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ALLIANCES AS A MEANS OF DEFENSE

A lecture delivered
at the Naval War College
on 3 November 1954 by
Professor Arnold O. Wolfers

Admiral McCormick, Members of the War College,

I am very happy to be at the Naval War College today, the one War College which I have not had the privilege of visiting before; particularly, to be here on the day after the elections when it is a pleasure to escape the partisan and political atmosphere of civilian life and to be among the professionally nonpartisan members of this body.

My lecture today is what is called a "theoretical" lecture, indicated by the fact that there is no map on the wall. I am not speaking about *a* specific alliance, or even specifically about our alliances, but about the problem of alliances in general. What role do alliances play in the foreign policy of countries? What problems do they raise for their members? These are the kinds of questions to which I shall be addressing myself.

For this country, it is of particular importance to talk about alliances. It is a country that has not been used to alliances. The fact that we have had to enter into a very widespread alliance policy, recently, means that we have had to put an end to the "go-it-alone" policy this country was fortunate enough to be able to pursue for a long time. I say 'fortunate enough' because an alliance policy is never a pleasant thing to contemplate; it is not something one enters into because of the peculiar charm of alliances. They are an evil, though very often a necessary evil or the least of the evils among which one is free to choose.

There are some people who have swung from the extreme of what, in a five-syllable word, one could call "pactophobia"

(a real fear of allianc ıg "entangling", or of being, as President Wilson assumed ıain cause of war) to the other extreme of "pactoma f thinking "the more alliances the better"). Whether ce is good or bad depends on the particular circumstanc the purpose to which it is put. Our alliances are instru of defense and must be judged in terms of defense. Alliances may also serve to bring countries closer together and may serve a good many other worthy objectives. But we have got to be clear in our minds that alliances have a primary military purpose and that their primary purpose, not their possible secondary kinds of usefulness, must guide alliance policy.

The primary purpose of an alliance follows from the definition which is generally accepted: an alliance is "a pact of mutual military assistance against a common foe". If it is not that, we had better not call it an "alliance". Alliances, in contrast to other inter-state agreements, are meant to supplement one's own armed forces where they need supplementation or they may serve to substitute for one's own armed forces. Substitution is a risky use of an alliance, however, because one has full control over one's own armed forces but only a precarious hold on allied forces. So, if some countries (because they want to save money) prefer to substitute other people's forces for their own, they should be aware of the risk they are running and should measure it against the value of what they save by doing so.

On the whole, the idea of an alliance is to supplement one's own forces and the "alliance need" is the need for such supplementation. Any country that has reason to believe that it can go-it-alone will not enter into alliances if it conducts a rational and wise policy. We are today in a position (I think there is general agreement on this) where to go-it-alone effectively would be, if not impossible, then at least so costly and risky that an alliance policy represents the far lesser evil.

That explains why this country has made a revolutionary shift from a clearly anti-alliance attitude to a quest for allies unequalled in the world. Even during the First World War we associated ourselves but did not ally ourselves with the European countries in order not to get entangled in their quarrels. Today, it would be hard to find a country more eager, sometimes overeager, to build up alliances, to supplement its own strength by the assumed or actual strength of other countries.

If we ask ourselves: What, then, is the range of opportunity for such supplementation? What do we have to look for in order to be sure that we are attaining our objective of increasing our defensive strength by entering into alliances? One answer comes to mind immediately: We have got to look for countries that have defensive strength — at least some defensive strength — that can be added to our own. It does not necessarily have to consist in armed forces, in the narrower sense of the word. Any strategic advantage we can get from being able to rely on the cooperation of an ally in case of war may be enough to make an alliance worthwhile. It may consist for instance — and very often does — in having access to the strategic location of another country. We may want to deny that country to the enemy. We may want to be sure that we can move in without hindrance. We may even be able to move in our forces in peacetime. This is supplementation.

If countries provide facilities for air bases, it may be worthwhile to enter into a mutual assistance pact with them. They supplement our strength by offering us their territory. But, on the whole, throughout history the basic idea of an alliance has been to permit a nation to add to its own armed strength by permitting it to count on the additional military forces of its allies.

The French have been great alliance-makers. Before the last war, it was they who were accused of "pactomania". But the

French were very careful to make it clear what they understood by an "alliance". A vague commitment which did not indicate to them that certain calculable armed forces would be at their disposal in case of war did not mean much to them. When, in the League of Nations Covenant, all members promised to come to the help of any victim of aggression, the French put very little trust in that commitment. They wanted to know how many divisions would be on their side of the Channel at a given time to fill the gap in their defense line against Germany. That was the most technically precise military alliance. But it is good to keep this in mind as a kind of standard by which to measure the value of alliances.

The further one gets away from precise commitments, the less reliable the supplement obviously becomes. If it is merely a set of words, with no convincing indication that in case of need it will lead to military movements of a predictable kind, it is very hard to base one's strategy on it, or to rely on it for one's own security.

In N. A. T. O. we have now advanced even beyond the traditional French type of alliance. While the French would have been satisfied to obtain from Britain a promise of a specified number of divisions to be sent to France as soon as war broke out, we now have placed forces on allied territory in peacetime. This is the most advanced type of supplementation; it takes place in advance of the outbreak of hostilities. It is quite clear why this has happened. There is just not enough time any more once war has started. Therefore, more and more the preparation for a coalition strategy has come to take place in peacetime.

But that merely makes N. A. T. O. more clearly an alliance. There was a good deal of confusion about the character of N. A. T. O. in the beginning. We did not like to call it a military alliance; so we talked about it as a kind of "regional arrangement", or as "collective security" or as a mere underpinning of

the collective defense provisions of the United Nations. I think that the Europeans understood very soon that to enter N. A. T. O. meant entering a multi-national alliance, military in character, even one of a particularly stringent nature because it meant deploying military forces in peacetime for a coalition strategy against a specific opponent.

There was one feature to the N. A. T. O. agreement that might have seemed to put it into a different category: the enemy was not named. But nobody was, or could be, fooled by that. It was obvious who the enemy was. This is good old diplomatic tradition — one does not tell the enemy in so many words that one intends a build-up of defenses against him, but as a rule, the intention is obvious as it was in this case.

One of the difficulties about the United Nations or the League of Nations as a substitute for alliances is that assistance to others in case they are attacked is promised against any aggressor anywhere. Here the enemy is not known. The assumption is that the pact will operate against any member of the organization who resorts to aggression. That takes the teeth out of it; it makes these organizations unsuitable for the purposes for which nations conduct an alliance policy. How can one develop a strategy, how can one rely on the assistance of others, if one does not know in which direction their forces are supposed to operate?

So, while N. A. T. O. was worded so as to be available against any enemy, the French were right not to assume that it gave them security against Germany. They might want some day to have a set of additional alliances directed against a possible German attack. It is interesting to note in this connection that when in recent discussions the French were clamoring for protection against Germany, nobody dared say: "You have N. A. T. O., after all". It is so obvious that the N. A. T. O. deployment of forces in Germany cannot suddenly be reversed and

be made to operate against Germany. If Germany becomes a member of N. A. T. O., how could one claim that in case of need, the coalition could simply turn around and, instead of moving in the direction of the east, turn on one of its members. The Brussels Pact, by the way, was changed to exclude any mention of future German aggression. This was necessary if Germany was to join the Pact.

It would seem, then, that it is militarily impossible to have what is called "collective security" if this means a promise of effective military assistance against any aggressor anywhere. If you will put your mind to it, you will surely find that it is impossible to conceive of military plans that could operate equally well against enemy A with the help of allies Q to Z than against one of these allies with the help of A. Surely, it would not be a reliable defense instrument.

This, then, is the first standard by which to evaluate alliances: whether the allies can offer something worthwhile in terms of military assistance. This means, among other things, that there are some countries that are not desirable as allies because they would be a drain on one's military strength rather than an addition to it. One has to be discriminatory and distinguish between countries that are potentially valuable as allies and those that are not. I will come back to this point later.

The second point, which needs to be emphasized, is that a pact by which a country promises assistance is not the same as this assistance itself. One has to be able to rely on the fulfillment of the pledge! Even if troops are already stationed where they are best able to meet the requirements of the alliance, they may still not be available when the day comes. To rely upon the assistance of allies is a very touchy problem. Much that will have to be said about reliance hinges on this problem: How can one be sure that the supplementation of one's forces will come to be a fact and operate effectively when the time arrives at which

one depends on it? That is one of the great drawbacks of alliances — that one builds up one's strategy and defense relying on a promise, but that for reasons honorable or dishonorable any promise of this particular kind may fail to materialize.

One cannot guarantee reliability. There are certain means, however, by which one can hope to strengthen it. One is the legal form of the commitment itself, and I do not think we should take that too lightly. If a nation signs a treaty of alliance with definite promises on the dotted line, this usually has a tremendous hold on government and people. We used to say to the French: "Why do you want all these alliances? Those who have the same interests as you will come to your assistance anyway and those who don't have the same interests will find ways of getting out from under their commitments. Why worry so much about having these pledges?" But I think the French were right, and we are acting today as if they were. They knew that a country which violates that type of pledge loses credit in the world and is in danger of not finding allies when it needs them. Therefore, the violation of an alliance is always taken to be a very serious act.

When the French did not come to the assistance of Czechoslovakia (when they told their Czech ally it could not count on them in 1938), this was a very serious act; it has hurt the French reputation for reliability in the eyes of many nations. It may have accounted for Czechoslovakia turning to Russia after the Second World War. The Czechs were saying: "How can we trust the French? How can we rely on the West if we cannot even place faith in a formal treaty of alliance?"

Italy, as you know, has wiggled out of alliances more than once; it has made it difficult for her to be taken seriously as an ally. This may mean that countries will not prepare to defend Italy in the same fashion than they would if they felt sure that Italy would actually fight on their side when and if the time comes.

The legal commitment is the first thing. But, more important is the popular support of the commitment. This is something about which one cannot be sure. When there are strong convictions in a country that the alliance is the right thing — that we have a vital interest in going hand-in-hand with our ally, that what the ally is doing is the right thing, and that it is right to be in with him — that means a great deal.

Strictly speaking, Canada had no alliance with Britain prior to World War II. But as soon as the war came, the Canadians immediately fell in with the British, which was, after all, pretty courageous. We did not fall in with the British at that time. We let them fight alone. For all practical purposes Canada was a sovereign country, but the public would not have stood for letting Britain down.

If there is an alliance — and you can sense that in this country today, I think — there may develop a feeling of solidarity that tends to make the alliance reliable. The Russians have alliances too: they have one with England and one with France. But these alliances count for nothing today. It is too well known that despite the legal document, there is no public support, no sense of solidarity behind them; the necessary public conviction is lacking. Therefore, when the French talk about security against Germany, they are not saying: "We already have the alliance with Russia to fall back on". It would take a complete change of sentiment and policy to restore the Franco-Soviet alliance to what it was intended to be and make it more than an empty document.

There are bound to be a number of difficult problems, then, to make an alliance reliable, to making sure that one is not basing one's expectations on something that will not materialize. The more an alliance gets out into the territory of unreliability and lack of precision, the more it threatens to become a trap and a handicap to sound policy. It means building up one's defense

forces on an unreliable element in the total defense picture. As you well know, that can be fatal.

— I remember once in the First World War, when I was on the frontier between Switzerland and Austria, just across from the Italian border where the Austrians and Italians were fighting each other. There I talked to a Czech soldier who was on the uttermost right-wing of the Austrian Army deployed between the Swiss border and the Adriatic. When I asked him how many Italians he had shot, he said: "Italians? We never shoot Italians." I asked him: "Whom do you shoot, then? You have a rifle." He replied: "When we shoot, we shoot Austrians." Here was an unreliable element for you, right in the front line. He also told me that in one of the big battles against the Russians, some Czech regiments in the Austrian Army had simply opened their ranks to let the Russians through thereby enabling them to surround the Austrians. In their hearts the Czechs were on the other side. They were enemies of the Austrians while "fighting" in their ranks. That is an extreme case of unreliability. —

This brings me to the third point, which is of a more objective nature though it has its subjective side too. I am speaking of the existence of a common interest. There are many "realists" who say one should not worry about the legal document or about public opinion. Nations, they say, are going to fight together when it is in their common interest to do so.

But, it is a curious thing about this "interest". Interest is not something one can pick up and say: "Here it is!" It depends on what people interpret to be their interests. The conviction of common interests is essential, but it is very hard to say in advance what people are going to consider to be their national interests. You may have read Hans Morganthau's book in which he says: "Let us be guided by the national interest". But when you ask, "What is our interest?", you get into the most heated controversy of our political life. Some say that it is

in our national interest to fight for Chiang Kai-Shek, and others with the same strong conviction say "No." Some say that our vital national interest requires us to defend Western Europe; there are so-called isolationists who object.

It all depends, then, who at a given time has the authority to interpret the national interest. It is not so easy to say in advance whether the French national interest as they may see it will always coincide with our own. We believe that it does. We believe that the French would be blind if they ever failed to see that their national interest requires them to be partners to our alliance against the Soviet Union. But if the French were convinced that they have an even more vital interest to be protected against Germany, then we would be up against a subjective but very real fact.

Therefore, part of every alliance policy consists in convincing other people that they should see their national interest in the way we see it, in convincing them that they are menaced and by the same foe, in convincing them that the alliance is the proper instrument to protect them against this foe. If they refuse to see it this way, little is gained for the alliance policy by accusing the other that he does not see his own national interest correctly. What keeps alliances together is a common conviction that the interests of all are best served by entering into and living up to the alliance.

It deserves to be emphasized that this conviction does not grow out of nothing and that it cannot be left to accident. If a country wants its allies to base their policies on the alliance and its preservation, it must make a continuous effort to associate them with any policies that affect the chances of having to call upon mutual assistance. This means seeking agreement — usually synonymous with compromise — on everything that is done or not done in respect to the common foe; it means struggling incessantly for the formulation of policies that transcend the limited

outlook and purposes of any one country. Especially, the leading nation in a peacetime defensive coalition cannot be relieved from the constant worry and burden of having to make the common purpose and common interest plain at home and abroad. The defense of the country depends on the success of this effort.

If there are pros and cons, then, to any alliance — potential military strength versus risks of unreliability e. g. — it would seem useful to draw up what I suggest be called the balance sheet of any specific alliance. This would serve as a kind of check list for planners or policy-makers, preventing them from seeing only the debit or only the credit side, the pluses or the minuses.

To start with the credit side — an alliance with country A is desirable primarily for the armed strength or strategic advantages country A has to offer for a war with enemy country X. That is the main asset one can expect to gain, so great an asset if reliably pledged that people are inclined to forget the other items on the balance sheet.

There are some other assets which deserve to be taken into account. Sometimes an alliance serves at least to keep another country from allying itself with the foe. The particular country may not be of much use to us, but it might be of great use to the other side. Mr. Churchill in his political and strategic thinking always insisted that Britain try to wean allies away from her enemies. According to him, his reason for favoring a Balkan campaign in 1944 was not to get to Vienna before the Russians, but to induce weaker allies of Germany to break away from her. He advised concentrating on weak allies because they could be most easily pulled out of the enemy coalition and drawn over to the other side. Both in the First and in the Second World War it was his hope that the Allies might be able to get Bulgaria and Yugoslavia to switch sides and that in doing so they might induce Turkey to join them. So one thing one can accomplish with an alliance sometimes is to make sure at least that a country will

remain neutral rather than to go over to the other side. If the alliance does not accomplish anything else, it has served a useful purpose.

There is a third asset which I think one ought not to underestimate. One might call it the propaganda value of alliances. In this age of ours, if one country or coalition can gather a great number of nations and count them on its side, then it appears to represent and can claim to represent the majority of mankind, the "peace-loving world community". It is good to be able to speak for the whole free World, e. g.: This makes for public support; this makes for greater willingness on the part of millions of people to fight with those who represent the cause of mankind against the cause of an evil aggressor.

But, here I think one has to be cautious. If for the sake of propaganda (not using this word in any evil sense), or if to gain strength for one's cause, one were to go out and sign alliances with any country that came along, one might very seriously distort one's strategy; the propaganda value might not compensate for the dangers of such distortion. If we started committing ourselves right and left today, there might not remain much strength for the main purposes of our strategy. Moreover, in most cases one can attain this desired psychological effect without going all the way to actual alliances, as we have defined them.

One does not always have to tie nations to one's cause by mutual assistance pacts. Very often a consultative pact, or a pact of friendship, or merely an arrangement to vote together in the U. N., may achieve the purpose. For the same reason, if some countries remain neutral, militarily speaking, this need not be objectionable from our point of view. They may still be on our side, morally; they may still support our cause. The only thing they are saying is that, for various reasons, they are going to try not to get into the fight. This is not necessarily detrimental to us, particularly if they are weak and vulnerable. After all, we

did fight the Korean War with the moral support of the majority of the nations in the U. N., but we did not get military assistance from many of them. This was not, as some people think, a sign of our weakness. We achieved a great deal by the fact of getting the votes of countries that insisted on remaining neutral. As a matter of fact, I believe one of our significant successes in the Korean War was to have had India willing to vote North Korea an aggressor (in the case of Red China she abstained). That did not mean she was going to fight with us, nor did we have any need of her fighting forces; but it did mean that public sentiment was being mobilized on our side at a time when the Soviet bloc was accusing us of being the aggressor. To have been able to speak for the World Community constituted a very valuable asset for our side. Naturally, more military assistance would have been better. If we could have obtained ten additional divisions from other nations, that would have been better. But if one cannot get that, if they do not possess or are unwilling to commit military forces, one may still be able to gain much from a support that falls far short of what is promised in an actual alliance.

There is a last asset of alliances which is worth mentioning, one that Bismarck emphasized, and he had experience with alliances. That is the ability of an ally to exert some control over his allies, to have some restraining or some activating influence upon his allies. We do not like it when others use alliances to put restraints on us; at the moment, that is one of our difficulties. Most of our allies are scared of what might happen, or of what we might do, so they are always trying to put the brakes on. At times, this may be dangerous; a country might be forced into a policy that looked weak merely because its allies were excessively apprehensive.

But let us not think in terms of one side only. We, too, due to our alliances, can hope to exercise a considerable amount of influence over countries which are allied with us. The main reason for this is that allies offer each other protection — which

may be the only real protection they enjoy — and that this protection can be withdrawn. They know they have got to pay a price for each other's reliability, and for the continuation of protection. This means that without having to blackmail or to use the "big stick", nations may be able to influence their allies into doing much of what they want them to do.

In the last few years, all this country has wanted its allies to do was to make greater sacrifices for preparedness and to coordinate their policies. We have been able to use the alliances to advance preparedness, not sufficiently perhaps, but to a considerable extent. But we may also be in need of putting more restraints on some of our allies. I think in the case of Syngman Rhee we did that rather effectively. The fear that he might run away with the show and start an aggressive war forced us to put restraints on him. That was one case in which we were operating in reverse, so to speak.

But once West Germany becomes our ally, a great deal may depend on our ability to keep Germany in line with a non-provocative, non-aggressive policy if such be the policy we want to pursue. If we do not want to start a war of liberation, it may depend on our ability to influence the Germans whether they can be prevented from making an attempt to free East Germany by force. An alliance is the best means by which one can hope to exercise such restraint, if this is what one wants. Our best argument with the French, today, is that we are not allying ourselves with Germany in order to give Germany the "go" sign so that she can drag us all into a war she might wish to start in the East. On the contrary, we hope to exercise a higher degree of control over her by offering her our assistance. As the leader of the N. A. T. O. coalition, we may be able to moderate the policies of its more impatient or impetuous members while activating the fighting spirit of the more complacent or fearful ones. This ability to influence allied conduct is an asset that must be weighed against the dangers of being too much influenced by one's allies.

This, then, is the "credit" side. Now let me turn to the "debit" side. Obviously, the main debit feature is the promise to help others, the commitment to come to their assistance. Usually, allies are held together by the conviction that the cause and security of one is the cause and security of all. The people who have objected to N. A. T. O. objected on the grounds that we were entangling ourselves in the fights of others. Obviously, if it were not our own security that were at stake in Europe, we would be making tremendous sacrifices in committing ourselves to defend Europe — to defend her possibly on the Elbe or on the Rhine.

It may seem astonishing that the weaker countries should be more upset about this debit item than we are. Why are so many in other countries hesitant about the value of an alliance with the United States? Why is there so much criticism of N. A. T. O. in Europe? Why is a strong group within the British Labor Party opposed to alignment with America? Why do the German Social Democrats campaign against the alliance? Why does India refuse even to consider allying herself with the West?

One would think that for all of them the asset of American protection would count for far more than the risk of having to fight a war in which their interests were not involved. After all, they are closer than we to the Iron Curtain. Many of our diplomats abroad have been thoroughly upset about this paradoxical psychological situation in which countries closer to the enemy seem to be wondering whether they are not risking too much in promising to help us defend ourselves. One man in the Swiss Army was overheard saying to another. "Say, fellow, I think we ought to send some of our divisions to the Elbe to help defend those poor Americans!"

Helping whom? When we defend ourselves on the Elbe, are we not defending the Europeans in the first place? The reason for this paradox lies in the fact that many nations are not

sure whether the best way of preventing a war on the Elbe, or in Asia, is to build up alliances and add to American strength. They are asking: "What if the United States were to start a preventive war? If we add to American strength, will we not encourage such a war as well as becoming involved in it?" That is the chief difficulty with many alliances: fear lest one ally might start a war and therby entangle the others. In the case of our present alliances, it is this fear, primarily, that leads so many people within the weaker countries — and all of our allies are weaker than we are — exposed as we think they are to the Communist and Russian danger, to wonder whether they are entangling themselves in other people's wars by the fact of allying themselves with the United States. Gradually, though, I think we are convincing them: (a) that we are not going to start a war, and (b) that if war comes as a result of Soviet aggression, it is not going to be *our* war but at least as much *their* war.

The second item on the debit side has to do with reliability. In N. A. T. O. we and our allies are constantly aware of the risks of allied unreliability. I do not think that our allies are afraid that we are going to turn 'isolationist', and violate our pledge, but a new element has entered into the picture which has made for hesitation abroad. They are wondering whether even with the best intentions, we can really protect them. What does real protection mean today — that we can help them win? Most of them are convinced that in the end we can help them win, but they are not quite sure whether they want to be liberated after having been conquered, or pulverized with nuclear bombs. They are not quite sure whether they want to be protected if it means that their cities will go up in smoke in the process. The nuclear weapons are causing new hesitation about the value of an "air umbrella" if that is all the ally can provide. Russia's trump card is that she can always point to the cities of our allies, saying "What use are your alliances to you? If you are not going to be conquered in the next war, you are sure to be destroyed anyway".

On our side, the prospects of nuclear warfare are having similar effects. If people begin to think in terms of air strategy only and become hypnotized by the notion of an inter-continental air war, they tend to think that allies are becoming superfluous. If we are going to fight from over here and be fought here at home via the air, territory and forces over on the fringes of Eurasia, that lie between us and our enemy, might become irrelevant. In this sense, then, it can be said that many present-day alliances would become a liability if ever a monistic air strategy should recommend itself. But, when that time comes, a great many other things will have to be liquidated too, including, I presume, this Naval War College!

Another debit element should not be forgotten; we hear it constantly discussed abroad. Alliances may prove provocative. They may provoke the war which they are supposed to prevent. That was what Woodrow Wilson had in mind when he condemned alliances as a cause of war. Alliances may mean open enmity to another country; they line up nations on two opposing sides. Because the enemy sees the build-up of strength, he may decide to move in before it is too late. He might start a war for fear of losing it later.

However, there is this same danger of provocation in armaments. Here, too, armaments and alliances resemble each other, which merely emphasizes the fact that alliances and armaments are but two different instruments of defense, one supplementary to the other, sharing many of the same characteristics. Both mean building up strength against a potential enemy. If one says that alliances are provocative, one must say in the same breath that armaments are provocative. That risk is always involved. It may also sometimes be true that in the balance, nothing is gained by either armaments or alliances because in every race of armaments and alliances, while one side arms or allies itself, the opponent may respond by doing the same. But I do not see how one can escape this vicious circle. One cannot sit back and say:

"If we do nothing, the other side does nothing either". One can only try to use these instruments of defense policy carefully with a view of not provoking counter-measures which the opponent would otherwise not have undertaken.

There was some danger — and there may still be some danger — in an alliance with Germany; it might create fear in the Russian mind that if they let it happen, they might never be able to catch up with us again. If that were the case, they would have a strong incentive to risk war as a means of preventing it. However, I think we can assume that we are strong enough to put a kind of umbrella of deterrence over the build-up of armed strength in Germany. Moreover, the balance of power in the world is not likely to depend on what happens in any single country, even if it be Germany.

There is one more debit item. It is not much use gaining one ally only to lose another as a consequence. And it is certainly no good getting one ally at the price of losing a stronger one. Sometimes an alliance antagonizes other countries to the point where they drop out as prospective allies. This has been our big problem with Germany and France, where it looked as if we might have to choose between one and the other — in this case gaining Germany and thereby losing France. So far, we have been spared this dilemma and a grave dilemma it would be because a French alliance for strategic reasons may be of little use without a German one, and a German one of doubtful value with-a French one.

We have the same problem in Asia; there it plays an even greater role. The hostility between many of our potential allies there poses grave difficulties. Even in her worst hour, Korea did not want Japan to become her ally because she feared being "liberated" by the Japanese at the risk of having them remain in the country. Similarly, at the beginning of the Second World War, the Poles refused to become the allies of Russia because

they did not wish Russian armies to enter their country even as allies, only to take half of it with them when they went home! For similar reasons the Turks remained neutral during the war. They did not want their "friends", the Russians, to enter Constantinople to help drive out the Germans. Would they not stay in Constantinople for good? There is such a thing, then, as the fear of certain potential allies.

We are always making a choice when we ally ourselves with a particular country. We choose one at the risk of losing others. The alliance with Franco Spain looked dangerous for a while because it seriously antagonized some of our best friends. But we moved slowly enough so that in the end we did not lose any ally. Again, our recent alignment with Tito was objected to by certain circles in some countries; it looked as if it might endanger our alliances with Italy. Fortunately, that too, has not happened. If an alliance with the Arab countries were ever to materialize, it will be difficult not to antagonize Israel, who may be stronger, militarily, than her neighbors.

I believe I have listed the chief items that make up the balance sheet. There is no way of weighing them against each other in any precise or mathematical way. It is a matter of statesmanship by the help of rational estimates of the various items to judge whether in any specific case the balance comes out with a plus or a minus. The basis of any rational alliance policy must be a calculation that takes all items into consideration.

The first move in any alliance policy consists in discovering which countries are desirable allies. Having sorted out the countries, some as being a pure drain on one's strength, some as being of so little military value that their neutralization is sufficient (not to worry too much about them except to keep them from going over to the enemy), some as being essential as allies and therefore worth great sacrifices, one can proceed to work out an effective alliance policy. This indicates that it would make

little sense to say: "We have got an alliance in Europe. Therefore, we have got to have one in Southeast Asia, too". Every case is different. If there are no military forces there, or if the debit side were too great there for other reasons, the situation would have to be handled differently.

Having chosen and gained allies, the second big issue in alliance policy is making the alliances effective. That means, among other things, giving one's allies military strength without draining one's own strength by more than one adds to theirs. More may depend on whether one succeeds in making alliances reliable. This is a psychological problem. I think we should talk less about psychological warfare and more about the need for a psychological friendship policy — which usually will not take the form of propaganda but of cooperation, of patience, and mediation among allies, and of all the efforts one can make to prove to one's allies that the common interest is dictating one's course of action. Such friendship policy should be an essential part of our diplomacy today. When our allies become troublesome, we are apt to get angry and things are said that endanger our alliances. As a rule, one cannot coerce one's allies. One cannot even put very much pressure on them (at least, not openly) without creating the kind of bitterness and fear that endangers the reliability of the alliance.

However, if coercion or pressure does not go far with allies wooing them and running after them is not likely to be helpful either. It is dangerous to give the impression that one has become absolutely dependent on one's alliances. This opens the door to all kinds of blackmail. I would not like to see our European allies believe that we had become utterly dependent on them while they remained convinced that they had a triple choice between an alliance with us, neutrality, and a deal with the Soviets. It should always remain clear that while we place great stock in our alliances and have no intention to let our allies down, we could survive, if need be, without them though at a terrible price.

And when it comes to making deals with the Soviets, we, after all, are by all odds in the best bargaining position. Others are inclined to forget this because we tend to give the impression of being absolutely inflexible in our attitude toward the Soviets.

Generally, then, alliance policy places great demands on the policy-makers and the public. Even if a judicious choice of allies has been made and one's own strength has been adequately supplemented by promises of military assistance, the struggle to keep the alliance intact and reliable must necessarily continue. But it is worth the sacrifices, and many painful compromises, if the additional defensive strength promises to deter the enemy, or to defeat him if war comes. Even if a go-it-alone policy were within the capabilities of a mighty country, the chances are that the price it would have to pay for pursuing such a policy successfully and in the face of grave danger would far outweigh the costs, the annoyances, and the risks of alliances, provided they rest on common interest, strong conviction and all-round ability to sustain an adequate common defense effort.

BIOGRAPHIC SKETCH

Professor Arnold O. Wolfers

Professor Wolfers was born in St. Gall, Switzerland in 1892. He received a Doctor of Law (JUD) degree from Zurich in 1917 and a Ph. D. degree from Giessen in 1924. He practiced law in Switzerland from 1917 to 1919.

Prior to coming to the United States, he was Assistant Professor of Economics at University of Berlin from 1929 to 1933 as well as Director of the Hochschule fur Politik in Berlin from 1930 to 1933. He has been Professor of International Relations at Yale University since 1935 and he was Master of Pierson College, Yale, during the period of 1935-1949.

During World War II, he was a Special Advisor and Lecturer at the School of Military Government, Charlottesville, Virginia from 1942 to 1944. At the same time, he was Expert Consultant, Office of Provost Martial General in Washington, D. C. The following year he acted as Consultant in the Office of Strategic Services.

During 1946, Professor Wolfers was a member of the Resident Faculty at the National War College. Since 1953, he has been President of the World Peace Foundation.

He has written several books and articles on law, economics and international relations, including *Britain and France Between Two Wars.*

THE CAUSE OF WAR

A lecture delivered
at the Naval War College
on 11 October 1954 by
Professor William A. Reitzel

I was given a firm directive about this lecture. I was to give the subject — *The Cause of War* — a broad-brush treatment, to use the philosophical approach.

This blocked all the easy openings. You can't be philosophical and flippant at the same time. You couldn't, for example, say that the only war with a sensible cause was the Trojan War, since it was about a woman. So what you are going to get is a straight dive into cold water.

The jump-off had better be a look at the extent to which the subject of war and its causes has been cluttered up by partial explanations — all of them laid on weak foundations — and built with strong conviction. A quick run through the literature gives you the following (Refer to Plate 1): Theory Number 1 is the biological, survival of fittest theory — favorite of scientific popularizers; Number 2 is the sociological-anthropological theory — more fashionable at the present time — also Marxist and historical determinism; The third is the classical political explanation — the recurring historical thesis; Number 4 is the long-standing favorite of all democratic societies.

Or, take the case of a much more elaborate analysis — Turner's "Five General Sources of War" (Refer to Plate 2):

> "This is a painstaking effort. It doesn't get get us beyond a mere list of sources of dispute and areas of conflict in human affairs. As a basis for talking about the Cause of War, it is about the same as saying that 'Boys will be boys'; or that the Mexican War was caused by the existence of Mexicans."

WARS OCCUR BECAUSE

1. Man is a fighting animal

2. Economic and social tensions between groups

3. Only means of settling disputes between states

4. Good and simple Man is led astray by self-interested Rulers -- Kings, Business Men, Munitions Makers, Military Minds, etc.

Plate 1

TURNER'S

FIVE GENERAL SOURCES OF WAR

1. ECONOMIC -- quarrels over territory, trade, fiscal affairs, communication routes.

2. DYNASTIC -- disputes over hereditary claims, rights of succession.

3. RELIGION -- forms of worship, conscientious devotion, fanaticism, intolerance, non-religious concepts.

4. NATIONALISM-- clashes of racial and group pride, envy, jealousy, traditions, patriotism.

5. SENTIMENTAL-- actions in terms of aspirations, sympathy, sense of right, longing for emancipation.

Plate 2

By jumping back and forth among lists such as these, men have been able to develop almost any theory of the cause of war that suited their taste; and, of course, have been able to show conclusively that a particular war supported the theory.

But this is not good enough for a philosophical lecture on *The Cause of War.*

Even more important, it is not good enough for your purposes at the Naval War College. For those purposes, what is said about the cause of war should be useful in making better judgments about the potential for war in a given set of circumstances.

So I want to start more or less from scratch — and I propose to move by the following steps:

First — I want to try to get the problem stated so that it can be examined profitably.

Second — I want to single out some aspects of the problem for separate analysis.

Finally — I want to see if the analysis can be applied to the present state of international relations.

To start with the statement of the problem: It seems to me safe to say that relations between human beings — whether in small or large, whether in loose or tightly organized groups — range back and forth through a spectrum of behaviors: (See Plate 3)

Between Peaceful Cooperation and Conflict, you could introduce a further range — controversy, dispute, etc.

Between Conflict and War, you could similarly introduce a further range — threats of force, show of force, incidents, border skirmishes, etc.



Plate 3

Each of these represents a normal pattern. None is mutually exclusive. Peaceful Cooperation is shot through with Conflict. Conflict can build up to War, or be dispersed into Peace. Even War can be marked by considerable areas of cooperation. Neither the British nor Napoleon took too stern a view of trading with the enemy. These patterns do, however, differ considerably in their degree of incidence in human relations — with Peaceful Cooperation probably the most characteristic and the most frequent.

We are consequently looking at a problem in which behavior is ranged on a scale, and in which one pattern of behavior is alway dissolving into another. The statement of the problem that, to me, best reflects this fluidity in human affairs is:

> Why, and under what conditions, does the normal human behavior of Peaceful Cooperation shift to the equally normal human activity of War?

I have a definite purpose in mind in putting the question in this way. I want to emphasize that we are talking about *relatives* and not *absolutes*. We are talking about human behavior and not about a mechanically operating system of cause and effect. Therefore, the question has been phrased to focus attention on the search for the conditions under which Peaceful Cooperation diminishes and Conflicts accumulate momentum and are likely to give rise to War.

Just about twenty-five years ago, I took part as an observer in a study of the social life of apes and monkeys. The London Zoo had just set up "Monkey Hill" — an area of about three acres, in which some 150 baboons, male, female, old, young, were allowed to run completely wild; and observers stood four-hour watches and kept full notes of what happened and why.

I'll give you the end of the story before I sort out the significant details. The end of the story was that "Monkey Hill" quickly became so bloody a shambles that it had to be closed to the public view.

In detail this is what took place:

The natural colony shaped itself into a number of families — an old male, several females with their young, and unattached bachelors. These families lived together in an unstable equilibrium, equally marked by cooperation and tolerance and by daily small scuffles about food and about which males should dominate in the various families. Behavior fluctuated between peaceful cooperation and limited conflict for small objectives.

Only rarely — at intervals of weeks or even months — did small conflicts become infectious and end up in a struggle involving the whole group.

Obviously, the point of interest here was: What happened to push the conflict beyond the point where the group could not revert to peaceful cooperation, but was drawn on into increasing tension until general fighting became the only release — the only means — of achieving a new equilibrium?

Every serious fight started when a female became unattached — that is, when the family control of an old male ceased to be undisputed. It usually began in a simple characteristic scuffle between two males for the possession of the female. The preoccupation of the two males gave openings for other males to try to snatch momentarily unguarded females. Thus the number of scuffles multiplied rapidly, and, as they multiplied, the agitation, excitability, and latent individual aggression in the colony reached higher and higher levels of intensity. The equilibrium of the group became more and more unstable until suddenly the entire community was in violent and chaotic motion.

However, evidences of a new equilibrium gradually began to show. For one thing, the female, around whom the tension had originally started to build up, had literally disappeared from the scene — usually by being pulled to pieces during the fight. Universal violence started to fall off, drifting through a diminishing

series of more and more individualized scuffles, until the colony finally settled down in a new state of balance. Females and bachelors were once more distributed around a limited number of dominant male family heads. A period of peace and tolerance, punctuated by normal daily small disputes, then followed.

Analogies between the behavior of animal groups and human societies have been very cheerfully drawn by any number of writers to the effect that humans, like animals, are always at loggerheads. I am personally dubious about the validity of these analogies. They are all too obvious. The evidence from "Monkey Hill" was much too inconclusive to justify a quick jump from relatively simple baboon circumstances to infinitely complicated human circumstances.

Nevertheless, "Monkey Hill" does throw some light that is relevant to our discussion. The evidence does suggest that the state of equilibrium of a group has a great deal to do with its behavior pattern. Let me summarize:

1. The equilibrium of any social group, whether a small tribe or a modern nation, or an international community of nation-states, is *unstable.*
2. Equilibrium is dependent upon the mutual reactions of all the members of the group. Changes in relation — in status, from decline in strength, from extinction, or merely from change of heart, for no matter what reason — upsets the balance.
3. The climax of the process of adjusting to change and of finding a new equilibrium provides the conditions under which normal conflict gathers force and can become the lead into widespread violence of behavior, or, as we humans call it, War.

This is very different from saying that wars are caused by the fighting nature of man; or by social tensions, greed, com-

petitiveness, and economic disputes. It suggests instead that there is a range of possible social behaviors always available, and that it is *only under special conditions* that the pattern called 'War' can be expected to dominate.

This does not mean the absence of conflict. Grounds of dispute and, hence, of actual conflict, are always present. But the conflicts are resolved at a low level of tension. They do not — by their mere existence — upset the general equilibrium of the community. Conflict becomes significant only if — and when — other forces combine to upset the general equilibrium. Then — and then only — does conflict build up to higher and higher levels of tension.

Let's backtrack for a minute and come at the matter from another angle. Let's move from "Monkey Hill" to human communities.

One line of evidence suggests that there is no great difference between the two. In the case of the BOUNTY mutineers, for example, twenty-six people landed on Pitcairn Island: nine British males, six native males, and eleven native females. The original equilibrium of this group lasted for about twelve months. Then it broke down. A new equilibrium was not reached for nine years. The inhabitants of Pitcairn Island then were one British male, nine women, and twenty-four children. This picture of human behavior is accurate enough as far as it goes — but it is incomplete, one-sided, and, hence, misleading.

Another line of evidence shows that human beings come together in organized groups. These groups are marked by a high capacity for internal peaceful cooperation. This capacity creates a climate in which ethical values and moral codes develop; and a fundamental difference from animal groups appears. Within the organized human group War is a rare occurrence. The prevailing pattern is Peace, intermixed with individualized conflict at a low level of tension. A value called "the common good" is developed

and is culturally transmitted. The force available to the group is applied through rules and institutions by government to the maintenance of internal peace, and to the protection of the group's equilibrium.

This gives you another accurate, but one-sided and misleading, picture. It is the picture, incidentally, that provides the basis of proposals for world government, proposals that envisage the extension of the area of controlled and institutionalized cooperation to the confines of the globe.

However, we don't get a complete and workable picture of human societies until we fit these two lines of evidence together. History tends to show that there is little in the concept of "the common good" that extends beyond a single group. Certainly not enough to check the use of force by one group against another.

On the contrary, there is much in the international community to encourage the use of force in this way. Although the individual potential for conflict is checked within a group, it remains very much alive and is available for use at levels of dispute and conflict between groups.

The observation that a baboon community normally operates in terms of an unstable equilibrium, in which an interplay of peaceful cooperation and low tension conflict is characteristic, can be repeated for human communities. And it can most emphatically be repeated for the modern international community whose members are nation-states. We must, therefore, keep a firm grip on the concept of a spectrum of possible behaviors — and on the picture of one pattern of behavior always ready to dissolve into another if — and when — conditions are right.

In this view, economic disputes, territorial quarrels, class conflicts, competing nationalisms, ideological differences become grounds for conflict. By themselves they do not constitute causes of wars. The cause of war lies in a general breakdown, for what-

ever reason, of an unstable social equilibrium. Under this condition, the transition from conflict to war can — and often does — take place. The transition, however, is not a simple chain of cause and effect. It is rather a dynamic accumulation of mutually interacting factors; and its product is a fundamental and organic change in the pattern of group behavior.

Actually, the shift from a pattern of conflict to a pattern of war has never been an easy one to make. As I said, it involves a fundamental and organic change in the behavior of a group.

The simplest way of accounting for this difficulty is to say that conflict is so customary an aspect of human and group relations that the techniques of dealing with it are built into human and group behaviors and operate almost automatically. But war, in contrast, is a highly specialized form of group activity — particularly so in the modern world. It requires anticipation, organized preparation, and organized maintenance. Even for relatively primitive social groups, war was differentiated from conflict by these requirements. At a minimum, weapons had to be made and stored, food stocks had to be accumulated out of small surpluses, the maintenance of special fighting men had to be organized. For complex modern societies, the equivalent of these requirements calls for such profound and comprehensive modifications in the structure and operation of a society that the deliberate shift to a state of war involves an extreme form of decision.

Modern conditions may have made the shift to war more difficult. But this does not mean that they have in the least reduced the incidence of Conflict in group relations. On the contrary, modern conditions tend to multiply the grounds of conflict and to intensify particular disputes simply because of the increased difficulty of using war to resolve accumulated conflict.

Nor has the growing interdependence of human societies increased the potential for peaceful cooperation. On the contrary, the sense of dependence involved has given rise to fears of ex-

ternal control and to policies of self-sufficiency. Regardless of what your personal experiences may have been, increased ease of communication has emphasized cultural differences and stimulated defensive attitudes in national cultures — thus furnishing additional grounds of conflict. International organizations have neither resolved conflict nor extended the areas of peaceful cooperation. They have merely provided new channels for the operation of whatever potential pattern of behavior predominates.

I hope that by this time our original question — Why do peaceful forms of behavior slide over into conflict and into war? — has taken on a depth of meaning that it may not have had at the start.

With this hope, I now want to move to the second stage of my talk and examine separately some aspects of the problem. I have singled out three: The Function of War, The Limits of Peaceful Cooperation, and The Changing Role of Conflict in the present international community.

The Function of War

If the behavior called "War" is to be distinguished from the behavior called "Conflict," it will be in terms of the degree of anticipation, planned preparation, and organized conduct that war implies. It was on this basis that the anthropologist Malinowski defined war as — "the use of organized force between two politically independent units in the pursuit of tribal purposes"; adding that, in this sense, "war entered fairly late into the development of human societies."

Historically, war has served a real function in the relation of states. This function has been differently understood at different times and places. Clausewitz thought of it as a method for continuing state policy, to be used when other methods became ineffective. Walter Lippmann, at one time in his life, regarded it as one of the ways "by which great human decisions were made."

Quincy Wright suggests that it was a method of violent adjustment, "used for achieving major political changes." And, according to the great imperialist states, the function of war in international society was to extend the range of law and order and to control conflict — not unlike the police function in a national society.

These ends were undoubtedly valid and the means useful when conditions made it relatively simple to move from conflict to war.

It is possible, however, that these purposes — useful and perhaps even rational in their time and place — can no longer be served by war. The technological and organizational requirements of modern war, and the obviously cataclysmic nature of its end product, may have made it virtually impossible for war as a pattern of behavior to function in international society as former wars have admittedly done. Sir John Slessor, in a recent article, even hazards a guess that "war — in the sense of total world war — has abolished itself as a practical instrument of policy." Yet nations must still settle disputes, make adjustments in their relations, and develop an equilibrium. Is it possible that these requirements are being met in terms of conflict? If so, then a new look must be taken at the meaning and character of conflict in contemporary state relations.

Peaceful Cooperation

Before we take this new look at Conflict, however, I want to say something more about the potential for Peaceful Cooperation.

I have no intention here of ending up with an impassioned vision of the universal calm that would follow if only . . . . I simply want to call attention to the operation and limitations of this pattern of behavior.

Admittedly, a potential for peaceful cooperation underlies all organized societies. It has made possible the establishment and

maintenance of large areas of law and order in the world. It has made it possible for human groups to develop techniques for resolving conflict and adjusting to change within a nation — electoral processes, constitutional checks and balances, the cultural transmission of the idea of "a common good," and the police function of government. These techniques, however, have not yet become applicable on a global scale to the international community.

While there were grounds for trying to construct international institutions on the assumption that the potential for peaceful cooperation was increasing, no one of these institutions — neither the League of Nations nor the United Nations — really provided states with the political means of settling disputes, of modifying the *status quo*, or of adjusting relations.

In fact, the international machinery either operated to *preserve* the *status quo* — as in the League of Nations — or involved a concept of *major power policing* — as in the United Nations. And both institutions assumed that Conflict and War differed only in degree, and that Peaceful Cooperation required the complete elimination of War and the drastic control of Conflict.

However, it would be off the beam to conclude that the international community does not contain at least the same potential for peaceful cooperation as any other human grouping. While this potential is obviously at a minimum at the present time, it would be politically ignorant to assume its nonexistence.

A New Look at Conflict

I have suggested three things. First, that modern conditions may make it very difficult for states to shift to that pattern of behavior called "War." Second, that the potential for peaceful cooperation in state relations is, and may continue for a long time to be, at an extremely low ebb. Third, that the grounds for conflict in state relations have multiplied rather than diminished, while the techniques for controlling conflict between states and

keeping it within bounds — as conflict is continually being resolved within the confines of individual states — do not exist. Yet, the functions of resolution, settlement, adjustment, and search for equilibrium — formerly served by war, but not so served in the 20th century — are as essential as ever to the conduct of human relations.

My sociological and political guess is that, within the framework of threats of war — atomic weapons, massive retaliation, armed forces in being, etc. — these essential functions are now being increasingly served by the pattern of behavior called "Conflict."

There are some straws in the wind that support this guess. For one thing, the multiplication of conflict has not led inevitably to a raising of the level of tension in state relations. For another thing, the increasing use of force in conection with conflict has not automatically triggered off a state of war. For still another thing, a heightened capacity to adjust psychologically to conflict has become apparent — the absence of settlement no longer leads so quickly to widespread feelings of frustration or to a sense of being boxed in by inconclusiveness. The tolerance of conflict in state relations has definitely increased. The term "Cold War" — although misleading in many respects — is a reflection of this acceptance of conflict as normal.

However, this acceptance of conflict as something to be expected and lived with has not yet been accompanied by a better understanding of the role at Conflict in group relations. We speak of "Cold War" turning into "Hot War" as if the progression from one to the other were automatic and inevitable. Of course, "Cold War" can be replaced by "Hot War"; but only if other factors come into the situation and only if a positive act of decision is made by somebody. We continue to think — unrealistically, in my view — of Conflict and Peaceful Cooperation as mutually exclusive terms. We speak of eliminating Conflict as if this were essential

to the expansion of the potential for Peaceful Cooperation; and, as if it were possible to eliminate Conflict without eliminating life.

My point here would be that we are not confronted by exclusive absolutes in Peace, Conflict, War. We can behave peacefully and still have conflict. We can engage in round after round of conflict without reaching the level of tension that would make us go in for organized war. Instead of exclusive absolutes, I suggest that we are confronted — as all human societies have been confronted — by a range of potential behaviors, all of which are inherent in human relations; and that what we should be concerned with are the conditions — the factors — by which one potential rather than another can become relatively predominant. To think in absolute catagories and to plan national action in terms of absolutes seems to me to lead to unrealism, to misdirected effort, and perhaps to failure. To formulate national objectives, policies, and strategies on any such basis is, I suspect, to cut a pretty poor figure in the modern world.

Now let's take a look at this modern world. But, before doing so, let's summarize where we've got to in this analysis. (Refer to Plate 4).

The Modern World

It is important to remember that the international community of the 20th century has some unique features. It is the first "closed" community in history — in the sense that it is coextensive with the globe. This means that all states, all human groups, are now, whether they like it or not, members of this "closed" system. One and all are locked in a tight relationship — for the very simple reason that there is nowhere else for them to go. Yet, the structure of this community and the relative status of its members is pure historical accident. It became "closed" at a moment in history when a long-standing hierarchy of power, with Great Britain at the summit, was just starting to be sub-

MAIN POINTS SUMMARIZED

1. Co-operation, Conflict, and War are interlocking patterns of behavior.

2. The state of Equilibrium of a Community determines which of these patterns will prevail at a given time.

3. A social Equilibrium is always unstable: its maintenance depends on constant mutual adjustments among members.

4. Co-operation does not create an Equilibrium: it merely works to preserve an existing one.

5. Conflict does not destroy an Equilibrium: nor does it inevitably preclude the development of a new one.

6. War does not lead to a new Equilibrium: it merely sets the stage for one to develop.

jected to undermining trends. Thus, its equilibrium as a community was highly unstable from the start.

Yet, this community had a surface appearance of extreme stability. It had a world-wide fiscal, trading and communications system. It was under widespread and effective political controls. Its potential for peaceful cooperation seemed to be steadily expanding.

Actually, however, its potential for conflict was higher. The political and psychological conditions that favored aggressive behavior were widely present. There were wide disparities with respect to the distribution of the community's resources and there were large gaps in the levels of aspiration and achievement of its members.

At the same time, there was nothing in the past experience of its members to suggest that these disparities could not be modified by war — that is, to suggest that the ends that war had served in preceding centuries could not be equally served by war in the 20th. It was in this context that the steps were taken by which states moved from conflict into the First World War.

However, there were surprises at hand. The totality of war in the 20th century was revealed. The organic effect of technology and organization on state behavior was revealed. The fundamental unbalance of the international community was exposed.

In contrast, the Second World War was moved into in a different way. There is little doubt that the Axis Powers effectively analyzed the meaning of the surprises of World War I. There is equally little doubt that they drew the wrong conclusions from the evidence. They concluded that war could still be made to serve its historical functions if only it were planned, prepared for, and executed more efficiently — and if conflict was deliberately created and manipulated so as to lead into war at a moment and under conditions of their own choosing.

However, in spite of these differences, let me remind you that neither the First nor the Second World Wars provided the basis for a new equilibrium in the international community. Consequently, instead of state relations sliding back from war — through diminishing areas of conflict — to equilibrium and peace, the potential for conflict remained high and tensions rapidly built up again. This was the situation on which German, Italian, and Japanese policy fattened between the wars and on which Soviet policy has thrived since World War II.

The international community is still, therefore, in a condition of fundamental unbalance. The hierarchy of power that the 20th century inherited from the 19th has progressively disintegrated and there is no sign as yet of what the basis of a new equilibrium will be.

Furthermore, the number of dissatisfied states in the international community has increased. These states are not all dissatisfied for the same reasons; nor do they seek satisfaction by anything resembling uniform and coordinated action. Nevertheless, the sum total of the impact of their discontents on the international community is to multiply points of conflict within the community and to impede the development of a new equilibrium.

Yet, no one state — and perhaps even no group of states — is in a political-economic-psychological-military position to impose by war, and to police by force, the equilibrium that it desires.

It is interesting to note that although the pattern of behavior called "Conflict" has steadily increased in scope and intensity through the first half of the century, yet, during the last decade, the pattern has not shifted significantly towards either war or peace. There is evidence to support the idea that Conflict — as a form of state action — may gradually be coming to serve many of the purposes that War formerly served in the relations of states.

One of these pieces of evidence is the fact that force has become increasingly a feature of conflict. In the case of Korea, force was highly organized — organized up to a level formerly associated with war. Yet in general we thought, spoke and acted as if this was plainly not THE WAR. Similar, though not so striking, illustrations can be brought from all quarters of the globe.

There is reason for this growing tolerance of and adaption to conflict. When the disequilibrium of a community is universal, the degree of force needed to clear the way for a new equilibrium is impossible to determine. This difficulty, however, is not so clearly felt in connection with conflict. Here, the ends are limited and localized, and the time span is short. Thus, small adjustments can be sought, aspirations partially satisfied, changes in status partially brought about, and momentary equilibriums achieved.

While it is true that, within a "closed" community, conflicts tend to get interlocked and to infcct the entire community with violent motion — don't forget that "Monkey Hill" was a "closed" community — this still does not lead inevitably to war in a human community. Certain key conditions must be present in the situation before this takes place.

These conditions sometimes arise from circumstances over which no group has control — population pressures, technical innovation, etc. Sometimes they are developed by design and as a matter of policy. Sometimes they appear simply because a state officially says, or a national group firmly feels, that they are present — that is, that vital interests, basic security, or fundamental values are threatened.

The implications of this picture of multiplied and intensified conflict would not be complete, however, without a reminder that the Axis powers deliberately and as a matter of policy forced a shift from conflict to war in the '30s. This memory is part of our recent experience; and our reading of the current situation

is undoubtedly conditioned by it. A key question, therefore, is whether or not we are confronted now, in Soviet policy, by a similar deliberate manipulation of conflict towards war.

We should not accept a ready, one-shot answer to this question. It is only too easy to misjudge a pattern of conflict and to call it war. Far too many of the present grounds of conflict in the international community would be present and active irrespective of whether relations between the United States and the Soviet Union were good or bad. Many of the present grounds of conflict between communist and other political groups would continue to exist if the United States and the Soviet Union were both to become completely isolationist. Even some of the present grounds of conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union would undergo a considerable reduction in intensity if they were to become disengaged from conflicts that have little basic interest for either state.

The initial approach to this question — and, at the broad level of this lecture, no more than this initial approach can be attempted — is to admit that the assumptions on which the one-shot answers rest can neither be proved nor disproved. Therefore, more evidence has to be looked for; or, better ways of thinking about the available evidence must be developed.

Since I do not expect the evidence quickly to become more positive either way, I am more concerned with better ways of thinking about the evidence we have. I know that the design of your work here is aimed at the same target. So I confine myself to a moderate and very tentative suggestion. It is that we habituate our thinking to the concept of an indefinite period of conflict-behavior between states; and that we avoid focusing our thinking too exclusively on war-behavior.

I can see advantages from the point of view of American policies and strategies in cultivating this habit. A developed sense

of the character, relative intensity, and uses of conflict gives one the means of avoiding exaggerated responses to its incidence. An ability to judge whether or not conflict is increasing or diminishing in intensity, whether or not more and more grounds of dispute are being drawn into a large and coherent field of conflict, enables one to phase one's participation in conflict with more accuracy and economy. A rational tolerance of conflict for what it is — a relatively low level of tension in human affairs — puts one in a better position to judge the significance of particular conflicts and to measure one's interest and design one's actions accordingly.

To observe situations from this point of view, to interpret events and prepare positions in this context, and to act readily and with economy of means in a conflict situation, does not interfere with proper attention to the contingency that conflict may sharpen into war. Nor — and this is equally important to the long-run national interest — does it foreclose on the contingency that conflict may lead to realistic adjustments in the international community and thus to a reduction of the existing checks on the potential for peaceful cooperation.

IN CONCLUSION:

There is always a real danger in a lecture like this one — a broad, philosophical aproach to a problem of human behavior. It is that it will come to nothing more than a fooling with words. I have been conscious of this danger throughout. I have continually kept in mind Winston Churchill's minute to the Chiefs of Staff Committee:

> "Headquarters seem to be getting more than ever 'sicklied o'er with the pale cast of thought.' It is quite right for Planning Staffs to explore mentally all possible hypotheses, but human affairs are simpler than that."

And yet, even with such a warning before me, I can not be sure that the danger has been avoided.

The only real test lies in whether or not the intellectual distinctions that have been made are valuable when they are put to use. Then — and then only — will it be known whether a more effective tool has been found for dealing with the realities of contemporary state relations; or, whether one more word game has been put on the market.

Naturally, I think that the suggestions I have thrown out — not dogmas or the final answers, but *suggestions* — will stand up moderately well to the test of use. I have a basis for this conviction. It is — that to see human relations as taking place fluidly within a range of potential behaviors is more likely to lead to appropriate national action than to see human relations in terms of absolutes called Peace, or Conflict, or War.

BIOGRAPHIC SKETCH

Professor William A. Reitzel

Professor Reitzel was born in Steelton, Pennsylvania in 1901. He received his education at Haverford College and at New College, Oxford, England.

He was Professor of English at Haverford College from 1926 to 1940 and Director, Historical Society of Pennsylvania from 1940 to 1942. In 1942 he entered the U. S. Navy and subsequently served with the U. S. Naval Forces Europe, Staff of Allied Naval Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, Psychological Warfare Section of U. S. Naval Forces Europe, Staff of Commander U. S. Eighth Fleet and the Staff of Commander U. S. Naval Forces Germany. He attained the rank of Commander, USNR, before leaving the Navy in 1947 to become Assistant Director, Yale Institute of International Studies.

During 1948-1950 he was in the Government Service. Since that time he has been Senior Staff Member, Brookings Institution and since 1952 he has also served as Professor of Social Science, Haverford College. At present, he is occupying the Chester W. Nimitz Chair of Social and Political Philosophy at the Naval War College.

In addition to acting as Editor, *Major Problems in U. S. Foreign Policy*, Professor Reitzel has carried out historical and economic studies of the industrial revolution in Great Britain. He wrote *The United States in the Mediterranean* (1947) and *Foreign Information and Publicity* (1948) for the Yale Institute, Foreign Affairs and Policy Studies. He is also author of *The Mediterranean, Its Role in United States Foreign Policy* (1948).

RECOMMENDED READING

The evaluation of books listed below include those recommended to resident students of the Naval War College. Officers in the fleet and elsewhere may find these of interest.

The listings herein should not be construed as an endorsement by the Naval War College; they are indicated only on the basis of interesting reading matter.

Many of these publications may be found in ship and station libraries. Some of the publications not available from these sources may be obtained from the Bureau of Naval Personnel Auxiliary Library Service, where a collection of books is available for loan to individual officers. Requests for the loan of these books should be made by the individual to the nearest branch of the Chief of Naval Personnel. (See Article C-9604, Bureau of Naval Personnel Manual, 1948).

Title: *The Requirements of Deterrence.* 23 p.

Author: Kaufman, William W. Princeton, The Center of International Studies, Princeton University, 1954.

Evaluation: A critical analysis of United States reliance on the doctrine of "massive retaliation." Concludes that massive retaliation, as presently formulated, is neither feasible nor desirable as a policy of deterrence. Further, it cannot be made feasible because of its lack of credibility, as shown by the present Administration's lack of unanimity in interpreting the policy, the past actions of the United States, and the state of public opinion. Suggests that a proper role for a doctrine of massive retaliation, within a policy of deterrence, would be a limited and specialized one, reserved for contingencies of the last resort. A well-developed, thought-provoking discussion when sound strategic principles may not be susceptible to practice. Recommended as an example of analytical consideration of strategic principles.

Title: *Civilization and Foreign Policy.* 277 p.

Author: Halle, Louis J. N. Y., Harper & Bros., 1955.

Evaluation: The subtitle, "An Inquiry for Americans," constitutes an accurate description of this book's contents. Beginning with an examination of the need for a foreign policy, the remainder of the book goes into an analysis of the world as it is and of the relationship of the U. S. to that world. The meaning and limitations of "power," the nature of the challenge, and the possibilities of various policies are discussed in this context. There are no definitive, positive answers developed, but instead a method of thinking about our problems which will not lead to erroneous answers. The book is interesting, illuminating and stimulating. Recommended reading as an introduction to the general fields of foreign policy and of communism as a world force.

Title: *Foreign Economic Policy for the United States.* 83 p.

Author: Randall, Clarence B. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1954.

Evaluation: A succinct description of international trade as it is today, with attention focused on United States foreign economic policy toward its allies and the communist world and the effect of existing policies on the future economic welfare and the security of the United States.

Title: *Commando Extraordinary.* 226 p.

Author: Foley, Charles. N. Y., Longmans, Green, 1954.

Evaluation: The first fourteen chapters are devoted to the exploits of Otto Skorzeny, German Commando leader, during World War II; the remaining three discuss the highlights of the British Commandos and how an enterprising nation with adventurous young manhood can advantageously employ strategic assault troops. The main thesis seems to be concern that Britain and the U. S. profit by the examples of the past war and apply the lessons learned in the use of strategic assault troops to any future war. The book implies that strategic assault troops can, utilize air, sea and land facilities, weapons and techniques, in some ways, more economically and more efficacious than presently organized regular units. The author believes that such troops must report to the top military or political leader, to enable them to secure the proper backing and support. He also brings into focus, by means

of the war crime trial of Skorzeny, the present confused state of international law as regards the successful attainment of war objectives. It is definitely recommended reading for all student officers to stimulate reflective type of thinking.

Title: *The Middle East.* 311 p.

Author: Hoskins, Halford L. N. Y., Macmillan Co., 1954.

Evaluation: A short history of the Middle East and a penetrating analysis of the strategic problems of this critical area of the globe. The author speaks with a voice reinforced with thirty years of study, research and personal travel in this area of the world. Concerned chiefly with facts, nevertheless there is sufficient authoritative analysis to lend interest and credibility to the work.

Title: *Defense and National Security.* 192 p. 1955.

Author: Marx, Herbert L., Jr. N. Y., H. W. Wilson Co.,

Evaluation: This volume is intended to present a full discussion of the "new look" in military defense, with the necessary background to understand it. Following the usual pattern of "The Reference Shelf" publications, of which this is one, the volume is devoted to articles and speeches by persons of authority or recognized ability, with the editor merely piecing them together. Included are the more important pronouncements of President Eisenhower, Secretary Dulles, Admiral Radford, Mr. George Kennan, Secretary Wilson, and others (since 1953) concerning the framework for our nationl defense policies, and our uniting with others against aggression. Commentary pro and con from leading periodicals is included to indicate reaction to policy pronouncements. No conclusions or recommendations are made.

PERIODICALS

Title: *The Decline of Western Democracy.*

Author: Lippmann, Walter.

Publication: THE ATLANTIC, February, 1955, p. 29-36.

Annotation: The first of three excerpts from the author's forthcoming book, *The Public Philosophy*, in which he analyzes the devitalization of the governing power of democratic states.

Title: *Who Sa ·mpossible?*

Author: Reinhar G. C., Colonel, U. S. A. (Ret.).

Publication: MARINE CORPS GAZETTE, January, 1955, p. 11-16.

Annotation: The author, now a consultant to the Rand Corporation and author of many articles on strategy and tactics in the atomic age, describes a method of continuing our unbroken series of amphibious victories. This article has special interest for those studying future naval operations. Modern weapons, strategy, and tactics are discussed. Atomic warfare and amphibious operations are found to be compatible.

Title: *The Future of Germany.*

Author: Conant, James B.

Publication: VITAL SPEECHES OF THE DAY, January 1, 1955, p. 932-937.

Annotation: Describes the significance of recent developments, especially the Paris agreements, on the future of Germany.

Title: *We Can Baffle The Brainwashers.*

Author: Gallery, D. V., Rear Admiral, U. S. N.

Publication: THE SATURDAY EVENING POST, January 22, 1955, p. 20-21, 94-95, 98.

Annotation: Discusses the Communist technique of brainwashing and urges that in the future U. S. prisoners of war be released from the restrictions of the Geneva Conventions.

Title: *United States Foreign Policy,* 1955.

Publication: CURRENT HISTORY, January, 1955.

Annotation: This entire issue is devoted to articles on U. S. foreign policy, reviewing its course from 1932-1952 and discussing our relations with certain nations and areas.

Title: *A Philosophy for the Atomic Age* (An address before the Poor Richard Club, Philadelphia, October 26, 1954).

Author: Hopkins, John Jay.

Publication: Pamphlet.

Annotation: The President of General Dynamics Corporation, builders

of the NAUTILUS, gives six good reasons for optimism in looking ahead at the atomic age. In succinct language, he points out that the great potential of nuclear fission in peaceful applications offers to mankind a means of erasing economic inequalities and, as a consequence, political tensions.

Title: *A Plan for the Development of International Atomic Energy under Leadership of American Industry*

Author: Hopkins, John Jay.

Publication: Pamphlet.

Annotation: In a lecture before the Annual Congress of American Industry, the President of General Dynamics tosses the challenge to the U. S. and American industry to get behind an "Atomic Marshall Plan." He quotes provocative facts to support his thesis that "we must consider atomic energy as the last opportunity we possess to create a stable world." He says the time has passed for paper studies; we should be *building* atomic plants. If we participate freely in a "lend-lease" program for practical development of industrial atomic energy, it may prove to be the only effective means of stopping the spread of communism. If we hesitate, we pass the leadership to the Soviet by default.

Title: *The Next Fifty Years.*

Publication: INTERAVIA, Vol. X, No. 1 (January, 1955).

Annotation: This issue is given over to a series of articles on the future of aviation, including discussion of vertical take-off, fighter-bombers of the future, air transport and atomic power.

Title: *Marx Was a City Boy — or, Why Communism May Fail.*

Author: Rostow, W. W.

Publication: HARPER'S MAGAZINE, February, 1955, p. 25-30.

Annotation: Contends that Marx failed to understand the farmer and shows how from this misunderstanding problems have arisen whose solution or failure of solution may prove fatal to the international communist movement.

Title: *Formosa's Future — Ike's Stern Warning, Chou's Bristling Reply.*

Publication: U. S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, February 4, 1955, p. 66-68.

Annotation: Text of President Eisenhower's message to Congress on January 24 and a statement by Red Chinese Premier Chou En-lai as broadcast by Peiping Radio on January 24.

Title: *A Key to Atomic Age Seapower.*

Publication: THE LOG, January 1, 1955, p. 54-55, 61.

Annotation: An illustrated article describing the U. S. S. FORRESTAL.

Title: *Germany — Friend or Foe?*

Author: White, Theodore H.

Publication: COLLIER'S, February 4, 1955, p. 46-58.

Annotation: A report on present-day Germany as one of Western Europe's strongest nations, capable of becoming a strong ally or powerful enemy.

Title: *Red Rocket Know-How Matches Ours.*

Publication: NATION'S BUSINESS, February, 1955, p. 34-35, 78-79.

Annotation: An interview with Dr. Richard W. Porter, President of the American Rocket Society and General Manager of General Electric's Guided Missile Division.

Title: *No Need to Bomb Cities to Win War.*

Author: Leghorn, Richard S., Colonel, U. S. A. F. R.

Publication: U. S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, January 28, 1955, p. 78-94.

Annotation: Urges a policy for nuclear war which would be based on the use of nuclear weapons against military targets only.

Title: *Latest Plan to Defend U. S.*

Publication: U. S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, January 28, 1955, p. 25.

Title: *The Joint Chiefs.*

Author: Abel, Elie.

Publication: THE NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE, February 6, 1955, p. 10-11.

Annotation: Briefly outlines the role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and presents a profile of each one.

Title: *War as a Continuation of Politics.*

Author: Esposito, Vincent J., Colonel, U. S. A.

Publication: MILITARY REVIEW, February, 1955, p. 54-62.

Annotation: Presents the thesis that Clausewitz was accepted by Marx and Lenin as substantiation of their theories pertaining to the relationship between war and politics. He further develops the thesis by drawing upon past and present Soviet policy. This is an extremely interesting approach to the theories of Clausewitz and is well worth reading for all students of Russian Communism and the world situation.

Title: *Letter From Washington*

Author: Richard H. Rovere

Publication: THE NEW YORKER, January 29, 1955, pp. 66-74.

Annotation: Treats of the revolution in military concepts due to: (1) discard of old assumptions; (2) the H-bomb; (3) the acceptance of belief that effective nuclear disarmament is infeasible; and (4) the questionable relevance of the industrial potential theory. Presents the effects of the rapidly changing situation on the reasons for entering into alliances, shows the changing nature of the Cold War, and concludes that the few trends noticeable to date do not include that the U. S. has an established policy.