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
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**NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
REVIEW**

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U. S. FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICY AND OUR NATIONAL SECURITY

A lecture delivered
at the Naval War College
on 27 September 1954 by
Professor Gardner Patterson

Gentlemen :

My assignment, as I understand it, is to discuss the relevance of foreign economic policy to our ability to defend ourselves. This is a broad topic and, with your permission, I shall restrict my remarks primarily to the United States foreign commercial policies : the terms and conditions under which we permit foreigners to sell goods here and our own people to buy goods abroad.

At the outset, let me acknowledge, yes, emphasize, that one such as myself who is not privy to the facts on the development of new weapons assumes a great risk of talking sheer nonsense on the topic I have been given. It is quite conceivable to me — indeed, from some of the reports I read in the papers I should think it may even be probable — that we have now reached a stage in our nuclear energy program which makes any discussion of the relations between foreign economic policy and our national security no longer pertinent. Our power in being may well be so overwhelming that from a national security point of view such matters as allies, sources of materials, industrial potential, and so on, are sheer irrelevancies. What I have to say this morning, then, is based upon the assumption either that prudence demands we plan to protect ourselves by conventional means as well as nuclear devices, or, alternatively, that both we and our potential enemies are each in a position to so completely destroy the other that resort can in fact not be had to these weapons.

It is common practice for academic economists in the United States when arguing for specific foreign trade policies, explicitly

or implicitly to assure that way, or to ignore, the security or military aspects of exports and imports. Similarly, if I read the record correctly, it has been a common practice for senior military authorities in the United States to pay almost no attention in their thinking to our international commercial policies. A striking characteristic of the periodic Congressional hearings on the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act is the absence of statements from or testimony by officials of the Department of Defense.

I submit that neither of us — neither the academic economists nor those charged with primary responsibility for national security — can any longer afford the luxury of assuming that there is nothing in common between tariffs and survival. Given the Russian threat, an economist, if he is to be responsible, must give attention — indeed, he must give precedence — in his thinking and in his recommendations to security considerations. His first concern in assessing specific foreign trade policies for the United States must be as to their appropriateness to the responsibilities and objectives of a great power in a hostile world. And if, as I hope to show, the ability of the United States to defend herself is in important part a function of the nature and extent of our imports and exports, then the problem of our foreign trade policies is one which you gentlemen also can no longer ignore.

Most economists today argue that from the point of view of national prosperity and the economic welfare of her citizens, the United States should pursue a general policy of substantially reducing the existing restrictions on purchases from and sales to foreigners. For over a century and a half now, the common and fundamental economic justification for permitting people to buy in the cheapest market and to sell in the dearest is that you thus get the advantages of international specialization. Let everybody do what he can do best, it is asserted, and everybody concerned is likely to end up with more goods than he otherwise would. Although the world as we know it today, with its extensive governmental interference in the marketplace, calls for many amendments to

the classical theory of international trade as a guide to current policy, there are still solid grounds for believing that a liberal trade policy is well designed to increase our real national income, even though more international trade may well cause serious damage to certain American producers who cannot successfully compete with foreigners.

But the question of concern to us here today is what happens to this doctrine or policy when precedence is given to national security considerations? Let me emphasize at once that what I have to say on this is with reference to the United States *at this particular time*. I have no suggestions as to what would be good policy for, say, France, or what would have been good policy for the United States a hundred years ago. I am not attempting to develop a general theory; rather, my interest is in analyzing a very specific problem — how best to further the national security interests of the United States in the 1950's.

It may be well at the very outset to dispose of two of the more popular security arguments offered for a greater amount of foreign trade by the United States. There are those who assert — with varying degrees of sophistication — that we ought to have a great deal more trade with the rest of the world because trade results in various peoples of the world knowing each other better and that once everyone knows his neighbors all will be friends and our security problem will thereupon evaporate. This is a pleasant thesis, but I cannot recommend it to you as a convincing one. International trade is essentially a series of business transactions and it would seem that such buying and selling, where, presumably, each party is trying to get the best deal possible, are as likely to be sources of friction as ones of warm and enduring friendships. This is not, it must be emphasized, to say that the sorts of friction resulting from trade are likely to result in armed conflicts. I know of no historical evidence to support such a contention.

Another "security" argument frequently heard which apparently has much emotional appeal to many is that trade makes people richer, that richer people are happier people, and that happier people are less likely to get involved in wars. The evidence seems to me persuasive only on the first casual relationship cited. For the other two, especially the last, surely the gravest skepticism is warranted. In any event, the economic cost of wars being what it is today, only a rich nation (and Russia is a relatively rich nation today, even though the present consumption levels of her people may be low) can be a serious enemy.

There are, however, some potent considerations which add up to an impressive case — on national security grounds — for more international trade by the United States. This morning there is time perhaps to look rather briefly into three of them: first, the effect that larger foreign trade will have on the structure of production in the United States; second, the growing raw material shortages in the United States; and, third, the effect of more United States trade, and the conditions under which this is carried out, on the cohesiveness and strength of our alliances. Let us take up these points in that order.

What effect does international trade have on the pattern of production in the United States and, more specifically, on the ability of our economy to produce the goods needed for defense? There is nothing, so far as I know, in the *general* theory of international trade that tells us very much as to whether larger imports and exports will have a favorable or an unfavorable impact on the ability of a nation to produce the types of goods needed for its defense. But there is, it seems to me, considerable evidence to indicate that more foreign trade would, in the case of the United States, *at this time*, increase our ability to make those sorts of goods most needed by you people in discharging your obligations.

A confident, firm, and detailed answer to the question of the effect foreign trade has on our ability to produce the sorts of

goods needed for an extended period of "cold war," or for a major military effort, would of course demand a detailed analysis of every single commodity we import, every single commodity we export, and every single commodity needed for defense purposes. This, obviously, I do not have time to do. Such tasks are appropriate only for large research organizations. Nonetheless, I am ready to hazard the statement that the major characteristics of our economy and of our international trade clearly show that, over large portions of the relevant areas at least, the United States has impressive competitive advantages over most foreign areas in producing just those goods which are most vital to a defense economy, or to a long war, and in those industries in which productive capacity over and above normal peacetime domestic requirements is most needed in times of war. That is to say, I think it happens, for a series of complex and often interrelated reasons, that the current record shows that international specialization has, by and large, resulted in the United States tending to specialize — and so create human skills and physical plant capacity — in producing those sorts of goods which are likely to be most needed in time of war.

Parenthetically, let me add at once that if this general proposition be valid then it behooves us to encourage larger imports, for it is only by taking more imports that we can make it possible for persons in other nations to buy more of our exports (or indeed to prevent a substantial decline in our exports) and so justify an expansion of our capacity for producing these goods. It should also be noted in this connection that to the extent we refuse to import from other countries when it is cheaper for us to do so than to buy at home, we tend, in many cases, not only to pay the price of buying in a more expensive market but we also divert resources, skills, and productive capacity within the United States to the production of goods of far less strategic importance than those which we might otherwise produce for export.

Perhaps these general statements can be made a little more clear and concrete by looking at the record for 1953 — the last year for which twelve months' data are available. In what types of production was the United States particularly strong as a competitor as evidenced by an ability to enter markets in foreign countries? Of our total exports in 1953, only about fourteen per cent, by value, were in crude materials, of which the largest single item was cotton, followed by tobacco and coal. Certainly our ability to produce cotton and coal efficiently and in large quantities is of indisputable value from the national security point of view. Fourteen per cent of the total was in foodstuffs. And the important thing to note is that these foodstuffs were basic foodstuffs — bread grains account for much of it — the sort of goods for which we need productive capacity in this country beyond our internal peacetime needs if we are to be adequately prepared to carry out a long war. I conclude that the existence of export markets has contributed to the maintenance in this country of a level of investment in both human and material resources for agricultural production which has stood us in good stead in time of trouble in the past and will do so again should the need arise.

Even more significant, perhaps, is that the remaining 73 per cent of our exports were in manufactured goods and that bulking large in this total were automotive equipment, aircraft, chemicals, petroleum products, electrical equipment, and so forth. By and large, this was the output of precisely those sectors of our economy which makes the planes, the tanks, the ships, and the associated products, the high production base for which we have such urgent need in time of war.

Although an *expansion* of our exports would not all take place in exactly the same goods as now leave our shores, it is to be expected that much of any increase would be in those categories of goods in which we have already demonstrated great competitive strength. If this be the case, then it would seem to be in the national security interests of the United States, and very

much in the interest of people such as yourselves who are responsible for planning for the defense of this country, to expand trade so as to increase still more our production of these items.

Let us now look briefly at the *import* side of our foreign trade. For what sort of goods do we rely upon foreign sources? Does our foreign trade result in creating a dangerous dependence on others for strategic goods and so reduce our ability to defend ourselves in a crisis as has sometimes been charged? The record shows that last year (1953), 40 per cent of the total value of our imports were in the form of raw materials. I ask your permission to put this aspect aside for a moment; it is so important that I wish to make my second major point around it. How about the rest? Nearly a third of the total — 31 per cent — was food and drink. But in contrast to our exports of foodstuffs, the imports were largely of items which a garrison economy or a beleaguered nation could do without and suffer little impairment of its capacity to defend itself. Over half of the food imported was coffee. There are obvious difficulties in convincing a group of naval officers that coffee is not an absolutely essential item, but I hold this nation could get along without it if our national security were very seriously threatened. It is not, that is to say, of the same importance as wheat (one of our big exports) from the national security point of view. The bulk of the rest of the food and drink imports were made up of whiskey, sugar (much of this from Cuba — a relatively safe source in wartime), miscellaneous fruits, fine-quality fish, and luxury foods. For people who must calculate not in terms of the demands of lush living but in terms of the brutal minimum requirements of a nation at war over an extended period, a very large part of these food imports are things which they could do without.

The remaining 30 per cent of our imports last year were made up of finished manufactured goods, of which the biggest single item by far was paper. It is difficult to determine how strategic paper is, but two things are obvious: we could make

do with much less than we now consume without seriously threatening our ability to defend ourselves and, in any case, virtually all of this paper comes from Canada — a source almost as strategically “safe” as the United States itself. Textiles also are an important part of our manufactured imports; they tended to be concentrated in the finer qualities and many were not the sort of basic textiles needed to keep military forces and civilians adequately clothed during a period when there is little premium in being chic. There were also some automobiles in this category, but it surely is apparent to all that the United States is not likely to become heavily dependent on foreign sources for its cars. There were, of course, scores of other items, but no large quantities of any one. As I read it, the record strongly suggests that — raw materials excepted — the United States economy has shown virtually no tendency to become alarmingly dependent on foreign sources for strategically important goods.

It is important, however, not to oversimplify this aspect. I do not mean to suggest that if we removed all barriers to imports we would not develop a great dependence on others for producing at least some goods vital to our security. There are, no doubt, some items of great strategic importance to us which could be but would not be made here — because foreigners can make them more cheaply — unless special protection in the form of tariffs, import quotas, subsidies, etc., is given to domestic producers. For some of such commodities, the answer may be stockpiling; at least, that is an answer for the short run for those sorts of commodities which can be stockpiled in peacetime at reasonable cost. But the more difficult case has to do with human skills and here there may be cases where we should restrict imports for security reasons. Will we, by a deeper flow of imports, come to rely upon foreigners to produce certain commodities vital for our defense, the making of which requires high-order human skills which are, because of the imports, no longer possessed by United States residents? It could be — and it may be — but I would urge you to examine with care and skepticism this argument whenever it is advanced.

The "special skills" argument is fast becoming the favorite retreat for American producers who for any reason fear foreign competition. It is common practice now for any producer who wants to receive special protection against imports to raise the cry that the technical skills of his employees are essential to national defense, that such skills are the product of many years of experience, and that if foreigners are permitted to drive his firm out of business by selling comparable goods at lower prices than he can offer, then the nation will be deprived of a resource — high-level skills — essential for maintaining an adequate defense. This thesis has demonstrated a great appeal to members of Congress, who pass the laws on most of these matters. This matter of skills is important. I deeply regret that some very indecent proposals have been made in its name in recent years and, what is more to be deplored, sometimes have been honored.

A particularly disturbing abuse which comes quickly to mind is the notorious "cheese amendment." In 1951, Congress amended the Defense Production Act so as virtually to embargo all cheese and dairy products imports into the United States. Domestic dairy and affiliated interests were instrumental in having the measure introduced in Congress and offered many arguments in support of such an embargo. One of the more important was that foreigners, with "cheap" farm labor, could produce cheese of a given quality more cheaply than the United States dairy industry and that if this foreign cheese were permitted to come in it would result in an alarming decline in the dairy cow population in the United States which could be disastrous if we were to get into another war. I do not object to the dairy people making this proposal — it is in their self-interest and under our system and rules they have every right, indeed obligation, to attempt to advance their interests. But surely it is obvious that this is an exceedingly narrow and twisted view of where the national security interest lies, especially since the embargo caused consternation among our allies, was in direct conflict with the objections of several of our other foreign economic policies, and was in clear violation of certain formal

internationnal obligations which the U. S. Government had voluntarily assumed in previous years.

Take another example. Some pottery manufacturers argue that you and I should not be permitted to buy, say, Italian pottery at the very cheap prices asked and the producers should also pay a very high duty. One of their arguments in support of this is that American pottery manufacturers cannot compete with cheap foreign labor and that if the American producers are driven out of business the nation will not have the skills and facilities for making various types of insulators needed in wartime. These two examples make the point, I trust, that there is scarcely an industry in the United States which cannot say, with truth, that it did during the last war, and can during the next if there be a next, make a contribution to our national defense and so should be protected from foreign competition.

But there are much more difficult and controversial cases than the above two. An example is the watch industry. Most of you doubtless read last summer of President Eisenhower's decision to double the duty on the imports of certain watches and parts, reversing that taken by President Truman in 1952. The arguments offered in support of the action were straightforward defense considerations, namely: it is vitally important from the national security point of view that the United States have available workmen trained to produce precision instruments; watchmakers have these skills which require many years to develop; if the import of inexpensive Swiss watches is not restricted, local watchmakers will be thrown out of employment and there will be no new entrants into the profession. The United States, it is asserted, will then soon find itself in the intolerable position of being dependent on workers living in the center of Europe for the skills needed to produce essential precision tools and appliances.

This is all very impressive. But it is not all there is to be said on the subject. There are other aspects which must be assessed before a decision is taken. We must not lose sight of the

fact that a price must be paid for the advantage of having watch-makers, or pottery-makers, in the United States when they are less efficient than their fellow craftsmen abroad. The price paid by the peacetime consumers of watches seems to me to be heavy and to argue for encouraging imports, but I have restricted myself today to national security considerations. What costs are there on this score?

One of the major ones has already been noted. If we refuse to buy from abroad, then — unless we are prepared to pay the price of giving some of our goods away — foreigners cannot buy our products. And, as we have seen, what foreigners buy from us tends to be concentrated in fields where security considerations make it important that we have capacity beyond our normal peacetime needs. Another cost I wish to touch upon later — the stresses and strains on our alliances. Frequently slighted, or ignored altogether in these discussions — but one which may in some cases be of great importance — is the possibility that the presence of foreign competition promotes and encourages the development and refinement of American skills, rather than destroys them. There is, for example, some evidence that if there had been no Swiss watch competition the American watch manufacturers would have been much slower than they have been in developing the skills required to make shock-proof watches, rust-proof movements, and other improvements. There is also, as another example, some evidence that more foreign competition in the microscope industry would have led both to lower prices and improved quality of the United States product, thus enlarging our productive capacity to produce these sorts of instruments and enhancing the skills of the American workmen.

But all this assumes there is grave danger of foreign competition depriving us of security-needed skills. There are no doubt such instances, but I think it is clear, to our great good fortune, that the problem in most cases of finding required skills in time of national danger is a relatively minor one for the United

States. This follows from the broad and diversified production base in this country with its huge cadre of skilled workers who, with remarkable ease and speed, can adapt their talents to new and highly specialized tasks which may have been performed for us by foreigners in peacetime.

The experiences in World War II in this country and others, especially Germany, showed, I am told, that the important thing in time of war was the *general* level of skills and aptitudes possessed by the people rather than the *particular* skills which these persons were exercising at a given time. Thus, for example, it was found during the last war that while the United States watch-makers were exceedingly good at making mechanical time fuses (and this is one of the major facts cited nowadays for keeping out Swiss watches), the more interesting and important fact was that over four-fifths of the mechanical time fuses produced here during World War II were made by employees of such companies as National Cash Register, Eastman Kodak, Edison, and so on. That is to say, if a nation has highly skilled workers — be they making watches or automobiles, or cameras, or cash registers, or computing machines — these skills apparently can quickly be transferred to making other products requiring high-order skills even though these products may have been made by someone else in peacetime. It should also be noted in passing that the United States has shown much talent and imagination in developing new skills. Some of you, for example, may know about the Army Ordnance project setting up a jewel-bearing pilot plant in a desolate area of North Dakota near an Indian reservation. They have found there that the Indians can be trained in quite a short time to be superb jewel-bearing craftsmen. This pilot plant is turning out only something like five per cent of our total requirements. But it is an experiment indicating that you can create special skills in unlikely places if some imagination is exercised and that defense considerations do not, as a matter of course, dictate that imports must be restricted if they compete with domestic industries making use of war-needed skills.

This casual and quick treatment will, I hope, convince you that one aspect of our foreign economic policy that is of great moment to you is the effect that increased trade will have on the structure of our domestic production. My general conclusion is that more trade — a national policy, that is, of reducing barriers to trade both at home and abroad — will in most, but not necessarily all, instances be an important source of strength from the national security point of view.

A second major consideration I see arguing for more liberal trade policies than we now follow and one we can no longer ignore, except at our great peril, is the raw materials position of the United States. Self-sufficiency is always a much desired goal by all citizens and especially by those such as yourselves who are charged with preparing the defense of the nation. How much easier your task would be and how much more comfortable I would feel if this country were wholly self-sufficient in everything needed to protect it. Unfortunately, if this ever were the case in the United States it is no longer — and it is becoming increasingly less so daily. It is not a question of using up our last barrel of oil tomorrow or of next week digging up the last ton of copper. But the trend for our consumption of industrial raw materials to outpace our production of them is strong and unmistakable.

According to the President's Materials Policy Commission, the United States in 1900 produced some 15 per cent more of all raw materials (except food and gold) than she consumed. By 1950, we were consuming some 9 per cent more than we were producing. And, if the trends of the past twenty years continue, by 1975 (twenty years from now) it is estimated that our consumption will exceed our production by at least 20 per cent. The rate at which we are becoming a "have not" nation in essential raw materials, especially in minerals and metals, is one of the most striking economic changes of this country in our time.

Before World War II (only some fifteen years ago), we were entirely or nearly self-sufficient in all minerals or metals

except tin, nickel, platinum, asbestos, chromite, bauxite, manganese, mercury, mica, and tungsten. Today, 1954, we are self-sufficient in minerals only in coal, sulphur, potash, and molybdenum. A shocking change in less than one generation. All of you on your trips from here to Washington in the last year or so have no doubt noticed the huge Fairless Steel Works that has just been completed between Trenton and Philadelphia. To me, the interesting and highly significant aspect of this is that these facilities will use imported iron ore. Indeed, I am told that the most important reason for locating the plant on the Delaware River rather than in Gary or in Pittsburgh was precisely because we have to rely more and more upon Labrador, Liberia, or Venezuela for iron ore and less and less on, say, northern Minnesota.

This change from a "have" to an increasingly "have not" nation in the sorts of raw materials which we must have to produce the materials necessary to defend ourselves has been due in part to the exhaustion of our resources, but, more importantly, it has been due to the greatly increased United States demand. This in turn has resulted in part from the great increase in population in the United States, the steady and rapid growth in investment, the increased standards of living, and the growing consumption of minerals and metals by the military establishment itself. And all of these continue to rise.

Whatever its causes, it presents us with an urgent and unavoidable security problem. What policies in peacetime can best assure us sufficient supplies of such materials in wartime? For the immediate future we have a large national program of stockpiling some 75 or so strategic and critical materials. There are some difficult problems in stockpiling but they need not detain us today. More important, and interesting, is the question: What should our policy be for the longer run? Clearly, we should seek substitutes, intensify scrap recovery activities, exercise economy in the use of scarce materials, and so on. Far less clear is whether we should also maintain or increase the barriers to imports of

these commodities seeking thereby to expand domestic output or, on the contrary, work toward a lowering of the barriers with the aim of conserving our own supplies and of increasing the productive facilities in friendly foreign countries.

The choice between these two policies is not an easy one and the proper one may well be a mixture, as is our present policy. It is generally the case today that we have no restrictions on imports of minerals and metals of which there is no production in the United States. There is, for example, no duty upon the import of rough industrial diamonds because there is no domestic industry to protect. On the other hand, there are many minerals produced in the United States in amounts inadequate to meet current and prospective demands but which bear heavy import duties. Mercury has many defense uses and we currently import 90 per cent of our consumption, yet there is an import duty of 40 per cent *ad valorem*. That is to say, local producers meet 10 per cent of the total need but are protected by a 40 per cent addition to the cost of mercury produced abroad. We import 75 per cent of our requirements in tungsten and all these imports are burdened with a 41 per cent tariff. One could go on and on citing such specific instances, but our concern today is with basic issues of policy, not a compilation of facts.

What are some of the major considerations which dictate maintaining or increasing the barriers to imports of industrial raw materials? I find three impressive ones. They are obvious and so need merely be listed here. First, to the extent foreign goods are kept out, encouragement is given to the finding of substitutes within our own frontiers. There are doubtless many possibilities for thus reducing our dependence on foreign sources at costs which, while burdensome, may not be crippling. Second, as we impose duties or other restrictions on imports and so raise their cost, conservation of these materials is encouraged. We have become wasteful in our consumption of many scarce materials (look at the chrome on our automobiles, for example) and if re-

stricting imports serves only to eliminate such prodigal practices it will not cut into the fiber of our strength. Third, as imports become more costly and difficult to buy, additional incentives are given to new explorations and, to the extent these are successful, our national security interests are well served.

On the other hand, a policy of erecting, or even maintaining, barriers to imports may have some very unhappy consequences. In most instances it seems likely to lead to a more rapid exhaustion of our own nonreplacable resources and surely a nightmarish situation would be to find ourselves in another war with our own resources of needed raw materials seriously depleted and, at the same time, with no developed and available sources of foreign supply. By the same token, a policy of encouraging imports does tend to conserve such domestic supplies as we may have, leaving them available for times of great crisis. (There is, of course, some danger that their availability may be more apparent than real. A forceful case sometimes can be made that domestic mines which are not actively worked soon flood or cave in or otherwise become unproductive. My own opinion is that in such instances a better case can be made for domestic subsidies to keep such installations in working order than for resort to direct restrictions on imports).

Another major national security consideration arguing in favor of encouraging rather than discouraging imports of these raw materials is that such a policy will stimulate exploration and increase production abroad. This is most clearly in our security interest as it increases the possibility of adequate production being available to us in times of both peace and danger. This in turn hinges on the particular areas where increased production is likely to take place if the United States market is made more accessible to foreigners. I tried to deal with this last year when I talked from this same platform and concluded that it appeared that a large part, but by no means all, of the increased production would be in Latin America and Canada — areas which, I understand, are assumed to be reasonably safe and accessible in time of such wars as we have current cause to fear.

My general conclusion on this second major aspect of my topic — the high and growing consumption in this country of minerals and metals — is that our policy should be a mixture of protection and freer trade, depending in each case upon the specific problems and especially the effects of encouraging imports of individual materials on our own production, exploration, and conservation. But I believe that for the long pull the mixture should be heavily weighted on the side of expanded imports; self-sufficiency in this area is not only very costly but it is almost impossible of achievement.

I come now, in these last few minutes, to the third concern which must be a matter of moment to you people: the influence of our foreign economic policies on our coalitions and alliances. The present foreign policy of the United States is built upon a web of relations which, taken together as a network, amount to an alliance among virtually all the free nations of the world. Through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Australia-New Zealand-United States Security Treaties, the new SEATO arrangements, the Rio Pact, and so on, we have agreed to undertake, with others, to build up the defenses of the free world. I accept it as given that for reasons of defense and national security, if for no other, the United States not only wants, but desperately needs, friends. This, I take to be at the core of our foreign policy.

We must hope, of course, that these alliances are held together by a sense of common destiny, common values, and a common danger. I am sure these are important elements. But, even so, prudent men must recognize that conflict in the economic sphere, or serious inconsiderateness in important economic matters, can only loosen — rather than cement — alliances. More important, military alliances today without firm economic underpinnings must be unreliable and inadequate. With modern techniques of warfare much indeed depends upon the basic industrial strength of the nations involved. This industrial strength in turn is increased as each nation makes the most efficient use of such economic resources

as are available in the whole alliance community. For most of the nations upon whom we now rely as allies, access to the United States markets and to supplies from this country are vital, affecting both their ability and their willingness to contribute to joint defense efforts with us.

Look briefly at this proposition. The United States, as a source of supplies and as a market for others' products, is a giant. With some 5 per cent of the world's population, the United States produces something over 40 per cent of the world's output of goods and services. In 1953, we accounted for something like 20 per cent of the world's exports (by value) and for something like 15 per cent of the world's imports. These are other ways of saying that the economic size of the United States is huge. They mean that we have the power to help, but they also mean that we have the power to hurt. Moreover, we must never lose sight of the fact that it is a very dangerous power which the United States wields because, although we are by all odds the world's biggest importers and by all odds the world's biggest exporters, our imports and exports, relatively speaking, are not so important to us as they are to those with whom we trade. That is, we now account for some 20 per cent of the world's exports but these exports only account for 4 to 5 per cent of the United States national income. Parenthetically, it should also be noted that the United States has accumulated something like 22 billion dollars' worth of gold down in Fort Knox. This has meant that the United States, alone among the nations of the world, can select foreign economic policies without paying any attention at all to their effect upon our international monetary reserves. This increases the area within which it is possible for the United States to behave irresponsibly. When a giant is irresponsible, trouble is very likely to result.

Although one could cite hundreds of instances, a few must suffice to illustrate how important the United States market is to foreign countries and how relatively unimportant the trade is

to the United States. The production of spirits is an important sector of the United Kingdom's economy, representing a heavy capital investment, a lot of employment, and a major source of foreign exchange earnings. One-third of her total production of Scotch whisky is exported to the United States and constitutes, I believe, the biggest single British export to us. Here, obviously, is a matter of great importance to the United Kingdom but it certainly is a minor factor in our national economy. We find it scarcely worth noting that a duty equal to nearly a third of the value of Scotch is levied at our frontiers. But such a tariff is obviously of great importance to Britain, affecting directly as it does her dollar earnings, her employment, and the welfare of a good many of her people. Spain, for another example, sells 75 per cent of her production of pickled olives to the United States. Olives are an important part of the Spanish economy and the market for them has nationwide repercussions on employment and general economic well-being there. Yet they are so unimportant to us that few pay any attention to the conditions under which their import is permitted. And in return for exports to us of items such as these, foreign nations import from us such commodities as wheat, raw cotton, automobiles, machinery, and medicines. This means, whether looked at from the point of view of what we buy or what we sell, that our allies cannot easily live without us and they certainly cannot live comfortably with us unless we are a good and stable trading partner. It is pretty hard, it seems to me, to build up strong political and military loyalties when the atmosphere is charged, as it has sometimes been, with threats from us to foreigners' well-being. We have not always been a stable trading partner.

I suspect that our friends the Danes, for example, find it much harder than they otherwise would to cooperate with us in all respects in NATO when we virtually embargo imports of Danish cheese. As I noted a few minutes ago, it was easy for Congress to decide that national defense interest called for special protection to the American dairy interests. But it also cost something in our defensive strength via its effect on Denmark. To the extent

a loss of the American market means lower prices for cheese and some unemployment in Denmark, it must become just that much more difficult to get military budgets approved there; and the whole notion of cooperating with the United States becomes that much more suspect by many of the people. The exclusion of Roquefort cheese from France gave the Communists there fine material for building their case against cooperation with the United States.

Many Australians have periodic doubts about the reliability of the United States as a partner because we seem always to be threatening to double or triple our tariff on wool. Most people in the United States do not pay much attention to this talk or to such increases, but in Melbourne such discussion, and they were common in Washington just a few months ago, is headline news. I gather from what I read in the papers that we desperately need Japan as a major base in the Far East. But the cooperation which the Japanese give us in these matters is certainly reduced when we urge them not to trade with China, on the one hand, and then threaten, on the other, to embargo tuna fish imports into the United States because we happen to have a tuna fish industry which cannot compete with the Japanese industry unless ours is given special protection. The Greeks have proven themselves fine allies. But alliances are of a necessity fraught with frictions and the unavoidable problems are exacerbated when, as today, we subsidize the export of California raisins to Western Europe. This means that the Greeks find it difficult, or impossible, to sell their sultanas in Europe and when the Greeks in the Peloponnesus lose a major export market for sultanas, the Greek Government is in genuine trouble. When the Greek Government is in trouble the military budget is endangered and the whole problem of cooperative relations with the United States becomes much more difficult.

More important to the Greeks and the Japanese, as well as to the British and the Danes and all our other friends, than these direct political difficulties our actions cause them is that unless we buy from them they cannot buy from us. If they are to mount

the sort of defensive forces we ask, they urgently need a lot of the goods we are especially well qualified to produce. The trade *each* way strengthens the economic foundations of our alliances.

In conclusion, I would only say that you who are charged in the first instance with the defense of this nation must, if you are to do your job well, take more interest than I suspect has been your habit in our international economic policies. These policies have a great impact upon our ability to defend ourselves, for they help determine the structure of production in this country, they affect the amounts available and the prices we pay for essential raw materials, and they can strengthen or weaken our alliances and coalitions.

BIOGRAPHIC SKETCH

Professor Gardner Patterson

Professor Patterson has been Professor of Economics and Director of the International Finance Section at Princeton University since 1949. He received A. B. and M. A. degrees from the University of Michigan and a Ph. D. degree from Harvard University.

At the beginning of World War II, he was a Teaching Fellow and Tutor at Harvard University. From 1942-1946, he was engaged in economic intelligence work, part of the time serving on active duty in the U. S. Navy and the remaining period as U. S. Treasury Representative, with assignments in North Africa, Egypt, England, Belgium, Greece, Yugoslavia, Albania, Bulgaria, and Rumania. At the close of the war he served as U. S. Financial Advisor to General Scobie (British), Commander in Chief of Allied Forces in Greece. Professor Patterson was appointed U. S. member of the International Currency Committee in Greece in March of 1946, after which — in September, 1948 — he accepted a teaching appointment at the University of Michigan.

The present work of Professor Patterson combines teaching and research, the former being entirely in the field of international economic theory and policy. The latter resulted in the publication of his *Survey of United States International Finance*, which has summarized the important issues and facts in the entire range of United States international economic policies and activities.

Last year, he made two trips to Israel, totaling four months, as consultant to the Department of State in connection with the United States aid program to that nation.

THE USES AND LIMITATIONS OF THE UNITED NATIONS

A lecture delivered
at the Naval War College
on 13 October 1954 by
Professor H. Field Haviland, Jr.

Admiral McCormick, Gentlemen:

I want to begin by thanking the Naval War College for inviting me to be here today and to say that I am delighted to be able to make the visit. Of course I must admit that Newport, having such an exotic reputation — above and beyond what the Navy may have done to that reputation — is a great temptation to a person who is as curious as I am to come here under any circumstances.

Perhaps it is not quite as true today as it was at the turn of the century, when Mr. Dooley said: "Newport is the exhaust pipe of the country. Without it, we might blow up. It's the hole in the top of the kettle." Well, it may not be quite as exotic as it was then, but it certainly still has a romantic aura about it.

As a matter of fact, it has long been an interest of mine as to the way in which exotic locales, such as this, and the Navy have a way of finding their way into each other's arms.

To come back to the challenge which I have been given this morning, we have the topic before us: *The Uses and Limitations of the United Nations*. The only reason that I dare embark upon quite as cosmic an issue as this is that my good friend, Bill Reitzel, had the temerity to speak to you previously on his topic, *The Cause of War*, in the same brief capsule of fifty minutes.

In thinking about this paper this morning, I mentally wrote four (4) papers (each of which would certainly have taken at

least fifty minutes) covering: (1) a history of the drafting of the U. N. Charter; (2) some background before the U. N.; (3) the historical evolution of the United Nations since its creation; and, (4), an evaluation of what the United Nations has actually done in terms of the United States national interest.

Then I proceeded (as you can see I had to do) mentally to tear up the first three and concentrate on the fourth, which I give you now. I did this not only because of the limitations of time but because I think it is more profitable to probe a particular aspect of the United Nations rather intensively. I also believe that the final evaluation in terms of the United States national interest is a sixty-four dollar question that goes to the very core of the subject with which we are concerned. I limit this discussion primarily to the security aspects of the United Nations not because I am not interested in the non-security aspects but there just is not time to do justice to the economic, social and dependent territory problems.

Because of these limitations, I am compelled to assume (as I am told that I can assume) that you are all quite familiar with the general pattern of the United Nations, its structure and its process. Yet, it may be worthwhile to spend just a minute or two on the salient features of the security organization.

Most of you probably recall that it was decided in drafting the U. N. Charter, following very much along the lines of the United States ideas on this question, that the organization was to have no binding authority except in the security area. In that field it was to be able to take a binding decision only through the Security Council and only in case the Security Council found an actual threat to the peace, such a decision to be subject to a veto by any one of the Council's five permanent members. The sanctions to be used would also be subject to previous agreements with individual states making national armed contingents available. Furthermore, such states were to be invited to participate in Council decisions regarding the employment of those states' forces.

I want to remind you that on all other matters the Security Council (containing eleven countries, including the five permanent ones) and the General Assembly (composed of all members of the United Nations) were empowered to do pretty much the same thing; that is, merely to adopt recommendations as distinguished from binding decisions. At the same time, it was provided that the Security Council would have primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security; whereas the Assembly, the larger body, would be primarily charged with more long-range and less explosive problems.

Now let us turn to the central question before us this morning, as I posed it before: how effective has the United Nations been in performing its security tasks in terms of the United States national interest? Of course I think we have to recognize that to many Americans the "national interest" was excommunicated and summarily ostracized under the reign of "Woodrow the Just." The culprit has only recently been rediscovered and restored to polite society to be "lionized" in the salons of the *avant-garde*. But in actual practice, those of you who have been in the uncomfortable front line position of making U. S. policy probably were never aware that the national interest had been away. Yet, if you try to define the national interest in very specific terms, you soon recognize that it is a slippery concept to come to grips with. No two people see it in exactly the same way.

This calls to mind an incident which befell a very good friend of mine (whom some of you may know), Burt Marshall, who used to be with the State Department Policy Planning Staff. In one of his barn-storming junkets through the country he happened to be accosted in one group by what he has politely referred to as an "exigent lady" in the audience, who demanded to know what the pattern of the national interest of the United States would be for the next ten years.

He proceeded to enlighten her by saying, first of all, that his analytical equipment did not contain a crystal ball; and, se-

condly, that as far as he could see all he could predict with any certainty for the next ten years was trouble. I am afraid this did not satisfy the lady, and it probably did not do the stock of the State Department any good in that particular hamlet. But I think that we would agree that there was a rich vein of wisdom in what he said.

Every wise policy-maker, as you know, is extremely cautious about signing his name to any formulation of the national interest, particularly if he thinks that it is going to be published, because he knows that it may be a strait jacket which will confine him in the future. Yet, would any of us go to the other extreme and say that it was impossible to formulate the national interest? I do not think so. I think there is an observable, even measurable and fairly durable, consensus in this country which one can put down in some terms.

For our purposes, I suggest that it may be sufficient to say the following. Our basic national interest, as I shall use it today, seems to consist of at least three (3) major objectives:

1. The maintenance of international peace and security as the necessary, though I remind you not the sufficient, means of allowing this country and others to pursue what Aristotle called the "good life."
2. The development and protection of what we call the "democratic processes" as the best means, in the long run, to resolve the tensions and conflict which, as Bill Reitzel pointed out in his lecture, are always with us.
3. The improvement of the general living conditions among peoples of our country, as well as other countries, in ways which will reinforce the pursuit of our other two objectives of security and democracy.

If we can agree that this is the general pattern of our national interest, then we ought to be able to use this today as a kind of measuring stick to gauge the actual performance of the United Nations.

One more word of caution before we proceed. The problems we are dealing with here have in the past, as Bill suggested in his introduction, been subjected to such high voltages of emotionalism that many persons who seized hold of these problems show decided tendencies to disintegrate into clouds of optimism or vituperation. What I would like to do to guard against this danger today is to give the whole business a very strong dose of figures. I would like to do this in spite of the unkind things which may have been said about statistics and statisticians. I would like to lay before you some comparative figures which I think may be revealing.

I know that this may not be as titillating as a less restrained flight of the imagination. I have a friend who says that he always enjoyed flying as a means of transportation until someone told him that planes are heavier than air. I think that we might as well recognize at the outset that what we are dealing with here are very real problems, problems of real diplomacy — not problems of abstract ideas. They are earthy problems that we have to study in a down-to-earth fashion. And, perhaps when we are finished, we will have something substantial on which to base our conclusions.

Again, let me remind you that our purpose is to assess the U. N. — not in terms of an abstract millenium, not in terms of some global interest which the proverbial Man from Mars might espouse, but in terms of the national interest which I mentioned before.

It is also important to keep in mind the general climate of international relations, since the war, within which the U. N. has had to operate. Here, I mean specifically the unexpectedly rapid

deterioration of relations between East and West and also the equally unexpected acceleration of the liquidation of empires and colonial systems.

Against this background, let us proceed. What I should like to do is to take this in three phases: (1) I would like to look at the experience of the U. N. in terms of the types of national interest involved; (2) I would like to examine the degree of tension involved, or the degree of explosiveness; and (3) I would like to compare the relationships between U. N. and non-U. N. operations, although I cannot go into that very intensively.

Looking at the first phase of this question — gauging the performance of the United Nations in terms of the national interest involved — it is interesting to recall at the outset that it was not expected that the United Nations would be able to act very effectively when the interests of one or more great powers were involved; i. e., the permanent members of the Security Council. The fact that each of them had a veto over any action to be taken in the Security Council was only an organizational reflection of a deeper political fact that without agreement among the great powers there would not be a solid base upon which to build the collective security system. Related to this assumption was the general understanding that the new organization would not be burdened in the beginning with the problems involved in the post-war settlement but that the new organization would, as far as possible, be free to try its wings without the cruel and explosive problems connected with the post-war peace treaties.

Yet, what do we find? We find, in actual fact, that of twenty (20) major political questions which have been dealt with by the United Nations since 1945 no fewer than sixteen (16), or 80%, of those disputes have directly involved the interests of the great powers; that eleven (11) of those have arisen from differences between the Soviet Union and the other Western powers and that they were the most pernicious of all, concerning which the U. N.

was expected to have the least success. Yet, as you see, they comprised eleven (11) of the twenty (20) that I shall deal with, or slightly more than half. Furthermore, six (6) of these eleven (11) dealt with post-war settlement problems directly connected with the peace treaties.

I suggest that these figures help one to appreciate the tremendous burden which was placed upon the organization at the outset — a burden far more onerous than had ever been intended or expected by those who planned the U. N. Hence, I think, if we are going to be frank, no objective observer looking at this experience and seeing the infant being led among the lions could possibly have expected a very happy outcome. The fact that the child emerged from this experience at all may well be considered a kind of modern miracle (perhaps almost in the same class with Ezzard Charles sticking eight rounds with Rocky Marciano).

Let us now measure in some concrete fashion (although I admit it is only approximate) the performance of the United Nations on a number of counts in connection, first, with these eleven (11) disputes which involved East-West conflicts. If you run down a list of certain criteria — and I have chosen, more or less arbitrarily, eight (8) criteria by which to measure this performance — you get something like the following box score:

(1) The U. N. can be said to have made a significant contribution in the area of information. By that I mean the collecting, the analysis, and the dissemination of information with respect to these disputes in all of the eleven (11) cases involved. This proved particularly important in terms of mobilizing very wide support for the United Nations position with regard to the questions involving Greece, Korea, and the Italian colonies. It was most limited in connection with the questions regarding the Czechoslovakian coup, which was brought before the United Nations briefly, and the alleged violations of human rights in the three Balkan countries of Bulgaria, Hungary and Rumania.

(2) I think that the United Nations can be said to have facilitated negotiations aimed at a pacific settlement of these questions in seven (7) of the eleven (11) instances, or 60%. This proved particularly important in connection with those questions involving Korea, the Italian colonies and Berlin. It was far less successful in other cases, such as the Greek situation.

(3) The U. N. succeeded in adopting its own recommendations on the issues at stake in six (6) of these eleven (11) instances; i. e., slightly more than 50%.

(4) The recommendations that were adopted by the United Nations were substantially implemented in three (3) cases out of the eleven (11), or 50% of those cases in which the U. N. adopted recommendations. These were concerned with the Italian colonies, Korea and the first Iranian situation, when we were concerned about the Russian occupation of northern Iran.

(5) The United Nations assisted materially in achieving a cease-fire in one (1) instance out of the two (2) instances in which a cease-fire was an issue; in other words, in the two cases in which fighting was involved. The cease-fire, as you know, was effected in Korea. It was not effected through the United Nations in any formal way in Greece, although in fact we have had a cease-fire there.

(6) The United Nations promoted the employment of sanctions (which, as I reminded you at the beginning, was considered the most difficult function) in two (2) instances — not only military sanctions in Korea, which everyone knows about, but also economic sanctions in both Korea and Greece. One must admit immediately, however, that the embargo upon war supplies and other economic supplies in connection with the Greek situation were not enforced to the extent they were in connection with the Korean conflict.

(7) A settlement was finally achieved with the help of the U. N. in five (5) of the eleven (11) cases — in other words, ap-

proximately 45% of those cases: Iran, the Corfu Channel question, Berlin, the Italian colonies and Korea, with a virtual settlement in Greece. I do not pretend that the U. N. was the primary factor in each instance, but I say that these settlements were achieved with the help of the United Nations.

(8) Finally, if you look at the whole pattern of these issues that I have been presenting in terms of the general direction of U. S. policy, I think than an objective observer must say that in ten (10), or 90%, of those cases the general direction of U. N. policy more or less coincided with the direction of United States policy — a very high degree of correspondence. In fact, we largely dominated the decisions in connection with the Iranian case, the Greek case, Korea, Berlin, and we went along in most of the others.

On the basis of this analysis, I think that we can begin to see grounds for at least some preliminary conclusions. If anything is remarkable about this experience, I believe it is that the major powers found it advantageous to beat a well-traveled path to the door of the United Nations and that the structure — in spite of its weaknesses — proved to be relatively useful and durable.

If we ask the more difficult question of why — Why did the U. N. prove useful in some instances and not in others — the following answers suggest themselves. First of all, where was the U.N. most successful, looking again at the over-all picture? I think that you can say it was most successful on the whole in dealing with the Iranian situation, the Greek situation, Korea, the Italian colonies, the Corfu Channel (and, here, I include the International Court as part of the U. N. structure, which it is) and the Berlin case.

Among the major factors that I would cite as contributing to this success was, first of all, the fact that the United States was in a position and a mood to exert very strong pressures in these instances through the United Nations, as well as outside the Organization. As you recall, the United States assisted Greece and Berlin largely outside the U. N. framework. In the case of

South Korea, the aid was largely channeled under the auspices of the U. N. Organization.

A second factor that I think has to be recognized is that the Soviet Union in these particular cases was not in a position to block action. In no instance did it have absolute control over the territories involved.

A third factor is that the United Nations also served as a convenient instrument for mobilizing very widespread agreement with which the United States could associate itself. Notice that in every case that I have mentioned the United Kingdom, France, and various important middle powers, such as Canada and others, stood arm-in-arm with the United States. We also have to remind ourselves that this invariably involved some compromises on our part as well as theirs.

The United Nations also proved a convenient negotiating center when various circumstances (this has to be stressed here) created a situation which was ripe for negotiation. This is especially true, as you know, in the cases of Korea, Berlin and the Italian colonies.

Finally, the Soviet Union in at least one instance that I have mentioned, Iran, was still sensitive to non-Soviet pressures and responded very quickly.

On the other hand, one can see where the United Nations was not successful. I think that you can say it was relatively unsuccessful in connection with the alleged human rights violations in the three (3) satellite countries which I mentioned previously; it was relatively unsuccessful in connection with the complaints on bacterial warfare and atrocities in Korea; it was relatively unsuccessful in connection with the Czechoslovakian coup and Trieste.

Here, I would say that, in these cases, the United States (and other states) had no easy access to those particular areas

except for one, and that was Trieste. Hence, the Soviet Union was, for the most part, able to block U. N. action. Moreover, there tended to be greater differences on these issues within the U. N. membership, as you can see just by naming them: the question of the human rights violations in the satellite countries, for example, gave rise to great differences on political, religious and other grounds. For these and other reasons, therefore, none of these situations proved ripe for negotiation within the U. N.

Having concentrated thus far on only the eleven (11) great power disputes, those disputes which involved East-West conflicts, I want to look at the next largest group of disputes. Those are the questions arising out of the colonial problem, out of the conflicts between the colonial powers and their dependent peoples. Nine (9) of the twenty (20) questions in all have touched upon this issue. Two (2) of these have already been mentioned in connection with the post-war settlement questions — that is, Korea and the Italian colonies. So, for the moment, I would like to concentrate upon the other seven (7) colonial questions. Notice that, of these seven (7), five (5) directly involved the interests of the Soviet Union.

Now, again, let us measure the U. N. performance in terms of the eight (8) criteria that I suggested before.

First of all, on the information side, on the very important matter of getting the facts before the world public — not from the point of view of any single nation but from the point of view of a multilateral group, which is more trustworthy to the general populations of the world — the U. N. can be said to have proved useful in seven (7) situations out of seven (7), or 100%. It was most useful in that connection in the cases involving Indonesia and Palestine.

I think that you can also say that the United Nations facilitated negotiations in five (5) of the seven (7) cases, or 70%.

I would say that the U. N. was able to adopt significant recommendations regarding the issues in five (5) cases, or 70%. These were most fully developed, I wish to remind you, in connection with the Indonesian question — the struggle between the Netherlands and Indonesia — and the Palestine case, where the recommendations adopted by the United Nations were very influential. In three (3) of these five (5) cases, the recommendations were largely put into effect.

One can go on and say that the U. N. materially assisted in establishing a cease-fire in both of the situations that involved fighting; that is, in Indonesia and Palestine.

The U. N. promoted the use of sanctions in 50% of those two (2) cases; i. e., in connection with Palestine. There was an indirect threat (which I think can be considered a sanction) in connection with the Indonesian situation, but that was an economic threat which the United States exerted largely outside of the United Nations.

Finally, one can say that a settlement was effected in three (3) of the seven (7) cases, or 40%.

Again, the general direction of U. N. policy tended to coincide with the general direction of U. S. policy in six (6) of the seven (7) cases, or 85%.

Once more, I think one can begin to draw some tentative conclusions. In spite of the fact that the East-West conflict was not directly involved in most of these questions, the U. N. had approximately the same degree of success here as it had in the other eleven (11) cases which directly involved East-West post-war issues.

In general, I think one can say that the U. N. proved most effective in connection with three (3) cases: the Indonesian question, the Syria-Lebanon question (that was the matter of persuading the British and French to withdraw from Syria and Lebanon)

and the Palestine situation. Here, again, there is no doubt that, at the top of the list of reasons for this pattern, the fact has to be mentioned that the U. S. took a strong stand on these particular issues — supplemented, again, by pressure exerted outside the U. N. as well as inside.

Unlike the category that was mentioned above, however, in this case the Soviet Union was not a direct opponent. In actual fact, it espoused positions which tended to reinforce those of the United States. We are inclined to forget some of the cases in which, for reasons of national interest, the Soviet Union strengthened the position of the United States. But I have only to remind you of three cases: Indonesia, Syria-Lebanon and Palestine, in which the Soviet Union was on the same side as the United States — only more so.

Furthermore, considerable support for U. N. policies was mobilized among other member states. True, there were some conflicts among the Western democratic nations. Still, the United Kingdom stood substantially with the United States on Indonesia and Syria-Lebanon, and in Palestine — where it was most directly involved — the United Kingdom placed no insuperable obstacles in our way. France resisted on the Syria-Lebanon question, but not on the others. The Netherlands seriously resisted in connection with the liquidation of her own eastern empire, Indonesia. But neither in the case of France nor of Indonesia did we face opposition by a first-class power.

Finally, I think you have to recognize something which the colonial powers themselves had difficulty in recognizing: that the revolting indigenous forces in many cases had the strength to create at least a stalemate which tended to make the situation ripe for negotiation. This was particularly true in Indonesia.

On the other hand, what are the weaknesses? We can see that the United Nations was relatively unsuccessful in the following cases: (1) In the complaint of the treatment of Indians in South

Africa, which has been with us since the first session of the General Assembly; (2) in connection with the Morocco and Tunisia difficulties, which have been much in the papers recently; and (3) in connection with the two disputes involving England directly — the Anglo-Iranian and the Anglo-Egyptian disputes.

While there was no direct Soviet interference on these questions, neither was there strong U. S. support for any specific solution except, I think you might say, in the Anglo-Iranian question. There, our support was largely exerted outside the United States, rather than inside.

There was also intense resistance on the part of the states involved. You have only to take one of these cases, South Africa. "Intense resistance" is a euphemism for the position that South Africa has taken.

One can also point to the fact that on these questions there was less unity among the non-Soviet powers, naturally, because of the conflicts between the U. S. and certain other powers on colonial questions. The United States and the other powers had to weigh carefully the desirability of unity on colonial questions as compared with the question of unity on East-West questions. The increasing tendency has been for the United States to give way on some of the colonial questions in order to buy support on the East-West side.

Thus far, we have concentrated on eighteen (18) of the twenty (20) political disputes that I mentioned at the outset. Now I just want to say a word about the remaining two (2).

One of these is the India-Pakistan dispute over Kashmir, on which the U. N. has lavished endless meetings and heroic patience with little to show for its pains except a cease-fire.

The other is the Spanish question, involving an effort by the wartime allies (the so-called "anti-fascist countries") to use the United Nations as a trumpet to blow down the walls of the

Franco regime. Unfortunately, or fortunately, however you look at it, the wind pressure generated has tended instead to prevent the walls from tottering and to keep the regime upright.

In spite of the fact that no major power opposed the U. N. position on either of these questions (and, hence, they would seem to be exactly the kind of disputes in which the U. N. could be most useful), the Organization's efforts on these questions to date have been among its least successful. Among the principal reasons for this state of affairs is the fact that the United States and the United Kingdom have not tried to force their views upon the parties involved — except very gingerly in the case of the India-Pakistan question, and that, as much outside as inside the United Nations.

Furthermore, opinion among the United Nations members, other than the great powers, has been extremely divided on these questions. Again, you have only to remind yourselves of these two facts: (1) of the India-Pakistan question, on which opinion has been extremely divided, and (2) of the Spanish question, on which the early unanimity has gradually degenerated.

Having analyzed the U. N. performance with primarily the interests at stake in mind, let us turn to the second phase of this analysis that I mentioned: an analysis according to the degree of tension involved, the degree of explosiveness, the degree of threat to the peace.

You will recall, again, that it was assumed that a threat to the peace would be the most difficult problem for the United Nations to deal with because it would require action by the Security Council, subject to the "veto." Let us see what has actually happened.

There have been five (5) cases of the twenty (20) that I have been talking about which involved open warfare: Greece, Indonesia, Palestine, Korea and Kashmir. What has been the performance? The Security Council has invoked Chapter VII in only

two (2) cases. Most people are aware of the Korean case, but this was true also of Palestine. Chapter VII is the chapter under which binding decisions were to be made and sanctions might be employed.

In all of these cases I think that the U. N. has proved a useful instrument for obtaining and analyzing information which bore on the situation. While you may not say that this was very important in the actual fighting, nevertheless it was a significant contribution in connection with Greece and in connection with Korea, as you recall, to get the facts accurately; to get the facts in a form that would be generally acceptable to the world; and to get them quickly. You may remember the ill-fated Lytton Commission which attempted to get the facts in connection with the Manchurian situation in 1931 — and which took approximately a year to return with the information.

Another point is that the United Nations called for non-military sanctions in two (2) of the five (5) cases, or in 40% of the cases. These were economic embargoes in connection with Korea and Greece.

The U. N. sponsored military sanctions in only one (1) case; that was Korea. But most people forget that it attempted to apply military sanctions in connection with Palestine — and failed.

A cease-fire was achieved, with U. N. assistance, in every single one of these five (5) situations.

Furthermore, U. N. observers (some of you have served in that capacity) have been utilized to help enforce certain agreements in every one of these cases, or in 100% of them.

Finally, a settlement was definitely achieved, with U. N. assistance, in one (1) case — Indonesia; partial settlements have been achieved in connection with Palestine, Korea and Kashmir; and a virtual settlement, a *de facto* settlement, has been achieved in Greece.

Again, you have to ask yourselves the question: What do these figures add up to? Perhaps the most interesting fact is that all of this activity, with respect to situations that were "hot," took place in spite of the fact that Chapter VII was virtually inoperative. The Charter provision with respect to armed forces has never been put into effect. Yet, you have all of this activity to which I have referred.

In exercising its various functions, the U. N. was naturally most successful in getting the facts — and, in connection with this, in furnishing observers as enforcement instruments. The U. N. was least successful in mobilizing economic and military support for its policies.

Now, I would like to go to the third aspect of this problem that I want to deal with: briefly, to say something about the connection between the U. N. and certain non-U. N. organizations. Although I know that it is going to be dealt with by another speaker, I think it would be a peculiar form of myopia not to say something about it in this connection.

One of the first questions which one is inclined to ask is: How important has the U. N. been as compared with these other arrangements, these special non-U. N. arrangements, regional and otherwise?

One measure of this is that, by my count, only eleven (11) contentious questions have been dealt with entirely outside the U. N., as compared with the twenty (20) which I have been talking about. Those eleven (11), to name them briefly, have involved the post-war settlements concerning Germany, Austria, Japan, Italy, Finland, Bulgaria, Hungary and Rumania. Aside from these post-war settlements, there are the problems of Indo-China and two (2) Latin American bouts: Costa Rica vs. Nicaragua and Haiti vs. the Dominican Republic.

Of these, the peace treaty questions were dealt with by the Council of Foreign Ministers and other Allied groups: Indo-China,

just recently by an *ad hoc* conference; and the Latin American questions, by the Organization of American States. Notice that N.A.T.O. is nowhere mentioned here.

One should also point out that, of the twenty (20) disputes dealt with by the U. N., only four (4) were also considered by non-U. N. organizations as well as the U. N. Those were Korea, Berlin, the Italian colonies and Trieste. Of those four (4), only Berlin and Trieste were dealt with primarily outside the U. N.

There are two (2) other questions which were dealt with outside the U. N., but not by organizations: the Anglo-Iranian question and the Anglo-Egyptian question. They were dealt with by *ad hoc* negotiations, most of which were bilateral.

This means that of the total thirty-one (31) questions which I have mentioned so far, only fourteen (14), or slightly less than half, were dealt with chiefly outside the U. N.; and, of those, only ten (10), or approximately one-third, were handled by standing international organizations.

One can also ask: Were the disputes handled outside the U. N. more significant? Were they more important than those dealt with inside the U. N.?

Here, I have never discovered a set of scales that would balance this kind of thing. One can weigh on one side the major non-U. N. questions (I would select Germany, Austria, Japan and Indo-China) and on the other side, I think, an equally impressive array of issues under U. N. jurisdiction (Korea, Indonesia, Palestine, Kashmir, the Italian colonies and Greece).

One is also inclined to ask: Among those major questions, was the degree of success experienced in resolving the tensions involved any greater outside than inside the U. N.?

In what we may call the major non-U. N. cases there are virtual settlements regarding Indo-China and Japan, but no meeting

of minds yet among the major disputants in connection with Germany and Austria — although there has been progress.

Among the major U. N. questions, a final settlement has been reached on Indonesia and the Italian colonies; partial settlements on Korea, Palestine, Greece and Kashmir.

Hence, I think you can say honestly that the actions taken on these two categories — outside and inside the U. N. — have met with approximately equal success.

Now, I would like to sum up. Having combed this experience, what answer do we find to the question set forth at the outset — What are the principal strengths and weaknesses of the U. N. as an instrument of U. S. policy?

First, there is the matter of membership — particularly, its scope. The U. N. is, without question, the most universal of all international organizations and, therefore, includes the major countries which have been involved in the issues which I have been talking about. Whether they are Soviet or non-Soviet, anti-colonial as well as colonial, the more important powers tend to be in the United Nations — not all of them, but most of them. Thus, it is a ready forum for negotiation to the extent that conditions exist which are conducive to negotiation. N.A.T.O., on the other hand, would not have been a suitable forum for negotiation on either the twenty (20) disputes handled inside the U.N., or the eleven (11) disputes dealt with outside the U. N., since its membership does not include the principal countries involved in those questions.

On the other hand, you will have to admit that the organizations of more limited membership (such as N.A.T.O.) are for the most part (and this does not include all of them, such as the League of Arab States) based upon a higher degree of consensus and mutual confidence than the U. N. Therefore, I think they can be said to be better foundations for stronger defensive, economic

and political arrangements than can be expected under the United Nations.

Furthermore, if you look at the membership question, the U. N. membership is so extensive, so all-inclusive, that there are many states (such as Yemen and a few others that I could mention) which are so uninterested, so ill-equipped, and so ill-informed on these questions that they are apt to act rather irresponsibly on many of these issues.

Then, too, we finally have to remind ourselves on the membership point that there are twenty-one (21) states at the present time which have applied for admission to the U. N., and are still on the outside looking through the knothole because they have been blocked by one or more of the great powers in the Security Council.

Another question is the matter of the degree of authority which the U. N. can wield. It would seem to be a strength of the United Nations that it can virtually take any action that its more influential members want it to take. You have only to look at the Korean situation and the "Uniting for Peace" resolution, which recognizes the authority of the General Assembly to call for any kind of action (including military action) by a mere recommendation, to see how flexible the system is.

If you agree, as I think we must, that Communist expansionism is the principal threat to world peace, today, it is interesting to recall that eleven (11) of the twenty (20) political questions dealt with within the U. N. involved the struggle to hold back the Communist tide; that in seven (7) of those eleven (11) cases, or 60%, I think you can honestly say that the U. N. made a significant contribution to containing the Communist threat — particularly regarding Korea, Greece and Iran.

Yet, the U. N. policy process shows us certain undeniable weaknesses. First, there is the fact that the U. N. cannot issue binding decisions except under Chapter VII of the Charter. The

fact that the members are not legally bound by U. N. recommendations allows them to be quite irresponsible, to vote for resolutions which they have no real intention of enforcing, as happened to some extent in connection with Korea.

Finally, there are no strong and certain sanctions behind U. N. policies. The Organization still has to depend upon *ad hoc* appeals. Yet, I want to remind you again that this may be remarkably successful if given the right circumstances, as in connection with Korea.

There is still another aspect — and that is the decision-making process. Here, I mean particularly the voting process. You recall that the veto, as a problem of voting, was originally thought of not as a strength or as a weakness but as a necessity, a reflection (as I said before) of the basic political situation and the preponderant military might of the great powers.

Since that time, many observers have considered it an advantage that security questions might be taken to the General Assembly, in which decisions could be made by a mere two-thirds majority of those members present and voting. This raises the question of weighted voting because, as you know, there is no formal system of weighted voting in the Assembly. Russia has the same vote as Luxembourg or El Salvador. Yet, we have to recognize that there is a kind of informal, unofficial weighting by the very fact that the great powers necessarily influence the policies of the lesser powers. To cite only one example: We could certainly not have forstalled the Chinese Communist representation question unless there were informal weighting. Regardless of this fact, however, it is still a disadvantage not to have the real differences among nations reflected automatically and consistently in the decision-making process. The present informal system never works the same way twice, and I think it is seriously distorted by the rather unpredictable and inequitable action of the blocs of smaller powers, particularly of the Latin-American and Asian-Arab Blocs.

One last point I want to discuss deals with the frequent complaint that international organizations such as the U. N. are overly legalistic and moralistic efforts to banish power politics. The first reply to this complaint is that power is as essential to politics as energy is to the human body. To try to banish power from politics is to tell the body to stop living. To use another anatomical analogy, balance is as necessary to power politics as balance among the organs and glands of the body. If the white corpuscles begin getting out of hand, the reds do their damndest to restore the balance. If there is any iron law of politics, this is it, and it applies to every organization I know of, including the U. N.

All one can expect of an international organization such as the U. N. is that it may tend to maximize the non-violent means used in this balancing process and minimize the violent ones. In answer to those who complain that the time-honored techniques of diplomacy have been displaced by the bloodless, ascetic machinery of the U. N., one has only to trace a single decision, such as that which side-tracked the question of Chinese representation, to appreciate the fact that diplomacy is the lifeblood of the U. N. — only it is more intensive than ever before since it must juggle sixty different national interests at once.

In closing my remarks, if one can squeeze out all of this a few drops of wisdom perhaps they are these: I think that the United Nations cannot be hailed as our saviour or condemned as our nemesis in any wholesale fashion with respect to every question. I think it can more aptly be likened to a large ocean liner, and, like such a liner, it can accommodate more passengers and encompass a larger variety of activities than any smaller vessel. But it is not self-sufficient. It cannot, for example, defend itself from a strong attack, and, therefore, has to depend upon auxiliary vessels.

In the final analysis, the U. N. is only one of many ways to get from where you are to where you want to go. Its use in any

specific instance depends upon one's analysis of the special characteristics governing each situation. On this matter, I think I can do no better than to quote Abraham Lincoln, who wrote in 1865: "Important principles may and must be flexible."

Thank you!

BIOGRAPHIC SKETCH

Professor H. Field Haviland, Jr.

Professor Haviland has been Associate Professor of the Department of Political Science at Haverford College since 1949. He holds A. B., M. A., and Ph. D. degrees at Harvard University.

He was Administrative Assistant on the Board of Economic Warfare, being stationed in Colombia and Venezuela during 1942-43, after which he was on active duty in the Supply Corps of the United States Navy (Supply Officer aboard a destroyer escort) from 1943-46.

Professor Haviland has held the position of Consultant to the following institutions: Foreign Affairs Task Force of the Hoover Commission; Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; The Brookings Institution; Woodrow Wilson Foundation; Ford Foundation, and Columbia University Teachers College. During 1953-54, he held a fellowship under the Ford Foundation Fund for the Advancement of Education.

He is author of: *The Political Role of the General Assembly*; *American Foreign Policy and the Separation of Powers*, and *Organizing for Peace*.

RECOMMENDED READING

The evaluation of books listed below include those recommended to resident students of the Naval War College. Officers in the fleet and elsewhere may find these of interest.

The listings herein should not be construed as an endorsement by the Naval War College; they are indicated only on the basis of interesting reading matter.

Many of these publications may be found in ship and station libraries. Some of the publications not available from these sources may be obtained from the Bureau of Naval Personnel Auxiliary Library Service, where a collection of books is available for loan to individual officers. Requests for the loan of these books should be made by the individual to the nearest branch of the Chief of Naval Personnel. (See Article C-9604, Bureau of Naval Personnel Manual, 1948).

- Title:** *NATO, The First Five Years.* 280 p.
- Author:** Ismay, Lord. Paris, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 1954. (Available through the British Information Services, 30 Rockefeller Plaza, New York, 20.)
- Evaluation:** A vital report of the first five years by the organization's Secretary General explaining how NATO works and its accomplishments, complete with numerous charts and appendices covering related resolutions and agreements. Soviet armed strength is touched briefly. A useful index is included.
- Title:** *American in Russia.* 328 p.
- Author:** Salisbury, Harrison E. N. Y., Harper, 1955.
- Evaluation:** The author, an experienced reporter, who has a working knowledge of the language, makes penetrating observations concerning the life and outlook of the average Russian in the Soviet environment. His shrewd observations range from the petty ways in which individuals must adjust

themselves to the Communist economy to speculation as to just how Stalin met his end. His analysis of the changes which have been made under Malenkov's leadership shows clearly an underlying instability within the Soviet hierarchy. Although this book was published prior to the recent changes in the Soviet government, it is a tribute to the author's insight that the names of Khrushchev and Zhukov were so prominently mentioned prior to the changes which resulted in Malenkov's partial eclipse. This book is valuable as a reference work for those who have an interest in Russian contemporary life and the background in which present and future Soviet policies are planted and nurtured.

Title: *Max Horton and the Western Approaches.* 302. p.

Author: Chalmers, W. S. London, Hodder & Stoughton, 1954.

Evaluation: An excellent biography of one of the Royal Navy's more dynamic and colorful Flag Officers. The emphasis is placed upon the efforts of Admiral Horton as Commander-in-Chief, Western Approaches, in combatting the U-boat threat. This study of the conduct of the anti-submarine war is a particularly good display of the British point of view with respect to escort operations and protection of convoys. Recommended as reference material for students of anti-submarine warfare.

Title: *The Soviet Regime.* 807 p.

Author: Kulski, W. W. Syracuse, Syracuse University Press, 1954.

Evaluation: A comprehensive study of the Soviet government in theory and practice and the position of the individual in the U.S.S.R. The book is divided into five parts, dealing with the Cultural Isolation and Conformity of the Educated Man, The Citizen and the State, The Freedoms of the Individual, The Worker and Social Stratification, The Peasant and Collective Farming, and The Post-Stalinist Era. Professor Kulski has thoroughly explored Communism as a theory of government and compares that theory with the writings and pronouncements of all the important Soviet Communists through the post-Stalin era. The work is valuable for reference use.

Title: *Britain — Uneasy Ally.* 279 p.

Author: Epstein, Leon D. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1954.

Evaluation: A fairly comprehensive review of the many factors in-

volved in the day-to-day diplomatic relations of the United Kingdom and the United States. The period covered is from the end of the last war to 1952. In discussing these many factors the author makes good use of British newspapers and periodicals, depending on news sources covering both sides of each question as well as so-called 'neutral sources.' Extensive use is made of direct quotations. This book clarifies the British position on various questions, such as the recognition of China.

PERIODICALS

- Title:** *Contemporary Africa: Trends and Issues.*
- Publication:** THE ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE, March, 1955.
- Annotation:** This issue consists of articles dealing with general background information and with economic, political and social situations and issues.
- Title:** *"In Any Operation" — Aircraft Carriers.*
- Author:** Sisson, T. U., Captain, U.S.N. (Ret.)
- Publication:** UNITED STATES NAVAL INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS, March, 1955, p. 257-261.
- Annotation:** Presents the case for the aircraft carrier in carrying out the primary mission of the Navy — control of the sea.
- Title:** *Our Neglected Shipping.*
- Author:** Piehl, R. H., Captain, U.S.M.C.
- Publication:** MARINE CORPS GAZETTE, March, 1955, p. 28-31.
- Annotation:** A brief description of the current state of amphibious shipping and some excellent ideas for improvements to meet the Navy's "new look" requirements. (First prize, Essay Contest, Marine Corps Association).
- Title:** *Problems and Progress in Latin America.*
- Publication:** JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, Vol. IX, No. 1.
- Annotation:** The theme of this issue is the political, economic, and social development of Latin America and the bearing these processes have on inter-American relations.

Title: *America's Moment of Truth.*
Author: Williams, Ralph E., Jr., Commander, (SC), U.S.N.
Publication: UNITED STATES NAVAL INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS, March, 1955, p. 245-255.

Annotation: The Prize Essay, 1955, discusses the problems and issues relative to the maintenance of national security in the unprecedented situation brought about by the development of atomic weapons.

Title: *First Details — R-Theta Navigational Computer.*
Author: Koby, Victor.
Publication: CANADIAN AVIATION, February, 1955, p. 34-35.

Annotation: Interesting article on new developments in air navigation. The development of an instrument that can automatically and continuously reveal to the pilot (1) How far he has traveled from home base and the course to home base, and (2) How many miles to intercept and in what direction to fly to make contact — is assuredly to prove beneficial to jet pilots, especially in combat.

Title: *Text of Broadcast by Dulles.*
Publication: NEW YORK TIMES, March 9, 1955, p. 4, and U. S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, March 18, 1955, p. 69-74.

Annotation: The Secretary of State's report to the nation on his trip to the Far East, including the Bangkok meeting and conference with Chiang Kai-shek.

Title: *The Navy and the Atomic Age.*
Author: Carney, Robert B., Admiral, U.S.N.
Publication: CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, March 10, 1955, p. A1629-A1631.

Annotation: An address by the Chief of Naval Operation before the Cincinnati Chamber of Commerce, February 21.

Title: *The Atom Bomb and NATO.*
Author: Spaak, Paul-Henri.
Publication: FOREIGN AFFAIRS, April, 1955, p. 353-359.
Annotation: The Minister of Foreign Affairs of Belgium and former President of the United Nations General Assembly ana-

lyzes the possibilities of atomic war and its possible effects upon the nations of Western Europe. Mr. Spaak concludes that the atom bomb leaves no room for neutrality or separate policy stands.

- Title:** *Effect of the Cold War on Foreign Economic Policy.*
- Author:** Hensel, H. Struve.
- Publication:** VITAL SPEECHES OF THE DAY, March 15, 1955, p. 1097-1102.
- Annotation:** Develops the thesis that military factors must carry great weight in the determination of economic and foreign trade policies.

- Title:** *United States Foreign Policy and Formosa.*
- Author:** Dean, Arthur.
- Publication:** FOREIGN AFFAIRS, April, 1955, p. 360-375.
- Annotation:** Mr. Dean clearly defines the problems facing the U. S. in her dealings with Formosa and with the Chinese Nationalists, as well as the policy position which our support of Chiang has created. He develops his article around the range of alternatives available to the U. S. and summarizes very clearly the possible effects of acceptance of any one of these alternatives. He concludes that we, the U. S., must take a positive stand, based upon the possible reactions of our Allies, of the other Asian peoples, and of the Chinese Communists.

- Title:** *Tomorrow's Battlefield*
- Author:** White, Theodore H.
- Publication:** THE ARMY COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL, March, 1955, p. 20-23.
- Annotation:** In an interview with General James M. Gavin, Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Research, Department of the Army, the author received the following views of the General on future warfare: the old concept of linear control of the battlefield will be replaced by one of dispersed area control; the present "monolithic" division will be replaced by a "cellular" division; air mobility will be the key to battle capability and 20,000 planes for the Army "might indeed not be too many."

- Title:** *Man: The Vital Weapon.*
- Author:** Ridgway, Matthew B., General, U.S.A.
- Publication:** THE ARMY COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL,
March, 1955, p. 16-19.
- Annotation:** An address by the Chief of Staff of the Army, in which he conveys to the Army his deepest convictions on the importance of the Army to the nation and the high privilege of service in the Armed Forces. In his summary, he states: "Armies are an essential element in our ability to conduct global war successfully, regardless of whether or not atomic and hydrogen bombs are used."
- Title:** *Brain-Washing: Time for a Policy.*
- Author:** Hill, Gladwin.
- Publication:** THE ATLANTIC, April, 1955, p. 58-62.
- Annotation:** Asserts that American authorities were unprepared for the use of brainwashing by the Communists as a military weapon and traces the uncoordinated courts martial of prisoners of war by Army, Air Force and Marines to show the need for a unified policy and preparation of U. S. forces for psychological attack.
- Title:** *American Policy and Preventive War.*
- Author:** Kissinger, Henry A.
- Publication:** YALE REVIEW, March, 1955, p. 321-339.
- Annotation:** Mr. Kissinger has presented a very searching analysis of the alternatives which are available to American policy makers in the present world situation. He examines the strategy of the U.S.S.R., sets forth two goals for U. S. strategy, and then establishes the alternatives which range from surrender to preventive war.