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SPECIAL ATTENTION TO THE READER

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STRATEGY AS AN ART AND A SCIENCE

A lecture delivered
at the Naval War College
on 18 September 1958 by
Doctor Bernard Brodie

Gentlemen:

I have been asked to speak on the subject of *Strategy As An Art and A Science,* and it is perhaps a measure of my eagerness to return to these halls that I have accepted this assignment. It is effrontery enough that I, a civilian, should talk to this professional military audience on the subject of strategy, but that I should also do so in terms that might imply a mastery of the artistic as well as the scientific approach to the subject borders on the preposterous. I must disclaim that implication, and then proceed to try to do my best with whatever is left of the subject.

After all, a lecture title, like a book title, has the dual object of communicating some meaning concerning content and also displaying some sex appeal. It is a point of manners not to examine it too clearly for its meaning. On the other hand, it does help for the lecturer in beginning his lecture to know what in general he is going to talk about.

The first thing that occurs to me when we talk about *Strategy As An Art and A Science* is that we seem to some degree to be alluding to two different eras of time. The kind of scientific approach to *strategic problems* represented by my own organization, The RAND Corporation — and by similar organizations associated with the Army and the Navy — dates only from World War II. Notice I said "strategic problems" rather than "strategy." Inasmuch as the latter term suggests something comprehensive, coherent, and on a level of high-policy decision, we are still far from having found out how to do it scientifically.

Nor do I wish to suggest that the approaches to strategy of the pre-World War II era were essentially unscientific. On the contrary, they were good or they were bad in the degree to which they reflected scientific values of objectivity, realism, comprehensiveness, and imagination.

Let me, however, caution you that except for some gifted individuals who have been historically scarce — and who may or may not have had much influence on their own and subsequent times — both art and science have generally been lacking in what presumed to be strategic studies. Whether we have much to crow about now I shall leave to a later point in my talk. But we should not be deceived by our own fine words, and when we are talking about strategy either as an art or as a science we should be clear in our own minds that we mean a study as ideally conceived but only infrequently pursued.

One other distinction I must make clear at this time is that between the study of strategic theory and strategic problems, on the one hand, and the actual practice of strategy by the general or the admiral on the other. The difference is not quite as sharp as it sounds, especially now that the important strategic decisions are made not in the heat of battle but during peacetime in relatively quiet offices. Nevertheless, within the limits of my assignment, I have elected to talk mostly about theory. This perhaps betrays my own bias, for the national interest (and I am sure your own professional interest) is in the practice, not the theory, of strategy.

On the other hand, it seems historically confirmed that when theory has declined so has practice. How could it be otherwise? Generals and admirals have to learn their art somewhere, but it makes a good deal of difference whether they have been trained in an atmosphere of live inquiry about strategy or simply handed down some stereotyped axioms. The terrible example of World War I in its land phases should be enough to convince us of that. I think it is fair to say that while good theory will not

guarantee good generalship, bad theory will certainly guarantee the reverse.

One of the first things that strikes the serious student of strategic thought is how small is the band of really significant contributors to the field. In the strategy especially of ground warfare, the most commanding figure by far is Clausewitz, who has, after all, been dead for over a hundred years. His contemporary, Jomini, was also a respectable figure, though not on the same plane as Clausewitz. However, he has, I think, been far the more influential of the two. He used French, which is a more international language than the German of Clausewitz; even in translation, he is easier to read and understand; he wrote much more; and, above all, he lived much longer. He lived to be a very old man and was prolific throughout all his life. It was Jomini who was read by the men who directed our Civil War, and it was Jomini rather than Clausewitz whom Mahan acknowledged to be his best friend among writers. I think that this is historically an important point because the influence of Jomini has certainly been made more apparent in our own time than that of Clausewitz.

After Clausewitz and Jomini, we find various contributors to special studies in strategy, some of whom were quite good. In Germany, there was the elder von Moltke, who was Chief of Staff in the Imperial Army for something over thirty years (apparently they were not very dedicated to rotation in those days). Then, of course, there was Schlieffen. In France, we had the distinctive work of Ardant du Picq, while in Britain there was the name of that Colonel Henderson who wrote so brilliantly of our own Civil War, and especially on the campaigns of Stonewall Jackson. I could continue to mention other respectable names, of course. Yet, it seems to me there was a profound decline from the time of Clausewitz in the quality of strategic thought. The decline finally took the form of a search for axioms which were simple and easy to grasp, something that Clausewitz himself had scrupulously avoided.

In the field of naval strategy we have one great name: that of the man who was so closely and productively associated with this institution, and whose name has been given to the building adjoining this one. He tends to overshadow a contemporary of his who would otherwise have been much better known — the British civilian naval historian, Julian S. Corbett.

In the field of air strategy we have one name, the Italian general, Giulio Douhet. His writings can all be put together in a book of rather small size; in fact, they have been so put together. Literally, there is no one else. You may think of names like Billy Mitchell and Alexander de Seversky, but Mitchell, though he was full of tactical ideas, really never gave evidence of having any strategic sense at all, while de Seversky, it seems to me, simply rewrote Douhet without acknowledgement and with much less sense of responsibility.

You perhaps feel I am treating very cavalierly a large amount of writing on strategic theory that has continued into the present day, as published in the various professional journals, for example. Let me however assure you, first of all, that the amount is not large; secondly, what amount there is tends (with few exceptions) to be of rather poor quality. I am not speaking of works in naval or military history. These are probably better done today than they ever have been done before; some very fine works in naval and military history have been produced over the last decade. I am talking instead about theoretical works in strategy, works which presume to explain rather than merely to describe the past, or which address themselves to present and future conditions. These tend to be repetitious, stereotyped, unimaginative, and, I am especially sorry to say, usually propagandistic. By "propagandistic" I refer, of course, to the warfare between the services.

Before we go on to speculate upon the aridity of strategic theory in our own times, let us consider the method of the great leaders of strategic thought I have referred to thus far. Let us

first take Clausewitz, who represents what we might call the "philosophic interpretation of military history," and who is certainly the greatest figure in that tradition. Clausewitz was himself a professional officer and also a profound student not only of war but of the science and philosophy of his times. He was a great admirer, for example, of the philosopher Hegel, who was ten years older than he and who died in the same cholera epidemic of 1831. His admiration caused him, unfortunately, to imitate the characteristic Hegelian dialectic in his own writing. Thus, like Hegel, he presents first the thesis of his argument; then, the antithesis; and, finally, the synthesis. This is the characteristic which makes Hegel so difficult to read, and such is also the case with Clausewitz. We see it, for example, in the first chapter of his book entitled *On War* — the only chapter he edited and considered completed before his death — in which he sets forth, first, the proposition that war in its pure form scorns any modifications of violence. This is the theme on which the book opens, and it is developed with considerable eloquence. Then, suddenly, after a few pages, he begins to develop the opposite theme: that war, however, never exists in its pure form but is rather a phase in the political activity of states. This brings him to qualify considerably everything he said previously about war being pure violence.

Because of his dialectical method, Clausewitz is very difficult to understand by anyone who tries to read him casually. But he is easy enough to quote, and some of the sentences in his opening pages have quite a lot of blood and thunder in them. The authority of his words has therefore been used to underline the absurdity of trying to moderate war when, in fact, the whole tenor of his book is that war is a political act and must therefore be governed by the political objective. He returns to this theme again and again throughout the book. Clausewitz has been called "the prophet of total war," when in fact he is almost the very opposite: he is almost "the prophet of limited war."

His deductions on strategy were derived from a close reading of the military history especially of his own times — which

embraced the Napoleonic Wars, but also the wars of the preceding two centuries. Of the ten volumes into which his posthumous works were gathered, seven are devoted to monographs in history. His treatment of military history is comprehensive, careful, and, above all, objective. This, I submit, is still the key to the good utilization of history and strategic studies.

Thus, the qualities that make Clausewitz great are first of all his philosophic penetration and breadth, which make him examine the place of war in the lives of nations and which thus save him from the error which is common to so many lesser figures in the field — the error of considering war as though it were an isolated act, serving no purpose outside itself.

Another aspect of Clausewitz which makes him great is his insistence upon looking at the particular subject he is discussing from all sides. He is just as determined to make clear the exceptions to any rule as he is to set down the rule itself. It is for the latter reason that Clausewitz insists that there are no principles of war; that is, there is no system of rules which, if pursued, will guarantee success.

His contemporary, Jomini, scolded him for that position. Clausewitz has been criticized on the grounds that he left no "system" of strategy; no method which can be indoctrinated by teachers and learned by students. The observation is true, but I consider it to his great credit rather than a ground for criticism.

Clausewitz, notice, was living near the end of an era in which military technology was changing scarcely at all. Whatever changes in tactics and strategy we can attribute to the Napoleonic wars did not involve changes in materiel. The smoothbore, flintlock musket was the hand weapon throughout the entire Napoleonic era, just as the horse-drawn smoothbore gun was the standard field piece. This puts Clausewitz's position in considerable contrast with that of Mahan, who began to write on naval strategy during a period of the most rapid and radical change in naval armament.

Sail had given way to steam, the wooden ship to iron or steel construction and armor, the smoothbore piece to the rifled turret gun, and so forth. Yet the interesting thing about Mahan is that he turned his attention away from these changes that were going on in his own time to what he considered to be the enduring conditions of war at sea.

Like Clausewitz, only more so, the bulk of his writings are histories — naval histories of the days of sail. His great hero is Nelson, of whom he also wrote a biography. His precepts on naval strategy are found mainly in his histories, though he finally wrote (towards the end of his career) a volume called *Naval Strategy* (which I think was published in 1911), which he himself considered intellectually not very successful.

Like Clausewitz, he is interested not only in how men fight but also in why they fight. The articles and essays gathered together in the volume entitled *Armaments and Arbitration* reveal him as having a very considerable sophistication in international politics.

Very different from either Clausewitz or Mahan is Douhet, the prophet of air power. To begin with, he is not only *not* an historian (as the others were), but he explicitly and vigorously rejects the idea that one can learn from a study of history how wars should be fought. He rejects especially the doctrine, derived from Jomini and which I am sure you have all heard many times, that "methods change, but principles are unchanging." In fact, he turns that doctrine upside down, and insists that an invention as radical as that of the airplane must change everything about war.

I, personally, feel that Douhet deserves great credit for his boldness in this respect. I recall that Mahan, in one of the few instances that he let himself utter a dictum, stated that "the *guerre de course* (i.e., commerce raiding) can never be by itself alone decisive of great issues." This, he based mostly on a reading

of the War of 1812. But when Mahan died in December of 1914, the submarine was already at hand to suggest otherwise — that perhaps the *guerre de course* can be decisive of great issues; however, Mahan failed utterly to predict the enormous potential of the submarine as a commerce raider. Certainly no one would have predicted the present potential of the submarine as a strategic bomber.

I think the so-often-repeated axiom that I quoted a moment ago — "methods change, but principles are unchanging" — has had on the whole an unfortunate influence on strategic thinking, encouraging, as it does, the lazy man's approach to novel problems. It has certainly slowed down our adaptation to atomic weapons. If we attribute it to Jomini. we must bear in mind that the kind of changes Jomini witnesses in his lifetime bear no comparison at all with those we see in our own. I think, also, that Douhet deserves credit for scoffing at the kind of encapsulation of knowledge we encounter in the usual treatment of the so-called "principles of war."

Nevertheless, I suspect also that Douhet's ignorance of military history helps to account for one of his more disastrous errors. You remember it was a cornerstone of his philosophy that henceforward the defense would be so much superior to the offense on the ground that lines would be static, even if the defending army was much inferior to the attacking opponent's. This idea he based on a rough reading of World War I (I think a more careful reading of World War I would have shaken that opinion), and it was the kind of error that a person who was as brilliant as he but also a better student of history would probably not have fallen into.

None of the men whom I have mentioned thus far used anything which remotely resembled modern systems analysis, but only in Douhet's case do you see it resulting in really grave error. The others were looking for what remained unchanged in war. This obliged them to depend heavily on historical research. But

Douhet was looking at what was essentially new, without having much to go on except his hunches. Thus, another cardinal error of Douhet's was that he grossly overestimated the amount of physical damage that could be accomplished with each ton of bombs, and grossly underestimated the amount of damage that any great nation could absorb. It was, in other words, his numbers or his quantitative judgments that were wrong. In some instances the error resulted from a failure to use elementary arithmetic.

Finding the correct numbers is what modern systems analysis particularly stresses, and Douhet would have greatly profited from it. To be sure, the atomic bomb came along to rescue Douhet from some of his worst estimates, but I think we are not being excessively purist if we deny him credit for that. Anyway, and more important, the atomic bomb and its nuclear successors went much too far in helping to redeem him from his errors. They have created new problems today which his philosophy fails to accommodate.

This makes us realize that the situation confronting us today points up Douhet's greatest deficiency: he forgot that war fits into a political context and must have a political function. He has not been alone in that respect, however. That error puts Douhet at the opposite end of the scale from Clausewitz, and it makes the philosophy of the latter in some crucial respects more pertinent to our own times than that of Douhet. However, I do not wish to imply that Douhet should be treated with anything other than considerable respect. His thinking was both imaginative and fiercely logical — after all, it was some of his premises that proved wrong, not his logic — and he was, of course, fearless in his opinions. Those are traits that will always deserve admiration and emulation.

I have tried thus far in this hour to help you recall something of the content as well as the method of the leading figure, or figures, in each of the three major fields of strategy. With your indulgence, I should like now to speculate on the reasons for what

I consider the relatively low state of strategic study over the years, now being somewhat improved by the introduction of important new methods of scientific analysis.

One of the first thoughts that comes to mind is that Clausewitz may very well have exhausted broad speculation in his field, just as Mahan later did in his. There is certainly something to that. It was difficult to say original and profound things after Clausewitz. I know, from personal experience in making the effort, that it was difficult to say important and original things about naval war after Mahan and Corbett. And yet, that cannot tell the whole story. Clausewitz did not pre-empt the field of strategy any more than Adam Smith pre-empted the field of economics, yet compare what has happened in each of these fields in subsequent generations: in the latter case the tremendous and still vital growth of theory and knowledge, and in the former case very little growth or development.

Of course it could also be true that people like Clausewitz and Mahan were accidents, anyway — brilliant and original thinkers and scholars in a profession which, let us face it honestly, has never attached too much value to these qualities. The very infrequency with which such men have appeared would argue as much, but the examination of Mahan's career tends to confirm it.

We have to recall that Mahan never received any career benefits from his superb contributions to the strategic thinking of his time, except for assignment to this College. He was retired as a captain and promoted to rear admiral in retirement only along with every other retired captain who had lived long enough to see service in the Civil War.

Mahan, in his autobiography, tells us that he came to regard himself as temperamentally unsuited to the career he had chosen. And, as a matter of fact, we know that he was not too well thought of as a ship's officer by some of his seniors at sea,

the last of whom gave him a bad fitness report as commander of the Cruiser *Chicago.*

The story tells us two things: first, that the Navy did not then place a very high value on strategic thinking *per se;* and, secondly, that Mahan himself largely dissociated his career as a scholar and writer from that as a naval officer. He seemed to feel that his naval career was important to him only in giving direction to his scholarly interest. Perhaps it also assisted him in his mastery of his subject, but we cannot be too sure of that. After all, a number of persons who did not have that background have also contributed to extremely important work, like Corbett and like that very interesting eighteenth-century figure, John Clark of Edinburgh, whose treatise on naval tactics had an important influence on the tactics at Trafalgar.

The Navy, like any military service, finds itself obliged to place a high value on certain other qualities besides scholarship in its officers. Notice that I am not criticizing this; far from it. Qualities like loyalty, physical courage and, especially, leadership are very high on the list. Intelligence is, of course, necessary to master the now very involved techniques, but it also can be fully absorbed in doing so. Since talents of any specific kind are always scarce, the more we emphasize one kind over another the more drastically we degrade our chances of getting the latter kind by any sort of inadvertence.

There is another characteristic of the military profession that I think is relevant. Unlike most of the esoteric professions, the military profession is rather averse to specialization. It is accustomed to specialization in technological fields, but from the career point of view on the basis of tolerance rather than encouragement. Compare this situation with that in the medical profession, for example, where the spectacular advances are the work not of the practicing physician, however specialized he may be in his practice, but of a relatively small corps of workers who are specialized in research.

The next question is: Why do the military services place such a low valuation on strategy (as I submit they do), which is to say on strategic insight and imagination and on the special kinds of knowledge that contribute to it? The answer falls into two parts, and I should like to say something about both.

One answer tends to be that the Navy, or whatever service it may be, does not need many strategists. After all, how many slots are there for commander-in-chief, anyway? As one German officer in the days of Schlieffen said to a young subordinate who was trying to develop his own ideas on strategy: "His Majesty retains but one strategist [Schlieffen], and neither you nor I is that man." However, this answer does not explain why the man who rises to the top — and thus who gets to be the practicing strategist — should be expected to do a successful job at it when he has been selected upward for other talents.

The other reason, I am sure, is the general conviction that strategy is easy. This statement may surprise you, but I submit that the conception of strategy being easy is implicit in all your training. Also, explicit statements to the same effect are not wanting. One good reason is by the late Field Marshal Lord Wavell, who, in taking exception to a statement by Captain Liddell-Hart, wrote the following paragraph:

> I hold that tactics, the art of handling troops on the battlefield, is and always will be a more difficult and more important part of the general's task than strategy, the art of bringing forces to the battlefield in a favourable position. A homely analogy can be made from contract bridge. The calling is strategy, the play of the hand tactics. I imagine that all experienced cardplayers will agree that the latter is the more difficult part of the game, and gives more scope for the skill of the good player. Calling is to a certain degree mechanical and subject to conventions; so is

> strategy, the main principles of which are simple and easy to grasp . . . But in the end it is the result of the manner in which the cards are played or the battle is fought that is put down on the score sheets or in the pages of history. Therefore I rate the skilful tactician above the skilful strategist, especially him who plays the bad cards well.[1]

Many generals, from Napoleon to Eisenhower, have asserted in one form or another the idea that the main principles of war "are simple and easy to grasp," but it is remarkable that even Lord Wavell should have joined in that chorus. After all, the one fatal mistake of his own career resulted from an error in strategic judgment. In one place, he candidly admits as much. In the early part of 1941 — only one year before he published the passage I just quoted — he lent his military authority to approving the British expedition into Greece, and committed a considerable portion of his forces to that purpose, without having first disposed of Rommel in the desert. He excuses himself on the ground that the action would have been justified against any ordinary commander, and then he adds: "I had not reckoned on a Rommel."[2] And he has nothing to say about the fate of the expedition in Greece.

To return to the quoted statement, one notices also the traditionally narrow conception of strategy as "the art of bringing forces to the battlefield in a favourable position" — a conception which falls far short of allowing for any consideration of the ultimate objectives of the campaign — and especially of the war itself — on which considerations Wavell might have sought to excuse the intervention in Greece (as others had done). Above all, the idea that strategy, like bidding in bridge, "is to a certain degree mechanical and subject to conventions" betrays the almost universal assumption that the ends or objectives of the military effort are always given or somehow obvious. Certainly in war (as

1 *Soldiers and Soldiering* (London, Jonathan Cape: 1953), p. 47.
2 Ibid., p. 78.

in many other critiques) it must be true that if one knows without question what one has to do, then deciding how to go about doing it (which is Wavell's definition of "strategy") makes far less demands on the leader than the actual doing. But, as the Korean War indicated, the question of what one has to do may be a quite confounding one the moment it is admitted to be a real question. For wars of the future, it may well be the greatest single question facing us. Also, for a variety of reasons, it is a question on which the politician can give us very little guidance, and we must not expect it of him. Let me digress for a moment to amplify that point, for I think it is a very important one. Remember one thing: you, and a very few civilians like myself, are able to spend most of our working hours brooding about the next war, but the politician is not able to do this.

Even if one accepts for the moment Wavell's own limited definition of strategy, one cannot help marveling at the cavalier way in which he dismisses strategic decisions as not only less difficult but also less *important* than tactical ones. Less difficult (within the limits he applies), they certainly are. The "main principles" of war of which he speaks, and which he so obviously overevaluates, represent for the most part modest refinements upon common sense, and to the thoroughly sensible man the making of a sensible decision upon a line of conduct might be quite easy. In contrast to tactical problems, which make heavy demands on technical skill and which in war are always multiple and often presented under great stress, the strategic decision is as a rule simple and gross in its content, is usually made in relative freedom from the heat and vicissitudes of battle, and it may be of a kind which is made once and for all for the campaign or for the entire war. But how crucial it is that it be correct!

To give you an example from a rather lower level — something which you might call "grand tactics" rather than strategy, but having some of the same characteristics — when Admiral Halsey in the supreme test of his art at Leyte Gulf threw his

entire vast Third Fleet against a decoy force, he effectively nullified both his own incomparable qualities as a leader and as a fighter and also the American advantage in possessing by far the superior fleet. The American landing forces — whose protection was his first responsibility — did not suffer the disaster his action invited, but he did lose the opportunity the Japanese had placed in his hands to destroy their main fleet (to be sure, it was destroyed subsequently and very soon). He made this error, notice, because of his rigid adherence to what he considered to be a "principle of war" — namely, the principle of concentration.

One thinks also of the arresting sentence with which Sir Winston Churchill qualified an otherwise harsh criticism of Sir John Jellicoe's conduct at Jutland: "Jellicoe was the only man on either side who could lose the war in an afternoon." What a world of trenchant meaning lies in that one admission!

Or, to use an example from the air campaigns of World War II, let us remember the decision of the RAF Fighter Command not to engage the German fighter sweeps sent over London at the onset of the Battle of Britain. A fairly obvious decision, to be sure — or was it? It took some stomach to refuse the German bait and let enemy planes fly unopposed over one's capital.

Let us remember, too, that the Allied strategic bombing campaign in World War II is rarely criticized for its tactical handling, which, on the whole, is generally admitted to have been magnificently done. All the important and voluminous criticisms of the effort center around questions which are essentially strategic. Were the basic military resources absorbed by it too great in view of the returns, or vice versa? Could not the air power involved have been better used, even as air power, for other military purposes? Were not the wrong target systems selected? And so forth. Whatever convictions one may have about the answers to these questions (or the spirit behind the questioning), the questions themselves are neither irrelevant nor unimportant.

Finally, on the very topmost level of decision was the Allied election, upon the entry of the United States into World War II, to concentrate on defeating Germany and Italy first, rather than Japan. This, in view of the attack on Pearl Harbor, was emotionally, I am sure, not an easy decision. But what could have been more simple and more obviously correct? We know this commitment was resisted, and we also know how fortunate it is that the basic resolve behind it never faltered.

It is hard to escape the conclusion that Lord Wavell's view reflects a peculiarly professional bias. There is no doubt that tactics and the administration of military forces are the areas in which the soldier is most completely professional. The handling of battles — whether of land, sea, or air — the maneuvering of large forces, the leadership of men in the face of horror and death, and the development and administration of the organizations which must effect these purposes is clearly not a job for amateurs. In these tasks there is no substitute for the hard training and the experience which the services alone provide over long years of training and experience.

It is understandable that these tasks should be much more carefully regarded and much more honored than those which seem to lie on the periphery of the profession, and indeed almost outside of it, which often cannot be tested until war comes — and perhaps not conclusively even then. And yet I feel that we are likely to make far more basic and costly errors in the field of strategy than we ever could make in tactics.

I now have time for just a few words about modern scientific method. First, let us remember that scientific method is useful and is being used in exploring alternative choices but not in making *the* final choice. The latter depends ultimately on good judgment, which is to say on the informed intuition of a person or of a group of persons who have been brought up in a particular indoctrination and whose approach to their work is fundamentally that of the artist, not of the scientist. I am not complaining about this — as

a matter of fact, I don't see how it could be otherwise — I am merely observing it.

The scientific work which gets accepted tends to be that which affects tactical problems rather than strategic ones, or which affects lower-level strategic problems rather than higher-level strategic problems. As a matter of fact until rather recently my own organization, the RAND Corporation, kept out of strategic problems. Only recently has it really penetrated into this area. You may say that it refrained from doing so largely because it was invited to refrain from doing so.

The universe of data out of which reasonable military decisions have to be made is a vast chaotic mass of technological, economic and political facts and predictions. To use scientific method in bringing order out of this chaos is nothing other than the best we can do. When the method is true to its own tenets, it is bound to be more reliable by far than the traditional alternative method, which is to rely on the intuitive judgment of experienced commanders. One reason it is better is that it tends to incorporate in an orderly fashion whatever is good in strong intuition.

However, our experience thus far with scientific preparation for military decision-making warns us to appreciate how imperfect is "the best we can do." Those of us who do this work are beset by all kinds of limitations, including a limitation in talents. Above all, there are limitations in available knowledge. Where the object is to predict the future for the sake of appropriate action now, we simply cannot wait until all the relevant facts are in. Besides, we can make progress only as we cut off and treat in isolation a small portion of the total universal data confronting us. For that reason, almost every study is to some extent (and sometimes to a larger extent) out of context. In addition, we are dealing always with large admixtures of pure chance. These are sometimes difficult to take into full account without seeming to stultify our results, and that, of course, one is naturally loathe to

do. The same is true of the large range of variables which deal with enemy intentions and capabilities. Finally, we are immersed in bias — our own and that of our clients and readers. To the latter we adjust in unconscious or semiconscious anticipation even when we try to be honest — and it is difficult always to be entirely honest.

A word on the great development in recent years of the gaming technique. A casual visitor at RAND might have the feeling that nothing goes on but games. RAND, I think, pioneered in the developments of all sorts of games, including games on a very high strategic level. I have in mind that the Naval War College has a considerable history in this respect, too, but I think it is largely on the tactical rather than the strategic level.

It seems to me that the technique of gaming does at least two things, both of which are extremely important. One is that it tends to make a reality out of the potential and also the intentions nominally ascribed to the enemy. I have had the privilege of studying over the years a number of so-called "strategic studies," and I have often been amazed at the degree to which they are permeated by what one can only call "wishful thinking." There will often be on the first page a list of stated assumptions or postulates which will say something like the following: "(1) The enemy is very intelligent; (2) He has the initiative." When you turn the pages, however, the enemy has ceased to be intelligent, and he has also ceased to have initiative. War gaming does not let you get away with that.

Secondly, and I think almost equally important, the list of the strategic studies which I have seen are really deployment studies. They are not war plans but deployment plans. War gaming forces you to push your thinking beyond the first step, and perhaps beyond the second and third steps.

Well, I see my time is up. What have I tried to present to you this morning? Certainly it was nothing that you can carry

away in a convenient package — and let me say that this was my intention. I have tried to persuade you that strategy is not a simple study; that it is an extremely important one; and that there are no easy answers.

Thank you very much!

BIOGRAPHIC SKETCH

Doctor Bernard Brodie

Doctor Brodie attended the University of Chicago, receiving his Ph.B. degree in 1932 and his Ph.D. degree in International Relations in 1940. In 1941, he was a Carnegie Fellow at the Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton University, and for the following two years he was an instructor at Dartmouth College.

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TAIWAN - - PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS

A lecture delivered
at the Naval War College
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Professor David N. Rowe

Taiwan, with its problems and prospects, now has come to be so important an element in national policy that it is important for us to realize, at least at the outset of any consideration of it, just how weak our fact basis is for public opinion in the United States regarding this matter. I think it is not an exaggeration to say that the general public opinion in this country — which we must take into account at all points when we talk about feasible and desirable policy — is about ten years behind the facts. This applies not only to Taiwan, but it also applies to the Chinese Communists over across the water from there.

In general, the misunderstandings and misapprehensions of the educated public in this country are based upon errors that go in two directions.

In respect to the Chinese Communists, the error is to assume that they are still in the position in China in which they were ten years ago, at which time they were in the beginning of a success. Today, the problems of China — which are built in and which any regime there has to face — are overtaking them. In response to those problems, the Communists seem to be drifting more and more rapidly into applying to these problems solutions derived from Marxist dogma of the Stalinist type. They have become more extreme in their dogmatism about the applicability of Marxism to the solutions of these problems as the problems themselves become more severe and more difficult. As a result, they are alienating very severely and very critically the opinion of their public toward them. They tried a little liberalization a year or two ago, as far as the expression of public opinion was concerned. Mao Tse-tung, who initiated this policy under the label of

"Let a hundred flowers bloom; let all points of view be expressed" (you may remember this), seemingly was so utterly dismayed and surprised by the hostile reaction of the public, of the intellectual elite, to the regime that he immediately had to clamp down. So they have now become more repressive than they ever were before.

On the other side of the Taiwan Straits there is another regime which in educated circles in this country again is thought of for the most part in the framework of facts relating to its situation ten years ago. At that time it was a beaten and discredited regime which had been thrown out of the Mainland and had fled to Taiwan, which was in a depressed situation inherited from the Japanese and the war. That picture has to be modified, today, for the situation is utterly different.

From that, I will embark upon a description of the situation in Taiwan, which I have organized under the three headings of *political, economic,* and *military.* I will try to back up the generalization that I have just given you.

Politically speaking, there is in Taiwan today a disciplined, smooth-running administration. By the facts of history and the facts of life, this administration has been purged of many of the people that contributed to its failures on the Mainland. In addition, there is concentrated in Taiwan today a far higher per capita talent pool than there is on the Mainland. Many of the most important manpower resources of the National Government came over to Taiwan. Instead of having the almost impossible job of governing a continental area (that is, Mainland China), they are concentrated on the governing of an area about the size of Connecticut and Massachusetts put together; instead of a population of 500-600 million, there are only 10 million. So they have seized upon this business. The administration which they have set up has its faults and defects, as all administrations do of course, but it is by all standards an excellent administration.

I have said recently (and I think this is a fair statement) that this is the best government China has ever had in modern times. That is a large statement, but as time goes on in this talk I will make a number of statements which will appear to you to be dogmatic. For me to try to prove that statement (I firmly believe I can) would, of course, consume the better part of an hour's lecture. But this is a judgment based upon the evidence.

This summer I travelled inside of Taiwan itself, during seven weeks in the field, a total of some 3,000 miles by car and airplane. I got into remote corners of the country and observed the Administration at firsthand. I speak Mandarin dialect but I do not speak the local language, which is Fukien Chinese dialect; however, after seven weeks I got so that I could also understand some of that. I will say that in all of my twenty-five years in Chinese territory, ranging all over the Mainland, I have never seen a better administered Chinese area; in fact, I have never seen an area administered as well. That, again, is a judgement for which I cannot take time in providing details to prove it, but it is my considered judgment.

The National Government in Taiwan is largely controlled by the people who came over from the Mainland. The talent pool which I mentioned is largely a Mainland-derived group. But in the case of local government in the Province, there has been a tremendous development of local control. They have five (5) major municipalities with mayors and sixteen (16) prefectures, which are subdivisions of the Provincial Government of Taiwan. Out of the twenty-one (21) mayors and prefectural magistrates, nineteen (19) are people born in Taiwan. Of 1,025 county and municipal assembly members, 923 are born in Taiwan, including 101 women. Of 66 provincial assembly members, 60 are Taiwan-born.

Elections for these people are held every three years. In January of 1958, the most recent election, 78.31% of all eligible voters did cast ballots — a very impressive record in view of the

fact that the experience of these people with the right of self-government is very, very new. It dates back only since the National Government occupied Taiwan, for these people had no such privileges and rights under the Japanese. The voters cast their ballots in secret. The majority rule and secret ballot that have, for better or for worse, been brought into Taiwan, are rooted there permanently. No power that I can imagine can uproot them, because this would be the cause of very grave civil disagreement.

Take the matter of civil rights. It is one thing to have an orderly government, but what about the public rights of people? I have spoken of these under the heading of "political participation." Civil rights have to be seen in Taiwan from the point of view of the war, in which the Chinese Government — or the Republic of China on Taiwan — is constantly engaged with the Chinese Communists.

Subversion and countersubversion are practices carried on by both sides — both by the Communists and the people on Taiwan. The result is that there is a very strongly developed police organization which works to uproot subversive activities, to corral the subversive agents, and to prevent their actions from having any harm. On the other hand, however, this does not mean that there is no open, strong criticism of the government in Taiwan. Strong, open criticism of the government is frequent, is unimpeded, and goes on in the local newspapers — many of which are owned by Taiwan people — and also in publications set up by Mainlanders who came over with the government. The people there get away with a good deal more than one would expect, if one considers the condition of war (which is an emergency situation).

As far as civil order and public tranquility are concerned, a few facts. As I saw and observed during my travels in Taiwan this summer, the country is basically stable. There is no hint of disturbance; there is no hint of civil disorder. In fact, the Chinese farmers on Taiwan are so prosperous today (they are the most

prosperous Chinese farmers I have ever seen anywhere in all my experience — I never saw anything like this on the Mainland) that they have very little time left to think about abstract political matters. They are not interested in changing the government, for the government has given them a "new deal," the like of which they never had before. Under the Japanese, by contrast (the Japanese ruled Taiwan for fifty years, from 1895 to 1945), there were some one hundred major civil disturbances during those fifty years, or an average of one every six months.

There were also some civil disorders in the early stages of Nationalist occupation. These should not be glossed over by any matter of means, for they were very important, and their residue of bitterness is seen in the relations between the National Government and the local people. But, by and large, those differences have now been buried in a mutual search for public welfare. There is no question but that the National Government is devoted to the welfare of the people, so much so (as I argued with important people in Taiwan this summer) that they may be going too far with raising the standard of living.

This seems to many people to be a rather peculiar point of view, and they ask: "Do you mean to say that the standard of living of Chinese farmers can be raised too high?" Well, you know that the standard of living is a matter of comparatives; that it is what one can afford to have. All I was urging was this: instead of keeping on with the objective of raising the standard of living constantly, they should slow down the increases in distribution; they should take off some of the excess of production in compulsory savings, in taxation, and have the government devote that to industrialization. But I got nowhere with such arguments. This is primarily because raising the standard of living of the farmers on Taiwan — and giving these farmers a standard of living which will excite the envy and admiration of all masses in Asia, no matter where they are — is a prime political warfare objective of the government. In their fight of political warfare

they know exactly what they are doing; they are not doing it purely for philanthropic purposes. They have, for better or for worse, come to believe a great deal of what has been said about their failures on the Mainland: namely, that if they had only put public welfare farther up in their scale of objectives for attainment, if they had only reformed landholding and gone in for agrarian reform, they would never have lost the Mainland. This may or may not be true, but whether it is true or not they have embodied this idea as part of their program.

This leads us into a consideration of the economy of Taiwan. I would say that the economy of Taiwan is flourishing. In the first half of 1958, for example, the exports from Taiwan came to a total of some 87.6 million U. S. dollars and the imports came to a total of 67.8 million dollars, leaving a surplus of 19.8 million U. S. dollars of exports over imports. Most of the surplus comes from the sale of sugar, of which about $100 million a year is sold abroad; there is also rice, of which a surplus of some 200,000 tons a year not needed for local consumption are sold almost entirely to Japan. The imports constitute chemical fertilizers, machinery, crude oil, and so on.

Military expenditures are so heavy that the budget must run out of balance. The only thing which keeps it in balance, keeps the currency stable, and prevents inflation is continued U. S. aid. This U. S. aid runs around $100 million a year; thus, over a ten-year period it has come to approximately a billion dollars. This U. S. aid is becoming slightly less necessary as time goes on, with the progress of economic development in Taiwan and, particularly, with the increase of industrialization. Whether this aid can ever be totally done away with is quite another question — I am rather inclined to think it cannot be done away with in the foreseeable future.

A few words about the military situation, since it is so tied into both economics and politics.

You must remember that at all times Taiwan has under arms some 500,000-600,000 men. This is about the same ratio between armed forces and total population as was involved in the level of armed forces in the United States in relation to our population at the peak of our mobilization for World War II. Of course we all know what happened to the American economy and to the American debt structure in World War II: we simply went into debt very heavily. The economy of Taiwan, however, does not have that kind of capacity for debt. The result is therefore that they would be on the road to absolute financial ruin if they kept this size of armed forces intact and at the same time were deprived of U. S. military and economic aid.

There is in Taiwan a system of compulsory universal military training and service — it is compulsory for all. Those who are trained go through a two-year course, are then put back into the civilian reserve, and a steadily increasing pool of manpower is thus made available for expanding the armed forces in time of emergency to approximately double their present size. This means that approximately 1.25 million men could be mobilized out of Taiwan during time of war without breaking down the economy. The rice surpluses would disappear — that is to say, they would not be able to export 200,000 tons of rice a year — but there would still be plenty of foodstuffs for Taiwan to feed its own people.

The military posture of this force of 500,000-600,000 men is strictly defensive. Indeed, it is because the Communists have always insisted they must take Taiwan and rule it for themselves as part of Mainland China that the mobilization in Taiwan is forced on the people. I say the posture is purely defensive. How can we justify such a statement? We can do this by looking at what they have to do with. When one remembers that the Armed Forces of the National Government — the Republic of China on Taiwan — have only a very small navy, that they have practically no landing vessels, that they have practically no heavy transport vessels, that they have practically no heavy bombers, one can see that they

do not have offensive weapons. They have no weapons which would justify or in any way make feasible an autonomous operation of transporting their forces over to make an attack in a landing on the Mainland. This is because of deliberate U. S. policy.

U. S. policy is to monopolize all potentially offensive weapons of war vis-a-vis the Republic of China, and not to allow the Republic of China to have those weapons with which it could determine the time and place when it would try to attack the Mainland. This is a fact, and there is no way of getting around it. Whatever people say about the danger that Chiang Kai-shek will get us into war through attacking the Mainland — well, any such attack would be utter suicide for him without our support, and I mean our support on a very large scale. In fact, the government of Chiang Kai-shek knows perfectly well what its situation is there.

I would describe the long-range military policy of Chiang Kai-shek today in somewhat the same terms as one should describe his policy regarding the Japanese between the years of 1931 and 1941. You will remember that in 1931 the Japanese attacked Manchuria. From that time on, they steadily drove the Chinese Government back and took over more and more of China. Chiang Kai-shek was powerless to retaliate; in fact, he was powerless to turn the tide. He "holed" himself up out in West China, behind the mountains (today, he is behind an ocean barrier — it is different, and yet the barriers are very similar in many ways), and there he sat! This situation looked utterly and completely hopeless, and the Japanese were convinced that it was. They went to him many, many times with offers to surrender and with offers to make peace. They said, "We will give you a big share in government if you will only see the light. What chance have you possibly got to drive us out of your country? You had better surrender while time is still available to you. Let's be reasonable; let's get together!" This, of course, was very tempting.

But remember that Chiang Kai-shek is not only a military man, but a politician. He is a man interested in power — as all

politicians have to be, because that is their business and what they deal in. So when the Japanese tried to get him to go in with them and to combine with them, he said "No!" He did not say that just out of sheer obstinacy and sheer nonsense; he said it because he had a policy and a theory as to how things were going to work out. His theory was: "If I wait long enough, the Japanese aggression, the Japanese expansiveness, the Japanese insistence upon controlling other people (which is aggression, after all) is going to bring them into conflict with people who will have to resist and who will have the power to resist. After that happens — Lord knows how many years it will take — what happens to China will be a function of events, of power situations and power distributions over which I, personally, have no control."

Now Chiang Kai-shek read the lesson of modern Chinese history absolutely correctly in that most of the things that have happened of great importance to China in the last century have been functions of external influences. There has never been anyone in China during modern times who has been able to build enough power to give China a power autonomy. No nation has complete power autonomy. But, to build a regime in China that has power self-determination, and that is not a dependency from a military point of view — well, the Communists certainly have not done that as yet, and I do not think they will do it for another fifteen or twenty years, if then. What will happen in between, nobody knows. But Chiang Kai-shek knew that what happened to China was a function of external relationships, of external power factors. So he said: "I'll sit it out. I know that the rivalries over China and the rivalries in the world are going to bring the settlement of the Chinese business into a framework of international rivalries and international power struggles." Well, he sat it out and he waited it out.

Of course it so happened that the Japanese thought they had to attack us, and they did so. This attack was brought on by their progress into Southeast Asia, which brought them into

frontal conflict with the Western European powers and their colonial empires. When this happened, the United States began to stiffen up, in spite of the fact that 90% of the public in this country considered war with Japan to be utterly inconceivable (and I do not think this is an exaggerated statement). Cast your minds back to the period of 1931 to 1941. Is it not true that the American public not only had no desire for war but had a horror of war, and that they thought two things: "We will never attack anybody — we don't want to. And anybody would be a fool to attack us, because they know they would get beaten eventually."

Well, we just took that all for granted, but no war is inconceivable. You see Chiang Kai-shek knew more about what the Americans were going to have to do than the American people did. Of course he may be wrong, today, but this time he is banking upon the same line of strategy. You may say, "But, man, you are getting awfully old — you are 72. How much longer can you go on with this?" At this point I want to make one fact perfectly clear: this is not a one-man concept; this is not a one-man conviction; this is a concept of a party and a regime.

One of the most interesting phenomena in the study of relations between States is the way in which allies conduct their relations with each other. On the one hand, Ally *A* says "I am having my relations with Ally *B* for this purpose — and this purpose alone." Ally *B* may also state, "I am having relations with Ally *A* for this other purpose — and this other purpose alone." The fact that these purposes may depart from each other with the speed of light, going in exactly opposite directions very rapidly, is something that is often lost sight of.

For instance, there is no question but what the people in the Government on Taiwan consider their relations with the United States and in fact their whole policy in Taiwan solely and simply from one point of view: as something which is going to help them to take back China. The Americans, however, consider the

policy utterly differently. They do not want Chiang Kai-shek to take back China — well, they would like it, of course, if he could do it without costing anybody anything. But to risk a war about taking back China — they won't face that! So our policy is, "No war! We are strengthening you for purely defensive reasons!"

These two policies do not jibe with each other; one policy or the other is going to give, and maybe they have to both give at the same time. But we are in a situation where the policy of the Government in Taiwan (whatever they say about no use of violence, and all that came out in a recent statement) and our policy are utterly different one from the other. These two things do not jibe; they mutually contradict each other. Now I do not think that a foreign policy based upon mutually contradictory aims between the two allies in relation to things both of them want to do can be maintained forever. The question here, of course, is: "Who is going to back down? Who is going to change? And, even more, whose policy is going to be backed up by the events that will take place?"

We hope, you see, that our policy of "No war" will be backed up by a development of the Chinese Communists in the direction of peaceful coexistence. The Chinese Government on Taiwan laughs at such an idea, however, and says: "The Communists are that way and they will be maintained that way. The more trouble they run into at home, the more certain are they to maintain their aggressiveness. Therefore, the American policy of trying to avoid frontal conflict with them cannot succeed."

Now, to bring up U. S. policy in relation to Taiwan, forces us then to consider it in detail as perhaps the single thing which bears most directly on the future prospects and possibilities in regard to Taiwan.

Let us enumerate the chief elements of the United States' policy regarding China at this point; then let us try to analyze this policy in order to see what has happened to it recently and

what is likely to happen to it in the future. The policy can be said to be made up of about seven (7) points.

The *first* of these points is that we recognize the Republic of China as the Government of China.

In the *second* place, we refuse to recognize the Chinese Communists and we also insist that we wiil not allow them to be admitted to the United Nations. We brand them as "aggressors," and we maintain strongly this kind of attitude toward them.

Third, there is a treaty of mutual defense between the Republic of China on Taiwan and the United States. This pledges the Armed Forces of the United States to the defense of Taiwan and of the Pescadores Islands which lie immediately off Taiwan.

Fourth, within the area of Presidential discretion lies the question of taking any necessary military action in adjoining areas which he may deem at any moment necessary for the defense of Taiwan and the Pescadores. In this connection, the President has, until very recently, refused to make any decision as to whether the offshore islands would be defended.

Fifth, there is another factor which has been brought into this policy that is negative: that is, the Presidential statement of 1955 and the recent statements that have come from the U. S. Government imply that an attack on the Mainland by the Republic of China would be a form of military aggression. We do not wish to have, or encourage, military aggression; we do not wish to encourage the solution of political and territorial problems by military force; therefore, we will not allow the National Government of China to attack the Mainland.

Sixth, part of our policy is to maintain constant contacts with the Chinese Communists, and we do this by having the talks with them which started at Geneva and which are now going on intermittently in Warsaw. The talks between ourselves and the

Chinese Communists have had two main contents: in the first place, we are insisting that the Chinese Communists release all American prisoners whom they hold; in the second place, we are trying to get the Chinese Communists to say that they will renounce the use of force in relation to Taiwan and the offshore islands in the Taiwan area. Our aim is to prevent war. The strategy here is to try to keep these people talking as long as possible, with the hope that if they continue talking they will not attack and talk at the same time. I do not think that modern history is very encouraging in that sort of business. We remember that the Pearl Harbor attack took place at the very time when talking was going on at a very high pitch. In fact, talking had been going on with the Japanese for almost a year before the Pearl Harbor attack — and still the attack came. So I think it is not incorrect to say that talks can be used as a *shield* for attacks. Simultaneous consultations and attacks are well-known things in military history. The talks may lull people to sleep about the possibility of armed attack. If they do this to us, in light of recent history and going back only a few years, we have ourselves to blame for whatever may happen.

Seventh, we provide full U. S. economic and military aid to the Chinese National Government on Taiwan. Here is where I brought up the divergence of use, intent, and aims between ourselves and the Chinese as far as this aid is concerned. It is at this point, indeed, where the whole policy becomes rather vulnerable.

Let us now take a look at this policy, trying to analyze a bit of what these separate items mean.

For instance, the nonrecognition of Red China and the recognition of the Republic of China is attacked as being unrealistic. One radio commentator, whose material I read recently, said: "We are acting as though the 630 million Chinese on the Mainland do not exist." I think this is an absolutely unjustified statement. In fact, nonrecognition of their government is a testimonial that we

not only know they exist but are acting in their best interest as we, ourselves, conceive of it. Our nonrecognition policy has, as a fundamental underpinning, the notion that this regime in China is not going to last; that to recognize it would help it to last longer and fasten it upon the Chinese people. Thus, recognition would be to the harm of the Chinese people, and nonrecognition is not a matter of neglecting them.

In the second place, since we do not recognize the government on the Mainland and we do recognize the Republic of China, we are tempted from time to time to think that we can stabilize our relations here and avoid war by initiating the so-called "Two Chinas Policy"; that is, that we can recognize and deal with both Chinas. We started out along this line by the talks with the Chinese Communists at Geneva and Warsaw. We *are* dealing with the Chinese Communists, whether we recognize them or not. But I do not believe that a "Two Chinas Policy" is feasible. I do not believe that it will ever be possible for us to recognize both regimes simultaneously and deal with them equally.

If we should offer the Chinese Communists recognition, today, and still maintain our recognition of the Republic of China, the Chinese Communists would reject our recognition and refuse to enter into diplomatic relations with us. If, however, we insisted on recognizing them, then the government on Taiwan would immediately break diplomatic relations with us. No, as far as the "Two Chinas Policy" and recognition are concerned, I do not think that we can "have our cake and eat it at the same time."

The British are making a pretty good play along this line. They have, of course, recognized the Chinese Communists. They also have a consular representative in Taiwan. Their consular representative is not accredited to the National Government, however, but is accredited to the Provincial Government. This is a very interesting point in international law, and one can find precedents for this. You know, some people say that we should be ruled

by laws, but I think this is a case where the laws are being used to do what one wants to do with them — which is entirely justifiable if one can get away with it.

This policy of dual recognition which the British are toying with in this case is not inexpensive to them; it is not something which they can get for nothing. The fact that they have a consular representative on Taiwan is not calculated to smooth out and maintain on a peaceful level their relations with the Chinese Communists. In fact, mere recognition between the two countries (the United Kingdom and the Chinese Communists) has never resulted in anything of very great value to either side except from a political point of view — and, here, I am inclined to think that the Chinese Communists have had all the better of it. So far as all such matters are concerned, the Chinese Communists in fact have an attitude of complete exclusiveness; that is, that one cannot play both sides, but must lean toward their side 100%; that one cannot argue that a stated condition of recognition will stabilize things.

To show you what this means in terms of the Chinese Communists, I wish to point out that after recognition by Britain (there was a long delay in Chinese recognition and in entering into relations with Britain), at least in one very interesting case, an official Chinese Communist delegation to the United Kingdom refused to deal with the British officials in England and insisted that all of its business should be conducted through the British Communist Party. That sounds very peculiar, and I suppose if one looked for a precedent for it in international law one would not find any. But that, of course, does not bother the Chinese Communists, for international law to them is a Western invention; it is an Imperialist device; it should be broken up. They do not believe in an international order. They will try at all points to do as much damage as they possobly can to the built-in order of the Western State system, which Communism and its World Revolution is designing, planning and working to overthrow, and for which the Communists wish to substitute a World Communist State. This

is not "Internationalism"; neither is it "Nationalism," as we understand it. But it is the image of the future in the Communists' minds. How can anybody do international business with people who do not believe in a multi-State system and who do not believe in the persistence of independent, autonomous State units, but who believe in the total domination of a World Communist State?

Here is where the mere question of recognition and nonrecognition becomes so insignificant, compared to the overall contradiction of aims on both sides, as to make the whole question of recognition and nonrecognition nothing but an academic matter. In other words, one recognizes people and enters into relations with them supposedly for mutual benefit on both sides. The trouble here is that there is one side that is entering into these relations truly from a destructive point of view. It desires to destroy the very structure within which the other side hopes to operate, which is on a basis of mutuality with them. It has a substitute for mutuality: exclusiveness; absolute monopoly of power; the wiping out of differentiations and the wiping out of differences, and thus the elimination of all compromises. How can one coexist with people like that? I think that coexistence is going to be increasingly impossible with the Communists. I use this case of recognition and nonrecognition only to illustrate the problems connected with it.

Now let's go to the policy of the United States in relation to the Republic of China — the policy of preventing any Chinese attack on the Mainland — for I would like to subject that to a bit of analysis.

Here, again, it seems to me, is where we are trying to "have our cake and eat it at the same time." We recognize the Republic of China as the sole legitimate government of China. This means in law (and we still supposedly believe in international law) that this government has title to all of China and that it represents the Chinese people. The fact that it does not possess all of China

is another point. If, by law, this government owns all of China, how can one tell it that it has no right to take back what it owns? Of course one might say, "You may take it back if you wish, but we will not help you!" — but that is an entirely different matter. If the United States says that, then they are afraid than an autonomous effort by the Republic of China to take back what it owns would start a war in which we, ourselves, would get involved; therefore, we wish to have nothing of it. I cannot make too much sense out of this policy. We recognize the Republic of China; we thus, of course, insist that it owns China whether it possesses it or not (which is exactly what we insisted about all of the refugee governments on our side that assembled outside of Western Europe during World War II, and which went back and took what they owned). If they legally own the Mainland, then what is the basis for our insistence that they have no right to try to take it back? I just present this to you, and you can think it over for yourselves. To me, it does not make any sense.

I do not know who sold the Administration this particular line of presentation, but it has to be broken up at some place. Either one has to say, "We don't recognize you as the Government of China," or one has to say, "Well, if you are the Government of China, more power to you if you can go back and take what you own!" But trying to have it both ways at once is one of the most difficult jobs in any field, and certainly it is difficult in the field of diplomacy.

Let's go on to the talks which were held first at Geneva and are now being held in Warsaw. Of course the basic idea here is that we are trying to get the Communists to give *us* something, but we are not talking to them in order to give *them* anything. In fact, I have never been able to find out what it is we are offering the Communists as a *quid pro quo* for the two main things we are trying to get from them in these talks — which, as I said before, are the release of all American prisoners and a flat statement that they will not use force to get what they claim they own in the

Taiwan area. What have we ever offered them as a *quid pro quo* for this? Recognition? No! Admission to the United Nations? No! "You are aggressors," we say. "You are really bad people — perhaps you are so bad that we should not even be talking to you. But we had rather talk to you and keep you talking, with the hope that this will keep you from shooting and from attacking."

This is unilateral diplomacy. This is putting the diplomats into an impossible and untenable position. Something has to give here! It seems to me it is only too obvious that no person who wants something can go and say, "Give it all to me — I give you nothing!" In the world in which we live we are supposed to give a *quid pro quo;* we are supposed to be commercial; we are supposed to pay for what we get. We are not supposed to be able (as the Communists try to do) to put these things on a basis of exclusiveness and unilateralism. Perhaps in Geneva we fell into the trap of trying to imitate the Communists. This, you know, is the kind of diplomacy that we always attribute to them. I do not think, however, that we are getting too far with trying it in this particular case.

What is the real meaning of these talks? Well, the real meaning is to weaken two important things. First, we weaken our nonrecognition policy. In other words we say, "Recognition means nothing, because at the same time that we will not recognize you, we will talk to you." These two things do not exactly jibe. The second thing we weaken is our policy of recognition of the Chinese National Government. At the same time we say to them, "You are the Government of China," we are dealing with the other regime. Then when you put together with this the fact that we have never offered the Communists a *quid pro quo* for anything we have asked them for, I, personally, wonder how the talks have gone on as long as they have. Perhaps they have lasted as long as they have merely because neither side wants to take the blame for breaking off the talks. The Communists do not want to say, "Yes, we refused; we broke off the talks," thus giving the moral advantage to the Americans. The Americans, having got

into this situation, do not want to say, "We are sufficiently obstinate and unreasonable; we broke off the talks," thus giving the moral advantage to the Communists.

Of course the Communists personally do not care about "moral advantage." But they care a great deal about it as a weapon of political warfare. It is the position in which they try to put us that is important in these matters. Of course we try to put them in a bad position, but I think they have had all the better of it in this business. The Communists go on the assumption that Taiwan and the offshore islands are Chinese property. This is China — and it belongs to them. How in the world can the Communists be persuaded to give up unilaterally the use of force in recovering what they consider to be rightly theirs? How can one possibly get them to do this? If they *would* do it for one reason or another, they *could* not do it — if only because, having sworn they will not use force, they would have given away the only weapon they have against us: the threat of war; military blackmail or atomic blackmail, if you will.

Atomic blackmail is a factor that is always present in the situation regarding Taiwan and the offshore islands: we use it against them, and they use it against us. We publicized the fact that the Seventh Fleet has a fantastically concentrated power of destruction perhaps unprecedented in military history. This is atomic blackmail used against the Communists. The Communists use the threat that any attack by us on them, or any military opposition to their aims in this area, will bring on World War III, and that means the Russians will be in it. That is atomic blackmail used against us.

Blackmail, of course, succeeds in direct proportion as the individual subjected to it is afraid of the results. Who is more afraid, or who has more reason to be afraid, of atomic blackmail today — the Chinese Communists or the Americans? Here is something on which, again, I think we must revise our point of view.

We go on the assumption that the Chinese Communists are less afraid of an atomic war than are we, and that the Russians are also less afraid of it than are we. Since we have come to this conclusion, we do the backing down. Every time when this subject comes sufficiently to the fore, we have to seek a way out of the threat of war. Moving to the brink, you see, is easy. But moving back from the brink is something we have to do, because we are more afraid of atomic blackmail than the Chinese Communists.

It seems to me, in fact, that atomic blackmail not only will be used by both sides but *must* be used by both sides. Then this question arises: Which side is going to win in the struggle to use atomic blackmail? At this point, it seems to me that the United States and our side can win just as easily and just as effectively as can the other side. At all times we must be very careful to make perfectly plain to the other side exactly what atomic war would mean to it; we also make plain to the other side that any major conflict today is going to be an atomic war. Here, of course, we run into the great moral blocks, the great fears, and the great apprehensions among our people and those on our side. Our people do not like the word "blackmail," to start with. And when the word "atomic" is attached to it, they like it even less. They have a moral tenderness, you see, that the other side does not feel — the other side has no such feeling as this. As a result, the people in this country who understand full well that the weapon of atomic blackmail must continue to be used, who are willing to use it, and who understand it can be used successfully, are hindered by the prevalent state of public opinion (which is unreal in the extreme. as far as I am concerned).

I think that the longer we keep on talking with the Chinese Communists in Warsaw, the more we are going to dig ourselves into an impossible diplomatic position. Since this is so, and since by the nature of the situation we have to prove how reasonable we are (we do not expect the Communists to prove how reasonable they are, but we think they are basically unreasonable), then in

every such case where we get ourselves into a diplomatic impasse of the kind we are building up at the Warsaw talks it will be the United States that will back out. The back-out over Taiwan and the offshore islands has already begun.

What is the shape of the back-out that has already begun? Well, we have gone to Chiang Kai-shek and have made him publicly state what he has said privately to us for several years: namely, that he knows he cannot go back alone and land on the Mainland by force. For what purpose was this done? Was this supposed to be something designed to make the Chinese Communists feel happier? Not exactly that — we are not really supposed to care too much whether they feel happy or not. It is aimed at our allies, whom we say are so afraid of war; it is aimed at our public, which we also think is so afraid of a possible war. So Chiang Kai-shek has now to say publicly — in front of the whole world — what everybody has known to be true but has been kept decently hidden in private up to this point.

This is like taking one of your aces (if you have two or three), or kings or queens which you are holding in your hand, and playing it at this point. The face is up; everybody knows what it is, and it is spent. Chiang Kai-shek cannot say that again, at least with any profit. We are thus inducing a process of gradually giving away our hand to the other side and playing it out. This is somewhat like the issue of the offshore islands in this sense. If the issue of the offshore islands could only be gotten rid of, would we not feel a great deal happier? The question which then arises is this: How many cards are there in your hand to play in this game? In other words, after you have gotten rid of the offshore islands, after you have played and perhaps won something with it (don't just give it away, but get something for it — say, get the Japanese, the Australians, and the Filipinos to come in with an alliance to defend Taiwan), the question which this then arouses is: What are you going to give away next? You must have a plan for this, you know. Well, what is next?

There are the Pescadores Islands — a few thousand fishermen live there. All the old arguments will be repeated: the presence of a Chinese Nationalist naval base in the Pescadores constitutes a threat of aggression against the Mainland; this makes the Chinese Communists uncomfortable; since, when they get uncomfortable, they get nasty and threaten us with atomic blackmail, if we can only give them these islands and make them feel comfortable they will forget all about this.

It seems, however, for better or for worse, that hunger is built into the psychology of these people. They will still remain hungry. Well, what about that? We had some experience with that problem, too. We said before 1937-39 that there were at least two classes of nations in this world: some of them were the "haves" and the others were the "have nots." We said if we only could make Hitler see reason, that we would be glad to make Germany a "have nation," at the expense of Czechoslovakia, of course. The question which arises is this: How much does Germany need to become a "have nation?" This complicates the business. If we could only wipe out the difference between people who have everything they think they will ever want and people who know they haven't got everything they think they will ever want — then we could have peace and stability in this world. Of course we could do that easily enough by abolishing the human race — that would be simple — and sometimes people think that is where our policy is going to lead us. But you cannot say, "I am going to give them this once and for all, because it will solve or settle the problem," because it does not solve anything.

So under those circumstances why not just be *unreasonable?* Is that asking too much? I do not think so. There comes a time when the virtue of flexibility, the virtue of compromise, and the virtue of reasonableness become not virtues. There are times when those virtues have to be thrown out the window in favor of other virtues which we perhaps do not like quite as much but which are necessary for survival. Those other virtues are: the virtues

of insisting that we will not give an inch on anything, that we are going to resort to principle and are going to say, "Your hunger is going to stop here; you are going to have to pull your belt in a notch for we are not going to try to satisfy your hunger."

In this business of China, as it lines up today, the future of Taiwan seems to me to be increasingly becoming a matter of surrender. "Oh, no," we say, "we are only insisting on settling the issue of the offshore islands, of removing this thorn in the side of peace, because we want to fall back on the main issue — which is Taiwan." I do not think that Taiwan is the main issue at all, for when the time comes then people will say, "What are the intrinsic values of Taiwan?" They will soon find that there are many reasons for denying there is any need at all to hold on to Taiwan. What are 10 million people? If you are willing to sacrifice 60,000 people on the offshore islands, 10 million people is just a matter of quantity, isn't it? The principle of saying, "The 60,000 people on the offshore islands should be given to the Chinese Communists," if applied widely enough, will lead us right to Newport, Rhode Island, will it not? Of course! And it will lead us right into this room!

It would be only too easy to sacrifice Taiwan. Personally, I can make some good arguments for giving up Taiwan. I can make a number of good arguments — the only trouble is that I cannot convince myself. But there are many people already convinced of it. All they want to do is to find a delicate, polite, and "moral" way out of this problem. The first thing to do, they say, is to dispossess the government that runs the island. We know that is an emigre government (it is Chinese, but it came from elsewhere); therefore, the thing to do is to dispossess it. I tell you that this idea again is ten years out-of-date. If you were to hold a free plebiscite with the consent of the National Government (which, I assure you, is impossible to get), I would argue that the Nationalist Party would win an overwhelming vote of confidence from

the local people. So there goes one of your answers — there goes one of your solutions.

Well, if we cannot dispossess this government, we will just say: "Look! We cannot afford to keep up economic aid to you any more for it is too much of a drain on the budget. So, economically, you are going down the drain!" This perhaps, we can do. We can perhaps economically destroy Taiwan if we set about it. If we disrupt it enough, perhaps dissatisfactions over the years will become sufficiently intense so that somebody else will come in, take it over, and run it. We will then have gotten rid of the island. We will also have convinced everybody else in the area who has similar problems to this, and who is dependent upon relations with the United States, that perhaps this is also the answer that is in the cards for them.

The political bandwagon under the direction of the Communist World will then come to take in Japan, for example. After Japan is organized into the Communist orbit — economically, if not politically — it will then be possible to have a generation of peace, a peace during which time the manpower, the know-how, and the plant facilities of the Japanese economy will be hooked to the resources of the Asian Continent for the creation in reverse of that "Greater East Asia co-prosperity sphere" which the Japanese were aiming at creating during the last war — only this time it will be in the hands of the Communists. If this makes you feel any more comfortable than it did to contemplate, during the last war, the "Greater East Asia co-prosperity sphere" in the hands of the Japanese, why I must confess that it does *not* make *me* feel any more comfortable.

These are the inevitable results of any policy which is based upon the notion of getting rid of problems by giving them away, by denying they exist, or by finding a way out short of insisting that you are going to deal with them yourself and not give them to somebody else to handle for you. Getting rid of your

problems in this way will mean getting rid of all the outposts in the Western Pacific region; it will mean the concentration of all Eurasia in the hands of the Communists. This will eventually mean the isolation and destruction of every ally whom we have and of their complete disillusionment with us; it will eventually mean our own surrender, because by that time we will be faced with forces against us which will be unfeasible for us to handle by ourselves.

People say that the defense of Quemoy is impossible. Personally. I do not think this is true — I believe that Quemoy can be defended and that is is being defended. But if Quemoy cannot be defended, how can the United States of America be defended? They say that these islands are vulnerable. Well, one of the most vulnerable places which I know of on the globe today is New York City. I do not really know of any way in which to defend it. The only defense of it is to insist that an attack upon it will bring about results which will make the other side lose more than it gains out of the attack. This can be done today on the few acres of Quemoy real estate much more effectively than it can be done in relation to Manhattan Island. This is really the issue on which the whole business is based.

You have speaking to you here today one of those somewhat unregenerate, old-fashioned characters who still believes that not all wars are bad wars. Has it ever occurred to you that the follies of our public opinion on current foreign policy are based upon the illusion that there is no such thing as a good war — has it ever occurred to you that this is so? I do not argue that wars are inherently good. But the idea that there can be no such thing as a good use of military weapons, a good use of military power, that there can be no such thing as a good war, I would argue was disproved by the last war and disproved by World War I as well. It was also disproved by most of the wars in which the United States has engaged. This includes the Revolutionary War, in which we had the help of certain allies in our rather weak condition. We were dependent upon Lafayette and the French, as

the Battle of Yorktown and other battles as well amply demonstrate.

The time when these alliances are not going to be necessary, the time when allies are not going to have to come through and deliver in terms of blood, treasure, and hardware — those times have not yet arrived. It is premature to think they are going to arrive in the near future. If this is the case, then, the place to defend is the *first* place which you can defend. The thing *not* to do is this: to seek the last possible place and give away all the first places.

Thank you!

BIOGRAPHIC SKETCH

Professor David N. Rowe

Professor Rowe was born in Nanking, China, and has traveled extensively in the Pacific area, China, Korea, Japan, Philippines, Hong Kong, Siam, Cambodia, South Vietnam, Malaya, Indonesia, Ceylon and India. He received his A.B. degree from Princeton University, his A.M. degree from the University of Southern California, and his Ph.D. degree from the University of Chicago.

He was a General Education Board Fellow in Humanities at Harvard University during 1935-1937 for the study of Chinese and Japanese languages, Chinese history and historiography. The following year, he was a Rockefeller Foundation Fellow at the College of Chinese Studies at Peking, China, for the study of the Chinese language and history.

From then until 1943, Professor Rowe was a lecturer in Far Eastern Affairs in the School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton University, where he taught the Chinese language and Social and Political Institutions of Eastern Asia. During the period from November 1941 to July 1942, he also served as a Special Assistant to the Director of the Branch of Research and Analysis in the Office of Strategic Services. He was then sent to Chungking, China, by the Far Eastern Section, and while there held an appointment as Special Assistant to the Ambassador at the American Embassy in Chungking.

Professor Rowe was a Research Associate at the Institute of International Studies, Department of Foreign Area Studies, at Yale University during 1943-1951. From November 1943 to September 1945, he served as a member of the War and Peace Studies Project for the Council of Foreign Relations in New York. At various times during 1945 he was also a lecturer for the Training Division of the Bureau of Naval Personnel, the Office of War Infor-

mation, and the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, in addition to being a member of the International Secretariat, United Nations Conference on International Organization, at San Francisco.

During 1945 and 1946, Professor Rowe was Director of the Staff Officers School for Asiatic Studies at Yale University. For the next two years he was the Director of the Undergraduate and Graduate Studies, Division of Foreign Area Study, at the same institution, and then served there from 1949 to 1951 as Director of Graduate Studies on East Asia. At various times since 1948, Professor Rowe has been consultant to the United States Consulate General at Shanghai. He has also held the position of consultant with the United States Air Force, the Stanford Research Institute, George Washington University, and the Department of the Army (Chief of Psychological Warfare).

Professor Rowe has lectured at the National, Naval, Army and Air Force War Colleges. During 1954-1956, he was a representative to The Asia Foundation in the Republic of China (Taiwan), a Visiting Professor of Political Science at the National Taiwan University, and Vice-Chairman of the Taiwan Committee at the China Institute in America. At the present time, he is Research Professor of Political Science and Director of Graduate Studies in International Relations at Yale University.

RECOMMENDED READING

The evaluation of books listed below include those recommended to resident students of the Naval War College. Officers in the fleet and elsewhere may find them of interest.

The inclusion of a book or article in this list does not necessarily constitute an endorsement by the Naval War College of the facts, opinions or concepts contained therein. They are indicated only on the basis of interesting, timely, and possibly useful reading matter.

Many of these publications may be found in ship and station libraries. Certain of the books on the list which are not available from these sources may be available from one of the Navy's Auxiliary Library Service Collections. These collections of books are obtainable on loan. Requests from individual officers to borrow books from an Auxiliary Library Service Collection should be addressed to the nearest of the following special loan collections:

Chief of Naval Personnel,
(G14)
Department of the Navy
Washington 25, D. C.

Commandant ELEVENTH Naval
District (Code 154)
937 North Harbor Drive
San Diego, California

Commandant FOURTEENTH
Naval District (Code 141)
Navy No. 128
Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

Commander Naval Forces,
Marianas
Nimitz Hill Library, Box 48
Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

U. S. Naval Station Library
Attn: Auxiliary Service Collection
Building C-9
U. S. Naval Base
Norfolk 11, Virginia

BOOKS

Rockefeller Brothers Fund Special Studies Report III. *Foreign Economic Policy for the Twentieth Century.* Garden City, New York, Doubleday & Company, 1958, 82 p.

This report is the work of Panel III of the Rockefeller Brothers Fund Special Studies Project, and it seeks to outline the economic challenge facing the mid-twentieth century world. Economic and social growth has become a matter of primary concern everywhere, and it is felt that, by basing these growth aspirations upon national and human dignity, a more enduring world community will result. This report traces the rise of the current problem, from the disintegration of the nineteenth-century political system, and the emergence of the world-wide desire for a better living standard to be achieved through political action, if purely economic efforts were not sufficient. And this world-wide social revolution has attained an even greater urgency because of the rise of militant Communism. The interdependence of nations of the world is demonstrated, and the importance of the United States as a market and as a source of supply fundamental to the economic growth of the free world. The report endeavors to outline an economic structure to be followed by the United States to advance world-wide economic growth. Many specific recommendations are made: on financing, on agriculture, on the role of private enterprise, on trade policies, on regional and on functional development arrangements, and others. The lack of continuity and meaningful purpose of our present foreign economic policy is decried, and it is advanced that implementation of the recommendations made in the report will greatly strengthen the United States and the free world.

Kracauer, Siegfried, and Berkman, Paul L. *Satellite Mentality.* New York, Praeger, 1956. 270 p.

This study records and analyzes interviews conducted in 1951-52 with several hundred escapees from Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary. It provides a detailed account of the manner in which communism works amongst peoples of satellite states and methods by which the latter offer resistance to Communist pressures. The political attitudes and hopes of peoples of these

countries are documented in a clear, forceful manner. Information difficult to obtain under totalitarian regimes is gained concerning how and why these people feel the way they do about their government and the state of the world. To some extent, this study should aid in indicating ranges in response by satellite populaces to future events. While it is limited because of the nature of the material on which it is based, the study sheds considerable light on possible developments as related to Western propaganda efforts directed at the satellite orbit; the effect of "limited" wars, such as Korea, on satellite nations; and the results which peaceful coexistence will have on the will of enslaved peoples to continue effective resistance.

Schroeder, Paul W. *The Axis Alliance and Japanese-American Relations.* New York, Cornell University Press, 1958. 246 p.

The principal contribution of this book is that it underlines the fact that Japan's role in the Axis, prior to Pearl Harbor, was a very vague one. Few Americans understood that Tokyo had little interest in the European War and still less in the cause of Hitler, but was merely jockeying for position in the world power balance when signing the Tripartite Pact. Strangely enough, from this distance, it seems that the Japanese hoped their Axis tie might somehow motivate the United States to a settlement in the Pacific. Mr. Schroeder shows how it had the opposite effect, largely because Secretary Hull was unable to put any credence in Japanese allegations of real desire for a peaceful solution. It was the implacable Hull who dissuaded President Roosevelt from meeting with Prince Konoye when FDR wavered toward Tokyo's blandishments. Mr. Schroeder has drawn an excellent picture of the naivete of United States diplomacy at a time when the hard-boiled pressures of power diplomacy were beating upon us just before World War II. He clearly indicates the American predilection for high moral preachment in international dealings, and our failure realistically to appraise the situation because of our historic persistence in trying to fit all peoples and nations into our own mold.

Yutang, Lin. *The Secret Name.* New York, Farrar, Straus and Cudahy, 1958. 268 p.

This book is obviously from the pen of a master, Lin Yutang, assuming the role of Prosecutor of Communism. His theme is that Communism will fall as a result of What Communists have done to labor. He describes the Communists' inversion of language: they are the worst of capitalists, a few bureaucrats enjoying the fruits of all capital and labor; they are the ruthless colonial power, with 21 colonial states. He calls on the free world to take the ideological and psychological offensive. There are so many books which "everyone should read" that one hesitates to say that this is another. And, yet, that is what the evaluator believes. The book is well-documented and is backed up with much detail. Many of the nasty details are prewar, but that does not invalidate them.

PERIODICALS

MacLean, Guy R. "Yugoslavia: The 'Trojan Horse' of Communism." *International Journal*, Autumn, 1958, p. 287-297.

Reviews Yugoslavia's differences with Russia, her industrial, agricultural and foreign trade situation, and concludes that her thesis of a peaceful transition to socialism holds some real dangers for orthodox Communist idealogy, though satellites cannot afford to support this heresy as yet.

"Review of the Situation in the Far East." *Army Quarterly and Defence Journal*, October, 1958, p. 19-22.

A review of the Far Eastern situation, with emphasis on Malaya, Singapore, Burma, Indonesia and Indo-China as of 20 August 1958.

Halmos, E. E., Jr. "Here's the Missile Industry." *Missiles and Rockets*, November 17, 1958, p. 11-14, 53.

A short resume outlining the extent of the U. S. missile industry.

Cagle, Malcolm W., Commander, United States Navy. "The Neglected Ocean." *U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, November, 1958, p. 54-61.

Concerns the importance of the Indian Ocean area to the Western Bloc and what effects its control by the Soviets would have on the spread of Communism; includes a discussion of what should constitute a U. S. South Asian fleet which could maintain adequate control of the area.

Stanbury, Max E., "The Man Most Likely . . ." *World Oil*, November, 1958, p. 149-154.

A humorous diagnostic article on the sure roads to failure — the habits and attitudes that mark a man for failure.

Sorensen, Max. "Law of the Sea." *International Conciliation*, November, 1958.

The entire issue is given over to an appraisal of the Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea by the head of the Danish delegation to the Conference.

Sullivan, E. Kemper. "Nuclear Energy and the American Merchant Marine." *Marine News*, November, 1958, p. 14-15, 39-40.

Discusses the nuclear-powered merchant ship program, using the N. S. **Savannah** as a prototype, and comparing its costs with those of a conventionally powered ship.

Finer, Herman. "Reflections on the Nature of Arab Nationalism." *Middle Eastern Affairs*, October, 1958, p. 302-313.

Inquires into the background, the components and the manifestations of Arab nationalism, which, under Nasser, is more a pan-Arabism, fostering nationalism by means of attacks on imperialism, kinship with Communism, heavy armament, and revolution, rather than by domestic social welfare and economic advancement.

Spaak, Paul-Henri. "NATO and the Communist Challenge." *International Journal*, Autumn, 1958, p. 243-250,

Attributes the need for NATO to the U. N. right to veto, which violated its effectiveness in foreign policy; it then goes

on to consider the possibilities and potentialities of East-West negotations and the new trend in international affairs, together with resultant consequent on NATO's success.

Owen, Professor John E. "Pakistan, Nation of Problems." *The National and English Review,* November, 1958, p. 186-190.

Considers the manifold serious problems in Pakistan — the poverty, the refugee situation, the black market, politics, illiteracy, hygiene — which the new nation faces doggedly without tending toward Communism.

Ronimois, H. E. "New Directions in Soviet Economic Policy." *International Journal,* Autumn, 1958, p. 280-286.

Examines the new Soviet policy of scrapping of central ministries in favor of territorial Economic Areas, presenting reasons for the change, the pattern of organization, doubts regarding the wisdom of abolishing central ministries, and application of the system to agriculture as well as industry.

Jacobson, Harold Karan. "The Soviet Union, the UN and World Trade." *The Western Political Quarterly,* September, 1958, p. 673-688.

The Soviet's growing interest and action in the work of the UN in the field of international trade are appraised and effects considered.

Hoover, George, Commander, United States Navy. "Highway to the Stars More Than a Dream." *Missiles and Rockets,* November 17, 1958, p. 19-26.

A development of a system for space navigation.

Kaplan, Morton A. "The Calculus of Nuclear Deterrence." *World Politics,* October, 1958, p. 20-43.

A model game developing the view that the threat of counterattack is the best strategy against the possibility of aggression, and that a nuclear counterattack is the most effective version of that strategy.

Simons, Rodger L. "Sweden's Defense Problem." *U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, November, 1958, p. 62-70.

The author discusses the nature of Sweden's defense problems, and what they have already accomplished in establishing themselves as an armed neutral; their strategic importance to the Baltic is emphasized.

Morgenthau, Hans J. "The New United Nations." *Commentary*, November, 1958. p. 375-382.

An analysis of the weaknesses of the Security Council and the General Assembly, stemming from the use of the veto, disintegration of the two-thirds majority led by the U. S., vain attempts by the United States and Russia to fashion this majority in support of their respective policies, and the attempts of each to minimize the voting support of the other side.

Cargo, William I. "The United Nations and National Security." *The Department of State Bulletin*, November 10, 1958. p. 725-733.

Comments on the nature of the current U. S. security position, and then discusses the role of the U. N. in relation to our national security.

"Defense and the Economy." *Forbes Magazine*, November 15, 1958, p. 13-24.

A group of articles focusing on the Navy, its management, where the money goes — what we have "in being," where it is, and what it's doing — and, finally, a discussion of Navy contracts and the impact of the expenditure on the economy in general and investor-held corporations in particular.