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IDEOLOGY OF THE WEST

A lecture delivered
at the Naval War College
on 17 September 1954 by
Professor Thomas V. Smith

Gentlemen:

In rereading the other day the book by your naval colleague, Max Miller, *Always the Mediterranean,* I was sent back in time to Plutarch, who was an early observer and historian of the intermittent but age-old conflict of countries around the Mediterranean.

You may recall that one day Pyrrhus summoned his wise man (that is, his fool) and in modern parlance said to him: "Pack your pajamas and tooth brush. We are pulling out tomorrow on a little conquering expedition."

The fool, named Kineas, said: "Yes, sire. Where are we going?"

Pyrrhus replied: "We will go over and conquer Italy."

The fool said: "Yes, sire. No doubt if you have made up your mind to conquer Italy, you will do so. You have a reputation of doing whatever you undertake. But this is going to be a fairly expensive expedition."

The king said: "Indeed, I have made up my mind. You be ready to march tomorrow at dawn."

Kineas replied: "Yes, sire. But do you mind my asking you a question: After we have conquered Italy, where do we go then?"

Pyrrhus replied: "Then we shall cross the Straits into Sicily."

The fool thought a moment and said: "Yes, sire, no doubt. But the Sicilians are good fighters and we may have our hands full."

The king answered: "I understand all of that, but my mind is made up. We shall march tomorrow."

But Kineas was still puzzled. "Yes, sire. But may I ask another question: When we have conquered Sicily, as no doubt we shall, where do we go then?"

The intrepid adventurer had not thought much beyond that so he extemporized and said: "Well, then we will cross the Mediterranean and will conquer Carthage."

The fool replied: "Yes, sire. But the Carthaginians are notoriously good fighters and this will be expensive of treasure and of lives. Have you taken full account of this?"

Pyrrhus said: "Yes, I have taken full account of it. You be ready to go in the morning!"

Kineas agreed, adding: "Yes, sire, I shall be ready. But just one more question: When we have conquered Carthage where do we go from there?"

The conquerer, impatient with all of this ideological specification, ends beyond ends, said: "Well - - - well - - - then - - - then - - - then *we shall sit down and take our ease.*"

The fool thought this over for a moment and replied: "Yes, sire. But if that is the only end for which all of the pain, labor, treasure and lives are to be spent, may I ask you this: Why don't we sit down *here* and take our ease *now?*"

This conflict between the will to power, if we may speak in great philosophic terms — represented by Pyrrhus in his famous remark to the effect that one more such victory and they would

lose the war — and the will to perfection — represented in this story at the simple hedonic level of sitting down, taking their ease and making the most of what they had — is an age-old conflict. It is a conflict not only between peoples who have expressed in their ideology the will to conquest and peoples who have expressed in their ideology the will to perfect what they have (whether in terms of religion, morality or simple enjoyment), but also — and much more interestingly — it is the story of the conflict in every ideology of its own conflicting elements. For if it were not for what we share with Russia — an overweening devotion on the part of both interpretations of democracy to egalitarianism — the matter would be very much simpler. But in our own ideology, without looking further for tension, we have enshrined and obtruded all of the conflicts obtaining between ideologies themselves.

I need not remind you that we are children of Greece and also descendents of Palestine; that we are all heirs of the older struggle between the Hebrew will to power in the name of holiness and the Greek insistence that the end of man is the perfection of his powers. We shall never understand either the *tragedy* or the *dynamics* of our ideology without seeing that it, itself, is born of strife, the mother of all invention. If we find piety enough to accommodate these two elements in our own, we may find patience enough to treat strategically the tensions between our own and another.

Put in the terms of the poets — and they, after all, are our best interpreters of the final elements of life — you remember the tired words of Wordsworth:

> "Great God! I'd rather be
> A Pagan suckled in a creed outworn;
> So might I, standing on this pleasant lea,
> Have glimpses that would make me less forlorn;
> Have sight of Proteus rising from the sea;
> Or hear old Triton blow his wreathed horn."

This discouragement with one element in our own ideology — fraternity — and the plumping therefore for an extreme emphasis on another element — liberty — this plumping for one to compensate for our fatigue with the other is a part of the story of our own inner tragedy and a large part of the story of our own outer progress in the world. For where no strife is, no progress is.

Leaving the words of the British poet, let me turn to an American poet, Carl Sandburg, to illustrate and to belittle the tragedy of ideals that have become fixed enough to be described as 'ideology':

> "I was a boy when I heard three red words
> a thousand Frenchmen died in the streets
> for: Liberty, Equality, Fraternity — I asked
> why men die for words.
>
> I was older; men with mustaches, sideburns,
> lilacs, told me the high golden words are:
> Mother, Home, and Heaven — other older men with
> face decorations said: God, Duty, Immortality
> — they sang these threes slow from deep lungs.
>
> Years ticked off their say-so on the great clocks
> of doom and damnation, soup and nuts: meteors
> flashed their say-so: and out of great Russia
> came three dusky syllables workmen took guns and
> went to die for: Bread, Peace, Land.

Looking back in his mind over the history of human carnage, around the triple-edged nature of Ideology itself (ideals tend to move in "three's," which I advert to in a moment), recalling that men have been killing each other from the beginning of time because they differed in their devotion to the same ideas or in fixation on different and conflicting ideas, Carl Sandburg swoops from pathos to bathos, and concludes the poem in these words:

> "And I met a Marine of the U.S.A., a leatherneck
> with a girl on his knee for a memory in ports
> circling the earth and he said: Tell me how to
> say three things and I always get by — gimme a
> plate of ham and eggs — how much? — and — do you
> love me, kid?"

But why should I divert you with poetry when I can perhaps be clearer at the level of prose?

With your minds fixed sharply — for otherwise, we will never understand our own ideology — upon the complexity of the ideological elements, let us now come at our conflict with Russia through recall of our conflicts at home.

Providence, Rhode Island (a neighboring name which perhaps you do not stop often to savor), was "Providence" indeed to Roger Williams in the Colonial days because Roger Williams, who emphasized in the name of religion one ideal — namely, the ideal of 'liberty' — met another man of God, equally pious, equally educated (they were both Cambridge men before they came over here), equally devoted to the good of mankind, John Cotton, who was devoted to another element in religion — namely, fraternity. In that conflict Roger Williams finally had to flee Massachusetts in order to save his life. He took refuge among the savage Indians of this near-by place, who were more kind to him than his Christian brothers. Williams found refuge on the bleak-enough shores (for it was in the dead of winter) of Narragansett Bay and he called his refuge Providence, for it was "Providence" to him.

But this conflict — not merely between our religious tradition from Palestine and our secular tradition from Greece but inside the tradition called "Christianity," itself — illustrates even more firmly the tragic point which I am trying to make at the beginning of this lecture. John Cotton was so adamant, in the name of the unity of the religious community over which he pre-

sided, to keep out any dissenting notions such as Roger Williams had (which were mild enough from our point of view, but not from John Cotton's) that he not only drove Roger Williams out, but he drove him to the extreme of appealing to the British Parliament against Massachusetts Bay Colony. Williams wrote a pamphlet entitled: "The Bloody Tenet of Persecution for Conscience' Sake," in which he said: "These Puritans came over here to get freedom for their consciences; now they drive me out because I insist on following my conscience."

John Cotton replied to that pamphlet in another pamphlet entitled: " The Bloody Tenet of Persecution Washed and Made White in the Blood of The Lamb." I will skip what he said until I finish the tale; then I will come back to this as the moral of the tale.

Roger Williams responded to that reply (these theological and philosophical arguments are always endless, you know; there is no way of settling them) in another pamphlet, I think literally entitled: "The Bloody Tenet of Persecution Made More Bloody Still by Being Washed and Made White in the Blood of The Lamb."

The moral of the tale is what John Cotton said in his pamphlet. I quote part of it, and summarize the remainder: "No, we did not drive Roger Williams out of Massachusetts because he followed his conscience, as he avers; but we drove him out of Massachusetts, rather, because he refused to follow his conscience in doing what he well knew to be right."

There, gentlemen, you have it in all of its tragic nakedness. If there is anyone to whom it is not clear, let me put it even more simply, for we rebel at recognizing this point in our own ideology. During my years at the University of Chicago there was a famous cult showplace over in Michigan, across the lake from Chicago, called "The House of David." Among the tenets of this cult, presided over by King David and Queen Mary, was the promise that if you would give your property to King David and Queen Mary, you

would never die. I dare say that most of us would be gratified — even if we were surprised — after we were dead to wake up and find we were still living; for immortality is a very dear part of our Christian ideology. This seemed, therefore, a real bargain to some of the simple-minded farmers of Illinois, Ohio and Iowa. So enough of them sold their property to keep this cult operative and prosperous.

One day one of my friends, a colleague, himself a Christian minister and a man of great good humor, was visiting the cult. After being shown through the whole grounds and having the ideology explained to him, he called aside the young faithful guide (who had been very enthusiastic) and said: "I did not want to embarrass you by asking you this question in the presence of the group. May I put it to you, privately, a personal question: "Tell me, what do you do with your members when they *do* die?"

The young man spoke up boldly for all to hear, utterly unabashed: "You ask me what we do with our members when they do die? I will tell you. We turn them over to the undertaker. We take the fact that they sneak off and die as a sure sign that they never did really at heart belong to us in the first place."

You would think that the moral of that remark: "We did not drive Roger Williams out of Massachusetts because he followed his conscience, as he avers; but we drove him out of Massachusetts, rather, because he refused to follow his conscience in doing what he well knew to be right," would be so transparent, as well as so austere, that nobody except a fool would fall for it. Yet, mankind falls for this kind of thing time after time and says: "If your conscience does not agree with my conscience then you ain't got any conscience; you are following something else."

As you remember, it was this type of experience which led to the first Article in our Bill of Rights: that religious controversies are so precious on the one side and so impossible of being logically adjudicated on the other side that the only way to

have freedom in fraternity, which religion emphasizes, is to declare religion out-of-bounds. Each man must keep to himself what he believes the absolute truth and never undertake to inflict it on anybody else. Even Congress has no right to enact anything as touching religion or prohibiting the free exercise of it — this Declaration of Religious Liberty was also intended to operate as a Declaration of Non-Religious Liberty, a right we sometimes forget. An atheist in the United States is just as much under the protection of the Constitution as is the most devout theist, and every kind of theist as much as any kind of theist.

So much for tensions in the religious field. The tendency of the 'fraternity' motif in our Trinitarian ideology of liberty, equality and fraternity — and this is as handy as any for summarizing what we believe about life and about government — the tendency of the fraternity idea is always, inevitably with an almost irresistible undertow, to turn into fanaticism. As some clever poetaster has put it:

> "In moments controversial my perception
> is quite fine:
> I always see both points of view — the
> one that's wrong — and mine."

Now look at the 'liberty' ideal on the other side as a part of our trilogy. In the field of politics we learned this lesson very early. We find it written in large in "The Federalist Papers," by James Madison — the so-called "Father of the Constitution." Seeing that when men begin to emphasize liberty, they have an inevitable tendency not to stop short until it has ended in license, James Madison raises the question in "The Federalist Paper (No. 10)": "What can we do about the partisan spirit?"

You remember that nearly one-third of George Washington's Farewell Address is a diatribe against "the party spirit," against "factions." What shall we do about this? James Madison says that ordinarily when you run onto a problem like this you

enquire as to what is the cause. If you are going to ameliorate the effect, you have got to find the cause. He said the truth is that we know perfectly well what the cause of partisanship is — it is liberty. You can destroy the liberties of men, admittedly, but that cure is worse than the disease itself. So you cannot treat this problem casually. Since you cannot afford to abolish liberty, you cannot get rid of partisanship.

James Madison puts that thought into immortal language! Let me read you his own statement about it from "The Federalist Paper (No. 10)": "The latent causes of faction are thus sown in the nature of man." That is the reason I said earlier, with Heracleitus, the great Greek philosopher, that strife is the mother of all things. Men do not grow unless they are struggling, and they do not grow spiritually unless they are struggling against themselves for 'it is sown in the nature of man.' "We see it everywhere, brought into different degrees of activity according to the different circumstances of civil society." Then, not quite content with leaving that bland statement of inevitable pluralism, of the utter necessity of resolving the conflict between our ideas by getting an ideology that includes all of them and covers over the conflict (which goes on, nevertheless, even when covered over), Madison says: " . . . so strong is the propensity of mankind to fall into mutual animosities that when no substantial occasion presents itself the most frivolous and fanciful distinctions have been sufficient to kindle their unfriendly passions and excite their most violent conflicts." Thus Madison, the "Father of the Constitution."

If there were no other justification for our emphasis on private property as over against the Communists, it would be enormously justified by a simple fact. If you do not give men something concrete to quarrel about, something that can be solved more or less, you will find them quarreling about ideals where there is no possible resolution at all; you will find them quarreling about ideology, where there is no earthly way of coming to terms. We have been extremely wise in keeping some concrete

things to quarrel about so that we do not have to quarrel — and kill — over theology or philosophy. The conflicts in our own ideology make us tolerant of conflicts between our ideology and another. We have learned to contain conflict — and that means we know how to take it!

Let me illustrate: Take the ideal of strength — it is a great thought, individually and nationally; take, too, the ideal of peace — it is a great thought, individually and nationally. To think such high thoughts, one at a time, is to be but a simple idealist and never more than half a hero; but to think these conflicting thoughts, together, requires a dash of toughness and a strain of heroism. To bare one's breast to the conflict of ideals requires courage — courage which under tensional circumstances matures as full-bodied heroism. Even the martial hero, as General Patton once told me in the Battle of Sicily, is not a man without fear but one who refuses to take counsel of his fears.

General Patton went on: "They call me a hero. Colonel, I give you my word for it, I have never been in sight of battle or in sound of gunshot in my whole life in the Army of the United States without being so scared that there was sweat in the palms of both my hands. No, it is learning not to take counsel of the sweat and fear that constitutes one an effective warrior."

Let me now confront these two conflicting ideals, "peace" and "prowess" as they meet in the human soul in its "hour of truth." In Austin, the capitol city of my native state (from which I have recently come), there is on one corner a church dedicated to the Prince of Peace. Within the same block, merely across a narrow alley, is a naval establishment with guns properly elevated, at least symbolically, for efficient action. Duplicate this scene endlessly and you have the ambivalence of which either impotence or heroism is made. I mean it would take courage, but not in heroic proportion, to cry from the church steeple: "Down with those guns!" and similar courage to cry from the turret: "Away with that church!"

Neither cry, however, would carry far. Pacifism is not truly heroic, nor is militarism. Each but carries to its own small limit the kind of consistency that is the hobgoblin of little minds.

You can pursue the ideal of peace until there is nothing left but apathy. Then, on the rebound of appeasement, nothing results but war. You can get going on the ideal of strength and preparedness on the other side until, in fear, you blacken the skies with your planes and until your guns get in the way of guns. I mean to say, in sequel, until all prowess wastes itself in provocation. Opposite ideals have, somehow, to be taken together. This is the sad, but fertile, story of the Ideology of the West. They should not be pursued separately. The world of power and the world of perfection make ambition and aspiration uneasy partners in heroism. Militarists can man guns and pacifists can preach sermons, but it takes a hero to come in on a wing *and* a prayer.

"We are a Christian people," once declared our own Supreme Court, "but we are also a nation with a duty to survive." As a nation with such a mission we are noblest and safest, though far from happiest, when soldiers from churches devoted to peace man those guns dedicated to war. True heroism arises from the conflict of our own ideology; it is of passion as well as of action. As W. J. Turner, an American poet, has written:

> To be brave is not enough,
> It is not enough to be rough;
> To be smooth is not enough,
> Cunning is not enough;
> It is not enough to know the truth.
> Vengeance is not enough,
> Pity is not enough, nor is Truth,
> Ruthlessness is not enough.
> Even righteousness does not make a man of worth.
> The way of salvation is a hard and narrow path
> Devious and hidden.

It is not disclosed to him who does what he is bidden.
Even constant persistence
Along the line of most resistance
Is not enough, is not enough.

He who would be a hero let him weep,
But for others, not for himself.
Upright, he must also know how to creep,
He does not even trust the secret passion in his heart;
He knows that to be a hero
Is like the mathematical zero.
In itself it is nothing but it multiplies by ten
The virtues of other men.
He must be so sane that he may appear mad,
So good that he may often appear bad.
So ordinary that nobody knows that it is he;
For he is only the man that everybody would be
If he followed the secret passion in his heart.
And, ever inwardly, in compassion,
Let him weep, let him weep.

To see that the whole secret of human progress is tribulation sustained within, to see that there is no peace save that which lies at the heart of the storm — this is the wisdom required in order to stomach this tensional Ideology of the West; of liberty, of equality, of fraternity.

Let us turn back now to the theme with which I began. We early found, both in religion and in politics — through John Cotton and through James Madison — that we cannot base our national life upon ideological factors for one good, simple and tragic reason: these factors are so pluralistic, so diverse and so much in conflict themselves that to try to build a nation on an ideology is to build a nation in which there will not be any freedom.

We found, I repeat, that fraternity runs naturally and inevitably towards — and oftentimes into — fanaticism. We found

that liberty naturally runs into license. So we disavowed at the beginning as a foundation stone of our national life any ideology, whether of Greece or of Palestine. Instead of ideological factors, we would set up the simple device of effective practice. We said: "Let us see what we can do together, without anyone mentioning what church he belongs to or what political party he belongs to, or what aesthetic cult he treasures." We made 'practice' the fundamental thing of our lives. Seeing that ideology is always divisive, we have to find something that is unifying. Men can unify themselves around a job as long as they do not obtrude the preciosity of their private beliefs.

We made in America what I think is the greatest single intellectual discovery of the human race. We made it because we were forced by religious people and by politics to make it. We made the discovery that men do not have to agree upon ideas, ideals or any intellectual matters in order to live together in peace, to build a fruitful society, and to further the cause of justice. This was the most radical thing in the history of civilization: to discover that men do not have to believe the same things. Jefferson said — it was unbelievably radical — that whether a man believed in no God or twenty gods he never picked his pocket nor broke his leg, so such beliefs were of no concern of his. Having made that discovery — that men do not have to agree upon fundamental things — the Fathers proceeded then to implement it, both in politics and in religion.

In the field of politics, they proceeded to implement it by saying that toleration must always be the order of the day — whether a man is a Republican, a Democrat, a Socialist, or whether he elects not to vote at all, is finally his business and it is not anybody else's business. Whatever a man believes as long as his practice is right — that is, that he obeys the laws and works at the community tasks — you can overlook. This is not to say they are unimportant. Indeed they are so important that you do not dare to drag them into the purview of the public where you know

they'll start a fight that cannot be stopped until somebody gets killed. That was the trouble about our Civil War, said Justice Holmes: neither side would quit when beaten! It was a war of principle against principle. It was our first experience with ideological war. In politics, the principle consists of utter toleration of all ideological factors. Before our Constitution, the final reason for having power was to make people's minds straight. "Brain washing" is man's oldest commitment: only now the technique is perfected. This is the history of the human race: when you find people with bad ideas you put good ideas in there instead. That was historically the final justification for having any power — to make orthodoxy prevail, some kind or other, somehow or other. But our Fathers found that by letting the ideological factors alone we could get what was supposed to be the fruits of them better than if we dragged them in. If we dragged the factors in, we got strife; if we let them alone we found that people, by working together, got to where they had some regard for each other's theories, ideas, and so forth, could indeed at last tolerate them. But toleration is not enough.

A few of them knew, and all of us have come to suspect, that toleration is not enough. We speak of toleration in the field of religion, but toleration is not enough in the field of religion. It is impossible to maintain tolerance, internally, about things that are as sacred and dear to us as religion is, so long as we go merely on the theory of tolerance. This theory is: I know what is right; I know that you are wrong, that you are in error — but I am not going to do anything, even though I have the power, towards correcting your errors. We are just such idealists at heart that if we maintain that theory we cannot keep in the pinches from doing something about it. In terms of religion if I stand by and see somebody else go to hell because he entertains erroneous ideas, then I will go to hell because I did not keep him from going to hell. Some such logic as that has made it necessary in the field of religion to go further than in the field of politics. Tolerance will do in politics; it is not enough in religion.

In the field of religion, we must achieve joy in variety, not merely tolerance of differences. I think we must come to one of two conclusions: We must either conclude that I, myself, do not know what the absolute truth is and since I do not know it, then nobody knows it; therefore, we are all brothers in ignorance. Or we must conclude that in the sense in which I know the absolute truth, everybody else knows it. Either this recondite knowledge is universal or it is non-existent — and either one will result in giving men complete freedom with joy in the variety of beliefs therefrom. Our ignorance will make us sympathetic with other fallible men. Our knowledge will also make us brothers if we admit that in the intuitive sense in which we know what is true others also know it. Our disagreement need not disrupt our cooperation. Men do not indeed have to kiss in order to cooperate. So much as touching the inwards of the Ideology of the West.

Now let me say a word about how Equality mitigates this tensional ideology. Liberty, we have seen, runs toward license and Fraternity runs toward fanaticism; and these two, we now observe, tend to cancel each other out. You cannot be entirely free and yet be fully fraternal, because the other man's freedom will lead him into overbearing eccentricities of faith, which you will not be able to stand. You do not want that kind of a 'brother,' 'Big Brother' indeed of *Nineteen Eighty-four!* Liberty and Fraternity are in such relative conflict — not absolute conflict — that each tends to abolish the other. The result is that the third ideal, that of Equality, is the bridge on which we pass from the one to the other. The Equality ideal has always been at the heart of the Ideology of the West, and in that sense Russian Communism brings our ideology to the test of its own climax. Egalitarianism was what made the French Revolution so revolutionary (they abolished overnight all orders of distinction); that was what made the American Revolution less revolutionary (we did not insist upon such radical levelling). It is this same ideal which makes the communistic ideology so devastating (the inordinate promise of radical and universal equality).

If you qualify Liberty by saying 'equal liberty,' or by saying, as we do on our national Supreme Court building, "Equal Liberty under Law," you save Liberty from license, through the timely mediation of Equality. If, on the other hand, you qualify Fraternity with equal rights of all the brothers, you then save Fraternity from fanaticism. With that qualification you cannot become a fanatic in the name of 'brotherhood,' because you have got to treat your brother with respect equal to his respect for you.

So, with double grace, Equality tends to save Liberty from license and Fraternity from fanaticism; and, at the same time, makes it possible for these two to dwell together in relative peace. But can this ideal of Equality, which saves other ideals from themselves and from each other, save itself from degradation, from the mediocrity to which de Tocqueville (in *Democracy in America*) and other friends of democracy have fearfully pointed?

I believe it can do so by a humbling admission and a radical reinterpretation. The admission is that Equality is a contrary-to-fact ideal. Equality is not a fact already existent nor is it a fact that can be created. Rousseau said that it is because men are unequal that the legislator should strive to make them equal. Men are not equal; they cannot be made equal; and if they could be, the world would be the worse off. Men simply are not equal; and the more specific we make the test, the more glaring becomes their inequality. Nor can we say that men are equal before God. That reflects on Deity; for God sees men as they are. If they are unequal, then He sees them that way.

Though all this is true, we are not prepared to give up the Equality motif from our ideology; it plays too constructive a role in saving Liberty and Fraternity from themselves and reconciling them with each other. We must therefore give the Equality claim another meaning, and this is the radical reinterpretation to which I have referred. We must make its meaning methodological rather than substantive.

That men are unequal we know, but we do not know in advance how unequal they are. This latter we need to know. We need to know it so badly that we grasp at fictitious foundations, like color or sex or creed or wealth. We want men treated as if they were equals, not because they are or because they can be made so, but because in this way we will find in what regard and how far they are actually unequal. Equality is a methodological device, and the only one we have found for discovering its opposite.

To ascertain accurately the inequalities of men yields two great advantages: the one negative, the other positive. The negative advantage is the minimization of aggression as a motive among men. When one is falsely treated as an unequal, it leads to bitterness. It is this upon which communism feeds, and this spirit of envy and aggressiveness which it intensifies. To treat children alike as early as possible and as long as possible allays this sense of injustice. As their true inequalities appear under such treatment, the one who is inferior, in whatever regard, can hardly blame the one who is superior, and, most of all, cannot blame the "System" for his status. Rather is he likely to say of the superior: "I knew him way back when. We went to the same school, but he pushed on ahead and now see where he is. I either couldn't or I didn't, and so if I am to blame anybody, I must blame myself." I do not overplay this, but the allaying of the motive of aggression is the first negative fruit of the application of the Equality ideal to men who are unequal.

The positive advantage which flows from disclosing the real inequalities of men is that the differences may then be turned to constructive account. Each can be allowed to find his own level; and the result is that inequalities spell out practically a world of variety, of color. Surely that, rather than a world of drab sameness, is what we want. Inequalities, tolerantly accepted, work the peaceable fruits of liveliness to those who are exercised thereby.

The glory of America, in the Ideology of the West, is that we have been able economically, by recognizing differences and putting them to work, to make Equality mean a levelling up rather than what in Europe was feared of capitalism, a levelling down. The steady and the ever-accelerating flow of goods which come from the division of labor is promissory in economics of a richer cultural pluralism which results from human differences.

Gentlemen of the Naval War College, this seems to me in large part the story — told chiefly at the national level — of the complex Ideology of the West. It reveals the true dynamics of our system of thought, and discloses how it turns strife to cultural fruitage. But it calls our attention, too, to the contemporary fact that there is almost intolerable strain between those who have given birth to this ideology and those who propose to superintend its destiny.

I propose, therefore, at the very end of this lecture to step down from the podium of theory to suggest three rules for our practice in the contemporary scene.

The Golden Rule is just the way in which we, at our best, put together all of these ideological elements — Liberty, Equality, Fraternity — all of which we are in love with. The Golden Rule is a magnificent rule: "Do unto others as you would have others do unto you" — providing you are dealing with a certain kind of 'others.' If you are dealing with golden-hearted people, then the Golden Rule is truly superb. But if you are dealing with people who are not golden-hearted, you will not gain or give any profit from trying to apply to them the Golden Rule. Let me illustrate.

I had a friend one time, for instance, who was crazy about Grand Opera and he deplored greatly my lack of musical taste. He argued with me endlessly. Now this is not really a matter which you can fruitfully dispute. Finally, I got terribly fed up on it. But at Christmas he gave me a season ticket for the Grand

Opera that year. He was doing to me what he wanted me to do to him. But it never did me any good. I did not like Grand Opera. I was afraid that if I went I might like it — and I hated the bawling stuff.

You cannot carry that role off any more than in Africa when the chieftan, converted to christianity by the missionary, brought in fifteen of his most beautiful maidens for a Christian harem. When the missionary, horrified, would not take them, the convert said: "I do not understand it at all. You have been teaching me the Golden Rule — 'treat others as I would have others treat me.' I hope to visit you in America some day. This is exactly the first thing that I shall expect of you." There is nothing wrong with the logic of that.

The Golden Rule does not apply across these great gulfs of inequality; it applies only to the golden-hearted people. Most of the people in the world you do not know, you never will know and you don't give a damn about them — and they would not be any better off if you grew maudlin about them. Doing good so easily becomes do-goodism. So give them the *Silver* Rule: "Don't do to others what you would not have others do to you." You will get along very much better through that neutralism and negativity than to become a "do-gooder." It is not salutary to convert the whole world when they do not want to be converted and when their conversion may not mean anything to you except to swell your own narrowed demands. Alas, we have learned in our generation that those two rules themselves, even together, do not suffice.

There are some people in the world who will not practice the Golden Rule or abide the Silver Rule; they have made up their minds not even to let us alone, no matter how much we let them alone. They have warned us that they will use to enslave us any liberty we show them. So I propose another rule — a practical rule, at the operational level — to bring together all of these ideological elements. I call this the *Iron* Rule: "Don't let others do to you what you would not do to them." In a pinch, I recommend this rule to you as the practical absolute of the generous and dynamic Ideology of the West.

BIOGRAPHIC SKETCH

Professor Thomas V. Smith

Professor Thomas V. Smith received his B.A. and M.A. degrees from the University of Texas and his Ph.D. degree from the University of Chicago.

Professor Smith has taught at the Universities of Texas, Illinois, Cornell, Columbia, and Barnard College, beginning as head of the English Department of Texas Christian University. He has taught literature, philosophy or politics for thirty years (with twenty-five years at the University of Chicago).

He was on active duty with the Army during World War II, serving as Military Governor in Sicily and Italy. He was a member of a special mission to England, was special democratizer for intellectual German prisoners of war, and was engaged in special educational missions to Japan, Germany and Austria for the State and War Departments.

Professor Smith has had wide experience in radio. He was a founder of "University of Chicago Round Table" and "Invitation to Learning," still appearing on both programs periodically. He has also appeared on "Information Please," "Wake up America," "People's Platform," "Town Hall," "Quiz Kids," and has had his own programs.

For four years Professor Smith was a State Senator and Congressman for two years from the State of Illinois. Since 1948, he has been Professor of Poetry, Politics and Philosophy at the Maxwell Graduate School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University. Among his books are *Democratic Way of Life, Philosophic Way of Life, Legislative Way of Life, Atomic Power and Moral Faith,* and *Foundations of Democracy* (with Senator Taft).

FORCES PRODUCING THE PRESENT WORLD SITUATION

A lecture delivered
at the Naval War College
on 24 August 1954 by
Professor John W. Masland

Admiral McCormick, Captain Moore, Gentlemen of the Naval War College:

It has been suggested that I discuss certain of the forces or basic pressures that have contributed to the present international situation of tension, conflict and uncertainty. My central theme is this: Certainly the Soviet threat is the central factor that Americans must keep in mind at all times in planning their national and international affairs; yet apart from this threat, there are other basic factors that have been with us over a longer period, that will remain with us into the future, and that are even more fundamental in their impact upon the American position in world affairs. To put this another way: Even if the Soviet Union were to be removed from the face of the earth tomorrow, the United States would still be faced with problems of tremendous magnitude in adjusting itself to the changing world situation. The existence of the Soviet Union, of course, makes each one of these factors more complicated and difficult to deal with. Yet the Soviet Union did not bring them into being, and in our understandable preoccupation with the Soviet threat, we must not neglect attention to these other extremely significant conditions.

A dramatic way to describe the forces underlying the present world situation is to do so in terms of the striking differences between the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In this way, we can understand some of the reasons why the relatively peaceful nineteenth century has been replaced by the conflict and instability of our generation.

Perhaps the outstanding characteristic of our present situation is the fact that we live in an era of fundamental, dramatic, far-reaching, revolutionary change. Change, of course, is not new. The significant feature for us is that the degree of change is greater and that the pace is faster.

John Condliffe, an economist at the University of California, has suggested that:

> "It is not unreasonable to expect that the economic and political maps of the world will register shifts in the location of industry and political structure and in the balance of power that will make the latter half of this century as different from the nineteenth century as the latter half of the nineteenth century was from the eighteenth century."

My device, then, will be to take up each one of these factors of change, to describe briefly the pattern that was developing in the nineteenth century, and then to carry this forward into the present. Of course nothing that I will say is original. I owe a great deal to the authors to whom I am turning constantly in my own reading and teaching. In preparation for these lectures, I have made particular use of the works of Hans Morgenthau and a new textbook by Norman Padelford and Colonel George Lincoln.

Technological Change

The first topic is technological change. I need not dwell on this at length to you gentlemen. But the points which I would like to emphasize are these: Technological development is a relatively recent phenomenon in human experience, it is happening very rapidly, and it is proceeding at an accelerating pace. Let me illustrate each one of these points.*

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* In the paragraphs immediately following, I have made profitable use of a lecture by my colleague, Professor John Wolfenden, Professor of Chemistry at Dartmouth College.

First of all, technological development is relatively recent. The social history of man extends back about 1500 years, yet this period of technological development at most can be measured in terms of several centuries; in other words, only about one-tenth or two-tenths of one per cent of man's history.

What about its rapidity? The newness of technological development can be illustrated vividly if we imagine man's whole social history (1500 years) compressed into the life of an individual of, say, fifty years of age. On this time scale the steam engine was invented only several days ago; the aeroplane was invented only yesterday, or the day before; the radio got underway last night; the A-Bomb went off only a few hours ago.

Consider the speed of this development in terms of the magnitude of the forces unleashed. If we think in terms of the acceleration of the destructive capacity of modern weapons we can appreciate the crescendo effect of technological development. I am told that during World War I the largest explosive was a 2,000-pound shell. At the outset of World War II, it was the 10,000-pound shell. The A-Bombs that were dropped on Japan in 1945 were four thousand times as powerful — 20,000 tons of TNT. We are told by the press that the explosions of the H-Bomb last March in the Pacific were in the magnitude, in the first case, of 10-15 million tons of TNT and in the second case perhaps up to 40 megatons.

Winston Churchill commented on this accelerated pace in a statement in the House of Commons made after these explosions in the Pacific. He declared:

> "We must realize that the gulf between the conventional high-explosive bombs in use at the end of the war in Germany, on the one hand, and the atomic bomb on the other (used against Japan), is smaller than the gulf developing between that bomb — that is, the A-Bomb against Japan — and the hydrogen bomb now being developed."

It is not only the application of these technological developments to military affairs that dramatic changes have been taking place. A statement which was made to me recently, which I have not checked but which I think must be pretty nearly accurate, was this: Approximately 75% of the income of the DuPont Corporation now comes from products which have been developed within the last fifteen years. Or take an old industry like the textile industry, one of our oldest. This has been revolutionized by the application of technology in the development of new fibres which are making necessary the development of new looms and all sorts of new techniques of design.

What about the implications and significance of technological change in national and international affairs? Note that it is proceeding at different rates in different parts of the world, and this situation produces all sorts of complications of a political, economic and social nature. Some of the countries are highly developed; others are undeveloped.

The countries in which technological development started in the nineteenth century are those in which it is proceeding now at a more accelerated pace, so that the gap between the developed and the underdeveloped countries is widening. This creates tensions between the developed and the underdeveloped areas as the latter attempt to catch up, as they attempt to skip certain stages of development and as they seek help from the outside but seek it on their own terms. We know that even within our own country these different rates of development cause trouble. Those of us who live in New England are aware of the problems created by the movement of textile mills to the South.

Technological development, going at this highly accelerated pace, has far outrun man's ability to devise social and political institutions to keep up with it. We are living in a world in which the basic political institution, the sovereign state, has changed relatively little, in spite of striking changes in environment. Man has grappled with various ways to close the gap between political

and technological change, but as yet he has been unable to create political institutions to match the new physical conditions. This is not surprising since man changes his political, social and economic institutions slowly. Yet in the business world, to take one example, we have been remarkably successful in devising institutions to keep up with the technological pace, as is demonstrated by the modern corporation. Likewise, on the domestic political scene, we have been able to devise new administrative arrangements to adapt our constitutional structure, which is the oldest constitutional system in the world, to present needs. But unfortunately we have not been able to project these accomplishments to the international level. Consequently the international community is woefully deficient in institutional arrangements for peaceful change and the adjustment of tension and conflict.

Note also that technological developments have contributed to division and disunity in international affairs. It is frequently suggested that with the development of high-speed transportation and communications, with the development of economic interdependence upon the exchange of raw materials and goods and services between one country and another, the world has been drawn closer together. It is declared that it is now possible for an individual to buy a ticket on short notice and fly almost any place in the world, to conduct his business and return. It is possible for him to project his voice around the world instantaneously, to reach the ears of millions in seconds, or their eyes in hours. Yet if we reflect a moment, we realize that while modern technology has made these achievements possible, it has at the same time given governments the means to block the free movements of individuals, the exchange of goods and services, and the communication of information and ideas. This is an age of the economic blockade, the trade boycott, the censor, the propaganda broadcast, the controlled press. Thus, although modern technology has given man the means to create one world, he has chosen to use these means for the opposite result. Technological achievements are

employed to separate people and to hold them apart, rather than to bind them together.

Population Change

The second factor underlying the present world situation that I shall discuss is dramatic and explosive population change. The globe is getting to be an increasingly crowded place. In the last three hundred years world population has increased from about one-half billion people to almost two and one-half billions, a fivefold increase. About two-thirds of this phenomenal growth has come in the last one hundred and fifty years. The peoples of Europe alone have increased in number at an even faster pace, a sevenfold increase in the last three centuries. The United Nations Secretariat, in a recent study, estimates that the population of the earth is increasing by 23-25 million people a year, or at the rate of about 65,000 people a day.

The implications of this population growth are far-reaching; I shall merely suggest a few. First of all, there is the problem of sheer numbers and the pressure of these numbers on the earth's resources. Several years ago, immediately after the war, a number of Neo-Malthusians cried with alarm about this situation. They feared that man's ability to reproduce himself was outrunning his ability to produce enough food, clothing and shelter. This problem of numbers can be exaggerated, particularly when we consider our ability to bring new areas into production and to get more production out of existing resources. Yet even so, it is a very significant problem in certain parts of the world, where the population is increasing and where the people live at a subsistence level. Even if we do accept the proposition that man, through the introduction of new techniques, can produce more food, more services, more goods, we still must recognize that to make these available to the people in these areas, will involve far-reaching social and political changes. In the Orient, for example, the whole family system may have to be altered. These social, political and

economic readjustments in turn are apt to create instability as well as creating political problems of some magnitude.

The second comment along this line is that, as with technology, there are various rates of change in population growth throughout the world. The relative rates of growth of the world's population can be broken down into three broad categories. There are the areas, particularly in Western Europe, of so-called "incipient decline." These were the first areas to experience the industrial revolution and the very rapid development of population in the nineteenth century. In these areas the declining birth rate has caught up with the declining death rate (or it had before the war) and relative stability within a generation or less was to be anticipated. Before the war many of the political leaders in Europe were concerned about the problem of inducing people to have larger families and thus to stem the tide of population decline. Australia and New Zealand, likewise, fall into this category.

In some of these areas, then, relative stability has been reached, with a leveling-off to be anticipated in a fairly short time. In other areas the populations are still in a period of "transitional growth," but relative stability at some time in the near future (a generation, perhaps) is to be anticipated. Many demographers placed the United States in this category before the war, anticipating that our population would level off in about 1970 at around 160-175 million people. The demographers so far have been wrong. Instead of leveling off, our population has continued to increase far beyond our wildest expectations. I suppose many of us here have contributed to this situation! But most demographers still place the United States in the category of transitional growth. They argue that the leveling-off has been retarded. Other countries in this category include Japan and the nations of central Europe. Even the Soviet Union is placed in this category. Although it is experiencing very rapid growth now and will reach 250,000,000 by 1970, it will then commence to level off.

The third category includes the areas of "high potential growth." These are the areas that have not yet experienced the industrial revolution: China, Southeast Asia, India, the Middle East and Latin America. In most cases the populations are large and very dense in terms of cultivated land. Yet, even greater population growth is anticipated. Some authors argue that if these areas are favored by relative internal and external political and economic stability, and if the processes of industrialization are then introduced, we can expect population increases which will be almost fantastic in terms of what we have experienced in the past. It is said, for example, that if these conditions prevail in India the population will increase by 50 million more in a decade. The significance of this situation is that these areas of tremendous potential growth will move out in front, leaving even the Soviet Union behind and, certainly the countries of Western Europe and North America. It means that the peoples of Asia, if they have the relative stability that they need and if they are able to industrialize (and this is not impossible) will outnumber to an even greater extent the peoples of Western Europe and North America who have dominated international affairs in the past century.

One further comment concerning population growth. In the nineteenth century, as the peoples of the earth expanded, they experienced relative freedom of mobility so that the pressures which were generated by rapid growth in Western Europe, for example, were in considerable part taken care of by the movement of people outward. We are familiar with the results of this situation in the history of our own country. To a very great extent the influx of millions of immigrants from Europe contributed to our technological and national development. South America, Africa and parts of Asia likewise experienced this transfer of people from Europe. This safety valve is no longer available; it has not been available for more than a generation. Man's freedom to change his abode from one country to another has been very greatly curtailed. We do have some migration but it is on a highly

selective basis. There have been some very considerable transfers of people, but they have been of a different sort. I am referring here to the practices of Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union which forced thousands of people to move from one area to another where they were utilized as forced labor. This type of movement, rather than relieving pressures, has increased tensions and created new sources of trouble.

Changed Distribution of National Power

We move on now to the third general factor underlying the current world situation. This is the changing distribution of power relationships in the world. The nineteenth century world was dominated by Great Britain and the Powers of Europe; it was centered in Europe; it was a European World. The industrial revolution started there and expanded from there. Europe dominated the trade and commerce of the world; it exported its political, its social and economic institutions to the rest of the world. But now we live in a world in which Europe is no longer capable of occupying this central role. The European system has collapsed. In fact the deterioration of this system occurred before the situation was recognized by many here in the United States as well as in Europe. Like a house being undermined from within by termites, the European system still stood into World War II and many of us assumed that its characteristic features would continue after the war. We found, much to our dismay and contrary to much of our planning, that this was not to be the case.

In absolute terms it would be improper to say that the power of Great Britain and of the European nations has declined, although in relative terms Europe is less powerful. As the British and the Europeans have been projected into the present century they find themselves in a world in which they must share their responsibilities and their central position with the two superpowers, the Soviet Union and the United States.

It is interesting to remind ourselves that this change has been generated in part by the Europeans themselves. As Barbara

Ward, editor of *The Economist* has said, "capitalism in one country was impossible for the British." They developed a capitalistic system and it was inevitable that they exported all of its features, but in so doing they laid the groundwork for the undoing of their own position. They exported their political institutions and political ideas, their economic institutions and economic ideas, and made possible the industrialization of other parts of the world which in turn could challenge them. It was a case of the 'children outclassing the parents' within a fairly short time, with the other European countries participating in this same process.

I would like to suggest certain of the factors which have contributed to the relative decline of Europe and the concomitant rise of the two superpowers. We can break these down into economic, political, and perhaps military factors. First, in the economic field, there is the situation that I have already suggested: namely, that the British, and subsequently the Germans and the French, developed their industrial leadership ahead of the rest of the world in the nineteenth century under conditions that were very much in their favor. John Keynes (later Lord Keynes), in his well-known book, "The Economic Consequences of the Peace," published at the end of World War I, analyzed the very delicate nature of the European economy that permitted this advantageous situation to exist. Its success depended upon the fact that the working people were satisfied to work for relatively low wages and their employers, the capitalists, were satisfied to live on only a part of their earnings, leaving a good share for capital investment at home and abroad. Thus the earning capacity of Europe — its claim on the rest of the world — steadily increased during the nineteenth century.

This delicate balance has been upset since World War I. The propertied classes have not been able to reinvest their earnings but have had to live on them. The working classes, as they have participated more and more in the political process, have been unwilling to accept the position which they rather willingly

occupied in the nineteenth century. They have demanded more goods and more services.

There are other unbalancing factors. In the nineteenth century the situation was such that Great Britain and the nations of Europe could buy foodstuffs and raw materials overseas at low cost and at the same time sell manufactured goods at a relatively high rate. The balance of trade favored the industrial nations. Reinvestment of earnings contributed to a considerable degree to the continued success of the system. This situation was undermined just before and during World War I and has been aggravated since World War II. We see it dramatically illustrated in the dollar gap. Europe, now behind in the industrial race, has had to pay more for its raw materials and foodstuffs and is selling its manufactured goods, generally speaking, at lower rates. The balance is now running against Europe rather than in its favor.

Another contributing factor is the altered position with respect to other industrial nations. The British developed their industrial might in a period of relatively free trade. They abandoned their protective tariffs, purchased raw materials and foodstuffs abroad and sold abroad in a relatively free market, not only in their colonies but even more so in other countries. As early as the 1870's, France and Germany, and then the United States, having commenced industrialization, adopted protective trade policies, closing their markets to imported goods in an attempt to build up their own industries. As this continued it not only worked against the British but also worked against the European nations. They were challenged by the industrial might of the United States as well as by Japan on the other side of the globe.

Another reason for the relative decline of European power in world affairs is population change. The population of Europe has been falling behind while the United States and the Soviet Union, as well as parts of Asia, have rapidly moved ahead.

Still another factor is the breakup of imperial systems that the European powers had erected in the latter part of the nineteenth century. Later, I shall discuss at some length the colonial revolution that has been taking place. This revolution was European in its origin because these people were acting on ideas which they learned from the Europeans. The resulting dislocation of the imperial system has weakened further the relative position of Europe in the world power structure. Hans J. Morgenthau has pointed out that the existence of the colonies in the latter part of the nineteenth century eased the pressure on the political balance in Europe itself. The European Powers, which were rather closely balanced in Europe, were able to relieve the tensions among themselves by making adjustments along their colonial frontiers in distant parts of the world. They could do that with relative ease. They could make compromises which were not costly; moreover, they could make compromises which were not unpopular at home. With the breakup of this system they no longer have that margin of safety, so to speak, for they no longer have these relatively small stakes with which to play the game of politics. Thus, the pressures are brought back directly within Europe.

With respect to the military changes, let me suggest a few points. As you know, the European system in the nineteenth century rested very largely on the naval supremacy exercised by the British. It is interesting to go back to the writings of Admiral Mahan to see just how that was accomplished. Mahan points out that the British were able to maintain sea supremacy not by scattering vessels throughout the world — although, of course, they did have a cruiser here or a vessel there to show the flag — but actually through the maintenance of their principal units in the waters around northern Europe and the Mediterranean. By controlling the approaches to Europe the British were able to maintain their sea supremacy around the world, because only from Europe could any challenge to that supremacy originate. By maintaining control of these waters against any combination

that might be brought against them they could alter a situation far removed from Europe.

What happened? This system was successfully challenged. In the first place, the Germans began to build up naval supremacy in local waters, limiting the freedom of action which the British had. The Japanese created a navy, in part with the help of the British. Toward the turn of the century the United States developed a navy of some strength and that, likewise, limited the freedom of action of the British in distant waters. In effect, the British had to come to political terms with both the Japanese and the Americans and give up any possible naval action in the Pacific and Western Atlantic, and limit themselves to the greater threat of Germany.

Likewise, during the latter part of the nineteenth century, with the development of land transportation, the influence the British could exert from outside Europe by exercising her sea power around the peripheries was no longer as great. Thus political changes — the rise of Germany, Japan and the United States — and technological changes, which were more dramatically spelled out in the present century in the development of the submarine and aircraft, altered basically the whole framework by which the military supremacy of the British operated in the nineteenth century.

Now what do we have? The nineteenth century was one in which there were, in addition to the British, five or six great powers on the Continent. A relative balance was maintained very successfully for about one hundred years. This system of balances had quite a number of sizeable actors in the game who were able by various devices, one of which I suggested in connection with the use of their imperial areas, to maintain stability among themselves. That meant stability throughout the world because these were The Great Powers. But with the disappearance of these Great Powers on the Continent, and the rise of the two super-

powers, Europe no longe can play this central role in world affairs. We now have a situation in which two powers face each other, with Europe playing a relatively small role in the attempt to maintain a balance.

At the conclusion of the war many Europeans talked in terms of a "third force." They thought that by acting together on the Continent, or perhaps the British apart from the Continent but acting with their Commonwealth, they could play the part of a third force, or balancer. But by 1948, with the inauguration of the Marshall Plan following the coup in Czechoslovakia, most responsible Europeans gave up that notion. Recently there has been a revival of the idea. With the difficulties which we are experiencing in maintaining a coalition of our allies, some of them again are thinking in terms of the possibility of Europe playing a significant role apart from the two superpowers. I am very doubtful that this can be done, thinking in terms of the realities of the power situation. But this is a consideration that will continue to motivate many Europeans, particularly those who wish to demonstrate their independence of the United States.

I conclude by emphasizing again that the nineteenth century was one in which Europe was central and in which the circumstances were such that Europeans, particularly the British, could maintain relative stability throughout the world; whereas the twentieth century is dominated by two superpowers, and the conditions of stability which prevailed in the nineteenth century have disappeared.

PART II

Breakdown of the Colonial System

The next factor contributing to the present situation is the emancipation of the colonial areas. One of the striking characteristics of the latter part of the last century was the development of the imperial systems of the European countries. Great Britain, France, to a lesser degree Germany, and to a certain extent we

in the United Stats, participated in this general movement. Now these imperial systems are disintegrating and the units are achieving political independence or relative freedom from the mother countries. As I suggested, in the nineteenth century these colonial areas were on the margins of power politics. Now they are to a very considerable degree in the center of power politics. The recent conflicts between the Great Powers have been centered in these areas: Korea, Southeast Asia and to a degree the Middle East. These former colonial areas, rather than remaining on the fringe in international affairs, are now explosive centers in themselves.

What are some of the factors which are bringing about the breakdown of the imperial system and what are some of the implications of this change? In the nineteenth century the existence of these imperial systems enhanced the power of the European countries. It was popular some years ago to say that colonies did not pay, and this was demonstrated on some sort of balance sheet. But that picture notwithstanding, the raw materials which were available to these countries from their colonies as well as the markets which they had there and the manpower on which they drew increased the power and prestige of these European Powers. Moreover, as Europe has become relatively weak, the colonial and former colonial areas in turn have been in a better position to demand concessions, and the granting of these concessions has further weakened Europe. And so the cycle continues. The process was greatly accelerated by the two world wars. More than one observer has suggested that the freedom of India, Pakistan, Indonesia and Indo-China would not have come about had not World War II taken place. Although the Japanese failed to win their wars of conquest in Asia, the impact of their initial victories was to make the restoration of the old pre-war colonial system impossible.

I have already suggested that to a considerable degree the breakup of the colonial pattern is a European achievement; that

in establishing these colonies the Europeans also established the ideas, the techniques and the goals which have led the peoples of these areas to attempt to cast themselves loose from their European masters. I came across a letter the other day from an American traveler-student in Kenya who has been following the development of the Mau Maus. Let me quote several paragraphs that suggest how this process has taken place. In describing an interview with a native African, he writes:

> "Joshua Thomas is a detribalized African. When I asked him his attitude toward the coming of the Europeans to his country, he said: 'You have showed us civilization, sir, but you don't give us a chance to practice it. You have taught us to eat good food, but we have no money to buy such food.'
>
> Joshua has had some schooling, but not much by Western standards. He is tri-lingual; in addition to his tribal dialect he speaks one other dialect and English. His English is fairly good, but now and then he gets tangled up. Most of his education was in mission schools. The missionaries played a big part in making him what he now is. They even gave him his Biblical name, which he prefers to his old African name. But what the Europeans did not give him was a place in the world in exchange for his old one. Today, Joshua Thomas is rootless, culturally. He has rejected life on the Reserves and has come to live near Nairobi. He strives intensely toward the world of the Europeans, although he knows full well that the color bar is impassable. He is bitter sometimes — and lonely always. He has given up the gods of his forefathers and clings to Christianity, although he dislikes the missionaries who brought him his new religion."

The life of this one African demonstrates the process that has been taking place. Here is an individual, like thousands and millions of others, who has picked up ideas of individual freedom, individual morality, conduct and justice, and who wants to apply these same things for himself. Likewise, many of his fellows are now acquiring the modern technological skills and knowledge. I would repeat, then, that this process of disintegration was inevitable in the system itself and that it is perhaps Western civilization's achievement that this has taken place in spite of the problems. Europe, the British, even ourselves, have exported our Western ideas of government, of morality and justice, and now other people are trying to apply them to their own situations, demanding the same freedoms that we already cherish.

Another element that is coupled with this desire for self-government is the demand for economic equality. These people have looked upon themselves as economically exploited. In the colonial and former colonial areas they have been called upon for the most part to produce basic raw materials, which have been exported to the more industrialized countries. They now wish (and they believe that political freedom is necessary for this) to develop more balanced economies of their own to secure release from the vulnerabilities of attachments to Europe and to build up thereby their own basic standards of living.

Likewise, they are demanding the ability to control their own security, to protect themselves. This reflects their fears in this bi-polar world which they see. In the past they have been associated with the imperial security systems of the European countries. Now they have the strength and the freedom of action to establish their own peculiar arrangements and to protect themselves. An illustration of this is the case of India who is trying to remain neutral. We happen to believe that they can not do this in the sort of world in which we all live. We say that neutrality is an ancient concept, no longer applicable. Yet in looking back at our own history we can see why these people, who have recently

achieved their own independence or are in the process of so doing, want to detach themselves from exposure to power politics and build up their own security system (which means their own industrial systems and their own military systems).

What are the consequences of this deterioration that has been taking place? I have already mentioned several. First of all, it will contribute to the continued relative decline in the role of the European Powers in the over-all global power pattern. Secondly, as this process accelerates in these colonial and former colonial areas, they will continue to be sources of conflict, both internally and externally; internally, because all sorts of adjustments — social, economic and political — are necessary as they assume the responsibilities of independent government; externally, because the Great Powers will not tolerate their neutrality and will attempt to line them up on one side or the other. Moreover, these new states engage in conflicts among themselves, as demonstrated by the difficulties between Pakistan and India.

One of the greatest consequences of the trends in the colonial world is the new signficance of Asia in world politics. This area contains approximately half of mankind. As many writers remind us again and again, this area is very much on the move and new patterns of action and new forms of behavior are developing. Arnold Toynbee, for example, recently declared:

> "The challenge of communism may come to seem a small affair when the probably far more potent civilizations of India and China respond in their turn to our Western challenge. In the long run, they seem likely to produce more deeper effects on our Western life than Russia can ever hope to produce."

Toynbee may be exaggerating, but certainly as these areas achieve political freedom and independence of action, they will play an increasingly large role, particularly if they are able to apply within their own societies the technical advantages which we have developed in our own.

The new awakening that I have been discussing has brought to the peoples of these areas an awareness of what might be called "the good life," not only in terms of levels of living but also standards of human conduct, morality and individual freedom. They are interested not only in the material betterment of their lives but in the freedom of action that has been achieved by Westerners. The problem is that these people, with a different heritage from our own, have grown up with different sets of values and attitudes toward life and different modes of conduct. As they develop, they may do so within entirely different patterns of human behavior from that which we follow and find acceptable. These people of India and south Asia have behind them a rich heritage and certainly one of which they can be proud, but it is quite different from our own. They have not experienced the Renaissance and the Reformation, the liberal movements of nineteenth-century Europe out of which came our political institutions, our notions of the relationship of man to the state, the dignity of the individual, and so on. Therefore, we can expect different attitudes toward life, toward the relationship of man to the state, toward the accepted systems which we have developed and which we cherish.

In this country we have been prone to think of the struggle of the colonial peoples in terms of a struggle for independence from the mother country. This is part of the picture, certainly. But we ought to realize that in these colonial and semi-colonial areas a termination of foreign rule is only part of the picture and that it certainly does not mean the end of exploitation. The British like to remind us that it may mean the beginning of exploitation. The removal of foreign administrators and foreign soldiers does not necessarily remove the only means of exploitation available. In many of the colonial areas there has been a relatively small ruling group separated from the mass of the people. It may very well be (in fact it has been in some instances) that emancipation from a foreign ruler will merely lead to further exploitation by a native ruling class that does not accept Western values and that does not have the interest of the masses of people

at heart. This class will use independence to enhance its own privileged position. So this conflict for independence is at least two-dimensional; it is a struggle against foreign domination, but it is also a struggle against any kind of domination including internal domination. The end of foreign rule does not automatically mean the end of illiteracy, disease, poverty or substandard living. It may mean, unfortunately, the continuation of that unless new leadership can come forward.

This poses a very serious problem for the Western nations since we wish to participate in the constructive development of the so-called "underdeveloped areas." We want to give them aid in a proper way, to give them, as one author suggests, 'a dynamic, upward lift' so that their economies can carry a much higher standard of living, but at the same time insure that our help will bring benefits to all of the people and not just to a relatively few who happen to sit at the top. Moreover, this aid and this upward thrust should be given in a way which will direct these people toward acceptance of the values and standards that we hope to see spread throughout the world. The problem is a great deal more than one of increasing productivity. Unfortunately in connection with our discussions of Point Four, for example, we have perhaps concentrated too much on the importance of increasing the productivity of these areas. We ought to realize that it is possible to increase productivity and at the same time impose totalitarian methods on a state. Certainly Hitler, Mussolini, perhaps Franco in Spain, were all interested in a higher standard of living, more outward signs of more goods and services such as public housing developments, trains that run on time, and all of that sort of thing. As the Soviet Union has demonstrated, it is possible to raise the standards of living and increase productivity dramatically while at the same time enhancing the power of the state and thus creating more of a totalitarian system.

Therefore, in addition to problems of increased productivity we have problems of political and social organization. How are

these people going to govern themselves internally? Are they going to do so under an authoritarian type of regime or will they move in another direction, with greater participation by all of the people in the formulation of national policies and in the achievement of the good which might come from increased productivity? Tied in with this, of course, is the last question: Just how will these people affiliate themselves, internationally? We all know the problem of India in that respect and we wonder about some of the other areas which have recently achieved their independence, or will do so in the near future.

This is a very brief commentary on one of the most complicated problems of the present international situation. It is to these recently colonial countries that we must turn for the signs of future developments.

Nationalism

A fifth factor causing change in the present world situation is nationalism. Nineteenth century nationalism (and I shall be simplifying very much here) was a constructive force. It was a product of nineteenth century European liberalism. Nationalism meant two things, principally: first, freedom from foreign domintion and second, increased popular participation in public affairs. Woodrow Wilson popularized freedom from foreign control in the term "self-determination," meaning that every nation should be politically independent. The nationalism of the nineteenth century was very largely that of national independence and self-determination, and it was constructive in that sense. Nationalism as associated with increased popular participation in national affairs was also a constructive force. Western European liberalism brought about the extension of the franchise, the development of parliamentary government, and the growth of concepts of individual freedom.

Turning to our own history we can see that nineteenth-century American nationalism was one of those forces which enabled us to expand across the continent, to grow materially, and

to develop our institutions. It enabled us to draw on the cultures of a great number of peoples who came to us from abroad, combining their best features with our own Anglo-American heritage. From the melting pot there came a new American nationalism and a constructive, powerful, spiritually-motivated force. By and large, differing in degree from country to country, this was the principal manifestation of nationalism in the nineteenth century.

What do we have in the twentieth century? We have gone quite some distance from this constructive type of creative nationalism toward a nationalism which is primarily exclusive in its manifestations. Man now glorifies the state as an individual in itself. Nationalism has come to be a device for achieving the adherence of all people to the goals of the state. Nationalism has created this idea of exclusiveness whereby anything which is not directly associated with that particular nation, or that particular state, is somehow no longer acceptable, is even evil. In its extreme, this form of nationalism was developed by the Germans under Hitler and the Italians under Mussolini, with the fantastic notions of racial superiority and national superiority.

You might say: "Well, this situation prevails in the totalitarian states but certainly nothing of this sort is practiced in the democratic states." Unfortunately the difference between the democratic states and the totalitarian states is not so much one of kind as of degree. We find the basic ingredient of this sort of exclusive nationalism manifested even in our own society.

To summarize: Nineteenth century nationalism was constructive. It was the principal ingredient which brought about the development of the state, giving it cohesive qualities which could then be applied to the further development of social and political institutions within it.

Increased Power of the State

Closely associated with the effects of nationalism is the different role of the state now as contrasted with the nineteenth

century. The nineteenth century was one of relative *laissez faire* in economic and social development. In the twentieth century the power of the state has increased markedly. This is particularly true in the totalitarian states but is also applicable to the democratic states. The state now has tremendous authority, great responsibility, and plays an ever-increasing part in the determination of human affairs.

There are many reasons why this has come about. Many of us decry it and think that it is a great tragedy. But whether it is or is not it is doubtful that it could be otherwise. The increased power of the state has come in part because of demands that the people make upon the state, particularly with respect to economic affairs. In the nineteenth century special groups or interests looked to the state for the utilization of its authority to enhance their own position. The simplest form of that is perhaps the demand for a protective tariff, a very natural sort of demand to make upon one's government. One feels foreign competition. One cannot stem it alone, but one can turn to the state and employ the authority of the state (in this particular case the erection of a customs barrier) to try to rectify this competitive situation to the advantage of the domestic producer. Over a period of years more demands of this sort have been made on the state. Each time that this is done it increases the relative role of the state in our society.

More important than these somewhat specialized requests are the demands made upon the state for services of a broader nature. Many of these we now fully accept, but taken together they account for the transfer of a great deal of activity from private to public hands. At one time the highways, the postal services, the waterways and the schools were all privately maintained. We look to the state for the use of its vast economic powers to try to even the peaks and the troughs in the economic cycle, to ease the burdens of unemployment and of destitution in periods of depression, to provide for old age and other benefits. The responsibilities of the state in these areas are now accepted and political

controversy relates now to methods of operation rather than to fundamental issues. Although many of us don't like the term "welfare state," there is relatively little dispute over the services of such a state, when each service is considered independently.

The principal cause for increased responsibility by the state in recent times has been the demand for security, not security in old age but physical security in the light of modern developments in warfare. It used to be that we could mobilize our resources for defense after a war broke out, or soon before. I need not tell you that this is no longer possible. It is absolutely essential for every state to concern itself with these matters at all times. In an age of modern technology this means concern not only with the actual training of men in the use of new weapons but in the production of those weapons, the budgeting for them, the scientific developments that lead to them, and so on, and this leads the state into a vast array of activities.

The fact that the modern state plays an ever increasing role in human affairs has important implications for international politics. Earlier I pointed out that technological developments, rather than bringing people together, perhaps are separating them because they have made available to these separate states the devices and the means of cutting off contacts, of cutting off the exchange of ideas and the movement of people, of controlling trade and commerce. As the power of the state has increased, the instrumentalities which it can use in international relations in this way have likewise increased.

As the state's control over the means of information and the education system has increased, it is in a better position than it ever has been before to motivate the individuals and to prescribe patterns of behavior. Here I refer to the totalitarian states, although perhaps the difference between these and the democratic states is one of degree rather than kind. Althought we now have available the means of mass education and exchange of information which enable more people to be better informed on a

wider range of subjects, the result seems to be rather that more people are thinking alike about more things than has ever happened before in our society. The consequences of this are felt internationally as well.

The International Economic Situation

The breakdown of the pattern of exchange of goods and services which was developed in the nineteenth century is another reason for the changes which have occurred in the twentieth century. The British, as they industrialized, developed a relatively free trading pattern, importing raw materials, food, and some services from overseas and, in exchange, exporting maunfactured goods, shipping services, investment and other services. In the nineteenth century this system worked with considerable success and the over-all productive level was increased throughout the world.

As Barbara Ward has suggested, the people of the time looked upon this system as automatic and God-given, it worked so well. Based on the gold standard, the systems of exchange operated from London, the money market of the world, without much knowing attention. The controls automatically kept the system in balance. If a country was buying more than it was selling, it lost gold through the operation of the gold standard and automatically was forced to curtaii its buying. The system was willingly accepted though some of the consequences were rather harsh. Sharp fluctuations in employment might be felt in an area, but they brought about adjustment and allowed the system to work.

As a result of all sorts of factors, this pattern was upset. The First World War had a great deal to do with it because it dislocated the normal productive pattern in Europe. Foreign markets were lost to the United States, Japan or to new local industries, and it was hard for the European suppliers to recover the markets after the war. Before the war they had been able to sell their manufactured goods at relatively favorable prices.

This was no longer so after the war. By that time protective tariffs were the usual pattern and the old relative freedom was destroyed. States moved to more, not fewer, controls, as they attempted to stabilize their economies.

The process of controls was greatly accelerated during the depression years, partly as a consequence of the demands for the welfare services, but to a greater degree because people would not accept the consequences of depression and demanded of the state that it take action. That action was national action. It is interesting to stop and realize that our own New Deal was a program of economic nationalism. Where there were conflicts between the relatively free trade ideas of Mr. Hull and the planned economy ideas of Mr. Roosevelt, Mr. Hull had to take a back seat for the first several years. The depression thus accelerated this breakup of the old pattern of relatively free exchange of goods and services.

During and just after the Second World War we in the United States hoped that somehow we could get back to that relative freedom. Although, traditionally, we have been a pretectionist country we recognized that to restore the pre-war trade pattern, we would have to break down our tariffs. We anticipated this approach when we wrote into the master Lend-Lease Agreements with the British, the French and others, provisions that looked forward to a post-war situation in which trade barriers could be reduced. We took the leadership in preparing a series of international agreements designed to carry this idea forward. For example, we helped set up the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund and took the lead in the abortive attempt to establish the International Trade Organization.

But in the years since the war we have come to realize that the disruptive forces were much greater than anticipated, that the European countries are not willing to make the changes in their internal economies that would make it possible to go back to relative freedom. In fact, we are not prepared to make the

necessary sacrifices ourselves, particularly with respect to certain protective industries and agriculture. Right now, we are still pretty much on the fence. The President was forced to raise the tariffs on watch movements from Switzerland but at the same time was very careful to issue clarifying statements and to set up arrangements for another study of our trade position, looking toward relative freedom.

In addition to economic considerations there is the political fact that the world is divided by the Iron Curtain so that there is relatively little trade between East and West. We can never go back to the relatively simple, self-operative trading system of the nineteenth century no matter how desirable it may look to us. We are no longer willing to make the sacrifices, both with respect to security and welfare, that that sort of a system involved. Yet, we have seen the consequences of the economic nationalism of the twentieth century. A course between these two is needed.

The Deterioration of Diplomacy

One of the more troubling developments of recent years has come in the area of the conduct of diplomatic relations. The procedures and standards of behavior employed have become more, rather than less, crude. In the nineteenth century professional diplomats were recruited within the separate countries from the same general social classes. Through similar educational systems they had impressed upon them similar standards and forms of behavior. They constantly improved these standards of conduct and of international behavior and brought into play qualities of decency and humaneness. This trend found its way not only into the prescribed rules of diplomacy, but also in the development of rules of warfare.

What do we have in the twentieth century? These commonly accepted standards of diplomatic behavior and of national behavior have badly deteriorated. Althought we in the democratic countries are doing our best to stick to them, we feel, nevertheless, that

we must violate them in certain cases in order to survive. Diplomatic procedures are prostituted for purposes for which they were never intended.

It is paradoxical that as these diplomatic standards of behavior have been violated, we have at the same time been building up other formal instruments for the conduct of international relations, both at the general and at the regional level. Particularly important is the development of the League of Nations after the First World War and of the United Nations and all of its associated instrumentalities since 1945. We now have available to us formalized international organizations that were not available before. This is not the place for an estimation of the value of the United Nations but I would like to suggest that the United Nations represents the culmination of many generations of activity toward the development of formalized institutions of international organization and does make available a forum through which international affairs can be handled effectively. The rules of the game seem to be breaking down but yet the instrumentalities are somewhat improved.

Associated with that is one additional complicating development. This, too, is of a paradoxical nature. In the nineteenth century political affairs were carried on by relatively few people, whereas in the twentieth century, even in the totalitarian states, there is popular participation. In a democratic state this means that the people participate in the formulation of policy and in the projection of those policies into actual programs. In a totalitarian state this broad participation is certainly not in the formulation of policy, but even in these states the ruling classes feel that they must create the illusion of broad participation and have developed devices for apparent participation.

What has been the consequence of this situation, associated as it is with mass education and with the modern means of transportation and communication? It has made the conduct of international affairs much more complicated. It is more difficult to achieve

balance and stability and perhaps at this stage in the game it has made the international scene even more volatile. In our own country we like to believe that a democratic country is necessarily a peaceful country, but I am not certain that we have demonstration of that in history. Many writers have pointed out that with broad participation in policy formulation, and in the discussion of national and international affairs, things are much more unstable than they were previously when a relatively few professionals, all subscribing to more or less the same standards of conduct, could negotiate, compromise and reach adjustment among themselves. In the day of the headline, TV, and radio, when these devices can be used to manipulate opinion and arouse emotional outbursts, tensions between nations and pressures for change may be greater than they were before. One of the contradictions of our time is that as more people participate in national affairs problems of adjustment and compromise become more, not less difficult.

The Nature of the Soviet Threat

I would like to conclude by repeating and amplifying what I said earlier. Although the Soviet Union is certainly *the* central problem to us today, nevertheless these other problems are more basic and more fundamental and will stick with us if the Soviet threat is eliminated. For the United States these factors that I have outlined, in the light of the Soviet threat, present some pretty tough problems. All of these conditions contribute to revolutionary change, breaking up old institutions, bringing about new patterns of behavior and new relationships of peoples to each other. The United States, as a developed and stable country, would be satisfied to keep things pretty much as they are. Unlike an earlier period in our history, we favor the *status quo*. Yet, we realize that we cannot survive by standing still and that these changes are going to continue all about us, creating problems that we simply cannot avoid. Although we would like to be relatively isolated and let things stay pretty much as they are, we cannot do this in a dynamic world. The Soviet Union, on the other hand,

has a tremendous amount to gain by further disintegration and dislocation throughout the world. The Soviet Union lives and breathes on conflict and chaos.

The United States, therefore, has the more difficult task of trying to maintain stability in a rapidly changing situation. This is particularly true of the changes in the colonial areas. We realize that these changes are inevitable, yet the accelerated changes are bringing instability for the time being, at least, and this situation works to the immediate advantage of the Soviet Union. Our problem, then, is to work with these changes in such a way as to preserve sufficient stability and yet enable the colonial people to bring about the social, economic and other changes that are required.

The real challenge to America is to remember that not so very long ago this country was a revolutionary country, the one which was feared by the advocates of the *status quo*, the crowned heads of Europe. At that time there was an American "subversion," the subversion of individual liberty and individual freedom as stated in our Declaration of Independence. We were feared then by those who tried to stem the tide of change, just as the Communists are feared abroad today.

The way to balance and to meet the Soviet threat is to think of what the American subversion can contribute to the peaceful development of each one of these factors underlying the present situation, recognizing that changes are inevitable, and that we have to lead them in constructive, rather than destructive, directions. So I would say, let's not forget the American subversion. We are revolutionists, too. We have the greatest revolution in the world.

BIOGRAPHIC SKETCH

Professor John W. Masland

Professor John W. Masland graduated from Haverford College with a B.S. degree and received A.M. and Ph.D. degrees from Princeton University.

He was Secretary and Research Assistant for King Features Syndicate during 1934-35, followed by the positions of Instructor, Assistant Professor and Associate Professor of Political Science at Stanford University from 1938 to 1945.

During 1942-43, Professor Masland was employed as Divisional Assistant in the Department of State. In 1945 he was a member of the Board of Editors, "International Organization," Sceretariat, United Nations Conference. This was followed by a position as research expert in the Government Section of the Supreme Command, Tokyo. During 1950, Professor Masland was a member of the resident faculty of the National War College. He has been Professor of Government at Dartmouth College since 1946.

U.S.S.R. MILITARY-ECONOMIC STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES

A lecture delivered
at the Naval War College
on 14 October 1954 by
Dr. Demitri B. Shimkin

Admiral McCormick, Gentlemen of the Naval War College:

My objectives in this talk this morning are: *first* to survey briefly the resources pattern of the U. S. S. R. — human, agricultural, and mineral; *second,* to summarize the basic economic policies of the U. S. S. R.; *third,* to indicate the rate of economic growth achieved over the past years, and *fourth,* to outline the salient capabilities, limitations and vulnerabilities inherent in Soviet economic potential.

Let us now turn to the resources pattern. The *population* of the Soviet Union today aggregates some 210 million persons, concentrated primarily in European Russia. In fact, about three-quarters of the population lives west of the Volga River. Also, the population is still primarily rural; only 40 percent of the people of the Soviet Union live in cities or in industrial settlements.

The *labor force* of the Soviet Union numbers about 105 million persons, a considerably larger proportion to population than in this country, where it is little more than a third. The reasons for the larger labor force in the Soviet Union, relative to ours, are the following: first, as a result of the tremendous war losses of World War II, a very large number of single women is to be found in the population. These single women must perforce seek employment. Second, the proportion of persons fifteen and over who are in school in the Soviet Union is considerably smaller than in the United States. Third, child, part-time and other marginal labor is inherently more useful in an agricultural and rural eco-

nomy than in one highly industrialized and urbanized. And 55 percent of the Soviet Union's labor force is agricultural, compared to some 12 percent in the United States.

The structure of the labor force also presents some other differences from that of the United States. The nonagricultural labor force numbers about 40 million people, exclusive of about 5.5 million in the armed forces and 2 to 3 million in forced labor proper. This is only about two-thirds as great as in this country. But the number in manufacturing, 17 million, equals the American figure; in general, two-thirds of the 40 million Soviet nonagricultural workers are in manufacturing, construction and transportation. Only a third are in service occupations. These proportions are directly the inverse of those of the United States.

In consequence of these facts, the U. S. S. R. has an organization of labor which maximizes current output but which has relatively little fat and few reserves who could be redeployed in time of emergency from one occupation to another. This absence of fat is also intensified by a number of other circumstances. The Soviet Union has an immense shortage of able-bodied males in relation to the size of its population. The war induced a direct military loss of over 7 million males in the armed forces (direct military killed) and an additional indirect loss of 5 to 10 million. (Total Soviet losses from all causes — direct and indirect, including the fall of birth rate — ran about 25 million persons in World War II.) As a result of this deficiency in males, over half of the labor force of the Soviet Union today is female. In other words, the employment of women today is almost the same level of intensity as was reached in the Soviet Union at the peak of World War II. Furthermore, the work week in the Soviet Union was increased in 1940 from 40 hours to 48 hours. At the height of World War II, it rose to 66 hours. Since the end of the war, the minimum work week, excluding a very few hazardous occupations, has been 48 hours.

When we combine all of these factors, we see, again, a maximum of concentration on current output and a distinct limitation in reserves.

The final aspect of the labor force analysis is the problem of productivity. Here, we must note that the over-all productivity of Soviet labor has not advanced greatly over the last fifteen years. In agriculture, man-year productivity has increased about 5 percent since 1937. Today, agricultural productivity in the Soviet Union is not much more than a tenth as high as in the United States. In manufacturing, the picture has been rather varied. In the field of machinery and transportation equipment, the Soviets have realized their best progress, partly through increases in hours but, more largely, through improved factory transport systems, higher speeds of machine tools, and various technological gains of this sort. In the last fifteen years, their productivity has risen something like 55 percent, a little higher than the rate of growth in this country. On the other hand, in industrial fields outside of machine building — among 12 million miners, steel-workers, textile workers and others — productivity has either remained at the prewar level or dropped. For example: in consumers' goods, the man-hour productivity of labor runs about 15 percent below the prewar level.

Thus, in comparison with the United States, the Soviet Union has, by and large, had great difficulty in keeping up in productivity. Today, in manufacturing as a whole, Soviet productivity ranges from about 20 percent to 35 percent as great as the American; in agriculture, as I mentioned, only a tenth. These are fundamental differences in potential.

Let me now turn to a rapid survey of agriculture, the cardinal weakness in the Soviet economy. I will not discuss in detail the geographic problems of agriculture, but I want to reemphasize to you the importance of the climatic limitations: the cold barrier which restrains effective agriculture north of the Leningrad-Urals-Irkutsk line and the drought frontier which elimi-

nates agriculture, other than with irrigation, east and south of the Batumi-Stalingrad-Barnaul line, from the Black Sea to the Altai. These limitations represent not only agricultural boundaries, but also limitations upon yields and upon the kinds of crops grown. For example: the Soviet Union must depend for its cotton production upon an extremely small area; two-thirds of all Soviet cotton is produced in the Fergana Valley in Central Asia, a region of only 5,000 square miles or the size of Connecticut.

Above all, however, the problem of agriculture is one of neglect, of a deliberate historic policy of squeezing agriculture as the fundamental source of investment for the rest of the economy. In addition to this, agriculture is organized in a fashion which maximizes control and which ensures the delivery of what the State demands, but at the same time which is devastating to production. The whole system of compulsory deliveries at nominal prices, all of the complex accounting, drag down the initiative of the farmers.

As a result of these facts, the progress of agriculture in the Soviet Union has been far short of the demands needed for the economy. Let me give you a few basic figures. Since the beginning of industrialization (the period between 1928-1953), the growth of the population of the Soviet Union, including annexation, has totaled about 40 percent. In contrast, grain output has increased only 30 percent. In livestock, there have been considerable gains made in swine numbers. But for cattle and sheep the picture is extremely adverse. Their numbers, as well as the number of horses, are actually lower than they were twenty-five years ago — lower in absolute as well as in relative terms. The increase in tractors and other mechanization since 1928 has little more than offset the decline in horse numbers. The shortage of power remains a major block to increased productivity in Soviet agriculture. The only sectors where the Soviet Union has really made progress have been cotton and sugar beets, where all of the mineral fertilizer and most of the agricultural investment have

been concentrated. Consequently, yields per acre, in most grain crops and in potatoes have actually been lower in recent years than they were before the beginning of industrialization.

The consequences have been many. The Soviet diet is today essentially on an Asiatic Standard. We know, from official data for 1950 that, even for the urban population and the armed forces, 85 percent of the diet, by weight, consists of bread, potatoes and coarse vegetables. Every other commodity — sugar, butter, milk products, meat — forms the other 15 percent. Of course this is a serious problem, particularly in regard to the health of the population. With the slim food margin available, the build-up of stocks for droughts or military emergencies is difficult. The expansion of livestock numbers is very slow and uncertain. Also, low peasant morale inevitably affects other segments of the population, especially the armed forces.

And finally, we have, within the distribution of agriculture itself, a serious problem. In the Soviet Union there are very distinct areas of food surplus and food deficit. In central and northwest Russia are some 60 million people who must import a very large share of their food from the North Caucasus and Volga regions. The Ukraine and the Urals, including the immediately adjacent Volga area, are about self-sufficient. In the Asiatic territories, including the Transcaucasus, we again find very marked differences. Western Siberia is a surplus area which must supply Central Asia and, to some degree, even the Transcaucasus. These areas do not feed themselves because so much of their arable land is taken up by cotton, tea, and other technical crops. The Far East also is not self-sufficient and it must generally import about 3 million tons of grain a year. Before the war, the fundamental base of supply was Western Siberia. At the present time this is being supplemented by shipments from Manchuria. Thus, the problems of distribution acerbate the difficulties in the agricultural situation as a whole.

In regard to mineral resources, the Soviet picture is far brighter. In general, the reserves of the basic ferrous metals — iron ore, manganese, chrome and nickel — are very strong, although there are scarcities in other metals, especially cobalt, molybdenum and tungsten. In addition, there are difficulties caused by the delayed and inadequate development of new deposits, the spotty adoption of new technology, and the excessive exploitation of the major working deposits.

This is especially serious in the Eastern regions where the most important iron ore deposit, Gora Magnitnaya in the south Urals, has been seriously depleted, and where the Soviets have been very slow in bringing in lower-grade deposits into production. Even for Krivoy Rog in the Ukraine, the richest and most important iron deposit in the Soviet Union, the strain has been severe because Krivoy Rog has had to supply not only the industry of the Ukraine, and in part that of Central Russia, but also that of the European satellites.

In nonferrous metals — copper, lead, zinc, aluminum and tin — the Soviet position is much less favorable. Soviet progress has been most marked in lead and zinc; for these metals, mid-1953 output represented 70 and 50 percent gains, respectively, over 1950 levels. Completion of the Ust Kamenogorsk hydroelectric plant and allied smelting facilities, which permitted improved refining of the Ridder ores of northeast Kazakhstan, underlaid this gain. (It must be noted, however, that the Soviet *reserves* of lead and zinc are quite limited.)

Copper output is a different matter, with ores available in Kazakhstan, the major reserve area, presenting constant difficulties to the Soviets. In the last year and a half, production has actually dropped. Since both Soviet and satellite electrical capacity is being vigorously expanded, the copper situation must be very tight.

In regard to aluminum and in regard to the most important of the nonferrous metals, uranium, the Soviet Union is above all, dependent upon the satellites. At the present moment, over 60 percent of the bauxite consumed by the U. S. S. R. comes from Hungary. At the same time, Hungary produces almost no aluminum. The shipments of bauxite have to be made to the Ukraine, to the new aluminum smelters in the Transcaucasus, and to the Volkhov region near Leningrad. The Urals plants run primarily upon local bauxite as does the plant in Stalinsk, in the Kuznetsk Basin. All in all, the aluminum situation of the Soviet Union is respectable so long as free transportation from Hungary is ensured.

In regard to uranium, a few points may be made. From a theoretical standpoint, and from the standpoint of the technology practiced in the United States, uranium is no longer a scarcity. For example: we are, today, using not only such ores as the carnotite of the Colorado plateau but also almost trace quantities of uranium from Florida phosphate rock. The development of uranium from the by-product gold tailings of South Africa is also significant. But this does not mean that we can translate such technology into Soviet practice. As far as I know, the fundamental resources still are complex low-grade cobalt-bismuth-uranium ores of the Erz Gebirge in Germany and Czechoslovakia and the carnotitelike ores of Central Asia — particularly in the Fergana Valley region, which is also the scene of one of the major hydroelectric developments in the Soviet Union.

Finally, a word or two about fuels. The U. S. S. R. has great natural resources in coal, petroleum and in natural gas; but, also, poor development, and, in part, mal-distribution. The Soviet Union is peculiar in the fact that 90 percent of the iron reserves are located west of 60 degrees east and 90 percent of the coal reserves are to the east of this line. In regard to coking coal there is a very real problem. The Donets Basin in the Ukraine is the sole producer, in most of European Russia, of coking coal, and

this coking coal is extremely poor. There is 3 percent sulphur in run-of-the-mill Donets coking coals, an absolutely unacceptable proportion from our standpoint. The other supplies of coking coal must come from the Pechora region (north of the Arctic Circle), or else from the Karaganda Basin in Kazakhstan, or from Western Siberia. The Urals do not have significant supplies of coking coal; neither does Central Russia. As a result, gentlemen, according to information from no less a person than Lazar Kaganovich, in 1953 the Soviet Union was sending some ten million tons of coal from the Kuznetsk Basin as far west as Moscow — and even beyond.

In regard to petroleum, the problems are parallel. The fundamental development of petroleum is localized, first of all, in the oil fields of the Caucasus; and, second, in the area of the Volga Basin (the so-called "Second Baku"). Smaller fields are found in Central Asia — Guryev and Krasnovodsk; some in the Fergana Valley and, to a very limited degree, at Sakhalin. Elsewhere, although the geology is extremely favorable (as it is in all of Western Siberia), so far as we know commercial production has never been achieved. As a result of this, there has to be wide distribution of petroleum products. This distribution is primarily by tank car. Less than 15 percent of Soviet petroleum is sent by pipeline, for Soviet pipelines are limited essentially to a number in the Caucasus, connecting with the Ukraine, and some in the Volga area. Outside of this, they are extremely short and of little account.

Finally, the Soviets continue to have very real difficulties in cracking and refining, particularly in regard to the treatment of high-sulphur crudes and in the treatment of low-volatility crudes, like those of Sakhalin. They do not have proper desulphurization and proper decarbonization units. As a result, in 1953 a very large proportion (around 10 percent) of all Soviet crude was involved in very long cross-hauls. On the one hand, the Volga refineries could not use Volga crudes for high-quality products and had to import crudes from the Caucasus. On the other hand, the high-

sulphur fuel oil of the Volga region flooded the local market, so that fuel oil was being sent from this area back to the Caucasus out to the Ukraine, and into Central Asia. It was the same way in the Far East. Here, petroleum products were being shipped from the refineries in he Urals all the way out to the Pacific, while crude from Sakhalin was being shipped out as far as Western Siberia. These problems, of course, accentuate the load on transportation that is developed both through maldistribution of basic resources, and through incomplete development and lagging technology.

To summarize the minerals picture: The resource base is essentially strong, although there are very definite gaps in a number of metals such as tin, cobalt, molybdenum, etc. The development is uneven, with technology often inadequate — particularly in such fields as heavy-media separation. There is an important supplementation of Soviet resources by those of the satellites, ranging from the uranium of the German-Czech area to the iron ore and coking coal (essential to the Far East) available from Anshan in Manchuria. And, finally, the distribution of the resources in relation to the urban population and manufacturing capacity is not altogether satisfactory.

Let me say a few words about Soviet economic policies. As you know, the continued emphasis of the Soviet Union has been upon a maximum strengthening of its military-economic potential. To implement this strengthening, the Soviet Union has developed a large amount of machinery typical of a nation at war. There is, of course, the centralization of planning and operational controls throughout the economy. There is a very large use of direct controls: first, in regard to labor, where movement is regulated by labor passports, where jobs cannot be left except by permission of the plant director, where minimum hours are enforced, and where all sorts of penalties are attached to underproduction. There are also direct controls in critical materials, which are allocated on a basis very much like our Controlled Materials

Plan of Korea and the later phases of World War II. Indirect controls are of tremendous importance on the consumers' side. Here, the basic system is that of enormous sales or turnover taxes, which, in general, take 60 percent of the consumers' rubles. In such basic commodities as bread, the tax forms 90 percent of the sales price. This is a very effective way of holding down "unnecessary" demand.

The system of coercion and of incentives has been fairly well developed and it is also tied in with another essential element: that of tolerated illegality. In other words, gentlemen, the fixer, the black market, the speculators, are essential parts of the Soviet economic machinery because it is only thus that plants can get that missing spare part which another plant is hoarding. Only through falsification can a plant director keep his nose above water when the politicians decide that production should be upped 50 percent in three months. All of these practices combine to form a type of political cynicism and opportunism which is both basic to and dangerous to the Soviet totalitarian state.

With this machinery, the Soviets have combined methods well known to Western economists to effect economic progress. These methods include a reallocation of resources. Over the last fifteen years, for example, the share of consumption (including health and education) in the gross national product of the Soviet Union has dropped from about 67 percent in 1938 to 50 percent today. The share of investment has risen from about 10 percent to 25 percent, or possibly a little higher. The share of government — including, especially, armaments — has risen from 14 percent to 25 percent of the gross national product. Labor has followed these resource allocations. Today, the armed forces' strength of the Soviet Union is over three times as great as it was in 1938. Manufacturing now has two-thirds again as many people as it did in 1938.

Another factor has been the simplification of designs; the continuation in production, in sectors of secondary importance,

of obsolete models. The 1928-model Ford is still in production in the Soviet Union. It suffices for certain purposes. Again, the Soviet Union has seen fit to neglect large areas, such as maintenance, and to concentrate on current production.

The intensified use of human and capital resources has also been vital. To illustrate it, I want to cite a case given by Kaganovich, the Boss of the Transportation System. Speaking this spring, he said that the Soviet Union concentrates about one-third of its ton-mileage on the Donets Basin, the Urals and the Western Siberian networks. On these networks the ton-mileage of freight transportation in 1953 was about 80 percent higher than in 1940. "But," (and I quote him), "the trackage had risen only 12 percent — station trackage only a matter of some 6 percent — while centralized traffic controls were actually 6 percent under the 1940 level." He then goes on with a laconic statement that the rate of growth of capacity is not keeping up to demand.

The final mechanism of growth in the Soviet Union has been the merciless drain of the satellites. Gentlemen, until the last few months it was not fully realized how significant and how crucial, even, the tribute exacted from the satellites has been as a margin of Soviet strength. In 1952, the Soviet Union exacted a tribute amounting to about 15 percent of the gross national product from Eastern Germany, and about 10 percent of the gross national product from Poland. The exactions from other satellites have been of a comparable nature. They have given an addition of 5 percent or 6 percent to the resources produced by the U. S. S. R. itself — about the relative addition provided by Lend Lease during World War II. It has been this margin which has been critical for military strength and for the maintenance of a high level of investment. China, of course, has been a drain — a serious one during the Korean war — rather than an economic asset.

All in all, what have been the achievements of the Soviet Union in comparison with the West? Over the last fifteen years

(from 1938-1953), the gross national product of the Soviet Union in fixed prices (essentially, 1937 rubles) has risen almost 70 percent. The rise of the American and the Canadian product over the last fifteen years has been 120 percent (in 1939 U. S. prices). In other words, the gap between the Soviet Union and the United States has widened rather than narrowed over the last fifteen years. The Soviet Union is at present making an intense drive to regain as narrow a margin as it had in 1938.

Within components of the economy, the picture has been rather different. For example: the gross output of manufacturing in the Soviet Union has risen, since 1938, nearly 130 percent. In the United States, the rate of manufacturing growth has been a little less than 100 percent. In other words, they are growing faster in manufacturing than we. Of course their weakness has been in agriculture. Here is a maximum of some 15 percent growth since 1938 while in the United States the growth has been extremely substantial.

When we compare further the entire picture of the East and the West, a comparable picture obtains. Among the free countries of Europe and Asia the one with the greatest gain has been Turkey, where there has been about a 70 percent increase in national product since 1938. Over-all for the countries of the proposed Western European Union — the United Kingdom, Benelux, France, Italy, Germany — the median rise from 1938 to 1953 has been 35 percent (in gross national product at fixed prices). In several European countries it is somewhat higher: Sweden's increase from 1938 to 1953 being 49 percent; Norway's, 52 percent. In a few cases it is rather lower: Greece is only 10 percent above the prewar level, and Ireland, about 20 percent.

Among the European satellites the greatest growth has been in Poland — a growth, incidentally, which was largely achieved through a change in boundaries through which the Poles acquired substantial German industrial capacity. In Poland, the

rise of national product has been 36 percent since 1938. Today, Czechoslovakia and Hungary are certainly not more than 20 percent above the prewar level. What the situation is in Rumania and Bulgaria is hard to say, but it is likely that they, like Eastern Germany, are less than 10 percent above prewar level.

So, from the standpoint of the best measurements that we have, the West is not losing ground to the East. Certainly the Soviet Union is growing faster than Western Europe, but the aggregate of the West so far is holding its ground, or doing a little better than that.

But this is not the whole picture because it is a problem not only of achievement but of getting a message across. The Soviet Union is today conducting a very serious cold war of statistics. It is attempting to convince its people and those abroad that the West is doomed; that only the armaments race holds the Western economies together; that the desperate condition of the starving workers of the West practically assures early internal strife and revolution. To the extent that this propaganda remains undisputed, regardless of the actual facts, neutralist elements in Asia, within Western Europe and even in the United States are sustained and can exercise a serious, adverse influence upon the political strength of the West. This is a political phenomenon of the greatest importance, as we have seen to our sorrow in Indochina and has been threatened in regard to E.D.C. and its potential successor, W.E.U.

Gentlemen, I have remarked upon a number of occasions about Soviet 'hot war' capabilities. As I see them, they have remained unchanged in substance over the last few years. Essentially, the Soviet Union has a number of important — though limited — assets: A high readiness of armed forces backed by substantial stockpiles; forward bases, especially in the satellites of Eastern Europe; a capacity for rapid mobilization and deployment, fundamentally directed to Western Europe, secondarily directed to the Balkans, to the Caucasus, up into Scandinavia and, to a much

more restricted degree, to the Far East. The capacity of the Far East, as far as I can determine, has not changed substantially from a level of about 35 or 40 Soviet divisions in action, or their equivalent in a larger number of Chinese or other satellite troops. Another important aspect is the increasingly effective Soviet air force — although great caution must be taken in substituting a picture of one plane, no matter how advanced, for the reality and the complexity of a well-balanced and operating strategic air force. Potential guerrilla action in Western Europe — particularly in France and Italy — cannot be disregarded in Soviet capabilities. Finally, the Soviets have the advantage of high secrecy.

All this adds up to the potential of a major threat particularly directed against Western Europe, with important efforts toward the isolation of that theater by the attack of the sea lanes and, to some degree, by the atomic bombardment and neutralization of ports of debarkation.

The limitations of the Soviet Union rest primarily in manpower. The effects of the war and a high degree of employment give a practical limit of around 15 million men under arms, which is about what we can sustain in this country. Soviet troop capacity is of course supplemented by the satellites. But, here, the Soviets run into serious problems of political reliability, training, communications, and other factors of this sort.

Another limiting aspect is the sheer difference in size between the Soviet industrial plant and the American. The Soviet plant is used to a high degree of capacity; by the measure of capacity, the margin between the Soviet Union and the United States is not a question of one-to-four, as in production, but closer to one-to-eight. For example, gentlemen, let us not forget that our entire munitions industry at the present time is operating exclusively on a one-shift basis. The U.S.S.R. also has specific bottlenecks, such as petroleum, cracking capacity, transportation, and aluminum.

There is another great problem: the absence of offensive sea power; the lack of ability to project power overseas on a

sustained basis. This absence gives the West certain potentials for the use of the island peripheries and of peripheries protected by water. It is an asset — and, on the Soviet side, a weakness — which must never be lost sight of.

Turning, finally, to weaknesses, I must stress the cancer of agriculture, which not only limits food supply (which can be remedied for the short run by stockpiling) but, more importantly, corrodes the morale of the peasant majority of the Soviet population. A vulnerability to air action is created by the heavy concentration of traffic and of output. In the Soviet Union today, 60 percent of the motor-vehicle production still comes from one plant. In the United States, the whole state of Michigan today produces only 30 percent of American motor vehicle production and Detroit, itself, produces around 15 percent — a tremendous difference in concentration. Another problem is the high degree of urban crowding. Here, the average density in the Soviet cities runs twice as high as in the United States, a very dangerous thing in the atomic age.

The Communist weakness in the Pacific must not be ignored, for that vast theater is bound to Soviet industry only by one ribbon of steel; there is no raiload north of Lake Baikal. Western exploitation of the weakness could mean the relief of Communist pressures all the way down to Australia, and directly against the heart of the United States. Too, the establishment of forward bases from the Pacific could introduce the fatal kind of shuttle bombing that led to the early demise of Germany.

All these basic weaknesses are magnified and added to by the uncertainty of the satellites.

Yet, the degree of concentration of Soviet power on effectiveness in being — and on armed strength in being — must not be forgotten. For all of these reasons the final estimate is this: The U.S.S.R. is a country of immense potential, with a large resource-base and a large population. It is a country which has effected

significant economic growth, primarily through the effective channeling of its resources rather than basic increases in efficiency, in productivity. Its goals are narrowly defined — particularly, the maximization of power-in-being. Its most dangerous capability, and one increasingly dangerous, is a short, heavy blow, particularly against Western Europe. But the time has yet to come when the Soviet Union can face with equanimity a battle of indefinite duration and indeterminate scope. So long as the West has its determination and its unity, so long as the West is not afraid to use the resources at its disposal, it is precisely that kind of a war which would be the fate of the Soviet Union in case of an all-out aggresion.

Thank you, gentlemen!

BIOGRAPHIC SKETCH

Dr. Demitri B. Shimkin

Dr. Shimkin was born in Omsk, Siberia, on 4 July 1916. He received his education in the United States, including B.A. and Ph.D. degrees from the University of California.

Prior to World War II, Dr. Shimkin did research work at the University of California in anthropology and economic geography with emphasis on western North America. He entered the Army on active duty in September 1941, and served with the Intelligence Division, War Department General Staff, and U. S. Forces European Theater (1941-46), specializing in Russian Affairs. He was assigned to the National War College during 1946-47, and lectured at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces during 1947. He is a graduate of the Army's Command and General Staff School.

Dr. Shimkin was a member of the Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, in 1947 and 1948. Since 1950, he has been consultant editor to the *Journal, Automotive Industries.* He has written numerous articles on Soviet economic geography and technology as well as a volume, *Minerals, A Key to Soviet Power,* published last year.

Dr. Shimkin was research Associate of the Russian Research Center and lecturer in Social Anthropology at Harvard University between 1948 and 1953. Since October, 1953 he has been Social Science Analyst on the Technical Advisory Committee, Bureau of the Census.

RECOMMENDED READING

The evaluation of books listed below include those recommended to resident students of the Naval War College. Officers in the fleet and elsewhere may find these of interest.

The listings herein should not be construed as an endorsement by the Naval War College; they are indicated only on the basis of interesting reading mater.

Many of these publications may be found in ship and station libraries. Some of the publications not available from these sources may be obtained from the Bureau of Naval Personnel Auxiliary Library Service, where a collection of books is available for loan to individual officers. Requests for the loan of these books should be made by the individual to the nearest branch of the Chief of Naval Personnel. (See Article C-9604, Bureau of Naval Personnel Manual, 1948).

Title: *The Meaning of Nationalism.* 208 p.

Author: Snyder, Louis L. New Brunswick, New Jersey, Rutgers University Press, 1954.

Evaluation: An erudite analysis of the many facets and expressions of nationalism, their derivations, evolutions, and portents. It presents the view that modern weapons of war make it vital for human beings to revise their social concepts to keep pace with the physical sciences as a matter of self-preservation; and that the desire for the well-being of one's own nation can be — and must be — made compatible with the welfare of all humanity.

Title: *Legal Controls of International Conflict.* 851 p.

Author: Stone, Julius. N. Y., Rinehart, 1954.

Evaluation: "A Treatise on the Dynamics of Disputes and War-Law" by a distinguished Anglo-Australian jurist. It covers, in addition to an analysis of international law, the whole sweep of the methods for the pacific settlement of disputes by traditional methods of diplomacy, by arbitration

and adjudication, and, finally, by the procedures established in the United Nations Charter. The bulk of the volume is given up to a comprehensive and penetrating review of war-law, including neutrality, economic warfare, the laws of land, naval and air warfare, and, finally, the legal protection of victims of war. This book will be invaluable to naval officers interested in the law of naval and aerial warfare, in the action in Korea, in the war crimes trials following World War II, and, generally, in collective security and collective defense arrangements such as NATO.

Title: *Close Contact.* 173 p.

Author: Dewhurst, C. H. Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1954.

Evaluation: The author, who served as Chief of the British Missions to the Soviet Forces in Eastern Germany, 1951-53, records his experiences in a lively, conversational style. He understands the Russians and is unawed by them. Because of his military-diplomatic background and his extensive experience, he is able to present certain conclusions and suggestions which would be of value to anyone concerned with the Soviets in the fields of diplomacy, propaganda, strategy and war plans. He covers such subjects as the character of the Russian people, security, strengths and weaknesses of the armed forces and the industrial potential, propaganda (Soviet and foreign), and the inner workings of the Soviet Government with some colorful sidelights on events leading to and subsequent to the death of Stalin.

Title: *Red Design for the Americas: Guatemalan Prelude.* 347 p.

Author: James, Daniel. N. Y., John Day Co., 1954.

Evaluation: The author sketches the transformation in Guatemala of a backward nationalist surge to a full-fledged communist coup. The standard communist take over by a strong, well organized Red minority in the face of an illiterate majority is clearly pictured. The author cites instances of organized demonstrations in various South American countries to illustrate the foothold communism already has in the Western Hemisphere. The implication that we are bulwarking our front doors while apparently disregarding our back door is clear, and the need for the Caribbean countries in our economic and defensive sphere is spelled out. Methods are suggested (economic, cultural, etc.) by which we can best combat this threat.

Title: *History of U. S. Naval Operations in World War II, Sicily-Salerno-Anzio, January* 1943-*June* 1944. 413 p.

Author: Morison Samuel Eliot. Boston, Little, Brown & Co., 1954.

Evaluation: The ninth volume of the History of United States Naval Operations in World War II deals with American naval activities in the Mediterranean and covers three major amphibious operations — the invasion of Sicily, the capture of the Salerno beachhead, and the long Anzio beachhead struggle. This is the first balanced account of the Mediterranean operations in 1943-44, and presents important information on joint and combined operations, in addition to those of the United States Navy. Morison discusses the Army's conversion to naval gunfire support, and the Air Force's non-support of the beachhead operations. Morison concludes that the Italian campaign had to be fought — but that the Sicilian operation plan was ill-conceived, that evacuation of German divisions from Sicily should have been prevented, that the Anzio operation was a mistake and that the Italian armistice was bungled.

PERIODICALS

Title: *Airpower is the Dominant Factor in War.*

Author: Radford, Arthur W., Admiral, U.S.N.

Publication: U. S. AIR SERVICES, November 1954, p. 7-10.

Annotation: An address, delivered at the meeting of the Illinois State Chamber of Commerce, deals with the role of airpower in our national defense. (Department of Defense Press Release, No. 997-54, October 15, 1954).

Title: *Communism in Asia.*

Publication: CURRENT HISTORY, November, 1954.

Annotation: The entire issue is devoted to this topic and contains articles by four Asians and four Westerners giving their viewpoints on the reasons for communism in Asia and evaluating its strength. (Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, p. 321; Pacific Charter, p. 323).

Title: *Where "Coexistence" Flops.*

Publication: U. S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, November 19, 1954, p. 32.

Annotation: Reports that India's Communist Party is gaining strength and causing trouble for Prime Minister Nehru.

Title: *Control of Sea Communications in a Future War.*

Author: Horan, H. E., Rear Admiral, R. N.

Publication: AIR POWER, Autumn, 1954, p. 15-20.

Annotation: A British admiral briefly describes the importance of and the threat to the vital lines of sea communications. Sets forth the principles of convoy protection (distant cover and close escort) and concludes with the statement that the protection of ships at sea is a matter for all three services acting in close coordination.

Title: *United States Defense Policy;* 1941.

Author: Kittredge, T. B., Captain, U.S.N.R. (Ret.)

Publication: U. S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, December 3, 1954, p. 53-63, 110-139.

Annotation: A review and summary of defense planning and preparations prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor based upon official documents and containing conclusions differing from those expressed in **The Final Secret of Pearl Harbor** that was published in **U. S. News & World Report**, April 2, 1954.

Title: *Our Navy* 1955-1975.

Author: Watson, Mark S.

Publication: ORDNANCE, November-December, 1954, p. 370-373.

Annotation: Tells what the Navy is doing and has been doing during the past six years to assure our command of the sea and to enable our naval forces to meet the responsibilities of the atomic age.

Title: *War Without Men.*

Author: Reinhardt, G. C., Colonel, U.S.A.

Publication: COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL, November, 1954, p. 40-43.

Annotation: Questions the present strategy of reliance on nuclear superiority and argues that atomic war will require more Army ground force divisions than a conventional war. The U. S. cannot "buy a mercenary army to prevent aggression," as Rome did to its sorrow, but must have a strong mobile force, composed mostly of Army divisions, to "contain local creeping aggression and keep U. S. global diplomacy from falling completely on its face."