FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

Vol. VI No. 8 April, 1954

CONTENTS

U. S. FOREIGN POLICY AND ITS DEVELOPMENT . . . 1
Dr. William T. R. Fox

THE ART OF SUCCESSFUL NEGOTIATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 19
The Honorable Edward S. Crocker

RECOMMENDED READING 43



SPECIAL ATTENTION TO THE READER

The material contained herein is furnished to the individual addressee for his private information and education only. The frank remarks and personal opinions of many Naval War College guest lecturers are presented with the understanding that they will not be quoted; you are enjoined to respect their privacy. Under no circumstances will this material be republished or quoted publicly, as a whole or in part, without specific clearance in each instance with both the author and the Naval War College.

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW was established in 1948 by the Chief of Naval Personnel in order that officers of the service might receive some of the educational benefits of the resident students at the Naval War College. Distribution is in accordance with BUPERS Notice 1552 of 31 July 1953. It must be kept in the possession of the subscriber, or other officers eligible for subscription, and should be destroyed by burning when no longer required.

The thoughts and opinions expressed in this publication are those of the author, and are not necessarily those of the Navy Department or of the Naval War College.

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

Issued Monthly
U. S. Naval War College
Newport, R. I.

U. S. FOREIGN POLICY AND ITS DEVELOPMENT

A lecture delivered
at the Naval War College
on 27 October 1953, by
Dr. William T. R. Fox

Gentlemen:

Today is the ninety-fifth birthday of Theodore Roosevelt, who did so much to move the United States out from a side eddy into the main stream of world politics and to transform the United States Navy into an instrument appropriate for carrying out the foreign policy of a great power. This is a particularly good day on which to talk to a Naval War College audience about the development of American foreign policy.

Theodore Roosevelt is firmly associated in our minds with a reawakening of American interest in foreign policy and in naval power, but we ought to remember that it is a *re*-awakening. The remarkable group of men who presided over our national defenses when our Republic was very young were wholly cognizant of the relation between armed force and foreign policy. They knew why the infant republic on the overseas periphery of the Western European civilization area had a chance to grow to maturity. They understood that the predatory powers of Europe would allow this country to continue to exist, free and independent, not so much because they wanted to see a noble experiment in popular government succeed (which they did not), as because their own conflicts with each other made it unfeasible for them to spare the force for the subjugation of the young American nation which would have to be sent overseas from Europe to accomplish this end.

The American Revolution had amply demonstrated that it was no easy task for even a great European power to bring to bear in Continental North America the force necessary to put down rebellion. How much more difficult, then, would it have been for

a European power to destroy the independence of the young Republic once it was given an opportunity to develop efficient central government, the kind of government which would make possible a much greater mobilization of the country's resources than had been possible in the days of the Continental Congress under the Revolutionary military leadership of George Washington?

When the authors of *The Federalists Papers* described the object of American naval strength as being to incline the balance in this part of the world so as "to dictate the terms of the connection between the Old and the New World," it is worth noting that it was not part of the policy of this first generation of American statesmen to dictate to Europe regarding the course of European affairs, but only to ensure that American issues should not be decided by powers concerned chiefly with European interests.

It is perhaps worth reading a quotation from *The Federalist Papers*, No. 11, in which Alexander Hamilton wrote:

> ". . . Our situation invites and our interests prompt us to aim at an ascendant in the system of American affairs. The world may politically, as well as geographically, be divided into four parts, each having a distinct set of interests. Unhappily for the other three, Europe, by her arms and by her negotiations, by force and by fraud, has, in different degrees extended her dominion over them all. Africa, Asia, and America have successively felt her domination. The superiority she has long maintained has tempted her to plume herself as the Mistress of the World, and consider the rest of mankind as created for her benefit. Men admired as profound philosophers have, in direct terms, attributed to her inhabitants a physical superiority and have gravely asserted that all animals, and with them the human species, degenerate in America — that even dogs cease to bark after having breathed a while in our atmosphere.

> Facts have long supported these arrogant pretensions of the Europeans. It belongs to us to vindicate the honor of the human race, and to teach that assuming brother, moderation. Union will enable us to do it. Disunion will add another victim to his triumphs. Let Americans disdain to be the instruments of European greatness! Let the thirteen states, bound together in a strict and insoluble union, concur in erecting one great American system, superior to the control of all transatlantic force or influence and able to dictate the terms of the connection between the Old and the New World!"

This, I take it, is a statement of the most fundamental of our original American foreign policies, a policy that we use as a base when we are talking about "developments" since then. Alexander Hamilton and the men of his generation recognized that under the conditions prevailing at the end of the eighteenth century, the United States could guarantee itself the opportunity for growth to national adulthood by maintaining a fairly small force to incline the balance as between the European Powers, any one of whom might be tempted to send small fragments of their total national military power into the New World.

The Founding Fathers, then, were sophisticated about the international politics of their day. They were just as sophisticated about national politics. Under the Constitution, they made the President so strong that there has never been any question of his power to evoke Congressional consent whenever he asks for a declaration of war. He is sufficiently unfettered so that he can conduct the nation to the brink of war, at which point Congress, of course, has no effective choice.

There were, however, two major restraints placed upon executive power. The President had to seek the advice and consent of two-thirds of the Senate for any international agreement

so solemn that it had to be in treaty form. This two-thirds Senate requirement reflected a clash of interests that was then capable of setting the sections of the country in conflict with each other. The interests of maritime New England were concerned with establishing the rights of New England fisherman to fish off the Grand Banks of Newfoundland. The southern states, on the other hand, were concerned about navigation rights on the Mississippi. The two-thirds Senate treaty requirement insured that during this formative period no one section could, by a bare majority vote in the Senate, sacrifice the economic interests of another section of the country in order to conserve its own.

A second effective restraint on the President's conduct of foreign and military policy was Congressional control over taxes and appropriations. While two-thirds Senate treaty requirement may have become obsolete as sectional conflicts of interests have declined in foreign affairs — I say "may" because a number of people, and notably Senator Bricker, believe that it is not only obsolete but not strong enough — the significance of the Congressional grip on the power of the purse has risen steadily. Practically every important international engagement today requires that Congress appropriate large sums of money if the United States is even to begin to fulfill its treaty obligations. Furthermore, as national security policy has come to require protracted, high-level mobilization, both in the fields of foreign policy and military policy, Congressional control has been greatly strengthened. For mobilization in advance of war requires huge appropriations which in the past Congress has been willing to grant to the President only after the war crisis had actually occurred. This means that, as never before, the Chief Executive and his foreign and military policy advisers have to carry the support of Congress and public opinion along with them as they develop American foreign policy. For without a willingness of the people to be taxed to support a given foreign policy objective, the government will be largely impotent in its conduct of foreign and military affairs so as to attain that objective.

Our Constitutional arrangements and the foreign policy orientations of the first generation of American statesmen reflected, then, their skillful understanding of the relations between *armed force* and *foreign policy,* and of these two to domestic policy, particularly as it relates to taxes and appropriations.

The enunciation of the Monroe Doctrine in 1823, we may take as the culmination of a foreign policy based on taking constructive advantage of Europe's strife in order to develop America's strength. As the United States became, in the nineteenth century, preoccupied with the "winning of the West" — the American West, the West of the prairie, the buffalo and the Indians, the West of the sagebrush and the cactus, not the West in its twentieth century "anti-Soviet Russia" sense — this intimate relation between armed force and foreign policy ceased to be understood quite so clearly. With England so powerful as to bar any other European power from New World intervention and with Canada growing every year more and more of a hostage to good Anglo-American relations, the United States enjoyed a risk-free, cost-free national security almost without parallel in the history of the Western state system. We seemed to need neither army nor navy to guarantee national safety. We had the benefits of an English alliance at the peak of England's strength, without the disadvantage of an English alliance, an alliance which might have brought us into intermittent hostilities with England's enemies.

We did have an army and a navy (including a marine corps), but their glorious deeds of valor were not so much in defense of national security as in support of the private rights of Americans who chose to live abroad or chose to live on the frontier. In Kipling's words, we used our armed forces to bring into line "the lesser breeds beyond law." The Army was preoccupied with making the American West a fit place for white men to live in and an unfit place for red men, while the Navy and the Marine Corps were making Central and South America (to say nothing of the shores of Tripoli and Yokohama Bay) a fit place for Americans to trade, travel, invest, and dwell.

One might almost say that during most of the nineteenth century the function of the armed forces was to make sure that the Bill of Rights and the United States' Constitution would be upheld, not only in our own West, but wherever Americans traded and traveled, except in Europe, where standards of law and order resembling our own were maintained, whatever the degree of friendliness or hostility the government might maintain towards the United States. In Europe, the United States' armed forces had no function whatever and, for that matter, no chance of operating successfully even if there had been a function to perform. It would not be too far wide of the mark to describe the task of our armed forces during much of the nineteenth century as being "to spread the blessings of due process of law to ever wider areas of American activity." So far as our government was in a position to do so, life, liberty and property (at least the life, liberty and property of Americans) was protected by our Army in the West and our Navy and Marine Corps abroad.

Armed force had little to do with national security policy for a period of several decades. Not even the American Civil War brought military force and foreign policy back into any sort of relation to each other. In fact, the Civil War experience may very well have been misleading. In the Civil War, the Union Forces could have but one objective, "absolute victory." Any cessation of hostilities which left the Confederacy in existence would have been a defeat for the side that was seeking to preserve the Union intact. It was particularly appropriate that General Ulysses S. Grant should have earned the sobriquet of "Unconditional Surrender Grant." Armed rebellion is the only kind of war in which unconditional surrender is the automatic policy objective, in which there is no problem of adjusting military means to policy ends.

The Civil War, if it did not teach Americans anything about the relations between armed force and foreign policy, did teach the powers of Europe a good many things. It was the first major war after the railway networks of the advanced industrial states

had been completed. It dramatically called the world's attention to the existence of a potential world power in North America. But the colossus of the Western World dismantled the Civil War's military establishment and went back to sleep.

A career in the United States Army in the 1870's, as in the 1850's, meant being shipped from one small outpost in the West to another. As did so many other Naval officers, the Naval War College's own Captain Mahan had ample leisure to reflect upon America's future as he cruised along the West Coast of South America. The most exciting events for our Naval officers again appeared in connection with the efforts to regularize the payment of interest on bonded debts and the protection of other rights of American citizens in Latin America. Just as President Franklin Pierce, in 1853, had justified the bombardment of Greytown, a Nicaraguan port, by describing the town as a "marauding establishment, too dangerous to be forgotten and too guilty to pass unpunished," so Secretary of State Bayard, a generation later, was to describe the visit of an American war vessel to Guayaquil, Ecuador, to effect the release of an imprisoned American citizen as "one of peace and good will, to the end of exciting the moral influence of our flag toward discreet and mutually honorable solution." In both cases, the somewhat euphemistic language of American officialdom describes the use of American armed force in support of the private rights of Americans abroad.

The reemergence of a concept of American military and naval power as something to be related to the preservation of national security, including the physical safety of the Continental homeland and the way of life carried on in that homeland, was still, at the end of the Civil War, nearly a generation away. The generation which followed the Civil War saw the final disappearance of the frontier as a force in American life, and it may very well be true that with American energies liberated from the successful effort of conquering the "Wild West," these energies became available for the promotion of American interests abroad.

The exuberant attitude of some Americans in this period is illustrated by the statement attributed to Secretary of State Seward, falsely: "On the map, South America looks like a ham and Uncle Sam has always been fond of pork." This, by the way, is the same Seward whose purchase of Alaska in 1867 led to that important territory being known by "Seward's Folly," or alternatively, as "Seward's Icebox."

It is well for us to remember that those who in the last quarter of the nineteenth century expressed concern that America should have substantial armed power at its disposal, and particularly naval power, did not do so in the reluctant, half-apologetic way in which many Americans, like myself, do so today. Today, we explain the necessity for more or less semi-mobilization by saying that the free ride in national security which the United States experienced during the last three-quarters of the nineteenth century is gone, and, unfortunately, gone for good; by saying that the great good fortune which enabled us to dispense with costly armies and navies, and not wholly reliable allies, has gone; and by saying that, much as we may regret it, the United States cannot again hope to stay out of the main stream of history. All that we can expect, and we should count ourselves lucky if we get it, is that our country shall have the minimum armed strength necessary to guarantee security; further, we ask only that as much as possible of the nation's productive energy shall be released for the satisfaction of civilian wants.

As the nineteenth century drew to a close, there were many who had a quite different rationalization for the expansion of American armed might. They may have felt that it was humiliating for a nation with such enormous industrial potential — our population was about that of any two of Western Europe's Great Powers, and steel production was surpassing that of England — to be so feeble in military affairs. Perhaps they felt it was wrong for our country not to have policy objectives commensurate with its power potential, wrong for the United States not to be asserting itself

in the councils of the world. Our Navy would then need to be expanded if American views were to sound authoritative. Whether or not because of some vulgarized interpretation of Darwin's conception of evolution in terms of the survival of the fittest, the feeling was widespread in the 1880's and 1890's that a great nation ought to have a great navy or the world might find some defect in its claim to greatness. Whatever the explanation, with Alfred Thayer Mahan as the leading professional Naval exponent of the political advantages of expanded naval power and Theodore Roosevelt as his civilian counterpart, the United States forged ahead in a general naval expansion at the turn of the century so that it stood third among the powers of the world at the outbreak of World War I.

Meanwhile, the railroad, which at first had seemed to confer such great benefits on the centrally located land-based powers of Europe to the disadvantage of British sea power, now began to operate on the other side. In the first phase of the railroad's impact on world politics, the great mobility which the railroad gave to centrally located Prussia weakened the hold which Britain had formerly had upon Europe by virtue of its control of the narrow seas surrounding that continent. Once the route which led through the English Channel and around the Western European peninsula into the Mediterranean at Gibraltar had ceased to be the main stream of the world's commerce, once the British-controlled narrow seas were no longer the only route by which goods and men could be transported cheaply and quickly from one part of Europe to another, the decisiveness of England's naval dominance was greatly lessened. The next turn of the wheel restored the advantage to the sea powers and, paradoxically, it is the railroad which was largely responsible.

The industrialization of Western Europe, which the railroad and the rapidly advancing technology of steam and steel made possible, had as its second consequence an increasing dependence of Europe on overseas sources of food and other raw materials. As

the railway networks were being extended in the United States, in Canada, in Australia, in Argentina, overseas-produced foodstuffs could be brought to nearby seaports, carried across the oceans, and laid down in European port cities at a fraction of the cost of producing the same goods on European farms — not only foodstuffs, but such things as nitrates, too, as Germany learned in the First World War. Agricultural production in Europe entered into permanent decline after about 1878, and the expanding urban population came more and more to depend on overseas food and raw materials.

Thus, as the power of naval blockades in the narrow seas surrounding Europe ceased to be so all-important, the power of naval blockade in denying overseas raw materials to Continental European industrial powers increased. In a war of attrition among European powers, victory would henceforth go to that group of powers which could deny to the others the use of the world's waterways, while keeping them open for its own use. Notice, it is the *world's* waterways now, not the control of the narrow seas.

The new use of the British Navy for blockading transoceanic routes rather than routes around the European land mass could not, of course, be effective *against* an overseas power with an independent industrial base of its own, such as the United States; but used in conjunction with American naval power, it could be decisive in a war of fixed positions and slow economic strangulation. American sea power was, we have seen, thanks to the efforts of men like Theodore Roosevelt, providentially ready for its great test in a joint Anglo-American effort to strangle the land-based Central Powers. However, it is an open question how many Americans had planned it that way.

The lessons of the First World War were not lost upon the makers of the Versailles Treaty. The Covenant of the League of the Nations reflected the prevailing belief in the compelling effectiveness of blockades based on Anglo-American sea power. Article

XVI of the League's Covenant provides for economic sanctions to go into effect automatically, presumably on the theory that the military sanctions can follow at their leisure because the cutting of the trade lanes would be so effective that it would be possible to bring the war to an end without ever really having to spill very much blood. The Covenant offers eloquent testimony to the decisiveness of sea power in the First World War. So did the victors in this First World War when they promptly entered into naval competition with each other at the end of that war.

It is only a third of a century ago that the doctrinary ideologists of sea power in Britain and America were discovering in the size of each other's navy portents of future conflict and war. Woodrow Wilson's belief that what he called "British navalism" was almost as much of a menace as Prussian militarism added an element of moral righteousness to the American effort to establish a lead in the naval arms race. It is one of the most remarkable facts of twentieth century inter-Great Power relations that American naval power was able to catch up with and surpass the naval power of Britain without the two countries having engaged in a naval war, as the United States began to draw abreast.

In retrospect, it is perhaps easy to see why an Anglo-American war proved so easy to avoid. Conflict has not taken the form of sea power *versus* sea power. Leviathan, the great sea monster, had found his mortal struggle to be not with other sea powers but with Behemoth, the great land monster. Perhaps because their leaders recognized all this, Britain had retreated at every point where she might have found herself clashing with the United States, and she had retreated long before American naval power assumed its 1919 dimensions.

The retreat began even before 1900. Germany's rapid industrialization and favored location in a railroad age, her tremendous diplomatic successes under Bismarck, and her restless and apparently unlimited diplomatic ambitions in the era of William II and

Admiral Tirpitz had so alarmed British statesmen that they mended their diplomatic fences with Japan, France, Russia, and, above all, the United States. In Anglo-American relations, for example, in the years around the turn of the century, Britain yielded to Secretary Olney's famous ultimatum of 1895, at the time of the Venezuelan boundary disputes, "Today the United States is practically sovereign on this continent, and its fiat is law upon the subjects to which it confines its interposition." She yielded, in the Second Hay-Pauncefote Treaty, Britain's incontestably good legal right to share in the building of a canal across the Isthmus of Panama, a right which was provided for in the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty of a half-century earlier. She dismantled her defenses and withdrew British troops from Caribbean garrisons. And, finally, she abandoned Canada's interests in the Alaskan-Canadian boundary dispute under circumstances that were particularly galling to the Canadians. Given this almost unqualified recognition of American paramountcy in the New World, it is difficult now to see what fundamental clashes of interest could have brought about an Anglo-American War. In the tense days, however, of the naval competition, which was only brought to a halt by the Washington Conference of 1921-22, this was not so clear.

While one may perhaps doubt that, in the absence of such a conference, Britain and the United States would have drifted into war, a failure to bring this naval arms race to a close might have very dramatically reduced the capacity of the two governments to cooperate when Nazi Germany brought a second war to the world. Nor should we forget that on the eve of the Washington Conference, Britain still had an alliance in force with Japan. If we are now sometimes tempted to think that the capital shipbuilding holiday, which was inaugurated by the Washington Treaty, was an act of folly, it is worth noting that we thereby brought the Anglo-Japanese Alliance to an end and laid the basis for pooling Anglo-American power in the critical time of trouble which was to come within two decades.

All the emotional outpourings which are characteristic of, let us say, Pilgrim Society banquets in London, where one hears the theme continually reiterated that "blood is thicker than water," the "hands across the sea" theme of Anglo-American friendship, ought not to obscure the world political pattern which has driven the great sea powers on the two sides of the North Atlantic into almost unavoidable collaboration. This may be the most important development in American foreign policy since the early period when we fought two wars against Great Britain.

For many decades, men on both sides of the Atlantic had understood that a pooling of British and American efforts could have far-reaching consequences. In fact, more than a hundred years ago the *London Economist* editorialized as follows:

> "independently . . . of England and the United States together commanding the whole navigation of the world, which gives them a power infinitely greater than is possessed by all the despotisms of the earth, any opinion, political or other, common to them, backed by their world success and their vast power, must become, not to say the common creed of mankind, but very widespread and powerful."

If there had been for several generations now an opportunity for Anglo-American collaboration to sway the destinies of the world, it has only been in the last half-century that this opportunity seemed on both sides of the Atlantic to have become a necessity. If what I have said earlier in this lecture is true, namely, that Washington, Jefferson, and Hamilton all understood that during the conditions prevailing at the end of the eighteenth century, America's safety lay in Europe's strife, it follows that these same men would have preached a very different foreign policy doctrine in a period in which some one power, or bloc of powers, either Germany or Russia, or Germany and Russia together, should threaten to bring an end to the European balance system. That ultimate nightmare, a world war in which Germany and Russia are

allies, we escaped by a hair's breadth in 1940, when Monsieurs Chamberlain and Daladier showed so much more zeal in going to the aid of beleaguered Finland than in perfecting Western defenses. Americans, like myself, who were egging them on, would probably still be fighting World War II if the reckless gamble of Chamberlain and Daladier had not been checked by Sweden's vigorous neutrality in the big war, while Sweden herself helped Finland generously in the little war.

We have seen that in two world wars United States' intervention prevented an overturn of the European power balance. Thus, we have seen the Anglo-American relationship transformed from the original hostility in the American Revolution and in the War of 1812, to the almost compulsory collaboration of the mid-twentieth century. We have seen the doctrine of "no foreign entanglement" replaced by a doctrine of explicit alliance, buttressed by the most detailed inter-Great Power political and military planning the world has even known in peacetime.

It may not be entirely fair to characterize NATO as one English visitor to this country did recently when he said that NATO was "like the Venus de Milo — all SHAPE and no arms," or, as Lord Ismay said: "Too much harness and not enough horse." These descriptions of NATO's shortcomings suggest that everybody expects NATO to be much more than a set of paper agreements. Why is this true, even in, and especially in, America?

There are two main themes which could be used to describe American relations with Europe, that part of the world where the dozen wars originated and which have since the seventeenth century in each involved all or almost all of the Great Powers of the world.

The first theme is the theme of "no prior commitment." From the end of the Revolutionary War to the beginning of the Second World War, there was never any prior commitment by the United States to go to the aid of any European Power; nor, ironi-

cally, and this is the second theme, was there any failure on the part of the United States to become involved in any European war in which it could possibly have been involved. We got into each war once and the Napoleonic Wars once on each side. This refusal to make an advanced commitment was combined with a level of defense mobilization in America so low that twice a prospective German aggressor counted on several years during which the American industrial potential would not be brought to bear in Germany's conflict with the Western democracies. This calculation may have hastened both the world wars of our century. Certainly, on each occasion the German government must have felt that there was a real chance of victory being achieved before the United States could become involved, could become mobilized, and, finally, could bring its massive might in to tip the scales. Thus, the outstanding development of the American foreign policy in the period since 1945 is the step that we have taken by our treaty commitments, our coalition military planning, and our massive rearmament to try to teach the rulers of Soviet Russia not to make the same miscalculation that the Kaiser and the Fuhrer made in 1914 and 1939.

The Americans have come to this realization almost at the last possible moment. Whereas, in World War I, it took American power to break the apparently interminable stalemate of trench warfare, based on the machine gun and barbed wire, in the period since 1945 it takes a very full mobilization of American power simply to make a war in Europe last long enough for the United States to move from semi-mobilization to full mobilization. We are seeking to convince our prospective Soviet opponents that the march to the Channel will be more than a picnic; that the war cannot, in fact, be won before American weight can be thrown in the balance. And we are finding that it is taking nearly 20% of our national income to achieve this modest objective.

We see that our American political institutions have been flexible enough to permit the development of this new American

foreign policy as our country has become exposed to new threats of totalitarian aggression. I think it is worth asking if our policy-making branches of the government are capable of making such further policy changes as the future may require. The answer that I can give is not wholly comforting. It took the tragedy of Pearl Harbor to liberate the energies of the American people to achieve their own salvation in World War II. It took the coup of February, 1948, in Czechoslovakia, to shock our Congress into approving the appropriations necessary to make Marshall Plan aid possible. It took the aggression in Korea in June, 1950, to trigger the rearmament in which we have been engaged since that time.

Can we count on Soviet leadership a third time to shock us into the adoption of a military and foreign aid policy which will protect our national security? Do we have the institutions and the men capable of producing adequate national security policies, and getting them adopted, if our prospective enemy is so unkind as to fail to give us this kind of advanced warning of the gravity of his intentions and the totality of his ambitions? I do not know. But I do know that it is the need for such institutions and such men that gives so much importance to the effort of professional military men like yourselves to understand the bearing of major developments in foreign policy on the tasks of the national defense establishment and to the efforts of some of us in civilian universities to understand how military means can best be made to serve foreign policy ends.

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

DR. William T. R. Fox

Professor Fox was born in Chicago, Illinois, on 12 January 1912. He received a B.S. degree from Haverford College in 1932 and an A.M. degree from the University of Chicago in 1934. He was a Norman Wait Harris Foundation Fellow at the latter institution in 1935-36 and received his Ph.D. degree there in 1940.

From 1936 to 1943, he was an instructor at Temple University and at Princeton University. In 1943, Dr. Fox became associated with Yale University, first as research associate in the Institute of International Studies and then as associate professor of political science. He joined the faculty of Columbia University in 1950, and he is currently Professor of International Relations and Director of the Institute of War and Peace Studies there.

Dr. Fox served as consultant to the U. S. Department of State in 1944-45, and as lecturer at Harvard in 1947. He has been on the Board of Editors, "International Organization," since 1946 and Managing Editor, "World Politics," since 1948. He was a member of the International Secretariat, San Francisco Conference, United Nations, in 1945. He is a member of the Political Science Association and Council on Foreign Relations.

Professor Fox is the author of "The Superpowers," 1944; co-author of "Absolute Weapons" (Part III: International Control of Atomic Weapons), 1946; co-author of "Technology and International Relations" (Chapter on "Atomic Energy and International Relations"), 1949.

THE ART OF SUCCESSFUL NEGOTIATION IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

A Staff Presentation Delivered
at the Naval War College
on 1 December 1953 by
The Honorable Edward S. Crocker

Gentlemen:

When I was asked to give a talk on the subject I am about to discuss and when I studied carefully the title which was assigned: "The Art of Successful Negotiation on the International Level," I could not but be struck by the childlike and simple faith that inspired the request. That negotiation may well be an art, rather than a science, is an assumption with which I have no wish to quarrel; but if there exists anyone anywhere who feels qualified to reveal the secrets of *successful* negotiation, I shall be only too delighted to yield the platform to him.

Successful negotiation is, of course, the obvious goal of any negotiator; after all, we can hardly picture anyone undertaking such a task for any other purpose than to benefit himself or his country, if we are speaking about negotiation at the international level. Of course there are occasions when a country or group of countries may be forced into negotiations when the hopes for success — measured by the yardstick of material gain or profit — may be very slim indeed. Such is almost invariably the case when a country has been defeated in a war and is forced to send representatives to a place of the victor's choosing to negotiate for peace, or when defeated military commanders are forced to accept terms imposed by the winning side for the achievement of an armistice. There are many examples. Nevertheless, even under the most adverse circumstances one is hard put to it to find an example where there does not remain, even to the side suffering from the most abject defeat, a measure of resources, or of moral strength or other

circumstances, that cannot be used for bargaining purposes. In such cases there is obviously an imbalance in which one side holds a preponderance of trading advantage over the other; this makes the task more difficult, to be sure, but account must nevertheless be taken of the resources remaining to the weaker side. Indeed, the very fact that there is any meeting between representatives of both sides at all is *prima facie* evidence that agreement is at least desirable, if not necessary. The dictionary states that "to negotiate is to hold intercourse or treat with a view to coming to terms on some matter," such as a treaty; or "to procure, induce or arrange for, by negotiation, as to negotiate for peace." If the winning side foresaw no advantage in negotiation, there would of course be no meeting, no negotiation, and it would proceed quite simply to impose its will upon the other side by force. But the use of force itself cannot be employed forever; it is too great a burden; it is a drain upon manpower, finances, economy and national resources and there comes a time when the advantages initially gained by the use of force become less apparent, and sometimes the continuation of the employment of force becomes intolerable.

It is at this point that the defeated side begins to acquire certain advantages which must inevitably be taken into account — advantages, to be sure, not of their own making, and perhaps to which one might argue they are not entitled; but they are none the less real for that. The simplest example of this may be found in the onus which devolves upon the military victor in seeing that the vanquished are fed, housed, clothed, and governed; these conditions are of course problems which the world has had to face only in comparatively recent years; they are the natural consequences of total war. Things were far simpler in the days when wars were fought between professional groups of fighting men and the issues decided strictly on the fields of battle where the outcome was fairly clear-cut and the winner was acknowledged as such, not only by both sides to the conflict but also by the rest of the world, in its capacity as bystanders. But since modern war today involves the personal well-being and the personal safety of

every individual, whether at home or in the front line, the responsibility of mankind to itself and to the existence of its fellow-man renders decisions gained by war less well defined and often leaves issues still unresolved.

In short, the use of military force as an instrument of national policy to achieve national purposes has come to have greatly different implications from those which existed before the present era of Total War. The question now arises whether in the broadest sense the use of military force today is either justified or is indeed to anyone's national advantage excepting as a defensive measure for the purpose of survival. This is not a doctrine of pacificism; it is not a plea for defensive tactics. We all know that defense never won a war and that no country which is not prepared to fight is worthy of existence. Nevertheless, let us consider carefully the fact that at least the military phases of wars are not started by defenders but by aggressors.

To return, however, to my earlier statement that all the advantages — or perhaps I should say all the bargaining assets — are not always and entirely on the side of the victor. We have seen the impracticability of undertaking the permanent occupation of a defeated nation; we have seen the advantages of ridding oneself of this burden at the earliest possible moment. This knowledge, which has been acquired at the cost of such inestimable suffering by the winning side, has not been lost on the losers; therefore, in a sense, and because they have little left to lose, the latter do not have to be so careful nor so skillful in peace negotiations to achieve ends which are in their own self-interest as do the winners, who may be led to impose unsound terms by the temptation of gaining short-lived benefits. Such temptations are almost always present, in all sorts of negotiations. They are not restricted to agreements having to do with temporary or permanent cessation of hostilities; they are ever with us, especially on the international level.

One of the most difficult tasks confronting any negotiator is the exercise of true wisdom in assessing his principal's P A L,

that is, — his principal's own self-interest. In so doing he may find himself in direct conflict — and often does — with public opinion of his own country inflamed with passion, bitter with defeat or intoxicated with victory. If one is not dealing with matters of peace or war, such public opinion may be swept away by matters of false pride or perhaps misconceptions of what constitutes national honor and the like; considerations that with the passage of time sometimes prove less germane to the problems to be dealt with than seemed to be the case when the terms of agreement were under discussion.

Self-interest is, of course, the only proper yard-stick by which a negotiator should be motivated; but *self-interest* should not be confused with *selfish interest,* which is in fact its own greatest enemy. Self-interest is only served by an intelligent understanding of the other fellow's point of view and of his self-interest. That is why it is so important for every country to know his neighbor, for every people to understand all other peoples so far as it is possible. From my experience of living in north, central and southern Europe, in the Far East, in the Middle East, and even for a short period in Latin America, I can say that to know your neighbor is not necessarily to like him — although I have been persuaded that it helps one to do so — but it is almost inevitable that understanding and appreciation of another's way of life, his philosophy, his particular code of ethics does in fact constitute a thoroughly practical lesson in how to deal with others and how to solve problems that arise between you. Certain things that one person by training and tradition takes for granted, certain beliefs that are held to be basic, certain principles that are accepted as axiomatic, we find to our astonishment are sometimes not so accepted or believed or held by others. This should make the intelligent among us pause and consider.

We need not be shaken in our faith, we should not abandon the heritage of our beliefs; but we should indeed recognize that we would do ourselves a grave disservice by impugning the mo-

tives of others who may be as true to their customs and code of behavior as we to ours. It is the belief that the fellow on the other side of the conference table is acting in bad faith — in other words, an impugnment of his motives — that breaks up more conferences than any difficulties attendant upon the more ordinary matters of horse-trading.

It is essential to know and understand the other nation's principles and point of view in order to negotiate intelligently in one's own interest, because the business of coming to terms requires that each side in a negotiation shall gain, or at least retain, something to his own advantage. But it is also important to bear in mind that an advantage to one side should be weighed carefully to determine the extent to which a corresponding disadvantage to the other side results. In cases where such occurs, compensation must be proffered to bring matters back into balance; in other words, it is only commonsense that both parties to a treaty, or a pact, or an agreement should achieve a measure of satisfaction. Only so long as these conditions obtain will it be in the interest of the signatories to maintain and respect it. Treaties are in fact scraps of paper, as Count von Bernstorff once resoundingly said. But lest this bald statement be taken out of context, let me hasten to say that I do not for one moment believe that they should be so; they are, and they should remain, solemn obligations binding upon both parties; and they should be amended as required by the orderly processes of negotiation. Nevertheless treaties, *when written*, have proven in actual practice to be a little more than a formal statement of the desires and intentions of the signatories at the time they are entered into. As soon as conditions have so altered as to render the terms burdensome or intolerable to one or the other, a treaty must be the subject of discussion and revision.

That brings up a general caveat having to do with the establishment of treaties between nations. Unless they are multilateral agreements of a very general nature, such as the Covenant of the League of Nations, the Kellogg-Briand Pact, the Atlantic

Charter, the Charter of the United Nations, and the like, it is usually desirable that they be limited to a definite period of time; and it is essential that they should have within them applicable provisions for their reaffirmation or revision at a suitable time and when circumstances may require. This last point is important even in agreements of the general kind which are not limited in periods of time. Any civilized nation is prepared to regard itself as bound by the provisions of a treaty, willingly entered into, for a reasonably limited period of time, even though conditions may have changed in such degree as to render the provisions extremely burdensome and even verging on the intolerable. But if there stretch into the future the unalterable bonds of an agreement or of a treaty whose provisions have become inacceptable to either party, and if that pact is not subject to revision, there must inevitably follow a unilateral abrogation by the aggrieved party that not only risks bringing armed conflict into play, but tends to undermine the entire basis of the sanctity of treaties.

The great weakness of the Four-Power and the Nine-Power Pacts of the Pacific, to which among others the United States and Japan were co-signatories in the early 1920's, was the fact that they were conceived and brought into being in the tendency to believe that they could settle all the Pacific problems for all time. They were thought to codify a permanent settlement; and no provision was made for their being brought up-to-date and into line with the changing circumstances. The result was that when Japan lost her alliance with Great Britain, due largely to our importuning of the British, she found herself in a position of relative isolation and inferiority and one in which she was destined to remain if she continued by the terms of the treaty that was designed to maintain the 5-5-3 naval ratio. In other words, circumstances had so altered for Japan that the terms of the treaties she entered into willingly in 1921-22 had then become unacceptable to her for reasons that should be obvious. The unpalatable 5-5-3 ratio was tolerated by her only so long as the British Alliance was in force; but when that element was withdrawn, the circumstances under which she signed

the treaties of 1921-22 were altered to such a degree that she felt her basic security was involved. And, there being no provision built into the treaty for revision, Japan had no other recourse but that of abrogation.

Such unilateral action is of course highly undesirable and strikes at the very roots of orderly relationships among civilized nations. And yet it is impossible to lay the blame on one side alone in the example we have just been considering when the very nature and character of the treaty itself was at fault in that it was not flexible enough; it did not contain within itself the necessary applicable provisions for its own amendment. When changing circumstances outside the treaty removed from one of the signatories one of the foundation blocks on which its interests rested, an imbalance in equity was established which the other signatories refused to recognize, and which the treaty itself was unable to deal with through its own terms or machinery.

In a brief glance backwards at the principles involved in arriving at sound international agreements, we may perhaps discover that these three are worthy of consideration: First, that international negotiators should be guided by motives of self-interest in contra-distinction to selfish interest; secondly, that most agreements should be limited either as to objectives or as to periods of time, or both; and, thirdly, that in international relations above all the principles of equity should prevail over purely legal concepts. In the case of the 5-5-3 treaty, it would appear that all these principles were violated.

Another point might also be brought up here. As a matter of general principle it seems scarcely necessary to emphasize the need for precision and clarity; in fact, it is essential if an agreement is to represent a meeting of the minds on the part of the signatories. The utmost care must be devoted in draughting so that misunderstanding and confusion may not result; this is especially true in treaties or agreements of a specific nature designed to settle

boundaries, to bind the signatories to a certain course of action, to limit reciprocal trade, to control illegal traffic, and so on and so forth.

Paradoxically enough, however, circumstances may arise in which adherents to an agreement find their interests are best served by introducing a measure of vagueness or generalities into the text so as to leave a margin of flexibility, a latitude of interpretation, a certain amount of elbow-room, so to speak, that might be used by the signatories to deal with unforeseen conditions which could arise in the future. This freedom of action could then be used to settle matters that might otherwise assume an importance beyond their intrinsic worth if the letter of the law had been spelled out too thoroughly. This flexibility might be the technique to be followed in treaties of the multilateral types dealing with voluntary restrictions on international conduct, such as those I mentioned earlier.

It is, however, absolutely essential that if any imprecision be introduced into such agreements it must be done deliberately and for effect, and that vagueness or lack of precision should not arise out of the defect of poor draughting. An example of the latter, for instance, is to be found in the Charter of the United Nations. In Article 27, the Russian, French, Chinese and Spanish texts state: (1) "Each member of the Security Council shall have one vote; (2) Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of 7 members; (3) Decisions of the Security Council on all matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of 7 members, including the *concurring votes of all the permanent members, etc.*" The English text, however, omits the vital word "all." It was on the basis of the English text, of course, that we were able to act and took decision on the Korean matter, even though the Russians were not present to vote in the Security Council. However, Article 111 states that the five different language texts are *equally authentic,* which forms the basis of the Russian claim that the Security Council's decision to act in Korea was illegal, because she herself was not present to vote on it.

Again, in Article 37 it is stated: "If the Security Council deems that the continuance of the dispute is in fact likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, it shall decide to take action under Art. 36 . . . . . " etc. However, the Russian text refers not to Art. 36 but to Art. 39, a different thing altogether. Art. 36 provides merely for *recommendations* for the adjustment of disputes; whereas Art. 39 provides for *deciding what measures shall be taken.* Whether this discrepancy arises from bad draughting or whether the Russians altered their text deliberately, is open to question.

Let us leave this very brief presentation of some of the principles and tactics which underlie international negotiations and, drawing on my memory, let me recall some of the various types of peoples and nations I have had to deal with over the years. And because these experiences are personal and reflect my own views, I hope that the use of the first person pronoun may be charitably received.

Perhaps the first experience of any consequence that I encountered in the field of international negotiation was when, as Second Secretary and Charge d'Affairs in Sweden in 1932, I was called upon to deal with the consequences following upon the collapse of the Financial Empire of Ivan Kreuger, the Swedish Match King. This story, now some 20 years old, may have faded from the memory of many and may be unfamiliar to others. Kreuger, a soft-spoken and shy Swedish real estate operator, formed a company with his partner, Toll, and became interested in acquiring match monopolies throughout the world for the manufacture and sale of Swedish matches on an exclusive basis. From the outset this venture proved enormously successful; and with the growing profits he acquired more and more monopolies until he formed a company known as the International Match Company, whose assets, by the end of the 1920's, had reached into the hundreds of millions of dollars. I believe this company was incorporated in the U. S. under the laws of Delaware. American citizens had invested

in the stocks and debentures of this company, the Swedish Match Company, and other associated Kreuger & Toll Companies, to the extent of some 350 million dollars; the British had about 300 million and the Swedes themselves, and a scattering of Swiss, Dutch, and other European holdings, accounted for perhaps another 300 million. These are round figures and are not important except to indicate the vast extent of foreign interests involved. And let us recall, somewhat nostalgically, that the dollar stood at 100 cents in those days so, for a comparative understanding of the sums involved, we may multiply by two or three times.

Kreuger soon was in a position to dispose of huge amounts of money and he began to make loans to European and other governments. He loaned some 75 million to France; some 125 million to Germany and about 105 million to Italy. These sums were welcomed by the Governments concerned, were available at reasonable interest rates and were usually secured by Government bonds of various sorts. All seemed to be going well until the collapse in Vienna of the Austrian Kredit Anstaldt and the stock market crash of 1929 in the United States. In a year or two Kreuger was forced to raise loans to keep his vast match empire afloat and, in order to do so, he pledged the foreign government bonds in his possesion, until they were all used up. Needing more loans, he then turned to other means, and among them he resorted to forgery in order to create more collateral. It later was discovered that he actually, and with his own hand, forged the signature of the (then) Italian Minister of Finance on supposititious Italian State bonds to the amount of 21 million pounds sterling. In January, 1932, he attempted to raise a loan from J. P. Morgan & Company in New York. Although up to that time not a breath of suspicion had arisen against him or the soundness of his vast operations, nevertheless the firm of J. P. Morgan, employing what was certainly at that time unusual caution, decided to inquire into matters before granting the loan; and in February, 1932, sent lawyers and representatives quietly to Stockholm to make certain enquiries. I remember that when these gentlemen came into my office one morning and

asked for the name of a reputable Swedish lawyer of the highest possible standing who was not connected in any way with any of the many Kreuger enterprises, I went over the list and was unable to find one who might be said to be entirely outside the orbit of the great network of Kreuger interests. Nevertheless, we finally settled on a former Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs of such eminence that his probity and standing in commercial and juridical circles was beyond reproach. And, with him to help them, these Morgan investigators proceeded to set in motion a train of inquiry that eventually brought to light one of the most fantastic financial tragedies the world had ever seen. Kreuger, in March, committed suicide in despair, but it was a week or more after this before the realization dawned upon an unsuspecting world that it had not suffered the loss of a great and good man and that, far from having created a huge, sound, financial and economic structure, Ivar Kreuger had at some point passed beyond the limits of legally justifiable activities and had finally been driven to downright forgery. If anyone wishes to search the files of the *London Times* during the first few days after March 12, 1932, he will find that in a moving editorial Ivar Kreuger is eulogized as a very great man who contributed almost immeasurably to European recovery and whose untimely death was greatly mourned. The language and tone employed were those usually reserved for Heads of State or world political figures. Not a breath of suspicion was stirring. But within ten days, revelation followed upon incredible revelation and the enormity of the swindle, hazy at first, slowly came into sharp focus; but before the full force of the circumstances was borne upon the world, the Swedish Government was already taking steps to protect itself and, to preserve such assets as might remain among the ruins, legislation was introduced into the Riksdag specifically for that purpose. Among such assets was a small item of International Match Company Gold Debentures in the amount of fifty million dollars. Now, these gold debentures were physically held in Kreuger's own bank, the Skandinaviska Kreditaktiebolaget in Stockholm, which acted as a depository only for the certificates. Neither the Bank nor the Swedish Government

held title to these debentures which merely happened, for reasons of convenience, to be on deposit in a Swedish bank; they might just as well have been deposited in Amsterdam, Geneva, or New York. However, the Swedish Government hurriedly introduced legislation to freeze all the assets of the Kreuger enterprises in Sweden, in order to avoid dissipation of assets through panic-dumping on the open market before a full inventory could be made. However, the United States Government, having been informed of this impending legislation by the (then) American Legation in Stockholm, immediately cabled by the Charge d'Affaires to protest on the grounds that an exception should be made in the case of the fifty million gold debentures to which the Swedish government held no title and therefore no right to freeze or otherwise control. I immediately went to the Foreign Office, protested, and was politely informed that as Sweden was a sovereign state she could pass such legislation as she deemed proper in her own interest and I had to cable Washington the result of my representations. This, of course, was a perfectly proper position for the Swedish Government to take; but feelings were running high in the United States to the effect that American citizens, having been bilked by Kreuger, did not propose to be done out of any of the assets that might remain. And so, upon receiving my first cable describing my polite but firm rebuff, the Department of State sent me another cable — not in language addressed to the Swedish Government — but expressing to *me*, very clearly and in sharp terms, the indignation that the United States Government felt at the action proposed by the Swedish Government. In other words, we realized that the Swedes were perfectly correct in their position but we were pretty annoyed about it. I remember that when I got the Department's second cable I scratched my head and wondered what I could do further. If I repeated my first request to the Swedes, I would be again politely invited to mind my own business — after all, I was only a second secretary and I could scarcely be expected to impress them too greatly — and yet I had no written communication to deliver from my Government. What to do? I finally hit upon an idea and I asked for an immediate appointment with the

Secretary General of the Foreign Office (a position corresponding to the Under-Secretary of State in Washington) and I took a copy of the Department's cable with me. I restated my case and, as expected, was politely told off again. At that point I said to the Secretary General, "Before I go, I wish you would read this cable I have just received from my Government" and, with that, I handed it to him. He read it and as he began to take in the tone of indignation that ran through it, he showed deep concern. Finally, he put the telegram down and said: "May I have a copy of this?" I shook my head and said I could not leave it with him except under instructions, but that he might wish to read it once more so that he could take careful note of the phraseology. This he proceeded to do and then he stood up, asked me to wait for him, and disappeared into the Office of the Foreign Minister. In a very few moments, he and the Minister came out, asked me to return to the Legation and there wait for a telephone call from them. I left and they disappeared together in the direction of the Riksdag. An hour later I got a 'phone call saying that the proposed legislation had been changed to make an exception not to include the fifty million of gold debentures, and that they hoped I would so inform my Government at once. After cabling this good news, I sat down with a martini and thought back over the situation to see what lessons I might learn from what had happened. First of all, I realized the value of creating an atmosphere of toughness without being tough; that is, I as a U. S. representative could scarcely bluster and threaten, but I was able to convey the sense of indignation and outrage that existed in Washington merely by showing the Swedish Foreign Office a cable which had been addressed to *me* that employed some pretty strong language. And it was effective because the Secretary General was estopped from a direct rebuttal to me, personally, for the reason that I had made no direct communication to him or his government. Therefore, no question of face was involved and no positions had been adopted from which retreat or amendment might be difficult or impossible. Discussion had taken place in private and not in public, where a clamor might arise over what the press would undoubtedly call attempted interference

in purely domestic matters; no doors were slammed, and this was in line with Ambassador Warren Austin's favorite dictum: "Always leave your adversary *room* for *retreat*." And, finally, no direct suggestions had been made; such action as they decided to take was on their own initiative. These have since proven to constitute sound rules for sound behavior in negotiating and I have always kept them in mind. There is a rather wry aftermath to this little story and that is that after we got our way and we had cooled down somewhat, the American Government came to appreciate the wisdom of the Swedish Government's proposed action to freeze all the assets involved and, consequently, of our own accord, we willingly left the gold debentures in the Swedish Bank. Some years later, I believe, these assets were recoverable in practically the full amount, which almost certainly would not have been the case had we taken them out of Sweden and dumped them in a panic on the open market at a time when confidence had been so badly shaken. Another moral to this tale is that no matter how good one's title to property may be, if assets are physically within the borders of a foreign sovereign state physical control has also been lost.

Different techniques and approaches, of course, have to be employed in dealing with different peoples and countries. In this case we were dealing with a highly civilized friendly country in peace time, whose international morality and ethics were close to our own. Let us see what happens in another country. I was in Japan as First Secretary of Embassy at Tokyo from March, 1934, to June, 1942. One of the things I learned about dealing with the Japanese was that individual relationships with members of the Japanese Government were of little value in getting things done in our interest or in reaching accord or agreement. No Japanese likes to take responsibility; it is the thing he is trained to avoid. So that any attempt to negotiate is invariably frustrated by having the person with whom one may be attempting to deal blandly disclaim his own qualification to agree to anything, except after approval of higher authority. This is not limited to minor officials

or individuals of lesser rank. It goes on up through the heads of departments, to Cabinet Ministers, and even the Prime Minister, right up to the Emperor. As tradition never permitted him to enter into any direct negotiation, we can readily appreciate the sense of frustration that set in when any foreign representative tried to get anything out of the Japanese Government. It is in the Japanese nature fundamentally to avoid taking decisions excepting after consultation. They have, or had at that time, a shadowy, ever-changing, hazy group of high political figures and elder statesmen — nobody ever really knew who they were at any given moment — who met in secret to consult on all decisions of really great importance. These people, whoever they were — and they were always referred to vaguely as "they" — would then undertake to advise the Emperor; and whatever decision "they" had reached, would be taken in the Emperor's name. Decisions taken by the Japanese — even in the most trivial and inconsequential matters — almost invariably were taken on a national basis; that is, on what was conceived to be to the advantage of the nation as a whole. This made for an inflexibility and a ponderousness that often proved most exasperating. They also had other traits that were trying. For instance, it was considered to be impolite for a Japanese to refuse a request outright or to give a flat negative response; therefore, a foreigner had to learn that either a continued silence or an absence of forward motion in response to a request must be considered as a negative, no matter whether on occasion even a flat but prompt refusal might have been more acceptable than mere procrastination. They also seemed to us to derive the wrong conclusions from certain facts; their logic was quite different from Occidental logic and thought processes. For instance, I recall that one summer when hundreds of foreigners lived at the seashore and commuted by train to Tokyo, some 45 to 65 minutes away, a petition was made to the Imperial Japanese Railway Administration to put extra cars on a certain morning train to relieve the congestion. People couldn't get seats; they had to stand all the way, and it was disagreeable. After due consideration, the authorities said they would grant our request; and so for the next two weeks

an extra car was placed on the 8:00 A. M. train from Kamakura to Tokyo. At the end of this period the car was taken off again and, in reply to enquiries, the Railway Administration replied: "Oh, yes, we tried putting on an extra car but we found that the train remained just as crowded as before; so we took it off because it didn't help any!" I also remember on one occasion, late in 1941, when Ambassador Grew was trying to negotiate with the Japanese over the question of our Marines in Shanghai, the Foreign Minister finally at one point in the long discussion said: "Well, how do you expect us to negotiate this question if you refuse to do what we ask?" Nevertheless, in spite of all these difficulties and exasperations and frustrations, there are still certain of the same fundamental rules of behavior to be observed in negotiation with these people as hold good in the case of the Swedes. The idea is to be extremely careful to see that the question of "face" is not allowed to arise; keep discussions out of the public domain; don't slam the front door without leaving the back door open.

In Portugal, where I was Counselor of the Embassy for a number of years during the war and until 1947, I was engaged in negotiations regarding the use of the Azores for military air bases (and later for commercial planes) and in trying to work out agreements also in other fields. I found out, in dealing with them, personal relationships and friendships were of far greater importance than had been the case in Japan. Nevertheless, the decisions were always made at the highest level — that is, by Dr. Salazar himself, who always had the last word. However, Dr. Salazar would listen to good advice from his subordinates on occasion; and if you could succeed in "selling" the proper official, he would sometimes exert a favorable influence on the Prime Minister's eventual decision. Another thing to be remembered in dealing with countries like Portugal — and I imagine the same applies to Spain — is that the people of countries who have had greatness in past ages are often inclined to live in an aura of that past greatness. Their prestige is of immense importance to them; this may lead to situations where the form becomes more important to them than the substance. It

was so during the course of negotiations between the United States and Portugal over the establishment and use of air bases in the Azores. For thirteen months we were locked in a struggle over details with Dr. Salazar on this vital question, during which time countless additional hours, gasoline, planes, shipping and lives were wasted as we were forced to fly to Suez and the Near East area by way of Brazil, Ascension Island, and across Africa. Nearly all these thirteen months could have been saved if our British allies, who have had a Treaty of Alliance with Portugal since 1374, had cut us in on the deal that they concluded in August, 1943, for the use of Lagens Field on Terceira Island. But we were forced to negotiate a separate agreement, which was not concluded until November of 1944. Several months at least might have been saved if Salazar had not been so insistent upon form, and we had not been so wary of it. The fact is that we in the Embassy often received, off the record, assurances from reliable Portugese sources that if we would only accept the Portugese drafting in certain cases we could do about what we wanted when it came to practice — no matter what the written word said. Quite naturally the U. S. Government — that is, the military — were unwilling to accept such informal oral assurances unless backed by the written word, and so wrangle over details of draughtsmanship continued. On our side, too, there was an instinctive reluctance to commit ourselves to certain requirements unless we were willing and able to carry them out. Such an attitude is commendable, of course, but on the other hand there are occasions when we seemed to be straining at a gnat. The outstanding example in this respect that I can recall — because I have notes or records of those tedious and drawn-out talks the Ambassador conducted with Dr. Salazar — was his insistence that Portugese troops be allowed to be the first to set foot on Timor when it became liberated. Timor had been seized by the Japanese early in the war and the Portugese were looking forward with intense preoccupation to its liberation and return to them. However, the American negotiators, under instructions from our military, were forbidden to give such a guarantee on the grounds that it was possible Timor might eventually be liberated

by the action of the Australians rather than ourselves, and that we could not undertake to commit the Australians! This impasse may have cost us two or three valuable months. How easy it would have been to say "Yes" to Salazar and arrange, if necessary, for a corporal's guard of Portugese to be set ashore on Timor from an Australian or U. S. ship, or whatever Allied ship eventually drove the Japanese out. The Portugese pride would have been catered to; it would have looked well in the written agreement; and we would have had the use of the Azores much sooner. That's what I meant earlier in my talk when I suggested that in negotiations it is extremely valuable to have real understanding of the people you are dealing with — how their minds work; what their hopes, fears and aspirations are, and what their motivations. We in the Embassy understood why Dr. Salazar put such stress upon what seemed to us a trivial thing; but the military back home in the United States couldn't be expected to understand. They merely saw a stubborn man trying to commit them to something to which they did not want to be committed. Although I was flown back in October, 1944, to go before a Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee on that and other matters, I was not able to move the committee on that particular point. I remember when we were negotiating a Commercial Air Agreement with Portugal after the war that I had to go before the Civil Aeronautics Board to plead that the Portugese Transatlantic Air Line be given the right to land in Boston. The U. S. Government was very much against that at the time — for reasons never entirely clear to me, but I think it had to do with fear of congestion. At any rate, I finally persuaded the CAB to alter its stand because I was able to explain to them that the Portugese wanted this written into the agreement almost entirely for reasons of prestige, and that in my opinion it would be a good many years before any Portugese Air Line would appear to claim its rights. This was seven years ago — and the Line is not yet formed, even on paper! I cannot leave the subject of Portugal without recalling a little anecdote that illustrates the divergences that existed at that time between the minds of one whose basic training was military and one whose basic training was Foreign

Service. At the Embassy at Lisbon we had a two-star General who had been sent over by the Army Air Corps to assist and advise the Ambassador on technical matters concerning the intended air bases in the Azores. At one rather sticky juncture the Embassy received a cable from the Department of State — these cables are always over the Secretary of State's signature — instructing the Ambassador to deliver a certain message to Dr. Salazar. I forgot just what the substance of the message was, but it was rather firm in tone and happened to be exactly what the General would have liked to have the Ambassador say. It so happened, however, that before receipt of the cable certain developments had occurred which would have rendered it unwise to deliver the message to Salazar. The Ambassador called a meeting of his staff and advisors to discuss ways and means. We at once produced a draft of a reply to the Department saying that under the circumstances it was proposed to withhold action on their instructions and pursue other tactics. At this point, the General protested that we had no right to go counter to our instructions. He said: "You have received an order from your Commanding Officer and you must obey it." After a lively and somewhat heated discussion the Ambassador decided to reject the General's strong recommendation and to pursue his own course, much to the General's chagrin. Now I only bring up this incident to support my belief in the great wisdom of having Foreign Service Officers attached to the several military war colleges, to live and study with their military colleagues, to establish mutual confidence with them, and to exchange points of view. Then when they meet abroad under circumstances such as I have described and have to work together in our common aims and purposes, there will be mutual understanding, appreciation and sympathy of ideas instead of divergence and perhaps friction. The General was entirely right, of course, from the point of view of a military officer whose training and instinct was properly based on obedience to command. No layman would have it otherwise. On the other hand, the Ambassador, who was a skilled negotiator and and experienced Foreign Service Officer, was trained to flexibility; trained to be nimble on his feet, to play it by ear, so to speak.

Either characteristic if out of place might lead to disaster; yet it would be absolutely essential in the right place and at the right time.

Now let us take a look at the Poles. When it comes to negotiating with any of the peoples behind the Iron Curtain it is axiomatic that the personal traits or national characteristics of the people in those countries — which ordinarily be a guide to a skillful negotiator in dealing with them — must be disregarded. Anyone who is trusted by the satellite governments to conduct talks or discussions with foreign representatives is sufficiently indoctrinated with the Moscow line, and trained in Soviet methods, to reduce him to the common denominator of Russian communism. Experience, I hope, has taught us that there is no such thing as true negotiation with Russian communism; you can talk, you can discuss, you can go through the outward form with such people, but it is quite impossible to attain a true meeting of the minds wherein each side understands and appreciates the desires and motives of the other to the end that satisfaction may be mutually achieved. That is, I think, because the cleavage between the two sides is so vast, so fundamental, that there is no real desire to negotiate. Moscow and its puppets understand and yield only to force; they appear never to agree voluntarily to anything. In brief, they are perfect examples of people who are motivated by selfish interest to the detriment, in my opinion, of their own self-interest. At any rate, that's the way it has seemed to me, although I was only behind the Iron Curtain for about a year and a half. It appeared to be impossible even to attempt to come to an understanding with the Moscow-controlled types unless force was either employed or the ability to use it was made so evident to them that they would accept the other alternative rather than suffer compulsion. There is one more basis, perhaps, for "negotiating" with such people and that is on the basis of a *fait accompli.* If you can get what you want first, and can hold it, there is some chance of getting them to agree to accept the fact — if you want to call that negotiating.

I remember that in Warsaw we bought a building to house the Consulate and the U. S. Information Service office, and then found that one of the floors was tenanted by squatters (living space was at a premium in that city which had been almost 85% physically destroyed). All our protests and representations to the Polish Foreign Office led to no results. We talked of rights, of equity; we brought up the question of reciprocal treatment, saying that if the Poles bought a house in Washington they could have unwanted tenants evicted by legal action. The Poles merely shrugged their shoulders and did nothing. So the Ambassador — a man of direct action and little patience, admirably fitted for at least certain phases of the job in Poland — had the USIS office set up three or four radios and phonographs, with loud speakers directed right at the walls and windows of the squatters' premises, and set them going full blast for twenty-four hours a day. He kept this up for several weeks, and I must say it became a question as to whose nerves would give way first — the Americans in the Consulate or the Polish tenants. He stuck to his guns, however, and in just under a month he had the squatters out of there and the Polish Foreign office found other quarters for their harassed citizens. Well, I don't believe there is much to be gained by spending any more time on the subject of how to negotiate with Poles — at least the Poles of today ——and I'll close with a few remarks about the Arabs.

Of all the countries I have lived in, and the people with whom I have had to deal, I should think that personal relationships count for more in the case of the Arab than anywhere else I know. The Arab is a great individualist; he is tribal by nature. Nationalism as it is known in the modern world is something new to the Bedouin, who for centuries has roamed the desert; lived off the sparse diet it provides; owned little personal property beyond the clothes he wears, the gun and dagger he carries and the horse or camel he rides. He owes allegiance to no one but his elders, his tribe and its chief. National boundaries have been created only comparatively recently in the Arab world, and those boundaries were largely imposed upon him by Europeans and were not always of his own

choosing. Even today herdsmen drive their sheep, their cattle and their camels north and south with the seasons, seeking water and grass where it can be found, with little knowledge and utter disregard of national boundary lines. Matters that came up for discussion and settlement in their inter-tribal relationships were always handled by the respective tribal leaders, or sheikhs, and the pattern was set many centuries ago for the conduct of affairs by individuals rather than by groups. The few who were qualified by personality, courage and wisdom took care of the needs of the masses who were inarticulate, unread, and were regarded as younger children in the family are regarded. Rather abruptly — within a matter of 30 or 40 years — these people have been forced into a pattern of nations and into intimate contact with other nations who have had the advantage of experience in international affairs. The Arab is not unintelligent — quite the contrary; but he is almost wholly without experience in the complex world of the second half of the 20th century. That makes him unsure of himself. He feels insecure and, consequently, he is suspicious — as is quite natural. He feels that he is largely at the mercy of the more sophisticated and is unprotected; therefore, his best defense lies in attempting to assess the character of the person with whom he must deal, to read his mind, to estimate his worth, to probe for his motives. And I must say that the Arab has developed an amazing skill in this art. He is quick to detect insincerity, sham, pretense, hidden motives and the like; it almost seems that he is gifted with a sixth sense in this direction. At any rate my experience there taught me that if you can win confidence of an Arab, if he really believes that you do not consider yourself his better merely by birth or nationality or reasons that have no bearing on the matter, he will come to trust you, and on that basis you can get a lot out of him. But if the reverse is the case and he detects the slightest indication of pretense or lack of genuineness, you can do nothing with him. He may not reveal his feelings in any other way, though, because the Arab is naturally courteous and dignified and a strict observer of the amenities. So in negotiations with an Arab it is wise to pick your man with the utmost care to see that he has the qualities which

may gain the Arab's respect and friendship — that is of the greatest importance. Then, too, it is equally desirable, if possible, to deal with the right Arab on their side. Often time is lost by dealing with one who is either not in a key position or who is without influence in the proper quarters, or who does not himself have a good character because they, of course, vary in character as do people everywhere. Another characteristic of the Arab is that he is a realist and at the same time a fatalist; this all adds up to a willingness to compromise, and a liking for bargaining and settlement by discussion. This is a trait that should always be kept in mind and one which, if fully understood, can render negotiation in that part of the world a pleasure — turning the matter into a game of skill, thrust and parry, fast footwork, and the exercise of patience and adroitness that brings real satisfaction to the participants.

In looking back over some thirty years of living among and dealing with many and varied peoples, races, religions, codes of ethics and characteristics, I believe the most valuable lesson which has been drawn from this experience is that an understanding of others, an appreciation of their thought processes, and a sympathy with their motivations and the bases from which they spring — coupled with a genuine respect and liking for people — is extraordinarily helpful in negotiating to the advantage of one's own country. Humility in the sense of according the same respect to your adversary as you do to yourself, firmness in adherence to your own principles and code of ethics, and a recognition of the fact that a lasting agreement can only be achieved where the interests of both parties is in some sort of balance — all these things are essential to the art of international negotiation.

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Honorable Edward S. Crocker, II

Mr. Crocker was born in Fitchburg, Massachusetts, on 20 December 1895. He was graduated from Princeton University in 1918 with an A.B. degree, and served as an ensign in the U. S. Navy until 1919. He attended law school at Columbia University in 1921-22, and in 1922 was appointed a Foreign Service Officer.

Prior to World War II, he served successively in legations and embassies at San Salvador, Warsaw, Rome, Budapest, Stockholm, and Tokyo, being interned by the Japanese for the first six months of the war.

Mr. Crocker served as first secretary and counselor at Lisbon during World War II, and as counselor and charge' d'affaires ad interim at Warsaw in 1947-48. He was Ambassador to Iraq from October, 1948 until June, 1952, when he became State Department Advisor to the Air War College at Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. After one year there, Mr. Crocker moved to Newport, Rhode Island, where he is currently serving as advisor to the Naval War College.

RECOMMENDED READING

The evaluation of books listed below include those recommended to resident students of the Naval War College. Officers in the fleet and elsewhere may find these of interest.

Many of the publications may be found in ship and station libraries. Some of the publications not available from these sources may be obtained from the Bureau of Naval Personnel Auxiliary Library Service, where a collection of books is available for loan to individual officers. Requests for the loan of these books should be made by the individual to the nearest branch or the Chief of Naval Personnel. (See Article C-9604, Bureau of Naval Personnel Manual, 1948).

Title: *Economics of National Security.* 643 p.

Author: Lincoln, George A. N. Y., Prentice-Hall, 2d ed., 1954.

Evaluation: The author deals with specific topics in the field of national security principally from the economic standpoint. These topics include the scope and management of manpower, materials, industrial facilities, procurement, a discussion of science and technology, financing the defense effort, stabilization of the defense economy, and the international aspects of the problem. The central thesis of the book is the vital importance of the economic element of national security. The text considers those measures which support ready military forces and those which are applicable to full mobilization. The primary objective is to make the reader aware of certain important problems of national security and the cost thereof, both in money and measures affecting the lives and livelihood of the individual citizens. This, the author accomplishes primarily through simplicity of discussion of a series of complex topics and unhesitatingly recommending and supporting selected actions as the discussion proceeds. Recommended to all officers of all services to assist in the recognition and clear understanding of the scope and complexity of our security effort, and the relationship between military preparedness and other elements which are part of the real fabric of national security.

Title: *Crisis in the Kremlin.* 319 p.

Author: Hindus, Maurice. N. Y., Doubleday, 1953.

Evaluation: Deals primarily with internal and external problems which have faced the occupants of the Kremlin from Stalin's accession to power to the present time. The author is a Russian-born, naturalized, American citizen and foreign correspondent who utilizes his Russian background and frequent visits to, and travels in, Russia to depict many of the troublesome situations facing Stalin and his successors. He points out the blunders, shortsightedness, and weaknesses in their handling of crucial internal and international situations. The book is up-to-date through July, 1953. Well written, apparently authentic, and timely, it is excellent in its portrayal of the people of Russia, their desires, and the Kremlin's impact upon them.

Title: *Ambassador's Report.* 415 p.

Author: Bowles, Chester. N. Y., Harper & Bros., 1945.

Evaluation: Ambassador Bowles relates his experiences covering not only his tour of duty in India but also his travels in most South Asian countries, including the Phillipines and Indonesia. Although much of the material concerns personal affairs and incidents described by the family, there are some very interesting chapters. Chapter VIII, Section 23, lucidly discusses the reasons for a flexible U. S. foreign policy in these Asian areas. Recommended also are Chapter III, Section 9, and all of Chapters V and VI. The author travelled extensively and has developed in this book a clear-cut foreign policy to be followed in dealing with Asians. The relative value of foreign aid, Point Four, information services, etc., are discussed. The important point is that all Asians insist on independence in running their own domestic and foreign affairs — no matter how badly. Nationalism is the keynote, and in so far as these countries are concerned there will be no more colonialism.

Title: *The New Japan.* 62 p.

Author: Dangerfield, Royden. N. Y., Foreign Policy Association, 1953.

Evaluation: A bird's-eye view of Japanese culture, politics and economics, past and present, with some comments and observations as to the future. The brief resume' takes the reader through some eleven hundred years of Japanese history, commencing with the period of the Shogunate rule (800 A.D.) and ending with contemporary Japan. Emphasis has been placed on tracing the problems which through the

centuries have consistently deterred the progress and development of the nation. The last chapter contains eight discussion topics with reading references and suggested visual aids conveniently arranged for further group study.

Title: *Canada and the Far East,* 1940-1953. 129 p.

Author: Angus, H. F. Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1953.

Evaluation: As the title indicates, this book covers Canadian-Far East policies from the beginning of World War II until the present. In addition, some background information is presented on Canada's historical interests and policies in this area. The volume is well written and of interest to all students who are concerned with our northern neighbor. Especially pertinent is the running comparison between U. S. and Canadian interests, policies, and actions in the Far East since 1940.

PERIODICALS

Title: *The Red Fleet Is Being Built Up.*

Author: Lusar, Rudolf.

Publication: U. S. NAVAL INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS, January, 1954, p. 57-66.

Annotation: Describes the progress of the Russian Navy since 1936. (Contains maps and ship diagrams).

Title: *German Naval Strategy in World War II.*

Author: Kauffman, D. L., Commander, U.S.N.

Publication: U. S. NAVAL INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS, January, 1954, p. 1-12.

Annotation: The author selects for study four strategic plans which had a major bearing on the war and which were either controversial or interesting and valuable as lessons.

Title: *U. S. Strategy — Hit Back Instantly.*

Author: Dulles, John Foster.

Publication: U. S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, January 22, 1954, p. 56-58.

Annotation: An outline of the new foreign policy projected by the Eisenhower Administration.

Title: *"Both Sides Will Use A-Bomb."*

Publication: U. S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, January 29, 1954, p. 50-56.

Annotation: An interview with Field Marshall Montgomery on the defense of Europe.

Title: *Our Mediterranean Bastion.*

Author: Wolfe, Henry C.

Publication: THE FREEMAN, February 8, 1954, p. 343-345.

Annotation: Spain and Turkey constitute modern Pillars of Hercules essential in our planning to prevent an all-out war; or, if that conflict comes, to launch a winning offensive.

Title: *A Strategic Study of Indo-China.*

Author: Hiatt, Wright, Colonel, (CE), U.S.A.

Publication: MILITARY ENGINEER, January-February, 1954, p. 1-14.

Annotation: A short article on the geopraphy, climate, topography, transportation, health and sanitation of Indo-China, plus an analysis of American aid to the area.

Title: *Twenty-Five Divisions for the Cost of One.*

Author: Van Fleet, James A., General, U.S.A. (Ret.)

Publication: READER'S DIGEST, February, 1954, p. 1-10.

Annotation: Proposes that low-cost training programs be set up in friendly Asiatic countries to conserve our manpower and money and at the same time meet the Soviet threat.

Title: *Policy: Matrix of Strategy.*

Authors: Reinhardt, George C., Colonel, U.S.A. and Kintner, William R., Lieutenant Colonel, U.S.A.

Publication: UNITED STATES NAVAL INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS, February, 1954, p. 145-155.

Annotation: Discusses the relationship of policy to strategy, the lessons of the past and the problem, today, of accommodating policy to certain military fundamentals in the situation U.S.A. vis-a-vis U.S.S.R.

Title: *Strategic Weaknesses of the Soviet Bloc.*

Author: Korda, S.

Publication: MILITARY REVIEW, February, 1954, p. 105-107.

Annotation: A translation from the Yugoslav magazine, "Front," cites a few examples of the strategic weaknesses of the Russian orbit to show that it cannot count on success in an attack of global proportions.

Title: *The International Staff Officer.*

Author: Blood, B., Lieutenant Colonel, (M.C.), U.S.A., (Ret.)

Publication: THE ARMY QUARTERLY, January, 1954, p. 213-217.

Annotation: Briefly points out certain factors to which officers must adjust when assigned to a multinational staff.

Title: *Significance of the Suez Canal in Current International Affairs.*

Author: Badeau, John S.

Publication: VITAL SPEECHES, January 15, 1954, p. 200-205.

Annotation: A recorded speech delivered by the President of the Near East Foundation, tracing the historical and present-day importance of the Suez Canal area.

Title: *For a Continental Defense.*

Authors: Killian, James R., Jr., and Hill, A. G.

Publication: BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS, January, 1954, p. 13-16.

Annotation: The President of M.I.T. and the Director of the Lincoln Laboratory point out that air defense of North America involves the whole military system. An adequate defense need not bankrupt the nation and may be small compared with the risks — the loss of whole cities.

Title: *Syngman Rhee: The Free Man's Burden.*

Author: Gibney, Frank.

Publication: HARPER'S MAGAZINE, February, 1954, p. 27-34.

Annotation: An account of our dealings with the Korean President illustrates the problems in foreign policy posed by our smaller allies.

Title: *On the Shape of Ships to Come.*

Author: Carney, Robert B., Admiral, U.S.N.

Publication: ALL HANDS, Jaunary, 1954, p. 10-13.

Annotation: Excerpts from speeches made by the Chief of Naval Operations, arranged under topics such as: The Evolution of our Navy, Seapower in the Atomic Age, Nuclear Propulsion, etc.

Title: *An Armistice in the Cold War?*

Author: Lippman, Walter.

Publication: LOOK, February 9, 1954, p. 70-71.

Annotation: Reports on the new military and diplomatic estimates of the world situation upon which the policy of both sides "to relax the tension" is based.

"Maritime skill is like skill of other kinds, not a thing to be cultivated by the way or at chance times; it is jealous of any other pursuit which distracts the mind for an instant from itself."

Thucydides, 399 B.C.