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CONTENTS

THE THEORY AND STRATEGY OF COMMUNISM . . 1
Dr. James Burnham

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE 39
Captain Charles H. Smith, U. S. N.

RECOMMENDED READING 63

THE GLOBAL STRATEGY DISCUSSIONS PROGRAM . 73

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THE THEORY AND STRATEGY OF COMMUNISM

A lecture delivered
at the Naval War College
on 8 September 1952 by
Dr. James Burnham

Admiral Conolly, Admiral Beakley and Gentlemen:

The philosopher, Spinoza, has observed that in order to say what a thing *is*, you must also be able to say what it is *not*. I'm going to follow his advice at the outset this morning. My object is to explain what Communism *is* and I am, therefore, going to begin by discussing two things that Communism is *not*.

To begin with, Communism is not a philosophy, not a doctrine, belief, or theory. It may seem surprising to you that I should start by denying that Communism is a philosophy or a belief. Many books have been written by both Communists and anti-Communists on "The Philosophy of Communism." Many other books about Communism, especially if written by professors, begin with several chapters on Philosophy.

They explain how Karl Marx, as a young man, was a student and follower of the dialectical, idealist, and very complicated philosophy of Hegel. Then they say that Marx and his friend, Friedrich Engels, stood Hegel (philosophically speaking) on his head. They substituted matter for mind and, making use of Hegel's logical principles, they set forth their own philosophy which they called "dialectical materialism." This, they conclude, was the beginning of the history of Communism.

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Now, I do not believe that Communism began with the philosophy of "dialectical materialism," or with any other philosophy. I do not even believe that Communism, as we know it, began with Marx. It was not Marx but, much later, Lenin who founded Communism—and what he founded was not a philosophy, but an organization.

Of course Communists do believe in a particular philosophy, and the philosophy in which they believe is the doctrine called "dialectical materialism." Anyone who wishes to make a thorough study of Communism has got to meet and master the principles of dialectical materialism. It would be a good thing for our country if more citizens were available who had made a thorough study of that kind. Nevertheless, I am convinced that the philosophical road is not the best approach to a correct understanding of the nature of Communism. The Philosophy is a by-product, a surplus—important, but not the heart of the matter.

In the *second* place, Communism is not a political party. You will at once protest: "But it is obviously a political party. It runs candidates for elections. It is registered as a party. In many countries Communists are mayors, governors, members of parliament, municipal councillors. How is it possible to say that Communism is not a political party?"

Somewhat as in the case of Communism considered as philosophy, I can agree that the Communists act frequently as if they were a political party. They use the form of a political party. But, in reality, they make up something quite different from what we ordinarily mean by the phrase "a political party."

There is an issue here—something much more than an academic dispute over a verbal definition. Curiously enough, the

Communists themselves are most anxious that we should think of Communism as either a political party or as a philosophy. Why should that be? What difference does it make? As things work out, it makes a very practical and serious difference.

Notice! If Communism is a political party, then that means it is the same kind of thing as the Democratic Party, the Republican Party, the Socialist Party; the Conservative Party or the Labor Party in Britain; the Christian Democratic Party in Italy, and so on. It then seems to follow that Communism should have the same rights and privileges as all of these other parties. Constitutional provisions about freedom of assembly and opposition then apparently apply to Communism, and Communists should be granted all the normal civil rights of ordinary citizens going about their ordinary business. If any one calls for outlawing the Communists, for illegalizing their organization, then he is a Reactionary and a Fascist, endangering the liberties of all parties and all citizens—or, so it would seem if Communism is a political party.

A similar practical conclusion follows if Communism is a philosophy. Then it is argued that the belief in and advocacy of Communism come under the right of "Free speech." To urge the outlawing of the Communists is "hysteria" and "witch hunting."

Is it clear why Communists are happy when non-Communists believe that their movement is a philosophy or a political party? These beliefs are a kind of insurance policy for Communism which protects it from many legal and practical hazards. Unfortunately these beliefs are widespread—even more so among high places than with the general public.

I think that we can best promote a clear understanding of the nature of Communism by calling it an "Enterprise." I use this

word in much the same sense that it has when we speak of a "business enterprise." Communism is not at all an ideal, an abstraction. Communism is, as we sometimes say of a business institution, a "going concern."

The Communist Enterprise is unique in history. Considered in its entirety it does not have any exact historical precedent. If we analyze it into its primary elements, we do find precedents or analogies for each of the elements taken separately. What is unique is the fusion of these elements into a single entity.

The chief elements out of which the Communist Enterprise is formed are three. Or perhaps I should put it in this way: we can understand Communism upon analysis from three different points of view. Let me review these. Communism, to begin with, is a *secular religion.* Let me explain just what I mean by the use of these two words. It is secular in the sense that it exists in terms of this world—not a transcendental world, not a hereafter, not a heaven which is beyond space and time. Its supreme goal, its paradise is an earthly paradise—in history, in space and time—not hereafter. Nevertheless, like all religions, it does have a supreme goal.

By calling it a religion, I mean on the one hand that it is a powerful and dominating faith—a faith of a kind that can absorb the whole heart, mind and soul of a man, in terms of which his whole life can become organized so that everything else and all other activities are subordinated to it.

On the other hand, by calling it a religion I mean that it contains elements which are non-scientific, non-rational and, indeed, irrational. Of course Communism claims to be the only scientific social philosophy, but examination proves that this is not the case.

As a matter of fact, in certain respects it is stronger because it is not, because the irrational elements (or some of them in Communism) correspond to very deep impulses, appetities and emotions in human beings. For this reason, the Communist is at least partly immune to rational argument.

This is often illustrated very directly. For example: All over the world today, one of the principal items in anti-American propaganda that is put forward by the Communists is on the negro question. They say that in this country the negro is an oppressed, terrorized and exploited race. In order to prove this, they claim that lynchings go on by the hundreds all over the United States. In the Communist press, in the Communist meetings, they speak of lynchings not only in the deep South (where, incidentally, they no longer take place), but even in northern cities. They speak of negroes being hanged from the lamp posts of northern cities.

Now, rationally, it is very easy to refute this because the facts are all there in statistics. You can point out just how many lynchings have taken place and where. You can show that they have come down to a very, very few. In most of the years of the last decade there have been none at all.

But this doesn't affect the Communist propaganda because in rousing up this anti-American feeling, in linking it with a racial question and in many cases very subtly with certain suppressed sexual impulses also, they appeal to a side of man that has nothing to do with reason, science or statistics. This also applies to their belief in the inevitability of their own victory, which has nothing to do with any arguments that are put forward one way or another.

Communism is secular religion, then, in these various senses,

and, finally, in the sense of being Messianic—in the sense of proclaiming a mission which will save the world.

The closest analogy to this whole aspect of Communism is, I imagine, Islam—of the early period just after the death of Mohammed. Of course Islam has an other-worldly goal as well as a secular goal in this world. Islam wishes to establish, in its strictest interpretation, a kingdom of this world as well as of the next. It doesn't say: "Put all your faith in the hereafter." Acting on their double faith, they became a crusading movement which, as you know, within a few generations swept all around the basin of the Mediterranean into the heart of Western Europe itself. I believe that this analogy between Islam of the early period and Communism could be pressed rather far.

I want to turn now to the *second* major element in Communism, the second fundamental way of looking at the Communist Enterprise. Communism, secondly, is a new kind of army. It shows in its organization, in its discipline, in its mode of operation, most of the classic characteristics of an army. It has the hierarchical principle of organization that the military has. The command is at the top, the command issues from the top and runs from the top down. The leaders give commands—not suggestions, opinions or advice. The Enterprise has the discipline of an army—enforces by rules and regulations which, at least for the inner core, are even stricter than those within an ordinary army.

It is noticeable that the Communists tend to use military terminology. This applies even in the most humble things. If they are going to take the DAILY WORKER out into the subway to try to sell it to a few passengers, or to get it known even if it is not sold, they speak of "shock troops." They consider it as a mili-

tary action which has a military objective, and they will draw up orders along military lines to carry it out. They speak of their highest bodies, like the Politburo, as the "General Staff of the World Revolution," and so on.

Finally, *third*, Communism is a conspiracy: integrally, not accidentally, not merely under some circumstances. This is part of its essential and fundamental nature. As a conspiracy, it shows the characteristics and modes of operation which other conspiracies display. It operates illegally, clandestinely, in the underground, in secret—and this type of operation is continuous. The Communists of course often disguise it, camouflage it, and pretend that this is only necessary under conditions of police terror. Not at all! As a matter of fact, Communist doctrine on this point is uneqivocal. Illegal work takes precedence over legal work. The illegal organization is the superior of the legal organization. The legal organization is only the "front" for the fundamentally illegal conspiracy.

In keeping with this, they develop a whole set of lessons based upon the protection of the conspiracy and its effective operation; all the things that one is accustomed to in these matters —the mode of cell organization, so that only a small part of the structure can be hit at once; the mode of communications, of code, of liaison, and so on.

Let me stress again that the Communist Enterprise is the integral fusion of all three of these aspects, or elements: secular religion, army, conspiracy. That is what makes it unique. When you consider any *one* of them, you can find a historical precedent. And I think it is illuminating, in studying the nature of Communism, to search out such precedents. However, putting them

all together into a single enterprise has, I think, never happened before in history.

Now let me turn to an analysis of the structure of this Enterprise. We can look at the structure, also, in several different ways. However as we approach it we find that it has what I called in that little outline "an onion-skin structure"; a central core or nucleus around which there are concentric layers of skin, concentric circles. I would like you to think of the cross-section of an onion; think of that central core and, around it, these concentric rings. To get at the central core, we have to peel away the rings.

Another way of putting this is to say that the Communist Enterprise is organized in accordance with the "cadre" principle, more distinctly, perhaps, than this is applied in any other field, though United States military organizations make use of this principle, also. There is a cadre (or a set of cadres) which acts as the central nucleus and the backbone for the whole, which informs and controls the entire structure that is built around it.

Let me, to begin with, look at this concentric ring structure in terms of "organization." Here, if we lift away one layer after another, we come to the nucleus or core which is the Supreme Leadership—the leadership which is physically located within the Soviet Union; in fact, more particularly within Russia: one of the constituent republics of the Soviet Union. The Leadership has its best-known persons assembled in what has been called up until now the "Politburo," but which will be called after next month the "Presidium." As a matter of fact, it is impossible to be certain exactly who belongs to the Supreme Leadership. It includes others besides the ones who are, formally speaking, in the highest committee; and probably one or two of the committee mem-

bers are not quite as important as some who are outside. The conspiritorial principle applies here, also; the concealment of some of the members of the Supreme Leadership must unquestionably be expected.

In the first layer around the core you have the immediately lower echelons of the central leadership and then the regional leaderships of the various sections of the Enterprise, which are operating in nations outside of Russia—operating, of course, in all other nations.

Then around the secondary leadership are organized the "cadres," as the Communists themselves call them. We must distinguish between the cadres and the ordinary Party members. The ordinary party members constitute the next ring, the next layer. The cadres mean those who are true Bolsheviks, who have been through a process of indoctrination and of practical and conspiratorial training—a training in the real meaning of the Communist Enterprise, hardened over a period of many, many years. It is not a matter for six months or one or two years, in a kind of finishing school: by no means. The training is carried out through the activities of the movement as well as in its intellectual training centers. The people who enter into the cadres have to show their mettle in action. They have to come up against the police; they have to fight, they have to kill people; they have to show that they are adept at terror and sabotage, as well as being skilled in Dialectical Materialism.

The ordinary party member is a less abnormal human being. It is easier to think of him going in and out of the movement under certain pressures. Hardly a handful of the cadres go, or ever are allowed to go—they are ordinarily prevented from leaving.

So far as proportions go, I have seen estimates in France, for instance, that when the French Party had close to 700,000-800,000 members a couple of years ago, the cadres probably were around 70,000-75,000.

Around the Party members (in fact, the outer ranges of the Party members would fade into them) are the "sympathizers" and "fellow travelers," an absolutely essential part of the Communist Enterprise. Without the fellow travelers and sympathizers the Communists never could have functioned in any of the Western countries, nor even in the Asian countries. It is they who act as the buffer, and as the filter for the absorption by the Communists of more and more of society, and as the gateway to their active infiltration of society. They are the bridge. They are the seemingly more or less respectable people—the people who, when any one attacks them, arouse the disturbance of the Liberals, who begin howling about "hysteria" and "witch hunting." They can function where Communists themselves would be altogether excluded, would not be listened to, or would be simply run out.

Still further in the outer layers of our onion are the "innocent dupes"—those who are not in their own consciousness following along with the Communists, but who have been taken into camp through one or another device of deceit. Please observe that among the dupes are to be found many people who in their own minds and in the minds of the public are non-Communists, or even anti-Communists. The Communists have found remarkable methods for making even their enemies serve their purposes.

A former member of the Secretariat of the Communist International, a very important member from one of the Scandinavian countries, has stated that in the eyes of the Communists

themselves 80% of their effective propaganda work is done through what they call the "bourgeois" press and radio. They rank all the hundreds of millions of dollars that they spend on their own press and their own radio as counting only 20% in terms of total effect. What they have discovered about the press of the enemy enables them to manipulate, sometimes in great detail, even the make-up of your morning newspaper.

For example: One of the great means of political and psychological attrition that is used by the Communists is the "hot and cold" method, turning it on "hot" one day and "cold" the next day—war looks just around the corner today, but all is ready for peace and negotiation tomorrow. This keeps non-Communist public opinion perpetually unbalanced. Now, the sensationalist methods of our press play completely into the hands of this hot and cold method. What deserves a big headline better than the thought that maybe there will be war tomorrow, or in a month from now? On the other hand, what better deserves a second major headline a few days later than the fact that Stalin hints that maybe he is ready to negotiate? So they always get the big headlines, whichever move that they are attempting. They study the methods of our press precisely for that purpose.

A number of you, I imagine, have been in Berlin during these past few years. If you have, you know that East Berlin is incomparably worse off than West Berlin. There is little food in East Berlin. There is nothing worth buying in the shops, no clothes, the people look completely drab. When you walk down the streets, where in the middle of the road there is the border between the Soviet sector and the Western sector, you can know immediately which is which because the appearance of the Western side is so much better. Yet the NEW YORK TIMES, a few days ago, pub-

lished several photographs about the magnificent Soviet reconstruction in the Eastern zone. The Communists take one street—they do a grandiose, a tremendous job on that at the sacrifice to the well-being of all the people in the city, and that is what gets into our press. But the day-by-day hard work, the routine work that gives people more food or jobs, better conditions of life, more freedom—that is not news.

Of course there are many reasons why people become dupes. Some are misled by sentimental reasons—they think that they are helping the negro or the savages of Africa, or helping solve some trade union or civil rights problem.

Incidentally, though I haven't time to do so, this organizational structure could also be analyzed in terms of institutions rather than of different types of persons. The way I have done it—from leadership out to ordinary members, to dupes—we are speaking of individual persons. You could put it in terms of the Politburo, or the highest committees of the party, the ordinary party committees and then out through the various United Front organizations right into the enemy organizations.

I want to turn now to another aspect of the structural principles of Communism: the ideological.

The same principle is observable, only here we have to introduce a complication. The interior, the heart of our onion, I have called 'true Bolshevism." In a moment I will say a little more about it. This, let me note, is not a written doctrine. This is what is taught in life, is taught inside the highest leadership over a period of years. It is like some of the ancient religions which had one secret doctrine for the high caste, or the priesthood, and a quite different doctrine for the ordinary believers. In the Middle

Ages, the Catharist movement had two doctrines of this kind—one for what they called "the perfect," and the other for "the believers." This inner Bolshevik doctrine one has to know about through direct experience—either of one's own, or by knowing people who have been in the leadership and have absorbed this doctrine in life, or by picking up a bit of it in books, especially novels and autobiographies.

The next layer surrounding "true Bolshevism" is what is ordinarily called "Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism." This is the official Party doctrine which is in official books beginning with the *Short History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union,* in the books of Lenin, of Stalin, and the other members of the hierarchy.

Finally, around this is a quite different doctrine—the doctrine that is put out by the Party and its sympathizers for the benefit of the general public, of the dupes, of people who have Liberal, sentimental, humanitarian views—sugar-coated very suitably for their digestion. I'll wait a minute to mention the subsidiary, supporting rings which are not quite capable of being put into the concentric circle scheme.

Let me illustrate the difference between these three doctrines by one or two specific cases. What is the goal of Communism? Well, that depends—it depends upon which of those three doctrines you are talking about. For ordinary people, the Liberals and the Progressives, Communists say that the Communist goal is the same as that of all "forward looking" persons. They say to Liberals: "Communists are different from Fascists, because we Communists seek the same ideals and values as you Liberals, even though we disagree somewhat about the methods to reach them."

"Peace and prosperity"—that is usually what it comes down to. Once in a while of course they mention, their ultimate goal of ideal Communism, or a classless society, in which there will be no war, no exploitation, and everybody will be happy with each other.

Suppose you consult Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism. What is the goal? Well, the official doctrine will say: "Ultimately, we are for ideal Communism, the classless society. But, so far as this period of history goes, we are for the dictatorship of the proletariat." They won't argue that this means peace and prosperity.

If you look in the official doctrine, it says: "No, the proletariat dictatorship, like all dictatorships, makes use of suppression. It is a government that has armies and police, there will be wars and civil wars, and revolutions and counter-revolutions during this period. But it is a dictatorship which represents the interests of the great mass of working mankind, and it is exercised by the Communist Party in their benefit, for them and in their name."

But, what is the true doctrine for which these are only one or another layers or disguises? The true doctrine, which is not at all ambiguous in the mind of any real Bolshevik, is that the goal is a monopoly of power for the Communists themselves—a monopoly on a world scale; that no one else, except the Communists, and no other institution, shall have any power. In the last analysis, because of the nature of their structure, that means no one except the Communist cadres—the real inner core of the entire Communist movement.

"The International Party," the official song says "shall be the human race." In an indirect way, that symbolizes its goal.

The Party will be the only part of the human race which has a power standing.

Take the question of "terror." What is the attitude of the Communists towards terror? According to the outer coat, they don't believe in terror—that is a slander by Fascists. It is Fascists, Reactionaries and Imperialists who use terror. Communists are against war, too, for that matter.

According to the official doctrine of Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism, they admit that under certain circumstances there must be violence, but they say "no individual violence." The Communist Party is absolutely against individual violence." It wants to represent the interests of the great majority and, particularly, the working majority. If the minority of Reactionaries, Fascists, and Capitalists try to thwart the will of the majority, the majority legitimately takes action against them. But they say: "We are not like Anarchists or Nihilists, who kill individuals, or who commit individual assassination." In fact, Communists have an elaborate theory that claims to explain why assassination is useless because it results in a counter-action against the masses, makes the masses more apathetic instead of enlivening them, and so on.

Now, incidentally, let me observe in general that Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism is the doctrine of Communism as it is understood by what are called "experts." Among the credited experts in this and in other countries you will find this to be the case if you consult the books they write. The experts in the State Department, in the Rand Corporation, and so on, go through the official literature, they cull out the paragraphs that they think to be the key sources, they systematize these, and say: "This is the

Communist Doctrine." Naturally, that is more or less what they have to do if they are analyzing from the outside.

On this point of "terror" the experts are completely fooled, as a rule—even very wise people. I remember that in the discussion of the attempted assassination of President Truman, even people like Dorothy Thompson (who is a considerable expert in modern international politics) said that this couldn't have had anything to do with the Communists because they don't believe in individual terror. Of course from the point of view of true Bolshevism, this is nonsense over which Bolsheviks must get a good deal of laughter. They use individual terror all the time, every day, and the list of their individual acts of terror includes thousands of incidents.

They blow up the homes of workers who vote against them in trade unions. In the Spanish Civil War they assassinated or captured hundreds of non-Communist opponents, Trotskyists, Anarchists, Socialists, and so on, and shipped them back to the Soviet Union. In the streets of Berlin, they have picked up several dozen journalists who were firm anti-Communists. Dr. Linse, one of the heads of the Free Jurists Association was kidnapped from in front of his apartment a couple of weeks ago. In New York, Juliet Stewart Poyntz was shipped off in a Soviet ship. Trotsky was assassinated in Mexico. They have developed entirely new methods of terror, some of which have gradually been discovered. They consider that Dialectical Materialism shows a whole new way of conducting "terror" operations.

Well, I'm running behind so I had better just say a word or two more about these other two theories. These also act as protection. There is a double function here. True Bolshevism controls

the outer layers, and these prevent the world from understanding what True Bolshevism is.

The *diversionary theories*: by that I mean theories that are developed so that people will spend their time and energy in ways that do not hurt Communism. For instance, the theory that is a favorite now in Washington and Wall Street—the theory that Communism is a product of adverse economic conditions, so that if you just fix up economic conditions a little you will get rid of Communism—is an extremely convenient theory for the Communists because it keeps people from doing things that really hurt Communism, and it also wastes the substance of the United States in ways that do not bear on the main point. This theory is propagated in the outside world by the Communists. In their own inner world, as far back as 1904, their official theory, beginning with Lenin, said that this notion was totally false. There are many other instances of this kind.

By the *ad hoc* theories I mean theories that are invented for tactical purposes—again to obscure the truth. For instance, in the case of China, you had a whole series of theories about the Communist movement that it was "just Agrarian Reformers," just "peasants," and so on in order to hide its true character. Today, the principal form of the *ad hoc* theory in the case of China is the idea that Mao Tse-tung is not really dependent upon Moscow, and is therefore a potential Tito.

In the Alger Hiss case you had another whole system of *ad hoc* theories as you went along. As soon as a new fact comes out, you invent a new theory to allow for it—often in contradiction to the preceding one; anything other than to recognize that Alger Hiss was a Communist agent. Hiss' opponent, Chambers, was "a sexual pervert," "was crazy," "was trying to get vengeance on Hiss."

Or, when all of those failed and the proof was too great, then "Maybe he did something wrong, but he was trying to cover up for some one else."'

Well, I had better get along. Looking at Communism geographically, you find the same kind of onion-skin structure. If you centered the world on Moscow (of course it doesn't work out quite perfectly in geometric terms), you have first Russia, which is the real heart. I mean Russia specifically, not the Soviet Union; unfortunately, this map does not show the national differences within the Soviet Union. Russia is the inner core.

The next circle around it, which will include this whole area, would be the other sections of the Soviet Union—the non-Russian section: here, the Ukraine, and down here Georgia, the Mohammedan groups, and so on in there.

Then, you begin to get a new layer in 1939: all around this group (the satellites). Outer Mongolia came considerably before that, beginning in the Twenties. Then it extends to China.

Then the next ring is the countries that are infiltrated heavily, where the Communists have a kind of veto power but don't yet control positively. This includes, for example, parts of the Middle East—like Iran. In the Communist opinion, this would include, I believe, all of Western Europe. They consider that they have now succeeded in paralyzing Western Europe. They are now working on Britain. In the outer circle there is only the United States.

Let me repeat that this onion-skin structure, as I call it, accomplishes simultaneously many things: An ease and flexibility of control, a camouflage adjusted to each kind of person, a legal

camouflage which protects the central core from legal action, and a system of actual physical protection.

I want to turn now (and I am going to have to go very much more rapidly over the remaining part of the outline that was distributed to you) away from the problem of structure to the statement of the Communist Strategic Plan. I will just summarize the material here.

In the Communist Plan the first major step, which we can call Phase I, was made in 1903. This was the founding date, or the date of incorporation, we might call it, of the Communist Enterprise. It took place in the course of a Convention of the Russian Social Democratic Party which began in Brussels and then, after some police difficulties, shifted to London. There were a series of disputes, but it is interesting to observe that the principal dispute was over the "organization" question. Lenin insisted that the Revolutionary Movement had to be a movement with centralized discipline, a movement of professional Revolutionists. The others wanted a looser organization, more decentralized—with amateurs and semi-pro's in it. At the Convention itself, though not in the Party as a whole, Lenin was in a majority—from whence comes the name "Bolshevik," meaning "majority." That was Lenin's first step, confirming, I think, my account of what we should regard as the core of the meaning of Communism. The organization of Lenin's professional faction, of his initial *cadre,* began the history of Communism.

Let me jump from the first phase to the last, which I have called Phase L (L, in the mathematical sense of a "limit" phase). Incidentally, among other things, I use that term because, like a mathematical limit, it can be approached but never quite reached.

As I mentioned before, the final goal is a world monopoly of power by the Communists. This is sometimes called "World Communism," sometimes it is called a "World Federation of Socialist Soviet Republics," or the "Classless Society." The content, whatever the words, means a Communist world power monopoly—a domination of the world exclusively by the Communist Enterprise. It is very important to understand the exact meaning here. It means that no other social grouping shall have any power—they can exist, but not have power. They can perhaps have their costumes, or even their language, or their ritual, or their games and athletics—but no power: neither nations, nor classes, nor businesses, nor churches, nor lobbies, nor parties.

Notice that this is perhaps the key contrast between our conception of a community and theirs. In our society there is a plurality of powers—spread out in trade unions, in business firms, in central government, in local government, in parties, lobbies, and voluntary groups of all kinds. Incidentally, it is this that makes Communism "totalitarian" and also what makes it literally impossible to compromise or negotiate with the Communists. Negotiation is always a capitulation if it is carried through. The goal, by the way, is not only the ultimate goal of the Communist Enterprise but the goal within each limited field where Communists work. It is the goal in a trade union to destroy all other factions, all opposition—to have Communists alone holding power in the union. Even in a Boy Scout Troop it is their goal.

The present phase (an intermediary between Phase I and Phase L), I call Phase L *minus* 4, and I define it as *the period of preparation for the open stage of the Third World War.* This phase began in 1944. It began as soon as the Politburo was convinced that Hitler was defeated. It was publicly indicated by the

Communist mutiny in the Greek Army at Alexandria; by the altered policy in the Balkans, where Tito turned his guns definitely against Mikhailovich and stopped fighting the Nazis; and by a turn in China where they shifted over from a friendly policy towards Chiang Kai-shek, which was followed from 1937 to the end of 1943, into the road toward the liquidation of Chiang.

Incidentally I defined this phase in that same year in the same terms that I use now—in 1944—and I made a lengthy study for the Office of Strategic Services at that time, a study which was finished in July, 1944. Most of this I later incorporated in my book, "THE STRUGGLE FOR THE WORLD," which was written in 1946. I mention this fact, not to take personal credit, but rather as a proof of the soundness of the principles which form the basis of my analysis.

Let me elaborate just a bit on the nature of the present phase. In terms of geographical perspective, there are two tasks: The consolidation and strengthening of the main base (that is, the Eurasian base); and the simultaneous weakening and undermining of the non-Communist nations. Incidentally, you have here an instance of what the Communists call "dialectic"—the opposition of "thesis" and "antithesis." The "thesis" operates inside the Soviet Union—positive, strengthening; the "antithesis" operates outside—weakening, breaking down. The "synthesis" is the revolutionary process considered as a whole.

This "thesis" - "antithesis" set-up, by the way, explains what to some people is paradoxical in Communists: how they seem able to believe two inconsistent things at one time. They can believe in disarmament here and in a maximum of armaments for the Soviet Union; they can believe in "no strikes" in the Soviet Union

and "strikes" all the time in other countries. One side is a belief concerning the "thesis," and the other concerns the "antithesis."

As to the selection of means in carrying out this double task. Priority in this phase is given to economic, political, psychological, and propaganda measures. This applies both inside the Soviet Union and outside; that is, in strengthening and consolidating inside and in weakening and undermining outside. Of course, there are also military measures in this phase. However, in relation to the whole process these can be considered supplementary and preparatory. There is actual fighting, but this is carried out by secondary and auxiliary forces, the main force is held in reserve and not committed in this entire phase. At the same time, in a preparatory way its strength is built up.

I included in the outline a *third* element: The continuing central sociological objective of the preservation of the integrity of the Communist elite. I am afraid that I will have to let that go because it is rather complicated, and it would take a more lengthy discussion than I have time for. Let me mention that this sociological objective follows from the whole conception of the structure of the Communist movement. The key point is the cadre, the fundamental nucleus of the movement. That is what must be preserved, and that is what acts in the really crucial moment. This applies even geographically. Because Russia is the primary seat of the cadre from a geographical point of view, you must at all costs protect Russia.

You also aim to protect the cadre—the elite—in ideological terms. That is why so much attention has been paid to purging intruding ideas that might interfere with Communist education, and

to keeping out alien literature and alien science in the interest of a purely Communist art, movies, music, biology, physics, psychology, and so on.

Then Communists carry out diversionary actions which help them in this task of the preservation of the integrity of the elite. There are ideological diversions, which I referred to in connection with the ideological structure of the Enterprise, and military or subversive diversions—the peripheral actions which have been mounted since 1944.

Notice that the ordinary explanation of these peripheral actions is that the Communist movement, being very dynamic, moves to fill any vacuum which presents itself. To some extent that is true. But there is another way of looking at it, which I am convinced is also true. These actions—such as have been carried out in Greece, in Iran, in Tunisia, of course in Korea on the biggest scale, in the Philippines, in Malaya, in Burma—keep the enemy occupied on the periphery, keep him nibbling at the fingertips, with the whole vulnerable section preserved from any kind of interference. That vulnerable section is Russia itself, the geographic base of the elite that embodies, historically speaking, the Communist Enterprise.

In the outline I listed five chief strategic principles of the Communist Enterprise and I will have time only to say a sentence or two in connection with each.

First, *the Party is the principal instrument of the Revolution.* This is really the principle that has been implicit in much of what I have been saying in relation to the structure and activity of the Communist Enterprise. The understanding of this is

what made Lenin a great and creative political leader. The Party comes first, before everything.

Incidentally, this principle explains some difficulties that arise in the minds of observers of the Communist movement. They say: "Why do Communists carry out foolish strikes that have no chance of succeeding or use provocative tactics that merely get people beat up when they know that they are not going to accomplish anything positive?"

The reason is because that through these methods they may be able to recruit two or three new people into the Party; or they can perhaps carry forward the training of half a dozen people toward their incorporation in the fundamental cadre. A half a dozen people into the cadre is far more important to Communists than the question of whether a hundred thousand workers get a raise or not, or even whether a union is smashed or not.

Prior to the full Revolution, most of the actions which the Party takes are considered as training exercises for the revolutionary shift of power itself. This, by the way, is another one of the forces that sharply distinguishes the Communists from all ordinary political groups. They do not pursue reforms, or temporary actions, or partial actions, or elections for their own sake—but only as methods of preparing the Revolution and training their own forces.

The Soviet Union, after the Revolution in Russia, *is the fortress of the Revolution*—not by virtue of geography, but by being the principal locale of the Party. If the Revolution had begun in some other country—Germany, Britain, say, or China—unquestionably there would have been a different view of the political strategy to be followed by the Communist Enterprise. But it happened

to be in Russia, from their point of view very fortunately, since greater Russia has the strongest natural position in the world.

It follows as a corollary that it is the absolute duty of all Communists to defend the Soviet Union before any other task whatsoever except the defense of the integrity of the Party. Therefore, it also follows that all Party members and fellow travelers are traitors to all nations other than the Soviet Union. This is a necessary conclusion, and a conclusion which is completely borne out in practice. Incidentally, its military relevance should certainly be considered. In their own eyes Communists are not traitors, but true to the Revolution. But from the point of view of any other country they necessarily are traitors. This holds for every Communist who has now been brought into the NATO armies.

The proletariat is the primary social base of the Revolution. This does not mean quite what it says. It doesn't mean that the party is made up of workers, which it is not, or that it genuinely represents either the will or interest of the workers. Workers are assigned the key role because they are strategically placed within the economies of the advanced nations. (I think that the Communist theory is in error here. It did not anticipate the growth or the importance of the engineering and technological groups).

Secondly, workers are more available, because they are already organized by industry itself and by the trade unions into great groups—not just dispersed masses. The proletariat, it is observable, is as a class less volatile, less up and down, than the middle classes and therefore more dependable from the political point of view. In many countries the workers are what the Communists would call "alienated" within the culture, both economically (they don't share any economic benefits) and also morally you

might say (they don't share spiritual values. This conclusion, by the way, does not apply to the United States, or at least it doesn't hold to anything like the extent which the Communists anticipated. It largely does in Europe. That explains why the Communists have got very far among the European workers and not very far among the American workers.

The peasantry is the main ally of the proletariat. Notice that the Communists never orient their strategic perspective on the peasants. The peasants are too dispersed; they are separated in individual lands and holdings. They don't work together like the workers in a factory. They are too reactionary, the Communists would say, in holding strongly to religious beliefs and wanting to have private property.

But the Communists saw, originally, that in great parts of the earth the peasant mass had to be flung behind the Revolution if the Revolution were to succeed, because the peasants constituted the overwhelming majority. This was the key to the Russian Revolution itself. It was accomplished when Lenin simply lifted the Social Revolutionary Party's Peasant Program, or Agrarian Program, from its platform and put it into the Bolshevik Platform. Then the principle was applied in Asia. Of course it is applied everywhere, but it doesn't make much sense in a country like the United States or most of the countries of Western Europe.

Essentially, the Agrarian Program has two stages: A pre-Revolutionary stage, which is designed to rouse the peasants, to get them politically behind the Communists. This features a program of distributing the land to individual workers on the land, of getting rid of taxes and debts, and granting certain subsidies and marketing benefits. Then, when the Revolution succeeds, you begin a transformation through various stages to "collectivization". Finally,

what they still have not been able to reach as a matter of fact, though they have attempted it in recent years in Russia here is the stage of "factory farming." The reason for collectivization and factory farming is also political. The aim is to eliminate the possibility of the peasants acting as an opposition class in society by taking away the economic base from which they could successfully and seriously oppose the regime.

Finally, another of the great creative insights of the Bolsheviks: *the Colonial and National struggle is the chief auxiliary of the Revolution.* Marx insisted that the Communist Revolution was a Revolution of the workers—"workers of the world unite!" Lenin and Stalin added to that conception: "....workers of the world *and oppressed peoples and nations unite!*" which was a great departure from the orthodox tradition. This again shows how it is the political dynamic that the Communists always fasten on. They saw that a great deal of the world outside the advanced countries was parceled out to the Western industrial powers; that these colonies and subject or controlled nations were capable of being stirred to revolt. This, they figured out, would undermine the Great Powers by taking them as it were from the rear, destroying their reserves of men and material, wasting their energies, lowering their morale. Along with that, colonial revolt would add to the quantitative weight on the Communist side of the world balance.

In the last decade, it is this principle which has been the primary one, in connection with which the great world successes of the Communist Enterprise have been staged.

I regret that I do not have any time at all today to deal even briefly with the tactical methods used by the Communist Enterprise—the methods by which the Communists carry out these strategic principles. These methods range from the well-known

maneuvers of the United Front to paramilitary operations in such fields as sabotage, terror, and guerrilla warfare. In order to complete a systematic account of the nature of Communism, they must be included. However, that will have to wait for another occasion.

I think that I have said enough to indicate to you what you surely do not doubt in any case—that our enemy is serious and formidable, the most serious and formidable that we have ever faced. He will not be defeated by money and firepower alone.

In December, 1916, in his Swiss garret, Lenin had neither money nor firepower at his disposal. Within a year, he was in command of one of the world's greatest nations and was already forging that nation into an additional arm of his unprecedented Enterprise.

It will take all our resources of mind and of will, as well as of matter, to defeat this enemy. Even these will not be enough unless we understand clearly what he is and what he seeks.

Thank you, gentlemen!

Biographical Sketch of Dr. James Burnham

Dr. James Burnham was born in Chicago, Illinois, on 22 November 1905. He was graduated summa cum laude from Princeton University in 1927 and continued his studies at Oxford University, England, where he received a B. A. degree in 1929 and an M. A. in 1932. He has been a member of the Department of Philosophy at New York University since 1929. During the 1930's he was active in the unemployed and trade union movements and in the attempt to build a new revolutionary Communist party, independent of the official Stalinist party. He edited "The New International," then generally recognized as the foremost theoretical Marxist journal, and wrote widely for labor and radical papers. But he never accepted the general philosophy of Marxism, and in 1940, after an extended controversy with Leon Trotsky, he broke definitely with every variety of communism. He is author of four books which have found a world audience: "The Managerial Revolution," 1941; "The Machiavellians," 1944; "The Struggle for the World," 1947; and "The Coming Defeat of Communism," 1950.

Dr. Burnham is a Trustee of Free Europe University in Exile, which is being developed as a center for training young East European exiles. This summer he was granted an honorary degree by the Free Ukrainian University (Munich) in recognition of his contribution to the struggle against Communism.

He is now on leave of absence from New York University and is presently engaged in lecturing and free-lance writing. He has lectured at the Naval War College yearly since 1948.

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

A lecture delivered
at the Naval War College
on 4 November 1952 by
Captain Charles H. Smith, U. S. N.

I—INTRODUCTION

Admiral Conolly - Gentlemen:

I am truly delighted to have this opportunity—and this honor—of talking with you about Psychological Warfare, because I have no doubt that some among you will, in your next duty assignments, learn that this subject is receiving considerably more attention than it was receiving when you left your last duty stations.

The most proximate reason for this new attention is the simple fact that Joint War Plans now carry psychological warfare Annexes which require planning action at practically all military levels. This is the first time in our history that we are consciously and systematically developing in peace a readiness to conduct sustained psychological warfare operations during war. Further, these joint plans have a firm basis in national directives which provide that civilian and military effort will be coordinated. No one could fail to be delighted to know this if he were familiar with the melancholy history of confusion and disorder which has characterized our national psychological warfare efforts for at least two world wars.

There are, however, important reasons behind the fact that joint war plans will require some of you to plan and mount operations of a type you may not have encountered heretofore.

Certainly not the least of these is that modern warfare has become total; it involves not only the man who fires the gun but every man and woman who can help build the gun or who can help make the man want to fire the gun; also, it is total in that full mobilization of dwindling material resources is necessary to build the gun. Therefore, military strategy must not only deal with overcoming the physical ability of the enemy to resist, it must also deal with the minds—to destroy morale—of whole populations in order that military victory is made with the least cost to us in men, money and materials.

Further, there has been a growing capability in the form of techniques and methods available to *influence* minds on a planned basis.

Additionally, there seems to be an ever-growing realization that force alone is insufficient to change the minds of man. Thus, if you have overcome the will of the enemy to resist to the point that he considers further resistance to be *useless*, you have won a military victory but may have lost the national victory if you have not also made him believe that further resistance is *needless*—that is, he now supports, or at least will not resist, your national objectives and will not find it necessary again to resort to war.

Finally, as the catalyst to all of the other reasons, there is the national awareness that we are engaged in a first-class ideological war with Soviet communism—a type of war which manifests itself in such ways as the fall of Czechoslovakia, the Berlin Blockade, the "Hate America" campaign, and the stalemate in the Korean armistice negotiations over the POW issue—to name just a few.

All of these reasons in combination have produced an important statement of policy which states, in essence, that psychological warfare techniques are accepted instruments of national policy. This policy contains, it seems to me, two significant principles.

First, it develops and refines Clausewitz' well known statement that "War is a continuation of politics by another means." The NSC has said, in effect: "....psychological warfare techniques provide an additional way in which to conduct politics, both in peace and war; the U. S. government will no longer deal only with other governments but will, when our national interests dictate, deal directly with the people over the heads of their government."

Secondly, the NSC has recognized the principle that psychological warfare, to be effective, must be a *continuous* process. During peace it is, for psychological reasons, called a "Foreign Information Program" and the over-riding objective is to promote the understanding of U. S. objectives in order to assist in the effort that these objectives are attained without war. During war the process is called "Psychological Warfare" for want of a better term. There have been several attempts to develop a more descriptive term but those who have tried it are often reminded of the story of the Australian Bushman who got a new boomerang and then drove himself crazy trying to throw away his old one. We are thus stuck with the term "Pyschological Warfare." In the post-hostilities phase psychological warfare gradually cycles back into peacetime Foreign Information as, for example, in World War II the military assets became the *Allied* Information Service, the *U. S.* Information Service and through several other names until its present name: The International Information Administration of the Department of State.

II—DEFINITIONS AND CONCEPTS

As citizens, we are of course interested in both the peacetime and wartime application of psychological warfare techniques. As military officers, we have a naturally predominant interest in the adaptation of psychological warfare to military Strategy and Tactics.

However, I believe it would be entirely unrealistic to launch immediately into a discussion of the capabilities and limitations of psychological warfare to support military operations without first endeavoring to:

Develop a framework of reference against which my remarks can be judged:

Touch upon some of the peacetime effort now being conducted, both for its illustrative value and as a basis for outlining organizational relationships in peace and what changes occur upon a transition to war.

Otherwise, we both may not know—to use a mooring board analogy—where we are and where we want to go, and thus might find ourselves in the same fix as a friend of mine who was the architect for the replacement of school houses in the Tennessee Valley Authority where this project was causing a wholesale relocation of towns, graveyards, roads and schoolhouses. Finding himself lost one day, my friend stopped in his auto to ask his way of a local mountaineer. After some discussion of how to make his way around flooded areas, blown out bridges and abandoned roads, the mountaineer said: "I'm telling you, Mister; if I was trying to get to that place I just wouldn't start from here."

So this is where we start from, a definition of psychological warfare—

> Psychological Warfare is the *planned* use, by a nation, of propaganda and related informational measures designed to influence the opinions, emotions, attitudes and behavior of enemy, neutral or friendly foreign groups in such a way as to support the accomplishments of its national policy and aims.

This definition appears in the Dictionary of Military Terms for Joint Usage. The underscoring of the word "planned" is my own, since I believe it to be a key word. Although there is no precise definition of "Foreign Information," I believe everyone would agree that there is no perceptible difference between Foreign Information and Psychological Warfare except one term applies to peace and one to wartime conditions. In none of my remaining remarks will I make any other distinction between them, but as a purely military term there are several points in this definition to be noted.

First, the target is not the body but the mind. Further, the target is not opposing psychological warfare forces as in normal warfare, nor is it confined to the minds of enemies but may include neutrals and friendly foreign groups. Psychological warfare is also unique in that psychological warfare forces have only limited responsibility for defenses against enemy psychological warfare. By that I mean: they do not shoot down enemy planes carrying leaflets nor conduct training and education programs to offset the effects of enemy propaganda, nor even disseminate public information to domestic audiences to counteract enemy claims. The only defensive measure which is a psychological warfare responsibility is counter-propaganda, which is as a rule to be avoided

as it is purely defensive and usually provides the enemy with more ammunition for his offensive.

Now you may well ask: What can psychological warfare do? It is of course impossible to analyze the capabilities of psychological warfare in the same way we would analyze the capabilities of Air Warfare or Undersea Warfare. The capabilities of psychological warfare are measured in terms of its capacity to convince. Further, it can only be analyzed in terms of a specific situation which defines *who* is to be convinced, *what* that audience now believes as against what you wish it to believe, *when* you wish the audience to commence performing *passive or active* deeds in response to this new belief, and *why* you wish the audience to set or behave in the planned manner.

Nevertheless, it is possible to develop a general concept of the capacity of psychological warfare to convince. I have attempted to portray such a concept graphically in Figure No. I

Briefly stated, the concept is that the four components of national power (Political, Ideological, Economic and Military) create in combination a psychological power, which, under the definition of *planned* psychological warfare, is latent and unknown until a psychological warfare operation creates a desired psychological effect through the sensory perceptions of *a selected* foreign audience. To expand on this briefly:

Political Power—To the foreign audience means WHAT WE WANT, as they understand it from our political history in such forms as the Monroe Doctrine, Truman Doctrine, North Atlantic Treaty, our international agreements to prevent the flow of strategic materials to the Soviets, and so forth.



FIGURE I

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Ideological Power—Is WHAT WE STAND FOR AND BELIEVE IN. When you see a man in clerical garb you unconsciously or subconsciously form a mental image of what he stands for; responsibility as against irresponsibility, truth against falsehood, right against wrong, and so forth. It is so with a foreign audience when they form a mental image of America. It is the job of psychological warfare to assist in ensuring that the foreign audience thinks of the United States in terms of free speech, the dignity of the individual, freedom of religious worship, the right of franchise, and all that we hold dear, instead of in terms of race riots, crooked elections, etc., which the enemy would have that audience believe.

Economic Power—means our capacity and willingness to assist them by economic aid in attaining what we mutually want without jeopardizing what we mutually stand for and believe in. Insofar as the Marshall Plan has accomplished this, it is a successful use of psychological power; where the economic aid has been provided without due regard for the psychological factors, it has failed to realize its full potential.

Military Power—how we stand ready to defend and protect by force if necessary what we believe in and stand for. The measure of our readiness is not only the existence of so many guns, planes and ships but is at once a measure of our Political Power to seek and attract Allies, our Ideological Power in showing how firmly and strongly we believe in our own standards of civilization, and our Economic Power to provide the munitions necessary for victory.

The thesis of this concept is that the fundamental capability of psychological warfare depends upon two factors:

> the inherent vitality and appeal of the four components of national power, and, the skill with which

the strength factors are brought to bear against weakness factors in the enemy's psychological power.

If, for example, your ideological power is weak, you cannot sell it,—as the Nazis and Fascists found out. If, on the other hand, your ideological power is inherently strong, as certainly must be the case of Western Civilization, its strength may never be known unless, in the words of Saint Mark, you go forth into all the world and spread the gospel to every living creature!

Some examples of the current effort to "spread the gospel" in the form of psychological warfare will be found on display in your library—examples of both Soviet and American efforts in the strategic field, and efforts of both United Nations and Chinese communists in the tactical field in Korea. Most of this material is "WHITE" or overt—that is, the source is clearly identified. There are a few examples of "GRAY" in that there is no attempt either to identify or conceal the source. There are examples, insofar as I can be sure, of "BLACK" propaganda—that is, a deliberate attempt to have the audience believe the source to be other than the true source.

As cold pieces of paper I'm afraid they do not convey a full impression of either the quantity or quality of effort being applied. For example, reading the Soviet posters alone would certainly not lead to a concept that, by the use of psychological warfare techniques, the Soviets have parlayed the four components of their national power in such a way as to compel the United States alone to employ nearly a million of its Armed Forces in direct or indirect support of combatant operations without one Russian soldier being engaged.

Nor do these displays indicate adequately the nature and extent of the U. S. effort. I therefore would like to ask you when viewing these displays to remember that the International Information Administration works in four functional fields.

First, the International Broadcast Service, or voice of America, which operates around the clock in 46 languages to over 100 countries.

Next, the Press and Publications Service whose daily wireless bulletins reach more than 100 million readers and which maintains libraries in 150 strategic localities overseas.

A Motion Picture Service in 40 languages is distributed to an annual audience of some 400 millions.

Finally the Exchange of Persons Program. Last year about 8,000 students, teachers, and other leaders participated in this program to let America be seen as well as heard. The theory behind this program is that the best 'missionary" to, say, Burma is a Burmese.

The IIA invites criticism and comment concerning their effort and if any of you have ideas as to how to assist in the Cold War write to the IIA or if you wish I shall be glad to forward them.

III—ORGANIZATION

So far we have seen what psychological warfare is and developed a general idea as to what it can do and is doing. Before going on into the specifics of a war time situation I believe it is wise to take a brief look at the organizational framework within

which the peacetime effort is conducted and what changes occur in organizational responsibilities upon an outbreak of general hostilities. I promise you it will be brief because I do not wish to be in the position a minister was when a little girl told him after church one Sunday that she liked his music but thought his commercial was entirely too long.

Perhaps the shortest way to do this is to take a hypothetical problem and trace it from its inception through the planning stages into actual operations in peace followed by war. Figure No. 2 will assist in following the course of events.

The extent and nature of wartime psychological warfare operations will depend of course on many factors which cannot be clearly foreseen at this time. One of these factors will undoubtedly be effected by the degree to which the Department of Defense has participated in the cold war. The degree of this participation has been undergoing an ever-increasing tempo of evolution and there is a growing awareness that the thousands of Americans in uniform abroad create a very considerable psychological impact whether we wish it or not. There is a recognized need for additional effort to be sure that this psychological impact is one which reflects and promotes our pyschological power.

This is, it seems to me, a three-pronged problem. The most important part is one of education, training, indoctrination and leadership in order that the mass as a whole is made up of individuals who truly understand that he is an important cog in the machine devoted to winning the cold war. On this firm foundation there would be ample room for extension of effort within present policy and budgets by insuring that normal military activities are conducted with due regard for the opportunities to create favorable psychological effects without affecting the primary objective for



FIGURE 2

62-106 b

NOTE—The discussion of organizational responsibilities extended to a higher classification and is therefore not included herein.

which the activity was planned. Further extension of effort—that is, *planned* use of measures designed to win friends and influence people abroad—is expected soon as a result of effort being applied to strengthen the Department of Defense participation.

But no matter whether in peace or war, under whatever organizational responsibility, the need for *coordinated* and *sustained* effort is essential.

IV—CAPABILITIES AND LIMITATIONS IN RELATION TO MILITARY STRATEGY AND TACTICS

We can now turn to psychological warfare by military forces in war.

War is not a discontinuity in time for psychological warfare; War is merely an interlude in the conduct of politics, during which *MILITARY POWER* takes on an added significance in the minds of the foreign audience, without any reduction in the significance of the other three forms of national power. The fact of war intensifies the basic human motivation and emotions of hope, hate and fear. It is the duty of the military commander to exploit all forms of national power to affect these emotions in such a way as to assist in winning his military victory.

Before examining the tools and techniques a few cautions seem in order.

The first of these would be the recognized fact that it is not an easy matter to bring a person to change his mind. Even seated by your fireside over coffee after a mellowing dinner I doubt you would succeed in changing the mind of a confirmed communist—assuming he would listen! Since your psychological warfare audience is separated from you by miles of space there

arises a definite limitation as to your capability to create an impression on his sensory perceptions. The perfect psychological warfare technique is mass hypnosis at a distance but even under those unrealistically perfect conditions we know that hypnosis could not prevail upon an individual to behave in a way to violate his basic sense of right and wrong. Therefore the appeals must be realistic to the intended audience. Some talk you may hear as to inciting certain groups to revolution borders upon a lack of realism comparable to that if the Soviets attempted to appeal to Southern States again to secede from the Union! Appeals must be in fact *appealing* to make any difference to the audience or we should be like the old ladies at the zoo who asked the keeper whether the hippopottamus was a male or a female and got the reply:

> "Lady, I don't know and I don't see how it makes any difference except to another hippopottamus."

A second caution is that psychological warfare is but an instrument of policy. It does not make policy, it supports policy. It is, as General Eisenhower said, "*a* tool in the arsenal of war which has earned its right to place of dignity." This is not to say that it should not have a voice in forming policy, and I believe, for example the "Unconditional Surrender" policy of the last war might have been avoided if psychological warfare people had been given an opportunity to analyze its probable effects.

Another limitation is that psychological warfare is not adaptable to *all* military situations. As a rule it is better to concentrate available resources on exploiting *existing* psychological situations than to try to *create* them for exploitation. Fear of gunfire, for example, is most exploitable when the shells are falling around. Military officers by their training and experience are likely to say to themselves, "My boss says my job is psychological

warfare—therefore I've got to do something." It could well be that the best advice might be: "Boss, this is the time we should keep our psychological warfare mouths shut." I would not, however, leave you with the idea that the "man-of-few words" type is the best psychological warfare officer because I'm reminded of an item in a news magazine:

> "In Seattle Mrs. Jones applied for divorce on the grounds that her husband had only spoken to her three times in their married life. The Judge granted the divorce and custody of the three children."

And, finally, before we see some examples of the use of the tools and techniques of psychological warfare, it is necessary to narrow the field to manageable proportions under either strategic, tactical or consolidation psychological warfare.

Consolidation psychological warfare is the type we have conducted in Japan since the war and that the Soviets are still conducting in and toward the satellites. It is probably the most important of the three types because of its potential to make the military victory a lasting victory, but because it is so closely associated with Military Government—which is not of primary concern to the Navy—I shall not give any examples of the tools and techniques and merely observe that with a captive audience all of the tools and techniques of education and training—movies, television, lectures, posters, precept and examples—are available in this effort to "win friends and influence people."

The following examples of the use of tools are mostly confined to actual uses, although some remarks as to their future

adaptability are permissable even though we have already said that the capability of psychological warfare can only be judged in a specific situation.

Radio. The "Commander Norden" broadcasts to the German submarine arm in World War II is a good example of strategic psychological warfare. Post-war analysis shows that these broadcasts over a period of nine (9) months from March 1943 were effective in lowering the morale of the U-Boat arm by creating doubt as to the strategy, tactics and effectiveness of the U-Boat campaign. Tactically, radio was used by the U. S. S. TEXAS in the Western Task Force off French Morocco as a part of a planned effort to induce the French not to oppose our landings, by voice broadcasts on the local wave lengths. The fact that it did not succeed does not mean the effort was not soundly conceived.

Leaflets. The use of leaflets has become so extensive that "leaflet warfare" is becoming almost an accepted term. Few people know—or knew then—that a Japanese soldier bearing a safe-conduct leaflet surrendered as early as August 1942 on Guadalcanal. At Okinawa nine million leaflets were used in support of the 6th Marine and 7th Army Divisions and analysis shows a direct relationship between surrenders and leaflet use. A good example of strategic use of leaflets is that in which the Japanese people were told—for the first time—of the fact that Japan was considering surrender by quoting the text of the Emperor's reply to an official note concerning terms of surrender. In Korea, over three billion leaflets have been dropped. We are now almost uniformly warning towns of bombing a day or so ahead, an hour or so ahead, and then after the bombing apologizing that it was made necessary by their leaders. Intelligence has shown the advisability of continuing this program.

The use of leaflets is very adaptable to Striking Force Operations and Amphibious Operations, when the element of surprise is no longer a consideration. If, for example, carrier-based strikes are to be conducted over a period of three days and the target program for the second and third days involves "X" number of targets, damage potential could be enhanced by dropping bomb-warning leaflets on "X + Y" targets. Appeals to evacuate the "X + Y" targets would of course be based on our desire for humaness and the fact we did not hit all of them — just the "X" number—would lend credence to the theme. More explicitly the leaflet could say:

> This factory is for war; let soldiers—not civilians—do the work.

Further, appeals for evacuation could be supported by news of important allied victories withheld by the enemy or by "comfort kits" containing needles, soap, fishhooks, vegetable seeds or medicines as an aid to more permanent evacuation or tied to appeals to help downed aviators to evade capture. The use of "safe conduct" leaflets in an objective area which is not likely to be the scene of any invasion could not help but cause some concern to the enemy and possibly cause redeployments of his forces. System effects might be produced by leaflets directing *non existent* guerrillas to continue in hiding to await the signal for uprising.

Rumor. Considerable strides have been made in research to determine the capabilities and limitations of rumor. It will always, I think, remain an art but it is at least approaching a science. Very generally speaking, rumor will be circulated in proportion to the importance of the subject to the individual and the ambiguity of evidence supporting or contradicting the rumor. Researchers are now even claiming that an analysis of the pattern of dissemination and distortion of the various types of rumor pro-

vide excellent diagnostic tools for intelligence as to morale and predicted future behavior under the stimulus of selected psychological warfare techniques. It would appear that in a closed society like a communist police state where factual news is tabu, the use of rumor might find very fertile soil.

News Sheets. In that connection, straight news could be the very best psychological warfare technique. The Soviet "Hate America" campaign which is apparently now being turned toward the theme that American armed forces are bestial and will commit atrocities against prisoners is certainly to be borne in mind, because too many Japanese have told us of their infinite surprise at receiving humane treatment after capture. Tactical news sheets resulting in capture without resistance of German positions in World War II have demonstrated their applicability. They have particular applicability to the areas behind the beach head which contain a valuable source of civilian labor which we would like to see friendly instead of hostile when we have overrun.

Posters. Linebarger tells of an effective use of a VD poster in China. Knowing that the Chinese were about to evacuate a town and that the Japanese would occupy it, the psychological warfare team left behind VD posters—ostensibly addressed to the former Chinese occupants, describing in some detail the symptoms of VD, one of which was a burning sensation of the urethra. Also left behind was a considerable quantity of a diuretic in the drinking water and it is claimed that two Japanese divisions were thus placed—shall we say—hors-de-combat—for two weeks. This technique would not have occurred to a person who was not intimately familiar with his psychological warfare audience to the extent he knew of the preoccupation of the Japanese race with their bodily functions.

There are many other tools and techniques—but my time is running out and I shall just enumerate a few.

Literature explaining how the sailor or the civilian worker can effectively feign illness.

Forged ration cards

Counterfeit money

False road direction signs

Soluble salt mines dropped at dusk but unsweepable because they melted in one hour.

Counterfeit orders such as posting on a reservoir "CONTAMINATED—DO NOT DRINK"—Signed by the Medical Inspector General.

And for its amusement valve I shall say that we have a letter which claims that the author can cause radio waves from two separated transmitters to modulate into voice in the air over troops—and thus be a panicky voice from the clouds!

To wind up on a more serious note, a few words on planning for psychological warfare.

The purpose of both strategic and tactical psychological warfare is to ensure that the psychological factors in a military situation are properly assessed in the Estimate of The Situation and carried forward for exploitation in the development of plans and operations subsequent to the Decision.

In the Estimate of The Situation phase two things are needed. First, basic knowledge of the inherent and static motivations of the enemy which determine psychological vulnerablities. This might take the form, for example, of a factor which would indicate that D-Day should not fall within a certain period in French Morocco, because you might thereby inflame an otherwise passive population because D-Day was one of the sacrosanct holy days of Moslems. Secondly, you need intelligence concerning specialized and dynamic psychological situations which are developing in the target area, such as food shortages, friction between military and civilian leaders, inadequate logistic support, etc., and which will be subject to exploitation *prior to* or after D-Day.

Once the decision is made, the planner must analyze three factors as a basis for psychological warfare operations. First, he decides on the basis of the factors in the estimate whether his available resources can best be concentrated on creating:

Mass effects—that is, psychological effects on whole populations or large segments of whole populations.

Leadership effects—that is, on individuals such as the political or military leaders at the seat of government or the commanding officers of naval units or the squad leader at the scene of an amphibious landing, or

System effects, that is, on the intelligence system, the police system, or the commanding officer—political officer system aboard a Soviet submarine.

As an example of what can happen in a system effect, think of what would happen if we arranged to have a document fall into the hands of the secret police in, say, Vladivostok giving a ren-

dezvous for an unidentified Soviet submarine with wording indicating the submarine was contemplating defection. As a maximum we might look for Naval orders prohibiting submarines out of sight of land, with consequent reduction in operational training. As a minimum we could hope for increased surveillance of all submarines and probably increased prestige of the zampolit (political commissar). We could then "needle" them piously over the overt Voice of America calling attention to the general lack of authority of commanding officers.

A second key factor is contained in the "IN ORDER TO" phrase of the commanders mission. Psychological warfare must of course direct its effort to support the purpose of the military operation. If, for example, the operation is mounted in order to gain a base for future operations the pyschological warfare planner must obviously think in terms of trying to assist in gaining a friendly population both before, during and after the invasion, and in terms of what the future operations involve. The customary annex containing the commanders "CONCEPT OF THE OPERATION" is a valuable tool in this respect.

Lastly, national policy must not be compromized. That is to say, you can make no promise in your psychological warfare output which is not in accord with expressed policy.

Two more statements of fact and I will have finished.

First, you should remember that all the facilities of State Department and the Army and Air Force are available as well as Navy facilities. There is ample authority, for example, for CINCNELM to request SAC to drop leaflets with naval themes in the Baltic area and the State Department to mount a weekly or daily radio program addressed to the Persian Gulf area.

And finally, perhaps the most important of all, is:

PSYSCHOLOGICAL WARFARE IS A FUNCTION OF COMMAND. The Classic tests of suitability, feasibility and acceptability are primary tools for the exercise of this command function.

Biographical Sketch of Captain Charles H. Smith, USN

Captain Smith, whose home town is Albany, Georgia, attended Marion Institute for one year before entering the U. S. Naval Academy, from which he was graduated in 1932. His first sea duty was in the USS ARIZONA, in which he spent two years in various departments. This was followed by three years aboard the IDAHO and two years in the JARVIS.

After seven years of sea duty, Captain Smith was ordered to the Postgraduate School at the U. S. Naval Academy. This duty was interrupted by orders to recommission the destroyer CROWNINSHIELD.

Captain Smith later went to duty at the U. S. Naval Academy. He went back to sea as Executive Officer of the destroyer CHAMPLIN which took part in the Sicilian Invasion. He received the Bronze Star as a result of action in sinking a German submarine.

Captain Smith had four years in command of destroyers, participating in the invasions of Saipan, Palau, Philippines, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa in the Pacific, followed by duty in the Atlantic in support of occupation forces in Europe. For this service he was awarded the Legion of Merit with Combat "V".

In 1947-48, Captain Smith was in the senior class at the Naval War College. This was followed by two years in Washington with the Central Intelligence Agency. In November 1950, he assumed command of Escort Destroyer Division 21 in Norfolk, and proceeded with this division to the Korean theatre. After a tour of duty there, circumnavigation of the globe was completed by return to Norfolk via the Suez Canal. For his combat tour in Korean waters Captain Smith received a Gold Star in lieu of a second Bronze Star Medal.

In January of 1952, Captain Smith reported for duty in the office of the Chief of Naval Operations, where he became the Director, Psychological Warfare Programs Division.

RECOMMENDED READING

Current Books

The evaluation of books listed below include those recommended to resident students of the Naval War College. Officers in the fleet and elsewhere may find these of interest.

Many of these publications may be found in ship and station libraries. Some of the publications not available from these sources may be obtained from the Bureau of Naval Personnel Auxiliary Library Service, where a collection of books are available for loan to individual officers. Requests for the loan of these books should be made by the individual to the nearest branch or the Chief of Naval Personnel. (See Article C-9604, Bureau of Naval Personnel Manual, 1948).

Title: *Lincoln and the Russians.* 311 p.

Author: Woldman, Albert A. Cleveland, World Publishing Co., 1952.

Evaluation: This is a book which paints a most interesting picture of our Civil War. It is based on dispatches sent by the Russian Minister Plenipotentiary, Mr. Stoeckl, to his Foreign Minister. It shows that Russia was the most friendly foreign power during this trying period in our history and in large measure prevented armed interference by England and France. Stoeckl had a low opinion of Lincoln, whom he described as a weak leader, inexperienced, and lacking moral courage; he was convinced that the war would result in a split in the Union and his dispatches indicate that he hoped this would be the case for, as the representative of the greatest autocracy in Europe, he wished to see democracy fail. The author, a thorough Lincoln scholar, has filled in the gaps to make a very coherent story. It is pleasant and instructive reading for those who wish to add to their background knowledge of U. S.-Russian relations. All the dispatches used are from source material in the Library of Congress.

Title: *Taming of Nations.* 362 p.

Author: Northrop, F. S. C., N. Y., Macmillan Co., 1952.

Evaluation: Philosopher and lawyer Northrop briefly analyzes the underlying philosophical base and the "living law" concept held by the larger existing cultural groups in the East and West today. Our world has multiple ideologies and multiple "living laws." Northrop sees that the present world has too many small sovereign states. Discontent within these states is not the result of nationalism but the resurgence of culturalism. Northrop feels that cultural unity offers the prospect for reducing the number of political units into seven cultural, political groups in the world today. While supporting the United Nations, Northrop holds that it has tried to take all nations, in one huge step, to a single-world law. This, he considers to be its central weakness. Instead, he claims that declining nationalism and resurgent culturalism offer the vehicle to bring the world first to a relatively small number of cultural, political units and, eventually, to a single, common world ideology. He feels that our foreign policy should be directed to the achievement of this goal. Northrop concludes that power politics is not effective; the only effective power, in the last analysis, is moral power. This book, fairly difficult to read, offers a different approach to the solution of world problems. It substitutes cultural understanding for power politics. Its thesis is challenging; its possibilities huge.

Title: *Forging the Thunderbolt.* 309 p.

Author: Gillie, Mildred. Harrisburg, Military Service Publishing Co., 1947.

Evaluation: A history of the development of tanks and tank warfare from World War I through World War II. The emphasis is on the development of U. S. equipment and tactics as seen through the eyes of one of the foremost exponents of tank warfare, Major General Adna R. Chaffee. As an officer in charge of tank matters on the War Department General Staff, and later as the first Chief of the Armored Force, General Chaffee conducted a tireless campaign to gain recognition of this relatively new weapon of war. Although he did not live to see the employment of U. S.

armored units in World War II, he had a major part in organizing and training them. The excellence of U. S. armor operations was due, in no small degree, to his vision and zeal. An intimate account is also given of his struggle against the ultra-conservative element in the Army blocking full-scale mechanization of our forces. Recommended background reading for a study of tank-warfare development in the U. S. Army.

Title: *One Great Prison.* 175 p.

Author: Fehling, Helmut M. Boston, Beacon Press, 1951.

Evaluation: Two-thirds of the book is devoted to a narrative of conditions observed in Russia by a German prisoner of war during the period from his capture in 1948 until his repatriation in 1949. The last third of the book presents in chronological order the official communications between the Western powers and Russia concerning the enormous numbers of German and Japanese prisoners of war still held by Russia, contrary to agreements entered into by her. The inhuman conditions under which prisoners of war have been, and are still being held in Russia are very amply illustrated in the narrative. The colossal deceit perpetrated by Russia regarding the repatriation of prisoners of war is well documented. Recommended for any student involved in the study of the prisoner of war.

Title: *The Arabia of Ibn Saud.* 179 p.

Author: Lebkicher, Roy. N. Y., Russell F. Moore & Co., 1952.

Evaluation: A discussion of ancient and modern Middle East history with particular emphasis on Arabia and the growth of the present government of Ibn Saud. It details religion, people, industries, geology, climate, customs, etc. There are many fine illustrations, particularly those showing ancient construction. The book is very valuable for reference work, especially in regard to Middle East oil studies.

Title: *Hitler.* 776 p.

Author: Bullock, Alan. London, Odhams, 1952.

Evaluation: This book is the complete life of Hitler, and is said to be the first published. It gives a narrative of his life, both personal and public, and includes material concerning his motives, opinions and thinking as reflected in memoirs and diaries of those associated with him, besides documented accounts taken from captured German archives. The author states that there are limitations to the available material, that it is incomplete and patchy. However, he seems to have succeeded in his purpose "to offer an account of one of the most puzzling and remarkable careers in modern history." Since Hitler and the Third Reich were so closely associated, a good picture is also given of Germany during the years 1933-1945. An excellent and useful bibliography and index are supplied. The book is considered valuable for reference work to anyone dealing with the subject. In addition to furnishing the picture of Hitler and Germany, it is excellent reading for anyone interested in the study of politics and the rise of dictatorships.

Title: *The Turbulent Era.* 2 vols.

Author: Grew, Joseph C. Boston, Houghton, Mifflin, 1952.

Evaluation: In two volumes (1500 pages), former Ambassador and Under Secretary of State, Joseph C. Grew, gives us the record of his diplomatic career extending from 1904-1945. In his memoirs, Mr. Grew gives an insight into the diplomatic maneuvers made behind the scenes. He discloses what went on in Berlin in 1914 and discusses details of the negotiations leading to the Treaty of Versailles. The drama leading to the war in the Pacific is vividly portrayed. A splendid book for foreign policy and historic background. Although lengthy, the reader will never be bored.

Title: *Von Rundstedt.* 280 p.

Author: Blumentritt, Guenther. London, Odhams Press, Ltd., 1952.

Evaluation: The biography of Von Rundstedt, written by a close friend and great admirer, deals for the most part with his role in World War II. Von Rundstedt is portrayed most favorably; this is not a novel feature, however, since most mili-

tary writers have a good word for Von Rundstedt. The author provides a clear insight to Von Rundstedt's personality; pictures him as a man who never feared open opposition to Hitler's plans and methods but at the same time a man who would never consider betraying Hitler. The author joins many other German military writers in an unsuccessful attempt to explain the German army's undeviating support of Hitler to the bitter end. This book will be of interest to those who study German miliary operations during World War II, but contains little to interest the general reader.

Title: *Canada's Century.* 214 p.

Author: Lebourdais, D. M., N. Y., Frederick Praeger, 1952.

Evaluation: Basically, a geographical picture of Canada, including the history, background and growth of the country. It emphasizes the enormous wealth of minerals, waterpower and resources which are yet to be developed. The author makes a conjecture as to the ultimate place Canada will assume in the world of economic importance, based upon her natural resources. It is an interesting and illuminating account to any reader who may be concerned with the development of Canada.

Title: *Heroic Finland.* 300 p.

Author: Hinshaw, David. N. Y., Putnam's Sons, 1952.

Evaluation: David Hinshaw presents a general orientation on Finland covering political, geographical, economic, cultural, sociological and military aspects—past and present. He employs a highly enthusiastic and often emotional writing technique. In spite of this apparent lack of objectivity the reader will find little to quarrel with as regards stated facts or opinions. Of particular interest is the account of Finland's centuries-old struggle for freedom and her amazing success in avoiding Soviet domination. For the reader who does not have time for detailed research, this is a very worthwhile book.

Title: *Brazil.* 115 p.

Author: Camacho, J. A. London, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1952.

Evaluation: This study describes the geographic, economic, and population contrasts of Brazil. The major portion of this book is devoted to a development of the racial, economic, and political affairs of that country and their relationship to its foreign policy and recent political, economic, and social affairs. The last chapter considers the economic possibilities that are offered by the SALTE Plan, which is an economic development program that was approved by the Brazilian Senate and Chamber in May, 1950.

PERIODICALS

Title: *Tug of War in the Baltic.*

Author: Hessler, William H.

Publication: UNITED STATES NAVAL INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS, December, 1952, p. 1301-1309.

Annotation: Surveys the geographic, military and political factors and developments of the Baltic area with a view to evaluating its role in the defensive strategy of the West.

Title: *Reliability Analysis of Modern Weapons.*

Author: Munk, Max M.

Publication: AERO DIGEST, November, 1952, p. 101-108.

Annotation: The prediction that a guided missile, or any other modern weapon, will be relatively reliable involves an understanding of matters not normally within the purview of naval officers during the routine performance of duties. This article provides an aid towards understanding this soon to be "close-to-home" subject.

Title: *Asia* 1952: *Part IV. Indo-China Near Disaster.*

Author: Douglas, Justice William O.

Publication: LOOK, December 16, 1952. p. 55-64.

Annotation: A report on the current situation in French Indo-China, where the war against communist forces has been going on for six years.

Title: *The Savage, Secret War in Korea.*

Publication: LIFE, December 1, 1952, p. 25-35.

Annotation: Illustrated report on the guerrilla warfare being waged by the ROK National Police against the communist guerrillas who have filtered into U. N.-held territory.

Title: *The Danger of a Pre-Conceived Naval Strategy.*

Author: Kittredge, G. W., Cdr., U. S. N.

Publication: U. S. NAVAL INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS, December, 1952, p. 1324-1325.

Annotation: Warns of the danger of preconceived ideas in formulation of naval strategy and notes three essentials for avoiding this danger.

Title: *New National Geographic Map of the Pacific.*

Publication: THE NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC MAGAZINE, December, 1952, p. 803-804.

Annotation: A new map of the Pacific, where the U. S holds administrative responsibility and military control over approximately 5,000,000 square miles.

Title: *New Horizons in Psychological Warfare.*

Author: Conine, Ernest, Lieut., U. S. A.

Publication: ARMY INFORMATION DIGEST, December, 1952, p. 21-27.

Annotation: An account of the training program being carried out by the Army at the Psychological Warfare Center, whose mission is to conduct individual training, supervise unit training, develop doctrine and technques and evaluate equipment.

Title: *Our Opportunity in Formosa.*

Author: Ravenholt, Albert.

Publication: THE REPORTER, December 9, 1952, p. 14-19.

Annotation: Reviews American policy regarding Formosa from the

outbreak of the Korean War to date, and suggests a policy for transforming Formosa from an American liability into a situation of strength.

Title: *Strategic Aspects of the Battle off Formosa.*

Author: Fukudome, Shigeru, former Vice Admiral, Imperial Japanese Navy.

Annotation: Outlines the Japanese plan of operation after the loss of the Marianas and gives the Japanese side of the Battle off Formosa.

Title: *The Soviet Aircraft Industry.*

Author: Green, William

Publication: ORDNANCE, November-December, 1952, p. 429-433.

Annotation: The potential of the USSR to produce aircraft is compared with that of the Western Allies, and the author concludes that all factors, except the force in being, favor the West.

Title: *Relations Between Britain and Communist China.*

Author: Chen, Theodore Hsi-en.

Publication: CURRENT HISTORY, November, 1952, p. 295-303.

Annotation: Reviews Sino-British relations from 1950 to August, 1952, and draws from this record a few general observations in regard to Chinese communist foreign policy.

Title: *The Russians Can Be Stopped in Europe.*

Author: Baldwin, Hanson W.

Publication: THE SATURDAY EVENING POST, November 29, 1952, p. 28, 102-104.

Annotation: Attempts to show that new weapons and imaginative tactics give hope for a successful defense of Western Europe against Russia.

Title: *An Evaluation of Finland's Armed Forces.*

Author: Haadem, Svein, Major, Norwegian Army.

Publication: MILITARY REVIEW, November, 1952, p. 33-36.

Annotation: An estimate of the value of Finland's armed forces, stating that the Army is capable of limited resistance and that the Navy and Air Force would be of negligible value in event of war.

Title: *Problems of a Guerrilla Leader.*

Author: Wilkinson, William C., Jr., Lt. Col., U. S. A.

Publication: MILITARY REVIEW, November, 1952, p. 23-28.

Annotation: Presents a historical example of the establishment and organization of a guerrilla unit in Northern Burma, emphasizing the problems involved and the lessons learned in establishing the unit.

Title: *Transportation: Rough Seas Ahead for Ship Operators.*

Publication: BUSINESS WEEK, November 15, 1952, p. 102-104.

Annotation: Paints a dim picture of the future prospects for merchant shipping. (Chart, p. 102).

Title: *The Illusion of American Omnipotence.*

Author: Brogan, D. W.

Publication: HARPER'S, December, 1952, p. 21-28.

Annotation: The author, Professor of Political Science at Cambridge University, discusses the American belief in American invulnerability and American omnipotence as one reason for the distress over failure of American policy in containing Russia.

Title: *Address by Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Air, John F. Floberg.*

Publication: DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE PRESS RELEASE NO. 224-52 S.

Annotation: An address on the importance of sea power to twentieth century America, delivered before a meeting of business and civic leaders at San Antonio, Texas, November 20, 1952.

Title: *The Soviet Army.*

Author: Mackintosh, J. M.

Publication: THE TWENTIETH CENTURY, November, 1952, p. 398-403. (Reprinted in THE NEW LEADER, December 1, 1952, p. 16-18).

Annotation: A report on the Russian Army, "the most imposing and formidable" of all the instruments of policy at the disposal of the Soviet Government.

Title: *United States Commitments.*

Author: Marshall, Charles B.

Publication: DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN, November 17, 1952, p. 767-771; November 24, 1952, p. 807-812.

Annotation: An article taken from an address before the NATO Defense College in Paris, on American foreign policy, composed of two parts: "The End of Isolation," and "The New Responsibilities."

THE GLOBAL STRATEGY DISCUSSIONS PROGRAM

Towards the end of each Naval War College year a period is set aside for the purpose of discussing National and world strategy for the United States. This is a scholarly investigation of facts and factors designed to help each participant to become aware of the problems confronting our nation, and to form his own ideas of the measures necessary to attain the national objectives. This period is entitled the *Global Strategy Discussions.*

This year the Global Strategy Discussions will be held during the period 4-8 May. The Naval War College will invite a group of distinguished civilian and military guests to participate with officers of the College in a series of round table discussions. In addition to the other guests attending these discussions, there will be seventy-five Naval and Marine Corps Reserve Officers from the continental United States. These officers comprise the senior reserve officer class trained annually at the Naval War College. The final week of training is scheduled so that it coincides with the Global Strategy Discussions period.

The subject matter of these discussions will range from the basic factors influencing the world situation to considerations of national and military strategy necessary to deal with situations of:

(1) precarious peace,

(2) quasi-war or limited wars and

(3) all-out war resulting from the present world situation. Discussions will provide for the integration of military, economic, spiritual and political elements of strength of the United States. Views will be aimed at only the most fundamental factors in order

to take advantage of many diverse opinions and still achieve discussion goals in the limited time available.

It has been found in the past that the experiences and views of our guests have an enlightening and a leavening effect on those of our student officers, and that a fuller awareness of the military problem involved helps our guests, in turn, to form more fully rounded judgments of their own. It is the firm belief at the Naval War College that the free and objective interchange of ideas is the one best means by which Americans can arrive at sound decisions of their own for the solution of the serious and potentially dangerous problems which confront the United States.