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**NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
REVIEW**

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SPIRIT OF THE OFFENSIVE

A lecture delivered
at the Naval War College
on 15 June 1955 by
Honorable Charles S. Thomas,
Secretary of the Navy

Admiral McCormick, Admiral Yarnell, Distinguished Guests, Ladies and Gentlemen, Members of the Graduating Class of the Naval War College:

To speak at a Naval War College graduation ceremony is certainly both an opportunity and at the same time a challenge.

It is an opportunity in the sense that this carefully selected group of graduates will now move to new and important duty stations throughout the Navy and Marine Corps, some of you to command ships, stations or squadrons; others to assume key billets in Washington, overseas and elsewhere. Thus, it is a chance to try and say something timely and helpful that perhaps can be carried to every ship and station of the Navy and Marine Corps.

Whenever I address myself primarily to the Navy and the Marine Corps (because this is the Naval War College), everything that I say applies to our friends of the Army, the Air Force, and the Coast Guard who are members of this graduating class. I would like to say here that I was the Assistant Secretary of Defense before I became the Secretary of the Navy, and I served intimately with the Air Force and the Army. I think I have just as many friends in the Air Force and in the Army as I have in the Navy and the Marine Corps, and I have just as much respect and affection for your Services as I have for the Navy.

In choosing a subject, today, I have purposely avoided one in the realm of strategy and tactics or logistics, because I know

that you are surfeited on these subjects and that you are just graduating from a very heavy program related to these particular fields.

Instead, I want to speak to you this morning on a theme which I consider paramount to the Navy and the Marine Corps (and that also goes for the other Services, too) — one which has been their traditional motivating force for almost two centuries and one which will be critically important in the eventful days which lie ahead: "The Spirit of the Offensive."

The spirit of the offensive, so characteristic and so much a part of the tradition of the U. S. Navy and the U. S. Marine Corps, is an illusive and abstract quality, hard to define and difficult to describe, but nonetheless vital and meaningful. For this unseen, yet very real, offensive spirit — the will to win — has made the United States Navy the greatest sea-fighting organization in the history of navies. And if ever there was a military organization suffused with the offensive spirit, I think you will all agree that it is the U. S. Marine Corps.

The offensive spirit has been a vital part of the Navy's and Marine Corps' heritage from the very beginning. I would like to briefly trace the development of this offensive spirit and to show how a rich inheritance has come down to you in direct and recognizable steps from the past to the present.

It was born on a moonlight night in 1779 aboard the foundering hulk of a poor sailing merchantman in the unconquerable spirit of a young naval captain, John Paul Jones. The sea battle he fought had little historical significance and less military value. Even his epic battle cry has been perfumed for history. What was significant and lasting was his gift of the offensive spirit, the indomitable drive for victory.

Aboard the *Bon Homme Richard* that historical evening was an officer whom Jones described as his only competent one —

a man caught up and captured by his captain's invincible spirit — Lieutenant Richard Dale.

It was Dale, you may recall, when some 200 captured British sailors were inadvertently released from the hold, who courageously herded them to the pumps to keep the sinking *Richard* afloat.

Twenty-two years later, Dale was Commodore of a naval squadron which sailed into Tripoli to curb the corsairs of the Barbary Coast. One of his captains was William Bainbridge. Bainbridge was a beneficiary of the original Jones legacy and a creator of the offensive spirit. He was later to command the *Constitution* when she conquered *Java*. During the war with the Barbary States, Captain Bainbridge's first lieutenant was an intrepid gentleman named Stephen Decatur. It was the bold offensive spirit of the aggressive Decatur in Tripoli Harbor in 1804 that resulted in the destruction of the captured *Philadelphia*, a feat which Lord Nelson described as the most daring achievement of the age.

Also serving with Captain Bainbridge was another lieutenant named David Porter. Porter, you will remember, had earlier served as a midshipman aboard the *Constellation* when that frigate captured the *Insurgente* in the most notable action of the naval war with France. In 1814, David Porter was commanding the *Essex* when she made that bold and remarkable raid into the Pacific — the First American man-of-war ever to enter that ocean. Aboard the *Essex* was a lad of only twelve who had been sponsored as a midshipman by a Commodore Porter. The offensive spirit was to be this youth's inheritance. In the battle against two British men-of-war, Porter reported the excellent bravery and conduct of that twelve year old boy. The lad's name was David Glasgow Farragut.

I know all of you are well acquainted with Admiral Farragut's bold offensive spirit; how he accepted grave risks to achieve

a notable victory during the Civil War. But I wonder if you know that one of the officers who served with Farragut in those days was a youthful lieutenant named George Dewey. Dewey was later to say, "Farragut has always been my ideal."

It was Dewey's offensive spirit that won the resounding Battle of Manila Bay and that, too, is well known to you. But I wonder if you know that in 1902, when Admiral Dewey was making his final cruise, that one of the ensigns who served with him was named Ernest J. King. King also served as an aide to Admiral W. S. Sims, who led our Navy during World War I.

I am also sure you know (many of you personally and from first-hand contact) of Admirals King's aggressive spirit of the offensive. His drive and determination were reflected and reinforced by Admiral Nimitz and further reflected by Admiral Halsey, with whom Admiral Carney served so long, and by Admiral Mitcher, whose Chief of Staff was Admiral Burke, who is here with us today.

You, then, are the inheritors of a rich and remarkable legacy of naval heritage, this spirit of the offensive. The same legacy can be traced in Marine Corps history from the Revolutionary War to Korea; it can also be traced in the other Services' history. It will be your responsibility to preserve it and pass it on in the same manner it has been given to you.

Let us examine and dissect this all-important inheritance. Why has our Navy been blessed with it and many other navies have not? Why do we still have it while some other navies have lost it? And exactly what is this spirit of the offensive?

First of all, it is the spirit of youthfulness — not youth, necessarily, but always the spirit of youthfulness. It is an attitude which can reckon the cost and which can strike a total of pro's and con's; it is a calculating spirit tempered by prudence and sobered by reasonable caution. But the spirit of the offensive is never shackled or weakened by any one of these. It is a willingness

to take calculated risks for victory; it is a spirit of dedication and selflessness which thinks more about victory than it does about numbers or sizes; it is the spirit which thinks more of duty and service than rights and benefits. It is the spirit which never becomes obsessed by what has been aptly called "the distorting prism of pure arithmetic." It is the spirit which refuses to be awed by mere numbers, the greater size of an enemy force, or dispirited by any atomic equation.

The spirit of the offensive is an aggressive spirit but not a belligerent one. It is not one which starts wars; but once started, wins them. It is a spirit of initiative, of innovation, and of experimentation. It is not a spirit of continuously following the book, and asking, "What's my authority?"; but rather it is a spirit which solves its own problems. It is a spirit based on confidence, knowledge and experience.

It is a spirit supported and guided by sensible doctrine. But the spirit of the offensive is not restricted by doctrine, for doctrine can often be deadly. You must have it and you must use it but it must never command you, only guide you. The offensive-spirited naval officer must know doctrine and he must know *why* it is doctrine. But he must also know when to discard doctrine, when to think for himself and when to strike out on his own.

But, most important of all, the spirit of the offensive is the spirit which says that *nothing less than victory is acceptable*.

Who creates and who perpetuates this spirit of the offensive? The answer to that is the real leaders. I have already mentioned a few of the many leaders in the Navy's past who created this intangible spirit of the offensive. There are many others who create it today, some of you sitting here. Those who make it may be unconscious that they are doing so. It is created and perpetuated mainly by commanding officers, those of your rank and service, the officers who command ships and squadrons, those who daily and directly deal with our men.

But every officer in the Navy and Marine Corps can and should perpetuate and practice this spirit of the offensive because it is so important to a vigorous and victorious Navy and Marine Corps and so vital to the security and safety of our country.

First of all, it confers several advantages. It often confers the inestimable advantage of surprise. It usually confers the important factor of initiative. And it always confers the psychological advantage of knowing that somehow, in some way, victory will be achieved.

In actual fact, our Navy and Marine Corps traditional offensive spirit has always enabled us to carry the fight to the enemies' shores rather than having to fight them on our own. In the atomic age now upon us the offensive spirit will be still more important, for the seas have taken fresh and increased importance as the highroads for carrying the battle to an aggressor's territory. War in the future, if it ever unfortunately comes, will never be won by staying at our bases, sitting in our foxholes or manning a fixed defense line.

Finally, how can we maintain the spirit of the offensive? This precious spirit can be lost and it can become rusty and neglected. It can be nurtured in time of war, but it can be easily lost in time of peace. Like a handful of sand, it can imperceptibly slip away.

Today, our Navy is experiencing an evolution of a magnitude never before known in its history. In the short space of ten years since the end of World War II naval warfare has encompassed nuclear weapons, jet and rocket power for supersonic speeds, guided missiles, atomic propulsion, helicopters, jet seaplanes and true submersibles. The age of automation and electronics is well advanced. Future years will undoubtedly add to this array of almost magic equipment.

In this turbulent period, therefore, we must not allow this all-important spirit of the offensive to be lost or become rusty. Rather, it must permeate our planning, our doctrine, and our engineering designs as well as our strategy and tactics.

We can maintain this spirit of the offensive in several ways. First of all, and most important of all, by aggressive foresighted leadership, the kind which is never self-satisfied by its condition or readiness. It can be kept by education, self-study and self-criticism, such as you gentlemen have been undergoing at the Naval War College. The offensive spirit can be fostered by a study of our naval history, which teaches the advantages of an offensive spirit and which transmits the inspiration and tradition of the past to those of the present and future. The spirit of the offensive can be maintained in our training programs, in our joint and combined exercises and in our practice cruises. It must be practiced in working ships, in planes which fly, in guns that shoot.

Most important of all, the spirit of the offensive can be perpetuated by the senior commanders of our Navy and Marine Corps exercising initiative in dealing with their juniors. The spirit can be fostered by selecting our future leaders with equal attention given to their future potential as to their past performance. Seniors must not merely *allow* the display of initiative, they must *encourage* and *demand* it. Encourage the junior officers to bring the ship alongside, to refuel, to replenish, to make the buoy. Encourage the junior aviators to lead the flight. Encourage new ideas, experimentation, and new approaches. The fear of being penalized for an honest mistake must not be permitted to stifle the offensive spirit.

Gentlemen, as you graduate this morning, take along with your diploma this priceless legacy of the offensive spirit, and remember that in your service life ahead it will be your personal responsibility to see that it is preserved and perpetuated.

Thank you very much!

BIOGRAPHIC SKETCH

**Honorable Charles S. Thomas,
Secretary of the Navy**

Secretary Thomas was born in Independence, Missouri, in 1897. He attended the University of California and Cornell University. In World War I, during his junior year at Cornell, Mr. Thomas joined the U. S. Naval Reserve as a Naval aviator. At the conclusion of his active service in 1919, he joined the George H. Burr Company, an investment house. In 1925, he became a partner and vice-president of George H. Burr, Conrad E. Broom, Inc. In 1932, Mr. Thomas became vice-president and general manager of Foreman & Clark, Inc., later becoming its president and a director in 1937.

In 1942, after the United States had entered World War II, Mr. Thomas was called to Washington, D. C., as a special civilian assistant to Artemus Gates, Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Air. A year later, he became special assistant to the Secretary of the Navy, James V. Forrestal. In that capacity, he set up the Navy's inventory control program and represented Mr. Forrestal in the Navy's logistic program. He was also concerned with procurement of aircraft. He is credited with initiating "incentive-type" contracts providing bonuses for saving on costs. He also developed a program for assigning trained negotiators to assist the Navy's contracting officers.

In early 1945, at the special request of Mr. Forrestal, Mr. Thomas made a 30,000 mile "morale and recreational survey" of the Navy's Pacific bases. For "outstanding service" in the field of Navy procurement and logistics, Mr. Thomas was decorated with the Distinguished Civilian Service Award and was awarded the Presidential Medal for Merit.

He resumed duties as president and director of Foreman and Clark in 1945. Mr. Thomas was airport commissioner for Los Angeles from 1945 to 1950 and concurrently served as the president of the eleventh region of the Navy League and vice-president of the Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce. His active participation

in local, state and national politics began in this period. From 1949 to 1952, Mr. Thomas was Chairman of the California Republican Finance Committee; he has also been a member of the National Finance Committee.

After taking office, President Eisenhower named Robert B. Anderson as Secretary of the Navy and nominated Mr. Thomas as Under Secretary of the Navy. Mr. Thomas became Assistant Secretary of Defense in charge of supply and logistics in 1953 and he was sworn in as Secretary of the Navy in May, 1954.

POLITICAL FACTORS IN NATIONAL STRATEGY

A lecture delivered
at the Naval War College
on 8 June by
Dr. Henry M. Wriston

A detailed consideration of the topic assigned would require a review so extensive that time would run out before the discussion was well begun. It is necessary, therefore, to approach the topic in very broad terms and try to establish some kind of frame of reference for more thorough consideration elsewhere.

The text for this approach is found in a remark of Prince Bismark, the architect of the German Empire. He said, "War should be conducted in such a way as to make peace possible." It is obvious that this is what might be called a statesman's paraphrase of the soldier's — Clausewitz's — aphorism that "War is nothing but a continuation of political activities with other means intermingled. We say with other means intermingled in order to maintain at the same time that these political activities are not stopped by the war, are not changed into something totally different, but are substantially continuous whatever means are employed How could it be otherwise? Do political relations between different peoples and governments cease when the exchange of diplomatic notes is interrupted?" If political activity were suspended, military victory would be utterly futile. "For the political aims are the end; the war is the means, and the means can never be conceived without the end."

These sentiments have become deeply imbedded in the textbooks, but not so deeply in public consciousness. I can well remember — as though it were yesterday — my first day's study of international law. It turned about a phrase which is a terse paraphrase of both Bismark and Clausewitz: "The object of war is peace." So compact and dogmatic a dictum startled me.

These expressions are deceptively clear, consistent, and harmonious. They might well give the impression that the statesman and the military strategist see eye to eye in matters of grand strategy. Upon occasion, of course, they do; nevertheless, there is an innate tension between the political and the military points of view that must ever be borne in mind.

The military objective is not only to impair the enemy's will to resist, but to destroy it. From a military point of view "unconditional surrender" is the truly satisfactory outcome. When that occurs there is a feeling that it is possible to say "mission accomplished" with more assurance than with any other outcome.

The objective of the politician, however, must be much less absolute. If he were to make unconditional surrender a political goal, and really mean it, true peace would be virtually impossible of attainment. Carried to its logical extreme such complete defeat would put an end to all political action until too late. It would not only lead to the destruction of the capacity and the will to resist, it would create a political vacuum. Historical experience shows that, when a political vacuum or even an approximation of it occurs, peace is out of the question.

What ensues is a dictated, not negotiated, course of action. Usually it means an occupation and alien rule. That is either a transient situation or it degenerates into imperialism. The longer an occupation is continued, the more serious and the more lasting are the basic resentments which are built up; they are certain to poison subsequent relationships. For the hard fact is that *in the long run* every peace is a negotiated peace; it must ultimately be satisfactory to the defeated if it is to survive and be more than a truce.

No one has ever expressed this idea with more pith and force than Prime Minister David Lloyd George. He sent a memorandum to President Wilson on March 25, 1919, in which he said: "You may strip Germany of her colonies, reduce her armaments

to a mere police force and her navy to that of a fifth-rate power; all the same in the end if she feels that she has been unjustly treated in the Peace of 1919, she will find means of exacting retribution from her conquerers." His words were indeed prophetic, yet they were not only neglected at the time, they were forgotten and the lesson they taught ignored. Only so could the idea of the of the "pastoralization" of Germany — reducing it to an agricultural economy — gain such great momentum during the Second World War.

Our relationship with Japan over the last ten years offers a pertinent illustration of the need for a peace satisfactory to the defeated. The surrender on the deck of the Missouri was as complete, and in that sense as satisfying, as any such event could be. Our occupation also was complete, and, as compared with other occupations, it was both efficient and benevolent. Moreover, it was not confused and bedeviled by divided responsibilities, shared too deeply with allies; to all intents and purposes it was completely in our hands.

It was by our decision that the Emperor retained his throne; it was by our will that the Constitution for the new Japan prohibited rearmament. What was the consequence? We created a military vacuum. Such a state of affairs could no more be expected to continue off the coast of Asia than it could be a satisfactory situation in the very heart of Europe. Now we have to reverse some fundamental policies in order to cure that unhealthy, indeed impossible, situation. It is now necessary to woo our recent enemy in order to make an ally. It is now necessary to rearm a nation to which we but lately forbade that right.

When such basic decisions, taken soon after the surrender, must be reversed within a decade, the wisdom of the original determination is inevitably called into question. It is also a reminder that for many reasons the moment of victory is brief, and the settlements made in that moment are brittle unless they are

satisfactory not superficially, but fundamentally and in the long run, to the defeated nation. The reason can be summed up in a few words: politics is continuous, while war, even a world war, is episodic.

Yet basic decisions must be made at the moment of victory, and should be well thought out before its attainment. The notion of a delay in such decisions during a "cooling-off period" has been advanced from time to time. Experience, however, shows the folly of such a concept. The delay does not cool off passions; they continue to rise, and the last state of the matter is worse than the first. The key to wise action is to determine political objectives in advance, and cling to them during the period of intoxication that victory brings.

No one in our history grasped the realities of this whole matter more firmly than George Washington. He was one of those rare individuals who was able to think both in military and in political terms, each in its appropriate setting. As he prepared to retire from the Presidency, he opposed extending the tie once so essential to our independence but by which France subsequently sought to make us a satellite; he sent Chief Justice John Jay to negotiate an unpopular treaty with Britain in order to ease the acute post-revolutionary tension with that nation; he established a new and sweeping concept of neutrality in 1793.

Then he set down in exceedingly compact form the philosophy which had guided the course of his diplomatic strategy: "permanent, inveterate antipathies against particular nations and passionate attachments for others should be excluded, and . . . in place of them just and amicable feelings toward all should be cultivated. The Nation which indulges toward another an habitual hatred or an habitual fondness is in some degree a slave. It is a slave to its animosity or to its affection, either of which is sufficient to lead it astray from its duty and its interest. Antipathy in one nation against another disposes each more readily to offer insult

and injury, to lay hold of slight causes of umbrage, and to be haughty and intractable when accidental or trifling occasions of dispute occur

“So, likewise, a passionate attachment of one nation for another produces a variety of evils. Sympathy for the favorite nation, facilitating the illusion of an imaginary common interest in cases where no real common interest exists, and infusing into one the enmities of the other, betrays the former into a participation in the quarrels and wars of the latter without adequate inducement or justification.” It would be difficult to express so profound a conviction in fewer words.

The key to his thought was complete absence of sentimentalism. He knew that our quarrel had been with the government, not with the people of Britain, and that, on the other hand, the French people would not sacrifice their interests to ours. The national interest — a rational, not an emotional, concept — ought to determine the course of action which the United States should follow.

The statements of Bismark and Clausewitz were designed to be applicable to war. But we should observe that, in the current state of world tensions, they are as pertinent to “cold war” as to a period of armed strife. This constitutes a very significant enlargement of their valid scope.

By extension, therefore, we can assert that the object of a cold war is peace. No American wants war as a way of life. Deeply imbedded in our historical consciousness is the belief in peace as the only sane course. We have no noted political philosopher who has argued with any conviction that war is better than peace, or that it is a biological or even a psychological necessity. That concept was essentially Germanic and became part of the Nazi and Facist ideology. Ludendorff repudiated Clausewitz: “War,” said he, “is the highest expression of the racial will to

life, and *politics must be subservient to the conduct of war.*" Robert Ley, leader of the Nazi Labor Front, put it tersely, "War is the blessing of God," and Nietzsche was equally blunt: "War and courage have done more things than charity." Such philosophical conclusions about war never made any headway whatever in the United States; indeed, the American aims in both world wars specifically repudiated these doctrines as inconsistent with our tradition and our faith.

Surely the argument as to the primacy of political objectives apply to cold war — and with perhaps even more pertinency, for cold war constitutes in some respects a greater strain. War tends to solidify a nation, and fighting draws out the innate heroism in men; it summons them to great tasks and great sacrifices. It has its dark side, which, in our tradition, seems much more significant, but no one should overlook its heroic aspect. Poets and dramatists have elaborated that theme from the age of Homer almost to the present day. Cold war, however, is more likely to divide than unite a nation; it summons men to no like heroism; there is no challenge to sacrifice everything — even life itself — to a great cause. Instead, cold war is a grim test of endurance, of moral and mental stamina, with few of the dramatic episodes which make battles into national sagas.

Nonetheless the objects of a fighting and of a cold war are the same — the simultaneous attainment of peace and the national interest. To put the matter bluntly, hot war and cold war are simply phases of national policy. National policy is continuous, but in varying circumstances it changes relative emphases, employs various implements, and summons different resources to attain its purpose. The differences between all-out war, cold war, and peace are in the degree to which various instruments are employed. There is no basic difference in kind. Arms and armaments are vital elements in every circumstance; always political policy is dominant and diplomacy, direct and indirect, is continuous.

Arms, it must be emphasized, are by no means idle during even a cold war. That is evidenced by the recent air clash over the sea off Korea. There are the uninterrupted construction of bases, the fabrication of new weapons, the energetic development of war plans, the unending operational cruises and flights, the testing by repeated war games.

Before turning to the specific application of these principles to the current situation, one or two other pertinent observations must be made regarding them. One such comment is inevitable; Bismarck's dictum is to some extent a counsel of perfection. For the most part he put his own doctrine into practice; he fought limited wars for limited objectives, and stopped fighting when those objectives were attained. In the war for Schleswig-Holstein and in the Austrian war he took pains not to be carried away by victory or to overshoot his objectives.

Nevertheless, in one fatal instance he went beyond the bounds of his own dogma. In the Franco-Prussian War he paraded his troops through Paris and proclaimed the new German Empire in the Palace at Versailles; in that instance he added humiliation to defeat. He also took Alsace-Lorraine, and exacted reparations beyond reason. By these excesses, which transgressed his own doctrine, he kindled the flames of resentment, stirred a passion for revenge, and made irredentism inevitable. He laid the foundations for a later war that was to impair — or even destroy — his lifetime of labor.

Historical perspective upon war as an instrument of national policy shows the difficulty inherent in Bismarck's effort to use limited force for well-defined ends. The truth is that force, when purposefully employed as an instrument of policy, almost always overshoots its objectives and produces situations so different from those forecast that the original objectives are lost to sight. The heat of battle generates its own new issues and so confuses perspective that, when the war is over, the peace almost

never conforms to the original goals. The longer the war is carried on, the greater the energies mobilized, the more bitter feeling becomes, the more original purposes are obscured, or even destroyed.

This is the complete and final answer to the argument for so-called "preventive war." The thesis upon which that enterprise is based depends upon projections or extrapolations of current trends. Such predictions are notoriously unreliable; they are based, of necessity, upon sketchy and incomplete data, upon estimates of dubious accuracy regarding the enemy. Moreover, they neglect all the multitude of forces that may at any time reverse present drifts.

Even more decisive in demonstrating the folly of the self-contradictory preventive war is the fact that when war is entered upon force is exalted as opposed to reason; and peace based on force is transient by nature. Only reason can attain the cherished goal of peace. While reason needs the support of force, it can use it most effectively when it is force-in-readiness rather than force-in-action.

The truth is that proponents of preventive war have become fatigued with the cold war. They want to seize the sword and cut the Gordian knot; they have neither the patience nor the persistence to reduce it by careful examination of its structure and by continuous effort to solve its complexities. There is nothing in all human experience that warrants either of the presumptions upon which the proposal for preventive war is based. We cannot predict the future with enough accuracy to justify the idea that we must act now or lose the game. Nor do we have any historical assurance that victory would attain the desired objective; the shape of the physical, economic, and political world might be so altered as to be unrecognizable.

In this discussion of preventive war, I have deliberately left out of account all moral considerations. That is not because they would not be decisive by themselves; it is because they are

unnecessary to an exposition of the folly of the proposal. Even if a preventive war could be "successful" in the objective sense, it is beyond belief that on moral grounds alone American public sentiment would tolerate the suggestion that we should start a war or incite a prospective enemy to do so.

The second observation is that, hard as application of Bismarck's aphorism proved to be under the best circumstances, it is still more difficult when alliances are involved. Bismarck was able to manipulate events to suit himself, as in his famous condensation of the Ems Dispatch to bring about a desired war. He could neglect the interests of allies; indeed, he used his Austrian ally in the war for the duchies of Schleswig-Holstein to lay the foundation for the war with Austria itself. If, under the most favorable conditions, his dictum is so difficult to obey in all its implications, how much harder it becomes when there are complex alliances.

Whatever one may think of the tact or even the morals of Richard Olney's famous boast regarding our relations with Latin America, it could be understood. He said the "fiat" of the United States "is law upon the subjects to which it confines its interposition. Why? . . . It is not simply by reason of its higher character as a civilized state, not because wisdom and justice and equity are the invariable characteristics of the dealings of the United States. It is because, in addition to all other grounds, its infinite resources combined with its isolated position render it master of the situation and practically invulnerable as against any or all other powers." In short, our position was then uncomplicated by any alliance; it was simplified by a long tradition based upon the Monroe Doctrine; it was fortified by the overwhelming power of the United States relative to that of the nations south of its border.

Alliances destroy all the simplicities which helped Bismarck attain the objective of a unified Germany and which long dominated the relationship of the United States with Latin America.

When there are allies, national policy must be modified to fit other national policies, which are superficially similar, but which nevertheless have fundamental historical and geopolitical differences. Sometimes alliances are called marriages of convenience. Like so many similes, that one conceals more than it reveals. An alliance is only a partial association and for limited purposes; its comparison with marriage is basically false and clouds our thinking.

When alliances become necessary — and I think few would challenge their present necessity — there is no possible room for a “flat”; Mr. Dulles could not paraphrase Olney about any spot in the world, even Formosa. Each act which implicates any of our allies must be shaped not only with our own national objective in mind; there must be equal attention to indirect and secondary effects upon the solidarity of the alliance.

We can observe this with great clarity when we think about Indo-China. The United States made contact with that area well over a century ago, but our interests were commercial and not colonial. It was in 1832 that we sent a roving diplomat — at six dollars a day — into the area. Little was known of the states in the region. Therefore, in his special passports the titles “appertaining to their majesties” were left blank, “those titles being unknown here.” But there was no such vagueness about his purpose. He was instructed to emphasize the superior virtues of the United States in dealing with countries of the East. “We never make conquests, or ask any nations to let us establish ourselves in their country as the English, the French, and the Dutch have done in the East Indies.”

In different language at different times that remained United States policy; it accounts for the reputation we long enjoyed of being anti-imperialists, and champions of freedom. Only as Communism under Russian and Chinese inspiration accelerated its processes of infiltration or subversion were we drawn into Indo-China as virtual receivers in bankruptcy of French colonialism in that region.

It is no secret that we have at no time been happy with French maneuvers there and it is no extravagance to say that they have at no time been happy with our intervention. This was revealed recently with extraordinary clarity in the statement of one of our high officials that alien domination of Vietnam is outdated, whether exercised from Washington or Paris or Cannes.

Yet, unsatisfactory as our relationship with the French has been in that whole area, it has been necessary for us in a hundred ways to adapt our action to French sensibilities. We have been obliged to consider the realities of the French relationship while striving to put an end to the anachronism of colonialism and give aid to the truncated nation in its effort to find means for governing itself. We regard it as highly important that it achieve such a degree of stability that the Communists will not have South Vietnam as a free gift in the plebiscite due to be held in the not distant future.

Meanwhile, we have to face the fact that our very interposition (despite its idealistic purposes of giving that people an opportunity to attain freedom and to organize their lives in accordance with plans which they draw for themselves) is nonetheless tainted by its association with the outmoded French imperialism. Consequently, what we gain by helping erect a barrier to Communism in that area is partially lost by the impairment of our traditional anti-imperialist position.

It does not help to denounce the blindness of some of the newer nations to the Communist menace. Their answer is that our thinking is obsessive, that we are egocentric and have Communism on the brain to such an extent that we do not see other problems which are pressing upon them more severely than Communist aggression. They are but lately released from colonialism. Their internal affairs are of prime importance — as ours were in 1793.

Most Americans now take the integrity of our national union so much for granted that they have forgotten with what

careful and persuasive argument Washington set forth its advantages, and sought to minimize the divisive forces which he could observe at work. They have forgotten, too, how he warned against "overgrown military establishments which, under any form of government, are inauspicious to liberty" — particularly in new and weak countries.

All these considerations, once so familiar to our forefathers, are now vitally important in the young, uncommitted nations. Moreover, their economics are disorganized and must be not only reoriented but vastly strengthened. Their people live on the very margin of subsistence and will not be patient with political policies or military expenditures which delay or postpone improvement of their standard of living.

The recent Bandung Conference should have taught us what India's behavior had already suggested. Many peoples newly independent have a genuine passion for freedom, one which parallels our own and should give us spiritual kinship with them. Nehru, Sir John Kotelawala, and others have shown not only verbal hostility but vigorous resistance to domestic Communism. So far as committing themselves to one power bloc or the other, however, their policies today are a virtual paraphrase of another section of Washington's Farewell Address: "Against the insidious wiles of foreign influence (I conjure you to believe me, fellow-citizens) the jealousy of a free people ought to be *constantly* awake, since history and experience prove that foreign influence is one of the most baneful foes of republican government. But that jealousy, to be useful, must be impartial, else it becomes the instrument of the very influence to be avoided, instead of a defense against it."

When we find the neutralism of the uncommitted nations as irksome as the world rivals found our neutrality in 1793, we may soothe our irritation by reflecting upon our own early history. We must, indeed, not only come to recognize the fact of uncommitted nations, but to be less annoyed by their interest in neutrality.

In his Christmas message at the end of last year the President said: "The times are so critical and the difference between these world systems so vital and vast that grave doubt is cast upon the validity of the neutralistic argument. *Yet we shall continue faithfully to demonstrate our complete respect for the right of self-decision by these neutrals.*"

The very weight of our power in the world — the fact that we are one of the two remaining dominant nations — makes every act of ours a focus of world-wide attention. Thus, when we appear recreant to our oft-professed faith, when tension amounting to rupture between our professions and practices seems to be developing, the attention of those recently freed from colonialism is focused upon current manifestations rather than upon remembrance of our anti-imperialist tradition. The nations of Asia and Africa not long ago released from colonial status now chafe when we exhibit patience with remnants of imperialism. I do not know a more dramatic, or, in a sense, a more painful illustration of the limitations upon freedom which are occasioned by an alliance than the manner in which we have had to adapt our behavior in unwelcome ways in the East because of the necessity to keep firm an essential alliance in the West.

Let us take another familiar example which demonstrates the way in which national policy — and therefore national strategy — is modified by an essential alliance. It is no secret that Sir Winston Churchill's often-expressed desire for a four-power conference "at the summit" was not shared by President Eisenhower. That a meeting is to be held this summer is due only partially to Soviet moves which seem to betoken a more reasonable spirit. It is true that the Russians have met, in form at least, one of the indispensable prerequisites established as part of the policy of the United States — an act of good faith by the Soviets. The Austrian treaty can be so interpreted, whether accurately or not remains to be seen.

Nevertheless, it is highly doubtful that, if the decision had rested solely with the United States, the President would have desired or even agreed to the meeting at this time. The strict limitations he put upon the duration of the conference, his insistence that it is not to arrive at substantive decisions but only set out a series of topics, and suggest methods by which the foreign ministers can deal with them, offer clear enough evidence to support the inference that the meeting is not wholly welcome. It was the fact of alliance which proved far more decisive in inducing our attendance than faith in the sincerity of Russian gestures.

It was as plain as a pikestaff that the French government was in no position to resist the pressure of domestic public opinion clamoring for the meeting. It was equally plain that with a general election on its hands the British cabinet would have run a grave political risk if it had declined to take advantage of even the slenderest chance to negotiate, though the "situation of strength" was neither so clear nor so decisive as might have been desirable.

The United States, under these circumstances, conceded something to the allies and agreed to the meeting. On the other hand, American public opinion is in no mood to sanction any effort at definition action by the heads of states at a hurried conference. Rightly or wrongly, Yalta has become a kind of symbol; though the circumstances of a meeting now would, in any case, preclude the kind of bargaining that went on there, no conference which remotely resembled it, even in form, would be palatable. It would be politically dangerous to agree to any meeting at which final decisions were to be made "at the summit." Therefore, the allies conceded to the United States such points as the duration and nature of the agenda of the conference. This was a characteristic compromise growing out of an alliance.

The fact of alliance in a sense dominates what is done in relation to another Far Eastern situation. The United States at

Cairo, as well as before and afterward, made profound commitments to Chiang Kai-shek. Upon American insistence and contrary to the judgment of the British, China under Chiang was treated not only as a great power but as *the* great power in Asia; for that reason it was given a permanent seat on the United Nation's Security Council. Looked at in the cold light of history, it is now clear that we were insisting upon a myth, indeed no pretense in so large a matter was ever proved more wrong more rapidly. Because our allies yielded to us, the flexibility of our policy in dealing with the realities in the Far East has been impaired ever since. The problem of recognizing Red China would have been less difficult if it had not involved the inheritance of a permanent seat on the Security Council where that government obviously does not belong.

After the sweeping Communist success, the British recognized the government of Mao Tse-tung as the government of China. They did this in accordance with the classic American position which may be said to be Jeffersonian in origin — that *de facto* is also *de jure*. To the British it seemed obvious, as it seems obvious to most of the world, that Mao does have *de facto* control of China. They regard it as unrealistic to deny the legal claim of the Reds to what they hold in fact, particularly since the predecessor government obtained its power also by revolutionary means.

Moreover, it now seems apparent that when the British extended recognition they did not do so in conscious opposition to American policy. In the first place recognition to them is a formal matter, "an acknowledgement of fact not a mark of approbation." Secondly, for reasons which may perhaps never be known precisely or at least not until many more documents are available than have yet been published, it seems clear that the British believed not only that the United States had no objection to their act but was likely to act in concert very soon. I do not know whether the British understanding in this matter was correct or due to a misinterpretation. There can be no doubt that

the difference in action did have the consequence of irritating Anglo-American relations, particularly at the level of public opinion, though this was neither intended nor anticipated by the British.

However that may be, the United States did not recognize Mao and on the ground that in modern times we have added a second qualification to *de facto* control — namely, that the government must have both the capacity and the will to discharge its international obligations. It has been our contention that whatever the capacity of the Red government, it has not shown any readiness to discharge its international obligations. We feel that our position has subsequently been validated by the action of the United Nations in denouncing Red China as an aggressor and by Chinese failure to observe the terms of the truce of Panmunjom and its holding of prisoners who should have been returned.

This series of circumstances has led the United States and Britain into positions which can be denounced as illogical and unrealistic. If it were not so desperately serious a matter there would be an element of farce in our treatment of the Nationalist Chinese on Formosa as a great power with a permanent seat on the Security Council. Is it any wonder that Nehru seeks to usurp the position of spokesman for Asia from the two contending parties? The British on their part because of their alliance with us cannot accept the logic of their recognition of Mao's government as the *de jure* government of China. They cannot press the logic of their position, namely that Red China should have the permanent seat in the Security Council and represent the country in the various organs of the United Nations. Thus the fact of alliance leads both Western nations into inconsistencies.

The difficulties are heightened because at the Cairo Conference it was agreed that "all the territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa, and the Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China." While under the treaty of peace Japan did not cede them to China, but only renounced

all right of title, the obvious logic of the British position is that Formosa and the Pescadores should go to the China it recognizes.

Logically there is no solution to this dilemma but, with the practical sense for which the British are famous, they have ceased to press the logic and seem ready to accept two Chinas, one on the mainland and one on Formosa. American policy in like manner has become more realistic; we no longer suggest unleashing the troops under Chiang to recover the continent. The unreality of that position without a deeper commitment to conflict than we are ready to make has become clear. As *The Economist* of London said some months ago: "The real Far Eastern policies of the State Department and of the Foreign Office have for a long time been quite close to each other."

Meanwhile, for a time after the abandonment of the Tachens, the only words that seemed to be known to journalists were Quemoy and Matsu; one might have supposed from the excited tone of the dispatches that they were *intrinsically* the key to war or peace. The Congressional resolution adopted with virtually unanimity left control of policy in that highly sensitive area in the hands of the President; and, for reasons which ought to be transparent, he did not define in advance precisely what he would do if they were attacked. Thus, the islands became symbolic of the different policies of the United States and Great Britain.

However, as a result conceivably of the Bandung Conference, of the interposition of Nehru, or of possible changes in Russian orientation, the fury of Red China's propaganda somewhat abated and the menacing gestures became less obvious — or the world got used to them. Again, the fact of alliance proved dominant over differences in policy. Britain and the United States seem to be tacitly collaborating in tacit progress toward a tacit cease-fire in the Formosa Strait! Mr. Dulles said *almost* that on June 7.

Britain and America hope that the Soviets and Red China will not act as one, but will again develop historic tensions. There are certainly enough points of friction, there are regions which both would like and regarding which both have certain claims. Moreover, Russia has had to turn Port Arthur and Dairen over to China though it would have liked to retain them. Chinese drains on Russian armament production carry potential difficulties, particularly as China may want more than Russia can afford to give, or may feel that it is being shortchanged if Russia should seem to charge more than the goods are worth.

The difference between the Western allies regarding their desire to reduce the solidarity of the Sino-Soviet alliance is in the tactical approach to the problem. The British seem to believe that China is too large ever to be a satellite in the sense in which Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Romania are held in thrall-dom. They seem to think that if we cooperate with the Reds in China it will give opportunity for the natural tensions between Russia and China and the clear contrariety of interests to develop. American action seeking the same ends has taken the line that dependence of Mao exclusively upon Russia will highlight to the Chinese Reds the disadvantages of so exclusive a relationship and will lead them to see the advantage of a less belligerent attitude toward the United States and a stricter regard for their international obligations.

In this matter, as in so many others, the fact of alliance has proved dominant and neither Britain nor the United States has pressed its view to a dogmatic degree. A practical working relationship, for the moment at least, underlies the difference in method which each would like to follow. Perhaps it may be said that the British are patient because they see that the United States does recognize some unpalatable realities, such as the partition of Korea and of Vietnam, and it may be that with the passage of time we will accept the possibility of two Chinas as a

practical matter, as Arthur Dean has suggested in his recent article in *Foreign Affairs*.

Japan is a vital factor in the Far East equation. As we reversed our policy toward Germany from the destruction of its industrial capacity and dropped the fantastic concept of an agricultural economy, so in Japan we have abandoned the policy of a military vacuum. But there was also an economic vacuum. The Asian co-prosperity sphere was destroyed by the war and Japan's economy became essentially upon the American occupation. Then with the peace treaty and the decline of our commitments and the trimming of American aid, the reality of the economic vacuum became more apparent.

Japan can no more live by itself than can Britain. Its loss of Formosa cut off important resources. Its markets in America are restricted; its markets in Oceania are restricted; its trade with Red China, though not forbidden by our occupation, has by no means regained normal size or consequence. Japan has not had opportunity to reestablish old relations or to create new relations of a commercial kind in Southeast Asia.

All this made it inevitable that the Hatoyama government should speak of normalizing relations with Red China, albeit cautiously avoiding stirring us up too much. It has also opened a way for the Soviets, in the name of bringing formal peace after a decade, to offer blandishments in an effort to withdraw Japan from our orbit. It is clear, however, that the strategic importance of Japan as an anchor for our chain of defense is so great that we will go to great lengths to hold it within the Western orientation.

There is one final political consideration which affects our whole strategic policy. The United States is the only nation which has actually dropped an atomic bomb in warfare. For some time we had a monopoly of that weapon and made it an obvious key to policy. The United States is the only nation which has tested a hydrogen bomb with such astonishingly lethal effect as to startle

the world. Both these facts raised serious questions in the minds of our allies as well as of neutrals whether we would regard those instruments as available for instantaneous use with all that such use might imply for the future of the world or whether they would be held in reserve as long as possible and employed only as a last resort.

It was this last question which caused the phrase "massive retaliation" employed by the Secretary of State on the 12th of January, 1954, to be drawn entirely out of its context and become in the minds of many a virtual summary of American military policy. It was regarded as an active threat that upon the least provocation we would resort to those implements. I do not think a study of the text of the Secretary's speech warrants that inference, but that such an inference was widely drawn does not seem open to question. Subsequent events, including discussions of implementing the President's proposal of an "atoms for peace" plan to the United Nations, helped offset the impression. Later developments and the rather favorable prognosis for the forthcoming Geneva conference on the peaceful uses of atomic energy seem to have quieted some of the fears and put the whole matter in better perspective.

Moreover, the revelation of the unexpectedly rapid development of Russian air power and clear evidence of its possession of atomic and hydrogen weapons have led to that situation which the President once described, where relative superiority ceases to be decisive, or synonymous with victory. It might, instead, be synonymous with a world holocaust which would injure friends and neutrals and ourselves as well as the enemy.

When we review in our minds what has taken place, it is not necessary to assume that ultimate Russian objectives have changed or that any other dramatic event has altered the prospect of peace. It is necessary only to observe that the Western alliance has held firm, that it has been strengthened by the treaty with

Germany, that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization has grown stronger, that the enlargement of the Brussels pact has proved an acceptable, though not a perfect, substitute for the European Defense Community, that the period of active warfare is over in Korea and in Vietnam, and that the tensions have relaxed somewhat in the Formosa Strait.

We are, therefore, reminded again that the world does not have a choice simply between perfect peace at one end of the scale and total war at the other. As the President said, we can have a *modus vivendi*. It may not be satisfactory to anyone but it can be tolerable to everyone. The passage of time may tend to blunt the sharpness of some issues and allow for the resolution of dilemmas which would not yield to impulsive or rapid action. The prospects for peace in its ultimate meaning are not good in the near future; the dangers of war in its ultimate extreme have mitigated somewhat. Meanwhile, we must conduct the cold war in such a way as to make peace possible.

BIOGRAPHIC SKETCH

Dr. Henry M. Wriston

Dr. Henry M. Wriston received his B. A. degree from Wesleyan University, Connecticut, in 1911, and has since received three additional degrees from that university. He studied at Harvard University from 1911 to 1914, was an Austin teaching fellow for the last two years and was awarded a Ph. D. degree in 1922. He has received honorary degrees from Columbia University, Princeton University, Harvard University, Western Reserve University, New York University, University of Pennsylvania, and others.

Dr. Wriston has been well known nationally in educational work for many years. He was president of the Association of American Universities; trustee of the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching, and its chairman; vice president of the American Association for Adult Education; trustee of the World Peace Foundation, and of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; and director and president of the Council on Foreign Relations.

From 1925 to 1937, Dr. Wriston was president of Lawrence College and from 1929 to 1937 he was director of the Institute of Paper Chemistry of Appleton, Wisconsin. Since 1937, he has been president of Brown University. In 1954, Dr. Wriston headed the Secretary of State's Public Committee on Personnel, which made a three-month study of the U. S. Foreign Service. Secretary John Foster Dulles approved the Wriston Report and ordered its recommendations to be put into effect.

He has written books on war, civil defense, and American foreign relations, including: *Prepare for Peace* (1941); *Challenge to Freedom* (1943); *Strategy of Peace* (1944). He is a frequent contributor of articles to journals and periodicals.

MORAL FACTORS OF NATIONAL STRATEGY

A lecture delivered
at the Naval War College
on 3 June 1955 by
Dr. Charles W. Lowry

Admiral McCormick, Friends:

I am very much exhilarated by the opportunity of meeting with you at the Naval War College and speaking from my heart on the gripping theme which has been assigned me. Undoubtedly, no more interesting or momentous subject has ever been given me in any quarter. I believe that this reflects notable credit on the President and Faculty of this College.

I am very much tempted to take a moment to share with you an anecdote that I suppose is really my favorite. It is on the greatest personality, in some ways, of our time, Sir Winston Churchill, and goes back to a period when Churchill's estate in public esteem was very different from what it is now. A friend of mine told me that Churchill told him in the early thirties that he was finished. This is an anecdote that goes back to that period.

It seems that Bernard Shaw was a friend of Winston Churchill and that he sent him one day a little note with two tickets to the opening night of a new play. He said:

"Dear Winston,

Here are two tickets, one for you and one for a friend — if you have a friend."

Well, I suppose that all of us realize that it is dangerous to quip with "the old master." He immediately wrote a letter back to Shaw, in which he said:

“Dear Bernard,

I am returning the tickets. Thank you very much for sending them. I had a previous engagement. I wish, however that you would send me two tickets for the second night of your play — if there is a second night.”

I am in the position of this being the “first night” as far as being before you gentlemen or at this College as a lecturer. On the other hand, I did have the very happy privilege of being here a year ago for your Global Strategy Discussions. So I do not exactly feel a stranger in coming here this morning.

Will you indulge me by allowing me a very short personal word as I break into this subject? As you all know, by profession I am a theologian and clergyman. For a quarter of a century, which is exactly the period since my ordination, I have nonetheless been profoundly and, I think, in a rather unusual way preoccupied with the crisis of the twentieth century at its most inward focal point — at the point which we may aptly describe as “the ideological storm center of the world hurricane.”

The moral and spiritual character of the crisis was first evident, for those with eyes to see, in the rise and spectacular impact of World Communism. The concurrent and infinitely more spectacular march to power of National Socialism in Germany sharpened the focus of perception into the inwardness and depth of modern man’s predicament — again, for those with eyes to see.

It was in late 1932, about the time I “went down” after seven terms at the ancient University of Oxford, that a sensitive if erratic English intellectual, J. Middleton Murry, published a volume with the title modeled on a famous book by the youthful Shelley a century earlier. The title of the book was *The Necessity of Communism*. In that book J. Middleton Murry asserted roundly:

“Communism is the one living religion in the Western world today.”

The emergence in Hitler and his Teutonic movement of a third installment in the totalitarian succession of Communism, Fascism, and National Socialism, was a verification not of the adequacy or accuracy of Murry's statement but of the clarity of his insight that behind the political, the social, the military happenings of our era there lay profound moral and religious disturbances.

About that same time, there was a Frenchman named Jacques Maritain, a famous lay Catholic philosopher, giving lectures in Spain, and he was characterizing Communism in a similar way.

Somewhat later two Englishmen, Arnold Toynbee, now world-famous, and the great wartime philosopher-Archbishop, William Temple, were speaking in about the same vein.

The germ of my own book, *Communism and Christ*, which is known to some of you and which was written in the summer of 1951, is to be found in a kindred insight; that is, in so far as the book has much value it is from this standpoint of a kindred insight, quickened and sharpened by many experiences in Germany, Italy, and England in the years 1930-1932. The immediate occurrences, however, that led to my attempting to write this book are so coincidental that I am tempted to share one or two of them with you.

In the fall of 1950 — and 1950 as a summer was quite a summer, you will remember, from several standpoints — I was called on to give an address at Princeton before an organization known as The Church Congress on the subject of *Christianity and Communism*. I was led, as a result of this particular conference, to try to sell the organization, The Church Congress (which was a voluntary church organization), on the idea of taking this sub-

ject to the American people — with high-level, thoughtful conferences — to try to develop the real seriousness of the problem. This led me to find that there was a sharp division in the American community, as we know that there came to be later on from another standpoint.

Also, at this period I kept on my bedside table for four months a copy of *The Communist Manifesto*, and brooded continually on the problem of a dynamic answer to the new secular gospel, to the new, extraordinary, "this worldly salvation system" that had, at the noonday of its scientific brilliance, turned our world upside down. Gentlemen, I think that it is this problem that hovers in the background as you and I are trying to think this morning on the *Moral Factors of National Strategy*.

May I throw in one word that is a word of caution? As I go on to emphasize and to attempt to put as sharp a focus as possible on the subject which you have given me — on this moral aspect of the total problem — let me make it absolutely clear that I have no conscious tendency to oversimplify the complex phenomenon of Communism, the globe which we presently inhabit, and our national defense posture, though I may be saying some things which because of the sharpness of the focus could lead you to feel that I am guilty of overemphasis. Please remember that I do realize the complexity of this whole situation; indeed, I recognize and try to preach constantly the importance of the economic, political, and military factors alongside and intertwined with what I like to call the "ideological aspect."

In particular, it seems to me that the average American needs a stronger realization than I think he often has of the indispensable role played by the American military establishment in the present "cold war" period. You and your brothers of the Armed Forces of this country are, in my judgement, the one absolute barrier in the way of Communism and its goal of world revolution and world subjugation. You are the defenders, whether

you always realize it or not, not merely of the United States of America but of Christian civilization and, indeed, of the whole tradition of high, humane civilization which is at stake. We who live and breathe normally in the civilian world sometimes take for granted this essential and inherently moral role of the Armed Forces in the defense of freedom and religion. We ought to cultivate more insight and have a broader vision in this matter. I think that we in the civilian world need to have a better understanding of your problems and needs.

But you who are of the Armed Forces, in turn, need to remember that your role in this age of storm and particular peril requires a sense of special vocation. To do your job well, you must have not only proper specialized vocational training, but you must have vision, moral insight and, perhaps most of all, a sense of dedication, for I think that is what we all need most. You must cultivate, as all thoughtful human beings must cultivate, a large perspective and an ability to lift your sights from time to time to those ultimate life-or-death issues that are in the background of our period of history.

I am afraid that you may feel that I have come up to the edge of what is a little sermonic, or up to the edge of preaching a little bit. If so, I do not apologize. After all, you invited me here knowing that I am by profession a preacher and a moralist. Any special value that my chosen avocation of ideologies, world politics, and the "cold war" in its intangible aspects may have stems from this basic personal reality.

But I do hope that everything which I shall now say will reflect the spirit of Baron von Hügel's advice to preachers when he said: "One ounce of 'is' is worth many pounds of 'ought.'" I guess that that is good advice for all of us.

Then there is the injunction of the friend of Charles Darwin and a nineteenth century scientist, Thomas H. Huxley, who, in a

simple maxim that has come to mean a very great deal to me, once said: "Sit down before the facts as a little child." I think that, again, speaks to all of us.

Finally, we can perhaps at least aspire, as we undertake to deal with the more intangible aspects of the world struggle of our epoch, to conform to the spirit and attempt of the great William James, who, as he was writing his book, *Principles of Psychology*, wrote his brother: "I have to forge every sentence in the teeth of stubborn and irreducible facts." That is a large order, and yet I am sure as I speak to men who are accustomed to deal with hard realities that you agree this is the spirit in which we have to try to operate.

Now I plunge in. As we reflect upon the twentieth century and its notable characteristics, two features appear to be dominating. The first is *accelerating technological power*, which is obvious I think. The second, which may not seem so obvious, is *waning moral power*. I am now talking about our age and its basic traits. The first great characteristic — namely, technology — is a subject on which you are certainly as well or better informed than I.

Let me note in passing, however, a coincidence that I think is calculated to give us pause. The United States is the foremost technological power in this world. The genius of our country has manifested itself conspicuously and uniquely in applied science, technical know-how, and industrial organization and productivity. This is something which we as a people take for granted; but it is this characteristic of America which inspires in Europe and Asia awe, fear, and, sometimes, hostility and hatred.

Marxism as a philosophy of life and society is a matter-centered, science-centered, and technique-centered philosophy. It is based on the intuition that technical man controls the future and the destiny of this planet. The strength of this instinct and the strength of this logic can be seen in the whole phenomenon of Soviet Russia, beginning with the October Revolution of 1917 and

coming down to the present moment. It can be studied in Marx, in Engels, in Lenin, in Stalin, and, I think very interestingly, in the decline of Malenkov and the rise of the Bulganin-Khrushchev clique in the Kremlin. I think that this situation is behind even the most recent events.

One reason for the growth of European "neutralism" is the fear that in the so-called "East-West struggle" there is a struggle between two contending materialisms. I think that it is difficult for us ordinary folks in America to realize this. As I say, we take so much for granted both our technological greatness and the moral resources and elements in our tradition. But I am quite convinced that this is a very important factor in the judgment in Europe about this conflict which disturbs many of us so much. The great religious cultures, likewise, of the Middle East, India, and Southeast Asia are even more likely to make the same judgment and then, quite illogically, to make haste in increasing the number of their own technicians.

For us who are deeply concerned about the United States, who love our country, who are deeply concerned about her safety as well as her worth and her greatness, this apparent meeting of extremes and this apparent materialistic intersection point is bound to be a subject of extreme gravity. Is this pure coincidence? Is this harmless parallelism? Is this simply historical accident? Or, is American culture in danger of being swamped by the very range and brilliance of its technological achievements? Is it in danger of losing its deeper soul? Are we as a people on top and in control of our particular brand of materialism or have we created a gigantic Frankenstein, which is without spirit and which could run away with us? I only put these as questions. For the moment, I leave them to percolate in the background of your minds.

The second dominating feature of this century, and perhaps the decades before this century, I have called "waning, declining moral power." I realize that is a provocative, and perhaps a star-

ting, assertion that some of you may be inclined to question. Most prophets of the nineteenth century — certainly the generality of the intellectuals and moralists of that century — assumed that the law of society was like the law of nature, and that the law of each one was progress — inevitable and necessary progress. These men believed that mankind was entering a great, new time of unification, peace, and fulfillment. The poet of this secular faith, which I think was also a religious faith to the people that held it and to some of us perhaps, was the poet laureate of England under Queen Victoria, Alfred Lord Tennyson. You will remember that as early as 1842 (and that is a good while back) this poet had sung:

“For I dipt into the future, as far as
human eye could see,
Saw the Vision of the world, and all
the wonder that would be;
Heard the heavens fill with shouting,
and there rain'd a ghastly dew
From the nation's airy navies grappling
in the central blue;”

But that was the prelude to something much finer:

“Till the war-drum throb'd no longer,
and the battle flags were furled
In the Parliament of man, the
Federation of the world.
Not in vain the distance beacons.
Forward, forward let us range,
Let the great world spin for ever down
the ringing grooves of change.
Thro' the shadow of the globe we sweep
Into the younger day;
Better fifty years of Europe than
a cycle of Cathay.”

But, today, Cathay (China) appears to want to return the compliment.

A more secular version of this faith was the view of one of Tennyson's contemporaries. I think this is a man of whom you may not know, for he does not have too much inherent importance any more — Henry Thomas Buckle — who wrote a three-volume work at the heyday of Victorian greatness entitled, *The History of Civilization*. He put forward a thesis that impressed his contemporaries and which is certainly a very strange one to us. He said that there were three discoveries that ensured the abolition of war: the first discovery was gunpowder; the second was political economy, by which he meant *laissez-faire* economics; the third was swift steam transport. These ensured not only world unification but the abolition of war.

At the very end of the century there was Nobel of Sweden, founder of the great peace prize and discoverer of dynamite. For him, there was no contradiction here. He thought that dynamite would make war so deadly that it would be eliminated.

How different is the reality of the new century, our own twentieth century! It has proven so far to be an age not of unification, but of division; not of fulfillment, but of destruction; not of peace, but of two world wars and global "cold war"; not of moral and human consummation, but of spiritual disintegration and monstrous immorality.

From the political standpoint, kings and dynasties have gone down like stars raining from heaven; ancient empires have been dissolved; strong, vital nations have made a bid for a place in the sun, for living space, for continental supremacy, even for world conquest — and have been struck down. To be specific, the last remnant of the Holy Roman Empire of a thousand years, Austria-Hungary, was dismantled in 1919; Germany was temporarily arrested in her bid for power, but was destined to rise

again in a titanic thrust to seize, first, the eastern marches, then, the world island, Afro-Eurasia; then, the world.

Somewhere around 1936, the British Ambassador to Germany, Sir Neville Henderson, was having a conversation with Hermann Göring, the Number Two Nazi. The latter posed the question: "Who profited most as a result of the settlement of World War I?" Henderson (this is from memory, but I believe it is correct), after some thought replied: "Probably Yugoslavia."

"No," said Göring, "Germany came out best. Still ahead of her was the achievement of her national unity."

In the end, however, Germany — the ablest European nation and, I believe, one of the most gifted peoples of all time — went down to destruction in a fearful *Götterdämmerung* (Twilight of the Gods).

In the same Second World War, Great Britain ceased to be a major power and, despite Sir Winston Churchill, persisted with the project of liquidating an empire.

The fate of Japan, ambitious to be an Asiatic Britain, was more disastrous but essentially similar.

France and Italy, likewise, joined or relapsed into the company of second-to-third-class powers.

It was the Soviet Union that emerged as the real victor in World War II. Why? Because she had never ceased to combine political warfare with military or armed conflict.

The United States emerged as the number one industrial and technological power, but she neither gained nor lost with regard to territory or to manpower.

By extreme naivete' with respect to the character of the Soviet ally, and, in my judgment, with respect to the true re-

lation between war and politics, she forfeited many advantages in the "cold war", already setting in, that should have been hers.

The first major alteration in the balance of power which existed at the end of the Second World War came with the Communist conquest of China. There are so many parallels which one is tempted to draw between China in 1949-1950 and Russia in 1917-1918. But there is one immense difference and one great advantage that the Asiatic nation had: it had the blueprint of the Soviet experience and it had a mighty, new, industrial giant to give it support where it needed it most. Of course it was this support that enabled China to wage the Korean War.

Now I want to give you a prophecy, written by Henry Adams in the year 1903. This passage is worth placing beside the well-known description of the two coming giants, Russia and the United States, by de Tocqueville. I am sure that you all know the de Tocqueville passage, but you may not know this Adams sequel:

"My statesmanship is still all in China, where the last struggle for power is to come. China is bound to go to pieces, and every year is a long step to the bad. The only country now on the spot is Russia; and if Russia organizes China as an economical power, the little drama of history will end in the overthrow of our clumsy Western civilization. We never can compete with Asia. In that event, I allow until 1950 to run our race out."

That is a rather arresting statement and the chronology is sufficiently close to give us a little disturbance.

Now I want to say that it seems to me that there is a great new element (that is why I have given this background) in our world situation which neither Adams nor de Tocqueville, nor the generality of thinkers of this period or later, took clearly

into account. We call this the "ideological element." Behind it is the rise of a new and potent, "this worldly faith," the faith of Communism.

History, as I believe, is the interaction of two principal factors. I think it may be valuable for me to just list these: the *power factor* and the *idea factor*. It seems to me that in these remarkable quotations and prophecies of de Tocqueville (which I assume you know) and of Adams, it is quite striking that little attention was given to the possibility that there could emerge a new revolutionary idea that would have tremendous import from the standpoint of getting intertwined with the power factors, which are familiar to you and which we commonly think of as the stuff of history.

I think that the great new element which has come into play in our world, which these men ignored is the rise of a new dynamic "idea" factor. I remark that it is certainly very striking that the primary emphasis of Friedrich Hegel, from whom Karl Marx appropriated the notion of "dialectic", was on not power immediately — though, indirectly, it was there — but on the idea. History, Hegel believed, was essentially the drama of the conflict and the advance of the idea. He said that it was the nature of the idea to clothe itself in the form of power; from another standpoint, to clothe itself in the artistic creations of mankind; and and from still another standpoint, to clothe itself in what Hegel would call "the poetry or the myths of religion."

Most of us would agree, today, that Hegel put too much weight on the idea. Also, I think that he was too completely obsessed with the concept of an ultimate and artificial unity in history and in reality. It is possible to argue, as indeed certain Germans have been known to do, that "might is final", and that "guns or atom bombs are more powerful than ideas or morals". Yet, surely the facts point to a more complex and a more intermediate view than either of these two extremes. Physics is a reality; so is

mechanics; so is geography and climate; so is human contrivance, ingenuity, and technical development. But it is equally obvious and equally unchallengeable that man is more than a machine; man is more than all materiality; man is more than blood and soil, as the Nazis taught. Man is a thinker, an imaginer, a dreamer, a believer, and a lover. Man is a being for whom time exists. Therefore, because time exists — past, present and future — because man transcends by his very nature any given moment or experience, man lives by values and loyalties that transcend the immediate and the instinctual.

“We look before and after,
And pine for what is not;
Our sincerest laughter
With some pain is fraught;
Our sweetest songs are those
that tell of saddest thought.”

Now let us step up the tempo of our argument and try to bring into sharp focus two momentous realities. *First*, there is the essentially moral nature of man; *second*, there is the moral aspect of the “cold war” struggle in its present phase. To move rapidly, I think there are really only three views of man.

The first view is that man is a thing, a material reality; that whatever there is in him of mind or spirit is a kind of manifestation, inexplicable, of basic atomic, material reality. Man, on this view, which is the doctrine of Communism, is as sheerly material as an electric dynamo or a flowing river or a stone quarried from a granite mountain.

The second view is the view that man is essentially an animal — a very clever and very ingenious animal, but still no more than an animal. I think this was the view of the Germans under Hitler. I wish I had time to tell you of an experience I had in 1939, while talking with some graduates of the *Ordensburger*, or

leadership academies, where we got into this whole issue of man. I haven't time to talk about it, but what they felt was that man is a being of nature; and that God is the principle of nature, but not a Being beyond — a kind of pantheistic point of view.

The third view is that man is precisely man; he can not be reduced to that which is lower; he is a being qualitatively above the animal or the thing and characterized by spiritual form or aspect.

Democracy, as a form of society, is based on this third doctrine. This is also the doctrine of Christianity and Judaism; this is the doctrine, in addition, of all the great world religions. They differ in many important respects, but they are very close together from the standpoint of believing that man is in the essential aspect of his nature a moral and spiritual being. I think that the heart of the contemporary crisis is to be located precisely at this point. It is a crisis in man's conception of himself and in the morals appropriate to what man is in his essential nature. Behind the present distemper of society, and the apocalyptic roar of conflict on a global scale for the highest stakes in history, there lies a hundred years and more of spiritual erosion, an increasing moral doubt as man felt less and less sure of himself as a personal being and more and more confident that the things that are seen and manageable by science are final and decisive. If this point gets over clearly, then it is the most important thing I can say, because Marxism, and Communism following it, represents the application socially, or the application in terms of a mighty world plan, of this confidence coming out of science in the nineteenth century, that "here is the final thing." We are not going to meet the whole issue at the proper level until we really grapple intellectually, spiritually, and morally with this problem. That is what I mean by the waning moral power of the modern era.

Now, the second focus: the moral problem in the "cold war" and as a consideration of our national strategy. If we look

at the impact of the idea factor, and I believe that in some ways it is the first thing to be taken into account, we realize that it is not just simply one idea among many but that the key thing is a full-blown ideology that mysteriously and strangely arose and has come to have this world impact. We call this "Communism". It is at once a world view, a theory of history, a vulgar application of science to society and politics, a revolutionary manifesto, and a kind of secular gospel or announcement of a good time coming for all men from the material and social standpoint.

Any idea that is believed fervently, or any strong loyalty releases moral energy. Here, perhaps, we can explain something that is confusing. Such energy has a "plus" that is over and above animal vitality or mechanical power. No group of men have understood this better than the great military captains of history. Napoleon simply put it with Gallic intensity when he said that "in war the moral is to the material as three is to one."

Moral energy has a negative side as well as a positive side. I can explain that by calling your attention to what the psychologists and psychiatrists say about the nature of love. The moral may turn into the immoral, just as love may turn into hate, and still there is what I am calling "the energy quotient," the ability to generate force. From a short-term standpoint, hate may seem more powerful than love. The sentiment of absolute anti-religion and immorality in an absolute sense may seem to release more energy than religion and morality — especially, if there is a reaction against an anemic, pale, and bloodless religion or morality, which I am afraid was the feeling of many people in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. That helps us to explain and understand the paradox that, with due respect, I do not think is always clear to military, technical, and operational people: the paradox of the dynamic, on the one hand, and yet the immoralism of Communism.

"The cold war" is the phrase which we have come to use for a twilight situation, in which, in a condition of theoretical peace,

Communism carries on by all possible means, short of all-out armed conflict, political war. This is a subject that could take a long time, but I want to focus on this point: I think that, today, we are in a new phase. I recently read General Sarnoff's memorandum (I am sure many of you have seen that). Yet, I think there is not enough in this which emphasizes what I think is a new phase of the "cold war". This phase is characterized by the so-called "atomic stalemate". Whatever military men may think of the theoretical validity of such a concept it is a reality in the popular mind, including scientists and intellectuals very widely, and I am impressed by the extent of this. Am I not right that it has already had an overwhelming impact upon our foreign policy?

At first, the public reaction, in tune with Soviet propaganda, attached itself to the theme of "coexistence". Now, a new and more powerful theme has come into play, the theme of "peace". Daily, we see the hopes of peoples rising and feeding on the most insubstantial shadows. I seem to detect in the reactions of many who should be among the most thoughtful Americans something that amounts to a kind of suppressed mutual congratulation that was has now fortunately been eliminated and rendered obsolete by the very destructiveness of the weapons which both sides possess.

In my conviction, this means that we have in fact now reached the most dangerous moment our nation and the world have known since perhaps the late spring of 1941, when it looked as if the madman (who was not so mad), Adolf Hitler, had Europe, Africa, and Britain in the hollow of his hand and it only remained to pick off the yet unoccupied pieces, one by one. Perhaps the present junction of events is much more dangerous than that, for all Asia is involved. Communist China is a reality and the adversary, Communist Totalitarianism, is far more seasoned, effective, impressive, and, from a strange standpoint, maturely logical than any tyranny so far known in history.

What is the character of this present moment? Let me try to give it to you as I see it for discussion as tersely and crisply as possible:

1. The atomic stalemate is a reality which is likely to obtain for a number of years. America has rejected the concept of "preventive war" and, in this matter, complete initiative has passed into the hands of the enemy. It is, however, inconceivable that the latter will be in any great hurry to exercise such initiative.

2. The rejoicing of many publicists, divines, and scientists, because of the belief that war is now obsolete, is premature (perhaps that is the understatement of the year). If we ask who stands to benefit most from the elimination of war as an instrument of national policy (I have in my hands a clipping of a recent statement by Chancellor Adenauer of Germany, which I got hold of after I put that phrase down, which reads: "The call for peace is growing even stronger in the world. In this age of development, war has defeated its own purpose; it has ceased to be an instrument of policy.") I think that congratulation is certainly premature. As I see it at the present moment, Communism stands to benefit most from the situation that is leading to this kind of statement. The atomic stalemate, indeed, presents on a silver platter a situation in which the men of the Kremlin and their confederates are freed to prosecute systematically, deliberately, without any hurry and exercising the patience that they have developed, their plan of world subversion, revolution, and monolithic integration.

3. There is one way out of this dilemma, and this way is the best hope of altering radically, and for good, the present historical situation: We must at long last accept the challenge of Communism, not only at the *hardware* level, but at the *moral* and *ideological level*. We must come to grips with the problem, which I am sure is a very difficult problem, of seizing the initiative and defeating the enemy at this level.
4. The war which we are in, misleadingly and unwittingly called the "cold war", is a new kind of war — not absolutely new, but I think in its totality a new kind of war. It has its own principles and laws, which must be studied and mastered. This war which we are in can be won only if we have the wit, judgment, patience, and imagination to evolve and carry through a grand strategy, a strategy that is superior to that of the enemy because it is bolder, more comprehensive, and more realistic.
5. My reference, of course, is to an "ideological strategy" I do not refer to guns or to logistics in the material sense. Perhaps we shall yet get down to a serious preoccupation with "spiritual logistics." Such a strategy must be spelled out in terms of broad strategic objectives. These objectives must be related to conditions and resources in various parts of the globe, beginning with the home front. This is very important from the standpoint of the totality of our defensive posture. Then, programs must be devised and set in motion with a view to realizing these strategic objectives. Some of these programs our Government can carry out; but I think that many of them must be

the work of private organizations, widely supported by the public — both in the United States and in other sectors of the Free World.

6. The moral factors are the decisive ones in the present phase of the world struggle. I do not mean that the other factors are unimportant (I have already expressed myself on that), but the moral factors represent the one area in which we have freedom of initiative, in which we have genuine freedom of action. I think that this must be reflected in our national strategy and its energetic and imaginative implementation.

The first line of attack (I am giving you now my own particular special analysis, not to eliminate other lines which you know more about than I, even from the standpoint of political warfare, but because I think that I am giving you something that has been neglected) should be at the religious level. All of the great religions of the world have a common stake in the battle against an enemy dedicated to atheistic materialism and godless inhuman tyranny.

The second line of attack should be at the ethical and human level. In person-to-person contacts, in radio broadcasts, in films, in printed matter, in what not, there should be appeal — constantly, sincerely, and well thought out — to human dignity, to conscience, to the Golden Rule, to what we as common beings have in common.

Then I, personally, think there is a third line of attack that has not been too well developed. It should be to elaborate and popularize a positive alternative to Communism. One of the great weaknesses is that we always appear negative. There must be a positive alternative worked out, an ideology for modern man that we might call "Democracy for the Twentieth Century." The

beliefs and concepts of such a positive democratic manifesto are the stock of the American tradition and I am convinced that they are deep in the instincts of the American people. If they could be recrystallized and related to the specific problems and the psychology of the multitudes in this post-colonial world, they would be invincible.

Such, in bare outline and in harsh summary, is the role of "the moral", as I see it.

In conclusion, and following the suggestion of your President, I want to venture to give you — not dogmatically but, I hope, thoughtfully — a note on morality and nuclear weapons. I mean this to be suggestive and not entirely comprehensive.

I, personally, belong to the school of ethics which repudiates pacifism and has an enormous respect for the role played by force throughout history. I think you may be surprised when I say that I think the dean of this particular school of ethics in our history was Saint Augustine, a remarkable realist as well as a great personality and theologian, who I used to tell my classes in theology was such a colossus that he at once became the father of the mediaeval synthesis and the inspirer of the Protestant reformation — not a mean combination. Saint Augustine once said (I think you gentlemen ought to remember this sentence): "The peace of the world is always based on force." That is one side. But, at the same time, force, and its extension in war, has its limitation. Unless limited and kept in check by reason and moral principle, it usurps its normal and necessary function, as I think it has in our time, and threatens the very fabric of civilization.

Accordingly, the two concepts, coming down to us from the mediaeval period of the Christian soldier and the just war, seem to me to be valid as ideals. Their spiritual continuation in the modern effort to set up definite norms and laws of civilized warfare, which have been badly frustrated, should not be regarded

cynically as *right's labor lost*. On the contrary, these ideals are quick and living as influences upon free, responsible, and Godly men, who face the grim realities of total war and who glimpse on the further side of gigantic mushroom clouds the possible dissolution of human civilization and even the destruction of every living thing.

As we visualize the enormous problems of our time, an era truly on which the ends of the world have come, there are no clear and definite ground rules available. A codified set of rules and laws is out of the question. There is something, however, that every true man can have: that is a spirit of sensitivity and of responsibility. Such a spirit must be more than a momentary sentiment or a fluctuating emotion, that, like a candle, flickers in the wind and can easily be snuffed out. It must be a stable attribute of will, grounded in a clear sense of right and wrong, responsibility and irresponsibility, love of life and mysterious urge to death that can grip men, both individually and collectively.

To such subjective moral preparation for war in a nuclear age, which must not be left to chance but should be a major educational objective in all of our Service Academies and War Colleges, we may add as an objective guide line the principle of "the lesser evil". This is as definite and as indispensable a principle in ethics as that of "the greater good", or "the greatest good". I think that this principle of "the lesser evil" offers us some guidance and help as we try to face, honestly and in good conscience, the infinitely grave issues of the employment of nuclear weapons.

Now, I am going to take an extreme illustration to try to focus this, one which I shall not mind if you regard as a little ridiculous. It is an extreme and somewhat artificial illustration, but it will perhaps focus the kind of problem we have to face.

Let us suppose that we fail to do what I have advocated — to stop the continuing ideological and political offensive of World

Communism. Asia, let us say, succumbs. I know people who prophesy (I hope it is not true and I do not believe that it is) such an outcome. Let us suppose that Germany has been neutralized by this new tactic that began with the neutralization of Austria and then in effect all of Europe. Africa can then be brought into the Soviet camp almost at will. Then let us add that in Latin America there are generally well-disciplined, progressive parties that can be activated on fairly short notice.

On the other side, let us suppose that the United States, luckily, has managed to maintain its technological superiority and is known to be far in the lead in the field of intercontinental ballistic missiles. This has kept the lords of the Kremlin from risking an all-out preventive war, but it is obvious that the risk to them of waiting is increasing with every day. What should we do? I think that the answer is evident, but let me try to state it. An evil incomprehensible in terror and magnitude — for, of course, retaliation upon us would be swift and as total as possible — must be embraced for, otherwise, we embrace a greater evil; we accept supinely the far greater evil of a monolithic, technically-administered, universal slave empire.

That case, which of course is purely invented, is a comparatively simple one. What you gentlemen will actually face in our lifetime is likely to be far more complex and difficult from the standpoint of decisions. Yet, the principles of moral sensitivity and the lesser evil are guide lines which I think are valid, both for thoughtful preparation now and for courageous decision in the day of large and pressing emergency.

In lieu of any attempt at a formal summary, I am moved — I hope not recklessly — to share with you a severe criticism of American performance so far in this century in what we may call — at least, partially — the field of moral judgment. I do this with the constructive design of stabbing us awake and seeking to immunize us against what I think is the peril when we talk

about "morals" and "morality"; namely, the complacency of every moral standpoint purchased at too cheap a cost. The following is a quotation. I do not agree with everything in it, but I agree with it in the main:

"Europe is the victim of the West's pursuit of political absolutes and the United States, throughout the history of its European interventions, has raised the delusion of extreme solutions to the rank of a tutelary myth, presiding over the fortunes of Europe. Absolutes call for absolute reactions. Hitler was the creature of the extreme nationalism that was the true victor in World War I. It is the tragedy of World War II that the one power, the United States, that had suffered the least in the fighting and was the least susceptible to ideological infections and could therefore have remained emotionally most detached, not only failed to cast its weight upon the side of moderation but proclaimed absolutes that, in their extremity, surpassed World War I dogmas of national self-determination and universal democracy. The extreme solutions issuing from World War I, and henceforth contradicting each other with ever-increasing dogmatic vehemence, are the projections of social alienation into world politics. There is no longer a middle ground. The choice is between brutish, bloodstained Germans and fair champions of democracy; between Stalin, the benevolent of Teheran and Yalta, and Stalin, the Kremlin despot; between cooperation with the Soviet Union and the dismemberment of the Soviet Union according to, of all things, the principle of national self-determination; between Morgenthau's ruralized Germany and the State Department's resurgent Germany — military and industrial despot of Europe. That these antiethical notions are shuffled at will and upon short notice,

and with the enthusiastic approval of experts and public opinion, does not bespeak collective mental equilibrium."√

Admitting the substantial accuracy of his indictment — not all details, but substantially — two reactions are possible. One is to repudiate absolutes entirely as far as human affairs are concerned; to regard and hold as permanently valid the cynical standpoint of *Realpolitik* — namely, that politics and morals are like oil and water, they simply do not mix; that politics is reality, and in essentials never changes (I know professors of political science who are saying that at this moment); that morals is the private affair, on the other hand, of every individual. That is a possible reaction, and, I think, a dangerous one.

The other reaction, which I believe is the genuinely American reaction, is to recognize candidly the combination of immaturity and hypocrisy which vitiated American moralism as a factor in international affairs from 1917 to 1947 and which still exists, no doubt, as a virus in the national blood stream. At the same time, it is unnecessary and cowardly to haul down the flag of "idealism". Without idealism, there will never be a better world; and I think that without it democracy, as a form of social order, is finished.

The true position for a nation, as for an individual, is to stand upon firm moral foundations and yet to realize and to be educated carefully in the knowledge that there is such a thing as the inexpedient and there is such a thing as the impossible. Needless to say, I believe that it is the genius and destiny of the United States to take the second course and to live in the American century by *the dialectic of idealism and realism*.

I thank you!

√ Dr. Robert Strausz-Hupe', *The Zone of Indifference*, G. P. Putnam's Sons, New York, 1952.

BIOGRAPHIC SKETCH

Dr. Charles Wesley Lowry

Dr Lowry was born in Indian Territory in 1905. He received his B. A. degree from Washington and Lee University (1926), M. A. degree from Harvard (1927), B. D. degree from Episcopal Theological School (1930) and Ph. D. from Oxford University (1933).

He was ordained a deacon in 1930 and the following year he was ordained a priest. From 1930-1932, Doctor Lowry was a traveling fellow, Episcopal Theological School, after which he became Episcopal Chaplain at the University of California. From 1934 to 1943, he was a professor of Systematic Theology at Virginia Theological Seminary.

Since 1943, he has been rector of All Saints' Church, Chevy Chase, Maryland. Since 1945, Doctor Lowry has been chairman of the Board of Examining Chaplains, Diocese of Washington, as well as the secretary of the Standing Committee. At present, Doctor Lowry is chairman and executive director of the Foundation for Religious Action in the Social and Civil Order.

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
SCHEDULE—FINAL EVENTS
ACADEMIC YEAR 1954-55

7 May -
20 May

During this period, forty-eight Junior Reserve Officers of the ranks of Lieutenant Commander and Major studied a specialized course on "Combat Staff Techniques and Operational Planning." The course included not only a study of military planning processes for solutions of staff problems but also the examination of currently important aspects of present and future naval operations.

28 May -
10 June

During this time, ninety-seven Senior Reserve Officers of the ranks of Commander through Rear Admiral resided at the Naval War College in order to examine current organization and procedures for National Security and to familiarize themselves with latest concepts of, and developments in, Naval Warfare. Both the Junior and Senior Reserve Officers were specially selected by the various Naval District Commandants, President of the Naval War College, Commandant of the Marine Corps and Commandant of the Coast Guard.

6 June -
10 June

This was the period allotted to the yearly Global Strategy Discussions and 1955 was the seventh of these gatherings.

Global Strategy Discussions are held "to promote an understanding of the problems confronting the United States in formulating a global strategy to attain our national objectives." This requires a critical look at the world situation, a

derivation of national objectives an examination of the major factors affecting global strategy and a consideration of the many courses of action which might contribute to the attainment of national objectives.

No attempt is made to arrive at any one overall solution since changing daily circumstances and the enormous size of the problem make that impossible. The desired end is to enable participants to exchange viewpoints and to develop their own conclusions.

In order to obtain the civilian viewpoint, prominent men from all walks of life are invited to participate. These men, together with the Senior Reserve Officers, furnish ideas from the civilian vantage point while military points of view are expressed by Naval War College staff and student officers.

This year there were twenty-eight military-civilian discussions groups, each having a moderator from the Naval War College staff or the student body.

Civilian participants numbered one hundred and twenty-five, which was the largest civilian representation ever assembled.

Lectures during the period included a welcoming address and "Summary of the Current World Situation" by Vice Admiral Lynde D. McCormick, U.S.N., a lecture on "The Principles of Sea Power" by Admiral R. B. Carney, U.S.N., a lecture on "Political Factors in National Stra-

tegy" by Dr. H. M. Wriston, and, finally, a lecture on "The Cold War" by General W. J. Donovan, U.S.A. (Ret.).

Hotel and BOQ facilities were taxed to the maximum,, but PHIBLANT flagship POCONO plus the carrier ANTIETAM were moored close to the College to assist in providing additional living spaces.

During this same period the Atlantic Fleet Type Commanders Annual Spring Conference was held aboard the ANTIETAM. This enabled approximately eighteen senior Atlantic Fleet Type Commanders and twenty-five of their staff officers to share in parts of the Global Strategy schedule. The Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Fleet, attended certain of the scheduled events before and after his Type Commanders Conference.

15 June -

Graduation exercises were held and a total of two hundred and fifty-two students received certificates of completion of various War College Courses. The Honorable Charles S. Thomas, Secretary of the Navy, delivered the key address, entitled "The Spirit of the Offensive." Also present were Admiral H. E. Yarnell, U.S.N. (Ret.) and Captain W. D. Puleston, U.S.N. (Ret.), who were celebrating the fortieth anniversary of their graduation from the Naval War College. Rear Admiral Arleigh A. Burke, U.S.N., prospective Chief of Naval Operations, also attended in connection with his coming assignment and was pledged the best wishes of those present by Vice Admiral Lynde D. McCormick, U.S.N., President of the Naval War College.