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**NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
REVIEW**

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EXERCISE OF COMMAND

An address delivered
at the Naval War College

by

Admiral Richard L. Conolly, U.S.N. (Ret.),

upon retirement from the U. S. Navy and
the Presidency of the Naval War College

We are all of us vitally concerned with the subject of command. We are all of us interested in the successful commander and the qualities, attributes, and abilities that contributed to his success. Command is our vocation. Preparation for command starts when an individual joins or apprentices himself to the officer corps of a military service and continues for as long as he can look forward to active employment in it.

I am impelled to give you my views and observations on this important subject due to my good fortune in having experienced command duty in the latter part of my career in a larger measure than is usual. My best qualifications are that in eleven and a half years, beginning in 1939 in the rank of Commander, I was privileged to exercise command of combatant forces for that entire period with the exception of fifteen months. During two short periods of seven and eight months, respectively, I served on the staff of the officers who at those times exercised command of our United States Naval Force in its entirety. As a result of thirty-eight months of it, I am constrained to say that I believe that wartime command, due to the pressure of circumstances and the accelerated tempo of events, is so concentrated as to be much more significant in an officer's career than almost any kind of peacetime employment. Having in mind Frederick the Great's mule, who after seven campaigns was still a mule, you are entirely at liberty to discount or ignore my experience. However, my wartime service did give me the opportunity of observing many eminent commanders — the opportunity of studying their methods

and of appreciating their outstanding qualities. In a number of different theaters, I either worked under them directly or in lower echelons in the chain of their command, or in associated commands. It is possible to learn much from every one of them.

The study of command would be a dry subject if we merely analyzed and defined it without visualizing its embodiment in the persons of known successful commanders. After all, command has to be exercised by human beings and not by mythical supermen possessed with impeccable sets of ideal qualities, all the virtues, and no vices. Thus, looking back through history, we find a host of successful commanders, all of them stamped with an individuality of their own, possessing the recognized qualities of command and leadership, each in different measure. Some were glaringly deficient in those qualities recognized as most important in the ideal commander, but, barring blind luck, each must have been possessed of the combination necessary to prevail and sufficient unto the occasion.

Nowadays, in the exercise of high command, one must prepare one's self for a large range of command functions. In the sphere of the Joint Chiefs of Staff or a theater command, the commander must have a good understanding of the inter-relationship between contemporary political factors and military strategy. Even the theater commander is not usually closely associated with the tactical battle, but he must understand tactical realities, tactical techniques, and weapons employment as they develop during the progress of the war. He must procure, to support his campaigns, the necessary total logistic support and be able to coordinate its distribution to his forces. In the succeeding echelons down the chain of command, strategy and tactics are usually both involved — and it is sometimes difficult to delineate where strategy ends and tactics begin. Still lower in the chain of command the command is purely tactical, but even here an understanding by the tactical commander of the general strategic situation and the main strategic objectives of the campaign are essential.

At every level a commander is responsible for providing, or assuring himself of adequate provision of, the requisite logistic support — the “sinews of war.”

It should be evident that some of the qualities required for successful execution of tactical missions might not be so important in the making of strategic decisions, and that a good strategic commander sometimes might not require the qualities required in a tactical commander. Not necessarily is this always true, for we may find that the successful tactical commander will also succeed in the higher art of strategy and in relating it to the political situation. It is easy to illustrate this last statement by merely mentioning an outstanding example, General of the Army Douglas MacArthur. Anyone familiar with all of his career would bear me out in this, I am sure. Countless other examples could be cited.

In order for a commander to establish personal leadership and control over his forces, he should be associated with them in his command capacity for as long a period as possible in the intensive and collective training and readying of the unit he is to command. His hold on his subordinates will be fully established and confirmed when he has commanded them successfully in active operations against the enemy for the first time.

Success in personal leadership in command becomes more and more difficult as the size and complexity of the unit commanded increases. To a few individuals is the personality of the commander of a unit larger than an army division known or felt. Notable exceptions to this are some of the great commanders of the last war who exercised large-scale tactical command most successfully, and whose men and officers knew and felt the influence of their authority and control. Examples that come immediately to mind are General Patton, Admiral Halsey, and Doolittle in our services, and Montgomery, A. B. Cunningham, and Slessor in the British services. All of these were known and idolized by their men and their officers.

I have heard the story, which I well believe, that in proceeding on an inspection across the U. S. front in the last war in France a sampling of this was taken and the soldiers were repeatedly asked by the visitor to what unit they belonged. Only upon entering the Third Army sector were the men universally conscious that they were members of an army. The reply usually took the form of their saying, "We are Georgie's boys." Such a proud spirit incalculated into such a large unit is of inestimable value and can be considered as the ultimate in command genius.

I have no doubt that approximately the same spirit existed in the British Eighth Army. Yet the two commanders, Patton and Montgomery, are as dissimilar in most respects as any two characters that you might encounter anywhere. Halsey exhibited a similar genius in the several types of command that he exercised in the Pacific: first, of a task force; then, of the South Pacific area; and, later, the Third Fleet. There was never any lack of consciousness as to who was in command, and the fiery fighting spirit of this commander was infused into his entire force as soon as he issued his first orders. All of these three — Patton, Montgomery, and Halsey — had decided personal idiosyncracies and yet, they each had one factor in common: a superior in strategic command who understood and appreciated their outstanding qualities and made use of them in the best way possible. Montgomery was under Alexander, himself a fine soldier of broad strategic appreciation, selfless, reserved, and of well-balanced judgment. The same words, with but slight modification, can be used to describe General Eisenhower and Admiral Nimitz.

We may ask what constituted military command. Well, I would say that it consists of the exercise of authority over the forces assigned by inspiring, leading, and controlling these forces in the attainment of military objectives and the execution of the mission as ordered by higher authority. You then may ask what are the qualities of a commander which may be considered as essential that he possess in some degree. Some of the qualities that

I will describe are often identified with leadership, but I believe the qualities of a good military commander must transcend those of mere leadership. Mahatma Gandhi was a great leader, but he lacked many of the qualities that could be considered essential in a military commander.

First of all, a military commander must possess a sense of *responsibility*, a willingness — and even eagerness — to accept responsibility, and he must keenly appreciate of what his responsibilities consist. I believe that there is a spiritual quality in this sense of responsibility, at its best, that springs from a proper pride, a loyalty to ideals, and a supreme self-respect.

A good commander should have a proper ambition to succeed and rise in his profession. This should spring from a desire and a hope that he will have scope for the exercise of the abilities which he is confident he possesses and for the benefit of the national interest — not merely in the furtherance of his own personal welfare, advancement, or glorification.

Another essential quality is *decisiveness*. This requires a bold and enterprising temper. Decisions must not be irresponsible, but time and circumstances often compel decisions involving different degrees of calculation — ranging all the way from the toss of a coin, an intelligent guess, or intuitive surmise to a reasoned and carefully evaluated estimate. All the world beats a path to the door of the man who can make a decision. Admiral C. M. (“Savvy”) Cooke said this to me — I do not know whom he quoted or whom he paraphrased.

There are countless cases in history where lack of decision on the part of the commander resulted in loss of battles, and, sometimes, where it resulted in the loss of campaigns. Often any decision to act would have been better than none with the resulting paralysis and chaos deriving from a total lack of directives. In war if you do nothing, you are sure to be wrong. If you do something, even blindly, you have about an even chance of being right.

Drive — this is a most expressive word to describe an important combination of qualities. It seems to me to involve a combination of determination, stubborn persistence, and a continuing energetic “follow-through” that minimizes resistance and overrides all obstacles to accomplishment. To succeed, a good commander must do things. He must have the drive necessary to get things done, implement his own decisions, and consummate his own plans. To paraphrase a famous Princeton football coach: “A man that won’t be frustrated can’t be frustrated.”

In order to execute his decisions, a commander must have another quality — *persuasiveness*. This will require that he be articulate in the formulation of orders and directives. He must write and speak clear and forceful English (or his native language, whatever it may be). Command cannot be practiced in differential equations. A commander should have the ability, in his contacts with his subordinates, of impressing them by word, by manner, and by his acts of execution with the importance — and even the necessity — of what they are doing. He must be sanguine and confident in manner and bearing. His exhortations must carry conviction that the plan of operations is sound and workable and that he has the capability of executing it with the forces and resources at his disposal.

Again, he must have *integrity*. This is considered to include loyalty. He must be loyal to his country, to the organization of which he is a part, and to his own command. I mention this because, although it should be taken for granted, the lack of it would incapacitate a leader — no matter how able, how brilliant, or how aggressive. But he must be true to himself. His ethical sense must dictate a line of conduct and impel him to follow it, even though it may be against his own individual interest. He must have the strength of character to refrain from backbiting and from practicing the gentle art of undermining his associates for the benefit of his own advancement. He must realize that his own career is insignificant compared to the welfare of his command,

the success of the operations, and the attainment of the objectives of the fighting.

We must include, as an element of integrity, reliability. A commander must be meticulous in the accuracy of reports to his superior; particularly, when he is reporting damage inflicted upon enemy forces. Upon the reliability and correctness of his estimate of damage to his own and enemy forces may depend the action of his superior in a far larger and more important field of activity than his own. In the last war there were many cases of reports from our own commanders which were distorted through wishful and hopeful exaggeration, mostly in good faith and in the enthusiasm of the moment. Sometimes these resulted in action in high places that was based on an incorrect estimate, it, in turn, being based on the inaccurate report. In the camp of our Japanese enemy, willful lack of integrity on the part of many, almost all, enemy commanders — high and low — resulted in misinformation everywhere. It amounted to a congenital weakness in the enemy command that again and again resulted in disaster and defeat to him. Meanwhile, the people of Japan were being fed continuously a diet of false information and propaganda that must have worn thin, even in the sight of the most stupid and fanatical. The people should know the truth and the military commander must know it.

Foresight is an essential in the good commander. Otherwise, he would always be dedicated to the defensive. With no foresight, his action would be limited to reaction. He would be confined to the riposte, the counterattack, and would never attain the initiative nor know what to do with it if he had it. A good commander is somewhat of a planner. Just as he must be close to the supervision of the operations, he must control the development of the plans and be sure they are so developed as to attain the objectives of the tasks assigned to him. He must continually satisfy himself as to the readiness of his command. All of these functions look into the future and require foresight.

Sense of judgment — he must recognize and properly assess the relative importance and relative values of all the various elements of a situation presented to him. He must reject all irrelevant or relatively unimportant matter, concentrate on the essentials, and hew to the line. He must keep his objective always in view.

Good judgment must combine imagination, keen intelligence, and practical good sense. It must be exercised in such manner as not to dampen initiative, but temper and shape it so that it is usable. Of the great leaders that I have known, Admiral A. B. Cunningham of the British Royal Navy comes immediately to my mind as one whose judgment in naval matters and in large-scale operations was almost infallible.

Character (Military Character) — He must have the moral courage to stand by his convictions and enforce his decisions upon his subordinates, have the necessary patience and determination to see his orders carried out, and sufficient personal physical courage to keep himself informed by close contact as to the progress of the battle, and, if and when necessary, to give an example to his subordinates.

A good personal character instills confidence in one's subordinates, associates and superiors. Everyone would like better to work with or for an officer who is also a gentleman, but it is not enough that the commander be merely a "nice man" or a "good fellow." Some undesirable traits can be forgiven if the moral character is sound and the commander is gifted in the art and practice of war. It has been said, for instance, that loss of temper under extreme provocation is condoned by subordinates. The troops expect the "old man" to be emphatic in his righteous rage at times; as long as the lightning does not strike them personally, they seem to enjoy a little of it. There is a famous word picture of the saintly Washington rallying defeated troops by laying about him with the flat of his sword and roundly cursing them for cowardice. His personal example and the very violence of his

anger helped to check the rout and saved the day. Of course, he had other qualities known to them and it was not fear of him but confidence in him that turned them about to face the enemy.

Military character is an essential in a commander because it will provide him with the moral strength and the self-justification to bear and to surmount the reverses and the loss of life which are concomitant to larger success and ultimate victory. It will mentally prepare him to accept the inevitable losses incident to all military operations.

War cannot be staged without loss of life. Again, the commander may be called upon to bear up under staggering losses of his material means and must find the fortitude to continue the fight with greatly reduced capabilities.

Strength of character should not be confused with calloused indifference, or a cold and brutal nature. No loss of life is negligible; no large loss of material resources can be lightly written off.

Ruggedness — he must have the physical force, the nervous stamina, and the mental energy to continue to execute his functions approximately unabated through long periods of extreme stress. This capacity is usually associated with youth. However, there are many cases of military commanders of very mature and even advanced years who have succeeded spectacularly. Probably experience, knowledge and habitude lessen the strains of command, and the tough fiber of a man is not always measured by years. Julius Caesar, Cromwell, Marlborough, Foch, Hindenburg, MacArthur and King are historical examples of elderly successes that will suffice.

It can be seen that the character, or kind of command, has much to do with the stress to which the commander is subjected. It takes an exceedingly physically rugged and mentally balanced individual to command an army division in the field,

or a task group at sea, or the air defense of an anchorage, or a force in any tactical situation where the commander must be alert and functioning at high tension over protracted periods. Probably the best criterion is the old adage, "Young men for fighting; old men for counsel." The efficiency of Mitscher, McCain, and Lee, who were our tactical vice admirals in the van of our Pacific advance, never flagged — but they all three died comparatively young. It cannot be doubted that this was due to the strain and incessant demands of too-prolonged vigilance and the cumulative fatigue of being on edge and keyed up to making, day and night, of instantaneous decisions affecting the prosecution of the campaign or the security of the vitally important tactical forces entrusted to their command. Somewhat younger men under slightly less stress, it is true, were merely tempered and seasoned by these rigors.

Humanity — a leader must have a degree of firmness exercised with kindness. By his personality he must somehow transmit his spirit, his high purpose, and his confidence to his subordinates. He must have a sympathetic understanding of their difficulties without too soft a treatment of either their frailties or their hardships. There is no place in high command for the bully or the sadist. Nevertheless, the commander must have schooled himself, psychologically, to bear the responsibility of losses of personnel, and his humanitarian impulses must be conditioned by the overriding necessity of prosecuting the war and winning the battle.

The leader is faced with the task of persuading men to overcome their most natural inhibitions and instincts. No man wants to die. Here is where war becomes serious business, indeed. The means by which a military commander convinces his men that it is necessary for them to risk their lives are many and diverse. The methods of leadership used vary with the commander, with the men he commands, with their nationalities, their state of training, their background in previous civil life, and their pride

and spirit. I mention nationality because it seems almost as if a nation had a personality. It is true that this may change, due to time, or progress, or decay; but just as some men will fight and some men won't, so it can be said of nations and so it can be said of armies or military organizations of any size and character. One of the most graphic and dramatic instances of the transformation of a fighting force from demoralization and defeat to savage resistance and aggressive prosecution of a most difficult and unpopular campaign has taken place in recent times. It was accomplished by one man, the late General de Lattre, in the campaign in Indo-China. The methods he used, I believe, were in the field of morale, emotion — perhaps described best by a French word, "esprit." His methods were adapted to the nationality, and the nature and character of the troops he commanded. His appeals probably would not have made the same impression upon American or British troops, but they were most successful in galvanizing to spirited action a very large force of Frenchmen. It is enough that he translated defeat into victory that season. Every true-hearted military leader can join France in mourning the loss of this great soldier.

Intelligence — this should be distinguished from formal education. General Bedford Forrest was an illiterate, uneducated man, but a man of high intelligence. Other qualities combined to make him one of the great leaders of our Civil War. There are cases, it is true, where dogged courage alone has prevailed, but the greatest victories in history were all achieved by highly intelligent commanders. The higher the position attained in the hierarchy of command, the less can stupidity be tolerated, and the more damaging the fatally defective would be the lack of intelligence in the commander.

Competence — I have left to nearly the last the quality that is too often omitted from treatment of either leadership or command. It may be acquired by formal education, by private study, or by exercise and experience. It is a combination of the

practical and the imaginative. It includes an ability to organize and to delegate authority, to procure from subordinates the necessary support and participation in shouldering responsibilities.

Regarding the education, the qualification, and the professional competence of a naval officer, John Paul Jones had much to say:

“The art of war deserves the exclusive attention of those who are engaged in it; the military science is only acquired by dint of study and reflection . . . (To the unprepared) - Some occasion will infallibly happen, when pungent regret for having neglected to obtain instruction will be felt in all its force by him who, charged with an important operation, is obliged to confess to himself his own incapacity to execute it. The time has gone by for beginning to attend to such study when he has unfortunately been promoted to command. Birth, patronage, solicitation, intrigue sometimes win employment and rank; but they do not secure success and credit.”

Mahan describes the professionally competent officer in French as “instruit.” This is another way of saying it is necessary that a military commander “know his stuff.” In war, ignorance is bound to be exposed. Initially, at least, Napoleon owed his rise largely to the fact that he was the most accomplished and thoroughly prepared soldier in the Europe of his day. An accumulation of brilliant tactical successes glorified him to his followers. He became, in the eyes of his soldiers, the embodiment of victory. Again, fighting men like to fight for a commander who wins.

Fighting spirit — without this, all the others become academic. It is the urge to aggressive action; a fire buried deep somewhere in a man’s make-up. It must be properly tempered and controlled by a prudent realization of the adequacy, the feasibility, and the consequences of one’s action. However, it must be

there. It must burn brightly and lastingly. It will impel a commander to continue to fight until victory, accepting no partial or incidental successes as a final result. It will transmit itself by contagion to the commander's subordinates, and repeatedly regenerate the whole command. Other qualities may be developed, but to a degree a man is born with this one. You cannot make a wildcat out of a rabbit.

During our Civil War, most of the leaders of the Confederacy seemed to have this quality. Most of the early Union generals seemed to lack it to a notable degree and had to be forced into fighting — either through public clamor or by having battle forced upon them by the enemy. Not until Grant, Sherman, and Sheridan (all obscure, retired, or discredited soldiers) were produced by actual combat operations, did this quality become evident. Even Farragut was almost overlooked. You cannot win in war without fighting, and the leaders must be fighters.

The qualities that I have mentioned are those that I deem either essential or consider to be most important. In some degree, a good commander possesses all of them. Military bearing and a commanding presence are superficial advantages. It has been said, "Good generals come in various shapes." So, I hope, do good admirals. It would seem to me that bearing, figure, and presence are of more importance when a commander is exercising either unified command over personnel of several services, and, still more so, in the case of the exercise of combined command where other nationalities are involved. In such cases, judgment is passed — initially, at least — more upon appearance and bearing than it is upon known and established reputation and the prestige one acquires over the years in one's own service. In the latter instance, an officer's qualities are apt to be well known and he is appreciated for what he has done, together with his own capacity, and not for what he looks like. Napoleon, Nelson, and Wolfe were all men of insignificant physical stature, even for that day. On the other

hand, Allbeny, Haig, Petain, Beatty, Sims, and Pershing — all World War I leaders — were exceedingly handsome military figures.

Here is what a very wise man some years ago had to say about the qualities of a good general:

“The general must know how to get his men their rations and every other kind of stores needed for war. He must have imagination to originate plans, practical sense and energy to carry them through. He must be observant, untiring, shrewd; (and, in turn) kindly and cruel; simple and crafty; a watchman and a robber; lavish and miserly; generous and stingy; and rash and conservative. All these and many other qualities, natural and acquired, he must have. He should also as a matter of course know his tactics; for a disorderly mob is no more an army than a heap of building materials is a house.”

The man was Socrates; the year was about 432 B. C.

Let it be understood that no able military leader achieves popularity by courting it. In war, the commander everyone wants is the one that can lead them to successes. In wartime, if you have the qualities and the aptitude for military command and you have prepared yourself for the exercise of high command, you will succeed inevitably for the following reasons: Every superior for whom you work is looking frantically and desperately for someone who can do a job for him; every subordinate is looking eagerly, hopefully, for someone who can lead him, tell him what to do, make decisions for him. From above, you will find yourself being pulled upward. From below, you will feel yourself propelled in the same direction. In moments when you may doubt yourself, and we all have those moments, look about you and see if you find anyone else who you think could do the job better than you. Usually, this will restore your self-confidence.

Command functions combine into a process that is progressive and continuous. While a commander is exercising military command, he is responsible without respite for the effective and vigorous prosecution of the operations which will achieve his objectives and contribute to the execution of the over-all mission. Obviously, no single man can do this properly unaided. He must sleep sometime. He must direct his attention and allocate his time only to those functions which absolutely require his judgment and decision. This makes mandatory a staff that can function on a continuous basis, performing most of the routine and the contributory and supporting functions for him. They assist him, but they cannot share his responsibility to his superior officer because they are responsible only to him and only in a staff capacity. They can exercise his authority only to the extent and for the purposes he has specifically directed — and then only in his name and with his responsibility. Modern military command of large and complex forces, especially when other services and other nationalities are involved, requires large and complex staffs. These must, however, be well organized, and the efforts of their components must be coordinated and synthesized in order that the commander can be spared any unnecessary effort or any work that others could do for him.

Commanders have certain personal predilections in the manner in which they exercise their command and employ the services of their staffs. It is my observation, however, that those geniuses who do not fully employ their staffs are headed for trouble. Either much is left undone, or they drive themselves to nervous distraction and a physical breakdown. I would say that it is all right to be a perfectionist, but, if carried to its extreme, this characteristic can alienate a staff from the commander and wreck the morale of subordinate commanders. This does not mean that the commander should lessen his drive for results nor lower his standards of performance, but that he should confine his notice and powers to the important factors and events. The chief of staff should be

the nagging villain of the piece that maintains the tone and high-grade technical perfection of the performance of the staff.

In my opinion, the Navy of the pre-war era was backward in its realization of the importance of strategic command and somewhat abashed at the necessity of establishing strategic commands with adequate staffs at a shore headquarters. Every naval officer aspires to tactical command afloat. The opportunities afforded for spectacular achievement, and for the glory and acclaim accorded a victorious naval commander after tactical victory, are difficult to foreswear. The hampering predilection to combine the functions still persists in spite of the many "horrible" examples of ineffective strategic direction, when attempts were made to exercise it afloat and to combine tactical command with it. Contrasted to these failures is the complete and outstandingly successful CinCPac-CinCPoa exercise of full strategic command and over-all administrative control from adequate headquarters at Pearl Harbor, and, later, at Pearl Harbor and Guam. Other instances are ComNorPac, especially Admiral Halsey as ComSoPac, and ConNavNAW and ComSEVENTHFleet — the first two, unified area commands, the latter two purely naval.

Also, I can say that the U. S. Navy was backward in realizing the necessity for properly equipped flagships and provision of adequate staffs and staff facilities for tactical commanders. The complexity, extent, and novelty of naval tactical command in the last war is best illustrated by the control of the execution of amphibious operations. The Navy was totally unprepared by either training, organization, equipment, communications, tactics, or education to undertake this important means of exercising and exploiting sea power. We can thank the Marine Corps and the British Combined Operations for keeping the art alive and developing it initially, and we should hang our heads in shame. Fortunately, the Navy is quick to learn and we were able to pull our chestnuts out of the fire. We were versatile in developing new and successful

equipment and techniques and a vast, but effective, command organization — and the commanders that could use it and prosecute this important type of warfare.

Our Navy from its very birth has required from its commanders strict accountability for their actions and their performance of duty. We are indeed fortunate that the United States Navy inherited from the Royal Navy a great measure of the traditions and ethics of command, and the spirit and code of fighting conduct at sea. Great Britain was then the supreme naval power, as she had been for a long time before and was to be for a long time thereafter. We were fortunate, too, because our parent nation had a long seafaring experience, and it was in that ancient school that our own seamen of that day were reared and instructed. These were priceless heritages, and they were fostered and propagated by our own leader, John Paul Jones. It was not only by the pre-eminent example of his genius for leadership, but greatly due to the fact that he was singularly articulate for a seaman of that day — or, perhaps I should say for a seaman of any day. He expressed himself in lucid, forcible English, and this thinking was deep, profound, and eminently practical. The philosophy and logic of his writings, the training, administration and schooling of John Barry, and the old "Articles for the Government of the Navy" provided the spirit, the standards, and the rules of conduct for our officer corps over the years of development of our new Navy.

It has seemed to many that the strict accountability enforced by our naval service, and the high standards of performance of duty relentlessly demanded from those in command, are cruel, unreasonable, and autocratic. Nevertheless, results over many years under the stress of intensive training for war, and of the actual fighting at sea, have proven them justified. Commenting upon a recent naval disaster, I would like to quote some extracts from an article in the *Wall Street Journal* of May 14, 1952, entitled, "Hobson's Choice." This validates better than any words of mine the Navy's unremitting requirement:

“Now comes the cruel business of accountability. Those who were there, those who were left from those who were there, must answer how it happened and whose was the error that made it happen. . . .”

“And it seems more cruel still, because all around us in other places we see the plea accepted that what is done beyond discussion, and that for good men in their human errors there should be afterward no accountability.

“.. . But we are told men should no longer be held accountable for what they do as well as for what they intend. To err is not only human, it absolves responsibility.

“Everywhere, that is, except on the sea. On the sea there is a tradition older even than the traditions of the country itself and wiser in its age than this new custom. It is the tradition that with responsibility goes authority and with them both goes accountability. . . .”

“It is cruel, this accountability of good and well-intentioned men. But the choice is that or an end to responsibility and, finally, as the cruel sea has taught, an end to the confidence and trust in the men who lead, for men will not long trust leaders who feel themselves beyond accountability for what they do.”

I do not know who wrote this, but I believe that he was neither a naval officer nor a seaman. However, he has grasped completely the philosophy of the United States Navy in holding its leaders entirely accountable for the results they obtain. May our great Service never accede to the importunities of softer counsel!

The question of professional competence is almost of as much importance, but it will not be as evident to the individual who fails as it will be to the superior who has trusted him and delegated him the authority and the accountability for the performance of important tasks. Unless involved in a disaster of unmistakable proportions, few in high command realize or are ready to accept the extent and magnitude of their failures or shortcomings. Usually, they can rationalize their conduct of affairs and justify themselves to themselves by ascribing their errors to bad luck, to that overworked phrase, "calculated risk" (which usually involves more risk than calculation), or even claim that they actually have succeeded — that the defeat or stalemate was in reality a victory.

It is not enough that an officer who aspires to flag rank has become proficient in all that is necessary to command a single ship successfully. These qualities, and the professional knowledge and abilities that qualify him for this important assignment, are only part of what he will need to exercise higher command. Over the years of his career — by formal education in our higher schools, by participation in and observation of fleet exercises, and by personal application and study — he should have acquired a knowledge of and proficiency in the practice of the higher arts of his profession: tactics (not of a single ship or unit, but of dispositions and formations — large and small); the objective uses and effects of weapons; the logistical and administrative needs of a large and diverse force; the strategy of campaigns and the relation of strategic matters to the whole contemporary political picture. He should realize that he is about to graduate into a new and greatly enlarged sphere of activity with infinitely larger responsibilities. Some do not comprehend the demands that will be made upon them until they find themselves faced with immediate and urgent requirements for leadership in a field of activity with which they are unfamiliar and ill-prepared.

So, if you have any aspirations or expectancy of some day attaining flag rank, expend over the years intervening between now and then a little effort each day in schooling yourself psychologically and in developing yourself professionally to shoulder the burden that may be yours. It is not sufficient that you merely wear the uniform of the rank that goes with the leadership, nor that you merely take over and hoist your flag, but you must be prepared truly to exercise the leadership and actually to command.

However they were chosen, I would say that our nation has great reason to be proud of its leadership in World War II — particularly in its high-command leadership, the so-called “brass.” Our own naval leaders were able to hold their own in the higher councils and exercised high command of both fleets and forces and of unified commands ably — even brilliantly in many instances. We never before in the history of the Republic had such uniformly competent and inspired naval commanders in our top command positions.

While you will not amass riches in our profession, I know of none that provides a more fascinating career. It has been said that “In war the true commander yearns not for a bigger tent, but for more command.” Your best rewards will be: the approval of your superior; the assignment of new and more important tasks; higher responsibility; the command of larger forces and of more important operations. If you are worthy and fortunate enough to attain high command in the Naval or Military Service, you will have achieved a notable success in life. If you should exercise such command in active combat operations against an enemy of the United States, you can take much comfort and justified pride in having inflicted damage on enemy forces or in having wrested from him important strategic positions — and thus in having made a material contribution to the final victory.

In closing, I would like to assure you that there is nothing in life that will give you more satisfaction than to look back

upon a career consisting of a large measure of the exercise of successful military command. It is exciting to contemplate, exhilarating to experience, and satisfying in retrospect. Ours is, indeed, an old and a most honorable profession. Be proud that you belong to it!

BIOGRAPHIC SKETCH

Admiral Richard L. Conolly, U.S.N. (Ret.)

Admiral Conolly was born in Waukegan, Illinois, on 26 April 1892. He attended Lake Forest Academy and was graduated from the U. S. Naval Academy in June, 1914.

From graduation until 1929, he served normal rotation at sea in battleships and destroyers; attended the Postgraduate School in Engineering at the Naval Academy and Columbia University, where he received an M. Sc. degree; was an instructor at the Naval Academy. In 1929, he assumed command of the U. S. S. CASE. Following this, he was a student in the Junior Course at the Naval War College and a member of the staff; served on the staff of Commander, Cruisers, Scouting Force, and in the U. S. S. TENNESSEE; was an instructor at the Naval Academy.

In May, 1939, Admiral Conolly was transferred to the Pacific area and assumed command of DesDiv 7. He became Commander, DesRon 6, in January of 1941. Following this, he returned to the United States in April, 1942, to serve, first, in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and then on the staff of Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet. Early in 1943, he joined the Amphibious Force, Atlantic Fleet, as Commander, Landing Craft and Bases, Northwest African Waters. In October of the same year, he was transferred to Amphibious Forces, Pacific Fleet, and was designated Commander, Group 3 in July, 1944. For a short period following the Japanese capitulation, Admiral Conolly commanded occupation troops and then was ordered back to the United States to serve, first, as DCNO (Operations) and then DCNO (Administration) until September, 1946. During this period, he had additional duty as United States Naval Advisor to the Council of Foreign Ministers at the Peace Conference in Paris and as United States Naval Advisor to the European Advisory Commission in London.

In September, 1946, he assumed duty as Commander of the U. S. Naval Forces, Europe, and of the Twelfth Fleet — with the rank of Admiral. In 1947, his title was changed to Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean. On 1 December 1950, Admiral Conolly became President of the Naval War College, serving in that capacity until his retirement on 2 November 1953. The following day, he assumed his present position as President of Long Island University.

Admiral Conolly has been the recipient of many foreign decorations. Other awards include: Navy Cross; Distinguished Service Medal with two Gold Stars; Legion of Merit and Gold Star with Combat "V"; Commendation Ribbon with Combat "V"; Mexican Service Medal; Victory Medal Destroyer Clasp; American Defense Service Medal, Fleet Clasp; Asiatic-Pacific Area Campaign Medal with silver star for five campaigns; Philippine Liberation Medal with two bronze stars; European-African-Middle East Area Campaign Medal with bronze stars for three campaigns; American Area Campaign Medal; World War II Victory Medal.

HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF U. S. FOREIGN POLICY

A lecture delivered
at the Naval War College
in academic year 1954-1955 by
Professor William T. R. Fox

I have been asked to speak this morning on the development of American foreign policy. If there is any one continuing theme which will run through my remarks, it is that the basic attitudes which Americans bring to perplexing problems of foreign policy has changed remarkably little since the early days of the Republic. The world, however, and especially the United States itself, has changed a good deal, and it is therefore hardly surprising to find that American foreign policy has changed along with it, for if one applies old ideas to new situations, one is likely to get new policies.

The viewpoints toward foreign policy which keep recurring in our public debates in this second half of the 20th century were all familiar in the second half of the 18th. Isolationism, what we now call Wilsonian Internationalism, and the emphasis on a rational calculation of the national interest were all evident, although the labels were somewhat different.

18th-century Americans had never been pleased by the fact that war in Europe was pretty sure to mean trouble in North America too. What we in America call the "French and Indian War" was, in European eyes, simply the North American part of the Seven Years War. The colonists resented being involved in skirmishes along the frontier with marauding Indians each time diplomacy reached an impasse' in Europe. When, in 1759, colonial soldiers suffering great privations finally conquered the inaccessible fortress at Louisburg on Cape Briton Island, only to have it restored to the French at a conference table in Europe,

some now familiar attitudes — that America has a separate set of interests all her own, that she should be allowed to stay out of European politics and to keep Europe out of American politics, that European power politics is evil and no fit game for honest Americans to participate in — all these attitudes were probably intensified by such experiences as that at Louisburg.

The natural irritation of the colonists at being pawns in the inter-dynastic chess game of European great power politics was reinforced by some ideas which were coming across the ocean from France, where revolutionary ideas were preparing the way for France's own Revolution. One classic formulation of the relationship between domestic and foreign politics must have seemed especially pertinent to the intellectual leaders of the American Revolution: "The flatterers persuade princes that the internal welfare of the people should be subordinated to the requirements of an expanding foreign policy. Duty tells them the opposite." Here is the notion that a republican government concerned with the public good is naturally isolationist, while a monarchical government concerned with the glory of the reigning prince is naturally interventionist. One student of 18th-century international affairs has written on this point that "the logical consequence was that in a reformed world based on reason, foreign policy and diplomacy would become unnecessary and that the new world would be a world without diplomats". It is interesting to note that the fear of European diplomacy and of secret diplomacy, which has been so prevalent in the United States in our own generation, has such deep roots. The notion that in any diplomatic negotiation our honorable but apparently not over-bright Uncle Sam would necessarily come home from the international poker game in a barrel because he had lost not only his shirt but his trousers as well is perhaps not quite so old, but it is a related idea.

The Utopians of the 18th century were isolationist. They believed in private international trade between individuals but

not in public international politics between sovereign states. In the 20th century, for reasons that I will discuss later, the utopian is likely to be internationalist. He brings to his zeal for reforming the organization of the world another 18th-century idea derived from America's internal political experience. The startling success of the United States in creating an instrument of government, the U. S. Constitution, simply by bringing together the leaders of the country and convening them in a constitutional convention has made it easy for Americans to believe that the political system of the world and especially that of Europe, could also be reformed by holding a conference, drafting a document, and getting it ratified. It is because so many Americans thought of the San Francisco Conference, which wrote the Charter of the United Nations, as a world constitutional convention which would usher in a whole new era of international relations unmarred by "power politics," that there is so much professed dissatisfaction and disillusionment with the accomplishments of that oversold organization. The extraordinary importance which American diplomacy attached to the ratification of the European Defense Community agreement and the excessive gloom which followed its defeat in the French Parliament seem to me to reflect a little of the same great faith in the possibility of changing a whole political system by a single act of constitution-making. Woodrow Wilson and John Foster Dulles may have much more in common than either the Republicans or the Democrats now care to admit. (Incidentally, in these days when it is so fashionable to associate Wilsonian internationalism with naiveté in foreign affairs, we ought to note that Woodrow Wilson was not quite so Wilsonian as some of his contemporary detractors would have us believe. He was quite willing, for example, to embark on a naval race with Great Britain, because he was as unwilling to see United States naval power menaced by the unchecked naval power of Britain as by the unchecked land power of Germany. Furthermore, in 1919 he accepted the necessity for an Anglo-American-French guarantee of France's German borders as an essential un-

derpinning to the general security arrangements in the League Covenant. Thus the North Atlantic Pact had its precursor two decades before, one which was unfortunately abortive, since Wilson's tripartite guarantee failed with the Senate rejection of the Versailles Treaty.)

The twin conception that America has a set of interests different from Europe which makes our foreign policy naturally isolationist, and that the old diplomacy of European monarchies is evil and must be replaced by a new diplomacy of democratic peoples, now seem to me to be incompatible; for the first point, toward withdrawal from European politics and the second toward participation in international organization. In the 18th century they reinforced each other to support the characteristic aloofness of the United States from European politics. But the two ideas are still alike in their antipathy toward what some people now call the game of power politics. For the doctrinaire internationalist is a potential isolationist. Conceiving of European politics as a "dirty game" and demanding that it be reformed as a condition to our participation is to suggest that we are willing, if our demands are not heeded, to withdraw altogether. Thus the isolationist and the doctrinaire internationalist are alike in believing that American non-participation is feasible, in believing that the United States can have some measure of security in the modern world by withdrawing from it and pretending that it does not exist. Warren G. Harding was elected President partly on the basis of his assertion that he was for a League of Nations but happened to be opposed to some of the details in the Covenant of *the* League of Nations, the only League which the United States happened to have the opportunity of joining at the moment. Thus, for all practical purposes, he was an isolationist, even during the campaign period when he was so assiduously cultivating the votes of those who wanted an even better League than the one which Wilson brought home from Paris. Today when we suggest that certain kinds of American aid may no longer be available unless our European allies behave in specified ways, that we may have

to undertake some "agonizing reappraisals," there is the implication that it is only out of generosity that the U. S. has helped Western Europe in the post-war period and that we on this side of the Atlantic are not really threatened at all and can stay home any time we choose, and may well do so if our European allies do not find a substitute for the EDC which satisfies us.

Before we turn to consider how changed world conditions have changed American foreign policy, even though some of our basic attitudes have not changed at all, it may be worth mentioning one other characteristic American foreign policy position — that the proper way to settle disputes with other sovereign states is by treating them as legal disputes and arguing them as if they were cases at law. Beginning with the Jay Treaty of 1794, the U. S. has been party to a long list of arbitration treaties. Perhaps it has been because, through most of our history, the United States has been well-separated from the cockpit of European power politics, perhaps it has been because American Secretaries of State have almost without exception been lawyers, as have indeed a very large proportion of our statesmen and politicians, that a variety of distinctive American policies have been stated in international law terms. During the century or so when it seemed feasible to plan to stay out of European wars, we took the lead in asserting neutral rights and arguing the virtues of a short contraband list. With the rise of American naval power, there came a noticeable de-emphasis in our insistence on neutral rights, and it is ironical that in the current exchange of acerbities regarding trade with Iron Curtain countries, the U. S. and Britain have exchanged their historical roles with the United States favoring much more extreme limitations on that trade during this cold-war period. Another historical legal position of the United States has been the *de jure* recognition of successful revolutionary governments. As a country which had successfully won its independence from monarchical Britain, we had little reason to deny recognition to other countries which had broken away from their imperial masters. As a republic which had abolished royal

prerogatives, we had little interest in denying recognition to other governments established illegally after successful revolution in the name of democracy. It is only since 1917 that we have felt the inconveniences of our traditional legal position which would have forced us to recognize regimes which our government has regarded with disfavor. It took us 16 years to agree to the recognition of Soviet Russia. From present appearances, Communist China may still have a long time to wait. Finally, there has been one other legal position which reflected our special position in the world. Lacking colonies of our own in the 19th century, it was hardly surprising that we tried to make international law do for us what colonial expansion did for others. We sought to give the American trader and investor the same kind of security of life, liberty, and property in underdeveloped areas that he would have had in the American West or that an Englishman would have had in a Crown Colony. We no longer put so much emphasis in our diplomacy on the enforcement of private rights, and, more particularly, on the regular payment of interest on the bonded debt, if only because, in the era of the cold war, we value the good-will of the governments and peoples from underdeveloped areas far too much to drive them into the arms of the Soviet Union by too harsh insistence on fair treatment of American traders and investors. As the United States has moved from the edge of European politics to the center of the world stage, it is no longer possible to treat each separate American grievance as a case to be argued solely on its own legal and moral merits.

Americans have always nourished isolationist dreams as if they could forget about the world, and utopian dreams that power politics and war could somehow be eliminated from international relations by changing the rules of the game or by treating every dispute as a case of law. But they have always had a capacity for hard-headed calculation of the national interest. Even the idealistic Jefferson, a francophile and an anglophobe who loved France for the ideas which it produced in the Age of Reason and hated England for the events that led to the American Revo-

lution, could say that the day the French flag flew in New Orleans, the United States would have to marry itself to the British fleet. For he saw as clearly as did Alexander Hamilton that America's safety lay in Europe's strife. He saw that the tiny maritime republic on the Western fringes of the Atlantic was safe from the predatory powers of Europe only as long as these powers had to keep their major forces in Europe and European waters in order to protect themselves against each others. The too great victory of any one of them might have spelled the end of the American experiment in republican government. The first generation of American statesmen saw clearly what the conditions were under which the new country would have a chance to grow to maturity.

The American Revolution had proved that such a great power as England could not easily put down rebellion in North America and finally chose to give up the struggle.

Each passing year would make it still more difficult for a European power to destroy American independence, once orderly central government was established and the normal processes of growth in population and production were allowed to operate. But if time was on the side of an independent United States, this was true only so long as the European powers were kept occupied in guarding against each other. It was this condition which led the authors of the *Federalist* Papers to describe the object of American naval strength as being "so to incline the balance in this part of the world as to dictate the terms of the connection between the old and the new world. Alexander Hamilton, in one of the *Federalist* papers, wrote that "our situation invites and interests prompt us to aim at an ascendant in the system of American affairs . . . The superiority she (Europe) has long maintained has tempted her to plume herself as the mistress of the world and consider the rest of mankind as created for her terms . . . But Americans disdain to be the instruments of European greatness. Let the thirteen states . . . concur in

erecting one great American system superior to all trans-Atlantic forces." But note that these statesmen who were so ambitious for America felt no desire and saw no possibility of dictating to Europe regarding the course of European affairs. Thus, a tough-minded calculation of the national interest pointed toward the same kind of policy as did our isolationist and utopian sentiments. The culminating point in this early diplomacy to establish American paramountcy in the new world was perhaps the Monroe Doctrine, enunciated in 1823, a foreign policy clearly based on taking constructive advantage of Europe's strife to develop America's strength.

The European-American relationship has undergone drastic modification in the century and a half since the first generation of American statesmen passed from the scene. In their day, there were never less than five great powers, and as recently as 1914, there were eight. Today, there are only two powers of the first rank, whatever honorific status may be given to Britain, France, and that other holder of a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council, the Nationalist Government of Chiang Kai-shek. In an earlier day, there were enough great powers so that a primitive collective security system operated almost automatically. Louis XIV, Napoleon, Bismark, the Kaiser and Hitler were each in their turn to discover that expansion could only go so far without provoking a grand alliance against a great disturber. And of these, only Bismark learned in time to save the fruits of early aggression for his Fatherland. Today, there are not enough powers of the first rank for this self-operating collective security system to work. Two, unhappily, is too few to collect, for if one of them breaks the peace, there is only one policeman left.

In the earlier period, great powers were all located in Europe. Today, Europe is no longer the home of the great Powers but the major arena in which they contend. Western Europe has come to play in American diplomacy a role something like that which Low Countries have historically played for England. It

is a buffer area whose independence we greatly cherish. Formerly we could count on the states of Europe to preserve their own independence in the operations of the European balance of power. Today we find that Western Europe will be very likely overrun unless we ourselves take active and costly steps to prevent it.

The reason for this is fairly simple: the same technological advances which made it possible for the United States to span a continent and grow strong also permitted the emergence of another great land power in Eurasia — the Soviet Union. It was the development of more efficient overland transport which permitted the rise of these two great land powers. The invention and spread of the railroad, of the automobile and truck, and of the airplane, and of telegraph and radio, have made the efficient administration of great land areas possible, which, in another era, would have broken apart. In Europe, on the other hand, where national boundaries hardened long before the revolution in overland transportation, the former great Powers are still about the same size as was appropriate to a more primitive state of overland transportation. If the power of Western Europe overcomes to be used as a single unit, it would provide some very effective competition for both the United States and the Soviet Union. But the record of effort toward unity shows how slow and painful progress is likely to be along these lines. Still another difference between the world politics of our own decade and that of the early days of the republic is the political awakening of Asia, where more than half the population of mankind is in a state of revolt against the existing order. With the two superpowers the United States and the Soviet Union, apparently so evenly balanced, we are likely to see a great many efforts to cultivate the good will of these newly awakened masses. Thus we seem to have moved into an era of inverted imperialism in which the underdeveloped areas are likely to be able to make successful demands upon the advanced Western powers, and particularly the United States. Finally, developments in military technique have made modern war a much less precise instrument for

achieving national objectives. Even victory may involve near-annihilation, and the all-around distaste for general war in an era of thermonuclear weapons is so great that the advantage in cold war and limited war may be decisive.

For more than a century, the United States enjoyed almost cost-free protection from any prospective European aggressor. It used its army to bring law and order to the American West, and its navy and Marine Corps to protect the American trader and investor from the halls of Montezuma to the shores of Tripoli, to say nothing of Commodore Perry's opening up of Japan. Americans like to believe that colonial wars were fought in other countries by imperial exploiters. Just as the colonial powers of Europe were bringing law and order to Kipling's "lesser breeds beyond the law", whether they liked it or not, in India and in Africa — so were our armed forces preoccupied with making the American West a fit place for white men to live in, and the Navy and Marine Corps making the shores of foreign countries a fit place in which to trade, travel, and invest. It was almost as if we had decided that the 14th Amendment of the United States Constitution was to be made to apply the world over except of course in Europe, where the legal systems for the protection of private rights were as advanced as our own.

Our armed power was not used in Europe, but it is not quite true that we stayed out of any European wars into which we could possibly have entered, for there was a century of absence of general war in Europe from 1815 to 1914, and we had gotten into the Napoleonic Wars, once for either side, first in the French Naval War of 1798, then again in the War of 1812. There we found ourselves, in effect, the allies of Napoleon, or so it must have seemed to our British enemy, who had to ration his armed force between two threats. Our experience in the 20th century, where there was again general war in Europe, suggests that we are likely to continue to get into every large war that occurs in Europe, and therefore must find some way to prevent war if we are to have peace.

You will remember that we have already said that American security has always depended on Europe being able to keep itself in balance. If it cannot, we have an interest in preserving the independence of the states of Western Europe against any challenge from the East, whether it comes from the Soviet Union or Germany or the two together. It is similar to that of the historic British interest in preserving independence of Holland and Belgium. This is perhaps why we are almost certain to be involved — and for three centuries practically every great power has been involved in every war in which there was a great power on each side, so that there have been something like 12 or 13 wars in which all or all but one of the great Powers were involved. We can, then, only have peace by appearing strong enough and ready enough to meet any challenge to the European order. It took American power to break the stalemate in the First World War. It took American power to check the advance of Hitler in the Second, and it is taking American power to counter Soviet expansionism before it finally results in a Third World War.

We have reluctantly reconciled ourselves to the need for a more or less permanent semi-mobilization of our war potential, because we realize that the free ride in national security which the United States experienced in the 19th century seems to be gone for good, that that state of affairs that enabled us to get along without large armies and navies and to get along without allies is also gone for good, that the United States can never again look forward to staying out of the mainstream of history. We are prepared to develop the minimum armed strength necessary to guarantee security and ask that as much as possible of our productive energies shall be reserved for the satisfaction of civilian wants.

How different our viewpoint is from that of a bare half century ago, when the United States, flushed with the triumph of the Spanish-American war, first felt the pleasurable sensation of being taken seriously in world politics. For a half century we

have been struggling to discover how to use our enormous power and what are the sobering responsibilities that go with its possession. Already, 50 years ago our steel production was surpassing that of any other power. Already, at the beginning of the 20th century, our population was about that of the two largest powers of Western Europe. Our Navy, after a generation of neglect following the Civil War, was rapidly surging ahead and was shortly to become one of the two or three greatest in the world. The railroad, which, in the first decades after its invention, seemed to be a device for increasing the power of Bismarck's Germany, for Germany was centrally located in Europe and, with the railroad, could apply its power first in one direction, then in another — paradoxically in its second phase, took away from Germany and restored to the sea power the advantage which it had first conferred on Germany. For the railroad had as its second consequence an increasing European dependence on overseas sources of food and other raw materials and exposed the land powers of continental Europe to the slow strangulation of economic blockade by whatever powers controlled the oceans or the food and raw materials that lay on the other side. As long as Britain and the United States worked together, there could be no question as to who would win a protracted war. The League Covenant, with its emphasis on economic sanctions, reflected the profound respect for the efficiency of economic blockade which the statesmen of the First World War period developed.

With the British and American navies working alongside each other in two world wars, conflict has not taken the form of sea power vs. sea power but rather of land power vs. sea power. Whether the British planned it that way is a subject on which we need not tarry, but Britain has been retreating in her conflicts with the United States for many decades and long before American naval power reached parity with Britain's. The rise of Germany under Bismarck, Germany's rapid industrialization, her restless rulers and their apparently unlimited diplomatic ambitions caused

Britain after about 1895 to mend her fences above all with the United States, but also with Japan, France and Russia. To the Canadians, her surrender of Canadian interests in the Alaska-Canada boundary dispute was the final recognition of American paramountcy in the new world. The bitterness of the Anglo-American naval arms race just after World War I somewhat hid the fact that the fundamental clashes of interest had been eliminated by Britain's withdrawal. From the American point of view, an effective collaboration with Britain has finally come, since 1941, to seem the indispensable cornerstone of a European policy aimed at preventing the overturn of European order by either an aggressive Germany or an aggressive Russia. We have come a long way from the doctrine of no foreign entanglement which we associate with Washington and Jefferson to the intimate military collaboration with Britain that has been continuous since 1941.

With the implementation of the North Atlantic Pact by the most detailed political-military planning the world has seen in advance of actual war, we have gone even further. It is possible that in both the First and Second World Wars, the prospective German aggressor would have been deterred, had he known how surely American industrial potential was going to be applied to destroy his armed forces. We have certainly done a great deal since 1945 to make it easy for the Soviet Power Center not to make the mistake which Hitler and the Kaiser made in 1939 and 1914. We hope that, with a balanced rearmament capable of meeting general aggression by a devastating counter-blow and meeting local aggression locally, our prospective Communist opponents will come to believe that war with the U. S. cannot be won before American weight can be effectively thrown in the balance. It is taking somewhere between 15 and 20% of our national income to achieve this modest objective, and there is apparently almost complete national unanimity about the regulation of our defense expenditures. While the Democrats may be accusing the Republicans of cheese-paring in national defense, the amount of the alleged cheese-paring in question is only 5 or 10% of the total military budget.

Are we doing enough to meet the present requirements of American foreign policy? It took the Communist coup in Czechoslovakia to win the Congressional approval of large appropriations under the Marshall Plan in 1948; it took the Korean aggression in June 1950 to bring about Congressional approval of the large-scale increase in force levels which have gone into effect. If we could always count on the Soviet leadership to shock us into the military and foreign aid policy that protects our national security, we are probably safe. But suppose that a more astute Soviet leadership fails to give us warning? Do we have the leadership to win public approval and adequate national security policies if Soviet behavior is moderate? It is this question which gives point to a continuing calculation of the requirements for adequate national security.

As in the 18th century, the isolationists and the utopians are still with us. Neither believes any longer that we can forget about national security and threats from the outside world. But the isolationist is apt to be as concerned with the threat of internal subversion as with that of foreign aggression. He is apt to be almost as distrustful of America's allies as of her enemies, especially of her larger European allies. So he may be a bit of an "Asia-lationist". He still believes in a "lone-hand" policy and may even for that reason alone want to stake America's primary defense on strategic air power.

The utopian is no longer sanguine about the possibilities of "utopia in one country". He wants international government, the four freedoms and full bellies everywhere in the world. Point Four and UNESCO — "peoples speaking to peoples" — would be his assurance for a warless future. He still believes that Uncle Sam can swear off power politics like an Alcoholic Anonymous swears off demon rum — by the laying on of hands.

An Alexander Hamilton or a John Quincy Adams, were he to revisit our troubled planet, would still believe that American security required the checking of any aspirant to universal hegemony in Eurasia, but he would recognize that this is a condition

we now have to work to maintain — by guarantee and military aid in Europe, by checking piecemeal aggression and by encouraging rising living standards in Asia, by mobilizing free world opinion through the United Nations and through our public information policies, but most of all by developing the balanced military strength to discourage the aggressor from making either big or little wars and to permit retaliation and recuperation if full-scale armed attack should nevertheless occur.

The past ten years have seen a revolution in American foreign policy. We have in this decade for the first time made an alliance in peace-time, for the first time built up our armed forces in peace-time to something like war-time levels, for the first time used economic aid and psychological strategy to support our military and political objectives. Some think it came thirty years too late, but it came. And it came on the basis of an interpretation of present-day facts which Hamilton and Jefferson would, I believe, both have approved.

What of the future? As a layman who finds astounding science fiction pretty pale stuff beside the reality of advancing military technology, I have only one concern — that in a day of rapid change, when the oceans no longer give us a shield of time and distance to mobilize after a war crisis occurs, when the military build-up takes longer than ever before with the increasing complexity of weapons and the ever more complete mobilization — that the critical decisions to keep our military and foreign policies in line may have to be taken several years before the actual war crisis, and that we may pass the point of no return without even realizing it. It is this that gives so much point to the serious study in our universities and in our war colleges of the common problems of foreign and military policy — so that threats to the national security can be identified in time to do something about them.

BIOGRAPHIC SKETCH

Professor William T. R. Fox

Professor Fox received his B. S. degree from Haverford College in 1932 and his A. M. degree from the University of Chicago in 1934. He was a Norman Wait Harris Foundation Fellow at the latter institution in 1935-36 and received his Ph. D. degree there in 1940.

From 1936 to 1941, he was an instructor in political science at Temple University and during the next two years he was an instructor and conference director in the School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton University. In 1943, Doctor Fox became associated with Yale University, first as a research associate in the Institute of International Studies and then as associate professor of political science. He joined the faculty of Columbia University in 1950, where he is currently Professor of International Relations and Director of the Institute of War and Peace Studies.

Aside from his professorial duties, Doctor Fox has served as a consultant to the Department of State at various times since 1944. He has been on the Board of Editors of *International Organization* since 1946 and Managing Editor of *World Politics* since 1948. He was a member of the International Secretariat at the San Francisco Conference, United Nations, in 1945.

Professor Fox is the author of *The Superpowers*; co-author of *Absolute Weapons (Part III: International Control of Atomic Weapons)*, and also co-author of *Technology and International Relations*.

AN INTRODUCTION TO THE NAVAL WAR COLLEGE COURSES

An address delivered
at the Naval War College
on 19 August 1955 by

*Rear Admiral Thomas H. Robbins, Jr., U. S. N.,
Chief of Staff*

Gentlemen:

As Chief of Staff, it is a pleasure to add my personal welcome to all of you. We are devoting the first day to this orientation in order that you may begin your studies here with a clear understanding of your goal, and the manner in which you will be working towards it during the coming year. Accordingly, it is my purpose in the next half hour or so to give you a general introduction to the Courses of the College as a whole. Later on today, you will be given additional and detailed information on your own courses.

To review for a brief moment, let us look at the Mission of the College. It has been somewhat changed from that contained in the Catalog of Courses which was mailed to you prior to your arrival. As recently promulgated by the Chief of Naval Operations it is:

**TO FURTHER AN UNDERSTANDING OF THE
FUNDAMENTALS OF WARFARE, INTERNA-
TIONAL OPERATIONS, AND INTERSERVICE
OPERATIONS, WITH EMPHASIS ON THEIR AP-
PLICATION TO FUTURE NAVAL WARFARE IN
ORDER TO PREPARE OFFICERS FOR HIGHER
COMMAND.**

Now let us analyze this Mission.

There are certain abstract factors which apply to warfare wherever it is fought, whether on land, at sea, in the air, under the sea, or in any combination. But a study of abstract factors alone is of questionable value to a commander, unless he practices weighing the fundamentals of warfare in relation to the situation facing him, thereafter practicing at arriving at sound conclusions; making his decisions; and preparing plans for the conduct of his current and future operations. Such practice enables the commander to bring his own personal characteristics and abilities to bear on his problems, and thus lifts the process of military planning and decision from the routine of a check-off list to the level of an art. The sound basis of the art of naval warfare, therefore, rests upon the knowledge of the fundamentals — the abstract factors, if you please — projected into the situations of today and of tomorrow, all vitalized by the brains, character, boldness and determination of the commander.

You will note that the Mission of the College takes these matters into account in stressing the words “fundamentals of warfare”, “application to future naval warfare”, and “preparation for higher command.”

The College has derived from this mission three overall objectives:

1. “THE INCREASE OF EACH OFFICER’S KNOWLEDGE OF THE FUNDAMENTALS OF NAVAL WARFARE AND OF OTHER RELATED SUBJECTS WHICH CONTRIBUTE TO AN UNDERSTANDING OF WARFARE
2. “THE IMPROVEMENT OF EACH OFFICER’S MENTAL POWER AND ABILITY TO RELATE KNOWLEDGE TO THE SOLUTION OF MILITARY PROBLEMS: AND
3. “THE PROVISION OF INTELLECTUAL LEADERSHIP IN THE FIELD OF SEA POWER AND

MARITIME STRATEGY FOR THE ARMED FORCES AND FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA."

The first of these objectives may be described as the core of the naval commander's problem. Naval warfare is a highly technical field. As in every other form of warfare, its basic elements lie in the minds, hearts and souls of men — that is, in the human spirit. The tools — the machines — which men must use in the practice of Naval Warfare, however, are highly complex and are continually changing. As the President of the College has stated, our higher commanders must be thoroughly competent in the operation of the tools of today and above all in the tools of tomorrow. The strategy and tactics, and operations, devised by a commander must rest upon a firm — in fact a solid foundation both of technical knowledge of his tools — his ships, his aircraft, his logistics, his weapons: and also of knowledge of national and international affairs.

The second objective is one concerning education — that of improving the mind in order that a commander may quickly and logically solve his problems of the present and of the future. This objective involves, also, an element of self-training. A commander must actually make decisions if he is going to solve any problem. Because there is something inherent in human nature that encourages procrastination, the commander must practice and train himself to call a halt at the proper time, to the business of weighing factors and looking for new evidence. He must face up to — and make — his decision. It is this type of exercise — this objective — for which the College provides much practice for the student.

The third objective reflects a function of the College which is traditional, and of greater importance today than ever before. The Naval War College must strive to send out officers who, in addition to being professionally competent, have a keen understanding of the effects and benefits of sea power, and of the Navy's present and future role in its employment. Our graduates

will then be competent to visualize and apply the unique attributes of sea power, now and in the future, in the furtherance of a National strategy involving the use of all arms and forces.

Before continuing with an explanation of how the College functions, I would like, at this point, to take a close look at this term "Sea Power" — for it does form the basis for the very existence of this College. It has often been misunderstood by many.

The Naval Officers among you have been acquiring throughout your careers knowledge of the significance of the term "Sea Power." All of you, whether naval officers or not, are aware of Sea Power. In its simplest and broadest terms, Sea Power may be considered to represent the ability to make use of the sea as an instrument of national power. You will note that I emphasize the "use of the sea."

The phrase "use of the sea" — has many implications that are worthy of examination. In peace, its uses may be more or less obvious; such as use of the seas for fishing grounds, as a source of food; — the use of its surface for avenues of trade; — its use as a means for the importation of strategic raw materials; — its use for peaceful contacts between nations; — and last, but by no means least, its use to deploy and sustain naval and other armed forces throughout the world — either for peaceful purposes or to counter anticipated aggression.

In a war of the future, use of the seas would embrace the same uses as in peace but would be expanded to include: exploiting areas of the sea (and the air above and the waters beneath) for offensive purposes and thus applying the pressure of destruction on the enemy by naval campaigns; — supporting generally a forward strategy that includes the use of land, naval and air forces in vital areas throughout the world; supporting logistically and tactically our army and air forces overseas by naval operations; protecting our shipping against critical losses; denying the use of the sea to the enemy — his trade and his fisheries both on the

high seas and in coastal waters, thus imposing on him the pressure of scarcity; denying the sea to the enemy for his military operations of any character; and, finally, providing us access to the shores of the enemy for raids or invitation as may be demanded by our overall national strategy.

By its very nature Sea Power enters into every other element of national power. Sea Power does not and cannot stand alone as a separate element of national power. It is interwoven through the fabric of our national existence — a part of our political power, our economic power, and our military power. In this connection, we must bear in mind that the term sea power is a very broad one. There may be a tendency to consider sea power as the equivalent of naval power. This must be avoided, as naval power is only one of the elements, one of the means, of sea power. With sea power developed to its fullest extent, a nation can make use of all the world's resources, and can thus grow in prosperity and in security. Without sea power, a nation may be limited to the resources, and the limits of one land continent. Considering the expanded world responsibilities of the United States, the need for a healthy and expanding American industrial economy, and the close interrelationship between world conditions and the political freedom and independence of the American people, it is obvious that sea power and the ability to use the sea, are, and will be, vital to the attainment of the objectives of the United States in peace and war.

To use the sea — to develop sea power as part of national power — requires the means to use it, the knowledge of how to use those means, and the will to do so.

The means which make up sea power include:

1. A sound economy. (This we have — and we hold it largely because of seapower. Without seapower, in peace and war, we would lose it, as did Britain during and after the last war).

2. A favorable geographic location — (We have had this since 1492).
3. Well developed and efficient ports — (We could improve on these today. We need much research to give us the answer on improvising new port facilities in the face of atomic attack).
4. An effective and efficient industrial organization — (This has always been a peculiarly American genius).
5. Physical access to outside natural resources — (We have that, and in war we must fight to keep it).
6. A well-developed shipbuilding industry and a strong and healthy and loyal merchant marine — (This we do not have. Foreign shipbuilding, foreign subsidies, and personnel problems of our merchant marine, have placed us in a very weak position).
7. Secure bases at home and overseas — (This falls within the military category).
8. A strong, active nucleus of trained personnel supported by a powerful reserve potential. (This is a continuing problem. As is the case with every other field of endeavor, the achievement of sea power requires trained men).
9. Naval strength for the exercise of the control of the sea. (We cannot rest on our laurels or on our reserve fleets for this one. Research is needed — much research, and development, to bring to us the most modern and effective ships, aircraft, weapons and techniques of the future.)

Now, possession of the means alone is not enough to make use of the sea. We must know how to use the means. That knowledge is arrived at by study and research into the future. That knowledge, it is the duty of this College to develop.

With the means — and the knowledge — there is still one vital requirement. A nation must possess the will to develop its sea power and benefit therefrom. That will must lie in our people. It must grow from realization of the fact of the importance of the sea to our way of life, to our national economy, and to our national security.

Now that I have touched on the foundation of our courses at the College, I should like to give you some information on our procedures.

The educational policy of the College is as follows:
TO DEVOTE PRINCIPAL EMPHASIS TO THE
PROMOTION OF THE GOOD JUDGMENT AND
INTELLECTUAL LEADERSHIP EXPECTED OF
A NAVAL OFFICER IN HIGH COMMAND.

The philosophy underlying this policy and the Objectives of the College — this philosophy requires that we advocate no dogma nor fixed rules for Naval Warfare. On the contrary, this philosophy is based on the general proposition which Admiral McCormick just gave you, that the art of war may be learned but it cannot be taught. Consequently, the College offers you every facility for you to train yourself in the making of sound decisions — decisions arrived at by careful weighing of facts, by the exercise of logical thinking, and finally by the exercise of educated judgment.

The College, therefore, offers you a vast amount of information on many subjects involved in, and related to, the conduct of modern warfare — but, it provides you with only such guidance as is necessary to prevent undue loss of time.

In support of this feature of our Educational policy, and as a most important corollary to your academic activities while you are here, is one which I believe you will find most refreshing: For the first time in many years and perhaps for the first time

in your military careers you will find yourselves quite free of administrative detail. This is made possible by a splendid group of civilian supervisors and other personnel of the Administration Department; and also an excellent group of Library personnel. These latter will, I am sure, prove to be of invaluable assistance to you in your research work. Incidentally, the College takes great pride in all of our civilian employees, most of whom have been here for many years — several, in fact, for over 30 years.

Now let us look at the courses themselves.

A general description of the various courses, was contained in the "Catalog of Courses" which was mailed to you. A somewhat more detailed outline of the curriculum of the Course in Naval Warfare and of the Command and Staff Course has just been issued to you in a pamphlet the "Supplement to the Catalog of Courses 1955-56." I want to review very briefly the purposes of each Course, in order that you may have a picture of the College's field of education as a whole.

The purpose of the Command and Staff Course, like our other courses, is to further an understanding of the fundamentals of warfare in order to prepare officers for higher command. In this course, emphasis is placed on the operational functions of command, including operational planning and command decision; and the organization, functions and procedures of operational staffs, together with participation in joint and combined committee work.

Similarly the Course in Naval Warfare has the same broad purpose of furthering an understanding of the fundamentals of warfare, in order to prepare officers for higher command. The course is two years in length, each year being a complete unit, both on the same academic level. However, the First Year of the Course emphasizes the integrated employment of the elements of naval power in the accomplishment of Navy missions. The Second Year emphasizes the strategic employment of Naval Power

in the furtherance of National Objectives. In both years, high command, and methods of participation in joint and combined work, are stressed.

The Course of Advanced Study in Strategy and Sea Power has a limited enrollment and is of 2 to 3 years duration. Members of this course pursue studies designed not only for the education of a small group of officers in advanced phases of strategic concepts, but also to foster creative thinking, and to produce studies of long term value to the Naval War College and the naval service in general.

The Flag Officer's Refresher Course is conducted "on call." When in session, the course is tailored to meet the individual needs of the officers enrolled.

The College has two additional short resident courses of two weeks duration, in session only once a year, in May. Both of these courses are for a limited number of Reserve Officers on annual two weeks training duty.

So much for the resident courses. As for the College's Correspondence Courses, you may be interested to know that there are now some 1600 enrolled. The several correspondence courses are offered in order to extend the facilities of the Naval War College, as far as practicable, to officers who are presently unable to attend the resident courses.

One additional program is shortly to go on the road. It is the Naval War College Reserve Officer's Lecture Program. In this, a team of officers from the College will go to each Naval District to present a series of classified lectures to reserve officers.

Having taken a look at the separate courses, I should now like to discuss briefly certain features common to all the resident courses.

All of the resident students study a number of subjects together where the areas are common to these courses. Probably

the most recurring element to all, lies in the field of strategy. Therefore, in all the courses, the College specializes in the development of the officer's ability to reason along strategic lines, and to further his understanding of strategy.

Also, in other fields, there are many additional studies that are conducted jointly or concurrently by students of the various courses. These fields in particular, are International Relations, Interservice Operations, and Naval Operations.

Although certain general fields of study of the courses may be the same, the different courses include the study of war at various levels of command; that is, from the unit command to that of the highest governmental level. The emphasis on level in any particular course is generally obtained by increasing the length of time devoted to the study of the problems of that particular level of command.

For example, in the Command and Staff Course a considerable amount of time is devoted to studies and applications of the "tools and techniques" of warfare. These studies are then integrated with further studies, and problems devoted to their employment at various levels of command. The predominant emphasis of the Command and Staff Course is on those levels of command having operational functions.

In the First Year of the Course in Naval Warfare also, a considerable amount of time is devoted to "tool and techniques." Well over half of the curriculum time, however, is devoted to studies of problems at the Force, Fleet, Theater and National Level. Here emphasis is given to those levels of command primarily concerned with the integrated employment of the elements of Naval Power in the accomplishment of Naval missions.

In the Second Year of the Course in Naval Warfare, the preponderance of time is devoted to the Departmental, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and National Security Council level. Problems of Theater and Unified Commands are also given a large amount of attention.

There are four other items in the College program to which all the Courses devote much time. They are: The Operations Problems, the Term Paper program, the Lecture Program and the Global Strategy Discussions.

Operations Problems have been used as an academic method at the College for many years. This method is similar to the "case study method" employed at many advanced civilian educational institutions. It is based on the precept that the value of knowledge, of itself, is greatest when knowledge can be applied to solve problems similar to those with which the student will be confronted in the future.

In our problems here at the College, the majority — because of their scope and complexity — the majority can only be solved by coordinated efforts of a group of students organized as committees or staffs. This method, as you know, is also that found in many high commands. In addition, however, and in order that each student may receive practice in making his own decisions — we introduce into each Operations Problem the requirement of the making of decisions by the individual.

Operations Problems, while concerned directly with operations, naval joint or combined, vary in purpose, scope, complexity, availability of weapons of the future; and in the type of operation, and in the level of command; and finally in geographic location — also with a view to the future. Naturally, the more elementary are conducted early in the College year.

In this regard, some of the first few will not include the "atom." Rest assured, however, that the College will provide ample study of this vital weapon. This stems from the fact that the College must give opportunity to study all aspects of naval warfare. Each problem is designed to illustrate a specific point and each has a different purpose and scope. Injection of nuclear weapons too early in the course would detract from the emphasis we desire to place upon the specific point underlying any given

operations problem. In any event whether or not nuclear weapons will be used by or against our forces, the fact remains that there are some features of our problems at the College which are basic to naval operations, and to war in general — features which illustrate basic points in strategy, in tactics, and in logistics, and which we must learn in order to be able to properly use any weapons, nuclear or otherwise. Further there may well be situations in cold wars, fringe wars, or peripheral wars where all fighting will be with conventional weapons and where the atom does not figure.

So much for the Operations Problem Program. The next item of general application at the College is the Term Paper program. You will hear more of this in detail later. For the moment I will merely mention the fact that each of the courses includes an extensive program of writing research papers — or staff duties. These are individual papers or studies — some quite lengthy, each in a different form and scope, and differing in subject matter as among the courses; and the existence of the program is based on the fact that formal writing is a major aid to clear thinking.

Next we have the Lecture Program. The College has lectures, both formal and informal, by outside guest speakers; presentations by members of the staff, and numerous seminar sessions in the various courses. In many of the lectures, the topics are intended to support the curriculum as a whole rather than any one particular course. All classes, or one or more classes, will be scheduled to attend, depending on the circumstances. In any event, if your particular class is not scheduled to attend a particular lecture or other program — and if you have the time available, you are urged to attend such programs.

Global Strategy Discussions will be your last scheduled curriculum item of the year. These Discussions consist of a series of round-table discussions in which the students are integrated into discussions groups along with outstanding civilian guests,

with Senior Reserve Officers, and with certain high ranking visiting Army, Navy, and Air Force officers.

So much for the separate courses and supporting programs. To get back to the overall picture, it is a basic premise of the College, in keeping with its Mission, to keep all of the courses dynamic, alive, and forward looking. For this reason the Courses are changed from time to time to meet the needs of the Navy and the evolution of warfare. Some changes are gradual, and others may be apparent while you are here. In this regard, the play of War Games at the College is undergoing — and will continue to undergo — major evolution. For instance, last year's Strategic War Game in the Course in Naval Warfare was one in which the College advanced beyond the limits of any similar game held in the United States. Before this Class graduates, there may develop the possibility of testing out the Electronic Maneuver Board System, which has been in the process of design and installation for several years. That installation will provide an extremely advanced method of playing two sided war games with weapons of the present and of the future.

Other improvements in the Courses and in academic methods are arrived at:

1. - Through the study of new material received from the Fleet, the Chief of Naval Operations, the Army, Air Force and Marine Corps, and from many other governmental agencies; and,

2. - Through the evaluation, or criticism, of each item of the curriculum as submitted by the students. Each student is asked to comment formally and in detail, on the various phases of our work here; and much of our progress stems from the good thinking in those comments.

3. - Through the work of the officers on the college staff, and of the distinguished civilians who occupy our professional chairs and our consultant posts. The College policy of changing,

or rotating its staff — officer and civilian — each year, insures an ever fresh and modern outlook on many of the factors which lead to sound and modern military decision.

4. - Through the study of ideas which are generated or derived from studies and free discussion at the College. In this connection let me again emphasize the point made by the President of the College regarding "freedom of expresion." You are free — in fact you are expected — to express your ideas at any time, and you can be assured that your ideas will receive consideration. This is a very important source of progress.

In general, we avoid a rigid adherence to methods, techniques and weapons which may have become outmoded; and we shall try to avoid an improper estimate of enemy capabilities, methods, techniques and weapons.

We try to stimulate the maximum exploitation of our own capabilities, both new and old. And we try to maintain a sound balance between the old and the new in order that we may be mentally prepared to operate with a miximum of effectiveness.

And lastly, we also attempt to maintain a proper balance between overpessimistic and overoptimistic approaches to the possibilities of future warfare — both equally undesirable.

To summarize: In this talk I have reviewed the courses of the College and their overall objectives, and I have shown you how these courses stem from and support the Mission of the College. Let us take another look at this Mission:

TO FURTHER AN UNDERSTANDING OF THE
FUNDAMENTALS OF WARFARE, INTERNA-
TIONAL RELATIONS, AND INTERSERVICE
OPERATIONS, WITH EMPHASIS ON THEIR AP-
PLICATION TO FUTURE NAVAL WARFARE,
IN ORDER TO PREPARE OFFICERS FOR
HIGHER COMMAND.

This Mission of the College will be fulfilled in each of you in such measure as you contribute your best thinking to your studies here. Remember, when faced with a new situation, recollection of the past is not a substitute for thought; and here we expect you to do a lot of thinking.

Gentlemen, I hope that you will find this year at the Naval War College enlightening, rewarding and enjoyable. I wish you well.

BIOGRAPHIC SKETCH

Rear Admiral Thomas H. Robbins, Jr., U. S. N.

Admiral Robbins was born in 1900 and was graduated from the United States Naval Academy in 1919 with the Class of 1920. After a year in the Atlantic Fleet, he saw service in the Mediterranean and Black Seas until 1924, when he commanded a submarine chaser for one year. Following a tour as instructor in Seamanship and French at the Naval Academy, he returned to the Atlantic Fleet for a year. In 1927, he was transferred to flight training at Pensacola.

Upon designation as Naval Aviator, he served for two years in cruiser-based scouting squadrons. Following duty as Aide to Rear Admiral W. A. Moffett, U. S. N., he served in the Pacific Fleet in command of an AVP and in carrier-based aircraft squadrons. He attended the Junior Course at the Naval War College in 1936, after which he served as a member of the staff for two years. He was Navigator of the U. S. S. LEXINGTON for two years and Aviation Officer on the Staff of Commander, Scouting Force for one year.

During 1942-1943, Admiral Robbins was Aviation Plans Officer at Headquarters, Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet. He became Chief of Staff and Aide to Commander, Fleet Air Quonset in 1943, after which he served as Naval Aviation Officer on the Staff of the Army and Navy Staff College until 1944.

He served aboard the U. S. S. ESSEX and U. S. S. LEXINGTON during the war. He was ordered back to the United States in 1945 to serve in the Office of DCNO (Air). During April-September, 1946, he had duty in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, followed by a term in the Office of the Secretary of the Navy. In October, 1949, he was appointed a Member of the Joint Strategic Survey Committee, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Admiral Robbins was appointed Chief of Staff at the Naval War College in August, 1953, the position which he presently holds, and from November, 1953 to May, 1954 he served as Acting President of the Naval War College.

He has been awarded the World War 1 Victory Medal (1 Star, Atlantic Fleet); Defense Ribbon (1 star, Pacific Fleet); American Theatre Medal; Pacific Theatre Medal; Philippine Liberation Medal (1 campaign star).

RECOMMENDED READING

The evaluation of books listed below include those recommended to resident students of the Naval War College. Officers in the fleet and elsewhere may find these of interest.

The listings herein should not be construed as an endorsement by the Naval War College; they are indicated only on the basis of interesting reading matter.

Many of these publications may be found in ship and station libraries. Some of the publications not available from these sources may be obtained from the Bureau of Naval Personnel Auxiliary Library Service, where a collection of books is available for loan to individual officers. Requests for the loan of these books should be made by the individual to the nearest branch of the Chief of Naval Personnel. (See Article C-9604, Bureau of Naval Personnel, Manual, 1948).

Title: *Midway, The Battle That Doomed Japan.* 266 p.

Authors: Fuchida, Mitsuo and Okumiya, Masatke. Annapolis Md., U. S. Naval Institute, 1955.

Evaluation: A detailed account of the Battle of Midway from the Japanese point of view, including the course of events leading up to the battle and its place in the overall Japanese strategic concept. The authors, both ex-Japanese naval aviators, were both present at the battle and appear eminently qualified to write this book. Their approach is objective, and they are free with their criticism of the Japanese conduct of the battle. The book is very readable, and should be of interest to all naval officers, particularly those who may have participated in the battle themselves. It is further recommended for its illustrations of the consequences of fundamental planning errors and lack of vision on the part of a commander.

Title: *U. S. Military Doctrine.* 256 p.

Author: Smith, Dale O. N. Y., Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1955.

Evaluation: General Smith has made an analytical study of military doctrine and national policy in the United States from

the time of the Revolutionary War, demonstrating the effects that the philosophies of the famous military theorists have had upon national military policy through the years. He deprecates the nine principles of war and heralds the four military doctrines of professionalism, unity of command, celerity with the counteroffensive, and technical application as comprising our dynamic new military policy. He feels that this policy is in accord with the executive policy of the government for the first time in history.

Title: *Admiral Ambassador to Russia.* 533 p.

Authors: Standley, William H., and Ageton, Arthur A.,
Chicago, Henry Regnery Co., 1955.

Evaluation: A report of the author's behind-the-scenes story of a crucial period in our wartime alliance with Soviet Russia and the critical maneuvers and problems facing the United States during his mission to Moscow, from April, 1942 to October, 1943. The inner workings of the Soviet state and government, the difficulty encountered by diplomatic officials in negotiating with the Russians, and a description of the people and the country are well related by the author in a most interesting manner. It is also a report of the conduct of American diplomacy under President Roosevelt.

Title: *France: The Tragic Years.* 360 p.

Author: Huddleston, Sisley. N. Y., The Devin-Adair Co.,
1955.

Evaluation: This is a book, by an author who has a deep love of France and the French, and who is obviously protesting as almost unbelievable the actions of Frenchmen which led to the fall of France, to dissension during and after occupation, and to the hates which remained to plague the country. He seems to judge all people and all actions against the criterion of the country which France ought to be. He is merciless in presentation of those who acted for personal prestige, and sentimental in treating those who acted for France; that is, the France that could and should be. The book covers the entire period from the opening phase of World War II until 1947, with brief treatment of 1947-1952. Of particular interest toward a better understanding of present feelings among Frenchmen is the treatment of "Revolution and Terror, 1944-46" the remnants of which still influence political and economic actions in France.

Title: *The Communist Struggle in Malaya.* 146 p.
Author: Hanrahan, Gene Z. N. Y., Institute of Pacific Relations, 1954.
Evaluation: The author traces the origin and early development of Malayan Communism, its activities, and its revolutionary course in the post-war years. The time span covers roughly nineteen years, from 1934 through 1953. This is a scholarly treatise, well documented, and enlivened with personal comments by the author. As a case study in the revolutionary Communist doctrines and operations, it is of value to the serious student of the course of Communism in the old colonial countries of the Far East. In addition, there is appended series of Communist Party doctrine papers for operations in the Far East.

Title: *Sea Wolves.* 340 p.
Author: Frank, Wolfgang. N. Y., Rinehart & Co., Inc., 1955.

Evaluation: An account of U-boat operations in World War II, and of Admiral Donitz's part therein. The author, who was Donitz's Public Relations Officer, attempts to glorify the U-boat service and their commander at every turn, maximizing their successes and minimizing their mistakes. However, apparently without realizing it, he reveals as much German error as he does German brilliance. Instances of brilliance were the alertness for revising strategy and tactics to meet changing opposition; the alacrity with which defective torpedoes were corrected; the remarkable speed with which the Type XXI was brought out and constructed in numbers, despite Allied bombings. On the other hand, the failure to have ready more U-boats at the war's start, and the failure to employ against England more of those available; failure ever to provide adequate air reconnaissance, etc. are instances of serious mistakes.

PERIODICALS

Title: "31-Knot" Burke — *How Will He Run the Navy?*
Author: Karig, Walter.
Publication: COLLIER'S, September 16, 1955, p. 21-25.
Annotation: Reviews the career of Admiral Arleigh Burke, Chief of Naval Operations.

- Title:** *The Planet Earth.*
- Publication:** SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN, September, 1955.
- Annotation:** The entire issue is devoted to a discussion of geophysical properties of the earth. The eleven articles include one of special naval interest: "The Voyage of the ATKA."
- Title:** *Prisoner Issue.*
- Author:** Murray, J. C., Colonel, U.S.M.C.
- Publication:** MARINE CORPS GAZETTE, August, 1955, p. 32-41 and September, 1955, p. 28-35.
- Annotation:** Conclusion of a comprehensive survey of the many factors surrounding the Korean armistice negotiations, together with a discussion of the modern prisoner-of-war problem.
- Title:** *The Rise of Russian Sea Power.*
- Author:** Hittle, J. D., Colonel, U. S. M. C.
- Publication:** MARINE CORPS GAZETTE, August, 1955, p. 20-27 and September, 1955, p. 12-19.
- Annotation:** A comprehensive article dealing with the history of Russian sea power and a survey of the current situation. Considered in its global aspects, the rise of modern Russian sea power presents profoundly serious implications. There may be some doubt in the Free World as to the importance of sea power in a war with the Communists. However, there is no doubt in the Kremlin as to how important the maintenance of sea lanes is to the non-Communist world.
- Title:** *Principles of Sea Power.*
- Author:** Carney, Robert B., Admiral, U.S.N., (Ret.)
- Publication:** UNITED STATES NAVAL INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS, September, 1955, p. 967-985.
- Annotation:** In summarizing his philosophy of sea power, the former Chief of Naval Operations discusses the growth of Communist sea power and its effect on the United States and its allies.
- Title:** *Defense of the Free World.*
- Author:** Liddell-Hart, Captain B. H.
- Publication:** MARINE CORPS GAZETTE, September, 1955, p. 36-41.
- Annotation:** A discussion by this world-famous military writer on

modern requirements for the defense of the Free World, in which he examines the fallacies of a policy of 'massive retaliation' and suggests other methods for checking aggression.

- Title:** *The Revolutionary Strategy of Mao Tse-Tung.*
- Authors:** Katzenbach, Edward L., Jr., and Hanrahan, Gene Z.
- Publication:** POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY, September, 1955, p. 321-340.
- Annotation:** An analysis and evaluation of Mao Tse-Tung's military doctrine as expounded in his works and employed in the Chinese Civil War, The Korean War, Indo-China and Malaya.
- Title:** *Armed Forces Unification and the Pentagon Officer.*
- Authors:** Henry, Andrew F., Masland, John W., and Radway, Laurence I.
- Publication:** PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW, Summer, 1955, p. 173-180.
- Annotation:** Part of a larger study of military education, with emphasis on the preparation of career officers for policy level responsibilities, this article reports some of the demands that have been placed upon military officers in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
- Title:** *Year One of the Peacetime Atom.*
- Author:** Bello, Francis.
- Publication:** FORTUNE, August, 1955, p. 113-116, 172-175.
- Annotation:** A report on A.E.C., and United States industry's efforts and plans for developing nuclear power. (Drawings of six reactors includes that used to power the NAUTILUS).
- Title:** *Red Far East Air Buildup Continues.*
- Author:** Witze, Claude.
- Publication:** AVIATION WEEK, August 1, 1955, p. 12.
- Annotation:** Reports that the ROK air force chief is worried, with only two wings of F-51's and F-86's facing 300 Mig-15's and 100 II-28's.

- Title:** *"Cold War" Goes On.*
- Publication:** U. S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, August 5, 1955, p. 19-21.
- Annotation:** Points out that while the diplomats talk, the Communists are hard at work taking over various parts of Europe and Asia. (List of areas, p. 21).
- Title:** *The Future of Our Professional Diplomacy.*
- Author:** Kennan, George F.
- Publication:** FOREIGN AFFAIRS, July, 1955, p. 566-586.
- Annotation:** A critical analysis of recommendations of the Wriston Committee on the Foreign Service of the United States.
- Title:** *The New Latin America and the United States.*
- Author:** Johnson, John J.
- Publication:** THE PACIFIC SPECTATOR, Summer, 1955, p. 244-255.
- Annotation:** Describes social and economic changes in the nations of Latin America and considers the meaning of these developments in terms of the area's relations with the United States.
- Title:** *The Interdependence of Logistics and Strategic Planning.*
- Author:** Ruehlow, S. E., Captain, U.S.N.
- Publication:** NAVAL RESEARCH LOGISTICS QUARTERLY, December, 1954, p. 237-257.
- Annotation:** Traces the development of planning from the beginning of World War II through its evolution to the present concurrent planning, showing the responsibility of the J. C. S. and the development of requirements based on J. C. S. strategic plans. (Includes charts and bibliography).
- Title:** *The Soviet Navy.*
- Author:** Baldwin, Hanson W.
- Publication:** FOREIGN AFFAIRS, July, 1955, p. 587-604.
- Annotation:** Discusses the size, composition and organization of the Russian Navy and assesses present Soviet naval capabilities

Title: *The Development of Political-Military Consultation in the United States.*

Author: May, Ernest R.

Publication: POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY, June, 1955, p. 161-180.

Annotation: Traces the steps taken in coordination of political and military views on foreign policy over the past fifty years, culminating in the establishment of the National Security Council.

Title: *Unconditional Surrender Reconsidered.*

Author: Chase, John L.

Publication: POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY, June, 1955, p. 258-279.

Annotation: An evaluation of the World War II policy of unconditional surrender, based upon an analysis of available records.