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THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF RUSSIA

A lecture delivered
at the Naval War College
on 2 September 1953, by
Dr. Philip E. Moseley

Admiral Conolly, Admiral Robbins, Gentlemen:

I feel very humble at attempting to summarize a thousand years of Russian history in a few minutes. All I am going to try to do is pick out a few of the factors which have shaped Russian history; and then to indicate, very briefly, how they affect the Russian position today in the world and, therefore, our relationship of conflict and struggle for survival against Soviet power of today.

There is one concept which I think is basic to some of our confusion about Russian power and Russian intentions. That was expressed in an off-hand statement some few years ago by a very able statesman but, in that particular moment, not a very great historian, in my opinion — Dean Acheson. He said: "Soviet Imperialism is simply the old Russian expansionism in another form." This is a very basic question. If Russia has always been an expansionist power, if communism is just a device, a method, a technique for securing Russian aims, then, of course, we have to take one attitude toward Russia. We would be justified in pressing as hard as we could, not only to return Russia to her boundaries of 1941 or 1938 but perhaps to her boundaries of 1651, for example, in order to allow other peoples now contained within the Soviet Empire to exert their own national purposes and, we would hope, to join the side of freedom. If, on the other hand, there are basic differences between Russian expansionism and Soviet expansionism, then we need to analyze those and try to find the crack in the armor where we can drive wedges in peacetime or in 'cold war' time, as well as in time of 'hot war.'

One of the factors which is basic in both Russian and Soviet government is the multi-national character of the state. Pre-1913 Russia had about 51% of great Russians, the other 49% being composed of other peoples. The Soviet Empire of today, similarly, has about 50% Russians — a little over 100,000,000 out of an estimated 210,000,000 total inhabitants.

I want to say just a few words about this problem of the multi-national empire because this comes right back to the question: Is it Russian rule over the non-Russian peoples that make for this empire of 210 millions — instead of somewhat over 100 millions — and, if so, is the diversity of nationality a factor of weakness that we should try to exploit in peacetime and in 'cold war' as well as in war?

I am not going to bore you with the details of the numbers and locations of the various peoples in the Russian Empire. You are generally familiar with them. I will mention that, in addition to the Great Russians, who inhabit the main part of European Russia and spread across Siberia to the Pacific, there is also the Ukrainian nation within the Soviet Union, forming a Soviet Republic. It is estimated to contain 40 million people, making it not much smaller in population than Italy, France or Great Britain and, actually, considerably richer than Italy and probably richer than France in its natural and industrial resources. Then there is the Byelorussian nation of some 15 million, which lies in the Western part of the Soviet Union bordering more on Poland. Both of these peoples are Eastern Slavs and both of them have had (in their eastern parts, at least) a long association with Russia, to which I will return in a minute.

Then there are several peoples of, roughly 3.5 million each, the Armenians, the Georgians, the Azerbaidzhans, Turks, and there are some 15 million Moslems east of the Caspian, in Central Asia, conquered as recently as the 1860's, and 1870's. Those are the most important and significant of the non-Russian peoples from

the point of view of Russia's political stability, which is what we want to discuss today.

One of the features of the old Russian Empire, pre-1917, and of the Soviet Empire of today is that it ranks its nationalities according to their degree of loyalty and reliability. This in itself is an important factor in analyzing the differences which have appeared among these peoples. One of the peoples who were treated as extremely reliable in the Imperial method and are treated as relatively unreliable today are the Ukrainian people, the second largest people of the Soviet Union. One indication of this was the very severe application of collectivization, of suppression of national culture from the period 1929 down to the war. During and after the war, all of the Ukraine was under German occupation. The shifting out of the population and the removal of all those elements accused or suspected of collaboration with the occupying forces of Hitler was carried out with rigor in the Ukraine. Another interesting indication is that the proportion of Communist Party members among Ukrainians is only half that among Russians.

Turning to another group of people, the Georgians and Armenians in the Caucasus, on the other hand, cooperated actively in joining the Russian Empire and rejoining the Soviet Union in 1920-21. That does not mean that they were all enthusiastic about it or that there was no opposition. In fact, there were uprisings in the mountains of Georgia as late as 1930. At that time, I was supposed to cross on horseback over a trail and I had to be diverted to another route because there was an uprising along the Sukhum military highway. On the other hand, the proportion of Communist Party members among Armenians and Georgians is, roughly, twice that of the general population of the Soviet Union. Lying on the border line, as two Christian peoples, they have a long history of survival against Turkish and Iranian Moslem pressure. This is certainly a carry-over from the tradition of close attachment to Russia and relatively lenient treatment of their culture by Russia and by the Soviet Union.

In addition to this positive ranking, in terms of Party membership, there is also a negative ranking which was applied both by the Russian Empire and by the Soviet Regime. For example, the Imperial Russian government, up to 1917, did not dare conscript Moslems from Central Asia; they were simply left out of military service in spite of the fact that the (then) roughly 12-14 million Moslems would have provided a substantial group for military service. The Soviet regime has conscripted them and has made a great boast that this demonstrates their strong attachment. But, as a matter of fact, the number of escapees and defectors from the Central Asiatic Moslems (where they have had an opportunity along the Iron Curtain to defect) is quite striking.

During and after World War II, the Soviet government actually destroyed six nationalities which, previously, had had Soviet or autonomous republics of their own. Among them was the Republic of the Volga Germans, which had been established by Stalin himself in 1918. Roughly, 600,000 inhabitants of this republic were seized in 1941 and scattered through construction jobs, lumber camps, prison camps, and in the far reaches of Siberia and the north; they have disappeared. I recently examined a map published in 1951 in Moscow, showing the administrative divisions of the Soviet Union in 1926, at which time the German Volga Republic occupied a substantial area along the lower Volga. That republic had disappeared from the map in 1951, which was supposed to show the administrative divisions of 1926. In other words, the Soviet regime is engaged in wiping out the memory that that republic ever existed in the Soviet system.

In 1944, the Crimean Tartars, a nation which had lived for 600 years in the Crimea and had some 450,000 people, was eliminated or liquidated. The people were simply gathered up, the women sent in one direction, the men in others, and the children to homes where they would be brought up speaking Russian and would disappear into the general population.

Several smaller peoples of the Caucasus, totaling about 600,000 — the Karachai, the Chechens, and the Ingush — similarly, were liquidated, their place-names wiped out, and they disappeared from the map and from the histories of the Soviet Union. The Kalmyks, a Buddhist people, settled since the late eighteenth century in the semi-desert area northwest of the Caspian, were also completely eliminated. It had a total of some 130,000 people before the war. You would be interested to know that the last known remnant of the Kalmyk people have now settled in Camden, New Jersey. There are about 450 of them. They have built a Buddhist temple. They have some difficulties with their neighbors because, according to tribal customs, they kidnap their brides. This is an occasion of great festivity, purely a ceremonial act, but their neighbors thought they had to call in the F.B.I., as kidnapping is a Federal offense. This has now been explained to the neighbors and the Kalmyks have also moderated some of their more extreme violence — or fictitious violence — in carrying out the kidnapping. Naturally, it is pre-arranged with the bride that she is going to be kidnapped.

Some people say that we should try by every means to play up the national differences within the Soviet Union — that this is the most reliable way of restricting the Great Russians to the territory in which they are settled, which is very extensive — and that we should attempt to regroup the peoples of the Soviet Union at some time in the future in a way which would set up a series of national states in all parts of the Soviet Union. There is a strong tendency in British thinking along this direction, with special attention to the Moslems of the Soviet Union, who are, actually, more numerous than the Moslems of all of Turkey.

There are a number of complicated factors here. For one thing, the relations between the Great Russians and the non-Russians have changed considerably during the history of the Soviet regime, as well as in the history of Imperial Russia. In the early days of the expansion of the Russian Empire, the idea was

that it should be a multi-national state with more or less equity, at least, of the ruling groups within each nation. Therefore, for example, the German barons of the Baltic region were able, from the time of Peter the Great until the 1880's (and in some respects down until 1918) to dominate the life of the three Baltic states. They were treated as partners by the Imperial Russian regime. Some of the Central Asiatic nations, through their ruling dynasties and groups, were treated in part as dependent allies rather than as a completely subject peoples.

However, from the 1860's and, particularly, from the 1880's on, the Russian Empire tended to stress adherence to Russian culture, language, and nationality as a superior factor to a mere political allegiance to the Russian Tsar as the ruler over many peoples. This proved to be a factor of weakness in the Russian Empire in its final decades because it intensified the demand of the non-Russian nationalities for, at least, autonomy and, eventually in many cases, for independence. Of course the most striking example of this unintended effect of "Russification" was shown in the case of Russian Poland. From 1815 to 1915, the Russian Empire held the largest segment of the Polish nation under its control. Particularly from the 1860's on, every effort was made to "Russify" the Poles. They were required to study in Russian from the beginning schools up. Underground schools in Polish had to be developed and maintained either by bribery or by trickery against the pressure of the Russian administration. Educated Poles could quite readily secure jobs in the Russian Empire, where they were likely to be absorbed into the Russians, but the officials in Poland had to be Russians. As a matter of fact, throughout those decades they were given special "hardship" allowances because it was felt they were serving in the midst of a hostile population.

The main result was to solidify the Polish nationality, to create a detailed knowledge of Russia, and a very strong and unanimous determination to reestablish an independent Polish state as soon as international changes in power gave them that opportunity.

On the other hand, the Moslem nationalities tended to remain pretty much within their old tribal village and religious culture without doing very much to adopt the knowledge and techniques of Western civilization. They remained in a more defensive, rather than counter-offensive, position in defense of their national independence. I mention this because in the Soviet period a different policy has been followed: that of trying to create a uniformity of ideas, ideology and culture, but using the different languages. The classic statement, of course, has been: "A culture, socialist in content and national in form." This means in effect that all the different nationalities in the Soviet Union are encouraged to read Stalin in their own language, rather than having to learn Russian in order to read it. That is not a very serious concession to the sense of national difference and national identity.

The Soviet attitude towards the relation between the Great Russians and the non-Russians has undergone three main stages, which I will simply list, without spelling them out in detail. During the first 12-14 years of the Soviet regime, down to 1929-1932, there was a definite preference given to the non-Russian nationalities. The history of Imperial Russian rule was treated purely as one of oppression and conquest, destruction of the national independence of other people. This put Russian language and Russian culture at a certain disadvantage in relation to the other nationalities. Between 1929-1934, the balance was shifted so that they could again speak of Russian culture, could stress much more than they had before the Russian language as the common language of the entire country for travel, work, and communication. There was a shift now in the interpretation of the Russian past. Instead of saying that Russian conquest from the sixteenth to the nineteenth centuries had been unmitigated evil and oppression, it was now stressed that Russian conquest had been the "lesser evil" compared with joining some other neighboring people; that it had, as a by-product of oppression, opened the area to the development of a more modern economy and to access of Western knowledge and science (much of which was, in fact, true).

During and after the Second World War, there has been a further shift toward extreme emphasis on the supremacy of Russian culture and nationality. This was expressed very sharply by Stalin at a big banquet to the leaders of the armed forces given in the Kremlin on May 16, 1945, when, at the climax of the banquet, he rose and gave a toast "to the Great Russian people which has borne the main burden of the struggle and which has never faltered in its support of the regime." He did not say that the Ukrainians had not faltered, or the Georgians, or other groups.

One reflection of this, especially since the war, has been the emphasis upon the continual superiority of Russian culture, the continual role of the Russians as the "elder brothers" to the non-Russians, and the emphasis that in every respect the earlier conquest by Imperial Russia was a progressive step. It was not a lesser evil; it was a great good. As one recent re-writing of the history of the Kazakh people in Central Asia has stated, in the official pronouncement condemning the history that had been approved and given the Stalin prize a few years before the line changed, the conquest of the Kazakhs not only brought them into the range of European civilization, but enabled them to learn the language of Lenin, the leader of the Revolution. All this occurred at a time before Lenin was even born; therefore, the Kazakhs might have been pardoned for not understanding several decades in advance that this was going to be a great privilege.

When we consider this problem, however, of whether Russia provides the expansion or whether it is Soviet ideology, we must consider several other factors and not merely look at the map in which many different nationalities are identified by names on the map. One factor is that the Russian language and culture (and, therefore, nationality since the Russians have never followed a racialist point of view but have always regarded as Russians those who learned the language well and adopted the point of view and the values of their culture) have undergone a widespread adoption, whether by attraction, by force, or by discrimination against the

non-national groups. In other words, if a Georgian wants to make a career outside of his small Republic of Georgia he has to, in effect, become a Russian in the ways that the Russians consider essential. The same is true even of a Moslem. And since the Soviet culture and Soviet ideology is anti-religious, it facilitates the adoption of a common non-religious, non-confessional culture in a way in which the emphasis upon the Orthodox Church, as the basis of Russian nationality, did not do under the Empire. But the Soviet Union has actually intensified a kind of supranational loyalty to the Communist Party, and the Soviet regime has channeled the ambitions of all active and energetic people from all the different nationalities towards supporting that end. Therefore, I think we should not assume that in all respects and in all segments of the population the non-Russian people are reacting in a hostile way against this emphasis upon, and propagation of, Russian culture since their own cultures also continue to operate within the narrow framework prescribed both for the Russian and the non-Russian cultures within the Soviet ideology.

Another factor to consider is that while the Imperial regime tolerated many different customs, many different ways of life, and different religions in different parts of the empire, the Soviet regime has actively been creating a uniform way of life. The spread of industrialization to the eastern parts of the country has greatly changed the way of life. In 1914, there were approximately 15 million people out of 150 million who lived in cities and, therefore, were undergoing urbanization and modernization in that sense. Today, there are around 85 million people out of 210 million living in cities, with a much more urban culture, much more emphasis upon urban institutions. Many of the cities of older Russia were really large villages which did not differ very much from the surrounding villages.

Urban life is extremely rugged in the Soviet Union and the hardships are great; but the emphasis upon educational, cultural and other institutions as a means of spreading the Soviet version

of "culture" is very striking. Certainly the process of churning up peasants into urban people has gone on at intensified rates.

In Imperial days, the Ukrainian peasants had their land customs, the Russian peasants had theirs, differing to some extent in different parts of the country; the villages of Central Asia followed more or less their immemorial customs. Today, for nearly twenty-five years, all of these peasants have lived under the collective farm system. It has a similar organization, a similar way of work, a similar degree of oppression and exaction upon the peasants throughout the country. There is, therefore, a greater degree of uniformity across the country than has ever prevailed before. That means that many of the basic problems of the people in their relation to the regime are not problems of nationality. They are problems of: Can the peasant get an adequate living? Can he both feed his family and acquire a few articles of clothing and household equipment as a result of working hard for an entire year? Can he get a somewhat lenient attitude from the government for his small livestock, which he is allowed to keep on his own small piece of land? These problems are more or less uniform throughout the country, in spite of its geographical diversity.

I want to emphasize then that the problem of national diversity is a very important one in the Soviet Union. It might mean — in case of a disruption of the regime by a sudden destruction, let's say, of its control and power centers — that people in outlying regions would reorganize their lives in accordance with their national identity. On the other hand, it is not clear that we would be able in time of 'cold war' to go very far in developing a sense of national oppression as a factor which appeals deeply to all the non-Russian peoples in the Soviet Union. We might find, as I have often found in talking with non-Russians who had escaped from the Soviet Union in the past few years, that this problem is not in the forefront of their minds at all. Problems of making the regime livable, of persuading it to relax its extreme demands upon all the people, are much to the forefront of their minds as they escape.

In dealing with the Soviet Union, we too often attempt to treat them as if they were fellow-Americans. We assume too often they have the same set of values; that we can appeal to them in terms of what we consider important and valuable in life. This is often a weakness because it means that we shoot past the mark or actually have a negative effect. For example, people brought up under the Soviet regime do not understand a multi-party system; they do not understand a system of alternation of parties in power. They consider that a government which does not demand extreme sacrifices of its people is probably a weak and hesitant government. That does not mean that we should not tell them about our system of government and, particularly, about the liberties which we have. But we cannot expect that to be understood or real to most of them. They simply have not been given access to that kind of understanding of the West. In fact, especially since the end of the Second World War, there has been a positive campaign to prevent any fair or historical treatment of the history of the West, and, particularly, of the United States. Any Soviet writer or scholar who would try to treat a Western and free society as having its own basic traditions would be denounced as a "cosmopolitan." That is the basic meaning of the term, which often seems obscure to us.

One thing which we have to remember from Russian history is that, while Russia in its early centuries (roughly, from the ninth through the twelfth centuries) was very much a part of Central Europe and did not differ notably in its culture or in its outlook from the rest of Europe, from the thirteenth century on, it was increasingly separated from the West and did not begin to deal on any intimate terms with the West until the eighteenth century. That is a very basic factor. First, there was the Mongol conquest in the middle of the thirteenth century, which oriented Russia toward the East, towards an Asiatic despotism, an armed camp of nomads which by terror and periodic exaction of tribute kept the subjugated peoples weak and unable to organize resistance during more than two centuries. During the time that Russia was under Mongol conquest and absorbing Mongol attitudes of absolute

obedience to authority and when, in the subsequent period, they were overcoming the Mongols but, at the same time adopting many of their concepts of rule, Western Europe was undergoing three very important historical transformations.

One of these was the development of feudalism. Feudalism was, of course, a pretty bloody and anarchic way of life, but it did have certain ethical values which were crystalized in the concept of chivalry and the gentleman. It had definite legal advantages for the rest of Europe, from Poland, westward; relationships were considered to be based not upon absolute authority and absolute obedience but upon a contract between the ruler and the ruled, between the feudal superior and the feudal inferior. Both the superiors and the inferiors had their rights and duties. While they could not always enforce them of course, in feudal anarchy, that concept was extremely important. In other words, at the very time that England was developing, through the feudal struggle and through the solidarity of the aristocracy, the Magna Carta of 1215, Russia was about to be dragged under an Asiatic despotism. That is a very important turning-point.

Another great European development which Russia missed completely was the Renaissance — the opening of learning to criticism, the development of the historical sense, the development of the attitude which led to modern science — based upon experimentation, observation, and systematic study; not upon appeal to authority. Russia acquired Western science wholesale at a late period; it did not grow out of the general experience of the cultivated people of the entire area, as in Western Europe.

A third factor that Russia missed almost completely was the Reformation — the great spiritual, ethical reawakening in both major groups of Western Christianity which resulted in bringing ethical and moral teachings and concepts far closer into the people and into their daily lives than had been true in most respects in the Middle Ages. Both the Reformation and the Counter-Refor-

mation passed Russia by because of its isolation. Instead, what developed in Russia was a garrison state; especially, from the middle of the sixteenth century (from the time of Ivan the Terrible) down, roughly, to the middle of the nineteenth century, the Russian ideal was the garrison state. This meant that the basis of Russian society was the subordination of every class in society to the needs of the state, particularly, to its needs for defense. The landowners were given land to use, and, later, to own, but they held it only in terms of service to the state. If they were not excused from military and, in part, civilian service to the state at their own expense, they could be deprived of that land. In other words, they were not a class of independent landowners by the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries who chose to give service to the state; they were in a sense the superior group of slaves to the state.

In 1730, one of the main demands of the very influential guard's regiments, which controlled the security of the capitol of St. Petersburg, was that their service to the state be reduced from "life" to "thirty years." Similarly, a small merchant class was harnessed to the service of the state. They were forced to accept that government by despotic rulers who made them form corporations which were then jointly responsible for collecting many of the forms of taxes and paying it over. If the merchant's guild failed to pay the various customs sought and many of the other taxes to the state, collecting them at their own expense and delivering them to the treasury, they were punished, their property confiscated, they could have their ears cut off or their tongues torn out and be sent to Siberia.

The peasants were attached to the land of the state or of the landowners in order to provide the necessary support for the landowning military class. The priests were similarly fixed in their occupation and their children were obliged to become priests whether they wanted to or not. The Russian Orthodox Church, of course, until recently, required a member of the priesthood to marry before he could be ordained as a priest, and the children were required to

follow the profession of the parents. This system of a "caste" society is far more rigid than anything that developed in Western Europe and the system of serfdom (which lasted for three hundred years in Russia) was far more rigorous than had prevailed in Western or Central Europe. In fact, Russian serfdom, right down to 1861, can only be compared with negro slavery in this country; with the one important exception, of course, that there was no color difference — they were white slaves. But, right down to 1861 individual serfs could be sold apart from the land. The landowner generally punished recalcitrant serfs by sending them to the army for twenty-five years; or, if the quota for the army which the landlord was required to fill from among his serfs was already taken up, he could send them to Siberia. Of course in doing so he was losing a valuable property; therefore, he frequently resorted to other forms of punishment. Capital punishment by the landowners was forbidden, but they were allowed to give up to a thousand strokes of the cat-o'-nine-tails and, usually, twenty-five strokes were enough to finish off a recalcitrant serf. Thus, 80% of the Russian people lived under a very oppressive system with no rights that they could defend against the landowners. Even the right of petition to higher authority was forbidden and a serf who tried to appeal to the governor of the province against cruel or unjust treatment was likely to be sent to Siberia immediately. Thus, Russia, until 1861, was governed as a garrison state with each group of society performing definite functions for the purpose of maintaining and enlarging the power of the state; particularly, its international power.

The period from 1861-1917 was too short to carry out a transformation of Russia along completely Western lines. It is true that there was a growing educated class which was outside of this concept of the former garrison state and which provided a large number of people to staff the new professions which were necessary in modernizing the country; they formed a corps of doctors, farm experts, lawyers, teachers, and many other professions that had previously had no real part in a garrison state. On the other hand

they, in turn — by adopting Western Dress, by Westernizing in part their vocabulary to take account of new concepts — became remote to the people. This is part of the tragedy of Russia in 1917: that the intelligensia, which had the finest intentions but not always enough practical experience, since it was kept at a distance by the bureaucracy and the autocracy (which was suspicious of the intelligensia), also did not have the support of the peasants.

What Lenin really did in 1917 was to capture the inner element of control of a spontaneous movement of protest, not so much against conditions as they were in 1917 as against the conditions of the previous three hundred years of Russian history. The peasants by 1917 had taken over most of the land from the landowners. There were still some conspicuous large estates which aroused their resentment. The peasant did not feel that he was a citizen; he still felt that he was just, briefly, an emancipated serf. This psychology ran through the whole of Russian Revolution.

Lenin and a small group of Communists proved to be best able to interpret this spontaneous movement for the destruction of the old regime and at the same time most skillful in organizing a new garrison state on the ashes of the old. This concept of the role of the Communist Party dictatorship as a garrison which would not govern by the will of the people but would govern allegedly for its good was clearly stated by Lenin only ten days before the seizure of power in November of 1917. There were influential members of the Communist Party who said that they should not seize power, that this would be a dictatorship; that they should progress in an orderly way toward democracy of the Western type. Lenin turned this around and said: "For three centuries the czar has governed Russia with the aid of 100,000 landowners ruling millions of people. Why cannot 200,000 Communists govern the whole of Russia?"

Therefore, the Communist Party, which has governed Russia ever since that time, after a period of desperate struggle, at first

for survival and then for complete control, has been organized as a garrison, a minority which does not want to be joined by the majority; which insists upon rigid indoctrination and discipline and strict obedience to orders from above. We cannot understand the Communist Party unless we consider it, in part, as an occupying force which receives policies and orders only from above and which imposes those both by methods of persuasion and indoctrination and by unlimited use of force against real or suspected adversaries upon the entire people of the area, including the Russians as well as the non-Russians.

What the heritage of Russian history has meant in Soviet communism has been, then, the rule by a disciplined minority, a discipline of the Communist Party replacing the greatly weakened discipline of the Imperial bureaucracy in its civil, its judicial, and its military components. The Soviet Union has been and the Soviet leaders are proud to maintain a garrison state in which authority is from above; all decisions are made from above; the people are treated as an instrument. If they attempt to show a will of their own, as, for example, by inconveniently dying of hunger at a time when their labor is needed, this is also a form of opposition to the state and requires still further punishment.

At the same time the Soviet Union has — before, during, and since World War II — increasingly reverted to pride in the external power of the regime as a binding force to hold it together and to justify the tremendous sacrifices of well-being, liberty, and even of individual choice by all the people within the state. If there were time, I would list some of the restraints. We speak about forced labor in the Soviet Union; certainly that has been both a tremendous instrument of control of those not in slave labor camps as well as those in them and a means of carrying out large-scale construction projects at what the regime believes is a lesser cost to the state. But the free population is not “free.” All Communist Party members must go where they are assigned at any time; workers are not allowed to change from one factory to another without the per-

mission of the manager of the factory inscribed in their labor books. A member of a collective farm is not allowed to go more than ten miles from his collective farm without a written permit from the manager of the collective farm. Thus, the entire population, as in the days of Ivan the Terrible and Peter the Great, is held within a rigid system of central control, losing all the great advantages of diversity, of autonomy, of initiative, from below. You must remember that there were no private associations tolerated in the Russian Empire until 1905, except for some cultural associations, and none at all, not even cultural associations, are tolerated under the Soviet regime. Until 1905, political parties were treated as conspiracies and punished accordingly. Trade unions were treated as conspiracies, even after 1905. The Soviet regime has turned it around by itself organizing the only political party, the only tolerated trade unions, and the only cultural, sport and other activities which are permitted in the country.

I am going to state, in a very dogmatic way, a number of differences between the foreign policy aims of old Russia (pre-1917) and the Soviet regime of the present day. I think that in itself will help to provide a lot of good meat for discussion. If I sound dogmatic, don't think that I really am completely so, even though dealing with Soviet affairs (which are handled in such a completely dogmatic way) does tend to make many people, in turn, dogmatic.

One important difference between old Russia in its relation to the outer world is that the old Russians of all classes considered themselves and their culture inferior to that of Europe and they regarded Europe as a whole. Learning from the West rapidly, they translated, they studied abroad, they traveled extensively, they invited many foreigners to Russia to learn their techniques — beginning, of course, even before Peter the Great with inviting Dutch seamen to Russia, artillery foundrymen, and so on from Western countries. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, claims that not only the Soviet culture of today but Russian culture at all times in the past has been superior to that of any other country or system

in the world. I do not think that most people in the Soviet Union take this too seriously, but it may flatter their national pride to have it told to them. This extends to absurd lengths in the field of invention, for example, and this reminds me of one story which came out of Soviet-controlled Bulgaria.

Two Bulgarians were discussing the latest Soviet discoveries. One Bulgarian remarked that so-and-so, a Russian, had discovered the radio long ahead of Marconi or any Western inventors. The other Bulgarian said: "Why, yes, but that is nothing to what they have discovered most recently. They have discovered a cow which grazes in Bulgaria and is milked in the Soviet Union."

There is another joke which comes directly out of the Soviet Union about Kaganovich coming into Stalin's office very excited and saying: "We have suddenly discovered that an old Russian freak by the name of Petrov discovered the steam engine. This is wonderful. Now we can put the West in its place." Stalin turned to him and said: "Yes, but who invented Petrov?"

A more basic difference, I feel, is that old Russia operated in a system of states. Imperial Russia did not expect to rule the world. In fact, it had trouble ruling many of its own people and a number of czars found that led to assassination of themselves or of members of their families. Old Russia assumed that there would continue to be six major powers in Europe, in addition to the United States and Japan, or, in other words, that Russia was one of eight major powers in the world as of 1914. Even during World War I, Russian ambitions, which were extensive, did not extend to the destruction of the system of states because they assumed that Britain, France, Italy, United States, Japan would all remain great powers even if Austria-Hungary were broken up and Germany greatly weakened.

The Soviet philosophy calls for the destruction of the system of independent states and its replacement by a world-wide system

of Soviet republics. This has been basic from the beginning of the Soviet regime and it will be treated in a later lecture on "Soviet Ideology." The Soviet leaders maintain a very rigid, very unsound, philosophy which justifies this view in their eyes and they act upon it. It is true that every now and then they talk about "coexistence," coexistence of different systems. There is a great deal of talk now coming out of the Moscow and pro-Moscow propaganda channels about "coexistence." But this is typical of Soviet propaganda tricks because when they use the term "coexistence" abroad, they simply say "coexistence." We, being inclined to a world of "live-and-let-live," "give-and-take," assume that they mean the same things as we would mean by coexistence — that is, the permanent continuation of a number of major power centers, independent of each other. But when they use the term "coexistence" within their own ideology and in their own propaganda, they always attach a very important reservation. They say: "Coexistence at the given stage of history." In other words, at this stage it is convenient to Soviet propaganda to maintain that they do not intend at this time to overthrow all other systems. But history always goes on, whether you take a Soviet or a free interpretation of history, and, therefore, there will always be another stage of history. At that stage, there will no longer be any need for admitting the possibility or the desirability of different systems. This is a basic difference, then.

We must remember that the exercise of power within the Soviet system depends upon an increasing adoption of the ideology, the philosophy, the assumptions of the regime, as people rise nearer the top. For example, when people are chosen to be admirals, generals, secretaries of Communist parties of the larger republics, or ministers of state of the various republics and of the central government in Moscow, they are sent to a special school for a year in which they are given the ultimate in training in the management of the Soviet regime. At the lower stages, there are various schools through which they pass as people of energy and loyalty are moved upward. So the system tries to perpetuate an increasingly rigid ad-

herence to its basic philosophy as people come nearer to the exercise of responsibility under the basic policies of the state.

Another important factor is that while old Russia was until 1905, and in some respects until 1917, also an authoritarian state, it was of a more traditional, old-fashioned kind. As long as a political writer did not actually advocate the overthrow of the Imperial regime, he could publish almost anything. Lenin, while in prison, was able to write editorials for a very subversive newspaper which always had a nominal editor who could go to jail if the censor felt it had stepped over the line of subversion, leaving the real editors free to go on editing the paper, usually, under another name. As a matter of fact, just before 1914 this paper, which is the present-day PRAVDA of the Soviet Communist Party, had a special system of evading the censor. The paper was set and the proofs were taken to the censor. If they saw a *gendarme* officer coming out of the office of the censor, they knew he was coming to confiscate that issue or remove some part of it. The Bolsheviks had a fast horse waiting around the corner of the street. Their spy would rush and get into the carriage with the specially chosen horses and get to the publishing house before the *gendarme* officer could get there with the less fast horses supplied by the government. They would then hastily scatter the type, thus removing all evidence, and evade arrest.

The Soviet system is a totalitarian system. That means that it not only does not tolerate a wide range of autonomous activity, thinking, writing, and even agitation, but actually monopolizes all these activities, including a monopoly of the control over all forms of the printed word, and, as far as it can, of the spoken word. This is an entirely different system, much harder to break into; but, on the other hand, it does not necessarily in a time of crisis receive the complete loyalty of its people. It is clear that to a considerable extent the loyalty of Soviet people to their regime during World War II was recreated by Hitler and by the extremely brutal and cruel policies which he was determined to follow toward the peoples of the Soviet Union.

Another factor is that old Russia had no universal philosophy of rule and conquest. The Russians did not find it easy to rule other peoples; they certainly did not consider that their system was superior to that of all other peoples and that it should replace them. The Soviet system has a closely-knit, although highly fallacious, system of ideology through which it also is able to gain strong allies in other countries. This is perhaps the final basic difference: that old Russia did not have a Russian Fifth Column in France or Italy, such as the Soviet system today is able to mobilize through ideology (and other forms of pressure) even within free society, in smaller or larger units and in all countries. On the other hand, the Soviet ideology today insists upon centralized rule of all Communist parties and regimes from Moscow in all basic matters. This was the factor that led to the splitting off of Tito, since he felt that the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, having achieved power in its own country, knew better than Moscow what was good for it. After making concessions (and being willing to make many more), he was not willing to make the ultimate concession of allowing his head to be chopped off. That, he felt, was asking too much.

It is both a strength and a weakness, then, of the Soviet techniques as well as of its philosophy of world revolution, that it insists upon the supremacy of the Soviet party, which is increasingly a Russian party — Russian in outlook and language, if not necessarily in composition, but perhaps also in composition — and that it cannot conceive of the expansion of the regime except in terms of obedience to Moscow and the maintenance of Moscow control. Old Russia had a long history of expansion. Much of it, however, was across unoccupied areas (or almost unoccupied areas) like our own expansion to the west. Other parts of it represented strategic expansion to the sea, as in the Baltic, the Black and the Caspian Seas; in the Far East, the attempt to move southward to take Korea, which they hoped to take in the 1890's, and, failing that, to take the more isolated point of Port Arthur. On the other hand, the Russian expansion (like the Soviet expansion) followed the lines of least resistance, which were usually preceded by strong efforts

to prepare the way and to build up a superiority of power and were not undertaken as a rash venture in most cases, although they suffered defeats, of course, when they miscalculated the forces.

The Soviet system, on the other hand, has in theory and in practice no limits except that of opposing powers or perhaps of fears imposed by its own limitations. I have tried to mention briefly some of the internal tensions and limitations which, over a period of time, may operate. If you ask me the key question — Will the Soviet regime slacken from within in this urge to expansion? I want to say that I do not believe that any of us can give an honest answer today and that the best we can do is to watch the internal processes of making the regime more livable for their own people; of watching the slowing down of the revolutionary fervor which was there in the beginning and which has become Russianized and dogmatized today. Then, on the other hand, we have to watch the very great ignorance and very great opportunity for misjudgement of the outside world which the Soviet leadership has shown, partly because of its extreme centralization, partly because of the ideological blinders which it wears whenever it looks at the outside world.

If there were time, I would go over some of the mistakes which Stalin made. Many of our publicists assume that the United States has made a lot of mistakes since the war. I would say that on the whole, we have made relatively few mistakes; that the Soviet leadership, on the other hand, has made many more miscalculations. That is perhaps the greatest immediate risk in that the Soviet leadership does not develop under its system and philosophy the tools of objective study and of free, uninhibited canvassing of all the different possibilities and all the possible lines of development which are open in a world in which, after all, we make our own history rather than its being made by a single, rigid, centralized philosophy, controlled by ten men sitting in a tightly-sealed room, cut off from the outside world.

Thank you!

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Dr. Philip E. Mosely

Dr. Mosely has been Professor of International Relations at the Russian Institute of Columbia University since 1946. Since February 1951, he has been Director of the Russian Institute.

He was born in Westfield, Massachusetts in 1905, and was educated at Harvard University (A.B. 1926, Ph.D. 1933), and Cambridge University, with briefer periods of study at Perugia, Paris, and London. He carried on graduate study in France and England, 1926-28, research in Russian diplomatic archives, 1930-32, studies of Balkan village life, 1935-36 and part of 1938. In 1947 he visited Poland, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, and in 1950 he revisited some ten countries of western and central Europe, including Finland, Germany and Yugoslavia. He also revisited Yugoslavia in 1951 and 1952.

Before the war he taught European history at Princeton (1929-30), Union College (1933-35) and Cornell University (1936-42). During the war Dr. Moseley served as Chief of the Division of Territorial Studies in the Department of State, was a member of Secretary Hull's delegation to the Moscow Conference (October 1943); served as Political Adviser to Ambassador Winant in the work of the European Advisory Commission (1944-45); as Political Adviser on the United States Delegation to the Potsdam Conference (July 1945) and to meetings of the Council of Foreign Ministers (1945-46); served as United States member of the Commission for the Investigation of the Yugoslav-Italian Boundary (1946) and the Commission for Drafting the Statute of the Free Territory of Trieste (1946). Since then he has served occasionally as a Consultant to the Department of State.

Dr. Mosely is the author of *Russian Diplomacy and the Opening of the Eastern Question in 1838 and 1839* (Harvard Press, 1934); editor and translator of Chernov, *The Great Russian Revolution* (Yale University Press, 1936); editor of "The Soviet Union Since World War II," the May 1949 issue of the *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*; author of some sixty articles on Russian and Balkan history, social institutions, world affairs and United States foreign policy.

RUSSIAN NAVY - HISTORY AND TRADITIONS

A Staff Presentation Delivered
at the Naval War College
on 23 January 1953, by

Captain Robert A. Theobald, Jr., U.S.N.

This is the history of a Navy which has lost more complete fleets than any other Navy in the world. It is the history of a Navy that has never been more than second rate; that has never been decisive in world history; and that has never developed a depth of tradition to compare with those of the Western Navies.

Why, then, do we bother to inquire into it? Because this is the Navy that may some day challenge the Western sea powers and thus hazard the security of the Western World.

One of the governing elements of the strategy of an armed force is the pattern of past actions from which its contemporary thoughts have grown. This, simply stated, is the influence of its own tradition on any service.

Military leaders in order to mould an efficient fighting force search for a tradition in which to build. That this tradition, when revived, is stated in terms which are not historically accurate does not impair its value. In this country in its early years we built up John Paul Jones as our naval hero, as the man who best typified the fighting spirit of the Navy. The Soviet leaders, today, are faced with the same problem. Their Navy is too young to have developed a tradition of its own and for this reason they have been forced, whether they like it or not, to search the history of the Tsarist Navy for this ingredient. Since this is the case, the history of the Imperial Navy must contain information which will be of value to Western Naval commanders.

Early in the year, Professor Hans Kohn gave us an interesting thumbnail sketch of Russian history; he omitted, however, the

naval phases of this history. I propose, today, to review this history — with the accent on its naval aspects, to determine whether or not there has been a pattern of naval thought and action running through it on which we can base our estimates of Soviet naval action in the next war.

I have broken this history into four periods.

Because Professor Kohn's "Kievan Period" and "First Period of Moscow Leadership" contain little of naval interest, I have combined them into one, which I call:

- (a) *Landlocked* — This covers that portion of Russian history before she had a Navy and runs up to about 1700.

The "Period of St. Petersburg Leadership," because it contains the bulk of Russian naval history, I have divided into:

- (b) *Opening the Window* — This spans the 18th century and features the reigns of Peter the Great and Catherine the Great. During it, we see the birth and rise of Russian Naval Power.
- (c) *The Treadmill* — This embraces the 19th century and continues into the present century until 1917. Here, the Russians worked hard but stood still as a Naval Power. At the end, we see the death of the Imperial Navy.

The "Second Period of Moscow Leadership" I have termed in my naval history as:

- (d) *The Stern Chase* — This features the Soviet attempt to reestablish their country's naval position.

The Landlocked Period logically starts with the early Slavs, the basic racial stock of the Russians. They established the first federation of Russian city states along the Lake Ladoga-Dnieper river line. These Slavs were excellent boatmen and, under the leadership of Norse princes, they developed a flourishing commerce to the East through the Sea of Azov and the Mediterranean through Constantinople.

Kiev was the capital of this budding commercial power and Novgorod and Smolensk were two of the more important cities. It was well on its way towards becoming a strong maritime power as its trade continued to expand. This growing prosperity continued until about the middle of the twelfth century, at which time their trade started to fall off and Kiev's people began to move to other areas.

The deathblow to this federation was, of course, the Mongol invasion and the sacking of Kiev in 1237. The Slavs at this time migrated in three directions: to the west, the north, and the northeast. It is this last group which interests us. They settled in the area between the Oka and the upper Volga, where they blended with the Finns to give us the Great Russians with the physical characteristics we know today.

They established the principality of Moscow, which soon became the dominant Russian city-state. All of these cities were paying enormous tribute to their conquerors. The Duke of Moscow by "playing ball" with the Tartar Khan, the Mongolian chieftan, had himself named as the leader of all the Russian Princes. This served to centralize the authority and strengthen the Federation.

This was the small seed from which grew the present-day colossus known as the U.S.S.R. The very location of this new federation, located in the center of this great land mass, erased any interest that the peoples might have had in things maritime. The society was basically agrarian; only the Princes maintained an interest in commercial traffic. In this they served as intermediaries

on the East-West trade route from the Volga basin to Novgorod. Manpower became the major interest, and how to acquire laborers to till the soil and how to keep them tied to the estates became the major problem. This led to the system of serfs and to a society in which there was no middle class. The serf problem certainly plagued all the later Tsars and was one of the greatest weaknesses of Tsarist Russia.

So the expansion began and is continuing today. By 1462 the principality had developed into the Duchy of Moscow, which you will note was still landlocked. It was not until 1488, four years before Columbus discovered America, that Ivan III (The Great) expanded his country's territory to the sea by the annexation of Novgorod.

Ivan IV (The Terrible), when he became Tsar in 1533, inherited a Russian Empire which was as good as made. We now see a swing back toward the West and the rebirth of Russian interest in maritime enterprise, although it is to be another 163 years before we see the first Russian fleet.

Ivan had himself crowned "Tsar of all the Russians" in 1547 and from this date forward bent every effort toward developing his country which, he realized, was far behind the other great powers. In 1555, he made use of his one outlet to the sea in the north to negotiate a commercial treaty with Elizabeth of England. This contact he knew would be invaluable to him for obtaining technical experts as well as materials of war for his conflicts with his enemies: Sweden, Poland and Turkey.

Ivan The Terrible was the first Tsar to try for an outlet on the Baltic. In this he failed. He did, however, open the road for eastern expansion by defeating the Tartars on his eastern border and in the southeast he opened a trade route to Persia via the Volga and the Caspian Sea.

Ivan died in 1584 and during the hundred years that followed there was no naval activity in Russia. It will be remembered that

this was the period which saw such wars as the War of the Spanish Armada, the Thirty Years' War, and the Anglo-Dutch Naval Wars during which the Western Navies developed rapidly.

The Landlocked Period shows us that these early Russians fully appreciated the value of water transport and that they were good boatmen. It also shows, I think, that they were commercially minded and that their imperialistic tendencies stemmed from purely commercial motives.

In 1682, almost exactly a century after Ivan the Terrible, Peter The Great became Tsar. Geographically, there had been little change in his country — the White Sea was still his only outlet to the oceans of the world. Politically, Poland had declined in power and was no longer a factor. Sweden in the north (controlling practically the entire littoral of the Baltic) and Turkey in the south (controlling the entire littoral of the Black Sea), were his major enemies.

Peter had spent a large portion of his youth in the German quarter of Moscow and was greatly impressed by the advanced culture of the Western World. He fully realized the backwardness of his country and that it was essential that she break out from her landlocked position. He wanted a "Window in Europe."

His first attempt was in the south. On the Don River he built a fleet tailored for the task. There was one 36-gun frigate, but the main strength of this fleet was in the shallow draft galleys with which he blockaded Azov. The campaign was successful and Russia was established on the Sea of Azov. Since any further movement in this direction would require an entirely different type of Navy, Peter ordered a sailing fleet to be built in his newly acquired bases. This was the first Russian fleet but it was only to last fourteen years. Before its end, in 1710, Peter had added no less than 58 sailing ships and innumerable small craft to this fleet. It was wiped off the board without firing a shot in its defense when the

Tsar was forced to sue for peace in order to extricate himself and his army after a crushing defeat at the hands of the Turks. In addition to the fleet, Peter also lost his bases — so once again Russia had no outlet on the Black Sea.

Meanwhile, the war with Sweden in the north had started. This was an economic war, pure and simple, and was to last for twenty-one years. Peter first obtained bases on the Baltic and then built a Russian fleet in those waters. This fleet has been in continuous existence to the present day. It was shortly after the start of this war that the Tsar built St. Petersburg and designated it his capital.

It is interesting to note that there were two distinct components of the Russian naval forces at this time — the sailing fleet and the galley fleet.

The sailing fleet was designed by and built under the supervision of Englishmen. The ships themselves were the equal of any in the world in so far as sailing and sea-keeping qualities were concerned. However, throughout this long war the fleet never searched out the enemy fleet to force a decision but, instead, was used in defense of its bases, as a covering force for the galley fleet, and for convoy purposes. This original concept of fleet employment seems to have continued throughout Russian naval history. When forced into battle, a stalemate was entirely satisfactory to the Russian admiralty provided they did not lose too many ships.

The galley fleet was built to transport and support the army. The ships, designed by Italians, carried about 200 troops each and were organized in accordance with the army divisions. This fleet seemed ideally suited to the Russian temperament and capabilities as well as to the waters in which it was to operate. Thus, years after they had disappeared from the other seas, we see the galley playing a very important role in the Baltic until the beginning of the 19th century.

It was with this force that the Russians had their greatest success. It was a most aggressive force and really carried the war to the Swedes. Rowing and fighting its way, this water-borne army moved along the south coast of Finland and, finally, near the end of the war, crossed over to the Swedish homeland where they ravaged the coast both north and south of the capital, Stockholm.

During this, the first Russian war involving a naval force, we see instituted the command relationship which has been continued to the present day. All the armed forces in the theater were under a single commander — in some cases the Tsar; in some, a member of the royal household, and in others an Army general who was given the title of "General-Admiral." This command structure has always worked to the detriment of the Navy, which has always been tied to a continental strategy.

Following the successful conclusion of the Swedish war, Peter, just before he died, conducted a short war in the south against Persia by which he obtained territory on the south shore of the Caspian Sea. It was during this expedition that the Caspian flotilla was formed, which has since been maintained in those waters.

Throughout his reign, as he developed his Navy, personnel was Peter's greatest problem. Because he had no merchant marine or large fishing industry which would have served as a training ground for his seamen, Peter was forced to look for foreigners to man his fleet.

Officers and leading petty officers for the sailing fleet generally came from Western Europe while the commanding officers of his galleys were in most cases Italians.

Seamen for the sailing vessels were obtained by simply breaking up the Tsar's regiments and sending them aboard to man the fast growing fleet. While these men were personally very brave, they were just not seamen. In an action in which ships fought at

anchor they gave a very good account of themselves but at sea they did poorly. In the main they had been conscripted from the farm — not only were they ignorant of the ways of a ship but they heartily disliked the shipboard life. It was because of this that the Russian fleet was so badly handled at sea. Also, this was probably the reason for Peter's order that the Swedes would not be engaged without at least a superiority of 3 to 2.

When he died in 1725, Peter left his country the dominant seapower in the Baltic — a position she was to hold until the 20th century. During the long war with Sweden he had added a grand total of seventy-three ships to his fleet; he had developed two excellent bases — Kronstadt and Reval, on the Baltic; and he had greatly expanded his building yards at Archangel. His window on Europe extended from a point just east of Helsingfors, around the end of the gulf of Finland, and along the south shore to Riga. His one failure was to establish Russia on the Black Sea.

It was not long after his death that Russia made her next attempt for an outlet on this sea when, in 1735, Tsarina Anne ordered a fleet built for the purpose. Then, as an indication of the importance she attached to such an outlet, she returned to Persia all of Peter's conquests in order to obtain that country as an ally. Despite all these preparations this attempt, like the first, was a failure on a grand scale. Anne's fleet, like Peter's, was eliminated by diplomatic action without firing a shot. Russia had lost her second Black Sea fleet.

Meanwhile the Baltic fleet had been idle and, as so often happens, it rapidly fell off in efficiency. There was one disadvantage to the Russian sailing ships which I failed to mention previously. They were built of pine, the most plentiful building material, and this gave them the very short life of about eight years. Unless naval interest was maintained and ships continually replaced, fleets rapidly became unseaworthy.

Catherine The Great took over the reins of government in 1762. Her first act was to take her country out of the Seven Years'

War by declaring a state of neutrality. She described the Baltic fleet at that time as: "Scarcely fit to catch herring." She immediately set about to correct this situation.

Six years after Catherine came to power Turkey declared war on Russia. The Tsarina welcomed this war in the south for by it she saw an opportunity to reestablish her country on the Black Sea. In addition to the land campaign, she sent a portion of her Baltic fleet into the Aegean to carry the war to Turkey by sea. This was the first time a Russian fleet had operated in waters not contiguous to the homeland.

Almost at the outset of this naval campaign the Turkish fleet was annihilated in the Battle of Tschesme. With the enemy fleet out of the way, the Russians were in complete command of the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean. Their ships were active from Egypt to the shores of Thrace, destroying Turkish trading vessels and bombarding the shore establishments. While this had some economic effect, its effects on the military picture were practically nil. It was an excellent example of the ineffectiveness of sea power when it does not have the necessary land forces with which to exploit control of the sea once it has been obtained. Had the Russian admiral been given sufficient troops, he could have carried the war ashore and forced a much earlier decision.

While this naval action was in progress in the Aegean, the Russian land forces had reestablished an outlet on the Black Sea, and in 1771 the third Russian Black Sea Fleet was commissioned. This force showed a good fighting spirit and was most useful in support of the army.

The treaty of peace, ending this war, ceded Azov and Taganrog to Russia, gave Russia the right to maintain a Black Sea Fleet, and reestablished the independence of the Crimea as a protectorate of Russia.

Catherine did not wait long before she annexed the Crimea outright — in 1783. This, together with other signs of aggressive-

ness, forced the Turks to again declare war. The Swedes, who had been waiting for an opportunity to recover some of their lost territory, saw their chance. After the Russians were well committed in the south, they, too, declared war.

This forced on Russia a naval war in two widely separated areas, a war in which her fleets could not support each other. This has been a characteristic of Russian naval wars throughout her history. The number of areas sometimes increased as high as four, but a war in a single area was indeed a rarity. Even in her wars with Turkey her Black Sea and Mediterranean fleets were kept separated by the Turkish Straits.

The war in the Baltic was very similar to the preceding one. The sailing fleet acted as a defensive force while the galley fleet and the army did the fighting.

In the Black Sea, the fleets did little but support the army. It was during this war in the Black Sea that John Paul Jones served in the Russian Navy as a Rear Admiral. He added nothing to his reputation and after a year of bickering over seniority with the galley admiral he resigned from the Tsarina's service.

During these wars, twice in the north and once in the south, the Russian admirals were caught with their forces divided and the main enemy fleet interposed between the two units. In all cases it could have been disastrous, but the enemy did not take advantage of the situation.

The war with the Swedes ended with the boundaries exactly where they had been before the war. In the south, however, Catherine added all the territory between the Bug and the Dniester to her country.

If Peter The Great had been the father of the Russian Navy then certainly Catherine must have been its greatest benefactor. When she died in 1796, she left Russia still the dominant naval

power in the Baltic — she had reestablished the Black Sea Fleet and extended her country's coastline on that sea from Azov to the mouth of the Dniester. Based solely on numerical strength, Russia was the world's second naval power — second only to England.

To my mind, the death of Catherine marks the high-water mark in Russian naval history. From this date to the end of the Imperial Navy it was on a treadmill working hard, but getting nowhere.

During the Napoleonic Wars the Russians were allied first with one side and then the other, shifting their allegiance a total of four times. There were several interesting happenings during this period: first, after the Battle of the Nile eliminated the French fleet, the Russian Black Sea Fleet sortied from the Dardanelles and, by amphibious attacks, cleared the French from the islands of the Ionian and Adriatic Seas. This was the only time in their history that this fleet left its home waters. Second, the Russians lost another fleet when the Tsar agreed to cooperate with Napoleon before he arranged for the safety of his fleet in the Mediterranean. It was blockaded by the English before it could return to the Baltic and was a complete loss to Russia. Third, we see the last major-scale action by a galley fleet when, in 1809, a three-pronged invasion of Sweden was launched. (Incidentally, it was this war which established the present-day eastern boundaries of Sweden). Fourth, when Napoleon started his famous but disastrous invasion of Russia, we see the Baltic fleet being sent to England for safekeeping.

Between the Napoleonic Wars and the next great test of Russian naval strength, the Crimean War, there was little of importance. A short war with Turkey, the commencement of the Sevastopol fortifications, and the establishment of the Aral Sea flotilla were the naval high lights during this period.

The Crimean War broke out in 1853 — in which we see the forces of Turkey, England, and France pitted against those of

Russia. The Russian Navy was sadly lacking in fighting efficiency. They had been left way behind by the industrial revolution.

Although the center of the stage during this war was the Crimea with its famous siege of Sevastopol, to Russia it was a world-wide affair. It was not, however, a glorious page in her naval history.

In the Pacific, after repelling the first attack on her base at Petropavlovsk, she abandoned that port and evacuated all the personnel to her bases on the Amur River.

In the White Sea, she did nothing to deter the operations of the small allied force operating in that area.

In the Baltic, she withdrew her fleet under the guns of her fortresses and kept it there throughout the war.

In the Black Sea, we see the end of the third Black Sea Fleet. At the outset this fleet fought the famous Battle of Sinope, often referred to in England as the "massacre of Sinope." In this action, which took only a matter of minutes, the Russian shell guns made short work of the Turkish squadron of wooden ships armed only with guns firing solid shot.

Soon after this battle the allied English-French Fleet entered the Black Sea, whereupon the Russian Fleet retreated to the protection of Sevastopol where they remained. Some were sunk as block ships and the remainder were sunk to prevent capture just prior to the fall of that fortress.

The Peace of Paris, ending this war, once again denied Russia the right to maintain a Black Sea Fleet.

In so far as Russian naval history is concerned that is about all that can be said, but this war is such an important milepost in the development of all navies that I do not think a brief summary of important events would be out of place.

It was a war fought during the transition period from sail to steam and by the end of this war all the allied ships were equipped with at least auxiliary steam power. It had shown the inability of the wooden ship to withstand the shell gun and this started the race between armor and armament. It was during this war that ironclads first made their appearance when, after the fall of Sevastopol, the French ironclads successfully engaged the fortress at Kinburn. Also, and this is significant, the mine made its appearance in the hands of the Russians. They laid a field off Kronstadt to hamper British operations against that fortress. This field damaged two ships and greatly impressed the Russians, who subsequently have been strong advocates of mine warfare.

Except for a brief war with Turkey in 1877-1879, the remainder of this century may be called a "building period" in Russian naval history. The country was fortunate in having in the Grand Duke Constantine a very able administrator who, as Minister of Marine, energetically undertook the task of once again rebuilding the Russian Navy. The Tsar had proclaimed that Russia should be the third naval power in the world — England and France being the first and second — and, further, that her Navy should be larger than all the minor navies combined.

Between the Crimean War and the next war with Turkey there were several important events. In 1860, culminating the eastern expansion started during the reign of Ivan the Terrible in 1582, Russia obtained by treaty the territory east of the Ussuri River and immediately commenced the fortifications of Vladivostok and the strengthening of her Far East fleet.

There occurred in 1863 a most unusual and interesting event, which is of particular interest to us for it concerned the United States. The Polish revolt had created a tense situation in Europe and it looked for a while as if Russia would be at war with France and England.

General-Adjutant Krabbe, who was running the Navy in the absence of Constantine in Poland, convinced the Tsar that the

best employment of his weak Navy was to send it abroad. He urged that such a weak force could accomplish nothing if bottled up in their home ports, whereas if they were sent to the United States they would be a distinct threat to the English and French trade routes.

The Russian Baltic Squadron, commanded by Rear Admiral Lisovski, was sent to New York; and the Pacific Squadron, commanded by Admiral Popov, was sent to San Francisco.

These admirals had orders that if war was declared they were to attack enemy commerce and colonies in the Western Hemisphere. Whether it is true or not, the Russians firmly believed that this action deterred the British from declaring war. One writer had reported that the Tsar, Alexander, considered this to be one of the greatest practical achievements of the Russian Navy. To my mind, it did illustrate for the first time some sound strategic thinking on the part of top Russian naval leaders. It was the only time in Russia's history that she has considered challenging the Western Sea Powers on the world's maritime trade routes.

In 1870, while the rest of Europe was engrossed with the Franco-Prussian War, Russia demanded and obtained the right to reestablish her Black Sea Fleet. This would be her fourth in those waters.

The building program was now in full swing as the Russian Navy converted from sail to steam. Generally they built ships of conventional design, but in 1873 two distinctly Russian types were launched: a protected cruiser which featured a light armor belt at the water line but otherwise completely unprotected; and the Popovs, or circular ships, which were absolutely round with a round turret at the center. These latter ships, of which three were built, were very stable but unhandy. On one occasion, while trying to ascend the Dnieper, the Popov was caught in an eddy and started to spin. All hands were described as suffering from vertigo, and it was not until it spun out into Kherson Bay that it could be brought under control.

War broke out with Turkey in 1877. This was primarily a land war and is interesting to us only because of the work of the Russian torpedo boats. The first successful Russian torpedo attack was the sinking of a Turkish ironclad on the Danube River by boats equipped with spar torpedoes.

When this war broke out, Russia had thirty-one old and useless ships on the Black Sea and to augment these she procured, abroad, fifteen fast merchantmen. Some of these they converted into torpedo boat carriers. The most famous of these was the GRAND DUKE CONSTANTINE, commanded by Lieutenant Makarov. Only a few of these attacks made by these boats were successful, but they were executed with great daring and were well conceived. There were three types of torpedoes employed: the White-head automobile torpedo was just making its appearance and, though used on several occasions, achieved no success; the towed torpedo, which was almost useless; and the spar torpedo, with which the Russians had their greatest success. These last required that the attacking boat make physical contact with the target. The Russian's ability to press this attack home seems to substantiate an opinion I have of the Russians that they are not lacking in intestinal fortitude and that they are dangerous foes when operating in small boats in shoal and restricted waters.

With the end of the war the building program was intensified. Now the Russians were concentrating on the more modern types and attempting to build classes of ships. In the Black Sea, however, construction was delayed for a few years until the base fortifications were completed.

The war which broke out with Japan in 1904 certainly should have been no surprise to the Russians for to the rest of the world it seemed inevitable. It was obvious that Russian aggressiveness in the Far East was threatening the security of Japan. Korea was the key — the Japanese could not tolerate that country controlled by any foreign power.

Russia, however, could not conceive of this upstart nation, just over fifty years old, challenging the mighty colossus of Europe. They ignored all of the warnings. The first of these was the attempted assassination, by a Japanese national, of the Grand Duke in 1891 — on the occasion of the ground-breaking ceremony for the Trans-Siberian railroad at Vladivostock. During the following thirteen years there were many indications that the Japanese meant business.

The outbreak of war found Russia unprepared. The fortifications of Port Arthur were not complete; the fleet lacked many of the lighter types of ships; the Pacific Squadron was not concentrated; the ships were in a poor state of material readiness; the crews lacked experience, had a low morale, and were poorly trained.

The Japanese, on the other hand, were ready in all respects. Their fleet was concentrated at Sasebo; their ships were in excellent repair; the crews were battle-trained and confident after the recent war with China; the transports were loaded with landing force equipment; and the expeditionary force was encamped and ready to embark on a moment's notice.

This was the situation when, on February 6, diplomatic relations were broken off. Only two days later the Japanese struck. Their landing force, supported by a cruiser division, landed on the west coast of Korea — on Chemulpo, now Inchon. The preceding night their torpedo boats had attacked the main Russian fleet laying outside of Port Arthur and the main fleet, under Admiral Togo, had taken up a position to cover the landing.

Admiral Togo, unlike the Swedish and Turkish commanders in the earlier wars, fully appreciated his advantageous position. He realized that both tactically and strategically he was interposed between the several Russian detachments.

In the strategic picture, he was located between the Pacific Squadron and its source of reinforcements in Europe. In the local

theater, he had the main enemy fleet at Port Arthur, three new armored cruisers and some smaller craft at Vladivostock, and two ships at Chemulpo. (These, incidentally, were sunk the first day by the cruisers supporting the landing). He was determined to defeat these separated units in detail.

This war falls, naturally, into two phases. The first is concerned with the annihilation of the first Russian Pacific Squadron by combined Army-Navy action. The second, a purely naval affair, concerns the destruction of the Second Pacific Squadron, commanded by Admiral Rozhdesvenski.

The Japanese realized that the success of their operations hinged on their control of the sea; if this was not maintained the army could not be supplied.

Togo stationed a cruiser division in the Straits of Tsushima to guard the line of supply to Korea against raids by the Vladivostok cruisers and then, with the rest of his force, concentrated on bottling up or destroying the main fleet at Port Arthur. The waters off this port held the center of the stage for the first eleven months of the war.

After the first torpedo attacks the Russian fleet had entered the harbor for protection. The Japanese made three major attempts with block ships to close the harbor, but were unsuccessful.

The Russians then resorted to defensive mine fields and light force action against the Japanese armies working down the peninsula to lay siege to the port.

The Japanese also used mines off the entrance and then tried to lure the enemy fleet over them by bombarding the forts and the fleet in the harbor with their heavy ships.

Both sides had some success with these tactics but the Japanese got the better of it and it was not long before the fortress was closely besieged.

On paper, the Russians had sufficient force to defeat the Japanese aims. The poor state of training and, more important, the inept leadership prevented it. There was a short period in March when it looked as if they would wrest the initiative from the enemy — when Admiral Makarov, the energetic lieutenant of torpedo boats in the last war with Turkey, arrived to assume command of the naval forces. It was at once apparent that he had lost none of his energy as he started preparing his fleet for offensive action. Repairs were rushed. He took his ships to sea at every opportunity to train them, with the result that Russian naval morale started to rise. Unfortunately, after one of these training cruises the flagship, the battleship PETROPAVLOVSK, struck a mine and sank — taking this fine officer to his death.

His successor was not of his ilk. The fleet now remained inactive in port. Guns were landed from some of the ships to add to the shore defenses. It was not until the Tsar, himself, ordered the new commander to break out that any move was made.

On August 10, the Russians sortied from the harbor for a run to Vladivostok. They were met by the entire Japanese fleet. In the action that followed, the Russians were severely mauled and the admiral killed. The second in command then took the fleet back into Port Arthur — having lost one battleship, two protected cruisers, one light cruiser, and six destroyers.

The Second Russian Pacific Squadron left its base at Libau, in the Baltic, for the long passage to the Far East on October 15. The Japs, fully informed, increased the tempo of their operations against Port Arthur in an attempt to eliminate the Russian fleet before the arrival of the reinforcements. In this they were successful as the fortress fell on January 1, and with its surrender the entire enemy fleet was destroyed.

While the main Russian fleet had been inactive at Port Arthur, the Vladivostok cruisers had been active against the Jap-

anese commerce. In all, they made five sorties from their base and accounted for a sizable number of merchant vessels.

With the end of the First Pacific Squadron, the stage was set to receive Admiral Rozhdesvenski with the Second Pacific Squadron when he arrived.

After steaming 15,000 miles this heterogeneous squadron arrived in the Straits of Tsushima on May 27, where they were intercepted by Admiral Togo's fleet fresh from its bases. The battle of Tsushima, lasting two days and a night, completely eliminated the Russian force.

It was following this action that President Roosevelt tendered his good offices and the war was brought to an end by the Treaty of Portsmouth.

The greatest error of the Russians in this war was their failure to grasp the one significant fact that the Japanese fleet was essential to their land operations and, further, that this fleet could not be replaced if once destroyed. If, instead of tying their fleet to the fortress, they had engaged the Japanese in a decisive battle the results might very well have been different. It made no difference how many ships the Russians lost if they could destroy the Japanese heavy units. If this had been done by the Pacific Squadron, then the Second Pacific Squadron, when it arrived, could have easily established control of the sea and the enemy forces on the mainland would have been left unsupported.

In comparison, the Japanese made few mistakes. Admiral Togo's tactics were necessarily cautious for he realized that his foreign-built heavy ships, if lost, could not be replaced by the Japanese industrial complex. Considering this limitation, little fault can be found with either the strategy or the tactics of this Japanese admiral.

Following this war, the Russians were once again faced with the familiar problem of rebuilding their Navy. And, once again, they were fortunate in having men capable of the task. After several years, during which the unbelievably inefficient administration fumbled with the problem, Admiral Grigorovitch was appointed Minister of Marine.

He started to clean house at once and reorganized the entire naval establishment. With this completed, he then laid out a long-range building program which, by 1930, would give Russia a strong fleet in the Baltic — the backbone of which would be 24 battleships and 12 battle cruisers, supported by light cruisers and destroyers. The Black Sea Fleet was to be as large as the combined fleets of the other Black Sea powers, but no types were specified.

This program far exceeded the capacity of Russian industry and World War I started before it was even well underway. With the outbreak of this war, the Russians immediately abandoned Libau as being too close to the German border. They withdrew their naval forces into the Gulf of Finland and laid an extensive mine field across the entrance from Hango to Nargen. The naval forces were considered to be nothing more than additional defenses for the capital.

While maintaining the strategic defensive, the Russian light forces were used for occasional offensive forays. The destroyers and cruisers were used to lay offensive mine fields off the German coast and the Island of Oland. These mines took a large toll of German ships, both combatant and merchant types.

Russian and British submarines operating from Russian bases were very effective in the Baltic against German transports and their supply route to Sweden.

In the Black Sea, the Russian fleet had a greater freedom of action but was used primarily to support the army. In addition to these operations they bombarded the Turkish ports in Anatolia

and during the Allied campaign in the Dardanelles they cooperated by bombarding the forts on the Bosphorus and by making naval demonstrations off the Turkish Black Sea Coast. These had some effect, as they drew off three divisions from the main defense line to guard against possible Russian landings. It was at this time that we see for the first time a submarine used to lay mines — when the Bosphorus entrance was mined in this manner.

With the failure of this campaign Russia's fate was sealed, for without this vital line of supply her military machine rapidly lost its effectiveness. The White Sea route could not handle the volume required.

March of 1917 marks the end of the Tsarist Navy. The fleet mutinies, in conjunction with the revolution within the country, effectively removed the Russian Navy as a fighting force.

During the period of the civil wars (1917-1921), the Red Fleet was just a collection of ships and men.

When the Communist regime was finally established, in 1921, it found itself faced with a long stern chase if it was to catch up with the navies of its probable enemies.

The Navy at this time was under the administration of the Minister of Defense, Mr. Trotsky. It had suffered heavily during the war and now consisted of only four old battleships, a few old cruisers, some destroyers and submarines. Many of these were damaged and unfit for service.

The policy now seemed to be to build a Navy of destroyers and submarines. Also, the naval air arm was started with a training school at Sevastopol.

The first Five Year Plan made no provision for the Navy. It merely tolerated it as an auxiliary of the Army, which received by far the greatest share of the funds appropriated for the armed forces.

By 1929, it was reported by a fairly reliable source that there were only 8 destroyers and 8 submarines in the Red Navy fit to put to sea.

The second Five Year Plan, starting in 1933, seemed to indicate an increased interest in the Navy. Contracts were let in Italy and France for cruisers and destroyers, and a building program was started in the yards at home.

During the thirties there was quite a controversy within naval circles as to the proper naval doctrine for the Red Navy. Lenin's teachings were interpreted as meaning that the Navy was an indivisible part of the Red Army. Naval leaders of the day adopted the motto: "Down with the Doctrine of Command of the Seas." In the tactical field these same men tried to adopt the principles of Marxism. They arrived at a theory in which there would never be one grand naval battle but, instead, a continuing action. They hoped to be able to develop tactics which would result in attacks from all points of the compass, using all arms of the military service.

By 1937, the new naval building program was well underway. Although a few heavy ships were laid down, the great majority of ships were in the lighter categories. The concentration was on destroyers, mincraft, and submarines. In addition, there was great effort made to expand the naval air arm.

As the importance of the Navy increased, it soon became evident that it could not be administered efficiently under the (then) existing organization. Late in this year the Navy was set up as a separate ministry, divorced from the Army and the Air Force.

During the next two years there was a large purge of naval officers, by the end of which time there were less than 200 officers remaining who had entered the service before 1917.

Just as in World War I, World War II caught the Russians at the outset of an ambitious building program. The Navy, in 1939,

consisted primarily of submarines and small craft. What heavy ships they had in commission, except for four 8000-ton KIROVS, were of World War I vintage. Their new ships were MTBs, AMs, DDs, and SSs.

There is a striking similarity between the employment of the Red Navy in World War II with that of the Imperial Navy in World War I.

The Baltic fleet once again was moved back into the Gulf of Finland to act as the support for the right flank of the Red Army. This time, however, their position was not as favorable, since Germany had bases in Finland which they did not have in World War I. The Germans' primary objective was to contain the Russian fleet, and to this end they laid an extensive mine field across the Gulf of Finland and off the principal Russian bases in this area.

A further indication of the preoccupation of Germany with the Soviet naval forces was the selection of initial targets for the Luftwaffe. It will be noted that on the first day of hostilities Kronstadt, Murmansk, Odessa, and Sevastopol were the targets hit.

As the Red armies were pushed further and further to the east, giving up one base after another, the fleet was finally forced into the extreme eastern end of the Gulf of Finland. Here, the large ships were moved into Leningrad to gain added AA protection and, at the same time, to add their fire power to the defense of that city.

The main Soviet offensive effort in these waters was by submarines, which continually tried to break out into the Baltic; some did and were quite effective, but at least 40 were lost to mines.

In the Black Sea, with a much greater freedom of movement because there were no extensive mine fields and there were very meagre enemy forces opposing them, the Red surface forces were much more active, yet they were not effectively employed.

At the outset, it looked as if the Red admiral was going to use his fleet effectively. He sent his two newest flotilla leaders

to bombard the German main base at Constanta and to disrupt the enemy naval efforts at their source. He lost one of the ships to mines in this attempt and never again sent ships to operate in that area. This was a mistake, for by offensive action he could have contained the German Navy in the mouth of the Danube; but, instead, he let them get out — and then he had to search them out over a wide area.

His light forces worked in cooperation with the Army in the defense of one port after another as it retired to the east and, at the same time, tried to interrupt the German water transport. In this later action they had some success but were unable to slow the German advance.

By the time the German advance was stopped the Russian Black Sea Fleet was in a sorry state. With the exception of two old light cruisers all of their heavy units were laid up in Poti and Batum. Only light, small craft were left to them. These they used in amphibious operations and against the German evacuation forces as the tide of battle turned toward the west.

The naval air arm, which could have been so valuable during this phase of the war, had been all but eliminated during the retreat to the east. In fact, by the time the Germans had reached Sevastopol the Russians were using old pusher-type flying boats for ground strafing in defense of that fortress.

In the Arctic, the Russians had a sizeable force of light craft that had been transferred to those waters via the Baltic-White Sea canal system. These forces, together with some naval infantry, were successful in stopping a German land attack on Murmansk. Thereafter, the submarines, motor torpedo boats, and submarine chasers operated against the German lines of supply. Although I think that the Russian claim of 1.5 million tons of German shipping is high, the Germans have admitted that this action had serious effects on the efficiency of their forces in that area.

Unfortunately, these forces did not work far enough afield to prevent the air and submarine attacks against the Murmansk convoys. This job was left, primarily, to the British Navy.

German action, primarily the Luftwaffe, in both the Baltic and the Black Seas had almost completely eliminated the Soviet naval power. The surrender of the Italian fleet had reduced the Allied naval force requirements. Pending the final disposition of this fleet, and to bolster the strength of the Red Fleet, the British loaned the U.S.S.R. the ROYAL SOVEREIGN, 9 ex-U. S. destroyers, and 4 submarines; and the United States loaned the MILWAUKEE, 24 mincraft, and 24 sub-chasers.

After the war these ships were returned and the Soviets received ships from the navies of the defeated powers. If one looks at "Janes," today, he will see that in almost all categories there is in the Red Navy a hodge-podge of old Russian, Italian, German, and Japanese ships superimposed upon more modern Russian ships of diverse designs. This situation must pose a difficult spare part and maintenance problem.

The position of this force within the military establishment, if we can believe the utterances of the Soviet leaders, does not seem to have changed. The Navy is still subordinate to the Army.

Following World War II, the U.S.S.R. was the first to unify her armed forces when, on February 25, 1946, the Army, Navy, and Air Force were once again placed under a single commissar.

This did not last long for, as once again the naval building program began to develop and the importance of the naval establishment increased, the Navy was divorced from the Army and the Air Force and made an independent Ministry. This took place in 1950 and is the organization under which the Navy operates today. It may be an indication of a changed status.

Looking back over this summary of Russian Naval History, there is one point which immediately becomes apparent: since the

days of Peter The Great the national leaders have been bound, bent, and determined to have a Navy. In addition, I think that there are other conclusions, based solely on this history, which are important. You should bear in mind that if you were to analyze the Soviet Navy, based solely on current intelligence, you might arrive at conclusions other than those which I will now state:

First. The geographical separation of her many coastlines certainly has had an effect on her naval policies. To my mind, the relatively recent attention given the North Sea route and the concentration of effort on her extensive canal systems are significant and these two projects will rapidly increase in importance for it is by these that Russia hopes to overcome the handicap of widely separated coastlines.

Second. There is a possibility that the dispersion of naval strength in the over-all national strategy, forced on them by geography, has influenced the thinking of the naval commanders in the field. These commanders, who for so long have seen the separate fleets, have unconsciously assumed this to be the proper disposition in the field of tactics as well.

Third. Since the origin of the Russian state, it has always had an aggressive foreign policy — a policy of expansion. At first, it was to the East and West; and as the limits were approached in these two directions, it has shifted toward the south where it remains today. Since they firmly established themselves on the Black Sea, it has been their ambition to make this a Russian lake. The proposals of Catherine to Joseph of Austria, in 1780; and Molotov to Hitler, in 1940, were almost identical (i.e., that control of the Straits be a joint Turkish-Russian affair and that Bulgaria be expanded to the Aegean to serve as a buffer between Europe and that critical area).

Fourth. In contrast to this aggressive foreign policy, the Russian Navy has always been defensively minded and for this reason has generally failed to support the national aims. The fort-

ress fleet concept and the extensive use of defensive mine fields are evidence of this.

Fifth. The Russian Navy has always been considered a part of the Red Army. It has been designed to operate in waters contiguous to the homeland as a support force. It has not been considered as a force with which to challenge the West's control of the high seas.

Sixth. Because of her geography, the Russian people have never been forced to use the sea and, consequently, are most unfamiliar with it. This lack of a seafaring population has greatly hampered the authorities in developing either a Navy or a Merchant Marine. The government, in its attempt to interest the people in the sea, has never been able to overcome their orientation toward the soil. The Russian, for these reasons, has always been a poor seaman and has always heartily disliked operating at any distance from his shores.

Seventh. In contrast to the last characteristic, the Russians have always been good boatmen. In the use of small boats on the rivers and in their coastal waters they have proved themselves to be most capable and a dangerous foe, both in ship-to-ship combat and in amphibious operations.

In short, gentlemen, I firmly believe that the consistency shown throughout this history is one of the best examples of Professor Kemble's thesis — the study of this history can indeed be invaluable to our naval commanders.

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Captain Robert A. Theobald, Jr., USN

Captain Theobald was born in Portsmouth, N.H., on 17 September 1910. He was graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy with the Class of 1931.

His first four years of commissioned service were spent in the gunnery departments of the old battleships USS MARYLAND and USS NEW MEXICO. In June of 1935 he commissioned the new destroyer USS DALE (DD353) as torpedo officer. Since that time all of his sea duty has been in connection with destroyers.

After sixteen months as an instructor at the U.S. Naval Academy, he recommissioned the USS RODGERS (DD254) as executive officer, and when this ship was sold to the British, he proceeded to San Diego where he recommissioned another of these famous four stackers, the USS CHEW (DD106), also as an executive officer. He next transferred to the destroyer leader USS PORTER (DD 356) as gunnery officer and then became executive officer of the USS SMITH (DD378). He was in the SMITH when World War II began and after one year became her commanding officer. He retained this command until March 1944, when he was ordered to the United States to commission the USS JOHN W. WEEKS (DD701) in which he returned to the Pacific war zone. In June of 1945 he became Chief Staff Officer to Commander Task Flotilla Three.

Returning to the United States in 1946, he was assigned to duty at the General Line School, Newport, R.I. as Head of the Seamanship and Navigation Department.

He returned to sea in 1949 as Readiness and Training Officer on the Staff of Commander Destroyers Atlantic. After one year he was ordered to command Destroyer Division 42.

In 1951 he was ordered to duty under instruction at the U.S. Naval War College in the course in Advanced Study in Strategy and Sea Power. After two years as a student, Captain Theobald became staff adviser for the Course.

RECOMMENDED READING

The evaluations of books listed below include those recommended to resident students of the Naval War College. Officers in the fleet and elsewhere may find these of interest.

Many of these publications may be found in ship and station libraries. Some of the publications not available from these sources may be obtained from the Bureau of Naval Personnel Auxiliary Library Service, where a collection of books is available for loan to individual officers. Requests for the loan of these books should be made by the individual to the nearest branch or the Chief of Naval Personnel. (See Article C-9604, Bureau of Naval Personnel Manual, 1948).

- Title:** *The Temper of Western Europe.* 118p.
Author: Brinton, Crane. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1953.
Evaluation: Mr. Brinton presents a very convincing case concerning the essential vitality of the peoples of Western Europe and shows in easily readable form the splendid progress in many fields which Western Europeans have made since World War II. While Mr. Brinton does not attempt to gloss over certain obvious weaknesses in our allies and their respective economies, he concludes that the assets, material and spiritual, which are embodied in Western Europe's culture are too valuable to be sold short or checked off in our reckoning. *The Temper of Western Europe* is a well written, interestingly presented volume which is worth while reading for the general student of current affairs.

- Title:** *Unconditional Hatred.* 273 p.
Author: Grenfell, Russell. N. Y., Devin-Adair Co., 1953.
Evaluation: A critical analysis of the political factors underlying recent European wars by a British naval officer who offers a controversial point of view that has not been generally publicized in recent years. His thesis is that the war aims and objectives of the allied political leaders in World Wars I and II were faulty in that they were not based on sound, long-range strategy. In particular he offers evidence to support his view that Germany is not the master aggressor of history that she has been declared to be since 1939, that

the Germans are no worse than other peoples of the world, and that the British should not hesitate to accept them as allies. Regardless of the merits of the argument, this well-written book is recommended to provide perspective and sharpen thought in the field of grand strategy.

- Title:** *Germany: Key to Peace.* 344 p.
Author: Warburg, James P. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1953.
Evaluation: The author traces the postwar policy of the United States toward Germany, and indicates the influence of British and French thought on such policy. He considers our policy toward the Germans to be a failure from the start, and recommends that a "hands-off" policy should have been arranged among the allies. The author repeatedly disagrees with U. S. policy from the beginning and describes his dissent as a "voice in the wilderness." He does not agree with the partition of Germany, nor does he believe that Western Germany should be rearmed. However, in summary the author states that "an All-German settlement would not of itself solve the problems of cold war in Europe." This book is a valuable addition to the literature on Germany in that it presents a decidedly different view than that of the majority, and one which has some over-all merit.

- Title:** *Struggle for Africa.* 251 p.
Author: Bartlett, Vernon. London. Frederick Muller Ltd., 1953.
Evaluation: A description of the whole continent of Africa, country by country, as Mr. Bartlett traveled through it. He has given a comprehensive picture of the different ways in which the white men of the various countries are dealing with the awakening blacks. Although he has written in great detail on the many problems, the author points out that he does not have the answers. This study is of value to anyone who would like an insight into the problems of Africa.

Periodicals

- Title:** *Don't Let Asia Split the West!*
Author: Pearson, Lester B.
Publication: WORLD, December, 1953, p. 9-14.
Annotation: Warns that the greatest threat to the unity of purpose

and policy of the Western grand alliance against communist imperialism and aggression lies in the Far East. (Map: "The Dynamics of Asia," p. 12-13).

- Title:** *The Impact of Atomic Energy.*
- Publication:** THE ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE, November, 1953 (entire issue)
- Annotation:** This issue contains 16 articles under four headings dealing with the impact of Atomic Energy on: (1) Nuclear Weapons; (2) Nuclear Power; (3) Political Power, and (4) Individuals in Society.
- Title:** *Aviation Looks Ahead on Its 50th Birthday.*
- Author:** Land, Emory S., Vice Admiral, U.S.N. (Ret).
- Publication:** THE NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC MAGAZINE, December, 1953, p. 721-739.
- Annotation:** The President, Air Transport Association of America discusses future developments in aircraft and air transportation.
- Title:** *Red Bridgehead in the Guianas.*
- Author:** Weyl, Nathaniel.
- Publication:** THE FREEMAN, November 30, 1953, p. 159-162.
- Annotation:** An account of the rise of the People's Progressive Party (Communist) in British Guiana and the attempt to transform the colony to a Soviet-controlled "people's republic."
- Title:** *The Defense of Europe.*
- Author:** Gruenther, Alfred M., General, U.S.A.
- Publication:** THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN, November 9, 1953, p. 633-637.
- Annotation:** A report on the progress made by NATO in building the defense of Europe and on the problems still to be solved.

- Title:** *Coming — A "United States of Europe."*
- Publication:** U. S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, November 20, 1953, p. 64-72.
- Annotation:** An interview with Paul Reynaud, Vice Premier of France, in which he replies to questions relating to European federation and the problems of the French government.
- Title:** *The Unforgiving Map.*
- Author:** Eliot, George Fielding.
- Publication:** AMERICAN MERCURY, December, 1953, p. 49-54.
- Annotation:** Brief analysis of American military policy shows that we have never been able to "go it alone," and that we cannot maintain the bases which give us strategic mobility without the cooperation of others who oppose Soviet aggression.
- Title:** *The Soviet's War Potential.*
- Author:** Sokol, Dr. A. E.
- Publication:** MILITARY REVIEW, December, 1953, p. 44-60.
- Annotation:** Makes a general assessment of the Russian war potential and compares, when possible, conditions prevailing in the United States.
- Title:** *An Answer to Critics of the U. N.*
- Author:** Lodge, Henry Cabot, Jr.
- Publication:** THE NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE, November 22, 1953, p. 12, 34, 37.
- Annotation:** The U. S. delegate to the United Nations explains what the U. N. is and what it is not.
- Title:** *Problems of Coalition Diplomacy: The Korean Experience.*
- Author:** Alstedter, Norman.
- Publication:** INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL, Autumn, 1953, p. 256-265
- Annotation:** An examination of the problems of Western unity in the context of an excellent summary of the Korean truce talks.

- Title:** *Fastest-Spreading Revolution: Communism.*
- Publication:** U. S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, November 13, 1953, p. 35-37.
- Annotation:** A report on the actual strength of communism around the world today, drawn from a report of a special subcommittee on security affairs of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. (Chart, giving strength in areas of the world, p. 36-37).
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- Title:** *The Mind of Asia A World Debate.*
- Author:** Menon, Lakshmi and Bowles, Chester.
- Publication:** WORLD, November, 1953, p. 10-17.
- Annotation:** Nehru's parliamentary secretary defends the Asian's point of view and attacks that of the Westerner. The former Ambassador to India in his reply outlines the basis for a new understanding between Americans and Asians.
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- Title:** *The Strategic Importance of the Netherlands.*
- Author:** "Batavus."
- Publication:** UNITED STATES NAVAL INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS, November, 1953, p. 1201-1211.
- Annotation:** The military correspondent of a Netherlands newspaper makes a study of the importance of Holland to the defense of Western Europe.