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NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
NEWPORT, R. I.

Department of Correspondence Courses

MEMORANDUM

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NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

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Newport, R. I.

THE PLACE OF THE ARMED FORCES IN THE MAKING OF NATIONAL STRATEGY

A lecture delivered
at the Naval War College
on 18 March 1953, by
Mr. Walter Millis

Admiral Conolly, Gentlemen:

I have been asked to speak today on "The Place of the Armed Services in the Making of National Strategy." Let me say, at the outset, that this is a subject which raises a whole host of intricate and complicated questions for which I certainly do not flatter myself that I can give any very clear answers. They raise issues which reach into the very foundations of our constitutional system and indeed, I think, into the workings of our society itself. They are issues which spring from what is perhaps the deepest dilemma of modern man, and that is the dilemma which is inherent in our attempt to build a society, a social structure, founded upon the principles of reason, law, consent and compromise in a world in which brute violent force is, nevertheless, the final arbiter in human affairs.

To exhaust, or even to approach, all the facets of this very large subject would take not a lecture—it would take many books—which I am afraid I would not be competent to write. That is my excuse for approaching it here in only a very generalized way—a way which, I am afraid, will be pretty elementary to you, which may perhaps, however, do a little bit to clarify some of the issues involved and which will at any rate express a few ideas of my own, and possibly invite you to knock them down.

The dilemma is not peculiar to the United States, nor even to the western liberal tradition. It is one with which every mod-

ern people, whether democratic, totalitarian, or autocratic has been wrestling with for the past 150 years at least, and it is one, I think, for which no very good answers have been developed anywhere.

Specifically, the problem is the problem of the proper relationship between the civilian policy-maker and the military technician in shaping the over-all policy or strategy of the modern nation-state. Actually, this is a problem which has been with this country at least since 1775, and which from that time on has occupied a very large place in our public discussions; but which the American people, as a whole, seem only recently to have recognized as one of basic importance to the functioning of their state.

In the past, the problem looked—and perhaps it really was—relatively simple of a solution. To all its complex difficulties, Americans brought two great dogmas, or traditions, which seemed entirely sufficient. These are the dogmas, *first,* of "civilian control"; and, *second,* of the complete supremacy of the military technician in the purely military field. These two principles appeared to define a logical and workable division of labor, and to many they still seem to do so—but, do they?

As recently as 1947, they were explicitly written into the National Security Act. That document (and to my mind, it is really a great document) was careful to preserve civilian control over the Armed Services, but was equally careful to make the Armed Services—as represented and embodied, primarily, in the Joint Chiefs of Staff—the responsible technical advisers, and consequently, for practical purposes, the real source of authority over nearly everything that a civilian policy-maker might feel it necessary to control.

If there is an element of inconsistency here, it suggests that one might take a closer look at the two foundation principles.

First, "civilian control":—this is another of those things which everybody talks about and nobody ever does anything about. These magic words have been endlessly repeated on every suitable occasion in Congress, in the press, and on political platforms. They are readily echoed, I think, by every military officer who has any sense at all of public relations. So far as I'm aware, no one has ever tried to define them, however, or to say just what it is the civilians are supposed to control or just how or up to what limits this control is supposed to be exercised.

Actually, the whole concept is, itself, a survival. It is a survival from the 18th century. No doubt it was sound enough in itself, but it originated in issues really quite different from those which we confront today. The blunt truth, is that it is no longer particularly helpful or even particularly applicable to the basic problem which is now before us.

The authors of the Constitution had a much keener sense of the significance of force in society and, therefore, the significance of the military institutions adopted by societies, than many of their descendants seem to have had. They were acutely aware that, whether in a republican, monarchical, or any other form of government, the man with the gun was in the long run likely to have the last word. They did give a great deal of their time and thought to questions of who would have guns, who would control the people who had the guns, and how the military forces of their new state should be organized. But in all this they were primarily interested in the focus of military power *within* the state. The problems of so organizing the state's military resources as to meet and defy great enemies on a world stage were, to them, somewhat dim and distant. In its origins, the tradition of "civilian control"' is, basically, a protection for the state against internal military subversion or usurpation.

This is no longer the problem. No one, today, seriously fears the man on horseback, or the military dictator. I think no one, even among those of our citizens who were alarmed by some of the implications of the episode of General MacArthur's recall in 1951—none, even of these, ever imagined that General MacArthur could or would take political power by other than constitutional means. No one then saw the army turning Congress out into the streets or marching down Pennsylvania Avenue to capture the seats of power. There may be some lingering fear still lest a military caste, unduly influenced by its own ambition or self-interest, should build up too large a claim on the economic resources of the country. This fear may be there, but I think that even this is hardly a real issue any longer.

"Civilian control" in fact, has in very large measure accomplished what it was supposed to do, but it has very little relevance to the problem which we must now meet. It is no longer one of balancing the military and the political forces within the state. It is one of the devising an external policy on strategy which will, in fact, secure the safety of the country; which will further its legitimate national aims, and mobilize its resources to the degree necessary—but only to the degree necessary—to ensure its defense and welfare.

Here, civilian control is not much help. Here, we have traditionally relied upon the *second* great dogma, or principle: that of the complete supremacy of the military technician in the purely military field. The tradition that in military matters, reliance must be upon the trained soldiers, seamen, and airmen who are supposedly competent in these fields has long been accepted in the United States, and today is seldom questioned in the run of popular or Congressional debate. Only the other evening at the annual West Point dinner, it was given rather a sonorous, if somewhat uncritical,

expression by General MacArthur, who sent his message to the various diners in these words: "The nation," he said, "must trust to the soldiers when the statesmen have failed to keep the peace . . . It must be said again, again, and again that in war there is no substitute for victory."

In the light of history, it seems to me that this is at best a somewhat dubious proposition. The principle upon which it rests is not even primarily American; it is not even, like the general principle of civilian control, a product of the major stream of 19th century Western, liberal, democratic thought. It was, to be sure, subscribed to in greater or less degree by virtually every Western Great Power, but its most classic origins, I think, are probably to be traced to none other than Carl von Clausewitz, with his generally sharp distinction between the military means and the political ends. And surely, it was given its most rigid, practical application during the 19th century, in the strict, devoted, and non-political professionalism of the Prussian Great General Staff.

It was in the Great General Staff that the idea was most rigorously cultivated of a complete divorce between policy and war. It is said of the elder Moltke that he had "an almost nervous fear of politics." The policy would be made by the civil powers—and for that the soldiers would take no responsibility. It was the function of the military to prepare (in isolation and usually in a large measure of secrecy even from their own political colleagues) whatever technical means might be necessary to make good these policies decided upon by the civil powers. The Prussian Great General Staff was the epitome of expert military professionalism, operating with supreme authority in its own field. While the concept, perhaps, was never so completely and rigorously developed in other countries, it was very widely imitated. So wise a statesman as our own Elihu Root took the Great General Staff as the

model for his Army reforms here; Haldane in Britain did much the same thing, and the French, Russian and other systems prior to 1914, were all based on the same principles.

Of course there were frequent clashes under this principle between the military and the parliaments; when the military made demands for funds, the parliaments refused; or, the parliaments made demands for reductions which the military refused. But, in general, if the soldiers did not always stay out of politics, at least they stayed out of the difficulties and the responsibilities of national policy formations. Few of the civilians, on their side, cared very much what the soldiers were doing nor even knew much about it. This seemed a reasonably sound arrangement.

Then came 1914, bringing a very rude awakening.

The opening crisis of that war itself gave a terrible demonstration of the fact that there was no such thing as a "purely military problem," and that military plans and preparations could not be evolved in a monastic isolation from the political and policy issues to which these plans were to be applied. The military plans turned out, in this moment of crisis, to have an inescapable and often a controlling effect over the efforts of the civilian authorities. I might say, to repeat what you all know, that the Russian mobilization plan made it impossible for Russia to mobilize against Austria, alone, and, therefore, she had to mobilize against Germany as well. The great Schlieffen Plan, which was so elaborately and professionally developed to enable Germany to fight a two-front war, made it impossible for her to fight anything else—and, so, committed her to the appaling horrors and ultimate defeat which, otherwise, she might conceivably have escaped.

The Anglo-French military conversations, which were begun as a safeguard without specific obligations against certain pos-

sible eventualities, ended as a commitment to act in those eventualities and a straight jacket from which the British civilian statesmanship could not easily and entirely extricate itself.

This was the first disconcerting discovery of 1914:

In their combined efforts to assure military security, the soldiers had assisted powerfully in turning a local crisis into an inescapable general war. Much worse was to follow. The war which they had thus prepared was one of which they themselves had no prevision. They had all, in every country been thinking and planning in terms of a short conflict and a quick victory—something on the order of 1870; of course to be much larger and more violent but, nevertheless, of the same general kind. What they actually ran into, was the four years of dreadful stalemate in which millions of men were to be ground up and destroyed to no rational purpose and which was, also, to call up moral, political and psychological forces as well as more strictly military strategic innovations which were totally beyond the experience of the military professionals of that time to manage or to direct.

Their planning had helped to produce a war of a kind to which their technical military skills were largely inadequate. None of them knew how to mobilize the great industrial resources demanded by this new kind of war. There was lack of political experience to call out their nation's manpower and emotional reserves. Every one of the warring powers soon found itself locked in a dilemma between civil and military control of its national strategy. The Russians never solved the problem, and ended in utter chaos. The Germans, in effect, adopted the military solution when they established the Ludendorff-Hindenburg military dictatorship—precisely on the principle enunciated in the quotation that I just read from General MacArthur. The result was a

complete defeat. One can hardly say, consequently, that this was a sound answer.

The Western democracies, by and large, chose the civilian solution. In general, they tended to promote their civilian leaders to a more direct control over military operations; and such very unmilitary figures as Wilson or Lloyd George; such amateurs of war as Clemenceau or Churchill, exerted a degree of control over purely military strategy which would have horrified a pre-1914 soldier and of course, as you all know, frequently did.

Their reward was victory, but it was a victory which had to be paid for. There was much more than mere cynicism in Clemenceau's famous dictum about "war being too important to be left to the soldiers." War, with all its political, moral and economic factors, *had* become too important and too intricate for the mere military technician. As Churchill himself summed it up much later—in fact, during the Second War:—"Modern war is total and the technical authorities must be sustained and, if necessary, directed by heads of government who understand not only the military but the political and economic forces at work, and who have the power to focus them all upon the goal."

True as this may have been, however, it was to turn out in the succeeding years that if war was too important to be left to the soldiers, peace was too important to be left to the politicians.

In the two decades after 1918, the soldier throughout the democratic West was generally held in a fairly low regard. The civilian statesmen were inclined to neglect his advice and to deny him the money necessary to keep the sword arm of the state reasonably bright. The tragic and ironic result, however, was another great world crisis—another general war—for which the pacific statesmen could be held at least as culpable as the military

planners had been in 1914. If it is true that prior to 1914 the largely secret military planning had gone forward with too little regard for the problems of statesmanship, it seems equally true that after 1918 the statesmen went forward with too little regard for the hard facts of military plans and potentialities.

As the world came up to 1939, the deep problem of civil military relationships in the modern state was still, it would seem, largely unsolved. Once the Second War had broken, the problem was never, for the Western people, as acute as it had been during 1914-18. So far as the Western coalition was concerned, the war direction in the second struggle seems to have reached a considerably higher level of smoothness and success than in the first. My own belief is that this was partly the result of circumstance; that it was partly due to the lessons which had been learned, but that it was mainly due to the fortuitous presence of several remarkable individuals in the seats of civil and military authority.

Whatever you may think of their purposes or ideologies, Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin were all men of unusual capacities. All were essentially civilian politicians with a keen sense of civil and political relationships. They all three had an understanding of war and its conduct beyond what one might ordinarily expect to find in a civilian leader. One more name I would like to mention here—not that he was the only such person, but that he was a distinguished one—and that is the name of George Marshall. It seems to me that he was a soldier with an almost equally unexpected capacity for the larger human and political relationships involved in the conduct of modern war. All of these men, of course, made their mistakes—some of them were serious ones—but, on the whole, the results were good.

On the German side, again, however, they were bad. The Germans were led by a madman. They were entangled in all the complications of his very peculiar command system—the OKW, the General Staff, the Luftwaffe, the Army, the Navy, the Todd Organization and so on, and they, again, ended in a total disaster in which no one would wish to imitate them. But even with the comparative success of the Western allies and the failure of the Germans before us, the dilemma remains unsolved. The devices adopted by the West during the Second War worked at least well enough while that war was under way. Even so, they worked to something less than perfection, I think we would agree. Now that the Second War is over, now that we find ourselves not in the expected peace but in a "cold war" which we had to enter almost completely unprepared, it sometimes seems questionable whether these devices are working at all.

The relatively successful wartime collaboration between the civilian makers and the military executants of national policy and strategy has in many ways largely broken down. In total war, although everything is sacrificed to the military end, civil-military relations (though they are difficult enough) are at least simpler than they may be under "cold war" conditions, under which the military needs must be continuously balanced with the legitimate aspirations and freedoms of civilian rights— and balanced in this way, perhaps, over long periods of years.

In facing this task, it is true that both sides have learned a lot. The civilians, and the great public to which they are responsive, are more keenly aware than they used to be that great political or moral aims cannot be established or sustained without reference to the military means available for their support. I doubt that another American president could repeat the almost staggering military insouciance with which President Woodrow

Wilson, in 1917, managed to enmesh American policy in a great war situation in almost total ignorance of all the actual military factors involved. A review of how little Wilson either knew or even wanted to know about the military conditions in Europe in 1917 would, I think, bring any modern military intelligence officer or C. I. A. man to his grave with horror.

On the other hand, military men, I think, have a much livelier sense than they once did, both of the political consequences of their military planning and of the limitations imposed on the plans by political and economic considerations. If this interest in the civilian side and the civilian mind were not present among our uniformed forces, I doubt very much that you would be sitting here this morning listening to such a civilian as myself.

These twin ideas—that civilian policy-makers must have at least a hand in even the technical details of military planning and that the military technicians must have some part in the development of those policies in national strategies which require military means for their furtherance—are, I believe, reasonably well established, even if they are frequently overlooked. But that is about as far as we have got. How do we build the bridge between the two?

The National Security Act of 1947, as amended, certainly presents the most thoughtful and thorough effort ever made in this country to establish such a bridge, to apportion the heavy responsibilities involved on both sides, and to provide the organizational machinery through which to achieve operational results. Judging by what one reads and hears, there seems to be almost no one who is really satisfied with the workings of this system. There isn't any real agreement on the limits of civilian control or of technical and military issues. There is no agreement on the matter of how

far a technical and military finding must be respected by the civil organs of policy. There is no directive to tell a high military officer just what weight he must give to economic, political, and similar considerations in drawing his military plans. There is nothing to make the President, the civil executive officers, or the Congressional committees accept any strictly military conclusions reached by the military advisers. Despite the Security Act, despite all the experience from which it was derived, the underlying problem is about as acute as ever. This was, I think, quite clearly indicated by President Eisenhower (when a candidate) when he spoke in Baltimore last September:

> "In time of peace, we have always cut the military establishment to the bone. In time of war, we have said: 'Let the professional soldier take care of it.' This matter has been bad enough in the past. In today's world of continuing tensions, it has been intolerable. Complexity creates confusion everywhere. Generals who used to be trained to concentrate on military decisions, now are compelled to consider economic factors. Those civilians who should exercise authority in military matters, feel hesitant because of their lack of authority and specialized knowledge."

But what he intended to do about it, he did not say. If he has said so since, it has at least escaped my attention. Actually, I am beginning to wonder whether anything more than the most generalized sort of tentative answers ever can be worked out. I am beginning to wonder whether we shall not have to abandon (or at least to modify) the very logical yet ideal concept on which the Security Act was primarily based, in favor of a somewhat greater willingness to accept in these vast fields something of the illogicality and confusion in which all human institutions (particularly in democratic societies) have always progressed.

If you will pardon a very elementary review, let us look at the Security Act. The civil power is supposed to define national aims and policies, after due consultations, through the National Security Council, with the military departments. The Joint Chiefs, as principal military advisers, would then determine the military means required to sustain these national aims and policies. The several Services would then determine the amounts of money, manpower, and equipment which each required to fulfill its part in providing these means. Their findings would then be consolidated into a military plan and military budget, which would then go back to the civil power for review. Ideally, it would then be up to the civil power—operating, first, through the President and his Budget Bureau and, subsequently, through Congress and its committees—either to supply the indicated men, money and materials or, if the total looked like too large an order, to revise the national aims and policies downward to those more modest proportions which could be sustained on lower military levels. This is the way it was supposed to work. As we all know, I think, nothing like this has ever actually happened. We all suspect, I imagine, that nothing like this has ever happened in any great modern power.

It may be that the people of the Kremlin really do adjust the military preparations and political aims of their monolithic state in this rigorous way. It may be, for example, that their political goal is "conquest of the world," or, say, the "overthrow of the United States." That they have very nicely calculated the number of aeroplanes and armored divisions, the number of propaganda broadcasts, atomic bombs, and so on, which this will necessitate and are following a consistent military-political plan toward this clearly defined end. It may be, but I am bound to say that I doubt it—I doubt it very much. For all their rigid ideology, I suspect that they operate on *ad hoc*, opportunistic, and evolutionary principles almost as much as do other statesmen. And I am sure

that the United States operates in this way; I wonder, too, whether it ever can or should do otherwise.

Admittedly, this present illogical and uneasy balance between the civil and military powers in our own society has two great defects. The *first* (and the least often noticed), is the civil power itself. Actually, in our country there is no *one* civil power, and that is something which those who talk so much about "civilian control" ought to remind themselves of more often. Rather, there is a vast milling and interaction of many powers and policies. To these, I think, an able President, or a strong Secretary, or an effective party organization can give leadership. They can give them a certain direction, a certain consistency. They never, however, can give them a hard and fast determination. They never can set up a national "line" comparable to the Soviet "line" or a national strategy from which the military man can draw concise, responsible and consistent directives as to just what it is the military men are supposed to do.

The literature may be full of the supposed misdeeds of the military men, but it is even more replete with the legitimate complaints of the military against the elusiveness and inconsistency of the instructions which the civilians vouchsafe to them.

The case of Korea is an illustration. If the civil authority could provide the Joint Chiefs, say, with a clear, concise statement of just what they want to achieve by military means there, I think it would be quite within the abilities of the Joint Chiefs to come up with an estimate of just how much it would cost in men, money, and possibly even in certain international complications. But the Joint Chiefs are seldom asked questions in this factual, positive way. And even if they were asked in such a way, perhaps it wouldn't do too much good because policy is always fluid. Any

consistent, long-range military plan which they brought up (if it could be published at all) would immediately be at the mercy of all those forces and factions which wanted to do it all differently, or wanted to do the same thing in the same way but for much less money and blood. That is the first difficulty.

The *second* difficulty, it seems to me, is the obverse of the first. If the forces of civil policy-making are inconsistent and often irresponsible in the demands they make on the military technical advisers, the military technicians are themselves inconsistent and inclined to shirk responsibility in the answers which they give to the civil authorities.

I may be unjust about this, but it has often seemed to me that while military men are eager enough to give their advice in specialized fields of interest in which they are particularly concerned, they are the first to pull in their necks and to take to their shells when it comes to those broader decisions having the greatest effect on over-all national strategy, in which sound military advice is most to be desired. Thoughtful naval officers have advanced many sound and cogent arguments for the importance of sea power in any over-all scheme of national strategy. Air Force officers have advanced other impressive arguments as to the importance of land-based, long range air power. But when the civil authority comes up against the hard core question of whether he is going to bet the nation's roll on Forrestals or B-47's, or if on both, then in what proportion—he usually draws a good deal of a blank. The Air Force is inclined to say that Forrestal aircraft carriers are outside its province altogether, and the Navy is apt to reply that it can say nothing about the military utility, or otherwise, of B-47's. The civilian is left in the middle.

The net result of present JCS planning is, to be sure, a kind of "least common denominator" or general average of the Service

views. In other words, CNO will not take public responsibility for the military utility of what he has agreed to in the Air Force budget. Neither will the Chief of Staff of the Air Force go to bat for the armored divisions which he has allowed to be allotted to the Army. If the civilians are confused when it comes to asking the right questions of the military, the military with their three Services, are equally confused in giving the answers. In fact, there is nowhere under the existing system to which civil policy can go to get a unified, over-all, military answer any more than there is anywhere for the military to go to get an over-all, unified civil policy directive.

These are the two defects of the present system: The civilians can't say what they really want and the three-service military establishment can't tell them how they are to get it. Both sides meet on a kind of confused, middle ground. Again, we have seen many illustrations of this recently—the most recent, and one of the most interesting, being the whole episode of General Van Fleet's return and his testimony as to the want of ammunition in Korea. You might think that there is no question which would be so completely technical as that of ammunition supply, that this was a matter which General Van Fleet would normally send through channels and which would never reach the civilian policy maker at all. Of course, quite the opposite has happened. General Van Fleet spoke out—very sincerely, I am sure—and he was immediately picked up by the senators. The senators started a hearing. Most of the military experts told the senators that there was no ammunition shortage; Van Fleet said there was an ammunition shortage; Senator Byrd prepared an angry resolution which declared that Van Fleet had been completely justified—"substantiated" was the word—and the senators will now go on to investigate still further.

This doesn't, it seems to me, to be making strategy—it seems to me to be mixing it, to be confusing it almost to the last possible point. It is a confusion of civil interfering in the military; of the military, perhaps, using appeals to civilian political factors in a way which perhaps they should not have done. The general result so far, I think, has been a complete mess. I would be willing to make a very small bet that when it is all over most of it will be forgotten and that not a single concrete and useful suggestion as to the improvement either of the ammunition supply or the national strategy is likely to emerge from it.

Admitting these two defects, both of them, I think, are subject to mitigation. It seems to me that strong direction—particularly if it comes from the White House—can define our real military problems perhaps a little more clearly and that organizational improvement could perhaps secure, on the part of the military as a whole, a greater sense of their unified responsibility in the formation of national strategy in its wider sense. But I doubt that either of these ends can be achieved, primarily, by redrawing the organization charts. As you know, there are now a number of proposals going about—some from very high sources—for a complete, or nearly complete, revision of the Joint Chiefs of Staff structure (or, rather, perhaps I should say of the Department of Defense structure). It would be somewhat temerarious of me to attempt to analyze any of these proposals and I don't think, after all, it would be particularly useful because I don't think that the primary failings of the past can be relieved by this type of reorganization—they may be helped, but they certainly will not be finally solved. And if there is danger in the present confusions and inconsistencies, I think we must not forget that logic alone also has its dangers, and some of these seem to me to be almost as menacing today as they have proved to be in the past.

Before we set up any one comprehensive, complete, professional, and authoritative source of military planning and policy —before we give it a commanding voice in the Councils of State —let us remember that this type of system, too, has its perils today just as in 1914. Already, at least some of the dangers into which Western civilization then fell seem to me to be uncomfortably real before us.

I hope you will not consider it invidious of me to use another small illustration. It seems to me that there is already a very ominous parallel between the efficient and professional logic of the Schlieffen Plan and the no less efficient and professional logic which, if I understand it rightly, now rules in the councils of the United States Air Force.

The Air Force, like the Prussian General Staff, has approached its problem with a philosophical rigor. The Prussians concluded that the great danger was a two-front war. The Air Force has decided that the great danger is an all-out attack upon the West by the Soviet Union. The Prussians developed a military plan to meet and quickly win a two-front war, with the result that when the crisis came it had to be a two-front war or none at all—and the Prussians failed to win it. The Air Force has developed a plan to meet an all-out attack by the Soviet Union on the West. Reasoning very soundly, they have concluded that the only way to win in this case would be by the destruction under nuclear attacks of—I think it was something like—70 Russian population centers; that the Russians know this, and that our attacks, therefore, will have to be delivered at once before the Russians can have a chance to knock out our own Strategic Bombing Command installations. All this is certainly well reasoned, but is surely in the spirit of the rigid professionalism of the Great General Staff. It is indeed, to my mind, a kind of aerial Schlieffen

Plan, based on the same presumptions that to win one must employ overwhelming force in the first moments of the war, sacrificing every political, or even moral, consideration to the military necessity for doing so. This seems to me now to possess not only the virtues, but also the fearful defects of the Prussian model. Perhaps this is a prescription to win the Third Global War, if it comes; but it is certainly to my mind a prescription to make impossible anything less than a Third Global War, a probably frightful total devastation with quite unpredictable final effects.

If Air Force doctrines—as they have been expounded to the public, at any rate, in recent years—had actually ruled from 1945 to 1950, we could never have met and held the enemy in the limited operation in Korea. We would have been obliged either to abandon that peninsula and go to work on Moscow with nuclear weapons, or else to abandon the peninsula, period, probably finding ourselves a few years later not only going to work on Moscow with nuclear weapons, but Moscow going to work on us.

Now, any completely unitary system of military planning—and such a system would be virtually an inevitable result of any program that gave the military complete and unquestionable authority in all purely military questions—must, it seems to me, lead to this type of danger. On the other hand, to say that the civil statesmen must be the final authority in all military matters is to run into the opposite mistake made by nearly all the democratic statesmen in the dire years between 1918-1939. On both counts, I am opposed to too much reorganization, centralization, and too much narrow definition as to either civil or military authority. It seems to me that the statesmen must have sound and continuous military advice available at their elbows; that they must always be reminded that their policies are only as good as the effective force which can be put behind them. The

military planners must, at the same time, have political and economic advice constantly available at their elbows, and they must always be reminded that their plans are only as good as the social and economic potentials which they can command and that the military plans are, themselves, a vital determinant in the course of the policy—inferring, naturally, a corresponding responsibility on the planners.

Statesmen and soldiers alike are both dealing with essentially fluid and constantly changing situations in which each must listen to the other, but in which neither can hope to get from the other those absolute answers which will solve his own problems for him. These "musts" are, of course, easy to state, but extraordinarily difficult to translate into common practice. They are obviously not things which can be set up in an organization chart, or decreed by legislation. There is very little to support the popular idea that by changing the laws and the charts it will be possible to make defense less expensive, more efficient, or more responsive to the true strategic needs of the nation. Improvements in the present system are, doubtless, possible—but miracles, I think, are not.

It seems to me that the present three-service system is, on the whole, desirable as a means of giving a vitally needed flexibility, variety and competence to the whole defense structure. It seems to me that many, if not most, of its alleged duplications are not really duplications. They are only representative of what you would have to have under three uniforms, or one, to meet the practical problems that the world will continue to present. It seems to me that both on the civil and the military sides there is a vast deal to be done towards harnessing our total national energies into a more coherent national policy and strategy, but that most of it will simply have to be done in the slow, rather undramatic course of education, experience, trial and error—rather than by redrawing the legislative lines of authority.

The basic problem of civil-military relations in the modern state is real, it is urgent—and from the success with which we solve it from day to day may well depend our national welfare and survival. Yet, it is a problem for which I doubt there is any one comprehensive, automatically operating solution. It is, and will continue to be, a day-to-day problem, present in all our decisions and reactions. Solutions are likely to emerge in the future only as they have, in fact, developed through the past—out of that rather magnificent clash of conflicting views, theories, purposes, patriotisms which we know by the name of "democracy." If only enough of us have a good enough grasp of the underlying historical principles involved, then I think the day-to-day answers will probably be increasingly better and better.

Improved organization and definition of responsibilities must surely help, but these are not the main things. The main thing, as I see it (possibly this is a very lame conclusion, yet it is the only conclusion which I could bring myself to)—the main thing, I think, is that all of us, whether in uniform or out of it, should live, learn, and grow to our common responsibilities as common partners in a great adventure in human history—the adventure of the armed, yet law-abiding, democratic state.

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Mr. Walter Millis

Mr. Millis was born in Atlanta, Georgia, in March 1899. He received his B. A. degree at Yale University in 1920, and immediately started his long and distinguished newspaper career, with his first assignment as Editorial Writer for the Baltimore News (1920-23).

During 1923-24, Mr. Millis was with the New York Sun and Globe. In 1924 he joined the staff of the New York Herald Tribune as an editorial and staff writer. He has remained with the Herald Tribune continuously since that time, except for a short tour of duty as a 2nd Lt. in the Field Artillery during World War I.

In addition to contributing to many magazines, and his daily newspaper writings, Mr. Millis is the author of: THE MARTIAL SPIRIT (1931), ROAD TO WAR (1935), WHY EUROPE FIGHTS (1940), THE LAST PHASE (1946), and THIS IS PEARL! (1947).

CONCEPTS OF WAR AND THEIR CORRELATION IN AN INTEGRATED STRATEGY

A lecture delivered
at the Naval War College
on 23 March 1953, by
Colonel Tom R. Stoughton (Inf.), U. S. Army

In approaching the subject of concepts of war it is very evident at once that we are dealing with a subject which today effects the lives of most human beings on this earth. In this age of total war when national strategies are determined by factors other than military, it is still the military who must implement these strategies by pursuing a concept of war that will bring victory and not defeat. The victorious concept must include victory in the post war period and not leave us after World War III as we were after World War II. Thus we in the military must know what we are talking about when we refer to the concepts of war and have at least a general agreement among the armed services on the subject. Currently our Joint Staff in Washington is meeting frustrations due to interservice bickering over just which concept of war should be the basis for planning. A kibitzer on a JCS planning committee at work could very easily come away with the opinion that he had been listening to General Clausewitz propounding his land concept, Admiral Mahan his sea concept and General Douhet his air concept. This prevailing air of disunity stems from many reasons, but I suppose that the stress that has been laid on the terms *land power, sea power* and *air power* has had a great effect on the unsatisfactory situation. In this modern age we should not be thinking in a three-way concept but should get our thinking truly unified on a one-way concept to *military power*. Walter Millis, a well known modern military and editorial writer has written at length on the thesis that

there is no such thing in reality as land power, sea power and air power—there is only military power. I do not wish to get into a lengthy discussion of this point but cite it only as a lead off to my claim that our Joint Staff must have a Unified Concept of War if they are to plan intelligently.

This faces us with the problem of how to evolve such a concept reasonably acceptable to all services. There appear to be three methods currently in evidence, all attempting to gain pre-eminence. The first of these and one probably most heard about due to its very nature, is the demagogic method. The dictionary defines a demagogue as "one skilled in arousing the passions and prejudices of the populace by rhetoric." Common examples in this field are the propaganda slogans of "Victory Thru Air Power," "From the Halls of Montezuma to the Shores of Tripoli," "He Who Controls the Sea Controls Commerce and He Who Controls Commerce Controls the World," "Who Rules the Heartland Commands the World Island, Who Rules the World Island Commands the World." There are many more, but I will desist before I too sound like a demagogue. I maintain that no sound-thinking professional military man wants to be classed as a demagogue even though such tactics have been known to be successful in budget battles on "the Hill." The pay-off is not in Washington, but on the battlefield where demogogic tactics do not win the victory. This, if nothing else, should throw this method out as a logical method of deriving a unified concept of war.

A second method is also unfortunately too much in evidence. This method is, briefly, to let each service have its own concept of war and give it the funds and support to implement it. Such a method would certainly keep most people in uniform happy, but I am afraid when budget time rolled around there would be some free swinging axe wielding by all review agencies. Our new economy-

minded administration with its "big business brains" cannot be expected to be so gullible as to bow down by any such three-headed monster. Such free-wheeling by each service in its own field is also bound to run into the major obstacle that our next war will be governed by a strategy of scarcity. Thus I would eliminate this method as unworkable, uneconomical and certainly not in the best interests of our nation as a whole.

This brings me to a third method which as you might suspect is the one I am about to propose. It is the historical analysis method. Concepts of war arrived at by a study of history have later achieved victory in many campaigns. It has met the test of time and proven successful. Some of you might have the ultra-modernistic view existing in some circles that anything that has been done in the past is too antiquated, old-fashioned and virtually immoral. I'll admit this age of atomic power, jet aircraft, guided missiles and advanced electronics is a far cry from the age of Napoleonic warfare, but I maintain that many valid and useful lessons still can be learned from the past. And finally I believe that historical analysis will certainly produce something a lot more concrete and realistic to deal with than the use of demagogic catch phrases.

Thus, if you will bear with me during a short period of world history, I would like to turn back the clock to the 15th century and do some hopscotching through the centuries to the present. Of course, if time and your patience permitted it would be possible to go back to the dawn of history and trace the evolution and growth of concepts of war to the present time. That does not appear to be a reasonable approach so I have attempted to be selective through the years in preparing an historical analysis of the concepts of war based on the theories of some of the best known makers of modern strategy of the last five centuries.

I will begin with the first really modern military thinker and, incidentally, the first real expert stinker in the international field. He could be called with justification the first master of the department of dirty tricks. I refer to the notorious Italian statesman, Niccolo Machiavelli. He lived from 1469-1527 and served in government posts at home and throughout the principal countries of Europe. He was not a military leader but studied the problems of military and political power exhaustively and produced somc most interesting concepts and doctrines. He preached that war was necessary and natural in order to establish the survival of the fittest in this world, and, consequently, that the complete destruction of the enemy must be the chief war aim of all nations. He stressed that war must always end in a definite decision. He is probably best known for his writings in the psychological warfare field, although he didn't know that is what it would be called some day. He stated that a general's interest should not be restricted to purely military actions but should be aimed at deceiving the enemy in every possible way, employing ruses, spreading false rumors and knifing him in the back when it hurt the most. His theories on financing wars were not exactly in keeping with the present powers of the Bureau of the Budget for he maintained that money is not the sinews of war. He did stress its importance however, in its relation to political power when he said that the basis of political power is military power and money constitutes political power only when transformed into military strength. Finally, Machiavelli is well known for his study of war as a social science. He concluded that discipline is the real foundation of a good army; that few men are brave by nature but good order and experience will make many so. He named the ability of the commander and the courage of his men as among the most decisive factors in the military game. I have dwelled quite at length on this old timer for I feel that many of his concepts are very applicable today and

it is well for us to realize that the solutions for some of our current predicaments might have been mentioned years ago.

Next, I will turn to the 17th century and to perhaps the greatest military engineer of all times, Sebastian Vauban, Marshal of France. He lived from 1633 to 1707. His most significant contributions to the concepts of war were in the fields of siegecraft and fortifications and the corollaries thereto. As a main corollary he preached the need of defending fortifications from without and considering armies as living and flexible curtains for all forts. As a defense expert it is noteworthy that he maintained that any attack could beat any defense provided the attacker kept his force secure, invested the enemy completely, used well flanked parallels and approaches, and made a single final attack with artillery and infantry. I might point out right here and now that this last mentioned maxim of an artillery-infantry attack can well be translated into the modern maxim of concentration of our effort for a single final attack and not the frittering away of our means by haphazard air operations in one place, naval operations in another, and land battles in a third place. The final assault must be a unified effort. The most significant part of this concept is that the offense produces victory provided that certain conditions are met and maxims followed. The history of all warfare amply sustains this concept.

The next gentleman I come to here really never produced any concepts of war but introduced a philosophy of war that is the basis of most modern studies, so he certainly merits a few moments of our time. He is Carl von Clausewitz, the German General of the Naopleonic era. He was a soldier from the age of 12 and served with distinction in the German and Russian armies. He lived from 1780 to 1831 when he died of cholera. He is best

known for his theory that war is nothing else than the continuation of state policy by different means. Political aims are the end and war is the means, or in other words, force is used in the pursuit of national policy rather than diplomacy. He stressed that the disarming or overthrow of the enemy must always be the aim of warfare; that the bloody solution of the crisis, the effort for the destruction of the enemy's force, is the first-born son of war. Time does not permit sufficient treatment of the many sound Clausewitzian theories, but I do wish to state his idea on two other points prior to moving along. First, he believed that although the defense is in general the stronger form but with a negative object, that a swift and vigorous assumption of the offensive, described by him as "the flashing sword of vengeance," is the most brilliant point in the defensive. Second, he cautioned against minimizing the vital role of the moral and psychological factors in war.

While speaking of this era in history it is well to bring to your attention a famous Swiss soldier of the times who is credited with having understood and interpreted Napoleon most proficiently; in fact, Napoleon said of this officer that he betrayed the innermost secrets of his strategy. I speak here of Antoine Jomini, born in the French section of Switzerland in 1779, rising to the general officer rank in both the French and Russian armies. He was fortunate to have lived to the age of 90 and saw many of the principles he advocated proven. His highest position in the French Army was that of Chief of Staff for Marshal Ney. He was convinced by all his studies and experiences that there have existed in all times unchanging and fundamental principles on which depend good results in warfare, and these principles are independent of the kind of weapons, of historical time and of place. He cautioned against treating the elements of war mathematically

but insisted there were a few basic principles which when followed make the chances of success great and when disregarded bring the danger of failure. Some of these basic principles are, the importance of gaining the strategical initiative, concentrating on enemy weakness, pursuit of a beaten foe, and the supreme value of surprise. Further, he showed a marked preference for the offense. He was an early vociferous opponent of the Maginot Line psychology of warfare, advising all commanders that even when forced to assume the defense by political or other considerations that every possible means should be used to avoid the mental and moral stagnation which eventually destroys any defense. He expressed it specifically as—

a. "to await attack in a strong defensive position with no other purpose than to maintain oneself is the worst of possible dispositions, a vicious disposition." Those Korean veterans present I am sure agree with Jomini on that one. And one last Jomini principle which hits quite close to home today was his caution that—

b. "the means of destruction in warfare are approaching perfection with frightful rapidity and the world's only hope is for the means of war to be limited by the laws of nations." He must have had a preview of this atomic age.

Moving to the American continent we find in this Napoleonic period a radical change in the tactics of warfare taking place. The formalism of European tactics with its strict marching and fighting formations and volley firing was being defeated by the untrained colonist and his accurate sharpshooting, combined with the systematic use of hills, fences, woods and at times entrenchments. The Europeans were greatly impressed when the Americans at New Orleans, a motley crew of frontier militiamen with a sprinkling of

pirates, negroes and Creoles, decisively defeated an army of 7,000 veterans fresh from the Napoleonic Wars. The Americans utilized ditches and ramparts and accurate musket fire to inflict heavy losses on the British while themselves losing only eight killed and thirteen wounded. This might be termed an American concept of war which was well adapted to the conditions of the times.

While speaking of early American contributions to the concepts of war, I would be remiss if I didn't say something about the Civil War. General Grant emerged in this period as the first of the great modern generals. Williams in his book "Lincoln and His Generals" stated that Grant was quick to grasp the concept of the totality of war as it involved the economic resources of the nation and its civilian populace. On the other hand, Lee considered economic war as needlessly cruel to civilians and he did not visualize the strategic implications of economy and military power. It was this aspect that Mr. Williams stated convinced him that Grant was the greatest general of the Civil War. Grant was a master of what today is called global strategy.

I would like now to jump a bit across the pages of history to the World War I period for another concept of war which has not always received all the attention it merits. This concept was revived and applied by the British archeologist turned intelligence officer and Arab expert, T. E. Lawrence. He was born in Wales in 1888, graduated from Oxford and went to the Middle East as an explorer and scholar. By 1916 when the British under Allenby were fighting the Turks, Lawrence had become so influential with the Arabs that he became virtually the behind-the-scenes leader in this conflict. It was at this time that he became a leading exponent of a concept of war that a predecessor of mine at the Army War College called "a creeping paralysis produced by an intangible

ubiquity which is substituted for fixed battle." In language that you and I will understand that ubiquity he was speaking of is the ability to be everywhere at once. The whole concept of course is better known to us today as guerrilla warfare. It was not new when Lawrence applied it in Arabia, but he brought it to focus there and in his well known book "Seven Pillars of Wisdom." He had predicted correctly that the untrained and poorly disciplined Arabs could not stand up against the veteran Turks in standard warfare and thus he concentrated on guerrilla tactics. This concept was successful and the operations of the Arabs made the Turks expend great efforts and produced a creeping paralysis that extended far back into the Turkish rear areas. Not only was this concept successful in the Middle East but Lawrence's book was translated into Chinese and we find in the early thirties the concept being applied actively and effectively against the Japanese invaders. Two of our well known enemies of today are experienced graduates of that period and expert exponents of Lawrence's concept. I speak of Mao Tse Tung and Ho Chi Minh. Mao used the concept in running the Nationalists out of China and Ho is doing pretty well in Indo-China. It was a loss to the Western Bloc when Lawrence was killed in a motorcycle accident in 1935. We could use his talents in the type of conflict facing us today and which is unquestionably in the future plans of the Kremlin.

Speaking of the Kremlin, an historical analysis of concepts of war cannot ignore our Soviet enemies. A brief look at some of the more modern leaders will indicate something of the Soviet attitude towards war theories. I have chosen Lenin, Trotsky and Stalin whose pictures I will not bore you with. Lenin, the hero of the Red Revolution in 1917 has written that Marxists have always considered the Clausewitz axiom that "war is politics continued by other means" as the theoretical foundation for the meaning of

every war. He learned from Marx and Engels his ideas of power politics and deduced that warfare is not only military but also diplomatic, psychological, and economic in character. Trotsky, another power of this early revolutionary period was the father of the Red Army today although no militarist himself. He was the author of much of their current doctrine and expressed himself as basing his thinking on the concept that war is the continuation of politics with the army as the instrument. He made no claim to being a military expert and it is interesting in these days of civilian control of the military to observe his comment of thirty-five years ago when he said:

a. "In parliamentary countries war and navy ministries are often given over to lawyers and journalists who, like myself, see the army chiefly from the window of their editorial offices." Our late Public Enemy #1 of the day, J. Stalin, is primarily known for his concepts for the industrialization of the Soviet Union, training the whole populace for industry and modern war, and in building a general psychological preparedness of the nation. However, he too stressed his belief in the spirit of the offense and stated to H. G. Wells:

b. "Who wants a military leader incapable of understanding that the opponent is not going to surrender—that he must be crushed." Although the Soviets are noted for their defensive stands in World War II the brilliant Marshal Timoshenko has said that throughout the long ordeal of defensive war the Soviet goal has always been an eventual offensive which would bring victory through annihilation of the enemy's force in the field. This brief glimpse of these outstanding Soviet Communist leaders makes it quite evident that the concepts of Machiavelli, Clausewitz, Jomini and Lawrence have been well absorbed in the Soviet mind.

As has been most evident up to this point I have been dealing primarily with land concepts or total concepts of warfare. However, since part of this presentation deals with an integrated strategy of all services I will touch briefly on several outstanding naval and air experts in order to permit me to arrive at my conclusions. It almost goes without saying that my naval selection is that famous alumnus of the faculty of this elite institution, Alfred Thayer Mahan. Any biographical data on him would be repetitious to this audience so I will skip that and proceed to merely refresh your minds on some of his outstanding theories. He is best known for expounding the principle of the command of the sea and the development of the elements of a nation's strength which contribute to sea power. He preached the necessity for controlling the sea by a great concentration of force able to drive enemy naval and merchant ships from the sea.

The ability to concentrate this power as required he held paramount. After the Russo-Japanese War especially he dwelled on the danger of dividing our fleet between the Pacific and the Atlantic. He expressed it simply as "concentration protects both coasts, division exposes both." Further, in the field of national power he repeatedly pointed out the close correlation between international affairs and naval requirements. His doctrine of sea power and principles of naval strategy have naturally been affected by the advent of fast carrier task forces and developments in land based air, but some of the basic concepts of Admiral Mahan are certainly still worthy of study. Much more could be said about this distinguished naval strategist, but I am sure it would be entirely unnecessary and superfluous before you naval experts.

While discussing naval contributions to concepts of war, I must not fail to mention the development of amphibious warfare.

There is no single individual I found to accredit with the work in this field so I would like to take my hat off to the US Navy and the US Marine Corps for the present status of amphibious warfare concepts. Although the advancement of the art of amphibious operations has been pursued through the years by our navy, it was in the post-World War II years that much was done to keep this a live subject. The army has been accused by some of dropping the ball in this important field, and in this case it was fortunate for the army that the navy picked up the ball and ran with it. Thus I believe history will record references to the US Navy, the US Marine Corps and amphibious warfare in the same chapter.

As for the air strategists, I do not want to tread on the territory of the Air War College team but want to merely highlight the principle portions of the air concepts of two well known figures in this field. The first is the Italian General Douhet, an artillery officer turned airman, who first wrote on the importance of air power in 1909, later insulted the Italian General Staff with his opinions and was court-martialed in 1916, was exonerated in 1918 and made head of the Central Aeronautical Bureau. He was made a general in 1921 and concentrated seriously from that time in writing on his theories. He based his theories on two major assumptions: first, that aircraft are instruments of offense of incomparable potentialities, against which no effective defense can be foreseen, and second, that civilian morale will be shattered by bombardment of centers of population. Growing out of these assumptions were his two main concepts; first, that it is necessary and sufficient in order to assure an adequate national defense to be in a position in case of war to conquer the command of the air; and second, that the primary objectives of aerial attack should not be the strictly military targets, but industries and centers of population remote from

the contact of the surface armies. There are additional portions of the now well known "Douhet Theory" which you will probably hear of later, so I will go on to that famous American airman who was also court-martialed, General William Mitchell. There are many parallels between the lives of Mitchell and Douhet even to the point that Mitchell too was a converted army officer who became supercritical of his superiors. Both men wrote a lot but the basic difference was that Douhet wrote mainly for professional military consumption while Mitchell pointed his writings at the general public in the hopes of convincing them of his air concept. Mitchell and Douhet were really contemporaries although most of Mitchell's theories were extensions or varied versions of the Douhet theories. General Mitchell was the first American to discuss the application of air power with a minimum of support by surface forces in global war. He differed here from Douhet who was willing to completely ignore the surface forces. Mitchell said with respect to defense against air attack that "the only effective defense against aerial attack is to whip the enemy's air forces in air battles." In the general field of air power concepts General Mitchell declared that "the advent of air power, which can go straight to the vital centers and either neutralize or destroy them, has put a completely new complexion on the old system of making war." With this brief coverage of the air concepts of Douhet and Mitchell I will leave the historical side of this subject for further treatment by the air experts.

In finalizing this historical analysis I would like to present some views of a famous Britisher with whom you are all familiar, Winston Churchill. In discussing the fate of the democracies in 1942, he said: "It is natural that the peaceful and improvident should suffer terribly and the wicked scheming aggressors should have their run of savage exultation. That does not end the story. If the great peaceful democracies could survive the first few years of the aggressors attack another chapter would have to be written."

Now, gentlemen, whether or not that is a concept of war it seems to me that the role of shifting from the defensive to the offensive in that second chapter to which Mr. Churchill refers is the big job facing us all. A concept which will prevent disaster in the initial Soviet onslaught and bring ultimate victory for the Western Powers in the eventual offensive is the objective we all must gain.

In reviewing the concepts of war, I do not intend to develop controversies such as the planes vs battleships debate, B-36 vs super-carriers, or atomic bombs vs guided missiles. I am afraid all of us would be soon far off the subject of this presentation. I would like to point out that the facts of history sustain the findings of Clausewitz, Jomini, Lawrence and Mahan. In the air concept field history has not given us conclusive evidence as to what is the final answer. The fact remains that all agree in their respective fields to the need for offensive power to crush the enemy, be it on land, on tne sea or in the air. All agree on the totality of modern war as it reaches into all walks of life. There are theories of land war, naval war, and air war, but unfortunately no accepted and agreed theory of war. For example this group of army officers I represent cannot conceive of the Douhet theory of winning the war without the army and navy, of bombing centers far from the battlefield and gaining victory smashing the armies in the field. The army needs the air for battlefield support as well as long range support. The army needs the navy to keep the sea lines of communication open, for carrier air and naval gun-fire support. The air force needs both the army and navy in many ways in gaining that ultimate victory we all seek. The fact that no single service can do the job itself is widely supported. General Vandenberg has stated on the subject, "The three services are in complete agreement that no one service can do the job alone." The decision over Germany, Italy and Japan was not

gained in the air alone in World War II, and it is our opinion that it never will be by any power alone—but only by military power. The balance of forces making up that military power will vary with the situation and in the discussions to follow you will hear our ideas on that subject in certain specific cases. So in summing up this general discussion of concepts it is our fixed opinion that no victory will be obtained decisively without getting the army on the objective, still fit to fight. That we see as one of the main purposes for the existence of every sailor and airman.

Now just in case some might accuse us of living in the past, I have selected the views of some of our modern military leaders to show that in this decade there is wide support for the concept of military power about which I have been speaking.

First, that great naval airman, Admiral Forrest P. Sherman, made the following remarks shortly before his untimely death:

On military and national power:

"I think we have to talk about the military power of the United States and get away from being too compartmented. It seems to me that the time has come to talk in terms of national strategy involving all elements of our national strength, rather than in terms of power in only one or two elements."

On isolation and international air war:

"If you try to survive with nothing but the resources of North America against the combined resources of the rest of the world, I believe that in the long term you would be doomed to defeat."

On national security:

"The security of the United States requires that we have a good army and that our forces be so proportioned that we can operate a balanced force wherever it is required. By a balanced force I mean a force of all arms."

Next for the views of our senior military officer in uniform. I quote General Omar Bradley:

On balanced forces:

"Considering the enemics we may sometime face, our combined forces must be much more effective than they are today. Our greatest danger is that we will be caught up in the fancy of a futurism, and commit ourselves to unbalanced forces that will not match the forces which might oppose us. When I speak of balance, I don't mean the dividing of funds equally among three services; I mean effective forces equal to the tasks that modern warfare may thrust upon us."

On military power:

"American armed strength is only as strong as the combat capabilities of its weakest service. Overemphasis on one or the other will obscure our compelling need—not for air-power, sea-power, or land-power—but for American military power, commensurate to our tasks in the world."

And now in spite of the fact that he has faded away, I do not think we should ignore that really great soldier, General of the Army, Douglas MacArthur. He stated in a speech at Miami in 1951, the following:

"It is our implacable purpose to retain undisputed control of the seas, to secure undisputed control of the air, to vigorously

implement our atomic program with a full commitment to the use, as needed, of the atomic weapon, while maintaining a well balanced and highly developed ground force."

Having quoted from well known and experienced army and navy officers, I deemed it appropriate here to go to an experienced civilian and military airman for his opinions on the subject at hand. I have chosen former Secretary of the Air Force, Finletter. He has indicated several times that all our air strategists are not advocates of the Douhet-Seversky theories and that many are realizing more and more the need for concentration on the defeat of the enemy armed forces in the field.. In an address to the Air Force Association in 1951, Mr. Finletter said, "Air power should be made to bring atomic power to bear directly on the enemy's ground forces, retarding his advance and rendering him unable to concentrate his forces decisively. Here we are entering into new terrain and we shall use all the imagination we possess to see to it that effective use will be made of atomic weapons against profitable targets in the ground battle area."

While quoting modern military leaders, and considering the color of the uniform I wear, I should not miss the opportunity to climax this epidemic of quotes by publicizing a comment by "the boss," incidentally one of "our boys" who made good, former General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower. He stated in his book "Crusade in Europe" that:

"War is waged in three elements, but there is no separate land, air or naval war. Unless all assets in all elements are efficiently combined and coordinated against a properly selected, common objective, their maximum potential power cannot be realized."

Any discussion such as this on concepts of war becomes purely academic unless we can apply them towards a definite situation. We have no problem in that sphere now and do not have to assume who our enemy will be—the threat to our way of life comes from only one source—the Soviet Union, and its satellites. We need no proof of that, but I would like to repeat here one of Stalin's public statements which went right to the point when he said, "The existence of the Soviet Republic side by side with the imperialists states for a long time is unthinkable. In the end one or the other will conquer. And until that end comes a series of the most terrible collisions between the Soviet Republic and the bourgeois states is inevitable." An interpretation of this statement is necessary to the extent of examining what is meant by the series of collisions Stalin has predicted. I maintain they are not necessarily the collisions we used to call war, but fall more into the economic, political and psychological fields. We are facing such collisions today in this period of the cold war or limited war. It appears that the strategy the Politburo has adopted for the present series of collisions is that of conducting limited war while holding out the threat of an unlimited war with a great military force as the ace-in-the-hole. This strategy has been fairly successful so far and no doubt the Soviets like to envision attaining world domination by such a course. Thus they face us with a puzzling dilemma of advancing their cause by means which are completely repugnant to us now, while at the same time holding up their armed might as something even worse if we take decisive action.

With such a dilemma facing us we find ourselves for the present needing a concept of war applicable to limited global war. We need the full power of the army, the navy, and the air force as diplomatic instruments. Our army in Western Europe, our navy in Formosan waters, and our air force in North Africa are examples

of our armed might in a cold war role. I could go on at length on this theme but it is the subject of another presentation which you will hear tomorrow. It is definitely a live and real problem which our concepts of war must be designed to fit.

The other situation we must consider is when the final collision comes what conditions will face us. First of all it is quite evident we face a large land power with strong tactical air support. We face a naval power impressive mainly in the field of its submarine and mining threats. We face a growing long range air threat with increasing atomic capabilities. Behind this military power are almost unlimited manpower resources and an expanding industrial might. Our foes have a dictatorial government in complete control of a nation which is accustomed to severe hardships and made up of individuals who don't write letters to their congressmen. In other words the state of psychological preparedness of the Soviet Union poses a definite threat which we must consider in our concept of how best to defeat our opponent. Further, the power of the Soviet is dispersed over a large land mass protected in many areas by terrain and weather barriers but with sea approaches to some of the most vulnerable areas. By this general and fragmentary coverage, I have hoped to bring out in very broad terms the highlights of Soviet potential. I have not developed Soviet vulnerabilities for I am sure it has been and will continue to be the subject of study by every one of you. I would like to put in a plug right at this time for a continued vigorous campaign by every military man to "Know Your Enemy." We cannot do too much in that field.

Now to adapt the concepts previously discussed to the Soviet menace. First in the field of sea power. Sufficient men, materiel and supplies to gain a decision can reach the Soviet Union by only

one means—crossing the seas. That very definitely requires the elements of Admiral Mahan's concept of command of the sea to be fulfilled. Our surface forces must have freedom of movement in the Atlantic, the Pacific, the Mediterranean, the Baltic, the Black Sea and all other bodies of water leading to Soviet shores. In order to accomplish such a requirement our navy certainly will have to have every element of sea power, be it in the form of super-carriers, underwater demolition teams or seabees. Should an assault on the Soviet Union be considered through a route such as the Mediterranean, the navy would be called on for all its power. Carrier based air, naval gunfire support, freedom of movement on the sea, antisubmarine warfare, logistic support, would all play a vital role in the success of our operations. As a rank amateur among experts in the naval field, I will venture an observation with which I hope all of you will agree—that even with all the facets of Admiral Mahan's concept, as modified by modern strategy. fulfilled, the definite decision of complete victory over the Soviet cannot be attained by sea power alone.

Now to the use of air power in the role it will play in defeating the Soviet Bloc. I have discussed Generals Douhet and General Mitchell and could have added Major Seversky to the same category. Certainly the concepts of these gentlemen have application, but not in their entirety, to gaining the kind of victory we want over the Soviets. Air power is a vital part of the military power that must be applied in full strength when the final collision of which Stalin spoke is upon us. Beginning at home the air force must provide an air defense which will prevent any disastrous paralysis to our war effort. The air lines of communication between the US and the USSR, the skies over our communications zones in the theaters of operations, and the most important area over the actual combat zone must be in our control. Next into enemy terri-

tory where the destruction of the combat logistic support will have an immediate effect on the front line situation. Finally we arrive in the heart of the enemy homeland where some air strategists would put all our air effort. I might say as an aside here that I do not intend to get into a discussion as to the exclusive use of SAC, that is a subject for discussion at the Air War College, but I do want to state that our concept of how to defeat the Soviet Bloc does not envisage the sole use of the Douhet concept. Military power must use air power in all its facets; it is just not good sense to ever put all your eggs in one basket. So my parting theme on the air picture is that the air force still has a major role to play as a member of the team that must have a winning concept when the chips are down.

I now turn to the army. The army still believes many of the concepts of war taught by Clausewitz, Jomini, Lawrence and other great soldiers of the past can be readily adapted to twentieth century warfare. Colonel Welborn is going to tell you shortly in some detail as to how the army fights so I won't discuss the matter here. However, it is our concensus that the army very definitely needs the navy and the air force in their complementary roles and with the cooperation the army will go as far into Soviet Russia as is necessary to gain the final decision. Conversely, we are equally convinced that the navy and the air force in their complementary roles and with that Omar Bradley has stated, "Ultimately a war between nations is reduced to one man defending his land while another tries to invade it. Whatever the devastation in his cities and the disorder in his existence, man will not be conquered until you fight him for his life."

After the foregoing review of the successes and failures of different concepts of war, a resume of the Soviet methods of conflict, an application of the concepts of war to the Soviet threat, there

remains but one other major item prior to coming up with a unified concept of war. I refer here to our national objectives, or just what is it we are shooting for when we evolve a unified concept.

You have all heard our national objectives expressed by our national leaders in different forms and have read the versions of many well known writers of the day. This Army War College Team is not aware of the national objectives currently accepted in the National Security Council but presents for your consideration an incomplete listing of some national objectives we believe should be agreed to and used by all national planning agencies. These are:

1. To protect our American way of life and preserve the general welfare of the people.

2. To restrain and reduce Soviet power and influence.

3. To seek peace by every means at our disposal but never by appeasement.

4. To destroy international militant communism if war comes.

With these objectives in mind and the foregoing part of this presentation as background, I am being presumptious enough to propose a unified concept of war which I believe will give the United States the greatest possibility of successfully attaining our national objectives. It is:

A UNIFIED CONCEPT OF WAR

IN ORDER THAT THE ARMED FORCES OF THE NATION BE READY FOR EMPLOYMENT IN SUCH A BALANCE AS REQUIRED TO MEET ANY THREAT TO THE SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES, THAT NATIONAL EXECUTIVE

AND LEGISLATIVE AGENCIES MAKE PROVISIONS FOR THE CREATION AND MAINTENANCE OF ARMY, NAVAL, AND AIR FORCES EQUIPPED WITH THOSE TYPES OF MODERN WEAPONS REQUIRED FOR SUPPORTING OUR NATIONAL POLICIES IN LIMITED WAR, AND PREPARED TO EXPAND, ATTACK AND DEFEAT THE ARMED FORCES OF THE ENEMY WHEREVER REQUIRED IN UNLIMITED WAR.

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Colonel Tom R. Stoughton, Infantry, U. S. Army

Colonel Stoughton was born at Jeannette, Pennsylvania, on 3 August 1908. He was graduated from the United States Military Academy and commissioned a Second Lieutenant of Infantry on 12 June 1930.

He was first assigned to Fort Hamilton, New York, where he served with the 18th Infantry and the 1st Division until assigned to the Infantry School, Fort Benning, Georgia, where he completed the Company Officers' Course in 1934. After a tour with the 31st Infantry in Manila, P. I. from 1934-37 he was assigned to the 38th Infantry at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, and participated with that unit in the several infantry division tests held at Fort Sam Houston, Texas, during the period 1937-40.

In 1940 he attended the National University of Mexico at Mexico City, Mexico, for one year prior to a tour of duty as an instructor in the Department of Modern Languages at the United States Military Academy. He left West Point in the spring of 1943 to attend the 13th General Staff Class at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and upon graduation was assigned to HQ ETO where he served in that headquarters during the preparations for the Normandy invasion and later in HQ Communications Zone as Deputy for Operations, G4. With the start of redeployment from the ETO he was assigned to the 5th Infantry Division and served in that unit as Regimental Commander and Chief of Staff until assigned to the 1st Course at the Armed Forces Staff College at Norfolk, Virginia, in January 1947.

Upon graduation from that institution in July 1947, he attended the Department of the Army Strategic Intelligence School and upon graduation in December 1947 proceeded to Montevideo, Uruguay, where he served as Senior Military Attache from 1948 to 1951, when he returned to the US and was assigned as a student at the Army War College for the 1951-52 course. He completed this course in June 1952 and was assigned to the Staff and Faculty, Army War College, his present assignment.

His decorations include the Bronze Star Medal, Legion of Merit, and Croix de Guerre with Palm.

RECOMMENDED READING

(Current Books)

The evaluation of books listed below include those recommended to resident students of the Naval War College. Officers in the fleet and elsewhere may find these of interest.

Many of these publications may be found in ship and station libraries. Some of the publications not available from these sources may be obtained from the Bureau of Naval Personnel Auxiliary Library Service, where a collection of books are available for loan to individual officers. Requests for the loan of these books should be made by the individual to the nearest branch or the Chief of Naval Personnel. (See Article C-9604, Bureau of Naval Personnel Manual, 1948).

Title: *Tito.* 443 p.

Author: Dedijer, Vladimir. N. Y., Simon and Schuster, 1953.

Evaluation: Vladimir Dedijer, an old party comrade and fighter in the Partisan War against the Nazis, relates the story of Tito's life and rise to power in the new Yugoslavia. It is a story from within, telling of the birth and growth of the Communist Party and the liberation of people from the yoke of oppression from both the Karageorgevich dynasty and the Soviet Union. The latter occurred when Marshall Tito and the Yugoslav people walked out of the Cominform. This was Stalin's first defeat and possibly the turning point in the plan for world subjugation to the Soviet system.

Title: *Peace Through Strength; Bernard Baruch and a Blueprint for Security.* 325 p.

Author: Rosenbloom, Morris V. N. Y., Farrar, Straus and Young, 1953.

Evaluation: Morris V. Rosenbloom has treated the services performed to the nation by Bernard Baruch from 1916 to the pres-

ent. It focuses on the recommendations Baruch actually made for action to achieve military and economic security over the years, specifically his constant urging for an ever-ready defense mobilization organization and his long emphasis of the need for waging peace with the same energy that has been devoted to war. Mr. Baruch's major proposals have been synthesized by the author into a nine-point program as A Blueprint For Security. Baruch's counsel is currently being sought by the Senate Banking and Currency Committee, before which on the twenty-second of March, he again expressed his views on the necessity for standby controls. Baruch's recommendations were valid in World War I and remain so to this day; for this reason, Peace Through Strength is of interest to all officers of the military service.

Title: *World Without End: The Middle East.* 374 p.

Author: Lengyel, Emil. N. Y., The John Day Co., 1953.

Evaluation: The author describes the Middle East, embracing the area from Turkey east to Iran and from the Black Sea to the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, as a world that is timeless yet in endless ferment. The entire history, economics, politics and sociology are covered in a most concise and effective manner. He concludes with a portrayal of the Middle East as a stage for world power politics and with a plea for the United States to pursue its assigned role.

Title: *Stilwell's Mission to China.* 441 p.

Author: Romanus, Charles F., and Sunderland, Riley. Washington, D. C., U. S. Government Printing Office.

Evaluation: The first volume in the China-Burma-India Theater subseries of the history of the United States Army in World War II covers the U. S. military effort in this theater from 1940 through 1943. The authors provide a full account of General Stilwell's struggle to establish bases and intra-theater transportation services, to rejuvenate the Chinese Army, and to conduct a campaign in Burma. This is a detailed study in which facts are well supported and interpretations are logical. Although this volume is by no means a Stilwell apologia, the reader will feel much sympathy for Stilwell as regards the complexity of his

tasks and command status. The authors have provided objective treatment, their documentation is thorough and the illustration is well chosen. They have produced a first-class historical work.

Title: *Bolivar.* 711 p.

Author: Madariaga, Salvador de. N. Y., Pellegrini & Cudahy, 1952.

Evaluation: A comprehensive biography which not only covers Bolivar's rise and fall in documental detail, but also gives a wealth of information about the Spanish, the Creoles, the Indians and the era in which they fought for or against independence. Much new material, including some which strengthens the author's belief that Bolivar desired to rule as a king, is included. The contrast between the wars for independence in North and South America in moral aspects, integrity of leadership, ultimate objectives and techniques is very noticeable.

Title: *The Aircraft Year Book.* 1952. 464 p.

Washington, D. C., Lincoln Press, Inc., 1953.

Evaluation: This book is a most complete review, directory and encyclopedia of American military and civil aviation in 1952. It is a chronicle of achievements and progress in this field published yearly for thirty-four years. For those interested in American aviation, whether it is in the industrial field, Department of Defense, airlines, important aviation personalities, official records, technical progress, etc., this book will be of great value. It contains no editorializing or personal opinion—only aviation facts.

Title: *The Russian Mind.* 291 p.

Author: Tompkins, Stuart Ramsey. Norman, Okla., University of Oklahoma Press, 1953.

Evaluation: The author presents a well-documented text which is designed to assist a reader to obtain an understanding of what in the Soviet system is derived from the past. The book covers the period up to 1855. Each chapter reviews a segment of the internal and external forces which have shaped the growth of the present social and governmental

structure of Russia. The subjects of social classes, education, the press, censorship, early internal revolts, and the Russian peasant are analyzed. An exceptionally complete biography is furnished. Highly recommended as a reference text for thesis preparation or as general background reading on Russia.

Title: *Formosa.* 218 p.

Author: Ballantine, Joseph W. Washington, D. C., The Brookings Institution, 1952.

Evaluation: As the subtitle indicates, this Brookings Institution study considers Formosa as "A problem for United States foreign policy." Pointing out that while the problem of Formosa is at the present moment relatively quiescent, it is by no means solved and can become pressing at any time. In this objective study, the author, a former Foreign Service Officer and Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs of the Department of State, undertakes to "acquaint the reader with the position in which the United States now stands with respect to the island and with the facts and considerations pertinent to forming judgments on ways and means that may need to be taken into account in dealing with the problem." The first two sections of the book deal with the history of Formosa and its place in international relations and with the part that it has played most recently in American foreign policy. The unemotional presentation of these facts and their objective analysis is in pleasant contrast to the many emotional and biased publications on the same subject that have appeared in recent years. In the last section of the book, consideration is given to the present and the future. The problem confronting the United States is summed up as: "Can the U. S. act in Formosa in a way that will not arouse antagonism among substantial sections of Asian opinion and thus deprive it of a foundation for a more comprehensive and long-term policy for stabilizing the Far East?"

Title: *The United States and Mexico.* 452 p.

Author: Cline, Howard F. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1953.

Evaluation: Mr. Cline, who is Director of the Hispanic Foundation of

the Library of Congress, reviews the salient features—geographical, historical, political, economic, and social—of Mexico in the past and present. A picture of the United States Foreign Policy—good and bad—toward Mexico is set forth in detail. There is an appendix which lists many facts on the population, political organizations, economy, ethnic groups, education, elections, and foreign trade. This book is an excellent reference. However, the fine print, factual style and lack of adequate maps detracts from its usefulness. The reader is referred to Mr. Cline's article in the March issue of Current History.

Title: *The Unitel States and India and Pakistan.* 308 p.

Author: Brown, W. Norman. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1953.

Evaluation: The author, an expert on India and Pakistan, presents a comprehensive study of the two nations. The major political, economic, and social problems are discussed, with detailed coverage given to the rise of nationalism and Hindu-Muslim Communalism which led in the first instance to independence from Britain and in the second to partition into India and Pakistan, with the resultant Kashmir dispute. In addition, the factors bearing on US-India and US-Pakistan relations are discussed in detail. This book can contribute to a better understanding of these two nations and the forces at play within them.

PERIODICALS

Title: *North Africa in Atlantic Strategy.*

Author: Goislard de Monsabert, Jacques de, General, French Army.

Publication: FOREIGN AFFAIRS, April, 1953, p. 418-426.

Annotation: Emphasizes the importance of keeping North Africa from communist control and points out its strategic importance in maintaining control of the Mediterranean and in providing a valuable logistic base for the West.

Title: *Curtain is Raised on Red Ilyushn Jets.*
Publication: AVIATION WEEK, March 30, 1953, p. 30-31, 33.
Annotation: First-hand observation furnished this description of the armament, jet engine type and performance rating of the new Russian IL-26, IL-27, and IL-28.

Title: *Three Months on an Arctic Ice Island.*
Author: Fletcher, Joseph O.
Publication: NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC, April, 1953, p. 489-504.
Annotation: The record of a three-month stay on a floating island in the Arctic Sea which was used as a base for Arctic weather reports and to study ocean currents and climatic conditions 100 miles from the North Pole.

Title: *A New Look at Formsa.*
Author: Taylor, George E.
Publication: ATLANTIC MONTHLY, April, 1953, p. 41-45.
Annotation: Reports that the Nationalist government has reformed and reorganized itself and, with aid and encouragement from the United States, could become the center of the resistance movement against the Chinese communists.

Title: *United States Foreign Aid in* 1952.
Author: Kerber, E. S.
Publication: SURVEY OF CURRENT BUSINESS, March, 1953, p. 13-19.
Annotation: An analysis of American foreign aid in 1952 shows that military aid exceeded economic assistance. (Tables summarize foreign aid by program and by major country for the period July 1, 1945 - December 31, 1952).

Title: *The State and Prospect of Europe's Defense.*
Author: Liddell Hart, B. H.
Publication: THE VIRGINIA QUARTERLY REVIEW, Spring, 1953, p. 161-174.
Annotation: A discussion of the military defense of Western Europe

deals with the psychological value of the European Defense Community and with the French attitude toward German participation in Western defense.

Title: *The Effects of Rank on Human Relations.*

Authors: Maccoby, Dr. Nathan and Hymovitch, Dr. B.

Publication: AIR UNIVERSITY QUARTERLY, Winter, 1952-53, p. 40-48.

Annotation: Reviews the problems of human relations that arise in organizations where members are placed in different ranks and discusses the research that has been done in this field.

Title: *On the Nature of Soviet Imperialism.*

Publication: YALE REVIEW, Spring, 1953, p. 333-350.

Annotation: A study of Russian imperialism, consisting of two articles: I. The Continuity of Russian Imperialism by Harry R. Rudin, discusses communism as a powerful weapon reenforcing Russia's ancient policy of expansion; II. Communist Innovations by David Dallin, deals with the communist theory of international revolution that has spread Russian power from Canton to the Elbe.

Title: *Communist Lessons from the Korean Air War.*

Author: Greenough, Robert B., Major, U. S. A. F.

Publication: AIR UNIVERSITY QUARTERLY, Winter, 1952-53, p. 22-29.

Annotation: Warns that the communists have had time to assess, evaluate, and devise counter-measures against U. N. tactics and use of air forces and that the primary aim of communist air power in Korea at present is control of the air.

Title: *Balanced Forces for the U. S.*

Author: Nickerson, Hoffman.

Publication: ORDNANCE, March-April, 1953, p. 776-779.

Annotation: The author points out the dangers of excessive military spending and warns that it must be kept in balance with

our economy. He concludes that our balance of forces during the cold war should depend upon an over-all strategy based upon sea power plus the gaining of local air superiorities.

Title: *Naval Mines.*

Author: Bates, Paul L., Colonel, U. S. A.

Publication: MILITARY REVIEW, April, 1953, p. 48-56.

Annotation: A discussion of mine warfare concludes that unless the minesweeping potential of the U. S. and its allies is improved, and means to eliminate the latest type of mines are devised, military plans otherwise feasible will become impracticable.

Title: *Death of a Myth.*

Author: Gurian, Waldemar.

Publication: THE COMMONWEAL, March 27, 1953, p. 622-624.

Annotation: The chairman of Notre Dame University's new program on East Europe and Soviet policies, warns that the strength of the Stalin myth ought not to be underestimated and expresses the belief that Stalin's political methods will continue to survive even if the USSR should disintegrate.

Title: *Scandinavia's Strategic Position.*

Author: Myhrman, Sam, Lieutenant Colonel.

Publication: MILITARY REVIEW, April, 1953, p. 93-96.

Annotation: Deals with the strategic situation of the Scandinavian countries and concludes that in World War III the area would be one of the focal points of the conflict. (Translated and digested from Ny Militar Tidskrift, No. 10, 1952).

Title: *Why Europe Distrusts Us.*

Author: Strausz-Hupe, Robert.

Publication: THE NEW LEADER, March 30, 1953, p. 8-11.

Annotation: Analyzes briefly the nature of American-European ten-

sions and finds the causes to be economic dependence upon America and resentment of U. S. policies designed to meet the Soviet threat.

Title: *We Are Losing the Cold War in the Near East.*

Author: Locke, Edwin A., Jr.

Publication: VITAL SPEECHES, March 15, 1953, p. 338-340.

Annotation: Urges that the U. S. sponsor a program for the economic development of Arab lands and thereby restore the faith of the Arab peoples in America and defeat the communist movement in the Near East.

Title: *The Naval War College Today.*

Author: Virden, Frank,Captain, U. S. N.

Publication: U. S. NAVAL INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS, April, 1953, p. 365-371.

Annotation: A complete description of the mission, curriculum and classes of the modern post-war Naval War College, which has kept abreast of the newest developments in naval warfare.

Title: *Reflections on the Conduct of a Future War.*

Author: James, William, Admiral Sir, British Navy.

Publication: JOURNAL OF THE ROYAL UNITED SERVICE INSTITUTION, February, 1953, p. 72-75.

Annotation: Argues that the strategical and tactical skill of the commanders of the Western powers will be the decisive factors in future warfare, which will be war of maneuver since modern weapons are becoming too expensive to be used in the enormous quantities employed in the two world wars.

Title: *Observations on NATO's Progress.*

Author: Anderson, F. L.

Publication: THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN, February 23, 1953, p. 290-291.

Annotation: Gives an over-all view of the defense build-up of the

Atlantic community and warns that if improvement is to continue the Western nations must strive for public support of the program for security and peace.

Title: *Spain Moves into the Defense Picture.*

Publication: CONGRESSIONAL DIGEST, March, 1953, p. 71-79.

Annotation: A series of articles outlining Spanish foreign policy, history, politics and the miltary and strategic value of Spain to the West.

Title: *Underground Air Force.*

Author: Thoren, Arne.

Publication: AIR FORCE, March, 1953, p. 34-36.

Annotation: Describes Sweden's Air Force as being the third strongest in Europe, with underground hangers and jet factories hewn out of rock to protect it.

Title: *Lessons Learned from Naval Operations in World War II.*

Author: Conolly, Richard L., Vice Admiral, U. S. N.

Publication: CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, March 10, 1953, p. A1290-1292.

Annotation: An address by the President of the Naval War College before the Naval Order of the United States in New York, December 11, 1952, in which he points out the lessons of World War II that can contribute to the efficient conduct of future naval campaigns.

Title: *The Trouble with Our Weapons.*

Author: O'Keefe, Philip.

Publication: FREEMAN, March 23, 1953, p. 449-451.

Annotation: Advocates that industrial engineers be employed in designing our weapons in order to improve their quality, since they fall far short of the technological perfection of our industrially-designed consumer goods.

Title: *Psychological Warfare: Can it Sell Freedom?*

Author: Schlesinger, Arthur, Jr.

Publication: REPORTER, March 31, 1953, p. 9-12.

Annotation: Contends that psychological warfare is an impossibility in a democracy where all policies are subject to inquiry by the people and Congress, and that the only way to win the cold war is by diplomacy.

Title: *The Aircraft Carrier.*

Publication: INTERAVIA, Vol. VIII, No. 3.

Annotation: This issue on carrier aviation should be of interest to all—military and civilian. Practically all the pros and cons on the place of the carrier in the atomic and jet age are discussed and analyzed. This series of articles gives the clearest and most unbiased evaluation of the present and future value of the carrier yet presented. The editors appear to "take no sides" and leave the decision to the reader, after reviewing the arguments presented for and against the carrier.

Title: *Malaya: Where Communists Lose.*

Publication: U. S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, March 27, 1953, p. 46-50.

Annotation: Sir Gerald Templer, High Commissioner and Supreme Commander in Malaya reports, in an interview, that Britain is getting the upper hand in the war against the communists.

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE CORRESPONDENCE COURSES

The Naval War College conducts correspondence courses in Strategy and Tactics, Logistics, and International Law. The scope of each course is briefly described in the following pages. Enrollment is open to officers of the Regular Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard, and officers (active duty or inactive duty status) of Reserve components of these services, of the grade of lieutenant (junior grade), or first lieutenant, and all grades senior. The Naval War College Catalog of Correspondence Courses, available upon request, contains outlines of the courses and information pertaining to the procedure for making application for enrollment. It is requested that commanding officers who receive the Naval War College Review bring this notice to the attention of officer personnel within their commands.

LOGISTICS

Restricted **8 Assignments** **48 Points**

Recommended for all officers.

SCOPE: Operational logistics is emphasized in this course. Following an introduction to logistics, the subject of organization is examined and its practical application studied in the form of these subjects: National Security Organization, Military Services, Military Staff. This provides the foundation for a discussion of logistics planning and the theater of operations, followed by a thorough consideration of each of the principal functions of operational logistics; supply; maintenance, repair, and salvage; medical; personnel; transportation; and base development. The concept and functioning of mobile logistic support is stressed throughout.

This course is evaluated as advanced in comparison with the Logistics NavPers 10902 which is basic in approach.

TEXTS: Memorandum Texts are prepared by the Naval War College, using material gathered from all service sources. Reference texts are: U. S. Naval Logistics in the Second World War, 1949, Ballantine; and Military Management for National Defense, 1950, Beishline.

STRATEGY AND TACTICS

Restricted **8 Assignments** **48 Points**

Recommended for all officers.

SCOPE: This course emphasizes the first three steps of the naval planning process; The Estimate of the Situation, The Development of the Plan, and The Directive. Strategic and Tactical exercises of progressively increasing complexity are used to familiarize the student with these three steps and to demonstrate the strategic employment of naval forces; the role of sea power in national strategy; command and organization principles; the integration of logistics with strategy and tactics; the employment of land, sea and air forces in joint operations. In addition, through the medium of short essays students can present their thoughts on naval subjects. Throughout the course, particular emphasis is placed on the development of sound and logical reasoning processes.

TEXTS: Memorandum Texts are prepared by the Naval War College using material gathered from all service sources.

A Guide to Naval Strategy—Brodie

The Battle of the Atlantic—Morrison

INTERNATIONAL LAW (Regular)

Unclassified **8 Assignments** **48 Points**

Recommended for all officers.

SCOPE: This course provides a comprehensive coverage of the international law of war and peace. Special emphasis is placed upon an analysis of current developments, e. g., collective security arrangements, changes in the rules regulating the conduct of warfare, recent treaties of peace, etc. Each assignment includes questions dealing with a defined era of international law and requires the solution of a specific problem situation that may confront an officer in the performance of his duties.

TEXTS: Air Power and War Rights, Spaight

The Law and Custom of the Sea, Smith

Naval War College Annual "Blue Books"

(International Law Situations and International Law Documents)

Charter of the United Nations—Commentary and Documents, Goodrich and Hambro

International Law of the Sea, Higgins and Colombos

Other special texts and pamphlets

INTERNATIONAL LAW (Advanced)

Unclassified **4 Assignments** **24 Points**

Recommended for all officers (Prerequisite: The completion of the regular course with a mark of excellent)

SCOPE: Research on current problems of international affairs in which the Navy has an active interest; fundamental tenets of U. S. foreign policy that are related to the principles of international law through custom conventions, treaties, and the works of jurists.

TEXT: Text books on International Law such as Fenwick, Hyde, Hall, Wilson and Tucker, and Oppenheim

Digests and Casebooks such as Hackworth's Digest, Moore's Digest, and Hudson's Cases on International Law

The Law and Customs of the Sea, 1948, Smith

Prize Law during the World War, 1927, Gamer

Collections of sources such as the Charter of the United Nations, Atlantic Defense Pact, and League of Nations Treaty Series

Periodicals such as the Department of State Bulletin and the American Journal of International Law