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THE FUTURE OF JAPAN

A lecture delivered
at the Naval War College
on 24 April 1957 by
Professor David N. Rowe

My subject for today is *The Future of Japan*. Although many questions can be raised about it, it is hardly a controversial topic as are so many others.

Now let us survey very briefly and topically the basic situation of Japan after its surrender in 1945, because everything in the future takes off from there. Japan in 1945 was quite tremendously changed — a country which it was hard to recognize if looked at from the point of view of only a few years before that time.

What was the basic situation territorially? Japan was reduced back down to her limits of 1868; it is a very small territory, about the size of the State of California. The population in the interval between 1868 and 1945, however, had increased somewhere between two and a half to three times.

The defense of Japan, once so highly elaborated — and, incidentally, such a large drain upon the productivity and the resources of that extremely energetic country — naturally enough at the time of her surrender had been reduced down to almost zero, and, of course, during the early part of the occupation they were entirely eliminated.

The economy of Japan was wrecked. It was twice ruined, as we all know from history: once, it was ground pretty much to a halt by the submarine warfare, which cut off the supply of raw materials and fuels for the factories and foodstuffs to the people; the second time it was burned down in great quantity by the B-29 bombing raids, which, in many cases, were burning

down factories not in operation because they had run out of fuel and substance. The economy at the time of the surrender was incapable of supplying the normal civilian needs of the country. Rehabilitation under the occupation was the only way in which the people could be kept from actual starvation. Even as late as 1946 (after the occupation began), the total economic production of Japan was only 24% of the average from 1934 to 1936, typical prewar years.

The internal polity, the internal government and social organization of Japan, were completely a question mark for the future. Some general signposts only had been erected by the Allies in connection with the surrender, having to do with such generalities as democratization, the elimination of supernationalistic propaganda, the elimination of supermilitarism, and a few things of that kind. Of course the idea was to avoid burdening the surrender with too much detail, which would make the surrender even harder to secure than it might otherwise have been. No one knew at the time of the surrender just what kind of a future political system the Japanese were likely to have, although the aims and interests of the Japanese Government in this respect had been generally indicated.

In its international affairs, at the time of the surrender, all of Japan's allies and friends whom she had counted upon — the Germans, the Italians, and, at one time, even the Soviet Union — were all gone. They either had been destroyed or reduced previously or else they had turned on her, like the Russians did by the unilateral abrogation of the pact of mutual neutrality. Japan at her surrender, therefore, was a series of unanswered questions — nobody knew quite what would happen. The Japanese themselves in many cases were very apprehensive, looking for the worst in many places and with fear of what the occupation would do even to the civilians.

In light of this very, very dangerous, weak and open situation of 1945, the post-surrender recovery of Japan from 1945

to 1957 has been brilliantly successful. This has been the result of a combination of factors and influences, both Japanese and external. I will take up the topics which I mentioned before, item by item.

The territory, of course, has remained essentially the same. However, we are witnessing now the beginning of efforts at recovery of lost territory. These efforts have extended in recent months and years in exactly the same geographical directions away from the heart of Japan as were taken by the Japanese in the nineteenth century, at the time of their coming into international relationship, when they began their original course of expansion that ultimately led them to their defeat.

In the northeast, they have attempted to make arrangements with the Russians for the restitution of small islands off the northeast coast of one of the main islands (without any success at the present time). To the southwest, they are making an increasingly interesting attempt to recover at least their rights of government in relation to the Ryukyu Islands — and, chiefly, Okinawa. Of course the methods by which they are trying to regain control over these territories, which were once an integral part of their territory, are quite different from what they could be in the nineteenth century. Instead of using unilateral occupation, or military takeover and conquest, the Japanese are now having to proceed entirely by negotiation plus that new weapon in international affairs that has come into such great prominence between the two World Wars and since the Second World War, namely, the weapon of propaganda; the weapon of the cold war; the weapon of persuasion, of political argumentation, of the use of popular pressures, and things of that kind. We find the weapon of propaganda employed particularly at the present time in connection with Okinawa, the outcome of which is yet to be seen in the future.

As far as population since 1945 is concerned, I would be so bold as to say that the single greatest disaster in modern Japan

is the tremendous population expansion. It is in many ways puzzling as to exactly why this latest population expansion continues in the face of the influences of modernization such as urbanization and industrialization. In Western countries these influences have brought about a voluntary decrease at least in the rate of population increases.

I won't try to analyze the psychological influences and social influences in great detail here, but I would like to suggest that since the war Japan has been involved in a total psychology of insecurity. One of the most primitive responses to the total psychology of insecurity — as is indeed seen in the most advanced countries of the world in times of war — is the maintenance of a high rate of biological replacement. I do not say this as an expert on population matters, and demographers may want to argue with me. But, in the United States and all Western countries during the great wars the replacement of population by abnormally high birth rates, and the peculiar phenomenon of the increase in the total proportion of male births during the time of war, are mysteries which the social scientists and biologists have yet to solve. It seems to me that this kind of an influence is very clearly at work in post-surrender Japan in face of the other influences in the direction of the reduction of high biological reproduction.

As far as defense is concerned, defense was initially the total responsibility of the Occupying Powers after Japan's surrender. We all know the recent history involving the creation of small Japanese defense forces in the face of the constitutional provision having to do with the total abjuration of war and with the denial of any armed forces in the future. We must assert, of course, that this constitutional provision was not Japanese-oriented. It did not originate with the Japanese people. It originated with the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers, and it was his suggestion that put that provision into the Japanese constitution.

This is just another illustration of the many instances in which the present of Japan (and probably the future of Japan) have been determined by a unilateral action taken from the outside. This was not always in complete harmony, shall we say, with what would have been done by the Japanese people if given free rein to determine things for themselves. This is not a matter of the ascription of moral responsibility: I think it is just a matter of stating the facts. In general, in looking at Japan's future, there is always a conflict which has to be assessed between what the Japanese are forced to do or think they are forced to do and what they want to do or believe at the time they would desire to do.

At the present time, the reluctance of the Japanese to rearm seems to me to be a product of a variety of causes. The constitutional provision does not inevitably stand in their way. Again, when the opportunity was given to revise it out of existence last summer, and a vote was taken on the matter, as you know, the Japanese refused to do so. They thus have taken a position which cannot be explained on the basis of a complete change in mentality. I do not think they have changed their whole attitude toward military things just in the course of a few years of defeat and occupation. No, I think that their refusal is based upon a variety of influences. This includes the development of some pacifism, particularly in intellectual circles in Japan but not deeply rooted among the people, and the development of a neutralistic attitude which has been the result of the current cold war difficulty. It is rooted in a conflict between the normal Japanese positive attitude toward things, desiring to determine their own fate, and the external influences of the cold war rivalry which put them in the middle of a very unhappy sort of situation. These influences are all fighting with a tendency which I think is typified in the reaction of the mass of the Japanese people, by and large, to the establishment of small defense forces — particularly land forces. You find, for example, that at all points the quota for enlistments in the defense forces is very, very heavily oversubscribed, so to

speak. There is no problem of compulsion involved here, for the Japanese people are naturally inclined in that direction. I think it is a matter on their part of waiting to see how a number of things come out before they go into a national rearmament program based upon an alignment with one side or the other in the cold war. What I am saying at this point is: at the present time, the future international alignment of the Japanese is not yet fully determined (I am going to go into this in more detail a little bit later on).

Perhaps the most brilliant sector of the post-surrender development has been in the economic field, where the Japanese have made an excellent recovery. This recovery is based upon the fundamentals of Japan: the fundamentals of low labor costs; adequate-to-excellent technologies; willingness to work hard; and organization which ranges from adequate to excellent. All of these apply to the typical Japanese productive system; that is, the import of raw materials, the processing thereof in Japan, and the export of considerable portions of the finished product — if not the vast bulk thereof — to the outside in order to keep the cycle of the import-export process going.

Throughout the occupation period, the increase of production was steady. Not only did the Japanese produce more goods, but their per capita real income suddenly increased from 1945 on. That is a very large and very important statement, because only on that kind of a basis could there be the other thing that has happened, which is a rather high rate of capital accumulation over the need for subsistence. This has made possible the constant increase in plant facilities, and thus has made possible the constant increase in production.

The internal regime in Japan is now in full possession of the powers of self-government. The political system which the occupation attempted to set up has reverted back somewhat under independence towards more typically Japanese ways of getting

things done. Of course this is what would be expected: a reaction of a simple cyclical or pendulum nature. The reaction was bound to have set in. The full acceptance and the high degree of cooperation with the occupation could hardly be expected to last indefinitely into the future — politically speaking, if only because the Japanese people were bound to reassert themselves in their rights of self-government and sovereignty and because they were also bound to revert back somewhat into their own ways of doing things.

This is seen in relation to both the national and local governments, where increasing degrees of centralization of power have been developed as over against the dissemination and dispersion of power which the occupation attempted to institute. It is also seen in the position of the bureaucracy, which is returning rapidly — or, at least, steadily — back to its previous position of domination in the government of Japan — a position of an oligarchic and perhaps originally of a feudalistic nature, involving the notion that well-educated and well-trained men are what is important in government, not laws and constitutions.

All of these developments are natural and should not be looked upon with any particular degree of apprehension. Any progress made in the direction of representative government of our kind, or in the direction of more individualism in government, and so on, are trends of foreign importation and not something indigenous to Japan. Therefore, we could not expect continuous devotion to them on the part of the Japanese people. As a matter of fact the constitution itself, written (as it was) by the occupation and handed to the Japanese, was typically foreign in one rather interesting and entirely unique way. I think, if I am correct, that this is the only modern state in which the first version of the constitution was written in a foreign language and not in the native language of the country. Of course their constitution was written in English, and then had to be translated into Japanese.

But translation and interpretation are two different things. Actually, some of the very words and terms written into the constitution by the American officials of the Supreme Commanders' Headquarters were so foreign that they were almost untranslatable into Japanese. Of course it is a fantastic truth that in spite of this the Japanese, with their unique ability at adaptation of foreign imports of all kinds, took the constitution and essentially managed to domesticate it during the years of the occupation. It is not surprising that since then the constitution has remained intact but that the practices which are involved in and under it, or that part of the constitution which is practice and not law, tended to revert back to their former nature.

As I said, these developments are not alarming. But there are some other more alarming developments, at least from an American point of view — and, of course, I speak here strictly from an American point of view. There is the position of the Communist Party in Japan: this position in formal politics is small. They have no large constituency; they never get massive votes; they have never managed to seat many people in the legislative body. But if its position in formal politics is small, I would say that the position of the Communist Party in Japanese society is increasingly important.

Again, this is perhaps not so much because of the inherent appeal that Communist ideology has for the Japanese; in fact, the contrary is true. It is more to be attributed again to the general feeling of insecurity that the Japanese have as to how the current cold war is going to come out. What is going to be the winning side is the question, because, of course, on that winning side the Japanese *must* be the next time. They were not on that side last time but they were on it during the First World War, and the contrast is only too obvious. So the Communist Party in Japan has a certain blackmail value and a certain intimidation value in Japanese politics. It has not made tremendous inroads

yet, but I think it is slowly gaining. We will talk about that a bit more later on.

In international affairs in general, Japan has been restored fully to the Community of Nations. The Peace Treaty of 1951 has been generally acceded to, and, in addition, they have now made their peace and gotten into normal relations with the Soviet Union. Particularly significant is the long, tortuous, and difficult process of readjustment with the new States of South-east Asia, including the Philippines and Burma. In these countries, of course, the Japanese War and Occupation left a legacy of terrifying problems. When you see the economic significance of these areas to Japan's trade, the fact of a political settlement becomes of prime importance. From a security point of view in international affairs, however, in spite of her coming back into full membership in the International Community of Nations, Japan is today entirely a security dependency, and she is a security dependency of the United States. This is not a happy situation for the Japanese in some ways, but in other ways it is.

When we talk about the "economic rebirth of Japan" and the "tremendous progress in economic reconstruction," we must remember — as in the case of Western Germany since World War II — that the economic development and growth, the increase in production, the rise in real wages, the investment of surpluses — all of these are related strongly to the fact that these countries do not any longer have to invest such a large part of their total income in military apparatus, in military preparation, in military manpower, and so forth. All of that which used to be such a drain on their productivity and on their economy they have gained, for they do not have to pay that out any more. Of course this is the net gain — and a very important net gain it is — in the economic field from military and security dependency upon other countries. Dependency after the surrender was inevitable; it could not be avoided. Therefore, the Japanese have

turned to it and begun to reap the profits of it in the economic field.

So much for a sketch of the situation as it now exists — and it has to be an adequate and impartial sketch.

With these guiding lines, let us now turn to look at the problems of the future. We will again take up most of the main points that we have already taken up in sketching the picture of the present.

The population is still the single greatest internal problem of Japan in relation to the ratio between territory, population and economic development. As to the future, of course, this leads to the question of whether the Japanese will again resort to territorial expansion on the basis of its supposed relationship to population. Must Japan's increasing population lead to a new territorial expansion? In a single word, it not only must not but it should not. Japan's population concentration has been cited as very high, but, in fact, it is not much higher than the population concentration of many other countries in the world today. As far as food is concerned, it has to be taken not as a matter of square miles but as square units of arable land. That is perhaps an oversimplified way to look at it because other resources are involved. In this respect, the Japanese position is clearly not so bad.

The prewar position of England and Wales was 1,141 persons per square kilometer of arable land. Compared to this, prewar Japan had 1,163 persons per square kilometer of arable land. That is only a partial picture and does not take all of the material resources into account, but it certainly is significant. Added to this is the fact that all the previous prewar expansion of Japan was no cure for the Japanese population problem in terms of the ratio between people and area. In fact, the expansion of Japan was used as an argument to justify and support the high rates in population increase. Of course the Japanese military and political people wanted "to have their cake and eat it

at the same time." At the same time that they were insisting that their population made expansion necessary, they also insisted that the necessity of expansion meant they must have large drafts of new manpower coming along all of the time. Thus, they were caught in a closed circle.

The Japanese expanded into areas in eastern Asia which provided them with no possibility of population relief on a migration basis. I say "no possibility." Where did they go? First, to Korea; then to Manchuria, Formosa and China. Of course China's figure is a figure of about half the population density per square kilometer as that of Japan, or, prewar, 504 persons per square kilometer of arable land. But the fact was that the Japanese people could not and would not migrate into Manchuria or any other part of China in great numbers — where the population was relatively low. The reason for this was that they could not compete with the native populations in those areas. The Koreans and the Chinese could underlive, so to speak, even the hard-working and extremely frugal Japanese farmer who had a higher standard of living in his home country than the Koreans or the Chinese ever had in modern times, or can anticipate having even in the near future.

The result was that there was no population relief by migration. The places into which the Japanese wanted to migrate would not accept them: North America, Australia, and places of that kind. So Japanese expansion was a matter of getting territory for the purpose of getting command over raw material resources and markets; then, importing those resources, processing them in Japan, exporting the finished products into the markets, and proceeding to do it all over again. It was this which allowed the Japanese population to expand two and a half to three times between 1868 and 1938, from an absolute figure back in the middle of the nineteenth century which was relatively stable. So territorial expansion for the purpose of relieving population pressure was only a partial answer, and, today, is seemingly an impossible

answer to Japan's population picture. The solution of this problem must come from the institution of birth control; it must come from the institution of free trade back and forth in the buying of raw materials and the selling of finished products.

Naturally, this leads us to consider the economic problem of the future. The economic problem is a problem of economic production. First, consider raw materials availability. Are raw materials less available to Japan now than in 1941? The answer is this: They are more available now than they were in 1941, but they are not available on a basis of actual control of the territories and not on a basis of purchase for Japanese currency, as was the case with Korean, Manchurian, Chinese and Formosan raw materials in the past. However, adequate supplies of foodstuffs, coal, oil, cotton, iron, and other metals are available, and have been available to the Japanese by purchase since 1945.

Of course this again brings up this whole question of what the trend of the world is today. Is the present peace — unquiet and unstable as it is — going to continue, a situation under which the Japanese can rely upon the normal channels of world trade? Or, must the Japanese — as they always did before — plan upon the inevitability of war? Well, nobody can be too optimistic about this. One can pardon the Japanese and understand them thoroughly if they feel utterly insecure in the present situation.

Now as to the problem of access to markets. This is a much more difficult problem. With raw materials, it is a matter of having the currency with which to buy them. People want to sell. The United States today is selling Japan a very large proportion of her raw materials: for example, cotton, coal, and also foodstuffs. Access to markets is much more difficult. Even in this country there are increasing moves to block out Japanese imports. This is economic and political nonsense. It is often urged that in this respect the Japanese must "revive" (I use this word, but it is not an accurate word) their previous commercial relations with China. "Revival," of course, implies a preexistence of

something. Today, China is not a place where you can "revive" very much of anything that the past involved. It is a new and different place. You cannot just talk about "reviving old relationships" with a country that is as new and utterly different from what it used to be as is China today.

In China in the past, as far as Japan was concerned, the problem was one of political and military relations. That is still a problem today. But now, of course, the "shoe is on the other foot." The Chinese are the people who are on the aggressive side; the Chinese Communists are the ones who want to go outward. It is certainly not the Japanese who are aggressive from the point of view of territorial acquisition. The Chinese are trying to push themselves forward, to use a slang phrase, they are "on the make," as far as economy and development are concerned.

How can the Japanese fit into this very formidable problem? As a matter of fact, the pressure for more trade with Communist China is not going to pay the Japanese off in terms of solving their economic problems. Is trade with the Communist Bloc, involving Communist China, a panacea for Japan's economic ills? The answer to this must be "No," and it can be seen from a few facts.

Let us take here a complicated set of statistics. Take seventeen leading Japanese imports during 1951 and 1953; out of these seventeen imports select thirteen. Of these thirteen commodities, involving 72% of all Japanese imports in 1953, the total Communist Bloc exports to all countries in the world were less than Japan's requirements alone. The other four commodities were: coal, timber, soy beans, and oil seeds. For Japan, these came to \$215 million in 1953. Perhaps Japan can get about \$150 million worth of these from the Communist Bloc, but only that much because the Communist Bloc itself needs these things. This would amount only to a maximum of 10% of the total Japanese imports in a normal year like 1951 or 1953. So the Communist Bloc has very little to offer Japan. As far as raw materials are

concerned, this is going to decrease instead of increase because although the economic development of the Communist Bloc will demand the increasing production of these commodities, it will also mean increasing absorption of these commodities in the processing and sale inside the Communist Bloc itself.

By contrast, the Japanese exports to Taiwan (that is, Free China) in 1955 were \$58.4 million and her imports from Taiwan were \$76.3 million. This compared to a maximum of about \$150 million, which they can get in imports from the entire Communist Bloc. The figure for imports from Taiwan, the small island of Formosa alone, is \$76.3 million, or one-half of the total potentiality that the Communist Bloc affords.

Let us point out that trade with Taiwan can be conducted on a free basis. There are no economic penalties, and, above all, no powerful political or military liabilities attached to trade of this kind. All we have to do is to convince the Japanese that trade with the Free World — including Taiwan, for example, as a part of it as it now stands — can go on. It seems to me that one of the great reasons that lies back of the current Japanese drive for more trade with the Communist Bloc is a worry in respect to how much of the Free World is going to remain “free” in the next ten years, starting with Taiwan and going on down the line. This is important. Will Taiwan become a part of the Communist Bloc? If so, then the question of trade with China assumes an entirely different aspect and a different meaning. It is because we cannot convince the Japanese at the present moment of the utter stability of our intentions in respect to Taiwan and other parts of the Free World remaining out of the Communist Bloc that we must pardon the Japanese if they politely say to us: “It is all very nice of you to talk as though things are going to remain as they are. How can you prove this to us?” We will talk about that question a little bit later on.

Another great problem in Japan, from the economic point of view, and one which is generally lost sight of, is the problem of

economic modernization in Japan. "Well," you say, "we thought Japan was the most modern nation in the whole of Asia from an economic and technological point of view." That is true — but that is only a relative statement, is it not?

Let me point out to you by one illustration what I am talking about here. In Japan, on the average, it still takes twice as many man-hours of labor to manufacture a ton of pig iron as it does in the United Kingdom. So the labor cost per ton of pig iron in Japan is still higher today than it is in the United Kingdom — and this is a positive fact. Their so-called "cheap labor" is really not so cheap. Yet, the penalty of cheap labor is the failure or the refusal to utterly modernize the methods of production. The British themselves are far from being on a high standard from this point of view. In the British case, their nearest competitor, geographically, is West Germany.

In the case of West Germany, the people there — by one of those sardonic twists of fate — have an advantage in the fact that they lost the war. The advantage lies in the fact that the loss of the war was accompanied by such wholesale destruction of their basic plant facilities that to get back into production at all had to mean modernization of plants. When combined with the tremendous industry or willingness to work, and the refusal to bargain over wages and hours of labor, or the refusal (if I may be so bold to say so) to put in the socialized system under which the laboring man can get exactly what he wants at all times — the West Germans have got all the advantages over the British.

If this is so in regard to Britain, and Britain is at an advantage regarding Japan, the true nature of Japan's economic production problem must be quite evident to us. This is particularly important in view of the fact that Japan's two greatest competitors for markets for metallurgical products in Southeast Asia are precisely the United Kingdom and West Germany. This being the case, it dramatizes the situation which is general throughout the Japanese productive system.

Of course we are asking the Japanese for a great deal if we insist upon them raising their standards of living, of getting back into production, of increasing their production, of doing all of this by tremendous energy and, at the same time, having to buy all new plants with which to do it. We did not quite bomb them out of existence that much! They do not require that much plant replacement in order to produce! But this is their basic problem. Fundamentally, I think that there is a drag here which does not come from the matter of lack of funds and which does not come so much from a matter of not seeing the truth. It comes from a certain reluctance to put enough of the profits again back into the building of capital, back into savings, and thus into the modernization of productive methods. This is a very severe and difficult problem for modern Japan in the economic field.

I mentioned Taiwan a short time ago. As far as Japan is concerned, from the economic point of view, I wish to mention another very important area — and that is Korea. To this day, of course, the Republic of Korea and Japan have not gotten into any general adjustment of their over-all relationships. The future of the Korean-Japanese problem is very uncertain and very cloudy at the present time. We can only hope at this time that Korean-Japanese relations in the modern world will not fall into the kind of pattern which the relations between France and Germany fell into so early in Western Europe — the relations characterized by complete mutual distrust, by a feeling of superiority on both sides for different reasons, by a feeling of the inevitability of victory of one side over the other. These two countries are natural customers, one for the other. Yet, we find the Koreans refusing to allow the importance of Japanese machinery, even when paid for by the United Nations or by American relief, and we find the Japanese being just as obdurate in other matters on the other side. The early solution of Korean-Japanese relations is a “must” for any kind of stability in this part of the world. But how this solution is to be brought about, in view of the vast psychological gulf that separates these two countries and which seems to me

to "alienate" them (I don't think that is too extreme a word) one from the other, is not an easy matter.

Now let us turn from the economic field to the internal political future of Japan. Of course the internal politics of Japan do have an external significance and importance. A great deal of attention is paid in the Western World to the political situation inside of Japan. We focus a lot of attention on the position of the emperor; we focus a lot of attention upon the possibility of a rise to power again of what we call "the militarists" in Japan; we focus a lot of attention upon the ideology and are interested in the revival of Shinto in Japan; we focus a lot of attention on the question of parliament and representative government, local government versus and vis-a-vis central administration, the position of the judiciary in the bureaucracy, and the matter of civil and personal rights. All of these things are things upon which we, as Americans, put a great deal of emphasis, and they have a high value in our focus of attention.

I would like to insist that the amount of attention which we focus on these things vis-a-vis Japan is largely unjustified because it involves the imposition upon the Japanese of a false standard of judgment. We cannot expect these people to come over all the way in our direction, particularly since it seems to me that from a political point of view the recent history of our relations with Japan has involved a rather crude approach, or, as it used to be jokingly said in the old days of the occupation: "We are going to give them democracy, if we have to shove it down their throats." Well, shoving democracy down people's throats is a contradiction in terms. I do not go as far as to say that we ever quite tried this. There is enough truth in it, though, to make us stop and think a bit about whether we ought to be so worried about these particular things as far as Japan's internal politics are concerned.

As far as internal Japanese government is concerned, I would like to point out at least two points that I think are far

more important for the future — both to us and to the Japanese people. The first point I will name under a general heading of "The Modernization of Operations." Here, I would like to insist that what is needed is a strong emphasis (because modern Japan in the past has not been characterized by this), and a real development of, reliance upon the rule of law. Here, I am not talking about the rule of law as a political abstraction. We can find in Western political ideology a tremendous emphasis upon constitutionalism as an "ism." I think that many of us do not seem to understand what the rule of law means. Here, the rule of law really means this: That one substitutes an impersonal, regularized, disciplined, formal approach to government procedures for a personal, irregular oligarchic — or, perhaps in Japan, bureaucratic — approach to government procedures.

The importance of all this was clearly seen during the last war. Again, maybe this is asking too much of the Japanese. We have always said that from a political point of view the Japanese were the most advanced nation in Eastern Asia. They did have a constitution early in their history and the constitution which they got was an expression of their basic values. Many people thought because the Japanese had a constitution that they had what we understand as "Constitutional government," but you know there is a difference between "a constitution" and having "constitutional government." If you don't believe that, go to the library and dig out the constitution of the Soviet Union.

After all, all a constitution is is a description of something, isn't it? It may be that it describes absolute despotism; it may describe an oligarchic government; or it can describe what we mean by "constitutional government," which, by and large, is government under law, in which the people that govern are ruled by the law just as much as the people that are governed. That is the essential meaning of "constitutional government" to us.

But I am talking about a belief in this as an abstract value. I am talking about the kind of thing which, if you want

it documented, I refer you to one of the most valuable books on modern Japan that I can think of, a book, incidentally, written by a former naval officer, Professor Jerome B. Cohen, called *Japan's Economy in War and Reconstruction*. In this book, he analyzes the war economy of Japan on just this kind of a basis: How did they operate? He demonstrates that they did not do as well even with what they had by a long shot as they would have if they had had the rule of law in orderly procedures, regularized methods, and systematic regularity. The Japanese government has traditionally and typically been the rule of an oligarchy: a rule by men, rather than by laws. Well, of course, you pay your money and you take your choice. There are times when the rule of men is very convenient, when it is more flexible and more adjustable. But in the matter of personal government, its flexibility tends to fall down and to collapse when one gets into emergency situations.

For all of the "inefficiencies of constitutional government" that have been so widely cited by believers in Fascism, in Communism, and in all other dictatorships and totalitarianisms, the fact is that constitutional government is the only kind of government which can be truly called "modern" in the sense that it truly fits in with a system of production and system of distribution based upon science, with all that means in terms of regularity, of discipline, and of system. The efficiencies that are involved here are things which have been lost upon the Japanese, by and large. The Japanese adopted a facade structure of Western government in the nineteenth century, but they never got the real point of Western constitutionalism, which is the point that I have been trying to demonstrate, both as to its meaning and its practical significance.

Sometimes when we begin to wonder about the future of our own people and of our own country, and when we begin to long for the simple efficiencies of a regimentation produced by totalitarianism, let us consider that no such regimentation can

be reconciled with the demands of a scientific technology. We will find this to be just as true in the case of the Soviet Union in the long run as we have found it to be true of those other would-be dictators of the world, Hitler and Mussolini. Of course, Mussolini made the Italian trains run on time. But these are small efficiencies. The big efficiencies do not come from that kind of a single, concentrated, personal type of control.

I have already referred to the second great political problem inside Japan, and that is the prevention in Japan of the new totalitarian ideology of Communism being substituted for the old Japanese ideology. The problem here is that Communism, as it always does, tries to exploit those tendencies toward democratic tolerance, mutual give-and-take, multiparty systems, and all of those things that we Americans believe in so heartily and which we think everybody else ought to automatically want and desire from the fundamental nature of man himself. As far as these things existing in Japan is concerned, the fact is they were to a great extent put in there under the occupation — and the Communists have exploited these situations and these facts.

Of course it has often been asserted that the Japanese are temperamentally inhospitable to Communism in view of their traditional ideology, and I think this is true. But, again, the freeing of education in Japan from the restraints of a hidebound authoritarianism of the old type has, to a great extent, resulted in opening it to Communistic influences. If you do not believe this, look up the figures on the constituency and membership of the Japanese Teachers' Union, which is described in the most optimistic possible terms as "left wing controlled." That is the most optimistic way you can talk about it. Under the auspices of such Japanese teachers in the schools, the indoctrination of the Japanese youth goes on apace — not necessarily in terms of overt Communism, not in terms of overt Marxism, but in terms of all those things which can be reconciled with those values that I mentioned previously; not to the extent that these people want to

become Communists, but that they will tolerate Communism. Of course this really gets us over into controversial ground, does it not?

Is it our duty, as some extreme people tell us it is, to tolerate all points of view and tolerate Communism? Well, if we indoctrinate the Japanese sufficiently in their duty to be that tolerant, we have only ourselves to blame for what will happen. Of course these people are working slowly and gradually in building up this thing. I give them a fifteen- to twenty-year period. As things are now, by that time I think they will have enough people thoroughly indoctrinated in at least a minimum of toleration of Communism to present a very serious picture as far as Japan's future attitude is likely to be toward Communist aggression.

Of course this leads us over into the international relationships of present-day Japan. Here, I would like to raise a fundamental question: Why should anyone on our side worry about what side Japan is on? What are the Japanese assets? What does Japan mean? Is Japan an asset to be safeguarded? You know that it used to be said in the early days of the occupation that Japan would turn into a "strong bastion or bulwark of democracy against Communism." Well, this has yet to develop.

The military position of Japan is significant. It is an insular area, near to a large continental region, but it is highly concentrated in that insular area. The vulnerabilities of that area are well symbolized by the current tendency to remove from Japan the forward organizations of control of such groups as the Far Eastern Air Force, for instance, the headquarters of which, it has been announced in the newspapers, are to be removed back to the Hawaiian Islands. In case of a major war, Japan's position — like that of the British Isles — is rapidly developing in the direction of a liability. But as far as small wars are concerned we saw, as in the case of Korea, the extreme value of this forward position. So it is a highly mixed situation; it depends upon what

your prophecies are with regard to the shape of future wars as to the value which their position would have from that point of view.

As to military manpower, I would say, "Yes, the Japanese are a great asset." It would be very simple and easy in any plan of emergency to raise 2 million armed troops from the Japanese population without cutting down the efficiency of operations or the economy to any marked extent. They lack the necessary equipment and arms, but these materials could be supplied to them. They are thus an asset to whichever side they might be on.

From an economic point of view, their productivity is not as great an asset to our side, not only on account of the low order of productivity in comparison to that of the great economic units in the world today — and, also, as I said before, on account of the vulnerability and the lack of resources. But, again, in connection with small wars such as we have had it is important. We have to call the Korean War a small war, whether we like it or not, and these are very significant.

If this is the meaning to us, we also have to evaluate Japan from an entirely different point of view. We must look at Japan's significance to the other side. The importance, of course, is relative. If Japan's plant and productivity is relatively less significant to us, it is highly significant to the Chinese Communists, for example. The great assets of Japan, looking at the matter from the Communist point of view, are precisely two: one is their plant; the other is their know-how.

First, their plant is the only large industrial plant in all of East Asia. This is not saying it is of tremendous magnitude — for it is not of the first, second, or third magnitude — but it is the only modern large industrial plant in East Asia. Second, as to know-how: the Japanese have the only substantial body of highly-disciplined and organized technical skills available in East

Asia today. Taken together, these Japanese assets are the only possible source for the one thing which the Chinese Communist want more than anything else: a relatively rapid growth of their own economic power. This they can achieve (and their aim is very obvious) by establishing in reverse what the Japanese used to call the "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere." You all remember that the Japanese planned, as a result of their conquests during the period from 1937 on, to establish a great integrated economic area in Eastern Asia, with themselves providing these two things which I have mentioned and with the other people from these areas providing them with raw materials of all kinds (which they did not have control of at that time), with cheap manpower in great quantities, and, above all, with markets in which to sell their finished products — both consumer goods and their available supply of heavy capital machinery. Taken from a purely selfish Western point of view, the denial of Japan to the Communist Bloc is an imperative "must," to be listed right at the top level of the great foreign policy objectives of the United States.

If this is something from our point of view, what is the meaning of all of this to the Japanese? Well, the meaning of all of this to the Japanese is very much the same as the meaning of their position in the nineteenth century was to them then. At that time, remember, Japan was a weak country, living in those small islands with no real military power of any kind, but with tremendous initiative, energy, industry, a tremendous drive, and a great deal of will and desire for "self-improvement" (to use the best possible term we can apply to this). What they had to offer was what we call "alliance value." They said: "We will ally ourselves with whoever it is that will pay us off in the best possible national coin."

This alliance value was seen very clearly and exploited by other countries. The British were the ones who then succeeded in exploiting it most clearly. This was typified in the Anglo-

Japanese Alliance in the first part of the early years of the twentieth century. This led to the Russo-Japanese War, to Japanese self-improvement, and to the servicing of a great over-all British strategic aim in inhibiting the Russian expansion southward in Eastern Asia, which was one of their primary objectives in that region.

You see, this meant that the Japanese in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (and this lasted all throughout World War I) adopted a highly successful technique of allying themselves with the kind of military power (in the shape of sea power) that would pay them off the most, the quickest, and the best. Why was sea power the power with which they wanted to be allied? Simply because Japan's insular position meant that they could not go anywhere from Japan except through military power expressed on the surface of the water. The dominant sea powers were the Japanese allies up to World War I and through the intervening years. It was only in the 30's — when the Japanese became so overconfident in their own sea power on an autonomous, independent basis that they threw away their alliance and their alignment with the great sea powers of the world in favor of an alignment with Germany and Italy, and an attempt later to be at least mutually neutral with the Soviet Union — that they were faced with the disaster which finally overcame them during the years after Pearl Harbor.

The current problem of the Japanese is just as simple as that, but it does seem that at least two new factors have entered into it. First, the future of the Soviet Union as a sea power is something that nobody can evaluate at the present time. The Japanese certainly cannot make up their minds as to what Russian sea power will mean as time goes on in relation to the sea power of other countries. In the second place — which is far more important, something over which we have control, and therefore something which we must emphasize — the Japanese cannot judge as to whether the Americans have a fixed and certain strategy

from a combined political and military point of view. The current Japanese problem is this: "Can we depend upon the United States, who obviously seems to be our national ally and the only country that can get us anywhere from where we are?"

Well, you argue: "Of course you can! Don't you see that we fought in Korea, that we are fighting the cold war, that we are trying to throttle the Russians and keep Communism from spreading?"

The first question that the Japanese will ask you is this: "If that was so, maybe you started too late. What about China? You let that country go, and that is a big area that we face in Eastern Asia. If your intentions are only to hold marginal regions, allowing the great continental zones to pass over firmly and irrevocably into the hands of the Communists, we are a little more dubious about this."

I would characterize the current Japanese attitude (I may be wrong — I may be overestimating it) as an attitude of doubt, an attitude of "We are waiting to be convinced." That is their attitude as I see it. It is easy enough for *us* to be assured of our reliability. Oh, yes, we insist that we know exactly what we are doing! Well, other people have to be pardoned for not quite buying it all that easily.

As one Japanese said to me in Japan a few years ago, "The one thing that is dependable about American foreign policy is that you cannot depend upon it." I tried to argue with him for I didn't look at it quite in that way. But I am afraid I have to confess I never managed to change his basic mind on that subject.

What are the real issues in the Far East and elsewhere on which the Japanese, for better or for worse, will have to establish their estimate of the dependability of the United States as an ally in the future?

I will give you one issue which is a very, very dubious matter today, one which is much more dubious than the treaties

would make it out to be: the future of Free China, the future of Taiwan. What is our attitude going to be toward Communist China? Are we going to allow the Chinese Communists to take over Taiwan? Well, no, we want to have two Chinas. The Chinese Communists and the Chinese Nationalists are not the only people who believe that two Chinas are impossible, and who reject it. You must remember that both the Communists and the Nationalists refused any such solution of the problem of China as two Chinas.

Almost all Asiatics with whom I have talked in the last couple of years (and I have been spending time out there) say: "You are 'trying to have your cake and eat it at the same time.'" Perhaps they don't use exactly those words, but that is what you come out with.

Are we going to surrender to Communist China on such points as the admission to the United Nations, recognition, cultural relations, and, finally, trade and economic development? Is all of this inconceivable? I don't think so — it is not inconceivable at all! It may all easily happen in the next few years, and the Japanese will look at that very hard!

Is Taiwan, their important market and source of foodstuffs, going to Communist China? If so, the whole attitude on trade with the Communist Bloc has to be dramatically revised, does it not? then our arguments about how the Japanese cannot basically profit from trade with the Communist Bloc will "go down the drain."

The second place to which the Japanese will look is our success or failure in South Viet Nam. In South Viet Nam, an excellent beginning has been made. How resolutely, how firmly and how consistently will we support South Viet Nam against the inevitable attacks that will come from all sides?

Another place at which the Japanese will look in order to evaluate American successes and failures is in the Philippines.

"Oh," you say, "that is a shocking idea! You mean there is any question about our relations with the Philippines?"

I say there are very grave questions regarding our future relations with the Philippines. The first of these questions has to do with nothing less than our mutual security arrangements — the situation of bases. This is all up in the air at the present time. The Japanese are going to look there. Are the Filipinos going to be insistent upon such a degree of nationalism as to be inconsistent with a real dependency upon the United States? Can the United States make dependency upon th U. S. attractive to the Phillipines by evading, by writing down and talking down the less attractive features?

The future of Indonesia is another case in point. Remember, the Americans are to a heavy extent responsible for the independence of the Indonesians from the Dutch. What will happen? Will this country go Communist? If so, how can the Americans be relied upon?

Then, finally, the security of the Republic of Korea, about which grave questions have arisen in the last few years, owing to the fact that the Communists — as usual — do not keep their bargains and that we do.

All of these things — as well as our direct relations with the Japanese over such questions as rearmament, Okinawa, trade, and a few other points of that kind — will be influential in regard to Japan. Thus, where Japan goes is, to a heavy extent, up to us.

I have gone well overtime, and I apologize for keeping you over in the formal presentation. But I am at your service as long as you want me for questions.

Thank you!

BIOGRAPHIC SKETCH

Professor David N. Rowe

Professor Rowe was born in Nanking, China, and he has travelled extensively in the Pacific area, China, Korea, Japan, the Philippines, Hong Kong, Siam, Cambodia, Malaya, Indonesia and India. He received his A.B. degree from Princeton University, his A.M. degree from the University of Southern California, and his Ph.D. degree from the University of Chicago.

He was a General Education Board Fellow in Humanities at Harvard University during 1935-1937 for the study of Chinese and Japanese languages, Chinese history and historiography. The following year, he was a Rockefeller Foundation Fellow at the College of Chinese Studies, Peking, China, for the study of Chinese languages and history.

From 1938 to 1943, Professor Rowe was a lecturer in Far Eastern Affairs at the School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University, where he taught the Chinese language and Social and Political Institutions of Eastern Asia. During November 1941 to July 1942, he served as a Special Assistant to the Director of the Branch of Research and Analysis, Office of Strategic Services. He was sent to Chungking, China, by the Far Eastern Section, and while there he held an appointment as Special Assistant to the Ambassador, American Embassy, Chungking.

Professor Rowe was a Research Associate at the Institute of International Studies, Department of Foreign Area Studies, at Yale University during 1943-1951. From November 1943 to September 1945, he was a member of the War and Peace Studies Project, Council of Foreign Relations, New York. At various times during 1945 he was a lecturer for the Training Division of the Bureau of Naval Personnel, Office of War Information, and United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration. Also, in 1945, he was a member of the International Secretariat, United Nations Conference on International Organization, at San Francisco.

During 1945 and 1946, he was Director of the Staff Officers School for Asiatic Studies at Yale University. The next two years he was Director of the Undergraduate and Graduate Studies, Division of Foreign Area Study, at Yale University, following which he was Director of Graduate Studies on East Asia there during 1949-1951. At various times since 1948 Professor Rowe has been Consultant to the United States Consultant General, Shanghai; the United States Air Force; Stanford Research Institute; The George Washington University, and to the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Department of the Army. He has lectured at the National, Army, and Air War Colleges.

During 1954-1956, Professor Rowe was a Representative, The Asia Foundation, The Republic of China (Taiwan), a Visiting Professor of Political Science at National Taiwan University, and Vice-Chairman of the Taiwan Committee, China Institute, in America. At present, Professor Rowe is Professor of Political Science at Yale University.

THE INFLUENCE OF SEA POWER ON MODERN STRATEGY

A lecture delivered
at the Naval War College
on 20 December 1956 by
Professor James A. Field, Jr.

I have been asked to consider the influence of sea power on modern strategy, to appraise its importance during the past twenty-five years, and to show that sea power and the control of the sea are still matters of critical importance. This, I take it, is preaching to the converted, for I assume that even those of you who wear the light blue have by this time been pretty well worn down to a nub. But it is doubtless always good to be confirmed in the faith, and in modern life the acceptance of claim rests heavily on the testimony of the independent expert. If by posing as one of these I can contribute to your peace of mind, I shall have as ample reward the pleasant and righteous glow of the revivalist.

One can perhaps go beyond the concept of the influence of sea power on strategy and speak of it as the precondition — the precondition both in war and in peace — of any strategy, military or economic or political, that has more than the most limited spatial dimensions. It was in its military aspect, or perhaps one should say a mixture of military and humanitarian aspects, that the problem was first clearly appreciated, when Captain Mahan's reading of the history of Rome led him to sympathize with the sore feet of Hannibal's soldiers and of Hannibal's elephants, and then, after referring to the map, to wonder why they had chosen to proceed from Africa to Italy by way of Spain and the Alps rather than to take the short route across. In a small way this classic situation is familiar to all of you: wiser than Hannibal, the Naval Base authorities have followed the precepts of Mahan

in providing water transport between the Carthage of Fort Adams and the Italy of the War College.

Yet, armies are not the only exports of importance to civilization, and the world is so made up that for economical movement over any very considerable distance you must employ the sea. Perception of this truth has penetrated far inland, and even the Swiss now operate a merchant marine. As with trade, so with aid: the father of our country, we are told, once threw a dollar across the Potomac, a feat duplicated in later times only by Grover Cleveland Alexander. This aerial infusion of hard money from one state to another was an impressive feat, but still a limited one. Later presidents, attempting to bolster the economies of states of kindred views, have found the aerial route feasible only in special emergencies or as providing a marginal increment. The Atlantic is broader than the Potomac, the requirements for the lift are greater, the use of the seas remains wholly essential.

Politically and culturally, too, the seas are the bases of strategy. It was by sea that Europe reached outward to change the histories of the rest of the globe and to create, in time, those new nations which now exercise the immemorial privilege of children in repeating their parent's mistakes. It has been by sea that the New World has now twice redressed the balance of the old. The seas are the ties that bind, the highways which unite what we refer to as "the free world." Thoughts and ideas, propaganda and instructions can now of course vault the oceans by airplane or radio wave, but the important artifacts of civilization still travel in the holds of ships. That bottled epitome of American life called Coca Cola, which our friends abroad receive with such oddly ambivalent feelings, travels by surface transportation. The cocacolonization of the world — along with some more important matters — depends on our being able to move freely upon the surface of the waters.

In all this I have told you nothing, surely, that you did not know, or that men have not known for a long time. "The

secret of war," said Napoleon, "lies in the communications," and even in his time war had outgrown the Continent and the navies which controlled the application of overseas resources had the casting vote. Today, the secrets of more than war lie in the wet places of the earth: all our hopes for the future, for a world of increasing cooperation and productivity and rationality and humanity, rest in the development of ties which can be woven only across oceans. Without sea power there is no strategy other than the strategy of inaction and immobility and decay.

II

Having now, I hope, fulfilled my engagement and proven my orthodoxy, I would like to put the issue in a somewhat different light and consider the influence not of sea power on strategy but of strategy on sea power. The point of course is that sea power has been servant not master, means not end, an instrument employed by man and not a force directing him. One should be wary about developing a determinist dialectic from a contemplation of the oceans. No one who has sailed upon them considers their behavior predictable. Furthermore, while all that I have said so far presupposes the positive employment of sea power, the use of the waters for that movement of commodities so central to the maintenance and the defense of civilization, it should not be forgotten that there is a negative aspect to these matters. Seas are highways under some circumstances; they can also be barriers. It is only too clear in our minds today that there is an effective kind of sea power which can be exercised by the possessor of one end of a canal.

In discussing the influence of strategy on sea power, I do not mean to be understood as suggesting that it is the only important factor which governs the use or abuse of maritime possibilities. Clearly, the whole situation is formidably complex. Mahan's calculus involved six factors, including such things as the nation's geography, size, population, government, and the like. All these and others, particularly changing technology, demand

consideration. But since the world as we have known it has been organized in national units, and since these units are possessed of directing policies or strategies, the human animal subsumes all factors when he exercises the managerial function. Well or ill, wisely or foolishly, he uses the factors of strength and weakness available to him to gain what he conceives as his desired ends. Perhaps the remarkable thing is the number of protean forms that sea power, or its attempted exercise, can take, under various permutations and combinations of international life. Let us consider a few that can be discerned in the history of recent decades.

The first of these is the strategy of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the strategy, if you please, of the Age of Mahan. This was a strategy of unbridled national competition, which we may call the strategy of "devil take the hindmost." Increasing popular participation in government in this period brought with it increasing nationalism as ruling groups discovered in flag-waving a helpful method of keeping their former power over the newly enlarged electorate. With industrialization there came to the fore new and powerful interest groups, concerned for markets and sources of raw materials, and desirous of governmental assistance in international competition. The example of Great Britain and the precepts of Mahan seemed to indicate that the road to the future and to an assured place in the sun was by way of the oceans into the outer areas of the earth. The result was the new imperialism which painted European colors on almost all the unclaimed areas of the map, and which ended in a period of delicate and unstable balancing of alliances and understandings. The importance attributed to sea power as the lever with which to move the earth your way was seen in a fairly unbridled navalism, in the union of industrialists and patriots in Navy Leagues, in the concern for overseas bases, and in expanded building programs.

To a considerable degree, then, sea power was the gospel of the age, and yet we must say that for many it proved a false

gospel. If the emphasis on its monopolistic nature put forward by Mahan meant anything, it meant that among those in close competition, among the powers of Europe in other words, there could in the last analysis be only one sea power. The Kaiser's building program thus carried within itself a large element of self-destruction, for Germany could not overtake the British, while the spectacle of the greatest land power seeking to become strong at sea increased and strengthened the coalition arrayed against her. Instead of dividing to conquer, Germany unified, and the influence of German sea power on strategy turned out to be less important than its influence on policy. This period which in its naval aspects may be dated from the German Navy Law of 1898, we may appropriately end in its European phase with the sinking of the High Seas Fleet at Scapa Flow.

Yet, under special circumstances the strategy of the new imperialism could, for a considerable time, work out effectively. Of those who joined the expansionist parade in the Age of Mahan, the Japanese nation was especially favored. Situated as the Japanese were at the opposite end of the earth, insulated by distance from the great powers of Europe as well as from the suddenly potent United States, the monopoly characteristics of sea power were for them attainable. Having assimilated the military techniques of the West at an astonishing speed — one of the colonels in the Russo-Japanese War had fought in his youth clad in chain mail and carrying a battle axe — the Japanese were enabled to reenact in Asia the history of European overseas expansion of four centuries before. Once again a highly organized state with modern weapons confronted ancient civilizations lacking these advantages. Learning from the West, yet separated from it by half the globe, insulated further by the Anglo-Japanese treaty and by the troubles of Europe, the Japanese from their own point of view at least made a good thing of sea power for almost half a century.

Victory over China in 1895 was followed in a decade by the defeat of Russia. Ten more years saw the disappearance of

Germany from the Orient, followed by the retreat of the other western powers. The more Japan shook the tree the more fell off, until that December-day when she gave it one shake too many. With this the monopoly situation, so profitable yet by some so inadequately understood, suddenly ended. Having gained so much by a sea power protected by distance and isolation, they lost all to a greater sea power through a misdirected strategy. Remote from Europe, they reintegrated themselves in the difficulties of the western world by erecting, on top of a presumed concert of interests with the Axis Powers, the Tripartite Pact. Having thus made it one world, the next step was to make it one war — and this proved fatal.

A second strategy, in addition to that of "devil take the hindmost," sprang from the Age of Mahan. This was not a strategy of conquest but, rather, one of defense and isolation. In a period of extreme national competition and rivalry such a strategy was reserved for the fortunate nation that was also protected by space, that felt no real pressure to expand, that cherished no serious dreams of conquest, but wanted only to remain undisturbed and to prevent them from taking it away or from even threatening to do so. This nation, of course, was the United States.

In America there appeared, of course, certain of the symptoms of the age — A Navy League, a building program, talk about overseas markets, incidents about overseas naval bases — but the imperialistic surge aborted early. Cuba was freed and not annexed, the Philippines were annexed and ultimately freed, the movement into the Orient was checked under the administration of the same "Rough Rider" who had organized the seizure of the Philippines. Preoccupied as America largely was with internal development, and possessed of what was or could be made to appear to be an isolationist tradition, the significant steps in the development of the new American sea power were the emphasis on a battleship navy of short range, presumably to keep the Germans out of the Caribbean, and on the construction of the Panama

Canal. The one-ocean navy was for the purpose of protecting our own shores; it was, as the slogan had it, "the first line of defense"; it was not to go adventuring in distant places. Little thought, however, was given to larger problems of the world balance and when, in 1917, America found herself caught up in the Great War, the battleships were of small use, there was an extreme shortage of destroyers, and the habits of thought were such that Admiral Sims, pressing for the immediate dispatch of urgently needed escort units, had the greatest of difficulty in making himself understood.

The trouble, of course, with the Continental strategy of the happy days of the early twentieth century — and of the defensive concept of sea power which America based upon it — was that it overlooked the interrelations of the Atlantic world. The century of peace had led men to forget that the ocean was no automatic barrier, that American isolation was less a function of distance than of European tranquility, and that since the first colonial settlements no major European war had failed to involve Americans. Yet, this error of the century's first decade was understandable in a way that its postwar manifestation was not. Between the two great wars the strategy of defense became one of indifference, and developed into a new strategic concept, the strategy of letting them stew in their own juice.

The trouble was, perhaps, that we had pitched our sights too high. The noble dream of reordering the world had led only to disappointment and frustration. To the Europeans, the nation which had been their savior was now a grasping Uncle Shylock; to Americans, their erstwhile glorious allies had become a bunch of welchers; to all, the nationalistic solution seemed best. There is a lesson here of immediate and current importance.

In this unfortunate context the United States piled tariff on top of tariff, greatly weakening the links between the nations of the maritime world; the United States saw her merchant marine continue its parallel and related decline; the United States put

its armed services in the national doghouse, refused to build up to treaty limits, and devoted its attention to pleasanter things. Only the rum runners defended by their actions the freedom of the seas, together with another important freedom, and only the Coast Guard, in hot pursuit, kept itself in training.

Like the strategy of defense, the strategy of letting them stew also ended in involvement in conflict. It is true, I suppose, that the Navy was somewhat better prepared for its actual tasks in 1941 than it had been in 1917. But this fact, so far as the policy makers were concerned, was somewhat fortuitous, resulting from the presence in the White House of an ex-Assistant Secretary of the Navy and in the country of a depression which made government expenditures seem socially desirable. Rarely in history has a public works policy paid off as well as did that which produced *Yorktown* and *Enterprise*, on a June day off Midway Island.

In the long run, it would appear, neither the strategy of conquest nor that of defense worked out. All hands found themselves involved in wars for which none were wholly prepared. For those satisfied with the general state of the world, the fact that wars came in which they had to defend themselves at tremendous cost was surely in itself a terrible failure of strategy. For those who aspired to change the nature of things and failed, the same was true. Yet, looked at from our side of the battle lines the effect of these strategic failures was to create a third strategy, which we may call the strategy of cure.

Now the strategy of cure is almost by definition an emergency procedure. It recognizes the existence of trouble, and it is called upon to act as a result of the presence of disease. Not surprisingly, then, it is pragmatic rather than conceptual, less the product of original thought than the reply to conditions demanding treatment. It is the result of the initiative of somebody else, riposte rather than lunge, extemporization rather than plan.

This being the case, the essentials for the strategy of cure are — perhaps we should say have historically been — space that can be translated into time and a vast and flexible productive capacity with which to supply not preplanned needs, but the needs of the moment. Thus the two wars of this century, in which the New World came forth to redress the balance of the Old, partook of the nature of vast improvisations: in the first, the rapidly mustered AEF transported on the bridge of ships; in the second, a vastly larger Army coupled with an almost incomprehensible production of ships, planes, landing craft, armored vehicles, and all the manifold paraphernalia of modern war.

As to the employment of this new materiel, this too, in the strategy of cure, has tended to be improvised, although we can perhaps say that experience helps and that we did a little better in the second war than in the first one. The techniques of convoy, which permitted the build-up in France in 1917-18, were extemporized at a late date and against strong entrenched opposition. Yet, although the battle instructions of the U. S. Fleet current in 1942 were certainly somewhat antiquated in outlook, there had nonetheless been accomplished important work on the operation of carrier forces and on the conduct of amphibious war. The foundations had been laid on which a very impressive superstructure could be and was quickly raised.

There is one other strategy of recent times which I would like briefly to consider. Just as the failures of the strategies of conquest and of defense led to the adoption of the strategy of cure, so the necessity of resorting to this unfortunate and expensive method of staying alive led to thought about a strategy of prevention. This strategy of prevention, as it had been worked out, can be subdivided into two forms, first the strategy of separation and second the strategy of keeping them at home.

The first of these subtypes, the strategy of prevention by separation, may be seen in the Washington naval treaties. There,

the problem of the Pacific was dealt with by the assignment to the principal Pacific sea powers of quotas of naval strength, to which was added the creation of a large central zone in which base development was banned. Everyone thus had enough strength to make him king of his own back yard and, presumably, insufficient strength and logistic facilities to permit him to go adventuring in foreign territory. A second and less formal aspect of the strategy of separation may also be seen in the concept not of keeping them apart but of prying them apart, principally by use of the submarine, as in the two German efforts to bifurcate the Atlantic community and in our own surgical operation designed to divide Japan from the Southern Resources Area.

The second subtype, the strategy of prevention by keeping them at home, has, in one sense, a long history in the form of alliance policy and the balance of power idea. In a more recent sense, however, its manifestations have been the Versailles settlement, the League, and the United Nations. In the first of these the procedure was to disarm the defeated Central Powers; in the second, to cope with the future by the provision of means for adopting sanctions against offending powers; in the third, the emphasis has been on counterarming through the concept of regional security arrangements.

It is this strategy of prevention to which, of course, we are now committed. In its administration I think it fair to say that we have become somewhat more sophisticated, and have realized that we cannot limit it to purely military realms, but must supplement these with efforts to make the desired stabilization both tolerable and flexible. If one seeks to inhibit the use of force as an instrument of policy one should, if possible, remove the incitements to resort to this final argument. This, in some measure at least, we have been doing through the promotion of multilateral trade, the encouragement of capital investment, the sharing of advanced technology, and by exhortation.

These all help, yet none of them can completely take the place of intelligence. The strategy of prevention has not always and in every case guaranteed success. Essentially, perhaps, this is because it is like all other strategies in one very important factor which we will call the factor of the Second Strategist. I think this is a factor worth emphasis. In this business we should try to be realists, and the first thing the realist should note is that where there are two sides there are always two strategists. This is perhaps a minimum estimate, for in the Suez incident there seemed to have been a strategist under every bush, each at cross-purposes with all the others.

It is perhaps worth listing some of the accomplishments of the Second Strategist. Japan solved the Washington Treaty settlement through the development of carrier forces, mobile logistic support, and amphibious techniques; their standards seem primitive enough, perhaps, as of today, but in 1942 their capabilities seemed far from primitive. German submarine efforts to pry their enemies apart were twice frustrated, though at considerable cost, by new devices and new techniques born of the stress of the emergency. The disarmament enforced by the Versailles Treaty, so absolute at the time, failed when the watchdogs slept, and within twenty years the disarmed were again the strongest. Our recent policies of national defense and of the build-up of Allies have indeed kept the Soviet forces within their postwar bounds, but with the passage of time new counterstrategies have appeared: aggression by proxy in Korea; in the Middle East, the repositioning of equipment preparatory to the dispatch of volunteers. It is useful to remember that while to those who impose a settlement or adopt a policy an answer seems to have been found, to those imposed upon or planned against these answers are only challenges. Times change. Plans have to be revised. There may be a building holiday but there is never really any time off for the thinker.

Our conclusions thus far are, I think, fairly clear and perhaps even trite. Strategies — national policies, if you prefer

— inevitably influence the concept of sea power that will be held by any given political unit at any given time. By thus influencing the concept of sea power they govern the planning, development, and administration of its instruments: economic policy, shipping policy, strategic materials policy, design of military establishments, and the like. And in any of these fields the taking of decisions will introduce rigidities of one sort or another which in turn will offer opportunities to the Second Strategist.

Now let us ask the nature of the subject in dispute. What is it, in the context of sea power, that our strategists are contending for? Why are the navies built? What is all the fuss about? Essentially, it seems to me, we can say that there are two basic maritime strategies, the one in which you propose to make the sea a highway for your own purposes, in which perhaps you must so use it or perish, and the other in which the problem is to make it a barrier to others. In Europe the maritime powers, the rimland nations, have long been concerned with the highway type of strategy, while the central powers have been preoccupied with erecting the barrier. In the Pacific, where the United States and Japan faced each other from opposite sides of the world's largest body of water, the strategy of each side was perforce a mix. For Japan the problem was to create a private highway to the southward and a barrier outside it, to create what we now know as a limited access highway or thruway; for the United States the task was to force a highway across the ocean, while erecting a barrier between the home islands and the resources areas that formed the prize for which Japan had gone to war.

This is simple enough in all conscience, and doubtless grand strategy is always simple, but its implementation is among the most complex of all the procedures known to man. No wonder, then, that in the second world war no single power found itself prepared in quantitative terms for what the ordeal would bring, and none fully prepared in quality. Yet sea power, in one or the other of its aspects, was a crucial concern to all. The maritime

aspect of the war, emphasized from the start by the presence this time of Italy on the other side, became of even greater importance once the British were run off the Continent and the Germans could operate submarines from French ports. Even before fighting broke out in the Pacific the maritime side of things had become crucial.

In this context it is perhaps edifying to glance at the major contenders and see how well prepared they were for what the future had in store for them.

The Germans who had begun the whole business were unprepared for a big war. Hitler and Ribbentrop had flattered themselves the British would not intervene. The discouragement which affected all hands when the news came was, of course, largely dispelled by the remarkable victories on land, but the victories did not alter the fact that the build-up had been a land and air build-up, that there were no invasion craft, and that while there were some surface ships designed for raiding the sea lanes there were very few submarines. Build as they might, there were never quite enough.

If the Germans were unprepared for the big war with its oceanic ramifications, it would almost be correct to say that the Italians, despite a fairly impressive navy and merchant marine, were unprepared for any war. Hitler had promised Mussolini that there would be no war before 1942. Taken by surprise at the outbreak, the Duce opted, perforce, for non-belligerence, but the collapse of France was more than he could bear. Entering a finished conflict in order not to be left out of the New Order, he found himself faced with a war of attrition, and for this he was wholly unready.

Yet, a look at the map would lead one to believe that not much readiness was necessary. For Italy it was, first of all, a barrier problem: to cut Britain's communications through the

Mediterranean and force the British back on Gibraltar and Alexandria. The Sicilian Straits are only about 90 miles wide, and a large part of these 90 miles is mineable. Yet the British were able to hold and support and operate Malta, only 60 miles from Sicily, and were able, whenever the risks seemed justifiable, to run convoys through. So remarkable an outcome stemmed, it would appear, from defects in Italian sea power in three spheres: the doctrinal, the technical, and the logistic. As to the first, the principal trouble was the independent Italian Air Force: the arguments of economy and versatility had prevailed over those of the navalists, but when argument gave way to performance the Air Force, wholly untrained for naval war, bombed both fleets with fine impartiality. In the technical sphere there were some troubles with ship design, notably in the submarines, some of the escort vessels were poor sea-keepers, and the fleet as a whole had traded armor for speed. Above all there was never, at any time during the war, any radar. As for the logistic problem, Italy is poor in natural resources, and there were many difficulties, but they can be boiled down to the single overriding one: no fuel. Given these factors, the skill and devotion of naval personnel were of little use.

So far as a European war was concerned, Great Britain was better off. Doubtless unavoidably, life being what it is, she was short on escort forces, a shortage which became acute with the fall of France and with the expanding German submarine program. Her surface gunnery units were in first-class condition, as was shortly and elegantly demonstrated in the Battle of the River Plate. Naval aviation was more of a problem: Coastal Command ultimately rounded into shape, but the long struggle between a unitary and a rational viewpoint as to the control of the air weapon had endowed the Royal Navy with a collection of antiques for shipboard use, a situation which was only solved by purchase abroad. To Americans, the whole fleet seemed rather short-legged, and dependent upon bases for replenishment, but this was largely a consequence of anticipated employment. Finally,

certain advantages may be noted: the expected use of the fleet in narrow waters had produced the armored flight deck, a design factor which proved to have a certain utility, and the remarkable inventiveness of the British had given them the world lead in radar.

So far as a European war was concerned, let us repeat, this was not too bad. It sufficed to hold the balance, to keep open the sea lanes which permitted, first, survival and ultimately new infusions of strength from America. But for an expanded war there was simply not enough. For trouble in the Pacific concurrent with war in Europe, there was no solution. Taxpayers and naval treaties had seen to that. This, perhaps, was what gave the problem of the French Fleet its excruciating quality and which led to the tragic action at Mers-el-Kebir. Margin to spare there was none, and to oppose the threatened Japanese advance there was only Singapore, a base without a fleet. The only possibly useful fleet in the Pacific was at Pearl Harbor far to the eastward, and separated from Singapore not only by the ocean but by all the doubts and fears that beset a nation which has burned its fingers once, which had legislated itself out of doing it again, and which in accordance with its constitutional practice was indulging in elections every two years. Election years, as is perhaps now clear, are not the best time to get a firm lead in foreign affairs from the Great Republic of the West.

As for Japan, it may perhaps be legitimate to say that with regard to the mission they had set themselves they had prepared better than anyone else. It is easy, of course, with them as with the others, to pick out faults in retrospect — the erroneous submarine doctrine which made our lives so much easier than they might have been, the failure or inability to replace everything from carrier pilots to shipping tonnage, the appalling error of striking first at the United States. But they had a larger proportion of carrier strength than any other navy; their original carrier air groups were as good as and perhaps better than any; the

technical skill and imagination with which they carried out the great series of strikes across 115 degrees of longitude from Pearl Harbor to Ceylon deserve great praise. Within the limits of their capabilities it is hard to see how they could have done better and, moreover, their navy had a correct strategic appreciation: the great Yamamoto, the man who had brought this fleet to such a peak, knew that a war with the United States was beyond his capabilities and worked to prevent it.

As for the United States, it will perhaps suffice to observe that we had a large navy and a good one, which was in the process of getting larger and better. We enjoyed the opportunity to profit from the experience of others before becoming fully involved, and we had the time and the facilities with which to build a force of unprecedented power with which to undertake the strategy of cure. With this we regained in the course of four years what the Japanese had captured in four months. Once again, we will do well to remember that there are always two strategists to a strategic problem and that prevention is cheaper than cure. To recur for a moment to the title of my talk, it is surprising how often the influence of sea power on strategy turns out to work across the lines and to involve the Second Strategist: the influence of his sea power on your strategy, of your sea power on his.

By 1942, the war on both sides of the world was stabilized. The Axis Powers had made great gains but had gained no decision. Our side had been run out and had to get back. The result was a war of research and production directed essentially as solving the maritime problem and deciding whether the oceans would be highways or barriers.

The vast amount of materiel that was produced, and the remarkable array of gadgets that was developed, were grouped with regard to their effects on sea power and strategy in three rather novel organisms: the heavy bomber forces, the carrier task forces, and the amphibious forces. Assessments of the effectiveness

of these groupings have been numerous, but the only firm conclusion would seem to be that the art of the possible in a war of the future is not susceptible of easy prediction, and that excess production capacity is very useful. Some had foreseen a quick end to a war through aerial bombardment of strategic targets; they did not get it. Some had thought the aircraft carrier a vulnerable waste of money; individually, under certain circumstances, it did indeed seem perishable; but, in quantity, the carriers showed that in that war they could take on not only their opposite numbers but major concentrations of land-based air as well. Many had felt, following the first world war, that the assault from the sea was no longer possible: Captain Puleston, indeed, had concluded his study of Galipoli with the observation that while it was problematical whether Great Britain could stand another war, it seemed certain she could not survive another Churchill. The opposite proved to be the case.

The nature of the influence exercised by sea power on strategy of the second war was the product of the working out of various combinations of these three new organisms. In this sense we may observe that arguments about the independent air weapon are beside the point. Armed, fueled, and supported by sea, the bomber campaign was, so to speak, an alternate spearhead for the maritime powers, which, if it worked, promised to replace not the need for sea control but the amphibious route to the classical land battle.

So the Allies bent to their task to build up a newer and greater sea power for a war in which seas and shores were of unprecedented importance. How this sea power would influence strategy depended, at least in part, on the rates of build-up, and these on the decisions of the mobilizers. Strategic decision, fortunately or unfortunately, cannot wait on the fully worked-out experiment. The answer has to be come by before the experiment is made, and adhered to while it is going on. The answer, in this instance, placed very heavy emphasis on bombardment aircraft,

and a very large part of the industrial capacity of both Great Britain and the United States was committed to their production.

This priority has been criticized, of course, on various grounds: it has been argued that the destruction of cities proved to be more a costly method of complicating postwar reconstruction than it did a means of gaining victory; it has been pointed out that a greater productive effort in the landing craft program would have removed the rigidities that prevented switching between Mediterranean and Channel and, even in the final phases of exploitation, between Riviera and Adriatic, southern France and the Balkans. On the whole, I incline to sympathize with these views on the ground that the long-run problem is less to beat down than it is to gain control, and that control is best gained by ground forces in the right place in plenty of time. This is, of course, particularly true when you have a two-front war and an ally doing his best to climb into bed from the other side and grab all the covers first.

But it is only fair to recognize, I think, that different target selection by the bomber commanders would have led to different and quicker results. Had they settled down at the start to the attack on energy sources, on fuel, that was begun in 1944, it would appear that an effective diminution of German war production would have come far more quickly. The same in effect can be said of the Pacific, where Japan was defeated twice over: once by the blockade, and again by the destruction of cities whose productive efficiency that same blockade had already removed. Only the richest of nations, and these only in special historical circumstances, can afford to win each war twice at the same time.

Looking back now over the past generation it is clear enough that if the strategies of conquest and of isolation and of separation were none too successful, that of cure did work — although at great cost. Further, it seems undeniable that in the implementation of the strategy of cure it was the maintenance of the control of

the seas followed by exploitation that produced the results. Sea power was the great permissive agent without which little else could have been accomplished. It was also, so far as it was properly employed, the basis of choice and control and initiative in the assembly and deployment of other forces.

Of Korea the same may be said. Here was a carefully planned piece of aggression, launched with every possible guarantee of success, and with the advantage which we now seem to concede as a matter of routine, the advantage of surprise. That it did not succeed was due to the astounding logistic improvisation permitted by a sufficiency of sea power in being, the speedy redeployment of forces on a global scale, and the rapid execution of the landing in the rear, the standard maritime counter to an offensive from within a land mass. The Trans-Siberian Railway, double track and all, is nothing like this; furthermore, it leads only to one place. Since oceans offer more varied destinations, our strategy of keeping them at home, our policy of containment, can be implemented in controlled fashion in peacetime, and the air and naval bases, the holding forces, and the supplies prepositioned. Sometimes I think we tend to worry ourselves into a failure to realize our advantages. If the Soviets had ringed us with the kind of base facilities that our maritime power and maritime diplomacy have laid down around their borders, we might well worry more.

III

All in all, a survey of recent history would seem to give us cause for self-congratulation on our possession of this formidable force, along with some reason to pray for wisdom as to its future employment. There are, however, dangers in excessive jubilation: life has a habit of playing tricks on individuals and history tricks on nations, and the wise man will look for the hidden aces. While we celebrate sea power as the power that controls all, as the lever that moves the earth, we should perhaps try to see behind the scenes. What controls the controlling power? What is the force that moves the lever? These questions lead us to the

crisis of the moment which we have been approaching these many years, and in the approach to which, indeed, sea power took the lead.

To use the seas you have to be able to move upon them, you must have some source of energy. Much depends upon the nature of this source. When navies and merchant shipping were moved by wind, the world was governed, so to speak, by meteorology. Areas of calms were of diminished commercial importance. The weather gage meant something both to fleets and to base areas, and gave virtue to the Windward Islands in the Caribbean and to those islands to windward of the coast of Europe inhabited by the British. The shift to steam brought no revolution at first, for Great Britain found herself possessed of the best steaming coal and of a sufficiency of bases at useful points on the globe where she could lay it down. The next change, however, was different.

We can date it, I suppose, from the Royal Navy's 1912 building program, in which for the first time the British committed themselves, in the search for larger guns on faster ships, to an exotic fuel found only overseas. The decision was a daring one, and crowned with success. The speed of the new ships, as demonstrated at Jutland, excited the admiration of Tirpitz, and the government investment in Anglo-Persian oil proved profitable: writing after the war, Churchill jubilantly reckoned that an advance of £2,200,000 had brought returns approaching forty millions. Alas, we may ask, where are the profits of yesteryear?

But as the appetite for fuel increased, so did the problems. It is remarkable how often in any retrospect of the second war the fuel calculation becomes decisive. Lack of oil immobilized the Italian Navy. Dependence on synthetic oil plants made the Germans vulnerable to the attack from above, while their eastern strategy was to a considerable degree conditioned by an effort to diminish this dependence. On the Mediterranean's southern shore the petroleum shortage proved Rommel's fatal weakness. Japan's

decision for war was the product of the freezing of her assets which left her with a small and diminishing oil reserve; conquering rich oil fields, she was yet unable to rectify the situation and, in 1944, had to base her major fleet units in the south in order to keep them operational. As for ourselves, with all our domestic production, the Marianas operation was to a considerable degree fueled from Venezuela, while at Leyte the logistic support included tankers direct from the Persian Gulf. In France, it was empty fuel tanks, not the enemy, which stopped the Allied advance in 1944.

Today, the sailor with a weather eye must look to the Middle East. There, in the Persian Gulf, is the source of the prevailing wind. Not only is this true of the implements of sea power; it is, of course, even more starkly true of the whole living structure of the western world, and increasingly true day by day. The figures are of course no secret, but they are worth a little ritualistic repeating on the part of all concerned with strategy of the maritime world.

Since 1938, our oil production is up by a factor of two; that of the Middle East, by ten.

Since 1947, Europe's total import of oil has tripled; that from the Middle East is up by a factor of 17.

In 1947 the Middle East produced 10 per cent of world output of oil; in 1955, 20 per cent of a much larger total.

The proved resources of the U. S. and Venezuela together form about a quarter of the world total; those of the Middle East, about two-thirds. The proved deposits of Kuwait alone are larger than those of the United States.

But if it is clear that the wind blows from the Persian Gulf, and will for the predictable future continue to do so, it is not at this moment wholly clear who has the weather gage. This should be clarified.

I said at the start that sea power was servant, not master, and that one should not indulge in deterministic thinking which shuffles all our troubles off onto an abstraction. Yet, here we seem to have developed an underlying determinism in the form of the availability of energy resources, through which all the old monopoly characteristics of sea power of which Mahan wrote are revived and reinforced, with the exception that monopoly may now precede rather than follow engagement. Below the surface manifestations of building programs and limitation treaties and battles won and lost a steady current has been sweeping us in this direction ever since Winston Churchill, First Lord of the Admiralty, took the plunge in 1912. Even had the atomic weapon not been developed it would seem that the oil problem would by now have priced war out of the market as an instrument of policy for old-fashioned nations, and brought us to the point where only super-powers or great collectivities of states can maintain the means of independent action.

It is in the nature of a cosmic joke that the world's great reservoir of oil should have been located in an area separated from all customers by sea, as well as by such other separators as culture, religion, and the touchy nerves of adolescent nationalism. But there it is! Without the diplomacy of adjustment and compromise that has traditionally been the policy of great sea powers, the path will be a rocky one. Without the sea control that will accomplish the movement and delivery of the oil, policies will be but empty words. It would doubtless be nice if we could dig a very deep hole and siphon it out from below, but until this seems feasible, or until the oil runs out, all will rest upon the ocean highways. In this sense sea power remains more than ever an influence, more than ever the precondition of strategy.

BIOGRAPHIC SKETCH

Professor James A. Field, Jr.

Professor Field attended Harvard University, where he received his B. S., A. M., and Ph.D. degrees, and also attended Cambridge University, England, in 1937 and 1938.

During 1939 to 1941, and again in 1947, he was a teaching fellow and tutor in the Department of History and Literature at Harvard University.

During World War II, Professor Field served with the United States Navy from 1942 to 1946. His wartime assignments included duty in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations; on an escort carrier in the Pacific area; as gunnery officer of Carrier Division 23, and on the Staff of Commander Air Force, United States Atlantic Fleet.

Professor Field occupied the Ernest J. King Chair of Maritime History at the Naval War College during the 1954-1955 academic year. At present, he is Professor of American History at Swarthmore College.

As a member of the Navy Analysis Division, USSBS, he collaborated in the preparation of *Interrogations of Japanese Officials and Campaigns of the Pacific War*. He is the author of *The Japanese at Leyte Gulf*, and the translator of *The Struggle for the Mediterranean* by R. de Belot.

RECOMMENDED READING

The annotation of periodicals listed below include those recommended to resident students of the Naval War College. Officers in the fleet and elsewhere may find them of interest.

The listing herein should not be construed as an endorsement by the Naval War College; they are indicated only on the basis of interesting, timely, and possibly useful reading matter. Many of these publications may be found in ship and station libraries.

Title: *For a Military Budget Item, It's a Long Hard Road to the Money.*

Publication: BUSINESS WEEK, June 29, 1957, p. 102-107.

Annotation: Traces the course of a typical military budget item, the Honest John Rocket, through the budgetary processes of the U. S. Government as a means of explaining military fiscal operations.

Title: *Atomic Force and Foreign Policy.*

Author: Morgenthau, Hans J.

Publication: COMMENTARY, June, 1957, p. 501-505.

Annotation: Deals with the changes in the role of force in foreign policy caused by the dependence on weapons of total destruction.

Title: *Everything is Fine in Russia.*

Author: Varga, Eugene

Publication: FORTUNE, July, 1957, p. 119; 218-227.

Annotation: One of the chief Soviet experts on international economics takes issue with an article entitled "The Crisis of Soviet Capitalism," and explains how strong Russia is economically.

Title: *Guided Missile Implications.*

Author: Galloway, Eilene.

Publication: MILITARY REVIEW, June, 1957, p. 3-16.

Annotation: Describes the development progress in rockets and missiles made by various foreign countries and analyzes

the implications of missile development for the pattern of future warfare.

- Title: *Controls, Inspection, and Limited War.*
Author: Kissinger, Henry A.
Publication: THE REPORTER, June 13, 1957, p. 14-19.
Annotation: The author of *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy* contends that current strategic doctrine and approach to disarmament leave no middle ground between total war and total peace, and suggests a program aimed at establishing a military and diplomatic framework which would cause future war to take less absolute forms.
- Title: *America's Responsibilities in the Far East.*
Author: Robertson, Walter S.
Publication: THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN, June 24, 1957, p. 995-1000.
Annotation: The Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs discusses our policies in Asia and the Communist menace in the Far East.
- Title: *G. I. in Foreign Courts: Justice and Law in Status-of-Forces Agreements.*
Publication: TIME, June 17, 1957, p. 16-17.
Annotation: A brief digest of how the Status-of-Forces Agreements have worked, and how Americans have fared.
- Title: *We Can Destroy Anything Military in Russia.*
Author: Norstad, Lauris, General, United States Air Force.
Publication: U. S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, July 5, 1957, p. 58-63.
Annotation: Testimony by General Norstad before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on June 7, 1957, explaining how we can destroy Russia militarily with assistance of our NATO allies.
- Title: *Soviet Shows Its Teeth in a New Part of the World.*
Publication: U. S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, July 5, 1957, p. 28-29.
Annotation: Recent movements of Russian naval forces into the Mediterranean Sea are listed, and explained as a show of force to boost Nasser.

- Title:** *With Red China as It Is, "No Recognition, No Trade."*
- Author:** Dulles, John Foster.
- Publication:** U. S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, July 5, 1957, p. 70-73.
- Annotation:** The text of an address by the Secretary of State, examining the question of China policy and reaffirming our present position in regard to Red China.
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- Title:** *There is No Substitute for Diplomacy or for Power.*
- Author:** Hessler, William H.
- Publication:** UNITED STATES NAVAL INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS, July, 1957, p. 691-697.
- Annotation:** Using the Suez crisis as an example, the author shows that diplomacy is the only effective means of settling issues between the great powers rather than through the United Nations organization.
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- Title:** *Military Planning at the Seat of Government.*
- Author:** Hittle, J. D., Colonel, United States Marine Corps.
- Publication:** UNITED STATES NAVAL INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS, July, 1957, p. 713-721.
- Annotation:** Colonel Hittle discusses the value of the committee-type approach in planning national strategy, as used by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, over the single Chief of Staff — as characterized by Prussian General Staff.
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- Title:** *The Soviet Union and Its Submarine Forces.*
- Author:** Huan, C., Lieutenant, French Navy.
- Publication:** UNITED STATES NAVAL INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS, July, 1957, p. 734-741.
- Annotation:** Traces the development of the Russian submarine forces to the present, and gives an account of their operations during World Wars I and II.
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- Title:** *British Defense Policy.*
- Author:** Slessor, Sir John
- Publication:** FOREIGN AFFAIRS, July, 1957, p. 551-563.
- Annotation:** The implications of the recent British White Paper on

Defense are described and their effect on NATO and United States policies are discussed.

Title: *Strategy of the Middle East.*

Author: Baldwin, Hanson W.

Publication: FOREIGN AFFAIRS, July, 1957, p. 655-665.

Annotation: Describes the basic strategic factors in the Middle East and discusses their relationship to our global security problems.