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NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

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
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SPECIAL ATTENTION TO THE READER

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NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW (formerly known as INFORMATION SERVICE FOR OFFICERS) was established in 1948 by the Chief of Naval Personnel in order that officers of the service might receive some of the same benefits as the resident students of the Naval War College. Distribution is authorized to officers of the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard—both regular and reserve—of the rank of Lieutenant Commander and above. It will be kept in the possession of officers only and destroyed by burning when no longer required.

As a reader of the articles herein, most of which are transcriptions of lectures delivered before the Naval War College, you share the same privilege as the resident students in receiving the speakers' frank remarks and personal opinions. As a reader, you also share the same responsibility of respecting the privacy of the speakers' expressions. This is true irrespective of the security classification.

The Naval War College Lecture Program has always been of great benefit and interest to officers because the speakers have been willing to talk frankly, thus contributing their most objective thinking to meet the needs of the students without having to consider the possible viewpoints and reactions of an unknown audience.

The thoughts and opinions expressed in this publication are those of the author and are not necessarily those of the Navy Department or of the Naval War College.

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**NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
REVIEW**

**Issued Monthly
U. S. Naval War College
Newport, R. I.**

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**REPORT OF FOURTH ANNUAL SESSION OF THE NAVAL
WAR COLLEGE GLOBAL STRATEGY DISCUSSIONS**

This edition highlights the Fourth Annual Session of the Naval War College Global Strategy Discussions.

As a part of its study of war, the Naval War College, each spring, invites a group of civilian and military guests to participate with officers of the Naval War College in a series of roundtable discussions. The subject matter ranges from the basic factors influencing the world situation to specific opinions on national and military strategy.

The reader is well aware of the continuing international tensions, and of the very unwelcome possibility that we may again find ourselves involved in a major war. It is properly the business of the Naval War College to inquire into what might be the nature and conduct of such a war, no matter how sincerely one hopes it can be avoided.

The Naval War College believes that only through free and objective interchange of ideas can we in the United States arrive at sound decisions for the solution of the many problems which confront us in this complex and turbulent world.

The Discussions this year were highly successful in that all participants enthusiastically entered into this free and objective interchange of ideas.

This fact is all the more noteworthy because of the eminence of the participants. In attendance were some 40 highly respected loyal civilians, each a leader in his own field. Some 76 Senior Naval

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Reserve Officers, many prominent in their civilian professions, added refreshing ideas to the Discussions.

Other service schools and various military organizations were represented by nearly 50 officers, 19 of whom were of flag rank. Including the students and staff of the Naval War College there were over 450 persons present. Please see list of participants published in this edition.

A schedule and agenda is published herein as a matter which may be of interest to the officers of the Service. While it is not possible to publish details of the Discussions, the feature lectures are reproduced for the reader's benefit.

The Naval War College is deeply indebted to the lecturers and participants for their valuable contributions in assisting the Naval War College carry out its mission. It is gratifying to know that a large percentage of the civilian members have expressed an enthusiastic desire to return next year.

The Fifth Session of The Global Strategy Discussions are tentatively scheduled during the month of May 1953.

SCHEDULE

9 June — Monday

- | | |
|-------------|--|
| 0830 - 1030 | Draw Global Strategy Discussions material in Library, Mahan Hall |
| 1045 | Opening remarks by the President, Naval War College, in the Auditorium, Pringle Hall |
| 1100 | Lecture |

1330 **Group Sessions**

10 June — Tuesday

0900 **Group Sessions**

1100 **"National Objectives of the United States"**
Dr. William L. Langer

1330 **Group Sessions**

11 June—Wednesday

0900 **Group Sessions**

1100 **Lecture, "Basic Factors Influencing**
our Strategy"
Dr. Henry M. Wriston

1330 **Group Sessions**

12 June — Thursday

0900 **Remarks**
The Honorable Dan A. Kimball,
Secretary of the Navy

1330 **Group Sessions**

13 June — Friday

0900 **Lecture, "The European Confederation"**
Major General William S. Donovan

1000 - 1230 **Plenary Session**

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THE GLOBAL STRATEGY DISCUSSIONS

- Subject:** Strategy of the United States in a Global war.
- Scope:** An examination of the world situation and the aims and strategies of the United States and its allies in the event a global war ensues within the next three years.
- Objectives:** For each discussion group to postulate a set of national objectives and to formulate an integrated allied war strategy which, in the event of global war, would attain these objectives.
- Purpose:** For each individual to understand:
- a. The situation faced by the United States and its allies.
 - b. What the national objectives of the United States should be.
 - c. What the military strategy of the United States and its allies must be to attain these objectives in the event of global war.
- Procedure:**
1. Small groups, consisting of officers of the Naval War College and civilian and military guests, met for discussion of the subject.
 2. A plenary session was held on the last day to present features of special interest which have been developed in the discussion groups and a presentation by one or more selected groups of their solutions of the subject problem.



THE U. S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE HELD ITS FOURTH ANNUAL Series of Global Strategy Discussions at The College, Newport, R. I., 9-13 June 1952. As a Climax to Ten Months of Study in the Art of Naval Warfare the Officer Students of the Naval War College met with civilians and Military Guests of each of the Services, in an Examination of the World Situation in the Aims of Strategy of the United States and its Allies in the Event of Global War. Shown in Committee Meeting are: L to R, Mr. John M. HANCOCK; Capt E. C. HOLDEN, Jr., USNR; LCol C. E. GRANT, USA; Lt Cdr J. A. MILLER, USN; Col M. L. DAWSON, USMC; LCol C. H. DAVISON, USAF; LCol J. B. MAULDIN, USMCR; Capt F. D. WITZEL, (SC) USN; Lt Cdr J. W. SMITH, USN; and Cdr A. W. HEFLING, USNR.

NOTE: The Naval War College does not necessarily believe a global war will ensue in the next three years. This is merely an assumption selected for the purpose of the Discussions.

TYPICAL DISCUSSION AGENDA

Monday, 9 June (PM) and Tuesday, 10 June (AM)

I. THE NATIONAL OBJECTIVES OF THE UNITED STATES

1. What should U. S. national objectives be?
2. What are the main international issues and factors, outside of our most probable enemy's capabilities, which may affect our progress toward our national objectives?
3. What are the internal economic, political, psychological, and military restrictions in the derivation and determination of U. S. national objectives?
4. What effect on the national objectives will U. S. commitments to NATO and the Mutual Defense Assistance programs produce?
5. What are our probable opponent's factors of strength and of weakness in economic, psychological, ideological, and military fields which oppose or favor our progress toward our national objectives?

II. BASIC FACTORS INFLUENCING OUR STRATEGY

1. What are the strength and weakness factors of the United States as opposed to those of our most probable enemy?
2. What potential for the successful pursuit of U. S. strategies can be expected from our allies?

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3. What potential for a war effort can be expected from our most probable enemy's allies?

Thursday, 12 June 1952

III. THE MILITARY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES AND ITS ALLIES

1. What should the military strategies of the U. S. and its allies be in the event of global war?

Friday, 13 June 1952

IV. PLENARY SESSION (Final Analysis)

NOTE: This typical discussion agenda merely represented one approach to the problem. Each group was to feel free to use any approach or agenda for the solution of the problem that the committee members deemed suitable.

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS AND WELCOME

By The President,
VICE ADMIRAL RICHARD L. CONOLLY, U. S. N.

To Participants in
The Naval War College
Fourth Annual Session
of the
GLOBAL STRATEGY DISCUSSIONS
9 June 1952

Permit me to extend to you officially a warm welcome to the Naval War College and a cordial invitation to participate in the Fourth Annual Session of our Global Strategy Discussions.

I would like to give you some idea of the composition of the group which is assembled here for these discussions:

First, the staff of the Naval War College and the students of our several classes, which are as follows: The Strategy and Tactics Class, the Strategy and Logistics Class, the Command and Staff Class, and a small group of five officers who are pursuing an Advanced Course of Study here.

Secondly, a group of representatives from the various Service schools and colleges:

U. S. Merchant Marine Academy
National War College
U. S. Coast Guard Academy
Armed Forces Staff College
Marine Corps School
U. S. Naval Academy
U. S. Military Academy

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Air University and the Air War College
Command and General Staff College
Army War College
Industrial College of the Armed Forces
Naval Intelligence School

Thirdly, a group of Naval Reserve and Marine Corps Reserve officers who have been selected for two weeks' active duty here at the War College from all of our Naval districts. These number 76 in all.

Fourthly, a group of about forty civilians who have been chosen from as many different phases of our national life as possible, each of whom is eminent in his own field and all of whom are highly respected, loyal and patriotic citizens of the United States. We are fortunate indeed to have these distinguished men come here to help us.

With regard to security of the discussions I request that you all respect our confidence, maintain inviolate the classification of papers and other information of a classified nature made available to you here and particularly that no statements of any participant be discussed outside nor attributed publicly to the author. Only by observing these restrictions can we hope to have free discussion in our meetings. All of the officers of our regular establishment are cleared for secret classification or above; all of the reserve officers and the civilian participants are cleared for secret information necessary for participation in the discussions. I mention this for the purpose of inspiring mutual trust and confidence between us.

The four groups that I have mentioned will be more or less evenly distributed and integrated into our twenty-three seminar groups. The fourth category, the civilians, may perhaps feel them-

selves confronted with an overwhelming representation of what has become to be known as "the military mind." I would like to alleviate apprehension on this score, at least to some degree, by assuring them most seriously that here at the Naval War College, and in fact at every one of our Service educational institutions, a very earnest attempt is being made to broaden the military mind by contact in an increasing degree with civilian influences. In regard to the Reserve officer group, although they served with us for a period of years during the late war, they have all had an opportunity since being released from active duty with the Services to undergo an emancipation and a purifying process, which some might call "demilitarization." Although they have been here already a week, I am confident that they have not been reinfected in that short time.

I am going to give you a little background for these discussions. Our students during the course of the year undertake to solve a series of operational problems of gradually increasing military complexity and expanding geographical scope. Operations Problem 9 reaches the ambitious and all-embracing size that requires for its solution a global strategic concept. This must confine itself to formulating a military strategy, although in that effort we must give proper consideration and due weight to the many other factors that affect a successful military strategy and, above all, we must shape the strategy so as to attain our national objectives. Our concept must produce an integrated allied war strategy. Inasmuch as there has not been a formal presentation as to what our national objectives actually are, we must begin by postulating a set which can be used as a basis for evolving the strategy calculated to achieve these objectives. Our military strategy will be considerably affected by many factors, such as: (a) the financial and economic capabilities of the United States and her allies to provide the resources for conducting such a war, (b) the political factors, (c) psychological and

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ideological factors, and so on. While we must properly assess these and their effects, due to limitations of time we cannot enter too deeply into a detailed discussion of each or any of these subjects which, for our purposes, we must consider as collateral and supplementary to our main and central theme, a military strategy.

In undertaking a study of this kind, in order to arrive at a strategic concept that will outline realistic planned action in definite geographical spheres, we must progress from the general to the more specific and from the abstract to the concrete. We must progress from policy to objectives and thence to the strategic considerations and, finally, evolve a strategic concept. I believe that you would do well to subject your final decisions, in arriving at this strategic concept, to some such test of suitability, feasibility and acceptability, as you can find outlined in our War College publication "Sound Military Decision."

As you proceed you will be dependent upon your own fund of information concerning allied strength, ready or potential, early and as the war progresses, and, similarly, upon knowledge of the enemy's strength, which may have become public knowledge or has become known to you either through special sources or as intelligence which can be made available to you here. Otherwise, where unknown factors must be used as a basis for decisions, *assumptions* must be made, but they should be noted as qualifications of your decisions.

Among the many concepts that will appear, I hope that consideration will be given to a global strategy that is not confined to any one geographical area ignoring and forsaking all others, but a strategy that is really global, not one for Eastern Asia *vs* Western Europe or vice versa, nor one that is merely Eastern Asia *and* West-

ern Europe, but one that takes into its consideration the military action that would be or might be required anywhere around the whole globe.

It seems apparent that any global war would be preceded by a prolonged period of the cold war. Perhaps there might be included in this period a long series of minor limited local wars. We hope not. This preliminary period would unquestionably have considerable influence upon the character of the ensuing all-embracing conflict and upon the setting and situation in which it is started. It is important that we estimate what the possible effects of this process will be and what will be the effects of a shifting ratio of relative ready fighting strength and even of relative total military potentials.

In the next three years we may justifiably foresee many far-reaching and significant changes in the political, economic, and strategic strength factors of the Western Allies. Most vital to this augmentation of total allied strength will be the increase in the strength of the Armed Forces and the total warmaking potential of the United States itself, for this is the base of the whole structure.

During this period our economic and military aid to the NATO nations, particularly in continental Europe, will, if they are as successful as we expect, have achieved a tremendous build-up of the capability to resist invasion. The ground and air forces of NATO on the continent will probably always require an increment of United States strength, together with a continued flow of material support to stiffen and nourish them. Nevertheless, as the combined strength of the Western European Armies grows, our commitment to them relative to our increased total force, can be lessened. In determining our strategy for the future, this opens up whole new vistas. I believe that we should look forward to employing on a

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global scale the advantage that sea power gives to us in exercising the strategic initiative wherever it is advantageous for us to attack, whether it be by bombardment, by raid, by expeditions of limited scope with limited objectives, or by movement of massive forces which can invade and occupy strategic positions vital to an enemy in any further prosecution of the war.

Although I will not attempt to forecast the character and the nature of the strategy of the next war, I would venture several prognostications as to what it will not be. It will not be shaped for the purpose of employing any single weapon or any single weapons system. It will not be a single front war. On the contrary, I believe that it will be global in scope and that it will employ all the energy, skill and genius of the entire American people and the allies of the United States, that it will employ every resource of all three of our Services.

Now let us fall to and proceed with the work at hand! Let there be light without heat but let the chips fall where they may!



OFFICER STUDENTS OF THE U. S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE met in a Series of Discussions, the Global Strategy Discussions, at the Naval War College, Newport, R. I., 9-13 June 1952. Joining the Officers in a Scholarly Investigation of the Aims and Strategies of the United States and its Allies in the Event of Global War, were a Group of Prominent Civilians, Leading Flag and General Officers of the Armed Forces, other Senior Officers of the Services, and Navy and Marine Corps Reserve Officers. Shown in Committee Meeting are: L to R (Back to Camera). Capt R. L. MORRIS, USN; Cdr A. PRATT, USNR; Capt R. A. THEOBALD, Jr., USN; Lt Cdr N. C. WOODWARD, USN; LCol J. H. FRANKLIN, Jr., USMCR; Cdr C. W. FIELDER, USN; Cdr F. M. Lamkin (SC) USN; Bishop Granville G. BENNETT; Mr. Thomas H. KUCHEL; Cdr H. H. LARSEN, USN; Cdr C. E. KING, USN; and Vice Admiral J. J. BALLENTINE, USN.

AMERICAN OBJECTIVES

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

by

Dr. William L. Langer

Admiral Conolly, members and guests of the Naval War College; This institution has always been a center for the study of strategy and of the policies on which strategy must be based. One of its early Presidents, Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan, was recognized in his own day, as he is in ours, as among the most original, brilliant and stimulating thinkers of modern times. Mahan rested his doctrine on the teachings of history. He saw things in the large and therefore reviewed strategy in the broad setting of politics and economics. Furthermore, he was no cloistered student. For a quarter of a century he threw himself into the political fray as a publicist and teacher. It is altogether fitting, therefore, that in the present critical days the Naval War College should not only continue the broad studies of strategy and policy which he inaugurated, but should call in men from private life to join in its discussions and share in its problems. I am happy and I am honored to be asked to contribute, even in a limited way, to your deliberations. The subject of my address this morning is "American Objectives."

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AMERICAN OBJECTIVES

A lecture delivered
at the Naval War College
on 10 June 1962, by
Dr. William L. Langer

The United States Government has been frequently charged, particularly of late, with failure to determine, proclaim and pursue consistently its basic objectives. Eminent critics like George F. Kennan have denounced our inveterate habit of following what he calls the legalistics-moralistic line, that is, the habit of attaching ourselves to abstract moral principles, such as freedom and justice, and looking to the orderly processes of international law to protect our interests, and assure our security. Personally I agree that this approach to international problems, however laudable in itself, is apt to lead to misconceptions and result in disappointments. The time has passed when we could afford to delude ourselves with pious hopes, high-sounding shibboleths and sanctimonious protests. Faced by a major crisis it is urgently necessary that we get down to brass tacks, decide what it is that we should strive for, determine what our capabilities are for attaining our objectives, and lay concrete plans for their implementation. Without clear definition of objectives it is impossible to plan sound strategy, impossible to make and hold friends, impossible to impress potential enemies.

Parenthetically it may be remarked that our mechanisms for planning policy are still woefully inadequate. While, through the Central Intelligence Agency, provision has now been made for the effective coordination of all foreign intelligence and for the production of national intelligence estimates, there is as yet no analogous staff organization under the National Security Council for the long-range study of national objectives and policies. Neither is there adequate provision for consultation and coordinated action between the executive and legislative branches. If there were, it is incon-

ceivable that such dickering as we have recently seen over the Mutual Aid appropriations should take place. This reckless cutting and slicing, to the tune of hundreds of millions of dollars, to me reflects a disregard for careful factual study, and a lack of understanding of national aims that can only confuse the country and shake the confidence of the world at large.

Let it be said, at once, however, that the definition of positive national objectives is no easy matter. In an age of increasing tempo, of shrinking space and of terrifying complexity it becomes, indeed, exceedingly difficult.

Reduced to the simplest terms, the basic objectives of any nation must be the preservation of its society and its territory against disintegration from within and against assault from without. These objectives, in turn, presuppose adequate resources and a sound social and political structure on the one hand, and adequate military power for defense in any emergency on the other.

It is unlikely that any nation will ever have the means to assure itself of absolute security. However, for a brief spell in the later 19th century, our own country approximated that happy state. Having severed the ties that bound it to Europe, and having overcome a domestic crisis of the most serious character, the United States was left undisturbed to develop its social and political system, to open up and exploit the vast resources of a continent and in general to build up wealth and power far beyond that attained by any other nation in history. Secure behind the barrier of the oceans on the east and west, flanked by thinly populated and generally undeveloped countries on the north and south, the United States could afford isolation and could hold itself aloof from the problems that plagued most other peoples of the globe.

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Seen in the larger historical perspective this period was, however, but a brief interlude. In the context of the present world crisis it is worth recalling that in the beginning of our history the fathers of the then weak and infant republic were also confronted with an ideological menace. They were all too painfully aware of the strength of the feudalistic, monarchical, undemocratic system of Europe. Because they feared reconquest by the old order against which they had rebelled, they made themselves experts in international politics and diplomacy. They bent their every effort toward playing off one power against another. In view of British seapower they did not regard even the broad Atlantic as an adequate protective barrier. What, after all, was the purpose of the Monroe Doctrine if not to extend the defense lines of the nation by thousands of miles and in principle at least to seal off the entire hemisphere against the renewed intrusion of a social and political system that was regarded as unalterably hostile to the ideals and objectives of the New World?

The threat that confronts us today is not dissimilar, though it is more immediate, because the number of genuinely great powers has been reduced to two and because the distances between them have been greatly narrowed by the improvements in communication. True, the threat now comes from the left rather than from the right; it is revolutionary and subversive rather than conservative and reactionary. But this appears to have made the antagonism all the more bitter and irreconcilable. It would indeed be difficult to exaggerate the depth of the gulf dividing American democracy and Soviet Communism, or to overplay the menace of Communism to American institutions and national security. Soviet leaders have been taught by Marx and Lenin to speculate on the collapse of the system of free enterprise, but in the interval to do everything possible to undermine and weaken it. Through the

brutality of their dictatorship they have been able to harness the power of a vast territory and a huge and rapidly growing population for the realization of their purpose, which is avowedly to make the whole world safe for Communism. Finally, through the ruthless exploitation of want and discontent throughout the world they have already subverted many neighboring governments and have expanded the circle of their power over European satellites and over the vast territory and population of China.

Returning to the question of American objectives it is clear that first and foremost this country must look to its defenses. We do not have and should not have any aspirations towards territorial expansion. The imperialist aberration of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century was never really popular among us and soon proved disappointing. The empires of the European powers have disintegrated and are in the process of liquidation. The idea of empire is dead and no one in this country, so far as I know, believes that the security of the United States can be strengthened by direct control of foreign peoples. The posture of the United States is, therefore, a defensive one. Directly threatened by a powerful state and a hostile ideology, it must rededicate itself to democracy and apply itself with renewed vigor to the solution of social, economic, racial, religious and kindred problems that tend to weaken and divide it, that create the climate for Communist agitation and subversion. To pursue this phase of the problem through all its ramifications would distract us from the issues with which this group is chiefly concerned. Besides, these are issues with which every thoughtful American is painfully familiar. It is sufficient, therefore, to remind this audience that historically speaking social and political systems that fail to provide a reasonably satisfactory mode and standard of living for the population are bound to be supplanted by other systems. The much

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vaunted "new order" may in our day be of the Fascist or the Communist variety. We as democrats may be convinced that, in terms of freedom and respect for individual rights, both varieties are the negation of freedom and progress. Nonetheless, they hold the promise of novelty, always a potent appeal to desperate men.

In terms of military power it is inconceivable that for the foreseeable future the United States can escape the burden of conscription and of heavy expenditure for defense. Obligatory military service, in addition to its cost in terms of labor power, is by its very nature distasteful to a free and individualistic people. The appropriation of a substantial part of the national income to unproductive and quickly outmoded military equipment is equally objectionable. No doubt the late President Roosevelt was right in holding that sane international relations are possible only if based on drastic disarmament all around. But there is, at the present, no even remote possibility of reaching agreement with the Soviet Union on such a program. The Kremlin retained a huge military establishment when, in 1946, the West hastily liquidated the great armies that might have served as a deterrent to Soviet expansion.

The facts are familiar to all: for a period of five years all Western Europe lay defenseless before Soviet Power. If in fact the Kremlin did not press its gains beyond Czechoslovakia it was certainly not for lack of divisions, planes and other equipment. It may have been from fear of taking over so large and so recalcitrant an area. More likely it was from fear of atomic retaliation on the part of the United States. Reluctant though I am to accept a simple explanation, I find it increasingly difficult to reject Mr. Churchill's view that the atomic bomb was in fact the decisive deterrent. But America's atomic superiority is no longer unchal-

lenged. The race for atomic power is already on. The Communists undoubtedly have a bomb and there is at least a strong probability that they have already built up a stockpile sufficiently large to enable them to wreak havoc on American cities and seriously, if not critically, impair the war making potential of the United States. It is impossible to speak with any assurance on these matters, but the very depth of our uncertainty dictates a supreme effort on our part. Since the Soviet Union has steadfastly refused to accept such control of atomic production as we regard necessary, we have no choice but to live with the threat and counter it to the best of our ability.

This country is as yet far from a state of preparedness even for self defense. The value of the atomic bomb as a deterrent has been reduced by the Soviet's presumed capability for retaliation. Under present circumstances it is all but impossible to foresee any alternative to large-scale rearmament and to redoubled efforts to devise ever more effective and consequently more terrible weapons. This is a dismal conclusion to arrive at, for it would seem that other methods than those of the jungle could be discovered for settling issues among nations. Yet given the apparently irreconcilable conflict between West and East no one, to my knowledge, has been able to produce any other solution. With two antagonists acting on incompatible principles and not even speaking the same language of international relations, I see no alternative to armament and more armament, at all cost short of national ruin.

Even among those who fully recognize the threat of Communist power to the security of the United States there have long been two schools of thought. Some hold that, with resources which are after all limited, the United States would do best to con-

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centrate on strictly national or at least on hemisphere defense. There is no prospect, they argue, that determined Soviet aggression in Europe or Asia can be contained. We are therefore in danger of having our capabilities drained by futile efforts to strengthen others or by hopeless attempts to check our opponent in far-off places where no decision is possible.

The other school, of course, insists that if eventually one has to fight, it is better to engage the enemy as far away as possible from one's own frontiers. This is the principle on which the system of hemisphere solidarity is based. It is the system which proved itself in both recent wars. For my own part, I believe it the only sound strategy. Indeed, when I hear people debating whether we should devote so and so much money and equipment to the defense of others, I am always tempted to say that the real issue is not whether we should support others, but whether we can, at whatever price, induce others to stand by us. For it cannot be a matter of indifference to us whether the Soviet Union overruns, subverts or in any way establishes control over all Eurasia. Perhaps other nations of the West do not like us. Perhaps they are apathetic and listless. Perhaps they would put up a miserable fight against Soviet aggression. Nonetheless, we need them. Actually we cannot expect them to fight for love of us, but only in their own cause, in their own interest. In any case, the essential issue for the United States is that they should provide us facilities, support our position, and resist as long as possible.

Quite aside from any positive contribution which Western Europe might make in an armed conflict with the Soviet Union, we have the greatest interest in denying that area to the enemy. The loss of China to the Communists has been a calamity. How much more so would be the loss of Western Europe! For the re-

sulting accretions to the Kremlin in terms of manpower, skills, resources, facilities and equipment would be such as to make it impossible for the United States to check Communist inundation of the Middle East and Africa, and probably even to protect the Western Hemisphere from subversion and conquest. The military strength of the South American nations is so limited that that continent could hardly be defended against a major hostile power in control of West Africa. In the light of these facts it appears that our agreements with the other American Republics involve grave liabilities unless supplemented by provisions for the utmost possible defense of Western Europe.

The foregoing considerations suggest that it is incumbent upon us to rally as many of the free nations as possible to our side and to give them all available support, economic and military, to strengthen their powers of resistance. In the most generalized terms this policy dictates adherence to and support of the United contribution not only to the peaceful solution of international differences but also to the frustration of aggression. The high cost in men and treasure of the Korean intervention and the disheartening deadlock that has ensued must not be permitted to blind us to the epoch-making importance of prompt international action in this instance. Failure to act would undoubtedly have entailed the complete collapse of international organization and a total loss of confidence in the purposes of the United States and other leading nations of the free world. Whatever the solution of the current stalemate, the fact remains that the Communist assault on South Korea was frustrated and that its immediate effect has been to dispel whatever doubts may have remained as to Communist aims and tactics. As a result of Korea the United States, and the West generally, are today in a state of military preparedness far beyond what would otherwise have been possible, and it is

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not unreasonable to suppose that further aggressions, as on Taiwan or Indo-China in the east, or on Iran or Yugoslavia, have been forestalled. The Korean action has certainly involved us in a remote and difficult theater. It holds the danger of too great commitment in what is strategically a secondary area. But our opponents can hardly be expected to act in accordance with our interests. On the contrary, we can probably count on them always to strike where it is most difficult for us to react effectively.

With respect to Europe the United States is now fully obligated by the terms of the North Atlantic Treaty and by the commitments inherent in the recent contractual agreement with the West German Republic and the European Defense Community, to support the free nations of the Old World in the event of attack.

The numerous agreements concluded between West European powers in recent years, supplemented by the creation of the Council of Europe and the mechanism of the Schuman Plan and the European Defense Community, have brought these nations more closely together than they have been since the decay of the Holy Roman Empire. Indeed, federation is now frankly envisaged as the ultimate solution of Europe's economic and military weakness. It is quite conceivable that eventually the United States might find a united Europe a formidable economic competitor and politically a somewhat obstreperous colleague. Nonetheless, I believe it important if not essential to build up this additional power center, to consolidate the European powers as at least a partial counterweight to the Soviet Union. Individually none of these countries can offer effective resistance to Communism. United they can certainly do much to redress the balance.

With American aid, advice and leadership something of a miracle has already been achieved in the line of economic reconstruction through the Marshall Plan, and it would be a mistake to underrate the progress that has been made in the direction of building military strength. Possibly the original schedules for rearmament, hastily drawn, were too sanguine. The effort to even approximate them has led to grave financial difficulties, discouragement and even unrest. On the other hand, there is good reason to suppose that as the defensive posture of Western Europe becomes stronger, the hopelessness and despair that has characterized the popular attitude in some countries and has facilitated the spread of Communism, will give way to a new confidence. The great danger, as I see it, is that we ourselves may become impatient and disillusioned. The recent Congressional debates on the Mutual Security appropriations seem to highlight this danger. As aforesaid, I take this attitude of impatient criticism to rest on the mistaken notion that American aid is a matter of generosity, if not charity, and that Europe alone is on the receiving end. Actually the vital issue is to hold Western Europe in line, in our own as well as in the interest of others. This is no easy matter, for Western Europe will for several years at least remain relatively indefensible unless the development of new weapons upsets present military calculations. Europeans know this and many of them are still prone to despair. While being no expert on national economics, I would judge that this country could afford up to ten billion dollars a year in foreign aid. In terms of the cost of our own defense preparations, and even more in terms of the cost of a great war the investment of such a sum to reinforce our own overseas defense lines would not appear unreasonable or exorbitant.

The question of European defense has raised such subsidiary questions as the rearmament of Western Germany, the exten-

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sion of aid to Franco Spain in return for base facilities in that country, and the provision of economic and military support to Communist Yugoslavia. Considering the nature of the emergency under which we live, all these policies can be defended as a matter of expediency. The case of Germany is in itself relatively simple, for it involves no ideological conflict and requires only the establishment of adequate safeguards against the abuse of renascent German military power. By contrast the idea of cooperation with Fascist Spain and Communist Yugoslavia is abhorrent to many Americans, for such collaboration seems a betrayal of the democratic cause. This argument is difficult to answer convincingly, but it is worth recalling that the records of history, even of recent history, are full of examples of such relationships, entered upon when national interests seemed to require them. In the present case it should be remembered that prior to the time of Woodrow Wilson our relations with other states were determined without reference to their internal regimes. We have happily outgrown the rather naive idea that the democratic system is the only desirable and suitable one, whatever the conditions and the circumstances. If we are to be purists and deny our friendship and support to all nations following a course other than our own, we shall soon find ourselves in self-imposed isolation, since almost all foreign regimes are to varying degrees socialistic or undemocratic. Actually there is reason to suppose that extremist regimes like those of Spain and Yugoslavia may see the errors of their ways more readily in cooperation with freer systems than while in a state of ostracism. Meanwhile both Spain and Yugoslavia are strategically of such importance to the defense of Western Europe and are of themselves so little a threat, actually or potentially, to American interests, that we can ill afford to renounce the aid they may provide.

However deficient may be the power of Western Europe, that area is a pillar of strength compared to North Africa, the Middle East and South Asia, the soft underbelly of Eurasia. The countries comprising that huge belt are almost without exception in a state of ferment. The opening up of these areas by European imperialism has brought in its train the introduction of European ideas, such as nationalism and self-determination, which have made the continuance of the imperial relationship impossible. European influence and the impact of great wars have made these colonial peoples conscious and resentful of want and oppression which their forefathers suffered for generations as a matter of course. Almost everywhere in these regions the social system is antiquated and the old agrarian structure is being shaken by the impact of modern industrialism. In many instances the traditional ruling classes are maintaining their privileged position despite the facade of democracy which has been erected. Invariably they exploit national feeling to throw off the shackles of European control or, where they have already achieved that objective, to divert popular attention from social problems.

Bad enough in itself, this situation provides an ideal setting for Communist activity, for the Kremlin has long shown itself expert in directing and exploiting the forces of discontent. Supposedly internationalist, according to the gospel of Marx, Soviet leaders have found no difficulty in championing the cause of nationalism where it serves their purposes. Their promises of a popular democratic regime, of expropriation of the upper classes, or of economic equality are so familiar as to require no elaboration. I do not say that the disorders in Morocco and Tunisia, the crisis in Anglo-Egyptian relations, the chaos in Iran, or the unrest seizing all of South Asia are the achievements solely of Soviet propaganda and subversion. I do say that they threaten the loss of parts or all of

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this important area to the West. No one can deny that relationships of these countries with the West have already seriously deteriorated.

What, in this context, should be the United States objective? Obviously to hold this area if possible, if only to deny it to the enemy. But how? If we support the dominant groups in these countries against their European masters, for example France, we definitely run the risk of estranging countries vital to the defense of Europe. Furthermore, if we countenance the existing regimes in their often benighted domestic policies we will sooner or later find ourselves in opposition to emerging popular forces. The problem in each case is a complex and difficult one, for which a general solution is not apt to be found. It would appear, however, that little is to be gained simply by adroit maneuvering. We have already made clear to the European powers that we consider imperial rule done for and that we welcome the liquidation of overseas empires. Beyond that we must look to fundamentals and do what we can to remove or alleviate the basic ills from which this part of the world is suffering and which tend to accentuate the unbalance in the world's forces. No doubt the Point IV program is an important initial step in this direction. Over the years it may prove crucial and turn out to have been the most worthwhile investment of all. It certainly is a potential demonstration of democracy in action. By reducing misery it opens the prospect of effectively countering Communism, of paving the way for reform and modernization of the social and political systems of undeveloped areas. In short it promises a vast return on a relatively modest investment, as witness the results of agricultural instruction, in India for example, by a mere handful of experts.

Furthermore, the work of education, health and technical aid introduces a positive element into American policy. The objec-

tives of the United States cannot be purely defensive or static. As John Foster Dulles has rightly said, if we merely hold our own in Asia our position in a few years will be hopeless. Communism being dynamic and aggressive, fired with the conviction of eventual triumph, it can only be fought successfully by a positive and constructive program. Publicity and information are important as weapons of refutation and instruments of truth. But they must be supplemented with the promise of improved living conditions and increased freedom. The unbalance in the world today, in terms of standards of living, population pressures, essential resources and industrial capabilities, are such that unless we can manage to raise the level of the lowly we are sure to be forced to reduce our own.

There is at present no prospect that the burdens entailed by the objectives of the United States can soon be lightened — that is, that the threat confronting our security and culture can soon be surmounted. On the other hand, progress has undeniably been made and it is not impossible, indeed it is likely, that growing strength will check the progressive implementation of the Soviet program. Since the seizure of Czechoslovakia in 1948 there has been no further aggression in Europe. On the contrary, Yugoslavia has been lost to the Kremlin. In the Middle East the Soviets have thus far failed to make capital of the unrest and tension, even in Iran. India seems to be veering steadily towards the West and in Southeast Asia the Communist cause has made no significant progress. With the Communist victory in China the Kremlin appears to have had relatively little to do, and one may assume that the emergence of the new regime in China has its dark as well as its bright sides for the Soviets. The Korean adventure has at least been frustrated, while the peace treaty with Japan has been put through despite Soviet opposition and protest. It may be taken for granted that even in the European satellites the Kremlin still has

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many problems to solve. In the Soviet homeland itself, there may be more latent dissatisfaction and hostility to the regime than we realize. Believing as we do, in the dignity of the individual and the virtues of democracy grounded in law, we cannot accept the idea that the brutality and oppression of totalitarian regimes can last forever. Mr. Kennan, who knows infinitely more about these matters than I, has noted that there are limits beyond which peoples cannot be driven. He believes in the possibility, indeed in the strong possibility, that Soviet power, like the capitalist world of its conception, bears within it the seeds of its own decay and that the sprouting of these seeds is already well advanced. Certainly the increasingly severe controls in Communist states would seem to reflect a growing need for such controls.

Consequently there is nothing implausible in the idea that Stalin and his confreres will try to avoid major armed conflict in the future as they have in the past, if only to safeguard their own dictatorship. There is nothing in their doctrine to suggest a timetable for achievement of their objectives. In the past they have shown themselves patient and flexible. They will, unquestionably, exploit, as it arises, any situation that promises success. Indeed, much of their effort is devoted to creation of such situations. We must expect them to move here, there and any where — to keep us on the run. But we may also expect them to avoid the ultimate test, at least so long as we retain certain elements of strength and can rally the support of the free world. The men of the Kremlin, unlike Hitler, have not shown themselves to be gamblers. There is reason to suppose that they hope and expect to attain their objectives without involving the Soviet Union in major armed conflict and that they would retreat rather than embark on a war in which the chances of success were uncertain. There remains a constant and grave danger that through miscalculation or through a tragic mis-

take on either side, a general war may develop. But barring such a contingency we may expect peace — a peace, however, that will long remain precarious, an armed peace maintained under pressure and in the midst of unbroken tension.

There are those who argue that in this situation, the United States might be well advised to strike while it still has the presumed superiority in atomic weapons, that is, that it should loose a preventative war. The argument is so logical as to be disturbing. Remember, however, that historically, preventive wars have rarely served their purposes, and remember, above all, that modern wars are so destructive that they harm the victor almost as much as the vanquished. The ruin and misery attending a war with the Soviet Union might well prepare the ground for the spread of the very social revolution we are intent on combatting.

Certainly it would be reckless to launch a preventive war and thereby lose the moral support of the free world so long as there is a reasonable chance of attaining our objectives by other means. On the theory that the Communist system cannot last forever, that power to resist will check its further spread, and that gradual improvement of conditions throughout the world will sap its appeal, it would seem to be the part of wisdom to learn patience and perseverance. Quite conceivably the situation may develop to the point where certain issues can be adjusted by agreement, even if but partially and temporarily. Such opportunities we should always seize and exploit, for even though they may not strike at the root of the matter, they may provide further time, and time has frequently proved the most effective solvent of apparently irreconcilable differences.

In any event, the main thought I should like to leave with you is that in this great crisis, in this great clash of ideas and cultures,

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American objectives cannot and should not be selfish, narrow or purely defensive: As human society is constructed today, we cannot hope to attain security for ourselves alone. Our fate is bound up with that of the entire free world. Consequently our interests, our objectives and our obligations strike across meridians of longitude and parallels of latitude. They extend as far as our influence can reach. As the greatest world power in the annals of history tremendous responsibilities and burdens have thrust upon us. Our objectives must be to discharge the obligations assigned to us by circumstances and events. Anything less holds promise only of disaster and defeat. On the other hand we have every reason to suppose that clarity of purpose, unity and resolution in action, and faith in the rightness of our cause will eventually lead us, even without war, to triumph over the dangers that presently beset us.

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF LECTURER

Dr. Langer was born at Boston, Mass., March 16, 1896. He was educated at Boston Latin School and Harvard University (A. B. 1915; A. M. 1920; Ph.D. 1923). He studied at the University of Vienna (1921-1922). He was Assistant and Associate Professor of History, Clary University, 1923-1927; Professor History at Harvard University, 1927 - present (Coolidge Professor since 1936); Specialist in diplomatic history; Author of **THE FRANCO-RUSSIAN ALLIANCE** (1929); **EUROPEAN ALLIANCES AND ALIGNMENTS** (1931 and 1950); **FOREIGN AFFAIRS BIBLIOGRAPHY** (1938); **THE DIPLOMACY OF IMPERIALISM** (1935 and 1951); **AN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF WORLD HISTORY** (1940 and later editions); **OUR VICHY GAMBLE** (1947); and, with S.E. Gleason, **THE CHALLENGE TO ISOLATION** (1952); Editor of the series **THE RISE OF MODERN EUROPE**, of which twelve out of twenty volumes have been published; member of numerous historical societies and of the American Philosophical Society; and member of the Metropolitan Club (Washington) and the Century (New York).

During World War I, he enlisted as a private in the 30th Engineers (later First Gas Regiment) and saw service at St. Mihiel and the Argonne. He was honorably discharged in the grade of Master Engineer, Junior Grade.

During World War II, he went to Washington in August 1941 to help General William J. Donovan set up the Office of the Coordinator of Information. He was Director of Research in that organization and later Chief of the Research and Analysis Branch of the Office of Strategic Services (1942-1945). In 1946 he served as Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Intelligence. He was awarded the Medal for Merit (1946) and an honorary LLD from Harvard (1945). From 1946 to 1951, he served as a member of the Board of Consultants of the National War College.

He returned to Washington at the request of General Walter B. Smith to set up and direct the Office of National Estimates of the Central Intelligence in January 1952 to resume teaching at Harvard.



THE PRESIDENT OF BROWN UNIVERSITY, Dr. Henry M. WRISTON, Addresses Participants in the Global Strategy Discussions, U. S. Naval War College, Newport, R. I. The Discussions, a Forum Series Investigating Facts and Factors Designed to Assist each Individual to Become Aware of the Problems Involved in Directing the Energies of our Nation in Time of Extreme National Peril, took place at the Naval War College 9-13 June 1952. Dr. WRISTON was one of the Principal Speakers before this Distinguished Assemblage.

BASIC FACTORS INFLUENCING OUR STRATEGY

A lecture delivered
at the Naval War College
on 11 June 1952, by
Dr. Henry M. Wriston

Basic strategy must be determined by a perpetual remembrance that the world is round. Like most other important observations this may be considered obvious, but its realization in the abstract and its application in the concrete are two different things. One has only to observe political behavior over the years to appreciate the fact that there is a sharp difference between those two points of view—the abstract and the concrete. Many who say it is round do not act as though it were.

If anything were needed to teach us that lesson, Korea would demonstrate it. Though it was explicitly left outside our defensive perimeter, once aggression started, we made a very heavy commitment after only a few hours of consideration. Despite the absence of a smashing victory and in the presence of a virtual stalemate, no presidential candidate has suggested we should pull out. That is a very persuasive index of public support of the decision, even though the war is far from "popular."

We are also well aware that the French effort in Indo-China is essential to the containment of aggression. What General Bradley has called "war by satellite" has done much to make clear the idea that all points are vital, and that security in one region cannot be bought by neglect of another. We must ever bear in mind Stalin's aphorism to the effect that the road to victory in the West is through Asia. Clearly that does not mean that we should concentrate on countering aggression in Asia alone; it does mean we cannot neglect Asia (Far, Middle, or Near), nor yet Africa or Latin America, if Europe—and ourselves—are to be saved.

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The second basic principle is that change is the rule in international relations. The essential reality of diplomatic history is the fluidity of coalitions; shifts from one side to another are often rapid and decisive. "A sharp observer has commented that one of the charms of power politics is that no one has time to become tired of his friends." The history of international relations is full of victorious allies who fell upon each other after the moment of victory. Our own times have manifested this: from the war-time alliance with Russia in the first World War, to our support of the White Russians and the invasion of Russian territory and the *cordon sanitaire*, through to the admission of Russia into the League of Nations and a period of collaboration, the decision of Russia to ally with Hitler and the reversal by which it allied with the enemies of Hitler, and now becomes our potential enemy. All this should be fresh in our minds; it is less extraordinary than one might suppose.

The behavior of Italy toward the Triple Alliance as the first World War of the 20th century developed provides a further illustration. It came to the Paris peace conference as a victor and one of the Big Four, but after disillusionment it turned to Fascism and to a new alliance with Germany. Following its defeat as an enemy in the second World War, it became first a collaborator, now an ally.

The position of Vichy France and of French North Africa after the collapse of May and June 1940 is another example. China before and after the triumph of Mao and the collapse of the Nationalist power on the mainland is still another. There is the change from the Morgenthau Plan for Germany to the Bonn contractual agreement. We could also list the position of Japan: its relatively long alliance with Britain, one of our associates in the first World War, and then the reversal to become one of our

enemies (some think our principal enemy), its surrender on the deck of the Missouri, and now again its restoration under our leadership to the family of nations with a status of semi-alliance. Tito was lately an implacable enemy shooting down our planes. Now he is an active collaborator in some phases, but still cannot come to an agreement with Italy over Trieste.

These are all illustrations that change is the order of the day. The idea that there will be no more such dramatic shifts is illusory. Consider what would happen if the Communists were to win an election in Italy or if deGaulle were to take over France or if extreme nationalists were to master Western Germany or if there was another break in the Soviet controlled area by which a satellite left the Russian orbit.

We must not think that the United States is unique and has escaped this changeability. In the effort to stay clear of the wars that dogged Europe after the French Revolution we succeeded in fighting both sides. Our long habit of regarding Britain as the enemy disappeared with the diplomatic revolution at the end of the 19th century. Even so, we were not ready to accept the obvious conclusion and, when World War broke out in 1914, Wilson urged us to be neutral in thought and word as well as deed. In the effort at neutrality we developed dangerous tensions with Britain, from the consequences of which we were both saved by the colossal errors of the German government.

Still unwilling to accept the clear inferences to be drawn, we became an "associated power" rather than an ally. After taking the lead in establishing the League of Nations, we eschewed it. In 1939 we again attempted neutrality, and only after a direct assault upon us did we become allies in word as well as deed.

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Perhaps it is in remembrance of this record, of which we are often blissfully unconscious, that present allies so often show nervousness as to the stability of our policy. I would not have it thought for a moment that United States policy is in any degree more unstable than that of other nations. It must be clear, however, that we should not look upon others with lofty scorn, neglecting to recall our own record of change.

Moreover, it is essential to emphasize the fact that dictatorships are neither more constant in political orientation nor more successful in diplomatic strategy than other forms of government. In order to make the point it is necessary only to think of the marriage of convenience between Hitler and Stalin just before the opening of the second World War of the 20th century; and then of Stalin's reversal after Hitler's reversal. We have also the illustration of Tito. One could go on indefinitely showing that the tendency to reverse alliances, the rule of change, is just as applicable to dictatorships as to democracies. We have, therefore, no reason to regard this tendency in international relations as attached to any particular form of government.

These and dozens of other less conspicuous evidences of the essential fluidity of politics under every form of government from democracy through totalitarianism must be constantly borne in mind. Our security can be menaced by a mental fixation which regards the whole of the Communist world as a closely and rigidly controlled Moscow axis. This mistaken concept can keep us from making the constant adjustment which is essential if peace is to be preserved, and is even more essential if we are to have allies should war come.

Obsessive thinking is rigid and leads to false assumptions. In every approach we should maintain the highest degree of

flexibility of mind. Such a phrase as the Iron Curtain is useful up to a point, but then it becomes something of a shutter over our own eyes. If you hold a penny close enough to your eye, it will blot out the world—a copper curtain. Back of the so-called Iron Curtain are fault lines; there are tensions and strains within the Soviet hegemony which can be exploited and should be exploited.

It is said that within Russia itself there are 20 million prisoners in forced labor camps. That is to say, according to John Foster Dulles, there are at least twice as many prisoners at forced labor as there are members of the Communist party within the Soviet. There could be no clearer evidence of tension and strain.

Incorporated within the U. S. S. R. are many peoples—Lithuanians, Estonians, Latvians, Ukrainians, Byelorussians, and many others. Despite intense efforts at consolidation there remain cultural, religious, and political traditions which are greatly prized. Police action can to some extent suppress their manifestation, but it cannot destroy folk memory—or hope. So long as tradition and hope survive there is potential instability.

Moreover, there is constant resort to purges in satellite countries: in Bulgaria, in Czechoslovakia, and most recently in Romania with the purge of Ana Pauker. That last episode was typical of what has happened in one satellite after another. Even discounting the validity of the charges made in any specific case, it is perfectly clear that the forces of nationalism within the satellites are extremely powerful. Though their manifestations may be suppressed by purges and by the dominance of the secret police, beneath the surface there runs a very deep and powerful current.

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Furthermore, in every dictatorship the struggle for power is perpetual, as well as intense. Since it cannot be waged upon the urbane level of bitter word and bland ballots, it must be carried forward by the desperate methods of political assassination, even though that action sometimes follows legal forms. None of this discounts the fact of Russian hegemony, but we make a mistake when we help consolidate that hegemony by assuming it to be more complete, more successful, and more stable than it really is. To fail to widen the rifts by neglecting to take advantage of tensions is a major error of judgement.

It should be clear that the right attitude of mind towards its problems is an important foundation for American strategy. This involves among other things, and fundamentally, the avoidance of a mind set which establishes a specific power group as the solid, and perpetual, enemy. Overconcentration upon one situation distorts perspective on others and destroys flexibility in dealing with the principal problem.

The dangers of mental fixation are becoming rather painfully clear in our relationship with our allies. Queen Juliana on her recent visit spoke with a voice of calm sanity when she said that the world cannot be dominated by nervous wrecks. She said with a good deal of bluntness, which was made more palatable by her personality, that the United States in its overconcentration upon the Russian menace was pressing Europe too hard and forcing the pace to such a degree that our allies are often irritated. The clear inference that we were building up emotional resistance which we would be well advised to soften by more alert sensitiveness to the views of other nations.

Queen Juliana was only the latest, and perhaps the most tactful, person to call these things to our attention. You will re-

member that a little over a year ago Canada's Minister for External Affairs, Lester B. Pearson, expressed the irritation of our nearest neighbor and our most constant international companion when he said: "The days of relatively easy and automatic political relations with our neighbor are, I think, over." "We are not willing to be merely an echo.....The only time the American people seem to be aware of our existence.....is when we do something they do not like." And he went on to say that Canada has "more outstanding problems with the United States this year than in any year of our history."

As evidence that this was not a passing show of irritation we have the recent official protest against the use of a detachment of Canadian troops at Koje, separated from the Canadian command. This should be a reminder of our own attitude at an earlier time when the French tried to incorporate some of General Pershing's troops into the general command without giving our commanding officer adequate control.

Earlier this year the Foreign Minister of Brazil made a complaint similar to that of our northern neighbor. He asserted that the United States could no longer take the support of the Brazilian people for granted and urged that Brazil be treated as an equal if her assistance was really desired. The irritability of Britain and France are too well known to require extended comment.

None of these instances leads to the conclusion that we need lose momentum merely by being considerate of the views and feelings of other nations. On the contrary, more alert regard for the sensitivities of our allies and friends may well strengthen our position vis-a-vis our potential enemy.

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It would be disastrous if the view that we are pursuing a national vendetta against Russia were to gain ground. The existence of that suspicion is indubitable; it should be allayed. In this connection it is well to remember one sacrifice we are pressing on our Western European allies which we are unwilling to share. Only in Europe are negotiations proceeding that restrict sovereign rights over vital economic resources and over military forces. That is a severe emotional wrench which must be treated with patience and sympathy, whereas some roving congressmen have shown neither. We must not ask sacrifices of other nations which would prevent their governments from remaining in office.

Tact, however, need not reduce energy in the pursuit of agreed programs. Because international relations exhibit constant change, we must pursue policies which are dynamic. Mere hesitation or stopping will not prevent change; even if we were to remain static, others would continue to move. Since change will be forced upon us, it is better to retain the initiative.

We have to base our plans for Europe on a series of assumptions, but remember that all are subject to alteration. One assumption is that the contract of settlement with Germany will be approved by the several parliaments and will go into full effect. Another is that the European army will be realized, that Germany will supply its share of the troops who will remain subject to the unified command. These hazardous assumptions must be made in the hope and for the purpose of creating such a formidable barrier that Russia will not precipitate a war.

We also have to take into account that war by satellite might precipitate a German civil war of far greater magnitude than the Korean war. Otto Grotewahl, the premier of East Germany, has plainly hinted that, if the contract of settlement is

signed and goes into effect, Germany will become another Korea. He has spoken openly of civil war and there are many evidences that the rearming of the East has been stepped up since it became clear that Russia's offer of union neutrality, and the right to have its own armies was not going to prevent the signature of the contract.

Another possibility is that Schumacher and his associates may defeat the contract in Germany or that it may be defeated in the parliaments of some of the other nations involved. Under such circumstances the army would never be organized upon the contemplated basis. That would leave us with an expenditure of vast sums of money and very great commitments without the gains in security which our present plans contemplate.

On the other side of the world we have to rely upon Japan in the light of our commitments under the San Francisco treaty. But if bad faith develops or nationalism sweeps the country or economic pressure leads to a reapproachment with Red China, we must be prepared for those eventualities.

One other observation is required to conclude this section of the argument. The changes I have been discussing are often functions of a dynamic balance. Sometimes they are essential to the maintenance of such a balance. Sometimes they are only thought to be, and are the result of miscalculation of the forces involved. Sometimes an imperialist urge sets change in motion to destroy the balance—that is our present estimate of the Russian design. In so far as change is an effort to restore balance it does not involve new national objectives, but only new means of attaining them.

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The third absolutely fundamental factor influencing our strategy is seldom, if ever, referred to: it is ideological consistency. It has become fashionable to say that democracy has no ideology, that the contrast between democracy and communism in this respect is absolute. Nothing could be further from the truth. In the formal sense of not having a party line, deviation from which is tantamount to political suicide, there is some color of truth in the remark. Substantively, however, democracy has an ideology as explicit and dominant as anything in the Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist dialectic.

The Declaration of Independence asserted that "all men are created equal." That is not a vague phrase, although it is easy to mock it and make it seem absurd by pointing out that men are not equal in stature, equal in strength, equal in abilities. What is meant is made clear by the next phrase: namely, "that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and pursuit of Happiness."

The word "Life" is important. We are so accustomed to taking man's right to life for granted that it is hard to realize in how many places in the world the right to life is not regarded seriously. We are willing to take a man's life only when he is a menace to the lives of others. Many states do not permit capital punishment even under those circumstances. Communists take a man's life for deviationism, which can mean anything and the evidence for which can be manufactured. In Maoist China man's right to life is not recognized. Mass executions are staged for the apparent purpose of terrorizing people into subjection. Justice has no relevancy to the proceedings.

The second word "Liberty" is in one sense an even more vital concept. It represents an antithesis of Soviet ideology so

fundamental that it is the nearest justification to be found for the division of the world into two spheres. "Liberty" means explicitly that each man may establish his own standards of value, his own strategy of living; he can set his own pattern so long as it does not impair the rights of others to establish theirs. It guarantees fluidity in society; a man's position is determined by his own effort, his own capacity, his own personality, and by nothing else whatever. In the communist ideology none of those things is acceptable; its society does indeed attain a sort of fluidity, for neither Stalin nor any of his politburo associates came to power by reason of birth or rank or privilege. It is, however, fluidity only within rigidly designed channels established by the party; it is not the fluidity that comes from the self-directed self-choices of free men.

The American ideal represents so sharp a contrast with what had previously existed that an acute observer well remarked that the Declaration of Independence "blew Europe off its moral base." If the document was correct in calling liberty a god-given endowment, it cannot be limited, in its validity, to Americans. Lincoln, as usual, summed up the fundamental idea when he asserted that the Declaration involved "liberty" not alone to the people of this country, but hope to all the world, for all future time."

That ideology shaped our history. It is that which made this a land of opportunity for the oppressed for more than a century. It is that which made the United States a revolutionary force and the opponent of tyranny. Under its impulse we were consistently the first to recognize revolutionary governments. Every opportunity was exploited to encourage liberal and nationalist revolutionaries. American agents were active in promoting revolution in South America; others eagerly watched the revolu-

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tions of 1848 in Europe; indeed, one went so far as to draft a constitution for a confederation of German states.

When the Austrian charge d'affaires protested secret instructions for a mission to revolutionary Hungary, Daniel Webster replied: "Certainly, the United States may be pardoned, even by those who profess adherence to the principles of absolute government, if they entertain an ardent affection for those popular forms of political organization which have so rapidly advanced their own prosperity and happiness, and enabled them . . . to bring their country . . . to the notice and respectful regard, not to say admiration, of the civilized world." It was that same spirit which made Woodrow Wilson become the hero of Europe at the close of the first world war of this century. It was that which led to his declaration, "The world must be made safe for democracy."

Wendell Wilkie spoke of this tradition as having provided a vast "reservoir of good will." It was to this tradition also that General Eisenhower referred when, in the course of his farewell visits to the NATO nations, he described our spiritual strength as vital, together with our economic and military resources. In London, on May 16, he said: "We are going to preserve peace only if we give great attention to three factors. The first and most important is the spiritual strength of our people. How much do we prize peace and freedom and security? How much are we prepared to pay for it in terms of individual sacrifices?"

I have lingered on this theme because it is absolutely fundamental. It is necessary to point out that we cannot impose freedom on people who do not value it. We tried it in parts of Latin America—specifically Cuba. It is an exportable commodity only to places where there is an active market, either natural or stimulated, for it. We are committed by our history to the

promotion of human liberty in every place where it is ardently desired; whenever our policy seems to waver from that orientation, difficulties become acute.

Today, in developing our strategy, we are faced with some exceedingly hard choices. Historically we have been opposed to imperialism, even though we have occasionally been infected with it for brief times in our own history, as when we took the Philippines, or when we set out to make the Caribbean an American lake and put our marines in several of the Central American and Caribbean republics.

Now with strategic bases in North Africa we suddenly find ourselves involved in tension between France and that area. We have been faced with the awkward choice between fidelity to an ancient principle and the necessity of maintaining vital allies. In Egypt we are confronted with a dilemma of our fundamental principles in tension with a strategically vital link. In the Near East our passionate attachment to the Jewish homeland on ideological grounds has led to tension with the Arab world. In the Middle East the flow of oil and the flow of politics run in contrary directions.

In dealing with India we fail to see the similarities between the Indian position today and that which we took during the Napoleonic wars when Napoleon stood in the position of Stalin and Britain in a position analogous to ours and we wished to pursue a policy of neutrality.

In Korea our ideology is the stumbling block to a truce. We have only to say that our non-communist captives have no right to life or to liberty and turn them over to their communist masters who drove them into battle; by that denial of their right to life and

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liberty we can probably have an armistice and release ourselves from vast pressures. To yield the point would plague us forever after; whenever men sought to flee tyranny and oppression, they would fear lest we send them back to concentration camps, slave labor, or death.

In a world where force plays so great a part, it is hard indeed to maintain anything like ideological consistency. But if we waiver, we will lose our moral position. That would be disastrous abroad, draining the last drop from that "reservoir of good will" which leads nations to trust our word and to accept it in good faith. Even worse it would disintegrate our domestic front. Those who are old enough to remember the storm which was let loose by our temptations toward imperialism at the turn of the century do not want to have such another debate precipitated in the midcentury. Beside it the so-called "Great Debate" of a year or two ago, which is already fading from memory, would be as nothing.

This ideological commitment is so profound that it transcends parties. That is why it is a mistake to speak of a bipartisan foreign policy. We must have a non-partisan or, more accurately, an unpartisan foreign policy. Tactical moves on the diplomatic chessboard are a matter of party management and rightly a matter of party debate; but the strategic concepts to which we are deeply committed rest upon the basic ideology of the United States. They run so deeply through the course of our history, through the fabric of our thought, that they are beneath, above, and around parties.

Only by holding the firm ground upon which our feet have been planted—namely that all men, without distinction of race, creed, color, are created equal, that all men by the fact of their manhood are entitled to life and liberty—only by ideological consistency in the pursuit of those aims which distinguish us so sharp-

ly from the communists, can we hope to preserve a public opinion within the United States which will make possible the maintenance of adequate armed forces. Only so can we count upon the confidence of allies in our integrity and fixity of purpose.

The fourth basic element in our strategy is a clear perception about such phrases as "total war" and "total peace." There never yet was a time of total war and there never was a time of total peace. The idea that either of those conditions ever existed is unreal and vitiates our capacity to form sound judgements on the great problems that are before us.

In the long view, for the basic factors that shape our strategy there is no sharp difference between peace and war. That distinction is one rather of law and of tactics. The legal distinction is great within the limited area of its significance, but war as such does not directly affect the basic national aims which it is the business of strategy to achieve. The strategical objective remains relatively constant; the change from peace to war is a change in emphasis upon the instrumentalities employed. As war approaches, force moves from a background threat to the post of action. But force is never an end in itself; therefore tactics should never dominate strategy lest it result in surrender of long-run objectives to short-run advantages.

If we are to take a long view, we must blunt the edge of two sharp words—war and peace. If we continue to deal with those two concepts as mutually exclusive, we confuse both the defense effort and the attempt to achieve peaceful objectives. We can gain some quick realization of the fundamental problem by pointing out that determining the start of war is like inquiring when a fire began. There were first of all the materials and conditions to produce fire, there were smoke and smoldering, then a flicker of flame. When

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in that train of events did fire actually begin? It is so with war, and history is full of arguments about its real onset.

We are faced with a kind of political theory of relativity: absolutes are manifestations of error; only relatives are trustworthy. To express this in the simplest terms possible, let us say peace is the pursuit of strategic objectives by the most economical employment of all the means at our disposal; war is the prosecution of those same objectives by an extravagance of method. That is the essential fact. The basic purposes of war and of peace are the same—the promotion of the national interest; the means are also the same in war and peace. The difference is in the intensity with which the various means are employed.

Since economy and extravagance are not absolute but only relative terms, the distinction between peace and war is never absolute, except in a narrowly legal sense. We recently had an illustration of this fact. In arguing the government case for the seizure of the steel industry before the Supreme Court, the Solicitor General spoke of "war" in Korea, and Justice Jackson asked if the President had not explicitly denied that it was "war." In the narrowly legal sense, fighting, even costly fighting, long continued, does not constitute "war." In a broader context, it is clear that war and peace are relative, not mutually exclusive, terms.

The transition from peace to war, therefore, lies in the transfer of emphasis from the economical instrument of reason to the extravagant means of economic pressure and of force. The ends remain reasonably constant.

Let us take a historical example familiar to all. After the Rush-Bagot Agreement of 1817 Canada had a special strategic relationship to the United States. If we were to have a long, virtually

undefended border, we must see that Canada never became a base of attack upon us. To guard against such an eventuality Seward, who had reason to regard Britain as the most probable enemy, wished to outflank Canada; he purchased Alaska and desired Greenland. One was to keep Russia from occupying Canada, the other to checkmate Britain. After the diplomatic revolution at the turn of the century by which we drew closer to Britain, Canada still remained within our defensive perimeter, and we utilized Greenland and Iceland for its protection against Germany. For 134 years the *end* has been the same, to prevent its use as a base to attack us. This objective has survived a triple change in our potential enemy—from Britain to Germany to Russia.

Take another example: one would have to go far to find greater consistency of strategic conceptions than those which we followed for nearly half a century in the Far East. We announced the policy of the Integrity of China and the Open Door. That basic strategy did not alter at least until the triumph of Mao and the collapse of the nationalists on the mainland. In action the concepts have seen tremendous vicissitudes, but our intent was expressed repeatedly and it remained a steady strategic objective.

Moreover, we refused to recognize changes produced by force: that was fundamental in the Stimson doctrine, which simply made explicit what had long been implicit in our attitude. That position may seem unrealistic, if looked at in short perspective. Its possible validity, in longer perspective, rests upon the historical reality that the effects of force are transient. That is evidenced by the fact that peace treaties, which are almost always expressed in terms of perpetuity, have singularly short lives. A recent article quotes a French author to the effect that over a period of three and a half centuries the average life of "permanent" treaties of peace was only two years.

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Without endorsing the accuracy of the computation, the fact of the transiency of peace agreements must be conceded. Their lives are not always so brief as that of the Treaty of Sevres between the allies and Turkey at the close of the first World War; it was replaced by the Treaty of Lausanne at the end of three years. The Treaty of Versailles lasted less than a generation, and many another treaty of "perpetual peace" has shown the same life history. Consequently the idea expressed in its most extravagant terms by Hitler, who told his men that on their arms rested "the fate of the German nation for the next one thousand years," is absurd. There have been many similar expressions, not quite so extravagant, but nonetheless ridiculous. Even the triumph of Mao, therefore, does not prove that our Chinese policy, long tenaciously pursued by administrations of both parties, has suffered permanent defeat.

If we are to think clearly about the future, we should emphasize the relativity of two of the words which are customary in public discussions: security and peace. Fashionable as the word has become, "security" is nonetheless a mirage. Perhaps it would be better to call it a semantic tent—it covers so much it can mean much, or nothing. It is used in Wall Street to describe certain pieces of paper; it is employed to indicate poise or personal self-confidence; it sometimes means secrecy; it has relationship to financial well-being; it denotes presumed immunity to attack or ability to repulse it successfully. These are only a random handful from its barrel of meanings. All have one thing in common—they are relative, none is absolute. We have never had national security and never was it in greater danger than when we thought it was virtually attained—in the early 20th century, after two Hague peace conferences. Likewise "peace" has never been perfectly attained and, historically defined, is one of the most unstable conditions in human experience.

The normal condition is neither peace nor war. Certainly our lives are cast in that type of normality. Whether we tend toward peace or toward war, there are five instruments of strategy; and all are potent under every circumstance. They are reason, culture, emotion, economic activity, and force.

At least at the extremes these five are arranged in order from positive to negative. When the emphasis is upon positive and constructive means, we have what is called "peace"; when negative or destructive action is dominant, we have what is called "war." They are also arranged from the least costly to the most costly — in money, in goods, in effort, and in life. Reason costs nothing but mental effort; force is extravagant in every kind of cost including even life itself. When we can attain strategic ends by reason, costs are low; when we restore to force, the cost mounts toward infinity.

In other words, these are five means to the accomplishment of national policy, which is the object of strategy; they are the instrumentalities by which we seek to attain the national ends. Stated in these oversimplified terms, it would seem that we should be able to tell at any given moment just where we stand between war and peace. The fact is, however, that there are many national policies, and they are pursued with uneven energy and variant wisdom. Among them there are bound to be confusions, incoherencies, and contradictions. When dealing with allies, as we are today, the sum total of all the national policies of all the countries multiplies incoherencies and contradictions. The upshot is that in some phases of our effort, reason is effective; that makes for peace. In some other phases, force is in the process of mobilization for use or in actual employment as in Korea; then the tendency is toward war. Both tendencies exist simultaneously in different sectors of interest and action.

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Historically, that is why it has always been so difficult to state with any degree of accuracy the causes of any particular war. When, for example, the Nye committee held that "the armament makers" were responsible, it was, to put it charitably, an oversimplification so great as to constitute a gross error. Whenever any other single factor is used as the key, it misstates an enormously complicated problem. This much can be said with absolute certainty, reason is always at work. The most frequently quoted dictum of Clausewitz recognizes that fact, and history amply supports his assertion.

Of all the strategic instruments reason is the only one which always has a positive orientation. It has consistent direction, but it is the reverse direction from reason, for it is essentially negative. Reason and force press toward opposite poles. Reason advances peace; force impairs the chance of peace. Reason, though always present, sometimes operates in an atmosphere so laden with fear and other emotions, or so saturated by the sense of power or by the sense of weakness, that it has too little opportunity to function. That is true of our relationship with Russia today. It often seems impossible to reason with the communists; their major premise is different, their minor premise is different, and therefore the two arguments do not meet. Reason has relatively slight scope for effectiveness.

It must be conceded that, even apart from Russia, the present world mood is not conducive to the effective use of reason. No one would ever be tempted to call this the "age of reason." It is the age of many other things, but nearly everywhere reason sells at a disastrous discount. The intransigence of Russia is, in a sense, only a symptom of a world-wide retreat from faith in reason. The economic determinism which dominated much of the first half of this century; many views of sociologists and social

psychologists and social philosophers; the vogue of Freud, whose work has been well described as "opposition to rationalism"—these and numerous other factors account for the antirationalism of our day.

We ought to recognize frankly that an age in retreat from reason is not likely to produce diplomats of classical proportions. When one reads recent books on American policy, he cannot help but be impressed with the fact that the use of reason is not given a primary position.

It is well to recall that many a war which was lost on the battlefield has been won in the conference room; the most brilliant historical illustration was the manner in which Talleyrand saved France from the normal and expected consequences of the defeat of Napoleon. If we are ever to gain even an approximation of peace, the importance of reason as an instrument of strategy must be more fully appreciated.

The second of the five instruments of strategy is culture. Every nation has a culture of its own, which at once reflects and shapes its dominant characteristics. It is relatively easy to change political forms and develop new economic activities, but culture is deeply imbedded in the life of a people. It is almost impossible to make fundamental changes rapidly in that area of life. Therefore when you think of dealing with people, you have to think in terms not alone of force and economic activity, but of their emotional setting and cultural pattern. To be irritated when they do not respond to a stimulus in the same way we do is folly.

Culture is an instrument available for use both positively and negatively. It does not have a fixed direction as do reason and force. Our cultural history and its relationship to Britain have

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now a powerful effect in holding the two countries in alignment. Common language, traditions, and literature are extraordinarily strong unifying influences. Similarly, the basic differences between Russian culture and that of the West made understanding difficult long before the Bolsheviks gained control. Kipling's admonition, "Make ye no truce with Adam-zad—the Bear that walks like a Man!" long antedates the Revolution. In like manner, it takes a vast effort of imagination to see in Chinese culture any resemblance to a structure of values coherent with our own.

In modern times the negative aspects of culture have been accentuated by propaganda. The cacophony of voices over the international radio is a manifestation of the enormous importance which it has assumed in the grand strategy of war and peace. Nationalism is heightened by cultural self-consciousness and, when nationalistic characteristics become dominant, strained and fantastic distortions appear, such as we have seen in Iran under Mossadegh.

Peace is advanced by the realization of the full potentialities of those aspects of culture which tend to unite men and give them a sense of human brotherhood. This is possible even if the customary expressions are different from our own. We have certain concepts of the tonal scale which are quite different from those of the Far East; we hiss in derision and they in pleasure; we wail in sorrow and they in glee. These are trivial illustrations of the profound reality that cultural habits may differ, and yet the emotional and intellectual realities may be the same. To be put off by things which merely seem to us strange is to be provincial in a world that calls for global strategy. Cultural charity and appreciation mean that, without giving up our own structure of intellectual and esthetic values, we nonetheless do not insist upon imposing them

upon others. Negative diversions of the channels of this deep-flowing human intercourse lead to war.

The third available strategic instrument is emotion. We perceive truth, not only logically, but appreciatively. Emotion, properly conceived, is a normal complement of reason; only when one's condition is pathological are emotion and reason set against each other. Employed positively, emotion exhibits amazing powers of attachment; used negatively, it is one of the most divisive forces known to mankind. For many years, because we had fought Britain in the War for Independence and the War of 1812, the United States continued to look upon it as "the" enemy—long after the substantive basis for tension was largely gone. In other words, historical emotion had the striking effect of perpetuating a sense of hostility though the foundation for that hostility had disappeared.

This should be a reminder that it is naive to suppose that nations always follow their true interests. Emotion often blinds judgement. It was never the true interest of Germany to challenge both the East and the West. It was never the true interest of Japan to pursue the policies which goaded us to war. We have, therefore, to be critical occasionally of our own policy, lest we trespass upon our true interests. We have to face decisions in terms of fundamental interest rather than mere tactical dispositions, which are often suggested by pique, ambition, or emotional misreading of basic interests.

Like culture, emotion has both positive and negative potentialities. Propaganda exploits all that science has learned about the emotions in order to unite one people and to divide them from others. Studies of the uses that Russia has made of propaganda for the consolidation of its monolithic domestic power show countless efforts to play upon emotion, some of them extraordinarily suc-

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cessful. We used an emotional appeal to Latin America with our "good neighbor" policy. Many other illustrations, both positive and negative, will occur to anyone who gives the matter a few moments of reflective thought.

The fourth strategic implement is economic; like culture and emotion it also has potentialities for positive or negative employment. Used positively, economic strength is the support of the free world. It is that which led General Eisenhower on his farewell trip to say that "economic strength" is second only to "spiritual strength" and one of the "important (factors) for all the others in the free world." "Without economic strength you can neither maintain a real spirit of morale nor preserve military strength. I might observe that to every British citizen the soundness of the American economy is just as important as any amount of force we can develop in the military field."

But economic power can have an equally strong negative effect. After the first World War economic "sanctions" were regarded as the principal instrument for the enforcement of the decisions of the League of Nations. They did not live up to expectations, and fortunately that lack of success dimmed the mistaken faith in economic determinism which had remained dominant for some years.

Nonetheless economic sanctions are a very powerful leverage indeed and one which we are intent upon employing against the Russians. The other day I heard a group of French journalists refer to our pressure against trading with the East as the "American Iron Curtain." Without admitting the fairness of that characterization, we are all well aware that economic leverage can exert great pressure upon both friend and foe.

Congress has been ready to use it with considerable harshness. That tendency heightens some of our present problems. In several Western European nations unemployment causes acute political repercussions, which native communists exploit. To ease unemployment there is a desire for trade with Eastern Europe—an old and “normal” pattern. Russia emphasizes our “inconsistency” in simultaneously calling for lower trade barriers and legislating new ones; it steals our thunder by clamoring for the elimination of trade restrictions and by talking about big East-West barter deals. That was done in dramatic style at the recent Moscow economic conference. Russian propaganda more than hints that American policy has for one of its aims the maintenance of economic hegemony over Western Europe. So tempting are its offers and so galling to European nations is dependence upon America (especially when accompanied by irritating legislative restrictions) that an acute crisis may develop.

In order to exploit our economic strength positively it is essential to remember that leadership must above all else abandon egocentricity. A leader without followers is a contradiction of terms; a leader with reluctant and resentful followers is no real leader at all. To drag nations behind us is a form of unconscious economic imperialism. We cannot simultaneously follow an imperialist and an anti-imperialistic course; we must walk the narrow path between them. Nothing is more evident than that we have not been sufficiently wary or steady in that effort.

Moreover, it is necessary to remember that, unless economic strength and economic stability are maintained, inflation can sap away whatever “situations of strength” might be gained by rearmament. There can be no question that the danger is great. Unbalanced national budgets cannot be compensated by an increase in production alone. Indeed too rapid increase in production with

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unbalanced budgets could increase the dangers when armaments level off. Nor is taxation a sovereign remedy, for there are limits to taxation; the precise limits are not determined, but it seems likely that Britain has already passed the point of absorbing too much of the national product and we appear to be approaching that practicable limit ourselves.

So, despite our wealth and enormous productivity, there are world-wide doubts of our economic stability—among both friend and foe. The sense that our dominant economy is unstable leads our allies to be fearful lest a collapse here carry them all down in ruin. On the other hand, it is as clear as daylight that the Marshall Plan and the Mutual Security program have been great constructive forces in maintaining the balance of power since the hostility of Russia became an established fact in current international relations.

We have to recognize also that the vast wealth of the United States, while it has accomplished much through the Marshall Plan, as it did through Lend-Lease during the war, nonetheless makes us objects of envy, one of the most corrosive of all emotions. It also makes us the object of suspicion; there is always a feeling on the part of the "have nots" that the "haves" got their wealth by methods which were shady, if not downright immoral.

This sort of suspicion is heightened because the United States is the only great power that is regarded as a full manifestation of capitalism. Socialism in some degree or other is characteristic of most European economies. As a nation we are intensely suspicious of socialism; the word is often used in this country as an epithet; in the same way capitalism is employed as an epithet by many Europeans. Such facts make mutual understanding all the more difficult.

Under all these circumstances we must walk warily as we employ our potent economic power as an instrument for the attainment of strategic objectives.

The last, and admittedly indispensable, instrument of strategy is force. Strangely enough, it can be fairly judged most successfully in advancing the national aims when it is not necessary to use it actively. I have heard that point of view urged more often by members of the Armed Forces than by civilians.

Wisely employed as a potential support of political action, force though costly is not destructive. Once it becomes necessary to make it the major instrument and to employ it actively, it tends to become an end in itself. It is so dramatic, its effects are so apparent, that it is easy to succumb to the phrase so often heard nowadays in talking about Korea, "nothing counts but force." Once that mood takes possession, force is certain to overreach its strategic objectives. Many a nation has burned a house to roast a pig. When that happens, the means have become more important than the ends. New problems are created which are more difficult to solve than the old.

In addition, the employment of force multiples almost infinitely the disastrous negative effect of economic power. In the first place, a special type of unemployment is artificially created; many men are taken out of productive employment, their work habits disorganized, their skills blunted, their capacity for normal adjustment dislocated, and the whole rhythm of their lives altered. In the second place, enormous productive capacities are destroyed, impoverishing the producing capacity of the world to a shocking degree. In the third place, many producing plants which survive are retooled to make munitions rather than articles of

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peace. Retooling takes a long time, even under the urgent pressures of rearmament and with government subsidies and rather negligent treatment of cost. But when the time comes to reverse the process and retool for peace, there is not the same urgency for speed; moreover it has to be done effectively and economically, else it could lead to bankruptcy. While reconversion proceeds the specter of mass unemployment haunts us.

Furthermore, the use of force inevitably closes the normal lanes of trade and leads to the introduction of synthetics and substitutes. At the close of the forceful episode, the world faces a dilemma: whether to go back to the original sources of supply and let the production of the synthetic go to waste or continue to manufacture the substitute and thus destroy historic trade routes. Whichever program is followed, and usually both are followed in some degree, it proves costly and wasteful. Finally, the land and its resources may be set back as much as 25 years after it has been fought over. In other words, the use of force doubles the disaster of economic warfare.

Force, as I indicated originally, has only one direction: it is always negative; its logic can never be constructive. It is necessary to use force sometimes in order to bring the enemy to the point where he will listen to reason, but force itself contributes nothing to reasonableness at the end of the war. It must be said, therefore, that it is at best a crude instrument with which to fashion and refashion civilization.

The point can be stated even more strongly: the use of force brings a certain irrationality into conclusions; for, when force is applied most violently, it amounts to a reversal of the moral order and tends toward a proclamation that "might makes right." The Russian participation in the victory of the last war has had a

baleful effect on the structure of the post-war world. Russia's present influence is all out of scale to its wisdom, its sincerity, or other qualities which normally would have great weight. Reason it eschews, even while using a dialectic that apes the rational process. Culture and emotion it exploits positively at home, negatively abroad. At home it defies the laws of economics, and enslaves its satellites. Force is its dominant method at home and abroad. That is why the danger of war is so great.

By way of review, the basic factors are four. First is the perpetual memory, in action as in word, that the world is round, that pressure applied at one point is felt at every other. Second, fluidity and change are the rule of international relations and there must be, therefore, flexibility of mind in tactical dispositions—diplomatic as well as military. Third, ideological consistency is even more essential to a democracy than to a dictatorship; the strategy of the United States is basically conditioned by the great affirmation of the Declaration of Independence that "all men are created equal." Finally, the instrumentalities of strategy—reason, culture, emotion, economics, and force — are omnipresent in peace and war and the twilight land between the two wherein we now live. Skill in their effective employment, each in its proper proportion for every given situation, is the measure of proficiency in the achievement of our strategic objectives.

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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF LECTURER

Dr. Henry M. Wriston was born in Laramie, Wyoming, in 1889. He received his B. A. degree from Wesleyan University, Connecticut, in 1911, and has since received three additional degrees from that University. He studied at Harvard University from 1911 to 1914, and was the Austin teaching fellow for the last two years. He has received honorary degrees from Ripon (Wisconsin) College, Columbia University, Tufts College, Rutgers University, Rhode Island State College, Lawrence College and Princeton University.

Dr. Wriston has been well known nationally in educational work for many years. He was President of the Association of American Colleges; trustee of the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching, and then its chairman; trustee of the American Federation of Arts; vice president of the American Association for Adult Education; trustee of the World Peace Foundation; and director of the Diplomatic Affairs Foundation.

Dr. Wriston was President of Lawrence College from 1925 to 1937, and from 1929 to 1937 he was director of the Institute of Paper Chemistry of Appleton, Wisconsin. Since 1937 he has been president of Brown University.

He has written books on war, civil defense, and American foreign relations. In 1941 he wrote, "Prepare for Peace"; in 1943, "Challenge to Freedom"; and in 1944, "Strategy of Peace." He is a prolific contributor of articles to journals and periodicals.



THE U. S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE, NEWPORT, R. I. was Host During the Period 9-13 June to a Gathering of Prominent Civilians, Leading Flag and General Officers of the Armed Forces and Other Senior Officers of the Services, including Reserve Officers of the Navy and Marine Corps, in a series of Global Strategy Discussions. The Discussions are a Scholarly Investigation of the World Situation and the Aims and Strategy of the United States in the Event of Global War. Shown in Committee Meeting are: L to R, Col J. R. KNOWLAN, USMCR; Mr. T. S. MATTHEWS; Cdr E. G. FAIRFAX, USN; Gen. L. C. SHEPHERD, USMC (Commandant, USMC); and Col G. A. ROLL, USMC.

THE EUROPEAN CONFEDERATION

A lecture delivered
at the Naval War College
on 18 June 1962, by

Maj. Gen. William J. Donovan, U. S. A. (Ret.)

I came in here with a copy of this morning's *New York Times*. It contained an article calling attention to the fact that today, before the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Senate there is under consideration the arrangement entered into in the nature of a peace treaty between West Germany and the Allied Powers.

Also in the press this morning one finds that the Laborite Party in England is asking that the approval be delayed and suggesting that a place be found later in the United Nations for Communist China. In addition one finds that the news coming from France and West Germany indicates a determination on the part of the Soviets to prevent ratification of this treaty. Of course, if there is delay, there can be prevention. The great problem is to see how we can overcome this danger which threatens the effort for European Union.

We know that the idea of European unity is not new — it is as old as Europe itself. For many centuries, at least for six hundred years, the idea of European unity has challenged the thinking of the best minds in all the world.

In the early twenties of the present century, the interest of thoughtful people was stimulated by the writings of Count Coudenhove-Kalergi, founder of the Pan-Europa Movement, and by the book, "The United States of Europe" which was written by Edouard Herriot, Prime Minister of France.

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In 1930, upon the initiative of Aristide Briand, then Prime Minister of France, the governments of Europe for the first time, as a group, considered the project of European union. This plan failed, not because it was too timid, but because it was too bold.

After that for many years the European union idea slept. It was reawakened by the same man who, during the years of Hitler's triumphs and Europe's martyrdom, had by his words and deeds personified for all the people of Europe the spirit of unity and freedom.

On March 22, 1943, Churchill outlined his conception of a United Europe which should be created after victory had been won. It is interesting to go back and consider what he said at that time. These are his words:

“One can imagine . . . there should come into being a Council of Europe . . . This council, when created, must eventually embrace the whole of Europe, and all the main branches of the European family must some day be partners in it.”

Very little notice was given to this statement and it was not until after the war in 1946, when he again raised the issue of the European union in his now famous speech at Zurich, that he obtained real attention. This speech began with a description of the greatness and also the tragedy of Europe. Then he went on to say:

“This noble continent is the home of all the great parent races of the Western World. It is the cradle of Western civilization . . . Yet it is from Europe that have sprung that series of frightful nationalistic quarrels which we have

seen twice in our lifetime wreck the peace and mar the prospects of all mankind Yet all the while there is a remedy which, if it were generally and spontaneously adopted, could as if by a miracle transform the whole scene. What is this sovereign remedy? It is to recreate the European family, or as much of it as we can, and provide it with a structure under which it can dwell with safety and freedom. We must build a kind of United States of Europe. Only then will hundreds of millions of toilers be able to regain the simple joys and hopes which make life worth living."

Now this Zurich speech of Churchill brought back to mind the words of George Washington who in a letter to Lafayette in 1787, after the adoption of our Constitution, wrote:

"We have sowed seeds of liberty and of union that will spring up everywhere upon earth. Some day, taking its pattern from the United States, there will be founded a United States of Europe."

These were prophetic words, for the proposal of a United Europe today is a live and practical issue in world affairs.

In 1947, inspired by Churchill's Zurich speech, groups of private citizens in the different countries and men of the Resistance, working together, organized the European Movement. This was a group of ordinary citizens. Under the leadership of Churchill, Spaak, DeGasperi and Blum, who were selected as presidents of that movement, this group began only as a temporary committee to organize the meeting at the Hague. Afterwards it became a permanent organization, which continues today for the purpose

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of coordinating the efforts of various groups in the different countries of Europe.

The first act of this spontaneous and democratic effort was to convene a Congress of Europe at The Hague in May, 1948. This Congress brought together more than 800 leading figures in European political, economic and cultural life.

In August of 1948, as the direct result of citizen action, the governments concerned created by treaty a Council of Europe which met for the first time on August 8, 1949, at its capital in Strasbourg, France. This Council of Europe is a unique political institution that consists of a Committee of Foreign Ministers and a Consultative Assembly made up of 127 parliamentarians from the 15 member nations.

In cooperation with the European Movement, the work of the Assembly has led to the creation of the Schuman Plan and the European Army Plan, now called the European Defense Community. It has also brought about a Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms which provides a supranational court to which an individual citizen can appeal to redress the violation of a human right as defined by the treaty. In these, and in other less spectacular work, the Council of Europe has made a real contribution to Europe's solution of its economic, social and political problems.

It would be wrong, as well as dangerous, to underestimate the difficulties of achieving the integration of Europe. We Americans ought to try to understand these difficulties because they have a great effect upon our security and upon our future. It is easier to emancipate fully evolved countries and transform them into independent states, either through the legal recognition of

their development or by an act of revolution, than to induce sovereign states, which have for centuries enjoyed complete independence, to abandon of their own free will even a fraction of their independence to a supranational authority — be it Federal, or otherwise.

To propose a plan is to take a much greater risk than to simply put forward an idea. The economic and financial difficulties which are universally being experienced; the political disorder which is reflected in these countries by unstable governments and precarious majorities; the remaining traces of nationalism and traditionalism; and, finally, the international insecurity fanned by propaganda and skilfully provoked incidents — all this creates an atmosphere which is hardly helpful to constructive and arduous reform.

The possibility of European unity is greatly dependent upon the ratification of both the Schuman Plan and the European Army Plan by the parliaments of France and of Germany.

In World War II, Germany was defeated in Europe, but there is still a struggle to see who will take over Europe. Hitler failed. Is Stalin going to succeed? Can the Europeans themselves hold Europe?

In this struggle, Germany is the central issue. This is so because the side which she chooses will be decisive. German industrial and military power represents a tremendous force for good or for evil. If German energies can be harmonized with the purposes of the Western World, the problem of ensuring peace and a high standard of living should be capable of solution.

The Schuman Plan, both political and economic in conception, seems the only practicable means for releasing the tremen-

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dous industrial energies of the German people for the benefit of not only Germany but of the entire Western world. France has suffered too long and too often from German aggression ever to consent to the unsupervised revival of German industry and its inherent war potential. On the other side, Germany would not suffer a long-term restriction of production without a resultant deep grievance against the West.

The Schuman Plan breaks this impasse by placing all Western European coal and steel enterprises under the regulation of a common supranational body that assures France that German industry will not become the servant of German aggressive ambition. At the same time, it offers to German enterprise an equality of treatment with their competitors in other Western European countries. The parliaments of France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg and Holland have ratified and can become an effective instrument in bringing about a constitutional federation.

The Plan of the European Army, however, has encountered more difficulties than did the Schuman Plan. The long negotiations for the European Army Plan, begun in Paris in 1951, were concluded only on the 8th of last month with the signature of the European Defense Community Treaty by the Foreign Ministers of France, Belgium, West Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. These negotiations passed through many dangers and there are many more dangers to be encountered. Before it can come into effect, the Treaty must be ratified by the parliaments of all the signatories. That is the problem that is before us today.

The aim of this treaty is to bring together under joint supranational organizations the armed forces of participating States, to ensure European defense and preserve peace against present and future threats. The same 6 nations constituting the Schuman Plan

also are sole members of the E.D.C. The creation of a Defense Community is considered an essential step towards the formation of a United Europe.

The essential political purpose of the treaty is to allow Germany to contribute to the Western defense effort without permitting the creation of the independent military power of the German Republic. This aim has been reached in the treaty by the fusion of the Army Forces of Germany with those of its continental neighbors. There will be no national army under its own general staff and its own War Ministry obeying the sole orders of its own government. On the contrary, there will be mixed contingents under a Combined General Staff and a Combined War Ministry dependent on combined arms, equipment and supply programs, fed by a common budget, and controlled by joint decisions on the highest level. The European nations hoped that Britain would be a party to this plan, but that has not worked out — although the European Army was proposed by Churchill.

Dr. Adenauer, the German Chancellor, has agreed to consider West Germany as a strategic area where it would be imprudent to manufacture certain types of weapons. Germany will not, therefore, be engaged in the manufacture of large aircraft, long range rockets or atomic bombs.

One of the best features of the defense treaty is the protocol which links the European Defense Community with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, because that link is very important. The two associations are bound to go to each other's aid in case of attack against any one of their members. Their councils may meet for consultation. Divisions of one nation may be placed under the Army Corps of another. Out of a total of 48 groups, 14 would be French, 12 German, and the rest divided between Italy, Luxem-

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bourg and Holland, as well as Belgium. This 6-nation army will come under the overall command of the 14-nation NATO, headed by General Ridgeway.

The European Defense Community Treaty, having already been initialled on May 28 by the 6 foreign Ministers, was then signed by them on May 30. It must now be ratified by the respective parliaments, including that of Germany.

We can be sure that every effort will be made internally by the Social Democrats, and externally by the Soviets, to block this ratification. Already our morning papers, in the news from Germany, disclose an exacting and feared political battle. Strong opposition comes from Social Communists and extreme right members of the parliament. This opposition is intensified by pressure on West Berlin by the East Germans and by the Soviets in offering new proposals of German unity calculated to tempt and divide the Germans from ratification. You see the effect of that if you just look at the headlines in The Times today where our Secretary of State, in order to reassure all concerned of the Big Three that nothing untoward was happening, had to meet yesterday again to say that they would remain in agreement.

Stalin seems ready to risk the dangers of a revived National Germany in order to prevent integration of Western Germany with the West. The European Defense Community is a method of integrating a German contribution without raising the danger of a German army.

The problem of keeping a United Germany in the Western camp and out of the Soviet camp is the most urgent problem facing the whole of the West. It can be done with the possibility of success only if Germany is united within the framework of a European Federation. Just as the Schuman Plan has a High Authority, and

an Assembly to reflect the supranational character of the organization, so a Board of Commissioners and an Assembly fulfill the same purpose in the European Defense Community. Once these two plans are ratified, European union will be strengthened in its economic and military aspects.

There remains, however, the establishment of its political character. This has been the primary source of disagreement since the Council of Europe was established. Even at the first session of the Assembly in 1949 it was clear that there were strong differences of opinion between the Continental countries who wanted a Federation with a formal written constitution and the British and Scandinavians who wanted no constitution written but sought a functional approach, gradual and piecemeal, with the acceptance of a political authority at some undefined time. The refusal of the British to support the Schuman Plan; Churchill's motion for the establishment of the European Army, but the British government's refusal to join; their repeated statements that they could not federate because of their obligations to the Commonwealth — all this should have made clear to the Federalists of Europe that the British would not yield.

The Continental countries persisted in offering compromises, however, because they didn't want to lose the British alliance. The French wanted the British for protection against Germany, and the Germans wanted the British to protect them against France. It was the belief of the nations of the continent that in any matter of conflict between the British and the European Continental nations, the United States ultimately would come down on the side of the British. That was the feeling throughout Europe. Every one of our ambassadors in the various countries would tell you that was the feeling.

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For that reason Spaak, who certainly is one of the leading statesmen of Europe and who at that time was Chairman of the European Movement as well as Chairman of the Consultative Assembly, said he hesitated to go into a federation without Britain. But he said that if the United States would approve the federation without Britain, he would enter into such an arrangement. Finally, however, the Continental countries, forced to realize that Britain would not integrate with Europe because she was not willing to yield any part of her sovereignty, took the initiative and undertook to set up a Federation of Europe.

Spaak had concluded that there was no possibility of a compromise and that he had to choose between two political courses — either to yield to Great Britain, or to help build European union without her. He chose the second course. He resigned as President of the Consultative Assembly in order to make his fight for federation from the floor “only the better,” as he said, “to carry on the battle and to do something concrete to prove the usefulness of American aid.”

Basic to the success of these two great projects is the creation of a Continental-European Federation with a political authority. On January 22 of this year, in Paris, General Eisenhower urged that the countries of Continental Europe “call a constitutional convention to examine and actually cope with the problems of economic and political unity.”

On March 5 of this year Adenauer, Chancellor of the West German Republic, declared that Europe's only salvation was the forming of the United States of Europe and that a European constitution must be created as soon as possible. These statements indicate the rapidity in the last year with which Continental Europe is moving towards a political federation.

Last week at Strasbourg, at the Council of Europe, Spaak introduced a resolution for a constituent assembly of representatives from the Schuman Plan nations to draft the constitution. As a matter of fact, since February a commission of jurists — 12 of the foremost legal and political figures from the 6 Schuman Plan nations — have been studying the problems involved in setting up a federation with limited powers where member states will continue to exercise many important functions and be responsible for the vital interests of their citizens.

A group in this country known as the American Committee on United Europe, has been able to raise funds to get research workers here in the United States to help those jurists with concrete, practical illustrations found in the experiences of federation.

In Europe today, public opinion is being mobilized. A popular referendum, based on petitions, has already been signed by 700 European parliamentarians. This referendum is strongly supported by the European Movement Youth Campaign and by the 12,000 mayors comprising the Council of European Municipalities.

Gentlemen, a very significant thing is that four days ago the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe held that it was essential that the establishment of the European Defense Community should be supported by the enactment of the constitution of a supranational authority. What will happen during the next 10 months will determine, therefore, whether Europe will become a strong partner in the Free World. You will notice that already, in coming back to the Council of Europe and in seeking to establish links between the Council of Europe and these countries, it shows what many of us always thought — that if these Continental nations would only go ahead and do the things they felt were nec-

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essary to do, that Great Britain would find it necessary to work with the Continental nations — if not directly, in a federation. At least working with that federation within the Council of Europe. It is probable that the Schuman Plan organization will be used as the instrument for the making of such a constitution.


BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF LECTURER

Major General Donovan was born at Buffalo, New York, in 1883. He received degrees from Columbia University, Niagara University, University of Notre Dame, and Syracuse University. He began the practice of law at Buffalo in 1907, and served as counsel for the New York State Fuel Administration. He was U. S. Attorney for the Western District of New York, and was Assistant Attorney General of the United States from 1924-1925.

In World War I he served as Captain of Troop 1, 1st Cavalry, New York National Guard; Assistant Chief of Staff, 27th Division, A. E. F., and became Colonel in command of the 165th Infantry Regiment (the old 69th, N. Y.). This was the "Fighting 69th" of the famous Rainbow Division. During his army service he was wounded three times.

Major General Donovan was awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor, the Distinguished Service Cross, the Distinguished Service Medal, the Legion of Honor and Croix de Guerre with palm and silver star (France), and the Croci di Guerra (Italy).

He was unofficial observer for the Secretary of the Navy to Great Britain and southeastern Europe during 1940-41. He was appointed Coordinator of Information in 1941, and Director of Strategic Services in 1942, which position he held until the O. S. S. was disestablished in October 1945. At present he is practicing law and is a frequent speaker at the Naval War College.



RESERVE OFFICERS CLASS, U. S. NAVAL WAR COLEGE, 1-14 June 1952. From l. to r., back row: Cdr R. Robbins, LCdr E. R. F. Johnson, LCdr W. A. Porteous, Jr., Capt Daniel Stubbs, Cdr Albert Pratt. Second row, Cdr C. L. Spillers, Cdr B. C. Algeo, Jr., Capt E. C. Palmer, Cdr J. H. Church, Jr., LCdr H. S. Reynolds, and Capt E. C. Burke. Third row, Col J. R. Knowlan, Cdr R. W. Lent, LCdr S. P. Corn, Cdr J. E. Sullivan, and LCol J. F. Moran. Fourth row, Cdr L. H. Schlom, Cdr R. H. Brening, Cdr W. C. Edwards, Col R. B. Bell; Fifth row, Cdr G. G. Boyd, Capt J. S. Horner, Cdr A. W. Hefling, Capt W. I. Dolbeare, Cdr N. L. Blemker, Capt E. J. Gluck, Col R. W. Thomas, Cdr J. T. Casey, Cdr H. C. Hart, LCol J. H. Franklin, Jr., Col J. Roosevelt. Sixth row: Adm H. J. Tiedemann, LCol J. R. Knowlan, Capt H. E. Bramston-Cook, Capt J. W. Golinkin, Capt E. C. Holden, Cdr A. E. Macgee, LCdr R. D. Warden, Capt E. S. Gillette, LCol W. C. Judge, Capt J. J. Bergen, and Adm. G. G. McLintock.

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FRANKEL, S. B., Captain, U. S. N.	Naval Intelligence School
HALL, A. G., Rear Admiral, U. S. C. G.	U. S. Coast Guard Academy
McLINTOCK, G. G., Rear Adm., U.S.M.S.	Superintendent, U. S. Merchant Marine Academy
GALD, Peder, Captain, U. S. M. S.	Dean, U. S. Merchant Marine Academy
ESPOSITO, V. J., Colonel, U. S. A.	U. S. Military Academy
DAVIDSON, J. F., Captain, U. S. N.	U. S. Naval Academy

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Representatives of Service Organizations

<u>Name</u>	<u>Service Organization</u>
BAILENTINE, J. J., Vice Adm., U. S. N.	Commander, Air Force U. S. Atlantic Fleet
FAHRION, F. G., Vice Admiral, U. S. N.	Commander, Amphibious Force U. S. Atlantic Fleet
JENNINGS, R. E., Rear Admiral, U. S. N.	Commander Fleet Air- Quonset Point, Rhode Island
GOOD, Roscoe F., Rear Admiral, U. S. N.	Director, General Planning Group Office of Chief of Naval Operations
PHILLIPS, W. K., Rear Admiral, U. S. N.	Assistant Chief of Operations for Naval Reserve
BOLSTER, C. M., Rear Admiral, U. S. N.	Chief of Naval Research
WELLBORN, C. Jr., Rear Admiral, U.S.N.	Commander, Destroyer Force U. S. Atlantic Fleet
MAHER, James E., Rear Admiral, U. S. N.	Commander, Service Force U. S. Atlantic Fleet
OLSEN, C. E., Rear Admiral, U. S. N.	Commander, U. S. Naval Base Newport, Rhode Island
HICKEY, R. F., Rear Admiral, U. S. N.	Chief of Information Office of Chief of Naval Operations
EARLE, R., Jr., Rear Admiral, U. S. N.	Commander, Destroyer Flotilla SIX
AUSTIN, B. L., Rear Admiral, U. S. N.	Director, International Affairs Division Office of Chief of Naval Operations
SCOGGINS, Olin, Captain, U. S. N.	Chief of Staff and Aide Amphibious Force, U. S. Atlantic Fleet
HULL, R. V., Captain, U. S. N.	Commanding Officer U. S. S. POCONO

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<u>Name</u>	<u>Service Organization</u>
RICKETTS, C. V., Captain, U. S. N.	Operations, Plans and Training Officer Amphibious Force, U. S. Atlantic Fleet
DAY, E. M., Captain, U. S. N.	Plans Officer Amphibious Force, U. S. Atlantic Fleet
HOPKINS, T. W., Captain, U. S. N.	Force Air Officer Amphibious Force, U. S. Atlantic Fleet
VAN RYZIN, W. J., Colonel, U.S.M.C.	Military Plans and Operations Officer Amphibious Force, U. S. Atlantic Fleet

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Naval War College Students and Staff

<u>Name</u>	<u>Next Duty Assignment</u>
ABRAMS, Earle B., Lieut. Commander, U. S. N.	Office of Chief of Naval Operations
ADAMS, Fred T., Jr., Lieut. Commandr, (SC), U. S. N.	Staff, Commander Naval Forces, Far East
ADAMS, Scarritt, Captain, U. S. N.	Staff, Commander Allied Naval Forces, Southern Europe
ALDRICH, Charles W., Captain, U. S. N.	Commanding Officer U. S. S. NOBLE
ALGIRE, Kent D., Commander, (SC), U. S. N.	Awaiting Orders
AUGUST, Charles V., Lieutenant Commander, U. S. N.	Office of Chief of Naval Operations
AYERS, Frank W., Lieutenant Commander, U. S. N.	Awaiting Orders
BADGER, Harry P., Captain, U. S. N.	Office of Chief of Naval Operations
BAILEY, Joslyn R., Colonel, U. S. M. C.	Staff, NavWarCol
BAIRD, William E., Major, U. S. M. C.	Staff, Commanding General, Aircraft, Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic
BAKUTIS, Fred E., Commander, U. S. N.	U. S. S. VALLEY FORGE (CV-45)
BALLANCE, Robert G., Colonel, U.S.M.C:	Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
BARDWELL, Charles L., Commander, U. S. N.	Staff, NavWarCol
BARNES, Stanley M., Captain, U. S. N.	Staff, NavWarCol
BARNETT, William R., Lieut. Commander, U. S. N.	Office of Chief of Naval Operations
BARNUM, M. Alice, Lieut. Commander, U. S. N.	Staff, NavWarCol
BARRY, Walter J., Commander, U. S. N.	Staff, NavWarCol

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<u>Name</u>	<u>Next Duty Assignment</u>
BARTLETT, William G., Colonel (Armor), U. S. A.	Staff, Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet
BATES, Paul L., Colonel (Armor), U. S. A.	FIFTH Army 5025th ASU, CGEC, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
BATES, Richard W., Commodore, U. S. N.	Staff, NavWarCol
BATTELL, William P., Colonel, U. S. M. C.	Marine Corps Schools, Quantico, Virginia
BEADLE, Eudora L., Lieutenant, U. S. N.	Office of Chief of Naval Personnel
BEADLE, Marvin L., Commander, U. S. N.	Staff, Commander, Amphibious Training Command, Atlantic Fleet
BEAKLEY, Wallace M., Rear Admiral, U. S. N.	Staff, NavWarCol
BEDELL, Porter F., Commander, U. S. N.	Commanding Officer, Air Transport Squadron THREE
BEER, Robert O., Captain, U. S. N.	Staff, Commander, Amphibious Group THREE
BEHRENS, Carl E., Mr.	O. E. G. Office of Chief of Naval Operations
BERKELEY, James P., Colonel, U.S.M.C.	Staff, NavWarCol
BERRY, Francis J., Lieut. Commander, U. S. N.	Naval Reserve Officers Training Corps Unit, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, Troy, New York
BIERER, Howard T., Commander, (SC), U. S. N.	Office of Chief of Naval Operations
BIVENS, William J., Commander, U. S. N.	Staff, NavWarCol
BOGART, Gerard S., Commander, U. S. N.	Staff, NavWarCol
BOSS, Jo Elaine, Ensign, U. S. N.	Staff, NavWarCol
BOWERS, Mervin C., Lieut. Colonel, U. S. A.	Staff, Commander in Chief U. S. Naval Forces Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean, London, England

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<u>Name</u>	<u>Next Duty Assignment</u>
BOWKER, Albert H., Commander, U. S. N.	Staff, NavWarCol
BREWER, William F., Commander, U.S.N.	Staff, NavWarCol
BRIDGERS, Henry C. Jr., Commander, U. S. N.	Staff, Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet
BRITT, George F., Colonel, U. S. M. C.	Staff, Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet
BROWN, James H., Commander, U. S. N.	Staff, NavWarCol
BRUSH, Frederick J., Captain, U. S. N.	Office of Chief of Naval Operations
BRYER, Paul J., Colonel, U. S. A.	Office of the Army Attache, Ottawa, Canada
BURDEN, Harvey P., Captain, U. S. N.	Commanding Officer, U. S. S. CURRITUCK (AV-7)
BURKS, Jesse B., Commander, U. S. N.	Commanding Officer, Air Transport Squadron TWENTY-FOUR
BURNETT, Louis R., Commander, U. S. N.	Naval Air Station Corpus Christi, Texas
CAREY, Joseph J., Captain, U. S. N.	Commander, Escort Destroyer Squadron FOUR
CARLSON, Daniel, Captain, U. S. N.	Staff, NavWarCol
CARLSON, Edward B., Commander, U. S. N.	Staff, NavWarCol
CAUFIELD, Cecil T., Captain, U. S. N.	Staff, NavWarCol
CHASE, Charles H., Colonel, U. S. A.	Staff, NavWarCol
CHRISTENSEN, Ernest E., Commander, U. S. N.	Staff, Commander, Fleet Air Quonset, Naval Air Station, Quonset Point, Rhode Island
CLEGG, Glenn W., Commander, (SC), U. S. N.	Naval Supply Depot, San Diego, California
COLE, J. Frank, Lieutenant Commander, U. S. M. C.	Staff, NavWarCol

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<u>Name</u>	<u>Next Duty Assignment</u>
COLEMAN, Wilson M., Commander, U. S. N.	Joint Staff, Washington, D. C.
COLLINS, William M., Commander, U. S. N.	Staff, NavWarCol
CONNELL, Thomas P., Lieut. Commander, U. S. N.	Staff, Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet
CONOLLY, Richard L., Vice Admiral, U. S. N.	Staff, NavWarCol
COOK, Dave J., Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. A.	European Command, Bremerhaven, Germany
COROTHERS, Earl M., Colonel, U. S. A.	TRUST, Trieste
COSTELLO, Maurice J., Lieut. Colonel, U. S. A. F.	Staff, NavWarCol
CRANSTON, George E., Colonel, U. S. A. F.	1007th Air Intelligence Service Group Headquarters Command, Washington, D. C.
CUCCIAS, Francis P., Commander, U. S. N.	Staff, NavWarCol
CULBERTSON, Eual W., Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. A.	Far East Command, Yokohama, Japan
CULVER, Fred C., Lieut. Commander, (SC), U. S. N.	Staff, Commander, Service Force, Atlantic Fleet
CURTIS, Ira N., Commander, (CEC), U. S. N.	District Public Works Officer, FIFTEENTH Naval District
DALE, John R., Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. A.	Far East Command, Yokohama, Japan
DAVIS, Royce P., Captain, U. S. N.	Staff, NavWarCol
DAVISON, Collier H., Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. A. F.	SIXTH Bomber Wing Walker Air Force Base, New Mexico
DAWKINS, Marion V., Jr., Lieutenant Commander, U. S. N.	Office of Chief of Naval Operations
DAYHUFF, Charles H., Colonel, U. S. A.	Staff, NavWarCol

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<u>Name</u>	<u>Next Duty Assignment</u>
DERAGON, William N., Commander, U. S. N.	Commanding Officer, U. S. S. SALAMONIE (AO-26)
DIERKS, D. John, Commander, U. S. N.	Staff, Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic
DIMITRIJEVIC, William J., Captain, U. S. N.	Commanding Officer, U. S. S. MONTAGUE (AKA-98)
DINGFELDER, Frank A., Captain, U.S.N.	Staff, NavWarCol
DODSON, Bennett M., Captain, U. S. N.	Staff, NavWarCol
DONAHO, Doyle G., Captain, U. S. N.	Naval Air Test Center, Naval Air Station, Patuxent River, Maryland
DONNALLY, Edward W., Lieutenant Commander, U. S. N.	Office of Chief of Naval Personnel
DOW, Leonard J., Captain, U. S. N.	Commanding Officer, U. S. S. WRIGHT (CVL-49)
DOWNING, Edward P., Major, U. S. A.	Staff, Commander FIRST Fleet, San Diego, California
DOYLE, Judson C., Lieutenant Commander, U. S. N.	Office of Chief of Naval Operations
DUDLEY, Clayton R., Captain, U. S. N.	Commander, Military Sea Transportation Service, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean Area
EALES, John E., Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. A.	United States Army Element, SHAPE, 8478th AAU Paris, France
EARLE, Ralph, Jr., Rear Admiral, U. S. N.	Commander, Destroyer Flotilla SIX
EASTMAN, Robert S., Lieutenant Commander, U. S. N.	Military Sea Transportation Service, Washington, D. C.
EDGAR, Donald, Foreign Service Officer, Department of State	Staff, NavWarCol
EDMANDS, Ernest J., Lieutenant Commander, U. S. N.	U. S. Naval Academy

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<u>Name</u>	<u>Next Duty Assignment</u>
EDWARDS, John E., Captain, U. S. N.	Commanding Officer, U. S. S. PICKAWAY (APA-222)
EWALD, Christian L., Commander, (SC), U. S. N.	Staff, Commander SIXTH Fleet
FAIRFAX, Eugene G., Commander, U.S.N.	Staff, NavWarCol
FARGO, Lynn D., Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. A.	Staff, NavWarCol
FICKENSCHER, Edward R., Commander, U. S. N.	Office of Chief of Naval Operations
FIELD, Jennings P., Jr., Commander, U. S. N.	Officer in Charge, Naval Guided Missile Training Unit No. 22A, Bendix Aviation Corporation, South Bend, Indiana.
FIELDER, Charles W., Commander, U. S. N.	Staff, Commander Fleet Air Wings, Atlantic
FISH, Harold B., Lieutenant Commander, U. S. N.	Staff, Commander Air Force, Atlantic Fleet
FITZ-PATRICK, Edward G., Lieutenant Commander, U. S. N.	Office of Chief of Naval Personnel
FOSTER, Edward L., Commander, U. S. N.	Office of Chief of Naval Operations
FOSTER, John L., Commander, U. S. N.	Commander, Mine Division TWO
FRADD, John E., Captain, U. S. N.	Staff, Commander, Eastern Sea Frontier
FRANK, Louis L., Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. M. C.	Staff, Commanding General, Aircraft, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
FULLINWIDER, Ranson, Captain, U.S.N.	U. S. Naval Attache and U. S. Naval Attache for Air, Karachi, Pakistan
GABBERT, John S. C., Commander, U. S. N.	Office of Chief of Naval Personnel
GAGE, Fred H., Jr., Lieutenant Commander, U. S. N.	Office of Chief of Naval Operations

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<u>Name</u>	<u>Next Duty Assignment</u>
GAGNE, Herbert F., Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. A.	Far East Command, Yokohama, Japan
GANNON, Henry T., Commander, (MC), U. S. N.	Staff, NavWarCol
GANNON, John W., Captain, U. S. N.	Commanding Officer, U. S. S. FLOYDS BAY (AVP-40)
GARDNER, Alton L., Commander, U. S. N.	Office of Chief of Naval Operations
GARRISON, Charles F., Commander, U. S. N.	Professor of Naval Science, Purdue University
GASTROCK, Martin D., Lieutenant Commander, U. S. N.	Office of Chief of Naval Operations
GAY, Donald, Jr., Commander, U. S. N.	Staff, Commander, Carrier Air Group THREE
GAY, William W., Jr., Lieutenant Commander (SC), U. S. N.	Staff, Commander, Service Squadron ONE
GODDING, Talmai F., Jr., Lieutenant Commander, U. S. N.	Staff, Commander, Air Force, Atlantic Fleet, for duty as prospective Commanding Officer of an air anti-submarine squadron
GOMMENGENDER, John A., Lieutenant Commander, U. S. N.	Staff, NavWarCol
GRANT, Carl E., Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. A.	9780th TSU, Chemical Corps, Material Command, Baltimore, Maryland
GURNEY, Marshall B., Captain, U. S. N.	Commanding Officer, U. S. S. BOXER (CV-21)
HALVORSON, George G., Lieutenant Commander, U. S. N.	Office of Chief of Naval Operations
HANCOCK, Wallace L., Commander, U. S. C. G.	Coast Guard Headquarters, Washington, D. C.
HART, Charles S., Commander, U. S. N.	Staff, NavWarCol
HARTMANN, Paul E., Commander, U.S.N.	U. S. S. LEYTE (CV-32)

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<u>Name</u>	<u>Next Duty Assignment</u>
HATHAWAY, Amos T., Commander, U. S. N.	Staff, NavWarCol
HAYES, Harold F., Lieutenant Commander, (SC), U. S. N.	Staff, Commander, Service Force, Pacific Fleet
HEMING, Harold M., Captain, U. S. N.	Commanding Officer, U. S. S. FREMONT (APA-44)
HENDLEY, Allen C., Major, U. S. M. C.	U. S. Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California
HENRY, Eugene B., Commander, U. S. N.	Staff, NavWarCol
HEROLD, Frank B., Commander, U. S. N.	Staff, NavWarCol
HINDMAN, Stanley E., Commander, U. S. N.	Staff, NavWarCol
HOGG, James H., Captain, U. S. N.	Commander, Destroyer Squadron EIGHT
HOLLIDAY, Dorothy W., Lieutenant (jg), U. S. N.	Staff, NavWarCol
HOLMSHAW, Harry F., Commander, U. S. N.	Staff, Commander, Service Force, Pacific Fleet
HOLTZ, Arnold H., Captain, U. S. N.	Staff, NavWarCol
HOMAN, Eleanor R., Lieutenant, U. S. N.	Navy Recruiting Station and Office of Naval Officer Procurement, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
HOWARD, Seth T., Commander, U. S. N.	Office of Chief of Naval Operations
HOWARD, William E., Captain, U. S. N.	Staff, Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet
HOWELL, John D., Commander, U. S. N.	Staff, Commander, Air Force, Atlantic Fleet, for duty as prospective commanding officer of a VS Squadron
HOWELL, William S., Captain, U. S. N.	Staff, NavWarCol
IVERSON, Clifton, Captain, U. S. N.	Office of Chief of Naval Operations

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<u>Name</u>	<u>Next Duty Assignment</u>
JACK, Richard G., Commander, U. S. N.	Staff, NavWarCol
JEFFREY, Richard P., Commander, (SC), U. S. N.	Staff, NavWarCol
JOHANSEN, Gustave N., Captain, U. S. N.	Commanding Officer, U. S. S. TELFAIR (APA-210)
JOHNSON, Dwight L., Commander, U.S.N.	Staff, NavWarCol
JOHNSON, Frank L., Captain, U. S. N.	Staff, NavWarCol
JOHNSON, William T., Major, U. S. A. F.	Headquarters, 18th Air Force, Donaldson Air Force Base, South Carolina
JONES, Donald O., Major, U. S. A. F.	Staff, Supreme Allied Commander, SACLANT
KAUFFMAN, Draper L., Commander, U. S. N.	Staff, NavWarCol
KAUFMAN, William M., Commander, U. S. N.	Staff, Commander, Naval Forces, Far East
KECK, James M., Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. A. F.	1007th Air Intelligence Service Group (Headquarters Command,) Washington, D. C.
KEITHLEY, Charles L., Captain, (SC), U. S. N.	San Francisco Naval Shipyards
KENNEDY, John R., Foreign Service Officer, Department of State	Department of State
KING, Charles E., Commander, U. S. N.	Staff, Commander, Naval Forces, Germany
KING, George E., Captain, U. S. N.	Office of Chief of Bureau of Ordnance
KING, Thomas S., Jr., Commander, U. S. N.	Staff, Commander, FIRST Fleet
KINSELLA, William T., Commander, U. S. N.	Staff, NavWarCol
KIRN, Louis J., Captain, U. S. N.	Office of Chief of Information, Navy Department

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<u>Name</u>	<u>Next Duty Assignment</u>
KLUNK, Richard S., Commander, (SC), U. S. N.	Naval Air Station, Pensacola, Florida
KOENIG, Joseph W., Commander, U. S. N.	Commander, Destroyer Division 302
KREITZER, William R., Lieutenant Commander, U. S. N.	Hydrographic Office, Suitland, Maryland
LAMADE, John D., Captain, U. S. N.	Staff, Commander, Air Force, Atlantic Fleet
LAMERT, David, Captain, U. S. N.	Naval Inspector of Ordnance, Ford Instrument Company, Long Island, New York
LAMKIN, Fletcher M., Commander, (SC), U. S. N.	Staff, Commander, Naval Forces, Far East
LA ROCQUE, Gene R., Commander, U. S. N.	Staff, NavWarCol
LARSEN, Harold H., Commander, U. S. N.	Staff, NavWarCol
LIGON, Henry W., Commander, U. S. N.	Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard
LOWRY, Raymond A., Captain, (DC), U. S. N.	Yokosuka, Japan Naval Hospital
LUCE, William T., Lieutenant Commander, U. S. N.	U. S. S. CORAL SEA (CVB-43)
MABLEY, Louis C., Commander, U. S. N.	Staff, NavWarCol
MANN, Charles C., Commander, U. S. N.	U. S. Naval Mission to Brazil
MANN, Hoyt D., Commander, U. S. N.	U. S. S. YORKTOWN (CV-10)
MARSHALL, Edmund S. L., Captain, U. S. N.	Staff, NavWarCol
McHENRY, Joseph A., Captain, (CEC), U. S. N.	Office of Chief of the Bureau of Yards and Docks
McINTOSH, David M., Commander, U. S. N.	Commanding Officer, U. S. S. HARRY F. BAUER (DM-28)
McKNIGHT, John R., Jr., Captain, U. S. N.	Commanding Officer, U. S. S. PRAIRIE (AD-15)

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<u>Name</u>	<u>Next Duty Assignment</u>
McMILLAN, Hoyt, Colonel, U. S. M. C.	Staff, NavWarCol
McWETHY, Robert D., Lieutenant Commander, U. S. N.	Commanding Officer, U. S. S. PIPER (SS-409)
MICKLEY, William B., Colonel, U. S. A. F.	1007th Air Intelligence Service Group, Headquarters Command, Washington, D. C.
MILLER, Jack A., Lieutenant Commander, U. S. N.	Office of Chief of Naval Operations
MILLER, Kenneth W., Lieutenant Commander, U. S. N.	Office of Chief of Naval Personnel
MILLER, Robert N., Commander, U. S. N.	Staff, NavWarCol
MILLER, Shirley S., Captain, U. S. N.	Staff, NavWarCol
MILLS, James H., Captain, U. S. N.	Staff, NavWarCol
MOORE, Granville A., Captain, U. S. N.	Commander, Destroyer Squadron FOURTEEN
MORRIS, Robert L., Captain, U. S. N.	Commanding Officer, U. S. S. MOUNT OLYMPUS (AGC-8)
MORSE, John H., Captain, U. S. N.	Staff, NavWarCol
MULLEN, Arthur C., Lieutenant Commander, U. S. N.	Staff Commander, Operational Development Force, Atlantic Fleet
MURPHY, Owen B., Commander, U. S. N.	Staff, Commander, Amphibious Force, Atlantic Fleet
NATION, Milton A., Captain, U. S. N.	Office of Chief of Naval Operations
NAUMAN, Harley K., Commander, U.S.N.	Staff, NavWarCol
NEAL, John R., Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. A. F.	1602d Air Transport Wing, Military Air Transport Service, Atlantic
NEWTON, Arthur G., Lieutenant Commander, U. S. N.	Office of Chief of Naval Personnel
NICHOLS, Franklin A., Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. A. F.	Staff, NavWarCol

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<u>Name</u>	<u>Next Duty Assignment</u>
NICHOLS, Richard E., Commander, U. S. N.	Commander, Submarine Division TWENTY-ONE
NORRIS, William H., Lieutenant, U. S. N.	Staff, NavWarCol
NUTTING, Kelvin L., Captain, U. S. N.	Commanding Officer, U. S. S. HENRICO (APA-45)
ODEND'HAL, Charles J., Captain, U.S.N.	NavWarCol—duty under instruction Advisory Group
OLSEN, Eliot, Captain, U. S. N.	Staff, NavWarCol
OSETH, John M., Commander, U. S. N.	U. S. S. NORFOLK (DL-1)
PHELAN, George R., Captain, U. S. N.	NavWarCol—duty under instruction Advisory Group
PHILLIPS, John J., Lieutenant, Commander, U. S. N.	U. S. S. ABBOT (DD-629)
PLAPP, Herbert C., Colonel, U. S. A.	Far East Command, Yokohama, Japan
PORTER, Ross A., Commander, (SC), U. S. N.	Staff, NavWarCol
RABORN, William F., Captain, U. S. N.	Office of Chief of Naval Operations
RAMBO, Reginald R., Commander, (MC), U. S. N.	Staff, Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet
RAMEY, John W., Captain, U. S. N.	Commanding Officer, U. S. S. POLLUX (AKS-4)
RASTATTER, J. R., Commander, U. S. N.	Staff, NavWarCol
RAY, Herman L., Captain, U. S. N.	Commanding Officer, U. S. S. BADOENG STRAIT (CVE-116)
REID, John E., Major, U. S. A.	United States Army Element, SHAPE, Paris, France
REIDY, John J., Jr., Commander, U. S. N.	U. S. Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California

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<u>Name</u>	<u>Next Duty Assignment</u>
REIFENRATH, Wilson G., Commander, U. S. N.	Commander, Escort Squadron TEN
REYNOLDS, Raymond M., Lieutenant Commander, U. S. N.	Naval Research Laboratory, Washington, D. C.
RIORDAN, James T., Commander, (CEC), U. S. N.	Staff, NavWarCol
RIZZA, Joseph P., Lieutenant Commander, U. S. N.	Staff, Commander, Amphibious Force, Pacific Fleet
ROBBINS, William I., Commander, (SC), U. S. N.	Field Branch, Bureau of Supplies and Accounts, Cleveland, Ohio
ROBERTSON, Edward L., Captain, U.S.N.	Staff, NavWarCol
ROBINSON, Walter P., Lieutenant Commander, U. S. N.	Office of Chief of Naval Operations
ROCHEFORT, Joseph J., Captain, U. S. N.	Staff, NavWarCol
RODGERS, Eli B., Commander, U. S. N.	Office of Chief of Naval Operations
ROLL, George A., Colonel, U. S. M. C.	NavWarCol—duty under instruction Advisory Group
ROOT, Lloyd E., Commander, (CEC), U. S. N.	Joint Staff, Washington, D. C.
RUSSELL, Bryant W., Lieutenant Commander, (SC), U. S. N.	Staff, Commandant, SIXTH Naval District
SAMUEL, Thomas W., Commander, U. S. N.	Staff, Commander, Amphibious Training Command, Pacific Fleet
SAPP, John W., Jr., Colonel, U. S. M. C.	Office of Chief of Naval Operations
SAVIDGE, Paul S., Jr., Commander, U. S. N.	Staff, Commander, SEVENTH Fleet
SAYLOR, Philip G., Lieutenant Commander, U. S. N.	Office of Chief of Naval Operations
SCHMIDT, Feodor O., Colonel, U. S. A.	Staff, NavWarCol

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<u>Name</u>	<u>Next Duty Assignment</u>
SENN, Charles C., Lieutenant Commander, U. S. N.	Navigator, U. S. S. WISCONSIN (BB-84)
SHANE, Charles N., Commander, U.S.N.	Office of Chief of Naval Operations
SHARROCKS, Charles S., Commander, (SC), U. S. N.	Naval Supply Depot, Naval Base Annex, Bayonne, New Jersey
SHEPARD, Richard D., Commander, U. S. N.	Staff, Commander in Chief, Naval Forces Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean
SHEPARD, Ralph L., Commander, (SC), U. S. N.	Staff, NavWarCol
SHEPHERD, Albert L., Captain, U. S. N.	Commander, Destroyer Division 202
SHERIDAN, John G., Commander, U. S. N.	Office of Chief of Naval Operations
SHIFLEY, Ralph L. Captain, U. S. N.	Office of Chief of Naval Operations
SHIVE, Donald W., Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. A.	Staff, NavWarCol
SIMMERS, Clayton B., Captain, U. S. N.	Commanding Officer, U. S. S. NIOBRARA (AO-72)
SMITH, Abbot E., Mr.	Central Intelligence Agency Washington, D. C.
SMITH, James W., Lieutenant Commander, U. S. N.	Staff, NavWarCol
SOUTHERLAND, Leonard B., Captain, U. S. N.	Chief of Staff, Carrier Division ONE
STANDISH, Eben M., Commander, (SC), U. S. N.	Staff, NavWarCol
STANEK, Robert, Lieutenant Commander, U. S. N.	Staff, Commander, Air Force, Pacific Fleet
STARKEY, Robert C., Commander, U. S. N.	Fleet Training Center, San Diego, California

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<u>Name</u>	<u>Next Duty Assignment</u>
STEERE, Richard C., Captain, U. S. N.	Commanding Officer, U. S. S. NEW KENT (APA-217)
STEEVES, Doris E., Lieutenant, U. S. N.	Staff, NavWarCol
STEVENS, Wynne A., Jr., Lieutenant Commander, U. S. N.	Staff, Commander Destroyer Flotilla FOUR
STROHBEHN, Walter W., Captain, U. S. N.	Commanding Officer, U. S. S. ANDROMEDA (AKA-15)
SWEENEY James B., Jr., Lieutenant Commander, U. S. N.	Office of Chief of Naval Operations
SYKES, Ira D., Jr., Commander, U. S. N.	Office of Chief of Naval Operations
SYPTAK, Raymond A., Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. A. F.	7th Bomber Wing (SAC) Caswell Air Force Base, Texas
TABER, Edward A., Commander, U. S. N.	Staff, NavWarCol
TAUL, James. Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. M. C.	Staff, NavWarCol
TAYLOR, Lamar S., Lieutenant Commander, U. S. N.	Commanding Officer, U. S. S. SEA OWL (SS-405)
THEOBALD, Robert A., Captain, U. S. N.	NavWarCol—duty under instruction Advisory Group
THOMAS, James A., Captain, U. S. N.	Office of Chief of Naval Operations
THOMPSON, Allyn R., Lieutenant (jg), U. S. N.	Staff, NavWarCol
THOMPSON, Bert A., Lieutenant Commander, U. S. N.	Staff, Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet
THOMPSON, Wallace O., Colonel, U. S. M. C.	Force Troops, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
TIBBETTS, Joseph B., Commander, U. S. N.	Office of Chief of Naval Operations
TUCKER, Robert W., Lieutenant (jg), U. S. N.	Staff, NavWarCol

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<u>Name</u>	<u>Next Duty Assignment</u>
TURNER, Charles W., III, Commander, U. S. N.	Staff, Commander, Destroyer Force, Atlantic Fleet
TUTTLE, Magruder H., Captain, U.S.N.	Commanding Officer, Fleet Airborne Electronics Training Unit, Atlantic
TYLER, William P., Commander, U. S. N.	Military Sea Transportation Service, Washington, D. C.
VAN AUKEN, Hanlon H., Colonel, U. S. A. F.	Headquarters, 26th Air Division (ADC), Roslyn, New York
VIRDEN, Frank, Captain, U. S. N.	Staff, NavWarCol
VOGELEY, Theodore R., Captain, U. S. N.	Office of Chief of Naval Operations
WAGLINE, John H., Commander, U. S. C. G.	Staff, NavWarCol
WAMPLER, French, Jr., Commander, U. S. N.	U. S. Naval Mission to Peru
WEBER, Paul T., Commander, U. S. N.	U. S. S. WASP (CV-18)
WELCH, David F., Lieutenant, Commander, U. S. N.	Staff, NavWarCol
WELLMAN, Alonzo H., Commander, U. S. N.	Office of Chief of Naval Operations
WESCHLER, Thomas R., Commander, U. S. N.	Staff, NavWarCol
WESSON, Joseph H., Commander, U. S. N.	Staff, Commander FIRST Fleet
WHITNEY, Alden W., Lieutenant Commander, U. S. N.	Command and Staff Course, Naval War College
WILSON, Albert H., Jr., Captain, U. S. N.	Staff, NavWarCol
WINN, Norman M., Colonel, U. S. A.	Staff, NavWarCol
WIRTZ, Peyton L., Captain, U. S. N.	Commanding Officer, U. S. S. OBERON (AKA-14)

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<u>Name</u>	<u>Next Duty Assignment</u>
WITZEL, Frederick D., Captain, (SC), U. S. N.	Staff, NavWarCol
WOODS, Mark W., Lieutenant Commander, U. S. N.	Office of Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance
WOODWARD, Nelson C., Lieutenant Commander, U. S. N.	U. S. S. TIRU (SS-416)
WYLIE, Joseph C., Captain, U. S. N.	Staff, NavWarCol
YOUMANS, Robert T., Lieutenant Commander, U. S. N. R.	Staff, Commander, Military Sea Transportation Service, Atlantic/Naval Control of Shipping Officer, New York
ZAHM, John C., Captain, U. S. N.	U. S. Naval Mission to Brazil, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil
ZALESKY, Richard C., Colonel, U. S. A.	Far East Command, Yokohama, Japan
ZIRKLE, Joseph C., Jr., Commander, U. S. N.	Staff, Commander, Air Force, Pacific Fleet, for duty as prospective Commanding Officer of an Anti- Submarine Squadron

RECOMMENDED READING

Current Books

The evaluation of books listed below include those recommended to resident students of the Naval War College. Officers in the fleet and elsewhere may find these of interest.

Many of these publications may be found in ship and station libraries. Some of the publications not available from these sources may be obtained from the Bureau of Naval Personnel Auxiliary Library Service, where a collection of books are available for loan to individual officers. Requests for the loan of these books should be made by the individual to the nearest branch or the Chief of Naval Personnel. (See Article C-9604, Bureau of Naval Personnel Manual, 1948).

- Title: *Lincoln and His Generals.* 363 p.
- Author: William, T. Harry. N. Y., Alfred A. Knopf, 1952.
- Evaluation: *Lincoln and His Generals* is not a military history of the Civil War, but rather an excellent discussion of the top direction of the war. It reveals, vividly, problems which Lincoln faced in liquidating an antiquated command system which was fraught with personal and political influence of his top commanders, and the action he took to forge a modern command system. It reveals Lincoln as the supreme strategist of the Civil War and how, in spite of his occasional errors and fumbles, he eventually stood above all his generals. It does not discuss the Confederate commanders, nor many of the familiar Union commanders. But it does portray the shortcomings of the top Union commanders as strategists, over-all commanders and organizers; and it brings to life many of the generals whom Lincoln appointed to top command and then discarded when they failed, such as: McClelland, Pope, Burnside, Hooker, Buell, Rosecrans, Fremont, McClelland—and culminates with Grant, whom Lincoln trusted above all the rest and to whom he entrusted many of his great powers which he had previously withheld. The author looks at the Civil War and the actions of the top Union commanders as it un-

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folded before the eyes of Lincoln. He evaluates their actions and Lincoln's decisions by the standards of modern war. It is a fascinating story and is recommended to all who are interested in the problem of, and organization for, high command.

Title: *Back Door To War: The Roosevelt Foreign Policy, 1933-1941.* 690 p.

Author: Tansill, Charles C. Chicago, Henry Regnery Co., 1952.

Evaluation: This book is about the U. S. foreign policy during the period 1933 to 1941. It is a detailed history of the political maneuvering of the period with a chapter devoted to diplomatic background prior to the period covered. The main thesis of the book is that U. S. foreign policies were, in a great measure, responsible for bringing World War II on and that Roosevelt maneuvered the U. S. into it after it had gotten started. While an excellent piece of research, it suffers severely from a lack of objectivity, particularly toward Franklin D. Roosevelt.

Title: *America and the Mind of Europe.* 125 p.

Author: Galantiere, Lewis. N. Y., Library Publishers, 1952.

Evaluation: A small book, of 125 pages, composed of an introduction by the editor and reprints of nine articles, each by a different author. The articles were published originally in a special issue of the SATURDAY REVIEW OF LITERATURE. The book deals mainly with what Europeans are thinking about the United States on a number of subjects including morals, journalism, painting, music, literature, and political ideology. The authors are frank in their appraisals of the reaction of the cultured minds of Europe to the emergence of the U. S. as the leader of the Western world. The book is of particular value to military personnel because it so closely presents the ideological, sociological and cultural problems which are blocking more complete cooperation between the U. S. and Europe.

Title: *Naval Wars in the Levant, 1559-1853.* 619 p.

Author: Anderson, R. C. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1952.

Evaluation: The scope of this volume is poorly defined by its title.

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It is a detailed account of naval action in all the navigable waters from Russia to Africa and throughout the Mediterranean, with emphasis on the Eastern Mediterranean during the period 1559-1853. The author, English president of the Society of Nautical Research, has performed an unusually complete research task and recorded his findings in a masterful war diary of the period. He has deliberately refrained from interpretation and strategical or tactical analysis, but his selection of facts exhibits throughout the entire book the problems of command relationships, logistics, overextended lines of communications, alliances, separate peacemaking, relationship of land and sea warfare, and planning, as well as more detailed operational problems of amphibious landings, advanced bases, concentration, exploitation, coordination of forces, escort, towing, gunnery, tactical training, mutual support, communications, intelligence, personnel, etc. The usually ragged efforts at combined operations during this period highlight the modern advances exemplified in Operation "Grand Slam". The book is too crammed with names, figures, and descriptions of things and events for easy reading, and contains only one map—an inadequate one of the Aegean. Place names given are related to the period described. These drawbacks are overcompensated by the general excellence of the reporting. This book deserves careful study by all students of naval history. With the aid of adequate maps it can provide a detailed knowledge of waters which are of high potential interest to all naval officers. It well illustrates the value of naval history in understanding the naval profession. Highly recommended for reading and for reference.

- Title:** *The Organizational Weapon: A Study of Bolshevik Strategy and Tactics.* 350 p.
- Author:** Selznick, Philip. N. Y., McGraw-Hill, 1952.
- Evaluation:** One of a series published as a result of the research undertaken by the Rand Corporation, this book basically has two objectives: (1) to analyze communist organization and organizational practices; (2) to provide an understanding of Bolshevik strategy and tactics. It concludes with a chapter on what could and should be done to offer a counter-offensive to communism in society. The book is well written and profusely annotated but unless the read-

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er is, or undertakes to become, familiar with sociological terms he will find it rather difficult to follow. Recommended for thesis reference or for those specifically interested in an explanation of communism by a sociologist.

- Title:** *The Voice of Asia.* 338 p.
- Author:** Michener, James A. N. Y., Random House, 1951.
- Evaluation:** An excellent and fast-moving book, written in a very readable style. In the form of dialogues involving fictitious persons, the author gives his impressions of what the thoughts of Asians are on the great religious and political problems, economic questions and social revolutions confronting that part of the world today. The conversations of the characters depicted represent a condensate of the thoughts and opinions of a cross section of those people of Asia not yet under communist domination. To obtain material for this book, the author visited most of the important cities of non-communist Asia and talked with many people in all walks of life. The author is a keen observer and apparently makes a sincere effort to present facts about Asia and its problems as he saw them.

- Title:** *War and Defense Economics.* 458 p.
- Author:** Backman, Jules. N. Y., Rinehart & Co., 1952.
- Evaluation:** In this volume the impact of the armament program upon the civilian economy is carefully measured. It covers the subjects of programming, production, strategic materials, agriculture, manpower, wage controls, inflation, fiscal and monetary policy, price controls, subsidies, consumer rationing and economic warfare. Special attention is paid to the current situation of producing armaments for limited war. Provides an excellent exposition of past experience coupled with constructive comment on our present attack on these problems.

- Title:** *The Enemy Within.* 314 p.
- Author:** de Jaegher, Raymond J. N. Y., Doubleday & Co., 1952
- Evaluation:** An eyewitness account of the communist conquest of China. The author describes the use of deceit, brutality and

treachery by the communists to force a regime on the predominantly unwilling Chinese people. This book is a major contribution to an understanding of communist tactics and methods, and gives a graphic explanation of the fall of the Chinese Nationalist Government.

Title: *How To Keep Our Liberty.* 339 p.

Author: Moley, Raymond. N. Y., Alfred Knopf. 1952

Evaluation: This volume—a political tract in the finest sense of the word—outlines our heritage of principles upon which this country was founded, reveals the present public policies which promote the trend toward socialism and presents an alternative series of policies which would strengthen our heritage. Finally the author gives detailed directions for political action by citizen's groups including methods of organization and the technique of getting out votes. It is an outstanding exposition of the conservative point of view in American politics. Recommended reading for all persons who can expect at some time to participate in the political life of their individual communities.

Title: *Rag, Tag and Bobtail.* 519 p.

Author: Montross, Lynn. N. Y., Harper & Bros., 1952.

Evaluation: Covers the military operations of the American War of Independence. It is a monumental piece of research, utilizing as it does the diaries and letters of literally hundreds of officers and men. As a result, there emerges an entirely different picture of the time with such relatively unknown men as Nathaniel Greene, William Heath and Horatio Gates and others emerging as the real heroes, and Benedict Arnold as not only a despicable villain but a very mediocre military man. It is probably one of the most complete single sources on military operations in the American Revolution. The author's broad experience well qualifies him to analyze these operations, which he does brilliantly. His literary ability makes the book extremely readable.

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- Title:** *The Anatomy of Communism.* 197 p.
- Author:** Scott, Andrew M. N. Y., Philosophical Library, 1951.
- Evaluation:** The author, as suggested by the title, has conducted a probing analysis of the anatomy of communism as represented by the writings of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin. Basic concepts are extracted from these writings and then Dr. Scott matches them one against the other in search for contradiction and inconsistency. Those which survive are subjected to further study designed to prove or disprove their validity in the light of history or common sense. The author purposely has not covered the economic theories of communism in order to concentrate on the general area of the psychology of communism. While he has been painstaking in his efforts, the scope of the subject is so large, compared with the coverage, as to leave the impression that the book is well done but incomplete.

Periodicals

- Title:** *Brain Washing in Stalinist China.*
- Author:** Lew, Daniel Hong.
- Publication:** VITAL SPEECHES, June 1, 1952, p. 497-501.
- Annotation:** Tells how the Chinese communists successfully apply the technique of the Kremlin to exercise control through the paralysis of men's minds.
- Title:** *The Soviet Design for Conquest.*
- Author:** Moch, Jules.
- Publication:** UNITED NATIONS WORLD, June, 1952, p. 11-14.
- Annotation:** The former French Minister of the Interior, who fought communist attempts to seize power in France in 1947, summarizes Soviet methods of conquest.
- Title:** *Why Japan's Anti-Submarine Warfare Failed.*
- Author:** Oi, Atsushi.
- Publication:** UNITED STATES NAVAL INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS, June, 1952, p. 587-601.
- Annotation:** Asserts that Japan failed in anti-submarine warfare be-

cause her navy disregarded the importance of the problem and substantiates this assertion by reviewing the strategic policies and operational organization of the navy in the Pacific war.

Title: *The Russian Doctrine.*
Author: Stevens, Leslie C., Vice Adm., U. S. N. (Ret.)
Publication: THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY, June, 1952, p. 55-59.
Annotation: A former Naval attache to Moscow analyzes the doctrine which the Kremlin has enforced.

Title: *Total Defense Without Inflation.*
Author: Baruch, Bernard M.
Publication: THE NEW LEADER, May 26, 1952, p. 2-4.
Annotation: An article adapted from a speech delivered at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces on the principles of mobilization.

Title: *Traitor Klaus Fuchs.*
Author: Moorehead, Alan.
Publication: THE SATURDAY EVENING POST, May 24, May 31, June 7 and June 14, 1952.
Annotation: A series of four articles telling why Fuchs betrayed the West and how he fooled security agents assigned to watch him.

Title: *Recent Soviet Writings on the Far East.*
Author: Ballis, William and Timmins, Emily.
Publication: PACIFIC AFFAIRS, March 1952, p. 59-76.
Annotation: Presents a review of selected books and pamphlets concerned with the Far East and published in the Soviet Union since 1945.

Title: *Behind Red China's Human Sea Tactics*
Author: Kai-yu, Hsu.
Publication: COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL, June, 1952, p. 14-18.
Annotation: Tells how clever propaganda is turning the non-political Chinese peasant into a fanatical revolutionary.

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- Title: *Why Moscow Sabotages an Austrian Treaty.*
Author: Gedye, G. E. R.
Publication: THE NEW LEADER, May 19, 1952, p. 2-4.
Annotation: Explains why Russia continues to block all efforts to conclude a peace treaty with Austria by describing how the Soviets, on the basis of the Potsdam agreement, have drained the Austrian economy and provided the USSR with a rich source of industrial and raw materials.
- Title: *A Policy of Boldness.*
Author: Dulles, John Foster.
Publication: LIFE, May 19, 1952, p. 146-160.
Annotation: Criticizes our present foreign policy as a negative one that will never stop the sustained offensive of communism and outlines a positive policy for the U. S. to follow in the role of leader of the free world.
- Title: *Why We Are Doing So Badly in the Ideological War.*
Author: Gallup, George.
Publication: CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, May 5, 1952, p. A2806-A2809.
Annotation: Asserts that our civil and military leaders know little about this type of warfare employed so skillfully by Russia, cites the need for a modern Clausewitz to formulate the principles of this new kind of warfare and discusses basic facts that must be recognized by specialists in this field. (Also published in VITAL SPEECHES, June 1, 1952, p. 501-504).
- Title: *Toward the Defense of Europe.*
Author: Fay, Sidney B.
Publication: CURRENT HISTORY, May, 1952, p. 257-264.
Annotations: An analysis of current developments in Germany and in West European defense.
- Title: *Soviet Germany, I and II.*
Author: Loewenstein, Karl.
Publication: CURRENT HISTORY, May, 1952, p. 257-264; June, 1952, p. 334-339.
Annotations: Two articles which constitute a study of the governmental

and socio-economic structure of Eastern Germany in order to appraise the prospects and potential consequences of a unified Germany.

- Title:** *Writings in Maritime History*, 1951.
- Author:** Albion, Robert Greenhalgh.
- Publication:** THE AMERICAN NEPTUNE, April, 1952,
p. 163-172.
- Annotations:** A bibliography of writings in English on all aspects of maritime history, including naval subjects, covering the year 1951. (A continuation of the bibliography covering 1945-1950 published in the January issue).
- Title:** *How Strong is Tito's Army?*
- Author:** Kadick, M. N., Lt. Col.
- Publication:** COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL, May 1952,
p. 35-39.
- Annotations:** An evaluation of Yugoslavia's military strength and of her economic situation under the Tito regime.
- Title:** *The Battle for Leyte Gulf.*
- Author:** Halsey, William F., Jr., Fleet Admiral, U.S.N.
(Ret.)
- Publication:** UNITED STATES NAVAL INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS, May, 1952, p. 487-495.
- Annotations:** A description of the battle as the author saw it develop, based on his log and his war diaries.
- Title:** *Russia and the Turkish Straits.*
- Author:** Williams, M. H.
- Publication:** UNITED STATES NAVAL INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS, May, 1952, p. 479-485.
- Annotations:** A study of the background of the "Straits Question," its role in history and its connection with the current "Cold War."

RESTRICTED**INFORMATION CONCERNING PERIODICALS LISTED
IN THIS ISSUE**

<u>Periodical</u>	<u>Subscription</u>	<u>Publisher</u>
The American Neptune (Quarterly)	\$5.00	The American Neptune, Inc. Salem, Massachusetts
The Atlantic Monthly	\$6.00	The Atlantic Monthly 8 Arlington Street, Boston, Massachusetts
Combat Forces Journal (Monthly)	\$5.00	Combat Forces Journal 1115-17th Street, N. W. Washington 6, D. C.
Congressional Record (Proceedings and de- bates published during Congressional sessions)	\$4.50 for 3 months	U. S. Government Printing Office Washington 6, D. C.
Current History (Monthly)	\$4.00	D. G. Redmond 108 Walnut Street, Philadelphia 6, Penna.
Life (Weekly)	\$6.00	Time, Inc. 330 East 22nd Street, Chicago, Illinois
New Leader (Weekly)	\$3.00	New Leader Publishing Association 7 East 15th Street, New York 3, New York
Pacific Affairs (Quarterly)	\$4.00	Institute of Pacific Relations 1 East 54th Street, New York 22, New York
Saturday Evening Post (Weekly)	\$6.00	Curtis Publishing Company Independence Square, Philadelphia 5, Penna.
United Nations World (Monthly)	\$4.00	United Nations World, Inc. 319 East 44th Street, New York 17, New York
United States Naval Institute Proceedings (Monthly)	\$5.00	U. S. Naval Institute Annapolis, Maryland
Vital Speeches (Semi-monthly)	\$5.00	City News Publishing Company 38 West 42nd Street, New York 18, New York