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THE RISE OF SOVIET POWER

A lecture delivered
at the Naval War College
on 30 September 1953, by
Dr. Merle Fainsod

Gentlemen:

I am going to talk today about *The Rise of Soviet Power.* In discussing that subject, I will confine myself primarily to its political aspects. I understand that *The Economic Potential of the Soviet Union* is scheduled for separate treatment in this course of lectures and, therefore, I shall try to avoid covering ground that is provided for elsewhere in your plans.

What I will try to do this morning is to discuss (and I fear discuss much too briefly) the origins of Bolshevism, the seizure of power in 1917, the way in which the Bolsheviks consolidated their power, the nature of this new Communist elite — its sources of support, the Communist formula of totalitarian rule — and the significance of some of the developments since Stalin's death.

I want to begin with an analysis of the rise of Bolshevism. To understand the appeal of Marx at the end of the 19th century in Russia it is necessary, I think, to see it against the background of the very rapid development in industry which was beginning to take place in Russia at the turn of the century. Russia up to that time was an overwhelmingly peasant and agrarian economy. In the last decades of the 19th century, Russia began to be industrialized. Railroad construction, mining, textiles, even steel industry began to expand. The number of industrial workers increased from a little more than half a million in 1865 to over two and a half million in 1900. That is of some significance because up to that point the Russian revolutionaries had looked to the peasantry as the great revolutionary class, but their hopes in the peasantry were

disappointed — the peasantry was slow to awaken. To intellectuals who despaired of the peasants, this new industrial working class that was in the process of formation, the *proletariat,* so-called, seemed to give new hope; this seemed to be the voice of the future.

As confirmation of their hopes, in 1896 there occurred the first great Textile Workers' strike; some 30,000 workers were involved in the capital at St. Petersburg. That strengthened the conviction of some of these intellectual revolutionaries that it was the proletariat that would become the instrument of revolution.

They began to organize. The Russian Social Democratic Labor Party, of which Bolshevism was an off-shoot, held its first congress in 1898; the second congress took place in Brussels and London in 1903. At the 1903 congress, divisions developed within the Party. It divided into a group of so-called *hards* and a group of *softs,* and the division was over the character of the party organization. The *hards,* who were led by Lenin, wanted to build a conspiratorial party of disciplined, professional revolutionaries who would lead the mass of the working class and act in its name. The *softs,* so-called, who were led by Martov, wanted an open party, a legal, mass Socialist Party, built on the Western European model of the German Social Democratic Party.

At this 1903 congress, the views of Martov on Party Organization triumphed, temporarily. But, in the election of officers at the end of the congress, Lenin's faction carried the majority. And because they received the majority of votes at the congress, they became known as Bolsheviks. This is from the Russian word *Bolshinstvo* which means "majority." They were the majority men. And Lenin's opponents became known as Mensheviks, from the Russian *menshinstvo,* which means "minority."

For a little while these two factions — Bolsheviks and Mensheviks — preserved a kind of paper unity in the same party. But under this facade of unity there was increasingly bitter factional

strife, and finally, in 1912, Lenin and his faction broke away and in effect organized a separate Bolshevik Party. It was a very small group to begin with. On the eve of the 1905 Revolution there were 300 members in all of Russia in the Bolshevik faction. Even at the height of the 1905 Revolution the party attained a total membership of only 8,000. They played a relatively inconspicuous role in the 1905 Revolution.

But that Revolution was a portent of things to come. In that Revolution, while challenge to the power of the Tsar was presented, the Tsar met the challenge by a combined policy of concession first and repression later, and the dynasty survived the 1905 Revolution because in the hour of decision it could still count on the allegiance of the army and navy officers, the police, the upper bureaucracy, the bulk of the landed gentry, and the leading figures of the business world.

By 1917, these sources of support were melting away. The war, with its vast losses of men, territory and resources and its indication of incompetence — even degeneration — in the very highest court circles, the mounting war-weariness, the hunger and deprivation, all of these combined to stretch the traditional loyalty to Tsardom to the final breaking point. All that was needed was a precipitating incident to reveal how bare and hollow the appeal of the autocracy had become. The incident was provided on March 8, 1917, with bread riots and strikes on the streets of Petrograd. During the next few days the disorders expanded into a general strike and the decisive step toward revolution was taken when mutiny spread to the Petrograd garrison and the soldiers of the regiment refused to obey the commands of their officers to fire on the crowd. The power was in the streets — but it was still formless, anarchic, without clear direction. The fate of the Revolution turned on who would rush in to fill this vacuum of leadership which had been created.

Out of the chaos of those early days (March, 1917), two centers of initiative began to take shape. One was the hastily org-

anized "soviet" of workers' and soldiers' deputies, which at first was dominated by the moderate Socialists — the Socialist revolutionaries and the Mensheviks; and the other center of initiative was the more conservative group of leaders of the old legislature of the Duma, who undertook to organize a provisional government based on the acquiescence of the Soviets. And so there began in March, 1917, a system of dual power in which the *provisional* government exercised formal authority and the *soviets*, with their mass support, retained a kind of *de facto* right of veto and initiative.

In the first month of the 1917 Revolution, the Bolsheviks played a minor role. Their total party membership in March, 1917, was less than 25,000 in a nation of 150 million people. Yet, in the short space of eight months this tiny band of professional revolutionaries was able to build up enough leverage to seize power. How do we explain it — how did it come about? One major source of Bolshevik strength was its highly centralized leadership and organization, its activist, disciplined membership, and its clarity about its goal. Another source of strength was its tactical brilliance, if you want to call it that, its success in exploiting all of the accumulated dissatisfactions in Russian society. The Bolsheviks were willing in an utterly irresponsible way to promise what the masses wanted; they were willing to promise land to the peasants, peace to the war-weary army, bread to the hungry, and so on. Then a final source of strength was the fact that they concentrated their efforts on building power where it strategically counted; that is to say, among the sailors of the Baltic fleet, in the Petrograd garrison, and in the Armed Workers' Red Guard in the factories of Petrograd.

Lenin's feat as a revolutionary engineer was his ability to identify Bolshevism with the major moving forces of mass discontent in Russian society. He did not create the war-weariness which permeated the army and the nation, but he knew how to exploit it — and with one word endlessly repeated, *peace*, he fused

it into the spark of Revolution. The land-hunger of the peasants was an ancient grievance. His political opponents, the Socialist Revolutionaries, had built their power in the villages on the promise to do something about it. But while the Socialist Revolutionaries — chastened by the responsibilities of power — temporized, Lenin acted and he stole their program from under their noses. With one word, *land*, he bought the neutrality of the villagers. Factory workers constituted one of the bases of Bolshevik strength. Lenin promised to take from the rich and give to the poor and with two slogans — "bread" and "workers' control" — he captured many of the factory workers away from the Mensheviks.

Now the Bolshevik Revolution of November, 1917, was not a majority movement. It was a carefully planned and remarkably well-managed *coup d'etat*, an insurrection. The last free election in Russia (the election to the constituent assembly which took place at the end of 1917) clearly demonstrated that the Bolsheviks' voting strength in the country at large was not more than 25%. But, as Lenin subsequently observed, "the Bolsheviks did have an overwhelming preponderance of force at the decisive points." In the areas which were strategically important for the success of the insurrection — Petrograd, Moscow, the Baltic fleet, the garrisons around Petrograd — Bolshevik influence was concentrated. The enemies of Bolshevism were far more numerous, but they were also weak, poorly organized, divided, and apathetic. And the strategy of Lenin was calculated to emphasize their division, to neutralize their opposition, and to capitalize on their apathy. Back in 1902, Lenin had written: "Give us an organization of Revolutionaries and we shall overturn the whole of Russia." On November 7, 1917, the wish was fulfilled and the deed accomplished.

I come now to the consolidation of Bolshevik power. What did that involve? In substance, it involved three operations: (1) the military defense of the new Red regime against the White armies and the small armies of the allies; (2) the suppression of

all opposition political parties inside the country, and (3) the consolidation of the dictatorship of the Party leaders.

Of the Civil War, I shall have very little to say. The first decision of the Bolsheviks after their ascent to power was to make peace with the Germans. That meant making peace on German terms. The terms were harsh, but Lenin argued that there was no alternative. In the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, which was signed in March, 1918, the Bolsheviks temporarily signed away to the Germans a third of their country and more than half of their industry. That treaty was designed to win them a breathing space. But the breathing space did not immediately materialize. The ink was hardly dry on the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk when the new Bolshevik regime was confronted with civil war and foreign intervention. That war lasted about three years. The Bolsheviks were attacked from all sides. But the Allies (the United States, France, Great Britain, Japan) were not prepared to press the attack home. They withdrew their troops and the Bolsheviks survived. And it was in this school that the new Red Army was created.

Coincidentally with the Civil War, all opposition parties were suppressed. For a very brief period (from late December, 1917 until March, 1918) there were three Left Socialist Revolutionaries (who stood very close to the Bolsheviks) in the cabinet, the so-called Council of People's Commissars. But they left the government as a protest against the signing of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk and after that the government went back to its original pure Bolshevik composition and it has remained such ever since.

Lenin made no bones at this point about the necessity for dictatorship. "There is no other way to Socialism," he insisted, "but the dictatorship of the proletariat."

"Every time I speak on this subject of proletarian government," he said, "some one shouts 'dictator.' You cannot expect that Socialism will be delivered on a silver platter. Not a single

question pertaining to the 'class struggle' has ever been settled except by violence. Violence, when it is committed by the toiling and exploited masses, is the kind of violence of which we approve."

Now the logic of Lenin's position led inexorably in the direction of the one-party state and the establishment of the Cheka and the Red Terror (the beginnings of the modern N.K.V.D.). By abolishing freedom for the opposition parties the Bolsheviks made the Soviets, the Trade Unions, and other forms of mass organization obedient instruments for carrying out the will of the monopoly party. When charges of suppression of opposition were made, the usual reply was the one made by Tomsky, who was for many years the leader of the Soviet Trade Union. "Certainly two, three, or four parties may exist under the conditions of working class dictatorship, but only provided that one party is in power and all of the rest are in prison." Tomsky, himself, was later arrested and only able to avoid prison by committing suicide.

From this one-party state it was only a short step to the establishment of dictatorship within the Party. This was uniquely Stalin's achievement. But Lenin had set the precedent. Away back in 1904, when they were fighting about the organization of the Party, Trotsky was criticizing Lenin's ultra-centralist ideas on Party Organization. At that time, Trotsky made a very prophetic observation.

He said: "In Lenin's scheme, the Party takes the place of the Working Class. The Party Organization displaces the Party; the Central Committee displaces the Party Organization; and, finally, the Dictator displaces the Central Committee."

Now that is exactly what took place, and the process by which it took place is an interesting one. In 1922, Stalin was appointed General Secretary of the Party. As General Secretary, he commanded the Party patronage; that is to say, his recommendations were largely decisive in appointments of local and regional Party

secretaries who then later returned to the Party Congresses as delegates — voting delegates.

When Lenin became ill in 1922-23, the most prominent contender for the leadership was Trotsky. But the man who had his fingers on the Party machine was Stalin. Stalin joined with two other leaders (Zinoviev, who ran the Leningrad Party machine, and Kamenev, who had a strong position in the Moscow Party organization), and together they united to rob Trotsky of a considerable degree of his authority. And they set up a *troika*, a triumverate: Stalin, Zinoviev, and Kamenev.

In that period, Stalin was cautiously, slowly building up his power. By 1925, he could afford to break with his allies, and Kamenev and Zinoviev moved over to join Trotsky, in opposition. But by that time Trotsky was a very weak figure. Stalin, in order to defeat them, mobilized his party machine, allied himself with the so-called "right wing" of the Politburo — Bukharin, Tomsky, Rykov — and, together, they got rid of Trotsky and his new allies. Then Stalin, having rid himself of Trotsky, in 1926-1927, turned around in 1929 to rid himself of the right wing — Bukharin, Tomsky and Rykov. And the purge of deviationists, oppositionists and rivals for power continued and finally culminated in the purge to end all purges, the "Great Purge and Trials of 1936-38," when virtually every old Bolshevik in the Party of any standing was put to death or banished.

We can only speculate about the reasons behind the liquidations of the old Bolsheviks. The official reason given was that they were responsible for the assassination of Stalin's favorite, Kirov, who was the Leningrad Party boss, and that they conspired together to assassinate Stalin and his colleagues. Other reasons asserted in the trials were that they were traitors, that they had acted as agents of Nazi Germany — but that, I think, has to be taken with a considerable degree of salt. Whatever the reasons, the fact remains that this purge — this liquidation of the old Bol-

sheviks — destroyed the last vestige of independence within the Party and practically removed at one stroke from the stratum of leadership in the Party, the Government, and the Army, the generation that made the Revolution and prepared the way for the coming to power of a new generation — the post-Revolutionary generation.

Now I want to talk a little about this new elite who were catapulted to power over the dead bodies of the old Bolsheviks. Let me start with some interesting statistics revealed at the eighteenth Communist Party Congress in 1939, the first congress held after the Great Purge. There they examined the age and Party standing of various officials. The first group were the "top" Party leaders — the Regional and Republic Party Secretaries — a group of 333. In 1939, after the Great Purge, 303 of these (91%) were under forty years of age; over 80% of them had entered the Party after 1924, or the year of Lenin's death. If you go down a little bit, look at the "middle" management of the Party — 10,900 secretaries of district committees, city committees, and so on, — in 1939, after the Purge, 92% of this group were under 40; 93.5% entered the Party after 1924.

What these figures point to is this: the functionaries of the Party who replaced the old Bolshevlks represent a new, post-Revolutionary generation. The rise of this generation is a factor of importance in the development of the Soviet Union. In the first place, it is worth noting that this is a generation for whom the Revolution is already a page in the history books — something that happened so far back in childhood that it ceased to be a meaningful part of experience. For the earlier generation, the Revolution was the high point in their existence; they had made it, they were the agitators, the propagandists, the people who fought the Revolution. This new generation is a somewhat different breed. Their lives have revolved around the great tasks of the post-Revolutionary period — industrialization, collectivization, the Purges, more recently the war against the Nazis.

This new generation has been educated in a political mold of Stalinite authoritarianism. It grew up in a period when the opposition to Stalin was being broken up and destroyed, when the totalitarian features of the Soviet State were being systematically developed and consolidated. It is a generation which, unlike the old Revolutionaries, has had very little contact with the outside world and which, indeed, has been deliberately insulated from such contacts. It is a generation, consequently, for which the whole experience of Western democratic society is known only in the distorted form of the shibboleths of Party propaganda.

In the third place, this new generation — this new leadership — comes to power with a different background of experience from the old. This new generation of leadership is drawn from the new aristocracy of plant managers, engineers, upper bureaucrats, privileged technicians and workers. They are organizers and administrators — not underground Revolutionaries. They do not belong to the party of the under-dog in the way that the old Bolsheviks did; they never had the experience of being under-dogs. This is a generation which occupies the privileged and responsible positions in public life. It may be under greater temptations than the last to enjoy its privileges and seek to perpetuate them, though perhaps that still remains to be seen.

As you can see from this analysis, the composition of the Party leadership has changed greatly as compared with the early years of the Revolution. It is a leadership which has been brought up in a ruthless school, a school which believes in strength and toughness, in authority, and in control.

On what support does the Soviet regime draw? It seems to me that there are three main pillars of support: first, the regime leans heavily on the support of this administrative and managerial elite — those who occupy the key managerial administrative positions, the higher level of bureaucrats, the plant directors and managers, high army and navy officers, the chairmen of the collective

farm administrations, and even the worker aristocracy of the stakhanovite workers, foremen, and brigadiers. The effort to consolidate the support of these groups, who play key roles in the administrative structure, takes two directions: first, the Party leadership treats them as a privileged category and pays them reasonably well; second, it seeks to draw them into the Party itself, and to identify them actively with the Party leadership and Party goals.

There is a second hard-core support for the regime and that is the support within the Party organization of what I call the hard, inner core — the apparatus (the *apparat*, the Russians call them) — the Party functionaries for whom the Party work is a full-time job and a career.

Then there is the third support, the repressive element — the Secret Police, the M.V.D., whose authority extends into every corner of Soviet society and for whom terror itself becomes a kind of system of power.

It is through these three main lines of authority — this administrative-technical line, this Party line and this police line — that the regime has worked out its basic pattern of control. Perhaps I can best illustrate how this control works by taking two examples: let us say, a collective farm and a factory. If you look at the collective farm, in the administrative line you find that it is run by a collective farm chairman who is usually a Party member and who is, indeed selected and approved for his job by the district committee of the Party. If you look to see where the kernel of support within that collective farm is, you will see that there is a little group around the collective farm chairman and his deputies and brigadiers who lead the work in the field who tend to be identified with the Party or with the *Komsomol*, the young Communists. It is this group that constitutes the core of administrative control. Within the collective farm there will also be, if there is a Party organization, a Party secretary who is responsible to the Party and who is there to watch the collective farm chairman. In

every rural district there will also be a district office of the M.V.D., the secret police, whose job it is to watch all of the collective farms, the machine tractor stations in the area. They have their network of informers who penetrate the countryside.

In the factory it is essentially the same scheme. In the administrative chain there is the factory director — now, invariably, a Party man and now technically trained for his job. Then you have the Party organization in the factory, presided over by a secretary. If the factory is of any size, this Party secretary is a full-time official, designated to his job by higher Party authority. He is there to watch from the Party point of view. Each factory of any size will also have its police outfit — the so-called "special section," a branch of the M.V.D., again, with its own independent channel of command. These people will control both Party and non-Party personnel in the factories through the network of informers of which I spoke earlier.

I could take this same pattern and trace it through for you in the army, the navy, or any other aspect of Soviet society. It is really a pattern that repeats itself over and over again.

The formula of totalitarian rule, as it took shape under Stalin, is a complex formula. In one of its aspects is represented a drive to safeguard his own security by obliterating all actual or potential competitors, or competing power centers. In a positive fashion, it tried to saturate and paralyze the minds of the Soviet people with a monolithic stream of agitation and propaganda which stressed the superiority of the Soviet system and the virtues of its leaders. Negatively, it sought to deny them access to any alternative by cutting them off from the outside world and by cutting them off from each other because of the spy system. Through the secret police, in other words, it attempted to create a milieu of pervasive insecurity founded on fear of the informer and the labor camps. The Party and the secret police guarded the loyalty of the armed forces and the administration and, in turn, they also watched each other.

In this system of institutionalized mutual suspicion, the competing hierarchies of Party, police, army, administration were kept in purposeful conflict, provided with no point of final resolution short of Stalin and his trusted henchmen in the Politburo or the Presidium. In other words, the concentration of power in Stalin's hands rested on the dispersal of power among his subordinates.

In another of its aspects, the Stalinist formula of totalitarian rule represented an effort to come to terms with the demands of industrialization. It enlisted the new Soviet technical intelligentsia, trained them, rewarded the elite among them with high material privileges and elevated social status. It created a labor aristocracy of honored stakhanovites to serve as a kind of bellwether for the working class. It repudiated equality and arranged its incentive system to reward the more productive workers, to penalize the backward and inefficient. It risked the alienation of the mass of unskilled and semi-skilled workers by paying them poorly, supplying them inadequately; but it also maintained its control over them by subjecting them to the most rigorous labor discipline.

A third characteristic of the evolving Stalinist formula of totalitarian rule was its effort to identify itself with traditional sources of authority in Russian history and Russian society. This search for legitimacy was a strange and devious journey. It led to a drastic reorganization of the educational system; it manifested itself in the restoration of the authority of the family, in restrictions on abortions and encouragement of childbearing, in tightening marriage bonds, on the assumption that these measures would contribute to stability in social relationships and contribute, more particuiarly, to enhance the power of the regime. It produced an uneasy *de facto* concordat with the orthodox church, in which the political loyalty of the clergy and their communicants was exchanged for a precarious toleration of religious practices. But it expressed itself most forcefully in a striking rehabiliation of patriotism as the cohesive force of Soviet society, resurrecting Russian history and old military exploits and heroes; by parading dangers,

fanciful rather than real; by sealing off the Soviet people from all contact with the outside world; by appealing to the most primal instincts of nationalism; by saturating (or trying to saturate) the consciousness of the people with a sense of the superiority of the Soviet order. The regime sought to consolidate devotion to Party and state interests. Through Soviet patriotism, the Party leadership proposed to create the Soviet man of the postwar world politically conscious, proud of his society, aware of the dangers of the so-called "capitalist encirclement," and prepared to make his contribution to the consolidation and expansion of the Soviet power.

Now, the question of the death of Stalin. Will the death of Stalin set forces in motion which will lead to important modifications of the Soviet regime? As you know, in the first month after Stalin's death the new regime initiated a series of measures which appeared to portend an easing of living standards for Soviet citizens, which promised "a liberalization of the dictatorship," which promised an alleviation of tension between East and West. Price cuts on food and consumer goods were put into effect; an amnesty was declared for minor offenders in prisons and forced labor camps; the release of the arrested Kremlin doctors was accompanied by a declaration that high secret police had fabricated evidence and abused their authority; that they had sought to stir up national animosity, and that the new leadership was prepared to guarantee "the constitutional rights of its subjects against any form of arbitrary action."

In the area of foreign policy, a marked change of line was evident. The American propaganda, which had been very intense up to that point, was muted somewhat. For the first time in a number of years the Soviet press referred to the aid rendered by the Allies during the Second World War. In his statement to the Supreme Soviet on March 15, 1953, Malenkov declared:

> "At the present time there is no dispute or unresolved question that cannot be settled peacefully

by mutual agreement of the interested countries. This applies to our relations with all states, including the United States of America."

That announcement was soon followed by the East-West accord at the United Nations on the designation of a new Secretary-General; the conclusion of the agreement to exchange sick and wounded in Korea; a Communist retreat on the issue of forceable repatriation of prisoners, and the signing of the armistice agreement in Korea.

Now, the ultimate significance of these moves can only be appraised in the light of future developments. They can only be determined as Soviet intentions are tested in detail. In my view, sanguine hope that Soviet domestic and international policies will undergo fundamental revision do not appear to be warranted. In the perspective of Soviet historical development, as I have briefly sketched it, the current peace campaign and the domestic concessions which accompany it must be viewed as a tactical maneuver designed to win the new regime a breathing space to consolidate its authority. During this period, the Kremlin can be expected to make every effort to quiet fears of Soviet aggression; to try to confuse and divide Western sentiment about long-term Soviet intentions; to woo the support of its own subjects and peoples.

Whether the present phase of defensive consolidation will be long-lasting will depend, in my view, in considerable measure on the success which the new leadership enjoys in stabilizing its authority. If a successor emerges who gathers all the reins of power in his own hands (Malenkov has made considerable progress in this direction) and if he is able to manipulate them with Stalin's dexterity, then I think no significant changes in the character and goals of the Soviet regime can be anticipated. If a successor (whether he be Malenkov or someone else) turns out to be a weak figure, or if the dictatorship is lodged in a divided committee, then power will become blurred and diffused among the rival elite formations, and

the opportunity to exercise strong initiative in foreign policy will operate under some restraint.

Some have seen in this combination the possibility for an eventual transformation of Soviet totalitarianism into some type of constitutional order — this uneasy equilibrium among the adminitration, Party, bureaucracy, armed forces and police. Mr. George Kennan has referred to it as the "erosion of despotism." In my view, the immediate prospects of such a development are not hopeful. It is undoubtedly true that the Soviet regime could greatly improve its popularity by slowing the tempo of industrialization and militarization, by devoting a larger part of its resources to the production of consumer goods, by imposing legal restraints on the police, by stabilizing the position of its bureaucratic elites. There are certainly forces in Soviet society which would warmly support the kind of evolution of which I have spoken: this yearning for peace, for security, for a rise in living standards is very widespread among Soviet citizens — judged by the interviews that we have had with those who have escaped.

But there are also important countervailing considerations. Stalin's successors, his best pupils, have risen to power by practicing the arts which he taught them. Their careers have been devoted to forging the weapons of totalitarianism. The system with which they have identified themselves carries its own dynamic momentum. The secret police, and the Party apparatus on whom the leadership depends to sustain its authority, have a vested interest in the perpetuation of their privileges and perquisites. The institutional pressures which they generate, operate to preserve and consolidate the dictatorship. As long as the Kremlin leaders continue to see their future in terms of forced industrialization, in terms of industrial and military might — they will probably persist in relying on totalitarian instruments to force the pace of industrialization.

Those who possess absolute power do not part with it willingly. As I see it, the governing formula of Soviet totalitarianism

rests on a moving equilibrium of alternating phases of relaxation and repression; but its essential contours do not change substantially. A totalitarian regime does not shed its police state characteristics; it dies when power is wrenched from its hands.

Let me conclude by summarizing my estimate of Kremlin intentions. The long-term goal remains not socialism in one country, but communism in one Kremlin-dominated world. The Communist leadership is prepared to move toward that goal as swiftly as we permit. It probably will not consciously precipitate a world war in the near future; certainly not unless it feels reasonably certain that it can win a cheap and easy victory. Meanwhile, I think it will continue to test our defenses — political as well as military; it will probe where it can hope to achieve gains with minimum risks and it will seek to accumulate strength against the day when it feels better prepared to throw down the gauntlet.

It was Lenin who proclaimed, many years ago, to be sure:

> "The resistance of the Soviet Republic, side by side with imperialist states for a long time, is unthinkable. One or the other must triumph in the end and before that end comes, a series of frightful clashes between the Soviet Republic and the bourgeois states is inevitable."

In the present juncture of world affairs, no one can be certain that Lenin will not prove a true prophet. What can be said, I think, is this: that if the Kremlin decides to move, it will move because of weaknesses and not because of our strength. So, the only alternative to total war and the only basis for effective negotiation remains an unremitting effort to keep the defenses of the West strong, to maintain the dynamics of economic expansion, to sustain so far as possible standards of mass welfare, and to demonstrate the unity and vigor of the Community of Free Nations.

BIOGRAPHIC SKETCH

Dr. Merle Fainsod

Dr. Fainsod, Professor in the Department of Government at Harvard University, was born at McKees Rock, Pennsylvania, on 2 May 1907. He received his B.A. degree from Washington University in 1928 and his M.A. degree from the same University in 1930. At Harvard he received an M.A. degree in 1931, and a Ph.D. in 1932.

Dr. Fainsod has been associated with the Department of Government at Harvard University since 1933, advancing from an instructor to the rank of professor, attained in 1946. He was Chairman of the Department from 1946-49. He also served as a visiting lecturer at Yale (1940); Staff Member of the President's Committee on Administrative Management, 1936; Consultant Temporary National Economics Commission, 1940; Price Executive, Consumers Durable Goods, Office of Price Administration, 1941-42; Director Retail Trade and Services Division, 1942-43; Commissioned Captain, Specialists Reserve, Army of the United States, May 1943. He was Deputy Director, Civil Affairs Training School, Harvard University, 1944-45.

Dr. Fainsod was awarded the Sheldon Traveling Fellowship, Harvard, 1932-33. He is a Member American Political Science Association (Executive Council 1948-50). His books include: "American People and their Government (with A. J. Lien), 1933; "International Socialism and the World War," 1935; "Government and the American Economy (with A. L. Gordon), 1941, 48. He is a contributor to "Public Administration Review," "American Economic Review," and the "Yale Law Journal." His latest book, "How Russia is Ruled," was published in 1953 by the Harvard University Press.

POLITICAL FACTORS IN THE FORMULATION OF NATIONAL STRATEGY

A lecture delivered
at the Naval War College
on 8 October 1953, by
Professor Harold D. Lasswell

Since military strategy is part of the decision-making process among participants in world politics, we may begin our examination of the subject by considering the arena of world affairs. A few years ago the professional students of international law, international relations and strategy would give a glib reply when questioned about the identity of the participants in world politics. They would talk in terms of the "state" or the "nation state". And it is still the conventional answer. But it has become increasingly unsatisfactory for anyone who must look beyond legal forms to the facts of power in a rapidly changing world. The conception of a "state" is formalistic. According to traditional theory all "states" are "equal" once officially recognized by the existing members of the state system. Such a conception can scarcely be taken literally by anyone who looks at the power relations among governments. Side by side with the language of international law there has grown up a vocabulary designed to describe the distribution of effective power. It speaks of great powers, middle powers, small powers and dependents; and, more recently, in view of the tendency toward bipolarity, of "superpowers" or "giant" powers. It is clear that any serviceable categories will use two sets of terms, one for formal authority, and the other for effective control. If we say that sixty or seventy states are sovereign equals, we must also be able to say that the effective pattern of power in the world arena is bipolar, polypolar, multipolar, or whatever else the facts indicate. We can make very important distinctions between lawful power (authoritative and controlling), naked power (controlling but not authoritative), and nominal power (authoritative but not controlling).

The disadvantage of taking the state as the unit of participation in world politics is not only that the distinction between formal and effective power is blurred, but that other participants have become so important that it is misleading to relegate them to a subordinate position. International intergovernmental organizations have been set up by official action for general purposes (League of Nations, United Nations), and for a diversity of special purposes (health, science, and the like). It is true that these organizations operate under the formal authority of national states. But an examination of their influence will show that on some matters they are of decisive importance. The result of having an international hierarchy of officials, and assemblies and councils that meet frequently is to establish a new mechanism of much greater weight on many subjects than was possible when intergovernmental cooperation was sporadic and bilateral.

The list of participants needs also to be enlarged by adding transnational political parties. They are not always under the domination of any one government. The communist movement, for instance, was a power factor in world affairs long before the seizure of power in Moscow in 1917. International bands of revolutionists were active for decades seeking to organize bases for revolutionary seizures whenever crises of unemployment, of military defeat, or some other catastrophe created a revolutionary situation. Even when a revolutionary party organization is transformed into a humble appendage of an existing government, some of its remaining influence comes from the impression in various quarters that it represents something bigger than the government in question.

Besides transnational political parties there is much to be said for adding the supranational pressure groups to the list of effective participants in the decision making process of the globe. Pressure groups are set up for the purpose of influencing policy. They differ from political parties in that they do not formulate comprehensive political programs, or openly put up candidates in elections. A recent tabulation suggests that about a thousand supra-

national pressure organizations are actively promoting changes in the educational, medical, economic and other relations among peoples.

When we go behind supranational pressure groups and parties we typically come to private associations that operate across national boundaries. These organizations are not primarily specialized to the power value; rather, they use power incidentally to other purposes. In this connection think of the impact of business organizations that reach across many frontiers, and of trade unions, churches, scientific and professional associations. Private organizations have often been strong enough to upset governments, and to give decisive help to new regimes.

If we push our analysis far enough we come to individual human beings. Influential individuals (and families) often operate transnationally.

The position of the military strategist in the modern decision making process is highly diversified. In some places he is the advisor to a national government, as in the U. S. Elsewhere he may be the advisor of a government that purports to represent several nations. When the element of coercion plays a significant part, we speak of an empire (like the Soviet Empire) rather than a unified national state (like Sweden). In some cases the military strategist is advising a small political class that is relatively cut off from the rest of the society under its control. The members of this small ruling class may follow world affairs, and share the news and comment current among all who keep in touch with happenings throughout the globe. Below the political elite the society may be composed of kinship groups more concerned with tribal affairs than with the world at large. The underlying population may be nomadic or agricultural. It may remain self-absorbed in the treadmill of the seasons and the world views of a traditional culture. The underlying population may be more or less disorganized as a result of employment as a labor force in mines, plantations and other large-scale

operations. The political role of the strategic advisor is circumscribed by the integration of the top decision makers with the society as a whole.

The military strategist often grades over to the role of a police officer or a subversionist. We all know the usual distinction between a military specialist and a policeman. According to our tradition the proper function of the armed forces is to repel foreign enemies, and we are inclined to look with a jaundiced eye upon attempts to involve these forces in the maintaining of internal order. The civilian tradition of English speaking countries has led us to put blocks in the road of executives who want to use the armed forces at home. (Our history recalls the abuse of authority in the hope of preserving unpopular dynasties).

In modern despotisms it is impossible to recognize a sharp line between military and police forces. Consider the interpenetration of the German officers corps by the Nazi party, and the complex allocations of responsibility for compulsory labor camps at home and abroad, and for extermination camps; and for the encouragement of foreign subversion.

To some extent the encouragement of foreign subversion has always been part of the military function. It has been taken for granted that an intelligence job would be done in advance on possible opponents (in addition to wartime operations). Inducements would be employed to encourage spies to betray the nation. Often these operations implicate large numbers of people. (We hear of the 70,000 agents used by the Germans in anticipation of 1870.) In more recent years the appearance of despotism, bipolarization and acute ideological conflict have enormously increased the strategic role of subversive activity.

Under modern conditions, therefore, military officers sometimes find themselves acting as advisors and liaison men to very strange groups indeed. They may work with supranational political parties to improve the strategy and tactics of espionage, sab-

otage and street fighting. From Nuremburg and other sources we know of the pre-war use of military advisors in connection with para-military formations and pressure organizations of many kinds. (There is, by the way, a big literature on the revolutionary technique evolved by the social revolutionists of the nineteenth century and the early twentieth, some of whom had professional training and experience).

When we consider the intimacy of association between strategists and top decision makers, the connection appears to be closest when the government has been taken over by military *coup*. But the top man may be satisfied with his own genius as a planner and a commander, so that anyone who is invited to advise finds that he is relegated to a modest role. Even under these circumstances, however, the advisor may be more than a "yes-man" who thinks only when spoken to. He may continue to make independent analyses of the factors that influence the security of the whole nation, and seek to clarify the minds of top decision makers concerning long-run matters. Cases of this kind have occurred among the advisors of warlords who seized power in some province in China. There have been nationally minded advisors who tried to shepherd their warlord along the path of unifying the whole Chinese people in order to maintain the integrity of China under modern perils.

It is noteworthy that trained officers are not as a rule at the top of modern mass party movements which have captured power. Actually there is latent and often overt tension between the leadership and trained officers. Men like Mussolini, Lenin and Hitler were gifted propagandists and organizers of mass movements who looked with mixed feelings at general staffs and top commands. The communist party was so fearful that the central policy of the organization would be under the domination of military specialists that they made a cult of the supremacy of the political man over the specialists. An entirely new set of officers were trained as rapidly as possible after the Civil War period in

the hope of wiping out ideological residues of the pre-Bolshevik era, and of indoctrinating officers of the Red Army with the fundamental importance of subordinating themselves to the central policy organs of the party (and government). Threatened by revolt and intervention, however, the communist rulers of the Soviet world have been recruited from individuals who almost invariably have political police training and experience. The Nazi movement took over control of the officers by the tactics of "divide and rule." Compliant members of the officers corps were advanced, while the more towering professional personalities were gradually disposed of by whatever methods (including false charges) were expedient.

In a nation possessing a strong tradition of popular rule, like the U. S. and Great Britain, the political factors in the formulation of strategy are in one sense simple. In Britain the responsibility for top decision rests with the Cabinet and the Parliament, and eventually the electorate. In the United States the integration rests with the President and the Congress, and ultimately the electorate. Formally speaking, political assumptions are communicated to the strategist by the competent political authorities, who receive advice for the over-all implementation of the national policy goals and objectives recommended. Top authorities clarify and commit national policy in the light of the advice tendered by the military strategists, and by those charged with diplomatic, economic and ideological implements of policy.

In practice the relation of the military strategist to the top is far from attaining such diagrammatic clarity. First of all, the words in which national goals and objectives are stated tend to be ambigious or ultraspecific. That is, if the President or the Congress is asked what they want to achieve in the domain of foreign policy in the next five years, the replies are likely to sound very ambiguous indeed. We know of course that the national security calls for the deterrence of aggression by foreign countries, abstinence from aggressive acts on our part, and successful counter-action if necessary. But the translation of these broad requirements into

more operational terms is not easy. By ultra-specificity is meant words that sound definite enough, but which must be taken with a grain of salt. Even the most emphatic and explicit statement may be a poor guide for the future. (In the U. S. the strategist is likely to remember Korea).

Uncertain as this may appear to be, of such are the facts of life in popular government. The military strategist must adapt himself to performing his obligation to the nation within this framework. On reflection, however, we conclude that the advisor-planner is by no means as devoid of guidance as the foregoing paragraph may suggest. By the proper use of the appropriate tools of investigation and analysis, much can be learned. By examining the trends of official policy in this country and abroad, the strategist is able to predict some of the situations involving national security that may arise, together with the policy objectives likely to be supported at home and abroad. The projection of past trends will often show that conflicts are in the making (typically when two opposing developments are practically certain to meet). The rearming of Germany, even in pre-Nazi days, pointed toward changes in the balance of power throughout Europe (and hence throughout the globe). Adequate interpretation of the future obviously calls for more than simple extrapolation of past lines of change, and the uncovering of facilities or incompatible trends. It is important to conduct a scientific examination of the balance of factors that have favored or retarded a given response, and to include in the assessment of the future, estimates of the probable presence or absence of these conditioning factors.

If we look at the history of strategic planning and recommendation, it is clear that the professionals have sometimes failed to make use of the tools of comparative historical, scientific, and projective analysis which are essential to the task. Our war histories are now calling attention to a number of alleged limitations that affected strategy between the two world wars. It appears that too much weight was given to the headlines of the twenties and

early thirties. The prevailing tone of the Presidents, the Congress, the political parties, the pressure groups, and the press was "isolationist." Since the U. S. had no diplomatic commitments to an ally, forward planning was often made on the assumption that the U. S. would go it alone in the war crisis of the future.

The tools of analysis to which I have referred in making an assessment of political factors affecting U. S. policy were actually used with success by the advisors of other governments. Important elements in Great Britain, for instance, correctly foresaw that if Britain were threatened by a resurgent Germany, the U. S. would interpret our national security to include the defense of Britain, and the prevention of the unification of Western Europe by conquest.

In developing strategies in execution of national objectives, once clarified (or postulated), a fundamental question is how much initial loss can be endured by the nation. How much loss can the U. S. afford to suffer at the outbreak of a war in which modern weapons are used by the opponent in his surprise attack? This is a more complicated question than tabulating and estimating data about weapons and industrial capacity. It is necessary to estimate the crucial political factors. Will losses of a certain magnitude (of people and production facilities) produce a disproportionately great increase in disunity? Will this significantly influence the strength of the immediate counterattack against the enemy? Will it importantly affect the restoration and use of production capacity in order to mount a decisive offensive within a relatively short time?

At first it appears that there are no exact parallels from the past. Crippling as the Japanese surprise attack was, for instance, it did not demolish a large fraction of our production facilities, nor decimate a significant fraction of our population. But it is possible to discern pertinent variables in past situations. Suppose that we try to envisage the direction, intensity and efficiency of the response of the American people should our industrial centers be made unusable by surprise, and the scale of civilian casualties

reach unprecendented heights. There have been cases of disaster in which panic has been held at a minimum. One factor was the very long anticipation shared by the public that the disaster might occur. Another point is that the members of the community must not feel that they deserve to suffer because they have been led into disaster by self-serving and short-sighted men. Furthermore, in the midst of a disasterous blow unity may be sustained if there is equality of treatment of all sufferers, irrespective of region, religion and color.

In calculating strengths and vulnerabilities in so far as they involve political factors, it is essential to consider all major deprivations to assess the probable response of the different components of the population, and to estimate the changes in attitude that are likely to be brought about between now (the time the estimate is made) and when the attack is postulated to occur.

All this has a bearing on such major estimates as the size and nature of the burden to be imposed upon the nation in advance of hostilities. Assume that we can make a dependable estimate of the level of armament that would exercise a stateable degree of deterrence of potential attackers. An element in the final choice of armament level is the probable internal effect of various levels upon U. S. unity. (Can we say, for instance, that when a specified level is exceeded, a comparatively sharp increase in disaffection follows?)

Up to this point we have looked at the position of the military strategist in the modern world, and paying particular attention to the political factors pertinent to the goals, objectives, strengths and vulnerabilities of the national policy served by the strategist. We shift now to another dimension of the problem, and examine some political elements that enter into the response of potential or actual opponents. We must see the world from the standpoint of the current and the prospective decision makers of foreign powers. Hence we encounter the same kind of uncertainty that enters

into the interpretation of our own decision makers. Even if we were able to ask those in charge of top policy abroad when they propose to attack (if at all), the replies (even though candid) might be ambiguous, or show the same ultraspecificity of which we remarked before. We can no more take the dictators at face value than we can take the democrats. In evaluating even direct testimony we must consider the imprint of another purge, or of a great success or defeat in an intermediate country.

The examination of the policy goals, objectives, strengths, and vulnerabilities of the potential opponent calls for the estimation of developments, assuming first that our policy remains much the same. Later we bring in the consideration of the impact of possible changes in our own policy. A key question in reference to the decision making process abroad is parallel to the question that we posed in reference to our own nation: What are the present authoritative prescriptions for the making of such basic decisions as war or peace? Do the agencies charged with nominal authority appear to have effective control? Who are the effective decision makers: What are their politically significant perspectives? How are these perspectives influenced by cultural characteristics? Class origins? Experience? Personality traits? By the security or insecurity of the position of leaders now or at various levels of crisis? In the future if changes occur in the group composition of the leadership, will it make any difference so far as the policies in which we are interested are concerned? For instance, if the leadership is widely recruited from diverse nationality groups, will it make for more or less internal unity, or for more or less aggressiveness in foreign relations? If the coming elite is largely recruited from the recently established families of the army, police, party bureaucracy, official bureaucracy, will it have any significant effect? (For instance: are those with military police experience so sensitive to internal division that they are timid about launching a war? Are they so much impressed by the progress of subversion at home that they believe a war to be necessary to preserve the regime? Are they so much impressed by reports of subversion abroad that war

appears unnecessary in order to win out in the world struggle? Are they impressed by the absence of successful subversion abroad so that security seems only possible as a result of successful war?) Are the personalities who come to the top in the regime willing to take great responsibility for important decisions; or, on the contrary, are they accustomed to evade risky decisions by temporizing? (Does this mean a drift into war because the top leaders do not stand out against a growing consensus among their numbers? Or does it mean that war is continually postponed?)

The foregoing questions have been directed to considering the composition of the decision makers, and assessing the perspectives in which they are likely to view political matters of importance to our security. A further step is necessary. Besides thinking of the results of a possible change in elite composition, we must estimate the probability that significant changes will in fact occur. This call for a systematic examination of the social processes which are likely to affect the political process of the opposing power. Without making an exhaustive inventory, we can at least direct attention to some dimensions of the total problem:

Wealth (economic institutions). What are the probable changes in the technology and the magnitude of production? Standards of living? Saving and investment? How will these developments affect the perspectives of the political elite?

Respect (social class institutions). How is the class structure likely to change? That is, will the upper, middle and lower respect groupings become more or less mobile? Will this increase or decrease the unity of the community as a whole? How will these changes influence the perspectives of the effective elite of power?

Well-being (safety, health, comfort). How are the numbers, and the physical and mental health, of the population likely to change? Will internal tensions be increased and the pressure for external expansion increased or reduced?

Enlightenment (public information, civic education). Will information about the outside world available at all levels become more fantastic, so that the external world is viewed as vile and pusillanimous? Will the information available at the top share this image progressively, or will it on the contrary diverge from the popular picture, creating perpetual sources of tension in the control of international chauvinism? Despite the images purveyed in mass media of communication controlled by the government, will undercurrents of scepticism result in a general disinclination to credit officially propagated statements, and produce a feeble positive faith in the destiny of the whole community in its foreign relations?

Skill (professions and occupations). Will the growth of industrialization bring with it a network of scientific, engineering, and skilled labor talent so absorbed in improving their own conditions of life and opportunities that there will be little interest in external expansion? Or will the growth of some skill groups create strong vested interests in expansion, in order to gain greater scope than the home countries permit?

Affection (family, fraternal institutions). Will the pervading suspiciousness characteristic of all forms of public life lead to intense emotional bonds among members of the family and the early friendship group, with the result that the security of the intimate circle is more significant than more grandiose dreams of expansion in the name of larger social units? Or will the concern for the family have the effect of leaving politics in the hands of egocentric, calculating and unscrupulous persons who are concerned with the vast drama of world politics, and willing to take all the risks involved?

Rectitude (standards of right and wrong, of responsibility). Will the older religious faiths continue to survive and indeed gain in vitality? Will secular doctrines lose their capacity to involve fervant faith and self-sacrifice? How will these changing standards influence the outlook of persons who have an opportunity to take

a strong role in political affairs? (e.g., will they withdraw and leave the decision to the utterly unscrupulous; or will they develop a sense of responsibility for ameliorating the general condition of tension?).

It will be observed that the catagories employed here refer to a way of describing the social process of any community, whether a local neighborhood, a nation, or even the world as a whole. We speak of the social process as *man* pursuing *values* through *institutions* using *resources*. The values (the categories of preferred events) are kept few for convenience of analysis (eight: power, wealth, respect, well-being, enlightenment, skill, affection, rectitude). The specialized patterns by which these values are shaped and shared are the institutions. Social processes may be compared with one another according to the degree in which values are widely made available to the members of the whole community, or the degree to which they are concentrated in relatively few hands. The first is a society that is relatively democratic; the second, relatively despotic (or a traditional oligarchy).

Having appraised the current and prospective decision making process of the opposing power, the strategist is in a position to evaluate the probable impact of the various instruments of action available to his own decision makers. Repeating a previous analysis it is convenient for many purposes to say that the goals and objectives of national policy may be sought by four major instruments of policy: military, economic, diplomatic, ideological. The distinctive means of military strategy are arms; of economic strategy, goods; of diplomacy, deals; and ideological strategy, words. In terms of distinctive effects military strategy aims at destruction (or production), economic strategy at scarcity (or abundance), diplomacy at the disunity of leaders (or unity), and ideological strategy at the disunity of masses (or unity). As a check list:

Strategy	*Distinctive Means*	*Distinctive Effects*
Military	Arms	Destruction (or protection)
Economic	Goods	Scarcity (or abundance)

Diplomatic	Deals	Disunity of Leaders (or unity)
Ideological	Words	Disunity of Masses (or unity)

The formulation and execution of military strategy calls for the proper articulation of all distinctive military means and effects with all the instruments by which national policy objectives are sought. The overriding principle is that of maximization, or the attainment of all the values sought by policy at the least cost (appraised in terms of those values). When we speak of political factors in the formulation of strategy we are referring to the assumptions that are to be made about the national goals and objectives to be accomplished; and further the weight to be assigned to factors of intention in achieving of these aims.

These instrumentalities of national policy may be employed in situations short of war, in war, and at the end of war. For the moment we are thinking of the political factors involved in the use of military strategy (in the context of policy goals, and in coordination with the other instruments of policy) in situations short of war, and intended to influence the opposing elite. We assume that the goals pursued are the deterrence of aggression by the opposing power, and the maintenance of a position which, if necessary, would enable us to use force effectively if aggression occurs.

In this connection we note first of all that military instruments possess certain special advantages in the prosecution of national policy in these short-of-war situations. I refer to the well-nigh compulsory control that can be exercised over the focus of attention of the opposing elite by moving our own "hardware." Ships, planes and guns are very tangible indeed, and exert peremptory control over the senses of those who are equipped to recognize the political significance of weapons. The top staffs and decision makers abroad must pay the same strict attention to our hardware that we do to theirs.

This point applies universally. But there are special factors that predispose the members of some ruling elites to emphasize

the significance of military weapons. Suppose that our opponent is indoctrinated with the idea that the "capitalist" enemy never does anything unless it is the outcome of a deep laid and hostile plan. This results in "over-interpretation" as well as over-sensitiveness to whatever weapon changes are attributed to us.

Assume further that the opposing elite is heavily indoctrinated about the importance of material factors in general. The emphasis upon such tangibles as the weapon and the factory underlines the significance attributed to developments on our side of these matters.

Suppose that the opposing elite is indoctrinated to think of themselves as "encircled" by a world conspiracy headed by the U. S. This predisposes them to give particular attention to moves anywhere in the world that appear in any way connected with us.

As instruments of national policy during periods of low-burning (as well as explosive) crisis it is clear that military weapons excel in manageability. They are amenable to central direction by professional planning and operating personnel: and they are run with an eye to security considerations.

The disposability of weapons, of course, is a factor that often results in the abuse of military instruments during short-of-war periods. Suppose that the problem is to induce the potential enemy to abstain from an aggressive action. If our weapons are unready, and if the intelligence services of the other side are in effective working order, it is folly to imagine that we are "deterring aggression" by moving some of our ships, guns and planes closer to their boundaries. (The task is always to estimate the opponent's estimate of our intentions and capabilities).

The disposability of military weapons often leads to another abuse, which is failure to plan military activity as part of a properly prepared joint enterprise, involving the articulation of diplomacy, economics and ideological instruments. A case in point is failure

to provide in advance for the timing of peacetime weapon tests in such a manner as to extract the maximum benefit.

We have seen the impromptu use of weapons which brought about the *withdrawal* of an opposing power from a position judged by us to be contrary to our national policy. The use of the Berlin airlift is a famous case. A more dramatic example would be the use of our combined weapons to bring about a withdrawal from occupied countries. The top decision makers must obviously be willing to shoulder the risk of war in connection with such moves. Otherwise the deterrence effect will be frustrated (as above, when the aim was to induce the opponent to *abstain* rather than to withdraw).

By putting so much emphasis upon abstinence and withdrawal, we have diverted attention from other aims of national policy as they affect potential opponents. The dominant objective may be to induce *cooperation* for purposes compatible with our security. One of the declared goals of American policy is to bring about by negotiation, if possible, an end to the present armament race on terms compatible with our national security.

It is generally recognized that if this objective is to be achieved, a yet more fundamental purpose must be realized. I refer to the *reconstruction* of the policy orientation of the opposing power. It is not enough from the standpoint of national security to gain local and unlimited success in terms of abstinence, withdrawal or cooperation. By this time it has become quite clear that the outlook must change of those who are making the effective decisions elsewhere. In a sense our rearmament since 1945 has been a "short-of-war" activity designed to accomplish a permanent change, by peaceful means if possible, of the effective policies of the Soviet Union. By maintaining superiority in arms, while abstaining on our part from aggressive action, the hope has been to reduce the confidence of the Soviet Union elite in their doctrinnaire outlook and their aggressive policies.

Finally, we turn to the use of military instruments in situations short of war for the purpose of influencing an *associated* or *uncommitted* power. One of the objectives can be *withdrawal.* We may want to put a stop to the continuation of measures that in our judgment endanger the peace, and promise no compensating gains for security. We may go so far as to use blockade to bring about this modification of policy on the part of a power with whom we are on generally friendly terms.

The object may be *abstention.* We may act to prevent extensions of measures which may appear contrary to our national security interests.

The object may be *cooperation.* Obviously an overriding aim of NATO is to organize cooperative activity against a common threat.

The objective may be *reconstruction.* U. S. policy has repeatedly declared in favor of bringing new institutions of unity into existence in Western Europe.

The consideration of any of these moves involves an examination of factors affecting policy in the associated or uncommitted country, an examination no less exhaustive than we have referred to in case of an opposing power. Without reiterating the fundamental catagories, the crucial point is whether our influence will strengthen or weaken national unity. Where the ruling elite of the associated power does not have the support of the underlying masses of the population, we are in the delicate position of needing to handle our policy instruments in such a manner as to bring about integration without further weakening of the power in question. Where the ruling elite has a great deal of popular support we have the problem, which has many conspicuous difficulties, of managing our relations in such a manner as to refrain from compromising our friends, and lowering their acceptability at home by seeming to transform them into puppets of our national needs.

There is no time to deal with the political questions that arise in employing military instruments of national policy in time of general war, or in immediate post-war periods. To some extent this omission is made because most of the modern discussion of our subject deals with problems of coalition war, and in seeking to work in harness with allies who may diverge in important ideological and organizational particulars from one's own nation; and in striving to accomplish subversive results in enemy jurisdiction.

So far as U. S. public policy has been concerned in the past, some of the most conspicuous failures have been in meeting the problems that arise at the end of active hostilities. It is essential to define national policy well in advance of the "onslaught of peace" if the political preparation is to be successfully carried through for the mastery of post-war situations in ways that contribute to national security goals.

On this note, we conclude. We have been viewing the political factors that concern national military strategy in a world arena whose participants are more diversified than the traditional conception of equal sovereign states. We are dealing with a bipolarizing world, a world of international intergovernmental organizations, of transnational political parties, of transnational pressure groups and individuals who may operate across traditional lines. The military strategist who is responsible to the top decision makers of modern powers under these conditions is confronted by a variety of problems and tasks that differ in many ways from the obligations of his predecessors. The political factors include the present and prospective assumptions to be entertained about the goals and objectives of national policy, and the articulation of military instruments with all the instruments at the disposal of national policy. The task varies greatly in situations short of war, in general war and in immediate post-war periods. The decisions affecting our national security now and in the future must be assessed by locating the effective as distinct from the formal elite, and by exploring the affiliations and experiences that influence their political demands,

expectations and loyalties. In predicting the future of policy the impact of change in all spheres of the social process must be taken into account. The potential impact of our own actions enters into the evaluation of the important decisions of the opposing leadership. Parallel questions must be raised for associated and non-committed powers, whether the objectives are primarily abstinence, withdrawal, cooperation or reconstruction. In general, political factors are factors of intention of perspective: of conceptions of goal; of expectations concerning the past, present and future as it affects these goals; and of loyalties. The strategy of military instruments in this context is to maximize the attainment of our national objectives by influencing the expectations that favor the actions that serve these security aims.

BIOGRAPHIC SKETCH

Professor H. D. Lasswell

Professor Lasswell was born in Donnellson, Illinois, on 13 February 1902. He received a Ph.B. from the University of Chicago in 1922, and a Ph.D. from the same institution in 1926. He has also done graduate work at the Universities of London, Geneva, Paris, and Berlin. In 1922 he joined the faculty of the University of Chicago in the Department of Political Science, advancing from an assistant instructor to associate professor. He joined the Washington School of Psychiatry, Washington, D.C. in 1938 as political scientist for one year. Since that time Professor Lasswell has been associated with the School of Law at Yale University. Until 1945 he was visiting Sterling Lecturer, and in 1946 he became Professor of Law, his present position.

Since 1939 he has also been Director of War Communications Research, Library of Congress. He has served as visiting Professor at Syracuse University, 1926; Western Reserve University, 1929; University of California, 1935; Yenching University, 1937. He has been a lecturer at the New School for Social Research, New York, since 1939. In 1928-29 he was a Social Science Research Council Fellow.

Dr. Lasswell is a member of a number of professional organizations, including the American Political Science Association and American Sociological Society, and is a contributor to many periodicals and is advisory editor of Ethics, Public Opinion Quarterly, Human Relations, and World Politics. He has published numerous books on world politics, some of the more recent being: "Power and Society: A Framework for Political Inquiry," 1950; "National Security and Individual Freedom," 1950; "World Revolution of our Time: A Framework for Basic Policy Research." 1951; "Recent Developments in Scope and Method," 1951; "A Comparative Study of Elites," 1952; "A Comparative Study of Symbols," 1952.

RECOMMENDED READING

The evaluations of books listed below include those recommended to resident students of the Naval War College. Officers in the fleet and elsewhere may find these of interest.

Many of these publications may be found in ship and station libraries. Some of the publications not available from these sources may be obtained from the Bureau of Naval Personnel Auxiliary Library Service, where a collection of books is available for loan to individual officers. Requests for the loan of these books should be made by the individual to the nearest branch or the Chief of Naval Personnel. (See Article C-9604, Bureau of Naval Personnel Manual, 1948).

Title: *Soviet Military Doctrine.* 587 p.

Author: Garthoff, Raymond L. Glencoe, Ill., The Free Press, 1953.

Evaluation: This book explains the relationship between the Soviet military and political doctrine; it analyzes Soviet principles of war, and it discusses field doctrine — organization, technical, and operational. Army, Navy and Air missions, with implementing doctrine as revealed, are interesting and informative. The organization of the Soviet Armed Forces is included as Appendix I. The entire volume is of value to the military man. Part I, "Bases of Military Doctrine," is of particular concern to strategy students. The ideas of Soviet leaders are revealed and should be studied.

Title: *The Arab World.* 412 p.

Author: Izzeddin, Nejla. Chicago, Henry Regnery Co., 1953.

Evaluation: The author deals with the historical and cultural development of the Arabs in the Middle East and Mediterranean areas and with the present situation and future prospects of the Arab world. She provides a broad and comprehensive review of the entire Arab problem in one volume. This work is principally of value to the reader beginning a study of the Middle East. It is a very convincing presentation of the current Arab attitudes and beliefs and their firm basis in the political and cultural history of the Arabs.

Title: *Triumph and Tragedy*. 800 p.

Author: Churchill, Winston S. Boston, Houghton Mifflin Co., 1953.

Evaluation: Sir Winston Churchill presents the final volume of his monumental history of the Second World War. He states the theme of this section as: "How the Great Democracies Triumphed and so Were Able to Resume the Follies Which Had so Nearly Cost Them Their Life." Book One is entitled: "The Tide of Victory," and narrates events from D-day in Normandy through the British intervention in Greece to the end of 1944. Book Two, "The Iron Curtain," somewhat more interpretive in approach, takes in events from Yalta to the end of the war, with heavy emphasis on the Russian machinations to set up their present system of satellites. This last volume of Mr. Churchill's great work is perhaps the most significant for the reader of today. Its narrative of the closing year of the war is distinctly subordinated to a thoughtful and documented commentary on how we failed to gain the advantage we might have expected from our victory. Triumph and Tragedy is, together with the rest of the series, a reference work of major importance. Because of the sharp relevance of its lessons to the dilemmas of today, this volume is also recommended reading. The heavy documentation makes complete study difficult, but the different size of type between quotations and text makes scanning easy, and the reader can select portions of particular interest for more careful perusal.

Title: *Modern China's Foreign Policy*. 399 p.

Author: Levi, Werner. Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1953.

Evaluation: The author addresses himself objectively to the underlying causes and current objectives of modern China's foreign policy. Confining himself to the briefest possible history of the early development of China's foreign policies, the major portion of his book is devoted to post-World War II policies. Mr. Levi takes no partisan view of the "China Question" that raged and still rages, so bitterly on the American political scene in his penetrating analysis. An extremely well-written and easily-readable book, his discussion of the Chinese Communist long-term objectives are worthy of study and reflection.

Title: *The Navy as an Instrument of Policy*, 1558-1727. 404 p.

Author: Richmond, Herbert. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1953.

Evaluation: A history of British naval operations for the period of 1558-1727, written from the point of view of their relation to grand strategy. It is a posthumous book of the author, Sir Herbert Richmond, who was probably one of the greatest modern historians and naval analysts. As an analysis of naval strategy it contains little that has not been covered in his previous work, Statesmen and Seapower. The book is valuable for reference use for those who are researching the period covered, or for those looking for historical examples of the employment of naval forces in grand strategy.

Title: *Britain and the United States*. 224 p.

Authors: Roberts, Henry L., and Wilson, Paul A., N.Y., Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1953.

Evaluation: An examination of various factors which have aided or prevented post-World War II cooperation between Britain and the United States. Jointly prepared by study groups of the Council on Foreign Relations and the Royal Institute of International Affairs, the report describes divergent views in economies, security, foreign and domestic policies. The individual appraisals of the problems besetting these two countries are informative and appear candid. The analysis of the complexities surrounding the British position in the conduct of the economic affairs of the United Kingdom is particularly enlightening.

PERIODICALS

Title: *City Hall Politics in Italy*.

Author: Mower, Edgar Ansel.

Publication: THE ATLANTIC, December, 1953, p. 59-61.

Annotation: Attributes the success of communism in Italy to a fact overlooked by U. S. officials overseas — its efficiency as a party machine.

Title: *The New Anti-Americanism in Japan*.

Author: Kawai, Kazuo.

Publication: FAR EASTERN SURVEY, November, 1953, p. 153-157.

Annotation: Summarizes the factors, political, social and psychological,

that contribute to the present Japanese attitude toward America.

Title: *Strategic and Logistic Planning.*

Author: Gray, Louis P., III, Commander, U.S.N.

Publication: U. S. NAVAL INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS, December, 1953, p. 1321-1330.

Annotation: Discusses the relationship between strategic and logistic planning illustrated in past campaigns and emphasizes the importance of logistic preparation to carry out strategic plans for the future.

Title: *General Emory Upton — The Army's Mahan.*

Author: Brown, Richard C.

Publication: MILITARY AFFAIRS, Fall, 1953, p. 125-131.

Annotation: Deals with the work of General Upton whose influence on the modern American Army compares with that of Mahan's in regard to the modern American Navy.

Title: *The Commands of NATO.*

Publication: PEGASUS, November, 1953, p. 7-10.

Annotation: Outlines the responsibilities of SACLANT and the Channel Command, the Naval Commands in the organization of the defense of Europe, which are co-equal with SHAPE.

Title: *Mao's Second Team.*

Author: Russell, George B.

Publication: THE FREEMAN, December 14, 1953, p. 204-205.

Annotation: Presents information on five English-speaking Chinese communists who are specialists in psychological warfare and are allegedly being trained by Mao to move into the international arena if China is admitted to the U.N.

Title: *Nuclear Energy and Sea Power.*

Author: Steele, George P., Lieutenant, U.S.N.

Publication: UNITED STATES NAVAL INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS, December, 1953, p. 1314-1319.

Annotation: Considers the effect of nuclear power in ships upon sea

power and calls for a program of personnel training to ensure successful naval utilization of atomic power.

Title: *Sea Power's Role in Atomic Warfare.*

Author: Reinhart, George C., Colonel, U.S.A.

Publication: UNITED STATES NAVAL INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS, December, 1953, p. 1279-1287.

Annotation: Deals with the impact of atomic weapons upon the Navy's mission and concludes that they will enhance the Navy's offensive strength at a time when it is being greatly relied upon.

Title: *Counterattack on Undersea Marauders.*

Author: Akers, Frank, Rear Admiral, U.S.N.

Publication: ARMY INFORMATION DIGEST, December, 1953, p. 9-13.

Annotation: The Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Undersea Warfare) makes an evaluation of the submarine's chances in the event of a third world war.

Title: *Defense and Strategy.*

Publication: FORTUNE, December, 1953, p. 77-78, 82, 84.

Annotation: Discusses the rejection of Secretary Wilson's first defense budget by the National Security Council, and the debate on a new strategic concept based on atomic weapons.

Title: *American Forces in Europe.*

Publication: PEGASUS, November, 1953, p. 3-5.

Annotation: Explains the command structure of American forces in Europe and their relationship to the NATO commands.

Title: *Soviet Inland Water Network.*

Publication: MILITARY REVIEW, December, 1953, p. 78-82.

Annotation: A comprehensive discussion of the existing and proposed inland waterways in the Soviet Union and her satellites. (Translated and digested from Revue Militaire d'Information, 10 February 1953).

Title: *The Treatment of Aerial Intruders in Recent Practice and International Law.*

Author: Lissitzyn, Oliver J.

Publication: THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, October, 1953, p. 559-589.

Annotation: Surveys the practice and doctrine with respect to intruding aircraft to the end of World War II, examines incidents since that time, and outlines certain standards of international law that may be regarded as established or in the process of being established.

Title: *Nuclear Weapons: Strategic or Tactical.*

Author: Brodie, Bernard.

Publication: FOREIGN AFFAIRS, January, 1954, p. 217-229.

Annotation: Deals with the trends in atomic weapons development and the implication of military utilization of these weapons.

Title: *The Past is Prologue.*

Author: Ofstie, Ralph. Vice Admiral, U.S.N.

Publication: SPERRYSCOPE, 4th Quarter, 1953, p. 7-10.

Annotation: Asserts that the Navy's principal stake is in the carrier-force-weapons system and reviews the growth of carrier weapons.

Title: *Big Three Warns Aggressors.*

Publication: U. S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, December 18, 1953, p. 55.

Annotation: Presents the full text of the communique' issued by leaders of the American, British and French governments at the end of the Bermuda Conference.

Title: *Anti-Bandit War.*

Author: Murray, J. C., Colonel, U.S.M.C.

Publication: MARINE CORPS GAZETTE, January, 1954, p. 14-23.

Annotation: An excellent article on the first real step in the policy of containment, the aid to Greece in her fight against communist expansion.

Title: *Peace Through the H-Bomb?*

Author: Herald, George W.

Publication: WORLD, January 1, 1954, p. 9-12.

Annotation: Considers the effect of an H-bomb war, also the possibilities of an H-bomb peace.

Title: *Influence of Sea Power in the Indian Ocean.*

Author: Venkatachar, C. S.

Publication: THE JOURNAL OF THE UNITED SERVICE INSTITUTION OF INDIA, July-October, 1953, p. 153-163.

Annotation: Briefly traces the history of sea power in the Indian Ocean from early times to the present.

Title: *Japan's Predicament.*

Author: Hittle, J. D., Colonel, U.S.M.C.

Publication: MARINE CORPS GAZETTE, January, 1954, p. 44-49.

Annotation: An important article of interest to all students in their study of our position in the Far East and the factors influencing it.

Title: *Air Power at Sea: A Fiasco in Flexibility.*

Author: Grenfell, Russell, Captain, R. N.

Publication: THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY, January, 1954, p. 56-60.

Annotation: Tells how the Nazi cruisers SCHARNHORST and GNEISENAU ran the gauntlet of British sea and air power and escaped from their French base through the English Channel.

Title: *Strategy of Restraint or Chaos Unlimited.*

Author: Baldwin, Hanson W.

Publication: COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL, January, 1954, p. 10-13.

Annotation: An able and scholarly study of morality as applied to the next war combined with an estimate of the ends desired in a war with Russia.

Title: *The New Look.*

Author: Radford, Arthur W., Admiral, U.S.N.

Publication: VITAL SPEECHES, January 1, 1954, p. 171-173.

Annotation: The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff outlines the defense plans of the U. S. in an address delivered in Washington on December 14.

Title: *Civilian-Military Balance.*

Author: Hoopes, Townsend.

Publication: THE YALE REVIEW, Winter, 1953-54, p. 218-234.

Annotation: Reviews the growth of military influence and responsibility and discusses President Eisenhower's reorganization plan as a measure aimed at achieving proper civilian-military balance.

Title: *Strategy Overtakes Mr. Wilson.*

Author: Murphy, Charles J. V.

Publication: FORTUNE, January, 1954, p. 80-81.

Annotation: A summary of the results of Charles E. Wilson's first year as Secretary of Defense.