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NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

Vol. VII No. 7

March, 1955

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SPECIAL ATTENTION TO THE READER

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**NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
REVIEW**

**Issued Monthly
U. S. Naval War College
Newport, R. I.**

Introductory Note

It is considered that the lectures published in this issue of the NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW should be of particular use and interest to the participants in the Global Strategy Discussions that will be held at the Naval War College in June of this year. The basic purpose of the REVIEW — to make available to “officers of the service . . . some of the educational benefits of the resident students at the Naval War College” — is also maintained.

The two lectures that follow, “The Higher Strategic Direction of War,” by the Nimitz Professor of Social and Political Philosophy, and “Origins of Maritime Strategy and the Development of Sea Power,” by the King Professor of Naval History, deal with their respective subject broadly, philosophically, and historically. They are intended to be read in relation to one another. Taken together, they introduce the reader to ideas that are relevant to the general discussion of strategy.

Attention is invited to the conclusions to which a reading of the lectures inevitably leads. These are: (1) that even the most apparently fundamental strategic concepts evolve and change character; (2) that the validity of a strategy must be judged by the requirements of the concrete situation for which it has been developed; and (3) that strategic decisions are man-inspired, man-made, and can only be carried out by men.

ORIGINS OF MARITIME STRATEGY AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF SEA POWER

A staff presentation delivered
at the Naval War College
on 29 November 1954 by
Professor James A. Field, Jr.

Admiral McCormick and Colleagues,

My subject is *The Origins of Maritime Strategy and The Development of Sea Power*. I feel a little diffident in approaching it for it is one, after all, on which every member of the audience (not excluding the delegates from the Air Force) must have a considerable number of 'trapped universals.' Additionally, it is a big subject, and in the course of an hour one can only hope to skirmish with certain selected aspects.

What I propose to do, therefore, is first to consider very briefly the historical development of Sea Power. Then, to see how the classic interpretation of this phenomenon came to be made by Captain Mahan, an officer with little previous interest in these matters, who had by chance been invited to give a short course in an almshouse to officers of a navy then in a considerable state of disrepair. And finally to move on to a consideration of Maritime Strategy in a context both somewhat broader and also somewhat narrower than is usual: broader in that I propose to consider strategy, following the lessons of recent years, as not limited to periods of formal war; narrower in that I propose to concentrate wholly upon the Maritime Strategy of our own country. Perhaps if I had to choose a short title it would be *The Influence of History upon Sea Power*.

In a phrase which deserves at least a local immortality, Admiral Brown once told the War College that "since man first sat astride a floating log, and propelled himself with the spatu-

late foot of some long-defunct animal," sea power has been of continuing importance to mankind. While not disputing the validity of so vivid a statement, I think we can for present purposes begin at a somewhat later date, and deal only with those times in which communities of men, rather than of solitary paddlers, have concerned themselves with these things, and in which civilization has been so far advanced that economic concerns — trade, or such more elementary forms of exchange of goods as conquest, piracy, or abduction — have provided a continuing incentive to maritime activity.

So far as the Western World is concerned these qualifications can serve to start us off with the city-states of Greece at the beginning of what someone has called the thalassic period of history.

Now "thalassic," of course, is only a big word which means for sea what "oceanic" means for ocean, but it is a Greek word. This is appropriate in view of the nautical accomplishments of these peoples, not only in the amphibious expedition against Troy and the explorations of Ulysses, but in trade, colonization, and the defense of their rimland against the invading Persian hordes. Their civilization was brilliant and cosmopolitan, as have been a good many maritime civilizations, but they failed — and this may be worth noting — to solve their political problems. Over-jealous attachment to their independence on the part of the several states defeated all efforts to match their cultural unity with a political one, and the result was gradual decline.

Their successors, and ultimately on a far greater geographical scale, were of course the Romans. These had great political gifts: after unifying Italy they defeated the rival Carthaginian sea power in the Punic Wars and then, in the course of three centuries, succeeded in conquering and also in organizing the whole of the Mediterranean basin and all Europe south of central Britain and the Rhine-Danube line. So great a structure depended directly upon communications. The Roman roads are of

course deservedly famous, and brought land transport to a peak not again reached until the early nineteenth century. But I would argue that the Mediterranean, the wet hole in this doughnut-shaped empire which facilitated not only the movement of legions but also the feeding of Italy from African granaries, was the real basis of their achievement.

But Rome, too, declined. Countless causes have been advanced by countless historians but I would suggest, without being dogmatic, that at least one central cause was corruption by success: some failure of the will, some refusal to accept responsibilities on the part of the ruling groups. Barbarian invaders — or, perhaps better, barbarian immigrants — filtered down from the north and reached the shores of the Mediterranean. There, despite edicts or laws to the contrary, they succeeded in mastering the arts of shipbuilding and navigation and turned trader or pirate.

More important, because the immigrants arrived fighting and at a speed which precluded Romanization and assimilation, was the advance of Islam westward from the Arabian peninsula. Their first breakout gained the Arabs the great shipbuilding center at Alexandria, and within a generation from the death of Mohammed they had conquered Cyprus and had mounted a major expedition against Constantinople. These Moslem invasions permanently shattered the cultural and political unity of the Mediterranean. They greatly limited — for a time perhaps destroyed — the vital East-West trade. They forced the European frontier westward to an extent not seriously modified until the nineteenth century.

With the end of Roman peace there came some centuries of disruption, of strife, of raiding and crusading. But the ideological conflict of Christian and Moslem should not be overestimated. It was not total or perpetual war. Sensible arrangements were often made for mutual profit. The Moslems themselves were great traders and opportunities for Europeans remained. We may

instance the rise of the Republic of Venice which, strategically situated at the head of the Adriatic and at the foot of the overland trade routes to the north, grew rich on the products of the golden east and acknowledged the maritime base of her prosperity by an annual wedding ceremony between her political boss and the sea.

Nonetheless, the great revival which we term the Italian Renaissance was a last flash. With the discovery of the sea route to the Indies, the Mediterranean was destined to become a back-water. The age of discovery marks the end of the thalassic and the start of the oceanic period in the history of sea power.

There had, of course, been signs of maritime vigor in the Western ocean long before the great discoveries of Portugal and Spain. Norsemen had sailed westward to Vinland and, perhaps, as far as Newport. Other Norsemen, usually called "Normans," had from the ninth century harried the coasts of Europe and had conquered Normandy, Sicily and England. In the Baltic and in the North Sea there had developed important trading communities. The wool trade between England and Flanders foreshadowed the rise of Dutch and British sea power.

There had also been indications that the long period of European compression—the period which had seen Europe steadily on the defensive—was approaching an end, and that these rimlands, unable to push eastward by land, were about to enter a great phase of seaborne expansion. The increased knowledge of the Renaissance, the increased resources which followed on improved social organization, permitted and indeed urged an organized effort in exploration. By the end of the fifteenth century Vasco da Gama and others had reached India by way of the Cape of Good Hope, while a somewhat less carefully planned effort by an Italian sailing under the flag of Spain to go east by heading west had resulted in the discovery of a new world.

Suddenly there were made available for exploitation by the Europeans immense areas of the world, some heavily populated and

some largely vacant, some rich and some not. But all were accessible by sea, and in none were the inhabitants able to compete on even terms with the armaments of the Europeans. There consequently ensued three centuries of remarkable expansion, a period in which much of the history of the world revolves around European competition for control of these overseas areas and of their trade.

With the ensuing wars for empire we can deal only in the very briefest of terms. Financed by American gold and silver, Spain threatened to dominate all Europe and, by so doing, called into existence a coalition which permanently ended this possibility. The attempt to conquer England led to the defeat of the Armada by the technically superior English squadrons. The attempt to put down the Dutch was no more successful but, by forcing the Dutch to take to the sea, made that small nation for a time the dominant maritime power of Europe. The great age of the Dutch Republic and of Dutch cultural achievement was based on an extremely rapid expansion into both East and West Indies and on what was, for a time at least, by far the largest merchant marine in the world.

The dominance of Holland on the seas was brief, ending with the Anglo-Dutch wars of the later seventeenth century. The British, having effectively liquidated both Spanish and Dutch threats, now found themselves faced with one if anything more formidable in that of France, competitor in India, competitor in North America, only a few miles away across the Channel, and by now the strongest power on the Continent of Europe.

As to the outcome of this crisis we need not remain long in suspense. The French overseas empire was liquidated in 1763, at the end of the Seven Years' War, although a delayed price was to be paid for this when French maritime intervention led to the loss of the American colonies. The prospect of French domination of Europe was ended with the final defeat of Napoleon.

Such, in capsule form, was the history of the European sea powers up to the time when the long peace of the nineteenth cen-

ture descended. We should not be too chauvinistic or narrow, however. It is well to remember that there have been other sea powers outside of our own Western tradition. The Chinese had developed the mariner's compass as early as the twelfth century and their age of exploration preceded that of Europe by a century or so. In the early fifteenth century the great Admiral Cheng Ho reached Africa, and there is some evidence that other Chinese navigators gained the western shores of North America. Those who aspire to flag rank, however, may be grateful that our naval customs, traditions, and usage come from Western rather than Chinese sources, for to become an admiral in Ming dynasty China one had first of all to become a eunuch.

Now if you will accept this outline history of the West, at least for purposes of discussion, let me ask you to consider what the meaning of it all would have been to a nineteenth century student of these things. Quite obviously, I think, it could have first been said that the record showed a succession of political units rising to more or less commanding position before giving way to their successors, and that somehow there seemed a relationship between prowess at sea and prominence in the general scheme of things. The precise nature of the relationship between exploitation of the seas and national power was perhaps a little more complex. But it would have seemed reasonable to say, as a first approximation, that strength at sea meant prosperity through trade and, other things being equal, the more prosperous the community the higher its cultural attainments and the greater its power.

If our enquirer should then have wished to push one step further, and to ascertain what factors in a community were important in permitting it to gain power at sea, he might well have produced a list of factors such as the six postulated by Mahan. These, you will remember, were: geographical position; physical conformation, including climate and natural products; extent of

territory; number of population; character of the people; character of the government and other institutions.

So far, so good, but once these general categories are established things become somewhat more complex. Changes in technology, slower then than now, could nonetheless seriously modify capabilities, as Medina-Sidonia found out when he sailed his armada against England. The two principal strategic resources of the British, in the centuries of their rise to power, were their geographical location and the direction of the prevailing wind. These, taken together, facilitated blockade of continental ports and permitted Mahan his famous phrase about the "far distant storm-beaten ships" that stood between Napoleon and the dominion of the world. What changes in this picture would come with steam, which blew in no prevailing direction? What changes, more particularly, had Britain not been well endowed with deposits of coal and iron?

Equally important, perhaps, was the way requirements of policy governed the employment of its instruments. The Roman problem of policing a closed sea was one thing; the Viking custom of raiding coastal and river towns was another; the wars of national states for trade routes were different still. Each made very different demands upon the sailor or, at least, upon the admiral. Lessons drawn from one set of conditions might not be necessarily valid for another. And this brings us to the captain whom Admiral Luce brought to Newport to lecture on these things.

Looking back in later life, Admiral Mahan described the individual who was invited to the War College in 1884 as one who had "grown up in the atmosphere of the single cruiser, of commerce destroying, defensive warfare, and indifferent to battle-ships; an anti-imperialist, who for that reason looked upon Mr. Blaine as a dangerous man." This was the old American doctrine, yet the man who had grown up with the commerce destroyer was to become the most effective opponent of the *guerre de course*; the

man who was indifferent to battleships was to be largely responsible for the biggest building program in the history of the world. The anti-imperialist became the principle exponent of views which encouraged Germans and Japanese to demand their places in the sun, and which so directed a war for the independence of Cuba that it led, somewhat improbably, to the annexation of the Philippines. How did all of this happen? The answer is one we should all ponder on. He read some books.

The summons to Newport found Captain Mahan cruising off the west coast of South America. There, while awaiting his relief, he began his reading. At the English Club in Lima he discovered Mommsen's *History of Rome*, and it was Mommsen's account of Hannibal's invasion of Italy, by the long march around through Spain, that first brought vividly to his mind the virtues of command of the sea.

Here was the fundamental insight. How it would be developed depended on further reading, and here three works were of supreme importance: first, *A History of the French Navy*, by Lapeyrouse-Bonfils; second, *A History of France*, by Henri Martin, covering the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries (the same period that was to be dealt with in *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History*); third, the works of Jomini.

Now observe the hazards of book-learning. The source books are all Continental European. The period under consideration is a restricted one, that of the Anglo-French Wars for empire. It is the period of contending mercantilist autocracies, when international politics took the form of perpetual economic warfare, of restrictive economic policy, of struggle for colonial empire, of blockades and battle fleets. Two heroes emerge from the tale: on the one hand, the Royal Navy whose successes (and indeed also failures) 'proved' the rightness of its intuitive policies; and on the other Colbert, the great Minister of Louis XIV, father of the French Navy and organizer of the most rigidly directed state eco-

nomy of the day who, even if success was not his, at least had the right ideas. The ultimate goal of policy was, of course, predominant national power by means of command of the sea.

The great work, perhaps the most important 'do-it-yourself' book published in the last hundred years, appeared in 1890 and had, as every one knows, colossal success — primarily in Great Britain, but with Germany, Japan, and the United States not far behind. In the light of its gospel British wisdom was justified. By its message the Kaiser was inspired, as were Theodore Roosevelt and some Japanese, and the course of naval activities for the next generation or so was largely defined. So far as the more remote American past was concerned, however, the effects were rather disheartening, and Truxton, Preble, Decatur, and the rest, while doubtless brave enough, now seemed to have been sadly misguided men. This attitude remains current in the works of many authorities who view the period of the old Navy as one of almost willful neglect of obvious and available lessons.

It seems to me that there are two alternatives in a situation such as this. Either our naval policy was wrong (this is the orthodox view) or the standard of judgment applied to it was wrong, and since everybody takes the former view I propose to argue briefly for the latter.

One can take a first step in this direction by pointing out that Mahan's principal lesson — the emphasis on the importance of the battle fleet and on command of the sea — is most helpful to the dominant maritime power and that weaker nations can find little comfort in it. In a way, it is a sophisticated statement of the old saw that "nothing succeeds like success." This, of course, accounts for the prevalence even after 1890 of other naval schools such as the *jeune école* in France, with their emphasis on the *guerre de course*. It could also account for our own naval history. I think, however, that there is more to it than this, and so, taking my finger off my number for a moment, I will suggest that the doctrines of

Mahan are basically un-American. This is so because his doctrines are drawn from just what the colonists revolted against — a society in which the state, and not the individual, is supreme.

Now this is perhaps not the generally accepted view. I think most people, if asked what has traditionally distinguished the American approach to the sea to naval and maritime affairs, would think first of not ideological matters but of technical ingenuity, of willingness to innovate, of skill in the development of new instruments of navigation and warfare.

There is much to be said for this attitude. You can find supporting evidence all the way back: the Dahlgren gun, Fulton's experiments in steam propulsion, and even earlier in the ingenious attack on British shipping in Philadelphia in 1777 by means of mines floated downstream. We can say here that the Americans gained both tactical and technical surprise. In naval warfare this is clearly an important business. But it is on the ideological rather than on the technical level — on policy, rather than the instrument — that I would like to concentrate for the rest of the morning.

What are the consequences of the belief in the supremacy of the individual — the consequences of the idea that all men have certain inalienable rights that no government may subvert?

I think that we can say that the American Revolution was a revolution in favor of the theory, and against the practice, of the eighteenth century. It was not just a revolution for a change in government, but part of a continuing effort for a change in the nature of government, from big government to small, from master to servant. It was part, if you wish, of the first serious effort to make government wither away.

Too much government by the British brought revolution and the Articles of Confederation. Too much government, or mis-

government, by the several States under the Articles of Confederation brought the Constitution with its manifold restrictions on State powers. Fear of too much government under this new instrument led to the creation and adoption of the Bill of Rights, specifying areas which the general government was not to invade. Although it may seem a little remote, I think all of this had important implications for the American approach to the seas and the world beyond them, in a word for American maritime strategy. And since any armed force reflects the society which produces it, there were also important implications regarding the nature and the employment of the Navy.

Let us take a few of these implications. From the point of view that the state should serve and not dominate the citizen — from this idea of small government — there came a fear of standing armies and the executive war-making power. You can see this in the insistence on state control of the militia forces, in the right of the citizen to bear arms, in the preference in naval matters for privateering — that is to say, warfare of the individual rather than the government. Hence, the reluctance to create a Navy; hence, once the Navy was created, reluctance to build a battle fleet; hence, also, the long disinclination to establish any rank higher than that of captain.

In the related area of foreign affairs, this same hostility to the leviathan state can be plainly seen. To a considerable degree, the attempt to cut the English connection came from a desire to cut the link with Europe's wars. There was also the feeling that alliances, particularly with great powers, were dangerous, as shown by the reluctance, even during the Revolution when life depended upon it, to go beyond a commercial agreement with France. There was the effort to force upon Great Britain the limitations in the use of naval power inherent in the "free ships, free goods" view of international law. There was the view — not yet dead — that diplomacy was just another word for skulduggery, and that all America needed abroad were consuls and commercial agents. This

last you can see in the writings of Jefferson; you can see it also in the hundred years' delay in establishing the rank of ambassador.

In economic terms, the opposite of "statism" is "individualism." Unlike Colbert, and unlike the British Parliament, the Colonists knew that in trade both parties profit. The Revolution was largely the result of resistance to measures restrictive of foreign trade. One consequence was the lasting bias, at least for a couple of generations, against a protective tariff. Another was the fact that the American Navy, wholly unlike the navy that Colbert created for France, was the result of individual rather than governmental aspirations. The first frigates were authorized to chastise the Barbary pirates, to open the Mediterranean to the commerce of American individuals, and also to redeem other Americans who were being held there in captivity. This concern for individual freedom, as well as for individual enterprise, is worth noting: Great Britain, with the strongest navy in the world, only freed her Algerine captives in 1816, and other European States lagged even further behind.

Although Americans, for both ideological and practical reasons, were opposed to war as something that could threaten freedom both from without and from within, they coupled with this antipathy an acute awareness of the existence of conflict in human affairs. War, well described in the motto cast upon European cannon, was the *ultima ratio regum*, the final argument of kings. As a substitute for this costly and dangerous expedient, Americans relied upon economic pressure — the final argument of the individual — to undercut if they could opposed governmental structures by working on the interests of important individuals and pressure groups. Hence, non-importation during the Revolution and embargo during the Napoleonic Wars, expedients not quite so silly as some later critics would have us believe; hence, also, privateering or war by private enterprise; and, finally, a Navy which, designed for police action against pirates, whether in Barbary or the West Indies or the Far East, was used in great power

situations for commerce raiding with or without formal declaration of war, as with France in 1798 and Britain in 1812. To take on Tripoli or to destroy the ships of the London and Marseilles merchants was within our means, was consistent with our philosophy, and was, or at least ought to have been, effective. To take on the Royal Navy was not.

So much then for ideology as expressed in general attitudes. The question arises now: What did it mean in terms of policy? What were the consequences in general terms for American maritime strategy?

Here, first of all, a warning. Any ideology so opposed to the European state system as the one just described might be expected, and indeed has often been described, as one tending towards "isolationism." There is no question that distance made this heretical kind of practice possible, for distance was a tremendous insulator, but to call it isolationist overlooks two important factors: first of all, the universal nature of the ideology itself, which applies not merely to Americans but to all men; and, secondly, the vital importance to the colonies and to the young nation of world-wide trade.

I would suggest that a more fruitful way of looking at this business would be to consider it an internationalism of those of like interests, plus containment of those too far gone in sin to be redeemed. Or, to put it another way, isolation *of* rather than *from* Europe, with Europe being operatively rather than geographically defined as those great powers which were always broiling. *broiling*

This idea of isolating Europe, as opposed to that of isolating ourselves, can be seen in our early history, in the efforts to break down the mercantilistic restrictions of European empires and in our support, as in Latin America, of revolutions against the home country. The Monroe Doctrine is perhaps the best known example

and, in its original formulation, the emphasis was on their staying out of here. Our staying out of there was largely pumped into it later.

There was originally no idea of going-it-alone. The Washington administration seriously considered collective action with Sweden and Denmark against British and French interference with maritime commerce. Even earlier, Jefferson (thought by some to have been a great isolationist) had proposed that we league ourselves with the smaller trading powers for common action against the Barbary pirates. Indeed, I think the unilateral action against Barbary which finally ensued can be taken not only as reluctance on the part of honest freemen to pay tribute to these scoundrels, after the fashion of corrupt Europeans, but also as an effort to limit the power of the war-like European nations by depriving them of these unofficial allies. Benjamin Franklin's remark that "if there were no Algiers it would be worth England's while to build one," is well known.

The consequence, then, of this ideology was a foreign policy concerned with such things as the self-determination of peoples, small government, limitations on war-making, international intercourse insofar as possible on the individual rather than the governmental level, multilateral fostering of trade — all this based on the belief that such a rational policy was conducive to the welfare not only of Americans but of all mankind. In the export and implementation of this world view, an export possible only by sea, the Navy played a central role, and the nature of the American experiment defined the nature of the Navy. Since the aim was not "command of the sea," but "freedom of the seas," the Navy was less an instrument of war than an instrument of policy. It was, if one can use a somewhat singular expression, a Navy of the Enlightenment.

If this analysis is kept in mind, and if the importance of policy as opposed to war is remembered, then it seems to me that

the manifold activities of the old Navy begin to make some real sense. It was in the first instance a police force, engaged in the protection of maritime trade throughout the world. Given this function, and the lack after 1815 of any serious threat to the Continental United States, the natural consequence was the organization of permanent overseas squadrons — Mediterranean, West Indies, Pacific, South Atlantic, and the rest. Overseas squadrons need base facilities and these, in the years before the Civil War, we obtained: in the Mediterranean at Port Mahon and then at Spezia; in the Far East at Hong Kong and then at Macao; on the west coast of South America, prior to the conquest of California, at Valparaiso and Callao.

Like many other institutions, the overseas squadrons survived their real period of usefulness, which ended with the post-Civil War collapse of the merchant marine. The survival of the squadrons accounts in large measure, in view of the lack of overseas coaling stations at this time, for the much-ridiculed return to sail after the Civil War. Whether needed or not, whether we had any trade or not, these squadrons were maintained. In the 1880's domestic considerations were paramount, but in 1882, when the British bombardment of Alexandria set the stage for the occupation of Egypt, the first foreign troops to enter that burning town were not our imperialistic cousins but United States Marines.

Now not only was trade worth protecting; it was also, as I have tried to indicate, fundamental both to the existence of the American economy and also to the American idea of a world worth living in that it be continually expanded. From this there flowed the numerous negotiations of naval officers aimed at integrating new non-European areas — that is to say, non-mercantilistic, non-statist, non-protectionist areas — into this mutually profitable and civilizing network of maritime commerce.

This missionary purpose was fundamental not only to the war with Tripoli, but to our negotiations with the other Barbary

powers. It lay behind the efforts of Commodores Biddle, Crane and Rodgers to make a commercial treaty with the Sultan of Turkey. It governed the actions of Commodore Kearny in China in the 1840's. The opening of Japan (which had been suggested as far back as 1815 by Commodore Porter) was accomplished by Perry with this purpose explicitly stated, as was that of Korea in the 1880's by Commodore Shufeldt. These were a lot of openings for a country of the second rank, and it is worth noting that these were all openings, rather than seizures, of territory — openings followed by commercial negotiations on the most favored nation basis to prevent, or at least to inhibit, occupation of these territories by other powers.

There are two other ways in which the old Navy acted as an instrument of policy: one, as a scientific institution adding to the sum total of useful knowledge; the other, as forwarding in one way or another the cause of human liberty and the self-determination of peoples. As regards the former, one thinks at once of the important hydrographic work of Matthew Maury and of the various exploring expeditions — the expedition to discover the source of the Amazon; the well-known Wilkes expedition of the late 1830's; and saltiest of all, the U. S. Navy expedition, all members of which were pledged to abstinence from intoxicating drink, which accomplished in 1848 the first charting of the River Jordan and the Dead Sea.

As regard to the latter function — the forwarding of the cause of freedom — a number of events can be cited in which the Navy, or people intimately connected with it, were involved. First of all, the modern-sounding question of arms aid to small nations to permit them to maintain their independence. In the 1830's the Turkish Navy was rebuilt, after its destruction at the Battle of Navarino, by two American naval constructors — Henry Eckford and Foster Rhodes — with continuing technical advice from our charge d'affaires at Constantinople, Commodore David Porter. Aid to Turkey is no very new thing, nor indeed are

Turkish naval missions to the United States such as the one which passed through Newport this fall. Two Turkish missions came here for naval purposes prior to the Civil War.

In 1848-49 there was in Germany an attempt to accomplish a constitutional federation. It failed, but not before serious negotiations had been entered into for the employment of American naval officers to organize the planned new German Navy. In the 1870's vessels of the navy of the Khedive of Egypt were commanded by Annapolis graduates. The Sultan of Zanzibar attempted to defend his possessions by creating a navy by the purchase of surplus Confederate warships from the United States. In 1880 similar negotiations were opened as regards the Chinese Navy between Commodore Shufeldt and the great Viceroy Li Hung Chang.

Distance made us safe, community of aspiration made us trustworthy, our technical skills made us useful. For all of these reasons, then, American help was solicited by rulers of backward countries desiring to modernize and to defend their realms.

Nor was 1848, in Germany, the only time that we showed this interest in popular revolution. Individual Americans in the nineteenth century fought for freedom in almost any revolution you can name. But perhaps the most interesting incident, as showing the effects of ideology on naval officers, occurred in 1860 when Garibaldi's forces, bogged down in Sicily for lack of ammunition, were secretly and unofficially supplied with gunpowder from the magazine of a U. S. man-of-war.

So much for the old-time American maritime strategy. The basic idea of knitting together a rational world of peaceful development and advancing liberty was and still is a good one. But as usual, with the passing of time, circumstances seemed to alter cases. The world changed.

For one thing, it became clear that Americans had grossly overestimated the possibilities of reforming non-European cultures,

the possibilities, if you wish, of exporting Americanism to these regions. The cultures were resistant and the military strength of the European powers remained superior. Of the three non-Western nations — Turkey, Egypt and Japan — which made serious efforts to modernize themselves in the course of the nineteenth century, only the last succeeded, protected as she was by her distance from the power centers of Europe.

The second basic assumption on which this old American policy rested — the idea that European great power civilization was hopelessly corrupt and had to be contained in the interests of progress beyond the seas — also required some modification. There had always been an ambiguity in the British position in this scheme of things. The British were the ancestral enemy, but they were also blood brothers. They were one of the powers to be contained and yet, being the principal sea power, they were also the principal agent of containment. As the peaceful century went on and as the British went over increasingly to policies of free trade, they became increasingly, in deed if not in word, partners in the American enterprise.

Furthermore, as time went by, these European powers succeeded in reforming and democratizing themselves to an extent wholly undreamed of by the Founding Fathers. Having thus made themselves more acceptable, in one sense at least, they then embarked on a new wave of imperialism which rapidly gobbled up all the remaining blank spaces on the map. By the end of the century much had changed: it seemed that nineteenth century democratized or constitutional monarchies could be just as imperialistic as the old mercantilist ones of the century before, while forced draft industrialization had brought with it a new mercantilist economy with state subsidies and tariff walls.

Nor had the United States escaped this new era. Like the Italians, like the Germans, we too had our war of nationality. As is our custom, it was the biggest, best and bloodiest war

of all. As two important by-products of this Civil War came the disappearance of the merchant marine and the advent of a high tariff policy which, the result of wartime accident, came shortly to be considered the acme of Republican wisdom. In this sense we, too, went mercantilistic, while concentration on internal problems led to neglect of the seas and of what lay beyond them. These, and other factors, fostered a national inwardness. In this period we really did become isolationist, and one consequence was the period of naval decay. It was at this time—the 1870's and 1880's—that it came to be felt that the first qualification of a Secretary of the Navy was not to have seen salt water outside of a pork barrel.

It is worth noting that this post-Civil War trend towards isolation paralleled a trend in military technology which, for the first time, made isolation feasible. This, of course, was the coming of steam, for when the limited coal bunker replaced the limitless winds, the radius of action was gravely diminished. One can compare the freedom of action enjoyed by De Grasse here during the Revolution with that of the unfortunate Admiral Cervera in 1898. The moral here for those who wished to play in these new mercantilist big leagues was to snatch colonies and bases faster than ever, and this, of course, was explicitly stated by Mahan. Indeed, even if we contend that he was un-American in the old-fashioned sense, we must concede that he was wholly in tune with his times.

In this context one can look at the new American Navy and observe two things: first of all, in accordance with the new fashion, derived largely from Mahan, it became in short order a battleship navy; second, since nobody ever really faced up to the problem of defense of our Far Eastern possessions, it became, by virtue of limitations of bunkers as well as limitations of ideology, an isolationist one. This, indeed, was made explicit by the Congresses, who were pleased to appropriate money for what they called "sea-going coastline battleships," the idea being that

if a captain was kept short on coal he would not involve this country in distant incidents with scoundrelly foreigners.

But while such a navy might be an effective instrument of war, say in the Caribbean, it was not a very effective or flexible instrument of policy. Conflict, in this new period, came more and more to be considered in polar terms of war and peace; it is worth noting that the years of battleship-building were also the great years of the peace and arbitration movements. What this neo-mercantilist world meant in terms of naval operations can be simply seen if you will contrast the world-wide deployment of the Navy, in any peaceful year between 1815-1890, with Theodore Roosevelt's parting piece of advice to his successor in the White House: "Never divide the fleet."

Yet in retrospect one may say the basic problems remained largely unchanged, if hidden from the eyes of contemporaries. If the peaceful, cooperative, trading, developing world that Americans had earlier envisaged was to remain even a possibility, the seas had to be kept free for people who were at least relatively inclined this way. It was always in a sense a question of "containment."

In the battlefleet era, from the rise of the German Navy to the disappearance of that of Japan, the main problem from our side was to prevent the consolidation at the two ends of Eurasia of warlike powers whose ideas were cast in a different mold. The Caribbean question, although alarming for a time, was never a critical one, assuming the continued existence of the Royal Navy. True, the purpose of containment was, from the American view, somewhat concealed in ideology, but the real problem in both World Wars was to keep Germany away from the Atlantic and to prevent an imperialist Japan from concentrating her hold on East Asia.

I think we now find ourselves in a third period, and here I find myself being a little un-American in postulating a sort of Hegelian thesis, antithesis and synthesis.

1. In the first period — the period of the old Navy — we had a policy: freedom of the seas, promotion of trade, the peaceful integration and betterment of mankind. The Navy was an instrument of that policy. Our power was limited. We did not propose to fight major wars. Command of the sea, in so far as needful, we left to the British to provide, under such restrictions as we could impose through the development of international law.

2. During the second period — from the building of the New Navy down to the defeat of Japan — we had increasing power. Yet, for whatever reasons, our policy, once you got beyond the defense of our own possessions, was never a very clear one. It seems that a world divided into many compartments is not an easy one for Americans to deal with intellectually. Increasingly in this period our Navy became an instrument of war, useful in emergencies but inflexible in other times.

3. In the third period things have become mixed. We have great power, yet our policy has been developing rapidly along the old American lines. Now, to keep the freedom of the seas which knits this free world together, we exercise command of the sea. In nineteenth century terms I suppose you could say that our armed forces (no longer only the Navy) perform the functions of both the Royal Navy and the U. S. N.

Eighteenth century ideas of the brotherhood of man persist in this country to a remarkable degree. We have, of course, a very large government in terms of budgets, stenographers, and mimeograph machines. But in the essential point it remains small: it is to serve, not dominate, the individual. Even in some Republican circles it is now permissible to talk of tariff reduction and of promoting international trade, and the barriers between peoples are coming down in other ways.

The artificial and somewhat divisive concept of sovereignty, which the Founding Fathers so successfully concealed and dis-

persed in our Constitution, is again being concealed and dispersed by alliances and understandings. I think it is perhaps not wholly playing with words to point out that some units of our Navy now fly the white ensign and that a good part of our Merchant Marine navigates under the flags of Panama, Norway and Greece.

Once again, as before the Civil War, the Navy is an instrument of policy. Once again we have overseas bases. Underway replenishment has restored to the fleet the range and endurance of the sailing squadrons. Once again we support the backward nations, over the whole scale from the states of Western Europe down to the emerging societies of the Orient. We can and do contain the new broiling powers, but while doing so we should remember that this is not the sole end of policy. How, we should ask ourselves, while containing, can we best use our freedom of the seas to develop our better world?

Now all this has been, I am afraid, pretty ideological, and perhaps seems somewhat remote from reality. You may say that ideology is all very well as a means of rationalizing a policy, or of selling it to the electorate, but that the policy itself should be built on facts and not on words. In conclusion, therefore, I would like to submit a brief factual argument which will show, I think, that our present maritime strategy, in its broadest aspects, is almost unavoidable given the international facts of life; and that something very like it would be developing even if this country had not been born on a Fourth of July in the late eighteenth century, attended by a very literate corps of obstetricians who forced the thinking of that period deeply into the national consciousness.

The argument is that of an Englishman, Sir Eyre Crowe, who was for many years one of the important permanent members of the Foreign Office. Written prior to the first World War to describe the situation in his country, it is now remarkably

applicable to ours. Crowe's argument, in brief, is a triple one. First of all, that in a very real sense the pervasiveness of maritime power makes the state supreme at sea neighbor to all other maritime states, and as such likely to excite their hostile fear and combination. Air strength, of course, is relevant in this equation today. Second, that the danger of these combinations could only be averted if the national policy of the dominant naval power harmonized with the general aspirations of mankind and, more particularly, in a world of independent nations, with the interests of as many states as possible. Third, and in conclusion, that since the first concern of any state is the preservation of its independence, Great Britain in her own interest then, and we in our own interest now, must oppose any power which threatens to dictate to the weaker communities of the world.

If this is true, our national strategy is self-defined. Necessity and inclination alike press the same policy upon us. "Go-it-alone" has no meaning, and the inescapable problem is as has always been, a double one: to hold the balance against the aggressor and, while containing him, to maintain what is by general consent a viable world outside.

BIOGRAPHIC SKETCH

Professor James A. Field, Jr.

Professor Field holds S. B., A. M., and Ph. D. degrees from Harvard University and attended Cambridge University, England, in 1937-38.

In 1939-41 and again in 1947 he was a Teaching Fellow and Tutor in the Department of History and Literature at Harvard University. During World War II, he served with the U. S. Navy from 1942-1946. His wartime assignments included duty in the Office of Chief of Naval Operations, on an escort carrier in the Pacific area, as gunnery officer of Carrier Division 23, and on the staff of Commander Air Force, U. S. Atlantic Fleet.

Professor Field is currently on leave from Swarthmore College, where he is Professor of American History. He occupies the Ernest J. King Chair of Maritime History at the Naval War College during the 1954-55 academic year.

As a member of the Naval Analysis Division, USSBS, he collaborated in the preparation of *Interrogations of Japanese Officials* and *Campaigns of the Pacific War*. He is the author of *The Japanese at Leyte Gulf*, and the translator of R. de Belot, *The Struggle for the Mediterranean*.

THE NATIONAL HIGHER STRATEGIC DIRECTION OF WAR

A lecture delivered
at the Naval War College
on 6 January 1955 by
Professor William A. Reitzel

Our subject — *The Higher Strategic Direction of War* — is the most unpleasant I've struck in years of committing academic sin. It has too many angles, too much undigested raw material, and, above all, too many people with too many opinions have tramped around in it with heavy shoes.

My first thought is not to hand on to you my own frustrations. I hope I can avoid this by making unmistakably clear the aspect I have selected for treatment, and if I say precisely what it is that I will be talking about.

I am talking about the higher strategic direction of war as a problem for the Top-level of a government — the level of the Head of State, his intimate associates, and his official advisers.

I am approaching the subject from two sides. First, I intend to schematize it — see what the situation looks like in the abstract. Second, I intend to examine three cases — the United States, Great Britain and Germany — and see what was actually done to deal with such a situation in its concrete form.


Then, and very hesitatingly, we can see if any conclusions are to be drawn.

The schematizing can best be done by commenting on some slides.

This slide (see Plate "A") is a model of the characteristic cycle of government operation. In its ideal form, this cycle would

BASIC PATTERN

LEVEL OF DECISION



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be continuous movement of Information — Decision — Action — Modification— etc. But the reality is not so ideal. Control over the operation is not and cannot be perfect.

For example, in the *updraft of Information*, the raw material is always subject to being processed by limited or specialized experience and doctrine, or by bias; and the resulting distortions are carried over into recommendations and advice. Or, again, other influences, not officially controllable, cut into the cycle— congressional opinion, public feeling, pressure groups, informal advisors who have accidental access to the level of decision.

Or, look at another disturbing possibility: the special bursts of activity in the cycle that are generated by unexpected demands. The top-side suddenly asks a question and you get a forced updraft of information. An action produces an unanticipated result and you get a cutting-across of information and action below the level of decision. The updraft of Information flags a new problem but the downdraft of Action resists change and continues to move along the line previously set.


Even under normal routine, action modifies the situation to which decision was originally addressed. The resultant updraft of fresh information may not reach the level of decision, but may cut across and set up a change in the down draft of Action— constitute in effect a kind of Inner Cycle of operation of which the level of decision may remain unaware.

The full implication of these divergencies from the ideal come out more sharply if we go to the next slide. (see Plate "B")

This slide combines the operational cycle with a model government structure. The four slices shown ignore many intermediate levels and say nothing of the elaborate and vaguely defined working relations between levels. After all, we wanted a visual aid and not a spider's web.

SCHEMATIC ACTION / DECISION

(ANY GOVERNMENT)



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Plate B

The separation of Political (or, better, Civilian) and Military has been done only to enable you to see at a glance the related statuses of civilian and military responsibilities. In reality, the two bodies are interlocked at each level in ways that the next slide will show.

For the moment, I am concerned to illustrate what can happen as the cycle of Information — Decision — Action operates in a government hierarchy.

Notice first that the cycle operates in a very complex institutional atmosphere. At every level in the updraft of information, economic, political, and security information is jostled together — competing for attention, claiming superior relevance, requiring sorting out and adjustment in order to become balanced recommendations and advice.

In the same way, the downdraft of action moves into economic, political, and security forms; and the difficulties of getting a balanced result increase as action takes place on lower and lower and more specialized levels.

Modifications, review, adjustments become correspondingly difficult to make.

These facts give us our first clue to what is involved in the higher strategic conduct of war. It lies in the degree of guidance that the Top-level gives to the updraft of Information, and in the degree of control that the Top-level exercises over the downdraft of action.

In this scheme, it is obvious that the area of basic decision is limited, and the number of key decisions few; but that the areas in which information is processed and implementing action is taken are extensive. The difference between 10% and 90% suggested by this is important to our discussion.

Now let's add a third model — a picture of the Top-level slice or, the area of key decision-making. (see Plate "C")

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TOP LEVEL SLICE
ANY GOVERNMENT - NORMAL CONDITIONS




Plate C

Here we have the Head of State, the close associates with whom he acts from choice, and the official advisors with whom he acts institutionally.

Here we have the three great functions exercised by this Group—the Political, the Economic-Social, and the Military-Security.

Here we have the updraft of Information and the down-draft of Action.

But here, also, we have information, recommendation, and advice pressing in unofficially—public opinion (whatever that may mean in fact), legislative opinion, expert opinion from the outside; and here we have too action being taken by individuals outside channels—the presidential representative, the expeditor, the “man in the know.”

In this picture, we are looking at what I would call the un-realized ideal—all functions in balance, the official updraft producing relevant and balanced information, the official downdraft producing coordinated and controlled action, unofficial and informal influences held to a minimum. This ideal condition has never been known to exist in fact. And we will look in a minute at the more usual state of things.

But, first, with models B and C in mind, let me try to spot the key points in the situation we are analyzing.

- 1) The relation of the level of decision to the updraft of information.
- 2) The control over the downdraft of action.
- 3) The balance of functions at the level of decision; that is, the extent to which information, decision, and action is comprehensive, co-ordinated, and consistent.

Now, it is of some importance to realize that this picture of the Top-level slice is also representative of the structure of any

slice in a government hierarchy. The same functions are present, the same official and unofficial flows of information and action take place, the same question of balance and co-ordination exists.

We'll take a quick look now at reality — compared with the ideal model.

Imagine our government just before a major election; or during a violent political controversy. (see plate "D") The political function lays the major claim on attention. Information, decision, and action are weighted on the side of this function. The ideal balance is upset.

Or, another type situation, in which the country is in an economic depression, real or imagined. (see plate "E") The balance is again upset; but in another direction.

Or, finally, (see plate "F") the country moves towards or is actually in a state of war. The Military-Security function becomes paramount and its consideration weighs heavily throughout the entire operational cycle.

In other words, the reality never corresponds with the ideal. The most that can be expected is that it will approximate the ideal balance as closely as actual conditions permit.

With these two charts B and C still before us, (see plate "G.") some final remarks of a non-schematic kind are in order.

The heart of our situation, as I have said, lies in the relations of the Top-level and its decisions to the updraft of Information and the downdraft of Action. These relationships do not respond readily to organization charts and administrative controls. The best effort of the expert in public administration frequently does little more than conceal the real difficulties of these relations by wrapping them up in layers of governmental machinery.

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TOP LEVEL SLICE
ANY GOVERNMENT - MAJOR ELECTION




Plate D

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TOP LEVEL SLICE
ANY GOVERNMENT - DEPRESSION




Plate E

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TOP LEVEL SLICE
ANY GOVERNMENT - WAR






Plate F

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TOP LEVEL SLICE ANY GOVERNMENT - NORMAL CONDITIONS



SCHEMATIC ACTION/DECISION (ANY GOVERNMENT)



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Plate G

And, above all, I ask you to remember throughout the remainder of this discussion that the Top-level — as well as the advisory and executive levels immediately below — are likely to be made up of powerful personalities with strong opinions. These levels consequently are not havens of peace and quiet: they are areas of push and pull and conflict.

Now, in the light of all this abstraction, let us come to the particular form of our problem. We are concerned with the type of governmental situation in which the economic and political forces in national life have become relatively subordinate to the requirements of national security. We are now looking at our problem solely as one of directing a war from the Top-level.

As this point, I follow a suggestion of Justice Holmes that “a page of history is worth whole volumes of logic;” and turn to an examination of three cases: the US-Roosevelt case; the British-Churchill case; and the German-Hitler case.

In this examination I will not be writing history. I am not concerned with the merits or the demerits of particular decisions. I am interested only in identifying the various ways in which the war was given higher strategic direction. And we must start here with broad strategic concepts in order to be able to understand the arrangements and organizations that were developed for their execution.

As of 1938, a German strategic design had been fully sketched out by Hitler, and the key decisions had been made. The stages of execution were clearly in mind and the means of execution were in process of being shifted from the political and economic to the military. Hitler laid out the picture for his Inner Circle of associates in unambiguous terms: “Our task is first to isolate Poland,” but “the fight will be primarily against England and France;” and the aim will be “A final military settlement with the West; that is, the destruction of the power and ability of the West ever again to oppose the further expansion of the

German people in Europe;" but this is only the prerequisite to an unhampered movement into Soviet Russia by which Germany would acquire an impregnable position as a world power.

No equivalent British concept existed in 1938. The record shows that the Chamberlain government worked by improvised reactions to German moves. Even the decision to go to war was the result of Germany having foreclosed on the alternatives; and not a freely made basic strategic decision.

No equivalent American concept existed in 1938. However, the consequences were not the same as for Great Britain because the American hand could not be forced. The United States had a number of options; and these remained open even after the war began in Europe. The United States had and kept a freedom of choice.

When a strategic concept was later shaped, and key strategic decisions were made in 1941, they were freely made after a due consideration of alternatives. In this respect, they satisfied a prime requisite of a high strategic decision — that it should represent a real choice and thus permit initiative.

The German concept and decisions originally had this quality also. These represented a real choice; and with it came an initiative that opened up opportunities for further choice — an initiative that was not militarily blocked until 1942.

In 1939, therefore, when the war began, we had three different situations with respect to the problem of higher strategic direction. The German goal was set and many of the essential steps had already been taken. Consequently, the task of the Top-level consisted of,

- 1) supervising planned action
- 2) controlling the timing and detailed execution of remaining steps.
- 3) preventing, or adjusting to, enemy interference.

The British situation was, in contrast, set by circumstances beyond British control. Great Britain had to follow a course marked out by others. Deprived of alternatives, the Top-level could do little more than dust-off the standard action patterns that had survived from the First World War — develop a blockade (now including air bombardment), fight a holding war, construct a military-political alliance. The task of the Top-level, therefore, called for a tight control over every detail of judgment and action on a current basis in order to remain as pliable as possible to take advantage of every opening no matter how small.

The American situation was an open one; but one in which there had been no preparation for action. The work of the Top-level accordingly fell into three stages:

- 1) to develop a strategic concept and to make key decisions
- 2) to prepare for a range of contingencies until the key decisions were made.
- 3) to be prepared to shift in the required direction, once that direction was set.

These differences in situation are reflected in the organizations that the Top-levels of the three governments developed.

If effective and absolute control is considered to be the answer — and it often is so considered — then Hitler's Germany had this answer by 1939. Hitler had in hand a system of controls that produced the maximum concentration of authority at a clearly defined point — himself. Information reached the Top-level only in response to questions and proposals put by Hitler and his Inner Circle. Decisions were made only by Hitler. Implementing action was under a remarkable degree of co-ordination and control.

Comparatively, the situation in England and the United States seemed out of hand.

In the United States, the Top-level was in that state of administrative disorder that is a familiar feature of American democracy and its political operations. All pressures, conflicting interests, and divergent opinions flooded in on the White House; and no clear chain of command stretched out from the White House. There was nothing unusual in this. Until the United States entered the war, Roosevelt was committed to acting like a President and not like a Commander-in-Chief; and the government institutions with which he had to work were not very pliable.

While the actual British situation was almost as confused, the British system of government lent itself much more readily to a concentration of power and authority in the Prime Minister. The institutions were pliable. All depended on the extent and on the purpose for which the Top-level wished to organize the institutions at its disposal. We know that, in the late '30s, Neville Chamberlain ran His Majesty's Government as a tightly-controlled one-man show for the express purpose of avoiding conflict with Germany and Italy. We also know that, when this purpose failed in 1939, and war became inevitable, power and authority at the Top-level were dispersed and clear direction was lost in a welter of committees. It remained so until it was reconcentrated by Winston Churchill in his own hands in 1940.

There is no better description of the consequences of this dispersal of the power to decide and the authority to direct than Churchill's memo, written in January 1940 as First Lord of the Admiralty.

"I see such immense walls of prevention to positive action, that I wonder whether any plan will have a chance of climbing over them . . . *First*, the objections of the Economic Departments . . . *Secondly*, the Joint Planning Committee. *Thirdly*, the Chiefs of Staff Committee. *Fourthly*, the insidious argument, 'Don't spoil the big plan for the sake of the small,' when there is really very little chance of

the big plan being resolutely attempted. *Fifthly*, the juridical and moral objections, all gradually worn down. *Sixthly*, the attitude of neutrals . . . *Seventhly*, the Cabinet itself with its many angles of criticism. *Eighthly*, when all this has been smoothed out, the French have to be consulted. Finally, the Dominions and their consciences have to be squared . . . Now, after all this vain bogging . . . arguments between good and worthy people unending . . . we reach the simple point on which action was demanded seven months before.

One can hardly find a more perfect example of the fatuity of waging war by committee . . . or rather by groups of committees.”

You can almost hear Churchill's sigh of relief when he becomes Prime Minister five month later, and says,

“I acquired the chief power in the state, which henceforth I wielded in ever-growing measure . . . At last I had authority to give directions over the whole scene.”

We have now before us the situation of three governments and three Top-levels in various states of readiness for dealing with those situations. With hindsight, we can say that the theoretically perfect German system failed; that the potentials of the British system were pretty fully realized and adjusted to Britain's particular task; and that the theoretically most imperfect — the American — came through successfully. Consequently, the analysis of what happened in these three cases should be enlightening.

I have referred to key strategic decisions — the spelling out of a strategic concept into basic patterns of action. I now want to be specific about these key decisions. Their nature and their

requirements differed in the three cases before us; and these differences are significant for our discussion.

Let me make a footnote remark here. I mean by "Key Strategic Decisions" the choice of a course of action so basic and so broadly stated that most subsequent decisions are subordinate to it and are concerned with execution and implementation. In this sense, the number of key decisions will always be small.

For my money, there was only one such decision made by Germany. It was the choice to exploit an unstable international situation in order to bring Germany to the top of the international hierarchy of power. The war merely represented a preconceived stage in the execution of this decision. Thus the problem of directing the war was 100% a problem of implementation.

Once the war was under way, the further freedom of choice for Germany depended upon steady success. Looking back, we can see that this freedom was lost in the winter of 1941; and that the direction of the war became unyielding and rigid. As Hitler himself put it: "Since 1941, it has been my task not to lose my nerve; instead whenever there is a collapse, my job has been to find a way out and a remedy, in order to restore the situation . . ." In these circumstances, the original key strategic decision became a one-way street—a straight-jacket. It did not even allow the alternative of surrender.

Again for my money, Great Britain was never in a position to make key strategic decisions, because freedom of choice was never really available. The freedom that had been lost to Germany in the 30s, was not regained when the Germans failed to eliminate Great Britain in 1940-41. For, with the entry of the United States into the war, Churchill's freedom of decision was limited by the extent to which he could identify what Great Britain wanted with what the United States intended.

If there was a controlling British decision after 1939, it was to enlist the aid of the United States on the most favorable terms — but at almost any cost.

Under these conditions, the Top-level job consisted first of improvisation until the United States came into the War; and second, of keeping British aims within the larger framework of American purpose. Churchill might sketch grand designs but he could not achieve them by British means. In the last analysis, his design was always subject to an American veto. To operate effectively in such straightened circumstances required a very close grip on all parts of the machinery for conducting war. All depended on attention to detail, on the ability and the means to make accurate judgments, and on a capacity rapidly to adjust to facts. Churchill's pattern of operation was to get and keep full control of the machinery and to use it with masterly pliability.

With respect to the United States, I can find only two key strategic decisions. They were,

- 1) A decision made in 1940 to keep Great Britain going.
- 2) A decision made in 1941 to concentrate force on Europe for the defeat of Germany and Italy, while waging a holding war of attrition against Japan.

Both these decisions were made solely on the basis of official estimates by a relatively small political-military group. They did not conform with well-developed and traditional service views. They were not opened up for public discussion and certainly did not correspond with any clearly defined body of majority feeling in American opinion. Most importantly, they were deliberate choices, made after examining a range of reasonably valid alternatives, and made with a pretty complete awareness of their implications.

These two decisions were not one-way streets from which there was no returning. On the contrary, the options that lay behind them remained open. The decisions could be reviewed and other choices made whenever the circumstances required. For ex-

ample, there was no time at which the United States could not have decided to shift its power to the Pacific.

Roosevelt's problem at the Top-level consisted essentially in making these key decisions, with all of their consequences, stick. We know this was not an easy job. Heavy domestic pressures had continually to be checked. Alternative proposals, developed at lower levels in the government, had to be watched for and squelched. Above all, the line had to be maintained in the face of strong and not wholly disinterested arguments from Allies.

Aside from this, the Top-level task was relatively simple. For the most part, the Top-level avoided entanglement with detail, delegated executive responsibility freely, and used its authority sparingly except when the basic decisions seemed to be in danger of change or distortion. This conception of the job obviously permitted a looseness of organization and operation wholly unsuited to either the British or the German situations.

These, then, were the ways in which the general problem of giving higher strategic direction to the war were presented to three Heads of State and their associates. The rest of this section of my talk deals with how these Top-levels worked in two respects—in relation to the updraft of Information and in relation to the downdraft of Action.

First, the updraft of Information.

All three Heads of State had their war rooms and their regular briefings. All three inserted personal representatives at what they considered key points in the governmental system. All three developed techniques for circumventing established government agencies and for cutting down traditional access to the top-level of decision. Here the similarities stopped.

Throughout the war, the up-flow of information to the American Top-level was relatively uncontrolled, irregular, and

accidental—with one very important exception. The processing of information to the Joint Chiefs of Staff was organized and well controlled. Outside this military cycle, however, there was uncertainty and confusion; and the co-ordination of information between agencies was casual and time-consuming. Significant matters, if they did not directly impinge on the military executive responsibilities of the Joint Chiefs, had difficulty in reaching the Top-level through official channels.

Consequently, they tended to seek and to move through informal channels of personal access and reached the Top-level intermittently, out of context, and distorted by personal biases. By the same token, agencies whose functions were peripheral to the actual conduct of the war found many opportunities to free-wheel in matters of post-war concern. I have in mind here, the Treasury Department, the post-war planning sections of the State Department, and even some of Roosevelt's own war-time creations—the Office of War Information and the Foreign Economic Administration.

President Roosevelt, in line with his previous practices and with his temperament, was content to sketch broad outlines and to delegate authority. Things worked well insofar as Roosevelt was Commander-in-Chief, and gave his military organization full play to execute decisions. Generally speaking, having selected his military advisers, he relied on their judgment—intervening only when they did not agree. Thus the machinery for the daily conduct of the war—as distinct from guiding the direction in which the war was to go—was satisfactorily settled in the Joint Chiefs. Churchill early learned, for example, that if he wished to argue specific aspects of military strategy, he had to take off his Prime Minister's hat and argue with American generals and admirals in the Minister of Defense's hat. Roosevelt would not confer with him as Head of State on such matters.

Churchill, unlike Roosevelt, was deeply attentive to the processes by which information reached him. He was suspicious of

the routines by which intelligence was "sifted, and colored, and reduced in consequence and importance." He was equally suspicious of official advice that came from committees — "that copious flow of polite conversation; the tactful report drawn up by a secretary . . . ; the arrival at that broad happy upland where everything was settled for the greatest good of the greatest number by the common sense of most after the consultation of all."

He had many devices for getting things into his own hands. One has to have private representatives examine raw intelligence material on his behalf and under his guidance. Another was to set up estimating teams of his own — particularly of statistical experts, whom he could trust to pay no attention to anything but realities. He ordered: "The utmost confusion is caused when people argue on different statistical material. I wish all statistics to be concentrated in my own office as Prime Minister, from which alone the final authoritative working figures will emerge." In a modern state, where statistics are the breath of life and the root of argument, no more painful or severe check could have been put on the flow of information.

Churchill also discouraged the upward flow of unsolicited recommendations and advice. He preferred to generate information in accordance with the needs of his Top-level by sending down memos, questions, problems, and demands. The flood from the front office could not have left much time for incidental creative thought at the lower levels.

The various records we have of Hitler at work give us still a third picture. Strictly speaking, there was almost no regular updraft of information to the top in Hitler's system. The machinery existed and it ground out volumes of reports; but little of this was desired by and little penetrated to the Top-level. Hitler, according to one observer, "was so sure of himself that influence on his thought would have been difficult. He always cut off reports by his people and expressed his own opinions regardless."

The transcripts of Hitler's conferences make it plain that processed information, recommendation, and advice was their least striking feature. Information was available to Hitler's professional advisors and to members of his Inner Circle, but they were either unwilling to force it on his resistive attention or were competing among themselves and kept their knowledge under wraps.

Hitler's temperament and the nature of his problem made this inevitable. He was inclined to dictate events rather than to study and take advantage of them. In addition, his goal was too precisely defined and his time-scheme too exacting to permit him the luxury of patience or the wisdom of looking disagreeable facts in the face.

Let us now turn to the other aspect from which these three cases can be compared—the downward control of Action.

Hitler's system was undeniably the most perfected, yet it was not an adequate solution to the direction of his particular war. The time came—and it came in the first winter of the war with Russia—when the very perfection of its controls over action became the source of ultimate disaster. The reason is a simple one. When German initiative was lost, the attention of the Top-level began to shift from the coherent direction of a broad strategic design to a niggling fascination with the details of rigidly maintaining a set purpose in the face of all evidence. This tendency grew as enemy pressure mounted and, finally, not even the smallest unit could be moved without Hitler's express agreement. By this time, though the machinery of control remained intact, it operated on irrelevant detail or in unreal situations.

Churchill aspired to an equally firm and complete control. His basic attitude was clear. "The efficiency of a war administration depends upon whether decision emanating from the highest authority are in fact strictly, faithfully, and punctually obeyed." From the moment he became Prime Minister, he set about to make all lines of influence and command lead into and

lead out of his combined offices of Prime Minister and Minister of Defense.

Once established, Churchill stoutly resisted all efforts to loosen his controls. He had accepted final responsibility and he meant to have absolute authority within the rather elastic limits of British institutions. He dismissed Sir Stafford Cripps' elaborate proposals for a more democratic system with a sniff — "This was in truth a social planner's dream. I judged it misconceived in theory and unworkable in practice." It was the work of a man "who had all the distinguishing qualities of a poker — except its occasional warmth."

In spite of the tightness of his structure, however, Churchill noticed several sources of trouble. ". . . anything contrary to departmental prejudices will be obstructed and delayed by officers of the second grade in the machine." The answer — "Make signal exceptions of one or two. When this becomes known you get better service afterwards." Remotely situated staffs — like his particular bugbear, the Operations Staff Middle East in Cairo — developed fixed and obstructive attitudes towards all plans they had not originated. Still another difficulty was to get all levels of all departments to speak with the same voice at the same time — the problem of co-ordination across the board.

A final note can be added about the Churchillian system. There is evidence that the Top-level bothered far too much about detail. This may have been the result of necessity, since materially as well as strategically Great Britain was operating on narrow margins and under great restrictions. It may also be that the Top-level of any system that is too tightly organized for control may tend to push into areas for which it is not suited. But it could also have been due to Churchill's temperamental interest in every aspect of war — he liked to think of knee pads and gloves for paratroopers as well as about high politics and grand combinations.

The American system, as Roosevelt allowed it to develop, was marked by a sort of schizophrenia — or divided personality, one of which was reasonable orderly and controlled, and the other of which was unpredictable.

To begin with, Roosevelt divided his problem in terms of two aspects of his office: he was President of the United States and he was Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces. His controls were largely organized in relation to his role as Commander-in-Chief, and they linked up directly through the Joint Chiefs with the American military organization. Operationally, he could and did leave immense powers of executive decision in the hands of his officially designated military advisors — reserving to himself and the Top-level, not so much the executive conduct of the war as the ultimate authority to give and to maintain basic strategic direction. This latter responsibility, Roosevelt guarded against all comers — his own military advisors, public and private pressures, or the allies pressing for alternative courses in Europe or elsewhere.

So we find a fairly tight structure of control over action in the military sense. But, what about political and economic action? both Churchill and Hitler would have asked. In this respect, Roosevelt swung over into his role as President, retaining the habits and methods of his peacetime "New Deal" administration. He improvised solutions, he delayed decisions, he played interests and influences off against one another, he worked through personal presidential representatives — the expeditors and coordinators like Harry Hopkins — and he never saw any need to do otherwise. In practice this exposed the Top-level to informal and unchanneled influences; and encouraged lines of authority and responsibility to become vague and confused. The result was the despair of all good bureaucrats and government officials. But it must be remembered — and Ickes' diary illustrates the point — it equally frustrated the large number of people who were sure

they knew exactly how to win the war and run the world and wanted to get to the Top-level with the good news.

There is, however, a final and really serious comment that can be made about this split-personality aspect of Roosevelt's methods. It tended to separate the military from the political factors involved in the higher strategic direction of the war. The technique was effective for "winning the war" in a restrictive military sense. The technique was also effective in producing a broad-brush picture of the post-war world for publicity purposes. But the process as a whole was unable to direct the war towards creating the conditions that alone could give reality to the picture.

This charge cannot be brought against either Churchill or Hitler. If they were unsuccessful in getting the kind of world they wanted, it was from inadequacy of means and not because of confusion of intent or weakness of control.

Churchill has an interesting comment on the American situation in 1945:

"We can now see the deadly hiatus which existed between the fading of President Roosevelt's strength and the growth of President Truman's grip. In this melancholy void, one president could not act and the other could not know. The military chiefs . . . confined themselves to their professional sphere. The State Department had not been close enough to the heart of things to comprehend the issues involved. Indispensable political direction was lacking at the moment when it was most needed."

As I look back over the road we have followed, I confess I am bewildered by the job of drawing conclusions about an ideal way of directing the higher strategy of a war. I think we will both be on safer ground if my concluding remarks are regarded

merely as observations on the nature of things rather than as statements of principle.

I believe and hope that we agree about the abstract form of the problem. I believe, also, that the three cases we've looked at show that, while the problem is always the same in the abstract, the concrete form in which it is presented differs from government to government, and differs for any one government from one situation to another.

There are, however, some useful distinctions that can be made. Notice, for example, that the whole business of strategically directing war split into two very unequal parts: 1) the making and maintenance of key decisions; and 2) the control of information, the control of implementing action, and the control of supporting decisions.

Notice, also, that both human and mechanical elements are involved throughout the whole process. The human factor is the controlling one in the making and maintenance of decisions. The mechanical factor is important in the machinery by which information is processed upwards and action is projected downwards. And the human factor certainly comes into play in preparing information and in the interpretation of action directives.

The mechanical factors respond to expert analysis and to administrative correction. The human factors tend to be resistive and, the closer you come to the Top-level, the more resistive they become.

It is interesting to note that the mechanical weaknesses of the American system were being closely studied before the war was over. Some of the results of these studies were built into the National Security Act of 1947. In fact, one of the main purposes of this Act — a feature that was obscured by the excitement about unification — was to set up official machinery for the better and more balanced processing of information. The Na-

tional Security Council and its adjunct the Central Intelligence Agency were intended to bring political, economic, and military considerations into regular and steady co-ordination and balance for the use of the Top-level. It is important to remember, however, as Mr. Acheson pointed out, that the NSC decides nothing. It is just one more piece of machinery for preparing and presenting matters for presidential decision.

The Act of 1947 and its amendments did not come equally to grips with the related issue of machinery for controlling action downwards. Consequently we have seen the American government since the war grapple with this aspect of the problem — by multiplying co-ordinating committees, joint *ad hoc* committees, perpetual consultations, and bipartisan conferences; by endlessly reorganizing agencies and inventing new staff systems; or, more simply, by making more telephone calls and writing more letters. An impression has accordingly been formed — encouraged by Hoover Commissions and public administration experts — that the matter can be dealt with by tinkering with the machinery.

I agree that improvements can and have been made by these means. Some of the uncertainties introduced by the human factor have been identified and their influence reduced. Secretary of the Army Stimson found that the formal machinery of the Joint Chiefs of Staff had “a most salutary effect upon the President’s weakness for snap decisions; it thus offset a characteristic which might otherwise have been a serious handicap to his basically sound strategic instincts.”

But I dissent emphatically from the view that the perfect formula for the higher strategic direction of war is finally arrived at by such devices. So here at the end I want to shift your attention exclusively to the human element.

No matter how perfected the mechanical solutions may be, we always reach a point in the analysis of this situation at which we are confronted by a small group of highly individual perso-

nalities. This is the Top-level — the slice of government in which key decisions are made — the slice for which and because of which all of the machinery operates. The plain and inescapable fact is that, when you reach this level, you are looking at the irreducible minimum of chance and accident in human affairs. There is no machinery for passing the buck beyond this point.

Consider the full implication of this for our problem. The qualities of insight, judgment, skill, and good faith that will be available at this level at any given time cannot be predetermined. The nature of the individuals who constitute this level, their relations with each other and with their subordinates cannot be predicted. The ways in which they will meet the demands of great occasions is a great unknown. And no political system — democratic, monarchial, or authoritarian — has the means to ensure that the desired qualities will be at the Top-level whenever there is a higher strategy of war to be determined and directed.

This irreducible minimum of chance can never be brought under absolute control. It can be buried in layers of administrative machinery. It can be ignored by a preoccupation with drawing organization charts. It can even be hedged against by a system of checks and balances. But it is always there.

The lower levels of processing and execution in a government hierarchy are the natural and inevitable enemies of this element of chance. They labor perpetually to reduce it. They cry out incessantly against the ambiguities, uncertainties, and frustrations it brings into their lives and work. But this is a struggle they can never really win.

The advice once found on the fly leaf of a Gideon Society Bible is applicable to their sad situation. Part of the advice was on a printed insert. It read: If you are troubled, read Corinthians X:19; If your job is getting you down, read Judges V:7; If the world seems against you, read Job VI:13; and so on. But, writ-

ten in pencil across the bottom of this insert was —“If none of these things seem to work, call Mabel — Center 297.”

This, after all, is the human reward that is open even for the lower levels. But, for the purpose of really understanding the situation we have been examining, it is well to remember that at the Top-level there is no Mabel to call. The Top-level is stuck in an exposed position. Nor does a nation have a Mabel to call. It is stuck with whatever Top-level is in place whenever the problem of the higher strategic conduct of a war is presented to it for action.

BIOGRAPHIC SKETCH

Professor William A. Reitzel

Professor Reitzel received his B.S. degree from Haverford College in 1922, his B. A. and M. A. degrees from Oxford University in 1925 and 1931.

In 1925, he joined the faculty of Haverford College, where he continued until 1940, being appointed Professor of English in 1936. In 1940, he resigned and became Director of the Historical Society of Pennsylvania and editor of "The Pennsylvania Magazine of History."

In 1942, he was commissioned in the Naval Reserve and served abroad in the European Theater until 1946. His assignments included Naval Observer, London; Assistant to Principal Salvage Officer, Mediterranean; Intelligence Officer, ComNav-Europe; Flag Secretary, ComNavForNorth African Waters; and Flag Secretary, ComNavFor Germany.

On returning to inactive duty, Professor Reitzel joined the Center for International Studies at Yale University as Deputy Director. He entered the Government service in 1948, resigning in 1950 to become a member of the Senior Staff of the Brookings Institution and Deputy Director of the International Studies Group. In 1953, he rejoined the faculty of Haverford College as Professor of Social Science, and now divides his time between Haverford and the Brookings Institution. He occupies the Chester W. Nimitz Chair of Social and Political Philosophy at the Naval War College during the 1954-55 academic year.

Professor Reitzel is the author of: *The Life of William Cobbett*; *The Mediterranean — Its Role in U. S. Foreign Policy*; and editor and co-author of the annual Brookings' publication, *The Major Problems of U. S. Foreign Policy*.

RECOMMENDED READING

The evaluation of articles and books listed below include those recommended to resident students of the Naval War College. Officers in the fleet and elsewhere may find these of interest.

The listings herein should not be construed as an endorsement by the Naval War College; they are indicated only on the basis of interesting reading matter.

Many of the publications may be found in ship and station libraries. Some of the publications not available from these sources may be obtained from the Bureau of Naval Personnel Auxiliary Library Service, where a collection of books is available for loan to individual officers. Requests for the loan of these books should be made by the individual to the nearest branch of the Chief of Naval Personnel. (See Article C-9604, Bureau of Naval Personnel Manual, 1948).

- Title: *Do We Need a Navy?*
Publication: THE ECONOMIST, December 25, 1954, p. 1061-2,
22 Ryder Street, St. James, London.
Annotation: This is a vitally important and timely article by the editors of the conservative and long-respected British periodical, "The Economist," regarding the Royal Navy. Anyone interested in Naval affairs would not want to miss this.

The article decries the present confusion as to the role of the Navy. It mentions recent conflicting developments, such as Field Marshal Montgomery's declaration of the obsolete nature of the aircraft carrier; the launching of the world's largest carrier in the U. S., with its decisive strategic importance; the repudiation of Montgomery by the First Lord of the Admiralty in a recent speech. It points out that the problem is really: What sort of Navy should be aimed for? — which, in turn, is based on the purpose of the Navy in an age of thermonuclear powers. The type of Navy to have must therefore depend on the major probabilities of the strategic situation. These are:

- (1) Full-scale thermonuclear hot war of short duration.
- (2) A long war with conventional weapons if first blows do not decide.

(3) Short "Warm" or "Korean" style wars,
plus continued "Cold War."

Analyzing one against the other, the Naval problem is reflected in the wide disparity of requirements between a "hot" war—where offensive power is all-important at the outset—as compared with the "long" war—where protection against surface, underwater and air raiders, would be a controlling consideration. The same fleet could not do both types of work.

The article goes on to point out that it becomes increasingly likely that a major war would be atomic at the outset; and its aftermath hard to imagine. Britain's principal objective in this atomic era is:—not to have the war.

This means that priority number one for Britain is the "deterrent" against any short hot war; and if that is successful the only other probable kind of war is the Korean style war. In any event, a long war with conventional weapons is thought to be unlikely. This leaves two types of war. Since the forces needed for the first are of the deterrent type, the Navy must support the Strategic Air Forces. Secondarily, it must have the power to deal with the "Korean" style of conflict. If a Navy cannot contribute to deterring war, it should be ruthlessly cut back and the funds spent on more strategic air power. The question therefore hinges on the aircraft carrier. In the "cold war" the carrier is the only naval weapon capable of backing naval policy immediately, since it alone delivers atomic weapons. Happily, it also is the most effective weapon in "warm" or "Korean" style wars. Many air force "enthusiasts" claim the carrier impossibly vulnerable and, therefore, a waste of funds. This point has not been proved. Expensive as it is, the carrier is a great mobile airfield. Fixed ground air bases (also very expensive) are limited in number and are bound to be primary targets at the outset. Ports would probably come next. But the location of carriers is not known—they could retaliate from unknown directions; if things went very much wrong they might be among the few bases from which NATO could strike back. Whether the carriers are used to launch attacks with piloted aircraft or with guided missiles, their being at sea reduces the range for their aircraft to their great advantage.

The case for the Navy is principally as a vital part of the deterrent.

The role of the Navy should be clearly delineated to clarify its importance to the nation without inter-ser-

vice bickering. Then only can the Navy be properly effective.

Final Note: The unmistakably clear implication of the article is that the case for the modern Navy is very strong if it is used first of all as an offensive force.

- Title: *Basic Airpower Debate Shapes Up.*
- Publication: AVIATION WEEK, January 3, 1955, p. 21-22.
- Annotation: Reports on Navy Secretary Thomas' defense of the United States Navy's strategic views, citing specifically an address by the Secretary before the Institute of Foreign Affairs at Riverside, California.
- Title: *A Look at the New Atomic Energy Law*
- Author: Kuyper, Adrian.
- Publication: BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS, December, 1954, p. 389-392.
- Annotation: An excellent review and summary of the new Atomic Energy Act of 1954, giving significant comparisons with the old act of 1946 and showing how sweeping changes have been made in the nation's handling of this new and formidable source of power.
- Title: *Reds Control Sky Over China Sea; Red Airpower Threatens Offshore Islands.*
- Author: Kurzman, Dan.
- Publication: AVIATION WEEK, December 13, 1954, p. 14 and January 3, 1955, p. 13-15.
- Annotation: Two reports from Formosa, indicating that Red China controls the air between the mainland and Formosa and evaluating the military capabilities of the Nationalists compared to those of the Communists.
- Title: *The Other Americas: Where Communism Is Strong — and Why.*
- Author: James, Daniel.
- Publication: NEW REPUBLIC, December 13, 1954, p. 9-12.
- Annotation: Discusses Communism in Latin America and briefly surveys conditions in Chile, Brazil and Bolivia.

Title: *Field Marshall Montgomery Tells What Next War Will Be Like.*

Publication: U. S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, December 17, 1954, p. 94-101.

Annotation: The full text of an address at California Institute of Technology, expressing views on the methods and weapons that would be used in the next war. (Comments on this speech by the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Air and excerpts from Admiral Carney's remarks at the launching of the U. S. S. FORRESTAL, p. 100-101).

Title: *Latin America Today.*

Publication: THE NEW LEADER, December 27, 1954.

Annotation: The articles in this issue deal with the political, economic and social problems of the nations of Latin America.

Title: *The Pistol and the Claw.*

Publication: TIME, January 10, 1955, p. 16-17.

Annotation: An editorial on a new military policy for the age of atomic stalemate outlines the role of the three Services under the tactical deterrent concept.

Title: *The Aims of the Soviet Union.*

Author: Crosthwait, M. L., Lieutenant Colonel, Royal Engineers, British Army.

Publication: MILITARY REVIEW, January, 1955, p. 19-24.

Annotation: A member of the British Army views Soviet policy as if through Soviet eyes. An excellent resume of position, present policy and possible courses of action for the immediate future, written in a most interesting and unique manner.

Title: *A New Look at the Soviet "New Look."*

Author: Wolfe, Bertram D.

Publication: FOREIGN AFFAIRS, January, 1955, p. 184-198.

Annotation: A noted Russian analyst presents his views of the new leadership within the Soviet Union, including his impressions of their possible actions.

Title: *Airpower Makes Sea More Important Than Ever.*
Author: Carney, Robert B., Admiral, U. S. N.
Publication: U. S. AIR SERVICES, December, 1954, p. 7-8.
Annotation: A digest of an address by the Chief of Naval Operations points out that the increased requirements for overseas bases and raw materials have increased the load on our maritime forces.

Title: *The Limits of Free Speech in the Military Service.*
Author: Latimer, Judge George W.
Publication: THE ARMY COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL, December, 1954, p. 30-32.
Annotation: In a philosophical essay the author, a member of the Military Court of Appeals, argues that it is necessary to limit the free speech and writings of members of the Military Services. The essay is part of the opinion in the case of Lieutenant Colonel Voorhees, who was court-martialled for publishing, without official clearance, several articles on General MacArthur's conduct of the Korean War.

Title: *The Naval War College Takes a New Look at Its Courses.*
Author: Moore, Granville A., Captain, U. S. N.
Publication: UNITED STATES NAVAL INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS, January, 1955, p. 68-73.
Annotation: The Head, Academic Plans Section, Naval War College, discusses the reorganization of the senior courses and the basic reasons for making these major revisions.

Books

Title: *The Death of Hitler's Germany.* 302 p.
Author: Blond, Georges. N. Y., The Macmillan Co., 1954,
Evaluation: The book directly supports Professor Reitzel's presentation of 6 January 1955 on "The Higher Strategic Direction of War." It is related how, by 1938, Hitler had encompassed within his own person the complete and virtually unchallenged direction of Germany's effort. The author, in interesting and popular prose, relates what

happened from the time of Normandy onward, when the ex-paper hanger as head of state tried to dictate all operations with little more than his own emotion as a guide and with scarcely any connection to reality.

- Title: *Faith and Freedom.* 308 p.
- Author: Ward, Barbara. N. Y., W. W. Norton Co., 1954.
- Evaluation: In this volume, the author traces through history the interrelation between two forces which have seemed to be dominant in determining the course which history will take. These two forces are freedom and necessity — “the freedom which comes from reason, generosity, and imaginative experiment, and the necessity which is embodied in blind nationalism, blind greed, and the blind pursuit of self-interest.” When the blind forces have prevailed, she shows how the world has seemed to degenerate into eras of violence but has emerged into periods of spiritual awakening when, with an awareness of religion and faith in God, reason and freedom are restored. Finally, Miss Ward looks ahead to the future and suggests that the hope of the world in these troubled times rests in a recovery of the faith which lies at its foundation. Although the book makes somewhat heavy reading in parts, it is recommended for its new and different approach to our present-day problems and their solution.

- Title: *Stresemann and the Rearmament of Germany.*
132 p.
- Author: Gatzke, Hans W. Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press, 1954.
- Evaluation: An account of the period 1923 to 1929 in Germany, during which time Gustav Stresemann was foreign minister of the German Weimar Republic, and of the part the foreign office, particularly the foreign minister, played in the secret rearmament of Germany in violation of the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles. The book is based upon hitherto unpublished papers of Stresemann, which came into allied possession at the end of World War II and were opened to research in 1953. The author admits that the full and complete story of Stresemann's part cannot be told because there are other papers of the German Foreign Office which are in the hands of Russians and others which are not available. The account concerns the various ruses, stratagems, evasions, etc., employed by the German Army to avoid demobilization and disarmament, the acquiescence and/or non-interference by the

foreign office in its efforts to circumvent the checks of the Inter-Allied Control Commission and the eventual throwing-off of controls altogether, as well as the laying of a foundation for later resurgence as a major power. In addition, this book points up some of the eternal fears of France of a militant Germany, of Germany's fears of a Polish invasion, and the working agreements between the Russian Army and the German Army as a result of the restrictions imposed by the Versailles Treaty. A very timely book, especially in the light of the current problems of rearming Germany, her admission to NATO, and of France's opposition. The reader will find many occasions to reflect if history is in the process of repeating itself.

- Title: *Tito's Promised Land, Yugoslavia.* 337 p.
- Author: Dragnich, Alex N. New Brunswick, N. J., Rutgers University Press, 1954.
- Evaluation: The author attempts to give a complete coverage of Communism in Yugoslavia from its origins to date. Analysis is made as to 'why' this country went into the Communist fold. The first decade of Communism in Yugoslavia is covered, showing the reasons for the break between Tito and Stalin in 1948, the effects of Communism on life in the country, the government, and the economy. The last two chapters attempt to look somewhat into the future of "... World Politics," and "... the Yugoslav People." By virtue of the three years that the author spent in Yugoslavia (1947-1950 and several months in 1952), plus his excellent language qualifications, it is apparent that he was well prepared to write on the subject chosen. The book seems to be well-documented. The author has no sympathy with Yugoslav Communism, its methods or its future. He feels that Western aid to Tito is unfortunate, in that it has destroyed the hope of the Yugoslav masses to become freed from the Communist yoke.