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## **SPECIAL ATTENTION TO THE READER**

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**NAVAL WAR COLLEGE  
REVIEW**

**Issued Monthly  
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Newport, R. I.**

## **BONDS AND STRAINS IN SOVIET AND SOVIET-SATELLITE RELATIONS\***

A lecture delivered  
at the Naval War College  
on 1 November 1956 by  
*Professor Andrew Gyorgy*

Captain Moore, Gentlemen:

It gives me a great deal of pleasure to be able to talk to you this morning on a timely and exciting subject. Before going into it, I would like to commend the Academic and Curriculum Boards of the Naval War College for the diabolical cunning with which they scheduled the discussion of satellite problems for this week and then casually cast the problem of Middle Eastern politics for the week after next. I have not as yet been able to determine the full extent of this collusion with certain divine and other powers.

I would like to dedicate this lecture to the spirit with which the Hungarian people have fought the past few weeks. In a way, I think it should be dedicated to the martyrs of what will definitely be recorded in history as the Revolution of 1956, far outshining the impact of the Revolt of 1848.

In approaching the tremendous subject of "Bonds and Strains in Soviet and Soviet-Satellite Relations," I feel like the late Wendell Willkie, who, when the final campaign was on, said that he felt "very humble and very proud." I approach this problem with a great deal of humility, as well as pride, in view of the recent record compiled by at least two of these former satellites, Poland and Hungary.

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\*Editor's Note: This lecture was delivered before the Suez Canal was closed.

I would like to suggest to you first of all that the area itself can be viewed in many different contexts. In effect, there are at least two or three prevailing approaches to what used to be a closed-off laboratory situation, a ten-year experiment in curtaining off this region with a population of 110 million people. I would like to suggest to you two major possibilities of viewing the region broadly and rather loosely described as Eastern Europe.

I would like to describe one view as the "Heartlandic" concept, going back to the great Scottish geographer, Sir Halford Mackinder, and his prophetic writings. According to this concept, we look at the European and Asiatic parts of the Soviet Union from the tremendous dimensions of the "Heartlandic" area. Judging from this perspective, Eastern Europe is indeed a very small and insignificant-looking slice in the northwestern corner of this huge territory. The "Heartlandic" view of this region in effect might be the underlying indication as to why the Soviet Union has been willing to withdraw temporarily its troops and advisors from Hungary and Poland. In effect there are other problems in the Soviet policy-maker's mind concerned with a zone of relatively insignificant satellite regions. A more significant "Heartlandic" view of the Russian position would turn the Soviet face primarily toward Asia, Siberia, Mongolia, China, and so on — not to speak, of course, of the Middle East. On the whole, I want to suggest to you that a heartlandic view would place the Eastern European-Danubian area in a relatively limited, and geographically somewhat de-emphasized, position.

The other way of looking at our region would be to take it as a very definite slice or area in which the Soviet Union has lasting and permanent interests. This would be the "security zone," or "sphere of influence" view, with its tremendous regional importance suggesting an overriding Russian interest; namely, that the Soviet Union wants to stay there, and has in effect realized in the past 10 years a 300-400 year old imperial dream. Looking at it particularly from the Central and Eastern European aspect of

the security problem, here lies the true strategic significance of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, East Germany, and even to a large extent of Yugoslavia, if it can be counted upon. The tremendous importance of the Black Sea satellites — namely, Rumania and Bulgaria — as militarily useful buffer zones must again be emphasized for all of you. This would be the “non-heartlandic” or continental-central European view of the vulnerable lands bordering on the western U. S. S. R.

Probably the most basic way of describing the region would be to suggest that the Eastern European region has always been exposed to a relentless “Push Toward the East.” This historic process has then been matched by a similar “Push Toward the West” by powers that have invaded the Balkans from the east and have inevitably been pushing westward. One expert succinctly suggested in a recent book that: “The pressure from two sides was unfortunately the normal condition of Eastern and Central Europe throughout the whole course of its history.”

I would like to pin the phrase “pressure from two sides” down in nonacademic and absolutely practical terms. The following few lines attempt to summarize and describe this double-exposure, which is not so much a “southern exposure” as an exposure toward the West and the East. On the whole, there have been six major waves of imperial rule lashing over the unfortunate region that we are discussing here this morning. These are the following:

1. Austrian Rule — 1291
2. Turkish Rule — 1526
3. German Rule — 1848, 1940
4. French Rule — 1919
5. Italian Rule — 1934
6. Soviet Rule — 1944

I am suggesting here an initial date for each wave of empire as it washed over Central and Eastern Europe.

The first wave came in 1291, with the appointment to the Austrian throne of Hapsburg Prince Rudolph, who became in a broader sense the first emperor of a new and rapidly developing Austria. The second wave, which, incidentally did not mean the end of Austrian rule but was a conflicting situation with two complicated imperial patterns developing in the western and eastern parts of this region, was the Turkish rule. In 1526, both the initial phase of a partial occupation of Eastern Europe as well as the high tide of Turkish rule was reached in the historic battle of Mohács fought on Hungarian soil. The Turkish armies then pushed on westward and were defeated in front of the gates of Vienna, in what was generally labeled the "First Battle for Vienna." From then on, having reached the high tide of its imperial power, the Turkish wave began to recede.

The third round consisted in effect of the first impact of modern German imperialism on the Danube Valley and the Balkans. Germany's influence covered the years 1848 until 1944, with major interruptions during the French interlude and the Italian experiment. Bismarck and Hitler certainly spelled massive disaster for the entire region!

I feel that the fourth wave can be much more precisely pinpointed. 1919 is a date that stands out clearly, suggesting that the end of World War I, with the Versailles Peace Treaty settlement, brought about a temporary ascendancy for the French. The brief French interlude, marked by the brilliant diplomacy of the years 1919-1934, brought peace and a certain amount of stability to the harassed region. This relatively peaceful era was abruptly and unfortunately interrupted in October, 1934 — almost twenty-two years from this date — with the infamous Marseilles murders of both King Alexander of Yugoslavia and the brilliant exponent of French diplomacy, Louis Barthou, French Foreign Minister.

The dramatic incident of this double assassination was the end of the French chapter, and ushered in the brief and ugly next round, which was marked by Italy's ascendancy. Mussolini's im-

pact on Eastern and Central Europe asserted itself through various Machiavellian types of diplomacies, with which he tried to turn country against country and exploit the obvious issues of international conflict. Italian rule ended in the summer of 1940, when the Italian army suddenly invaded France. This was the end of *Il Duce's* prestige and power position in Eastern Europe.

The sixth and last wave of empire consisted of the establishment of Soviet control over Eastern Europe. Soviet rule started in 1944, with the east to west sweep of the Red Armies through the Danube Valley. From 1944 on, we have been witnessing the development of the sixth and most recent chapter in the "colonial" history of this region.

This is a simplified way of looking at the Eastern European area, where the six waves left in their residue a great deal of bitterness, confusion, and national and local frustrations of every type. As part of this pattern of historic confusion, we must also observe that throughout the 16th, 17th and 18th centuries there were at least 380 political units in this area, centered around the Kingdom of Bohemia and the Empire of Austria. These small political entities were composed of tiny duchies, states, small towns, and frequently of nothing more than castles and small customs areas. I think it can be well said that Napoleon consolidated this part of Central Europe in 1805-1806, and cut the 380 political units drastically down to about one-tenth in number, or approximately 38. This was the prevailing pattern of fragmentation and uncertainty which has characterized the last 600-700 years of Eastern European history. No wonder that the region has been in the headlines and has never settled down to politically stable living at any time!

As the next section of my discussion, I would like to comment briefly on the history of World War II. The most recent and terrible disaster was the fact that World War II plunged the nations of Eastern Europe into a turmoil of conflicting interests,

which were complicated by the oppressive features of a prolonged Nazi-German occupation. It is important to remember that by June, 1941, the date for the German invasion of the Soviet Union, Hitler either controlled or directly occupied all of the countries in the Danubian-Balkan area. The economic and political features of Hitler's "New Order" were then put on a full-scale wartime footing. So years of total war raged back and forth over this unfortunate area, draining its human, material, and strategic resources.

It is important to note while we are on this subject that the area has always been a tremendous magnet for outside powers. Certain strategic materials have drawn an immense amount of military interest and focused it on this region. Let me illustrate this point by the map dealing with the physical features of the area.

(SEE PLATE 1)

In my opinion strategic resource Number One is the Danube River, which flows through Vienna, Budapest, Belgrade, and then through Rumania — with Bucharest only fifty miles away — finally winding up in the tremendous delta region of the Black Sea. The 1,800-mile-long Danube River, with 1,400 miles of its course controlled by the Soviet Union, is the most significant strategic resource of the region. I want to point out to you two additional and very important assets, with one localized in Hungary and the other in Rumania. The tremendous oil resources of Rumania are located about 40 miles north of Bucharest, in the Carpathian Mountains. This is the single largest oil deposit in Continental Europe, first developed by the Germans, then seriously damaged by our bombers in World War II, and more recently, intensively developed by the Soviet Union. The other resource of interest is the large-scale bauxite deposit in southern Hungary, the second largest source of bauxite in Europe. Its military implications and increasingly important role cannot be emphasized sufficiently.




PLATE 1

To continue with the historical narrative, I would like to suggest that when the military operations of World War II ended in Eastern Europe, and the Red Army was safely in control of the entire region, the nations of this area were sharply divided in two groups. This division, which, in my opinion, is not sufficiently recognized in Anglo-American literature, pitted the two camps against each other. After the liberation from German occupation one set of countries emerged on the victorious side, and was promptly given a voice in drawing up the peace treaties and in penalizing the countries which lost the war. I am referring here to three very important nations, which are playing a key role in the historic pattern, namely, Czechoslovakia, Poland and Yugoslavia. It is very important for all of us to remember that these three countries were already members of the United Nations through their governments in exile and their refugee statesmen; that they were given a major voice in the peace conference negotiations in Paris during the summer of 1946; and that all along they had been officially on the victorious Allied side.

We may now turn to the other side and suggest that there were three countries, the former Axis satellites, which were immediately penalized for their most unfortunate and disastrous role in World War II. These three were Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria. Under terrific pressure, they had thrown in their lot with Hitler, and naturally they now had to be punished morally and politically for the disasters of World War II. We find that the significance of this long-term division between the two groups of nations lingers on in the minds of the people and is still of tremendous importance in the historic recollections as to who won or lost World War II. In addition to this basic division between the two camps we must cite the single most important complicating factor: the continued presence of Soviet occupation troops and officials.

In the past eleven years there have been three major

phases of development in the evolution of the "Peoples' Democracies," as the Soviet Union laughingly describes them. Before we get into this three-phase theory it must again be stressed that the presence of Soviet occupation troops and officials (highly trained experts in military government) actually predetermined the specific political and ideological development of each satellite nation. There were countries like Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, where the Red Army showed up only briefly, put in a purely token appearance, and quickly withdrew. Obviously, therefore, the Czechs and Yugoslavs have different feelings about the Soviet Army and its practices than the countries which suffered as much as Hungary or Poland.

I would like to mention the three phases here briefly, and then describe each of them with its salient features. The first phase is the so-called "take-over process," engineered by Soviet troops and occupation officials. This began in 1945 and ended sometime in the spring of 1948. I would like to describe Phase Two as the process of "Total Satellization" or "Total Sovietization," of which the initial date would be the spring of 1948 — possibly the Prague Revolt of February, 1948 — and the terminal date (this is the most important date to remember in all this narrative) the death of Stalin in March, 1953.

The third phase began with the announcement that the hated dictator had just died, or had been murdered (experts are still discussing this fine point, but it makes very little difference in the long-term process of de-Stalinization), and it ended with the outbreak of the Hungarian revolution in October, 1956. What has happened since the end of October could possibly be described as a new and fourth phase in this development.

The most important point in connection with the first or "take-over" phase is that there was at that time a political and military vacuum in Eastern Europe, and the Soviet Union had a minimum of difficulty in filling it. It is depressing to realize in

retrospect how little trouble the U. S. S. R. had and how few obstacles were put up by the brave and recalcitrant spirits who have masterminded the recent Hungarian and Polish revolutions. Since the take-over process has been analyzed often and in detail, I will merely suggest that politically, militarily, diplomatically, and economically the Soviet Union had been firmly entrenched by the spring of 1948. I suggested to you earlier that the February revolt in Prague was a convenient, if frightening, terminal point for the first chapter of this story.

The second phase is much more important since it denoted the high point of Stalinization, exploiting every available method and avenue of action. We are talking here about the 1948-1953 period, and I would like to emphasize two of its highlights. The most significant single factor was the open and violent use of mass terror to an extent which was new and startling even to the 110 million captives of Eastern Europe. (I am including the Yugoslavs here because Tito engaged in the practice of the same methods of repression with his 17 million captives). In this connection, I would like to stress the role of the Ministry of the Interior, which was the source of such mass repression and open violence that it bordered on genocide in some of the countries reviewed here. The people of Eastern Europe lived in constant terror, while the Minister of the Interior, as the governmental head of a tremendous Secret Police, a Cultural Police, Political Police, and Economic Police, operated in a fashion that certainly kept the individual nations in complete submission.

The other important political fact that I would like to point out to you has been the elimination of the well-formed political parties and groups of this area. I think the most striking feature of the so-called "Peoples' Democracies" has been the elimination of the traditional political forces which has governed Central and Eastern Europe for at least a hundred years. The new system ruthlessly alienated and submerged every possibility of developing political groups in the monolithic one-party state.

Writing on October 31, 1956, John MacCormac of *The New York Times* made this observation on the then current situation in Hungary: "The major political parties in Hungary, even the Communist Party, have now united in a common front against the Soviet Union and for a return to democracy." He implied here that the political parties which supposedly had died as a result of the ruthless drive toward full Stalinization and the extirpation of political movements, had in effect survived in underground positions, in guerrilla-fight postures, and had then emerged to the point where they were openly challenging the Stalinist regimes.

The "People's Democracy" can easily be defined by suggesting that in it the one-party state appeared in a full-blown form; that the so-called "Workers' Party" achieved a monopoly position, while other political groups had to go underground.

Specifically in three countries the Soviet Union ran into severe trouble in its ruthless attempts to carry out the process of Stalinization. We are referring here to the two countries which have assumed headline importance in the last few months, Poland and Hungary, but I would certainly want to add Czechoslovakia as a third.

Let me start with Czechoslovakia. A lot of us are surprised that the Czechs are not more active or vocal at this point. However, I would like to counsel a certain amount of patience. Two factors have militated against the ruthless process of Stalinization in Czechoslovakia. One was the total absence of the Orthodox Church; in other words, not the presence of other churches but the absence of one of the principal instruments of Soviet-Russian control. This leads to the further observation that the Catholic Church in Czechoslovakia has produced awe-inspiring martyrs and has had a fine record of resistance in every way. The other factor which separates Czechoslovakia from the rest of the satellite world has been the absence of the Pan-Slavic tie which some other countries, and notably Bulgaria, possess to a large extent. You simply can-

not tell the Czechs that they are the Slavic brothers of the Russians because the Czechs feel they are an entirely different type of people. They are culturally, linguistically, and politically Western-oriented; the Pan-Slavic nonsense does not appeal to them.

Let's move on to Poland. I would like to point out two factors which, in my opinion, are clear-cut reasons why the Polish revolt had started and why it has been so successful in such a short time. One of the two main areas of resistance to Stalinization has been Polish nationalism. Nationalism, the spark of which, as one writer observed, "each Pole seems to imbibe with his mother's milk," may be a vague cliché for some of us, but to the Pole it is a specific and definite phenomenon. The impact of Polish irredentism thus helped to bring into the foreground a national Communist leader and Poland's own version of Tito, Wladyslaw Gomulka. The other factor in this case is clearly economic. The low standard of living and the generally cruel economic treatment of the Polish people caused a tremendous revulsion and hatred toward the regime. These pent-up feelings then exploded in the Poznan riots of June, 1956.

While talking about Stalinization, I want to suggest that in Hungary the resistance moved along two lines. One was clearly religious, in a country where there are about 70% Roman Catholics and such outstanding personalities as Cardinal Mindszenty. The other area of resistance was based on a vigorous tradition for divergent political parties, whose leaders have tried to resume their careers in the course of the 1956 revolution, but were ruthlessly suppressed by Soviet power and Communist treachery.

One final comment on this period, and then I will cover the last three years briefly. Another major Communist instrument of power must be cited here, one which has aptly been described by a British author as the "mental Bolshevization" of the region. What he meant by "mental Bolshevization" is the colossal battle for the minds of the captive peoples, or, to modify

the terminology, the imposition of a "Cultural Iron Curtain." The "Cultural Iron Curtain" has implied a capture of the minds, a Communist re-streamlining of all educational possibilities, and the subversion of the religious and ideological affiliations of the people. Freedom of press, the right to free speech and the right to assembly have disappeared completely. This "mental Bolshevization" has probably been the most painful and horrible aspect of Soviet rule. This is what the people have hated most and this is why they have revolted recently in Poland and Hungary.

I would like to move on to the most recent period. This third and last phase covers the days from Stalin's death to the political de-Stalinization which has taken place until recently. In view of the limited time, I want to summarize a long and complicated story in three specific points.

The first point is that the Anglo-American public is making, in my opinion, a serious mistake when viewing this region as a fully homogeneous, political area, suggesting that Eastern Europe is merely a replica of the U. S. S. R. six or seven times over. I would call this the danger of "clichéitis," implying that these countries are simply local variations of general Communism; that the Czechs are like the Poles, and the Albanians are like the Hungarians in terms of their politics; that you look at one, and have the other six or seven also clearly identified. Nothing could be further from the truth. The Hungarians and Poles have rebelled so obviously and are apparently so different from the other countries that we can pass over this point by suggesting that there are here 110 million people in seven countries, with seven different political units, and with enormous variations in political and ideological orientation.

The second point worth stressing is the essentially negative or passive characteristic of Eastern European politics. (However, this feature would certainly not apply to the Poland and Hungary of 1956 and 1957). Several of you raised such well-justified

questions as: Why haven't the Czechs moved? What is going on in Rumania? Why not Bulgaria? What about East Germany? There is indeed an essentially negativist and passive feature here which I think we must seriously consider as a sort of Balkan or Eastern European version of the "mañana" or "nichevo" way of life. The Eastern European version of: "It is hopeless," or "Let's do it tomorrow," or "Why hurry?" or "Why not adjourn to the coffee house?" This is the feeling of what appears on a higher plane as the phenomenon of "passive resistance," an inclination or affinity toward civil disobedience, toward patient sabotage below ground, which in the long run can be a very effective nationwide countermeasure. It is not proven yet whether the "open-revolt" angle of the Hungarian Revolution is more successful than the concealed "subterranean sabotage" in which the Czechs have always excelled and have gathered additional recent experience under the Nazi and Russian occupations. Latent forms of industrial sabotage are brilliantly carried out in countries like Czechoslovakia and Poland. Do not underestimate the quiet type of resistance that goes on in these countries!

Let me summarize the two points mentioned so far: namely, that each of these countries has its own problems but also its own way of life, and, although essentially negative and passive in their politics, there is a point where either underground or aboveground, these peoples' patience is bound to break. This leads me to the third, and probably most important comment. Place the process of de-Stalinization on top of all of these factors, combine all of them, shake them up before using, and you will undoubtedly have a boiling pot of soup, a soup that has boiled for so long that it suddenly spills over and burns the bystander.

Political de-Stalinization is in many ways the most interesting and inspiring recent development which can readily be applied to the whole region. As an ideological phenomenon, this is nothing new. Other countries and other dictators of the past have found that the danger of giving people only a little bit of

freedom is immense. Freedom is something that you cannot disburse on the installment plan, that you cannot ration! Once the prison door is an inch, even a mere fraction of an inch open, the prisoners will rush immediately in that logical direction. The process of de-Stalinization in this area did not start with the famous Khrushchev speech of February, 1956. It started with the so-called "New Course" which was first announced in the satellite countries in the summer of 1953. The slogans then launched have reached their fruition in the fall and winter of 1956. These slogans are very simple: "Bread and Freedom," or, by reversing them, we can assert the emphatic battlecry for "Freedom and Bread!"

One of our two great national parties frequently talks about "Peace and Prosperity." The peoples of Eastern Europe are, of course, not used to either. Still, even in their minds, you cannot separate this double-edged platform and withhold freedom while giving bread, or give freedom while withholding bread. What I would like to suggest to you at this point is that the events of the last few months can best be appraised as the *long-term* and *run-away* implications of de-Stalinization. What I meant by the following equation . . . .

$$F + L - EC = OC(IR)$$

is to suggest the danger of having "F" plus "L" ("*Ferment*" plus "*Liberalization*") — this is Ideological Ferment plus Political Liberalization — *minus* the EC factor, which is "*Economic Concessions*." In other words, freedom, but no bread. The presence of "*Ferment*" plus "*Liberalization*", while withholding "*Economic Concessions*", will inevitably lead to an "*Open Challenge*" of the regime. This "*Open Challenge*" I have tried to describe in a further and secondary development by referring to an "*Incipient Revolution*." What has caused, therefore, the present massive outbreaks throughout Eastern Europe were the processes of political de-Stalinization combined with the infectious spread of an impressive amount of freedom suddenly handed out to these people. At the same

time, the complete withholding of EC, or "*Economic Concessions*," has naturally led to one overriding result: namely, the obvious and open challenge of the whole system.

I would like to make three or four concluding remarks and suggest to you that we can carry this trend of thought a couple of steps further, and maybe even look briefly into the immediate future — although I will do that with a great deal of trepidation and modesty.

I firmly believe that recent events at least foreshadow the relative certainty of a further spread of Titoism throughout the very countries which we have surveyed in this lecture. The further and massive spread of a national form of Communism is one of the likeliest developments in this region. To the Russians the "specter" and to us the "promise" of Titoism has already acted as a sort of "sorcerer's apprentice," a magnificently constructed Frankenstein, where the master tries to stop the monster or his apprentice but is incapable of doing so. Therefore, we have a typically run-away situation, which is all to the good as far as we are concerned, and which simply means that the old "His Master's Voice" label must be changed radically, since the little dog is not listening to the well-known blaring of the voice any longer!

Another conclusion I would like to draw is to suggest to you what we might almost call a law in physics as much as a law in international politics. Recent developments in Hungary and Poland have not only accelerated the process of de-Stalinization, but they have also pointed up a major and cheerful thesis in international politics. This Soviet satellite empire, like four of five other imperial units in recent history, was *quickly gained and quickly lost*. Today, I think we can confidently say that the Soviet leaders can ill afford to indulge in imperial dreams for the more distant future.

One other expectation has also gone sour as far as the Soviet rulers are concerned. The artificial and irrational state form which they have planned and prepared so carefully throughout the past fifteen years, the so-called "People's Democracy," has failed completely and miserably. This hybrid was at best a transitional state form. To that extent, the transitional period of the People's Democracy was a particularly interesting one since, in my opinion, the transition does not have to go forward, it can also be pushed backward. The peoples of Eastern Europe are now "transitioning" backward to some sort of a pre-Communist status quo. I would like to paraphrase the old Latin remark: "Sic transit gloria mundi" and suggest to you the other Latin possibility: "Sic transit democracia populi!"

Finally, I would like to suggest that there is an opportunity for us in the next few months to emphasize our greatest national interest, which is to develop a belief in human dignity and freedom even in the seemingly most hopeless parts of the world. It is of the greatest American national interest today to push forward and bring about a broad lifting of the Iron-Curtain complex in at least three immediate directions, in the *foreign political* field, the *cultural* and the *international trade* directions. Beyond these, there may be the possibility of a more dynamic, forward-looking policy which would develop new governments, new ideas, new leaders, and constitutional forms of government for the suffering and exploited peoples of Eastern Europe. Above all these possibilities, we must lay the foundations for a growth of the most cherished values of Americans, Hungarians and Poles, the flowering of democratic ideals for peoples and individuals alike.

## BIOGRAPHIC SKETCH

### Professor Andrew Gyorgy

Professor Gyorgy received his A.B. and J.D. degrees from the Law School of the University of Budapest, and his M.A. and Ph.D. degrees from the University of California.

He studied law and politics at Sorbonne University in Paris during 1936-1937, studying the following two years at the University of California on a Rockefeller Foundation Fellowship. During 1941-1942, he was a lecturer in the Department of Political Science at the University of California at Los Angeles.

During World War II, Professor Gyorgy was an instructor in the Army Specialized Training Program at the University of California, and, later, an instructor in the Academic Department of the Infantry School, Fort Benning, Georgia.

After serving as Assistant Professor of Government at the University of New Hampshire during 1945-1946, he was Assistant Professor of Political Science at Yale University until 1950. For the following year, he was a Visiting Associate Professor of Political Science at Johns Hopkins University. During 1951-1952, Professor Gyorgy was a research associate at Yale University, and for the following two years was research associate at the Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Since 1952, he has been Professor of Government at Boston University and Lecturer on Eastern European Affairs at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University.

Professor Gyorgy is the author of *Geopolitics, The New German Science*, and *Governments of Danubian Europe*. He is also the editor of *Soviet Satellites, Studies in the Politics of Eastern Europe*, and *Problems in International Relations*. Professor Gyorgy is on leave from Boston University to act as Consultant for International Relations and Social Sciences at the Naval War College during the first term of Academic Year 1956-1957.

## THE SOVIET SOCIAL SYSTEM

A lecture delivered  
at the Naval War College  
on 31 October 1956 by  
*Dr. Alex Inkeles*

I would like this morning to address myself to an examination mainly not of the detailed structure of Soviet society but rather to a very brief survey of some of its main features, pointed towards an assessment of its relative strengths and weaknesses as a social system. I think there are three explanatory principles that are generally used in an effort to assess Soviet society as a social system and to explain the mainsprings of the behavior of its government.

The first, and perhaps most popular, of these principles is the assumption that everything that is done in and by the Soviet system can be understood mainly as a manifestation of some concrete principle of Marxism-Leninism, or, in its more recent version, of Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism.

The second theory, which is popular in somewhat different quarters, asserts that to understand the Soviet system and its behavior one must really consider its historical continuity with traditional Russia. This type of theory tends to place great emphasis upon the elements of continuity between many aspects of the old Russian system and those which exist today. It stresses, for example, that autocracy and complete governmental control has been a typical characteristic of Russian society and that they have always used the Secret Police.

Still a third popular theory asserts that because of the tendency of the Soviet Union through time to become more and more a large-scale industrial system it is to be understood mainly on the same basis as is any other large-scale industrial power, allowing of course, for its distinctive and unique location at a

particular point in Europe. Those who adhere to this theory, tend to say with regard to understanding its behavior, that if you would consider what you would do if you were in the same relative geographic and economic position you could make pretty good predictions.

It is my opinion, as is generally true with matters of social science prediction, that no one of these theories is the sole clue to an understanding of Soviet developments and Soviet behavior. Rather, one must examine the particular cases and the distinctive contribution of each of these theories to an understanding of what has happened, what is happening, and what is likely to happen in the future of Soviet social development. I stress the future as well as the present because in my opinion the Soviet Union is still in a process of development. It has not yet reached the form of social organization which it will hold for the indefinite future, although I think it is fairly close to it. However, in my opinion, to anticipate my conclusions, it is a very viable system but, like all social systems, it has certain inbuilt structural strains which characterize it and of which it is our responsibility to be aware.

I would like to begin with a subject which I think is most appropriate today because it so clearly touches on the critical problems which face us at the moment in deciding what is happening in the satellite areas: that is, the nationality problem or policy as it faces the Soviet regime. Viewed in terms of its economic aspects, the Soviet nationality policy has essentially and most importantly been an effort not too different from similar efforts made by more skilled and advanced national peoples in other areas, who, by a process of force in some instances and by encouragement in others, effect a double purpose: in the first place, to settle large numbers of nomadic peoples on the land; in the second place, to take others who were already settled on the land, but whose economy was relatively primitive, and to move them

forward rapidly into the period of industrialization — especially by improving the technology of their agriculture.

The consequences of this effort, because it has been largely attempted through force, has been very substantial social upheaval inside the Soviet Union. To choose but one example: the Kazakhs of Central Asia, who were subjected to this process of forced settlement, in a very short period of time had their total tribal structure virtually destroyed. One of the best indices of this destruction, because of the resistance which the Kazakhs produced, was in the realm of population losses. Starting with a base of a mere four million in 1926, the absolute decrease in population in the Kazakh Republic between 1926 and 1939 was 869,000. The relative decrease in population, counting not only the absolute loss of life but also the unborn children, was 1.5 million. Or, to choose another aspect of the problem, one which throws some light on the population losses when we remember that this was predominately a nomadic and herding people, the livestock losses between 1928 and 1934 were as follows (all from a base of 100%) :

Losses of cattle .....	73%
Losses of sheep and goats .....	87%
Losses of horses .....	88%

In other words, this people was faced by virtual starvation, totally impoverished, and placed entirely at the disposal of the regime. This economic cost is on the *negative* side.

On the *positive* side, however, we must reckon with certain long-haul gains which the Soviet regime accomplished through this forced settlement. For one thing, it has achieved a basic increase in the productivity of many of the so-called "backward areas" within its own borders. It has also freed and allowed the development of various natural talents in the population which otherwise were restricted by the traditional tribal structure. In addition, it has created the possibility for certain centers of na-

tional identification in areas where previously the only main basis of identification was with that of fragmented tribal groups. It has also achieved a very substantial propaganda weapon which it can use in its discussion abroad, holding up the apparent economic advance of some of the backward peoples as indicating the kind of model which the Soviet Union provides for those underdeveloped areas.

In the case of the political aspects of the nationality problem, a similar type of analysis could be attempted. On the one hand, the consequences for the system have been that there have been very important releases of certain national and cultural aspirations; that some of the conflicts between the minor nationalities have been largely reduced; that some of the national feeling and sentiment has been channeled into the direction of the development of the local economy, in this way supporting the Soviet system-at-large.

At the same time, one must regard on the balance sheet some of the tensions that have resulted from the basic political aspects of the nationality policy. This, on the whole, can be summed up as follows: permitting and encouraging the use of the local language and the development of the local culture, but doing this only in so far as it does not conflict with the principles of control by the Communist Party, the Sovietization of the land, the movement in the direction of Socialism, and so on.

The tensions which this has produced may be sketched roughly as follows. In the first place, the encouragement of local pride leads to political separatism, and there is a critical question in all of the national minority areas of the Soviet Union as to where one can draw the line between what is acceptable local pride and what in the Soviet definition is the kind of local chauvinism that leads to separatist tendencies and away from the central authorities. There is also the fact that to a large degree, Socialism and Communism are super-cultural; that is to say, they are above

national boundaries. Consequently, there are often conflicts between the objectives of the central authorities and the cultural aspirations of the local peoples.

To turn now to a somewhat different area, or, namely, the area of religion, we have here a story of more successful accommodation than on the whole characterizes the adjustments made in the realm of the nationality policy. To review for a moment the ideological and political base of this question, we must keep in mind that the initial starting point of the Soviet regime was one of extreme hostility to all organized religion. There were two main aspects which supported this basic hostility. The first aspect was essentially ideological. By and large, there was a profound conflict felt to exist in the minds of Soviet leaders between its own materialistic philosophy and what is regarded as being the non-materialist philosophy of the churches. In addition, the church was a very important conservative influence, holding back the process of social change which the regime was eager to speed up. Furthermore, there were certain inevitable difficulties for a rigid doctrine like Bolshevism when it faced the prospect that might have split allegiances, something which we accept with ease in the West, but which is very difficult for the average Bolshevik to accept.

In addition to these ideological factors, there were very important secular or political considerations which were involved. The church at the time was one of the major secular powers within Russian and Soviet society. It was both a landowner and also a group in charge of very important social functions. It declared itself in open and direct opposition to the central leadership. Indeed, the Patriarch Tikhon declared an anathema on the Bolsheviks in 1918. He said: "I call upon every believer not to enter into any kind of association with these monsters of the human race." In other words, he called for a program of relatively absolute civil disobedience. Under these circumstances, there was a long history of conflict between the church and the regime. In the early

years, this took the form of open warfare and eventually came to a point where they were about to try the Patriarch. In later periods, there were continual flurries, trials, closings of churches, and similar activities down to the period of the war, during which, as you know, there took place a relative accommodation between the church and the regime. This continues to the present day and represents a very substantial departure from the early orientations of the leadership.

Here, again, to assess this in terms of its consequences for the stability or instability of the regime, we can draw something like the following balance sheet. I think that the basic considerations which influenced the leadership were essentially these: that the restriction on the independent secular power of the church had largely been accomplished and effected in the early years of the revolution. During the period of the war, the church had demonstrated its loyalty and support to the government in such a way that the regime could count on the leaders of the church doing substantially what they were expected to do with regard to the central interests of Soviet policy abroad and at home.

In addition to this, there were several important arguments for a positive conciliation. Much of the energy that had gone into fighting religion could be diverted into economic and other fields. It was possible to avoid alienating many people who otherwise indicated that they would be willing to support the regime except for its attitude towards the church. There was, as I have indicated, the foreign policy aspect: the possibility that the church abroad would support the Soviet regime, as it has done down to the present time, including playing an important role in the peace campaign.

The results, therefore, of this particular program of development add up to this: the regime in this important respect has been strengthened without any real ideological embarrassment because it can now claim that in its early years it was really not

opposed to religious practice but mainly to the interference of the church in the internal affairs of the government. The control of the church and its adaptation to internal purposes has been largely assured, with the reduction of internal tension.

The next consideration is the media of communications. Most of you are probably familiar with the basic facts with regard to the Soviet system of communications. It is an extremely elaborate one, which has been carefully designed to maximize on the available resources, which is thoroughly controlled for political purposes, and which is very vigorously and energetically utilized to service and advance the purposes of the central regime.

Just to cite one fact through the example of the Soviet radio. Unlike the radio in the United States, and elsewhere, most of the Soviet radio network is essentially a wired rather than an aerial reception system. Most of the people who listen to the radio in the Soviet Union do so as one would if one were a telephone subscriber to a telephone service. They have a small box which has an "on" and "off" switch and a volume control, but which allows no choice of stations. The programs which come over this wired set are selected and determined in a central authority like a telephone exchange, only in this case it is obviously called a "radio exchange," where an editor, carefully selected and supervised by the Communist Party, selects only those programs which it is felt to be safe to allow the particular group of Soviet listeners to hear.

The sources of strength in such a system are obvious. On the structural side, it gives the regime absolute control of the content of the media of mass communication and determines what a person will be exposed to and when he will be exposed to it. It also gives the regime the ability not only to put in what is desired but to keep out what is not desired. For example, it prevents the "Voice of America" from being heard by any substantial portion of the Soviet population in so far as it can get through

jamming. Because of the fact that the system is one unified system, it supports the same program and presents the same general message in both its radio and press communications.

On the content side, the media of communication serves the regime in a substantial degree as an instrument for economic and social mobilization. They can also be used at will by the leadership as a device for releasing tension. For example, one of the characteristic uses of the media of communication is to conduct periodically what seems to be warfare against bureaucrats. The press declares, as it were, a kind of "open season" on government bureaucrats, encourages people to write in letters, and prepares articles itself which largely criticize the functioning of many Soviet institutions at the lower non-policy-setting level. They often succeed thereby in convincing people that the reason why there are no shoes or the reason why the baths do not have hot water is because some local bureaucrat has been falling down on his job, rather than permitting a free examination of the real reason for this: namely, the system of economic allocation, which permits only a small amount of resources to go for consumer's goods and services.

In addition, the media of communications can be used, as they often are, to appeal to the basic hope and aspiration of the population for such things as peace, for equality, for the elimination or an absence of want, and other forces of this kind. One of the things that one must inevitably be struck with if one travels in the Soviet Union, for example (which I did recently), is the extraordinary reverberation which seems to occur between what appears in the press in any particular day and the kind of arguments that ordinary citizens in the street offer when they begin discussions on policies that involve international affairs. The domestic situation is somewhat different.

There are, despite these strengths, however, certain rather significant weaknesses in the Soviet approach to the mobilization

of communications. I think the most important weakness is the conflict between the realities of Soviet life and the goals which the Soviet communications media stress as being prime objectives. Also, the conflict between means and ends, which is visible in such things as the extensiveness of the police system and the general weariness of the population with the constant repetition which characterizes the Soviet communications media. As a result, there is a very heavy emphasis on utilization of rumors and a very strong tendency on the part of Soviet people to read between the lines, often interpreting Soviet mass communications in a very different way than what was intended by the regime.

I will take the time to touch on just one more area of this kind before turning to a somewhat different problem, and that is the area of social stratification. Here, again, we can trace out the same steps in the development of this system, starting with its early ideological commitments, then the change or adjustment made to accept social reality, and, finally, the consequences which have followed from it.

Starting with the ideological base, we must recognize that the early assumptions of the Soviet regime involved the possibility of a classless society. This was stated to be the goal to be achieved at least in the long run; whereas in the short run there were to be some drastic reductions in the social, economic and status differences that characterized groups in the population. It was also stressed that physical and brain work would not be sharply distinguished but would be treated as if they were equivalents, especially in pay — but, also, in status. It was in addition asserted that power and influence would not be indefinitely strictly in the hands of the Party but would presumably shift to the proletariat, or working class, which was the base from which all power eventually sprang. In the process, while power was being turned over, the workers would presumably be sharers and participants in the process of ruling the country. Status was to be given in the first instance to the industrial worker from production and, generally,

the highest share — or, at least, an equal share — of economic resources was to go to them.

The contrast between this ideological goal and the social reality is indeed very substantial. The Soviet Union is now a society in which there is a fairly clear formal recognition of class differences, and there is actually in the Soviet press a decrease in frequency of reference to the equalitarian goals which at an earlier stage were very important. There is a distinctive and progressive class differentiation, which involves such things as style of dress, the type of speech in which people engage, where they live, and what types of manners they have. Those of you who see items of this kind may have noticed that recently the American press reported an item from the Soviet press which was very typical of the kind of thing that reflects this social revolution. The article was written by a man who is obviously a person of intelligentsia or professional background. He said that he was upset because he had bought a hat (if you have travelled in the Soviet Union you realize how distinctive a hat is because the cap is what is essentially worn there and therefore any foreigner who is wearing a hat immediately stands out, although those who are moving into the upper regions are beginning to wear them) and there was no group of rules or no manual of etiquette which would tell him what he was supposed to do with this hat, such as when to put it on, when to take it off, when to hold it in his hands, when to put it on the table, and so on. He therefore called upon the Soviet publishing agencies and requested them to speed up the process of producing a manual of this kind. This is simply one item amongst thousands which one could choose that reflects the growing development of the relatively self-conscious upper and middle class in Soviet society.

In addition, differences between brain and physical labor are fully recognized in the Soviet Union. They are recognized in pay, in working conditions, in the structure of unions, in the patterns of authority, and in a variety of other ways. Similarly, in

the question of power and influence it is of course obvious that the Party remains the focus of power and decision-making in the Soviet system. Again, with regard to the question of status, we know quite well, both from Soviet sources and from direct observation, that the worker has very few advantages with regard to status; that, by and large, it is the people with power and responsibility who get the prestige and respect which the system can afford.

As to consequences of this, here, again, we can consider certain gains and certain losses. On the "gains" side, one of the things which this stratification development has done is to make it easier to have effective patterns of authority in Soviet society. In the earlier days of relative emphasis on equality it was very often difficult to work effectively in those institutions like the factories, which required a clear-cut structure of authority. Under the system of stratification which now exists, most of the authority patterns are reinforced by differences in economic resources and prestige which go along with the differences in authority.

In addition, one of the things which the stratification system has done, because it was based mainly on differential reward for those whose productivity was regarded as more useful to the system, is, that it has tended to make people more motivated to work for higher productivity and to give greater effort within the system. Finally, it has produced for the regime a corps of people who are relatively successful in their occupational lives, who are important to the running of a compressed industrial society, and who, in some respects, are the main base of social support for the leadership.

At the same time, in this area as well, there have been certain major losses to the system. One of these has been the resentments against the disparities in consumption which exist between those who are well off and those who are poorly off

in the face of the general condition of shortage which exists. There have also been certain losses in dynamic appeals. For example, as I have indicated, the regime now finds it hard to claim that everyone should sacrifice to the utmost because such an appeal is likely to be effective only where rewards are distributed according to the amount of sacrifices, whereas many of the ordinary workers and peasants feel that their sacrifices are great and that their rewards are less. In addition, one of the things that this system has done is to encourage people to engage in all sorts of illegal activities as a way of getting larger incomes. The society now allows, and indeed in a substantial degree encourages, the accumulation of substantial personal fortunes.

All of these features, which I have stressed, are in the category of those where there have been major changes. They need to be put in a context of aspects of the Soviet system which have been relatively unchanging, relatively stable. I would list amongst these just very briefly, in order to provide their context, two major sets of which the first group are essentially *economic* and the second group are predominantly *political*.

Amongst those aspects in the political category, I would list substantially the following items. First, and perhaps the most important, is the stability of the *élite* theory. No matter what has happened in the way of change within the Soviet system, it has remained the case that the Communist Party has been conceived of as the main driving and organizing corps within the system; that, indeed, within the Communist Party a small and essentially self-regenerating *élite*, or core group, at the very top is the essential seat or locus of political power. This was markedly true under Stalinist orthodoxy, but in my opinion, it remains to be true at the present time. I see no major signs within Soviet society of a move away from the emphasis upon this type of approach in the political realm.

A second major aspect of the political realm that has been relatively unchanging, and that goes along with the former one,

has been the emphasis upon the subordination of all of the major institutions of the society to the central purposes of the political leadership. The idea of a really free association for a profession is still unthinkable in the Soviet Union. All of those great associations which constitute independent power in our system are in the Soviet Union, subordinated to, and yielding to, the central purposes of the political élite. This includes the universities, the trade unions, the professional societies such as those for doctors and lawyers, the military, and so on.

An additional element of the system which has remained relatively stable — although, here, there has been a substantial attrition in time — is an assumption that the regime will not hesitate where it finds it to its advantage to use force and political terror against individuals or groups within the population. There has been, and I will comment further upon this later, a substantial reduction in the intensity with which the terror is applied in the Soviet Union. But the principle of the political terror has not been clearly disavowed by the top leadership and remains a very real institutional possibility. The change is mainly in the direction of how many people are arrested, who is arrested, and for what reasons. I will cite, for example, the fact that some 130 people who were associated with Beria have all been subjected to the political terror, arrested, (and generally without trial) through the usual agencies of the political police, and most, apparently physically eliminated.

Another aspect of the political system which seems to remain relatively constant is the emphasis upon extreme indoctrination and mass persuasion; in other words, the governmental use of the media of mass communications for the central purpose of mobilizing individuals in support of, and in the belief of, the main policies of the regime.

I would include in the second major bloc of system features, those containing mainly economic relevance. Here, I will stress

just a few of the obvious and essential ones. The first of these is the continuing commitment to an extensive program of large-scale industrialization, within which the emphasis on consumer's goods is relatively minor. A minor portion of the total rate of investment goes to improvements in the standard of living. The system of forced savings, prime investment in heavy industry, (and within the realm of heavy industry mainly in those industries which are related to the production of further machinery) remains the essential system. This means a continuing tendency within the Soviet Union for pressure on the population and denial to it of the possibility of achieving the kind of standard of living which the Soviet economic system would otherwise make possible.

Another element of constancy in the system involves the whole realm of agriculture. It seems to me that there is no serious doubt, whatever may happen in the satellites, that the Soviet Union will now abandon the collectivization of agriculture; that, despite its history of forced action and the terrible losses and costs which were necessary to accomplish it, and its presently relatively lower level of productivity, the Soviet system will continue to base itself in agriculture predominantly on the collective farm system or its equivalent.

In this discussion I have, on the whole, however, omitted to say anything about what, from a sociologist's point of view, is ultimately the most critical source of strength and weakness: namely, the attitudes and life experiences of the population which makes up the society. I would like, therefore, in the time that remains to me, to turn very briefly to a consideration of some of the things we learn mainly through our work with former Soviet citizens who decided not to return to the U. S. S. R.; about their attitudes and life experiences in the system, and then to go on to a final summary evaluation of strengths and weaknesses.

Perhaps the most outstanding fact that we discovered in our survey of attitudes and life experiences within the Soviet

system — something for which I think we were on the whole prepared, but which in its extensity went beyond our anticipation — was the extent to which the Soviet Union emerged as a remarkably stratified society, a class society, in which attitudes and life experiences seemed very highly determined by the position that a person had in the larger social structure. By his position in the larger social structure, I mean predominantly, what his occupation was. It is largely a man's occupation that is associated with his level of education and determines his income and his style of life.

For example, if you consider something like the "life chances" with which a person is born when he starts out in life, and contrast the situation of those born into the relatively "advantage families" and those born into the relatively "disadvantage families," very striking contrasts emerge. By the "advantaged families," we mean essentially those who fall into the category of the administrative and professional intelligentsia — the managers of factories, the heads of government bureaus, the more skilled engineers, professors with more training, members of the academy, doctors who head polyclinics, and similar categories. Then we go down the scale in the society past the ordinary professionals to the white-collar workers, the skilled workers, the ordinary workers, and, eventually, at the bottom of the heap, the peasants. One of the things which emerged here, as I say, was a very sharp differentiation in the life chances and in the experiences that would be had by a person depending on which segment of the society he was first born into; or, if he was mobile, what segment of the society he eventually moved into.

Consider, for example, the question of education. If you were born into a professional intelligentsia family in the Soviet Union, in the period before and during the war, the chances were three or four times to one that you would attain a higher education as compared to what your chances would be if you were the son of a peasant or a worker. For example, if you consider

the proportion of people of different backgrounds, you find the pattern is roughly as follows: among children of professional administrative family origin, approximately 58% of the young people have achieved a higher education — college training, or better — as compared to approximately 8% of those of peasant origin. By contrast, of those who were born in the homes of professional and administrative personnel less than 1% were held back to only four years of schooling, whereas somewhat better than 50% of the peasants achieved only four years of schooling. As you can see, there is a very marked difference.

Or, to take another area, something like the per capita income available to be spent in your home by your parents on you, thus allowing for the differences in the number of children in the home. The per capita income available to be spent on you as a median would be two and one-half times greater if you were born into a professional-administrative home as against what would be true if you were born into the home of an ordinary worker.

To take still a different issue, let's consider the atmosphere in the family, measured in this case, by the sense that the individual had that his home was a stable place, or was one that was relatively unstable. Judged by this measure, we found that the family atmosphere was five time more likely to be perceived as one where, under Soviet conditions, the family "grew apart," as against one that "grew together," if you came from the home of a peasant as against what would be true if you came from the home of the professional-intelligentsia category.

These things which I have been describing are essentially those factors that are associated with your life chances at birth. But, obviously, you then move on to achieve in some cases a position like that of your father, in other cases a position much better than his, and , in a few cases, a position somewhat poorer than the one which he attained; in other words, a process of

social mobility goes on. I might say that the chances you would attain a position as a professional, or an administrator, or an engineer were markedly different if you were born into a working-class home as against what was true if you were born into a home of the professional administrative category.

After this process of sifting out the population took place, what were your chances for enjoying the conditions of life as they are offered in Soviet society? Again, a similar pattern of differentiation emerges. For example, take a measure like job satisfaction, a very simple one. People were just asked on the whole, "Did you like the job that you had, or didn't you like it?" This can be put in various other forms, such as: "Would you have changed jobs if you had a chance?" and so on. Amongst those in the professional-administrative category, almost 80% liked the jobs that they had; amongst ordinary workers, only 20% liked their jobs; amongst peasants, there was a ratio of differential satisfaction of about five to one between the top echelons and the bottom echelons of the occupational structure.

Or, take something like the material conditions of life. We asked people: "Do you feel that on the whole you are better off than most people, about as well off as the average, or worse off than most people?" Amongst people in the professional intelligentsia category, more than 70% said that they felt they were clearly better off than most people; amongst the employees, 50% felt they were better off; while amongst the ordinary workers and peasants only 10% felt they were better off than most people. In other words, there is a ratio or differential in satisfaction of seven to one.

The same thing is true almost regardless of which question you ask. For example, if you tried to enquire into whether or not people felt they were being fairly rewarded, the same pattern emerged. When comparing their pay with the pay of those doing the same type of job, only 47% of the peasants — as

against 70% of the professional-administrative people — felt that their pay was equal or better. This is true as you go across the line with regard to most issues.

In other words, both at the time of birth, and subsequent to your attainment of an occupational position, the chances that you have to attain and what you get in the way of satisfaction in income and rewards in the Soviet system, are markedly differentiated.

This differentiation, which was very striking as you can see, applied to all sorts of areas, including areas of attitudes and values. (Incidentally, these figures ought to indicate to you the extent to which the former Soviet citizens by no means gave a totally black picture of the Soviet system). For example, when we asked whether the people approved the Soviet educational system, 80% of those in the professional intelligentsia category said, "Yes, we approve the Soviet educational system"; amongst the peasants, where, obviously, very few of them benefited from the system, only 45% said "Yes."

When we asked the people whether they thought that the access to theaters and concerts had improved a great deal under the Soviet system, 70% of the members of the intelligentsia (who used the theater more) said "Yes," while only about 40% of the workers and peasants (who did not use the theater as much) said "Yes."

When we asked the people whether they should keep or change certain features if the Soviet regime were changed, we found that many people surprised us by not naming any feature, but by giving a blanket response. They would either say: "Change everything," or "Keep nothing." Here, again, you find marked differences. For instance, 40% of the peasants (the angry men of the regime) said: "Keep nothing; change everything." Only 10% of the intelligentsia professional category took such a

blanket view; they found many things that they could specify they liked and more things they were willing to name that they were willing to change.

The same thing applied with regard to political action. For example, when we asked whether or not in their opinion if the Soviet leaders could be caught they should be given a fair trial or put to violent death, we found that a much larger proportion of those in the lower classes, who tend more to violence, said, "Put them to immediate death," as against what was true for the intelligentsia professional category, who wanted a trial.

Despite these massive differences in life experiences and attitudes under Soviet conditions, and despite the fact, that this obviously had some influence on the hostility to the regime, or in other words, to the leadership, we were struck by the fact that there was an impressively high allegiance amongst these former Soviet citizens and very little difference amongst them with regard to the issue of the "welfare state" as it had been developed in Soviet society. In other words, they made a distinction between the main "welfare state" features of the Soviet system and the Soviet leadership, or the Soviet regime. Their allegiance to these principles was, as I have stressed, impressively high — especially when you consider how relatively little the system often paid off for many of them.

For instance, when we asked them, "Do you approve of state ownership of heavy industry?" more than 80% of those in all classes, regardless of their occupation, said "Yes." When we asked them whether they approved of state ownership of the means of communication, about 85% (regardless of their social class) said "Yes." Similar patterns emerged when we asked whether or not they believed in the responsibility of the government to guarantee every man a job; whether or not the government should own light industry; whether it should be in control of the system of trade, and so on down the line through a very long list

of items. There was this very persistent pattern of former Soviet citizens, (despite the differences in their life experiences) pretty uniformly accepting the main ideas of the Soviet welfare state.

We found, furthermore (and, here, I must say that we were somewhat distressed), that not only was there a basic allegiance to the main ideas of the welfare state as practiced in the Soviet Union but there was not as much involvement in the issues of political freedom and liberty as we thought might well characterize a group of people who had after all taken an important voluntary step in running away from, or refusing to return to, a political totalitarian system. When we asked them questions about civil liberties and appropriate personal freedoms, and the rights of the government to restrict the freedoms and rights of the individuals, we found that on the whole a very high proportion of the former Soviet citizens were not at all shocked by the idea that the government had a right to restrict the individual's rights to practice his religion, to express those ideas which he thought important, to enjoy a free press, freedom of assembly, and others incorporated in the American Bill of Rights.

If it is true that there is such strong support for the welfare state amongst the former Soviet citizens, and if they are less upset than one might have imagined them to be about the absence of, or restriction on, freedom in Soviet society, why is it that so many of them have turned against the regime? What seems to be the clue to the basic difficulties which the Soviet regime has been having — and still to some extent is having — with its home population?

Here, we found that one had to make a sharp dichotomy (which I have already suggested) between, on the one hand, the Bolshevik regime — as represented by the men in the Politburo who conduct the leadership of the Communist Party — and, on the other hand, some of the main institutional features of the

Soviet system, and especially those features that have to do with welfare functions.

For example, when we asked what, in their opinion, were the features of the Soviet State which should be kept if the Bolsheviks were overthrown, they responded very consistently by giving prime emphasis to a few very limited features. They particularly emphasized that the system of education, as the Soviet regime had developed it, should be maintained; that the system of public health should be maintained; that the system of workers' benefits should be maintained; and that the emphasis upon social equality and social mobility should be preserved. They gave the Soviet system, as a system, very substantial credit for accomplishments in these areas and indicated that no matter what kind of a government they had, they would not like to eliminate these features.

On the other hand, there was a sharp differentiation between this aspect and those things in the system which they felt ought to be changed. Here, the institutional features of the regime in the political realm were most emphasized. They outstandingly stressed among the things they would be sure to change if the Bolsheviks were eliminated, the political system — and, especially, the emphasis on the political terror and the importance of the Secret Police. They also stressed that they would like to change those aspects of the collective farm system that were most coercive and destructive of the autonomy and freedom of the peasant, although they were, in general, opposed to the agricultural system-at-large. They also felt very strongly that the system of artificial forced and harsh labor discipline, which was enforced in the Soviet factories before, during, and after the war, was also very evil and should on the whole be eliminated.

They were rather lacking in original ideas as to substitutes, however, for the other main aspects of the political system. For example, they were not too inventive in suggesting the possibility

of a real democracy; of the possibility of a multi-party system; indeed, many of them did not even think of the possibility of having two candidates within the framework of the Communist Party.

Rather, their feelings seemed to be that on the whole the main structural features of the Soviet society were not bad, and that the evil had lain mainly in the way in which that system was executed or administered by a group of men who had for a while acted like very bad leaders. In other words, they made a deep cleavage between the "we" aspect on the one hand — those ordinary citizens, including many in responsible positions, who wanted to make the system work well and who were not oppressive and terroristic — and a small group, on the other hand, whom they defined as "they" — who were essentially after political power, who inclined to exploit and act harshly with the population. They particularly complained about such things as the intensity, the pace, or the tempo which had characterized the early stages of Soviet development. They used the formula: "They (meaning the leadership) are always pushing on us, hurrying us, forcing us, and showing no concern for our feelings." They complained bitterly about the deprivations of the material comforts of life, the forced pace of industrial development, and the consequent reduction in the standard of living from which the population was forced to suffer. They complained about the political terror which I have already mentioned — this arbitrary, unjust, impersonal and cold execution. And, finally, summing it all up, they said: "We feel that this is a government which has no trust in us. It does not believe in its people. It will not allow them to work within the framework of the system like a leadership which believes in the reliability of its people. Instead, it is always suspicious of us, is always pushing us and always forcing us to do things which are not what we wish to do. It is failing to show that basic trust which is essential between a government and its people.

In the light of these changes, I think one can make certain major assessments about some aspects of the strengths and weaknesses of the Soviet system, both as they have classically existed and as they may now be in a process of change as the result of some of the more recent developments in Soviet society.

In making my summary, I would like to start with the major sources of social strengths in the Soviet system. Here, very briefly, I would enumerate five major sources of strength.

The first of these strengths is the intensive utilization within the Soviet system of its human and social resources. It is a system which has extraordinary power to mobilize for the purposes of centrally-determined goals the entire population, and to demand from its people the kind of behavior — if not the kind of allegiance — which is essential to this mobilization.

The second major source of strength within the system is its monopoly of communications, which gives it an extraordinary instrument of thought control, and, in the absence of important messages coming from outside, often prevents its people from realizing the truth about their own system, even though they can see it at first hand.

A third major source of strength is that it has very important emphasis upon educational and social mobility opportunities. Despite some reduction in this realm, it is striking to find the extent to which Soviet citizens feel that, although there are big differences between those who are better off and those who are not so well off, this is still a society which is open to talent. They are awfully confused about the extent to which such mobility exists in the Western World, and, particularly, in the United States. They have the impression if you are born a worker or a farmer in the United States that you remain such all of your life; that only people from upper-class backgrounds ever win positions of responsibility and good education in our system.

A fourth major source of strength which I have already touched upon is the emphasis on the social security program. The Soviet people are much impressed with the continued absence of unemployment, they are much impressed with the medical care program, and they are much impressed with other features of the system which I have mentioned.

For the fifth major source of social strength, I would cite the patriotism which the regime is able to elicit. This was particularly marked in the period during and since the last World War, when the regime has given more emphasis to this theme and which I think has accumulated a great deal of strength. More and more the Soviet citizen, except for those in the minor nationalities, tends to think of the Soviet Union as *his* home country in the same sense that the old Russian peasant thought about Czarist Russia — and, indeed, I think more so.

On the “tensions” side, and the sources of weakness, one has to put down a somewhat different list. I have already hinted at what these seem mainly to be.

In the first place there is resentment over the deficiencies in the standard of living. This is especially marked relative to the citizen's feeling that his country, as his government tells him every day, grows wealthier and wealthier and yet his own standard of living seems to lag behind.

A second major source of tension and weakness, most important of all, is the resentment over the system of political controls, and, in particular, the system of police terror and the synthetic injustices that were connected with it.

A third source of weakness and tension is the whole system of agricultural collectivization, which traditionally has forced from the peasant such a large measure of his labor in exchange for so small an economic reward that almost the whole of the peasantry has been one seething mass of disaffection. The peasant, as

we have described him, is the "angry man of the Soviet system," and the collectivization program in its present form continues to exact that measure from him.

A fourth source of tension and difficulty is the continuing frustration of nationality aspirations, a topic on which I have already touched. This shows its most extreme form outside the official Soviet borders in the present satellite upheavals but it has, on a modest scale, equivalent potential within the borders of the Soviet Union in areas like the Ukraine, in Georgia, where, as you know, there were riots not so long ago, in Armenia, and in some of the central Asian countries.

For a fifth source I would cite the loss of social dynamism and social promise, which characterizes the Soviet regime in its present tendency to stabilize on a new level. Many of the fancy ideas with which the ideology once captured people's minds have lost their dynamic appeal. A great many of the young people in the Soviet Union are obviously not deeply committed to the ideology but are rather in many ways extraordinarily like American young people, who are mainly interested in getting ahead, in enjoying life, and who would rather leave politics to someone else.

There have been a certain number of basic changes in recent times which must be considered (and I will conclude very briefly with these) against the background of this assessment of strengths and weaknesses. I think you will see that most of these changes go into the direction of meeting very specific aspects of the weakness picture that characterized the Soviet Union in an earlier period.

These recent developments include, first and most outstanding, the tremendous easing in the intensity of the terror. The political terror in the Soviet Union has suffered an enormous decline in frequency and in intensity — one which, indeed, is in some ways hard to believe. The instruments of terror remain in

the hands of the government, and it uses them on a small scale when and where it feels it necessary and desirable. But, on the whole, the rate of arrest is tremendously reduced and, as compared to earlier periods, is almost nonexistent. Along with this, and very important for the political stability of the regime, has been the downgrading of the Secret Police and the decrease in their relative autonomy of action.

A second major improvement, and one that, although it has been a modest one in the eyes of the people, seems to be a very important one, is the improvement in the urban standard of living. The standard of living, although it continues to improve with very small increments and in some ways is today not much better than it was in 1913, is substantially better than it was in 1946, something which most Soviet people seem to use as their present standard of judgment; also, it is quite a bit better than it was in 1952 — during the last years of the Stalin era — when it had reached quite a low level.

In addition to this, there have been certain improvements, such as: the greater freedom that labor has in the factories, with the cancelling of the restrictive labor legislation; the extremely popular increase in old-age benefits; the increase in the level at which the minimum wage is placed; and other changes designed to improve the urban standard of living.

Along with this, although somewhat less striking, there has been a series of measures to ameliorate the condition of the peasant, and, in particular, to enable the peasant to get a better economic return for his labor on the farm. Some of these measures which were taken so extreme that they have backfired, but I think that on the whole they have eased the attitude of the peasant.

For example, one of the things that happened was that so high a price was set for milk, cheese, and similar products

that many peasants who lived near cities found it to their advantage to go to the city in the morning to buy bread at very low prices at the public store. Then they took this bread home, made a mash from it, and fed it to their cows. The milk was then sold in the market and the money was used again to buy bread, with a very handsome profit for the peasant in the turn-over process. When the regime took the wheat away from the peasant at so low a price, it by no means intended that it should be sold so cheaply as to make it attractive to buy it back this way. Yet, this is symptomatic of the general effort being made to ameliorate the situation of the peasant, even though it means throwing him sops and not freeing him from the collective farm system.

Finally, there has been some improvement in the chances for social mobility. The school system no longer has fees, neither at the secondary nor higher school level. The expansion of the ten-year school system has been extensive and top learners now have somewhat lesser privileges.

I will turn now, by way of final summary, to what the present stability and future viability of the Soviet regime seems to be in the light of these remarks. It seems to me that the Soviet Union is, in the first place, kept going by some of the forces that keep all societies going. One of the things that most struck us about the people to whom we spoke — first, outside the Soviet Union and, later, inside it — was the desire of most of them to live peaceably; if possible, to have their conditions of daily life improve a little bit; and not to be too involved in the political process. The women keep the men pretty much in line, and the jobs take care of the rest of it. The system in many ways seems to go on in the same way as it does in other industrial societies.

In addition, we see very low chances for an internal upheaval. I continue to maintain this position despite what has happened inside the satellites. The predictions for the satellites involve very different assessments than were true for the internal

structure of Soviet society. By this I do not mean to say that the developments in the satellites will not cause severe repercussions inside the Soviet political leadership. On the contrary, I expect that such developments will occur. But it seems to me, that they are most likely to lead to a change in ruling personnel rather than to a change in any of the fundamental features of the Soviet system similar to the changes now taking place in Poland and Hungary.

By and large, the average Soviet individual, as we met him, seemed to us to be a relatively atomized person, without much opportunity for mobilizing opposition. Also, by and large he was interested not in fundamental change — other than the kind that has already been adopted — but, rather, a steady amelioration or improvement of his conditions of life.

The long-range process of stabilization which appears to be going on in the Soviet Union may possibly be on our side in two major senses. In the first place, it may slow up Soviet adventurism, and the less adventurous the Soviet Union is in its foreign policy the less likely is the possibility of a world conflagration. I think that what is happening at the present time in the satellites adds an additional source of strain or pressure on the Soviet regime, inclining it to be less adventuresome in its foreign policy ventures.

At the same time, the process of social change which is going on in the Soviet Union may be producing a kind of mellowing in which, as is often said, a growing middle class, satisfied with its conditions of life and eager to avoid marked upsets in the system, tries to exert restraints on the political leadership and, indeed, infiltrates the political leadership with such sentiments. They seek to have a more peaceful and less aggressive foreign policy as the dominant aspect of the Soviet system, something which would meet a very substantial positive response in the Soviet population. Although this is a very real possibility, I think

that it by no means has yet come to full fruition, and, until such time as it does, there is no other possible course of action for American policy except to assume that as of the moment the long-range goals of the Soviet Union in the foreign realm remain exactly as they have been in the past: namely, as rapid a movement as is possible towards a situation where there is the domination of Communism throughout the world by whatever means that seem most advantageous.

## BIOGRAPHIC SKETCH

### Dr. Alex Inkeles

Doctor Inkeles received his B. A. and M. A. degrees from Cornell University, and his Ph. D. degree from Columbia University. He was a Teaching and Research Assistant in the Department of Sociology and Anthropology at Cornell University in 1941-1942.

During World War II, Doctor Inkeles served as a Social Science Research Analyst for the Division of U. S. S. R. Intelligence in the Office of Strategic Services. In 1945-1946, he was a Candidate for Certificate at the Washington School of Psychiatry.

In 1948, he was an instructor in Social Relations and Regional Studies at Harvard University, and during the following three years he was Lecturer in Social Relations and Regional Studies, as well as Research Associate, of the Russian Research Center at Harvard University. During 1949-1951, he was a Consultant to the Program Evaluation Branch of the International Broadcasting Division, Department of State.

During the summer of 1950, Doctor Inkeles was a lecturer in Sociology at the Institute for the Study of the Soviet Union, Social Science Foundation of the University of Denver. During the same year, he was Consultant to Survey of World Communications Facilities, United Nations Education, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). During 1950-1955, he was Research Director of the Refugee Interview Project at the Russian Research Center, Harvard University, where, since 1951, he has been Senior Fellow at the Russian Research Center and Lecturer in Social Relations.

Doctor Inkeles is the author of *Public Opinion in Soviet Russia*, and he has contributed articles to numerous magazines and periodicals.

## RESOURCES AND GEOGRAPHY OF THE MEDITERRANEAN BASIN

A lecture delivered  
at the Naval War College  
on 19 November 1956 by  
*Professor Robert E. Kuenne*

1. *Introduction.* In the interests of giving this lecture some focus in the brief time available, I have taken two liberties with the title. First, I shall concentrate attention upon the eastern Mediterranean Basin, both those nations bordering on it — Turkey, Syria, Lebanon, Israel, and Egypt — and those with important economic and political interests in it — Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Iran. These are the nations of major importance most often included in that vague area, “the Middle East”; by using this group of states, of course, we do not mean to imply that having a littoral position on the Mediterranean, or close proximity to it, is the major criterion of our interest in these states. Second, my interests in this area’s geography and resources shall not be primarily by virtue of their importance to the nations themselves, but rather because of their contribution, actually or potentially, to the national objectives, policies, and interests of the Western bloc and the Soviet Union.

2. *The Area in General.* It has often been remarked that the interest taken in the Middle East by major world powers — an interest that has both blessed and plagued the region — is almost exclusively the result of geology and geography. The existence of petroleum and strategic location have combined to write the chapters of history concerned with big power struggles in the Middle East. But before turning to spend the major portion of our time on these two aspects of geography and resources, let us devote a minimal amount to the exposition of the area’s less internationally-relevant data.

The basic geographical fact of the area — reflected in every aspect of the existence of its people — is its aridity. Geographers normally list a region with less than 10 inches of rainfall per year as arid, and between 10 to 20 semi-arid, with the 20-inch rainfall line the margin of ability to grow crops. However, these data of necessity vary with such factors as the amount of evaporation resultant from temperature. As a result, one of the leading geographers states that break between aridity and semi-aridity should be located at 15 inches of annual rainfall, because of the prevalent temperatures in the Middle East. \*1 Since the prevailing winds are westerlies, and the greater part of the area is far from rather small bodies of water, air masses reaching most regions have lost a good deal of their moisture; indeed, as a first approximation it might be said that the amount of rainfall varies proportionately with the length of westward-facing coastline, after adjustment for topography has been made.\*2 Westward-facing slopes of mountain ranges benefit at the expense of eastern slopes. On both the counts of westward-facing coastline and a spine of mountains, the Levant region receives an abundant rainfall of up to 30 inches per year or even more; however, this is crowded into a six-month period — a characteristic of the rainfall throughout the area is a summer of drought and a winter with some rain. But a very little distance inland from the mountains and the sea one encounters the steppe areas, with rainfall of between 10 to 17 inches. Beyond these intensively cultivated areas lie the true desert regimes as illustrated by interior Syria.

These conditions of aridity are relieved by the major river systems which provide basins in which farming by irrigation can be engaged in: the Nile Valley, the Tigris-Euphrates Basin, and the Jordan River with its Orontes and Yarmuk tributaries,

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\*1 W. B. Fisher, *The Middle East*, London, 1950, p. 353

\*2 W. B. Fisher, *The Middle East*, London, 1950, pp. 47-52.

to mention the major systems. But both precipitation and irrigation make only a small portion of the total land area cultivable:

*Table 1 \*3*

*Cultivable Land Area of the Middle East*

<i>Country</i>	<i>Per Cent Cultivable</i>	<i>Per Cent Cultivated</i>
Turkey	30	15
Syria and Lebanon	30	8
Israel	44	33
Egypt	5	4
Jordan	5	4
Iraq	20	3
Iran	10	2
Saudi Arabia	not available	not available

When it is recalled that the Middle East is primarily an agricultural region, and it is also remembered that a good portion of the land listed as cultivated is allowed to lie fallow each year (a third to half), these are meager indeed. As would be expected, the greatest potentials lie in Anatolia and the Levant, with Iraq an exception to the general rule due to the unexploited possibilities of the Tigris-Euphrates system.

Total national incomes and per capita national incomes, springing primarily from agricultural pursuits carried on in Malthusian contexts, are some of the lowest in the world:

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\*3 W. B. Fisher, *The Middle East*, London, 1950, p. 179

Table 2 \*4

*National Incomes and Populations, Middle East*

<i>Country</i>	<i>Per Capita Incomes</i> (1949)	<i>Populations</i> (1954)
Turkey	\$125	24.110 million
Lebanon	125	1.425
Syria	100	3.906
Israel	389	1.748
Egypt	100	23.240
Jordan	not available	1.500
Iraq	85	5.200
Iran	85	21.146
Saudi Arabia	40	2.000

These compare with a United States' per capita income of about \$1,450 in 1949 and British levels of about \$770. The low levels reflect the paucity of cultivable land, the low productivity per man, and the very high population densities in the cultivable areas. For example, the densities of some of the nations' rural populations per acre of cultivable land are given for 1951: Egypt — 1,410; Iraq — 450; Israel — 344; Lebanon — 810; Turkey — 266; Jordan — 160. Yields per acre of crops such as wheat, barley, and corn are lower in most nations than in the United States, in spite of the fact that the land is used much more intensively in these nations.\*5

In short, then, we shall have to consider the struggle of the major world powers for strategic positions and control of oil concessions against the background of a group of extremely poor agricultural nations, over-populated, with rather poor potentialities for agricultural expansion, struggling to keep food production ahead of the high rates of population growth ruling. One road open to many economies in the past and the present was that of industrialization, but the prospects on the whole seem poor in

\*4 United Nations data quoted in Royal Institute of International Affairs, *The Middle East*, 1954, London, Appendix III, p. 560.

\*5 United Nations data quoted in Royal Institute of International Affairs, *The Middle East*, 1954, London, Appendix III, p. 561.

this regard. Mineral resources — especially such requirements as energy sources, iron ore, and other basic minerals — are few, although the area has not been entirely surveyed. Entrepreneurial classes, trained to carry on the managerial and technological function needed for establishment of a strong industry, are non-existent, such functions being carried on by governments largely. Lastly, domestic capital has, over the centuries, failed to provide the wherewithal for industrialization, as opposed to the use of working capital to finance relatively riskless, quick-turnover types of activities as trading.

In view of these considerations most of the planning for the economic future, with the notable exception of Turkey and Israel, has been to concentrate upon irrigation schemes and other methods of keeping the food supply increasing at least *pari passu* with prospective population growth. In the past, the struggle of the Middle East nations to maintain their standards of living has been complicated by the active interest taken in them by Western powers. These powers impressed upon the countries certain of their standards whose net effect was to interfere with progress; the popularization of non-technical education, which has led to an often-acknowledged plethora of humanists, lawyers, and other professions, with a scarcity of engineers and architects, is a good example. The rise in survival rates concomitant upon the introduction of sanitation practices and modern medical procedures is another example of a not-unmixed blessing of Western culture. But for the foreseeable future the development of the area will have to take place within a changing but still fundamental framework of Western concern for oil and strategic position. To these two "resources" of the area and their effects upon the current and foreseeable power struggle we now turn.

3. *Petroleum.* Present geological theories concerning the formation of oil from organic material require a peculiar coincidence of historical and geological accidents to produce an oilfield which is commercially exploitable. First, a sea or estuary capable

of sustaining large amounts of plankton and other marine life is required. As this life died and sank to the bottom it was covered with deposits of fine sediment, until air was excluded and the process of decay prevented. Certain bacteria in the absence of air brought about a partial decomposition of the matter into globules of petroleum. At this stage in the process, then, globules of oil were scattered throughout a thick sedimentation, together with natural gas — another product of the partial sedimentation — and sea water.

A second stage occurred when the pressure upon the silt compressed it into rocks of various types, forcing the oil globules, natural gas, and water to migrate out of its parent material to form pools with natural gas above and dissolve in the petroleum, which in turn floated on pools of water. But in order for it to gather into such pools the geological structure must allow the formation of a basin, which implies a disturbance of the underlying material; but if too much disturbance is present the retaining structure might be broken and allow the oil to seep away and become too dissipated for commercial exploitation. Lastly, to prevent this same seepage, there must be an impermeable rock layer lying above the oil-bearing rock. Given all these conditions, fields of oil can develop and be exploited under present-day technology.

These conditions are present to a remarkable degree in the Middle East. In long geological ages past a large, warm-water sea stretched from the Atlantic to the Persian Gulf, covering Spain, Italy, Turkey, parts of Arabia, and North Africa — the Tethys, of which the Mediterranean is a remnant.\*6 The rich marine life which flourished, gentle fold movements which occurred, and the existence of both porous and impervious rock, resulted in the creation of a rich oil basin extending from Egypt and Saudi Arabia up through the Caucasus and Rumania.

(SEE PLATE ONE)

As presently exploited, there are four major groups of oil fields in the Middle East: (1) the Khuzistan fields of southwest

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\*6 *Encyclopedia Britannica*, Volume 17, p. 537, and Volume 4, p. 842.




PLATE 1

Iran; (2) the fields of northern Iraq-northwestern Iran; (3) the Saudi Arabian-Persian Gulf fields; and (4) the fields of northeast Egypt. These major fields are given brief consideration below:

a. *The Khuzistan Fields.* These consist of six fields lying very close to the head of the Persian Gulf in Iran, all of which are connected by pipeline to the now famous refinery at Abadan on the Karun River near its mouth in the Persian Gulf. The first field in this area was opened in 1908, a second in 1928, and the remainder during or after World War II. This area contains the major holdings of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company's concession, whose stock is held to the extent of 52.55 per cent by the British government.\*7

Crude oil output of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company is given below:

Table 3 \*8

<i>Crude Oil Output of Anglo-Iranian</i>	
<i>Year</i>	<i>Long Tons</i>
1946	19.190 million
1947	20.195
1948	24.871
1949	26.807
1950	31.750
1953	1.456
1954	3.360
1955	17.920
1956 (estimated)	26.051

b. *The Northern Iraq-Northwest Iran Fields.* One major and two minor developed oil fields comprise this group, the most important being that of Kirkuk in Iraq, a minor one in Iraq, and another in Iran. The latter two are used almost exclusively to service

\*7 W. E. Pratt and D. Good, *World Geography of Petroleum*, Princeton, 1950 p. 178

\*8 *Statesman's Yearbook*, 1956, p. 1284.

local needs and do not supply appreciable amounts for export. The location of Kirkuk, about midway between the Persian Gulf and the Mediterranean, led very early to the decision to market its products by pipeline to the Mediterranean. By 1934, lines of 12-inch diameter led from Kirkuk to Haditha on the Euphrates and split there into a northern section crossing the Syrian desert to terminate at Tripoli in Lebanon, and a southern branch crossing Jordan to end in Haifa in Israel. The northern branch was supplemented by a 16-inch line to Tripoli in 1949, and a 26-inch to 32-inch line terminating at Baniyas in Syria. The southern branch was also meant to be supplemented by a 16-inch line, largely completed, but which never reached Haifa because of the Arab-Israeli difficulties.

In 1952 a field was opened at Mosul, near the Turkish border, by linking its output into the Kirkuk system. This concession is held by the Mosul Petroleum Company, a subsidiary of the Iraq Petroleum Company.

The production of oil is given below for all of Iraq. With exception of a small field in the south near the Gulf, which will be discussed under the next group of fields, all of this output represents the production of the northern fields;

*Table 4 \*9*

*Crude Oil Output of Iraq*

<i>Year</i>	<i>Long Tons</i>
1949	4.067 million
1950	6.457
1951	8.349
1952	18.851 (includes Basra, 2.238 million)
1953	27.716
1954	30.145
1955	37.080

\*9 Statesman's Yearbook, 1956, p. 1123.

The Kirkuk field is operated by the Iraq Petroleum Company, and other fields in Iraq are operated by its subsidiaries. The northwestern Iranian field is an operation of the Anglo-Iranian Company.

c. *The Saudi Arabian-Persian Gulf Fields.* These fields along the western shore of the Persian Gulf include the Basra field in Iraq, owned by a subsidiary of the Iraq Petroleum Company, the Kuwait fields, the Saudian fields, Bahrain, and the Qatar fields. The Saudi Arabian and Bahrain fields are linked by pipelines which flow to a refinery at Ras Tanura and another at Bahrain, as well as connecting up with the Trans-Arabian Pipeline system connecting Sidon, Lebanon through Jordan and Saudi Arabia.

The Kuwait fields are exploited by a company owned equally by Anglo-Iranian and Gulf, the Saudi Arabian fields by Arabian-American Oil Company (Standard of California, Standard of New Jersey, Texas Company, and Socony-Vacuum), Bahrain by a company owned equally by Standard of California and Texas Company, and Qatar by a company with some ownership as the Iraq Petroleum Company.

The annual outputs for these fields is given below:

*Table 5 \*10*

*Crude Oil Outputs of Persian Gulf Fields*  
(in tons)

<i>Year</i>	<i>Basra</i>	<i>Kuwait</i>	<i>Saudi Arabia</i>	<i>Bahrain</i>	<i>Qatar</i>
1951	.....	28.327 M	36.609 M	1.508 M	2.370 M
1952	2.238 M	37.631	39.870	1.510	3.296
1953	.....	42.654	40.888	1.506	4.003
1954	.....	46.969	46.174	1.570	4.704
1955	.....	55.000	47.000	.....	.....

\*10 From data in B. Shwadran. *The Middle East, Oil, and the Great Powers*, New York, 1955.

d. *The Egyptian Fields.* These include five sites close to the southern entrance to the Suez Canal, along the Red Sea. Production was about 2.4 million tons per year for 1951-1953, about 1.8 million tons in 1954. Ownership includes British, Dutch, American and Egyptian interests.

The spatial structure of this Middle East petroleum complex can best be studied by a consideration of its nodal points: refineries, seaports from which petroleum and its products are shipped, important points along pipelines, and markets. Let us turn to the location of refineries and their capacities:

(SEE PLATE 2)

Table 6 \*11

*Middle East Refineries*

<i>Country</i>	<i>Location</i>	<i>Capacity</i>	<i>Fields Serviced</i>
Iran	Abadan	24.075 M	Khuzistan
	Kermanshah	.118	N. W. Iran
Iraq	Kirkuk	.120	N. Iraq
	Alwand	.383	N. Iraq
	Haditha	.329	N. Iraq
	Basra	.193	Persian Gulf
	Doura	1.250	N. Iraq
Kuwait	Mina al-Ahmadi	1.479	Persian Gulf
Bahrain	Awali	10.269	Persian Gulf
Saudi Arabia	Ras Tanura	9.894	Persian Gulf
Aden	Little Aden	5.000	Persian Gulf
Lebanon	Tripoli	.479	N. Iraq
	Sidon	.363	Persian Gulf
Israel	Haifa	4.092	N. Iraq
Egypt	Suez (2)	3.300	Egypt

\*11 The most recent estimates available in B. Shwadran, *op. cit.*, Royal Institute of International Affairs, *op. cit.*, and S. H. Longrigg, *Oil in the Middle East*, London, 1954. Conversion factors for barrels per day into tons per year dependent upon the specific gravity of crude were taken from the latter book, Appendices III and VIII.




PLATE 2

This is a total of 61,344,000 tons of refining capacity per year located in the Middle East, or something less than 50 per cent of the 1954 output of about 142 million tons. The key points for United States and Western strategy are Abadan, Ras Tanura, Bahrain, and Aden in the Persian Gulf area, having, as they do, a refining capacity of 50 million tons per year, all on the far side of Suez.

The key pipelines in the Middle East are the northern branch of the Iraq Petroleum Company's line already mentioned, with its nodal points of Kirkuk, Haditha, Banais, and Tripoli; and Aramco's Tapline from Damman to Sidon.

(SEE PLATE 3)

The key Persian Gulf ports from which major shipments of petroleum and petroleum products leave are the following: the Abadan area in Iran, the Basra area in Iraq, Ras Tanura in Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Umm Said in Qatar, Mina al Ahmadi in Kuwait. Aden port has become important as a nodal point. Lastly, of course, Banais in Syria and Tripoli in Lebanon are major dispensing ports in the Mediterranean.

(SEE PLATES 2 & 3)

Let us attempt to construct a picture of the major flows that occurs in this spatial structure by *first* estimating amounts shipped from the nodal points above:

Table 7 \*12

*Estimated Shipments, 1956*

<i>Port</i>	<i>Crude</i>	<i>Refined</i>	<i>Total</i>
Abadan area	12.0 M tons	3 M tons	15 M tons
Basra-Fao area	7.2 M tons	.....	7.2 M tons

(continued next page)

\*12 Sources for these estimates include the books listed in Footnote 11, as well as issues of the London Economist, Aramco's Report on Operations, 1954, and its Handbooks for American Employees, Volume I.




PLATE 3

<i>Port</i>	<i>Crude</i>	<i>Refined</i>	<i>Total</i>
Ras Tanura	12.0 M tons	11 M tons	23 M tons
Bahrain	.....	11 M tons	11 M tons
Qatar	5.0 M tons	.....	5 M tons
Kuwait	53.5 M tons	1.5 M tons	55 M tons
<i>Persian Gulf</i> ....	89.7 M tons	26.5 M tons	116.2 M tons
Aden — not a net addition		5 M tons	5 M tons
Sidon	15.4 M tons	.4 M tons	15.8 M tons
Tripoli-Banais	24 M tons	1 M tons	25 M tons
<i>Levant</i>	39.4 M tons	1.4 M tons	40.8 M tons
<i>Total</i>	129.1 M tons	27.9 M tons	157.0 M tons

To complete the spatial structure, we must attempt to distribute the petroleum, crude and refined, to its customers overseas. Table 8 shows the breakdown by destination of the 145 million tons of crude and refined petroleum listed as exported by the *Economist*:

*Table 8 \*13*

*Percentage Distribution of Middle East Oil, 1955*

<i>Destination</i>	<i>Proportion</i>
Western Europe	61.6%
Asia east of Suez	15.1
North America	9.6
East and South Africa	6.8
Australasia	3.4
North and West Africa	2.7
South America via Cape	.7

Applying the Western European proportion to our estimate of Middle East production in 1956, this would yield a tonnage of roughly 100 million tons taken by this area. This is about 75 per cent of total oil consumption in this region at the present time.

\*13 August 4, 1956, p. 420.

Britain is even more dependent on the Middle East supplies, obtaining almost 100 per cent of her consumption from Kuwait, Iran, and Iraq.,

Lastly, the breakdown of the outputs in the Persian Gulf and Khuzistan fields by percentages, going north through the Suez Canal or those going south of it, was about 64 and 36 per cent respectively. Applying this figure to our estimate of the outputs of these regions, we should expect about 75 million tons of the 116 million exported to move through the Canal. As can be seen from our estimates, if *all* of the Levant's output went to Western Europe, at least 60 million of the required 100 million tons would have to be drawn from the Persian Gulf area.

4. *Location and Other Strategic Considerations.* The Middle East lies squarely across all lines of movement between Western Europe, East Africa, and Asia, except that which goes around the Cape of Good Hope: therein lies the basic fact of its locational importance today. The lines of movement of oil reveal that there are two nodal points of political significance to the West where the threats to an interruption of the movement to petroleum to Europe are greatest: (1) the Suez Canal, and (2) Syria.

a. *Suez.* The nature of the Suez Canal as an important nodal point in the movement of oil to Europe has been peculiarly topical in the last few months. Before Nasser's action of premature nationalization a tonnage of about 135 million per year of all types moved through Suez, over twice the amount moved as recently as 1948. Tonnage and number of ships moving in both directions is roughly the same, since tankers return to the Gulf carrying ballast. More than 65 per cent of the ships using the Canal and about 70 per cent of the northbound tonnage are directly concerned with petroleum movement. Origins and destinations of cargo and ballasted ships in both directions is given in Table 9:

Table 9 \*14

*Direction of Suez Traffic, 1955*

<i>To and From</i>	<i>Percentage*</i>	<i>Amounts</i>
Persian Gulf, Red Sea, Aden	65%	87.75 M tons
India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Burma	11	14.85
Malaya, East Indies, Far East	14	18.90
East Africa	7	9.45
North America	12	16.20

\* Does not add to 100 because of duplication

The dominance of the oil traffic is brought out quite clearly here. It would be even greater if the traffic reflecting the indirect support of oil operations in other parts of the world were included.

Britain is most dependent upon the Canal for her oil. Of the 75 million tons of oil moved north through the Canal in 1955, Britain received about 23.5 million tons, or about one-third. But both France and Italy are substantial users of oil from the Persian Gulf area. As we have seen, our analysis of the last section would have led us to expect about 75 million tons of Persian Gulf and Khuzistan oil to move through the Canal, most of it bound for Western Europe.

Using London to the Persian Gulf as a representative trip for the Western European oil traffic, and assuming tanker speed of 14.5 knots with 4 days for loading and discharging:

1. A round trip over the 6,400 miles via Suez takes 37 days;
2. A round trip over the 11,300 miles via the Cape takes 65 days;
3. A tanker can make 9 trips a year via Suez;
4. A tanker can make 5.3 trips a year via the Cape.

Since the world's tanker fleet as of January 1, 1955 was 2,696

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\*14 The Economist, August 4, 1956, p. 420.

ocean-going vessels totalling 37,823,000 deadweight tons. The average tanker has a deadweight of about 14,000 tons. Using a coefficient to reduce to cargo deadweight, of .75, we obtain an effective carrying capacity per ship of 10,500 measurement tons. When we convert this to short tons we obtain a capacity of 11,760 short tons per ship.

The relationship between tonnage landed, number of ships used, average cargo deadweight, and length of haul is given below:

$$\text{Tonnage landed} = \text{Number of ships} \times \text{Average cargo deadweight} \times \text{Number of trips per year.}$$

Since about 65,000,000 tons of oil go through the Suez to Western Europe, we can solve for the number of tankers needed by substituting:

$$65,000,000 \text{ tons} = X \times 11,760 \times 9$$

$$X = 614 \text{ ships, or about } 22 \text{ per cent of world tanker capacity.}$$

This estimate is based upon the assumption that at least 35 million tons of petroleum and products can be based on the Levant's output from pipelines.

If, however, the Suez Canal were closed to Persian Gulf oil, and all of it bound for Europe had to be transported around the Cape, the reduction in the number of trips per year to 5.33 would increase the number of tankers needed to:

$$X = 1,036 \text{ ships, or about } 38 \text{ per cent of world tanker capacity.}$$

Thus, the closing of the Canal would be equivalent to reducing the world's tanker fleet by 422 ships, or by about 15 per cent.

On an emergency basis, substantial help could be rendered by the United States in substituting Western Hemisphere oil for Persian Gulf. A Middle East Emergency Committee of 13 oil companies in the United States was formed to pool tankers and storage in August, 1956, to meet any emergency which might

arise if the Canal were closed to European-bound oil. But the long-run solution could not very likely lie in this direction from the economic point of view: expansions in these lines would have tremendous effects upon the balance of payments of Europe, substantially undoing the progress made by the Europeans in reducing their dollar gap. The increased dollar payments would have to come from United States gifts and grants, and these would reverse the movements made since 1951. Moreover, although the Committee has plans to use tankers more efficiently in such emergencies, the increased need for tankers would not be averted.

It seems to the writer that the major effect upon the strategic abilities of the West, which would result from closure of the Suez Canal, lies in the reducing the effectiveness of the tanker fleet. In the event of war with Russia, in which nuclear bombing took place, the Middle East oil fields will be neutralized, either by action against the production or nodal transportation points. In the event of war with Russia without the use of such weapons it is still doubtful whether the NATO nations could hold these fields against the strength of Russia in near proximity and be able to bomb with conventional weapons. On the other hand, it would be extremely difficult for Russia, if she gained control of the production, to move it over the extremely difficult terrain into Russia: the building of pipelines would involve tremendous engineering difficulties, and the United States and British navies could effectively block the Gulf and Mediterranean. Once again, then, Middle East oil would be neutralized.

It is, however, in the limited type of war that the Suez Canal closure would have important repercussions along the lines we have been discussing. No other nation other than Russia can interdict the Mediterranean to NATO, nor could it seriously challenge control of Middle East oil fields. Imposing the longer trips upon NATO would materially reduce an already short supply of tankers for the projection of military power to foreign shores, as well as, to haul the increased supplies of petroleum always needed

when war occurs. The jet airplane consumes about five times the gallonage of fuel as conventional types, haulage of which would put extreme demands upon the limited tanker fleet at times when domestic demand soars for war purposes. The chairman of the Federal Maritime Board has recently stated that tanker capacity would be in short supply in the event of war. A limited war, of greater extent than Korea, might cause serious inroads indeed, into such free world tanker capacity.

The second major reduction in strategic capacity, which a closure of the Canal might effect, the writer believes, is in the economic sector of NATO's life. These countries are already wrestling with the problems of implementing strategies within strictly limited budgets. To impose the increased costs of oil brought round the Cape or from America upon them would be to hurt their practicable strategic capacity.

In the longer run, certain solutions to these problems present themselves. First, the increasing use of the super-tanker tends to make the Cape trip more economical than the present charges of \$1.26 per ton Suez net, a little larger than net British-registered tonnage, with cargo, and fifty-seven cents in ballast. But over the next ten years no substantial help can be expected when the expected increase in absorption of Middle East oil by Western Europe is taken into account. The fact that at least half of the world's reserves lie in this region, reinforces the economic reasons for not increasing dependence upon American sources. The alternative that jumps to one's consideration, then, is to by-pass the Canal in some way to get to the Gulf, and the only feasible method, of course, is by pipeline. But this brings us to our second nodal point of political significance.

b. *Syria*. A glance at the map will reveal that if access via Egypt is omitted from consideration, only four nations can give access to the Mediterranean to Khazistan, northern Iraq, and Persian

Gulf oil: *Turkey, Syria, Lebanon, and Israel*. A second glance will reveal that the present pipeline system, gives a throttling grip potentially as great as that given Egypt by control of the Suez node, to Syria. Since the two presently operating lines—IPC's northern branch and Tapline — cross Syria and one of the two termini of the first lies in that nation. This potential strangulation is most threatening to Iraq since its northern fields do not have at the present outlets to the Gulf, so that most of its crude except for small amounts refined for local consumption, moves over the pipelines. On the other hand, Tapline is presently sending only one-third of its crude over the pipeline, marketing the remainder through the Gulf. But if Suez were closed, Aramco's relative two-route competition would substantially disappear.

The only alternative IPC now has is the ill-fated southern branch of the pipeline, which avoids Syria by using Jordan. However, the line stops at the Israeli border, for it had been intended to terminate it at the large Haifa refinery in one of the best harbors of the Levant. Needless to say, both politically and at present even physically this is no alternative.

Lebanon also has a strong bargaining position with both IPC and Aramco since it contains, at Beirut and Sidon, the termini to the companies lines. However, the existence of a Syrian alternative to the first, and of a Suez and Gulf alternative to the second, gives it considerably less maneuvering ability than Syria.

(SEE PLATE 3)

It is to be expected that the political nodal locations afforded Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan would be exploited, just as it is almost inevitable that if Suez remains in the hands of Egypt that nodal position will be exploited. This is particularly true because of the ironic fact of petroleum distribution that little of it has yet been found in those countries which could best use its proceeds in economic development. Consequently, these nations

feel quite justified in taxing the flow through their territories. At the present time, the IPC has agreements in force with Syria which share on a 50-50 basis with that government the money saved on transporting crude petroleum by pipeline instead of by tanker via Suez; Lebanon has signed a similar agreement with Tapline, with the exception that the one-half must be shared among two other transit lines. However, Lebanon is now attempting to pressure IPC by a law threatening heavy taxation retroactive to 1952 or confiscation. Her bargaining position is considerably weakened by the fact that IPC can withhold a planned 9 million-ton increase in throughput and send it through Syria — an illustration of the weaker bargaining position she finds herself in when compared with Syria.

Some difficulties have already manifested themselves in the Syrian sector. The support given Israel after 1948 led the Arab League to oppose the extension of American interests in the Middle East. The refusal of Syria to ratify an agreement to allow passage of Tapline to Lebanon caused construction to be suspended for a full year, and the company almost abandoned the project. The agreement was concluded speedily, however, when it was learned that Egypt was quietly attempting to obtain an Egyptian terminus for it, and work was resumed in 1949.

Two more instances of political interferences with pipelines throughput concern actions of Iraq. The Arab-Israeli war broke out in the midst of constructing the southern branch of the IPC line. Iraq refused to allow any of her oil to be sent to Haifa, at the same time she was agitating to obtain more production, and, therefore, at a serious financial loss to herself. To this date she has maintained this opposition, and Israel's Haifa refinery is forced to import costly crude from Venezuela. Another instance of Iraq's interference with pipeline construction, concerns the proposed Mepline project, or Middle East Pipeline, intended to open up Kuwait's Gulf oil to a Syrian port and refinery at Tartus. Iraq refused to allow passage on the basis that its own oil fields

were not being called upon to produce enough oil, and made her acceptance conditional upon another pipeline from the Kirkuk fields to the Levant. The Mepline project was shelved.

These nationalistic considerations are becoming increasingly complicated, of course, as the Arab-Israeli dispute and the natural rivalries of Middle East nations become more entangled in the rising forces of Arab nationalism and Russian influence in the area. The Soviet Union has grasped the realities of the Middle East petroleum situation by focussing its attention upon two nations: Egypt and Syria. The latter has been assured of Russian backing and offered Russian arms. It contains the least stable government in the Middle East, dominated at the present time by the Army and a Social Resurrection party, both pro-Egyptian and Pan-Arab, with a shaky governmental coalition in power. Communist influence is stronger here than in any other nation in the area. On the other hand, Iraq has moved closer to the West in the Baghdad Pact, frightened as she has been of Russian invasion, particularly since the departure of the British Ismailia garrison, desirous as she is of concentrating her energies upon economic development, and lacking, as she does, a common frontier with Israel. Saudi Arabia forms the third of the Egypt-Syria-Arabia bloc which finds Jordan wedged between her family ties to Iraq, her anti-Israeli interests and popular feeling, and her needed \$30,000,000 subsidy from Britain. Quite apart from the natural wariness of foreign investment under such conditions, purely strategic considerations would militate against the expansion of pipeline facilities. Although the threat to Suez might seem to argue for their expansion, it is when such threat exists that the bargaining power of the transit nations really increases and becomes most dangerous. Moreover, any action against a Nasser must take into account the possibility of the joint military command of Egypt-Syria-Saudi Arabia cutting off the Levant sources as well as Suez. Thus, further extensions along these routes seem doubtful.

The alternative nation on the Mediterranean does exist, however. With Iraq as solidly in the Western camp as can be expected, the project now being considered is to link the Kirkuk-Mosul fields with Turkey, bypassing Syria, and terminating at Iskanderun. The major objection to this is the cost of extending the line through extremely mountainous terrain, particularly inside Turkey.

Given the gravity and unpredictability of the political situation in the Middle East, and given that we are correct in believing that the major strategic threat to Western nations in times of war, lies in the increased need for a limited tanker fleet which it entails, a more rational approach seems to be in extending the use of the so-called supertanker. Pipelines are the most immobile of transport media, peculiarly subject to blackmailing and confiscation, not to mention shutdown. Tankers, on the other hand, possess a flexibility without which, for example, the gap left by the closing of Abadan could not have been filled so quickly. From the viewpoint of the foreign owner of capital, as well as from the Western nations' ability to meet potential threats arising from the spatial structure of Middle Eastern oil, an increase in the tanker fleet seems the medium-term answer. Also, this involves the creation of a bargaining tool with the controllers of nodal points in the oil structure which could be invaluable in keeping them open. And, lastly, such action would merely further the increasingly attractive use of the super-tanker which actually can make the trip around the Cape at least as cheaply as through Suez, although perhaps not so cheaply as by pipeline to the Levant and tanker beyond.

5. *Summary and Conclusions.* I have attempted to focus attention upon the two resources which the Middle East possesses which are most relevant to the international power struggle: petroleum and location. To do so, I have had to present a study of the spatial structure of the petroleum industry in this area, focussed upon nodal points of shipping and refining. It is difficult to escape

the conclusion that Western Europe is so dependent upon this oil and will become increasingly so in the future that United States and NATO strategy must take all possible steps to guarantee the continuance of its flow. Some of the considerations most relevant in this strategic appraisal have been presented.

## BIOGRAPHIC SKETCH

### Professor Robert E. Kuenne

After serving with the United States Army from 1943 to 1946, Professor Kuenne attended the University of Missouri and received his B. J. degree there in 1947. The next two years he attended Washington University at St. Louis, Missouri, where he received his B. A. and M. A. degrees in Economics.

He was an instructor at Washington University during the summers of 1949 through 1952. From 1951 to 1953, he was a Teaching Fellow in the Department of Economics at Harvard University, and received his A. M. and Ph. D. degrees.

Professor Kuenne was an instructor in Economics at Harvard University from 1953 to 1955. The following year, he was Visiting Assistant Professor of Economics at the University of Virginia. At the present time, he is Assistant Professor of Economics at Princeton University, where he has been on leave during the first term of Academic Year 1956-1957 to act as Consultant on Economics at the Naval War College.

## RECOMMENDED READING

The evaluation of books listed below include those recommended to resident students of the Naval War College. Officers in the fleet and elsewhere may find these of interest.

The listing herein should not be construed as an endorsement by the Naval War College; they are indicated only on the basis of interesting, timely, and possibly useful reading matter.

Many of these publications may be found in ship and station libraries. Books on the list which are not available from these sources may be obtained from one of the Navy's Auxiliary Library Service Collections. These collections of books available for loan to individual officers are maintained in the Bureau of Naval Personnel; Headquarters ELEVENTH, FOURTEENTH, FIFTEENTH Naval Districts; and Commander Naval Forces, Marianas, Guam. Requests for the loan of these books should be made by the individual to the nearest Auxiliary Library Service Collection (see Article C9604, Bureau of Naval Personnel Manual, 1948).

- Title: *Southeast Asia in Perspective.* 309 p.
- Author: King, John Kerry. New York, The Macmillan Co., 1956.
- Evaluation: Doctor King's thesis is that greatly increased technical and economic aid by the United States, without attached conditions and on a long-term basis, is necessary to counter communism in the existing power vacuum in Southeast Asia. He considers it vital that the area be denied to communism and that the various countries be so subsidized and aided that immediate and significant economic improvements may be achieved under stable economic conditions. The relative weakness of local economics and political institutions as they now exist are examined in detail, as is the communist strategy of ideological, political and commercial infiltration. The overriding importance of the issues of colonialism to the peoples of the area is demonstrated conclusively. The author concludes that present American emphasis on indigenous

military power is inadequate, that our military policy of massive retaliation is inapplicable to the containment and defeat of communism in the area, and that long-term socio-economic assistance on a greatly increased scale is essential and in the best interest of the United States. In addition to such assistance, he recommends that we establish publicly an unequivocal position against colonialism and all its aspects.

Title: *American Defense and National Security*. 202 p.

Author: Stanley, Timothy W. Washington, D. C., Public Affairs Press, 1956.

Evaluation: Mr. Stanley has admirably accomplished his stated purpose of his work: "... to objectively trace the evolutionary pattern of our defense and national security structure and describe the present structure processes and people — and the interrelationships between them — as factually and as concisely as possible." The book is divided into three parts. First, there is an excellent treatment of Coordinating for National Security, at the Executive level, including an hypothetical example of the process of arriving at a high-level politico-military policy decision. The second section treats with the Department of Defense, its origins, structure, powers, and problems. Included in this section is another hypothetical case, and its treatment, involving a uniform policy determination in the field of administration. Part Three consists of Appendices, Comparative Notes on British Defense Organization, The National Security Act, The Reorganization Plan #6, and The Functions Paper. The author studiously avoids value judgements, and is meticulous in presenting the arguments for both sides of each controversy mentioned. The main value of the book lies, for the Naval Officer, in its being a complete collection between two covers of digests of the Organization for National Security, and the trials and tribulations that have beset that organization. The value of the book is further enhanced by a formidable mass of source references, and a comprehensive bibliography.

Title: *Arms and Men*. 382 p.

Author: Millis, Walter. New York, G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1956.

Evaluation: *Arms and Men* is a study of American military history. While necessarily brief in covering so broad a field it gives one, nevertheless, a better understanding of the complexities, perplexities and exasperating inconsistencies

of United States military policy. The key to the book lies in the last paragraph of the foreword: "Is it possible, by retraversing the history of American military institutions in the light of the newer attitudes, to shed any illumination upon the extraordinarily difficult, the seemingly insoluble, military problems which confront the nation today?" The work which follows is an experimental attempt to answer that question.

- Title: *Mid-East: World-Center.* 386 p.
- Author: Anshen, Ruth Nanda, ed. New York, Harper & Bros., 1956.
- Evaluation: A survey of the social and economic factors leading to a better understanding of the Mid-East complex. It consists of twenty short articles on that part of the world. Some of the writings furnish a detailed historic, and even pre-historic, background of the area. Chapter VI deals with the strategic importance of the area, and Chapter VIII is a commentary on the variations of political behavior in the Middle East countries. A very interesting chapter, and probably the one which might offer the reader the most food for thought is the one entitled *Communism and Islam*, by Bernard Lewis. Here, the author endeavors to analyze those features of life in the world of Islam which might provide fertile ground for the growth of communism. He points out some uncomfortably close resemblances between communism and Islam, but he also indicates that Islam is still *the* religion for the great mass of its believers; that communism cannot be a religion, and its adherents would have great difficulty in imposing their atheist creed upon pious Muslims.

- Title: *Target: The World.* 362 p.
- Author: Kirkpatrick, Evon M., ed. New York, The Macmillan Co., 1956.
- Evaluation: *Target: The World* is a report on Communist propaganda activity, as a component of their global strategy, during the year 1955 and into 1956. Missing, however, is coverage of North America. It shows how propaganda is employed, how tactics are changed in order to achieve established objectives, how propaganda is prepared and slanted for each area, the many means employed for spreading propaganda, emphasis placed upon it and the funds allocated. To fully understand Communist strategy is to understand this all-important component — PROPAGANDA. Characteristic of the year 1955 was the "softer" approach; e.g., the signing of the Austrian Peace Treaty and the meeting

at the "Summit." Everyone concerned or interested in Communist strategy must fully understand this component — PROPAGANDA — a powerful weapon.

- Title:** *The Big Thaw.* 275 p.
- Author:** Sulzberger, C. L. New York, Harper & Brothers, 1956.
- Evaluation:**

A comprehensive view of the entire Soviet empire in the post-Stalin period up to mid-1956, with emphasis on co-existence, Titoism, and the opportunities available to Western policy. After an appraisal of coexistence and the Russian "new look," with its degradation of Stalin and the "cult of the individual," the author leads the reader through a very interesting and revealing tour of the Soviet orbit from one end to the other. Each satellite is examined in turn, with special attention to Yugoslavia and Titoism, and with a thorough assessment of communism's progress in the Middle East and Central Asia. The compelling demands and opportunities for imagination, flexibility, and audacity in Western policy are analyzed convincingly. A challenge is thrown out to the West to encourage and assist, politically and economically, Titoist deviation and a feasible degree of national independence in the satellites, while realistically appreciating the enduring objectives of Leninism. Mr. Sulzberger, foreign affairs columnist of *The New York Times*, writes in a newspaperman's informal style with liberal use of personal observations, quotations, and humor. This book is a comprehensive, short course in current Soviet communism and imperialism — its progress, its strengths and weaknesses, and its challenge to the United States and the West.

- Title:** *The War Potential of Nations.* 310 p.
- Author:** Knorr, Klaus. Princeton, N. J., Princeton University Press, 1956.

- Evaluation:** War potential, as conceived in this volume, is the stuff from which military strength can be mobilized in time of war or national emergency. Its principal components are not only industrial capacity but, equally important, the administrative skill with which it is managed as Knorr so aptly describes it. Together, these two elements to a very great degree determine the share of the national economy which is to be available for producing military power. Political scientists, sociologists, psychologists, historians and economists will find their methods and researches combined in this examination of factors which

should be considered in evaluating war potential. The concept thus worked out provides the student of international politics and of military policy with a valuable tool for understanding the role of power in the present age. Throughout his study, Professor Knorr has used historical data for the sole purpose of developing insights into the kinds of conditions to which the practical student of war potential must pay heed. The framework and conclusions which have thus emerged can be of help in the estimate of actual situations and should reduce the need for resort to intuitive judgement in questions of potential capacity.

## PERIODICALS

- Title:** *The Question of Defining Aggression.*
- Author:** Sanders, William
- Publication:** THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN, November 5, 1956, p. 731-735.
- Annotation:** A statement on the complexities and problems of defining aggression made by the United States representative on the Special Committee on the Question of Defining Aggression.
- Title:** *A Warning to Russia.*
- Publication:** U. S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, November 30, 1956, p. 30-32, 35.
- Annotation:** An interview with General Lauris Norstad, U. S. A. F., Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, on NATO defense capabilities.
- Title:** *Protecting Bases Against Erosion.*
- Author:** Saundby, Sir Robert, Air Marshal
- Publication:** AEROPLANE, October 26, 1956, p. 622-624.
- Annotation:** Points out three vital national interests that Britain must protect if she is to survive, and how the loss of overseas bases threaten these interests. Importance of Suez to these vital interests is stressed.
- Title:** *What Suez Left Behind: A Traffic Jam on the World Sea Lanes.*
- Publication:** BUSINESS WEEK, November 17, 1956, p. 36-38.
- Annotation:** Discusses current ocean shipping problems — the rising

freight rates and the lack of shipping, particularly tankers, in relation to the closing of the Suez Canal.

Title: *The U. N. — Illusions and Realities.*

Author: Lodge, Henry Cabot, Jr.

Publication: THE NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE, November 18, 1956, p. 9, 70-73.

Annotation: Discusses the capabilities and the limitations of the United Nations in dealing with international problems.

Title: *The Task of Waging Peace.*

Author: Dulles, John Foster

Publication: THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN, November 5, 1956, p. 695-699.

Annotation: An address by the Secretary of State on October 27, in which he discusses current problems in American foreign policy.

Title: *The Words That Jolted the Kremlin.*

Publication: U. S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, November 23, 1956, p. 34.

Annotation: Reprints General Gruenther's answers to the Russian threat to Britain and France, in which he warned Soviet leaders that such action would lead to their destruction.