sudanese are not too enthusiastic about the Egyptians. They have experienced Egyptian control, for it was a condominium that ruled the Sudan; this was why it was called the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. It is of some significance that the technical advisers they are calling on to help them are British, not Egyptians. All this, and much more I have no time to consider, makes me feel that once there is a body of independent African States, they are going to take their own position vis-à-vis the problems of the rest of the world — in the U. N., in various international conferences, and so on, much as Ghana is already doing.

As far as the United States in its relations to Africa is concerned, we must remember that while we have to respect the sensibilities of our European allies, we must also not forget that the future of Africa is going to be in the hands of the Africans. This is obvious from the way in which developments have been going in the last ten years, and in the accelerated crescendo of change; and it calls for knowledge and flexibility in our diplomacy. With this, however, I am confident that we shall succeed in holding the friendship the peoples of Africa have for many years extended to us.

ADDENDUM

During the four months that have elapsed between the delivery of this lecture and the revision of the recorded text, the events that have taken place in Africa give the most effective documentation of the rapidity with which changes, particularly in the political sphere, are taking place. The independence of Guinée has been followed by the Ghana-Ghinée pact. The Accra Conference, held in December, affirmed the separate identity of Sub-Saharan African States, present and future, and provided a stimulant to more action, looking toward African independence. All the other former territories of France have become autonomous Republics within the French Community, but four territories in the west — Senegal, Soudan, Upper Volta and Dahomey — have proposed a Federation, to be named Mali, still within the Community. The political map continues to change; Ubangi-Shari has become the République Centrafricaine, while the Middle Congo has become the République du Congo. Elections in the British Cameroons indicate a desire of those in the south to be independent of Nigeria, and perhaps they may join their fellow-Cameronians who have lived under French tutelage.

All this has had repercussions in Belgian territory. On January 9, riots broke out in Leopoldville, and extended to Thysville and Matadi. They are said to have been inspired by the *Abaco* group, now proscribed, with its leaders under arrest. On January 13, by previous arrangement, a new Belgian policy for

the Congo was announced, pledging the Government to gradual extension of political participation to Congo inhabitants, the abolition of all forms of racial discrimination, and the future admission of Africans to all ranks of government service. *Abaco* being a Bakongo movement, the potentialities that have appeared in terms of a drive to have a future Bakongo state, embracing the lower Belgian Congo, the Republique du Congo, Cabinda and the Bakongo area of northwestern Angola have profound political implications.

Nyasaland and the rest of the Federation have experienced considerable unrest, with military and police reserves being called up in late February to contain growing nationalist activity. And in the Union of South Africa many local protests by women against the newly passed laws, and the anticipated stronger implementation of *apartheid* under Dr. Vorwoerd, do not seem to indicate any lessening of tension.

I should emphasize, however, that the drama of these developments should not cause us to overlook the less striking, even course of events that mark the life of Africa everywhere in its economic, social and other aspects. What they do is to underscore the need of the United States, as I mentioned in my lecture, to exercise imagination in our approach to African affairs, imagination that must be based on sound knowledge and proper perspective, and implemented by flexibility in the implementation of policy.

BIOGRAPHIC SKETCH

Professor Melville J. Herskovits

Professor Herskovits received his Ph.B. degree from the University of Chicago and his A.M. and Ph.D. degrees from Columbia University. In 1923, he received an appointment from the Board of Fellowships of the National Research Council which enabled him to pursue a three-year research into the anthropometry of the American Negro. During this time he was serving as a lecturer at Columbia (1924-1927), and was also engaged in research and lecturing at Howard University during 1925.

Professor Herskovits was appointed an assistant professor of anthropology at Northwestern University, where he became an associate professor in 1931 and a full professor in 1935. Since 1951, he has also been Director of the Program of African Studies.

He headed several field expeditions under the auspices of Columbia and Northwestern Universities to study the ancestry of the American Negro. He visited Dutch Guiana during 1928-29, West Africa in 1931, Haiti in 1934, Trinidad in 1939, and Brazil during 1941-42. He received the title of honorary professor of anthropology from the Facultad of Filosofia at Bahia, Brazil.

During 1937 and 1938, Professor Herskovits was a Guggenheim Memorial Fellow. During World War II, he served on the Council of Human Relations of the Forestry Service of the Department of Agriculture (1939-1945) and as a member of the advisory committee on music in the State Department's Division of Cultural Co-operation. He was also chief consultant with the Board of Economic Warfare during 1942 and 1943.

In 1953, Professor Herskovits spent nine months in Africa, visiting most of the territories of the Continent south of the Sahara (his area of specialization). The following year he visited Dakar, and in 1955 visited Liberia, the Gold Coast, the Belgian Congo and Uganda in connection with the meeting of the C. C. T. A. at Bukavu. Last year, he again made a nine months' tour of the Sub-Saharan Continent, continuing his research into the general problem of continuity and change there.

RECOMMENDED READING

The evaluation of books listed below include those recommended to resident students of the Naval War College. Officers in the fleet and elsewhere may find them of interest.

The inclusion of a book or article in this list does not necessarily constitute an endorsement by the Naval War College of the facts, opinions or concepts contained therein. They are indicated only on the basis of interesting, timely, and possibly useful reading matter.

Many of these publications may be found in ship and station libraries. Certain of the books on the list which are not available from these sources may be available from one of the Navy's Auxiliary Library Service Collections. These collections of books are obtainable on loan. Requests from individual officers to borrow books from an Auxiliary Library Service Collection should be addressed to the nearest of the following special loan collections:

Chief of Naval Personnel,
(G14)
Department of the Navy
Washington 25, D. C.

Commandant ELEVENTH Naval
District (Code 154)
937 North Harbor Drive
San Diego, California

Commandant FOURTEENTH
Naval District (Code 141)
Navy No. 128
Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

Commander Naval Forces,
Marianas
Nimitz Hill Library, Box 48
Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

U. S. Naval Station Library
Attn: Auxiliary Service Collection
Building C-9
U. S. Naval Base
Norfolk 11, Virginia

BOOKS

Millis, Walter. *Arms and The State*. New York, Twentieth Century Fund, 1958. 436 p.

Arms and The State is a scholarly treatise on civil-military relations in the United States. The time period is 1930-1955, with most emphasis on the last decade. It describes in detail the major crises in which this government has participated since 1930, and the associated civil-military relationships which predominated. Aside from the intimate views of the headline personalities discussed throughout, real value in terms of military analysis is contained in the discussions. Completely absorbing to read.

Mouzon, Olin T. *International Resources and National Policy*. New York, Harper, 1959. 752 p.

This volume has been written primarily to be used as a textbook for the study of international resources and their effect on national policy. It is further intended as a review of the many problems and policy decisions on resources that have been the concern of industrial leaders and governmental officials, and consequently is adapted to serve as a guide to those that must deal with these resource problems. Another purpose of the book is to recommend a much-needed strategy of security for the United States, based on production potential, international resource interdependence, and the objectives and policies of other nations. Organization of the book provides, first, for a discussion of the objectives and policies of the United States, followed by a detailed section on strength and production potentials. This latter section presents the factors of spatial, agricultural, energy, material, capital and human resources in considerable detail. The concluding section of the text is concerned with the strategy of security and the best employment of the United States' elements of strength and production potential to achieve this security.

Treadgold, Donald W. *Twentieth Century Russia*. Chicago, Rand McNally, 1959. 515 p.

This book on the history of Russia is, in this reviewer's opinion, a most valuable analytical survey of the broad panorama of twentieth-century Russian and Soviet development. It is an *outstanding* book, with numerous specific merits and few — if any — drawbacks. Dr. Treadgold is especially skillful in

using varied Russian literary sources to buttress his arguments and to illustrate the many complications and inner contradictions of Russian and, more recently, of Soviet patterns of behavior. The book is beautifully proportioned, well organized, and judiciously divided between the pre-1917 events and an analysis of the postrevolutionary story of Soviet development. Although he is no military historian, Dr. Treadgold has done an exceptional job in presenting a detailed and accurate picture of the military aspects of World War II from the Soviet viewpoint.

Bouscaren, Anthony T. *A Guide to Anti-Communist Action*. Chicago, Henry Regnery, 1958. 244 p.

This publication is an excellent practical handbook which outlines in very plain terms the development and aims of the Communist doctrine. The author "pulls no punches" in quoting names and organizations that are promoting enslavement of the free world by advocating World Communism, and he states specific measures on how the free world can defend against this threat. A comprehensive, nontechnical study, this book is written primarily for the education of the common man. It describes the identifying marks of the Communist, and thus helps the unwitting from falling into traps set by the "masters of deceit." Of particular value to the person desiring a greater understanding of Communism are the author's very complete bibliography, appendix, and notes utilized by him in preparing this study. Also, the work is extensively documented by the views of many well-known personalities. As a nontechnical, informative study, this book is highly recommended as a guide to anti-Communist action.

Skousen, W. Cleon. *The Naked Communist*. Salt Lake City, Utah, The Ensign Publishing Company, 1958. 341 p.

The unbelievable success of the Communist conspiracy to enslave mankind has been the result of two species of ignorance — ignorance concerning the constitutional requirements needed to perpetuate freedom and, secondly, ignorance concerning the history, philosophy and strategy of World Communism. For those who take the time to read it, this book will do a great deal toward destroying both these species of ignorance and the human "fear of the unknown" which they engender. Mr. Skousen has recorded and expanded upon the distilled essence of more than a hundred and fifty authorita-

tive writings on the subject of Communism, including Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin, George Kennan, Elizabeth Bentley and Whittaker Chambers. The author writes with the experience and emotion engendered by more than sixteen years of fighting this insidious philosophy as a member of the FBI, and with the depth of understanding gained from more than six years as a teacher and lecturer on the subject. The organizational structure of the book is such that it is easy to read and assimilate. After reading the first two chapters, the reader will understand what motivated Marx and Engels, and will appreciate why so many intelligent and well-educated Americans have embraced the Communist ideology. In the chapters which follow, the reader can view the entire panoramic history of the Communist movement. In one of the later chapters, entitled "The Future Task," the author has set down at least ten "fronts" on which Western leadership can move forward to destroy this latter-day monolithic philosophy of slavery and degradation. Many who read this book will find the chapters on "How to Build a Free Nation" and "Free Enterprise Capitalism" as enlightening as any of the chapters on Communism. This is Communism presented in the *Reader's Digest* manner. As a condensation of all that is important on the subject, this book should provide the reader with a springboard from which he can take off on trips of deeper exploration into those facets of the subject which interest him. Everyone who reads this work will learn and benefit therefrom. An extremely well-written and solidly-documented condensation of the whole of Communist history and philosophy.

PERIODICALS

"26th Annual Inventory of Air Power." *Aviation Week*, March 9, 1959.

Contains many good articles and much statistical information. Of particular interest is the series of articles starting on page 73, discussing the impact of the '60 budget on the services and their plans to reduce the effect of the constant-level budget. Attention is called to "German 'Disengagement' Is Crisis to NATO," and a discussion of the U. S. integrated space plan.

"The Case for the Nuclear Powered Aircraft Carrier." *Armed Forces Management*, March, 1959, p. 11-12.

The editors have reviewed the reasons the Navy wants a nuclear powered aircraft carrier, and have presented arguments why the Navy needs such a carrier. Part of the article presents charges against an aircraft carrier at all, with the Navy's rebuttal to such charges.

York, Dr. Herbert F. "The Antimissile Missile." *Ordnance*, March-April, 1959, p. 837-841.

An excellent description of ARPA's functions and programs, including ballistic missile defense, development of solid propellants, and astronautics.

Levi, Werner. "The Fate of Democracy in South and Southeast Asia." *Far Eastern Survey*, February, 1959, p. 25-29.

A thoughtful analysis of the difficulties facing the successful development of democracy in countries where fundamental concepts, ideologies and social realities are so contrary to those of the Western countries, where democracy was conceived and made a viable system.

Ascoli, Max. "The Countdown Has Begun." *The Reporter*, March 19, 1959, p. 12-13.

States that no peace is possible with Russia, and that it is better for Germany to remain divided than to unify, as the Soviets mean "unification." A truncated Germany is a glaring example of how unendurable is the coexistence of the Communist empire and democratic freedom.

Dodd, Thomas J. "German Reunification." *Vital Speeches of the Day*, March 15, 1959, p. 328-332.

Senator Dodd reviews the question of German reunification and the Berlin crisis, and lists six basic principles upon which he has based a resolution on these matters.

Mansfield, Michael J. "Policies Respecting Germany." *Vital Speeches of the Day*, March 15, 1959, p. 335-339.

The Senator from Montana discusses the responsibilities of Senators in the present crisis, and reviews his nine points for exploration in a search for a positive policy on Germany, marking their similarities to and differences with official policy.

Miller, William O. "World Rapidly Adding More Missile Ranges." *Missiles and Rockets*, March 9, 1959, p. 15-17.

A report on negotiations being attempted for world-wide missile range coordination and a summary of the presently established test ranges.

"Birth of a Missile Base." *Naval Aviation News*, March, 1959, p. 6-9.

The United States Naval Station, Roosevelt Roads, Puerto Rico, has evolved into the Navy's newest and the Atlantic Fleet's largest missile base.

Spaak, Paul-Henri. "New Tests for NATO." *Foreign Affairs*, April, 1959, p. 357-365.

Coordination of the foreign policies of the NATO members, action on the Berlin crisis, and the "perennial" problems relating to atomic armaments are matters demanding future action by NATO.

"Spotlight on NATO." *The Reporter*, March 19, 1959, p. 23-31.

Three authors report on: (1) Britain and the bomb — the future of the British nuclear deterrent; (2) the Southern European Task Force (SETAF) in Italy, its elements, rocket armaments, and its missions, support for Italy's armies and the improvement of Italian-American relations; (3) and a description of the atmosphere — physical and psychological — of Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe.

Travis, Martin B., and Watkins, James T. "Control of the Panama Canal: An Obsolete Shibboleth?" *Foreign Affairs*, April, 1959, p. 407-418.

A reassessment of the strategic and economic arguments for U. S. control of the Panama Canal.

Hoefding, Oleg. "Substance and Shadow in the Soviet Seven Year Plan." *Foreign Affairs*, April, 1959, p. 394-406.

Studies the new Soviet Seven Year Plan, its goals, methods of achievement, and the adequacy of the industrial progress which provides Soviet political strategy with material means for affecting Communist aims.

Smythe, Allen M. "What \$40 Billion in Defense Spending Means." *The Magazine of Wall Street*. March 14, 1959, p. 626-628, 662.

The spending patterns for defense are affected by many factors — crises, actions of our allies, armament development

or obsolescence in Russia, promotion of revolutionary military projects of our own, current strategic decisions — all of which exert wide-spread influence on industrial activity, employment and investment.

“The Underseas Navy.” *All Hands*, March, 1959.

A special issue, devoted to undersea naval operations and the men carrying them out — submariners, frogmen, divers, etc.

Wakin, Edward. “Two-Headed Arab World.” *The Nation*, March 21, 1959, p. 243-244.

Examines the two versions of Arab unity: one championed by Cairo, the other by Baghdad.