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REALISM IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

a lecture delivered
at the Naval War College
on 2 October 1957 by
Professor Hans Morgenthau

Gentlemen:

The problem of "realism in foreign policy" is a special manifestation of a general philosophic and intellectual problem which has been with us almost since the beginning of Western civilization. There are two fundamental attitudes that a man can take toward a political problem and a social problem in general. Either he can start with the assumption that this problem is the result of some historic incident, of some faulty institution or deficient social arrangement, and that by changing this arrangement or by transforming the institution — that is, by bringing about some kind of reform — the problem can be solved once and for all. Or he can assume that the fundamental problems which have confronted man from the beginning of history are the result not of ephemeral historic configurations but rather stem from the very essence of human nature. They, then, cannot be made to disappear, but they can only be mitigated; they can at best be temporarily submerged or shoved into the background; they can be transformed; but they cannot be eliminated altogether.

In politics, and in international politics in particular, those two attitudes have manifested themselves in the juxtaposition between "realism" and "idealism" or "utopianism." There has been a school of thought, particularly strong since the beginning of the twentieth century and making particular headway in the Anglo-American countries, which believes that what we call "power politics," with all of its disagreeable and dangerous manifestations, is a kind of historic accident — the result, let me say, of the remnants of aristocratic government. For instance, the British philosopher Herbert Spencer believed this when he said that war was

the result of aristocratic society; that in an industrial society men would find an outlet for their combative instincts in financial investments, in stock exchange speculations — a somewhat utopian approach, as we now realize.

There are others who believe that a democratic form of government would, by itself, eliminate war and what is called "power politics." Woodrow Wilson is the outstanding example in our country of those who believe that if one could only establish democracy throughout the world one would thereby have eliminated all by itself most of the risks and evils which we have historically associated with foreign policy.

Take, for instance, a school of thought which played an enormous role in the nineteenth century: the idea that free trade, the elimination of trade barriers, all by itself would bring about the millennium in international politics. As the British liberal leader, Richard Cobden, said: "Free trade, what is it? The international law of the Almighty."

Or take the confidence in international law and, more especially, international arbitration. In the late nineteenth and the first decades of the twentieth century it was quite widely believed that war and international conflict could be eliminated if only all nations would pledge themselves to submit all international disputes to compulsory arbitration.

Finally, the idea has been widely held that international organization *per se* provides a kind of panacea for the ills of international politics; that the very fact of a League of Nations or a United Nations would provide an alternative to what is generally called "power politics."

Perhaps all of this is summed up in the statement of a leader of nineteenth century British liberalism to the effect that the test of free communities and of democratic societies in future times would be whether or not they had a foreign policy to begin

with. In other words, it was the abolition of foreign policy — to get away from this dangerous and risky game — which was at the bottom of those utopian approaches to foreign policy.

It would be a mistake to believe that this utopian approach has been discredited completely by the succession of past disappointments and disillusiones. It always reappears in a new garb, in a new setting, in a new formulation, testifying to the innate human tendency to escape from the burdens of power politics, from the risks and liabilities of power itself, and to find refuge in some kind of millennium to resort to some kind of panacea which only needs to be put into practice in order to bring mankind the blessings of its beneficial results.

Think, for instance, of the present utopian expectation according to which any drastic change in the Russian system of government or even in the outlook of the present leaders of the Soviet Union would somehow do away with the problems with which the Soviet Union has confronted us since the end of the Second World War. Here, again, we are in the presence of this assumption that the troubles of international politics are the result of some isolated, circumstantial event, such as Stalinism or Bolshevism. Do away with Stalinism or Bolshevism, and you will have done away with the main problems of international politics themselves.

This, it seems to me, is a complete misunderstanding of the nature of international politics. I would say, and I have said many times before, that if the Czars still reigned in Russia, that if Lenin had died of the measles at an early age, that if Stalin had never been heard of, but if the power of the Soviet Union were exactly what it is today, the problem of Russia would be for us by and large what it is today. If the Russian armies stood exactly where they stand today, and if Russian technological development were what it is today, we would be by and large confronted with the same problems which confront us today. Certainly we would not have the problem of subversion in the same

way in which we have it today, but we would have a bipolar political world, and the United States would have to bend every effort to maintain a balance of power between itself and so powerful a Russia. So the expectation that a change in the form or in the composition of government or even in the outlook of a particular government could materially affect the problems which face us today is a truly utopian expectation.

I could go on and on to give you examples. I'll give you another one which just comes to my mind: the expectation (which was very prevalent in the last year or so of the Second World War) that at the end of that war, with the enemies defeated, we would enter into a kind of millennium from which, again, power politics with all of its manifestations would be dispelled. Secretary of State Cordell Hull, when he came back from the Moscow Conference of 1943, at which the establishment of the United Nations had been agreed upon, said that the United Nations would usher in a new era in foreign policy by doing away with power politics, with alliances, with the armaments race, with spheres of influence, and so forth. And he repeated this utopian expectation much later in his memoirs.

This is another example of the belief that the difficulties which confront us, the risks which threaten us, the liabilities which we must face in international affairs are the result of some kind of ephemeral, unique configuration; that if you do away with the latter you will have done away with the liabilities, the risks, and the difficulties as well. This belief is mistaken; for it is the very essence of historic experience that whenever you have disposed of one danger in foreign policy another one is going to raise its head. Once we had disposed of the Axis as a threat to American security, we were right away confronted with a new threat: the threat of the Soviet Union. I daresay if we could, by some kind of miracle, do away tomorrow with the threat which emanates from the Soviet Union, we would very soon be confronted again with a new threat — and perhaps from a very unexpected quarter.

At the foundation of the realist's approach to foreign policy there is the conviction that the struggle for power on the international scene — as the struggle for power on all levels of social interaction — is not the result of some historic accident, of some passing social, constitutional, legal, or economic configuration (think, for instance, of the utopian expectations of Marxism), but that it is part and parcel of human nature itself; that the aspirations for power are innate in human nature; that it is futile to search for a mechanical device with which to eliminate those aspirations; that the wise approach to political problems lies in taking the perennial character of those aspirations for granted — in trying to live with them, to redirect them into socially valuable and beneficial channels, to transform them, to civilize them. This is as much as a man can do with this psychological and social heritage which he cannot escape. In other words, a realistic approach to foreign policy starts with the assumption that international politics is of necessity a struggle for power; that the balance of power, for instance, is not the invention of some misguided diplomats but is the inevitable result of a multiplicity of nations living with each other, competing with each other for power, and trying to maintain their autonomy.

Now let me turn to some practical problems which illustrate the characteristics of realism in foreign policy as over against the utopian or idealistic approach. Take, again, the balance of power. The balance of power, you may say, is for foreign policy what the law of gravity is for nature; that is, it is the very essence of foreign policy. I remember very well that when I used the term "balance of power" at the beginning of my academic career in the early 30's I met with an unfavorable reaction. "Balance of power" was then a kind of dirty word — something which respectable scholars would not use, at least not in an affirmative sense. It was something not to be investigated, not to be practiced; it was something to be abolished. I remember again very well a lecture I gave in Milwaukee (I think it was in '44) in which I made the point I just made: that when the war was

over there would of necessity be a new balance of power, a new set of problems which we would have to solve — and that more likely than not it would be the Soviet Union which would raise the problems. Many in the audience seemed to believe that I was a kind of Fascist agent who was trying to perpetuate an evil that they were just in the process of getting rid of.

Take, again, the outstanding example of Woodrow Wilson. Time and again, he most eloquently proclaimed that the purpose of America's intervention in the First World War was to get rid of the balance of power — to replace the balance of power with something else, something different, something better.

I am not at all blind to the shortcomings of the balance of power, but this is beside the point. The real question is: What else have you got to put in place of the balance of power? You have nothing as long as you have a multiplicity of autonomous nations competing with each other for power.

I am reminded of the story which is told about the earthquake of Lisbon in 1756, when somebody walked around in the devastated streets of Lisbon hawking anti-earthquake pills. He was asked what good they would do. His answer was: "What else would you put in their place?" I am not saying that the balance of power is as useless as are anti-earthquake pills, but I would identify myself with the reply of the hawker by asking: What else have you to put in its place? In other words, to criticize the balance of power for its shortcomings leads nowhere as long as you have no viable alternative with which to replace it.

What we call isolationism in this country — the reflection of the historic fact of America's actual isolation in the nineteenth century — has very much to do with the problem we are discussing. For there is again in twentieth-century isolationism a very strong tendency to believe that a great nation has a choice between an active foreign policy, involving it of necessity in all the risks and disabilities and liabilities which are concomitant

with foreign policy, and abstention from foreign policy. In the same way in which Woodrow Wilson and Cordell Hull believed that the United States had a choice between power politics and a United Nations or League of Nations politics, so the isolationist believes that America has a choice between an active foreign policy, pursued with traditional means for traditional ends, and no foreign policy at all. So you see that this somewhat abstract and philosophic discussion with which I started has very practical ramifications.

Take another problem which is of vital importance for our foreign policy and very much misunderstood: the problem of foreign aid. As you well know, every year there is a bitter discussion not about the purposes of foreign aid, not about its practical application, but about the amount of money to be appropriated for the purposes of foreign aid. There exists a considerable confusion on all levels of public debate about the purposes and the policies of foreign aid. At the bottom of the controversy there is again the conflict between the two approaches to foreign policy which we are discussing. One school of thought believes (at least in its extreme form — there are many gradations between the two extremes) that foreign aid constitutes, as it were, the key to the whole problem of international order and peace. That school of thought makes a series of simple equations: *First*, that foreign aid will lead to a rise in the standard of living; *second*, that a rise in the standard of living will lead to democracy; *third*, that democracy will lead to peaceful foreign policies. I have oversimplified the picture on purpose, but in essence those are the assumptions which underlie the extreme philosophy of foreign aid.

The over-all assumption which underlies those different assumptions themselves is that if you could raise the standard of living, if you could establish democracy, and if you could thereby promote peaceful foreign policies, you would have solved, as it were, the problem of foreign policy itself — at least with regard to the so-called “underdeveloped areas.” This seems to me to be

an extremely doubtful assumption, for it can well be maintained from a study — even a very cursory study — of history that it is not the underdeveloped areas of the world which threaten the world with war; it is the higher developed areas of the world — and, especially, the highest developed areas of the world — which so threaten us. As long as the Soviet Union was an underdeveloped country, it did not threaten the world because it did not have the power. It threatened the world verbally or by subversion, but certainly not as the other great power of the world. It became the other great power of the world only after it had left the stage of underdevelopment. One can therefore well maintain the proposition that the industrialization of the underdeveloped area — whatever its other merits may be, whatever may be said in its favor on other grounds — cannot be defended on the ground that it will make for a more peaceful and stable world. Quite on the contrary, more likely than not it will lead to new, unforeseen and unforeseeable problems in international politics.

Take, for instance, Communist China. As long as Communist China remains a backward, underdeveloped nation, it is only a potential threat to the rest of the world. But once 600 million Chinese are in the possession of the modern instruments of industry, then they will become an enormous threat to the rest of mankind, the Soviet Union included. Thus, the terms in which foreign aid is generally discussed and especially in which it is defended present another manifestation of the utopian approach to the problems of foreign policy. What is needed instead is a realistic correlation between foreign aid and the national interest of the United States. What is the national interest of the United States with respect to the economic development of a particular country, and what kind of foreign aid will serve that interest, if it does serve it at all? It is with such questions that a realistic debate on foreign aid ought to concern itself.

Let us take another problem — and wherever you look you will find a problem which exemplifies this controversy. Take the

problem of disarmament. The belief is widespread that disarmament constitutes the key to the problem of international peace. That belief is based again upon a very simple equation: Wars are fought with weapons; diminish the quantity of weapons and you thereby diminish the likelihood of war; do away with all weapons and you will have eliminated the likelihood of war, and you will have solved the most urgent problem of international politics.

In truth, the armaments race is a mere symptom of the actual problem, which does not lie in the possession of weapons but in the existence of unsolved political problems. For instance, as long as the political problems between the United States and the Soviet Union remain unsolved, what you would do by disarmament — if you could have disarmament at all (which I personally doubt very much) — would be to simply change the technology of war; you would not do away with the incidence of war at all. If you were able to abolish atomic weapons (which, of course, is a perfectly utopian assumption) — let us suppose you could get an agreement for the outlawing of all atomic weapons and make it stick — what you would have achieved would simply be the reduction of the technology of warfare to the state it had reached at the end of the Second World War. You would simply have made sure that the Third World War would be fought with preatomic weapons, at least at the beginning, rather than with atomic weapons — and I grant you that this would be a very important and beneficial thing. But certainly it has nothing to do with the argument that there exists a direct relationship between disarmament and the incidence of war; that by disarmament you can increase the chances for peace or even do away with war altogether.

Certainly a disarmament agreement in itself would have a great and beneficial psychological effect, but this again begs the question because without the relaxation of psychological tensions preceding a disarmament agreement you are not likely to get a disarmament agreement to begin with. The unsolved political problems of necessity intrude into the disarmament negotiations

and make the disarmament negotiations simply a reflection of the different attitudes and interests of the nations undertaking them. This was obvious, for instance, in the disarmament negotiations which led to the Washington Treaty of 1922, providing for naval disarmament; it was obvious in the discussions of the disarmament conference at Geneva of the early thirties; and it has been obvious again in recent times in the disarmament conferences taking place under the auspices of the United Nations.

Each side in those negotiations inevitably regards the negotiations as a particular phase of the over-all struggle for power and tries to gain an advantage in that struggle by putting forward certain proposals relating to disarmament. So I would almost regard it as axiomatic that to start with disarmament is the utopian approach to the problem of war; that any knowledgeable government which starts to try to solve the problem of war by negotiating on disarmament shows that it is not serious about the solution of the problem to begin with. For in the presence of unsolved political problems which have given rise to the armaments race in the first place, it is a mere manipulation — and a necessarily unsuccessful manipulation — of symptoms to try to get a disarmament agreement among nations which are divided by incompatible political interests.

Take, again, another problem in which this basic philosophical conflict becomes obvious. Take the problem of the United Nations, to which I have already briefly referred. It is still widely believed in our country that if you submit a dispute to the United Nations, you have thereby done something politically and morally more meritorious than if you had tried to solve that problem by traditional diplomatic methods. Many of us still hold to the belief (no longer as strongly as we did ten years ago, it is true) that somehow the United Nations has a virtue, or even an efficiency, in terms of the solution of political problems which is superior to that of the traditional methods of diplomacy. In truth, as the United Nations is presently constituted, it is merely an extension

of the ordinary traditional diplomatic processes. It is simply another forum in which the struggle for power is fought out, as it has been fought out before the advent of international organizations, in the chancelleries of diplomats and on the battlefields.

It is not a question of principle — moral or otherwise — but a mere question of expediency whether, let me say, the Government of the United States wants to use the United Nations for its purposes or does not want to do so. Especially under present conditions, when in terms of the distribution of votes the United States is in an infinitely more difficult position than it was before the drastic extension of the membership of the United Nations a year ago, it becomes much more doubtful from the point of view of the United States whether it is wise to emphasize the role of the United Nations for the foreign policy of the United States.

During the first decade of the United Nations, and, more particularly during the Korean War, the United States could count upon the two-thirds majority in the General Assembly necessary to pass a recommendation. Today, the United States is just barely sure of getting the one-third minority necessary to prevent a two-third majority from forming in support of a recommendation. So while five years ago, let me say, the United States was able to use the United Nations for many of the purposes of its own foreign policy, today it must rather be satisfied in being able to prevent others from using the United Nations for their purposes. In other words, there has occurred in the distribution of voting power — which, I would say, is the only effective power within the United Nations General Assembly — a drastic and not generally recognized change that works clearly against the interests of the United States. Here, again, you can see not only how intellectually untenable but also how politically dangerous those oversimplified utopian assumptions and conclusions are when they are applied to the current problems of foreign policy. It is simple and superficially attractive to say: "Let's appeal to the United Nations; let's submit the problem to the United Nations." But in

actuality if you look at the subtle relationships of power and influence which exist in the world, the United Nations included, you will realize how useless and even how dangerous and pernicious such a simple utopian approach to foreign policy can well be.

Let me say, in conclusion, a word about another manifestation of this basic philosophic problem which concerns again the nature of foreign policy and of the way it is to be conducted. There is a very strong tendency — especially in democracies — to identify the positions of the different antagonistic nations with simple, clear-cut moral positions. Especially in Anglo-Saxon democracies there is a strong tendency to look at the international scene as if it were a struggle between good and evil, between virtue and vice, and there is never any doubt where virtue and good are located and where evil and vice are to be found. Underlying this simple “black-and-white” conception of foreign policy there is always the assumption that the triumph of virtue and good is somehow assured by the very nature of the historic process.

This oversimplified approach is not limited to Anglo-Saxon democracies even though it has appeared there in the nineteenth century in a particularly strong form. Marxism has developed a similarly oversimplified and distorted view of the nature of international politics, only with the location of virtue and vice and good and evil being reversed. Under the impact of this interpretation of international conflict as being essentially a moral conflict, foreign policy is bound to transform itself into a crusade, serving the inevitable triumph of virtue over vice. In such a crusade, there is no place for the traditional methods of foreign policy. For if the purpose of foreign policy is the triumph of virtue over vice, then diplomatic negotiations, of necessity aiming at accommodation, compromise, and the give-and-take of bargaining, have no place in foreign policy. One can even go farther and say that those diplomatic methods of compromise and accommodation are

then tantamount to a betrayal of the moral principles for which the nation is supposed to stand.

Here, again, you see the intimate relationship between this moralistic approach to foreign policy and the general utopian conception of foreign policy — something which a nation has a choice of either embracing or doing away with. For if the foreign policy of a nation is tantamount to a crusade and the only objective of foreign policy is the unconditional surrender of the enemy who is identified with all that is evil in the world, diplomacy then becomes really an instrument of war, preceding the actual armed conflict. Any retreat — however tactical — any concession — however temporary or however outbalanced by a concession from the other side — becomes a betrayal of the very principles for which the nation is supposed to stand.

The very fact that what I have just said very much corresponds to the actual practice of foreign policy of the last ten years between East and West shows to what extent foreign policy, realistically understood, has degenerated in our time. What we call the “cold war” is really in its essence a denial that diplomacy has any important role — let alone a decisive role — to play in the struggle between East and West. The very transformation of the struggle between the two major powers in the world into a struggle fought with the means of propaganda and subversion, with peace reposing upon a stand-off in the strategic atomic field — all of this points to the decline of foreign policy, realistically and traditionally understood. To a considerable extent, in other words, foreign policy in the postwar era — especially as practiced between the United States and the Soviet Union — has indeed become not only in philosophic conception but in actual practice a conflict between two moral principles — each claiming its absolute superiority over the other.

It seems to me that to a great extent the future peace of the world — and the future peace of the world means under present conditions the future existence of the world — will depend

upon the restoration of the original, the traditional, the realistic concepts of foreign policy: of a foreign policy which was regarded and practiced as what you might call the "mundane business" of accommodating divergent interests, defining seemingly incompatible interests, and then redefining them until finally they became compatible. For it seems to me to be very unlikely that the "cold war," as it has been practiced in the last ten years, will continue indefinitely.

About five or six years ago Sir Winston Churchill said in a speech in the House of Commons exactly this: "Things as they are cannot last; either they will get better, or they will get worse." If the present trend continues I think, in spite of what has been said about the desirability and possibility of limited war, the danger of an all-out atomic war will increase. One of the instruments to avoid this universal catastrophe lies in the restoration of those processes of a realistic foreign policy to which I have referred.

BIOGRAPHIC SKETCH

Professor Hans Morgenthau

Professor Morgenthau, Professor of Political Science and Director of the Center for the study of American Foreign Policy at the University of Chicago, was born in Coburg, Germany. He attended the University of Berlin, University of Frankfort, and University of Munich, and also did postgraduate work at the Graduate Institute for International Studies at Geneva.

After he was admitted to the bar, in 1927, he practiced law in Munich and Frankfort and also acted as President of the Labor Law Court in Frankfort. A year before Hitler came to power, Professor Morgenthau joined the faculty at the University of Geneva, where he taught Political Science from 1932 until 1935.

In 1937 Professor Morgenthau came to the United States, and was naturalized as an American citizen in 1943. He was an instructor in Government at Brooklyn College from 1937 to 1939, and for the succeeding four years was Assistant Professor of Law, History and Political Science at the University of Kansas at Kansas City. From 1943 to 1945, he was a visiting associate professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago, and for the next four years was Associate Professor of Political Science. He became Professor of Political Science, his present position, in 1949.

Professor Morgenthau served as Consultant to the Department of State in 1949 and 1951, and has lectured at the Air War College and Army War College since 1950.

He is author of several articles and books on International Law, International Politics and Political Theory. Among them are: *Scientific Man vs. Power Politics* (1946); *In Defense of the National Interest* (1951); and *Politics Among Nations* (Second Edition, 1954).

LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY

A lecture delivered
at the Naval War College
on 7 October 1957 by

Rear Admiral Henry E. Eccles, U. S. N., (Ret.)

Gentlemen:

I come before you today with rather mixed feelings. I am delighted to talk to you, but I feel a sense of special diffidence because I am going to bite off a very big chunk. I can't tell you all there is to know about it — no one can. However, it is very, very important that somebody take a bite at this problem.

The Atlantic Monthly of October, 1957 in "The Atlantic Report on the World Today," headlined Washington, speaking of the appointment of a new Secretary of Defense, said:

The task facing McElroy is simply this: to devise a new military doctrine and to create the military forces necessary to carry it out in the light of the changed and changing nuclear facts of life and the nature of the Communist threat.

Theoretically, under our unification system, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are supposed to give military advice to our civilian masters — namely, the high-level government executives who, under the Constitution, have management of our national security matters (We must also remember that we have two other masters: public opinion and the Congress). Until recent years, those responsible for the management of military affairs could turn to a classical theory of war for enlightenment in times of controversy. Today, our classical theories of war are clouded by doubt and cast into disrepute as a result of the nuclear-electronic phase of the Industrial Revolution. Instead of the military advice — the military doctrine — being presented in clear-cut manner to the civilian masters of this country, it would appear that frequently

the supposedly clear military doctrine is a rather curious mixture of sound military theory and various party-line propaganda statements. I suggest that this situation requires a reexamination of everything we know about the theory of war.

In order to make this reappraisal, we must review the classical theories of war, then study the political, electronic and nuclear revolutions which have taken place in the last few years and understand the influence of these factors on the theories of war. It is for that reason that I speak to you with great humility, because this is a very great task.

First, I would like to say that the most important element in war in the past has been the mind of command, and I believe this will continue to be the most important element in war — the intellectual aspects of command. We have had some distinguished gentlemen discuss decision making here, and sometimes the terms and abstractions which they used were not easy to grasp. Admiral Bates gave a splendid discussion of certain specific decisions.

Some years ago a very great philosopher, Alfred North Whitehead, was asked by a friend: "What is more important, ideas or facts?"

Whitehead pondered the question for a moment and then said: "Ideas *about* facts."

I suggest this thought makes an appropriate kickoff for a discussion of strategy and logistics and the manner in which logistics influences strategy.

In this discussion, I will use certain abstractions and I will talk about theory. Theory does not pretend to solve problems — theory does shed light. It helps to avoid or to compensate for trouble. Theory assists the man who is thinking about a problem, and it can help him to solve it.

A comprehensive theory of war, among other matters, must include an understanding of the nature of war. It also must in-

clude the theory of strategy and the theory of logistics. Today, I will discuss the theory of strategy and the theory of logistics very briefly. But, before going into the substance of the discussion, I will quote a recent comment on theory in general.

Samuel Huntington in an excellent book, *The Soldier and The State*, has said:

Understanding requires theory; theory requires abstraction; and abstraction requires the simplification and ordering of reality . . . Obviously the real world is one of blends, irrationalities, and incongruities: actual personalities, institutions, and beliefs do not fit into neat logical categories, yet neat logical categories are necessary if man is to think profitably about the real world in which he lives and to derive from it lessons for broader application and use.

We must start from a sound perspective when we think about this, and I suggest that the Command Perspective is the great perspective for those who are interested in the study of war.

I submit that:

The perspective of command is that point of view which knows the nature and relationships of the technical problems of the command; which recognizes how they affect its capabilities; and which understands the amount of time and effort required to solve these problems.

The commander must know the tasks, the problems, and the challenges of his technical specialists. He must be able to reconcile the contradictions which inevitably arise. He must be able to compensate for deficiency in one area by action in another, and he must be at times willing to sacrifice one or more special interests in the higher interest of the over-all objectives of the command. This is not a simple task.

To speak profitably about strategy and logistics today, we must understand the problem which is facing command. What is war today? Well, war is no longer the old business of two teams coming out on the stadium after a formal mobilization with a referee, the laws of war, and a whistle — the declaration of war — and an end with another whistle, which was the signing of the peace, and a definite score with a victor and a vanquished. It's not that way. It is a harsh fact of life that we are living in a state of continuing conflict.

This Chart (See Figure 1) has been up on the Bulletin Board for a week or ten days. I suggest that in the mind of command — military command, particularly — and the governmental command at the national security — presidential level, we are in the midst of a Spectrum of Conflict in which we start over to the left with an abstract, impossible, romantically ideal situation of peaceful international competition — sweetness and light — and go on successively through the Spectrum. In approximate terms, we encounter areas of economic competition with tariffs, trade quotas, currency restrictions and devaluations, political sabotage, propaganda, boycotts, subversive infiltration, arrest, deportation, seizures of ships and cargoes, blockades, border incidents, violations and reprisals, materiel sabotage, riots and revolutions fomented from outside, seizure of territory, partial mobilization, air and naval bombardment, full mobilization, submarine sinkings, expansion of the scope and area of the conflict, expansion of the objectives, and, finally, we may come close to the use of thermo-nuclear weapons — gas and bacteriological warfare.

Now, here, at the left, we have a state of peace. Obviously, it is peace. Here, in the middle, it is not quite so obvious — it changes a little bit and pretty soon it has been taken over by a cold war, and peace is technical only; it is not a real peace. And, moving to the right, we find that the war warms up — it gets hot. There are many limitations here. Pretty soon, we have gotten to the point where there are no limits. Thus, we have absolute

peace, relative peace, increasing tension, limited war, unlimited total war. We have an area where we can control what is going on. Our policies may be effective in exercising control, but eventually we may lose control and become helpless except to ride the whirlwind.

Where is the dividing line between the controllable and the uncontrollable? Nobody knows. It cannot be determined. As tension increases, more weapons and tools of conflict are used. In each case as more weapons come into play the use of the older weapons continues. Thus, there is a cumulative involvement which eventually may get out of control.

Now gentlemen, we hear a great deal about the limitation of war. If we are to think accurately about war or conflict, we mustn't kid ourselves. There have been very, very few instances in history of completely unlimited wars. The fact of the matter is that the vast majority of wars have been limited. Now, how can wars be limited? They are limited by objectives. They are limited by the scope, and the scope can be divided either by nations or by geography. They are limited by the degree of effort applied. They are limited by the weapons used. So, if you wish to understand the situation, you must be sure that when you are thinking in terms of limited and unlimited wars you think in terms of: limitation of objectives, limitation of scope, limitation of effort, limitation of weapons. There is such a thing as unlimited war but it is very rare, and up until recently an unlimited war — while it might be extremely damaging — did not have the implications that an unlimited war with present technology might have.

I have spoken of the Spectrum of Conflict. I have spoken of the responsibilities of command. Now, regardless of what politicians say or what directives are issued, we must remember that we are dealing with a form of government in which the political leadership can change. No political party today can commit the government party of 1965 to any course of action whatsoever.

The military commander has got to be able to think so realistically, so toughly about the war that when the politicians change their minds and say, "We're not going to do it the way we said we would do it yesterday; we're going to do it some other way," that military commander will not be caught short, mentally. He may be caught short from the standpoint of forces, but his mind has got to be able to deal with the new situation.

Now let's take a look at the structure of war itself (See Figure 2). Strictly, it is conflict — but it is easier to speak of it as war.




Figure 2

The structure of war consists of a group of general factors: political, economic, geographic, military, psychological, scientific, and technological — and, you might add somewhere along this line, ideological. All these factors are interrelated. There is no sharp division between them.

Today, we are not going to deal with the broader factors. I am going to concentrate on the military factors, and I suggest to you that military factors consist of: strategy, logistics, tactics, intelligence, and communications. These military factors are based on the general factors, and all the factors are interrelated.

Let's give a brief description, not definition, of the military factors. I suggest that we are on firm ground if we say that:

<i>STRATEGY</i>	Determines the objective and broad methods for attainment.
<i>LOGISTICS</i>	Provides the means to create and to support combat forces and weapons.
<i>TACTICS</i>	Determines the specific employment of forces and weapons to attain objectives of strategy.
<i>INTELLIGENCE</i>	Sheds light on the situation.
<i>COMMUNICATIONS</i>	Transmits information and decisions

Well, I said that these factors were interrelated. How are they interrelated? Here, in these three discs (See Figure 3) is an abstract concept of how they may be interrelated. We have the dominant factors of strategy, logistics and tactics. Every war situation is a blend of strategical, logistical, and tactical considerations which can be represented by three discs. Sometimes they coalesce into a single disc; at other times they draw apart, but never beyond the point of tangency.

The mind of command is primarily interested in that central area where there is a blending of strategic, logistical and tactical considerations. Intelligence sheds light on the situation, and communications transmits the will of command. Now, in addition to

the blend, there are the particular elements of each one of these abstract subjects which are the realm of the specialist. No commander can possibly know all there is to know about all of these subjects, but he must know that central area as it applies to his situation. The specialist in each area is also needed to assist the commander.




Figure 3

Now, a sound concept of strategy is the foundation for all high military thinking. I believe that the higher the level of thought, the more strategy and logistics tend to coalesce. Doctor Rosinski concurs with me on that, for he thinks of logistics as an included part of strategy. Admiral Robbins disagrees with me on that. So, we have two students of war who disagree categorically on the particular abstract formulation that I have presented to you. But, they both agree on the importance of each man seeking his own understanding of these relationships.

Now a few words on strategy, because a sound strategy must be the essential element of all high military thinking. What, then, is strategy? Doctor Rosinski has summed it up better than anybody I know in a paper that he wrote two years ago for the President of the War College ("Thoughts on Strategy and Tactics"). In this very brief, extremely interesting paper he said, among other things:

Strategy is the comprehensive direction of power. Tactics is its immediate direction

Since strategy must take into account the multitude of possible counteractions, it becomes a means of control. *This element of control is the essence of strategy*

Strategy must be selective in order to achieve economy. Therefore, comprehensive control requires concentration on minimum key actions or positions from which entire field can be controlled

The concept of control applies equally to offense and defense.

I think that this concept provides a solid foundation for strategic thinking. There is much more to be said on strategy — much more — and much thinking to be done.

Now, let's take a look at logistics. It can be seen in two lights. First,

The logistics process is at one and the same time the military element in the nation's economy and the economic element in its military operations.

This was said first by Duncan Ballantine in 1947, and picked up in a Munitions Board Study in 1949. I think it is an extremely important concept. Logistics must have its roots in the

economy. It has its purpose, its objective, in the sustained effectiveness of the combat forces, and, thus, logistics becomes the *bridge* between the national economy and the tactical operations of the combat forces.

In the charts (Logistics, the Bridge) which you will find in the back of this lecture, I have developed some of the applications of this abstract concept which I believe give a fair representation of the most important aspects of this thought of logistics being the bridge between the national economy and the operations of the combat forces. We must always bear in mind that the objective of all logistics effort is to create sustained combat effectiveness.

Now let's look at this in a somewhat different way:

The practical application of strategic concept = specific tactical operations *preceded* by logistic action.

Dropping all theory, forgetting about abstractions, getting right down to the practical elements of the situation, it doesn't do you a bit of good to have the finest strategic concept in the world if you cannot translate it into tactical operations. If you do not precede your tactical planning and your tactical operations by the necessary logistical planning and the necessary logistical action, the strategic concept is worthless. Mr. Eden found that out, to his disgrace and ruin.

Let's take a quick look at the economic sources of strategy. Economic factors are interlocked and regenerative and, among other things, they include: the development of trade routes, the sources of materials and distribution of products, the desire to attain or maintain a standard of living, the problem of excess population. Remember, economic warfare springs from economic competition — and, as economic warfare increases in intensity, it may combine with social-political competition to produce violent conflict. When conflict takes place and violence takes place, the

enemy's economy becomes the target for destruction or interdiction. His logistics system bridging the economy and the combat forces becomes an immediate target.

Now, a further thought which I will repeat from time to time:

Economic capabilities limit the combat forces which can be created.

Logistic capabilities limit the forces which can be employed.

It doesn't do a civilian economist or a civilian business man any good to become Secretary of Defense — and produce a defense system oriented around business economy and procurement and the most economical and efficient business management of a military force — if, by reason of the neglect or ignorance of logistical factors, the combat forces created at that great effort cannot be profitably employed in the execution of tactical operations supporting strategic objectives and concepts. Well, what does all this mean? It means that economic-logistic factors determine the limits of strategy.

A further thought: economic factors can upset the political stability of a nation, or an alliance, and can force changes both in policy and strategy. You have a brilliant example of that in the British White Papers of recent years, in Britain's action in regard to NATO, and the defense of Western Europe.

Now, a further thought along this same line of economic-logistics. As I said before, economic factors determine the upper limits of the forces which can be created; strategic-tactical-logistic factors — a blend of them — determine the nature of the forces; and the logistic factors determine the balance and, ultimately, the combat effectiveness of these forces.

That is a mouthful. But, remember that in determining the balance of our forces, the disposition of our forces, the bal-

ance between the combat force and the logistic force, we must evaluate strategic, tactical, and logistic factors, and from this analysis determine the proportion of tactical and logistic forces which will produce the greatest combat effectiveness. *This best proportion does not necessarily mean the largest number of combat forces.*

Let's take a look at some general strategic-logistic relationships. What are the general types of strategic-logistic relations? (See Figure 4).




Figure 4

In the first place, the scope and timing of logistics plans is influenced. As I said a moment ago, the composition, balance, and deployment of forces in the force build-up is influenced by these factors. Strategic overseas base site selection and build-up is a striking illustration of the relationship between strategy and logistics. A critical logistic element in your own forces may greatly influence your strategy. We have the situation of attempting to maintain a political position without war. We have the well-known strategy of blockade, which is an economic matter and involves the selection of critical logistic targets.

Well, let's get back to history. What does history tell us about these things in the past? How have these matters acted and how have they influenced strategy? (See Figures 5, 6, 7).

UNCLASSIFIED		NAVAL WAR COLLEGE	
ILLUSTRATIONS OF STRATEGIC-LOGISTIC RELATION			
EVENT	RESULT	ILLUSTRATES	
GLORIOUS FIRST OF JUNE SEA BATTLE 1794 HOWE VS VILLARET	CHESAPEAKE FOOD CONVOY ARRIVED. FRENCH REVOLUTION SURVIVED.	STRATEGY OF BLOCKADE VS NATIONAL ECONOMICS PLUS MISTAKEN OBJECTIVE	
U.S. SUBMARINE CAMPAIGN VS JAPAN	DESTROYED JAPAN'S OIL TRANSPORT. CRIPPLED FLEET & AIR FORCE.	STRATEGY OF BLOCKADE & CRITICAL LOGISTIC TARGET	
CHINA 1947 - 1949	NATIONALIST FORCES IN HUKDEN SURRENDERED WHEN PROMISED U.S. LOGISTIC SUPPORT DID NOT ARRIVE.	LOSS OF POLITICAL POSITION WITHOUT WAR - LACK OF SOUND LOGISTIC PROCEDURE	
U.S. AIR LIFT BERLIN BLOCKADE 1948	UNEXPECTED U.S. CAPABILITY FOR AIRLIFT SUSTAINED BERLIN.	MAINTENANCE OF POLITICAL POSITION WITHOUT WAR	

Figure 5

UNCLASSIFIED		NAVAL WAR COLLEGE	
EVENT	RESULT	ILLUSTRATES	
CAIRO CONFERENCE 1943 SPECIFIC ITEMS.	MAJOR STRATEGIC DECISIONS.	SCOPE & TIMING OF STRATEGIC PLANS.	
NORMANDY LANDING 1944 A.	DELAY 1 MONTH	ALLOW TIME FOR BUILD UP.	
SOUTHERN FRANCE 1944 B.	DELAY 2 MONTHS	CRITICAL LOGISTIC ELEMENT, AVAILABILITY OF LANDING CRAFT.	
AGEAN EXPEDITION. C.	CANCEL.	CRITICAL LOGISTIC ELEMENT, LANDING CRAFT OILERS.	
MOULMEIN LANDING D.	CANCEL.	CRITICAL LOGISTIC ELEMENT, LANDING CRAFT & STEEL.	

Figure 6

I take my first example from Admiral Bates' previous lecture. In his splendid talk he discussed the Glorious First of June

Sea Battle in 1794 between Howe and Villaret. The result of that battle was that the Chesapeake Food Convoy arrived. This contributed greatly to the survival of the French Revolution and the subsequent Napoleonic Wars. This illustrates the strategy of blockade *versus* a national economic target, and it also introduces something which is not logistical but which is strategical — the mistaken objective.

UNCLASSIFIED		MARINE WAR COLLEGE	
EVENT	RESULT	ILLUSTRATES	
ALL WPI & PACIFIC AMPHIBIOUS LANDINGS	SUCCESSFUL STRATEGIC DRIVE TOWARD ENEMY HOMELAND & DESTRUCTION OF ENEMY BASES, FLEET & AIR FORCE.	OVERSEAS BASE SITE SELECTION & LOGISTIC BUILD UP ALONG LINE OF STRATEGIC ADVANCE.	
NORSEMAN MANEUVER, SELECTION OF SWATHON BITE & SCHEME OF MANEUVER.	ESTABLISHED FIRM BASE FOR DESTRUCTION OF GERMAN ARMY & LIBERATION OF EUROPE.	INTEGRATION OF STRATEGIC-LOGISTIC-TACTICAL PLANNING. COMPOSITION-BALANCE & DEPLOYMENT OF COMBAT & LOGISTIC FORCES.	
SUEZ CRISIS 1956	P P P	LACK OF INTEGRATED STRATEGIC-LOGISTIC PLAN. CRITICAL ECONOMIC-LOGISTIC ELEMENTS, OIL & TRANSPORTATION LACK OF RAPID FORCE BUILD UP. LACK OF SEA-AIR TROOP & COMB LFT.	

Figure 7

The United States submarine campaign against Japan destroyed Japan's oil transport, crippled their fleet and their air force. It illustrates the strategy of blockade and a critical logistic target.

In China, in 1947 and 1949, we have a very interesting and controversial illustration in which the Nationalist Forces in Mukden surrendered when the promised U. S. logistic support did not arrive. This illustrates the loss of political position without war and illustrates the consequences of a lack of sound logistical procedure.

We have the United States airlift in the Berlin Blockade, in which an unexpected U. S. capability for airlift sustained Berlin and we were able to maintain a political position without war.

Now there is nothing more interesting to the student of strategy and logistics than to study the minutes, the reports, and the analyses of the great international conferences which took place in 1943, 1944, and 1945. The Cairo Conference of 1943 resulted in major strategic decisions, and illustrates the influence of logistics on the scope and timing of strategic plans. In particular, the Normandy Landing was delayed one month to allow time for logistic build-up. The Southern France Landing was delayed two months because of a critical logistic element — the availability of landing craft. The Aegean expedition was canceled because of two critical logistic elements — landing craft and oilers. The Moulmein Landing of Lord Mountbatten was canceled because of the critical logistic element — landing craft and steel.

Every World War II Pacific Amphibious Landing illustrates this relation between strategy and logistics. The result of those landings was a successful strategic drive toward the enemy homeland and the destruction of the enemy bases, his fleet and his air force. They illustrate the problem of overseas base site selection and the logistic build-up along a line of strategic advance.

The Normandy Invasion is another beautiful example, because here is the selection of the invasion site and the scheme of maneuver. This invasion established a firm base for the destruction of the German Army and the liberation of Europe. It illustrates the integration of the strategic, logistical and tactical planning. It also illustrates the problem of the composition of balance and deployment of combat and logistic forces.


Gentlemen, we don't yet know all the ultimate results of the Suez fiasco of 1956, but we do know that the following strategic-logistic relationships were illustrated. There was a complete lack of strategic-logistic planning. We saw the working of a critical

economic-logistic element: the economic element of oil; the critical logistic element of a lack of air and sea lift to move combat forces rapidly. There was a lack of time for force build-up, and this, of course, was the same — the lack of troop and cargo lift.

I have briefly presented some specific, very practical examples of the relationship between strategy and logistics. There are hundreds more. The study of them and the search for them is fascinating. There is much to learn.

Now let's turn again to the theory of integration of strategic and logistic planning. What is the basis for plans?

THE BASIS FOR PLANS



This is oversimplified, but the basis for plans is the objective or the mission, the forces involved, the scheme of maneuver, the intensity of action, the timing. All these must be related to the geography and to the availability of combat forces. From these factors we can develop time-phased logistic requirements both to create and to support the combat forces. In other words, from these elements we get: What? How Much? When? Where? And these answers must be related to availabilities of logistic resources. The concepts must come from the mind of command — but, in our complex technology of today, the mind of command must be supplemented by efficient and understanding staff work.

The staff responsibilities are:

Operations states forces and schemes.

Logistics states probable shortages.

Operations and logistics jointly suggest modifications.

Command evaluates and decides.

For this to be effective, the strategic-logistic discussion and thought among the members of the staff in the logistics division and in the operations division must be concurrent. You cannot have a strategic plan burst full-blown from the brow of Zeus, and then pass it over to the logistics boys and ask, "Now can I do it?" because too much time is consumed. The men who are doing operational and strategic planning must know enough about logistics so that their schemes are not absurd. And, gentlemen, in the past we have had some awfully absurd schemes spring from the minds of so-called "strategists," who isolated themselves from the logistics facts of life.

Now I told this to the Naval Warfare I Class last week, and I will repeat it and tell it as long as I have the breath in my body: It is not the task of any logistics division to decide logistics feasibility. The logistics division decides on the logistic requirements to support a scheme for operating combat forces. It must know the state of logistic availabilities, and states to the Commander what shortages to expect under the scheme which he proposes. One of the toughest of all command decisions is to decide this question of "logistic feasibility." It cannot be passed to a logistics division except in cases where the mass of material, the complexity, and the lack of foresight have been so great as to result in a plan which is so obviously bad that it cannot come close to being supported.

Now, what is logistic feasibility? What is a calculated risk? Logistic feasibility is the measure of the degree of risk and

hardship that the Commander is willing to place upon his subordinates in order to accomplish the tactical and strategic objectives of his strategic concept. It is a command decision, and great sacrifices may be called for in this matter. Too often we hear people use the term "a calculated risk" when there has been absolutely no calculation whatever, but merely a guess. They are dangerous words — "feasibility" and "calculated risk" — and it is well to know what you are talking about when you use them.

A few more thoughts along this line:

Command transforms war potential into combat power by its control and use of the logistic process.

In other words, a Commander who does not understand and has not the ability to control and to use his logistic support effectively is very limited in the degree to which he can develop combat power, regardless of what war potential or combat forces he may have.

Before considering the general trends which seem to be developing in our defense system, it is well to restate the basic thought:

Economic factors limit the combat forces which can be created.

Logistic factors limit the combat forces which can be employed.

X X X

What are the trends of today? The trends are complex and contradictory because the sources of these trends are themselves complex and contradictory. The trends which we can observe grow out of fundamental human forces — the same forces which

have caused the Industrial Revolution and its latest phase, the Nuclear-Electronic Revolution.

Among these trends we have a trend toward increasing centralizing, with the elevation of military decision to higher and higher brackets of command and its transfer to civilians in government. This applies to strategy, logistics, and tactics. If you don't think it applies to tactics, just think of the question of who decides on the tactical use of atomic weapons.

Weapon systems demand their own logistics more and more. Each new complex weapon system is asking to have its own logistic support, and that factor alone presents some very difficult problems for command to handle.

Another trend is that the center of gravity of personnel is moving back toward the Zone of the Interior as the balance of personnel swings to logistics by reason of technological advance. Of course the most striking example of that is the Air Force, where the job of combat pilot seems to be disappearing rapidly. Certainly it takes a lot more men to make sure that things work right when you push the button than it takes to decide to push the button. In fact, today, gentlemen, military commanders are making fewer combat decisions and more logistical decisions. This has important implications in the study of command.

In preparing to act effectively throughout the whole Spectrum of Conflict, we should recognize how logistics factors tend to dominate. For example, we have the logistics of thermo-nuclear war. To a large degree this is a matter of civil defense. The logistics of recuperation requires the use of methods of advanced base development. It also needs decentralized logistic support to sustain thermonuclear retaliation.

But what about a conventional war? Any conventional war which we may engage in will be fought under the threat of thermonuclear war. Conventional logistics to create sustained com-

bat effectiveness will be required. Economy of resources will also be needed — not only to maintain an economic-political position, but also as a standby for possible thermonuclear war. And certainly the logistics of a cold war requires economy of force — and as they cut the budget, the shoe begins to pinch. The logistics of the cold war requires logistic readiness, both for conventional warfare and for thermonuclear warfare. Furthermore, a healthy economy is required for the long-range economic-political struggle.

I have briefly stated some of the problems. I think they all add up to a study of principle — the understanding of cause and effect. These matters involve difficult decisions for command, and in these there must be integration of strategic and logistical thinking. They require combat effectiveness in conflict. There is no payoff if the troops can't fight.

At the highest level of command, command is concerned with the economic-logistic influences and their limitations on strategic decision. As the level of command descends, these limitations and influences tend to shift to the purely logistical, and, there, they limit and influence the immediate employment of specific combat forces.

Today, the mind of civilian command is concerned primarily with economic influences and limitations. The mind of military command is concerned primarily with operational logistic influences and limitations, although it has plenty of work in the economic field, too.

But the chief point is that both civilian and military Commanders must be aware of these influences and of these limitations, and must understand the shifting relationships in the exercise of control which modern conflict requires.

Well, do I presume to call this a comprehensive theory of war? Do I presume to call it a modest start on pointing your thinking toward what we need to know? Perhaps it is one, perhaps it's

the other. Regardless of which it may be, I think it is rewarding to think in the following terms.

We need to know more about the elements of power in modern conflict.

We need to know a great deal more about the position of strategy as continuous comprehensive direction of power for the purpose of exercising control.

We need to know more about the selection of correct strategic objectives and the employment of appropriate elements of power in the attainment of those objectives.

We need to recognize the need for adjusting the use of power as the nature and area of the conflict shifts.

We need to know a great deal more about the position of the process, the art, the science of logistics as the bridge between the national economic base and the effective employment of combat forces.

We need to know more about the manner in which logistic factors limit the employment of combat forces.

We need to know a great deal more about command and command decision.

And, finally, we need to know that high command must always seek the understanding, the organization, and the decision process which are most suitable to the flexible employment and direction of power in modern conflict.

BIOGRAPHIC SKETCH

Rear Admiral Henry E. Eccles, U. S. N., (Ret.)

Rear Admiral Eccles was born in Bayside, New York. He attended Columbia College, and was graduated from the United States Naval Academy in 1922. He received his M.S. degree in Mechanical Engineering from Columbia University in 1930.

He spent twelve years in submarine duty and the remainder in battleships, cruisers and destroyers. He had command of the U. S. S. JOHN D. EDWARDS, Asiatic Fleet, during part of World War II, taking part in the Netherlands East Indies Campaign during that period. Subsequent assignments were in the Navy Department and a return to the Pacific Area with Service Force, Pacific Fleet, where he remained until the end of the war. During 1943, he attended the Command Class at the Naval War College.

In 1946, Rear Admiral Eccles (then a Captain) commanded the U. S. S. WASHINGTON. Following this, in 1947, he reported to the Naval War College to plan and organize the newly formed Logistics Department and to serve as the first head of that department, where he remained until 1951.

During 1951 and 1952, he was Assistant Chief of Staff for Logistics with Commander Allied Forces, Southern Europe, through the formative period of that Command. He retired with the rank of Rear Admiral on 30 June 1952. Since 1952, he has been with the George Washington University Logistics Research Project.

LOGISTICS, THE BRIDGE

CHART 1

THE LOGISTIC PROCESS USING THE FUNDAMENTAL ELEMENTS OF LOGISTICS: REQUIREMENTS, PROCUREMENT, DISTRIBUTION, AND THE BASIC ASPECTS OF COMMAND: ORGANIZATION, PLANNING, EXECUTION AND SUPERVISION, FORMS A BRIDGE BETWEEN THE ECONOMIC SYSTEM OF THE NATION AND THE ACTUAL OPERATIONS OF THE COMBAT FORCES.

THE FOLLOWING CHART PROVIDES AN OVER-SIMPLIFIED DESCRIPTION OF HOW THIS WORKS. IN STUDYING THIS CHART A FEW BASIC THOUGHTS MAY BE HELPFUL.

LOGISTICS IS: AN ART, A SCIENCE, A PROCESS.

THE LOGISTICS PROCESS IS AT ONE AND THE SAME TIME THE ECONOMIC ELEMENT OF OUR MILITARY OPERATIONS AND THE MILITARY ELEMENT OF OUR ECONOMY.

GOOD PROGRAMMING AND FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT SHOULD PERMEATE WHOLE PROCESS. (COMPTROLLER TECHNIQUE IS PART OF THIS.)


THE PROCESS OF FULLY INTEGRATED STRATEGIC-LOGISTIC PLANNING RELATES MEANS TO SPECIFIC STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES. WHEN THIS IS FOLLOWED BY SOUND LOGISTIC PROCESSES AND PROCEDURES THE TIMELY LOGISTIC SUPPORT OF TACTICAL FORCES IS ASSURED.

CRITERIA = { COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS--ALWAYS.
BUDGET ECONOMY IN PEACE.
TIME—RESOURCES — OBJECTIVES IN WAR.

FINALLY, DO NOT THINK THAT THESE DESCRIPTIONS AND CATEGORIES ARE EXACT NOR THAT THEY CAN BE PRECISELY DIFFERENTIATED. IN REALITY THEY ARE INTERTWINED IN WONDROUS MANNER!

LOGISTICS, THE BRIDGE


CHART II



LOGISTICS, THE BRIDGE

CHART III

HOW VARIOUS LEVELS OF COMMAND EXERCISE LOGISTIC CONTROL



NATIONAL ECONOMY

RECOMMENDED READING

The evaluation of books listed below include those recommended to resident students of the Naval War College. Officers in the fleet and elsewhere may find them of interest.

The listing herein should not be construed as an endorsement by the Naval War College; they are indicated only on the basis of interesting, timely, and possibly useful reading matter.

Many of these publications may be found in ship and station libraries. Books on the list which are not available from these sources may be obtained from one of the Navy's Auxiliary Library Service Collections. These collections of books available for loan to individual officers are maintained in the Bureau of Naval Personnel; Headquarters ELEVENTH, FOURTEENTH, FIFTEENTH Naval Districts; and Commander Naval Forces, Marianas, Guam. Requests for the loan of these books should be made by the individual to the nearest Auxiliary Library Service Collection (See Article C9604, Bureau of Naval Personnel Manual, 1948).

- Title:** *The Korea Knot.* 206 p.
- Author:** Berger, Carl. Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1957.
- Evaluation:** In this short history of Korea, the author presents a very readable sequence of events leading to the present divided status of Korea. Beginning with the early history of Korea, he attempts to show that the Koreans themselves have had little influence over their destiny. Rather, the destiny of the nation has continually been molded by other countries.
- Title:** *The Soviet Union and the Muslim World, 1917-1956.* 151 p.
- Author:** Spector, Ivar. Seattle, Wash., University of Washington Press, 1957.
- Evaluation:** This book is a study of relationships between the lead-

ers of the Soviet Government and the Communist Party and the peoples of the Muslim World, inside as well as outside the borders of the Soviet Union. Ivar Spector has endeavored to concentrate his efforts in studying those periods wherein Soviet policy towards the Muslim area has been most dynamic. These are the Bolshevik revolutionary period and the World War II and post-war period. He demonstrates that, despite the anticolonial fervor of the Muslims and the fact that they have exhibited from time to time certain characteristics that would make them tractable for Communist-inspired revolutionary activity, the Soviet Union has never been quite able to achieve success. Of especial background or current interest are these features which are treated in some detail:

- (1) The Baku Congress of the Third International in 1920. Here, early Bolshevik revolutionary zeal became coupled with naivete, and the disastrous experiment has never been repeated. Calling first for a JIHAD ("The Holy War" idea which the Germans also tried), Zinoviev went on to denounce the Muslim faith and the revolutionary Turks. After picking up the pieces and observing their ignorance of the Muslim East, the Soviet Government established the All-Union Scientific Association of Oriental Studies.
- (2) The attempted rapprochement with Mustapha Kemal (Ataturk) during the period of the Turkish revolution and Greek invasion. Here, the cynical and resourceful Turkish leader outsmarted the Soviets at every turn. He used their military aid, and then had the Turkish Communist leaders drowned in the Black Sea.
- (3) The fairly successful Soviet efforts in Afghanistan.
- (4) The Soviet failure in Iran.
- (5) Finally, an effort is made to discuss the current Soviet cultural impact on the Muslim world. Of especial interest are the 1934 Communist Party action programs for the Muslim area. The author states that his book contains the first English language translation of these documents.

- Title:** *Combat Beneath the Sea.* 240 p.
- Author:** Brou, Willy-Charles. New York, Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1957.
- Evaluation:** The author, Major Willy-Charles Brou, a Frenchman, has presented in very readable, first-person form, some of the daring exploits of underwater swimmers and midget submarines during World War II. There is no indication of the authenticity of the operations covered, but the results achieved are well known; e.g., the sinking or damaging of the *Queen Elizabeth*, *Valiant*, *York*, *Takao*, *Tirpitz*, *Ulpio Traino* and *Laksevaag*, to name a few. The tactics and equipment used in these operations is described in detail. From the book one gains not only a high regard for the heroism of the men involved but also an appreciation of the success of, and the difficulties in, combating such operations.
- Title:** *Turkism and the Soviets.* 244 p.
- Author:** Hostler, Warren. London, Allen and Unwin, 1957.
- Evaluation:** This is a rather detailed account of research into the origins and geographical locations of groups of people whose origin is ethnically Turkish. After showing that such people inhabit large portions of central Asia, including the southern part of the U. S. S. R., the author reveals how, through history, the spirit of Pan-Turkism has been kept alive. Instances of appreciation of this are given, such as the formation of Russian-Turkish regiments in the German Army during World War II. The thought is advanced that by fostering the Pan-Turkish movement among the Turkish people of the U.S.S.R., some hope can be held for a weakening of the Russian geographic complex.
- Title:** *Modern India.* 255 p.
- Author:** Griffiths, Percival. New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1957.
- Evaluation:** A brief background history of India, with the majority of the book dealing with contemporary India. The British author's special interest is the development of India's foreign policy and economic affairs since her independence.

Title: *Norwegian Sea Control Seen Even Against Red Sub Threat.*

Author: Neubauer, John.

Publication: NAVY TIMES, October 12, 1957, p. 20.

Annotation: Analyzes the recent NATO naval exercise, "Operation Strikeback," and points out the successes and failures of this operation.

Title: *Maritime Strategy in the Mid 20th Century.*

Author: Roskill, S. W., Captain, Royal Navy.

Publication: SHIPMATE, October, 1957, p. 2-8, 10.

Annotation: Shows how and under what conditions the principles of sea power as developed by Mahan, Corbett and Richmond are applied today. Captain Roskill then explains how a maritime strategy should be applied under modern conditions of war.

Title: *Major Issues Before the United Nations.*

Author: Dulles, John F.

Publication: THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN, October 7, 1957, p. 555-559.

Annotation: The Secretary of State lists and explains the United States position on important questions before the United Nations.

Title: *GE Seeks to Predict 1972's Weapons.*

Author: Klass, Philip J.

Publication: AVIATION WEEK, October 14, 1957, p. 101-109.

Annotation: Describes General Electric's Technical Military Planning Operation, called "Tempo" for short, a group which seeks to evaluate future trends in weapons from a political, economic, psychological, and technological viewpoint.

Title: *Is Whole World in Trouble?*

Publication: U. S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, October 11, 1957, p. 33-36.

Annotation: A brief listing of the troubles and turmoils affecting the world on a country-by-country basis.

Title: *Three Views of Sputnik.*
Publication: THE NEW LEADER, October 28, 1957, p. 3-6.
Annotation: Three articles, by noted writers, covering the political, scientific and military implications of the Russian satellite.

Title: *How the U. S. Stands on Guided Missiles.*
Publication: BUSINESS WEEK, October 19, 1957, p. 66-80.
Annotation: A special report on guided missiles and rockets in this country, explaining: the progress made to date; the trouble spots in development; and who is doing the work.

Title: *Is War Near in Middle East?*
Publication: U. S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, October 25, 1957. p. 36-37.
Annotation: Reviews events and describes pressures that might lead to the outbreak of war in this area.

Title: *A Military Policy for the Missile Age.*
Author: Baldwin, Hanson W.
Publication: THE NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE, November 3, 1957, p. 13, 86-88.
Annotation: A noted military writer urges a complete reevaluation of our basic military policies and philosophies to meet the challenges of the revolutionary changes that have occurred since World War II.

Title: *The Atlantic in a World War.*
Author: Denny, Sir Michael M., Admiral, Royal Navy.
Publication: MILITARY REVIEW, September, 1957, p. 73-79.
Annotation: Briefly reviews NATO command structure and responsibilities, and discusses tasks that must be accomplished to maintain control of the Atlantic.

Title: *The Communists Also Have Their Problem.*
Author: Dulles, Allen W.

Publication: THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN,
October 21, 1957, p. 639-646.

Annotation: The Director of Central Intelligence analyzes the recent changes in the Soviet Communist World, and finds that radical changes are taking place which strike at the heart of the system.

Title: *Storm Over Turkey.*

Publication: THE ECONOMIST, October 19, 1957, p. 192-194.

Annotation: Describes Turkey's strategic importance, geographically and politically, to show why Russia is exerting pressure in this area.